




MILITARY POLICE

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF THE MILITARY POLICE CORPS



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
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FEATURES

ARTICLES

- 4 OPERATION OZARK CHALLENGE..... Dr. Charles E. Notar
The Move to Fort Leonard Wood
- 10 WANTED: Small Group Leaders MAJ Howard Hunt'
1SG Chris L. Karayannis
- 11 The New Face of Training CPT Mark M. Weber,
- 16 Information Operations Dr. Charles E. Notar
- 23 POWERING DOWN OUR "LAW of WAR USE of FORCE
TRAINING: A Necessary Step Toward Progress MAJ Mark C. Prugh
- 38 POLISH/AMERICAN JUMP SFC Sherry L. Claus
- 42 PATROLLING IN PANAMA SFC Lek Mateo
- 46 Joint Croatian/American MP Boat Partols SSG Cameron Porter
Zama MP Play Key Role in Cherry Blossom Festival Ms Michelle Evers
- 50 Learning to Lead in Today's Army Mission 1LT Sara A. Snyder
- 52 Coalition Training with the Kuwaiti Army's
3rd Military Police Company 1LT L. Omar Lomas
- 55 MPs Secure Task Force Rijeka Area SSG Cameron Porter
- 57 Physical Fitness Improvement During IET SFC Joseph T. Harris
- 58 WARFIGHTER TEAM CHALLENGE IV SSG Earnest D. Fletcher
- 62 In honor of those who served, sacrificed SPC Ali Leone
- 63 Forcè Protection Equipment Demonstration II LTC Bruce M. Swagler
- 65 783rd Military Police Battalion (EPW/CI)(lineage and honors)
- 66 U.S. Army Military Police Regimental Hall of Fame
- 67 Looking back in history...
The Korean National Police COL W. H. Maglin
- 70 1st Military Police Company (lineage and honors)
- 71 INDEX of ARTICLES



Page 12



Page 45



Page 60

DEPARTMENTS



- 2 Military Police School's Commandant
- 3 Regimental Command Sergeant Major
- 37 Military Police Deployments
- 74 Letter's to the Editor
- 75 MILITARY POLICE Subscription Form
- 76 Military Police Regimental Association Membership Application

MP Brigade-Level Commands, Reserve Component MP Brigade-Level
Commands, MP Battalion-Level Commands (*inside back cover*)

3D Military Police Brigade (*back cover*)

Military Police School's Commandant

Brigadier General Donald J. Ryder



It is truly an honor to join you as the Commandant of our great Corps. Coming aboard at the time of our 57th Anniversary is especially meaningful. We stand on the threshold of change as we begin our journey together. Our great soldiers continue to be deployed throughout the world, just as they have been for the past twenty years. Our Nation and our Army continue to select us to respond when America's best is needed. As this issue goes to press, our MP soldiers are continuing this tradition by spearheading our worldwide security efforts to prevent retaliation from terrorist threats. Again, we have answered the challenge quickly, professionally and with complete competence.

Our leadership has again expressed complete confidence in our ability to do the job without fanfare or self-interest. Just another job—well done. As it was in Grenada, Panama, Haiti, the southwest Asia desert, Somalia, Bosnia, on the 38th Parallel in Korea and now as we secure our Nation's interest throughout the world. Our TRADOC Commander recognizes our contribution, as do all our senior leadership. "There is no other organization in our Army that we have to lean on for the wide and varied missions that are going on...You are America's heroes and you are part of something very



Commandant, United States Army
Military Police School
Brigadier General Donald J. Ryder

As we continue to deal with downsizing and continuous, unrelenting mission requirements, we have our proud history, elite reputation and the best soldiers and leaders in the world to bolster us.

I am immensely proud of each and every one of you. You are the best without peer or challenge. Let us continue to set the example as we show our Army the way. All our MP soldiers are truly heroes. **Assisting—Protecting—Defending**

special." (from a speech delivered by General Abrams at the 57th Anniversary Review)


We cannot bask in our successes nor reflect or celebrate. Our charter is to continue our stellar performance and strive to perfect it. That will not be a simple task as we face new and familiar challenges that are daunting. Constant deployments have taken their toll on our young men and women. The challenge of being first in and last out on relentless deployments has tested our resolve and affected our retention. At the same time we are taking down our training base and moving it to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

My promise to you is that there will be no interruption nor degradation of your training. I cannot tell you that the future will be easy or simple.

"There is no other organization in our Army that we have to lean on for the wide and varied missions that are going on...You are America's heroes and you are part of something very special."

General John N. Abrams

Regimental Command Sergeant Major



CSM Harold L. Burleson

As we begin the relocation of the U. S. Army Military Police School to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, I want to highlight the transition of the MP NCO Academy into the newly designed MANSCEN NCO Academy. The main changes in the personnel structure eliminate the MP Commandant and Assistant Commandant positions.

I vividly recall the day that our Academy was stood up. At that time I was performing duties as the first MP NCO Academy's First Sergeant. Serving today, as the NCO Academy's Commandant, has been an emotional roller coaster for me to experience the changes that have occurred over the years. The MP NCO Academy environment has been a blessing to students and cadre from beginning to end.

Although the MP NCO structure and position titles have changed, the professionalism of the NCO cadre and support staff have always been regarded as the best the Army has to offer. Many of the former cadre and students have developed into the MP Corps Regiment's top NCO leadership. The vision, leadership, guidance and professionalism of the cadre has traditionally brought the academy to a high level of unparalleled excellence. This remarkable excellence has set the standard for other NCO Academies to emulate. As a direct result of this tradition of excellence the MP NCO Academy has received five commendable ratings which were earned during the recent United States Army Sergeants Major Academy's (USASMA) accreditation/visit/inspection. The USASMA has not rated an Academy as commendable in over five years. This achievement sets the standard for NCO professional development throughout the Army. It singles out the MP Noncommissioned Officer Academy cadre as the future senior leaders of our Regiment. The exceedingly positive and powerful impact on the Military Police Corps will be felt for years to come by the soldiers who have been coached, mentored, educated and led through the Academy.



Regimental Command Sergeant Major
U.S. Army Military Police School
CSM Harold L. Burleson


The NCO cadre is responsible for over three resident ANCOC and thirteen BNCOC classes consisting of students who are prepared to lead the Regiment well into the twenty-first century. Each cadre member has been responsible for looking after the welfare of NCO students within their small group. In addition to their normal duties as Small Group Leaders and Course Managers the cadre maintain their professional edge by participating in individual competition such as the Instructor and Small Group Leader of the Year Program. Their professionalism is extremely evident in the high number of NCO cadre members who have earned Post NCO of the quarter. In the last two years five cadre members have earned Post NCO of the quarter competitions. This significant record of excellence has never been matched by any other unit on the installation.

Also, the MP NCO cadre has well represented the Military Police Corps Regiment through its flawless execution of the annual worldwide MP Warfighter Team Competitions. The NCO Academy has made this event one of the premier showcase events of the Regiment. This worldwide MP Warfighter Team competition during the last four years highlights our Nations' greatest credentials, our Military Police soldiers and team leaders. The Academy cadre's dedication to duty and selfless service have benefited hundreds of soldiers and NCOs who have participated in Warfighter events. In their effort to foster competitiveness, professional growth and team work the cadre have made a positive and everlasting impression on the lives of future NCO leaders. We salute each MP NCO cadre member, past and present, who have always demonstrated excellence in the performance of his or her duties. I am confident that we will continue to provide this tradition of excellence and smoothly transition into the MANSCEN NCO Academy. **Assist, Protect, Defend!**

OPERATION OZARK CHALLENGE: The Move To Fort Leonard Wood (FLW), Less Than One Year And Counting

Dr. Charles E. Notar

MANSCEN



You have moved several times in your military or civil service career. You have either bought a house or moved into quarters that were in existence and adjusted to the space and configuration available. How many times did you wish you could change things? The MP Corps and The United States Army Military Police School (USAMPS) have the opportunity to build from scratch, based on past experience, brand new facilities. For members of the MP Corps this is an exciting and challenging time — As most of you know USAMPS will relocate to Fort Leonard Wood (FLW), Missouri beginning the first quarter of 1999 and is scheduled to close completely by 30 Sep 1999. This will co-locate the Chemical, Engineer and Military Police Schools to create the United

States Army Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN) under TRADOC. (Figure 1 movement schedule) Only construction can delay the move, and as of this publication, the contractor is on or ahead of schedule. USAMPS Advance party will leave in December to occupy MP buildings to facilitate the installation of phones, computers, and furniture.

This updates the MANSCEN article that appeared in the *MILITARY POLICE* Professional Bulletin (PB 19-97-2) last year. Our next issue will contain more detailed information on the organization and facilities as well as the actual move.

The USAMPS Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Office will conduct detailed planning and minute by minute coordination until closure. The focus throughout is

to transition without interrupting or degrading training. Every attempt is being made to make this a door-to-door move.

Over 80% of USAMPS civilian employees who were offered jobs at Fort Leonard Wood plan to make the move. This will help assure operational and training continuity during the transition period and on into the next century. In addition, a number of the individuals who retired will have their positions filled by highly trained interns, who have been working at USAMPS for 18 months.

We are excited about the prospects of training in new facilities designed for Military Police specific training. Mr. Dan King, who was responsible for the interface for all DOT facilities with the Corps

Engineers and the contractor says, "The facilities at FLW will be ideal to facilitate the conduct of training. This will be the first time that the USAMPS will have general instructional and applied instructional classrooms completely designed to accommodate MP training at all levels. Often in the past, training was conducted in a structure or facility that was originally built for another purpose. These newly constructed facilities coupled with our outstanding instructors will help to ensure that the "Force of Choice" remains in the forefront."

USAMPS will benefit from several exceptional new training facilities. The General Instruction Facility (GIF) will be the home of the school. (figure 2) This \$57 million facility provides an entry to USAMPS through a three-story

atrium. The left side of the General Instruction Facility is where the MP School proper will be located (figure 3). The MP Officer Advanced, Officer Basic, Warrant Officer, Apprentice Special Agent Course, Military Police Investigation, and NCOA classes will be conducted in this building. In addition to classrooms and office space USAMPS will be fully networked with fiber optic cable and 12 TRADOC classroom XXIs.

The \$30 million Applied Instructional Facility (AIF), more commonly known as the MP Village, (figure 4) is a complex of 14 buildings where One Station Unit Training (OSUT), Advanced Law Enforcement Training (ALET), and Family Advocacy Law Enforcement Training functional courses will be conducted. The main class-

room building in the MP Village is constructed with a facade providing a city "look." This will provide a realistic environment to respond to incidents. Other buildings in the Village for OSUT MP training are the mock MP station, mock confinement facility, unarmed self-defense facility, simulation center, interview and interrogation facility and a covered bleacher area for traffic accident investigation.

When our new recruits report to FLW they will find not only new facilities, but a "new" brigade. The MP Training Brigade at FLW is being designated the 14th Military Police Brigade (figure 5). Their motto is "We Give Our Best."

The ALET facilities in the Village will include the Parker building, which houses classrooms and office space and a tactical clearing




Figure 1. Movement Schedule



Figure 2. General Instruction facility




Figure 3. Aerial view of the General Instruction Facility




Figure 4. MP Village

complex. The tactical clearing complex is composed of a bank, medical clinic, company headquarters, and two stand alone quarters used for practical exercises in SRT, hostage negotiations, drug investigations, and protective services operations. These facilities are all fully integrated with video and audio systems

to record every practical exercise. Mr. Tom Taylor, Chief of the Specials Reaction Team Committee, describes these facilities as the "best tactical police training facilities in the nation."

The other occupant of facilities within the MP village is the Family Advocacy Law Enforcement Training

(FALET) program. Mr. Russ Strand, program manager, states "the FALET house is a \$600,000 child abuse crime scene lab. This will be the only facility of its kind in the world." The FALET house will train experienced investigators and special agents from around the world to investigate child abuse and domestic violence.

Several new ranges and training areas have been constructed. The SRT Range complex includes two live fire "shoot" houses, four pistol/shotgun/submachine gun stress courses, and a three-story marksman/observer rifle-shooting platform. Mr. Lee Chewey, a SRT training team chief and instructor describes this facility "as a one of a kind law enforcement range." There is a new MK 19 grenade machinegun range as well as a 9mm pistol range. Two new ranges for driver training

have been constructed. The one and 1/2 mile evasive driving track provides a facility for military police driving exercises, primarily to teach antiterrorism attack avoidance. Mr. Tom Weems, senior instructor, stated "that this track will, no doubt, be the best in the mid-west."

FLW did not have a MOUT (Military Operations in Urban Terrain) training complex. After the expenditure of \$4.5 million—it does now. This new facility has 17 buildings built in a European setting.



Figure 5. The 14th Military Police Brigade will be reactivated at Fort Leonard Wood.




Figure 6. Directorate of Training Development

A Directorate of Training (DOT) training schedule has been developed so that most training will stop in July 1999 at Fort McClellan and resume in August 1999. This does not include OSUT which will conduct split-based training.

The MANSCEN consolidated Directorates of Training Development (DOTD) and the Directorate of Combat Development (DCD) will move into existing facilities. The footprint for both organizations has been established and work is continuing to make a door-to-door relocation. Standup of DOTD and DCD is scheduled for 1 April 1999. The DOTD is designed (figure 6) to have divisions for each school for unit, individual, and new equipment training. The MANSCEN DCD operational concept (figure 7) has department for each school. Within




Figure 7. Directorate of Combat Developments Operational Concept



Figure 8. Construction Site of the Unaccompanied Enlisted Personnel Housing (UEPH)

each school department, there will be a division for concepts, organizations, and material development. This new DCD provides for a proponent school spokesperson. It also provides for one point of contact for MP related requirements. The distributed simulations test bed and battle lab support elements become a single department entitled Analysis and Simulations Center.

The housing for Noncommissioned Officers Academy (NCOA) students will be in the \$59 million Unaccompanied Enlisted Personnel Housing (UEPH) at figure 8.

It is built to the latest specification for unaccompanied NCOs. The complex is approximately one quarter of a mile from the GIF where NCOA classes will be conducted. Study areas, recreation/TV lounges and a consolidated dining hall are key features of this state of the art complex.

Plans for the movement of our Memorial Grove are being finalized. A natural bowl has been chosen and approved as the site. The wall and seating will be similar to those at the present grove. It will be part of a larger memorial park consisting

of five acres. The park is close to our Regimental museum and a fully functioning WW II chapel which will serve as an inclement weather alternative, and is available for special events.

This is an exciting and challenging event for our Corps. The OPORD has been issued; your support is necessary to insure that this critical Corps mission is conducted in the most positive manner. Until the next issue, "See you in Missouri," 1 October 1999.

Dr. Charles E. Notar is the DTLOMS integrator for USAMPS and is assigned to the Directorate of Training.

WANTED:

SMALL GROUP LEADERS DO YOU HAVE WHAT IT TAKES TO BE AN SGL?

*Major Howard Hunt
and*

First Sergeant Chris L. Karayannis

You have probably heard the old saying: "Those that can't do, teach". This is not true at the United States Army Military Police School (USAMPS). For many years USAMPS has been combing the field, asking senior MP leaders to send their best and brightest to the school to train new generations of soldiers and leaders. And now, USAMPS wants you!

USAMPS is looking for bright, articulate, leaders of vision that have been out to the field, "been there, done that, got the T-shirt", successfully lead soldiers, and want to come back to the fountain of knowledge and share their experiences. And sharing these experiences with future leaders of the MP Corps- leaders who will walk in your shoes- is a must if we are to move forward in developing MP doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

USAMPS uses the small group method of instruction in many of its courses for the simple benefit of having a better teacher to student ratio. Having teacher to student ratios around 1:12 and by using the conference method of instruction, the school has enhanced the learning process and increased student interaction with the instructor. This technique better fa-

cilitates the educational process and provides better trained battle ready leaders for the Military Police Corps of the future. And none of this will change as we transition USAMPS to Fort Leonard Wood.

In fact, Fort Leonard Wood will offer us some very unique opportunities to train with other branches of the Army that have shared similar experiences with us in past operations. Much of the focus of the Army of late has been on Force XXI and the Army After Next. The Military Police will play a critical role in this whole process of redesigning the model for landpower well into the 21st Century.

Becoming a small group instructor always is perhaps the most rewarding assignment you could have. Teaching the MP Corps and then having them execute to standard provides the instructor immense satisfaction.

It's an exciting time to be at USAMPS. With the implementation of the five MP functions, and the pending publication of FM 100-5 (Operations), FM 100-20 (Stability and Support Operations), and FM 100-40 (Tactics), we all have an opportunity to influence MP doctrine and provide input for the new FM 19-1 and FM 19-4.

USAMPS is looking for quality instructors to transition the MP Corps into the future. The Military Police Officer Advanced Course (MPOA) and the Military Police Officer Basic Course (MPOB) both use the small group method of instruction. MPOA is authorized six captains and three sergeants first class, while MPOB has slots for nine captains, one sergeant first class and three staff sergeants. Officers interested in one of these positions should contact LTC Douglas Bonebrake at DSN 865-3413/3717.

In addition to the positions in the officer advanced and basic courses, the Military Police Non-commissioned Officers Academy has small group leader positions as well. The move to Fort Leonard Wood, coupled with a revised program of instruction promises to challenge and reward the best NCOs committed to training and developing the best NCOs. NCOs in the rank of staff sergeant who are physically fit, have recent successful squad leader experience and would like the opportunity to facilitate small group instruction to the squad leaders of the future, are encouraged to contact 1SG Karayannis at the MP NCO academy, DSN 865-3645/4578.

USAMPS needs quality leaders at the Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN) to train and mentor future quality military police leaders. These leaders will be responsible for transitioning the MP Corps into Force XXI and play pivotal roles in the redesign of landpower for the Army After Next.

What role will you play in that redesign?

Major Howard Hunt is currently a small group instructor for the Military Police Officer Advance Course.

First Sergeant Chris L. Karayannis is currently the assistant commandant of the Military Police NCO Academy.

The New Face of Training

Captain Mark M. Weber

"Sir, Private Barrett reporting for duty,"—magic words to a unit that has been lucky enough to receive a fresh batch of newly trained military police soldiers from Fort McClellan, Alabama. A few months ago a command sergeant major (CSM) pinned E8 stripes on a soldier that came to him back in the mid-80's as a brand new private. Shortly after that a first sergeant helped pin Captain's bars on a soldier that he trained during basic training back in 1990. Basic training and military police training impacts the lives of every single individual reading this article.

The importance of accomplishing the vital mission of training young recruits cannot be overemphasized. Whether you went through the 795th or the 787th, or maybe the 40th and possibly even the 10th, 11th, or 12th MP Training Battalion's, the training you received set into motion a set of standards to be achieved and maintained. Good, bad, right or wrong, nothing is more important than the first step. The question is, are we doing a good job at it?

The New Face of Training

Basic Combat Training (BCT) and Advanced Individual Training (AIT) is getting the attention it deserves from senior leaders because they are realizing its importance to our future. Brigadier General David W. Foley, the former commandant of the MP School, has ensured success for the new emphasis being

placed on training through his insight of command. Long before Secretary of Defense directives and senior leader initiatives, BG Foley was bringing in "warfighters" like Colonel John Della Jacono; CGSC graduates for the Executive Officer and Brigade Operations positions; and hard hitting CSM's, which have all helped adjust perceptions of the U.S. Army Training Brigade and the role of leaders raised in combat support MP companies.

A higher or lower standard, that is the question from the ranks and is often determined by when you came into the Army. But do you really remember what you learned in basic training? What were the

standards and how well were they enforced for you? Do you think it was harder back then? Of course, the answers to these questions are relative? In reality, many of the stories regarding BCT and AIT of days past have reached mythical proportions. As they should, many of our drill sergeants have become heroes and legends, all harder and more caring than the previous. You might hear, "When I went through basic training it was a lot harder. My drill sergeants didn't have to worry about cursing and the trouble-makers were "taken care of" or "We never had to worry so much about all this safety stuff...." And yet, events at Aberdeen caused a stir that continues to reverberate through the ranks, regardless of where and specifically who was involved.

A direct descendant of the Aberdeen fiasco was the question of whether or not gender integrated training should occur at all. Accordingly, senior leaders have devised a "safe and secure" policy for soldiers in an effort to tackle this sensitive issue. Definitive increases in the level of alertness for sexual misconduct or



Drill Sergeant Gordon provides inspiration to a trainee on the "tough one."

abuse, with or without trainees, in or out of the military, has been a factor for a long time. Aberdeen only made an uncomfortable situation much worse for the Army. Underneath all of the warnings and caution signals of being in the trainee environment is the drill sergeant, first sergeant, and company commander who are indoctrinating civilian's into trained, responsible, disciplined, military police men and women who can think and act better than any other soldier in the Army's inventory. The excellence we demand and receive is not a choice, it is a necessity. Today's MP soldier is being deployed all over the world, in every kind of condition, to conduct any one of our five different battlefield functions. So it starts with the trainers:

Drill Sergeants

Today's Army demands a higher and harder set of standards for our drill sergeants, evidenced by the new review policies for prospective drill sergeants. Likewise, drill sergeants are beginning to receive better treatment with regard to career enhancement. There was once



Drill Sergeant Gilmore dives into the low crawl pit as she and Drill Sergeant Attaway demonstrate the proper way to negotiate the low crawl obstacle.

a day when it was very important that an NCO become a drill sergeant to achieve success, now it's almost a requirement. Demonstrated leadership is the greatest demand.

The following exaggeration illustrates the change over the course of twenty years. Which is harder: 1) slapping a soldier

around or "taking care of a soldier" for being insubordinate? Or 2) demanding high standards, without hurting him/her and not losing cool when a new soldier becomes insubordinate? Although hitting and slapping soldiers is absolutely unacceptable today, the cursing, frustration, and impatience are certainly inescapable with such diversity. There can be no doubt that it is much harder to demand and achieve high standards from an average class size of 150 civilians, most of them undisciplined, in such a short period of time. Although patience and understanding may have occurred in the past, it is demanded and expected today. The shrinking "purse strings" of the Army, higher expectations in initial entry training (IET) counseling, and soaring technological advances with their associated costs have only made the job that much harder.

Make no mistake about it, some of the best NCO's in the Army today are located right here in the U.S. Army Training Brigade, Fort McClellan, AL. Thank God we've got them. The civilians who arrive here come from all walks of life.



Drill Sergeant Schultz demonstrates the proper stance for the kneeling-hand grenade throw.

Drill sergeants take these individuals and turn them into teammates. Think back, you may recall how important it was for you.

If you've ever read or experienced the stories of how a drill sergeant's day begins at 0330 and ends at 2100, I can assure you it does the job no justice. There is no way to understand it, but to do it. DS Naegle rolls out of the bunk at 0300 and gets himself ready for the day. When he gets to work he doesn't have the platoon that he has grown so accustomed to, he's got a brand new bunch of undisciplined individuals that may or may not choose to listen to him today. Physical training (PT) will be done on his own time because he has to watch the trainees to make sure they are doing it correctly. When their PT is over he has to bring the trainees to chow. That should take about 15-20 minutes on a good day. When chow is over he's got to get ready to move out because the soldiers have to be marched to training. For the next eight hours he makes on the spot corrections almost non-stop. The first 50 or 60 corrections are pretty easy, after that "they get pretty damned annoying." Patience wears thin, and yet it must be maintained. Lunch will be a highly anticipated break, if MRE's are served. If not, he has to march them or follow them back to the chow hall to supervise while they eat. The afternoon is the same as the morning and then dinner. The evening is filled with small group instruction. It will feel good to have so many soldiers hanging on his every word, but it will take every ounce of energy he has to drum up the patience required after a full day of never-ending corrections. He is the only discipline many of them have ever known. Personal time for the trainees begins at 2000. If he isn't the CQ he can go home and at 0300 the day starts all over again. Even if his family members are "night owls" he will only get one or two hours with them.

If you're still not convinced the job is one of the hardest in the Army then let's just say, for arguments sake, that we wanted to limit the schedule outlined above to the first two weeks, arguing that the schedule will just slacken up from there. Try it for one week and just think about doing it for two years. The only plus is that although you only get to see your family for an hour or so a day, even though they may be asleep when you see them, you do get to see them.

If the story I've just described invokes pity, you will have to keep it because a drill sergeant won't want it, no offense. Seeing a newly trained soldier step across the parade field knowing that they succeeded in the one thing they both set out to do is reward enough. Drill sergeants have no choice but to attack each new day with a motivation and drive that will carry him and the soldiers under their care. If they don't, the life they live would be wholly consumed and they would be overwhelmed. The importance of the drill sergeant is proven, as it always has been, in the fact that a

soldier never forgets, nor wants to forget, his/her drill sergeant.

Today's Soldiers

Today's soldiers are responsible for much more than any of the past. As with the drill sergeant they must learn to be patient but firm. Today's soldier must learn how to tgeir mind to fix or avoid a tough situation. They must be smart enough to know when not to act as well as when to act. Military police soldiers are one of the most deployed components of our Army today, deployments that find officers and NCOs in scenarios that require tact and stunning levels of maturity. They are tasked with missions of peace, missions where the enemy is vaguely defined, if at all. They too, must do more with less. Vietnam veterans will recall the hell of being in this type of environment, many times a "no win" situation when the bullets started flying.

Basic Training and Advanced Individual Training (OSUT)

The bottom line is that the intent of basic training hasn't really



Command emphasis is key in the trainee environment. Captain Weddell provides that emphasis along with a little motivation!



Integrated training happens everyday. Male soldiers train right next to female soldiers at the rifle-bayonet training site.

ever changed. Soldiers are trained to shoot, move and communicate, as they always have been. Remember that earlier question? How many of you do remember your initial entry training? Remember your roots! Leaders must keep this in mind when they get new soldiers. What should a newly trained soldier be able to do, everything? If that were the case, training in the line units would be much easier and some of it completely unnecessary.

Soldiers learn the basics when they are in basic training. Physical training alone takes many of them from no PT to a lot of PT to the Army standard in just 17 weeks! Often called the "Nintendo Generation," today's youths are labeled as lazy and insubordinate. Our job is to shake them of those habits and give them an introduction to the Army. It is the responsibility and duty of the unit's team leader, squad leader, and platoon sergeant to teach him/her what it means to be an integrated part of the MP team, squad, and platoon. Three years in the training environment is like putting a soldier in a bubble, their environment teaches them nothing other

than what it can offer, which for them is a world surrounded by trainees. The units they arrive at will always conduct the primary training of a soldier, it couldn't happen any other way. New soldiers require the training provided by team leaders, squad leaders, and platoon sergeants to complete the learning process. This last is one of the most critical transitions for

the new trainee and cannot be over-emphasized. Time and again we see the scene unfold, "hey troop, take it easy, relax, you're not in basic training anymore. Don't be so serious!" Many will survive such an induction into the ranks, but few will feel the need to ignore the advice of their NCO and maintain the pace they started in OSUT.

In a few months the Army will expand it's BCT program by one week. The one week will be used for a variety of training enhancements, but focuses principally on teaching newly inducted soldiers the importance of the seven Army Values. "The inculcation of the Army's seven values" has become the watchword for the training environment, and the Army as a whole. The plan is to incorporate at the additional week of time into the existing BCT period of instruction, making it a total of seven weeks.

Training Philosophy

It's simple and familiar, FM 25-100 and FM 25-101 tells everyone in the Army how to train, and IET is no different. The Training Brigade was turned upside down in July

1997, with the introduction of Colonel John L. Della Jacono as the brigade commander. "Train as you fight" became the watchword. As discussed above, the U.S. Army Training Brigade environment is somewhat limited in what it can truly accomplish. Colonel Della Jacono addressed those areas that could be positively influenced by "train as you fight." One example of this change of focus rested in the Individual Tactical Training (ITT) part of basic training. Instead of walking in a circle of engineer tape and stations that closely resembled a round robin training event in an open, sparsely wooded field, soldiers participate in a training lane, of which many are all too familiar in today's Army. Trainee leadership, carefully selected, is utilized as it has never been used before. With a careful and watchful eye, the drill sergeant allows the trainee leaders to take the squad size element, in tactical formation, to its objective.

In the military police phase training, "train as you fight" takes on a different meaning. Trainee leaders are given more responsibility. One of the questions that was asked was: "Why are drill sergeants waking privates up in the morning of their tenth week of training, when what we want them to do is develop a sense of discipline in themselves?" With this intent, drill sergeants have discovered an untapped resource in their trainee leaders. As does a platoon sergeant or squad leader, the trainee leader is accountable, the same way they will be held accountable when they get to their new units. Again, this requires a close and careful eye from the drill sergeant.

Gender-Integrated Training?

"Train as you fight" has one, and only one, interpretation: train soldiers in the exact same manner and in the exact same conditions (or as much as possible) under which they will be expected to fight. Soldiers



The phase III FTX stresses those skills that were trained in BCT. Here, a squad takes a temporary halt during movement to contact under trainee leadership.

will experience more stress in combat than could ever be recreated in the training environment. What is the answer? There are hundreds of possibilities, but if we follow this one simple cornerstone of our training philosophy, the choice seems obvious. It follows the same logic as holding them accountable for waking up in the morning. If we can't trust a soldier to do what they're supposed to do in training, albeit a stressful environment, how will we get them to do it in war when it will be worse? If this is happening in the training environment, better we learn how to deal with it now.

Phase III Field Training Exercise

A focus on "train as you fight" and keeping "battle focused" has led to the concept of a field training exercise (FTX) that has returned to the basic training phase of OSUT. As explained before, trainee leaders are given more responsibility, just enough to challenge them (this is not Primary Leader Development Course). Squad leaders and team leaders are appointed and operation orders are read. Company areas are set up the same way an MTOE company would set up, complete with dismount points and generator powered light systems. This realism in training doesn't come easily. Drill sergeants don't have the

luxury of assigning responsibility to experienced squad leaders. Supervision takes on a whole new meaning. Although this type of training demands more from the drill sergeant, nothing better prepares him/her to become absolutely brilliant squad leaders and platoon sergeants as they hone the "check and re-check" mentality that must permeate their every action in the line units of their future. They experience training shortfalls and supply problems. They must deploy and redeploy from an FTX in BCT and AIT (two times in four months) within three and five days respectively, which makes this an excellent exercise for both trainees and drill sergeants alike.

Hall of Fame

One of the signature accomplishments to the new command is the implementation of a trainee excellence award. Reminiscent of the distinguished leadership award that is now all too familiar in the field, this award recognizes the few soldiers that are capable of attaining the rigorous and above average standards set forth for achievement. The soldier must complete the following tasks:

- Score 290 or above on the Phase V APFT.
- Score 22 out of 22 "first time go's" during end of cycle testing.
- Qualify expert with the M16A2.

- Qualify expert with the 9MM Pistol.
- Receive 90% "first time go on all Phase IV and Phase V exams.
- Complete a 15K road march in 1 hour and 45 minutes, full combat gear with weapon.
- Complete a four-mile run in the prescribed time: Males-33 minutes/Females-36 minutes.
- Have no record of disciplinary action.

Four trainees have achieved this standard in six months. They receive an AAM and a permanent place in the U.S. Army Training Brigade is held for them on a perpetual plaque with their name and photograph.

Summary

Make no mistake about it, when you get a new soldier into your unit, trust and know that they are not an assembly line creation. There are too many senior leaders and drill sergeants that care, too many commanders, company to brigade alike, that demand a quality that is as important as the names on their uniforms, for you to get a new MP soldier that was trained and tested to standard. There is a new face to training and it's the demand for quality in the shrinking Army that is creating it.

Captain Mark M. Weber was the HHD commander, S1/S4, for the 795th Military Police Battalion, Fort McClellan, Alabama, at the time this article was written.

Information Operations (IO) and its Implications on the Five Functions of the Military Police

Dr. Charles E. Notar

"Any military—like any company or corporation—has to perform at least four key functions with respect to knowledge. It must acquire, process, distribute, and protect information, while selectively denying or distributing it to its adversaries and or allies."

Alvin and Heidi Toffler

War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century

Information Operations are: "Continuous military operations within the military information environment that enable, enhance, and protect the friendly force's ability to collect, process, and act on information to achieve an advantage across the full range of military operations. IO include interacting with the global information environment and exploiting or denying an adversary's information and decision capabilities" (FM 100-6) (Figure 1).

IO involves acquiring, using, protecting, exploiting, denying, and managing information and information systems (INFOSYS). When effectively executed, these critical activities supplement the human skills of battle command, speed decision making, minimize or eliminate uncertainty, focus combat power, help protect the force, harness organizational capabilities, align the military information environment (MIE) to the global information environment (GIE), and enhance situational awareness for soldiers and leaders. These activities apply to both information and INFOSYS (hardware, people, orga-





Figure 1. Information Operations

nizations, and processes). Although listed sequentially, these activities are concurrent and seamless in their application (Figure 2).

IO is not new. However, the application and synchronization of advanced technology and the use of battlefield visualization can produce the knowledge advantage necessary for the success of our modern Army in peace, conflict and war. Because IO drives this knowledge advantage, it directly supports the Army goal of achieving land force dominance quickly, decisively and with


minimum casualties. Similarly, in support and stability operations (SASO), IO is critical to making more effective decisions and defusing crises. Further, it enhances the commander's lethal and nonlethal means to achieve unit missions, while deterring war and promoting peace (Figure 3).

Command and control warfare (C2W) is defined as the integrated use of operations security (OPSEC), military deception, psychological operations (PSYOP), electronic warfare (EW), and physical destruction



mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary C2 capabilities, while protecting friendly C2 capabilities against such actions. Command and control warfare applies across the operational continuum and all levels of conflict. To be effective, C2W needs to be fully integrated into the commander's concept of the operation and synchronized with other operations. The synchronization should insure that the C2W objectives are part of the planning guidance and priorities. C2W directly supports the Army goal of achieving information dominance and winning any conflict or succeeding in any SASO quickly, decisively, and with minimum casualties. C2W incorporates both the sword against an adversary's C2 system and the shield against the C2-attack actions of the adversary. This combination of both offensive and defensive aspects into an integrated capability provides expanded

Figure 2. Information Operations Activities



OUTPUTS/ PRODUCTS

Operation Order

- Concept
- Task Organization
- Command and Signal

Other Annexes

- Signal
- Intelligence
- Forward Support
- PSYOP

Separate Annex

- C2W
- PA Operations
- Movement
- CA Operations

Figure 3. IO Planning Process




Figure 4. Employment of Information Operations

opportunities for synergy in warfare. C2W allows the Army and individual commanders to accomplish missions with fewer risks, in shorter time frames, and with fewer resources (Figure 4).

C2W applies to all phases of operations, including those before, during, and after actual hostilities. Even in SASO, C2W offers the military commander lethal and nonlethal means to achieve the assigned mission while deterring war and/or promoting peace. The offensive aspect of C2W can slow the adversary's operational tempo, disrupt his plans and ability to focus combat power, and influence his estimate of the situation. The defensive aspects of C2W minimize friendly C2 system vulnerabilities and mutual interference.

The foundation for C2W is robust and redundant command, control, communications, and computer INFOSYS, coupled with seamless, national to tactical, relevant information and intelligence support. The building blocks, or elements, of

C2W include—OPSEC, military deception, PYSOP, EW, and physical destruction. These building blocks contribute to protection of the force and mission accomplishment in various ways, depending on the situation. This situation dependence leads to the building blocks that are shown in a constantly changing pattern. The integrated employment of these five elements leads to synergy on the battlefield and results in the most effective execution of C2-attack and/or C2-protect tasks. The commander drives this C2W process to achieve agility by focusing attacks on the adversary's ability to command and control his forces while simultaneously protecting friendly C2.

The two disciplines that comprise C2W are C2-attack and C2-protect. C2-attack is defined as the synchronized execution of actions taken to accomplish established objectives that prevent effective C2 of adversarial forces by denying information to, by influencing, by degrading, or by destroying the

adversary's C2 system. The three principles of C2-attack are to a) Plan based on the unit's mission commander's intent, and concept of operations; b) Synchronize with and support the commander's plan- and c) Take and hold the initiative by degrading the adversary's INFOSYS and forcing the adversary to be reactive. Reactive means that C2-attack slows the adversary's tempo, disrupts the adversary's planning and decision cycles, disrupts the adversary commander's ability to generate combat power, and degrades the adversary commander's means for executing mission orders and controlling subordinate unit operations.

In general terms, C2-attack has four effects that focus on the adversary's C2 infrastructure and information flow to produce a lower quality and slower decision-making process. First, the adversary is denied information by disrupting his observation, degrading his orientation and decision formulation, and degrading information collection

Information collection can be degraded by destroying collection means, by influencing the information the adversary gets, or by causing the adversary not to collect at all. Second, the adversary commander is influenced by manipulating perception and causing disorientation of his decision cycle. Third, adversary IO are degraded by selectively disrupting C4I (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence) systems. Fourth, adversary information capabilities can be neutralized or destroyed by physical destruction of nodes and links. Destruction operations are most effective when timed to occur just before the adversary needs a certain C2 function or when focused on a target that is resource-intensive and hard to reconstitute.

C2-protect is defined as the maintenance of effective C2 of ones own forces by turning to friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information to, to influence, to degrade, or to destroy the friendly C2 system. C2-protect can be offensive or defensive. Offensive C2-protect uses the five elements (OPSEC, deception, PSYOP, EW and destruction) of C2W to reduce the adversary's ability to conduct C2-attack. Defensive C2-protect reduces friendly C2 vulnerabilities to adversary C2-attack by employing adequate physical, electronic, and intelligence protection.

The C2-protect process can best be understood by reverse engineering our C2-attack process. Commanders ask how the adversary can employ destruction, EW, military deception, OPSEC, and PSYOP to disrupt our C2 systems and decision making process. Having wargamed the adversary's C2-attack courses of action, the commander can develop a comprehensive protect operation, synchronized with the main effort and C2-attack. The commander is guided by the five principles of C2-

protect. The five principles are:

1) To gain C2 superiority. This principle includes functions such as the unimpeded friendly processing of information, accurate development of courses of action, valid decision making, and efficient communications to and from subordinates.

2) To stay inside the adversary's decision cycle. This is done by denying, influencing, degrading, and/or destroying the adversary's C2 personnel, equipment, and systems.

3) To reduce the adversary's ability to conduct C2-attack.

4) To reduce friendly C2 vulnerabilities using C2-protect measures. As an example, countering the effects of adversary propaganda or misinformation through PSYOP and public affairs (PA).

5) To reduce friendly interference in our C2 systems throughout the electro-magnetic spectrum (EMS) (deconfliction and coordination).

The effects of C2-protect mirror those of C2-attack. We can deny information the adversary needs to take effective action. We can influ-

ence the adversary not to take action, to take the wrong action, or to take action at the wrong time. We can degrade and destroy his capabilities to perform C2-attack against friendly forces. PSYOP and PA supports C2-protect. PSYOP can drive a wedge between the adversary leadership and its populace to undermine the adversary leadership's confidence and effectiveness.

As stated earlier IO is not new. However, as military police, we must be able to articulate what we can and should be doing to those who plan operations. FM 100-6 makes specific mention of the role that the MPs will be able to fulfill and tells commanders that they should look to us for assistance. "While the 1993 version of FM 100-5 recognizes the impact of global news coverage on the scope, nature, and duration of major operation, recent events demonstrate that the GIE also affects operation at brigade, battalion, and company levels. Commanders at every level may now find that Civil Affairs (CA), military police (MP), public affairs (PA), PYSOP, and Special




Figure 5. Army Force-Projection Cycle

interaction and is trained in professional development and CID courses.

CID also plays a major role in IO. In addition to the physical security and PAO role they investigate computer crimes.

It will be your responsibility to meet the challenges of IO as officers, NCOs and soldiers in the Military Police Corps. These challenges are not restricted to grade or position (Figure 8). The presently identified five challenges are information




Figure 8. Challenges

security, continuous operations, policy and public opinion, global visibility of operations, and legal and rules of engagement.

Only, if we are prepared as a Corps to respond to the challenges of IO as we go about performing our functions, can we achieve information dominance (Figure 9).

Dr. Charles E. Notar is the DTLOMS Integrator for the U. S. Army Military Police School and is assigned to the Directorate of Training.




Figure 9. Response to the Challenge Information Dominance

POWERING DOWN OUR "LAW OF WAR" USE OF FORCE TRAINING: A NECESSARY STEP TOWARD PROGRESS

Major Mark C. Prugh

"If you're going to [prosecute soldiers] and put their life on the line, you owe them to tell them in advance what's right and what's wrong and how they can avoid being prosecuted.

Then, if they [violate the rules] they do it willfully, knowing the consequences."

Kenneth A. Raby, Colonel (Retired), JA,
Military Defense Counsel, *U.S. v. Calley*,
War Crimes (A&E Television Networks Film) 1996

I. INTRODUCTION

A. MY LAI

A little over thirty years ago, at 0730 hours on 16 March 1968 Second Lieutenant William L. Calley and other members of 1st Platoon, C Company, Task Force Barker, 11th Light Infantry Brigade, Americal Division, Republic of Vietnam, landed by helicopter about 100 meters west of a village known as My Lai 4. Calley's company and the two other company size units that comprised Task Force Barker (A Company, 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment and B Company, 4th Battalion, 3d Infantry Regiment) had been ordered to conduct coordinated combat air assault operations that morning. Their collective mission was to destroy as many enemy forces and facilities as they could in the vicinity of Song Mai (an area encompassing My Lai 1, My Lai 4, My Lai 5, and My Lai 6). CPT Ernest L. Medina,

2LT Calley's Commander, addressed all members of C Company the night before the operation. He told them that they could expect to encounter the 48th Viet Cong Regiment when they landed and that the enemy would likely outnumber them by more than two to one.

Indirect fires from 105mm howitzers attached to Task Force Barker and helicopter gunships under Task Force control poured high explosive artillery and direct gunship fire into the village as Calley's men approached. His platoon, the first combat unit to arrive at My Lai 4, found a village solely occupied by unarmed, unresisting women, children, and old men. The evidence at Calley's Court Martial showed that, based on his interpretation of CPT Medina's guidance, Calley ordered everyone in the village killed. 2LT Calley, who personally participated in some killings, was eventually found guilty of three specifications of premeditated murder (which

collectively meant he was criminally responsible for twenty two murders) and one specification of assault with the intent to commit murder at a General Court Martial. In April 1971, Calley was sentenced to a dismissal from military service, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement at hard labor for life. The convening authority reduced his confinement to twenty years shortly after the trial. Three years after the trial, while the Army preserved their ability to act in Calley's case by appealing the decision of a federal district court overturning the court martial conviction on three grounds, the Secretary of the Army further reduced Calley's confinement to ten years and granted him parole. In all, Calley spent about 6 months in confinement at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and a little over three years under house arrest in government quarters at Fort Benning, Georgia. He is a free man today. CPT Medina, also prosecuted for the My Lai massacre, was acquitted of all charges. LTC Barker, the Task Force Commander, was killed in combat shortly after the incident. The 11th Infantry Brigade Commander, Colonel Warren K. Henderson, was acquitted at a General Court-Martial. Major General Samuel H. Koster, the Americal Division Commander at the time, was censured for failure to investigate the incident and retired as a Brigadier General.

B. JUST CAUSE

At about 0400 hours one morning during the week before Christmas, 1989 I was awakened by an unexpected telephone call directing me to report to work right away. I was a trial counsel (prosecuting attorney) in the 82d Airborne Division. When I arrived at the office, I was told that units (including some from the Division) were a day away from departing for a combat parachute jump into Panama in support

of Operation Just Cause. I was given an overview of the existing Division operations plan, intelligence estimate, and Rules of Engagement (ROE). The Infantry Regiment I was assigned primary responsibility to prosecute for was not going to participate in the operation—hence I would not be among those actually deploying. Instead, my task was to instruct various combat units (in company sized groups) on the basics of the operation's ROE. I was to tell deploying soldiers and leaders how they should apply the Law of War and other related guidance during this particular operation. I went immediately to the personnel holding area to meet with the deploying troops.

As I spoke to the soldiers (covering the basics of how they could and could not use force, handle people, handle property, and handle violations of the Law of War) I examined them carefully. I could tell that, despite their obvious professionalism and keen desire to learn, they weren't soaking up much of what I was telling them. I answered individual questions after each presentation and left to instruct the next unit until every outfit I had been assigned to brief was covered.

By this point in my career, I had served at every level from platoon through Division in leadership, operations, or operational law jobs. I had also been introduced to soldiering in the very unit these guys were a part of—the 82d Airborne Division (having previously served as a rifle platoon leader, assistant infantry battalion air operations officer, and general's aide with the 82d). During my service as a battalion air operations officer, I had helped formulate guidance for soldiers (including instructions for using a Rules of Engagement Card) deployed to contain Cuban refugees. I had also served as an assistant brigade operations officer and mechanized infantry company com-

mander in the 8th Infantry Division in Germany prior to attending law school and becoming a Judge Advocate General's Corps officer.

I knew, without being told, that the soldiers about to jump into Panama were trying to digest a mountain of new information (on top of what I was telling them); that they were operating under severe time constraints; and that they were dealing with a fair amount of stress. After all, in addition to the familiar fear of making a nighttime combat-loaded parachute jump—something I was sure most, if not all, of them had done during training before—these guys were going to do it against a hostile force. I was also familiar with the vast amount of information they *had* to master in order to just get to the right place on the battlefield to succeed, including (but not limited to): call signs; passwords; grid coordinates; radio frequencies; link-up points; key responsibilities for assembly; movement formations from every location to every other location; primary and alternate routes (with various combinations of azimuths associated with each); plans for clearing danger areas; objective locations; plans for identifying friend from foe during daylight and at night; back-up plans in case someone with a primary responsibility was killed or injured (every combat soldier, particularly airborne troops, must be ready to instantly perform the duties of superiors at least two levels above them); cross-loading (to ensure enough personnel, ammunition, and other supplies made it to the battlefield in case a plane or two was lost or didn't drop for any reason); their unit plan; the plan of adjacent units; the plan of the next higher unit; the plan of subordinate elements; the enemy situation; and the expected terrain and weather. They also, of course, had to draw, pack, and maintain the right weapons, equipment, ammunition, food, and water for the operation.

On top of all that they were leaving loved ones behind for an indefinite period and were contending with cold, rainy weather at Fort Bragg.

The optimum time for teaching them new things, I knew, had long since passed. I also knew that of the few new things they might be able to absorb, the particulars of the law of land warfare would be low on their priority list. The information I was covering, after all, had little relationship to the very important (if you can't do them, you can't do anything) tasks they had to master just to get to the right place on the battlefield. They were primarily (and justifiably) concerned with the basics of shooting, moving, and communicating.

Still, I made several enthusiastic presentations (as did other attorneys) in an attempt to get these guys ready for successful application of the Law of War during the upcoming operation. In addition, each soldier was issued a "Rules of Engagement" (ROE) card to supplement our instruction.

I also made a special trip to one battalion that had a peacetime affiliation with the Regiment I prosecuted for. I gave the unit adjutant a copy of FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, and gave him an orientation to its contents and uses he might find for it during and after the conflict.

I finally left the area after the troops headed to the airfield feeling that I hadn't really helped the soldiers I'd briefed much and that (although FM 27-10 is a fine general reference on the law of war) I might as well have handed that adjutant a book of Chinese poetry in Chinese.

On 23 December 1989, during the third day of Operation Just Cause combat operations, 1SG Roberto Enrique Bryan, the First Sergeant of D Company, 3d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, shot a Panamanian male dressed in civilian clothing. The shooting occurred shortly after

someone in the dead man's group tossed a hand grenade toward 1SG Bryan's troops during a traffic stop in the vicinity of Madden Dam. 1SG Bryan was charged with murder and defended his actions at a General Court Martial several months later. He was eventually acquitted of all charges and was promoted to Sergeant Major shortly after his trial.

C. DESERT SHIELD/ STORM

I was the newly assigned Chief of Operational Law at XVIII Airborne Corps less than a year after Just Cause ended when Saddam Hussein's forces rolled into Kuwait on 2 August 1990. A few hours after the duty day ended on Monday, 6 August, I was recalled to work. This time my task was to write Rules of Engagement and Legal Annexes to the Corps Operations Plan for Operation Desert Shield. I stayed up all night on 6/7 August adapting United States Central Command's (CENTCOM's) ROE guidance for use by XVIII Airborne Corps units. By dawn the Corps wartime ROE and Legal Annexes were complete and a wartime "Rules of Engagement" card for use by individual soldiers was ready to go to the print plant. I was ordered to deploy immediately as the legal representative to the XVIII Airborne Corps Assault Command Post. We landed at an empty airfield at 0837 local time on 9 August 1990 in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Ours was the first aircraft, a U.S. Air Force C-141, to arrive in support of Operation Desert Shield. Deploying soldiers had already been issued the white wartime ROE cards printed on 7 August. Since we were not at war upon arrival, I immediately wrote, staffed, and disseminated Corps peacetime Rules of Engagement guidance—including a blue peacetime ROE card. By the end of August CENTCOM had approved the

Corps ROE and by December our ROE had been adopted for use by all land forces in theater.

Between August 1990 and the commencement of Desert Storm I developed and disseminated Law of War training guidance for all units affiliated with XVIII Airborne Corps. I also served as the unit legal advisor for eight non-divisional units (including, for a time, an MP Brigade) subordinate to XVIII ABN Corps and instructed many units and staffs on the law of war.

There were no Courts Martial alleging excessive or improper force directed at protected persons during Operations Desert Shield/Storm—largely, I believe, because the soldiers were better prepared for operating within the rules than they had been during either My Lai or Just Cause.

II. PURPOSE

This article addresses foundational aspects of how we prepare soldiers to use force properly under the law of international armed conflict (the law of war). The international law of war's use of force rules are the article's focus because, as discussed in more detail below, the international rules serve as the foundation for use of force guidance during all (even "non-international") military operations.

Foundational aspects of how we prepare soldiers to use force, of course, have direct relevance to the Military Police Corps. MP's are or should be the "force of choice" in many contemporary deployment scenarios and are uniquely able to operate across the international legal spectrum. In other words, the Military Police are soldiers who happen to be police not the other way around. As such, a firm grasp of the foundation upon which all use of force guidance rests is especially important to our Military Police professionals.

This article specifically examines three questions:

1. Should we train our soldiers and leaders on the law of war's use of force rules at all?

If so,

2. What do they need to know? and

3. How should we train them?

The article concludes, based on the author's experience and research, that we must train soldiers to use force properly under the law of war.

The article goes on to identify two simple fundamental rules for using force during military operations that, in the author's opinion, all soldiers and leaders should master and suggests that we focus (or refocus as appropriate) future law of war and use of force training around those two rules. Simple diagrams capturing the essence of what all soldiers and leaders should know about using force under the law of war are also included.

The article suggests that we concentrate future training efforts on empowering soldiers to use force properly during military operations. In other words, we should focus our training efforts on getting simple, understandable guidance (like the diagrams and rules discussed below) into the hands of every soldier and leader well before any specific operational mission begins.

III. SHOULD WE TRAIN ON THE LAW OF WAR AT ALL?

You may have wondered, heard, or asked some variation of the following questions: Since war is all about destroying the enemy (breaking things and killing people), isn't it silly to concern ourselves with applying rules during combat? In fact, if we focus on limitations (including, but not limited to, the law of war) might we not fail to break or kill something or someone that needs to be killed or broken and

thereby diminish our chances of achieving battlefield success? Why, then, should we spend much if any precious peacetime training time on the law of war?

Those questions might actually give us some pause—until we analyze their basic assumptions. There is, obviously, a lot more to conducting successful operations, even during wartime, than simply killing people and breaking things.

There are at least six reasons (compelling moral issues aside) for all professional soldiers and leaders to have a thorough understanding of the law of war.

First, as everyone should understand, we can accomplish any assigned combat mission (breaking lots of things and killing lots of people as necessary) in full compliance with the law of land warfare. The law of war is designed, after all, to protect those who cannot protect themselves (whether they can't do so because of their physical circumstance (e.g. sick, wounded, and shipwrecked) or because of their status (e.g. prisoners of war, medical personnel, and chaplains). The minimal protections afforded enemy combat, combat support, and combat service support elements should be understood, but (as discussed in more detail below) are not a major impediment to our closing with and destroying enemy forces. In other words, there is no good reason not to understand and comply with the law of war.

Second, soldier level ignorance of the basic rules of combat decreases their ability to accomplish the mission. Leaders at all levels justifiably want soldiers who are appropriately aggressive and appropriately confident on the battlefield. Ignorance of the law of war decreases the likelihood that soldiers will be either. Imagine taking a three hundred pound man off the streets of New York on a football Sunday, putting him into a New York Giants football uniform, and

sticking him into the offense line during an actual National Football League game. Suppose he was in good physical condition, had never played an actual game, and had only received a few lectures concerning the basic rules. How effective would he be? Would he be appropriately confident? Would he be appropriately aggressive? Would he contribute? He would probably be totally ineffective and would lack justification for any confidence he might possess. He would probably be either too aggressive (in which case he'd cause a penalty) or he'd be too hesitant (in which case the other team would sack the quarterback or break up developing plays). When we send soldiers into combat, knowing that they are going to have to use force, we should insist that they know how to use that force properly. In short, we should demand at least the same level of professional mastery of the rules of war that National Football League players have to have of their craft.

Individual soldiers' level of mastery of the rules of war should, in fact, be quite high. We run a risk of actually decreasing soldier effectiveness when we simply tell them that there are rules that they must comply with but don't ensure a detailed understanding of those rules.

Third, related to the second reason mentioned above, soldier and leader ignorance of the fundamental rules of war can, under certain circumstances, immobilize (or paralyze) soldiers, units, and even entire armies. Units in which everyone has a clear understanding of what's right and what's wrong enjoy at least two important advantages over untrained units. First, trained units have a built-in corrective capability that helps to ensure individual members don't stray. If one soldier or leader begins to go down the wrong path, there are (in an empowered/informed unit) plenty of others capable of getting them back in line before any harm

is done. Second, well trained/informed units are better able (because of their training) to get to the bottom of apparent improprieties quickly and effectively. In untrained units, individual members aren't sure what's right or wrong. Any conduct close to the line is likely, in those units, to be treated with suspicion and, due to the prevailing level of basic ignorance within the unit, will typically require an expenditure of considerable unit resources and, probably, the help of outside agencies. Leaving soldiers and leaders in the dark results in soldiers, units, even armies susceptible of being paralyzed or immobilized for varying lengths of time—even if the apparent impropriety turns out to be unfounded.

Fourth, violations of the law of war decrease public support. As demonstrated during the Vietnam War, the United States cannot succeed on the battlefield without domestic support. We must also very often (as in Desert Storm) have allied support. If our forces kill innocent persons (those who cannot protect themselves) or destroy protected places without justification, the operation will quickly lose valuable support at home and abroad.

Fifth, those who violate the rules can be prosecuted criminally. This is a fact, not a positive motivator. Violations of the law of war are prosecutable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, title 18 to the United States Code, or both. In addition, any other nation can prosecute alleged war crimes using their internationally recognized power to exercise universal jurisdiction over violations of the law of war.

Finally, violations of the law of war are likely to give enemy forces greater resolve. Enemy psychological operations (PSYOPS) experts will try to turn any overreaching we do to their advantage. If we clearly violate the law of war we've made their PSYOPS job easier and have given the enemy a ready-made

rally cry. The last thing we want to do is give the enemy an incentive to fight harder by violating the law of war.

IV. WHAT DOES EVERY SOLDIER AND LEADER NEED TO KNOW ABOUT USING FORCE ON THE BATTLEFIELD?

A. GENERAL

Before deployed soldiers and leaders can apply the law of war they should understand where the rules come from and must know what the rules mean.

B. WHERE DO THE RULES COME FROM?

1. General: DoD Directive 5100.77. Department of Defense Directive 5100.77, DoD Law of War Program dated 10 July 1979, states that: "[t]he Armed Forces of the United States shall comply with the law of war in the conduct of military operations and related activities in armed conflict, however such conflicts are characterized." In other words, it is our general policy to hold United States soldiers to the standards set forth in the international law of armed conflict even when we don't consider the conflict to be international (and could technically excuse ourselves from the application of the international rules on that basis). Whenever United States forces are deployed overseas, then, our troops must generally comply with the law of international armed conflict. This is true even during operations in which we didn't anticipate using force when we first deployed.

2. Operation Just Cause: A Narrow Exception. Operation Just Cause provides an example of a flexible application of DoD Directive 5100.77's guidance. The United States did not classify Operation

Just Cause as an international armed conflict. Instead, we decided that since we still had some ownership interest in Panama, since the legitimate (Endara) government invited us in to help capture General Manuel Noriega; and since Noriega was wanted for (in fact had been indicted on) drug and racketeering charges, we could treat him like a common criminal. As a result of that legal position, the United States chose not to afford General Noriega the same international legal protections normally given to prisoners of war. Instead, he was handed over to federal law enforcement authorities for criminal prosecution. He was ultimately found guilty of both drug and racketeering offenses and sentenced to forty years in jail. Noriega's treatment is an exception to our general policy of adhering to the international legal standards regardless of the way we characterize an operation. One federal judge, in fact, eventually ruled that Noriega deserved prisoner of war status. See *United States v. Noriega*, 808 F.Supp. 791 (S.D. Fla. 1992).

3. What Soldiers and Leaders Should Understand. Soldiers and leaders should know that the rules they follow derive from the international legal standards. In other words, operational procedures and doctrine employed by U.S. military forces must generally comply with the requirements of the law of war. Exceptions to the general rule are going to be rare and may not (as in the case of General Noriega's status) withstand close scrutiny. The bottom line for soldiers and leaders is that they can safely rely upon the international law of war for guidance on how to use force in *any* deployed setting. Soldiers deployed in support of Operation Just Cause, in fact, were briefed on the international (i.e. law of war) rules concerning use of force because those international standards still (courtesy of DoD Directive 5100.77—and

notwithstanding our position on Noriega) fully applied to them.

C. WHAT DO THE RULES MEAN TO SOLDIERS?

1. General. Soldiers and leaders need to know how to integrate the international legal standards into their operations. Specifically, they must comply with three general limitations any time force is used; must understand the difference between offense and defensive uses of force; and must know when and how to engage enemy hostile forces as well as how and when to engage otherwise protected persons when their conduct justifies using force against them.

2. Limitations. First, all soldiers must understand the three general limitations applicable to using force on the battlefield: military necessity, unnecessary suffering, and proportionality.

a. Military Necessity.

(1) General. Military necessity allows combat forces to use "measures not forbidden by international law which are indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible." See para. 3, FM 27-10.

(2) Meaning. The military necessity rule simply means that soldiers can do anything not otherwise forbidden by international law (see the discussion on unnecessary suffering and proportionality below) so long as what they are doing is a necessary part of bringing the enemy to his knees.

(3) How Soldiers and Leaders Can Ensure Compliance. Some fundamental practices followed by United States Armed Forces help ensure that we stay within the boundaries of military necessity. The second paragraph of every field order, operations order, contingency plan, and operations plan from squad through Joint Chiefs of Staff level, for example, is "mission." United States forces are unlikely to run afoul of the military necessity

requirement so long as each echelon is conducting disciplined operations in accordance with mission-related guidance passed from one echelon to the other. Also, plans at Division and higher are reviewed by a Judge Advocate General's Corps officer to ensure compliance with the law of war. Disciplined adherence to the mission coupled with thorough and accurate legal reviews should ensure that our forces are operating well within the boundaries of the military necessity rule.

b. Unnecessary Suffering.

(1) General. The unnecessary suffering rule comes from the Hague Convention of 1907. The Hague Convention states, in part, that "it is especially forbidden . . . to employ arms, projectiles or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering." Art. 23, Hague Convention.

(2) Meaning. The unnecessary suffering rule tells us that there are weapons and munitions that we cannot use on the battlefield. Field Manual 27-10 explains that barbed spears, irregular-shaped bullets, and glass projectiles are illegal and may not be lawfully employed. Nuclear weapons, on the other hand, are not forbidden. The rule also means that it is illegal to take otherwise permissible weapons and munitions and use them in a manner calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.

How is it that we can use nuclear weapons but cannot legally give our soldiers barbed spears? Simply because the "banned" list is comprised of weapons and munitions that nations have been able to agree upon. Few countries see a problem with banning barbed spears while nuclear powers like the deterrent effect of their nuclear arsenals and have been unwilling to ban them altogether.

(3) How Soldiers and Leaders Can Ensure Compliance. Fortunately, the unnecessary suffering rule doesn't require commanders, leaders, or soldiers to memorize laundry lists of illegal and permis-

sible weapons and munitions. All U.S. weapons and weapons systems (including munitions) must be reviewed by The Judge Advocate General (TJAG) of the affected service. See DoD Instruction 5000.2, DoD Instruction 5500.15, Army Regulation 27-53, and SECNAVINST 5711.8A. Weapons may be excluded for use on the battlefield through the TJAG review if they are illegal per se, if the proposed or intended use of the weapon or munition would be illegal, or if our country has agreed in a treaty not to use such weapons or munitions. Each item in unit arms rooms and ammunition supply points (ASP's) must have passed the legal review and is presumptively authorized for use. Ensuring compliance with the unnecessary suffering rule, then, is quite simple. All soldiers have to do is take their weapons and munitions from their unit arms rooms and ASP's. Another key to compliance, of course, is discipline. It is illegal to modify otherwise legal weapons and munitions if the modification yields a weapon or munition capable of causing unnecessary suffering. It is probably wise to tell soldiers not to modify their weapons without approval and to have any proposed modifications (including, when possible, field expedient weapons) reviewed by unit legal advisors.

c. Proportionality.

(1) General. The loss of life and damage to property caused by military operations "must not be out of proportion to the military advantage to be gained." See para. 41, FM 27-10.

(2) Meaning. Proportionality is a fairly broad, ill-defined standard. It basically means that we cannot go too far in using force. Misconceptions like "we cannot use .50 caliber machineguns on troops in the open" have spread because of the rule's breadth. It's fairly safe to say that if we use a nuclear weapon against a sniper in a built up area we have violated the proportionality stan-

dard. Beyond that, it's difficult to say when the rule has been violated. The rule's breadth, in fact, will make it difficult to enforce at a criminal trial. The common law rule has long been that when persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at a criminal law's meaning and differ as to its application, the law is void for vagueness and cannot be enforced. See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). The proportionality rule is probably so vague that it is unusable as a criminal standard. Still, commanders and leaders must understand that the same characteristic (great breadth) that makes the rule difficult to enforce also gives opponents, enemy PSYOPS units, and other detractors room to argue that we have violated proportionality whenever we get close to using excessive force on the battlefield.

(3) How We Ensure Compliance. Soldiers and leaders at all levels should carefully consider how much force to use in any given situation. Having a solid rationale for the amount of force used is important but, as discussed above, will not prevent the enemy and others from arguing that we went too far. Reasonable caution, basic discipline, and the sheer force of logistics should combine to ensure that we stay well within the requirements of the proportionality standard—even if we won't always convince the enemy and other detractors that we were right.

3. How to Use Force.

a. General. Simply understanding the three limitations described above is not enough to ensure successful application of the law of war on the battlefield. Soldiers and leaders at all levels must also understand how they can (not just how they can't) use force in order to succeed. There are two overlapping "how to use force" rules. Soldiers must, therefore, understand both rules before they will be able to use force appropriately. They

must also understand the difference between offensive and defensive uses of force.

b. The First Rule: "Hostile Forces" and their associated Property May be Destroyed (Consistent with Military Necessity, Unnecessary Suffering, and Proportionality) Regardless of Conduct or Usage (see Figure 1). The first rule for applying force on the battlefield is that neither civilian targets [including civilian persons, buildings, vehicles, etc.] nor protected parts of the enemy armed forces [including, again, persons and property associated with protected military persons] may be engaged. Stated another way, only the non-protected parts of enemy armed forces may be engaged. The rule tells us that all civilians and some enemy military forces are presumptively protected under the law of war. The following individuals, though wearing the enemy uniform, are protected: medical personnel, clergy, prisoners of war, sick and wounded, shipwrecked seamen, and crewmembers of disabled aircraft (during descent only). Those not protected under this rule may be offensively targeted and engaged wherever they are and whatever they are doing—unless of course, what they are doing (surrendering) places them in a protected category.

c. The Second Rule: Persons and Places Protected Under The First Rule Engageable Only To The Extent Their Conduct (Persons) or Usage (Property) Justifies Using Force Against Them (Figure 2).

(1) General. The second rule reminds us that the battlefield is dynamic. Persons and places protected under the first rule may, through either misconduct (for persons) or improper usage (for property), lose their protected status.

(2) Persons. What must protected persons do to lose their protection? Civilian persons lose their

protection when they commit a hostile act (i.e. typically when they either attack or threaten imminent attack) against specified targets. Protected enemy military persons lose their protection and become targetable in the same way (i.e., when they commit a hostile act). In addition, prisoners of war may be engaged with deadly force as a last resort during escape and regain their combatant status completely when they flee beyond the control of captors and rejoin their own or allied forces.

(3) Property. Two different rules apply to protected property. First, all protected property (except hospitals) loses its protected status if it is used for any military purpose. A ball-bearing factory, for example, may be targeted and destroyed on this basis simply because the ball-bearings it produces are usable in military planes and vehicles. The military purpose rule is a low standard, but the object of the attack is mere property. Hospitals have to have a different rule. After all, patching up enemy sick and wounded is probably a military purpose and applying the military purpose rule to hospitals would render them unprotected. Instead, the rule for hospitals is that they lose their protection only when they are used for "acts harmful to enemy forces." This elevated standard means that hospitals can be targeted only if they are used for such things as observation posts, command and control headquarters, or weapons emplacements. Even when misused, the law of war tells us that we must issue a warning tantamount to an ultimatum prior to engaging a hospital. Naturally, if we are receiving direct fire from a hospital the warning need not be issued. In other words, the people rule trumps the property rule.

(4) Defensive Engagements. Persons and places that lose their protection through improper conduct or usage become defensively

engageable. Unlike offensive engagements, reactions to improper conduct or usage must be limited to stopping the improper act (the hostile act or attack) or destroying the improperly used property. Once an unanticipated attack is repulsed or improperly used property is destroyed, then, the authority to use force ends.

D. Recapping What Soldiers and Leaders Need to Know: The Football Field Analogy

1. General. The basic rules associated with using force on the modern battlefield may be roughly analogized to the game of American football.

2. The Field of Play. Just as in football, we can hit the other side and hit them hard when they are on the "field of play." See Figure 1. During battle, we can offensively engage the combat, combat support, and combat service support elements of the enemy's armed forces (including all but protected members of enemy hostile forces) limited only by military necessity, unnecessary suffering, and proportionality (plus any other limitations field commanders decide to impose on their forces [through Rules of Engagement] not required by the law of war).

3. Protected Entities. All civilians and civilian property and certain military persons and property are presumptively protected (i.e. off the field of play). See Figure 1. Thus, enemy medical personnel, clergy, prisoners of war, sick and wounded, shipwrecked seamen, and crewmembers of disabled aircraft (during descent only) are protected. Property, including vehicles, buildings, vessels, and aircraft associated with those protected persons are also protected.

4. Engaging Protected Persons and Property. Otherwise protected persons and property move

RULE ONE: NON-PROTECTED PART OF "HOSTILE FORCES" AND THEIR ASSOCIATED PROPERTY MAY BE DESTROYED REGARDLESS OF CONDUCT OR USAGE. ALL OTHERS ARE PRESUMPTIVELY PROTECTED

**PROTECTED ENTITIES
(OFF THE "FIELD OF PLAY")**

I. MILITARY

- A. PERSONS+
- B. PROPERTY+

II. CIVILIAN

- A. PERSONS++
- B. PROPERTY++
 - 1. HOSPITALS
 - 2. OTHER

+THE FOLLOWING MILITARY PERSONNEL ARE PRESUMPTIVELY PROTECTED UNDER THE LAW OF WAR: MEDICAL PERSONNEL, CLERGY, POWS, SICK AND WOUNDED, SHIPWRECKED SEAMEN, AND CREW MEMBERS OF DISABLED AIRCRAFT (DURING DESCENT ONLY). PROPERTY ASSOCIATED WITH PROTECTED PERSONS IS PROTECTED ALSO.

++ALL CIVILIANS AND THEIR PROPERTY ARE PRESUMPTIVELY PROTECTED UNDER THE LAW OF WAR.

THE "FIELD OF PLAY"

OFFENSIVE:* NON-PROTECTED PARTS OF "HOSTILE FORCES"

DEFENSIVE:

LIMITATIONS:

*MILITARY NECESSITY, UNNECESSARY SUFFERING, AND PROPORTIONALITY (PLUS OTHERS FROM ROE).

Figure 1.

on to the field of play and become defensively engageable when they engage in improper conduct (persons) or are improperly used (property). See Figure 2.

**E. Doctrinal Resolution:
A Prerequisite to
Meaningful Training**

1. General. The specific approach to law of war training, suggested above, needs to be doctrinalized and incorporated into future law of war training. Another issue ripe for doctrinal resolution is: who has the authority to declare

forces hostile? Other key decisions (what targets should be protected from hostile acts for example) are probably best left to planners and leaders involved in specific future operations.

2. Hostile Forces. One key issue in need of doctrinal resolution is: Who designates "hostile forces"? Elements declared "hostile forces" should be limited to uniformed (or otherwise identifiable) enemy military or paramilitary forces with known hostile intent. The definition should include the armed forces of any enemy but may also include

police or other paramilitary forces located within enemy territory. The definition might (but need not) also include such identifiable civilian groups as the Dignity Battalions encountered in Panama (which were not declared freely engageable) and the "technicals" found in Somalia (certain categories of whom were declared hostile). Apparently, as demonstrated in the Calley case, the decision to declare persons and their associated property hostile (and therefore freely engageable regardless of their conduct) is not appropriately left

RULE TWO: PERSONS AND PLACES PROTECTED UNDER THE FIRST RULE BECOME ENGAGEABLE ONLY TO THE EXTENT THEIR CONDUCT (PERSONS) OR USAGE (PROPERTY) JUSTIFIES USING FORCE AGAINST THEM




Figure 2.

to platoon leaders or company commanders—or even to their Battalion, Brigade, or Division Commanders. Who, then, has or should have that authority? Perhaps a doctrinal resolution is in order. Maybe theater commanders should specifically reserve the right to declare forces hostile during a given operation. That's the way we resolved this potential problem during the Gulf War. Future theater commanders, though, might need an unclassified doctrinal reminder to ensure they re-

solve this issue before they find tactical commanders making decisions of their own.

3. Consequence of Declaring Forces "Hostile". Once a proper authority resolves the issue of which forces are hostile, remaining problematic issues narrow. Knowing who is hostile tells us whose forces occupy the offensive end of the field of play in Figure 1. We already know, courtesy of that critical decision and the law of war, which elements of that hostile force are presumptively pro-

tected (medical personnel, clergy, etc.). See Figure 1. We also know that all civilians are presumptively protected no matter which force is declared hostile.

4. Rules Permitting Engagement. The remaining issues (represented in the middle "Rules Permitting Engagement" column in Figure 2) are probably best resolved by planners in the context of a specific military mission—and do not require the heavy overprint of doctrine. Someone needs to decide what constitutes a hostile act

(typically defined as an actual attack or one that is minutes or seconds away); which targets are protectable with force (typically U.S. and allied military forces, but sometimes including commercial assets or even civilians); how the “acts harmful with warning” and “military purpose” rules should be applied in the context of a given operation; etc. Those decisions, however, tend to be mission specific and are probably best left for resolution by planners and leaders in the context of specific operations.

V. HOW SHOULD SOLDIERS BE TRAINED ON THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE USE OF FORCE RULES?

A. GENERAL

Now that we’ve decided that we should teach the law of war use of force rules to soldiers and leaders and know what we should teach them, let’s turn our attention to the final critical question: How should we train them?

B. THE PAST: HOW NOT TO TRAIN

1. General. The examples from Vietnam, Panama, and Desert Shield/Storm cited above tell us more about how we should not train than about how we should.

2. Vietnam: Courts Martial are a Poor Substitute for Training. 2LT Calley and his soldiers were obviously not prepared to properly deal with the unexpected protected persons they encountered at My Lai 4. They could have been and should have been; they just weren’t. They took their Company Commander’s intelligence assessment as the gospel and, void of adequate training, didn’t have the mental agility to arrive at the right answer on their

own. Colonel (Ret) Raby was correct when he said we owe it to our soldiers to train them before subjecting them to prosecution. Perhaps the most important lesson to take away from Calley’s trial is that courts martial are poor substitutes for training and not places where any lessons are truly learned—even in individual cases like Calley’s. In retrospect, given the inadequacy of his training, it is not surprising that Calley was granted parole after serving a few months in confinement and a little over three years under house arrest.

3. Panama: Courts Martial Haven’t Become Better Training Vehicles and Last Minute Briefings with no Doctrinal Underpinning are of Little Value.

a. Value of a Prosecution. Before I left the 82d Airborne Division Staff Judge Advocate’s Office for the Corps Operational Law job, I was tasked to consult with the Article 32b Investigating Officer and to review his investigation in the pending case against 1SG Bryan. The 32b Investigating Officer was unsure whether sufficient evidence of criminality existed to prove the case at trial. He felt that, while sufficient evidence existed to send the case to trial, given the minimal evidentiary requirement to send the case forward, there was little hope of proving the case. I could not disagree. In fact, my honest assessment, after reading the file and discussing it with the investigating officer, was that 1SG Bryan and one of the officers in his unit had a misunderstanding about what the rules for using force were. I concluded that had Bryan and the officer who became his chief accuser been adequately trained (i.e. if both had been “fluent” in the meaning and application of Figure 2 as it applied to their mission) they would have been in a much better position to successfully resolve the unexpected episode they encountered on their own. I further concluded that it

would have been better for all concerned to resolve that particular case without requiring a court to tell us what seemed very likely anyway—that 1SG Bryan was not criminally responsible. With adequate training, the officer accuser involved in the case would, as a minimum, have known what specific lines of inquiry to pursue—without delay. The result, based on my review of the case, would have been either no court martial at all (the most likely outcome) or a court martial that would have convicted the 1SG. As in Calley’s case, no real lessons learned can be gleaned from Bryan’s trial—except, once again, that courts martial are not adequate substitutes for training.

b. Value of Last Minute Briefings. The briefings we gave on the eve of the Panama invasion were too little, too late. Having lawyers brief soldiers days away from deploying into combat might have been better than what Calley and his men got, but is still not an adequate substitute for meaningful law of war training. The door is definitely closed to meaningful training once the deployment sequence begins. In fact, there is a sound argument that last minute briefings are worse than none at all. There is a risk, after all (human communications being what they are), that soldiers will come away from such briefings lacking a grasp of how to comply with relevant rules—understanding only that there are rules and that they can go to jail if they violate them. The result just might be a confused, demoralized soldier—the opposite of what everyone wants.

4. Desert Shield/Storm. Little changed about our basic approach to law of war training between Panama and Desert Shield/Storm except that we had more time to get the training done and had a captive and motivated audience for five months before hostilities began.

5. Rules of Engagement Cards. Rules of Engagement Cards, though

routinely used in military operations for at least the last thirty years, are also a poor substitute for actual training. They are an indication to outsiders that some training has occurred; but actually communicate very little by themselves to soldiers.

C. THE PRESENT: NO SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE

A recent survey of law of war training currently conducted in the training base, during pre-commissioning, at service schools, in operational units, and at JRTC reveals that little substantive change has occurred from the way we've conducted law of war training in the past. There is plenty of law of war training going on and the JAG Corps has created a Center for Law and Military Operations. Still, neither the substance nor the focus of current training is as specific or soldier-oriented as suggested in Section IV above. Pre-commissioning and training base law of war training is provided through lectures. Units continue to focus on what they must: the basics of shooting, moving, and communicating. Some solid lane training and situational training exercises designed to prepare soldiers for specific missions (in preparation for real world deployments to Bosnia and training missions at JRTC in particular) are ongoing. The rules concerning use of force are still largely, however, considered lawyer's business and no specific, comprehensive doctrinal approach to use of force issues (like the one suggested in this article) has been developed.

D. THE FUTURE: HOW TO TRAIN

1. General. The answer for future effective law of war training is simple: we've got to power the training down in order to ensure that soldiers and leaders are trained in enough detail to enable them to understand and apply the law of

war's use of force rules effectively. One way to do that, this article suggests, is to teach the specific information contained in Section IV above in the training base; through more focused individual and collective training (battle drills) in the unit; and through a more empowerment oriented approach at the Joint Readiness Training Center and National Training Center. Effective training will require coordinated contributions from everyone involved in operational planning and execution (not just commanders and leaders) including: unit S-2's and G-2's (intelligence officers and enlisted); unit S-3's and G-3's (plans, training, and operations officers and enlisted); and army lawyers.

2. The Training Base. Officers should be introduced to the concepts contained in section IV above during their pre-commissioning (OCS, ROTC or West Point) training. Enlisted members should be taught it beginning in basic training. It should also be integrated into the curriculum of all officer and NCO basic and advanced courses. It should also become part of CAS3 and CGSC training for officers.

3. Unit Training. Division, Brigade, Battalion, and Company commanders and subordinate leaders should reinforce the basic concepts in unit training plans. Individual and collective battle drills should be developed and used to reinforce the approach suggested above.

4. Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and the National Training Center (NTC). Observer/controllers at JRTC and NTC should check out the effectiveness of individual and collective unit training during unit rotations through the centers (as they are now), but with the approach suggested in Section IV as the foundation for understanding and training.

5. Intelligence Specialists. Intelligence specialists at all levels need to understand the interplay of the two basic "use of force" rules. At

an appropriate level (probably theater Army) they need to help their commander designate appropriate forces "hostile" and should know the consequences for all concerned inherent in that designation. They also need to keep the operations specialists and others involved in drafting rules of engagement informed of changes in the enemy situation that might affect that critical distinction. This approach should not be locked away in some classified procedural guide; instead unclassified procedures should be developed (using the approach suggested in Section IV above) for use in all scenarios.

6. Operations and Plans Specialists. Operations specialists will need to integrate the specifics of the law of war mentioned above into their training too. They need to stay abreast of which forces are declared hostile, which entities can be protected using force, etc. The planners should practice looking out into future operations while the operations personnel focus on the near battle using the foundation indicated above as a common point of departure/understanding.

7. Lawyers. Army lawyers should stand ready at all levels to assist in the implementation of law of war training consistent with Section IV above. They will either draft or review rules of engagement for particular operations and plans—very often putting final determinations made by others in writing. They may also continue to be called upon to draft ROE soldier cards or to conduct ROE briefings to deploying or deployed units. The difference, if the suggestions contained in this article are implemented, is that future such briefings and cards will mean more to the recipients because everyone involved will have a specific, common base of understanding upon which to attach meaning. Army lawyers might also be ideal candidates for giving specific law

of war instruction (based on the specifics of Section IV above) to soldiers in the training base, in the unit, and at the JRTC and NTC.

VI OTHER ADVANTAGES OF THE TRAINING APPROACH SUGGESTED BY THIS ARTICLE

A. General. Use of the training methodology mentioned above is encouraged because the suggested approach tunes soldiers in to relevant rules applicable during all operational missions; will help soldiers and leaders better understand and keep in perspective other sets of use of force guidance; increases the chances of achieving mission success; provides an easily understood model for use by Reserve Component forces; and provides further legitimacy to our system of military criminal justice.

B. Applicability Across the International Legal Spectrum. The material contained in Section IV above has applicability to all military operations across the international legal spectrum. It has obvious direct application during wartime. There will likely be several forces categorized as "hostile" and, therefore, placed in the offensive end of the field of play during combat operations. The same model also, however, works as the foundation for use of force guidance during peace operations. The offensive end of the field of play is simply vacant during most peace operations. During counter and antiterror operations specific individuals might be declared hostile by an appropriate authority. The flexibility of the training scheme suggested by this article was borne out in practice during the Gulf War. We transitioned units from a peacetime use of force mindset (during Operation Desert Shield) into the

wartime mode (for Operation Desert Storm) by simply identifying relevant hostile forces and ensuring soldiers and leaders understood that these hostile forces were, as of the commencement of Desert Storm, open targets on the offensive end of the field of play.

C. Predicate to Understanding and Applying Other Training Guidance. Another advantage of the training methodology suggested above is that it helps soldiers and leaders better understand and keep in perspective other guidance they might receive through Rules of Engagement or from other sources. MAJ Mark Martins wrote a 1994 article entitled Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering. In the article he suggests adopting four rules for using force directly applicable to soldiers and units responding to unexpected attacks. The acronym he suggested for soldier use is "RAMP" (which stands for Return fire, Anticipate attack, Measure your force, Protect only lives with deadly force). Several Army units have successfully adopted and applied the RAMP methodology at JRTC and elsewhere since the article was published. RAMP is merely one way (and represents a good starting point for doing so) for commanders and leaders to fill in the middle column of Figure 2 with guidance. Similarly, Chapter 3, Army Regulation (AR) 190-14 provides specific guidance applicable on the subject of use of force by Military Police. A clear understanding of Figure 2 above will help Military Police and others to better incorporate guidance such as RAMP and AR 190-14 into their operations.

D. Increases the Chances of Achieving Mission Success. Informed, well-trained soldiers have an obvious corresponding better chance of achieving mission success in any operational setting when they are fully trained.

Proper training will empower them to be appropriately confident and appropriately aggressive in all operational settings.

E. Application to Reserve Component Forces. We can expect all future conflicts and other operational deployments to be "come as you are" for reserve component as well as active forces. If anything, it is more important, relative to the needs of the active force, for our reserve component brothers and sisters have the benefit of a simple, comprehensive training construct such as the one described in Section IV above.

F. Enhances the Legitimacy of the Military Criminal Justice System and the Role of the Military Operational Lawyer.

1. The System as a Whole. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the simple yet comprehensive training methodology suggested above will bring enhanced legitimacy to our system of justice—already the best system of military justice in the world. Our entire system is vindicated and operates smoothly when the cases we bring to trial are a success. No one benefits when (as, it seems, happened in Calley's case) we convict a soldier at trial and he serves very little of his sentence (a little over three years for twenty two murders in Calley's case) because, in part, the white hot heat of public, command, and judicial attention (to be expected under our system of justice any time we seek to prosecute a person for using excessive force and, thereby, seek to label him or her a criminal) indicates deficiencies in our training. Had Calley been properly trained, there would have been much less likelihood of a massacre and had there been one a much higher likelihood that any adjudicated sentence would have been served in full. Better training in 1SG Bryan's case would, in my view, have meant either no court martial or a court martial conviction. As it was, we had a mess "resolved" to no

one's satisfaction through trial. A more recent conviction reversed (after training deficiencies were suggested) was that of SPC James Mowris (the MP convicted for shooting a fleeing Somali in 1993).

2. Legitimizing the Role of Operational Lawyers. As soldiers, leaders, and units become more fully trained on the specifics of the law of war they should see greater roles for their unit legal advisors. As unit legal advisors transition from purely prosecutorial duties (a most unempowering orientation) they will find themselves in position to make significant contributions to their supported commands.

VII CONCLUSION

Just because we have the best military judicial system in the world doesn't mean we should rely upon it to resolve matters that can be handled better elsewhere. Few golfers would expect to improve their golf game by replacing their putter with a baseball bat—regardless of the quality of the bat. A chainsaw would cut a birthday cake, but wouldn't be the ideal tool for the job. Similarly, the potential of our judicial system is not maximized (and the entire Army suffers) when we rely on lawyering and our courts to take the place of adequate training.

Knowledge tends to be power in any organization. We need to empower our soldiers and units with knowledge so they can succeed with honor during future operational deployments. If we provide our soldiers and leaders with specific law of war use of force training (as suggested in this article) the result should be more confident soldiers; a corresponding better chance of achieving mission success; less likelihood of a court martial; and little chance that deficient training will be usable to escape or mitigate responsibility when we do go to trial. Stephen R. Covey, author

of "Seven Habits of Highly Effective People" would call this a "win-win" solution. If implemented, I believe that the suggestions contained in this article will help make our system of military justice (already the best in the world) even better.

We owe it to our soldiers to prepare them to properly use force during operational missions. Training is important because it helps us retain the moral high ground during military operations; ensures appropriate soldier-level confidence and aggressiveness on the battlefield; prevents units from becoming immobilized by problems they aren't trained to deal with; ensures that we maintain domestic and international support for our operations; keeps soldiers from having to learn through courts-martial; and keeps the enemy from using our misdeeds to fuel their soldier's desire to fight against us.

The substance of what all soldiers and leaders need to know is not complicated. As depicted by Figures 1 through 2, soldiers must know that only the non-protected elements of "hostile forces" are engageable, regardless of enemy conduct (unless surrendering), consistent with the requirements of military necessity, unnecessary suffering, and proportionality; that protected military persons and all civilians are presumptively not engageable under the law of war; and that protected persons and property may, through improper conduct or usage, become defensively engageable.

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Military Police

A Full Spectrum Force

Duty Respect Selfless-Service

Loyalty

Honor



Integrity

Courage

Trained and Ready

MILITARY POLICE DEPLOYMENTS

Military police units, both active and reserve, remain deployed throughout the world. We continue to represent Force Projection at its finest. (Current as of January 1999)

OPERATION / UNIT

DEPLOYED LOCATION

USAREUR:

JOINT FORCE:

560th MP Escort Gd Co(-), Mannheim, GE	Tuzla/Taszar
501st Div Co PM Cell, Bad Kreuznach, GE	Tuzla/Taszar
272d MP Co, Mannheim, GE	Tuzla/Taszar
554th MP Co(-), Stuttgart, GE	Tuzla/Taszar
527th MP, Wiesbaden, GE	Tuzla/Taszar
NSE PM (OPM)	Mannheim, GE

FORSCOM:

JOINT FORGE:

59th MP Co, Fort Carson, CO	Tuzla/Taszar
410th MP Co, Fort Hood, TX	Tuzla/Taszar
178th MP Det Dog Team, Fort Hood, TX	Tuzla/Taszar
523d MP Det Dog Team, Fort Riley, KS	Tuzla/Taszar
148th MP Det Team, Fort Carson, CO	Tuzla/Taszar
42d MP Det Dog Team, Fort Bragg, TX	Tuzla/Taszar
163d MP Det Dog Team, Fort Campbell, KY	Tuzla/Taszar
NTC MP Co Dog Team, Fort Irwin, CA	Tuzla/Taszar
COMNAVBASE (USN) Dog Team	Tuzla/Taszar

SOUTHERN WATCH:

978th MP Co(-), Fort Bliss, TX	Kuwait
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PANAMA/HONDURAS:

66th MP Co, Fort Lewis WA	Panama/Honduras
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USSPTGP

PM Cell	Haiti
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USACIDC:

JOINT FORGE:

43d MP Det (CID), Fort Hood, TX	Tuzla/Taszar
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USARPAC:

COUNTERDRUG/SECURITY OPS:

Elements of USALEC and 25th MP Bn	Pacific
Fort Shafter and Schofield Barracks, HI	

ARNG:

2 Plts (rotations)	Panama and Italy
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POLISH /AMERICAN JUMP 7 May 1998

SFC Sherry L. Claus



Eagle Base, TUZLA, Bosnia-Herzegovina..."Six minute time warning." "Get ready." "Portside personnel stand up." "Starboard personnel stand up." "Hook up." "Check static lines." "Check equipment." "Sound off for equipment check." "One minute." "Stand by." "Go!"

Sounds like a typical pre-jump drill called out by the primary jumpmaster, First Sergeant Vincent T. Crosby, of Fayetteville, North Carolina. However, there was little that was typical about this particular airborne operation – fact, the jump at Tuzla Air Base on 7 May was actually history in the making. Fifteen Polish Airborne troops from the 16th Battalion, 6th Parachute Assault Brigade met with 28 American soldiers from the 21st Military Police Company (ABN) for a combined parachute jump where they not only exchanged training tech-



Lieutenant General Sir Hew Pike practices a Parachute Landing Fall (PLF) during sustained airborne training.

niques, but also their respective country's jump wings. What made this jump so unique is that this event was not only the first time that

the U.S. Military Police have jumped with Polish soldiers, but also, the first time Polish soldiers have jumped with a conventional U.S. airborne unit since World War II. Add to that the fact that this all took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina; the participants have an incredible war story to tell their grandchildren. Following ground training, the Poles, Americans, one Norwegian and two British soldiers – one of which was Lieutenant General Sir Hugh Pike, Stabilization Force Deputy commander – lined up for the first of two flights in a CH-47D Chinook.

As the paratroopers jumped, landed (some not exactly where they'd hoped), repacked their chutes and ran back to the loading site, smiles split their sweat drenched faces. The joy they all felt was apparent in many languages!

Sergeant First Class Tomas Swierad, of the Polish 16th Bn, 6th Parachute Assault Brigade currently stationed at the NORDPOL Brigade, expressed his pleasure with this event in uncertain terms.

"This jump was just excellent! What a great opportunity to jump with the U.S. soldiers-we(Poland) will probably join NATO next year and this has given us a chance to



First Sergeant Vincent Crosby, 21st Military Police Company(Airborne) from Ft. Bragg, NC, reviews the jump commands that he will give inside the CH-47 Chinook Helicopter as primary jumpmaster during the combined airborne operation that was held over Tuzla Air Base.



SGT Marshall Ware, 21st Military Police Company (Airborne) out of Fort Bragg NC, assists a Polish paratrooper in donning his parachute.



First Sergeant Crosby, 21st Military Police Company, Fort Bragg NC, lands hard on the Tuzla Air Base taxi.

get to know American troops and their ways of training," said the Krakow, Poland native.

He said the main difference he noted in the parachute guidelines between the two countries is that Americans stress emergency procedures a bit more than Poland, but as Swierad explained, "That's as it should be. You can never be too careful with this work."

Both Polish and American soldiers alike were very excited about exchanging jump wings, too. One MP was perhaps even a little more excited than others-and with good reason.

Staff Sergeant James Osburn, with the 21st MP Co(ABN) from Fort Bragg, N.C. stationed at Eagle Base, made the final jump required for his Master Jump Wings on this very day. He would be receiving them along with the Polish wings during the ceremony. "This was great! It took some time and planning but the jump was approved and now we're finally here," said the Barboursville, West Virginia native, but how many people can say they made a jump inside Bosnia-Herzegovina?"

As the two countries lined for the exchange ceremony, there was a scurry of activity on the runway

as a surprise visitor came forward to place the wings on the chest of the Polish Airborne Battalion Commander and the 21st MP Company Commander.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry Shelton stopped by enroute to a meeting to greet the group of paratroopers, along with General Eric K. Shinseki, Major General Larry R. Ellis and Brigadier General Anthony R. Jones.

General Shelton wished the soldiers well and congratulated them on their joint success of the day, as did MG Ellis.



Lieutenant General Sir Hew Pike exits the CH-47 Chinook Helicopter.

As the rest of the soldiers received their wings, the pride was evident on their faces and, afterward, by the vigorous hand shaking and backslapping as the two groups joined once again – this time for farewell.

Both teams gained much from the experience. The Americans and Poles added a new set of jump wings to their uniform, an honorary certificate to their personnel files and a deeper understanding of each other's culture.

The Polish soldiers also took away something else from the day – they added a new word to their vocabulary that sounds the same in both languages – “Hooah!”

SFC Sherry L. Claus was with the 196th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, at the time this article was written.


(Photographs throughout this article were taken by SGT William Lee, 55th Signal Company (COMCAM) Fort Meade, MD.



All the participating paratroopers gathered for this photo.

PATROLLING

IN PANAMA



*Sergeant First Class Lek Mateo,
100th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment,
Texas Army National Guard*

FORT CLAYTON, Panama—Every morning Victor Prescott arrives at his workplace in the basement of Building No. 213 to begin another day of polishing soldiers' boots and washing their cars. One day recently, Prescott arrived to discover he was another victim of crime at Fort Clayton, Panama.

Even a steel-grate-covered window could not keep the determined thieves from their quarry. They merely cut their way through with a pair of wirecutters.

Where nine pairs of boots once stood, which Victor Prescott and his partner had meticulously spitshined for their U.S. military cus-

tomers the day before, there was only an empty rack.

To Staff Sgt. Raleigh H. Sullivan, a St. Petersburg, Fla., native assigned to U.S. Army South's 94th Signal Battalion and a long time customer of Prescott's, the break in meant just the loss of a couple pair of Army boots.



U.S. Army Pfc. William S. Blake (right) takes a statement from Victor Prescott, victim of a theft. They discuss the filing of a police report with the military law enforcement officials on Fort Clayton, Panama.

"I am not going to cry over it" Raleigh said. "You have to be more alert and security conscious. Crime affects us all. Even Victor is not immune to it."

Lt. Col. Don Carter, the United States Army South provost marshal acknowledges that crime is prevalent on post. Recent statistics from the military law enforcement office indicated a dramatic drop in the crime rate on post from during fiscal year 1998 to its lowest point in the first half of the year, which Carter said was the best record ever U.S. Army-South.

However, Carter said the crime rate has increased about 40 percent since then, which includes larceny of government and private property; burglary; and housekeeping; and auto theft in U.S. military areas on the Pacific Ocean side of Panama.

Carter attributes 50 percent of the thefts which occur on post to carelessness and property owners who fail to take security consciousness seriously.

Carter predicted that on-post crimes would increase if the U.S. military draw down continues, along with the quickly approaching scheduled base closures in accordance with the Panama Canal Treaty.

Every U.S. military post in Panama has experienced an increase in crime, Carter noted, not just at Fort Clayton.

"Thieves have a perfect window of opportunity to commit crimes in the mist of the transaction" he added.

Carter has made crime deterrence his main priority by identifying high crime areas and directing

the military police and assets necessary to counter the thieves' activities Carter started by identifying areas that were poorly lit and highly powered security lights placed there.

New tactics and procedures are also being implemented by Carter's law enforcement office.

"We are conducting foot patrols in the housing areas where a high incident of theft has occurred and we're also enforcing a 100-percent identification check at the gate after normal hours, to include vehicle searches," he said.

The military police are also being more aggressive promoting crime prevention awareness. The message is getting through, Carter noted.

His military police officers are also placing "Gotcha" cards on



Army Reserve Cpl. Sherry L. Meyers (right), Spc. Randall E. Davis (middle) and an unidentified U.S. Army-South military police officer, attentively listen to as a U.S. Army desk sergeant briefing them during "guard mount" prior to the Army Reserve military police officers starting their night foot patrols.

peoples' personal or U.S. government property unsecured. Carter warned that people should take the Gotcha card warning seriously, because repeat offenders will be turned over to their chain of command for disciplinary action.

"A lot of times people are just careless," Carter said. "This is just a way of letting them know."

Carter called the added security assistance provided by deploying National Guard and Reserve military police units "invaluable" with citizens-soldiers robustly filling in the ranks of U.S. Army-South's two military police companies, the 549th and the 534th.

"Statistically, crimes on post decrease when National Guard and Reserve soldiers are here, Carter

said, adding the Reserve Components bring a wealth of law enforcement experience with them. "A lot of these guys are seasoned police officers and corrections officer. Some of the best work I have seen from MPs is from the National Guard and Reserve."

People like U.S. Army Reserve Staff Sgt. David N. Maurer who is assigned to the Army Reserve's 363rd Military Police Company, has been in Panama for more than two weeks. During his time on the isthmus, he performed a wide variety of law enforcement duties.

"In the past when we deployed (to Panama), we were normally assigned gate duty because a lot of us have the training to perform complex tasks such as administering


field sobriety tests." Maurer said. "Now the active duty components treat us as an equal partner, and have given us more responsibilities and are allowing us to expand our role."

On one patrol, two of Maurer's partners worked the "graveyard shift" conducting foot patrols in one of the areas on post that has experienced a high incident of reporting thefts, Fort Clayton's 1100 housing area.

With him on night patrol were Cpl. Sherry L. Meyers who works with at-risks youths in civilian life and Spc. Randall E. Davis who recently came off active duty.

Meyers said she believed their night patrols are making a difference.

"Civilians appreciate the personal contact when we are on foot patrol" she said.



Army Reserve Staff Sgt. David N. Maurer inspects a damaged fence which thieves may have used to gain access into areas at Fort Clayton, Panama.



Army Reserve Staff Sgt. David N. Maurer prepares to issue the owner of a child's bicycle a "Gotcha" tag at a housing area while on night foot patrols on Fort Clayton, Panama.

Meanwhile, Davis, armed with a 1,000-watt floodlight illuminated the ink-black jungle looking for any prowlers along or near the fence line.

"There has been a lot of thefts in this area because of the close proximity of the homes to the 8-foot-high line that separates the jungle, which the thieves cut to gain entry"

Maurer said. We are a visual deterrent, we are letting the thieves know we are here."


"It keeps the thieves guessing," Maurer added.

After the military police concluded their patrols following a relatively uneventful night, the next morning Prescott arrived at his shoe shine and car wash stand. He smiled as he worked diligently on the boot of a new customer sitting under the only reminder of his previous misfortune-the plywood-

patched window. Life goes on despite the soldiers' stolen boots, he said.

But even though military police like Maurer, Meyers and David failed to catch the thieves, the military law enforcement promise they and other military police deploying to Panama will tirelessly continue making it harder on the bad guys.

(Photographs throughout the article by Sgt. 1st Class Lek Mateo, 100th Mobile Public Detachment, Texas Army National Guard)



Army Reserve Cpl. Sherry L. Meyers checks the fence line that separates the housing area from the jungle which thieves oftentimes use as cover to gain entry onto Fort Clayton, Panama.

Joint Croatian/American MP Boat Patrols

Staff Sgt. Cameron Porter
21st TAACOM Public Affairs Office

it's a 24-hour mission and his unit has set up shifts which last anywhere between 4 hours to 12 hours each. Izquierdo said their mission in support of Task Force Rijekka is totally different than what they would

Pfc. Jeremy Covert, a MP from the 554th MP Co., said they go out with the Croatian police in their boat for about two hours at a time, re-turn to port for a few minutes break, and then back out again. Covert said



The 37th transportation Command's 28th Transportation Battalion's M915 tractor trailer trucks and humvees from the 95th Military Police Battalion sit at the Port of Rijekka awaiting the arrival of the ship, USNS Soderman, and the equipment which the trucks will move to Bosnia in support of Operation Joint Forge. The MPs will act as port and convoy security during the Operation.

RIJEKA, Croatia -- Being a military policeman in the U.S. Army is a high profile and highly visible occupation. In garrison, MPs can be seen checking identifications at the gates or managing traffic control. During disaster relief missions, MPs can be seen pulling security or assisting with evacuations. And during combat, MPs can be seen processing POWs or escorting units and convoys through secure or unsecured areas.

But when the 21st Theater Army Area Command's logistical task force deployed to Rijekka, Croatia with the mission of off-loading the 1st Cavalry Division's trucks, trailers, helicopters and containers from the USNS Soderman and preparing and processing that equipment for onward movement to Bosnia, the MPs from Stuttgart Germany's 554th Military Police Company were seen somewhere doing something that MPs never do -- aboard a Croatian Police speed boat pulling security.

"We have been patrolling around the USNS Soderman keeping a lookout for any suspicious activities or anything that doesn't look like it belongs out here," said Spc. Damian Izquierdo, a military police man in the 554th MP Co., 95th Military Police Battalion. "And if we get any calls from the building or the ship, we'll respond," Izquierdo said. So far there's been a couple of calls, but we didn't find anything out of the usual. "It might have been a dolphin or something," Izquierdo said. When something suspicious is spotted, we report it immediately, get a closer look and sometimes call in the Croatian Military Police divers to investigate, Izquierdo said.

Izquierdo said the boats they use belong to the local Rijekka municipal police, and the zodiacs the Croatian MP divers use belong to them. "It's been great working with (the Croatians police). They're cooperative, friendly, and they respond quickly to all our requests for assistance or support," he said.



Military Police Soldiers of the 554th Military Police Company, 95th Military Police Battalion, augmented by Croatian municipal police and Croatian Military Police divers pulled 24 hour security in and around the USNS Soderman as its cargo is unloaded at the Port of Rijeka. The cargo ship is carrying the 1st Calvary's equipment which is bound for Bosnia.

normally be doing back in Germany. He said that working with the Croatian police department and the military police divers was a unique and interesting experience.

"Because boat patrols are something that we're not trained to do," Izquierdo said, "we're rotating all of us out here so everyone gains a little experience."

Izquierdo said that he, like all MPs, takes his job seriously, but since the bombings in Tanzania and Kenya, he thinks about it a lot more. "Anything could happen especially with billions of dollars worth of equipment out there on that ship," he said.

"If any boats come close to the Soderman or the helicopter landing zone, we have the right to stop them, check their identifications and search their boat."



A Croatian MP diver prepares to enter the water. Divers are called upon when the boat surveillance teams spot unusual activities, or when sightings or reports from personnel on the ship or port are called into the joint security force.

Covert said during one shift a small rowboat came within 30 meters of the Soderman. "We stopped him, and the Croatian police checked his identification. There was a small bag inside that the Croatian police officer made the guy open while we searched the rest of the boat," Covert added. "We let the guy go but before we did, the Croatian policeman told him to stay clear of the ship from now on."

"If there was what appeared to be something suspicious going on or we suspect something dangerous, be it a bomb or whatever, we have every right to activate our rules of engagement and, if necessary, do whatever is necessary to stop them," said Covert.



Dejan Sandrk, a Croatia police officer, and Pfc Jeremy Covert, a Military Police soldier from the 554th Military Police Company, scan the waters around the USNS Soderman. The Croatia police, Croatia military police and the American Military Police joined forces to provide force protection in and around the port of Rijeka.


Zama Military Police Play Key Role in Cherry Blossom Festival

Ms. Michelle Evers

While community members and Japanese friends enjoyed the cool shade of the cherry blossom trees the Military Police patrolled sun-soaked hot spots to protect the peace. By patrol car, bicycle, golf cart and foot, 11 MPs covered crowded

areas of Camp Zama at the annual Cherry Blossom Festival.

"Basically, we are here to make sure everyone has a safe holiday," said SGT Josh Greeson, an MP. "And we are here for security reasons as well."



Japanese guests swarm around Gate 1 while waiting to enter Camp Zama for the Cherry Blossom Festival.

As is their mission at every open post event, the MPs oversaw the event to prevent accidents, keep traffic to a minimum and to watch out for suspicious activity.

At Gates 1 and 4, where Japanese guest clustered onto the base, MPs searched bags and belongings for any dangerous items. "We look for glass, knives, replica guns- anything that could be used as a weapon," said Staff SGT. Douglas Baer, who stood at Camp Zama's Gate 1 for most of the day.

At the traffic circle near the post chapel, MPs acted as crossing guards, directing both the multitudes of people and traffic.

"We're here for safety reasons," said Spc. Michelle Gullett, as she held one hand up to stop a line of cars. "We're here to keep them from running over one another," she added with a smile.

Near the food booths, picnics areas and parking lots, MPs diligently tend to crowd control. Certain areas of the post, such as the housing areas, were off limits during the festival and MPs saw to it that no one crossed the boundary into these areas. They answered questions for community members about parking areas and worked with the Japanese police to help lost guests.

At an event with more than 20,000 people, the MPs were an integral part of the festival, said Bob McKeta, coordinator of the Cherry Blossom Festival.

"With such a big event, the MPs being on site giving direction and coordinating safety is very important," he added. Despite the fact the MPs could not picnic and relax during the festivities, they understand the importance of their mission, said Sgt. Cal Rolfes, who was in charge of the MP mission that day. "They are all dedicated to their jobs. They're here so everyone else can have a good time."

Ms. Michelle Evers was a "Torii" staff writer with the PAO, USARJ. Photographs by SGT Brett Traver, PAO, USARJ)



Spc. Michelle Gullett (above) gives a visitor directions to the Cherry Blossom Festival and Staff Sgt. Douglas Bear (below) checks bags and belongings of Japanese visitors at Camp Zama's Gate 1 during the festival.



LEARNING TO LEAD IN TODAY'S ARMY MISSION

First Lieutenant Sara A. Snyder

Today's military operations are diverse, complex, and demanding – the military need leaders and soldiers who can think intelligently, obey orders precisely, and understand the purpose behind their mission. A bipolar world no longer exists; there is not one enemy to which we can focus our energies and training. While the Army's primary goal remains to win our nation's wars, it is increasingly



Platoon SFC Wilson, and squad leader SSG Jones share a moment of jocularity.

focusing its efforts toward peacekeeping operations. We require that our soldiers operate in a multi-polar world and be able to quickly differentiate levels of threat and decide on a proper recourse. As former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammerskold stated, "Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it." The Military Police Corps plays a vital role in peacekeeping because of its versatility, firepower, and ability to protect a non-threatening image to the world. As a platoon leader for a military police platoon, I found that

the distinct mission of peacekeeping requires well-trained soldiers and capable leaders.

Two months after my arrival, my company was notified to prepare a platoon for possible deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina in support of Task Force Eagle. As the newest platoon leader, my commander charged me to prepare to deploy my sister platoon. Third platoon had not trained in over a year; it had remained in Germany to conduct law enforcement when the rest of the company deployed to Bosnia in November 1995. In readying for the possible deployment, I would lead this platoon through a preparation training exercise. This exercise would evaluate the platoon's ability to plan and execute four different missions performed by Military Police units in Bosnia. The missions were as follows: inspect a weapons storage site of a former warring faction, set up and operate a checkpoint, escort a convoy containing voting ballots, and investigate reports of a small hostile force in a village.

My biggest fear in facing this evaluation was my experience. I knew that, if deployed, I would face situations similar to these, and I wanted to make the right decisions. NATO's current mission in Bosnia requires soldiers to interact daily with local nationals and

former warring faction soldiers. These close relations occasion a variety of potential scenarios that could quickly escalate into delicate situations in Bosnia that one leader's split-second decision in a confrontation could have catastrophic results for the entire NATO peace process. This is alarming to a platoon leader responsible foremost for the welfare and safety of all his/her soldiers, but also entrusted to enforce the peaceful implementation of the Dayton Accords.

During the ride to the exercise training area, I contemplated the upcoming events and challenges I



SPC Dunning of the 2/212th MP Company is busy at work.



Left to right are SSG Jones, and SGT Brissette, squad leaders, and SFC Wilson, platoon sergeant, members of the 2/212th MP Company.



Members of the 2/212th Military Police Company, shown left to right, are SPC Boderck, and SPC Hendricks.

would face. At first, I was overwhelmed. But, I realized that throughout life I would be repeatedly asked to undertake unfamiliar tasks for which I feel inadequately prepared. This is essence of learning and gained experience. I thought of the scores of new lieutenants our nations sent directly to war in Vietnam with no time to lead soldiers through a preparation training exercise. Their initial evaluation was

often life or death; mine would be much less severe. I also recalled the amount of training I had to receive at West Point and Military Police Officer Basic Course. I realized that though I lacked experience, I certainly do not lack competence. I was qualified to lead this platoon to succeed. This confidence carried me through many difficult decisions the following days. The platoon performed well in every scenario and

each soldier left the exercise with pride in the unit and the confidence in his/her ability to handle stressful situations.

Although we did not deploy to Bosnia, I took many valuable lessons from the experience. Most importantly, I learned that confidence is one of the most important qualities a leader can possess. I had faith in my abilities, which, consequently, gave the platoon confidence in themselves, and in me. Once the soldiers realized I knew my job, they were eager to follow me. My confidence carried did not mean I was unwilling to listen to input; being in power does not mean making decisions alone. Often, when I briefed the squad leaders on the mission plan, they considered contingencies that I had not. Their suggestions and ideas prepared us to handle a wide range of circumstances that the mission presented.

I found that learning how to lead requires daily growth and self-discovery. The world is constantly changing, developing. One day the hot issue may be an arising conflict in a third-world country; the next day it's a vicious debate over the morality of doctor-assisted suicides for terminally ill people. The world needs competent, courageous leaders who can handle challenges and make tough decisions. It needs humble, cooperative leaders determined to work together for the greater good of all involved. It needs wise, reflective leaders who can learn from their own mistakes and those of generations past. It needs bold, visionary leaders who dare think on a different level and to see beyond the current situation in order to correct it. Highly effective leaders are those who cannot only embrace all of those qualities and consistently employ them, but also inspire their soldiers to do the same.

1LT Sara A. Snyder was assigned to the 2/212TH MP Company, 793d MP Bn, 18TH MP BDE, Kitzingen, Germany, at the time this article was written.

COALITION TRAINING with the KUWAITI ARMY'S 3rd MILITARY POLICE COMPANY

First Lieutenant L. Omar Lomas

On 26 February 1998, the 209th Military Police Company, "Warriors," was deployed to Camp Doha, Kuwait, in support of Operation Desert Thunder. The company deployed all its equipment and soldiers for a five and a half-month deployment. In addition to the real world missions and heightened Threat-Con levels, the company received a mission unlike any other mission. It was also the first time the Joint Rear Area Coordinator and an MTOE Military Police Company had ever conducted such training. The mission was to provide a platoon to conduct Coalition Training with the Kuwaiti Army's Third Military Police Company. The training would consist of tasks from the five military police functions such as Maneuver Mobility Support Operations (MMSO), Internment and Resettlement, Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT), and Air Assault operations. In addition, the host nation soldiers would receive an introduction into MP weapons, tactics and techniques, functions and operations. The entire coalition training operation would be challenging, but an enjoyable 10 days of training, learning, and camaraderie between two countries.

The training plan was simple: conduct eight days of training on individual tasks culminating with a two-day field training exercise (FTX). On day one the introductions

between the two units took place. Sixty-eight Kuwaiti MPs and the First Platoon "Outlaws" were introduced to each other. Nervousness and apprehension could be felt in the classroom, but after the initial introductions, and as the week went by, the soldiers from the two countries learned that they shared many similarities as military police soldiers. The Kuwaiti soldiers were

introduced to the U.S. military police weapons, equipment, vehicles, operations, and functions. They were impressed and awe struck by most of our equipment such as the MK-19 Grenade Launcher, M-249 SAW, AN-PVS-7B, and even chem-lights.

Day two consisted of a practical exercise on setting up a platoon perimeter and defending a unit location. Once again, our hosts surprised us



Kuwaiti MPs capture "enemy" (SFC Scott D. Schissel) and prepare to search him.



Soldiers from the Kuwaiti 3rd Military Police Company move through the MOUT site.

in that they too operated in a similar manner. Days three and four concentrated on internment and resettlement operations such as collecting enemy prisoner of war (EPW), transporting them and securing them. These two days were perhaps the most interesting to the Kuwaitis. They were eager to know every detail pertaining to EPW operations. The driving factor was that it was the 3rd MP Company's combat mission to establish and operate an internment facility, if Iraq ever invaded Kuwait again. Days five and six concentrated on MMSO topics such as establish a traffic control post, check point, roadblock, straggler control points, and conduct a route reconnaissance. The Kuwaitis seemed to know these tasks well. They proved themselves proficient and very knowledgeable in these areas. On days seven and eight the First Platoon and the 3rd Kuwaiti Military Police Company convoyed to Ali Al Salem airbase to conduct Air Assault operations ground training on French Super Puma helicopters. SSG Luke Kittel, former rappel master assigned to First Platoon, conducted the training. This was the first time that both units ever conducted an

air assault operation in conjunction with a MOUT operation. The training was intense, but exciting.

The culminating point of the coalition training came on days nine and ten during the FTX. This FTX was held on the Mutlar Ridge overlooking the Persian Gulf and Camp Doha. First Platoon and the 3rd Kuwaiti MP Company deployed to the ridge with all their equipment for a two-day field exercise. Every task that was learned as a practical exercise on the previous eight days was tested on these two days. On the first day of the FTX, soldiers from both units inter-mixed to form large MP squads. The squad leaders were then given fragmentation operations order (fragos) to run certain missions with their squads (+). In addition, both units established and operated an internment facility. OPFOR soldiers from Third Platoon, 209th MP Company in playing the role of captured enemy prisoners of war. It was up to the MPs (Kuwaiti and American) to search, process and safeguard these EPWs. On the second day of the FTX, two French Super Pumas landed close to our perimeter and picked up all the soldiers on several sorties. They were

then inserted to a Kuwaiti Special Forces training camp for a MOUT operation where a platoon of opposing forces (OPFOR) was waiting for them. The battle raged on for an hour with the MPs taking few casualties and occupying the MOUT site.

Through out the 10-day training period, there were naturally some challenges that were encountered. First and foremost was the language barrier. Arabic and English are totally different languages. Fortunately, the Kuwaitis spoke English pretty well. Three Kuwaiti interpreters were attached to the 3rd Kuwaiti MP Company to serve as the official interpreters for the more difficult military terms. The interpreters made the training less stressful and easier to grasp.

Another challenge that took getting used to was the Kuwaiti time schedule. Their time schedules are based on and work around their religious customs. Training started at 0800 with a breakfast break at 1000. Training would then restart at 1100 until 1200 when they (Kuwaitis) broke for prayer and chow. Training would start once again at 1300 and run until 1430. Getting off work that early was very important to the



Ssg Johnathon Britt shows off the M2 .50 caliber machine gun to young Kuwaiti soldiers.



Ssg Luke Kittel demonstrates an M4 rifle with a mounted night scope to Kuwaiti soldiers.

Kuwaiti MPs because they held family time in high regard. Due to their customs, they believe in spending as much time as possible with their families. This, however did not phase First Platoon. As professional soldiers, they adapted to their host's religious customs and drove on with the mission.

Through the entire 10-day exercise, the First Platoon soldiers learned many important lessons, customs, and a new way of life. They had to adjust to their new environ-

ment and accomplish a mission they had never encountered before. The Kuwaiti MPs treated the Americans with mutual respect, dignity, and kindness. As hosts, they could not have been better. The Kuwaitis were very open as soldiers and as people. It seemed as if every Kuwaiti soldier wanted to have the platoon over for dinner every night. Unfortunately, this request could not be granted, but the message was very clear, they enjoyed training alongside American soldiers.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: The officers and NCOs of the Joint Rear Area Coordinator (JRAC) deserve a very special thanks in helping organize and support this mission. Without their support and guidance this coalition training mission would never have happened.

First Lieutenant Omar Lomas was the First Platoon Leader, 209th MP Company, Fort McClellan, Alabama, at the time this article was written. (Photographs throughout the article were taken by 1LT Lomas.)

MPs Secure Task Force Rijeka Area

*Staff Sgt. Cameron Porter
21st TAACOM Public Affairs Office*

It's 2:30 a.m. and most everyone has long since called it a day and gone to sleep. But rounding the corner of the building, two silhouettes move tenaciously forward breaking the still of the night. One holding a flashlight, the other his nightstick. As they move closer, their battle dress uniforms and holsters remain barely visible in the dimness of the street lights.

Their job is not a job for everyone. It's not from nine to five, and

it's not ever the same. But the soldiers from the 554th Military Police Company's 3rd Platoon know the importance of their work, and they do it to the best of their ability.

1st Lt. Edwin Escobar, 3rd Platoon Leader, said that working in support of Task Force Rijeka is an important mission for his platoon. With 30 military police soldiers under his command, Escobar said force protection is their main objective and his biggest priority.

"We're accomplishing so many various missions right now," Escobar said. "We're marking the convoy routes; escorting convoys and VIPs; pulling perimeter guard and roving patrols; controlling access into the port; guarding the boat and the equipment; and we have two quick-reactionary force teams on stand-by."

The soldiers of 3rd Platoon are very dedicated and very experienced, said Sgt. 1st Class Stacy Ferguson, 3rd Platoon Sergeant. "I know they can accomplish these missions (here in Rijeka). "It's a piece of cake for them."

Ferguson said 3rd Platoon has had lots of practice as of late. They just returned from a 90-day deployment to Slavonski Brod, Croatia in support of Operation Joint Forge



Spc. Greg Goode and Spc. Tim Williams from 3rd Platoon, 554th Military Police Company conduct roving guard and security surveillance in and around the Port of Rijeka. Thirty military police soldiers are deployed in support of Task Force Rijeka. Their primary mission is force protection.



Karlheinz Lohmueller, a safety specialist with the 21st Theater Army Area Command, discuss safety requirements with a security specialist supporting Task Force Rijeka. Lohmuller spends much of his time advising seaport operations personnel on safety concerns. More than 350 21st TAACOM soldiers and civilians have been temporarily assigned to Croatia in support of the operation there.

and one year earlier they deployed for nine months to Hungary and Croatia in support of Operation Joint Endeavor and Operation Joint Guard.

"The mission here is totally different than our mission in Slavonski Brod. There we did convoy security and convoy escorts. "Here we're doing just about every MP mission there is," Escobar said.

"This operation (in Rijeka) was a rapid deployment mission for us," said Ferguson. "We were just finishing up in Slavonski Brod when we got the call. We staged our equipment in Tazsar, Hungary, deployed back to central region to see our families for two weeks, and then rapidly deployed to Rijeka."

Private 1st Class Michael Gonsalves, said they were fortunate to spend any time at home at all. "We lucked out, being deployed, then actually being able to come back home for awhile before leaving again," said Gonsalves, a military police driver in 3rd Platoon.

"I thought going back for such a short time would be a problem, but actually it turned out to be an enhancement because at least we had a break to go see our families and loved ones and then re-deploy," Ferguson said.

"It's not often that my unit gets to deploy on missions like this," said Escobar. "There's a lot of experience to be picked up here."

"We're working side-by-side with civilian and military policemen from Croatia. There are 80 Croatians military police soldiers and 26 local municipal police here with us," Escobar said.

"This is the first time in the 13 years of my career that I have had the opportunity to do a port mission where we actually got to work with the international police," Ferguson said. "I've never worked in a joint task force with another military police force before. And most of my soldiers have never had that opportunity before either, or this is their first deployment so it's very exciting."

Physical Fitness Improvement During Initial Entry Training

SFC Joseph T. Harris

After having served in numerous leadership positions such as team leader, squad leader, drill sergeant and platoon sergeant: I cannot recall the number of times I have listened to noncommissioned officers in my units complain about the physical condition of the new soldiers they received from the Initial Entry Training (IET) environment. It is common to hear "I just received Private so and so, and he scored 220 on the APFT, What are they doing in Basic Training?"

A 220 may seem like a low score. However, it may be an outstanding score for that Private, and represent a firm foundation upon which to build. Noncommissioned Officers must consider the soldier's fitness level upon entry into the Army, just a few months prior to his or her arrival at the unit. Soldiers in IET often achieve phenomenal growth in physical fitness measured by the APFT. At no time after will they ever gain so much so fast.

Assessment begins almost at the reception battalions; all soldiers undergo a fitness assessment on their second day of in-processing. Male soldiers must complete at least 12 correct push-ups and females at least 1 push-up. If they fail to meet this entry standard they are sent to the Fitness Training Unit (FTU), where they undergo intense physical

training for up to three weeks before being shipped to a unit for training. Once they arrive at their Basic Training unit, they begin what is for many of them the first intense physical training

they have ever experienced. A recent initial diagnostic APFT during the first week of Basic Training showed the average male soldier performs 24 push-ups, 34 sit-ups and runs 1 mile in 7:51. The average female soldier performs 4 push-ups, 24 sit-ups and runs 1 mile in 10:02 during the same test.

The physical training in IET is extremely challenging. It is conducted six days a week, alternating between cardiovascular training and muscle strengthening training. On run days soldiers are placed in ability run groups based on their time during their Initial Diagnostic APFT. They begin by running 1 mile and increase the distance a half-mile as each week passes. After six weeks of Basic Training, soldiers are administered an APFT. They must score at least 50 points per event in order to pass. Recent APFT results show that after 6 weeks of training the average male soldier performed 42 push-ups, 58 sit-ups and completed the 2-mile run in 14:40. This is an increase of 18 push-ups, 24 sit-ups and 1 minute faster on the run. The average female soldier performed 19 push-ups, 50 sit-up and completed the run in 18:40. This is an increase of 15 push-ups, 24 sit-ups and over 1 minute faster on the run.

The length of Advanced Individual Training (AIT) varies. For the

purpose this article, I will use Military Police training, which is 10 weeks in length. Before a soldier can graduate, they must meet the Army's standard. During a recent Phase V APFT taken at the soldiers 15th week of training, by average, male soldiers in the 17-21 age group performed 58 push-ups, 76 sit-ups and completed the 2 mile run in 13:23. Female soldiers in this age group completed 39 push-ups, 75 sit-ups and completed the 2-mile run in 16:17. By comparison male soldiers performed 34 more push-ups, 42 more sit-ups than they did their initial APFT and were 2:18 faster on the run. Female soldiers performed 35 more push-ups and 51 more sit-ups and were 3:20 faster on the run. Using the Army APFT scoring table, male soldiers increased their overall score by an average of 104 points, while female soldiers increased their overall score by an average of 200 points. Leaders must understand that when a soldier reports their unit from the IET environment, he or she is basically a trained soldier. The same is true for physical fitness. Soldiers must meet the APFT standard prior to graduation. While some scores may seem relatively low, a comparison of a soldier's fitness level when reporting for training and graduation will almost always show remarkable progress. It is up to us; the soldier's leaders, to build on this foundation.

Sergeant First Class Joseph T. Harris, has held numerous leadership positions in the past and is currently the 795th Military Police Battalion Training NCO, at Fort McClellan, Alabama

INITIAL DIAGNOSTIC APFT (FILL WEEK)	PHASE III (SIX WEEKS)	PHASE V (15 WEEKS)
STANDARDS: PU SU 1-MILE RUN	STANDARDS: PU SU 2-MILE RUN	STANDARDS: PU SU 2-MILE RUN
MALE 13 18 9:18	MALE 32 42 16:54	MALE 42 52 15:54
FEMALE 6 18 10:42	FEMALE 13 40 19:54	FEMALE 18 50 18:54
AVERAGE:	AVERAGE:	AVERAGE:
MALE 24 34 7:51	MALE 42 58 14:40	MALE 58 76 13:23
FEMALE 4 24 10:02	FEMALE 19 50 18:40	FEMALE 39 75 16:17



WARFIGHTER TEAM CHALLENGE IV, 1998

Staff Sergeant Earnest D. Fletcher

At 0600 hours on September 18, 1998, the 4th Annual Warfighter Team Challenge began. Thirty-two three-person teams from duty stations worldwide were poised to begin the three-day event, which has become the harbinger for the Regimental week.

The challenging competition was broken down into eight phases.

Phase I, being administrative in nature, involved inprocessing, a thorough inbriefing, including a site walk-thru and finally equipment issue.

The first day of competition began with Phase II, the Warfighter Fitness Test, which consisted of the standard pushups, situps and a grueling two-mile run that ended at the peak of Iron Mountain.


With very little rest, the Warfighters started the Obstacle Course, Phase III. With the addition of a few obstacles that were left out of previous WFTC, it proved to be quite challenging. From the obstacle course the competitors moved on to one of the most demanding events of the entire competition: Phase IV, Team




BG Donald J. Ryder (left) with the winning team, SGT Theodore Hanger, SPC Jason Byrd, and SPC Jose Maldonado from the 519th MP Battalion, Fort Polk, Louisiana. Second row, left to right is LTC Teddy R. Spain, Commander, 519th MP Bn, CSM Dennis Lafferty, SGM Charles E. Guyette and RCSM Harold L. Burleson.

Drills and Soldier Skills. Here the young warrior's battle drill skills were tested as well as their ability to execute common tasks under very limited visibility conditions. The only light that was made available - a red lens flashlight. As teams finished Phase IV they were released for the day only to be back in formation the 19th of September at 0215 hours.

Phase V, Land Navigation and Maintenance began with the first land nav chalks stepping off into the Pelham Range darkness at exactly 0400. The teams were challenged to locate 13 distant points in the fastest amount of time, with a maximum allowable time of five hours.



Physical fitness testing



Obstacle course

The team representing the 94th Military Police Battalion in Korea was the first and only team to ever receive the maximum score of 70 points. As the exhausted teams finished the challenging course they




Land navigation course

went on to the maintenance competition which involved task organization by the team leader to perform PMCS on five different pieces of organic MP team equipment in 20 minutes.

As teams finished maintenance, they were transported ten teams at a time from Pelham Range to Phase VI, the M16 rifle range back on Fort McClellan. All team members shot twenty rounds trying to achieve the highest score. The M16 event marked the end of the second day of competition, leaving one intense day ahead: Phase VII, The Ruckrun, M9 pistol range and last but not least, the written exam.



M16 competition (above), and 9mm competition (below)



The last phase of the WFTC began at 0400 sharp when chalk one departed the start point and headed off into the cool, still, predawn Alabama wilderness. Most of the teams finished in less than three hours and as they did were whisked to the M9 pistol firing line, each warfighter shooting ten rounds apiece. Fresh fruit and Gatorade awaited the competitors in the holding area for the written exam. The exams were

geared to the different skill levels of the MP teams.

Throughout the entire WFTC, current standings were not made available to anyone and not until the award ceremony were the individual event winners and the overall first, second, and third places announced. The Warfighter Team Challenge champions for 1998 were from the 519th Military Police Battalion out of Fort Polk, LA. The team wa



Team MK19 competition (above), Warfighter written exam testing area (below)



composed of Sgt Theodore Hanger, SPC Jason Byrd, and SPC Jose Maldonado. Their team, although not winning any individual event, consistently placed in the top 5 which gave them an overall combined score of 335.5 points out of a possible 400 points. The second place team, from the 94th Military Police Battalion, lost by a narrow margin, only 1.2 points.

The flawless execution of the entire event was due to the outstanding efforts and teamwork of the Military Police Noncommissioned Officer Academy. Since March 1998, planning, coordinating and rehearsing for this event had been at the forefront of their minds. This preparation paid big dividends in the third week of September, 1998 and was quite obvious to the nearly one hundred warfighter competitors and the hundreds of spectators that watched the three day event. The Military Police NCO Academy would like to extend its congratulations to all the warfighters. Also, a special thanks to the various chains of command throughout the regiment for the obvious support they gave their teams in preparation for what the newly appointed Chief of Military Police, BG Donald J. Ryder, called "The Capstone" of the Military Police Corps anniversary week.

SSG Earnest D. Fletcher was the Warfighter Team Challenge Non-commissioned Officer In Charge (NCOIC) at Fort McClellan, Alabama.



In honor of those who served, sacrificed

Spc. Ali Leone
USARSO Public Affairs Office

FORT CLAYTON-Every year for the past several years, a lone soldier makes a trip to Washington, D.C., not for a vacation, but to honor those in his field who have made the ultimate sacrifice-their lives. Sgt. Christopher Thompson, 534th Military Police Company, attends the annual National Peace Officers' Memorial Day Service each year on behalf of U.S.



Sgt. Christopher Thompson, 534th Military Police Company, holds a little boy who lost his father that previous year while on duty as police officer. Thompson and this child are two of thousands of families who have lost a relative in the line of duty.

Army South. He, like many others there, pays a personal respect to each of these officers who have died in the line of duty.

The service is a culmination of a week-long series of seminars and candlelight vigils held in honor of National Police Week.

The day, May 15, was designated as National Peace Officers' Memorial Day in 1962 by President John F. Kennedy.

Thompson, who is a seven-year veteran of the Army, became interested in a program called COPS or Concerns of Police Survivors about four-and-a-half years ago, following a devastating car accident in which his father, a police officer, was killed in the line of duty.

Thompson, already actively involved in the police-run Drug Awareness and Resistance Education

Program (DARE), attended that year's memorial service in Washington, D.C.

At the ceremony, his father's name, along with so many others who had given their lives that year, was added to the wall commemorating each of the fallen peace officers.

And, at what may have been the loneliest time for him he made an effort to reach out to a group of children who were dealing with

the same feelings he was coping with. This gesture led to his involvement in COPS which make a difference in every life he touches.

"I didn't feel like being alone," he said, "but I felt kinda out of place. So I volunteered to work with kids who were also there for the ceremony. I already had a background dealing with kids because of the DARE program. It felt so good...it felt right to work with the kids.

Since that initial experience, Thompson has been attending the service each year and has continued his work with the children. In addition, Thompson said there are several seminars designed for family members throughout the week.

Recently, a letter was sent to Thompson's chain of command requesting he return for the ceremony, as he plays such a vital role helping the children deal with their grief.

The one thing Thompson would like the military community here to realize, is that the memorial in Washington, D.C. does not only honor civilian police officers, but also military police officers from all branches of the services as well.

To honor these officers, flags on all installations were flown at half-staff Friday.

Thompson said that once he leaves the military, he will follow in his father's footsteps and become a civilian police officer, even though he knows the risks involved.

"Being in law enforcement is something I have always wanted to do," he said. "Once you've done something like that, helping someone ... you just want to do it again. Even though you know the consequences. Helping someone definitely outweighs the consequences."

He also said no matter what he may do in the future, he will continue to attend the ceremony and pay his respects to his father and the many other officers who made that ultimate sacrifice-one that will make a difference to all those who live in their communities.

Force Protection Equipment Demonstration II (FPED II) ANNOUNCED

LTC Bruce M. Swagler

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, and the Department of Justice have jointly announced that a second Force Protection Equipment Demonstration (designated FPED II) will be held at Quantico Marine Corps Base, Virginia on 3-6 May 1999.

The FPED was born as a result of the 25 June 1996 Khobar Towers bombing and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to find material solutions to force protection needs. The idea behind the FPED is to show commanders and decision-makers what force protection equipment is commercially available. It is anticipated that those attending will identify those items they consider most promising and appropriate for their needs. Those items identified will be assessed for possible follow-on testing by appropriate governmental testing agencies.


According to Mr. Mike Toscano, the Project Coordinator, this demonstration will be bigger and better than the one held at Quantico in September 1997. Mr. Toscano noted that for the 1997 FPED, we had over 2000 visitors over the four-day period. Comments from these visitors were overwhelmingly positive. But, even with this success, we learned

how to do things better. As a minimum, he noted, we will open up the demonstration to vendors from other countries. This will clearly increase the value of the demonstration all that much more. We have also expanded our capability to reach potential vendors. Regardless of

who attends, we want to present them with the broadest selection of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) force protection equipment possible. When asked to identify what is considered force protection equipment, Mr. Toscano stated that force protection encompasses a broad range



Static displays and live fire demonstrations of a variety of non-lethal weapons including the Grab-Net are expected in the display during FPED II.



Many of the products will be featured in live-fire exercises to demonstrate their ability to operate as designed in an explosives or ballistic attack.



A Marine Corps marksmanship team fires 7.6mm and 5.56mm rounds into one of the many protective vests demonstrated during FPED in September 1997.



The MSSMP and other high-flying equipment will be on display during FPED II.



A number of fixed and temporary (tactical) barriers will be on display during FPED II. Many of these barriers will demonstrate their ability to operate as designed against blast and ballistic threats.

of items. Equipment such as barriers, sensors and detectors of various types, access control systems, protective gear, and non-lethal weapons are typical and expected to be in abundance in FPED II.

The U.S. Army Product Manager, Physical Security Equipment (PM-PSE) will again be responsible for coordination and on-site operations of the FPED. Mr. Jerry Edwards, the FPED Lead Project Officer, noted that even though this FPED will be larger than the last one, one aspect that will not change is the need for vendors to demonstrate their products. Mr. Edwards noted that the demonstration of force protection items of equipment is what sets the FPED apart from all other shows or exhibitions. When visitors come to the FPED they have an expectation to see the equipment in operation. This is exactly what we plan to do. Mr. Edwards summarized the expectations of everyone involved with the FPED when he stated that FPED II will be one of the best opportunities ever that commanders, provost marshals, security managers, and others

associated with force protection will have to see, all in one place, just what commercial industry has to offer.

As with the first FPED, details are on the world-wide web. The address for the FPED website is <http://www.csc.com/fped>. Persons wanting to attend FPED II can register online through this website.

LTC Bruce M. Swagler was the Product Manager, Physical Security Equipment, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, at the time this article was written.

783rd Military Police Battalion

EPW/CI



Lineage and Honors

Constituted 12 November 1942 in the Army of the United States as the 783rd Military Police Battalion. Activated 28 November 1942 at Fort Custer, Michigan. Inactivated 29 November 1945 at Camp Clairborne, Louisiana.


Redesignated 26 March 1948 as the 301st Military Police Battalion, allotted to the Organized Reserves redesignated 25 March 1948 as the Organized reserve Corps: Redesignated 9 July 1952 as the Army Reserve). Inactivated 31 May 1952 at Kansas City, Missouri. Redesignated 24 June 1952 as the 783rd Military Police Battalion. Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment activated 19 December 1991 at Inkster, Michigan.

Campaign Participation Credit

World War II
Normandy
Northern France
Rhineland


Decorations

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered EUROPEAN THEATER



U.S. Army Military Police Corps Regimental Hall of Fame

- | | |
|--|--|
| Major General Harry H. Bandholtz (1897-1923) | Brigadier General Jeremiah P. Holland (1927-1957) |
| Major General Allen W. Gullion (1905-1944) | Colonel Orville N. Butts (1958-1988) |
| Major General William H. Maglin (1917-1955) | GM14 Ronald E. Decker (1943-1990) |
| Major General John D. Granger (1954-1982) | Colonel C. Victor Cadwell (1917-1954) |
| Command Sergeant Major James W. Frye (1955-1984) | Colonel Carl C. Sutherland (1968-1992) |
| Major General Harley L. Moore, Jr. (1940-1973) | Major Fouad K. Aide (1953-1996) |
| Brigadier General David H. Stem (1960-1987) | Brigadier General Francis E. Howard (1927-1956) |
| Colonel Henry H. Tufts (1942-1974) | Command Sergeant Major Joshua Perry (1964-1994) |
| Command Sergeant Major Roland M. Gaddy (1960-1988) | Colonel Michael L. Sullivan (1960-1964; 1968-1996) |
| Major General Eugene R. Cromartie (1957-1990) | Brigadier General Evelyn P. Foote (1960-1989, 96-97) |
| GM15 Robert A. Brisentine, Jr. (1945-1989) | Brigadier General Thomas F. Barr (1883-1901) |
| Major General Charles A. Hines (1954-1992) | Chief Warrant Officer Four Maurice A. Parker (1940-1972) |



The Korean National Police

*Colonel W. H. Maglin,
CMP Director National Police,
Korea (Dec 1945 - Aug 1947)*

On a Sunday in February 1946, while two officers were visiting me at my billet on the outskirts of Seoul, Korea, we heard the sound of wood being chopped. The sound appeared to be coming from the forest that bordered the grounds. The Japanese had neglected their reforestation program for Korea during the war and natives had nearly stripped the hillsides of trees and saplings in order to obtain fuel. The American Military Government had issued directives making the cutting down of trees illegal. As Director of the Department of Police, I had instructed the Police Commanders to enforce this regulation by foot and mounted patrols. We were all concerned with abating the anticipated spring floods. My visitors decided to go out to investigate and they soon returned with a middle-aged, poorly clad, Korean whom they said was found cutting saplings. Accompanied by my house boy, George, who spoke some English, they piled into a Jeep and took the prisoner to a Police Box about a quarter of a mile away. Upon their return they told me that they had explained to the policeman on duty, through George, what had happened and that the policeman said, "O.K., I handle," and with that he struck the prisoner a stinging blow in the face knocking him down.

I was so incensed at hearing this that I got into the Jeep with George and went to the Police Box. The policeman was quite surprised at my



taking exception to his action. Upon my query as to whether he had been in the police under the Japanese, he replied that he had joined only two months before, after graduating from the Police Academy which we had established. The prisoner insisted that it was all right and that

he got what he deserved. On the way home George informed me that the police had to beat persons or the Koreans would not respect them.

All this gave me food for thought. In November 1945, three months before the incident I have related, I came to Korea to be Director

of the Department of Police under Military Government. All our directives, instruction, regulations and conferences were pointed toward establishing a democratic police system. Over twelve hundred recruit policemen have passed through the National Police Academy where it was emphasized that the police were of the people and that they had no punitive powers. Harsh, brutal, and arbitrary treatment of prisoners and others would not be tolerated.

The Japanese had ruled Korea for over forty years through the police. The police dominated the daily lives of the people through fear. Their methods were brutal and arbitrary. The Korean under fifty years of age, knew nothing but fear of and hatred for the police. This fear and hatred was enhanced by the vicious "thought" and political police, police censorship of press, radio, and theater, and the police control of economics and health.

Our task was to remove this fear from the people and to indoctrinate the police with new procedures of serving the police. We had already eliminated the hated "thought police" and "political police." We took the police out of censorship and health control. No longer did we have the "economic police." In spite of this and our constant repetition and emphasis on democratic, courteous application of police practices and methods, the incident I related earlier convinced me that after three months we still had not succeeded in establishing the fact in the minds of the police and the people that the policeman was not a law unto himself. We had made progress in reducing the torture methods to obtain confessions, but we had a long way to go to eradicate the old conception of a policeman.

I then pondered over added measures to accomplish our objectives. It occurred to me that the police should have a motto. After considerable thought, I adopted,

"Service and Order." I had 25,000 metal plates with the words "Service and Order" in Korean on them and directed that every policeman wear this motto above his shield. Wide publicity was given this through the press and radio explaining that "Service" meant that the police served the people, that they protected them from harm and assisted them in every way possible; that "Order," meant the police would control traffic, large assemblies and arrest violators of the law. The policeman was impressed with the motto's meaning and importance by repeated reference in police circulars and instructions. The results were gratifying. Immediately We began to receive reports of considerate, kindly and courteous treatment by individuals and units of the police.

Many Americans, including some of my assistants, felt that we would make greater progress toward this goal of a democratic police, if we removed from the police ranks any Korean who had ever served in the police under the Japanese. They felt that such personnel were so imbued with the Japanese system that it was hopeless to reconcile them to new methods and further that their retention in the police gave weight to the charge that we using "pro-Japs." I resisted such proposals and was supported by both Major General Lerch, the Military Governor and Lt. General Hodge, the U. S. Commander of the Occupation Forces.

In order to understand why these policemen who served under the Japanese were retained; it is necessary to know the conditions, in relation to the police, that faced the occupation forces. Although figures were not available because of war secrecy, the National Police under the Japanese numbered about 25,000 for all of Korea. During the war this force was supplemented by a large number of military police and secret police. The 25,000 police under the Japanese consisted of

about 15,000 Japanese and 10,000 Koreans. Most officials above head policeman (compares to our Sergeant of Police) were Japanese. Rarely did a Korean rise above Head Policeman. In Southern Korea, the American Zone, there were about 4,000 Koreans in the police when our forces moved in. Of course, the Japanese in Korea were removed from office and repatriation to Japan started. This left a nucleus of 4,000 Korean policemen about which to organize a new force of 25,000. We needed men because of their experience even though they had little executive or administrative ability. The unsettled conditions did not permit a period of training for an entirely new force, because law and order had to be maintained.

Whenever it was discovered that a former policeman had such unsavory reputation with Koreans because of his actions while serving under the Japanese, that it was unwise to retain him, we dismissed him. We also dismissed any policeman who had ever served with the Thought and Political police. Whenever it was found that a former policeman was so imbued with the Japanese practice that he could embrace the democratic practices which we were instituting, steps were taken to remove him from the police service. To further counteract any undue influence of these former policemen we placed educated and prominent civilians in the high brackets. For instance the man selected to be the Korean Director, my opposite number, was Dr. P. O. Chough, formerly a professor at the University. The Metropolitan Division, a force of 4,000, which policed the Capitol City of Seoul, had for its chief, T. S. Chang, a highly educated wealthy former Korean businessman. Many of the administrative positions in the Police were filled by substantial Koreans who had no prior experience with the police. While some of the former

policemen, who became Lieutenants, Captains, and Inspectors in the new force did many things in good faith that were contrary to our doctrine, we did not remove them enmasse merely because they had served under the Japanese. We felt that time and education would correct their shortcomings. Furthermore, they served us loyally during a trying period when we needed them and the American spirit of fair play would not permit us to scrap them after they had served their purpose. A strong advocate of the retention of these former policemen was Dr. P. O. Chough, the Korean Director. Dr. Chough is a great patriot. During the Japanese occupation he resisted the Japanese to the extent that he was imprisoned by them on two occasions - once for two years and again for three and one half years. He, however, is a practical, realistic man. His premise was that these former policemen were not "pro-Jap" but rather "pro-job." Even though he had opposed the Japanese he was tolerant of those who, in order to make a living, accepted employment in the service of the Japanese.

In addition to establishing democratic police methods and eliminating the brutal, total control by police that existed under the Japanese we made, at first, a determined effort to have the new police impartial and free from any political affiliations. At the start, in late 1945, my endeavor was to establish a National Police free of any political affiliation and impartial in its treatment of the people and in the enforcement of laws. However, at the time of the announcement of Trusteeship in late 1945, all Koreans rose in protest. Then suddenly the Communist and strong Leftist Koreans (undoubtedly on instructions from Moscow) reversed their stand and declared themselves for Trusteeship. Immediately there were indications of a split in the Police ranks along these lines. The

Communists and their Leftist followers took action to discredit and hinder the American effort. Secret documents obtained in raids on Communist and other Leftist political headquarters clearly showed their detailed plans to disrupt all government activities and to attack the Police. The Police from the start were strong supporters of the American Military Government. Now it became necessary to weed out from their ranks those active Communists and Leftists whose endeavor was to attack and disrupt the Police. Recruitment of new policemen was decentralized to the various divisions of the National Police in each Province. It was evident that the recruiting officials would not accept candidates who were known Communists or ardent Leftists, so, as the organization was increasing from fifteen thousand to twenty-five thousand, it became Rightist in general.

Communist cells appeared in a number of Police Districts in spite of the care in recruitment and caused dissension within the ranks of the Police. It became necessary to ferret out these cells and in some instances to use police force in separating the individuals from their police positions.

The impression that the Korean Police are using terrorist methods comes from the fact that they are forced to fight fire with fire in order to survive and to prevent revolution. The strong methods used by the Police were made necessary after the October 1946, riots which started in Taegu. The riot in Taegu, which proved to be Communist inspired, resulted in the brutal mutilation and murder of sixty Policemen and as the riots spread to other parts of the country, the Police were the targets and many more were murdered with Police Stations being burned and otherwise destroyed. Policemen in isolated Police Boxes were attacked by overwhelming mobs. In

many instances Rightists sympathizers went to the aid of the Police. This action, while being severely criticized, was countenanced by me on the premise that in time of great disorder any good citizen should come to the aid of the Police.

It is true that the Police in their retaliation for the murders and indignities may have gone too far in arresting large numbers of Communists, Leftists and Leftists sympathizers and they may have permitted Rightists Youth Organizations to assume police powers; however, this vindictive action on the part of the Police did not last long. Constant pressure exerted to stop such activities produced good results. After that short period, all actions on the part of the Police in arresting Communists, Leftists and others who were plotting to create disorder were based on sound legal grounds.

Police are human beings - they, too, have the emotions of revenge and self-preservation common to all human beings. Considering the vicious enemy with which they were confronted with its fanatical and diabolical methods, it is a credit to the National Police that they did exercise so much self-control.

There is no doubt that the National Police of South Korea is strongly Rightist but that they are "gangsters" and "terrorists" as alleged, is false. Considering Orient police psychology, the turbulent conditions existing in South Korea and the intense political convictions of all thinking Koreans, I can say that the Korean National Police is a disciplined and controlled force of twenty-nine thousand responsible for the maintenance of law and order in all of South Korea. The fact that the force is predominantly Rightist in its political thought is the result of circumstances forced upon the American Military Government and the Korean officials of the Police.



1st Military Police Company



The distinctive unit crest insignia of the 1st Military Police Company derives its design from the unit's participation in World War I. The crest was presented by General John J. Pershing to the unit in 1928. The use of yellow and green symbolize the colors used by the Provost Marshal throughout history. The horizontal waves are symbolic of the unit's deployment to Europe in 1917. The center crest is the French fleur-de-lis. The three words are from General Pershing, the Commander of the American Expeditionary Force, when asked to characterize the service and contribution of the soldiers of the 1st Military Police Company during the Great War.

LINEAGE AND HONORS

Parent unit constituted 24 May 1917 in the Regular Army as Military Police element of Headquarters Train and Military Police, First Expeditionary Division, redesignated 6 July 1917 as the 1st Division, redesignated 19 August 1942 as the 1st Infantry Division. Reorganized and redesignated 31 March 1946 as the 1st Military Police Company of the 1st Infantry Division. Inactivated 15 February 1957 at Fort Riley, Kansas; concurrently relieved from assignment to the 1st Infantry Division. Assigned 23 October 1963 to the 1st Infantry Division and activated 2 January 1964 at Fort Riley, Kansas.

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT

WWI

SONINIÉVILLER	AISNE-MARNE
SCISSORS	ST. MIHIEL
ANSAUVILLE	MEUSE-ARGONNE
CANTIGNY	LORRAINE 1918
MONTIDIDIER-NOYON	PICARDY 1918

VIETNAM DEFENSE

COUNTEROFFENSIVE, PHASE II
COUNTEROFFENSIVE, PHASE III
TET COUNTEROFFENSIVE
COUNTEROFFENSIVE, PHASE IV
COUNTEROFFENSIVE, PHASE V
COUNTEROFFENSIVE, PHASE VI
TET 69/COUNTEROFFENSIVE
SUMMER/FALL 1969
WINTER/SPRING 1970

WWII

ALGERIA-FRENCH MOROCCO
(WITH ARROWHEAD)
TUNISIA
SICILY
(WITH ARROWHEAD)
NORMANDY
(WITH ARROWHEAD)
NORTHERN FRANCE
RHINELAND
ARDENNIES-ALSACE
CENTRAL EUROPE

SOUTHWEST ASIA
DEFENSE OF SAUDI ARABIA LIBERATION
AND DEFENSE OF KUWAIT


DECORATIONS

Meritorious Unit Commendation, Streamers embroidered EUROPEAN TREATY, VIETNAM 1967-1968, VIETNAM 1968-1969, and SOUTHWEST ASIA. Army Superior Unit Award, Streamer embroidered GRENADA 1984-1985. French Croix de Guerre with Palm, World War II, Streamers embroidered KASSERINE and NORMANDY. French Croix de Guerre, World War II Fourragere. Belgian Fourragere 1940. Cited in the Orders of the Day of the Belgian Army for action at MONS and EUPEN-MALMEDY. Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1965-1968. Vietnamese Civil Action Honor Medal, First Class Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1965-1970.

INDEX of ARTICLES

PB 19-95-2, Winter 1995

- Drill Sergeants and Initial Entry Training-**
SSG Timothy P. Dunnigan, page 5
- Military Police, A Force Multiplier in Force XXI-**
MG Alfonso E. Lenhardt,
LTC Robert W. Gee, page 6
- UCCATS: Advanced Simulation-Based Military Police Tactical Training-**
LTC Dane L. Rota, page 9
- Military Police Warfighters Center-**
CPT Wayne P. Stilwell, Page 11
- Force of Choice: The Panama Solution-**
MAJ David M. Van Laar, page 12
- Detainee Operations in Haiti During Operation Uphold Democracy-**
CPT Edward R. Armstrong, page 16




- Responding, Reacting, and Resolving, The 511th Military Police Company in Cap Haitian, Haiti-**
CPT Patrick J. Lafferty, page 20
- Crime and Computers: The Modern Hydra-**
CSM Ross M. Gardner, page 25
- Fort Campbell Provost Marshal Operations-**
CPT I. M. Dolata, Jr., page 29

- Convoy Escort in Guerilla Country: The Soviet Experience-**
Mr. Lester W. Grau, page 32
- The U.S. Military Prison at Shepton Mallet, England-**
MAJ Ronald O. Gienapp, page 41
- Paving the Road to Combined Movements Control Doctrine-**
CPT Kimberly S. McGee, page 44
- Do-It In Transition-**
Mr. Richard Harrison, page 45
- 463d MP Company Deployed to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba-**
MSGT Tina Sims, USAF,
SGT Terry Webster, USA, page 46
- Lessons from History, The EPW Situation in the Korean War-**
LTC Walter R. Schumm,
CPT Kenneth M. Kildare,
1LT Fred J. Wieselhaus,
CSM James O. Kjosa, page 48
- Reorganization of the U.S. Army Military Police School-**
Dr. Charles E. Notar, page 52

PB-19-96-1, Summer 1996

- Armored Security Vehicle(ASV)-**
MAJ Muareen W. Cross, Page 5
- Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Task Force Eagle-**
LTC Wayne L. Meeusen, page 8
- The Balkans - Then and Now-**
MAJ Max J. Riekse, page 16
- The 95th Military Police "Superstars" Deploy for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR-**
MAJ Katherine N. Miller, page 18
- Military Police Support for the Sava River Crossing-**
CPT Mick Simonelli, page 22
- Mine Detector Dogs in Bosnia-Herzegovina-**
SSG Billy Meier, page 24
- Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR 230th MP Company, 95th MP Battalion "The Best The Best" From Tazsar, Hungary-**
1SG Charles V. Slider, Jr. page 26
- The Dragoons Deploy to Bosnia, 212th Military Police Company-**
1LT Jennifer S. Scott, page 27
- Assault Command Post-**
1LT Byron P. Baggett, page 29

- Winter Escort in Bosnia-**
2LT Luther R. Wiest, page 31
- Doing What Must Be Done-**
LTC Glenn P. Beard,
CPT Bradley W. Graul, page 33
- Customs Inspections and the Corps-**
CSM(Ret) Norm Kaucher, page 35
- The MACOM Provost Marshal Office: At the Crossroads of Change-**
LTC Gary J. Harrity, page 36



- Expanding the Military Police Role in Force Protection-**
MAJ Robert C. Grunewald, page 39
- Military Police Workload Planning Factors-**
MAJ Michael R. French, page 43
- Deploying with CALL in Support of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR-**
CPT Kim S. Orlando, page 45
- Unit Ministry Team-18th Military Police Brigade-**
2LT William Payton, page 47
- Realistic Training "International Style"-**
2LT Rick G. Heidorn II, page 48
- Negotiation in Contingency Operations-**
MAJ Kevin J. Dougherty, page 50

Battlefield Circulation Control on the Republic of Korea-
2LT Richard J. Ball, page 52

Foal Eagle '95- Direct Support to 1st CAV in Korea-
1LT Kyle Vowinkel, page 53

The Soldier Enhancement Program (SEP) and USAMPS-
MAJ Arthur J. Aragon, Jr.,
Mr. John T. Kociaba, page 54

Shared Training at the Military Police Warfighters' Complex-
CPT Wayne P. Stilwell, page 57

Unarmed Self-Defense (Are You Really Ready?)-
SSG Leonard C. Holifield, page 58

U.S. Army Hawaii Military Police Make VJ-Day Celebration Success-
CPT Karen A. Berger, page 60

716th Military Police Battalion Memorial Dedication-
1LT Michael S. Dooley, page 62

Preparing for Command: Army Automation Solutions-
CPT John G. Voorhees,
1LT Vernon D. Anderson,
1LT Eric E. Barras,
1LT Todd C. Mooney, page 64

The Fort Myer Military Police Company Guardians of the Nation's Capital-
1LT William J. Benner III, page 66

Military Police Officer Named Instructor of the Year-page 69

Military Police Warfighter Symposium II-
SGT Claudia A. Lawrence, page 70

PB-19-96-2, Winter 1996

USAMPS Commandant Letter-
BG David W. Foley, page 4

The British Provost Company-
BG(Ret) Raymond E. Bell, Jr., Page 6

Bond of Friendship-
LTC(Ret) T. Pemberton OBE, page 9

Exchange Officer with the British Army School Of Training Support(ASTS)-
MAJ John Huey, page 10

Military Police Support The 1996 Centennial Olympics-
CPT(P) Susan K. Donaldson,
MSG Shirley Reed, page 14

Teamwork and Leadership Make the Difference-
MAJ Denise A. Goudreau, page 18

USAREUR Law Enforcement and the IFOR Deployment-
Mr. Thomas E. Lohman, page 21


The 95th Military Police Battalion Catches Glimpse of the Future-
1LT William B. Pitts, page 25

MI/MP Team in Bosnia-Herzegovina-
2LT Tina Blair, page 27

Inspection of the Tuzla Army Barracks By 709th MP Battalion-
2LT William Payton, page 29

Partners in History-
Ms. Jerry G. Burgess, page 31

Tomb Sentinel-First Woman to Earn Badge-
Mr. Thomas E. Mani, page 33



Lest We Forget-Military Police on Okinawa in 1945-
MAJ James L. Emerson, page 35

Soldiers of the Gauntlet in III Corps Warfighter 96-
MAJ Scott Halasz

U.S. Forces in Good Hands with the Carabinieri-
Cadet Scott J. Roney, page 44

Military Police Compete in Warfighter Team Challenge-
SGT Claudia A. Lawrence, page 48

MP Takes Army Level Honor-
SPC Jon Tiller, page 51

PB 19-97-2, Summer 1997

MANCSEN-
Dr. Charles E. Notar, page 4

Lane Training Explained-
COL David F. Treuting, page 12

Expanding the Role of the PWIC-
MAJ Edward J. Kornish, page 20

Force Protection and the Military Police Corps-
CPT Steven L. Donaldson, page 24


Military Police in Military Operations in Urban Terrain-MOUT, A Senior Leaders Perspective-
MAJ Stephen J. Mills, page 26

Warfighter Rear Operations, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) Battle Command Training Program-
MAJ Brice A. Gyurisko, Sr., page 30

MP Story, Patrols Keep Peace-
SGT Jack Siemieniec, page 33

From the Manufacturer to the Foxhole-
CPT Burt D. Moore, page 34

Pair Make History at Tomb-
SGT Ron McLendon II, page 36



MP Corps Regimental Command SGT Major Receives Legion of Merit-
PVT David S. Howell, page 37

Educating the Force XXI Army: The KSAs Underlying the Hi-Tech Solutions-
Dr. Charles E. Notar, page 38

Back home they'd call it 'Downright Family-Like!'
MAJ Mark J. Bowen, page 44

Standardized Field Sobriety Test-
SFC James D. Peterson, page 46

Ps, TEXCOM Test New Security Vehicle-
SGT Eartha L. Rufat, page 50

Guarding the Stockade: The 538th MP Service Company-
Dr. Roger T. Zeimet, page 53

CID Warrant Officer Sets Gold Standard for Personnel Support-
Mr. Paul Boyce, page 55

317th Military Police Battalion,
page 56

Fort McClellan Military Police Company Wins General Stem Award-
PVT Roxanna N. Lemmon, page 57

230th Military Police Company Wins J. P. Holland Award, page 58

PB 19-98-1, Winter 1998

What Makes A Leader?-
Dr. Charles E. Notar, page 4

Superstars Take on the Concrete Jungle EXERCISE URBAN STAR-
1LT Jessica W. Killin, page 8

Silver Sword-
MAJ Doug Dankworth, page 12

9th MP Co at the Cutting Edge-
2LT Jason S. Liggett,
SSG John G. Urban, page 14

209th Test the Driver Vision Enhancer(DVE)-
2LT Jason S. Liggett,
SSG John G. Urban, page 15

Military Police End Training, Leave for Bosnia-
SGM Mary E. Starmer, page 18

Military Police in the Netherlands: Doing It All-
CPT Aston L. Hayes, page 20

Military Police to Robo Cop, Fact or Fiction?-
Malcolm P. Cheatham, page 22

Military Working Dogs-The Army's Four Footed MP-
SFC Tammy L. Quirin, page 24

Casing the Colors, 555th MP Company-
1LT John C. Giordano, page 26


OPMS XXI, Changing Officer Career Patterns of a Force XXI, Army-
CPT Stephen T. Willhelm, page 28

Looking Back in History...THE BATTLE OF SAIGON...30 Years Ago-
William A. Oberholtzer, page 30

Women in Israeli Defense Force Military Police-
BG(Ret) Raymond E. Bell, Jr., page 36

The Military Police Codes of Ethics,
page 39

The Code of Conduct Across the International Legal Spectrum-
MAJ Mark C. Prugh, page 40



The Regimental Grove,
page 50

Warfighter Team Challenge 1997-
SFC(P) Dorsey L. Newcomb, page 52

Duty, Honor, and Country-
Private Roxanna N. Lemmon, page 56

A Horse Named Recognition-
BG Francis E. Howard, age 58

The Military Police Corps Regimental Museum, page 61

PB 19-98-2, Summer 1998

95C I/R, A Master Stroke of Reality-
Dr. Charles E. Notar, page 4

Total Army School System (TASS)-
MAJ Ralph Tafuri, page 9

Plan of Attack: in Pursuit of J. P. Holland Award-
LTC Wallace E. Embrey, Jr., page 11

Robotic Security for the Next Millennium-
LTC Bruce M. Swagler, page 14

USAMPS, Meeting the Information Age Head On-
MAJ Carlotta M. Dallstream, page 16

Law and Order-
SPC Matt J. Johnson, page 19

Disaster Hits Alabama-
SSG Norman Arnold, page 20

Bragg Battles Bias-based Crimes-
John Paul Boyce, Jr., page 26

MP Sergeant of the Guard a Pioneer-
CPT Karen A. Berger, page 28

The War on Drugs in the Far East-
CPT James M. Falcone, page 30


Every Dog Has Its Day-
SFC Tammy L. Quirin, page 32

The Camcopter-
SFC Larry Lane, page 34

Military Police 5 Functions-
Dr. Charles E. Notar, page 37

"Tet" 1968 Remembered-
John Buckley, page 40


Looking Back in History...BG Thomas F. Barr-
SGT Claudia E. Wehbe, page 43



Military Police Corps Regimental Museum-
Scott Norton, page 44

Small Town Holds Big Homecoming-
SGM Mary E. Starmer, page 49

USAMPS Instructors Named Head of Class-
PFC Carrie Fortner, page 54



Letters to the Editor

Dear Readers,
 There will be many changes when the U.S. Army Military Police School moves to the new Maneuver Support Center at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. I will have a new address, phone and fax, which will be announced in the Summer 1999 issue of the MILITARY POLICE Professional Bulletin.

The personal subscriptions will be handled as they are now in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, with no change. Worldwide mailing to units will also continue in the same manner from Laurel, Maryland. If there are any changes in addresses they should be directed to me. Even though I do not mail out the worldwide distribution, I maintain that list for the Government Printing Office. I receive many letters and phone calls with comments about the articles in *MILITARY POLICE*. I want to thank you all—your input from the field, from former military police, and from civilians is valuable to me. When submitting articles for publication please include action photographs with captions, graphics and a brief biography of the author or authors. Photographs will be returned upon request. Please include current address and phone and FAX numbers. Send to:

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 kaymundy@aol.com

I receive many inquiries about the policies for publication in *MILITARY POLICE*. All articles are staffed to subject matter experts within the school for comment and approval. Please refer to the masthead (inside front cover) for further explanation of the intent. The United States Army Military Police School homepage is <http://www.mcclellan.army.mil/usamps>. There are some new areas that have recently been added—the Memorial Grove and the Military Police Hall of Fame. Some other areas have been updated and some are under "construction." For more information, comment or questions email—garblers@mcclellan-mps.army.mil or go to the homepage and click on webmaster. I appreciate the tremendous support I receive. Thank you, KLM

Dear Editor,

Throughout my career I have made mention to many soldiers, who present coins, of that one particular coin that, all Military Police would be proud to bear. That is the Military Police Regimental Coin. I have lost my coin in my, soon to be twenty years of service, that I used to carry with me in my pocket as if it were my last chance at life. Whenever times would weigh heavily on my mind and body, I could reach into my pocket and, as if given a renewed spirit, remember what it means to be a soldier and a Military Police.


I remember that coin in the worn condition when I held it for the last time, but my spirit goes on as the recollection continues. Now and again, I find myself reaching into my pocket bringing back that spirit of being a professional, being a soldier, and being a Military Police.

I would greatly appreciate it if the list of the members of the Hall of Fame was published in the *MILITARY POLICE Professional Bulletin*. This itself, would be better accepted than any award present as a retirement award. Again, I sincerely appreciate your assistance.

SSG Ford D. Wing

Dear Editor,
 I am looking for anyone who attended OSUT with me. I was assigned to Company D, 4th Platoon, 11th Military Police Battalion. I would like to get a copy of my platoon photograph. The dates are – 10 October 1980 – 25 January 1981. Thank you.

Jack Sadousky
 273 Cypress Drive
 Mastic Beach, NY 11951
 (email: Peace273@aol.com)




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WARFIGHTER SYMPOSIUM

The Fifth Annual Warfighter Symposium will be conducted at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, on 30 March—1 April 1999. The focus of this year's event will be to showcase the new U.S. Army Military Police School's (USAMPS) facilities.

All Military Police Brigade and Battalion Commanders and Command Sergeants Major are invited to participate. For further information contact USAMPS Proponency, DSN 865-4710/3817, Commercial 256-848-4710/3817 or email: chiefprop@mcclellan-mps.army.mil



MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE-LEVEL COMMANDS

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM	UNIT	LOCATION
Otis E. Cooksey	Charles E. McGee	8th MP Bde	Yongsan, Korea
Terry S. Moreau	John A. Sampson	16th MP Bde	Ft Bragg, NC
Dario A. Compain	Edward M. Keuten	18th MP Bde	Mannheim, GE
Carrie W. Kendrick	Angela C. Wilson	89th MP Bde	Ft Hood, TX
Graves T. Meyers IV	Ross M. Gardner	3d MP Grp (CID)	Ft Gillem, GA
Thomas Keller	William F. Merrill	6th MP Grp (CID)	Ft Lewis, WA
Brittain P. Mallow	Luis G. Valdes	701st MP Grp (CID)	Ft Belvoir, VA
Charles D. Lowman	James R. Degrizio	HQs 2d Region (CID)	Heidelburg, GE
David F. Treuting	Robert L. Etzold	Garrison	Ft McClellan, AL
David L. Patton	Samuel J. Goodwin	Garrison	Ft Myer, VA
John L. Della Jacono	David S. Ahlansberg	Tng Bde	Ft McClellan, AL
Michael A. Lansing	Donald E. Martin	USDB	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Lois C. Beard	Michael D. Brandstetter	1st MP Bde (P)	Ft Lewis, WA
Manolito Garaboto	Janez Grkman	USA MP BDE HI	Ft Shafter, HI

RESERVE COMPONENT MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE-LEVEL COMMANDS

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM	UNIT	LOCATION
James T. Dunn	Raymond W. Funaro	43d MP Bde	Warwick, RI
Mark R. Bailey	Varney D. Smith	220th MP Bde	Gaithersburg, MD
Dion P. Lawrence	Richard N. Espinosa	260th MP Bde	Washington, DC
Dennis J. Laich	Robert L. Kilburn	300th MP Cmd (EPW)	Inkster, MI
Robert G. Mennona	Ernest Trinca	800th MP Bde (EPW)	Uniondale, NY
Larry Ware	Eugene R. Bowman	177th MP Bde	Taylor, MI
Robert G. Harvey	William H. Freeman, Sr.	1st Bde, 80th Div (IT)	Ft Meade, MD
Paul H. Hill	Charles P. Cavanagh	367th MP Group (EPW)	Ashley, PA

MILITARY POLICE BATTALION-LEVEL COMMANDS

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM/1SG	UNIT	LOCATION
Donna G. Boltz	Douglas E. Porterfield	94th MP Bn	Yongsan, Korea
David B. Lamauk	Michael P. Hamilton	95th MP Bn	Mannheim, GE
Rodney E. Johnson	John W. McConnell	503d MP Bn	Ft Bragg, NC
David E. Quantock	Mark L. Farley	504th MP Bn	Ft Lewis, WA
Teddy R. Spain	Dennis Lafferty	519th MP Bn	Ft Polk, LA
Eugene A. Smith, Jr.	Daniel B. Rimmer	709th MP Bn	Hanau, GE
Keith C. Blowe	Derrick Washington	716th MP Bn	Ft Campbell, KY
David D. Phillips	Adrian K. Arnett	720th MP Bn	Ft Hood, TX
Forrest R. Newton	Alfredo Hernandez	728th MP Bn	Taegu, Korea
James C. Abney	Carl E. Hemler	759th MP Bn	Ft Carson, CO
Richard W. Swengros	James S. North	793d MP Bn	Bamberg, GE
Joseph G. Curtin	Bennett I. Sapp	704th MP Bn	Ft Lewis, WA
Colleen L. McGuire	Aaron Henderson	705th MP Bn	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Joseph A. Rapone	Merle D. Jones	701st MP Bn	Ft McClellan, AL
Jack R. McClanahan	Leo M. Usry	787th MP Bn	Ft McClellan, AL
Steve M. Herold	James F. Barrett	795th MP Bn	Ft McClellan, AL
Michael I. Bumgarner	Michael P. Lessard	LEB, 3d MP Bn (P)	Ft Stewart, GA
Steven D. Volkman	Raul Salinas, Jr.	LEC, 25th MP Bn (P)	Schofield Bks, HI
Frank G. Lester III	Bruce A. Bell	10th MP Bn	Ft Drum, NY
Marvin K. King	Roosevelt B. McGarrah	LEC	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Douglas S. Baker	Curtis R. Rodocker	LEC	Ft Bliss, TX
James W. Harrison	Kenneth J. Zawodney	5th MP Bn (CID)	Kaiserslautern, GE
Stephen M. Wilkins	Michael E. Hill	10th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Bragg, NC
Dennis H. Thompson	Benjamin M. Kellam	11th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Hood, TX
Peter V. Wojcik	Robert R. Murray	19th MP Bn (CID)	Yongsan, Korea
Jeffrey G. Colley	Craig J. Blackmon	22d MP Bn (CID)	Ft Lewis, WA
Gerri K. Graugnard	Catherine R. Brunner	CID District	Ft Riley, KS
Paul R. Capstick	Pamela J. Chavez	CID District	Ft Myer, VA
Donald G. Salo, Jr.	James D. Adamski	CID District	Ft Benning, GA
Christopher G. Essig	Thomas J. Colson	CID District	Ft Carson, CO
Edward J. Sannwaldt, Jr.	Deborah McMahon	CID District	Ft Campbell, KY
Thomas L. LaCrosse	Thomas E. Brown	CID District	Ft Monmouth, NJ
Kevin J. Palgutt	Jacob L. Ashton	CID District	Bamberg, GE

Current as of 1 January 1999



43D MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE



LINEAGE AND HONORS

Constituted 4 March 1959 in the Rhode Island Army National Guard as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 103d Replacement Battalion. Organized and federally recognized 1 April 1959 in Providence. Converted and redesignated 1 May 1968 as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 43d Military Police Brigade. Reorganized and redesignated 1 May 1976 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 43d Military Police Brigade.

Editor's note: We intend to feature an MP brigade and a battalion in each issue. If you desire your unit to be featured, please provide the unit history to Editor, MILITARY POLICE, U.S. Army Military Police School, Bldg. 3181, Fort McClellan, Alabama 36205-5030 (or email to kaymundy@aol.com or elliotr@wood.army.mil).

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


Figure 6. IO Synchronization Matrix

forces (SF) activities that support, enable, or influence operations have become integral to their decision process and operations and require careful coordination and synchronization to achieve maximum effect. Commanders must continue to carefully manage the separation of PA and PSYOP function to preserve the integrity and credibility of PA operations. The methods of using C2W, PA, and CA together to enhance operations is discussed in detail in chapter 3, FM 100-6." We must understand our role, articulate it, and then perform.

LEADDEX Model and the Army Force-Projection Cycle (Figure 5) are no different. When you add the Synchronization Matrix (Figure 6), to the projection cycle you can see the numerous areas that the MPs will perform their functions and meet the corresponding integrated IO objectives. As one of the first in and last out, units that are deployed across the levels of hostility (Figure 7), it is obvious that the MPs will need to counter our adversary options. This will happen in the global information environment in which the MPs have been operating over the last 10 years.

There is limited MP activity in the area C2-attack - Gain control over the adversary's command and control function. This is offensive in nature. However, C2-protect - Limit vulnerability of friendly command and control, is the primary MP contribution in IO. We are directly involved through our MP functions such as Physical Security of information facilities/infrastructure. We teach the physical security course for the army, and are the proponent for physical security equipment/doctrine. The CID Crime Prevention Surveys identify vulnerabilities.

THREATS TO INFORMATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS




Figure 7. Threats to Information and Information Systems

Our area security operations focus on protecting combat assets including command, control and communications during conflict. Police Intelligence Operations gathers and analyzes information on criminal/terrorist activity during Wartime, OCONUS. Information on criminal activity is gathered in peacetime and wartime in all locations. It is stored and analyzed in databases such as the CID Automated Criminal Intelligence Reporting System (ACIRS) and MP Management Information System (MPMIS).

The Military Police Corps is an active participant in the offensive

part of C2-protect. Civil affairs creates a positive image of U.S. Forces and gathers information. MPs are involved in Host Nation Police relations/training. MPs frequently work with the local police force in establishing/maintaining order. This results in a positive image of US military presence as "helpers". Similarly, disaster/humanitarian relief, MPs provide assistance to relief officials with security, communications, facilitating movement of supplies, etc.

MPs are one of the major sources for the public affairs office (PAO). PAO—ensures that the mes-

sage gets out accurately. They will be telling our Corps, the Army and the Nation's story. This story comes from our several functions. This can be how we conduct our Interment/resettlement operations. MPs provide protection and ensure proper treatment of detained persons. Within the PAO mission is support to PSYOPs by dispelling the "monster" image of U.S. Forces portrayed by the adversary. Our constant contact with the populace provides opportunities for rumor control and feedback on how the message is received. In addition to our indirect support MPs have direct media