



MILITARY POLICE

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF THE MILITARY POLICE CORPS

2024 Annual Issue



HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

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Covers: The brassards are part of the U.S. Army Military Police Corps Museum artifact collection. Photographs were taken by LTC Robert E. Bonham.

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Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School



Colonel Charles A. Green

My Family and I look forward to serving the U.S. Army in my new position as the 53d Commandant of the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) and the Chief of the Military Police Corps Regiment. We fondly remember my previous assignments at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, as an executive officer with the 795th Military Police Battalion and a platoon leader/executive officer with the 463d Military Police Company. We met many great leaders; and, early on, we learned about the importance of USAMPS and the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence to the generating force and about the essential and eternal bond between the installation and surrounding communities. My wife Jenny and I thank Brigadier General Sarah K. Albrycht and her husband Rob for their incredible support and assistance in our transition from Hawaii to Fort Leonard Wood this summer.

Brigadier General Albrycht has been incredibly steady and focused on driving change for our Regiment as the Army adapts and transforms in contact. I look forward to building on the solid foundation that she has set to transform, innovate, and adapt the Regiment to meet the challenges our Army will face in 2030 and beyond. I wish the entire Albrycht Family the best of luck as they transition to Washington, D.C., and I look forward to working closely with Brigadier General Albrycht as she becomes the 20th U.S. Army Provost Marshal General.

“But, what cannot change is the unwavering support of the Military Police Corps Regiment for protecting and preserving readiness as we transform in daily contact on our installations and throughout the world.”

which impacts our Soldiers and Families today. Change is always difficult and requires us to overcommunicate in order to keep our teams informed.

But, what cannot change is the unwavering support of the Military Police Corps Regiment for protecting and preserving readiness as we transform in daily contact on our installations and throughout the world. We must remain steadfast and lead through change by focusing only on those tasks that military police can carry out for our Army; continuing to build the team across all components; and continuing to demonstrate the incredible value, service, and sacrifice that military police have provided to our Army and our Nation, from the days of the Continental Army to the present day.

Thanks for what each of you is doing to communicate, inform, and assist USAMPS with professional bulletin article submission, solarium participation, and incorporation of lessons learned from training exercises. Please keep communications flat, and feel free to reach out to me at any time. I recognize that driving change will require that all of us work together. Your feedback and perspectives are critical in helping shape understanding as we adapt.

I look forward to working with the incredible professionals at USAMPS and the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence and to serving our Regiment, Families, and community. And, I want to thank our Families for their daily sacrifices for their Soldiers and their ironclad support of the Regiment.

“Assist, Protect, Defend”

“This We’ll Defend”



In completing my service as Watchdog 6 for one of the first units to inactivate subordinate units as a result of Army structure decisions, I know first-hand that we face significant change and transformation,

Regimental Command Sergeant Major

Command Sergeant Major William M. Shoaf



U.S. Army Military Police Corps Regiment: I want to thank you for your dedication and resilience over the past year. It has been an honor to represent you as your 16th Regimental Command Sergeant Major, and I have been blessed with the finest teammates anyone could ask for. The Regiment has faced many challenges over the past 11 months, but this team of teams has repeatedly proven that no challenge is too great and no problem is too complex. Our officers, noncommissioned officers, enlisted Soldiers, and civilian partners are dynamic leaders, critical thinkers, and problem solvers; we will continue to be the force of choice for the Army of 2040 and beyond.

Transition is part of the U.S. Army journey—and this summer, we bid farewell to Brigadier General Sarah K. Albrycht as she takes on her new roles as Provost Marshal General and Commander, U.S. Army Corrections Command. Her presence and leadership will be missed. Additionally, we welcome Colonel Charles A. Green and his Family to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, as he assumes the role of the 53d Chief of the Military Police Corps Regiment and Commandant of the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS).



This September, we will celebrate our 83d Military Police Corps Regiment anniversary during our traditional anniversary week, held at the home of the Regiment at Fort Leonard Wood. We will hold several events that honor our Regimental history and recognize those who have served and impacted our Regiment. Additionally, we are reenergizing the Military Police Competitive Challenge and bringing back team competition. We will challenge our teams more than ever this year by integrating our critical tasks in the areas of warfighting, police operations, and corrections. The week would not be complete without our traditional Regimental bass-fishing tournament, golf scramble, and ball. As always, anniversary week will be a world-class celebration and we look forward to seeing all of you there.

As the Army continues to transform to meet the demands of a dynamic and complex operating environment, the Regiment must keep pace. Restructuring and modernization will change the way we look and the way we fight. We may not resemble the Military Police Corps Regiment at the height of the Global War on Terrorism; but rest assured, we are still capable and positioned to support maneuver commanders with lethal and flexible formations across all operational environments. Combining new technology with our warfighting and policing skills will continue to make the Regiment the premier dual-purpose force.

Assist, Protect, Defend!



Regimental Chief Warrant Officer



Chief Warrant Officer Four Angela J. Rulewich

As the Department of the Army (DA) Criminal Investigation Division (CID) continues to transform, the role of the Military Police Regimental Chief Warrant Officer will also be transforming. The chief warrant officer in that position now serves as the senior CID advisor to the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) Commandant and, due to the Commandant's dual status as the Chief of the Military Police Corps Regiment, is recognized across the Army as the Regimental Chief Warrant Officer. In the near future, the Regimental Chief Warrant Officer will serve as the senior military advisor to the director of training for the new DA CID training facility at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

On 10 March 1999, then Brigadier General Donald J. Ryder, who was the Commandant, USAMPS, Fort McClellan, Alabama, at the time, established the Chief Warrant Officer of the Regiment position, which was assigned to the Directorate of Training as the senior manager for investigative courses and investigative programs of instruction. From then until 2004 (when the position was discontinued), the Chief Warrant Officer of the Regiment supervised all investigative instruction and development of investigative training and approved all changes to investigative courses and programs of instruction prior to final approval by the Assistant Commandant.

On 18 March 2004, then Brigadier General Stephen J. Curry established the position of Chief Warrant Officer of the Military Police Corps Regiment (or the Regimental Chief Warrant Officer). The Regimental Chief Warrant Officer is currently the principal advisor to the USAMPS Commandant on all DA warrant officer issues, serves as a member of the Army Senior Warrant Officer Advisory Council, provides mentorship to all branch warrant officers, and assists with developing programs for the Leader Development Decision Network. Soon, the Regimental Chief Warrant Officer will serve in a similar capacity—but as the senior military advisor to the director of training for the new DA CID training facility at Fort Leonard Wood.


Throughout its history, DA CID has experienced considerable organizational changes as well as changes in crime prevention techniques and procedures for conducting felony level criminal investigations. But through these changes, common principles remain the same—CID agents and the Military Police Corps continuously sacrifice and strive to keep our Soldiers and military communities safe from crime. CID has historically been on the forefront of innovation, with tremendous contributions to the areas of forensics, polygraph, and investigative techniques. And CID is again leading the way in innovation, partnering with law enforcement professionals across the spectrum of jurisdictions to train and equip special agents for its vital mission.

The role of the Regimental Chief Warrant Officer existed long before the present title was ever conveyed, and the position has been filled by some of the very best special agents with whom I have had the pleasure of serving. The following special agents have performed the role of the Regimental Chief Warrant Officer while serving under numerous Military Police Commandants over a span of more than 20 years, and all left a legacy of their own:

- 1st Regimental Chief Warrant Officer—Chief Warrant Officer Five Philip E. Tackett (Retired), March 2004–October 2008.
- 2d Regimental Chief Warrant Officer—Chief Warrant Officer Five T. L. Williams (Retired), November 2008–June 2010.
- 3d Regimental Chief Warrant Officer—Chief Warrant Officer Five David Albaugh (Retired), July 2010–June 2012.
- 4th Regimental Chief Warrant Officer—Chief Warrant Officer Five Leroy Shamburger (Retired), July 2012–October 2016.
- 5th Regimental Chief Warrant Officer—Chief Warrant Officer Five Joel E. Fitz (Retired), October 2016–August 2019.
- 6th Regimental Chief Warrant Officer—Chief Warrant Officer Five Mark W. Arnold (Retired), August 2019–May 2023.
- 7th Regimental Chief Warrant Officer—Chief Warrant Officer Four Angela J. Rulewich, May 2023–present.

Thank you to all Military Police Corps leaders, past and present, for your support and leadership.

*Do What Has to Be Done!
Of The Troops and For the Troops!*



Farewell from



Brigadier General Sarah K. Albrycht

The Future of the Military Police Corps Regiment

Over the past 2 years, I have spent most of my time focused on the future of the U.S. Army Military Police Corps Regiment. As the Army made cross-cutting decisions about structure and proponentcy that will have deep impacts on our Military Police Corps Regiment, it was time to reset our foundations. The tremendous professionals at the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, enabled by broad engagement from leaders throughout every corner of the Regiment, dug deep into the pillars of our history and worked on constructing the blueprints of our future. If you have been relegated to longingly peering in the rear-view mirror, you are missing the progress the Regiment is making and the chance to help build our future. The transition will not be easy; nothing worth doing ever is. We will lose storied units; premier capabilities; and experienced, combat-hardened leaders in the process. The question is: Will we build a Military Police Corps Regiment that is prepared to assist, protect, and defend the Army of 2040 while simultaneously safeguarding the people, places, and assets that we need today—and every day—between now and then?



To borrow the U.S. Army Engineer Regiment motto, *Essayons!*—Let us try (with the emphasis on **us**)! Let **US** try. There is no one else to do the work—or anyone else as vested in the process as we are. The success of the Military Police Corps Regiment is not the work of the Commandant, Regimental Command Sergeant Major, or Regimental Chief Warrant Officer. And it is not the work of USAMPS. The Regiment rises and falls on the efforts and reputation of its people. Never before has there been a greater need for us to be on message as a Regiment. All components, all levels of command, and all ranks must understand where we are going and must work together to move the Regiment forward. We will not all agree—nor will we get it perfect. But we cannot let our pursuit of perfection become the enemy of our progress. It is with that spirit that USAMPS has been making necessary changes.

As I reflect on the hard work and accomplishments of our team over these past 2 years, three key themes stand out—protected logistics, new military police company design, and policing professionalism.

Protected Logistics

The Army is undergoing transformational change in preparation to win the next fight, forcing us as a Regiment to holistically contemplate how we will support the Army of 2030 and 2040 by enabling sustained operations in large-scale combat operations. When logistics are contested, the logic of efficiency through predictive and precise logistics rules until we get to the brigade support area; then, the focus must be on effectiveness of the close combat force to prevent early culmination. Military police extend the commander's operational reach through protected logistics of key sustainment nodes and priority resupplies. As the force structure of Component 1 becomes smaller, we can no longer provide the same level of service to support every brigade combat team; however, we can enable sustainment through protected logistics to extend the commander's operational reach.

Protected logistics ensures the prompt arrival of priority supplies to frontlines, which increases endurance and prevents culmination. Small, dispersed units on a future battlefield will have no emergency supply reserves with which to continue operations in case of a missed resupply window. For sustainment to provide predictive and precise logistics, protected logistics must ensure that priority supplies reach the frontlines.

In World War II, military police extended the operational reach of the division and assisted the commander in increasing the tether between the forward line of troops and the base of operations. In 2030 and beyond, military police will prioritize supporting sustainment by enabling the corps commander to balance the tension among endurance, momentum, and protection.

New Military Police Company Design

Based on discussions at a recent strategic conference and recommendations from the operational force, I directed the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence Organization Branch, with support from USAMPS, to develop a military

police company force design update to enable mission command with small-unit leadership on the expanded and dispersed battlefield. This may increase the number of platoons in a company (from three to four) while right-sizing squad size (from four to three teams per squad) and decreasing the size of company headquarters (which would still need to go through further analysis). The additional platoon would retain unit cohesion and provide mission command when dispersed in a potentially degraded, denied, intermittent, and limited-communications environment requiring small-unit initiatives.

A four-platoon company would directly support the proposed Army Warfighting Concepts and Framework for 2040, which would optimize military police for a distributed and less predictable battlefield.¹ This organization would contribute to the Secretary of the Army design principles and would enable the Army of 2040, as a member of the joint force, to defeat military peers on a transparent battlefield.² The efficiencies gained with the new design would generate more capacity for large-scale combat operations through platoon task organization for different mission sets in a dispersed environment across the expanded battlespace, as the close area could potentially extend up to 300 kilometers in depth.

Policing Professionalism

As our Regiment becomes smaller as a result of the directed divestments from the optimization of people, we must increase our investment in training and programs to refine our policing enterprise and to ensure that military police Soldiers are ready to police in an innovative and standards-based manner.³

During March 2022 meetings about future force structure, USAMPS recommended a low-risk divestment. We received a directed course of action to divest 3,000 spaces. To maximize capability and mitigate the loss of capacity, we prioritized no risk to law enforcement by making the following recommendations:

- Standard divisions will include one military police company and one law enforcement company organized as a table of distribution and allowances unit to perform specialized garrison missions.
- Priority divisions will have a military police battalion headquarters, two military police companies, and a law enforcement company organized as a table of distribution and allowances unit.
- Each law enforcement company table of distribution and allowances will be tailored to each installation to meet baseline requirements. Any additional requests to task a military police company above baseline support will degrade readiness.

Conclusion

Over the past 2 years, we, as a Regiment, have accomplished amazing feats that are critical to remaining relevant and ready in support of future large-scale combat operations. Through a blend of historic research and experimentation for the future, our concept of protected logistics is resonating with senior leaders. Our new four-platoon military police company design, which provides an additional command and control node on the expanded battlefield, is the first step in modernizing our force. As technology matures, the capacity of future military police formations will increase due to autonomous-capable systems that will remove military police from hazards and reduce Soldier labor. We are enhancing our policing professionalism with a stalwart focus on improving the quality of our military police as (standards-based) problem solvers.

War is a uniquely human endeavor that demands a resilient force that can as easily fight off a determined enemy as it can reroute displaced civilians—a force that can as deftly protect logistics as it can protect people struggling to flee from the effects of war. Remember—military police have *always* served as the humans in the loop at the greatest points of human interaction and operational friction. No matter when or where, as we solve people problems for the Army, we must always be professional, do what is right, and give a damn.

We are excited to welcome Colonel Charlie Green, the 53d Commandant of USAMPS and the chief of the Military Police Corps Regiment, and his Family to Fort Leonard Wood. The depth and breadth of Colonel Green's experience are perfectly suited to build on the foundation that the last few commandants have faithfully laid. The Regiment is ready to move into the future, and I am confident that Colonel Green and his team will move rapidly and inculcate positive change as we build the Military Police Corps Regiment of 2040.

Thank you for allowing me to be your commandant. It has been a tremendous honor for Rob, Catherine, and me to represent our Regiment. I extend my deepest appreciation to the home team here at USAMPS. You are the true face of the Military Police Corps Regiment as you instruct, lead, and build our people, our structure, and our future. Our Soldiers, Civilians, and Families deserve our care, our efforts, and our professionalism—and any faults in delivering those things to the best of our ability lie solely with me.

Assist, Protect, Defend! No matter when or where . . .

Endnotes:

¹“Army Multi-Domain Transformation: Ready to Win in Competition and Conflict,” Headquarters, Department of the Army, 16 March 2021, <<https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2021/03/23/eeac3d01/20210319-csa-paper-1-signed-print-version.pdf>>, accessed on 30 May 2024.

²Bobby Lin, “China’s Power: Up for Debate 2021—Keynote Remarks by Secretary Christine Wormuth on the U.S. Army’s View of the China Challenge,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 6 January 2022.

³“Army Force Structure Transformation,” Army White Paper, 27 February 2024, <<https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2024/02/27/091989c9/army-white-paper-army-force-structure-transformation.pdf>>, accessed on 30 May 2024.

What's Old Becomes New: Reviving “Obsolete” Doctrine for Multidomain Operations and Beyond

By Captain Carlos J. Valencia

After a nearly 20-year focus on counterinsurgency/limited-contingency operations, the U.S. Army shifted its doctrinal focus back to large-scale combat operations in 2017. In October 2022, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*,¹ introduced the Army's newest operation concept—multidomain operations, which includes many new elements such as the strategic context, the five domains/three dimensions of the operational environment, updates to the operational framework, and more. However, not all of the multidomain operations concepts are genuinely new. In August 1982, now-obsolete FM 100-5, *Operations*,² introduced the Army's operational concept of AirLand battle, which adopted a nonlinear view of the battlefield and was established to fight our enemies (the Soviets) through their depth with fire and maneuver, broadly expanding the battlefield and emphasizing unified air and ground operations. AirLand battle era doctrine introduced the elements of zones and sectors, main efforts, supporting efforts, and reserves; focused on the division as the unit of action; and included other doctrinal principles reintroduced as part of the multidomain operations concept. (See Figure 1 for a sample illustration of the operational framework [offense] during the AirLand battle era.) Even earlier versions of Army operational doctrine also shared concepts with or influenced present-day Army operational doctrine. For example, the 1962 version of FM 100-5, *Operations*,⁴ introduced the spectrum of war (encompassing the full range of conflict from cold war, to limited war, to general war), which is similar to the current

strategic context (including competition below armed conflict, crisis, and armed conflict).

Doctrine is a living entity that builds upon itself; as adversaries change, doctrine must also change. In the process, professional knowledge is sometimes lost when it is no longer anticipated to be needed; however, obsolete doctrine can come to the rescue when necessary—as long as it can be found.

The basic disciplines and mission set of military police have remained relatively unchanged since the official birth of the Military Police Regiment in September 1941. Still, as military police, we have forgotten a thing or two as the face of warfare and technology has changed. A few months after I began working in the Military Police Doctrine Branch, Doctrine Division, Fielded Force Integration Directorate, Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, our team received feedback from the field regarding a gap in our detainee operations doctrine. A group of observer, coach/trainers overseeing an exercise in Hawaii had determined that FM 3-63, *Detainee Operations*,⁵ lacked sufficient information regarding the use of Army watercraft for transporting detainees. During the training, the observer, coach/trainers and the unit they were supporting developed tactics, techniques, and procedures to bridge the gap and they submitted their findings to us. Following additional research on sister Service watercraft and detention doctrine, we developed actionable information that will be added to the next revision of FM 3-63 (currently under development)—but this was just the beginning. Over the next year, our team received additional feedback from the field regarding a need for more doctrinal information about detainee operations in maritime-dominated environments. We needed to determine the detainee operations framework for a maritime environment—an operational environment in which our enemy potentially has antiaccess/aerial denial capabilities. We arrived at boats as a solution, but things would get more complicated (see Figure 2, page 8).

As outlined in Chapter 7 of FM 3-0,⁶ the operational framework in a maritime-dominated environment can be very different from that of a land-dominated environment since the rear, close, and deep areas can be located on different land masses. These noncontiguous areas of operations can create problems when transporting detainees from detainee collection points to a theater detention facility, as the normal detainee backhaul framework relies primarily on returning supply trucks. The simple solution to this issue would be to task Army or U.S. Navy watercraft to move detainees from




Figure 1. Example of the operational framework (offense) during the AirLand battle era³




Figure 2. Maritime detainee framework

land mass to land mass, but what if the distances between land masses are great? Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 4-15, *Army Watercraft Operations*,⁷ indicates that combat-equipped Soldiers should only be transported on the weather deck of a vessel for up to an hour, so how could a detainee movement of several hours or even several days be planned? Weirdly enough, we discovered that the Army seemed to be the first military Service contemplating large-scale detainee operations at sea. Current Navy and U.S. Coast Guard doctrine focuses mainly on the detention of pirates or migrants; this led us to think about history. We researched various island-hopping campaigns in the Pacific during World War II and learned that prisoners of war were moved from division/corps holding areas located across the ocean to detention facilities primarily in Australia, New Zealand and, occasionally, the mainland United States.⁸ We had a new starting point; but unfortunately, old Navy doctrine is hard to come by. (Most professional writing about World War II prisoners of war is focused on European combatants.) Still, we found what we were looking for on a bookshelf in the Doctrine Division at MSCoE—a dusty copy of now-obsolete FM 19-40, *Handling Prisoners of War*,⁹ with a section labeled “Evacuation by Water.” Following a few modern-day modifications to this old doctrine, readers of the upcoming iteration of FM 3-63 can look forward to using 72-year-old planning considerations for planning and executing a multiday maritime detainee mission.

This was but one of many times that our team has located and consulted older doctrine during my time in the Doctrine Division. Following the publishing of *Army Structure (ARSTRUC) Memorandum 2025–2029*,¹⁰ we looked for and incorporated verbiage and various graphics from FM 19-10, *Military Police Operations*,¹¹ into the next edition of ATP 3-39.10, *Police Operations*,¹² due to their continued relevance for emerging law enforcement activities and today’s police operations. We also borrowed concepts from now-obsolete FM 19-1, *Military Police Support for the AirLand Battle*,¹³ and combined them with feedback from the field when developing tactics, techniques, and procedures for littoral, port, and watercraft security for next edition of ATP 3-39.30, *Security and Mobility Support*.¹⁴ These are just a few examples of how our team has reinvigorated older or obsolete doctrine for use in upcoming publications as the Army focuses on large-scale combat operations. I envision more principles and concepts from

the AirLand battle era and earlier being reintroduced and expanded upon.

If—after becoming entirely comfortable with the new version of FM 3-0 (published in October 2022)¹⁵—you have time, you could read the 15 previous editions of FM 3-0 and FM 100-5 and observe the evolution of the Army’s operational doctrine. But to save time, I will tell you that it is quite interesting to see how the Army shifts its focus back and forth between general conflict/large-scale combat operations (as in World War II, the Korean War, the Cold War, and conflicts of today) and insurgency/limited contingency-focused operations (as in the Vietnam War, the post-Cold War, and the War on Terror). Additionally, I will say that the readability of the series has improved over time, as doctrine developers have slowly omitted tactics, techniques, and procedures (on local security, troop movement procedures), which are better suited for other types of publications (such as today’s ATPs), and have streamlined and focused the series on operational-level topics and discussion. Overall, it’s fascinating to see how various concepts originated, disappeared, and reemerged. Although “obsolete” Army doctrine was genuinely a product of its time, it still retains significant value for military arts and sciences practitioners.

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1-01, *Doctrine Primer*,¹⁶ defines Army doctrine as the “fundamental principles, with supporting [tactics, techniques, and procedures] and terms and symbols, used for the conduct of operations and

as a guide for actions of operating forces and elements of the institutional force that directly support operations in support of national objectives”; I define it for the Military Police Captains Career Course as “all the language and lessons learned from the Army’s 270-plus years of warfighting.” As I have studied, reviewed, written—and, basically become immersed in—doctrine for the past 2.5 years, I have seen my definition become more and more accurate. Doctrine is genuinely a living entity, and understanding it is imperative for success in all operations. However, doctrine is descriptive—not prescriptive. It provides leaders with a “50 percent plan”; it’s up to leaders to develop the other 50 percent. 

Endnotes:

- ¹FM 3-0, *Operations*, 1 October 2022.
- ²FM 100-5, *Operations*, 20 August 1982 (now obsolete).
- ³Ibid.
- ⁴FM 100-5, *Operations*, 19 February 1962 (now obsolete).
- ⁵FM 3-63, *Detainee Operations*, 2 January 2020.
- ⁶FM 3-0.
- ⁷ATP 4-15, *Army Watercraft Operations*, 3 April 2015.
- ⁸Arnold Kramer, “Japanese Prisoners of War in America,” *Pacific Historical Review*, 1983, pp. 67–91, <<https://doi.org/10.2307/3639455>>, accessed on 17 April 2024.
- ⁹FM 19-40, *Handling Prisoners of War*, 3 November 1952 (now obsolete).
- ¹⁰*Army Structure (ARSTRUC) Memorandum 2025–2029*, Department of the Army, 27 February 2024.
- ¹¹FM 19-10, *Military Police Operations*, 30 September 1976 (now obsolete).
- ¹²ATP 3-39.10, *Police Operations*, 24 August 2021.
- ¹³FM 19-1, *Military Police Support for the AirLand Battle*, 23 May 1988 (now obsolete).
- ¹⁴ATP 3-39.30, *Security and Mobility Support*, 21 May 2020.
- ¹⁵FM 3-0.
- ¹⁶ADP 1-01, *Doctrine Primer*, 31 July 2019.

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COMBAT SUPPORT ENABLEMENT OF PROTECTION SECURITY AND MOBILITY OPERATIONS

By Captain Andres N. Figueroa

From the lens of a junior officer with some experience in a military police combat support battalion, the enablement of protection is evident in multiple operational environments. The beauty of the U.S. Army Military Police Corps Regiment is that we enable protection during crisis in garrison and deployed environments. However, I argue that we don't just *enable* protection; rather, we *are* protection.

Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations*, defines protection as the “efforts to secure and defend the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area to maintain mission effectiveness.”¹ If you've ever been part of a military police combat support battalion, you know that it embodies this definition around the clock. During all hours of the day, the sons and daughters of our Corps tactical military police battalions immerse themselves in protection through law enforcement operations. A subordinate unit within the same battalion simultaneously indulges itself in protection by providing support to combatant commanders in tactical environments. This multifaceted aspect of our combat support battalions is the primary reason for our extreme value to the Army. Although I know how crucial we are in providing protection during crisis in both garrison and deployed environments, I'd like to demonstrate just how our tactical units epitomize protection on the battlefield.

According to JP 3-0, a crisis is “an incident or situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national and/or strategic objectives”²; and according to Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-37, *Protection*, it “occurs when an adversary takes action or when there are indications and warnings that our opponent is likely to do something contrary to U.S. interests that is serious enough to warrant a military response.”³ For the purposes of this article, let's refer to crisis as “war.” Our Army exists to fight and win our Nation's wars, and protection is a critical component that enables our success.

There are four categories of primary protection tasks: conduct risk management, protect capabilities, protect areas, and protect information.⁴ Our combat support units

arguably find themselves to be primary contributors for protecting capabilities and areas during war. But, how do they do this? Protection on the battlefield is accomplished through one of our most prized disciplines—security and mobility support.

I believe that we can support maneuver commanders and add tremendous value to the fight when our combat support units focus on assisting with establishing the forward line of troops (FLOT) and rear area security. Performance of these tasks allows us to prove that our tactical elements are critical factors impacting the entire battlefield.

War must start somewhere, and the FLOT must be established. Our role at the FLOT is short-lived; our combat support units replace maneuver assets at the FLOT, which allows the maneuver units to push further into the battlefield thereby turning the FLOT into the rear area. Within the protection realm, the military police combat support unit is the primary force that understands security, making it valuable for the offensive advances of maneuver elements. To contextualize this process, think of a gap crossing and where it fits in on Figure 1.

On the map of Figure 1, our combat support units have a heavy presence at the FLOT. In supporting entrance onto the battlefield, the focus should be mainly on traffic control posts and route reconnaissance. Traffic control post efforts allow freedom of movement and maneuver in the deep area. Military police combat support units ensure that the battlespace does not get congested. If requested, our forces can also execute route reconnaissance and provide valuable feedback to maneuver commanders. Traffic control posts and route reconnaissance enable us to carry out the fundamentals of security. Military police provide reaction time and maneuver space for the main efforts.

As actions on the objective at the FLOT continue and maneuver forces pass through the governed sectors, the responsibility of the military police combat support unit quickly transitions from securing the FLOT to securing the rear area. In the rear, the most critical combat support unit efforts consist of convoy security and area security. In this space, the combat support units quickly become the security experts in order to protect supporting forces of other warfighting functions against Level I and Level II threats. Here, our Regiment can be heavily involved in brigade and division support areas within large-scale combat operations, as depicted in Figure 2.




Figure 1. Notional protection measures during large-scale combat operations⁵

Support units at the helm of brigade and division support areas recognize significant value in our military police combat support units because we allow them to focus on their primary missions by keeping them secure. Many of the elements within these support areas consist of sustainers and maintainers that must fully focus on their jobs in order to appropriately support maneuver forces; they cannot sacrifice personnel for security. That is where military police come into play. Our modified table of organization and equipment allows us to protect and defend support forces with the correlating weapons required to defeat enemy forces that might find their way into the rear area. Tactical military police units can facilitate continued support operations in the rear area by securing logistics package operations during movement and support areas during operations. These aspects of our jobs may not be the most appealing, and they can be extremely thankless—but they allow us to embrace our enabling capabilities for adjacent units during large-scale combat operations.

I know what you are thinking: There are other military police disciplines like policing operations and detainee operations as well! You're right; there are. I am not arguing that one discipline is stronger or more critical than another; that would be a long dissertation. Instead, I am attempting

to generate thought about the most critical aspects of proving our worth to maneuver forces on the battlefield. As our Army continues to emphasize large-scale combat operations, our military police combat support units must establish themselves in the fight for maneuver space by enabling protection through security and mobility operations. Although protection is but one of the six warfighting functions (and some may view military police as just a “piece of the pie”), without military police, protection cannot reach its full potential.

Endnotes:

- ¹JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations*, 18 June 2022.
- ²Ibid.
- ³ADP 3-37, *Protection*, 10 January 2024.
- ⁴Ibid.
- ⁵Ibid.
- ⁶Army Technique Publication (ATP) 3-39.30, *Security and Mobility Support*, 21 May 2020.

Captain Figueroa is currently a student at the Army Special Operations Captains Career Course, Fort Liberty, North Carolina. He holds a bachelor's degree in accounting from Ave Maria University, Florida; a master's degree in criminal justice from Liberty University; and a doctorate in education from the University of Miami, Florida.




Figure 2. Notional military police support to a division in the offense⁶

Operation Pathways: A Framework for Creating Protected Sustainment in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

By Major Jacob C. Pressler

In March 2023, General Charles A. Flynn, U.S. Army Pacific commander, coauthored a *Defense One* article entitled “Interior Lines Will Make Land Power the Asymmetric Advantage in the Indo-Pacific: The Army is Building Compact Lines of Maneuver, Communications, and Logistics”; in it, he describes the Army role in suppressing an antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) system designed to find and target adversaries in the maritime, air, cyber, and space domains—not dispersed land forces operating within a “protective bubble.”¹ The Army fills this role by creating windows of opportunities for the joint force, primarily through long-range precision fires (LRPF) and other effects applied by the new multidomain task forces and other critical assets dispersed across the theater. This fires-centric concept relies on the continued presence of the United States and partner nations in the region to counter the magazine depth of our adversaries and deter conflict through Operation Pathways.

Enabling the “Protective Bubble”

Operation Pathways grew out of a series of exercises collectively known as Defender Pacific, which were conducted in various countries across the Pacific. The transformation occurred in 2022, when the Defender Pacific exercises developed distinct linkages, enabling the Army to establish interior lines and support key partners.² These changes required that the 8th Military Police Brigade, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, reevaluate how to enable protection at tactical and operational levels. For example, each of the individual exercises had previously occurred annually or biannually, independent of one another; however, following the transformation, the brigade initiated a 3-year plan for incremental unit participation in 16 Operation Pathways exercises in direct support of theater objectives along specific lines of effort. This approach allowed the brigade and the 728th Military Police Battalion, Schofield Barracks, to plan deliberate experimentation focused on Component III integration, littoral security, Army watercraft security, detention operations, military police company structure, and counter-small, unmanned aircraft systems within the theater. Additionally, this multi-year approach drove efforts to reevaluate military police support operations on a noncontiguous battlefield in the maritime domain and impacts on military police doctrine.

Participation in multiple exercises required that the 8th Military Police Brigade coordinate closely with Component III military police. Specifically, the relationship between the brigade and the 11th Military Police Brigade, Los Alamitos, California, ensured the availability of military police requirements for each exercise in the face of Army

force structure reductions. The integration of forces across two brigades resulted in the habitual support of the 11th Military Police Brigade for specific exercises with mixed component platoons and companies—the first of which was Keris Strike 23 in Malaysia, followed by Joint Pacific Multi-national Readiness Center Rotation 23-1 in Hawaii, where the 11th Military Police Brigade provided detention operations platoons task-organized under the 57th Military Police Company, Schofield Barracks, allowing the 728th Military Police Battalion to field and perform mission command for a full military police company in support of both exercises. This enabled both brigades to experiment with detention operations west of the International Date Line. It also allowed for the development of the connective tissue necessary for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of Component III elements into the theater. The coalition of Pacific-aligned military police is crucial not only for enabling the 8th Military Police Brigade to effectively support operations within the theater but also for building the framework that will be central to the ability of military police to support operations beyond 90–180 days of a crisis or conflict.

Operating Across Domains

The maritime domain dominates the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility; however, as discussed in the March 2023 *Defense One* article, future success in the theater will rely on forward-positioned logistics, which refers to Army units positioned forward in the land domain in order to secure logistics nodes across the theater.³ Through participation in Operation Pathways and the analysis of identified gaps, the 8th Military Police Brigade has concluded that military police will play a significant role in littoral defense and Army watercraft security.

The Philippine archipelago is comprised of 7,641 islands spanning 1,150 miles from north to south; therefore, any area or critical-site security mission will necessarily involve near-coastal regions. Reliance on LRPF will require the movement of critical Class V supplies along sea lines of communication via Army or contracted watercraft within littoral areas. Other heavily used capabilities in this theater are joint logistics over the shore (JLOTS) and/or joint petroleum over the shore assets, which operate within the littorals and require protection. In essence, the supportive security tasks are the same regardless of whether or maritime or land domains dominate the area of responsibility; military police must be prepared to conduct these tasks no matter what theater they support.

Starting in the summer of 2023, elements from the 728th Military Police Battalion began experimenting with

critical-site security of JLOTS and joint petroleum over the shore assets in the Philippines. The lessons learned during the Salakanib 23 and Balakatan 23 exercises confirmed that military police operations within the littorals are fundamentally no different than similar missions conducted on land; missions conducted in the littorals simply occur in a different domain under more challenging conditions. For example, a critical-site security mission to protect JLOTS assets requires steps or measures that are similar to those taken to protect other critical sites, regardless of the domain. The same principle applies to Army watercraft security. Watercraft will be transporting critical Class V supplies around the littoral area of the 7,651 Philippine islands to support LRPF. These movements will require protection from Level 1 and 2 threats that may potentially be operating from these numerous islands. In essence, this will be a convoy security mission (under different conditions) in the maritime domain.

Becoming Dispersed but Not Forgotten

During any crisis or conflict in the Pacific, the Army will operate within the adversary's A2/AD bubble, as LRPF are used to suppress or degrade the ability of the adversary's system to target the joint force. Maneuver forces will seize objectives in order to place LRPF in positions of relative advantage and to better apply effects against the adversary. Detainees will need to be held closer to the forward line of troops for extended periods while the Army tries to defeat the various A2/AD systems. The division support area may be located on a particular cluster of islands or in another area with similar terrain features. A2/AD threats could deny the Army the ability to transport via air, and the demand for watercraft will be severe. As a result, military police supporting divisions will need to be prepared to hold detainees longer, further forward, and across dispersed locations until they can be relocated to a more secure area or to the theater detention facility via strategic lift.

Operation Pathways also allowed the 8th Military Police Brigade to experiment with the structure of military police companies. The nature of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command theater requires that military police operate in a more dispersed fashion than normal. Luzon, the main island of the Philippines, is approximately 460 miles long. In crisis or conflict, elements of a military police company could be conducting critical-site security of a multidomain task force firing point in North Luzon, providing protection of JLOTS in central Luzon, while another element is conducting a water security mission for Class V supplies bound for the multidomain task force firing point. This level of dispersion may seem extreme—but as discussed by General Flynn, the transition from Operation Pathways to conflict could occur overnight. U.S. forces in the region could be the only forces available for the first 90–180 days. The brigade restructured Operation Pathways-aligned units to a four-platoon/three-squad concept, which reduced capabilities within the squads but increased capacity within the platoons.

Protecting Across the Framework

The proliferation of relatively cheap small, unmanned aircraft systems (SUAS) in recent conflicts drove in-theater experimentation. One of the lessons learned from the various Operation Pathways exercises is that counter-SUAS, will be a part of every mission conducted. Units must employ individual and collective protection to degrade the effectiveness of adversary SUAS. Specifically, military police must include counter-SUAS in nearly all operations, including support provided to security operations tasks. To support a critical-site security mission, military police must now consider the air domain to be a Level 1 or 2 threat where Group 1 or 2 SUAS can easily be employed with dramatic effect. And this threat is not limited to forces on land, as SUAS also pose a threat during Army watercraft operations as the watercraft traverse the littorals transporting Class V supplies. In addition, a persistent SUAS threat will be present across the operational framework, from the strategic support area to the division close area. Military police conducting security missions within the strategic support area employ counter-SUAS at force-generating and projection locations, in transit on Army watercraft, in support of JLOTS/joint petroleum over the shore within the littorals, during critical-site security missions in support of LRPF/integrated air and missile defense/agile combat employment sites, and in the division support and close areas. The 8th Military Police Brigade has already executed this scenario during Operation Pathways and other associated exercises.

Conclusion

Operation Pathways is the mechanism that sets the U.S. Indo-Pacific theater and builds interior lines that support the joint force. Operations conducted in theaters dominated by the maritime domain (including the U.S. Indo-Pacific command theater) will require changes in how military police view their traditional mission sets. Military police will be required to conduct missions across domains and with greater dispersion amongst their elements. As the Army employs LRPF to suppress A2/AD systems and maneuver forces to seize objectives that support that mission, protecting logistics will be crucial for military police. Detention operations will occur in dispersed locations, where detainees will be held for extended periods. While these unique situations will drive change in current doctrine, they will not change our core mission of *Assist, Protect, Defend*. 

Endnotes:

¹Charles Flynn and Sarah Starr, "Interior Lines Will Make Land Power the Asymmetric Advantage in the Indo-Pacific: The Army is Building Compact Lines of Maneuver, Communications, and Logistics," *Defense One*, 15 March 2023, <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2023/03/interior-lines-will-make-land-power-asymmetric-advantage-indo-pacific/384002/>>, accessed on 22 July 2024.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

Major Pressler is the operations officer, 8th Military Police Brigade. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from California State University, San Bernardino, California, and a master's degree in security management from Webster University.

Enabling Protection During Crisis

By Lieutenant Colonel Justin D. Roman

U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) military police formations **Assist** by mobilizing units to aid in defense support to civil authorities and to help installations maintain law and order. Concurrently, we **Protect** by mobilizing fully modified table of organization and equipment units to North Atlantic Treaty Organization-affiliated countries to protect our vital national interests and to train with our allies and partners. Lastly, we **Defend** by providing forces to support combatant commands such as the U.S. Southern Command, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, the U.S. European Command, the U.S. Central Command, and the U.S. Africa Command to deter aggression, shape the environment, and provide relief to vulnerable populations. We *Assist, Protect, Defend* by providing protective-service details around the world, both continuously and on short notice.

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-37, *Protection*, directs that “Protection assessments at echelon must reflect continuous and enduring protection activities that are comprehensive, integrated, layered, redundant, and enduring.¹ USAR is integrated into the veins of American society, protecting our networks, commerce, businesses, critical infrastructure processes, and communities on a daily basis. Protection activities that are conducted during peacetime significantly impact the transition into crisis. During a crisis, the first kinetic strikes will likely be against command and control, communication, and logistic nodes in an attempt to hinder our national response to hostilities. These strikes will encompass conventional and unconventional means along the spectrum of crisis to conflict.

The communities outside of Regular Army installations must also perform passive and active antiterrorism/protection activities through vigilance and proactive engagement. Through civilian employment, the USAR population performs community policing, physical security, communications, cybersecurity, and various other activities. Even as they work in their civilian professions, USAR Soldiers embody our motto of *Assist, Protect, Defend* through conflict.

The 290th Military Police Brigade “Titans,” USAR, Nashville, Tennessee, enable protection during a crisis by providing a robust force of policing and

investigative professionals both at home and abroad. The 290th must protect the force and its Families by performing the law-and-order function throughout the spectrum of conflict. Providing law and order; redundant, secure communications; decentralized mission command; and resilient formations will be the key to survival and response in a first-strike crisis.

The Titans actively seek to bridge the gaps between the U.S. Army components while also working together to *Assist, Protect, Defend*. We are undergoing significant growth by adding allied partners to our training events and planning conferences in order to share knowledge and lessons learned and to understand the differences in our formation structures and capabilities. Allied participants are increasing interoperability and strengthening the bonds that we need to effectively *Assist, Protect, Defend* together in crisis. These events and conferences demonstrate the significance of collective, joint, and combined activities to identify challenges and solutions. 

Endnote:

¹ADP 3-37, *Protection*, 10 January 2024.

Lieutenant Colonel Roman is the operations officer for the 290th Military Police Brigade. He holds a bachelor's degree in public management with a concentration in criminal justice from Austin Peay State University, Clarksville, Tennessee, and a master's degree in organizational security management from Webster University.



MARYLAND'S FINEST PROTECTION FORCE



By Lieutenant Colonel John P. Rodriguez

For the Army National Guard, a crisis can come in many forms, from natural disasters to near-peer threats to our national interests. The 115th Military Police Battalion (part of the Maryland Army National Guard), Salisbury, Maryland, is a unique organization with diverse capabilities suited to enabling protection for the state, our Nation, and the joint force across the spectrum of threats during a domestic or international crisis. The 115th consists of a military police headquarters detachment; two military police companies (the 29th and the 200th); the 231st Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Company (Hazard Response), Camp Fretterd, Maryland; and the 244th Engineer Vertical-Construction Company, Hagerstown Armory, Hagerstown, Maryland. With this potent combination of assets, the 115th has enabled protection by assisting with disaster response, protecting democracy, and defending the joint force throughout multiple crises.

Assisting With Disaster Response

The 115th Military Police Battalion has responded to numerous natural disasters and assisted local and state authorities in mitigating the threat to the populace. The 115th can be mobilized for state active duty under the authority of the governor of Maryland during natural disasters. Under “Title 32” authorities, if the President of the United States declares an emergency, the 115th can be activated to conduct federally funded operations that are under state control.¹

Given the diverse climate of Maryland, the 115th Military Police Battalion has responded to hurricanes, floods, and snowstorms. The unit assists local and state authorities by providing vehicles and drivers capable of operating under degraded road conditions. It can evacuate civilians endangered by floodwaters or traverse snow-covered roads to deliver paramedics to individuals in need of medical attention or to move patients in medical crises to a cleared road or further transport by ambulance. The unit can also support police efforts to block roads to protect motorists from entering areas with environmental hazards such as flooded roadways.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the 115th Military Police Battalion was mobilized multiple times under Title 32 orders to assist the Maryland Department of Health with addressing the federal disaster; the battalion

remained under state control but was federally funded. Soldiers from the 115th ran testing and vaccination sites to provide health protection to the people of Maryland. They ensured the smooth flow of traffic and the efficient registration of patients to maximize the capability of the civilian nurses who were administering the tests and vaccinations.

Protecting Democracy

Domestic crises can result from manufactured as well as natural causes. The 115th Military Police Battalion has responded to multiple civil disturbances—including protests after the death of Freddie C. Gray while he was in police custody in 2015 in Baltimore, marches in reaction to the death of George P. Floyd Jr. at the hands of Minneapolis police in 2020, and the 6 January 2021 insurrection at the U.S. Capitol—under either state active duty or Title 32 status. In these cases, the 115th has conducted area security, police operations, and populace control as well as protected the First Amendment rights of citizens to protest, while also safeguarding critical infrastructure and maintaining law and order. For example, military vehicles have been used as improvised roadblocks at large demonstrations to prevent ramming or explosive vehicular-borne threats, which have been advocated and even attempted by domestic and foreign extremist organizations.² Through training on civil disturbance tactics and techniques and with the extensive nonlethal capabilities of the 29th and 200th Military Police Companies, the 115th can also effectively support law enforcement responses to civil disturbances if protests escalate toward violence.

The presence of National Guard Soldiers on the frontlines during protests can be especially effective for deescalating tension while allowing free speech. During the Freddie C. Gray protests, Maryland Army National Guard personnel provided critical site security at Baltimore police stations where protestors had gathered. While protestors were upset at police, their outrage was not directed toward the Soldiers manning the shield wall. The protests did not escalate into violence; protestors did not attack Soldiers, and Soldiers did not respond to protestors’ taunts with violence, as had been the case with other protests directed against police.³ Other Army National Guard units replicated this successful deescalation of tensions during the 2020 George P. Floyd Jr. mass demonstrations.⁴

Defending the Joint Force

During an international crisis, the 115th Military Police Battalion is capable of enabling protection throughout the force protection process, from fort to port—through reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. The protection provided by the 115th enables efficient deployment of the joint force and allows the force to focus on preparing for large-scale combat operations.

During a crisis, protection starts in the homeland since near-peer and even nonstate adversaries could launch terrorist attacks against the joint force as it mobilizes. Protesters, potentially inspired by adversary propaganda, could also interfere with deployment operations through nonviolent but disruptive demonstrations.⁵ In addition, technological advances like the weaponization of commercial unmanned aerial systems may pose potential threats to military installations.⁶ Army National Guard military police companies can conduct law enforcement operations at domestic military bases to supplement or replace Regular Army units deploying forward. Such companies can also conduct area security of aerial or seaports of embarkation in the continental United States, similar to the manner in which these types of units conducted area and critical-site security after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Deep local knowledge and connections that Army National Guard companies have with local and state law enforcement officials may increase the effectiveness of security operations off-post, as Regular Army units likely lack this familiarity. Furthermore, the 231st CBRN Company can respond to any CBRN threat within the continental United States; for example, it can mitigate the contamination of seaports of embarkation subjected to CBRN attacks to protect personnel and ensure the continuation of deployment operations. The 231st demonstrated this ability while serving as command and control CBRN Response Element B in the continental United States mass casualty CBRN response enterprise.

The 115th Military Police Battalion can also be forward-deployed to protect the joint force, with military police companies conducting area security missions at aerial or seaports of debarkation in the joint operations area. These area security missions can protect against adversary intelligence collection or sabotage from terrorists. And area security encompasses convoy security. Military police companies can also perform site security for base camps, just as the 29th Military Police Company provided security to Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo. In addition, the 231st CBRN Company can mitigate CBRN hazards by deploying forward to provide decontamination capabilities for area security missions at aerial or seaports of debarkation or at reception, staging, onward movement, and integration locations. With the M1135 Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicles in its reconnaissance and surveillance platoon, the 231st can also detect CBRN threats. Finally, the 244th Engineer Vertical-Construction Company can improve survivability by constructing protective positions or hardening infrastructure and protect the force from environmental hazards

by building shelters and barracks for deploying troops, which might be especially important when deploying to austere environments.

Conclusion

Through a combination of its military police, chemical, and engineer units, the 115th Military Police Battalion can respond to various threats and hazards across a broad spectrum by protecting the force from hostile action, responding to civil disturbances, and mitigating environmental hazards. These capabilities allow the battalion to prevent or minimize risks and threat effects; preserve combat power; and enable freedom of action for our local, state, federal, and joint force partners. With this flexible set of capabilities and mission sets, the 115th Military Police Battalion—the finest protection force in Maryland—embodies the Army National Guard motto of *Always Ready, Always There*. 

Endnotes:

¹Jim Absher, “What’s the Difference Between Title 10 and Title 32 Mobilization Orders?” *Military.com*, 27 January 2022, <<https://www.military.com/benefits/reserve-and-guard-benefits/whats-difference-between-title-10-and-title-32-mobilization-orders.html>>, accessed on 8 July 2024.

²“Vehicle-Borne Attacks: Tactics and Mitigation,” *First Responders Toolbox*, Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, 18 December 2020, <https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/jcat/firstresponderstoolbox/NCTC-FBI-DHS_Vehicle-Borne_Attacks-Tactics_and_Mitigation-survey.pdf>, accessed on 25 June 2024.

³Shaila Dewan and Mike Baker, “Facing Protests Over Use of Force, Police Respond With More Force,” *New York Times*, 2 June 2020, <<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/police-tactics-floyd-protests.html>>, accessed on 25 June 2024.

⁴Gary Sheftick, “Guardsmen Defuse Tensions With Atlanta Protesters,” *National Guard*, 9 June 2020, <<https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2212394/guardsmen-defuse-tensions-with-atlanta-protesters/>>, accessed on 25 June 2024.

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⁶Elivira N. Loreda et al., “The End of Sanctuary: Protecting the Army’s Installations From Emerging Threats,” RAND, 10 November 2020, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA107-1.html>, accessed on 25 June 2024.

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VANGUARD: HISTORY OF THE 972D MILITARY POLICE COMPANY

By Sergeant Matthew P. Ahern

Soldiers of the U.S. Army Military Police Corps Regiment strive to uphold the regimental motto—*Assist, Protect, Defend*. Established after the inception of the Corps on 26 September 1941, this motto has long been embodied by Soldiers fulfilling military police duties. These words are particularly emphasized within the context of the Army National Guard portion of the Military Police Corps Regiment, considering the critical roles that these Soldiers have in defending the home front in times of emergency. Given the expeditionary nature of their mission set, U.S. Army special operations forces are often referred to as the “tip of the spear.” In this context, Army National Guard military police are the center of America’s shield. They are the backbone of the Nation’s defense, serving as protectors on the home front; frontline responders during extraordinary emergencies; and a deployable force ready to defend the United States and allied elements abroad. These qualities are exemplified in the history and current operations of the 972d Military Police Company, Massachusetts National Guard.

The 972d Military Police Company was established in Gloucester, Massachusetts, in 1787 and is older than the Military Police Corps Regiment by nearly 200 years. In 1861, upon the Confederate firing on Fort Sumter, South Carolina, the 972d (known then as Company G, 8th Massachusetts Volunteer Regiment) was among the first units in the Nation to answer President Abraham Lincoln’s call for state militias to help suppress the rebellion. Within days, the company was routed to Washington, D.C., to defend the Nation’s capital. The unit played a critical role in securing the *U.S.S. Constitution* from secessionists occupying Annapolis, Maryland, and was ultimately staged in the U.S. Capitol during the opening days of the Civil War. For their swift, protective action in responding to this national emergency, the Soldiers of Company G earned the moniker “Minutemen of 1861.” A century before the *Assist, Protect, Defend* motto was formalized, the 972d embodied those values—and it continues to do so today.

Over the past half-decade, the 972d Military Police Company has been known for its constant presence and its swift and robust response during local and national emergencies. It participated in COVID-19 relief efforts and was the first Army National Guard unit to put boots on the ground during the 2020 summer of civil disturbance in Boston, Massachusetts. It stood by, ready to respond if civil unrest and disorder were to occur during the 2020 national elections. And, facing fears of a correctional officer shortage in 2021, it was activated as a part of a task force established to aid Massachusetts Department of Corrections staff in maintaining unchecked operations of the state prison system.



8th Massachusetts Volunteer Regiment in the Capitol Rotunda

The 972d Military Police Company is one of the few military units that has twice been called to defend the U.S. Capitol—first in 1861 and then again on 6 January 2021, as part of the swift response force summoned in the aftermath of the Capitol riot, where it augmented local law enforcement agencies and provided law enforcement training to nonmilitary police units activated alongside it.

Today, the 972d protects the Commonwealth of Massachusetts by providing an annual presence at the “First Muster,” held on the Salem Common; the Boston Marathon (where it augments local police departments along the 26.2-mile route); and the Independence Day celebrations, held at the Charles River Esplanade. The 972d safeguards against potential threats, acts as a deterring force, and assists local agencies in maintaining peace. Its commitment to the values of the Military Police Corps Regiment goes beyond the expectations of traditional Army National Guard Soldiers.

“Vanguard” is now the callsign of the 972d Military Police Company; that code name describes the constant role of the company in being among the first to respond to emergencies. Repeated quick and robust responses are the key factors that allow the 972d to effectively carry out the *Assist, Protect, Defend* motto, regardless of the circumstances. Whether referencing the “Minutemen of 1861” or the “Vanguard” of today, the 972d Military Police Company is among the first line of protection for the Massachusetts Commonwealth during times of crisis.



Sergeant Ahern was previously a team leader and unit historian for the 972d Military Police Company. He currently serves with the 126th Military History Detachment.

Enabling Protection Through Social Media

By First Lieutenant Regina M. Koesters

More than half of all Americans admit to using social media as a primary source of news and information.¹ And the influence of social media platforms is rapidly growing and regularly shaping community perceptions.

The military police mission is to provide security and protection to the Army community. Military police units ensure that their Soldiers receive the proper training to appropriately respond to a variety of law enforcement incidents that take place in physical neighborhoods across installations. However, more attention should be paid to protecting digital neighborhoods and mitigating the impact they may have on law enforcement operations. To effectively *Assist, Protect, Defend* the entire Army community, every provost marshal's office needs to develop and maintain a social media strategy focused on crisis management, community engagement, and crime prevention.

Crisis Management

Crisis management, a critical element of efficient policing, promotes community safety through clear and concise communication. During a crisis, the reach and influence of military police Soldiers can be extended through social media. Damage is typically done when the community is left uninformed by proper authorities. By analyzing social media trends during crises, it is possible to examine how users may simultaneously spread misinformation and cause further chaos. Regardless of the severity of the situation, incident updates will inevitably be provided in online groups and forums—even if the information is received from other sources.

Real-life crises, such as the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, serve as fundamental examples of the essential role of social networks during emergency response. Former Boston Police Department Commissioner Edward F. Davis instructed his department to use social media to inform the public about the details of the incident just 10 minutes after the bombing. Therefore, the primary source of accurate information was the official Boston Police Department social

media accounts, while other news outlets spread misinformation. Captain Zachary Perone, a public information officer for the Palo Alto, California, Police Department, stated, “[The Boston Police Department] became the news source during the crisis. . . . It was a watershed moment for law

“A simple post on social media from a trusted law enforcement source can make these preventative resources more accessible to the general population, creating a safer and more informed community and reducing the risk of more common crises.”

enforcement and social media.”² The community received timely updates regarding the investigation and had a direct line of communication to the authorities. Using social media, the Boston Police

Department demonstrated how transparency and trust between law enforcement agencies and the public are vital to the success of crisis management.

Community Engagement

Community policing continues to serve as a primary means of connecting the military with Service members and their Families; however, the focus of community policing is often solely on coordinating in-person events for the community. According to the *2015 Final Report of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing*, “Law enforcement agencies should adopt model policies and best practices for technology-based community engagement that increases community trust and access.”³ Social media provides innovative and potentially more engaging communication between these entities, improving transparency and encouraging collaboration. Without a deliberate presence on social media even during mundane daily operations, members of the public may not feel they can rely on the provost marshal's office as a source of information during a crisis.

Crime Prevention

The goal of military police operations is to uphold the law and promote a safe and secure community. Still, the military policing approach is frequently reactive rather than proactive, potentially resulting in repeat incidents. Social media presents a unique opportunity for a strategy that shifts the focus to proactive policing through crime prevention. Military law enforcement professionals receive training on available resources, including the Family Advocacy Program, the Army Suicide Prevention Program, the Army Substance Abuse Program, and the Sexual

(Continued on page 21)

The Role of the Law Enforcement Tactics Branch in Enabling Protection During Crisis

By Chief Master Sergeant Scott M. Henshaw (Retired)

Critical Incidents

Sadly, names like Columbine, Virginia Tech, Sandy Hook, and Parkland have become synonymous with tragedy. But, active shooters do not exclusively target learning institutions. The Century Aurora 16 movie theater, Aurora, Colorado; the Pulse nightclub, Orlando, Florida; the Route 91 Harvest Music Festival, Las Vegas, Nevada; and the Sutherland Springs First Baptist Church, Sutherland Springs, Texas, also fell victim to these primal predators, who were hunting for soft targets with masses of people unable to effectively oppose them. Even military installations with robust force protection measures in place are not immune to active shooters. Attacks on Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington; the Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.; the Naval Air Station Pensacola, Pensacola, Florida; and Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, collectively left 21 innocent people dead and another 39 injured. And Fort Cavazos (formerly Fort Hood), Texas, experienced two separate active shooter incidents; those two shooters were responsible for 16 deaths and 43 injuries. Crises like active shooter incidents not only result in catastrophic losses of life but, when the military is targeted, can also compromise our Nation's ability to achieve strategic objectives. And unfortunately, active shooter incidents show no signs of decline.

In 2022, 50 active shooter incidents occurred across the United States. This number represents a 66.7 percent increase compared to 2018.¹ In one of those incidents, an active shooter entered the Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, and killed 21 people, seriously injuring another 17. Of those killed, 19 were children ranging from 9 to 11 years of age. The 77-minute delay between the on-scene arrival of the first officers and neutralization of the shooter made this incident even more tragic. The delay ultimately contributed to a more significant loss of life. The U.S. Army Installation Management Command (IMCOM) subsequently distributed a summary of the Department of Justice critical incident review,² which is a comprehensive analysis of the overall law enforcement response in Uvalde. IMCOM recommended that all garrison leaders read and understand the Robb Elementary School critical incident review to "better understand their roles and responsibilities in building installation resilience to disruption and attack."³ Among other findings, IMCOM stated that responses to active shooter incidents call for "precise and swift movement."⁴

Special Reaction Teams

The Robb Elementary School active shooter incident ended when three members of a U.S. Border Patrol tactical

team, followed by deputies from two local sheriffs' offices, pushed past more than 300 other officers on the scene, entered the school, and killed the shooter. Assigned to U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Border Patrol tactical teams provide immediate-response capabilities for high-risk incidents that require specialized skills and tactics. While civilian law enforcement agencies may have "tactical teams" with various other names, most possess a special weapons and tactics team capability. The Military Police Corps Regiment has tactical teams with the same capabilities; these teams are known as special reaction teams (SRTs).

SRT members are specially trained, armed, and equipped military police Soldiers and civilians who are responsible for responding to and resolving high-risk incidents. They serve as the commander's principal rapid-response force in the event of a significant disruption on an installation. SRTs can effectively resolve crises that would otherwise exceed the capabilities of traditional law enforcement personnel. Examples of these critical situations include, but are not limited to, active shooter threats, barricaded subjects, threatened suicides, high-risk warrant services, sniper incidents, drug raids, hostage situations, and acts of terrorism. SRTs are among the Army's most highly trained, technical law enforcement assets. The primary characteristic that distinguishes SRT members from other military police personnel is the concentration of effort; SRTs focus solely on tactical solutions, seeking out opportunity within the chaos created by crisis.

The mission of the Advanced Law Enforcement Training Division, U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, is to "provide subject matter expertise and specialized training in advanced law enforcement and antiterrorism tactics, techniques, and procedures [TTP] supporting all Services within the Department of Defense and select civilian law enforcement agencies with resident and mobile training team capabilities."⁵ The Law Enforcement Tactics Branch of the Advanced Law Enforcement Training Division is solely responsible for training SRT members. All Law Enforcement Tactics Branch cadre members (consisting of Soldiers, Marines, Airmen, and Army civilians) possess extensive training and operational experience. They are true subject matter experts who teach sound, doctrine-based TTP. In addition, they continuously examine data collected from civilian and partner nation counterparts to develop and refine the training. The end state of the training must employ best police practices, exceed industry standards and, most importantly, produce SRT members who can enable protection in crisis.

The SRT course focuses on close-combat marksmanship, breaching methods, vehicle interdictions, room entry, and building-clearing TTP. While the course includes limited classroom instruction, most training time is spent on the ground, honing skills through countless repetitions of learned TTP. Students spend time in live-fire shoot houses (with as many as five team members in the same room), engaging photo-realistic targets. All TTP are further reinforced and tested under force-on-force conditions, with each mission progressively escalating in scope and difficulty. This scenario-based training builds resistance to stress and bolsters critical thinking and decision making.

SRT Support for the Military Police Corps Regiment Motto

Aligned with the Military Police Corps Regiment motto of *Assist, Protect, Defend*, SRT members apply tactical solutions to enable protection in crisis.

Assist

SRTs assist assigned military police personnel through the training they can provide. They represent the resident subject matter expertise in weapons employment and tactical movement within any organization. Simply put, SRT members can better educate formations on fundamental and advanced levels of shoot, move, and communicate actions. (If any of the first police officers on the scene at the Robb Elementary School had received SRT training, the outcome may have been dramatically different and more lives may have been saved.) An aspect of the training that is often overlooked is that it also enhances the mental preparedness of responding patrols. Moving toward the sound of gunfire is nearly impossible without the appropriate training and mental preparedness. Law enforcement personnel responding to crises require a high level of confidence in their own skills as well as the collective skills of the other first responders. SRT course graduates-turned-trainers push well past “confidence” and train to maintain a mindset of complete dominance. This gross overmatch mentality was evident during yet another tragedy—but with a much different outcome than those in the examples previously mentioned.

On 27 March 2023, an active shooter entered the Covenant School in Nashville, Tennessee, and, before law enforcement personnel could arrive on the scene, fired 178 rounds from a rifle and pistol, killing three children and three adults. Due to traffic conditions, it took 11 minutes for the first patrols to respond to the incident. However, from the first officers’ arrival to neutralization of the shooter, only 3 minutes lapsed. That’s worth repeating—*only 3 minutes!* Upon their arrival, officers Rex Engelbert and Michael Collazo entered the school but did not hear gunshots or know the location of the shooter. They began systematically clearing rooms. Once they heard shots fired, they immediately moved to the second floor, past other officers, and killed the shooter. As recorded by body cameras, officers Engelbert and Collazo never stopped moving toward the sound of gunfire.⁶ Their actions were a direct result of the training they had received and the mental preparedness they possessed. That body camera footage represents the standard for active

shooter responses and should be required viewing for all law enforcement officers. It also illustrates the type of training that SRT members have received and can, in turn, provide to others.

Protect

SRTs protect military police patrols with their enhanced patrol response capabilities. Whether assigned to a full- or part-time team, SRT members also perform patrol duties with other military police Soldiers and civilian police officers. When properly employed and supported, a single SRT member offers capabilities above and beyond what multiple patrols can provide—and, at the very least, are a force multiplier. Through superior ballistic protection, SRT-trained individuals can arrive at a crisis with improved survivability for themselves and others. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ), which is responsible for measuring and rating ballistic protection levels provided by various products, has assigned typical body armor worn by patrols NIJ ratings of Handgun (HG) 1 or HG 2. These vests can defeat pistol ammunition ranging from 9 millimeters to .357 Magnum (HG 1) and 9 millimeters to .44 Magnum (HG 2).⁷ During the 50 active shooter incidents that took place in 2022, 26 rifles were used by the shooters.⁸ A single SRT member can bring to bear a ballistic shield that provides an NIJ rating of Rifle 2, which is capable of defeating 5.56-millimeter and 7.62-millimeter ammunition.⁹ It is worth noting here that one of the reasons for the delay in neutralizing the active shooter at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde was that initial responders would only advance toward the gunfire with a ballistic shield, which was unavailable. Not only can SRT members protect other first responders with a shield, but they are also trained to accurately engage and neutralize threats while doing so.

Another capability that SRT members offer to enable protection in crisis is accessibility. Closing and locking doors is standard procedure during active shooter incidents. If the shooter is on the other side of those doors and responding military police personnel do not have immediate access to keys, then they must move past the doors. SRT members, on the other hand, can use several methods to breach locked doors, allowing immediate access to those areas. This saves precious time for clearing the threshold and moving to dominant positions before the shooter can recover.

Defend

SRTs defend the “effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure.”¹⁰ The U.S. Army Military Police Corps Regiment is manned, equipped, and trained to provide flexible and tailorable support to joint force commanders. This support directly enables warfighters to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. Within multidomain operations, military police personnel execute three distinct disciplines—police operations, detention operations, and security and mobility support. SRTs act as force multipliers throughout the range of these disciplines. For more than 248 years, the Marechaussee Corps and provost marshals and, more recently, the Military

Police Corps Regiment, have enforced the law, secured rear areas, and afforded freedom of movement during almost every major conflict, from the Revolutionary War to the Global War on Terrorism.

Conclusion

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-37, *Protection*, states that “The foundation of protection starts with the individual Soldier.”¹¹ Within the Military Police Corps Regiment, SRTs are the foundation of protection during crisis. Compared to the rest of the Military Police Corps Regiment, they are better trained, equipped, and postured and they possess a mindset of complete domination. Therefore, they can provide an enhanced response for countering an adversary’s undesirable actions. In preparing for a crisis, Soldiers have repeatedly heard, “You’ll never rise to the occasion and will always default to your training.” SRT members know that disputing this axiom is nothing more than a tactical fantasy.

Endnotes:



¹“Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2022,” U.S. Department of Justice, 2023, <<https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/active-shooter-incidents-in-the-us-2022-042623.pdf/view>>, accessed on 8 July 2024.

²“DOJ Critical Incident Review: Active Shooter at Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX,” Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services, Washington, D.C., 2024, <<https://portal.cops.usdoj.gov/resourcecenter/content.ashx/cops-r1141-pub.pdf>>, accessed on 22 July 2024.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵“Advanced Law Enforcement Training Division,” USAMPS website, 2024, <<https://home.army.mil/wood/units-tenants/USAMPS/courses/advanced-law-enforcement-training-division>>, accessed on 8 July 2024.

⁶Dan Marco, “Nashville PD’s Response to the Covenant School Active Shooter was ‘By the Numbers,’” *Police1*, 28 March 2023, <<https://www.police1.com/active-shooter/articles/nashville-pds-response-to-the-covenant-school-active-shooter-was-by-the-numbers-1HDA18PV63fLCEKP/>>, accessed on 8 July 2024.

⁷“Standard Protection Levels, Specification for NIJ Ballistic Protection Levels and Associated Test Threats,” NIJ, October 2023, <<https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/307347.pdf>>, accessed on 8 July 2024.

⁸“Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2022.”

⁹“Standard Protection Levels.”

¹⁰ADP 3-37, *Protection*, 1 January 2024.

¹¹Ibid.

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(“Enabling Protection . . .,” continued from page 18)

Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention Program. A simple post on social media from a trusted law enforcement source can make these preventive resources more accessible to the general population, creating a safer and more informed community and reducing the risk of more common crises.

Conclusion

Integrating social media into law enforcement operations is crucial to enabling protection. A deliberate strategy that includes establishing policies and procedures, identifying goals, and training personnel is necessary. Because technology and the online world are constantly and rapidly changing, we must continuously adapt our approach based on transparent feedback through polls, open forums, and direct collaboration with the public. Failure to emphasize social media priorities through a strategic approach will limit the ability of each provost marshal’s office to provide safety and security to its community—especially during a crisis. 

Endnotes:

¹KiDuck Kim et al., *2016 Law Enforcement Use of Social Media Survey*, International Association of Chiefs of Police and the Urban Institute, February 2017, <https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/88661/2016-law-enforcement-use-of-social-media-survey_5.pdf>, accessed on 20 June 2024.

²Jessica Mulholland, “Social Media: Big Lessons From the Boston Marathon Bombing,” *Government Technology*, 22 April 2021, <<https://www.govtech.com/public-safety/social-media-big-lessons-from-the-boston-marathon-bombing.html>>, accessed on 20 June 2024.

³*Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing*, Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services, Washington, D.C., May 2015, <https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc948674/m2/1/high_res_d/taskforce_finalreport.pdf>, accessed on 20 June 2024.

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By Captain Richard D. Wilson

On a chilly, rain-soaked Wednesday morning, emergency services liaisons and key leaders gathered around the incident command post, mobilizing in response to a simulated active shooter threat during the annual large-scale exercise at Fort Eisenhower, Georgia. As military police and Department of the Army civilian police confirmed neutralization of the threat, control of the incident command post seamlessly transitioned from the fire department to law enforcement officials. Installation lockdown protocols were concurrently lifted, facilitating the transfer of casualties to local hospitals, while installation emergency operations center personnel pivoted their efforts from containment to rapid recovery. This exercise represented the culmination of a year-long endeavor that encompassed rigorous training and collaboration among numerous agencies from the installation and across local, state, and national emergency services.

Through extensive preparation and cooperation, the 35th Military Police Detachment and the 222d Military Working Dog (MWD) Detachment, both at Fort Eisenhower, exemplify the principles encapsulated in the Military Police Corps Regiment motto—*Assist, Protect, Defend*. With a proactive approach and the ability to quickly respond during crisis situations, these units not only safeguard lives and property but also demonstrate their unwavering commitment to ensuring the safety and security of everyone on Fort Eisenhower.

Assisting in Crisis

Law enforcement organizations—especially military police units—play a crucial role in guaranteeing the safety and security of individuals and communities during crises. At Fort Eisenhower, the 35th Military Police Detachment and the 222d MWD Detachment spearhead a synchronized effort to address diverse emergency challenges. As an integral component of emergency management, the 35th Military Police Detachment excels in executing critical tasks (traffic control, perimeter security) and in escorting personnel to transport assets to affected areas. The 222d MWD Detachment stands ready to assist; the specially trained MWDs and their handlers can detect explosives, narcotics, and other substances that pose a threat to the installation. Emergency operations center personnel convene with first responders at the incident command post to effectively stage available

resources for use on and off the installation. This concept seems straightforward; however, in reality, the process is complex—particularly during large-scale events when regional resources are scarce. Despite these challenges, the expertise and synchronization of the emergency response teams guarantee efficient and effective response efforts, maximizing support for impacted communities.

The Fort Eisenhower community is protected through its work with local agencies across each phase of emergency management. During the preparation phase, collaboration with local authorities involves developing comprehensive emergency response plans tailored to the specific needs and vulnerabilities of the community. Training and drill exercises jointly conducted with surrounding counties enhance readiness and interoperability. In the response phase, the swift deployment of specialized personnel and resources can effectively address emergency situations that involve providing medical assistance, conducting evacuations, negotiating for the release of hostages, or providing special weapons and tactics teams. Throughout the recovery phase, close cooperation facilitates the efficient allocation of resources necessary for cleaning up, rebuilding, and ensuring that affected individuals receive the support they need to rebuild their lives. During the mitigation phase, ongoing partnerships with local organizations enable the swift identification of, and response to, potential hazards and vulnerabilities and the implementation of measures to diminish the risk of future emergencies and bolster community resilience. Through this multiphase approach, coordinated efforts with the surrounding area can be instrumental in minimizing the impact of an event.

Reliable communication platforms are crucial in assisting the installation community. By regularly conducting communication exercises, Fort Eisenhower emergency services personnel enable the rapid dissemination of critical information, integrated response efforts, and ability to provide support for affected individuals. Across the garrison, communication plans and methods are validated to achieve unity among responders and provide timely updates to the public. The installation uses the National Incident Management System for a standardized approach during events; the system provides a framework for managing incidents, regardless of size or complexity. By employing standardized terminology, principles, and procedures, the National

Incident Management System enhances the overall effectiveness of emergency response efforts for the installation. Despite the spectrum of potential threats, from cyber attacks to disruptions that disable communications, emergency services maintain the ability to communicate effectively.

Protecting in Crisis

Military police fulfill a range of responsibilities to ensure individual safety and to protect the installation, critical infrastructure, and resources during times of emergency or disaster. The 35th Military Police Detachment can establish perimeter security around critical facilities, control access to restricted areas, conduct patrols to deter potential threats, and immediately respond to incidents that might endanger lives or disrupt operations. The specialized skills of the 222d MWD Detachment are vital in patrolling areas and apprehending suspects. During critical circumstances and events, these detachments ensure that crowds are controlled, chaos is prevented, and order is maintained within the community. Military police and their counterparts work tirelessly to posture themselves to meet any threat.

The most valuable resources on Fort Eisenhower are the Service members, Families, and civilians residing there. Military police play a crucial role in assisting with evacuation and shelter plans to preserve those resources. For military police, evacuation efforts include providing traffic control measures; directing evacuees to designated cleared routes; and transporting vulnerable populations, such as the elderly or disabled. Fort Eisenhower emergency response personnel assist in establishing and managing evacuation shelters, confirming that they are safe, well-organized, and equipped with necessary supplies. Military police will continue to coordinate with other agencies to provide support services, such as medical and humanitarian aid. Through the combined security and logistics expertise of the Fort Eisenhower Directorate of Emergency Services, the 35th Military Police Detachment stands ready to contribute to the efficient and orderly evacuation and sheltering of at-risk populations, mitigating the impact of crises and safeguarding lives.

One asset that is unique to Fort Eisenhower is the Army National Guard Youth Challenge Academy. Troubled juveniles ranging from 16 to 18 years of age from across the state of Georgia participate in the Youth Challenge Academy, working to turn their lives around for the better. Escalations that may occur during this rigorous program might require the delicate management of civil order and discipline among the juvenile participants. Having been specially trained for this unique situation, the 35th Military Police Detachment is prepared to step in when necessary.

Defending in Crisis

Nestled within the Fort Eisenhower Directorate of Emergency Services, the 35th Military Police Detachment seamlessly merges with its civilian counterparts as well as various other groups, forging an unparalleled depth of protection. The unit, equipped with advanced training, is a vigilant force, ready to swiftly neutralize hostile situations or

implement proactive measures to deter potential threats. Situated at the forefront of intelligence and cyber operations, Fort Eisenhower plays host to numerous prestigious entities, which make it a pivotal operational hub. And with ever-evolving threats (from cyber intrusions to the proliferation of drones) looming over the homeland, ensuring comprehensive protection throughout the installation and conducting around-the-clock activities during crisis situations are of utmost importance.

Partnerships with on- and off-post organizations with unique capabilities enhance the defense readiness of the installation. The significance of communication and unwavering cooperation among partners cannot be overstated. Due to limited capabilities and resources, several Fort Eisenhower units face challenges. Nevertheless, their united efforts have mounted a formidable defense, proficient at safeguarding the installation during a potential urgent event. The 35th Military Police Detachment and the 222d MWD Detachment are pivotal in fostering this collaborative spirit; they enable units to optimize their contributions and effectiveness through consistent interfaces and participation in regular training exercises.

Enabling Protection

The 35th Military Police Detachment and the 222d MWD Detachment collectively serve as the linchpin for the Fort Eisenhower security ecosystem, closely aligning with internal organizations and external local and state agencies to ensure the safety and well-being of the Fort Eisenhower community. Through strategic partnerships, the detachments leverage the unique specialties of each entity to fortify defenses against potential threats. Whether conducting joint training exercises, coordinating response protocols, or sharing best practices, the 35th Military Police Detachment and its civilian counterparts foster a cohesive network of protection that extends beyond the borders of the installation. Through ongoing training and preparedness initiatives, regular upgrades to equipment and maintenance, and a commitment to continuous improvement based on lessons learned and community feedback, Fort Eisenhower continues to strengthen its protection capabilities. These enhancements are made possible by the dedicated efforts of the 35th Military Police Detachment and the 222d MWD Detachment, which stand as cornerstones in protecting the security and resilience of the installation. In upholding the military police motto of *Assist, Protect, Defend*, these organizations demonstrate their unwavering dedication to safeguarding and supporting the Fort Eisenhower community during crises, serving as a reliable source of security and assistance.



Captain Wilson is the law enforcement operations officer for the 35th Military Police Detachment. He holds a bachelor's degree in history from the Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, and a master's degree in homeland security from Liberty University.

PREVENTING TERRORIST ATTACKS THROUGH COMMUNITY POLICING

By Colonel Richard S. Vanderlinden (Retired)

Despite the understandable shift in Department of Defense mission priorities and resources toward threats from near-peer competitors, the threat posed by terrorists and violent extremists has not diminished. Recent terror attacks, such as the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel and the 22 March 2024 Islamic State Khorasan Province attack in Russia, reveal the fact that large-scale terrorist attacks remain possible. Of equal concern, the Hamas and Islamic State Khorasan Province attacks demonstrate the ability of some groups to conduct external operations. A 2017 research brief by investigators for the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism highlights the volume of attempted jihadist attacks, including those thwarted by public and law enforcement efforts; according to the brief, since the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City, New York, there have been 121 jihadist-linked plots to use violence against the American homeland.¹ The numbers of attempts and successful plots have increased in recent years (2003–2016) in the United States and other countries, with a steep increase after 2014 (see Figure 1).

Antiterrorism Strategy Sets the Tone for Community Action

In February 2024, the U.S. Army Provost Marshal General approved *Maneuvering the Phalanx: Army Antiterrorism Strategic Plan, Phase V–2023*, which plots the way ahead for Army antiterrorism over the next several years.³ As with any strategy, it represents a projection based on the known past and the logical analysis of future developments. Although no plan can guarantee success, the *Army Antiterrorism Strategic Plan* prompts action aimed at achieving the vision of “preventing terrorism, protecting our people, and ensuring Army readiness.”⁴ The need to improve threat information sharing and suspicious-activity reporting is embodied in the vision and objectives of the plan. This is where strategic planning connects with local police community engagement to prevent terrorist and violent extremist activities. Numerous tasks contribute to terrorism prevention, but few are more important than individual awareness and the willingness to take action to protect one’s community.

Prevention Programs Contribute to Community Vigilance

The Army Protection Program includes many enabling functions that offer tools and techniques to help local police and communities ensure a safe and secure environment while also supporting warfighter readiness. The Army employs numerous prevention programs; the following programs are specifically linked to terrorism prevention:

- **Crime prevention**, defined as “efforts to reduce criminal opportunity, protect potential human victims, and prevent property loss by anticipating, recognizing, and appraising crime risk and initiating actions to remove or reduce it,”⁵ is one of the most enduring prevention programs within

the Army, and it contributes to terrorism prevention. By preventing crimes of all types—including acts of violence such as terrorism—Army communities maintain a secure environment.




Figure 1. Frequency of successful and foiled attacks by year (1993–2016)²

- **Operations security** is a primary task within the protection warfighting function. The primary purpose of operations security is to protect critical information that is vital to the successful achievement of unit objectives and missions while denying access to this information to our adversaries. Protecting critical information makes it more difficult for terrorists to gather intelligence during planning and target selection cycles.
- **iWATCH Army** was one of the first neighborhood watch initiatives focused on terrorism prevention. Developed in 2009 and modeled after the Los Angeles, California, Police Department iWATCH program, iWATCH Army encourages and empowers the Army community to identify and report suspicious behavior that might potentially be associated with terrorist activity. Individual situational awareness of one's surroundings is a passive element of iWATCH Army. An active element of iWATCH Army involves individuals taking action to report suspicious behavior or activities to military police or local law enforcement agencies for investigation.
- **iSALUTE** is an Army counterintelligence reporting program. According to an "Antiterrorism Awareness—iSalute" article, "Unlike iWATCH Army, iSALUTE seeks to discover, prevent, and report espionage, sabotage, subversion, and international terrorism. iSALUTE seeks Army-wide community support to report threat incidents, suspicious activity, and counterintelligence matters that are potential indicators of espionage, terrorist-associated insider threat, and extremist activity."⁶
- **Insider threat** refers to "a person with placement and access who intentionally causes loss or degradation of resources or capabilities or compromises the ability of an organization to accomplish its mission through espionage, providing support to international terrorism, or the unauthorized release or disclosure of information about the plans and intentions of U.S. military forces."⁷ Examples of U.S. military insider threats include the 2009 terrorist mass shooting at Fort Hood, Texas; the 2013 Washington, D.C., Navy Yard shooting; and the 2010 leaking of classified information by Private Bradley E. Manning (now known as Private Chelsea E. Manning). In 2013, the Army established an insider threat program designed to prevent, deter, detect, and mitigate actions by insiders who represent a threat to national security. A key component of the insider threat program is training the workforce on indicators of possible insider threats and on reporting procedures.
- **Joint Analytical Real-Time Virtual Information-Sharing System (JARVISS)**, a threat common operational picture and information-sharing platform for the antiterrorism and broader protection and warfighter communities, helps to identify and assess threat and hazard incidents, allows collaboration with internal and external stakeholders, and assists leaders in making informed decisions using advanced data analytics. The JARVISS program management team is in the process of fielding a JARVISS mobile application, which will expand the use of the platform and include a tool for users to report suspicious activity, threats, and incidents and to share

information. JARVISS is currently capable of submitting eGuardian suspicious-activity reports into the eGuardian system and archiving the suspicious-activity reports information for data analytic purposes in the future.

- **eGuardian** is "a web-based platform where federal and state law enforcement entities can collaborate, coordinate, and deconflict investigative activity. eGuardian allows other federal agencies; state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement entities; the Department of Defense; and fusion centers to document, share, and track potential threats; suspicious-activity; and cyber, counterterrorism, counterintelligence, or criminal activity with the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] and with each other."⁸ The Army has been an avid participant in the eGuardian program from its inception in December 2008. Antiterrorism awareness emphasizes the importance of ensuring the involvement of the entire Army community, while eGuardian provides a means for the community to report suspicious activities. The Antiterrorism Division of the U.S. Army Office of the Provost Marshal General, Washington, D.C., produces antiterrorism awareness and suspicious-activity report informational materials to encourage the use of eGuardian. Reports of suspicious behavior or activity submitted to military police are reviewed through law enforcement and investigative channels and then routed through the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division for approval and entry into eGuardian. With capabilities that include email notification, a user dashboard, and custom searches, eGuardian allows users to be aware of when a relevant incident is available and to apply basic analytics. A geospatial mapping tool that can be used to map relevant incidents is also available. Military police organizations should contact local Criminal Investigation Division offices for eGuardian support.
- **Don't Be a Bystander** is a prevention program that is based on the notion that bystanders are often best positioned to spot indicators of radicalization and mobilization toward violence—and often prior to law enforcement agency awareness or ability to investigate.⁹ When bystanders serve as active observers and report suspicious behavior or activity, they extend the eyes and ears of security and law enforcement agencies; therefore, it is vital that military police and local law enforcement agencies take active, positive measures to engage their communities and encourage assistance with community protection. Building relationships of trust and encouraging community members to remain vigilant to local threats can lead to bystander willingness to report suspicious behavior and activities. Each of these programs has its own characteristics and functions, and each plays a role in terrorism prevention. The linchpin that ties all of the prevention programs together in support of terrorism prevention is Army policing.

Conclusion

Effective community engagement is a key task for all law enforcement agencies. As former U.S. Attorney General William P. Barr once stated, "Serving as a police officer is

the toughest job in our country. As they put themselves on the line to keep us safe, they deserve our gratitude and support.”¹⁰

Community policing is a “philosophy that promotes organizational strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.”¹¹ According to Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-39.10, *Police Operations*, the foundation of community policing consists of effective and enduring “police operations and associated activities, which are critical to the commander’s anti-terrorism program.”¹² Army policing techniques are detailed in ATP 3-39.10, which includes extensive information on the role of military police in antiterrorism and community policing (including plans to prevent, defend against, and respond to terrorist activities). ATP 3-39.10 also mentions the community-based iWATCH Army program, and Chapter 7, “Police Engagement,” describes the planning, coordinating, and conducting of community engagements.

According to Anthony A. Braga’s article entitled “Crime and Policing Revisited,” “Developing close relationships with community members helps the police gather information about crime and disorder problems, understand the nature of these problems, and solve specific crimes.”¹³ Community-oriented policing can be a cornerstone for building community partnerships and—by helping to operationalize prevention programs—can support terrorism prevention. Community members who trust the police are more likely than those who do not to report suspicious behavior or activity that may be associated with terrorism or violent extremism. A whole-of-community approach to the prevention of all threats and hazards supports force protection and warfighter readiness.



Endnotes:

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⁶“Antiterrorism Awareness—iSALUTE,” 8th TSC Antiterrorism and Force Protection Office, 28 August 2017, <[⁷AR 381-12, *Threat Awareness and Reporting Program*, 1 June 2016.](https://www.army.mil/article/193073/antiterrorism-awareness-isalute#:~:text=Unlike%20iWATCH%2C%20which%20is%20the%20Army%27s%20program%20that,of%20espionage%2C%20terrorist-associated%20insider%20threat%2C%20and%20extremist%20activity.>, accessed on 23 May 2024.</p></div><div data-bbox=)

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¹⁰William P. Barr, *Brainy Quote.com*, <https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/william_barr_1060757>, accessed on 23 May 2024.

¹¹“Community Policing Defined,” Community-Orientated Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice, 2014 <<https://portal.cops.usdoj.gov/resourcecenter/RIC/Publications/cops-p157-pub.pdf>>, accessed on 5 June 2024.

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¹³Anthony A. Braga, “Crime and Policing Revisited,” *New Perspectives in Policing*, National Institute of Justice, <<https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/248888.pdf>>, accessed on 22 May 2024.

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Enabling Protection During a Crisis: The Role of the MSCoE NCOA

By Sergeant First Class Fidben Lepe

The U.S. Army Military Police Corps Regiment consistently adheres to its motto—*Assist, Protect, Defend*. The U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE) Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, fosters this dedication and continues to create great leaders who uphold that motto.

The MSCoE NCOA, which continuously adapts to the changing demands of the contemporary operational environment, is crucial to the Military Police Corps Regiment. Through a partnership with the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), Fort Leonard Wood, the academy has spearheaded efforts to revamp the Military Police Advanced Leader Course and the Military Police Senior Leader Course curricula. This collaboration has resulted in the revision, modernization, and implementation of 59 lesson plans, amounting to 435 hours of programmed instruction. The new curricula prioritize the preparation of leaders for the complexities of large-scale combat operations and stress the critical importance of understanding Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, which emphasizes the shift of the “Army’s readiness focus from counterinsurgency to large-scale combat operations” while incorporating “elements of the multidomain operations concept.”¹ The continuous adaptation of NCOA curricula and training approaches to meet Army demands for conducting operations better prepares military police noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to embody the core values of the *Assist, Protect, Defend* motto and ensures that leaders are versatile and skillful at handling domestic and international challenges.

Assist

The MSCoE NCOA educational strategy aims to equip leaders with the operational skills and leadership abilities necessary to effectively support and assist their units. The objective is to develop leaders who can think critically, solve problems, and apply basic military skills in any operational environment. This type of training is essential for enabling military police NCOs to effectively manage personnel and resources and for better preparing them to navigate through complex situations during a crisis. The focus of the courses is currently on large-scale combat operations in conflict zones (including major sustainment ports) in the Middle East, Europe, and the Indo-Pacific. However, various regular,

irregular, and hybrid threats can challenge U.S. forces in any geographical area.

MSCoE NCOA NCOs gain the fundamental knowledge and basis of comprehension necessary to ensure that they are competent leaders who can assist commanders in defeating enemy forces and seizing, occupying, and defending land areas, as needed for Army operations.² The support of the NCOA is vital for achieving operational success while guaranteeing the safety and effectiveness of military personnel in challenging situations.

Protect

The basis of protection, which begins with the individual Soldier, applies to all elements of the military profession, including Army civilians. The Military Police Advanced Leader Course and the Military Police Senior Leader Course curricula focus on more than just the physical safety of assets and information; they emphasize the core elements of protection. The MSCoE NCOA stresses that protection involves prioritizing the well-being of all members associated with the profession of arms. The courses of instruction include enhanced training in security protocols and risk management, which prepare NCOs for implementing vigorous protection strategies in peacetime and in times of crisis. This decreases vulnerabilities and improves the safety of military operations and civilian interactions in any setting.

The MSCoE NCOA also extends its holistic approach to protection by creating a supportive environment that values and empowers leaders who are capable of facing adversity. Coursework ensures that leaders are familiar with Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-37, *Protection*, which focuses on providing protection for the welfare of their charges; providing area security; and protecting and maintaining clear lines of communication for the efficient deployment of personnel, logistics, and resources required to sustain, enable, and control operations in any environment.³

Regardless of the echelon in which military police leaders operate, they will consistently deliver adequate protection, preserving combat power and reinforcing freedom of mobility and maneuver across any dynamic or complex environment.

(Continued on page 30)



LEADING FROM WITHIN

By First Lieutenant Jennifer R. Robinson

As Jack Welch, former chief executive officer of General Electric®, suggests “An organization’s ability to learn, and translate that learning into action rapidly, is the ultimate competitive advantage.”¹ With young lieutenant watch commanders, the Northwestern Joint Regional Correctional Facility, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, forges such a competitive advantage every day. This feat requires a strong team of senior noncommissioned officers who help mold the lieutenants into well-rounded, multifaceted military police officers.

According to Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-37, *Protection*, “Protection is the preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and non-military personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area.”² A junior military police officer with corrections experience can significantly contribute to mission planning and execution in a warfighter protection capacity.

I am a military police officer currently serving as an operations officer in the newly constructed Northwestern Joint Regional Correctional Facility, which houses incarcerated Department of Defense prisoners from all Services—Army, Air Force, Marines, Navy, Coast Guard, and Space Force. I serve in the 508th Military Police Battalion (Detention), which has two mission sets: corrections and detentions. The 508th offers junior officers exposure to Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 31Es—Internment/Resettlement Specialists and provides young officers the opportunity to work inside the prison as watch commanders. Serving in this capacity gives us a deeper understanding of corrections, making us well-rounded military police officers.

As a military police officer, I attended the Military Police Basic Officer Leaders Course, U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, as my first professional military education course. The goal of the course is to produce competent and ethical leaders

capable of addressing the unique challenges within the Military Police Corps Regiment. The most important aspect of the lessons taught center around the three military police disciplines of security and mobility support operations, police operations, and detention operations.³ A significant portion of the Military Police Basic Officer Leaders Course is concentrated on elements of maneuver, mobility support, and police operations; detention operations is overlooked in favor of a more tactical knowledge base. However, exposure to the Military Police Corps Regiment in its entirety is crucial to becoming a well-rounded military police officer. Fortunately, I find myself in an assignment that allows me the chance to gain knowledge and experience in several military police disciplines, from combat support to corrections and detentions.

Not long after my arrival at the 508th Military Police Battalion, I assumed the duties and responsibilities of a platoon leader with the 1st Platoon, Northwestern Joint Regional Correctional Facility, marking a significant milestone in my career. This leadership role puts me in direct alignment with the dynamic environment of the correctional facility and its ongoing developments. Serving as a platoon leader has helped me recognize the paramount importance of leading and caring for Soldiers, while also acquiring a comprehensive understanding of the duties and obligations of a corrections/detention specialist.

Detention operations, one of the primary tasks for the protection warfighting function, directly align with security and mobility support operations as an integral component that shapes the battlefield. The military police disciplines—specifically, corrections and detentions—are embedded into the operations and tasks that enable protection during armed conflict and large-scale combat operations. While performing at the strategic level, commanders and their staffs attempt to harmonize all key warfighting functions to produce a clear operating picture. Detention operations are explained and emphasized as playing a vital role in operational planning. Not only do detention operations apply to detainees, but the procedures outlined

for 31Es are also relevant for handling displaced civilians in an urban environment. Consequently, knowledge about corrections and detention operations becomes transformational and transactional across the Army.

Unified land operations require that the Army prepare for detainee operations; someone is going to be expected to develop a plan for providing for the custody and care of detainees during unified land operations. When that time comes, senior leaders shift focus to their military police counterparts. At that moment, the military police officer's knowledge and experience in corrections becomes valuable. The information that proficient military police provide to a maneuver commander allows the maneuver commander to effectively manage the battlefield—meaning that a well-rounded, competent military police officer can strongly influence the planning process, impacting the overall mission.

The battlefield is full of combatants, who are often located around large, dense urban areas—an environment with which the Army has become familiar over the past 20 years. Over the years, the Army has led countless operations under conditions for which the detention of individuals is likely. Therefore, Soldiers and leaders must understand the procedures to be followed upon capture of these combatants.

In conflict zones or areas of instability, the detention of enemy combatants and suspects is essential for gathering intelligence and maintaining security. A junior military police officer who is trained and has experience with corrections can aid in mission planning and execution by providing maneuver commanders with critical intelligence and actionable insights to mitigate threats. For instance, a military police officer who is experienced in corrections can perform thorough, systematic evaluations of facilities within the operational area and can recognize possible susceptibilities, such as blind spots in surveillance coverage or areas prone to breaches. Moreover, such officers are knowledgeable about numerous types of unlawful tactics and stratagems. They can offer insight into how potential adversaries might exploit security weakness or attempt to penetrate military operations. Lastly, equipped with experience in managing and mitigating risks within prisons, a young military police officer can offer support in conducting comprehensive risk assessments for mission planning.

The realms of correctional missions and detention operations are intricately intertwined, sharing common objectives. The use of Soldiers with combat MOSs in correctional roles within the Army presents challenges that accentuate the need for employing 31Es. While combat Soldiers undoubtedly possess skills and training relevant to certain military operations, they are not subject matter experts in the area of corrections and detention operations. Combat training stresses tactics, the use of force, and rapid decision making in high-stress environments. In general, Soldiers with combat MOSs do not possess the temperament or employ the approach required for corrections work and they may disproportionately apply the use of force—a cornerstone of combat training—to correctional contexts. They may

struggle to adhere to the principles of the Geneva Convention,⁴ undermining the integrity of the correctional system. Military police officers, on the other hand, are trained and equipped with interpersonal communication skills and are subject matter experts in the art of diffusing difficult situations. Therefore, seasoned military police officers enable the thoughtful decision-making aspect of detention operations.

Junior military police officers are exposed to law enforcement operations, where the focus is on deterring crime and holding society accountable. Junior military police officers exposed to corrections and detention operations are introduced to the care, custody, and control of U.S. prisoners and the humane and legal treatment of detainees. The introduction of corrections and detention procedures broadens the skill set of a military police officer. Lieutenants performing the duties and responsibilities of a watch commander bear the responsibility for the overall health, safety, and welfare of the prisoners and Soldiers in their charge. When these lieutenants are placed into brigade combat teams, such experiences prove to be transformational.

Knowledge about correct and legal means of confinement is indispensable when operating at the strategic level. Senior military leaders expect military police officers to articulate the art and doctrine of corrections to help the leaders plan and make decisions. Corrections experience provides young military police officers with the aptitude to speak articulately about detention operations and to properly practice and execute care, custody, and control on the battlefield. Performing work inside a correctional facility lays the groundwork for learning how to set up and operate a detention holding area or theater internment facility. Experience gained by interacting with prisoners translates to interactions with detainees on the battlefield.

Working alongside corrections/detention specialists has proven to be a distinctive and rewarding experience for me thus far. Exposure to the specialized world of 31Es has expanded my understanding of the Military Police Corps Regiment and deepened my appreciation for the diverse roles within our ranks. I encourage all junior military police officers to explore the world of corrections, embracing all that encompass the Military Police Corps Regiment. Brigadier General Sara K. Albrycht, former Commandant of USAMPS, has addressed how the Army is transitioning and the Military Police Corps Regiment must align its warfighting policing tasks with the changes to come.⁵ A well-rounded military police officer proves to be a greater asset to the Army and enables maneuver commanders on the battlefield.

Conclusion

I strongly encourage junior military police officers to seize the chance to enhance their effectiveness in the military police field by considering a position as a corrections platoon leader and watch commander. Serving as a platoon leader in a detention battalion (with duties as a watch commander as well as other broadening duties, such as military police duty officer) has provided me with a comprehensive view of military law enforcement and corrections. The

wealth of knowledge acquired during my tenure in this role has molded me into a well-rounded military police officer. While the learning curve has been steep, the experience has been invaluable in refining my leadership and communication skills and cultivating a profound understanding of the correctional landscape, empowering me to fulfill the capabilities expected of a warfighter.



Endnotes:

¹Greg Barnett, “Building a Learning Organization From the Ground Up,” *The Predictive Index*, 25 January 2016, <<https://www.predictiveindex.com/blog/building-a-learning-organization-from-the-ground-up/>>, accessed on 15 July 2024.

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First Lieutenant Robinson is the deputy director of operations for the Northwestern Joint Regional Correctional Facility. She holds a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice and history from Springfield College, Massachusetts.



(“Enabling Protection During a Crisis: . . .,” continued from page 27)

Defend

The MSCoE NCOA, considers “defending” to involve a profound commitment to upholding our country’s highest ethical and moral standards, as required by the oath that we took to “support and defend” the U.S. Constitution. This commitment has played a pivotal role in major conflicts, from the Spanish-American War, to the Vietnam War, to operations in Grenada and Kosovo and beyond. It was notably evident when, on 14 October 1968, following its significant contributions in Vietnam, the Military Police Corps Regiment became a combat support branch.⁴ And it is a legacy that has been carried forward by the Regiment, as it continues to demonstrate the capacity to defend individuals and settings while also maintaining the Nation’s highest ethical and moral values. NCOA instruction helps ensure that the actions taken by leaders in the field align with Army objectives and the interests of the Nation. The NCOA is committed to enhancing the readiness of all leaders in the event of a crisis in any geographic location. Army and military police commanders and NCOs prioritize addressing difficulties in defending ethical and moral standards in conflict settings in both national and international territories in any operational environment.

Conclusion

In conjunction with their partners, the MSCoE NCOA and USAMPS provide military police leaders with a solid educational foundation. The Military Police Advanced Leader Course and the Military Police Senior Leader Course equip these leaders with the tools and resources necessary to embody the *Assist, Protect, Defend* motto in every facet of their military careers. This holistic approach enhances the role of the Military Police Corps Regiment in supporting the Army mission “to deploy, fight, and win our Nation’s wars.”⁵ It not only secures operations of today but also fortifies the future of operations as it prepares leaders who will navigate, and influence the outcomes of, potential conflicts at home and around the globe.



Endnotes:

¹FM 3-0, *Operations*, 1 October 2022.


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⁵ADP 1, *The Army*, 31 July 2019.

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A New Chapter: The Transformation of the 508th Military Police Battalion

By Sergeant First Class Christopher W. Thorp

As the landscapes of military operations evolve, so too must the units and structures that support them. The 508th Military Police Battalion (Detention), Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, is at the forefront of this transformation, navigating a shift from its current designation of a modified table of organization and equipment unit to its newly established role as a table of distribution and allowances unit known as the Northwestern Joint Regional Correctional Facility Battalion. This transition, which will occur in 2025, marks a pivotal moment in battalion history. It signifies a change in designation and a redefinition of the role of the 508th within the U.S. Army.

Founded on a legacy of service and dedication, the 508th Military Police Battalion enjoys a rich history, dating back to its inception on 29 July 1921. The unit played crucial roles in various military operations and deployments over the last 8 decades. From providing security and law enforcement support in Germany to conducting detainee operations throughout the Global War on Terrorism, the battalion has consistently demonstrated its commitment to excellence and professionalism.

One of the significant changes associated with the upcoming transition is the inactivation of the 595th and 67th Military Police Companies. These units, which have served alongside the 508th Military Police Battalion throughout the past 2 decades, have immensely contributed to the success of Army missions. Whether stationed at home base or deployed overseas, the contributions of these units to force protection, detainee operations, and law enforcement have been invaluable. Although the units are preparing to inactivate, their legacy of service will undoubtedly endure, leaving an indelible mark on the history of the Military Police Corps Regiment.

595th Military Police Company

Constituted in August 1943, the 595th Military Police Company has a proud history of providing security and law enforcement support in diverse environments. From patrolling the streets of hostile countries to safeguarding critical infrastructure, the unit has consistently upheld the highest standards of discipline and integrity. The 595th established its reputation during conflicts in World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Global War on Terrorism. Its inactivation signifies the end of an era characterized by unwavering dedication and commitment to duty.

67th Military Police Company

Constituted in February 1944, the 67th Military Police Company, renowned for its rapid-response capabilities and

tactical proficiency, has played a pivotal role in enhancing the operational readiness of the 508th Military Police Battalion. Focusing on conducting detainee operations, the company has earned accolades for its exemplary performance in challenging environments. The 67th served in Algeria, Austria, France, and the Middle East during the Global War on Terrorism. Its inactivation symbolizes the culmination of a legacy defined by valor and resilience in the face of adversity.

Northwestern Joint Regional Correctional Facility Battalion

The transformation of the 508th Military Police Battalion to the Northwestern Joint Regional Correctional Facility Battalion represents a strategic realignment to enhance operational effectiveness and efficiency within the Military Police Corps Regiment. With a renewed focus on Army correctional facility management and rehabilitation, the battalion will meet the evolving challenges of the modern battlefield.

As this transition occurs, the Soldiers of the 508th Military Police Battalion/Northwestern Joint Regional Correctional Facility Battalion will continue to remain focused on the battalion CARE motto of “Committed, Agile, Ready, Experts.” With these qualities, the Soldiers carry forward the proud traditions established by their predecessors, ensuring the safety and security of our Nation and its citizens. The battalion will continue to uphold the highest standards of professionalism and integrity while fulfilling its mission to provide care, custody, and control of the inmates confined within the Northwestern Joint Regional Correctional Facility.

As the Soldiers of the 508th prepare to embrace their new role, they honor the legacy of those who have served before them while looking forward to the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead. With dedication, professionalism, and a commitment to excellence, the Soldiers of the 508th Military Police Battalion will make a lasting impact within the U.S. Army Corrections Command and beyond. 

Sergeant First Class Thorp is the first sergeant of of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 508th Military Police Battalion, 42d Military Police Brigade, Joint Base Lewis-McChord. He holds a bachelor's degree in information systems from Park University, Parkville, Missouri, and is working toward a master's degree in information technology from the Florida Institute of Technology, Melbourne.

The Future of the MWD Program: LSCO Integration and Holistic Health and Wellness

By First Lieutenant Catherine A. Nelson

The growing threat from China in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command region has prompted a shift to large-scale combat operations (LSCO)-oriented training as a driving factor across the force. For the military working dog (MWD) program, the shift from counterinsurgency operations to LSCO has also meant a shift in mentality toward our canine companions. In the LSCO environment, MWDs are now considered warfighters. The 520th Military Police Detachment “Sheepdogs,” Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, have adopted new ways to care for, train, and employ MWDs across the Pacific Theater. The Sheepdogs are changing the way that MWDs are integrated into LSCO and taking a new approach to holistic health and wellness for MWDs.

As with any other Soldier, the health and wellness of MWDs is paramount to their success in future conflicts. The Sheepdogs embraced this mentality by including their MWDs in their foot marches, installing a treadmill for MWD use, and working closely with the veterinary team to build tailored fitness programs for each MWD. The fitness programs cover everything from stamina to work/rest cycles, diet, and the behavioral health of the dogs. Within the realm of MWD behavioral health, the Sheepdogs have implemented various methods of controlling MWD behavior in and out of the runs and keeping aggression under wraps. Key aids used in the runs include puzzle bowls and calming toys. Puzzle bowls force hyperactive/aggressive dogs to slow their eating and deliberately think about how to get their food—which, in turn, forces them to redirect unproductively spent energy to a more meaningful task. And “aggression balls”—which are essentially large, rubber bouncy balls—allow dogs the opportunity for productive play. The use of puzzle bowls and calming toys in the runs helps keep the MWDs from becoming overstimulated and overstressed before they are assigned a task.

Focusing on holistic health and wellness produces MWDs that are ready for law enforcement missions and integration into LSCO throughout the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command area of operations. One of the first LSCO exercises to include MWDs was the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division,

Schofield Barracks, Bronco Rumble, in which MWD teams from the 520th Military Police Detachment were integrated with combat support military police platoons. The teams conducted route sweeps and assisted with security patrols and other tasks. This exercise set the conditions for 520th MWD teams to support the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center, Schofield Barracks, where the teams served in similar capacities with infantry units from the 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, providing support to their maneuver elements. During the time between these two exercises, leaders became rappel master-, fast rope insertion/extraction systems-, and special patrol insertion/extraction system master-certified. These certifications and work with the Lightning Academy, Schofield Barracks, and the 25th Combat Aviation Brigade, Wheeler Army Airfield Hawaii, enabled MWD handlers to train on tactical insertion and movement methods with their dogs. Since the culmination of this training, MWD handlers from across the detachment have served as subject matter experts to partner nations, bolstering their MWD programs, conventional forces, and nonconventional forces.

From the home of the 520th Military Police Detachment at Schofield Barracks, the Sheepdogs continue to lead the way in MWD health and wellness, bringing the benefits of lessons learned into the modern battlespace to ensure that our battalion, brigade, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Army are ready for any missions that come our way. 

First Lieutenant Nelson is currently on rotation in South Korea in support of a mission from the 8th Theater Sustainment Command, Fort Shafter, Hawaii. She holds bachelor's degrees in sociology and criminal justice from Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana.

ENHANCED COMBAT SUPPORT DURING THE VIETNAM WAR (26 SEPTEMBER 1966–25 JULY 1970)

By Mr. Ronney Z. Miller

During the Vietnam War, the primary functions and duties of the U.S. Army Military Police Corps significantly expanded. For the first time in branch history, a brigade level command was deployed to an active combat theater of operations. The 18th Military Police Brigade, which was activated on 14 June 1966 at Fort Meade, Maryland, became operational in Vietnam on 26 September 1966; that same day, it assumed command and control over all nondivision U.S. military police units in the Republic of Vietnam.

The 18th Military Police Brigade was comprised of three major subordinate commands—the 16th Military Police Group, the 89th Military Police Group, and the 8th Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation)—and more than 5,000 personnel. A combined seven military police battalions were assigned to the three military police groups; the battalions of the 16th and 89th Military Police Groups contained a mixture of military police and infantry companies. For the remainder of the war, the 18th Military Police Brigade and its subordinate units provided direct tactical and logistical support to commanders throughout the Republic of Vietnam.

In November 1966, during the introduction to Operation Deckhouse V, military police units conducted convoy escort and traffic control for elements of the II Field Forces. In January 1967, the 18th Military Police Brigade directly supported the 173d Airborne Brigade during Operation Cedar Falls; and afterward, at the request of the 173d Airborne Brigade, a platoon from the 66th Military Police Company, 93d Military Police Battalion, was assigned to Landing Zone Uplift—with one caveat: All members of the military police platoon would be required to cross-train as artillery observers. In February 1967, the 18th Military Police Brigade supported the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions during Operation Junction City and the 1st Cavalry Division during the latter phase of Operation Thayer II. In April 1967, military police units supported Task Force Oregon with the newly arrived Americal Division. In June 1967, the 18th Military Police Brigade supported the 1st Infantry Division during Operation Billings; in July 1967, it participated in Operation Paddington with the 9th Infantry Division and the 1st Australian Task Force; and from 21 July to 14 September 1967, it participated in Operation Emporia with the 9th Infantry Division and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. All of these combat support missions were conducted within the first 10 months of the arrival of the 18th Military Police Brigade in Vietnam.¹

On 20 October 1967, the 18th Military Police Brigade was assigned supervisory oversight of a 22-square-mile tactical area of responsibility (TAOR), marking the first time that a military police unit had been assigned a TAOR in a combat zone. The mission of the 18th Military Police Brigade involved locating and destroying Viet Cong and North Vietnamese army forces, enhancing the security of the Long Binh Post and Bien Hoa Air Base, and aiding South Vietnamese forces in upgrading the outposts occupied by regional forces/popular forces in the TAOR. Company B, 720th Military Police Battalion (Bushwhackers)—which was comprised of a headquarters platoon; three ambush platoons; a small, rigid-hulled patrol boat, river (PBR) unit; and a 12-man, 81-millimeter mortar section—was designated to conduct the main effort. Along with the standard issue of M-16 rifles and .45-caliber pistols, Company B was equipped with extra M-60 machine guns, M-79 grenade launchers, and M-72 light antitank weapons. The “Bushwhackers” of Company B represented the first U.S. Army military police unit to engage in a sustained infantry counterinsurgency mission; the unique service was conducted under the codename “Operation Stabilize.”

During Operation Stabilize, Company B conducted infantry type missions, including combat patrols, search-and-destroy operations, and the defense of local villages. Military police successfully utilized military working dogs on a large scale throughout the Vietnam War, and the Bushwhackers were often reinforced with teams from the 212th Military Police Company (Sentry Dog). The entire western and southern borders of the TAOR assigned to the 18th Military Police Brigade were impounded by a freshwater tidal basin—and rivers served as the principal network that the Viet Cong used to transport men and materials. Consequently, in early 1968, the U.S. Army converted the 458th Transportation Company (Light, Amphibious Resupply, Cargo) into a PBR company. Headquartered at Pershing Field, near Ton Son Nhut Air Base, Saigon, the 458th Transportation Company (PBR) was placed under the operational command and control of the 18th Military Police Brigade. The crews of the 458th consisted of two U.S. Army mariners (coxswain and engineman) and two military policemen who served as gunners. An assigned local national, who served as an interpreter, was also onboard.

All U.S. Army Transportation Corps PBR mariners were volunteers, and they participated in specialized training with the U.S. Navy on Mare Island, California. In contrast,

the Bushwhackers relied exclusively on on-the-job training in individual combat skills, patrolling techniques, combat intelligence, scouting, and tracking, as experience proved to be the best teacher for those skills.²

The primary 458th Transportation Company (PBR) mission consisted of policing the Dong Nai, Bien Go, and Buong Rivers and their many backwater tributaries. The company was specifically tasked with performing river security for military and civilian traffic, guarding the various supply barges that transported ammunition and fuel, and checking civilian vessels for contraband and infiltrators. And like their road-bound counterparts in military police gun jeeps, the PBRs responded to any other contingencies that arose on the (brown-water) “highways” within the assigned TAOR.

Sergeant Richard Walker of Company A, 720th Military Police Battalion, was responsible for forming and supervising the first PBR unit attached to the 720th; it was comprised of volunteers from all three organic companies assigned to the 720th. That PBR unit provided firepower and logistical support to battalion tactical operations and day/night transport and logistical support for the ambush platoons of Company B. It also had a small fleet of Boston Whaler “Skimmers.” Driven by a 25-horsepower outboard motor, these boats could “skim” along the top of the water at high speeds and operate in areas of restricted mobility. For 9 months, Companies A and C, 720th Military Police Battalion, had participated in combat patrols as part of Operation Stabilize; however, on 26 June 1968, those two companies were detailed to other commitments. (The previous year, Company C had become the first unit to field the V-100 Cadillac Gage Commando—a vehicle that had been specifically engineered as an armed convoy escort vehicle for the U.S. military police during the Vietnam War—and convoy escort was one of the most hazardous missions conducted by military police units during the Vietnam War.) In concert with the Tet Offensive of 1968, Operation Stabilize had an enduring impact on the history of the Military Police Branch.

On 14 October 1968, the Military Police Corps was designated as an arm and a service (permanent branch) and was officially redesignated from a combat service support branch to a combat support branch—an initiative that was justified by the battlefield performance of military police units in Vietnam. The redesignation reflected reality and provided long-overdue formal recognition of the types of missions military police have consistently performed since the Revolutionary War. For example, during the Tet Offensive of 1968, military police units fought significant battles in several major cities in South Vietnam. And during the Battle of Saigon, the 716th Military Police Battalion and its attached units emerged as the first line of defense in the most intense battle that military police units have ever fought. Employing small-unit infantry tactics, military police units fought block-to-block, street-to-street, house-to-house, and floor-to-floor—effectively disrupting the enemy’s battle rhythm and providing the margin necessary for infantry and armor units to arrive on the scene.³

During Operation Stabilize, the Bushwhackers frequently engaged the enemy in direct combat. On one such occasion (23 February 1969), North Vietnamese regular forces and Viet Cong insurgents initiated a coordinated series of 125 sapper attacks and 400 artillery and/or rocket bombardments against military targets across South Vietnam. Labeled as “Tet 1969,” the attacks of this campaign were concentrated against military installations instead of urban areas. Long Binh Post, Vietnam’s largest U.S. logistical base, was an obvious target. In anticipation of an impending attack, an 11-man patrol (Ambush and Reconnaissance Team 76) was deployed outside the southern perimeter of Long Binh. Upon occupying Hill 15, Staff Sergeant Donald J. Meador (Company B, 720th Military Police Battalion) observed flashes from mortars and rockets launched against the post. He immediately called for and adjusted accurate indirect fire on enemy positions, eliminating the threat. Soon thereafter, his small patrol intercepted a large, hostile force. Meador fearlessly exposed himself to small-arms and automatic-weapons fire while he adjusted artillery and mortar fire and called for close air support. He was ably assisted by Corporal Thomas Watson. When their position was on the verge of being overrun, the patrol was ordered to withdraw. As his comrades retreated, Watson remained behind to cover them with machine gun fire and hand grenades, while Meador continued to direct air strikes and artillery fire. At least 50 enemy fighters were killed, and their attack faltered. The ambush and reconnaissance team was credited with breaking the thrust of the attack on the southern perimeter of Long Binh Post. As a result of their efforts at Long Binh Post, Staff Sergeant Meador was subsequently awarded the Silver Star Medal (for gallantry in action) and Corporal Watson was awarded the Bronze Star Medal (for battlefield valor).

Meanwhile, in another sector of the perimeter, a second patrol was pinned down on Hill 23 and the point man was wounded. Specialist Fourth Class Fred H. Pazmino maneuvered against an enemy machine gun position and, although wounded, destroyed it with rifle fire and grenades. He then volunteered to rescue the stricken point man and, along with another Soldier, successfully completed the mission. Shortly thereafter, the enemy broke contact. For his heroic actions, Specialist Fourth Class Pazmino was awarded the Silver Star Medal.⁴

On 25 July 1970, the 720th Military Police Battalion relinquished ownership of its TAOR to the 25th Infantry Division. From 20 October 1967 to 25 July 1970, the Bushwhackers earned 24 Purple Heart Medals (13 of which were awarded posthumously); two military policemen were awarded the Silver Star Medal, and several others were awarded Bronze Star Medals. Despite the constant peril and close combat they experienced during Operation Stabilize, because the Bushwhackers did not hold Military Occupational Specialty 11B—Infantry, they were ineligible for the Combat Infantryman Badge. For decades, these military police “infantrymen” received scant recognition for their significant contributions during their service

in Vietnam. However, that oversight was abruptly rectified on 24 July 2023. On that day, during a ceremony held at Capitol Hill, Washington, D.C., veterans of Company B, 720th Military Police Battalion, were retroactively awarded Bronze Star Medals. These medals were also awarded to the military working dog handlers of the 212th Military Police Company. The event officially acknowledged the combat role performed by the Bushwhackers and their attached military working dog handlers and clearly honored who they were and what they did—and defined how they should be remembered.⁵



Endnotes:

¹Thomas F. Guidera, “A Report on the 18th Brigade’s First Six Months in Vietnam,” *Military Police Journal*, July 1967.


²*History of the 720th Military Police Battalion*, 720th Military Police Battalion, U.S. Department of the Army, 7 April 1970.

³Brent L. Richens and Russell B. Shor, “18th Military Police Brigade: Three Years in Vietnam,” *Military Police Journal*, September 1969.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Svetlana Shkolnikova, “Out of the Shadows: Military Police From Vietnam Receive Long-Awaited Awards,” *Stars and Stripes*, 25 July 2023.

Mr. Miller is the historian for the U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.



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89TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE



Lineage and Honors

- Constituted 19 February 1966 in the Regular Army as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 89th Military Police Group.
- Activated 15 March 1966 in Vietnam.
- Inactivated 21 December 1971 at Fort Lewis, Washington.
- Activated 13 September 1972 at Fort Lewis, Washington.
- Reorganized and redesignated 16 July 1981 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 89th Military Police Brigade.

Campaign Participation Credit

Vietnam

- Counteroffensive.
- Counteroffensive, Phase II.
- Counteroffensive, Phase III.
- Tet Counteroffensive.
- Counteroffensive, Phase IV.
- Counteroffensive, Phase V.
- Counteroffensive, Phase VI.
- Tet 1969/Counteroffensive.
- Summer–Fall 1969
- Winter–Spring 1970.
- Sanctuary Counteroffensive.
- Counteroffensive, Phase VII.
- Consolidation I.
- Consolidation II.


Southwest Asia

- Defense of Saudi Arabia.
- Liberation and Defense of Kuwait.
- Cease-Fire.

Decorations

- Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1967–1968.
- Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered IRAQ 2004.
- Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered IRAQ 2006–2007.
- Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered IRAQ 2009–2010.
- Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1966–1971.

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and for the troops*



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