



# MILITARY POLICE

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF THE MILITARY POLICE CORPS

2025 Annual Issue

## THE SHIELD

# MP



## PROTECTING THE FORCE, ENABLING THE FIGHT

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

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# MILITARY POLICE

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- 1 Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School
- 2 Regimental Command Sergeant Major
- 3 Regimental Command Sergeant Major Farewell
- 4 Regimental Chief Warrant Officer
- 5 **Military Police Contributions to the Future of the Protection WFF: Evolving to Enable Formation-Based Layered Protection**  
*By Lieutenant Colonel Christopher A. Evans, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony E. Perrizo, and Colonel Robert A. Davel (Retired)*
- 9 **Using UASs to Bridge the Military Police ISR Gap**  
*By Captain Ryan P. Clemente*
- 11 **Building Trust and Fostering Innovation Through Army Leadership: Insights From ADP 6-22**  
*By First Lieutenant Austin T. Sandel*
- 13 **Military Police Are Here, Now What? Observations and Perspective as a Military Police OC/T at NTC**  
*By Captain Michaela C. Lang*
- 16 **Lessons Learned at JRTC: A Look into 194th Military Police Company Preparation and Execution**  
*By Captain Jacob T. Maule*
- 18 **Military Police Contributions to Moral**

## Readiness in Just LSCO

*By Chaplain (Major) Michael D. Demmon*

- 22 **716th Military Police Battalion: The Future of Air Assault Military Police**  
*By First Lieutenant Sam M. Carlson*
- 23 **Restoring Warrior Skills**  
*By Sergeant First Class Dustin A. Thomas*
- 25 **The Army Corrections Command: Professionalism, Justice, and Strategic Risk Mitigation**  
*By Captain Joshua I. Bogle and Staff Sergeant Caitlin E. Sias*
- 28 **Pacific Prowess: Adapting Military Police Capabilities for the Indo-Pacific**  
*By Major Ryan C. Timmons, Captain Andrew P. Spikes Jr., and First Lieutenant Alan T. Paiz*



# Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School



## Colonel Charles A. Green

As we move forward in 2025, the Military Police Corps Regiment stands at a defining moment—where tradition, transformation/change, and operational necessity converge.

This year's Regimental theme, ***"The Shield—Protecting the Force, Enabling the Fight,"*** captures the very essence of who we are and what we do across all echelons of the U.S. Army.

**It is more than a symbol or a slogan—it's a promise. . .**

A promise that no matter the threat, no matter the hour, no matter the cost—we will stand between danger and those we are privileged to protect—between good and evil.

It is our duty to protect, to defend, to serve—to act as a shield. This commitment has no expiration date, no time off, no shortcuts. We uphold our promise, unwavering and absolute.

Our role as the Army shield is grounded in a proud heritage that began in 1778 with the Marechaussee Corps. Over the years, we have evolved in response to the changing operational environment, adapting to conventional and asymmetric threats and multidomain challenges. Today, our Soldiers continue to serve as guardians of discipline and law, defenders of critical assets, and enablers of maneuver through decisive action.

**Protecting the Force** involves more than just physical security; it also encompasses the preservation of readiness, cohesion, and trust within our formations. Whether we are conducting law enforcement on our installations, managing detainee operations, or securing the movement of forces across contested terrain, we serve as force multipliers. Our efforts enable commanders to focus on the mission by ensuring that their units remain secure, resilient, and prepared.

**Enabling the Fight** emphasizes our role in large-scale combat operations. Our capabilities in mobility support, police intelligence, and security operations are essential for shaping the battlefield and achieving operational dominance. We are no longer on the sidelines; we are at the forefront of the strategic advantage of the Army in complex, multidomain operations.

To every military police Soldier, leader, and civilian—you are the living embodiment of this year's Regimental theme. Whether deployed forward or supporting from garrison, your actions represent the unwavering strength of the Military Police Corps Regiment. I challenge you to lead with integrity, serve with honor, and continuously sharpen our capabilities—demonstrating the immense value of our Regiment. **You are our credentials!**

As we move toward the future, we do so together—united by a strength of purpose, a clear mission, and a steadfast commitment to action. The Military Police Corps Regiment remains dedicated to its promise to protect and support, now and in the future.

Let us continue to be the shield—willing to Assist, Protect, and Defend in peace and war—no matter when or where!

***"Assist, Protect, Defend"***

***"This We'll Defend"***





# Regimental Command Sergeant Major



## Command Sergeant Major James W. Rutherford

**I**t is a tremendous honor to serve as the 17th Regimental Command Sergeant Major. The Military Police Corps Regiment is disciplined, adaptable, and ready to confront challenges head-on. My goal is to inspire positive changes and foster collaboration that will help our Regiment achieve excellence. We must embrace innovation, enhance our training, and hold ourselves to the highest standards. I encourage every Soldier and leader to be bold, think outside the box, and strive for excellence. Together, we will ensure that our Regiment meets and exceeds the Army's evolving needs. The courage and commitment of our Soldiers fuel this Regiment, and we must be prepared to adapt to a Military Police Corps that is technologically advanced, operationally unmatched, and unwavering in our commitment to Soldiers, the Army, and our great Nation. Through innovation and an unrelenting focus on readiness and lethality, we will meet the challenges of the future while honoring our proud legacy. I am dedicated to supporting our Commandant in driving his vision and priorities for our Regiment. To succeed, we must unite in teamwork and collaboration across our entire Regiment. We are more than capable of meeting the challenges ahead as our Corps evolves to face future conflicts. Protect the Force and Enable the Fight: Assist, Protect, Defend—Of the Troops, for the Troops!



### Professional Vision Statement

Provide engaged servant leadership that positively influences every Soldier and Civilian in the Military Police Corps Regiment to provide **Trained** and **Ready** military police professionals to **RESPOND, SUPPORT, PROTECT**, and **WIN** in **Any Environment Against Any Adversary**.

### Personal Vision Statement

Set the example as a husband, father, and leader, never wavering in my faith, values, and beliefs.

**L - ead** from the front.

**E - mpower** leaders.

**A - ccountability**—take ownership of mistakes—hold yourself, each other, and your Soldiers accountable.

**D - iscipline**—the unenforced standard becomes the new set standard.

**E - fficiency**—time is a valuable resource; do not abuse or waste a Soldier's time.

**R - eadiness**—challenge Soldiers with tough and realistic training (8-Step Training Model) and physical fitness (Human Resources [HR] Metrics/Medical Protection System [MEDPROS]).

**S - upport**—we win and lose as a TEAM, and Family is the foundation of our TEAM.

**H - ave** FUN and build the TEAM.

**I - nform**—communicate; don't suffer in silence. Bad news never gets better with time.

**P - resent** and engaged servant leadership; know Soldiers and their Families.

### Foundations of Institutional Excellence

Army Values, Warrior Ethos, Soldier's Creed, the Creed of the Noncommissioned Officer, and the NCO Guide

# Regimental Command Sergeant Major

## *Command Sergeant Major William M. Shoaf*



Greetings once again from Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri! It has been the honor of a lifetime to serve as the 16th Regimental Command Sergeant Major for the last 2 years. As a Regiment, we have experienced significant change while navigating the U.S. Army transformation to fight and win on the future battlefield. I am proud of the leadership, professionalism, expertise, and competence that every Soldier, leader, and Civilian exemplifies each day. The Regiment continues to prove why we are the premiere dual-purpose formation of the Army. As we embrace change and transformation, the Regiment is positioned to lead the protection warfighting function from every camp, post, station, and forward line of troops in all operational environments.

As colors and guidons of historically significant organizations are cased across the Regiment, we pause and reflect on their contributions to our Regimental history, the important roles they played in our Army history, and the ways they continue to shape the future of the Regiment. The reduction of combat support for military police formations has been challenging, but it has also provided opportunities to expand our law enforcement expertise through the establishment of law-enforcement-centric organizations across Army installations. Professional policing and protection of support areas will increase the ability of the Army to maintain readiness and project combat power when required.

What was once old becomes new again. Maneuver support, support area protection, and detention in large-scale multidomain warfare will continue to drive how we approach upcoming strategies and innovations to best support the Army of the future. Many of us old timers remember a much smaller Regiment. Combat support formation relied upon great leaders, Soldiers, and tactical/technical expertise to win. Those things are still the foundation of military police formations. Modernization and experimentation with the addition of human-machine integration, artificial intelligence, next-generation combat platforms, unmanned aircraft systems, and counter-unmanned aircraft systems will offer smaller formations a greater range of operational reach and lethality. When combined with continuously updated doctrine and professional military education, leaders at echelon will continue to excel as experts in their field.

As the Regiment celebrates 84 years of dedicated service to the Army, the Regimental team is preparing for the traditional Regimental Week events. The honors board has convened, and soon the commandant will announce the winners of the Regimental Command Sergeant Major James W. Frye Noncommissioned Officer of Excellence Award and the Chief Warrant Officer Five Philip E. Tackett Excellence in Law Enforcement Award, as well as the nominees for the Regimental Hall of Fame and the Distinguished Members of the Corps. We are excited to once again host our honored guests, the Warfighter Competition, the Senior Leader Forum, and multiple events throughout the week and to celebrate the Regiment at our traditional Military Police Ball.

As I conclude my final entry for the *Military Police Professional Bulletin*, I want to extend my sincere gratitude to each of you for all that you do for our Regiment and our Army. To the entire team here at the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), Fort Leonard Wood—you have gone above and beyond to turn the Commandant's vision into reality. While there is still much progress to be made, the assembled team is poised to shape the future of the Regiment. To the leaders, Soldiers, and civilian partners of the Military Police Corps Regiment—it has been an honor to serve with you. My Army journey is taking me to the Army Training Center, Fort Jackson, South Carolina. I am excited about this new chapter, and I look forward to being closer to home.

*Assist, Protect, Defend!*

#16 . . . signing off.





# Regimental Chief Warrant Officer



## *Chief Warrant Officer Four Angela J. Rulewich*

The Army Transformation Initiative has just begun, but the transformation of the Department of the Army Criminal Investigation Division (DACID) is already in progress. CID continues to focus on its essential mission: to identify, disrupt, and defeat criminal threats against Army personnel, property, and resources. This mission significantly enhances the readiness, lethality, and technical superiority of the Army across various conflicts and all operational domains.

As part of this transformation, the position of Regimental Chief Warrant Officer will be phased out in October 2025. It will be replaced by the Chief of Military Training for the new DACID Military Training Academy (MTA) at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The Chief of the MTA will be responsible for overseeing the transition of designated courses to CID and will establish the organization as the primary proponent for felony-level investigations and the protection of high-risk personnel within the Department of Defense (DOD).

Serving as the 7th Regimental Chief Warrant Officer, I have been consistently impressed by the dedication and professionalism of the team at U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), Fort Leonard Wood, and across the field. The Soldiers and Civilians of the Military Police Corps Regiment demonstrate an unwavering commitment to the mission. We will continue to collaborate, in training and operational environments, to ensure that the law enforcement mission of the U.S. Army continues to assist, protect, and defend globally.

I want to express my sincere gratitude to everyone involved at all levels who has supported this transformation, provided training assistance, and offered guidance throughout this process. Your contributions have been essential to the success of daily military police and law enforcement operations. We are dedicated to maintaining uninterrupted training during this transition. The support and mentorship from the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence, Fort Leonard Wood, as well as USAMPS personnel, have been crucial in developing the next generation of CID special agents.

Moving forward, the CID MTA will work closely with personnel from the DACID Training Directorate and the DACID Training Academy at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. The aim is to align training for the DOD law enforcement operational force, which includes the Regular Army, U.S. Army Reserve, U.S. Army National Guard, and civilian components. CID understands the importance of consistency within the investigative field and is committed to maintaining a unified approach. Special agents assigned to USAMPS have already begun this synchronization process and will continue their efforts throughout the ongoing transformation.

Throughout history, despite times of change, core principles have remained the same: "Seek diligently to discover the truth, deterred neither by fear nor prejudice." CID agents consistently demonstrate their commitment and sacrifice in protecting Soldiers and Army communities. Traditionally, CID has been a leader in innovation, significantly contributing to the fields of forensics, polygraphy, and investigative techniques. CID continues to lead the way by partnering with law enforcement agencies across all jurisdictions, training and equipping special agents for our vital mission. Let us always remember our history and the progress we have achieved.

Thank you to all Military Police Corps Regiment leaders, past and present, for your support and leadership as I transition into a new role to support the future of DACID and the Army.



*Do What Has to Be Done!  
Of The Troops and For the Troops!*

# Military Police Contributions to the Future of the Protection WFF: Evolving to Enable Formation-Based Layered Protection

*By Lieutenant Colonel Christopher A. Evans, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony E. Perrizo,  
and Colonel Robert A. Davel (Retired)*

**The contents of this article do not represent the official views of, nor are they endorsed by, the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.**

***Protection—The “no fail” warfighting function. In the 21st century battlespace, if you fail in protecting the force . . . none of the other warfighting functions matter.<sup>1</sup>***

***Dr. James K. Greer***

The battlefield of the future promises to be more volatile and unpredictable than ever before. Large-scale combat introduces complexity, lethality, ambiguity, and speed to military operations that are uncommon in other contexts.<sup>2</sup> The U.S. Army is entrusted as the contact layer for the joint force to set conditions for successful operations. The U.S. Army faces this critical challenge by securing personnel and protecting assets and operations against a new generation of threats. These threats from our adversaries are generating new forms of mass, such as unmanned systems strategically layered at the tactical edge,<sup>3</sup> that impact populations within an area of operation and drive the need to protect multiple movements of critical assets across formations at echelon. These forms of mass ultimately aim to create temporal dislocation—the ability of mass to appear, disappear, and reappear rapidly across the battlespace.

Formation-based layered protection (FBLP) seeks to revolutionize battlefield protection by integrating it directly into Army formations, from division to individual Soldiers. Recognizing that modern threats demand a unified and adaptable defense, FBLP equips formations with layered defenses, technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, advanced sensors, and networked command structures. At the division level, specialized units provide comprehensive layered defense, while at the brigade level and below, these capabilities are interwoven into existing units. This layered approach creates a protective bubble around formations, enabling them to effectively maneuver, fight, and resupply. By embedding these capabilities within formations, FBLP seeks responsiveness, survivability, and lethality to overcome diverse threats across the modern battlefield.

Military police must evolve to provide essential elements for holistic protection by providing protection functions and tasks at every warfighting echelon, including direct support to close combat forces and Army Protection Program activities within the homeland. Military police are a vital link in the protection chain. The Military Police Corps is currently tasked with leading the protection warfighting function for area security, protected sustainment, and detention and is an integral enabler for mobility and counter-small

unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) in the support areas across divisions and corps areas of operation. Military police also perform critical roles as protection chiefs in divisions, corps, and U.S. Army Service Component Commands.

## **The Evolving Threat: Temporal Dislocation and the Need for Agile Protection**

Temporal dislocation seeks to render an enemy force irrelevant by creating a better situational understanding, allowing for faster decisions that, over time, cognitively overcome an opponent.<sup>4</sup> The rise of adversaries capable of temporal dislocation disrupts traditional protection paradigms. No longer confined by linear battlefields or predictable timelines, these threats demand a paradigm shift in how the Military Police Corps Regiment anticipates, deters, and responds. Simultaneously, the need for expanded maneuvers to consolidate gains and to control endurance, agility, and operational reach will be paramount, requiring the ability to project and sustain military power across vast distances.

The Military Police Corps made difficult choices in 2023 regarding how to best optimize the force structure by prioritizing capabilities in each component (COMPO). The Regular Army (COMPO 1) prioritizes modernized, human-machine-integration-enabled battalions and companies ready to deploy to support their local divisions and corps, with low risk to policing and protection at camps, posts, and stations. The U.S. Army National Guard (COMPO 2) comprises the majority of deployable combat support structures that enable the U.S. Army during extended, large-scale combat operations. It also includes a military police command headquarters that supports theater protection synchronization and homeland defense. The U.S. Army Reserve (COMPO 3) focuses on long-term detention operations and homeland defense, providing the military police command headquarters a major general to serve as the commander of detention operations. The solutions outlined in the following paragraphs enable the Military Police Corps to effectively transform and execute its missions, providing robust future protection capabilities that allow the consolidation of gains to extend endurance, agility, and operational reach.







# Formation Based Layered Protection OV-1

## Temporal Dislocation

- Sensors (Sense)**  
• Counter sUAS  
• Counter Sensing  
• Counter Targeting
- Automation and Decision Support (Decide)**  
• Next Generation Command & Control  
• Protection Decision Support Tool  
• Integrated Battle Command System - Maneuver
- Effectors (Act)**  
• Terrain Shaping  
• Vehicle Protection Systems  
• EW (Protect / Attack)  
• Obscuration  
• Tech Effects  
• Counter sUAS (Kinetic / Non-Kinetic)



What will not change in the future is the need for reliable sustainment. The Army will always require a resilient and agile sustainment network to avoid culmination. The sustainment network must effectively provide critical classes of supplies (fuel, ammunition), reinforcements, and support for casualty evacuation in the close area to prevent operational culmination. Military police protecting sustainment greatly increase the agility of the system, prevent adversaries from exploiting logistical vulnerabilities and opportunities to temporally dislocate friendly units, and increase the probability of priority supplies reaching Army forces at the tactical echelon. This is required to maintain the heightened tempo of operations needed in multidomain operations. The expansion of threats across all warfighting domains requires an integrated and layered multidomain system to protect the force from adversaries through formation-based integrated protection.<sup>5</sup> While FBLP must be cost-optimized, military police forces are specifically designed, trained, and highly capable of performing this critical role.

### The Empowerment of the Military Police Corps Regiment

Meeting these complex challenges requires a multifaceted solution. Beginning with the military police, FBLP is empowered to integrate sensors and information across domains, from the corps to the squad level. The Military Police Corps must be tailored to fulfill its unique roles in leading protection efforts, integrating human-machine protection innovation at speed, restructuring organizational protection, adapting doctrine, and optimizing detention operations for intelligence dominance.

### The Human-Machine Collaboration

Harnessing advancements in robotics, artificial intelligence, advanced sensing, cyber intelligence, and autonomous systems can significantly increase the range and speed of localized lethal effects provided by the Military Police Corps. Military police must be able to have real-time sensing (sense), automated decision support (decide), and an integrated range of defeat mechanisms (kinetic and non-kinetic) to provide proactive protection (act). To capitalize on the needed interoperability to sense-decide-act that effectively provides protection, Military Police Corps modernization must keep pace with the Army elements they support to be able to maintain operational tempo in the future fight. Military police must become interoperable to synchronize protection effects that enable endurance and tempo. This preserves combat power and enables tempo, which is required to support the tactical echelon layered protection units and provide brigade-and-below units adequate protection while on the move that can—

- **Protect the protector.** Deploying robotic platforms for hazardous tasks in the rear areas that protect reliable sustainment networks while providing the capability to disrupt or defeat Level 3 threats helps to ensure the safety of those tasked with protecting others. This enables the required sustainment bandwidth across the security and mobility support spectrum of military police tasks,

minimizing risk to personnel, critical assets, and infrastructure.

- **Expand protective coverage.** In the future operating environment, military police squads must possess capability and reach similar to the military police platoons of today. By utilizing autonomous systems, persistent surveillance and reconnaissance will be achieved, providing early warning and extending the reach of the Military Police Corps across the battlespace. This coverage must integrate with the Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2) architectures.
- **Enhance threat recognition.** Leveraging artificial-intelligence-powered sensors and data fusion identifies and analyzes potential threats in real time, enabling proactive and predictive protection measures. Using a commander-at-echelon approach, military police integrate into the division and corps protection architecture, providing additional information streams to inform enemy targeting. Effective targeting requires robust sensor and intelligence data to drive NGC2. Military police can fulfill this requirement if they are properly equipped and trained to do so.
- **Neutralize small UASs.** Military police protect critical sites from small UASs in the homeland across posts, camps, and stations due to their unique law enforcement authorities. Military police of the future will be trained, equipped, and ready to protect seaports of debarkation and airports of debarkation during fort-to-port power projection, and will later be dispersed across the expanded battlefield during large-scale ground combat operations. As military police refine their continental-United-States-based counter-small UAS program, they simultaneously build the expertise required to counter this evolving threat, providing the U.S. Army an organic capability embedded in FBLP to extend operational reach and reduce casualties.

### The Restructuring for a Fluid Battlespace

Adapting the structure and organization of the Military Police Corps Regiment is crucial for ensuring responsiveness and effectiveness in a dispersed and fluid battlespace. War remains a human endeavor that requires commanders to concurrently address enemy combatants and noncombatants in population centers. This organizational restructuring capitalizes on the current military police force array across the entire battlespace, from a home station to the forward tactical echelon, and leverages human dimension skills gained in detention and police operations to enable commanders to excel by creating—

- **Agile protection companies:** Using a force design update to create smaller, highly mobile military police units equipped for independent operations across vast areas, capable of rapidly responding to emerging threats.
- **Close area and support area security elements:** Adapting military police structure at the battalion level to enable protection from irregular threats while simultaneously creating robust sustainment protection. Military police battalion-and-below levels transform into key formations, providing the sensors and data required to integrate division and corps protection efforts. The COMPO 1



military police brigade structure can be adapted to establish the required command and control structure that enables FBLP (protection brigade, multifunctional brigade, or support area security brigade).

- **Protection fusion for intelligence gathering:** Integrating protection fusion functions into military police units and equipping them with advanced targeting tools, allowing military police to analyze and disseminate real-time threat information to enable proactive protection measures. This critically informs active collective targeting and provides a connective problem-solving capability at the division to corps levels.
- **A military police branch as the protection fusion center:** Transforming battalion and brigade headquarters into protection battalions and brigades to create fusion centers that enable military police to focus on identifying, anticipating, and facilitating the targeting of enemy threats to reduce risk to U.S. Army personnel and assets. This new tactical fusion connects to existing division and corps protection staff and increases FBLP effectiveness.

### The Doctrinal Adaptation for a Fluid Battlefield

Existing doctrine must evolve to reflect the dynamic nature of future conflict, empowering the Military Police Corps to provide flexible and responsive protection. Human-machine integration in future conflict enables military police to create more effects with fewer personnel. In the future FBLP ecosystem, military police provide the core expertise to synchronize both kinetic and nonkinetic effects. Doctrine must reflect the history of the Military Police Corps as an economy of force element to protect the force and preserve combat power.

- **Decentralized command and control:** Further empowering junior leaders within the Military Police Corps Regiment, which historically operates at the squad level, with greater autonomy to make rapid decisions in response to immediate threats and opportunities.
- **Mission command for protection:** Fostering a culture of initiative and adaptability within the Military Police Corps Regiment, enabling commanders at all levels to rapidly tailor protection measures to specific situations in real time.
- **Prioritized protection of sustainment:** Integrating protection planning into all phases of sustainment planning and execution, focusing on the critical role of the Military Police Corps in enabling the consolidation of gains, agility, endurance, and operational reach.

### The Role of Detention Operations in Enabling Intelligence Dominance

Detention operations optimized by detention management tools enable the quick removal of detainees from the battlefield, preventing congested lines of communication and enhancing operational reach. Military police provide critical intelligence to disrupt enemy networks and inform the broader operational picture through the exploitation of high-value targets. This capability is constrained by reductions in

the military police force structure, which creates a time-delayed reliance on COMPO 2/3 for detention operations above the division level.

- **Mobile detention capabilities:** Developing rapidly deployable and secure detention capabilities for swift expeditionary detainee backhaul operations across the battlespace, ensuring humane treatment and adherence to legal obligations. An opportunity exists to reduce the effects of the time-delayed reliance by placing COMPO 1 Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 31E—Corrections and Detention Specialists personnel into security force assistance brigades or by providing a multiCOMPO security-like capability as a part of each theater exercise program to assess host-nation and partner detention capacity (personnel/facilities).
- **Specialized training:** Providing comprehensive training in detention management tools, intelligence fusion, counter-small UASs, military deception, data-driven analysis, cultural awareness, and legal procedures to streamline removal from the battlefield.
- **Human dimension policing skills:** Capitalizing on this unique skill gained during home station law enforcement and proactive policing operations. Using this uniquely developed skill (the ‘police lens’) gives commanders a competitive advantage to address human-centered challenges that plague operations in the information domain while enhancing the legitimacy of the U.S. Army.

### Conclusion: The Essential Role of the Military Police Corps in FBLP

In the complex and unpredictable battlespace of the future, the role of the Military Police Corps as part of FBLP and its leadership in key areas of the protection warfighting function are essential. By embracing technological advancements, optimizing force design, adopting agile doctrine, and refining detention operations to enable intelligence dominance, the Military Police Corps Regiment can effectively counter the threat of temporal dislocation, secure critical assets, and protect sustainment, allowing operational reach of the U.S. Army in the face of any challenge. The Military Police Corps Regiment of the future will be defined by its adaptability, lethality, and unwavering commitment to protecting and enabling the U.S. Army to achieve decisive victory in any future conflict.

#### Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>Dr. James K. Greer, “Insights Into 21st Century LSCO from the War in Ukraine,” SAMS Insights into Evolving Character of Warfare, November 2024, p. 15.

<sup>2</sup>Autonomy Characteristics of Need to Support Human Machine Integrated Formations, Army Futures Command, 13 January 2025, <[https://govtribe.com/file/government-file/autonomy-con-as-of-13-jan-2025-for-public-comments-dot-pdf?recommendationType=similar\\_recommendations](https://govtribe.com/file/government-file/autonomy-con-as-of-13-jan-2025-for-public-comments-dot-pdf?recommendationType=similar_recommendations)>, accessed on 2 June 2025.

<sup>3</sup>Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, 21 March 2025.

<sup>4</sup>T.J. Holland, “Technology at the Point of Contact: Shaping the Future of Warfighting,” *NCO Journal*, 25 November 2024, <<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCO-Journal/Muddy-Boots/Technology-at-Point-of-Contact/>>, accessed on 27 May 2025.

(Continued on page 12)

# Using UASs to Bridge the Military Police ISR GAP

By Captain Ryan P. Clemente

**The contents of this article do not represent the official views of, nor are they endorsed by, the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.**

**T**he war in Ukraine has demonstrated a revolution in the tactical employment of unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) in modern military operations. Commercially available quadcopters are at the forefront of this revolution. Inexpensive commercial UASs applied at a tactical level have become the most critical battlefield enabler for Ukraine, allowing precise targeting at tactical echelons. The fires and movement and maneuver warfighting functions most clearly benefit from the *en masse* integration of commercial quadcopters for tactical purposes. However, the protection warfighting function—particularly as it relates to military police—also greatly benefits from employing UASs. The requirement for large numbers of tactical UASs in future large-scale combat operations (LSCO) will likely extend far behind the forward edge of the battle area and well into the corps rear area.

Security tasks to protect sustainment in the corps rear area will largely be the responsibility of a U.S. military police brigade and its subordinate units. Military police combat support platoons and companies will have direct responsibility for security in different sectors of the rear area. They will execute myriad tasks including area security, route security, movement support to mobility operations, and detention operations and potentially provide support to the populace and resource control. Military police combat support companies will likely be overstretched in their areas of operation, and military police patrols alone are unlikely to detect all threats to the rear area. Commercial quadcopters offer military police a highly mobile, perceptive, and stealthy force multiplier.

Military police combat support companies often control the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets directly supporting their mission while the battalion and brigade security offices coordinate and synchronize the overall information collection picture. Unfortunately, most military police combat support companies do not yet possess the ISR assets necessary to continuously detect threats to the rear area at average modern standoff ranges using a 5.5-kilometer estimate based on the upper-middle range of modern antitank-guided missiles. Military police companies do have a limited number of RQ-11 Raven® UASs (made by AeroVironment®) with low readiness levels (due to wear and tear and cumbersome system training requirements). Even in conditions of high readiness, the respectable RQ-11 flight time of 90 minutes is not high enough for a detached platoon to continuously screen its area of responsibility.



**A Vesper® UAS in flight**

The potential for threat use of commercial UASs for surveillance against U.S. military assets during times of crisis below the threshold of armed conflict is increasing. The proliferation of diverse models of commercial UASs in the current environment presents a peacetime vulnerability to military installations. Tracking down UASs and identifying the operator for questioning, detainment, or arrest is currently a military police duty on Army installations. However, small commercial UASs can move by nap-of-the-earth (low-altitude, terrain-contouring flight) and, when identified from the ground, can easily maneuver away from roads to evade law enforcement—and, like other U.S. law enforcement personnel, military police are geared toward ground-based law enforcement actions and do not yet commonly possess commercial UASs. Military police require new tools to address this challenge, and the most effective could be commercial quadcopters, which could be incorporated into a countersurveillance role. Just as the airplane was adopted for military use, military police ownership of the quadcopter will likely become the best means for counteracting threat quadcopters.

In a hypothetical application of a UAS in a counter-UAS role, a military police desk sergeant could receive a report of the sighting of a potential threat UAS and inform the on-duty military police team equipped with a UAS kit. That team would then employ its UAS to conduct countersurveillance against the potential threat UAS. The military police team UAS would follow the potential threat UAS at distances necessary to avoid detection. Upon observing the potential threat UAS return to its operator, the UAS team would notify relevant military or civilian law enforcement personnel of the location of the threat UAS operator and continue to provide surveillance until ground law



enforcement could apprehend the threat. Employed counter-UAS systems are currently capable of destroying or neutralizing individual UASs, but doing so would only neutralize the symptom—not adequately affect the source of the potential threat. Identification of the operator will be the key to winning the impending fight.

The RQ-11 Raven (first employed in 2001 and currently used by military police) exceeds the cost of a commercial UAS by a ratio of roughly 7:1 (\$35,000 for an RQ-11 versus about \$5,000 for an average commercial UAS). RQ-11 Ravens are unwieldy, noisy, easily visible when in flight, and widely regarded by Soldiers as unreliable. They lack thermal cameras, and the color video images are known for their poor quality. Furthermore, it is difficult to acquire replacement parts for the RQ-11—and, using the war in Ukraine as a benchmark, there are too few RQ-11s for the levels of UAS battlefield attrition in LSCO. In short, the RQ-11 has become obsolete due to its cost and lack of capabilities, and supplementation or replacement by newer tactical UAS systems is required.

The extraordinary number of commercially available UASs has rendered the field highly competitive. According to the Atlantic Council, the People's Republic of China is the top producer of commercial UASs, currently controlling 80 percent of the global market.<sup>1</sup> The Chinese company DJI® produces the Mavic series, which is the most popular UAS series for both Russian and Ukrainian forces. The cost and performance of Mavic UAS models are highly competitive; the price is less than \$4,000 and, according to DJI, the maximum speed is between 35 and 45 miles per hour, and the flight time is approximately 20–45 minutes. While DJI produces the most globally popular UAS and U.S. forces will likely encounter those UASs in the future, the Department of Defense has prohibited their use for military purposes due to security concerns.

Fortunately, several American companies sell highly capable UASs that can be used for tactical purposes. The Vesper® UAS, manufactured by Vantage Robotics®, is an American-made modern quadcopter that was designed for the U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command and the Air Force Security Forces Center, Lackland, Texas, in 2020. The platform could greatly enhance the ISR capabilities of military police battalions. Vespers are invisible to the human eye at a distance of 100 meters, while their sound is undetectable to the human ear at a distance of just 50 meters. The system is equipped with two low-light infrared cameras and a thermal imaging camera with a stabilized 48x zoom capability. Using optical flow, Vespers can fly in a Global Positioning System-denied environment and their methods of communication are National Defense Authorization Act<sup>2</sup>-compliant. They are approved for unit purchase by the Department of Defense Blue UAS Program.<sup>3</sup> Weighing in at just 1.5 pounds, Vespers are easily portable—and they have a maximum speed of 45 miles per hour, a flight time of 50 minutes, and a maximum flight range of 28 miles. While neither Vespers nor most other quadcopters have the endurance of an RQ-11 Raven, they can be purchased through

General Services Administration Advantage for \$6,721; therefore, five Vespers can be obtained for the cost of a single RQ-11 Raven. The affordability and added capabilities of currently available U.S.-manufactured quadcopters, such as the Vesper, would provide military police battalions with the modern ISR redundancy that is required to protect sustainment in corps rear areas (ground lines of communication) during an LSCO fight.

The biggest obstacles to the military police procurement of commercial quadcopters have been a lack of existing UAS training programs (especially programs addressing airspace coordination) and procurement costs not covered by the unit military table of organization and equipment. However, the Department of Defense is taking steps to facilitate individual unit UAS procurement with the Blue UAS Program. This program provides a web-based list of all commercial UAS systems and parts vetted by the Department of Defense and approved for purchase at the unit level. Individual unit procurement of modern commercial quadcopters using the Blue UAS Program is the best interim solution for addressing the military police ISR gap. As the revolution in UAS-related technologies continues, bridging the gap at the Army level will require a holistic approach across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy.

UASs are at the forefront of all future tactical engagements from squad to corps level. The outcomes of future armed conflicts will be defined by the quality and quantity of UASs involved and the tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by them. Future tactical UASs will need to have effective capabilities and be efficiently produced in order to surpass the military and military-industrial capacities of our peer adversaries. The U.S. Army Military Police Corps Regiment will require modern UAS platforms for continuous ISR coverage and protection of their critical areas of responsibility in periods of competition, crisis, counterinsurgency, or LSCO.



#### Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>Matthew Kroenig and Imran Bayoumi, “A Global Strategy to Secure UAS Supply Chains,” Atlantic Council Issue Brief, 25 June 2024, <<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/a-global-strategy-to-secure-uas-supply-chains/>>, accessed on 26 September 2024.

<sup>2</sup>National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, 118th U.S. Congress, 22 December 2023, <<https://www.congress.gov/118/plaws/publ31/PLAW-118publ31.pdf>>, accessed on 30 September 2024.

<sup>3</sup>“Blue UAS,” Defense Innovation Unit web site, <<https://blueuas.diuu.mil/drones>>, accessed on 30 September 2024.

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*\*This article was edited with the assistance of AI tools, and subsequently reviewed and edited by relevant Department of Defense (DOD) personnel to ensure accuracy, clarity, and compliance with DOD policies and guidance.*

# Building Trust and Fostering Innovation Through Army Leadership: Insights From ADP 6-22

*By First Lieutenant Austin T. Sandel*

*The contents of this article do not represent the official views of, nor are they endorsed by, the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.*

In today's dynamic and rapidly evolving global environment, U.S. Army leaders face complex challenges that test their resilience, adaptability, and decision-making capabilities. The Army Leadership Requirements Model, presented in Army doctrine publication (ADP) 6-22, *Army Leadership and the Profession*, provides a framework for nurturing these qualities through the core leader competencies of—

- **Lead**, which emphasizes the ability of the leader to inspire, motivate, and influence others.
- **Develop**, which focuses on the growth of subordinates through mentorship, training, and the creation of a positive command climate.
- **Achieve**, which highlights leader actions that result in the success of a mission or task.<sup>1</sup>

The model also addresses the following three core leader attributes:

- **Character.**
- **Presence.**
- **Intellect.**<sup>2</sup>

A significant distinction between the core leader competencies and core leader attributes of the Army Leadership Requirements Model is that core competencies are skills that can be trained and developed, while core attributes encompass enduring personal characteristics, which are molded through experience over time. This article discusses the importance of implementing Army Leadership Requirements Model strategies to develop core competencies, build trust, and foster innovation in order to achieve mission success.

As challenges become more complex, leaders must develop the core competencies outlined in the Army Leadership Requirements Model, as these competencies contribute to a leader's ability to build trust and foster innovation. Trust and innovation are not merely obscure ideals; they are essential aspects of enabling units to maintain cohesion during adversity and respond effectively under pressure.

Building trust is fundamental to a leader's ability to inspire, motivate, and influence others. Through formal or informal positions of authority, leaders can cultivate trust by exhibiting transparency, engaging in effective communication, demonstrating integrity, and accepting accountability for their decisions and actions. Some specific examples of ways that leaders might build trust with, and make a tremendous impact on, their units include—

- A command team might foster open dialogue with its subordinates, providing context and explaining the reasoning behind missions, creating a shared understanding, listening to concerns, and encouraging feedback.
- A platoon leader or platoon sergeant might stand up for subordinates during higher-level discussions or might ensure that they have adequate resources.
- A squad leader might be actively engaged in training the squad, empowering team leaders to lead by example.

Fostering innovation requires a command climate in which continuous learning, creative problem solving, and professional growth are actively supported. Leaders should be approachable and should encourage and empower subordinates to seize initiative, conduct experiments, and take risks within safe boundaries. Approachable leaders respect others' opinions—even if they are contrary or non doctrinal. This creates a positive environment and allows subordinates to explore new ideas without fear of failure. Providing the necessary resources and recognizing innovative contributions are crucial steps that leaders can take to motivate their subordinates to think critically and propose viable solutions. Leaders can also provide continuous feedback regarding proposed solutions, thereby refining the process. And after action reports can be used to sustain and/or improve those solutions. Through these practices, leaders establish a culture of adaptability and forward thinking, which significantly enhances the resilience and success of the command.

ADP 6-22 states that “A leader's primary purpose is to accomplish the mission.”<sup>3</sup> Achieving results while

building trust and fostering innovation requires a delicate balance between setting clear goals and promoting a creativity-supportive environment. Leaders must provide direction and maintain high expectations, ensuring that objectives are met, while also encouraging their teams to develop innovative solutions. By balancing accountability with empowerment, leaders can create a climate in which subordinates feel trusted and valued, enhancing cohesion and morale. There is often a ripple effect associated with success in this area, as achieving results tends to reinforce trust in leadership and boost confidence in team capabilities. Leaders who prioritize mission success and a positive command climate demonstrate that building trust and fostering innovation does not compromise results but, rather, amplifies the overall team effectiveness.

The Army Leadership Requirements Model provides a critical framework for building trust and fostering innovation within a command. By emphasizing the core leader competencies of lead, develop, and achieve, the model empowers leaders to balance operational success with the development and well-being of their teams. Leaders are encouraged to implement these strategies to build trust, foster innovation, and ensure mission success. By doing so, they can create a culture of excellence that meets and exceeds expectations, preparing their teams to tackle challenges with confidence and creativity.

#### Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>ADP 6-22, *Army Leadership and the Profession*, 31 July 2019.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 1-15.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 7-1.

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*("Military Police Contributions to the Future . . ." continued from page 8)*

<sup>5</sup>Robert R. Leonhard, *The Art of Maneuver, Maneuver-Warfare Theory and Airland Battle*, Presidio Press, 1991.

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*\*This article was edited with the assistance of AI tools, and subsequently reviewed and edited by relevant Department of Defense (DOD) personnel to ensure accuracy, clarity, and compliance with DOD policies and guidance.*





# Military Police are Here, Now What?

## Observations and Perspective as a Military Police OC/T at NTC

*By Captain Michaela C. Lang*

*The contents of this article do not represent the official views of, nor are they endorsed by, the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.*

As part of the transition to the new force structure, many military police units are inactivating and re-flagging under different organizations. While the Military Police Corps Regiment is restructuring, the branch will continue to conduct combat support and law enforcement operations. In certain cases, military police companies will be directly assigned to divisions. At the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, while units are tested in large-scale combat operations, the utilization of military police in support of security and mobility operations can prove a vital asset. The purpose of this article is to discuss how brigade combat teams (BCTs) and divisions can best utilize military police based on observations from the perspective of an observer-coach/trainer (OC/T) at NTC.

### Rear Area Security

Rear area security is not a new mission set for the military police. However, challenges persist due to inadequate early integration, incorrect task organization, and insufficient planning—issues that will remain until a solid integration plan is implemented. Military police often attempt to respond to enemy attacks on the main command post of the brigade, but due to its distant location, they are unable to provide timely support. Nevertheless, there are many tasks that military police can support while conducting rear area security. OC/Ts have observed several operations, including detect, delay, secure, and control.

#### Tasks

Prioritizing military police support based on the prioritized protection list is one approach to organizing forces for the rear area security mission; another is to assign areas of responsibility and task each military police element with support to mobility and/or security tasks revolving around secure, control, delay, or detect functions. In addition, deploying military police as a rapid response force enhances

readiness, allowing for swift engagement, effective counter-measures, or strategic delays against the enemy.

#### Success

Regardless of whether or not military police support originates from within the division, integrating them into the planning process and the dissemination of the plan enhances coordination and effectiveness. Military police have been highly adept at providing early detection by utilizing observation posts and/or ground line of communication security within the rear area, as military police can defeat most combat reconnaissance/patrol vehicles or dismounted enemy forces. Planning and integration drive success; for example, if no one informs the military police of the location of the main command post of the brigade, their response time is significantly delayed. At NTC, if military police do not have antitank weapons, Javelins, Stingers, or counter-unmanned aircraft systems, security operations in the rear area are hindered. An M2 .50-caliber machine gun will not delay a T-90 Russian main battle tank, and an MK19 automatic grenade launcher can only delay a T-90 by making a precise shot to the tracks. Even then, the tank will remain fully capable of employing its weapons system. While the Military Police Corps Regiment is exploring future equipment upgrades, military police at NTC, without these advancements, can only defeat combat reconnaissance/patrol vehicles and dismounted forces by using organic assets. This could enable a prolonged delay or even defeat of the enemy, particularly against a lighter adversary; however, if the unit tasks military police to secure a site on the prioritized protection list, military police should have some form of antiarmor to defeat or delay enemy forces. Ensuring equipment readiness is essential. Precombat checks, inspections, and load plans that are properly validated and executed enhance operational effectiveness across all missions. In the future, military police rear area security could evolve beyond securing lines

of communication and critical assets, incorporating broader operational concepts within specified and prioritized areas. The integration of counter-unmanned aircraft systems and antiarmor weapon systems will be vital to the success of the protection warfighting function in brigade combat team operations and higher-echelon engagements.

### **Sustainment**

Throughout history, attacks on logistics and nodes have helped determine the success or failure of a unit. If sustainment cannot reach the forward line of troops, then the forward line of troops will not move forward.

Securing sustainment nodes is critical to operational effectiveness. So, how do commanders prioritize where to send military police? Do military police get tasked into the brigade support area (BSA), or is the priority to secure logistics release points? There is no correct answer, as it is ultimately dependent on the situation. Some questions to consider are: Does the BSA have its own security measures? Does the logistics release point have security? How far and where is the element going? Is this one of the commander's priorities, or is it on the prioritized protection list? Have there been recent activities along the main supply routes or on transportation assets?

Movement and maneuver at NTC are not easy tasks. Night movements, including the loading and unloading of supplies, require several hours to complete. When examining logistics release points originating from a BSA and a brigade engineer battalion, it is rare to find security on these elements in the rear area. As the rear area expands during combat, military police must assess the security assets with greater scrutiny.

Military police should focus on controlling routes and securing sustainment assets while establishing a priority. For example, a military police company could employ two platoons and a headquarters to enforce route regulations, establishing static posts with mobile patrols along main and alternate supply routes for early detection and delay when necessary. Command and control or operations elements would be positioned at the point of greatest friction, based on the evolving fight. The remaining platoon would serve as a convoy security element, operating in squads to secure assets and remain ready to respond as needed. When they were not actively on mission, they could provide critical site or area security at the BSA.

Protected sustainment can be executed in many ways, and no single approach is always the solution. A military police platoon could achieve the same objective, but with squads rather than platoons.

### **Movement Control**

Traffic jams along major ground lines of communication, movement corridors, or lanes are a frequent challenge during major training exercises. When units receive military police support, the military police are often directed to establish traffic control points (TCPs). However, this often results in static posts at random intersections with no tracking

mechanisms, prioritizations, or clear operational boundaries for higher-level support.

### **Improvements**

Military police senior leaders must be enabled to assist the BCT or division in planning movement control for large operations, and the provost marshal should be included in this process. The following are additional strategies for conducting effective movement control, regardless of whether military police support is available. A traffic control point is ineffective if it lacks a clear task and purpose.

### **Detention Operations**

Detention operations are the primary consideration for BCTs and divisions when assessing military police utilization. During WWII, an average of 1,000 enemy prisoners of war surrendered daily. If this situation arises in the future, military police resources will be insufficient to cover all areas. Every Soldier must understand point-of-capture procedures, as rapid movement to the rear may no longer be as common as it has been. Historically, front-line Soldiers collected detainees, and military police took over detention operations at the division facility.

When military police resources are limited and prioritized for detention operations, they can be prepared to maintain and operate a detention control point (DCP) for the BCT. If considering a division-level asset, assigning a detainee holding area would make more sense. A DCP can be hasty (a circle of concertina wire with water and rations). Alternatively, the DCP could be developed into an enhanced DCP that possesses all the necessary resources to hold detainees for 24 hours or longer. Due to the significant increase in BCTs, OC/Ts do not recommend attempting to establish a DHA, as it requires a substantial amount of manpower and does not necessarily guarantee the ability to accommodate more detainees. Looking ahead, BCTs and divisions must plan for detainee transportation—whether military police support is organic or not—to ensure that detainee operations do not hinder the tempo of friendly forces. While this primarily applies to detainees, it is critical to recognize that large-scale combat operations also involve civilian internees, refugees, and other displaced individuals. Military police must be trained to understand and effectively manage these differences.


If there are other missions for which military police need to provide support, OC/Ts at NTC recommend maintaining an element on a “be prepared to” (BPT) status to ensure that the DCP remains operational. If detention operations are the sole mission of military police, where should they be positioned? Consider an approach similar to the one outlined in the following paragraph.

### **Military Working Dogs (MWDs)**

At NTC, MWDs support BCTs during rotations. However, MWDs have been utilized to maximum efficiency only twice in the past three years. Generally, this is due to MWDs being task-organized to military police in the rear area and not having been trained with the BCT before rotation.

Training the specific MWD team assigned to a BCT for a combat training center rotation presents significant challenges. Any prior training will greatly benefit the brigade. This is essential not only for proper utilization, but also for understanding the logistics and resource requirements of the MWD team. MWDs can support forward elements by conducting building searches for explosives and personnel, detecting explosives, searching vehicles at entry control points, and providing early warning detection for sentry guards. Successful rotations have demonstrated the value of MWD support. In one instance, an MWD assisted in a raid by locating a high-value target (HVT). In another, an MWD team served as sentry guards for the main command post of the brigade. When intelligence indicated a possible minefield nearby, the MWD team successfully identified its location.

## Conclusion

The tasks discussed in this article are only a portion of the responsibilities the military police are evaluating as the new force structure is implemented and additional military police are integrated into divisions. Military police can be a force multiplier when effectively integrated. These tasks should be considered during home station training. In addition, military police can support training on various stability tasks, including nonlethal operations, civil disturbance, and riot control. The role of military police in the protection warfighting function is critical to the success of the BCT or division, whether through action or advisement. If you, your BCT, or your division have questions about military police maneuver support, the NTC team is ready to assist. 

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*\*This article was edited with the assistance of AI tools, and subsequently reviewed and edited by relevant Department of Defense (DOD) personnel to ensure accuracy, clarity, and compliance with DOD policies and guidance.*



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# ***Lessons Learned at JRTC:***

## **A Look Into 194th Military Police Company Preparation and Execution**

*By Captain Jacob T. Maule*

*The contents of this article do not represent the official views of, nor are they endorsed by, the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.*

**T**he 194th Military Police Company, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, recently completed a rotation at Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Johnson, Louisiana, in support of the 2d Mobile Brigade Combat Team (MBCT), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell. This rotation was unique in that the 2d MBCT is one of only three brigades going through transformation in contact. In addition to normal preparations, it was necessary for the 194th Military Police Company to adjust many operating concepts to more closely align with the highly mobile and technologically advanced MBCT. The deliberate preparation, task organization, enhanced capabilities, increased mobility, aligned communication, and practiced survivability contributed to the ability of the 194th to effectively execute operations and support the Army transformation in contact MBCT.

### **Task Organization and Alignment**

The speed and advanced technology of the 2d MBCT drove the analysis for proper 194th Military Police Company alignment with the MBCT. The company, dispersed throughout the training area, was aligned based on prioritized mission sets, with a changing command relationship during the rotation. Several squads were aligned under operational control of battalions to execute critical site security for assets on the defended asset list. This level of control presents a few issues with regard to accomplishing the overall intent of the brigade across different phases of the operation. It was clear that, in order to mitigate the risk of changing command relationships for squad formations, these military police missions needed to be executed off a brigade-synchronized matrix. Company leaders and operations personnel worked closely with the brigade and subordinate unit staffs to best align capabilities against each of the mission sets. The commander of the 194th Military Police Company developed a close working relationship with brigade operations and provost marshal personnel to coordinate military police operations with the overall timing of brigade operations.

To keep pace with the much faster and more mobile infantry squad vehicles of the 2d MBCT, the 194th Military Police Company reduced the amount of modified table of organization and equipment with which it deployed. The company deployed its high-mobility, multipurpose, wheeled vehicle fleet but not its mine-resistant, all-terrain vehicles. Although this resulted in fewer platforms and fewer common remotely operated weapon station systems, the company

gained significant maneuverability. The wrecker, contact truck, a light medium tactical vehicle, and one water buffalo were also deployed to minimize sustainment requirements from the MBCT.

Designating primary missions to each of the platoons proved to be successful. One platoon with the lightest of equipment sets was designated the light mobile platoon and was aligned with the MBCT. That platoon configured its formation to execute military police tasks in a light, agile manner conducive to supporting a long-range, large-scale air assault. Another platoon that was focused on detainee operations created the most mobile detainee collection point possible, which allowed the platoon to expediently process detainees and to move locations at regular intervals. A third platoon, which provided a squad-sized reserve to the company, supported mobility and security tasks. Its mission set focused mostly on convoy security and forward arming and refueling point critical-site security. This task organization allowed the company to be more agile and responsive, enabling it to provide tangible and sustaining assets to the brigade's multiple lines of effort.

### **Support to the Strategic Support Area**

The JRTC rotation focused on the 2d MBCT long-range, large-scale air assault ability, with some equipment moving off installation by barge. The 194th Military Police Company leveraged the opportunity to test its ability to support force projection from Fort Campbell. The company assisted in movement control operations and discussed at length what would need to happen if the movement was contested. For future combat training center rotations, division protection efforts and garrison support agencies should be integrated into the planning process for "red team" deployment activities to develop possible options for the commander to ensure that units can rapidly deploy from fort to port, as required.

### **Training**

The 194th Military Police Company integrated with the 2d MBCT early on, attending the initial planning conference and briefing the brigade commander on military police company capabilities. Although much coordination was conducted through the brigade provost marshal, the 194th also worked directly with brigade operations, logistics, and communications personnel to ensure full integration. This communication resulted in a more connected company, which enhanced its ability to integrate into

prerotation training, such as Operation Lethal Eagle—the qualifying training event for the 101st Airborne Division prior to the JRTC rotation. Operation Lethal Eagle allowed the company to work closely with brigade and division assets to ensure the early establishment of logistics and lines of communication.

With increased unmanned aircraft system (UAS) threats and the dispersed nature of the 2d MBCT, the 194th Military Police Company needed to find new means of providing protection to the MBCT. As a result, the company ensured that it had personnel trained in man-portable air defense systems and surface-to-air missiles within the formation, which became a combat multiplier for dislocated squads providing security for assets. On numerous occasions, Soldiers assigned to the man-portable, shoulder-fired guided missile system prevented the company or defended assets from a catastrophic attack by the enemy. Due to the baseline relationship established with the 2d MBCT, the 194th was provided counter-small UAS equipment and it trained teams on this equipment, providing an additional layer of protection.

Additionally, early alignment with the 2d MBCT and the 101st Airborne Division enabled the 194th Military Police Company to develop relationships with other attached enabler units such as human intelligence, explosive ordnance disposal, civil affairs, and psychological operations teams. These relationships proved invaluable when developing a common operating picture of the environment. As many enabler units are not on the same transformation and fielding schedule as MBCTs, the prior communication ensured that a synchronized pace plan was in place, allowing future coordination once in the training area at JRTC.

## Communication

As part of the MBCT transformation process, the 194th Military Police Company had already fielded integrated tactical network communications equipment. This created a disconnect that the 194th was mostly able to overcome during training events prior to the rotation. Working directly with brigade communications personnel and supporting units, the 194th acquired additional capabilities and other solutions that allowed the company to talk across the division network. To mitigate communications friction, integration must start early; and although the 194th had Android Team Awareness Kits (ATAKs), the Joint Battle Command Platform, and multichannel manpacks, integration was not seamless. ATAK platforms operating on the Contingency Response Situational Awareness/Situational Understanding Tactical Applications Leader Kits were not compatible with MBCT Nett Warrior-enabled ATAKs, recently fielded multichannel manpacks did not contain data profiles, and Joint Battle Command Platforms did not operate on the latest mounted mission command software to allow full compatibility with the MBCT. Through pre-rotation coordination efforts, the 194th built a system that allowed communication with the brigade; it is still working to better align these systems for the future.

*\*This article was edited with the assistance of AI tools, and subsequently reviewed and edited by relevant Department of Defense (DOD) personnel to ensure accuracy, clarity, and compliance with DOD policies and guidance.*

## Survivability

The 194th Military Police Company focus on survivability started at the Soldier level and was developed from there. The ability of the Soldiers to quickly and efficiently camouflage themselves and their equipment was imperative; it was the most effective way to ensure their survivability on the battlefield. The need for effective camouflage led to the fielding of the new ultra-lightweight camouflage net system, which performed physical and heat signature dispersal very well. Additionally, the 194th trained extensively on quickly and efficiently displacing its tactical operations center on a routine basis, allowing for the company to relocate the command post with ease throughout the fight. By the end of the JRTC rotation, the 194th could effectively displace at regular intervals, remaining undetected by the enemy and committing assets against its position. The dispersion efforts and the ability to quickly displace were the primary reasons that the company was not targeted by precision fires or directly targeted by enemy forces.

Once paired with the counter-UAS assets, the ability of the 194th Military Police Company to rapidly displace provided an even greater level of survivability. Employment of the counter-small UAS equipment actively detected, warned, and defeated enemy UAS and enemy aircraft on a nightly basis. The same level of protection that was provided to squads that the 194th was employed to protect was also provided for brigade critical assets. With the consistent threat of drones used for surveillance or enemy data collection or as deadly weapons, the counter-UAS devices provided the ability to detect, deter, and defeat enemy forces. The early warning allowed the 194th to move itself or any protected assets to an undetected position; remove the threat from airspace; and, sometimes, hide in plain sight. On numerous occasions, the devices allowed the company to prepare for oncoming attacks from enemy forces, keeping the unit ahead of the enemy and appropriately postured.

## Conclusion

The success of the 194th Military Police Company at JRTC can be attributed to extensive preparation, task organization and alignment changes, additional capabilities, increased mobility, sustained communications, and enhanced survivability. It is important that military police adapt to execute a mission and more effectively support units. The ability of the 194th Military Police Company to provide value and support to the 2d MBCT while maintaining high mobility, communication, and survivability sets an example for other units striving to improve their integration efforts. The dedication of a unit to the fundamentals and a strong understanding of its capabilities and limitations will greatly assist in the effective planning and execution of the mission.

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# Military Police Contributions to Moral Readiness in Just LSCO

By Chaplain (Major) Michael D. Demmon

*The contents of this article do not represent the official views of, nor are they endorsed by, the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.*

**Editor's Note:** This article is presented in the following form at the explicit request of the author. Very few editorial changes were made to the content, structure, and language.

As large-scale combat operations (LSCO) loom on the horizon of an increasingly unpredictable world, the Nation turns to the U.S. Army to confront emerging threats and meet any challenge. Maximizing moral readiness for LSCO enables the Army to meet such challenges with lethality while honoring the principles enshrined in our Nation's founding documents. The U.S. Army Military Police Corps connection to the cardinal virtues of justice and prudence throughout the range of LSCO ensures our inevitable victory and reflects our ethical principles.

This article explores how the just war principles of legitimate authority, right intention, and distinction exemplify the contribution of the Military Police Corps Regiment to the Army's "ethical application of land power."<sup>1</sup> Military police support the Nation and commanders' legitimate authority through assisting good order and discipline. They assure right intention by focusing on human dignity across the range of military operations and assist in distinction by providing expertise in economy of force from the law enforcement (LE) mindset. Forged through the hard lessons of the Global War on Terror (GWoT) and grounded in the *Military Police Code of Ethics*,<sup>2</sup> the moral foundation of the Military Police Corps Regiment affirms that when the United States unleashes the force of war, its enemies witness a lethality that is disciplined, deliberate, and emblematic of the "most powerful force for good in human history."<sup>3</sup>

## Just War Tradition—A Quick Review

Anchoring ourselves in the Just War Tradition (JWT) clarifies the military police role in a just LSCO. "For a war to be just, three things are required, namely the authority of a prince [legitimate authority], a just cause, and upright intention."<sup>4</sup> War is never good, but it is narrowly allowed on moral grounds when considering a much worse alternative. Therefore, LSCO "could hypothetically be obligatory and even virtuous" if it meets such conditions.<sup>5</sup> Building on the historic foundation laid by Augustine through Aquinas, later thinkers add proportionality—meaning force that matches the provocation or the military necessity—and distinction

between combatants and noncombatants to JWT criteria.<sup>6</sup>

As members of the profession of arms, we recognize not only the brutality of LSCO but also its unfortunate necessity. Writing in late 1930s Britain, C.S. Lewis, an Oxford professor and World War I veteran, remarked, "If war is ever lawful, then peace is sometimes sinful,"<sup>7</sup> underscoring the moral imperative to confront evil even when the cost is great. Echoing the insight of J.S. Mill, our current Secretary of Defense similarly notes that "war is not the ugliest of things," but that far worse is "the degraded state of moral and patriotic feeling that thinks nothing is worth a war."<sup>8</sup> The fierceness of American lethality is not the worst of things, for it is the forerunner of peace. However, LSCO, unrestrained by justice and prudence, is the worst, for it forfeits any chance of a lasting peace. As MPs "assist, protect, and defend,"<sup>9</sup> they secure the Army's moral readiness, even in dreadfully lethal LSCOs. By keeping us connected to the virtues of justice and prudence, MPs win a peace that honors our founding documents.

## Legitimate Authority—Military Police as Ethical Guarantors

Only legitimate authorities can prosecute just wars.<sup>10</sup> Private individuals enjoy access to their country's justice systems to adjudicate disputes. Sovereign powers, such as nation-states, thus include violence in their legal purview and designate militaries and law enforcement agencies with the professional jurisdiction over violence.<sup>11</sup> Military Police find themselves at the center of this Venn diagram, embodying America's legitimate authority as the guarantor of lawfully employed violence.

The legitimate authority of the United States extends from sovereignty sourced in the U.S. Constitution. The phrase: "provide for the common defense" in the Preamble underscores the Constitution's foundational role in securing American sovereignty. One also notes that "establish Justice" comes before "common defense" in the Preamble, with "insure domestic Tranquility" in between. The authority to justly wage war comes from the power of Congress to declare war and establish the Uniform Code of Military Justice and in the President's



role as Commander-in-Chief.<sup>12</sup> Rooted in the ethical foundation of legitimate authority, military police link constitutional principles of defense to justice by securing lasting peace and domestic tranquility.

With the Constitution establishing the ethical principle of legitimate authority, the Army maintains the legitimacy of LSCO through ethical conduct. Even if the republic for which we stand continues unquestioned, our legitimacy suffers when we conduct LSCO with wanton disregard for moral readiness. Further, eschewing limits on ethical conduct has strategic consequences<sup>13</sup> and disconnects us from the JWT, even if LSCO begins with legitimate intent. Military police sustain the legitimacy of military authority by serving as the Army's law enforcement conscience, embodying the enduring presence of justice even in the midst of war. Neglecting justice in war threatens the sovereign authority of the United States and its moral standing toward its allies, its enemies, and even its own Soldiers charged to uphold Army ethics.<sup>14</sup>

The legitimate authority for LSCO extends from the Constitution, through Congress and the Commander-in-Chief, to the commander on the battlefield. To execute LSCO well and faithfully, the commander must establish good order and discipline. "War may be hell, but Soldiers deserve a predictable form of rule-based discipline."<sup>15</sup> Commanders carry the responsibility to enforce these rules, and military police "operate in support of commanders to establish and maintain an orderly environment in which commanders and their forces can operate with minimal threat interference."<sup>16</sup>

The *Military Police Code of Ethics* ensures that military police support commanders with "the highest standards of Soldiering" and "protect fellow Soldiers in a manner that is Fair, Courteous, and Impartial."<sup>17</sup> Military police do this because "[a]rmies without discipline are mobs; killing without legal and moral grounds is murder."<sup>18</sup> Army doctrine trains military police to anchor us to our values in the midst of the chaos of war, and ensures good order and discipline in the face of the inevitable disorder of LSCO.<sup>19</sup> Military police assisting with good order and discipline focus lethality like a sharpened sword in a manner that reflects our legitimacy and honors our founding principles.<sup>20</sup>

### **Right Intention—Values Expressed as Disciplined Lethality**

I often remind students at the U.S. Army Military Police School that the purpose of the U.S. Army is to fight and win the Nation's wars and secure a lasting peace.<sup>21, 22</sup> Legitimate authority empowers us to provide for the common defense by upholding justice as a foundational element of national security. Today, we say "Peace Through Strength."<sup>23</sup> When we must unleash the full arsenal of American might, the Army Ethic validates that our intention is never wanton violence, but disciplined lethality toward just goals.

Military police put national philosophy into action by embodying justice on the battlefield. "When we act

morally, we are better than our philosophy."<sup>24</sup> Rather than setting aside our Army Ethic in pursuit of victory, our right intentions are the blood in our muscles that assure our victory. Guided by the ethical principle of right intention "prevents less honorable motives like bloodlust or the love of violence for its own sake."<sup>25</sup> The Warrior Ethos, expanded into the Soldier's Creed,<sup>26</sup> reflects measured violence in service of our values, not values in service of our violence.

"The surest sign of good intentions in war is restraint in its conduct."<sup>27</sup> As MPs lead in the Protection Warfighting Function, they provide measured restraint to maintain our right intentions. "Soldiers fight best when they are disciplined and controlled, not wild and frenzied."<sup>28</sup> As we develop the moral muscles required to fight LSCO ethically, our restraint enhances our lethality not by limiting it but by properly focusing it. Consider how a parachute harness, along with the disciplined training before ever donning that parachute, restrains the paratrooper in the air but guides him into the battle on the ground. Our right intentions guide us before, during, and after the battle—not as constraints to victory, but as forces that focus us toward it as sure as gravity. Disciplined restraint enables the professional and moral Soldier to properly focus lethality through right intention.

The LE mindset provides this moral resource to the Army. "Police activities often complement other graduated response mechanisms that are intended to reduce violence and disorder within an area by mitigating the unnecessary escalation of force."<sup>29</sup> Military police enable commanders to face varied threats by offering varied response options. "The prudent and measured application of force is often critical to gaining and maintaining public support. Excessive force can alienate the population, undermine police efforts, and pose a threat to friendly forces."<sup>30</sup> As experts in the measured application of lethality, military police connect right intention to legitimate authority, upholding the Army's ethical conduct even amidst the volatility of LSCO environments.

The right intention of our measured lethality brings LSCO to a swift and just conclusion, winning a victory that honors our people and our values. "The mix of lethal and nonlethal capabilities makes [military police] relevant anywhere that a flexible force option is required."<sup>31</sup> Through their expertise in the economy of force, military police sustain the Army's connection to the virtues of both justice and prudence.<sup>32</sup> Military police know when victory requires escalation or de-escalation; when to use a hammer, a scalpel, or handcuffs. Economy of force and distinction in the LE mindset protect our own by caring for the innocent, the enemy, and the criminal.

### **Distinction—The LE Mindset Applied to Ethical Victory**

Hard-won lessons from World War II through the GWOt demonstrate that future LSCO will likely involve

the presence of noncombatants and surrendering enemy personnel on the battlefield. “When soldiers no longer pose serious external threats — notably by laying down their weapons and surrendering—they may no longer be targeted with force and should, in fact, be extended what international law calls ‘benevolent quarantine.’”<sup>33</sup> A full discussion of detention doctrine is beyond the scope of this paper, but remembering the Military Police Corps detention expertise ensures that the Army maintains justice and safeguards human dignity—yes, even for the enemy—during the horrors of LSCO.

The LE mindset helps discern proper conduct and appropriate use of force across a varied enemy population. “Even during LSCO, enemy forces often blend into the civilian population [and] criminals frequently escape or are released from jails and prisons...”<sup>34</sup> Military Police buy down risk and buy up ethical conduct for combatant commanders by leading the detainee mission. Assuring human dignity by treating our detainees in a humane manner allows maneuver commanders to focus on achieving overall victory.<sup>35</sup>

“Military police units support [commanders] by preventing the diversion or tasking of operating forces.”<sup>36</sup> Trained for combat and skilled in the LE skillset of population distinction and detainee care, military police “preserve combat effectiveness” for the rest of the Army.<sup>37</sup> By ensuring the appropriate use of force and proper custodial care of enemy detainees, military police enable the broader force to maintain its morally proper focus on mission accomplishment and the pursuit of victory.

While calls for ruthless lethality<sup>38</sup> may resonate in the heat of battle, true strength lies in knowing when to sheath the sword. To break our enemy’s will, we cannot simply meet barbarism with barbarism.<sup>39</sup> “To speak more frankly, that’s just not the American way. The forces of civilization remain civilized even as they confront ruthless barbarism.”<sup>39</sup> As a lethal and morally ready force, military police provide that the Army remains anchored to the values of civilization by upholding the JWT principle of distinction.

### **Objections—Addressing Contrary Arguments**

While the barbarism witnessed throughout the GWOt remains vivid for many, some wonder if we can maintain justice while winning in LSCO. Even the current Secretary of Defense, before his appointment, voiced doubts about our ability to win while upholding ethical principles. “Makes me wonder, in 2024—if you want to win—how can anyone write universal rules about killing other people in open conflict?”<sup>40</sup> His frustration stems from the burden placed on American warfighters to uphold JWT standards that are neither expected of nor observed by our enemies. “We are fighting with one hand behind our back—and the enemy knows it.”<sup>41</sup> An ethically bound U.S. Army may, at times prolong LSCO by marching at the pace of its principles. As I’ve

presented the case, our MPs seem to hold that hand back.

To reiterate, lowering our standards to match our enemy’s barbarism is not the American way. Even when we face “enemies who fight like savages, disregarding human life at every turn,”<sup>42</sup> our conduct must reflect the Nation we represent. Matching the enemy’s brutality betrays both our professionalism and our commitment to our teammates and mission. Still, it raises a serious question: Does the current Secretary of Defense advocate sacrificing moral readiness, or diminishing the role of the military police, for the sake of expedient victory in LSCO?

Any argument that favors discarding ethical restraint and moral readiness for increased lethality must be firmly dismissed. Such line of reasoning risks inviting war crimes and betrays the Warrior Ethos. Yet, considering the Secretary of Defense’s other affirmations of that very ethos,<sup>43</sup> It seems more likely that his concern reflects the tension between operational urgency and moral obligation—not a call to abandon the latter.

If Secretary Hegseth’s intent is to hone our craft, refocus our disciplines, and enhance our professionalism in pursuit of mission accomplishment, then it reinforces the truth that right intention, combined with overwhelming lethality, leads to victories worthy of the Army Ethic. When trained in moral readiness to face the moral challenges of LSCO, we *can* “unleash them [our warriors] to win.”<sup>44</sup> Military police help preserve justice and prudence during the chaos of LSCO and the fog of war, serving as the vital tether to ethical conduct when it is most at risk.

If Secretary Hegseth believes our warriors deserve “to get the overwhelming benefit of the doubt”<sup>45</sup> in the face of wartime mistakes, then we must equip them with moral readiness to match their physical readiness. Military police secure both. The Secretary also says that “we should fight to win or not go at all.”<sup>46</sup> If we cannot uphold the moral standards that define American warfare, with military police anchoring us to justice and prudence in the process, then he’s right—we should not go at all.


We do not enhance the lethality of the American warrior by compromising moral readiness or severing ties with the JWT. Rather, we strengthen it by embracing the Secretary of Defense’s guidance on the Warrior Ethos and the enduring the power of America’s founding documents.<sup>47</sup> We double down on the Soldier’s Creed, the Army Values, and the *Military Police Code of Ethics* to defeat the enemy in action and in philosophy. In the same breath that every Soldier declares readiness to “deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States,” they also affirm: “I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life.” This is not a contradiction. It is a commitment to both—for if we ever reduce it to an either-or, we lose more than the

fight; we forfeit our way of life. Through selfless service, personal courage, and the commitment of the military police to lead “by personal example, the highest standards of Soldiering,”<sup>48</sup> our moral readiness strengthens the American warfighter, guiding the path to certain victory while preserving our national values.

If our founding values truly remain “the most powerful force for good in human history,”<sup>49</sup> then we must settle for nothing less than their full embodiment in our moral readiness. The lessons of the GWOt place a distinct responsibility on the Military Police Corps Regiment to lead in sustaining ethical conduct and operational discipline in future conflicts. To repeat our mistakes undermines our intentions, dishonors our warriors, and enables the very enemies who scorn our founding principles. Undisciplined ruthlessness—enabled not by the Warrior Ethos but by wanton violence, a lack of moral readiness, and becoming untethered from justice—stumbled us into atrocities like Abu Ghraib. Precisely because of these past mistakes, military police must lead the way in preventing “adverse strategic impacts.”<sup>50</sup>

“The United States is capable of projecting its power like no other state can.”<sup>51</sup> The world must know that American warfighting is undeniably lethal—any enemy who chooses to face us invites inevitable defeat. Yet, also, conduct beneath our rigorous moral standards must be seen as so foreign to the American Warrior Ethos that it is unrecognizable in any current or future fight. Winning in a way that creates more enemies or generates longer wars is no victory at all. Following through on this requires a well-honed moral foundation garnered through learning hard lessons that are tethered to justice and prudence—qualities exemplified by the military police.

## Conclusion

Secretary Hegseth recently wrote that “The United States military was designed to act as the immune system of America’s sovereignty... [as] the promise of consequence against foes of freedom.” Military police serve as guarantors of both the legal and moral foundations of a just LSCO. As our anchor to the cardinal virtues of justice and prudence, military police who are “Of the Troops and For the Troops” utilize the combat-honed LE mindset to ensure that our economy of force matches right intention. With military police on our teams at every echelon, we win *because of*, not *in spite of*, our high moral standards. Our renewed commitment to the Warrior Ethos and our founding documents reflects a deeper truth: by assisting, protecting, and defending our moral readiness, military police guarantee that America’s immune system is functioning properly and does not develop an autoimmune disease that undermines Peace Through Strength. 

### Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, *Army Leadership and the Profession*, 31 July 2019, p.1-2, para 1-8.

<sup>2</sup>Graphic Training Aide (GTA) 19-01-001B, *The Military Police Code of Ethics*, 2 April 1975.

<sup>3</sup>Peter B. Hegseth, *Restoring America’s Fighting Force*, 29 January 2025, <<https://media.defense.gov/2025/Jan/29/2003634987/-1/-1/1/RESTORING-AMERICAS-FIGHTING-FORCE.PDF>>, accessed on 11 June 2025.

<sup>4</sup>Gregory M. Reichberg, “The Doctrinal Status of Just War in the Contemporary Teaching of the Catholic Magisterium,” p. 487, PhilPapers, <<https://philpapers.org/rec/REITDS-2>>, accessed on 23 June 2025.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid, 488.

<sup>7</sup>David C. Downing, “C.S. Lewis on War and Peace,” 2 January 2010, <<https://www.cslewisinstitute.org/resources/c-s-lewis-on-war-and-peace/>>, accessed on 23 June 2025.

<sup>8</sup>Peter B. Hegseth, *The War on Warriors*, p. xx.

<sup>9</sup>*The Military Police Regimental Motto*.

<sup>10</sup>Reichberg, p. 487.

<sup>11</sup>George Lucas, *Military Ethics: What Everyone Needs to Know*, 2016, Oxford University Press, pp. 182–185.

<sup>12</sup>*U.S. Constitution*, Article I, Section 8, Clauses 11 and 14; and Article II, Section II.

<sup>13</sup>Field Manual (FM) 3-39, *Military Police Operations*, 21 April 2025, p. 2-20, para 2-66.

<sup>14</sup>ADP 6-22, p. 1-7, Table 1-1.

<sup>15</sup>Brian Orend, *The Morality of War*, Broadview Press, 2006, p 134.

<sup>16</sup>FM 3-39, p. 1-1, para 1-2.

<sup>17</sup>*The Military Police Code of Ethics*, Clauses 5 and 6.

<sup>18</sup>Jared L. Vineyard, “The ETHICAL Warrior.” *INFANTRY*, Fall 2020, pp. 44–49.

<sup>19</sup>Lucas, pp. 102–106.

<sup>20</sup>Orend, p. 112.

<sup>21</sup>ADP 6-22, p. 1-1.

<sup>22</sup>ADP 1, The Army, 31 July 2019.

<sup>23</sup>Peter B. Hegseth, *Secretary Hegseth’s Message to the Force*, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 25 January 2025, <<https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4040940/secretary-hegseths-message-to-the-force/>>, accessed on 23 June 2025.

<sup>24</sup>Peter Kreeft, *Back to Virtue: Traditional Moral Wisdom for Modern Moral Confusion*, Ignatius Press, 1986, p. 25.

<sup>25</sup>Lucas, p. 84.

<sup>26</sup>U.S. Army, *Soldier’s Creed*, <<https://www.army.mil/values/soldiers.html>>, accessed on 23 June 2025.

<sup>27</sup>Orend, p. 116.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid, p. 178.

<sup>29</sup>FM 3-39, p. 1-11, para 1-36.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid, p. 1-13, para 1-48.

(Continued on page 24)



# 716th Military Police Battalion: The Future of Air Assault Military Police



*By First Lieutenant Sam M. Carlson*

**The contents of this article do not represent the official views of, nor are they endorsed by, the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.**

As the U.S. Army navigates through the transformation from counterinsurgency operations to large-scale air assault operations, the 716th Military Police Battalion, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, strives to leverage change to create something new: the air assault military police battalion. Due to its Fort Campbell location, the 716th Military Police Battalion has a long history of supporting the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell motto, “Rendezvous with Destiny.”

On 25 January 2025, the 716th Military Police Battalion participated in a patching ceremony signaling their realignment under the 101st Airborne Division. This movement was the first step in aligning military police protection efforts with support air assault operations. The battalion wants to redefine how detention operations, security and mobility support, and other protection operations integrate with and best enable the 101st Airborne Division large-scale air assault mission.

Military police units are often employed as protection warfighting function enablers. While air assault operations are inherently mobile, they rely on numerous key nodes to effectively support large-scale air assault operations. Critical sites such as landing zones, pickup zones, and forward arming and refueling points create disaggregated and dispersed protection priorities that military police can protect to preserve maneuver combat power. Military police alignment to disaggregated protection priorities allows maneuver units to disperse combat power on the objective instead of expending critical combat power at security pickup zones and forward arming and refueling points. As forward arming and refueling point locations become key terrain for enabling large-scale air assault, they also become high-payoff targets for enemy forces. The combination of weapons, the ability to self-transport, and the organic observation equipment that military police units bring to the fight make them highly adaptable to securing these sites. While the core of air assault operations leverages speed as security, less mobile and highly targetable large-scale air assault support structures can benefit from the ability of the air assault military police battalion to move at the speed of maneuver while enabling protection.

Although large-scale air assault missions are fast-paced and unique, military police can effectively integrate into these operations in a manner similar to the one used for the passage of lines or gap crossings. The same tactics, techniques, and procedures used in these operations to enable the ability of the division or brigade combat team to maneuver by using defiles, signage, and holding areas are also applicable in mobility support to large-scale air assault missions. A properly integrated military police company possesses the structure and training to organize and control the flow of personnel and equipment at landing and pickup zones. By implementing the movement control plan, the air assault military police unit enables the synchronization of moving units through the control of marshalling areas, holding areas, defiles, and force flow signage areas. In addition, the robust headquarters section of the military police company creates the bandwidth not only to execute these mobility tasks, but also to integrate with adjacent and higher units to manage force flow, freeing up combat power and sustaining operational tempo.

Along with delivering mobility and protection support for large-scale air assault operations, the air assault military police formation provides unique support to detention operations. In a fast-paced air assault operation, the drain of combat power associated with safeguarding surrendering and captured prisoners of war could severely reduce tempo. However, in this situation, air assault military police are critical to enabling a maneuver commander. The air assault military police battalion execution of a highly mobile, air-assault-capable detention operation such as a hasty detainee collection point (operated by dismounted military police, minimal equipment, and a remote autonomous integrated defense engagement rover that is sling-loaded by a Chinook helicopter) mitigates potential detainee problems. This small element frees up combat power and is capable of coordinating the movement of captured personnel to the rear area, further enabling friendly force freedom of maneuver. Therefore, the integration of air assault military police into large-scale air assault detention planning would clearly allow better control of detainees by subject matter experts and minimize operational risk while maximizing combat power on the objective.

*(Continued on page 29)*

# Restoring Warrior Skills: Reintegrating Traditional Sergeant's Time Training

By Sergeant First Class Dustin A. Thomas

*The contents of this article do not represent the official views of, nor are they endorsed by, the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.*

In recent years, the U.S. Army has experienced a significant decline in using fundamental warrior skills, such as “shoot, move, and communicate.” These skills are crucial for military readiness and effectiveness but have been compromised by an increasing emphasis on socio-political agendas and metrics. Although these initiatives aim to modernize and streamline Army operations, they often divert valuable time and energy from noncommissioned officers (NCOs), hindering their ability to educate Soldiers on essential combat skills. As a result, there is an escalating disconnect between bureaucratic requirements and the operational readiness needed for combat.

The Army must implement consistent, weekly Sergeant's Time Training to address this issue across all installations. This specific training for Soldiers should include a certification process conducted twice a year to validate Soldiers' skills. This approach would rejuvenate NCOs as field-trained Soldiers and reaffirm the primary goal of preparing Soldiers for combat.

According to Field Manual (FM) 7-0, *Training*, “realistic and rigorous training trains units and personnel to enter, fight, and succeed in the field of battle.”<sup>1</sup> This article discusses the factors contributing to the decline of warrior skills, identifies shortcomings in current training methods, and proposes solutions to make mandatory Sergeant's Time Training a reality.

## Declining Core Warrior Skills

### Priorities and Training Gaps

The increasing administrative focus within the Army has shifted time and resources away from hands-on combat training, eroding foundational Soldier skills. Maintaining metrics, conducting excessive meetings, and managing socio-political initiatives often precede rigorous field exercises. Lack of this training has resulted in a gap in training continuity, with NCOs and senior NCOs burdened by non-mission-essential obligations. FM 7-0 emphasizes that “commanders, supported by their NCOs, must prioritize training that directly contributes to combat readiness.”<sup>2</sup> However, without institutional backing for dedicated training time, these priorities often become overshadowed.

### Inconsistencies

Although some units independently implement Sergeant's Time Training, the lack of Army-wide regulation and enforcement leads to inconsistency in its execution.

Certain commanders emphasize such training, while others deprioritize it in favor of administrative tasks or operational requirements. This disparity results in uneven skill levels across units, leaving gaps in critical competencies like weapons handling, small-unit tactics, and communication drills. According to FM 7-22, *Holistic Health and Fitness*, consistent, structured practice is vital for Soldiers to build “muscle memory and mental resilience needed for combat effectiveness.”<sup>3</sup>

## Solutions

### Standardizing Training Days

To restore warrior skills, the Army must establish a weekly training day. It should be mandated across all installations and units and dedicated solely to foundational tasks. Known as Sergeant's Time Training, this session would enable NCOs to focus exclusively on essential combat skills such as land navigation, weapons qualification, tactical maneuvers, and radio communication. This standardization would ensure that Soldiers across the force maintain a uniform level of proficiency, regardless of their duty station or unit.

### Validating and Certifying Training

The Army should implement a biannual validation process to evaluate Soldiers' competencies in critical areas. As outlined in Army Regulation (AR) 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development*, such evaluations are necessary to track individual progress and ensure training effectiveness.<sup>4</sup> These validations could be overseen by commanders or their designees, with results logged into the Digital Training Management System (DTMS) to provide accountability and facilitate long-term tracking. By integrating this process into existing systems, the Army would foster a culture of continuous improvement while maintaining a clear record of the readiness of each Soldier.

### Empowering NCOs

Mandatory Sergeant's Time Training would also reinforce the traditional role of NCOs as the primary trainers of the Army. The NCO Creed states, “My two basic responsibilities will always be uppermost in my mind—accomplishment of my mission and the welfare of my Soldiers.”<sup>5</sup> This program would empower NCOs to fulfill these responsibilities by providing dedicated time to mentor and train their Soldiers, fostering trust and cohesion within their teams.



## Proposed Benefits

### Enhancing Soldier Readiness

Implementing structured and consistent Sergeant's Time Training would directly contribute to the fighting readiness of the Army by addressing existing gaps in warrior skills. The need for realistic, repetitive training is outlined in the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (Pam) 525-8-2, *The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2030–2040*, which emphasizes that these methods are essential to train Soldiers for the volatility of modern warfare.<sup>6</sup> By focusing on core skills, the Army ensures that every Soldier can lead in high-pressure environments.

### Accounting for and Reinforcing Army Traditions

Integrating training validation into DTMS provides a clear and consistent method for monitoring movement across the force. This integration holds Soldiers accountable for their performance and enables leaders to quickly identify and address shortcomings. It also facilitates ongoing training and skill development, even as Soldiers transition between groups or installations. Furthermore, reinstating mandatory Sergeant's Time Training aligns with the Army's longstanding tradition of discipline, professionalism, and excellence in warfighting. By prioritizing combat training, the Army remains true to its foundational mission: protecting the Nation through bravery and vigilance. The integration of training validation into DTMS provides a clean and consistent way to monitor movement across the force.

## Conclusion

The erosion of basic warrior skills in the Army is a pressing issue that leaders must immediately address. Administrative priorities and socio-political efforts have shifted the focus away from essential "shoot, move, and communicate" skills critical for mission success. Although some units attempt to compensate for this deficit through ad hoc training programs, the absence of Army-wide standardization has led to significant disparities in readiness and capability.

Implementing weekly Sergeant's Time Training is an affordable and effective way to address these shortcomings. By mandating this training and introducing an annually monitored validation cycle documented in DTMS, the Army can reestablish a commitment to combat readiness and equip NCOs with the necessary tools to effectively train their Soldiers. This approach enhances Soldier skills and accountability and reinforces the Army's longstanding dedication to discipline, professionalism, and winning wars.

As the Army evolves to meet the challenges of the modern age, it must focus on what it does best—training Soldiers to fight and win the Nation's wars. Emphasizing uniform training in warrior competencies is not only an Army imperative; it also demonstrates a commitment to maintaining high standards and being well-prepared for the future. ✂

### Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>FM 7-0, *Training*, p. 1-1, 14 June 2021.

*\*This article was edited with the assistance of AI tools, and subsequently reviewed and edited by relevant Department of Defense (DOD) personnel to ensure accuracy, clarity, and compliance with DOD policies and guidance.*

<sup>2</sup>Ibid, p. 1-2.

<sup>3</sup>FM 7-22, *Holistic Health and Fitness*, p. 4-3, 1 October 2020.

<sup>4</sup>AR 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development*, 10 December 2017.

<sup>5</sup>"NCO Creed," U.S. Army, <<https://www.army.mil/values/nco.html>>, accessed on 13 May 2025.

<sup>6</sup>TRADOC Pam 525-8-2, *The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2030–2040*, p. 2-3, 12 February 2024.

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*("Military Police Contributions . . ." continued from page 21)*

<sup>32</sup>Ibid, p. 2-3, para 2-5.

<sup>33</sup>Orend, p. 110.

<sup>34</sup>FM 3-39, p.2-20, para. 2-63

<sup>35</sup>A worthy discussion of diplomatic, informational, military, economy (DIME) could flow from here.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid, p. 2-21, para 2-67.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid, p. 2-21, para 2-66.

<sup>38</sup>Hegseth, *War on Warriors*, p. 184.

<sup>39</sup>Orend, p. 112.

<sup>40</sup>Hegseth, *War on Warriors*, p. 180.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>Previously cited SECDEF memos dated January 25 and January 29.

<sup>44</sup>Hegseth, *War on Warriors*, p. 183.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid, p. 184.

<sup>47</sup>Hegseth, *Restoring America's Fighting Force*, p. 2.

<sup>48</sup>*Military Police Code of Ethics*, Clause 6.

<sup>49</sup>Hegseth, *Restoring America's Fighting Force*, p. 2.

<sup>50</sup>FM 3-39, p. 2-21, para. 2-66.

<sup>51</sup>Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Military Intervention and Justice in Equal Regard*, p. 128.

<sup>52</sup>Hegseth, *War on Warriors*, p. xiv.

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# The Army Corrections Command: Professionalism, Justice, and Strategic Risk Mitigation

*By Captain Joshua I. Bogle and Staff Sergeant Caitlin E. Sias*

*The contents of this article do not represent the official views of, nor are they endorsed by, the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.*

Corrections and detention operations have been integral to the U.S. military since 1776, during both peace and war. Headquarters, Department of the Army established the Army Corrections Command (ACC) to exercise command and control over all Army correctional facilities. The ACC is responsible for confining and rehabilitating military personnel convicted at courts-martial while ensuring discipline, security, and the fair administration of justice within the military justice system. The Army Corrections Brigade (ACB), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is the home of military corrections and represents the largest subordinate unit of the ACC. The ACB maintains command and control of the United States Disciplinary Barracks and the Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, managing more than 685 inmates around the clock.

The ACB exemplifies expertise in high-risk close confinement and contributes globally to correctional practices. Military corrections enforce both federal and military laws under the Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),<sup>1</sup> reflecting the military's commitment to recruit individuals of strong moral character and reform those who violate laws. The ACB plays a vital role in the military justice system, ensuring that offenders face consequences while being rehabilitated and deterred from reoffending.

The highly trained personnel of the ACB support commanders and their staffs in planning and executing detention efforts across all military scenarios. The ACB provides advisors to U.S. Army National Guard and Army Reserve units during mobilization and deployments. In conflict zones, correctional experts work with allied forces to manage detainees from capture to detention facilities, freeing combat units from detainee operations. Military police detention efforts aid stability by turning the challenge of internment combatants into an opportunity for reintegration as informed, productive citizens.

Ultimately, the ACB mitigates strategic risk for the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense (DOD) by providing correctional expertise in high-risk close confinement, serving as the culmination of the military justice system and providing advice and assistance to support the active-duty component through detention operations in large-scale combat operations.

## Harnessing Talent and Experience in High-Risk Close Confinement

Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 31E—Corrections and Detention Specialists undergo 7 weeks of Basic Training and Advanced Individual Training before participating in further skill development at correctional facilities. Upon assignment, they complete a rigorous, two-part training program: a week-long preservice course and 5 days of immersive on-the-job training. These programs equip Soldiers with essential skills such as security protocols, inmate management, and emergency response, fostering decision making and confidence.



**Detainee operations training**

The ACC excels in handling high-risk inmates in close confinement, such as those housed in the special housing unit, where specialized skills are required. Soldiers selected for special housing unit duty complete a multiphase training regimen, including a 2-day certification and on-the-job training focused on operations, communication, and the identification of high-risk behaviors. This ensures that ACC personnel are prepared to handle complex situations in demanding environments. Behavioral health staff further enhance the capabilities of the ACC by addressing the psychological needs of inmates, managing those prone to violence,



and aiding their rehabilitation. These efforts support transitions from a special housing unit to the general population, society, or military service.

## Culminating the Military Justice System

Correctional facilities are crucial to the justice system, where sentences are enforced while offenders are rehabilitated to reenter society. Corrections personnel follow court rulings, ensuring that punishment is carried out and public safety is upheld.<sup>2</sup> Correctional rehabilitation programs (such as education, job training, and therapy) prepare inmates for successful reintegration into society, with the goal of reducing recidivism. Parole hearings and sentence modifications involve corrections professionals, whose reports influence decisions about release.

This commitment to rehabilitation and reintegration extends beyond the walls of confinement. If an offender is granted supervision or parole, the Army Corrections System (ACS) continues to regularly monitor them upon their release through electronic tracking, drug testing, and other methods. During this time, the ACS coordinates with law enforcement agencies to assist in monitoring high-risk offenders and respond to violations of parole conditions. Parole violators are reincarcerated to serve out the remainder of their sentence along with any additional time imposed by the courts for reimprisonment offenses. To ensure that inmates fulfill their confinement obligations, the inmate administrators within the ACC recalculate release dates to account for lost good conduct time, earned time, or special acts of abatement.<sup>3</sup>

## Linking Corrections and Detention Operations

Corrections and detention operations involve the confinement and management of individuals, but they differ in their


scope and legal foundations. The ACS focuses on safely and securely incarcerating and rehabilitating U.S. military prisoners and protecting the community through deterrence.<sup>4</sup> In contrast, military detention operations typically occur within a warzone and involve individuals captured during combat or deemed a security threat. These operations are governed by international law, including the Geneva Conventions, which dictate humane treatment and the handling of detainees. Two relevant examples of U.S. military detention operations include those at Andersonville Prison, also known as Camp Sumter, a Confederate prison camp during the American Civil War located in Andersonville, Georgia, and at Abu Ghraib prison, a prison complex located 20 miles west of Baghdad, Iraq, used during the Iraq War.

Historical examples highlight the need for trained personnel and codified systems in detention. During the Civil War, prisoners at Andersonville Prison suffered horrific conditions caused by an untrained guard force, insufficient logistical support, and overcrowded facilities. Designed for 10,000 prisoners, it swelled to over three times its capacity within 6 months, leading to disease outbreaks and malnutrition. By the end of the war, more than 13,000 prisoners died from poor sanitation, overcrowding, exposure to disease, freezing temperatures, and hunger.<sup>5</sup>

Operational challenges at Andersonville Prison were mirrored at Abu Ghraib after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Reports in November 2003 revealed multiple cases of abuse, including torture, sexual violence, and detainee deaths caused by military police Soldiers from the 800th Military Police Brigade, Uniondale, New York.<sup>6</sup> Inadequate training in prisoner handling procedures, a limited understanding of Geneva Convention provisions, and Soldier quality-of-life issues—driven by logistical constraints of the broader conflict—produced an environment conducive to prisoner abuse.<sup>7</sup> These incidents underscore the critical role of trained correctional specialists in minimizing risks during detainee operations.

As operations shift between counterinsurgency and large-scale combat operations, the United States must address adversaries across space, cyberspace, air, maritime, and land domains in addition to the physical, information, and human dimensions.<sup>8</sup> Units must train to safeguard and transfer detainees as the battlefield evolves. Large-scale combat operations pose sustainment challenges in securing resources for construction materials, medical support, and mortuary affairs for temporary and permanent detainee facilities, requiring innovative logistical solutions.

Detention operations support the operational tenets of agility, convergence, and endurance.<sup>9</sup> Agility is achieved by quickly collapsing and relocating detainee collection points to adapt to the evolving battlefield. Convergence ensures that detainee operations synchronize with battlefield progress, advancing detainee collection points alongside the forward line of troops to support combat by processing captured enemy detainees.



Andersonville Prison

## Mitigating Strategic Risk

Corrections operations are regulated by Army Regulation (AR) 190-47<sup>10</sup> and Department of Defense Instruction Number (DODI) 1325.07,<sup>11</sup> which govern the ACS. The ACS complies with the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, which establishes national standards for prison rape prevention and response.<sup>12</sup> Additionally, the ACS adheres to accreditation standards set forth by the American Correctional Association. Per AR 190-47, the ACS protects communities by incarcerating U.S. military prisoners; providing safe, secure environments; and fostering rehabilitation through programs, administrative reviews, parole supervision, and sex offender registration.

The National Defense Strategy directs DOD efforts to mitigate strategic risks. Specifically, the 2022 National Defense Strategy emphasizes defending the homeland, deterring strategic attacks, and building a resilient joint force.<sup>13</sup> It warns that internal issues can undermine mission cohesion and success.<sup>14</sup> The ACB and ACC reduce strategic risk by managing corrections and detention operations for the DOD.

Aligned with the National Defense Strategy priorities, the ACB continuously conducts corrections operations, maintaining custody and discipline under the UCMJ. The ACC ensures safe and humane incarceration worldwide while preparing prisoners for reintegration into society or the armed forces. These efforts uphold the law, deter offenses, and protect national security by safeguarding sensitive information and preventing radicalization in civilian prisons. Correctional facilities enhance force readiness by rehabilitating prisoners to become productive citizens. The ACC also provides professional corrections experts to commanders, ensuring humane detainee treatment on battlefields, reinforcing national values, and strengthening public trust in the military.

In conclusion, skilled correction and detention professionals are essential to military corrections at home and detainee operations abroad. As the final stage of the military justice system, the ACC plays a critical role in deterring indiscipline and criminal activity. The expertise gained in ACC facilities, combined with specialized training, enables Corrections Specialists to effectively advise commanders on detention operations. As a result, the ACC reduces strategic risk and reinforces its relevance in the modern military framework.



### Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>AR 27-10, *Military Justice*, 8 January 2025.

<sup>2</sup>Doris L. MacKenzie, "From Theory to Policy: Evidence-Based Corrections," in *Introduction to Criminal Justice: A Sociological Perspective*, 2013, Stanford University Press, p. 5-6.

<sup>3</sup>AR 190-47, *The Army Corrections System*, 17 March 2023, p. 53.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>5</sup>"History of the Andersonville Prison," *National Park Service website*, <[https://www.nps.gov/ande/learn/historyculture/camp\\_sumter\\_history.htm](https://www.nps.gov/ande/learn/historyculture/camp_sumter_history.htm)>, accessed on 2 June 2025.

<sup>6</sup>Thomas O'Dea, "Andersonville: Prisoner of War Camp," *National Park Service website*, <<https://www.nps.gov/articles/andersonville-prisoner-of-war-camp-teaching-with-historic-places.htm>>, accessed on 2 June 2025.

<sup>7</sup>Paul T. Bartone, "Lessons of Abu Ghraib: Understanding and Preventing Prisoner Abuse in Military Operations," *Defense Horizons*, 1 November 2008, p. 1-8.

<sup>8</sup>Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, 1 October 2022, p. X.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 3-2.

<sup>10</sup>AR 190-47, *The Army Corrections System*, 17 March 2023.

<sup>11</sup>DODI 1325.07, *Administration of Military Correctional Facilities and Clemency and Parole Authority*, 11 March 2023.

<sup>12</sup>Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, Public Law 108-79, 108th Congress, 45 United States Code §§ 15601-15609, 2003.

<sup>13</sup>United States Department of Defense, *2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review*, 2022, <<https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD1183514.pdf>>, accessed on 9 June 2025.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*

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*\*This article was edited with the assistance of AI tools, and subsequently reviewed and edited by relevant Department of Defense (DOD) personnel to ensure accuracy, clarity, and compliance with DOD policies and guidance.*



# Pacific Prowess:

## Adapting Military Police Capabilities for the Indo-Pacific

*By Major Ryan C. Timmons, Captain Andrew P. Spikes Jr.,  
and First Lieutenant Alan T. Paiz*

*The contents of this article do not represent the official views of, nor are they endorsed by, the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.*

The U.S. Army Military Police Corps faces unique challenges in the dynamic Indo-Pacific region, a theater characterized by diverse terrains, advanced technology, and evolving threats. Recent exercises, such as those at the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center (JPMRC), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, Rotation 2025-01, have illuminated the strengths and critical gaps in military police capabilities within this strategically vital area. This article examines those challenges and proposes solutions to ensure that the Military Police Corps maintains its critical role in ensuring regional stability and security.

### What is JPMRC?

JPMRC is a combat training center necessary for enhancing the readiness of brigade combat teams operating in the Indo-Pacific region. Leveraging a sophisticated blend of live, virtual, and constructive training environments, JPMRC fosters joint and multinational interoperability across diverse terrains, preparing units for complex operational scenarios. The focus of the center is on data-driven improvements and advanced battle management systems that ensure training effectiveness and adaptability to evolving operational requirements. A key initiative, JPMRC-Exportable, is a scaled-down version of JPMRC that aims to create a portable training model for broader use within the U.S. Army Pacific, further expanding the reach and impact of JPMRC readiness-building capabilities. In essence, JPMRC delivers combat-credible readiness for units deploying to the Indo-Pacific, ensuring that they are well-equipped to face the unique challenges of the theater.

### JPMRC 25-01: A Crucible of Readiness

The 552d Military Police Company, Schofield Barracks, provided trained and ready protection formations supporting the 25th Infantry Division, 2d Light Brigade Combat Team, Schofield Barracks prototype at the JPMRC 25-01. The 552d Military Police Company participation in JPMRC 25-01 presented valuable insights into the realities of military police operations in the Pacific. Augmented with personnel and equipment from the U.S. Army Reserve,

11th Military Police Brigade, Las Alamitos, California, the company successfully supported six different units across two islands, demonstrating adaptability and operational flexibility. Their innovative use of military working dogs in air assault missions and the seamless integration of small unmanned aircraft system (UAS) and counter-unmanned aircraft system (C-UAS) capabilities were pivotal to their success. However, the exercise also highlighted persistent challenges.

### Critical Gaps

The lack of appropriate equipment, particularly in communications, is a continuing concern. While ingenuity and strong interunit relations mitigated these issues in JPMRC 25-01, the reliance on ad hoc solutions is unsustainable. The current modern table of organization and equipment needs urgent revision to adequately equip military police units operating in the Pacific. Specifically, this includes—

- **Advanced communication systems.** Reliable communication and interoperable systems for brigade combat teams are essential in maintaining situational awareness across diverse and geographically dispersed areas of operation. The successful implementation of two-channel manpack radios and mobile user objective systems during JPMRC 25-01 underscores the need for a broader adoption of such systems.
- **Small UAS/C-UAS capabilities.** The increasing use of small UASs by friendly and adversarial forces demands robust C-UAS capabilities within the Military Police Corps. Adequately training and equipping units with effective countermeasures is paramount.
- **Improved planning and coordination.** While the JPMRC 25-01 showed successful ad hoc solutions, formalized proactive planning and coordination between reserve units and higher headquarters are needed to ensure seamless equipment distribution and integration before deployments. Including company representatives in U.S. Army Reserve annual training is a good start, but training must be expanded and formalized.

## Pathways to Improvement

Overcoming these challenges necessitates a multi-pronged approach:

- **Modern table of organization and equipment reform.** A thorough review and modernization of the modern table of organization and equipment (communications, night vision devices, and C-UAS and small UAS capabilities) are crucial to ensure that military police units receive the necessary equipment for effective operations in the Pacific.
- **Combined arms training.** Training should emphasize combined arms operations, integrating military police units with other battlefield elements (infantry, armor, aviation). This training enhances interoperability and overall effectiveness.
- **Leadership development.** Organizations require lieutenants with a strong understanding of their property and the capabilities of their unit equipment. Captains need to better understand how to execute a combined arms rehearsal and articulate the employment of their capabilities. Leadership training to develop this crucial skill must be provided to ensure success.
- **Regular exercises.** Conducting more frequent and realistic training exercises and incorporating more robust opposing force simulations would better prepare units for the diverse operational challenges in the Pacific.
- **Interoperability.** Collaboration with allied and partner nations is essential for maximizing interoperability and ensuring seamless joint operations in the Indo-Pacific.

## Conclusion

The Military Police Corps is vital in providing protection assets to ensure stability and security in the Indo-Pacific. By addressing the equipment and training gaps identified in JPMRC 25-01 and embracing innovative solutions, the Military Police Corps can continue to adapt and excel in this challenging but strategically crucial theater. The lessons from JPMRC 25-01, combined with adequate proactive planning and investment, will pave the way for even more significant successes in the Pacific Theater.



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*("716th Military Police Battalion: The Future of Air Assault Military Police" continued from page 22)*

The 716th Military Police Battalion is transforming to meet new requirements; however, more change is needed. The 716th has always championed the air assault culture, but greater emphasis on advanced air assault enabling skills must continue. An increased focus on pathfinder, rappel master, fast rope insertion/extraction systems/special patrol insertion extraction systems, and the Air Assault Sustainers Course would better enable future air assault military police battalions to fight and win.

The 716th Military Police Battalion must update its modified table of organization and equipment to be able to move at the speed of maneuver. The divestment of nonair-assault-capable equipment is necessary. The future air assault military police battalion will require equipment that matches the needs of the units the 716th supports. The integration of infantry squad vehicles or similar platforms into the air assault military police unit modified table of organization and equipment is a critical next step to ensure that maneuver counterparts are supported. Likewise, advanced key enabler training is required to enable light and highly mobile air assault units.

During the past year, the 716th Military Police Battalion provided advanced training on man-portable air-defense systems, counter-small unmanned aircraft systems, and mobile detention operations. These enabling skills, coupled with the structural reorganization to move military police companies toward four lighter and more mobile platoons, bring innovation and outsized value to the military police support of the 101st Airborne Division. Air assault military police units can now provide maneuver commanders enhanced flexibility to maximize combat power on the objective. While other units can complete these tasks, the unique structure and capability of air assault military police units create a low-cost, high-reward solution.

The utilization of military police forces as an integral part of large-scale air assault operations maximizes combat power on the objective while reducing operational risk. As the 716th Military Police Battalion transforms alongside the 101st Airborne Division, they train to create a one-of-a-kind unit, which ensures that the Military Police Corps is ready to Assist, Protect, and Defend the Screaming Eagles' next "Rendezvous with Destiny."



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