MILITARY POLICE

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF THE MILITARY POLICE CORPS

2022 Annual Issue

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COMMANDANT
COL Sarah K. Albrycht.....563-8019
<sarah.k.albrycht.mil@army.mil>

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
COL Kirt R. Boston.....563-8019
<kirt.r.boston.mil@army.mil.>

REGIMENTAL COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR
CSM Shawn A. Klosterman.....563-8018
<shawn.a.klosterman.mil@army.mil>

REGIMENTAL CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER
CW5 Mark W. Arnold.....563-8035
<mark.w.arnold.mil@army.mil>

DEPUTY COMMANDANT
Mr. Mark L. Farley.....563-6221
<mark.l.farley.civ@army.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT–USAR
COL Christine M. Udvardi.....563-6223
<christine.m.udvardi.mil@army.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT SGM–USAR
SGM William J. Angelo.....563-6198
<william.j.angelo.mil@army.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT–ARNG
MAJ Jason M. Porter.....563-4570
<jason.m.porter.mil@army.mil>

14TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE
COL Kirk J. Whittenberger.....596-0968
<kirk.j.whittenberger.mil@army.mil>

CSM Paul P. DeSanto.....596-1194
<paul.p.desanto.mil@army.mil>

701ST MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
LTC David T. Bright.....596-2377
<david.t.bright.mil@army.mil>

CSM Nathan B. Marriam.....596-2284
<nathan.b.marriam.mil@army.mil>

787TH MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
LTC Andrew K. Douglass.....596-2910
<andrew.k.douglass.mil@army.mil>

CSM Cari A. Rajewski.....596-4748
<cari.a.rajewski.mil@army.mil>

795TH MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
LTC Daniel S. Naab.....596-2384
<daniel.s.naab.mil@army.mil>

CSM Michael E. Moore.....596-2387
<michael.e.moore1.mil@armymil>

USAMPS Directors

DIRECTOR OF TRAINING AND EDUCATION
COL Michael P. Crane.....563-8098
<michael.p.crane3.mil@army.mil>

CHIEF OF STAFF/DIRECTOR OF PLANS AND OPERATIONS
LTC Shawn C. Keller.....563-8027
<shawn.c.keller.mil@army.mil>

FFID Doctrine - Publications Branch

Managing Editor, Ms. Diana K. Dean.....**563-4137**
<diana.k.dean.civ@army.mil>

Editor, Ms. Cheryl A. Nygaard.....**563-5226**
<cheryl.a.nygaard.civ@army.mil>

Graphic Designer, Ms. Jennifer C. Morgan.....**563-7644**
<virginia.c.morgan.civ@army.mil>

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

MARK F. AVERILL
Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army
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Military Police, an official U.S. Army professional bulletin for the Military Police Corps Regiment, contains information about security and mobility support, police operations, and detention operations. The objectives of *Military Police* are to inform and motivate, increase knowledge, improve performance, and provide a forum for the exchange of ideas. The content does not necessarily reflect the official U.S. Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other U.S. Army publications. *Military Police* reserves the right to edit material. Articles may be reprinted if credit is given to *Military Police* and the authors. All photographs are official U.S. Army photographs unless otherwise credited.

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Military Police

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The Military Police Doctrine Update is also available separately at the following website address:

<https://home.army.mil/wood/application/files/9216/2627/3499/MP_Doctrine_Update.pdf>

The brigade-level-and-above and battalion level command lists are now available separately at the following website address:

<https://home.army.mil/wood/application/files/6916/2610/3015/brigade_battalion_level_commands-1.pdf>

"We are the Army's premier dual-purpose force.

In competition, we preserve readiness.

In crisis, we secure critical capabilities, assets, and activities.

In conflict, we support maneuver with security and mobility support, police, and detention operations.

Our actions mitigate strategic risk, all day, every day."

—Brigadier General Niave F. Knell

Front cover: U.S. Army military police Soldiers practice facing and turning drills during a weapons training event in Mihail Kogalniceanu, Romania. Photo by Private First Class Michael Ybarra.

Back cover: U.S. Army photographs

Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School

Colonel Sarah K. Albrycht

As I look down at the new patch on my left shoulder, I am brought back to the first time I wore it as a second lieutenant at Fort McClellan, Alabama. Although the times and the location of the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) have changed, the mission of our Regiment has remained consistent with the lyrics of our Regimental march—to "Assist, Protect, Defend our own. No matter when or where."[1] Here at the home of the Regiment, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, I quickly found what I had often heard—that this community is unparalleled in its support for our Soldiers, civilians, and Family members. Rob and I are looking forward to discovering all of the opportunities this area has to offer and how our Family can contribute to this vibrant community.

I am absorbing information about all of the work done here—not only the training of our military police Family, but also actions taken as the proponent for our branch. These are times of change for the Army, as we focus on prosecuting a new way of war while simultaneously adjusting to evolving threats to our security at home and abroad. We do not yet know exactly what these changes will mean to our Regiment, but I can tell you that we will look different. How the Military Police Corps nests within Army formations, the specific leadership opportunities that are available, and that way that we are arrayed across military installations may change. What will not change is the need for policing professionals to provide safe and secure installations and deployed policing capabilities on the battlefield. The Military Police Corps needs people who are committed to our values, who want to make a difference in their communities, and who are always ready to execute our combat mission when called upon. If that is why you were called to serve in our Regiment, do not fear the changes that are coming.

Military police have long been required to adapt to a changing security environment. That was the reason that we were founded, and that is the reason that—after every major conflict—we have experienced a shift in our numbers, our organizations, and our missions. Those same shifts have also occurred every time we have entered into major conflict, as the need for the regulation of law and order, movement control, and security of special populations increases exponentially with the friction experienced by people in crisis. As a result, our Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve and military police Soldiers have long been called to serve their communities in crisis. When the security of people is impacted by uncertainty, crisis, and friction, our military police will always play a vital role.

I challenge you to remain ready and open to the change that is coming and to remember why you serve as a military police professional. From General George Washington's Marechaussee to the Military Police Corps of today, we have always ensured readiness through the enforcement of standards and discipline. Always on call, we will stand ready to respond in crises. Always on guard, we will safeguard Army communities and capabilities, both home and abroad. Always on mission, we will fight to secure and enable maneuver across the spectrum of conflict and win in any environment. Each and every day, our Army leaders realize how important the Military Police Corps is—not because we will be at the decisive point on the battlefield, but because we will always be at the decisive point of the moral authority of the Army. That is an incredibly powerful responsibility.

As the 52d Commandant and Chief of the Military Police Corps Regiment, my No.1 priority is synchronized with that of my predecessor: to drive change through doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) and to maintain the force modernization necessary to develop a regiment that is ready to support the Army and our Nation.

Today, it is more important than ever that we are clear about the level of risk we are assuming and deliberate about how we train to maintain our skill sets. We will only be successful if we collaborate broadly and communicate frequently. I ask you all to lean into this effort with me and encourage you to continue to engage with USAMPS staff members by providing your opinions, insights, and recommendations as we work together to forge the future of our Army and our Military Police Corps.

Thank you for being part of the team that is always. . .

"Of the Troops and For the Troops."

Endnote:

[1]"The Military Police Regimental March," *The International Armed Forces Council* website, <http://www.iafnc.org/Music_Files/US_Branch_And_Service_Music/MP_Song.html>, accessed on 29 June 2022.

Regimental Command Sergeant Major

Command Sergeant Major Shawn A. Klosterman

Military Police Corps Regiment: First, I would like to say how honored my Family and I are to have the privilege to serve our Corps, Soldiers, leaders, Families, and civilians. As the 15th Regimental Command Sergeant Major, I do not take this responsibility for granted. I will work hard to be a positive steward of our profession. I will strive to be the best servant-leader I can be. And I will not lead based on the piece of cloth that I wear on my chest, but from the heart that beats underneath it. I look forward to the path ahead; together, we will work to strengthen the foundation of excellence that our Corps demonstrates every day.

Since the onset of the Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), many of the events normally conducted at the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, have been modified or canceled. I am excited to say that we have gained momentum and will soon be returning to the standards and traditions of the past. In celebration of the 81st anniversary of the Military Police Corps, we will host Regimental Week 2022, which will consist of a full complement of events of the past, including a senior-leader forum, competitive challenge, hall-of-fame induction, and military police ball. We look forward to the connection and esprit de corps that these events bring to our Regiment.

During the course of my career, I have had the privilege of serving with many exceptional leaders and leading the finest Soldiers that the Army has to offer. Along the way, I have formed some basic views of leadership and would like to share the following advice:

- **Commit to character.** Commitment to character comes first. There is no such thing as a good Soldier with bad character. Tough times don't build character; they expose it. Have the courage to say "no" for all the right reasons. Say "no" to minimum effort. Say "no" to sexual assault. Say "no" to indiscipline. Be the ultimate team player; it makes a difference and proves that you care. A team with commitment can succeed at any task. Always do the common things uncommonly well because those common things are directly related to the morale and spirit of our people.
- **Practice positive personal leadership.** Never underestimate the power of positive personal leadership. A positive and trusting leader approaches each day with energy and optimism and ensures that subordinates understand why things are done the way they are. Nobody deserves to be led by leaders who explain their directives by saying "Sergeant, I told you so." Soldiers need leaders who are present and approachable and who can communicate effectively. Explanations and guidance must flow down, and ideas must flow up. Success of the team is important, even when it's difficult to achieve. It's not about you being right; it's about *us* being right. Ask yourself this before you execute something that you are thinking of doing: Will I be doing the right thing, in the right way? If the answer is no, change your plans.
- **Maintain balance in life.** Leaders must use the vast resources available to build and maintain readiness, care for their Families, and care for themselves. Practice maintaining balance in life. It won't be possible to achieve balance daily; but over time, do what you can to uphold balance and stay ready for the long run. We are all human, and we all have flaws. Own your mistakes early, stay humble, and make positive changes. There will be disappointing days. But don't let a current frustration impact your long-term goals.
- **Be proud, love what you do, and have fun.** Everyone should focus on developing a highly effective team with members who want to come to work—not only to meet the mission, but also because they feel valued by the people around them. Knowing that you are part of a team with members who care about each other matters. Never let the things that you can't control control you. Genuine respect gains lasting success—and that, you can control. Always believe that the best job you've had is the job that you're currently in.

Please continue to protect yourself by enforcing mitigation measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19, thus exemplifying our Military Police Corps motto and preserving our force. Look out for each other, on and off duty. We need you on the team.

I am humbled and extremely proud to be a member of this Corps, and I look forward to serving alongside you all. Remember that it's not about you, but it always starts with you. Prove that you care.

Assist, Protect, Defend! Winning Matters!
People First!

Regimental Chief Warrant Officer

Chief Warrant Officer Five Mark W. Arnold

Greetings from the Home of the Regiment!

First and foremost, I would like to thank you for all that you do for the U.S. Army Military Police Corps Regiment and the U.S. Army. As the Army continues to modernize, rest assured that the commandant is showcasing our capabilities and what we do for the Army; you make that easy because of your continuous outstanding support to the senior mission commanders.

On the topic of modernization, I would like to explain a little about what is happening with the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID). As you may know, Mr. Gregory D. Ford assumed responsibly as the director of CID on 17 September 2021. This was a significant step in the restructuring of CID. Most of the initial changes at CID were focused internally; many of those involved policy changes to address some of the findings from the Fort Hood, Texas, Independent Review Committee report. Other changes in the restructure consisted of organizational name changes (changes in names of field offices, resident agencies, resident units) to be aligned with other federal investigative organizations. Field offices are located at and support corps and division installations such as Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Drum, New York; and Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Resident agencies are located at and support nondivisional installations at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; Fort Belvoir, Virginia; and Fort Lee, Virginia. Resident units are located at and support the smaller installations of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Fort Dix, New Jersey; and Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. Although the names may have changed, the mission remains the same: Conduct felony level criminal investigations in which the Army is, or may be, a party of interest.

Another significant change for CID is moving to a more civilianized organization. CID has historically been structured with 90 percent military special agents and 10 percent civilian special agents, with the majority of the civilian special agents assigned to the Major Procurement Fraud Unit. Under the restructure, the percentage of military special agents will eventually be reduced to 40 percent of the organizational staffing. This change will not take place overnight, but will require more than 5 years to complete. Most of the downsizing should occur through reduced recruitment and normal attrition.

Additional changes may include training. CID special agents are currently trained here at the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), Fort Leonard Wood, while personnel from other military criminal investigative organizations, such as the Naval Criminal Investigative Service and the Office of Special Investigation, receive part of their training through the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Glynco, Georgia. During his 4 November 2021 visit to USAMPS, CID Director Ford stated, "The location of the training doesn't matter as long as the content of the course meets the needs of CID." Future meetings to discuss possible curriculum adjustments are planned to ensure that USAMPS is meeting the need.

Other changes are being considered, and I will update the Corps when I have more information to provide.

Assist, Protect, Defend! Of the Troops,
For the Troops!!

"As the Army continues to modernize, rest assured that the commandant is showcasing our capabilities and what we do for the Army; you make that easy because of your continuous outstanding support to the senior mission commanders."

On the Shoulders of Giants:

The Military Police Corps Bids Farewell to Titans of the Regiment

By Brigadier General Niave F. Knell

This past year, our Corps heavy-heartedly bade a final farewell to two steadfast helmsmen. These men led us through competition, working long hours to preserve our force readiness. They led us in crisis, professionalizing our force to secure critical assets and to respond to border issues, civil disturbances, the Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), and evacuations. They led us in conflict, guiding our Soldiers as our Corps continually answered the call to support maneuver with security and mobility assets, police operations, and detention operations.

In December, we lost Chief Warrant Officer Five Leroy Shamburger (Retired), our fourth Regimental Chief Warrant Officer. In addition to a phenomenal career from case agent to group operations, he vastly improved our special-agent courses at the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, to ensure that future agents could investigate felony level crimes with precision and professionalism.

In March, we lost Regimental Command Sergeant Major Daniel Rimmer (Retired), our fourteenth Regimental Command Sergeant Major, who greatly influenced the establishment of our current regimental home. Command Sergeant Major Rimmer led the 14th Military Police Brigade from Fort McClellan, Alabama, to Fort Leonard Wood. He was then selected to serve as the Regimental Command Sergeant Major. He was integral in the development of the relationship between the schoolhouse and the units across Fort Leonard Wood.

The presence of these two men is felt across every formation whose flag bears pistols crossed for law and order.

In April, we also bade a bittersweet farewell to First Sergeant David Ross (Retired) upon his retirement. In a ceremony filled with joy and appreciation for his decades of service, our hearts swelled with pride for his accomplishments and the role that he played in training more than 100,000 military police professionals.

These great leaders have always been present and reassuring for the Regiment. They were and forever will be the lifeblood of our organization. It is impossible for their passion and effect to disappear. We owe thanks to these men, for we gratefully prospered under their guidance. To Leroy, Daniel, and David, we are a better Regiment because of you. Your service inspires us, and your legacy guides us. You are the Regiment, and the Regiment is you.

As with life, the nature of our profession is one of change. Progress is the result of the determination of the leaders at the reins, who are giants amongst men—common men, capable men. Giants like Leroy, Daniel, and David, who rise to humble prominence with the weight of the profession on their shoulders.

These three are now amongst the same giants upon whose shoulders they once stood long ago. Just as they discovered the truth built on the dedication of their predecessors, we now discover the truth built on their commitment. It is on the shoulders of these great men that we now stand. We are prepared for the future because they have trained and molded us to be prepared.

We have no confusion about our purpose: *To Assist, Protect, and Defend!*

Brigadier General Knell previously served as the chief of the Military Police Corps Regiment, the 51st commandant of the U.S. Army Military Police School, and the deputy commanding general for Protection, U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence, Fort Leonard Wood. She is now the deputy commanding general at Fort Riley, Kansas.

Multi-Domain Operations:

An Early Look at the Latest Evolution of Operational Doctrine

By Captain Carlos J. Valencia

Doctrine represents the total collection of U.S. Army knowledge gained over 247 years of war, uneasy tensions, and peace. Over the past 40 years, the world and the operational environment (OE) in which we find ourselves have significantly changed, as various advancements have been made by peer threats. Loitering munitions, electronic warfare, unmanned systems, and nonnation state actors (among other technologies and factors) have revolutionized how war is now fought and how the Army must adapt to meet these threats. After a nearly 20-year focus on counterinsurgency operations, the Army began shifting its doctrinal focus back toward large-scale combat operations in 2017, with the publication of the current edition of Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*.[1] The upcoming 2022 edition of FM 3-0 (now in draft form and scheduled for release in Fall 2022) will introduce a new Army operational concept that retains the focus on large-scale combat operations, builds on the importance of integrating joint and multinational capabilities, and expands on the combined arms approach—with an emphasis on creating complementary and reinforcing effects with capabilities from multiple domains.

Multi-domain operations (MDO) refers to the combined arms employment of capabilities from all domains that creates and exploits relative advantages to defeat enemy forces, achieve objectives, and consolidate gains during competition, crisis, and armed conflict. MDO constitute the Army contribution to the joint fight. All operations are MDO, regardless of joint force capabilities contributed at each Army echelon. This is because Army forces employ organic capabilities in multiple domains and continuously benefit from capabilities that they do not control; examples include benefits gained from the Global Positioning System and from combat aviation support from the U.S. Navy or the U.S. Air Force. MDO demand a mindset that focuses on how Army forces view their OE and threats. But what does the modern OE look like, and how do the domains fit in?

An OE is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities that bear on the commander's decisions. Within the context of an OE, a domain is a physically defined portion of the OE that requires a unique set of warfighting capabilities and skills. The OE includes portions of the land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains as impacted through three dimensions (human, physical, and information). The land, maritime, air, and space domains are defined by their physical characteristics, and cyberspace—a manmade network of networks—connects them, as represented by the dots shown in Figure 1.

Leaders must understand how these three dimensions impact the OE. From a simple machine gun team crew action to a major offensive campaign, all operations affect the physical world, the humans who reside in it, and the information by which it is conceptualized. Additionally, MDO aim for Army leaders to think beyond previous planning considerations and emphasize the integration of the Army capabilities across the five domains in order to compound effects with sister Services and deter and defeat peer threats at the lowest cost.



Figure 1. The OE

"The upcoming 2022 edition of FM 3-0 . . . builds on the importance of integrating joint and multinational capabilities, and expands on the combined arms approach—with an emphasis on creating complementary and reinforcing effects with capabilities from multiple domains."

An additional change to the updated version of FM 3-0 (draft) will be the introduction of the strategic situation, which stems from the competition continuum introduced in Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*.[2] The strategic situation describes how the Army conducts itself across the range of military operations in three strategic contexts—competition below armed conflict, crisis, and armed conflict. Together, these three strategic contexts form a progressive continuum along which the Army must be prepared to proceed in order to match an adversary's escalating violence and increases in U.S. national interest. In competition below armed conflict, nation- or nonnation-states with unaligned interests use various peaceful and malicious methods to compete with one another and gain an upper hand. The traditional Army contribution to unified action during this strategic context of competition below armed conflict consists of military engagement and security cooperation while preparing for armed conflict. As events or incidents that threaten U.S. national interests occur, the strategic context gradually moves toward crisis; this may require Army intervention, and Soldiers may be deployed to forward locations to deter conflict and prepare for war. If all else fails, then nation- or nonnation-states may begin using lethal force to achieve their goals; and in response, the Army conducts combat operations, exploiting its preparations from the competition and crisis strategic contexts to defeat the adversary. Competition below armed conflict, crisis, and armed conflict are not terribly foreign concepts, but the strategic situation helps leaders better conceptualize operations as the Army operates in different strategic contexts around the world.

Along with the previously mentioned updates to the current edition of FM 3-0, additional major updates and changes will include—

- Establishing the dynamics of combat power—leadership, information, mobility, and survivability—which are generated by the warfighting functions.
- Identifying the four tenets of operations: agility, convergence, endurance, and depth. These tenets are attributes that should be built into all plans and operations, and they are directly related to how the Army operational concept should be employed. The new FM 3-0 (draft) will introduce convergence as the concerted employment of capabilities from multiple domains against combinations of objectives to create effects against a system, formation, capability, or decision maker.
- Describing the nine imperatives as actions that Army forces must take to defeat peer enemy forces and succeed in operational environments extended through all domains.
- Providing an update to the operational framework. The update will—
  - Expand assigned areas, introducing and defining zone and sector areas.
  - Remove consolidation area, as the consolidation of gains now occurs throughout the entire operation, regardless of location.
  - Reintroduce main effort, supporting effort, and reserve, which replace decisive, shaping, and supporting efforts.
- Adding informational considerations to the mission variables, which are aspects of the three dimensions (human, physical, and information dimensions) that affect how humans and automated systems derive meaning from, use, act upon, and are impacted by information.
- Introducing influence as a ninth form of contact.
- Adding the theater strategic level as the fourth level of war.
- Adding chapters on Army operations in maritime-dominated environments and leadership during operations.

Similar to events of the past, the 2022 version of FM 3-0 (draft) will drive an evolutionary change across Army doctrine, including updates and changes to military police doctrine. As the Army doubles down on its focus on large-scale combat operations, FM 3-0 (draft) should serve as a reminder that the three military police disciplines of security and mobility support, detainee operations, and police operations exist to support maneuver commanders in closing with and destroying the enemy. In the next few years, updates will be made to Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-37, *Protection*,[3] FM 3-39, *Military Police Operations*,[4] FM 3-63, *Detainee Operations*,[5] and various military police Army techniques publications so that they align with FM 3-0 (draft). Military police leaders must lean forward, understand FM 3-0 (draft), and use the information contained therein when communicating with senior leaders and Soldiers. Military police leaders and Soldiers will need to answer various questions posed by this year's update to FM 3-0, including—

- How do military police capabilities complement and reinforce other branch and Service capabilities across each of the domains?
- How do military police forces create effects through the different dimensions?
- How do military police contribute to competition below armed conflict, crisis, and armed conflict?

As military police, we are no strangers to the three dimensions, as we work within those dimensions on a day-to-day basis, conducting our three disciplines in support of competition below armed conflict, crisis, and armed conflict. The five domains are trickier. Initial thoughts are that, as a ground force, we can really only affect the land domain; but with some additional critical thinking, it is evident that we complement the others. For example, just through the one security and mobility support task of providing critical site security, we enable all of the other domains by securing seaports of debarkation/embarkation (maritime), airfields and air defense batteries (air), antiballistic missile launch facilities (space), and satellite communication uplink sites (cyberspace). Although, each of these critical sites is within the land domain, power is projected through the others. This is just one example using one task; I challenge everyone to think critically when reading the updated version of FM 3-0 (draft) and to come up with other examples.

According to the preface of FM 3-0,[6] FM 3-0 is a critical piece of doctrine that leaders must read in order to understand Army operations and how each and every branch of the Army contributes to the fight—and this year's version will be no different.

Following the release of the new FM 3-0 (draft) publication, military police doctrine will be updated and sent throughout the Regiment for review. As drafts of the various publications appear in leaders' e-mail inboxes, I implore each of you to read them and provide your feedback; this is the only way that we can improve our doctrine.

Endnotes:

[1]FM 3-0, *Operations*, 10 June 2017.

[2]JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 12 July 2017.

[3]ADP 3-37, *Protection*, 31 July 2019.

[4]FM 3-39, *Military Police Operations*, 9 April 2019.

[5]FM 3-63, *Detainee Operations*, 2 January 2020.

[6]FM 3-0.

Captain Valencia is a doctrine analyst/writer for the Military Police Branch, Doctrine Division, Fielded Force Integration Directorate, Maneuver Support Center of Excellence, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He holds a bachelor's degree in history from the University of Texas, San Antonio.

The Long War and Continuous Improvements to Support Antiterrorism Readiness

By Colonel Richard Vanderlinden (Retired)

The mission of the U.S. Army is "to deploy, fight, and win our Nation's wars by providing ready, prompt, and sustained land dominance by Army forces across the full spectrum of conflict as part of the joint force."[1] Terrorism is the Long War. Terrorist threats that the Army faces today represent the culmination of an evolution dating back more than 2,000 years. And during the past 4 decades, the Army has been increasingly engaged in a war on terrorism waged by organizations and individuals employing tactics that instill fear to achieve political objectives. The evolution of terrorism is documented in countless historical and academic research studies as well as in Army antiterrorism doctrine, which summarizes the early days of terrorism by describing Jewish extremists (Sicarii) who attacked Roman occupiers; the Hashshashin, a faction of Shia Islamists that employed assassination tactics; the French Revolution, in which terrorist tactics were used against counterrevolutionists; and the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand preceding World War I.[2] The website for the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (available at <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/>) is a comprehensive source of information on the history and study of terrorism.

Waves of Global Terrorism: From 1879 to the Present, written by David C. Rapoport, contains an interesting perspective on terrorism.[3] Rapoport provides an in-depth look at global terrorism and describes four waves of terror—anarchist, anticolonial, new left, and religious. He explains that the waves are centered on the ability of terrorist organizations to launch fear campaigns and establishes revolution as a common theme. Rapoport states that each wave lasts about a generation and suggests that "If history repeats itself, the fourth wave will be over in 2 decades"[4]—around the year 2025. Given Rapoport's emphasis on the terrorist organization as a defining factor for each wave, the rise of extremist ideologies and individual and organizational domestic terrorism—which have grown within the United States and across the globe during the last decade—may be an indicator of the next wave.[5]

The Evolution of the Threat

Department of Defense and U.S. Army antiterrorism capabilities have expanded significantly since the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. In the years that have followed that bombing, U.S. Services and the Nation of the United States have been targeted by additional terrorist attacks. Some of those attacks marked turning points in the evolution of Army antiterrorism. In 1995, the United States experienced the "worst act of homegrown terrorism in the Nation's history" when Timothy McVeigh (a former Army Soldier) bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.[6] This attack led to the establishment of the Interagency Security Committee and the development of physical security standards for federal facilities. A year later, a building that housed U.S. Air Force Service members in Al-Khobar, Saudi Arabia, was attacked with a large vehicle bomb. Of significance is the fact that both the Marine barracks and Khobar Towers bombings were conducted by members of Hezbollah. Each of these bombings also involved a large, vehicle-borne improvised explosive device that targeted buildings and compounds housing U.S. Service members in host nation countries. These two attacks demonstrated the vulnerabilities of U.S. military operational forces conducting multinational operations overseas. Following the Khobar Tower bombing, many in the security profession believed that vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks were the primary tactic of foreign terrorist organizations—until the attack on the *USS Cole*. In 2000, two suicide terrorists on a small, improvised explosive device-laden boat attacked the port side of the *Cole* while the ship was refueling in the Yemeni port of Aden. This was a devastating attack on a U.S. Navy warship by a small team of terrorists employing asymmetric tactics. A year later, on 11 September 2001 (9/11), the homeland was attacked by terrorists who gained control of airplanes and flew them into the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. If the previous attacks on the U.S. military weren't enough to galvanize the Nation's commitment to terrorism prevention, the attacks of 9/11 and the wars that followed certainly steeled our commitment. One additional key attack worth mentioning is the 2009 Fort Hood, Texas, shooting committed by Major Nidal Hasan. The Fort Hood attack (along with more recent attacks by U.S. military members) demonstrated a different adversary (with a different tactic)—the insider threat.

The Evolution of Antiterrorism

The protection of personnel and assets from acts of terrorism is one of the most complex challenges for commanders. Antiterrorism has necessarily evolved in response to the threats that have been faced, and key events

"Now is the time to re-examine our history, postulate the future terrorist threat (in all forms), and develop measures to deter and prevent future attacks. A new strategy, developed in conjunction with all Army major commands, is key."

have driven the status of terrorism today. The Marine barracks and Khobar Towers bombings drew attention to the threats to forces deployed overseas. When the Khobar Towers incident occurred, the Department of Defense shifted to a force protection construct, which drove the establishment of antiterrorism offices at the Department of the Army and major subordinate command levels. However, within months of the Antiterrorism Branch, Headquarters, Department of the Army, becoming operational, the attack on the *USS Cole* occurred. After this attack, the Antiterrorism Branch stood up a Combating Terrorism Task Force to study the attack and to develop recommended changes across the force. Historical records from May 2001 indicate that 50 recommendations for Army action were tracked across a number of areas, including intelligence; counterintelligence; theater response forces; in-transit unit security; training for Army leaders and force protection officers; lessons learned repositories; vulnerability assessments for ports, routes, and in-transit units; force protection standards within logistics doctrine; and procedures for coordinating and establishing combatant command threat levels. The 2001 Army Antiterrorism Posture Statement identified 5,500 personnel staffing requirements and a funding need of $2.4 billion to address access control for Army installations and other force protection enhancements.[7] These efforts, led by the Antiterrorism Branch, sought to "close" Army installations and address shortfalls identified by the intelligence community threat assessment that had taken place ahead of the 9/11 attacks. Leadership decisions made post-9/11 quickly led to a rapid response to address security across the Army. Other notable actions that advanced the Army Antiterrorism Program included—

- Development and revision of antiterrorism policy.
- Development and revision of antiterrorism doctrine.
- Annual budget cycles to justify critical funding requirements.
- Investments in the security of Army installations.
- Increased focus on protection of stand-alone facilities.
- Transformation of the Army Threat Integration Center.
- Establishment of requirements and the fielding of the Joint Analytic Real-Time Virtual Information-Sharing System.
- Development of a methodology to establish and validate manpower requirements.
- Numerous studies to understand threats (foreign, domestic, and insider).
- Integration of antiterrorism into the Army Protection Program.

Near-Peer Competition and New Terrorism Actors

Today's persistent threat from near-peer competitors employing a wide range of asymmetric terrorist tactics, combined with relatively new threat actors, creates a complex operating environment. Adversaries now operating across the terrorism sphere include cyberterrorists, insider threats, transnational criminal organizations, super-empowered individuals,[8] individuals and organizations with violent extremist ideological beliefs, active shooters, and lone actors. Some of the commonalities among these actors include their desire to instill fear through violence, create anger among the populace, promote distrust of the government, challenge democratic institutions, and destroy individuals' sense of safety and security. Compounding the challenges of an expanded terrorist domain are the rampant and growing nature of foreign influence operations as well as misinformation and disinformation, which have inundated the Internet and other forms of media. Given the many forms of attack that occur across cyberspace, terrorism has become less kinetic and more non-kinetic.

Key for Army war planners is the assumption that Army forces must be ready and capable of operating and deploying from a contested strategic support area. Army planners recognize that near-peer competitors will likely employ a wide range of tactics to disrupt, degrade, and delay the operational deployment of U.S. military forces from the homeland. Examples of these tactics include cyberattacks, the weaponization of social media, and "military intimidation, paramilitary activities, information operations, industrial and academic espionage, and economic coercion."[9]

Back to the Future

During the past 4 decades, the Army has made significant strides in improving antiterrorism readiness as the operational environment has continued to evolve. Antiterrorism organizational structure and manning, policies, doctrine, training, assessments, high-risk personnel protection, threat information sharing, operating budgets, the integration of protection programs, leadership advocacy, and effective strategies have all contributed to this progress. The ability to understand the evolving threat and assess and act on lessons learned and best practices for installations, stand-alone facilities, and operational forces are the reasons that Army commands and communities have been successful. Despite the investments in time, energy, and resources, there is much more to be done. We must learn from the past while preparing for the future. Now is the time to re-examine our history, postulate the future

(continued on page 27)

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment 11th Military Police Battalion

Lineage and Honors

- Constituted 12 August 1943 in the Army of the United States as the 11th Military Police Section, Criminal Investigation.
- Activated 14 August 1943 at Fort Custer, Michigan.
- Reorganized and redesignated 19 March 1944 as the 11th Criminal Investigation Section.
- Reorganized and redesignated 11 October 1944 as the 11th Military Police Criminal Investigation Section.
- Reorganized and redesignated 19 January 1945 as the 11th Military Police Criminal Investigation Detachment.
- Allotted 1 August 1951 to the Regular Army.
- Reorganized and redesignated 10 February 1954 as the 11th Military Police Detachment.
- Inactivated 9 June 1969 in Germany.
- Activated 1 August 1973 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
- Reorganized and redesignated 1 September 1996 as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 11th Military Police Battalion.

Campaign Participation Credit

- World War II.
  - Normandy.
  - Northern France.
  - Rhineland.
  - Ardennes-Alsace.
  - Central Europe.
- Southwest Asia.
  - Defense of Saudi Arabia.
    - Liberation and Defense of Kuwait.
    - Cease-Fire.
- War on Terrorism.
  - Iraq.
    - Iraqi Governance.
    - National Resolution.
    - Additional campaigns to be determined.

Decorations

- Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered Iraq 2005–2006
- Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered Iraq 2007–2008

The Versatility of Military Police:

The 46th Military Police Command Supports Civil Authorities as Task Force 46

By Captain James A. Phillips

Assist, Protect, Defend! The 46th Military Police Command, Michigan Army National Guard, Lansing, Michigan—headquarters of the multicomponent chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) response element, Task Force 46—supports the ideals of the U.S. Army Military Police Corps motto in ways within and beyond the scope of military police doctrine, while still maintaining the core of the military police mission.

As the U.S. Army refines its operational focus to prepare for large-scale combat operations against near-peer competitors, Task Force 46 exemplifies the leveraging of unique capabilities to safeguard the homeland against the potential threat of those adversaries. As part of a coordinated federal response to manage any complex catastrophic continental U.S. emergency, Task Force 46 supports the designated lead federal agency responder—typically, the Federal Emergency Management Agency. By air, on the ground, and in cyberspace, the task force engages its capabilities to augment what civilian agencies offer in disaster response and recovery.

The defense support to civil authorities mission is multifaceted and dynamic. Because of its nature, Task Force 46 trains with partner civilian agencies across the Nation. Through dense-urban-terrain exercises, tabletop exercises focusing on the cyberspace warfighting domain, and an annual nuclear detonation response exercise, Task Force 46 maintains a state of readiness with a continuous emphasis on assisting, protecting, and defending the continental United States.

Task Force 46 provides command and control for one of two CBRN response enterprises under the Department of Defense. To fulfill this mission set, Task Force 46 participates in two training exercises—Guardian Response and Vibrant Response. Guardian Response, which focuses on training in the field for subordinate Task Force 46 units, brings together more than 2,500 personnel and guides participants in exercising command and control in a multicity catastrophic-incident scenario. The intent of the exercise is to demonstrate the ability to deploy, employ, and sustain a specialized military response in support of a lead federal agency in a realistic environment. Vibrant Response is the command post exercise for the B Element (Army National Guard) of the CBRN response enterprises—the other name by which Task Force 46 is known. It draws on multiple federal and state agencies, including the Federal Emergency Management Agency and units from multiple U.S. states and territories. Building on the success of previous iterations, Vibrant Response 22 focused on tactical operations center operations and interagency coordination. The 46th Military Police Command focused on building the capacity of the command staff to function as the enterprise leader.

Task Force 46 tactical operations center

Task Force 46 Vibrant Response training

Along with the main Task Force 46 training events of Guardian Response and Vibrant Response, participation in dense-urban-terrain exercises throughout the United States also keeps the task force in a constant state of readiness. Dense-urban-terrain exercises held in New York City, New York, and Los Angeles, California, showcased the possible future of defense support to civil authorities exercises. In New York City, first responders and emergency management coordinators worked hand in hand with their National Guard CBRN response enterprises counterparts, allowing not only for essential training, but also for the development and strengthening of important interagency relationships. Task Force 46 conducted demanding dense-urban-terrain events under difficult circumstances in New York City. These included simulated subway rescue scenarios and hypothetical nuclear blasts impacting multiple buildings and neighborhoods. The exercise included more than 170 Soldiers from 12 Army National Guard units, two U.S. Army Reserve units, and Canadian armed forces units with military police, engineering, medical, logistics, and hazardous material response capabilities. Despite the large military presence, military personnel trained in a subordinate role, always in support of federal, state, and local civilian authorities—just as they would have during actual CBRN response events. After learning some lessons from the exercise in New York, the task force refined its training and capabilities at the exercise in Los Angeles in October 2021. The Los Angeles Police Department and Fire Departments hosted Task Force 46 during the joint exercise, which consisted of a variety of events including search-and-rescue scenarios, an academic seminar in which subject matter experts shared best practices, a communications exercise, and mass casualty decontamination training. One of the scenarios tested the reactions of first responders to a simulated domestic terrorism threat. The event tested the overall effectiveness and efficiency of military and civilian partners when presented with a hazardous-emergency situation.

Task Force 46 also takes its capabilities into the cyber warfighting domain. Cyber Impact 2022, held in March 2022 in Buffalo, New York, showcased the ability of the task force to work through the effects of a cyberattack to protect and support civilian agencies. The 3-day event built unity of effort and familiarity among the task force and its homeland defense partners. The training event also involved participants from the National All-Domain Warfighting Center, Grayling, Michigan, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, who remotely joined in for the tactical operations center portion of the exercise. Multidomain operational exercises like Cyber Impact 2022 help Task Force 46 and major metropolitan partners prepare for a changing threat environment.

While the 46th Military Police Command is a military police unit through and through, its other mission as the headquarters for a multifunctional disaster response task force highlights the unique ways that it functions. Assist, Protect, Defend: Across multiple domains and throughout the country, the 46th Military Police Command and Task Force 46 fulfill those directives.

Captain Phillips is the public affairs officer for the 46th Military Police Command. He holds a degree in English literature and secondary education from Wheaton College, Illinois.

Lessons Learned as a Division Staff Planner

By Major Christopher A. Evans

In late June 2018, I was deployed to Afghanistan, where I was appointed as the new planner assigned to the legendary 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky. The Screaming Eagles emphasize reception and integration of all new Soldiers, both officers and enlisted personnel. Everyone must earn their way onto the team through hard work, talent, and an aggressive mindset. In the Plans Section of the 101st, the new planner is traditionally assigned a large and complex project to determine if he or she will "sink" or "swim."

I do not remember much of my first week of deployment, but I do remember sharing computers because there were more majors than there were workstations. As a planner assigned to U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A), I was no longer in my military police comfort zone. Additionally, the division chief of staff tasked me to plan the USFOR-A force structure for the next year. Fortunately, my previous operational assignments had prepared me to tackle that assignment. I had just graduated from the intense graduate level program taught by successful battalion commanders and civilian instructors with doctoral degrees—the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas—the month prior. Through broad reading assignments and concepts, which expanded my knowledge base beyond a knowledge of doctrine, AMSP served as a lifeline.

Key Concepts of AMSP

My first AMSP reading assignment had been *Young Men and Fire* by Norman Maclean.[1] The book contains an account of Maclean's investigation; the development of his understanding of the fundamental nature of fire; and an evaluation of the ground decisions, tactics, and responses of smokejumpers to the 1949 Mann Gulch Forest fire that killed 13 of the 15 smokejumpers who parachuted into the situation. Of the two smokejumpers who survived, one chose the correct direction in which to flee and was fast enough to outrun the wall of flame. The other was the experienced foreman, who was able to rapidly develop an untested escape tactic based upon his deep understanding of the nature of the fire.

The reason behind the success of both survivors was their immediate recognition that their operational environment (OE) had unexpectedly changed and their previous plan was no longer applicable. For the rest of that year, AMSP drove home the following two key points with each new concept introduced:

- The more accurate your understanding of the OE, the more effective your tactical actions and responses will be.
- The poorer your ability to reassess, reframe, and understand your OE, the more likely it is that an unanticipated event will cause mission failure.

The most insightful piece of information that I learned in AMSP is from John Lewis Gaddis's *The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past*.[2] Gaddis uses the metaphor of history as a painting. Historians, like painters, smooth over the complex/unique details and intentionally focus on the larger patterns in order to quickly and easily transmit knowledge to the audience. A painting can depict key details such as a waterfall and trees and can evoke the same emotions and memories of the original landscape, but it can never replicate the real-life observations of how the leaves swirled in the air or how the filtered light shined through the water. Likewise, a historical vignette may contain many key facts but it can never fully replicate the oppressive fear and doubt that a leader may have felt in the moment. Gaddis's key idea is that the artist and the historian selectively scale (decide how much detail) and scope (decide what type of detail) the critical information concerning their chosen subject.

"I learned that my role was to analyze the problem and then selectively scale and scope the information to that which is critical for the commander to make an informed decision."

Gaddis's work resonated with me because it helped me overcome my personal belief that I was lying if I did not present my boss with all of the facts that I had before he or she made a decision. I learned that my role was to analyze the problem and then selectively scale and scope the information to that which is critical for the commander to make

an informed decision. As my experience and knowledge increases, my perspective broadens and my ability to predict future patterns and identify unexpected situations with potentially catastrophic impacts increases. I can only anticipate future patterns by having learned to identify them in the past. Like a brush and paint, concepts and models distill the complex and unique into useful generalizations through manageable variables.

USFOR-A Staff

My first USFOR-A planning project spanned 7 months and required coordination with all division staff sections; brigades; and regional train, advise, assist commands and task forces. I was tasked to analyze and make recommendations about how USFOR-A could optimize the force structure by transitioning from two partial brigade combat teams to a single organic brigade combat team without a loss of combat capability. One critical subtask consisted of adjusting the array of the security force assistance brigade (SFAB) based upon changes in the OE.

I initially believed that this was solely a U.S. force structure problem. In framing the OE only in terms of the United States, my force structure recommendations did not take into consideration the impact on countries deployed under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Operation Resolute Support mission. And there were plenty of impacts—especially considering the SFAB array of forces in Afghanistan. Some of our North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners viewed the allocation SFAB teams as a physical demonstration of strategic priority—that is, the more teams in a location, the greater the strategic importance of that location. My recommendations unintentionally sent the wrong message to higher headquarters and to our allies, who quickly lodged concerns with senior U.S. officers. My first attempt as a planner was a "no go," and I received immediate retraining.

Once I reframed the OE in terms of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the SFAB array of forces became the planning priority. My recommendation regarding the SFAB array of forces in Afghanistan contained more than 56 revisions in order to nest within guidance from higher headquarters and incorporate recommendations in answer to our allies' concerns.

As a planner, I learned a humbling lesson. My initial failure to understand the OE led my recommendations to create friction between senior headquarters, resulting in needless frustration and greatly increasing the amount of staff work necessary to resolve the issues.

Conclusion

During my time as a planner for USFOR-A, I learned that leaders must clearly understand their OE, accurately identify patterns, and then constantly perform assessments with each action taken. Each assessment and iteration refine the leader's understanding of the OE, which improves the effectiveness of the plan.

Recommendations and solutions to complex problems are like paintings. Regardless of whether the painting is of a wide landscape of the Rocky Mountains or a close-up of a basket of fruit, the painter selects the type of paint, method of application, and level of detail. A staff officer does the same thing for the organization by selecting the key variables, scaling and scoping the details provided to a senior leader. The most successful leaders are artists who can accurately distill the complexity of the problem into manageable variables and metrics that a commander can rapidly understand and use to make decisions.

Endnotes:

[1]Norman Maclean, *Young Men and Fire*, 1992.

[2]John Lewis Gaddis, *The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past*, 2002.

Major Evans is the strategic initiatives officer for the U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He holds a bachelor's degree in sociology from the University of Texas at Austin and master's degrees in business and organizational security from Webster University and operational art from AMSP, Fort Leavenworth.

Military Police Doctrine Update

"War is not an affair of chance. A great deal of knowledge, study, and meditation is necessary to conduct it well."

—Frederick the Great,
Prussian King, 1740–1786

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence Fielded Force Integration Directorate, Doctrine Division			
Publication Number	**Title**	**Date**	**Description**
Current Publications			
FM 3-39	Military Police Operations	9 Apr 19	A manual that describes the military police support provided to Army forces conducting unified land operations within the framework of joint operations; increases the emphasis on simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks; and contains a critical discussion of the defense support of civil authorities. **Status:** Current.
FM 3-63	Detainee Operations	2 Jan 20	A manual that addresses detainee operations across the range of military operations and provides detainee operations guidance for commanders and staffs. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-37.2	Antiterrorism	19 Aug 21	A manual that establishes Army guidance on integrating and synchronizing antiterrorism across the full spectrum of conflict and into the full range of military operations. It shows how antiterrorism operations nest under full spectrum operations, the protection warfighting function, and the composite risk management process. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.4	Military Police Platoons	9 Apr 20	A publication that establishes doctrinal framework and techniques for employment of military police platoons in support of Army operations. It provides fundamental guidelines and serves as a quick reference guide to assist platoon leaders and Soldiers in successfully executing key military police missions at the platoon echelon. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.10	Police Operations	24 August 21	A manual that addresses each element of the military police law and order mission, including planning considerations, police station operations, patrol operations, police engagement, traffic operations, and host nation police capability and capacity. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.11	Military Police Special Reaction Teams	26 Nov 13	A manual that serves as a guide for commanders, staffs, and trainers who are responsible for training and deploying military police special reaction teams. **Status:** Under revision. Projected publication in 1st quarter (Qtr), Fiscal Year (FY) 2023.
ATP 3-39.12	Law Enforcement Investigations	19 Aug 13	A manual that serves as a guide and toolkit for military police, investigators, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID) special agents, traffic management and collision investigators, and Soldiers conducting criminal and traffic law enforcement (LE) and LE investigations. It also serves to educate military police commanders and staffs on LE investigation capabilities, enabling a more thorough understanding of those capabilities. **Status:** Under revision. Projected publication in 2d Qtr, FY 23.

Military Police Doctrine Update

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence Fielded Force Integration Directorate, Doctrine Division			
Publication Number	**Title**	**Date**	**Description**
ATP 3-39.20	Police Intelligence Operations	13 May 19	A manual that addresses police intelligence operations that support the operations process and protection activities by providing exceptional police information and intelligence to support, enhance, and contribute to situational understanding, force protection, the commander's protection program, and homeland security. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.30	Security and Mobility Support	21 May 20	A manual that provides Army military police commanders, staffs, and Soldiers at all echelons a foundation for the conduct of security and mobility support in support of decisive action. The tasks in this manual are primarily focused on applying military police combat power in support of the movement and maneuver and protection warfighting functions. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.32	Physical Security	8 March 22	A manual that establishes guidance for all personnel responsible for physical security. It is the basic reference for training security personnel and is intended to be used in conjunction with the Army Regulation 190 (Military Police) series, Security Engineering Unified Facilities Criteria publications, Department of Defense directives, and other Department of the Army publications. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.33	Civil Disturbances	21 Apr 14	A manual that addresses continental U.S. and outside the continental U.S. civil-disturbance operations and domestic unrest, including the military role in providing assistance to civil authorities. **Status:** Under revision. Projected publicaton in 1st Qtr, FY 23.
ATP 3-39.34	Military Working Dogs	19 May 22	A manual that provides commanders, staffs, and military working dog (MWD) handlers with an understanding of MWD capabilities, employment considerations, sustainment requirements, and the integration of MWDs in support of full spectrum operations. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.35	Protective Services	31 May 13	A manual that provides guidance for protective-service missions and the management of protective-service details. **Status:** Current.
Note: Current military police publications can be accessed and downloaded in electronic format from the U.S. Army Military Police School website at <http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/>. Users must adhere to any limited-dissemination control markings that appear on publications and follow the authorized-dissemination requirements to authorized recipients only. Comments or questions about military police doctrine can be e-mailed to <usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.mpdoc@army.mil>.			



Beyond CompStat:
A Tiered Crime Analysis Framework at Fort Drum

By Major Benjamin G. Franzosa

Since the release of the *Report of the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee*, the Military Police Corps has redoubled its efforts to provide installation senior commanders with crime data and analysis.[1] Installations have responded to the call to action from the report with vigor, refining computer statistics (CompStat) processes and hiring or assigning crime analysists. As a Corps, we have become increasingly proficient at demonstrating when, where, and how crimes are committed on military installations. Additionally, on many installations, such as Joint Base Lewis–McChord, Washington, military police units are experimenting with focused crime prevention programs.[2] But the Military Police Corps needs to go further. As police and emergency services professionals, military police leaders must provide senior installation commanders with expert solutions for opportunities for crime prevention. Supported commanders need tools to help them visualize policies that they can implement to positively impact criminal justice outcomes and a system that produces quantifiable data that demonstrates if the policies they implement have the desired effects.

To this end, the Directorate of Emergency Services (DES), Fort Drum, New York, has developed a four-tiered crime analysis framework, with the tiers consisting of crime data analysis, predictive analysis, program analysis, and practice meta-analysis, as shown in Figure 1. Fort Drum DES uses traditional CompStat methods for crime data analysis. For predictive analysis, the results of crime data analysis are overlaid with relevant elements of the operational environment to demonstrate how patterns of life affect crime trends on Fort Drum. To enhance the program analysis and practice meta-analysis tiers, Fort Drum DES has adapted the program analysis framework from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) "CrimeSolutions" database.

The purpose of this article is to provide a model for tiered crime analysis and to demonstrate the need for a military police organization to implement and manage programs and a database, modeled after the NIJ CrimeSolutions database, specific to military law enforcement.

The NIJ CrimeSolutions Framework

NIJ CrimeSolutions is a centralized, evidence-based database designed to help criminal justice policy makers and practitioners understand what works for law enforcement- and justice-related programs and practices.[3] The application of the program analysis framework in the NIJ CrimeSolutions database to the Fort Drum tiered crime analysis framework is novel. In 1996, the U.S. Congress directed the U.S. Attorney General to conduct an independent review of national and local crime prevention programs to determine their effectiveness.[4] Based on this directive, the NIJ, with research assistance from the University of Maryland at College Park, published "Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising"; this report attempts to apply scientific rigor to crime prevention programs and practices and "hold all crime prevention programs accountable for their results."[5] This framework evolved into the NIJ CrimeSolutions database.

There are two aspects of the NIJ CrimeSolutions database—a repository of previously analyzed crime prevention programs and practices and a process for rating programs and practices.[6] Both are incredibly useful for policy makers and practitioners. The repository provides a comprehensive list of programs and practices that have been vetted by one



Figure 1. Tiered crime analysis framework

meta-analysis or more and shown to achieve results. The repository also provides a list of the programs that don't work, giving leaders a tool to avoid enacting ineffective or counterproductive policies. The process for rating programs and practices provides military police leaders and senior installation commanders with a powerful framework for analyzing their own local polices. This is the process that Fort Drum DES has adapted into its tiered crime analysis framework.

Tier 1: Crime Data Analysis

The Fort Drum DES baseline tier for its crime analysis framework consists of crime data analysis—the compilation, mapping, and analysis of raw crime data. Crime data analysis follows the traditional CompStat style of crime mapping pioneered by the New York City, New York, Police Department in the early 1990s. The crime-mapping process that eventually evolved into CompStat started with pushpins and crayons in the New York subways in the late 1980s before it was ever conducted on computers.[7] Mr. William J. Bratton, New York Police Department commissioner from 1994 to 1996, leveraged computer technology, making it the centerpiece of his crime-fighting strategy, which later became an industry standard.[8]

At Fort Drum, the Law Enforcement Division builds its crime data analysis on the Microsoft Power BI© (Business-Intelligence) platform. A sample screenshot of this program is shown in Figure 2. This system allows for interactive crime mapping using either ArcGIS© or Google Maps© and provides visual analysis of crime hot spots on the installation. Lieutenant Kevin L. Edmonds, Fort Drum crime analysist, compiles, maps, and analyzes crime statistics and trends in the Fort Drum area of interest. Lieutenant Edmonds has already shared this system of crime data analysis as a best practice throughout the U.S. Army Installation Management Command. He demonstrated the system during the 1st Quarter, Fiscal Year 2022 Installation Management Command CompStat briefing to Installation Management Command provost marshal leadership and Installation Management Command Group 6 (comprised of Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Campbell, Kentucky; Fort Stewart, Georgia; Fort Irwin, California; and Fort Polk, Louisiana) law enforcement representatives and has provided follow up "how-to" sessions to interested analysists.

Improvements in automation and data systems have made the process of categorizing and mapping crimes faster



Figure 2. Example crime data analysis

and more accurate; but even with an excellent automations-enabled analysis system, there are inherent limitations to crime data analysis. The major limitation of CompStat type crime analysis is that it is purely reactive. Functionally, it still accomplishes the same thing as putting crayon marks where crimes happened. Any discussion of the data without context is irrelevant. This limitation led to the development of predictive analysis methods at Fort Drum.

Tier 2: Predictive Analysis

The next tier in the Fort Drum DES crime analysis framework is predictive analysis—the determination of expected crime trends, given the unique factors of the operational environment. The Fort Drum DES effort to formalize predictive crime analysis started with an attempt to show the seasonal effects of weather on crime. The variations in crime statistics, which were presented monthly to the senior installation commander, were difficult to contextualize without first considering weather effects. Ensuring that those crime statistics were presented in context required predictive analysis. The aim of the predictive analysis was to illustrate the expected crime trends and then evaluate whether monthly crime statistics were better or worse than anticipated—rather than simply whether they were better or worse than those of the previous month.

The initial DES theory was that the primary driver for crime statistics on Fort Drum was weather and that crime trends were cyclical based purely on the season. The truth was far more complex. The graphing of multiyear crime trends (Figure 3) immediately revealed the impacts of the Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) and the associated tightening and loosening of movement restrictions. Data on criminal offenses also changed as units deployed; executed Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana, rotations; or otherwise left the installation. Unit level crime data analysis also exposed microtrends when overlaid with the Joint Readiness Training Center rotations and other major training exercises. The significant decrease in offenses surrounding periods of winter and summer block leave provided the final piece of the puzzle. Analyzing this data indicated that offenses decreased at a higher rate than the rate of nonlocal leave, meaning that the decrease was not due to a decrease of Soldiers on the installation; rather, the key factor was stress.

The Fort Drum DES searched for models that explained how stress affects military life. Fortunately, analyses of stressors related to military life are not new. The 2012 report entitled *Army 2020: Generating Health and Discipline in the Force Ahead of the Strategic Reset* (commonly referred to as the Gold Book Report) comprehensively lays out the effect of stress on Soldiers; specifically, the Composite Life Cycle Model depicts common stressors related to military life.[9] This model shows how transitional stressors (large training events, deployments, permanent changes of station, Family events) cause acute, recurring, and cumulative stress. The Fort Drum DES expanded upon this concept by plotting multiyear crime trends on the instillation and then analyzing how stressors drive noncompliant and criminal behavior.[10] The DES model for predictive analysis then provides estimates of what is expected to happen based on the unique stressors present in the operational environment and allows for the identification and targeting of high-risk windows of time (see Figure 4, page 22). This enables visibility for senior leaders.

Tier 3: Program Analysis

Program analysis is the next tier of the framework, in which the Fort Drum DES analyzes a specific set of activities designed to achieve a specific goal in order to confirm if those goals have been achieved. Predicting crime trends through predictive analysis enables the targeting of those trends with proactive law enforcement and crime reduction programs. The driving philosophy for these programs for the Fort Drum DES is to get "upstream" of the problems that lead to the noncompliant or criminal behavior, addressing the root symptoms before they become emergencies.[11]

Tracking the progress of these upstream efforts through crime data analysis is the basis of the Fort Drum program analysis tier. Crime analysts and DES operations personnel measure the results of crime reduction programs and compare them to expected crime trends. Determining what works requires a comprehensive analysis of all harm reduction programs (Army Substance Abuse Program, Behavioral Health Program, and Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention Program)—not just law enforcement programs—to observe their effects on crime statistics.

The Fort Drum DES adapted the NIJ CrimeSolutions framework to validate the effectiveness of these programs.[12] The "what works, what doesn't, and what's promising" methodology, shown in Figure 5, page 23, provides the senior installation commander with an honest assessment of the effectiveness of law enforcement and crime reduction programs. It is important to note that this program analysis framework includes an iterative process that evolves as the execution of a program changes and new data becomes available. Together, the continuous tracking of the status of all active crime prevention programs and the highlighting of selected programs as a part of the monthly senior installation commander crime briefing constitute a best practice. During this monthly briefing, DES provides the senior installation commander with a running estimate of the current situation, determining if the current law enforcement and crime reduction programs are proceeding according to his intent and showing what DES can and cannot do to impact the future operating environment.[13]

Tier 4: Practice Meta-Analysis

The zenith of the Fort Drum DES tiered crime analysis framework is practice meta-analysis. In this framework, the key difference between the program analysis and practice meta-analysis tiers is that program analysis deals with a specific set of activities designed to achieve a specific goal, whereas practice meta-analyses involves assessment of the effectiveness of many related programs across a number of studies.[14] As a single installation, Fort



Figure 3. Multiyear crime trends

Drum does not generate the scale of data necessary to conduct a true meta-analysis of crime prevention programs. As a result, the Fort Drum DES also intended to adopt the NIJ CrimeSolutions database for this tier. While the Crime Solutions database contains a multitude of analyzed practices, the practices in this database do not account for the unique factors associated with law enforcement in a military community, which require dedicated military police law enforcement and crime reduction practice meta-analysis.

Given the improvements in automations-enabled crime data analysis (including mapping), installation personnel can do their own crime data analysis and predictive analysis. Using the framework described in this article, they can also do their own program analysis. However, installation personnel cannot do their own practice meta-analysis. If they want to make use of the accumulated knowledge of the military justice community, installation DESs need a database of meta-analyzed practices provided to them. A higher echelon must produce and manage a repository of these meta-analyzed practices, modeled after the CrimeSolutions database. Conducting scientific practice meta-analysis and building and maintaining the database would require a dedicated organization within the Military Police Corps. That organization would require time and resources, but the time and resources spent would be returned by making the programs and practices implemented by the Military Police Corps more effective and ensuring that military justice policymakers and practitioners were not implementing repeated, counterproductive programs across installations.

Conclusion

The Military Police Corps is proficient at crime data analysis, informing supported commanders when, where, and how crimes are committed on their installations. But the Corps can do better. Through a structured, tiered crime analysis framework, military police professionals/offices/teams can track and analyze relevant data to provide crime prevention assessments and recommendations to senior installation commanders. Improving crime data analysis gives senior installation commanders a better understanding of when, where, and how crimes are committed. Predictive analysis provides senior installation commanders with an assessment of what is expected to happen on their installation based on the unique factors of the



Figure 4. Predictive analysis

installation operational environment. Through program analysis, the results of crime prevention programs are then measured against expected trends, showing what works, what doesn't, and what's promising. Through a military police organization dedicated to practice meta-analysis, the Military Police Corps can build a database of vetted, military-specific law enforcement and crime reduction practices.

This tiered crime analysis framework, developed by the Fort Drum DES, can serve to provide timely, valuable, and reliable analyses to senior installation commanders. Ideally, this framework could serve as a model that other installations can adopt and could drive the requirement for a military police organization to create and manage a database of military police programs and practices templated on the NIJ CrimeSolutions database. The specific composition and proponency of such an organization are beyond the scope of this article, but the current inability for installations to make efficient use of the accumulated knowledge of the military justice community demonstrates the need. A framework for scientifically analyzed programs and practices would make military police a central tenant in senior installation commanders' visualizations of the states of their installations and accomplish the Miltary Police Corps mission of assisting unit commanders in maintaining good order and discipline in their formations.

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

Figure 5. Program analysis

[7]Raymond Dussault, "Jack Maple: Betting on Intelligence," *Government Technology*, 12 August 2010, <https://www.govtech.com/magazines/gt/jack-maple-betting-on-intelligence.html>, accessed on 15 June 2022.

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Major Franzosa is the operations officer for the Fort Drum DES. He holds a bachelor's degree in history from the University of Dayton, Ohio; a master's degree in organizational and business security management from Webster University; and a master's degree in military arts and sciences from the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

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Articles should be concise, straightforward, and in the active voice. If they contain attributable information or quotations not referenced in the text, provide appropriate endnotes. Text length should not exceed 2,000 words (about eight double-spaced pages). Shorter after-action-type articles and reviews of books on military police topics are also welcome.

Include photos (with captions) and/or line diagrams that illustrate information in the article. Please do not include illustrations or photos in the text; instead, send each of them as a separate file. Do not embed photos in Microsoft PowerPoint® or Word. If illustrations are in PowerPoint, avoid excessive use of color and shading. Save digital images at a resolution no lower than 200 dpi. Images copied from a website must be accompanied by copyright permission. Please see the *Military Police* writer's, photograph, and illustration guide at <https://home.army.mil/wood/application/files/8416/3889/6980/MP_Writers_Guide_New.pdf> for more information.

Provide a short paragraph that summarizes the content of the article. Also include a short biography, including your full name, rank, current unit, and job title; a list of your past assignments, experience, and education; your mailing address; a fax number; and a commercial daytime telephone number.

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PROTECTION PLANNING AT EVERY ECHELON

By Major Meghan L. Engleson and Major Stacey N. Wuchter

Protection is the overarching function under which the Army ensures preservation of the force and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel and resources in order to ensure freedom of action throughout the whole of an operation.[1] Effective protection planning and prioritization will become increasingly important in events leading to future large-scale combat operations, and commanders and staffs at every echelon will need to place great emphasis on integrating protection planning across all domains and throughout the entirety of operations. Protection as a warfighting function is not limited to echelons above brigade. Commanders at every echelon must understand what to protect and how to protect it in order to best mitigate hostile actions and preserve gains while continuing to enable freedom of movement and momentum.

Theater Level Protection

According to Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-37, *Protection*, "Protection support within a theater of operations during large-scale ground combat operations is executed throughout the operational framework . . . protection priorities are not the same at every echelon or in every area of operations."[2] Each echelon prioritizes protection requirements differently across domains, and lower levels should nest with higher ones. However, protection priorities are changeable and should be reassessed and allowed to evolve as transitions and changes occur throughout the area of operations and with regard to available resources, operational or mission focus, or the commander's priorities.

There is currently no formal protection cell at the theater level. However, protection considerations are to remain a priority for large-scale combat operations. Air defense artillery officers from the brigade level to the theater level must synchronize their efforts with their joint counterparts to utilize the most effective capabilities for maneuver forces. Civil considerations are also important in establishing clear communication and trust amongst joint and coalition forces, allowing them to efficiently work together. While challenging, the commander must select the appropriate Service with which to plan and synchronize the staff for protection activities, depending on the area of operations.

Protection Planning at Echelons Above Brigade

The Army Strategic Education Program–Commander Program provides general officers at the division, corps, and army levels with a developmental course to enhance leadership capabilities and prepare the Army's highest leaders for the future warfight. Designed to complement both Army and joint general officer education, this program focuses on Army doctrine, systems, capabilities, and other activities that enhance overall readiness of its formations, while simultaneously preparing commanders to conduct unified land operations at echelons above brigade. During the Army Strategic Education Program–Commander Program, multiple vignettes are presented by the various centers of excellence. The Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, is responsible for the contribution of protection considerations and applicability for joint reception staging and onward integration (JRSOI), forward passage of lines, shaping operations, wet-gap crossing, transition to the defense, and consolidation of gains in an urban environment.

For JRSOI, protection focuses on maintaining force projection; building combat power; and protecting critical nodes, tactical assembly areas, and lines of communication. The rapid reconstitution of critical facilities and infrastructure is another consideration. All 16 protection tasks outlined in ADP 3-37 are key during JRSOI operations. Even before a Soldier arrives at the JRSOI location, force health protection sets the theater via Soldier readiness processing and environmental baseline surveys.

The protection focus for the forward passage of lines includes the transfer of obstacle control between responsible units (back to survivability), fratricide avoidance (which is at greatest risk during this operation), the construction and repair of passage of lines and assembly areas, and the engagement of the noncommitted enemy force while defeating enemy security and counter-unmanned aerial systems to prevent acquisition of the passing force. The forward passage of lines is one of the riskiest military operations, and commanders must plan avoidance measures along movement corridors to retain forward momentum and ensure that the tempo is not decreased. Engineers, which are task-organized with maneuver forces, conduct route clearance and improve ground lines of communication. Military police manage traffic and provide route security for uninterrupted freedom of movement. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) assets conduct route and area reconnaissance in case of any potential CBRN attacks.

Protection consideration for shaping operations should include the commander's critical capabilities, assets, and activities and active and passive protection integration. Protection considerations for wet-gap crossing include locations for pre-positioned bridging, allocation of assets, and the manner in which protection is to be provided to the support area during the wet-gap operation.

Protection considerations for wet-gap crossings and transitions to the defense include enabling brigade combat teams in the close fight while the division and corps continue with the deep fight. During this type of operation, the protection prioritization list is reprioritized, as assessed and designated by the commander. Heightened protection measures for command nodes are critical in the prevention of electronic warfare attacks, and CBRN attacks should be anticipated as the enemy force conducts a counterattack. During security operations, commanders may reposition the theater detention facility and reserve force for area security in the support area. Information collection plans are also refined, and rehearsals of deception plans are incorporated based on time- or event-based triggers.

Protection considerations for detainee operations at the corps and theater level during consolidation of gains are paramount. To put this in perspective, divisions and, potentially, corps will need to establish plans for detainee holding areas and the transport of detainees to theater detention facilities. Detainee movement will be at a much larger scale than what our formations are accustomed to planning for. Other considerations include the impact of displaced civilian populations and the utilization of information operations to influence movement away from mobility corridors. During consolidation of gains, the protection warfighting function focus is on area security support to maneuver units, route remediation and repair, countermobility in support of defense and survivability, critical infrastructure repair, restoration of the rule of law and resettlement of the population, and detainee operations.

Protection Planning for Brigade and Below

Echelons below division do not have designated protection cells, yet commanders and staffs must ensure that the force remains protected, integrating directives from higher echelons and ensuring that subordinate units are receiving the support they need to execute protection tasks at their level. Effective protection plans require continuous and integrated vertical, and sometimes horizontal, planning, as many of the protection tasks require coordination with sister units.

Following are four examples of protection planning considerations at the levels of brigade and below. The first two are obviously applicable to tactical-level missions. The second two are less obviously applicable, but serve as examples of tactical planning to support operational and strategic operations.

Conduct Survivability

Camouflage, cover, and deception planning must be conducted at all levels. Over the past 2 decades, our forces have lost some of the skills that they had gained from effectively camouflaging our personnel and equipment during past wars. In Iraq, colossal bases surrounded by concrete Alaska barriers and monitored by surveillance cameras on walls, buildings, and in the air became the norm. Our presence in Iraq was not concealed. In fact, enemies used aerostat blimps as targets for indirect fire because they were centrally located and anything fired at them was sure to hit *something* on the ground. Threats from indirect-fire attacks were somewhat mitigated by hardening buildings. However, in the large-scale combat operations fight, it is unlikely that units—especially maneuver units—will remain in place long enough to effectively harden buildings. Instead, units need to learn to employ camouflage on the move and to very quickly find or create cover when halted. Today's technology has made it easier than ever to collect information and identify high-payoff targets—both for us and our adversaries. Deception planning at the tactical level includes taking measures to ensure that our critical assets and equipment are not easily identifiable or easy to target or attack.

Provide Force Health Protection

A vast number of casualties in any conflict are not due to combat operations, but are the result of illness sweeping through units. Ensuring that the unit understands and follows preventive-medicine guidelines, developing field sanitation plans, and training field sanitation teams result in incredibly high returns on investment for our warfighters. These actions include planning for acclimatization periods for replacements during JRSOI, training to identify poisonous plants and venomous animals in the region, and constantly pushing to prevent Soldiers from adopting the stray animals they will likely encounter. The adoption of strays by individuals and units during conflict may seem innocuous, but it is a well-documented phenomenon that has had terrible consequences in the past.

Coordinate Air and Missile Defense Support

Air and missile defense (AMD) support is a task that would be easy for a brigade staff to brush off since AMD assets are often reserved at the theater level. However, brigade staffs must understand two things:

- There may be AMD assets that could be potential targets within their areas of operations, and there may be critical assets or infrastructure that require AMD protection within their area of operations.
- The staff at higher echelons cannot develop the protection prioritization list and the critical asset/defended asset list in a vacuum.

A brigade protection officer or operations officer must coordinate with the division protection cell to develop the protection prioritization list. Higher echelons may not have the "on ground" understanding that brigades, battalions, or companies have of their assigned areas of operations. Constantly communicating and reassessing the protection prioritization list and ensuring that information flows both up and down the chain support the coordination of AMD assets at the highest levels.

Conduct Detention Operations

Those who are not in a military police unit are likely thinking that their units do not need to plan for detention operations. After all, detention operations is a military police function, right? Well, partially. The maneuver force

must have a plan to hold detained persons until they can be handed over to military police. This may mean that the maneuver force is responsible for operations at the detainee collection point and, potentially, at the detainee holding area.[3]

All echelons must have a thorough understanding of how to execute the care, custody, and control of detained persons in accordance with Army regulations and the Geneva Conventions.[4] Improper execution at the tactical level can have detrimental effects at the strategic level, negatively impacting joint and partner operations and perceptions throughout the world. Additionally, crime does not necessarily stop just because elements are moving against the enemy and commanders are responsible for stopping and controlling criminal actions (whether normal crimes or war crimes) as they occur or are brought to light.

Protection at the level of brigade and below is not focused solely on the tactical-level subtasks listed in ADP 3-37, although those are important in guiding planning. Brigades must include deliberate protection planning and support to the division protection cell in order to ensure that the plans remain comprehensive, integrated, layered, redundant, and enduring—the principles of protection. Brigades need clear guidance and a complete understanding of the vision and desired end state of division and corps level operations in order to understand their responsibilities in the scheme of protection. The Army Strategic Education Program–Commander Program provides division, corps, and army commands with the commanders and subject matter experts from the various centers of excellence and a forum for deliberate planning for some of the most dangerous operations our future Army will face.

Endnotes:

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At the time this article was written, Major Engleson was the chief of the Protection Branch, Requirements Determination Division, Capability Development Integration Directorate, Army Futures Command, MSCoE. She holds a master's degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University and a master's of public administration degree from the University of South Florida, Tampa.

At the time this article was written, Major Wuchter was the chief of the Military Police Doctrine Branch, Doctrine Division, Future Forces Integration Directorate (FFID), MSCoE. She is now the knowledge management officer, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, Texas. She holds master's degrees in criminal justice from the University of Cincinnati, Ohio, and library and information science from the Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.

("The Long War," continued from page 10)

terrorist threat (in all forms), and develop measures to deter and prevent future attacks. A new antiterrorism strategy, developed in conjunction with all Army major commands, is key. As the Department of Defense "act(s) to sustain and strengthen deterrence" from our near-peer competitors of China and Russia, it "will remain capable of managing other persistent threats, including those from North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations."[10] As a strategic goal included in the 2022 National Defense Strategy, integrated deterrence may warrant a new look in order to strengthen and integrate antiterrorism into the Army Protection Program and Department of Defense mission assurance.[11]

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[11]Ibid.

Colonel Vanderlinden (Retired) is a principal military analyst with the Antiterrorism Division, Office of the Provost Marshal General. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from Northern Michigan University and master's degrees in criminal justice from Michigan State University and strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College. He is also a graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy.

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