Courtesy Photo | Counterintelligence and managing of information largely lends itself to the larger use...... read more read more
Imagine yourself on a boat in the middle of the ocean. Waves gently rock the hull as you step onto the deck. You’re there with several of your friends, making a living, catching fish and selling them to local vendors. War rages in the world around you, but here it’s nothing but your boat, a wide‑open sky, and calm seas. Then, something in the water breaks the rhythm of the morning. As you draw closer, you call out to your friends as your peaceful world has suddenly turned into a nightmare. Floating in the water is the corpse of a man in a military uniform, a briefcase chained to his wrist. What began as a routine day has become a mystery.
This was not a scene from a film, but the real experience of José Antonio Rey María, a Spanish fisherman.#_ftn1 Around 9:30 a.m. on April 30, 1943, he and his fellow fishermen discovered the body of a man identified as “Major William Martin” off the coast of Huelva, Spain. Little did they know this discovery would have some of the biggest consequences of the war in Europe. Inside the briefcase were documents outlining Allied plans for an invasion of Greece. The documents traveled up the chain of German intelligence and ultimately reached the desks of the German High Command. It was determined that the documents were genuine.#_ftn2 The papers were convincing, the uniform was convincing. But, surprisingly, all of it was false.
So, you can imagine the confusion on the faces of the few German soldiers who remained in Sicily when the Allies landed there in July 1943. Operation Mincemeat, the operation to plant false information within the German high command had succeeded. The Allies had executed one of the most profound deception operations of the war in Europe.#_ftn3
The British plan required a fair amount of preparation and then relied on known and presumed knowledge of the flow of information on the European mainland. First, it required a believable story. “Major Martin” needed a backstory, personal effects, a mission, and an identity that would withstand scrutiny. The British went to great lengths to create the illusion of “Major Martin” having an alibi leading up to the discovery, and a family back on the mainland. Second, it relied on the German intelligence community having access to intercepted Allied communications and cipher knowledge. Third, it exploited Adolf Hitler’s tendency to overestimate Allied intentions; he already suspected the Mediterranean was vulnerable, and the forged documents reinforced the idea that Greece not Sicily was the true target.
It also presumed the Spanish would pass the documents to the Germans and that the information was vague enough to seem authentic, yet specific enough to influence German planning. The British sent scripted messages through channels they knew were compromised to reinforce the documents authenticity as a valuable piece of intelligence. Once the Germans accepted the deception, the payoff was the liberation of Sicily just a month after the Allied landings there.#_ftn4
There was no shortage of similar deceptive and counterintelligence operations during World War II. Gen. Omar Bradley’s fictitious First United States Army Group was activated before D‑Day to convince the Germans that the Allied landings would occur at Calais, the shortest run of the English Channel. The 23rd Headquarters Special Troops—the “Ghost Army”—used inflatable tanks, sound deception, and fake radio networks to simulate entire divisions. These operations were not new to warfare, but they underscored a critical truth: controlling the information space is as important as controlling terrain.#_ftn5
In 1950, American plans for an amphibious assault on the west coast of the Korean peninsula were discovered by North Korean and Chinese operatives in Japan. Although it wasn’t the complete plan, the documents revealed enough for communist forces to anticipate a landing. However, the knowledge that the plan had been partially leaked could be used to the advantage of the Americans. That’s just what Gen. Douglas MacArthur and the rest of the American forces did.
American forces constructed the appearance of an impending landing at the port city of Kunsan located south of Incheon. False radio traffic, naval demonstrations, limited air activity, and carefully controlled secondary leaks reinforced the narrative. These measures aligned perfectly with North Korean assumptions that the rough tides and high seawalls at Incheon made it less desirable landing site, and that any American assault would prefer sloped beaches.
On September 15, 1950, the Americans launched its amphibious assault at Incheon, achieving strategic surprise and driving rapidly toward Seoul. While naval bombardments and small arms exchange had occurred in the days leading up to the landing, the occupying North Korean forces were largely taken by surprise. The Americans had successfully transformed a leak of intelligence plans into a highly successful deception tactic.#_ftn6
By the Vietnam War, American forces had refined these techniques into routine practice. Controlled leaks of information about troop movements, landing zones, and operational objectives were used to manipulate Viet Cong intelligence networks. These were reinforced by deceptive radio broadcasts and intentionally “lost” documents planted where enemy scouts would find them.#_ftn7 Each branch of the military contributed to the deception environment. The Navy frequently engaged in feints to deceive coastal positions and the North Vietnamese naval forces. The Army’s Operation EL PASO,#_ftn8 employed strategically placed (and acquired) pieces of information to effectively lure Viet Cong forces. The Air Force’s Operation BOLO, lured North Vietnamese MiGs into an ambush by mimicking the flight profiles of vulnerable bombers.#_ftn9
Information flowing from the battlefield can shape command decisions and influence public perception. Before the modern era, American newspapers carried reports that were often weeks old that shaped public sentiment. By the time the information reached readers, the battlefield had already changed. This had major implications even for military operations. In the War of 1812, Maj. Gen. Andrew Jackson’s force engaged and defeated a large British force at New Orleans despite the war having ended weeks before.#_ftn10 As the battlefield changed, so did methods to control information fed to the enemy.
Control of information was not something that was exclusive to what was happening on the battlefield. Vietnam was the first war broadcast into American living rooms in near real time. Suddenly the public was faced with pictures and scenes of a bloody conflict just like their evening TV programs. Public Affairs Officers were responsible for reporting facts while balancing operational security and counterintelligence requirements. The struggle to manage public perception became a defining feature of the conflict.#_ftn11 This largely transformed how the Public Affairs Corps conducted operations and enforcing Operational Security.
Counterintelligence is fundamentally about controlling the information space and shaping minds. It exploits assumptions, biases, and expectations. Popular culture romanticizes the double agent, but real counterintelligence is far more complex and constantly evolving. In today’s interconnected world, information moves at the speed of a click.
In the ongoing war in Ukraine, most intelligence gathering relies on social media posts, open‑source satellite imagery, and geospatial analysis. Counterintelligence efforts operate in the same environment, with inflated casualty numbers, exaggerated operational tempos, and manipulated imagery all contributing to the fog of information.
There’s a cautionary tale to be told here as well. With the rise of artificial intelligence generating the depth of deepfakes, false photos, and videos, the risk of misinformation has increased dramatically. Many actors will even compose fake news stories that appear to the untrained eye to be authentic. Thus, the increase in emphasis to verify information when it is received, regardless of the source.
Modern Operational and Information Security training reminds government personnel how easily information can be weaponized. The internet is an open source for nearly everything. It’s wise to pause before posting that vacation update or exercise schedule. Otherwise, you may find yourself a modern, less frozen “Major Martin.”
As for the real Major Martin, he was buried with full military honors by the Spanish on May 2, 1943, in Nuestra Señora de la Soledad Cemetery in Huelva, Spain. In 1998, the British government added an inscription acknowledging his identity: Glyndwr Michael, a drifter, who served posthumously as Major William Martin.#_ftn12 Worry not, my dear fisherman friends. His story is tragic, but his role in one of history’s most remarkable deception operations earned him a unique place in the effort to end one of the most brutal wars ever fought.
#_ftnref1 Macintyre, Ben. Operation Mincemeat. Bloomsbury, London, United Kingdom. 2010. p13. #_ftnref2 Ibid. #_ftnref3 Zabecki, David T. “Operation Mincemeat.” World War II Magazine. November 1995. #_ftnref4 Macintyre, 2010. pp354-355. #_ftnref5 Beyer, Rick; Sayles, Elizabeth. The Ghost Army of World War II. Princeton Architectural Press. 2015. #_ftnref6 Utz, Curtis. Assault from the Sea: The Amphibious Landing at Inchon. Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C. 2000. pp20-22. #_ftnref7 Spencer, Jack H. Deception Integration in the U.S. Army. Command & General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 1990. #_ftnref8 Ibid. #_ftnref9 Brown, Robert K, ed. “Operation Bolo, Air to Air Combat, Vietnam.” Soldier of Fortune. Omega Group, Boulder, Colorado. 2020. #_ftnref10 “New Orleans.” American Battlefield Trust. 31 JAN 2018. #_ftnref11 Hammon, William M. Public Affairs: The Military and the Media (1968-1973). Center of Military History, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. 1996. #_ftnref12 Morgan, Roger. “The Second World War’s Best Kept Secret Revealed.” After the Battle. November 1996. pp31-33.
| Date Taken: | 01.30.2026 |
| Date Posted: | 01.30.2026 12:32 |
| Story ID: | 557190 |
| Location: | US |
| Web Views: | 14 |
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