MILITARY POLICE

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF THE MILITARY POLICE CORPS

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***The brigade level and above and battalion level command list is now available separately at the following web address:**

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Cover photographs by Carmen S. Daugherty

Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School

Brigadier General Brian R. Bisacre

Building the Military Police Regiment of 2028 and Beyond

Military police play a vital role in the readiness of the force and in enabling the freedom of action and maneuver. The U.S. Army is transitioning its focus on stability and counterinsurgency operations to a focus on large-scale combat operations (LSCO) against peer and near-peer threats, which have advanced in technology and capability. Our likely peer and near-peer threats have gained parity in relation to us in certain aspects of capability, as we have spent the better part of 2 decades conducting limited contingency operations around the world. The future strategic environment calls for a comprehensive range of activities to ensure that the future military police force is properly led, trained, resourced, manned, equipped, and organized so that its members serve as expert professionals in both the military and policing aspects of our force in multi-domain operations (MDO)—an umbrella operating concept that also includes LSCO. The Military Police Corps Regiment must be able to adapt its capabilities to serve as a key enabler for the joint force commander and to aid in freedom of maneuver, decisive action, promotion of the rule of law, and the ability to protect and preserve our force and our Families at home and abroad.

The Military Police Corps Regiment must look toward the future for new ideas and different ways of thinking in order to employ our capabilities in support of MDO. Our current organization and capabilities have been maintained at basically the same levels as in the 1990s, with increments of improvement over time. Generally though, we are doing the same things in the same way. We must create a culture shift in our way of thinking to break old mindsets of limited contingency operations and counterinsurgency, embrace innovative thinking and adaptive execution, and leverage evolving technology and concepts to meet the demands of LSCO against peer and irregular threats. The mission of the Military Police Corps Regiment is now—and will be in the future—to enable movement and maneuver through the continuum of MDO, specifically in the execution of LSCO in a complex and challenging environment.

The Military Police Corps Regiment of 2028 will be organized to provide multidiscipline capability at echelon to support the diverse execution of decisive action from the close area through strategic support areas at an accelerated tempo. We will continue to execute professional police operations to provide good order and discipline to the command and to support the rule of law. Force modernization concepts will account for technology advances in the areas of mission command systems; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems; and fused intelligence through police intelligence operations, forensics, and biometrically enabled intelligence. The military police fighting platform of the future will help increase the lethality, protection, and survivability of the military police team executing the mission on the ground. The Military Police Corps Regiment of 2028 must be organized, trained, and equipped to protect and preserve the combat power that is essential for overmatching an adversary at home and abroad; establish and maintain secure environments to enable freedom of action; and detect, deter, and defeat Level I, Level II, and bypassed/reconstituted Level III threats—all to successfully conduct LSCO, which enable maneuver commanders to shape, prevent, and prevail during MDO.[1]

Today, our Military Police Corps Regiment is a critical and powerful enabler that provides the U.S. Army with professional Soldiers who excel in conducting policing, investigations, and corrections; enabling protection; preserving the force; and promoting the rule of law. It is critical that we modernize and evolve over the next decade so that we remain the "force of choice" for the U.S. Army. Failure to do so could result in future adversaries constraining our Nation and our ability to deter, detect, and defeat them. We must provide the U.S. Army with a military police force that unequivocally enhances and supports our ability to defend our great Nation and win in war.

Endnote:

[1]Levels I, II, and III threats are described in Army Doctrine Publication 3-37, *Protection*, 31 July 2019, pp.1–12.

Of the Troops, For the Troops—Assist, Protect, Defend—Preserve the Force!

Regimental Command Sergeant Major

Command Sergeant Major Michael P. Bennett



It has been a fast-paced year since assuming duties here at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. During that time, the officer cohort worked through a new talent management process, which will soon be transitioned to the enlisted population. In preparation for the talent management transition team, personnel at the Home of the Regiment have spent extra time updating Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (Pam) 600-25, *U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide*, to help inform noncommissioned officers (NCOs) about fiscal year 2020 select-train-educate-promote boards.[1, 2]

Within the next few years, NCOs will be allowed more input on the location of their next assignment. The Armor Branch is currently conducting a test of the enlisted version of Assignment Interactive Module 2, which is a program now used by officers and warrant officers who are eligible for assignments. As this program is incorporated into enlisted formations, it will be critical that all Soldiers understand which positions result in the most potential for advancement within each of the four disciplines within the Regiment.

The first major change to DA Pam 600-25 that NCOs will notice is that senior NCOs must perform in two leadership assignments—first sergeant (E-8) and program manager—to be competitive for promotion to sergeant major (E-9). Soldiers must fulfill these critical leadership assignments for at least 18 months—and, optimally, for 24 months or more. For fiscal year 2020, a Soldier can perform the first sergeant and program manager assignments from any career management field position. A follow-on change to DA Pam 600-25 will occur in fiscal year 2021: Only Career Management Field 31 Soldiers who fill first sergeant and program management positions are eligible for promotion to E-9. The reason for this change is that 13 percent or more of military police Soldiers have been identified as working outside the career management field in positions coded for other career management fields. We are in need of more first sergeants in military police formations, and this change to DA Pam 600-25 will ensure that master sergeants return to our Regiment.

Key leader developmental assignments are those assignments that create the greatest potential for selection for promotion in accordance with DA Pam 600-25. The Soldier's ability to select assignments that are considered critical leadership roles is a major change to DA Pam 600-25 and has the greatest impact on the individual Soldier. There is not a long list of key leader developmental assignments for military police Soldiers. We have identified key leader developmental assignments that are important to the future of the specific career field within each of the military occupational specialties (MOSs). For example, program manager assignments for MOS 31K—Military Working Dog Handler and MOS 31D—Detachment Sergeant positions for the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID) are two key developmental assignments that will need to be worked into an NCO's career in order to afford that NCO the greatest potential for advancement. Failure to perform these specific program leadership assignments for the specified length of time (at least18 months) may cause the NCOs to be noncompetitive for promotion to the next higher rank.

The last item that I would like to discuss is the role of the sergeant first class in the U.S. Army Recruiting Command. While Soldiers are detailed as recruiters, they play a critical role in ensuring that our Army is manned; the U.S. Army Military Police Corps Regiment does not have authorizations for sergeant first class recruiter positions within the command. Those NCOs who are promoted to sergeant first class within the Recruiting Command must seek immediate leadership positions within the Military Police Corps Regiment if they want to stay competitive with their peers.

Being a part of the Military Police Corps Regiment has been one of the greatest aspects of my life. I am extremely proud of all military police Soldiers who are "leading from the front" at the access control points of their own camps, posts, or stations, making a difference in their communities every day. We have had military police Soldier representation at every major competition over the past year, and I predict that this level of competition will be no different in the coming year. Keep up the great work!

Assist, Protect, Defend!

Endnotes:

[1]DA Pam 600-25, *U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide*, 11 December 2018.

[2]The select-train-educate-promote process can be found in "NCO Professional Development System," *United States Army Human Resources Command* Web site, 13 February 2020, <https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/Noncommissioned%20Officer%20Professional%20Development%20System>, accessed on 18 February 2020.

Regimental Chief Warrant Officer

Chief Warrant Officer Five Mark W. Arnold

Greetings from the Home of the Regiment. This is my first message to the field as the Regimental Chief Warrant Officer of the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. As such, I believe that it would be beneficial to provide some background about myself (other than what is detailed in my official biography),[1] so that you might better understand my perspective on future topics.

I was born and raised in a small farming community in Illinois. The population of the town was about 2,000, and my 1985 high school graduating class consisted of approximately 20 students. During summer breaks, we detasseled corn, baled hay, and "walked" (weeded) soybean fields to earn money. Most of that money was used to buy clothes and school supplies for the following year. It was through these jobs that I learned the importance of hard work and the value of money.

In June 1984, during my junior year in high school, I enlisted in the Illinois National Guard and was assigned to the 233d Military Police Company, Springfield, Illinois. In 1985, I attended basic combat training and advanced individual training courses at USAMPS, Fort McClellan, Alabama. After completion, I was required to perform monthly drill training with the U.S. Army Reserve, which mainly involved performing vehicle maintenance and cleaning weapons. During the summer of 1986, I had the opportunity to participate in annual training at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, which began with a 360-mile convoy (in which I drove a ¼-ton, soft-top jeep) that included setting up a company level bivouac site and executing 24-hour operations, and culminated with another 360-mile convoy back to Springfield, Illinois. Keep in mind, I was a private first class (E-3) and was not attuned to all that was happening. I focused on executing the individual tasks that I had learned in basic combat training and advanced individual training; so basically, I did as I was told. I really enjoyed my time in the Illinois National Guard and even progressed to the rank of specialist (E-4), but I needed a change.

In 1987, I decided to enlist in the Regular Army. My first active-duty assignment was in Korea, but not by choice. Initially, I was not really enthused or eager to go to Korea. I was a country boy and had rarely traveled outside the state of Illinois—and never outside the borders of the United States. But, as it turned out, that assignment was a great professional experience for me and set the path to where I am today. I was assigned to the 557th Military Police Company, Camp Humphreys, as a high-mobility, multipurpose, wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) driver. HMMWVs were relatively new at that time, and the company had just recently received them; the odometer of my assigned vehicle indicated that it had traveled about 300 miles. Over the next 2 years, I was given more responsibility and began performing traditional military police duties as a gate guard, patrolman, and desk/blotter clerk. The first week of each month, I worked the day shift; the second week, I worked the swing shift; the third week, I worked the midnight shift; and the last week was reserved for training. During the training week, I performed individual and collective tasks and executed short-notice missions and company tasks (radio relay missions, railhead operations). I recall that, on several different occasions, I received last-minute notice to draw my weapon from the armory, travel by train (in the railcar or caboose) from Pyongteak to Pusan to provide security of sensitive equipment, load a vehicle, head to a remote location, set up a radio antenna, and monitor the communications network. I've spent my fair share of nights setting up, camping out, and performing missions on a Korean mountainside. Annually, one of our sister military police companies assumed our law enforcement commitment/duties so that our company could conduct a 2-week field training exercise under the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP). ARTEP exercises were long and challenging, but they fostered amazing teamwork and comraderie. I can't say that I looked forward to them, but it was always a great feeling when they ended.

One day, during morning formation, the first sergeant asked for a volunteer to work on computers for the local U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID) office. Sensing a need for personal change, I raised my hand. In fact, I was the only one to raise a hand; so, I was selected to go to work for CID as a member of the Joint Criminal Intelligence Center. For the next 2 ½ years, my job was to automate and maintain the Criminal Intelligence System, which consisted of entering information from case files and data cards into a computer database. Once completed, more in-depth criminal analysis could be done to develop and report crime trends and assist commanders in preventing crime. During this time, I also assisted CID as a member of both the Drug and Blackmarket Teams. The work that I did with CID piqued my interest in criminal investigations, but I was not yet ready—or eligible—to apply to become a CID special agent.

In 1991, I received permanent change of station orders to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Garrison, Fort McCoy. This was a unique assignment, as we conducted only law enforcement operations for the garrison command. It was a great experience that exposed me to other aspects of law enforcement. During my assignment, I served as a special weapons and tactics (SWAT) team member, patrol supervisor, desk sergeant, and protective services coordinator. I trained with the Wisconsin State Police and attended Protective Service Training at Fort McClellan and the Antiterrorism Evasive Driving Course at Bill Scott's Raceway, Winchester, West Virginia. It was at this point in my career that I craved more knowledge and experience in the criminal investigations career field, so, I applied to be a CID special agent and was accepted into the program.

I attended the Apprentice Special Agent Course at Fort McClellan in 1994; and for my first duty station, I was assigned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, as a CID special agent. For 3 years, I learned all aspects of conducting criminal investigations at an extreme—and sometimes overwhelming—pace. As a CID special agent at Fort Bragg, I routinely worked 14- to 16-hour days, performed weekend duty calls, and served as the dreaded 24-hour duty agent. It is difficult to explain all of the intricacies of the job of a CID special agent. The day is spent working assigned cases, which include conducting interviews, comparing statements, coordinating with the laboratory, and briefing commanders and lawyers. The average caseload varies from place to place; a caseload of five is manageable, but CID special agents are often asked to cover cases for other agents so that those agents can attend training or take leave. Every CID special agent dreams of solving a big case—getting a confession or finding the preverbal "smoking gun" that breaks it all wide open. Special agents tend to associate their duty assignments with the cases that they worked at those locations. For example, I distinctly remember my Fort Bragg assignment by the work that I did there on a sniper case in which a Soldier had opened fire on a physical training formation, a case of a $250,000.00 travelers checks theft, and a complex fraud case involving a cleanup contract in the aftermath of Hurricane Fran. After I was promoted to the rank of staff sergeant and I recognized my desire to focus on criminal investigation, I decided to pursue becoming a CID warrant officer.

In February 1997, I moved back to Korea, where I—as a warrant officer—was assigned as a team chief in the CID office at Camp Humphreys. The responsibilities of a CID warrant officer include teaching, coaching, and mentoring CID special agents; leading investigative teams; supervising criminal investigations; and managing investigative subprograms. I spent 4 years in Korea, building teams, solving cases, and refining my leadership and investigative skills before I got the opportunity to run my own office.

In 2001, I was assigned as the special agent in charge of the CID office, Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois. That office was responsible for a five-state area that included Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and the Upper Peninsula of Michigan. The assignment was probably as similar to a civilian job as possible. Most of the work involved traveling to interview individuals at the request of other CID offices. What I most remember about this assignment was meeting and working with local, state, and federal agencies throughout the five-state area.

In 2004, I returned to Korea, where I served as the special agent in charge of the CID office, Camp Humphreys. A year later, I deployed as the special agent in charge of the CID office, Tallil, Iraq. Next, I returned to Korea, where I assumed command of the 21st Military Police Detachment (CID), Camp Humphreys. I spent the next 3 years employing my leadership and investigative skills; these were truly some of the best years of my career. I had the opportunity to teach, coach, and mentor many CID special agents.

In 2009, I was selected to serve as the Chief, Military Police Investigation Division (MPID), USAMPS, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, where I was responsible for six training courses—the CID Special Agent Course, the Military Police Investigations Course, the Advance Crime Scenes Course, the Crime and Criminal Intelligence Analyst Course, the Warrant Officer Basic Course, and the Warrant Officer Advance Course. This proved to be the most challenging assignment because I was required to learn and navigate the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command processes. I worked with some of the best people at the "Home of the Regiment." I learned a lot, and decided that Fort Leonard Wood was a place that I would like to revisit.

From Missouri, I was selected to serve as the battalion investigative operations officer for the 22d Military Police Battalion (CID), Joint Base Lewis–McChord, Washington, where I was responsible for providing investigative oversight among six subordinate CID units, which were located at Joint Base Lewis–McChord; Fort Carson, Colorado; Fort Riley, Kansas; Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Fort Irwin, California; and Monterey, California. The most challenging part of this assignment was probably deploying within 30 days of my arrival. In December 2011, the unit deployed to Afghanistan to provide investigative oversight to CID offices located at Bagram Airbase; Kandahar Airbase; and Forward Operating Bases Salerno, Sharana, Shank, and Fenty. Some of the high-profile cases worked during that deployment included "Green on Blue" cases, a Quran-burning incident, and a Soldier killing of 16 Afghan civilians.

One year after redeployment, I was reassigned to the CID Headquarters in Quantico, Virginia. During this assignment, I came to understand the broader, strategic implications of CID investigations on the entire U.S. Army and on Department of Defense entities.

In 2016, I was selected as the group investigative operations officer for the 3d Military Police Group (CID), Hunter Army Airfield, Savannah, Georgia, where I was responsible for providing investigative oversight of five CID battalions located at Fort Bragg; Fort Campbell, Kentucky; Fort Benning, Georgia; Joint Base Meyer–Henderson Hall, Virginia; and Kaiserslautern, Germany.

Last, but certainly not least, in 2019, I was proudly selected to serve as the sixth Military Police Regimental Chief Warrant Officer.

In summary, I have served a total of 35 years in the military, with 33 years on active duty. I have experience in military police combat support, garrison law enforcement, special services, and the full spectrum of criminal investigations. I held the enlisted ranks of private through staff sergeant before serving as a warrant officer, and I have served at the operational, tactical, and strategic levels. I trust that providing this in-depth information about my career will help you understand my perspective. For those of you who aspire to this or other leadership positions, my door is always open to discuss your career paths and how you can best contribute to our Military Police Corps Regiment and the U.S. Army.

Endnote:

[1]U.S. Army Military Police School Web site, <https://home.army.mil/wood/index.php/units-tenants/USAMPS/MP-leadership/regimental-chief-warrant-officer>, accessed on 5 February 2020.

Assist, Protect, Defend—Preserve the Force—Do What Has To Be Done!

Chief Warrant Officer Five Arnold (right) pictured with two other military police Soldiers in 1987

Professionalism and Community Engagement: A Call to Action

By Colonel Karst K. Brandsma and Captain Victoria A. Moscoso

On 20 October 2019, a civilian who had no apparent military affiliation approached the federal exclusive jurisdiction boundary at Joint Base Lewis–McChord, Washington, and used his cell phone to record a video of the area outside of the installation as well as the entry control procedures that were in use in an attempt to engage military police and Department of the Army civilian police who were working the access control points and patrol areas. The individual waited for police to approach him and then began arguing with them about the need for him to provide identification and the legality of him recording activities at the installation.

This incident is an example of a growing trend of so-called "First Amendment audits" that have been occurring at military posts, camps, and stations and at civilian law enforcement agencies across America.[1] In fact, a similar incident had occurred at Joint Base Lewis–McChord just a few months earlier. And a quick search of the Internet shows that these types of "audits" have been occurring at a multitude of military and civilian agencies across the country for years. The intent of these incidents is to assess the ways in which law enforcement officials handle private individuals exercising their First Amendment rights.

There are a plethora of legal opinions and suggestions about the tactics, techniques, and procedures that should be used to handle these situations, but the underlying challenge is that law enforcement professionals must discern why these incidents occur and determine how they affect the relationships between law enforcement personnel and the communities that they protect. The treatment of American citizens by law enforcement officers and the intensified pressure on military and civilian police professionals to perform their duties in a manner that is above reproach are clearly under substantial scrutiny. Citizens are increasingly demanding higher levels of accountability from police, including military police. As a Regiment, we must stay abreast of these issues to ensure that we maintain professionalism and relevance.

The U.S. Department of Justice defines *community policing* as "a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies that support systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime."[2] Community policing differs from "traditional" methods of policing in that community policing focuses on building a rapport with the communities, organizations, and individuals that the police serve. A critical feature of community policing is the ability of police to work with communities, learn about the people of the communities and their routines, and understand the dynamics of situations as they occur. After a foundation of trust is developed between law enforcement personnel and the populace, citizens are more likely to come to the police with information or in times of need.

Conversely, more militarized policing styles have proven to have significantly different effects on the communities they serve.[3] Scholars use militarization in policing to refer to the process in which civilian policing organizations increasingly draw from and model their operations and equipment to be comparable to the military.[4] This has become increasingly common in recent years, as evidenced by frequent news stories about events such as those that occurred in Ferguson, Missouri; Charlotte, North Carolina; and Southampton, New York—all of which were criticized for civilian police force use of military style tactics. One study found that during the past 40 years, the use of military style tactics has increased by over 1,400 percent.[5] In a study conducted by Jonathan Mummolo, it was discovered that the increased use of special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams and militarized styles of policing fueled public distrust and decreased the levels of support from local communities.[6] Mummolo's study also found that more aggressive policing tactics disproportionately affected marginalized groups.[7] Considering the societal climate across the country today, this bears significant concern. As militarized policing tactics increase, so too does public distrust of law enforcement personnel. This erosion of trust degrades the ability of the police to perform their duties of protecting and serving our communities.

The use of community-focused policing techniques instills trust between military police and on-post communities, builds positive relationships, and improves the legitimacy of the policing organization. As military police, we have a duty to assist, protect, and defend; to accomplish this mission, we must have the trust of the community that we serve. If we

fail to meet the needs of the community, we lose credibility and legitimacy. The newest U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-39, *Military Police Operations*, does not provide prescriptive details about implementing community policing; however, it does describe six essential policing principles:[8]

- Prevention.
- Public Support.
- Restraint.
- Legitimacy.
- Transparency.
- Assessments.

Of these six principles, four (public support, restraint, legitimacy, and transparency) are directly related to community policing methodologies.

The current regimental motto is, "Protect the force today, to preserve the force tomorrow." Without sufficient training and the correct messaging, we cannot succeed in this mission. Far too often, our Soldiers arrive at their first duty station straight from basic training and advanced individual training and are thrust into conducting law enforcement operations immediately following completion of their post-specific certification courses. Civilian law enforcement officers, on the other hand, often receive intense academy training, followed by a 1-year probationary period, during which they receive instruction on how to navigate each type of case. Training and evaluation programs such as the "Reno Model" provide in-depth mentorship and evaluation to ensure that new officers are ready for the variety of scenarios that they may encounter throughout the course of their duties.[9] Due to many factors outside of the commander's control (aggressive demands for military police combat support capabilities during supported unit training cycles, the need to remain tactically proficient for the increasing demand of military police forces worldwide), military police Soldiers only get a fraction of this training. With limited training time, it is crucial to not only conduct routine certification training to standard, but also to continually reassess those tasks deemed as high-payoff against legacy tasks required at each installation. This reassessment process will ensure that we meet current challenges while bringing forward best practices gained from experience.

The military has historically mirrored society, and military police have adapted to changes in societal patterns by borrowing best practices from civilian law enforcement. As the public increases the pressure for greater transparency and accountability of civilian police, military police can expect proportionate pressure from military populations. Although First Amendment audits are regrettable and, frankly, can be slightly embarrassing for those involved, they will continue to occur. As a Regiment, we must not shy away from taking a hard look at how we engage with the public and demonstrate our professionalism. Commanders, provost marshals, and department of emergency services officials need to think critically and creatively about how military police training inculcates professional standards for all military police Soldiers and Department of the Army civilian police across a myriad of potential situations. The training must include doctrinally focused community policing principles and tactics training for military police and Department of the Army civilian police leaders. It must also include training on creatively solving unforeseen problems for which the more junior military police and Department of the Army civilian police do not yet possess the experience to navigate. By using scenario-driven and outcome-based training and certification, authorities can assess military police Soldiers and Department of the Army civilian police to best prepare them to successfully engage with our communities and teach them how to be community police professionals across a host of possible scenarios. Our public expects it—and our high standards demand it.

Endnotes:

[1]Tami Tanoue, *"First Amendment Audits" Coming to Your Town?*, Colorado Intergovernmental Risk-Sharing Agency, <https://www.cirsa.org/news/first-amendment-audits-coming-to-your-town/>, accessed on 12 February 2020.

[2]"Community Policing Defined," U.S Department of Justice, first published 2012 (revised 2014), <https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-p157-pub.pdf>, accessed on 12 February 2020.

[3]Arva Hassonjee, "Militarization of Police Fails to Enhance Safety, May Harm Police Reputation," Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 21 August 2018, <https://www.princeton.edu/news/2018/08/21/militarization-police-fails-enhance-safety-may-harm-police-reputation>, accessed on 12 February 2020.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Ibid.

[8]FM 3-39, *Military Police Operations*, 9 April 2019.

[9]The Reno Model is described in, *Reno Police Department's Police Training Officer Program: Basic Manual*, <https://www.renopd.com/formAdmin/content/pdfs_lib/PTO_2_0_Manual.pdf>, accessed on 12 February 2020.

Colonel Brandsma is the former commander of the 720th Military Police Battalion and installation provost marshal, Fort Hood, Texas. He is a U.S. Army Advanced Strategic Planning and Policy Fellow and a doctoral candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts.

Captain Moscoso is the commander of the 54th Military Police Company, 504th Military Police Battalion, Joint Base Lewis–McChord, Washington. She holds bachelor's degrees in psychology and criminology from the University of Miami, Florida, and a master's degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University.

Military Police
Test the Best of the Best

By Master Sergeant Andy N. Yoshimura

As summer was ending at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, the competition was heating up for 39 law enforcement Soldiers who were vying for the title of "the best" in this year's Military Police Competitive Challenge (MPCC), hosted by the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS).

On 26 September 2019, the MPCC kicked off the Military Police Corps Regimental Week celebration, marking the 78th birthday of the Military Police Corps. Regiment Competitors participated in 23 events, including three road marches, from Saturday through Monday. Their days started at 0230 and ended in the afternoons, with temperatures reaching the mid-80s (°F).

A Soldier from the 54th Military Police Company, races across a rope bridge on the Physical Endurance Course during MPCC.

Soldiers from across the country, as well as some stationed in South Korea, Germany, and Cuba, traveled to Fort Leonard Wood to take part in the competition. The Regiment also invited two British military policemen to compete in this year's event.

"The MPCC has been on and off for the last few years," Regimental Command Sergeant Major Michael Bennett said. "As soon as I got on board [with USAMPS] this year, it was one of the first tasks that the team started on. We wanted to ensure that we had the chance for units to showcase their best Soldiers and NCOs [noncommissioned officers] at the Home of the Regiment," he added.

The first day of the competition started with the Alpha Warrior Tower, an obstacle-course-like challenge similar to those of the popular television show *American Ninja Warrior*.[1]

"I need to work on my grip strength," said Sergeant Vincent Bohl, representing the 54th Military Police Company, Joint Base Lewis–McChord, Washington. Sergeant Bohl, along with most of the competitors, struggled on the apparatus, which was designed to challenge Soldiers' upper-body strength.

The morning continued with a simulated active-shooter scenario with an officer down. After carrying two 30-pound sandbags and pulling a 135-pound sled around the course, the competitors used the new SIG Sauer© M-17 pistol to react to the simulated active shooter. Most of the competitors were not accustomed to using the new M-17, a weapon that the U.S. Army began fielding just last year. According to Specialist Trevor Gibbs, who was representing Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 525th Military Police Battalion, Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, "We did a law enforcement weapons training and qualifications [course]. I had heard of it; I had seen it, but I had never actually gotten to go out there and do it. And using the new M-17 was pretty neat."

The new law enforcement weapons training and qualification requirements are different from the previous

A Soldier from the 728th Military Police Company, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, navigates an obstacle during MPCC.

Beretta© M-9 pistol qualification requirements, where time is limited—especially when drawing from a holster in 1.5 seconds and firing two shots.

After knocking down the targets, the competitors applied a tourniquet to a simulated casualty and then pulled the casualty on a stretcher to the finish line. Next, they threw on their rucksacks, cinched down their straps, and marched to the location of the final event of the day—the Emergency Vehicle Operations Course, where they were evaluated on driving accuracy in a patrol car.

The two British soldiers who competed in the Emergency Vehicle Operations Course were not accustomed to the American way of driving because they were visiting the United States for the first time. However, British army Corporal Jordan Main (with the 110th Provost Company, 1st Regiment Royal Military Police) along with U.S. Army Staff Sergeant Ryan Brownfield (615th Military Police Company, Vilseck, Germany) were presented the commandant's coin for their superior characteristics as Soldiers. "We have an NCO and Soldier representing the [United Kingdom] this year; and from what I can tell, they have done extremely well so far," Regimental Command Sergeant Major Bennett said, "For next year, we are going to extend the invitation to additional countries that we have already partnered with and give an invitation to the other branches of the U.S. armed forces."

On the second day of the competition, following an 8-mile road march, participants competed in the Land Navigation Course, tackled the Physical Endurance Course, and then completed two written tests and a shoot/don't shoot exercise.

The long day of strenuous activity, in which the competitors were on their feet for 14 hours and covered a distance of more than 12 miles, resulted in sore feet and legs; however, motivation kept the group going.

For Sergeant Maria Flores Garcia, who represented Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 15th Military Police Brigade, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, setting an example for her Soldiers was the motivation. "I wanted to keep the spirit of the Corps alive," Sergeant Flores Garcia said, "I wanted to show Soldiers that it is important for us to continue with our traditions."

The final day of the competition included the Army Combat Fitness Test and a round-robin event that tested basic Soldier and military police skills in the areas of combatives, weapons assembly, first aid, fingerprinting, and the donning of a chemical suit and protective mask.

After the final event, the competitors marched to the awards ceremony, where Sergeant Robelto Rose and Specialist Antonio Argueta, both with the 289th Military Police Company, Fort Myer, Virginia, were announced as the winners of the 2019 MPCC NCO and junior enlisted Soldier competitions, respectively.

Endnote:

[1]*American Ninja Warrior*, A. Smith and Company Productions, National Broadcast Company.

Master Sergeant Yoshimura works in the Public Affairs Office, 200th Military Police Command, Fort Meade, Maryland. He is a graduate of the Public Affairs Qualification Course and the Basic Broadcasters Course, and he holds a bachelor of science degree in business administration from Post University, Connecticut.

MWD Trainer/KM Course: Adapting Programs of Instruction to Enhance the Lethality of Combat Effectiveness of the 31K MOS

By First Lieutenant Mark B. Strong

The Military Working Dog (MWD) Trainer/Kennel Master (KM) Course is an indispensable development opportunity within the MWD handler profession. Unfortunately, this extraordinary training opportunity is underutilized, seemingly due to the misconception that it is only for KMs. In reality, this course is designed for any Soldier of Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 31K—Army Military Working Dog Handler who has demonstrated the potential to successfully handle increased responsibility and is prepared to take the next step in becoming the best MWD handler he/she can be. If you are a 31K squad leader or plans and training noncommissioned officer or you are assigned to a KM position and are not on a temporary profile, then you are eligible for consideration to attend the MWD Trainer/KM Course.

The 15-day MWD Trainer/KM Course is a joint Service course held at Joint Base San Antonio. The intent of the course is to enhance students' operational understanding of their field of expertise. The course provides a unique opportunity for tailored instruction on duties associated with MWD trainers and KMs and prepares today's 31K junior leaders to enhance kennel performance through advanced instruction on the most up-to-date dog-training methods. This vital MWD Trainer/KM Course features in-depth training that covers—

- Operational responsibilities.
- Transportation requirements.
- Available resources.
- Employment factors.
- Perimeter security.
- Drug interdiction.
- Explosives handling.
- Evaluation procedures.
- Principles of conditioning.
- Proficiency.

Additionally, eligible graduates of the MWD Trainer/KM Course have a prime opportunity for career advancement, professional development, and superb understanding of the many facets and capabilities of MOS 31K.

The program of instruction (POI) for the MWD Trainer/KM Course has recently undergone significant changes. These changes aim to enhance the effectiveness of the teaching methods and student retention of course material, which will considerably augment kennel training programs across the force. Updates to the course have resulted in a total of 140 hours of classroom instruction (a decrease of 16 hours from the previous version) and 15 days of training (a decrease from 17 days under the previous version). Staff Sergeant Nedal K. Alsayyed, Army MWD Trainer/KM Course instructor, summarized these changes by stating, "The course begins with dissolving common myths and misconceptions that negatively plague the 31K MOS. The primary purpose of the initial phase of the [MWD Trainer/KM] Course is to dispel rumors and provide lessons learned on best practices, tactics, techniques, and procedures to facilitate success within a kennel. This initiative is focused on getting more people in the course and the right people in the course."

Due to the length of time between when MWD handlers graduate from the MWD Handlers Course and when they attend the MWD Trainer/KM Course, the revised POI also includes refresher training on principles of conditioning. Following the principles of conditioning training, the course covers the Deferred Final Response Method; according to Staff Sergeant Alsayyed, "Previously, this method was the way prior military working dogs were taught detection. Since the revision of the POI, dog-training techniques have evolved to develop a more autonomous dog, capable of operating with significantly reduced instruction or guidance from a trainer."

The most notable modification to the POI is the significant increase of hands-on application with dogs. Based on previous end-of-course critiques, MWD Trainer/KM Course

A MWD Trainer/KM Course instructor providing training guidance during MWD certification

instructors assessed the kennels and determined that failure was not due to a lack of administrative knowledge but, rather, to the absence of proper dog-training abilities. Therefore, as a result of student feedback, more time training with the dogs was added to the POI, while time spent covering the administrative details of kennel management was decreased. Kennel management (including the associated administrative details and information about how to facilitate the higher handler-to-dog ratio) is now covered in prereqisite online training. To be eligible for consideration, Soldiers desiring to attend the MWD Trainer/KM Course must complete the prerequisite online MWD Trainer/KM Course prior to arrival.[1]

The MWD Trainer/KM Course provides students with hands-on MWD training, pairing each student with a dog and introducing them to situations similar to those that may be experienced in the field. The tactics, techniques, and procedures used in the MWD Trainer/KM Course are continuously adapted in order to produce increasingly capable 31K leaders who will meet the demands of the modern battlefield within a diverse geopolitical landscape. The POI for the course is currently in the process of being rewritten again, although the date of circulation has yet to be determined. Because MOS 31K is one of the newest MOSs in the Army, it is uniquely possible to adapt policies, doctrine, and regulations to rapidly changing schools of thought. The MWD Trainer/KM Course is leading the way in training dogs and their military police handlers and developing fully-mission-capable MWD teams.

Endnote:

[1]"Military Working Dog Trainer/Kennel Master Course," *U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) Courses*, <https://home.army.mil/wood/index.php/units-tenants/USAMPS/MPOrganizations/directorate-training-education/usamps-courses/military-working-dog-trainerkennel-master-course>, accessed on 12 February 2020.

First Lieutenant Strong is the former executive officer of Company D, 701st Military Police Battalion, Joint Base San Antonio, Texas. He is attending the Captain's Career Course at the U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from the University of Indianapolis, Indiana.

COMPLACENY KILLS:

Understanding the Evolving Terrorist Attack Cycle

Compiled by the U. S. Army Antiterrorism Division, Office of the Provost Marshal General

Although it may appear to be business as usual when it comes to antiterrorism operations, it is important to remember that complacency kills! We cannot allow ourselves to be lulled into a false sense of security because nothing "big" has recently occurred. Rest assured, our enemies are biding their time—waiting for us to lower our guard and expose exploitable vulnerabilities. We must constantly evaluate our defensive posture and vary our routines to prevent terrorists from gaining the upper hand.

The Terrorist Attack Cycle

Although there is no universal model for a terrorist attack, Figure 1, page 14, depicts a generalized version of the terrorist attack cycle, which terrorists might modify based on specific objectives, resources, and time available. The terrorist attack cycle can also be viewed as a continuous sequence in which terrorists plan, prepare, apply experience and skill, and take action to achieve objectives. Each phase of the cycle builds upon the next, culminating in the attack. Even with periodic setbacks, the resolve of terrorists to maintain a compelling agenda is often progressive, adaptive, and enduring, achieving long-term organizational objectives. By understanding the terrorist attack cycle, we can better prepare ourselves to deal with the threat of terrorism, which includes everything from determining terrorists' objectives to exploiting the results of an attack. The terrorist attack cycle consists of eight phases:

- **Phase I: Determine objectives.** There are three levels of distinct terrorist objectives—ideological or ultimate aim (long range), strategic (middle range), and tactical or military (short range). These levels, which are interrelated and not necessarily discrete, are comparable to the levels of objectives sought by governments in wars, campaigns, and battles. The scope and magnitude of the planned attack and the resources required to mount the attack can normally be directly correlated to the level of the objective.
- **Phase II: Identify potential targets.** Phase II encompasses the collection of information to identify numerous potential targets. Information is gathered from diverse sources, the vast majority of which are open-source. Collectors may be core members of the terrorist cell, sympathizers, or people who provide information without knowledge of the intended purpose. Some examples of information that might be collected include—
  - Stories from newspapers and other media, which can provide background details.
  - Internet data such as text, pictures, blueprints, and videos.

  Potential targets are screened based on the intended objective and assessed for specific purposes, such as symbolic value, critical infrastructure, the expected number of mass casualties, and the potential to generate high-profile media attention. The number of preliminary targets that can be screened is limited only by the capabilities of the group to collect information. Targets that are considered vulnerable and that would further terrorist goals are selected for the next phase of intelligence collection.
- **Phase III: Initial intelligence gathering and reconnaissance.** Targets that show vulnerabilities may receive additional attention and priority of effort. During Phase III, which is usually fairly short, operatives gather additional information on a target's security posture and vulnerabilities. Phase III initial intelligence gathering and reconnaissance should not be confused with target surveillance (Phase V). The main difference between intelligence gathering/reconnaissance and surveillance is that reconnaissance, which requires relatively minimal resources, is used to refine the number of potential targets, while surveillance requires vast resources and is not conducted until after specific targets have been identified.
- **Phase IV: Specific-target selection.** The selection of a specific target for actual operational planning requires consideration of the following factors:
  - Does success impact a larger audience than that of the immediate victim(s)?
  - Will the target attract high-profile media attention?
  - Does success convey the desired statement to the correct target audience(s)?
  - Is the expected effect consistent with the objectives of the group?
  - Does the target provide an advantage to the group through demonstration of its capabilities?
  - What are the costs versus benefits of conducting the operation?

  The decision to proceed with a specific target is made after it has been determined from initial intelligence gathering and reconnaissance that the target is viable. Continued intelligence collection and assessment is required for such targets. In addition, intelligence may still be collected against targets that do not receive immediate consideration in case future opportunities are presented.
- **Phase V: Target surveillance.** During this phase, members of terrorist operational cells begin to become more visible because they are actively conducting surveillance;



Figure 1. Terrorist attack cycle

therefore, they are more likely to be spotted by target security forces. Trained intelligence and surveillance personnel or support members of the terrorist cell may be organized to conduct target surveillance and test security measures. During this phase, which usually lasts days to weeks, information is gathered on current patterns of the targets. The attack team confirms the information gathered from previous reconnaissance activities. The areas of concern are essentially the same as those of Phase III, but with greater focus placed on known or perceived vulnerabilities. The type of surveillance employed depends on the activities of the target. The information gained is then used to—

- Conduct security studies.
- Conduct detailed preparatory operations.
- Recruit specialized operatives (if needed).
- Procure a base of operations in the target area (such as safe houses or caches).
- Design and test escape routes.
- Determine the type of weapon or attack.

In 2004, there were multiple accounts of terrorist surveillance incidents that, for years, were conducted on the International Monetary Fund, the Prudential Building, the New York Stock Exchange, and the banking facilities for multiple casinos in Las Vegas, Nevada. The elements of information typically gathered include—

- **Practices/procedures/routines.** For facilities, this category includes scheduled deliveries, work shift changes, identification procedures, and other observable routines. For individuals, it can include patterns of life, such as regularly scheduled errands and activities like taking smoking breaks, warming up a vehicle before departure, and routinely parking a vehicle in the same location.
- **Residences and workplaces.** This category applies primarily to the physical layout and individual activities that occur at the two places where the target typically spends the most time.
- **Transportation/routes of travel.** For individuals, this category pertains to the mode of transportation and common routes to any regular destination. For facilities, it addresses ingress and egress points, types of vehicles allowed on the grounds, and the availability of transportation into the target site.
- **Security measures.** This category includes information gathered about the security measures surrounding the holding areas during vehicle searches and personnel security clearance checks. The information collected depends on the complexity of the security measures around the target; the presence of a guard force; the reaction time of response units; the hardening of structures, barriers, or sensors; personnel-, package-, and vehicle-screening procedures; and the type and frequency of emergency reaction drills. The intent of terrorists is to bypass and avoid security measures and detection to strike the intended target; therefore, this is one of the most important areas of information for attack site selection.

- **Phase VI: Operational planning and rehearsals.** Terrorists conduct rehearsals to confirm planning assumptions, improve the odds of success, test security force reactions to particular attack profiles, and develop contingencies. Terrorists use their own operatives as well as unsuspecting people to test target reactions.

  Typical rehearsals include—

  - Equipment and weapons training.
  - Staging for final preparatory checks.
  - Deployment into the target area (including occupation of safe houses/locations).
  - Actions on the objective.
  - Escape routes.

  Tests are conducted in the target area to confirm—

  - The target information gathered to date.
  - Patterns of activities of targets.
  - The physical layout of the target or operations area.
  - Security force reactions, such as the state of alert, timing response, equipment, and routes.
- **Phase VII: Execution.** When terrorists reach the execution phase of the operation, the odds for a successful attack increase. Terrorists conducting planned operations

have all of the advantages of surprise and initiative, including the—

- Choice of time, place, and conditions of the attack.
- Employment of diversions and secondary or follow-up attacks.
- Employment of security and support positions to neutralize target reaction forces and security measures.

Because of the extensive preparation conducted through reconnaissance and surveillance, enemy security measures are anticipated and neutralized.

- **Phase VIII: Escape and exploitation.** Escape plans are usually well-rehearsed and well-executed, with one exception—suicide operations, in which the impact of the attack is enhanced by a willingness to die. Even with suicide attacks, support personnel and handlers (such as personnel filming the attack for media exploitation) require a means of escape or evasion from attack response forces.

  Exploitation is the primary objective of the operation. To achieve the intended effect, the operation must be properly publicized. Media control measures and prepared statements are examples of preparations that effectively exploit a situation. These are timed to take advantage of media cycles for select target audiences.

In addition to the negative impact on the adversary, successful attacks bring favorable attention, notoriety, and support (funding and recruiting) to the terrorist organization. Unsuccessful operations are disavowed when possible. The perception that a group has failed may severely damage the organization's prestige, indicate cell vulnerability, or suggest a lack of capability.

Methodology

Terrorist activities may appear to be random acts, but they are typically purposeful, directed activities carried out by sophisticated groups that generally follow a deliberate planning and execution cycle. Terrorist organizations are often compartmentalized to ensure operational security, making it extremely difficult for authorities to successfully interdict and eradicate the entire group. Different cells are given responsibility for different aspects of the operation, while a very limited number of individuals from one cell have knowledge of operatives from another cell. Figure 1 illustrates which cells are responsible for specific phases of the attack cycle and where overlaps occur.

Sequence and Timing

The sequence and timing of terrorist activities depend on organizational capabilities and limitations, operational constraints, and the commitment level of an actor or organization. Understanding the underlying motivation is fundamental to appreciating the terrorists' resolve to plan and act. Terrorists create conditions to optimize their awareness, training, and mission readiness to achieve desired objectives.

Targeting

Terrorists determine the objectives of the attack, gather information on potential targets, determine the likelihood of success, determine the tactics to be used, commit resources, establish execution timelines, and train and rehearse for the operation. At any point in the cycle, attack planning can be halted or accelerated based on gathered information, friendly-force actions, or changes in group intentions. U.S. forces can influence and/or disrupt the cycle during any of the phases.

Risk Versus Reward

Terrorist operations are typically designed to minimize risk and achieve the highest probability of success by avoiding enemy strengths and concentrating on enemy weaknesses. Emphasis is often placed on maximizing irregular force security and terrorism effects. Security measures for a pending terrorism mission and the actors involved in it usually include planning and operating with small numbers of irregular-force members to ensure operational security.

Intelligence and Analysis

The collection of information against potential targets is generally detailed and may occur over a lengthy period of time—possibly even years—before action is taken. However, operations that are planned or are underway may be altered, delayed, or canceled due to changes in the target or in local conditions. For example, some targets may be vulnerable and suitable for attack within shorter periods of observation; when such opportunities arise, planning can be deliberately shortened. The psychological impact on a targeted population is the overarching objective of any terrorist operation.

Operational Planning

Terrorists use their expertise and experience to effectively apply traditional principles for planning and operations and often exchange tactics, techniques, procedures, and expertise in particular skill sets (intelligence, recruitment, media affairs, training on various forms of direct action). Tactical methods and analyses of successful missions are often shared via the Internet and Web sites hosted by irregular forces. Adaptability, innovation, improvisation, and risk assessment are key components of plans and actions toward mission success.

Conclusion

Although it is impossible to know exactly what terrorists are thinking, an understanding of the attack cycle is important in effectively interdicting those who would intend to do harm. It provides the knowledge necessary to analyze suspicious activities that may indicate preparations for an attack. A predictive-analysis approach helps determine what terrorists are up to while they are still in the planning and preparation stages of an attack. It allows us to detect—and therefore potentially prevent—a possible attack.

This article is a collaborative effort of personnel in the Antiterrorism Division, U. S. Army Office of the Provost Marshal General, Washington, D.C. , with Mr. Eric K. Black as the lead author.

Military Police and the Maneuver Support, Sustainment, and Protection Integration EXperiment

By Mr. Dennis G. Hutchinson and Mr. Curtis R. Ratliff Jr.

From 23 April through 9 May 2019, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, hosted Maneuver Support, Sustainment, and Protection Integration EXperiment (MSSPIX) 19, which was a collaborative effort between the Maneuver Support Battle Laboratory, Fort Leonard Wood, and the Sustainment Battle Laboratory, Fort Lee, Virginia. For 2 weeks, a team of Soldiers, Army civilians, and contractors subjected technologies from Army laboratories and private-sector organizations to a series of trials in an operationally relevant environment and collected data to assess operational utility. While MSSPIX 19 included 18 approved technologies addressing maneuver support, sustainment, and protection, this article concentrates on technologies that could benefit Soldiers from any field.

Activities for MSSPIX 19 started with a call for technologies in November 2017. This call went out through Army distribution channels and on what was then known as the *Federal Business Opportunities* Web site.[1] The call identified capabilities desired for inclusion in the experiment and prescribed the proposal process.

After the closing date for proposals passed, the focus shifted to technology selection. In order to be selected, a technology needed a sponsor from the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence or the Sustainment Center of Excellence. To be a sponsor, an organizational representative was required to show an interest in the technology, identify what was to be learned, and specify how the learning would be applied.

The planning phase was next. During this phase—

- Vignettes to execute the technologies were developed.
- Required security clearances were obtained.
- Experiment and analysis plans were created.
- Soldier support was requested (with requests submitted through the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans [G-3]).

Following the planning, the experiment was executed in April 2019.

Three Soldiers from the 89th Military Police Brigade, Fort Hood, Texas, served as members of a team supporting MSSPIX 19. These military police Soldiers assessed the protection technologies and staffed the experiment through the tactical operations center (TOC). Seven of the 18 approved technologies were related to base defense and were primarily used in either the unit TOC or the base defense operations center. During MSSPIX 19, the military police Soldiers received training on seven of the assigned systems, independently operated the systems, and tracked the locations and status of the other Soldiers taking part in the experiment. For example, one of the technologies assessed was the physiological status monitor (PSM), which monitors a Soldier's location, heart rate, and body temperature. A squad of engineer Soldiers from the 5th Engineer Battalion, 36th Engineer Brigade, Fort Leonard Wood, wore the PSM devices on their wrists, much like a watch. The information gathered was digitally transmitted to a display (known as the PSM leaderboard) in the TOC, where the military police leaders monitored the physiological status of the Soldiers. The PSMs and the PSM leaderboard were provided by the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Soldier Center, Natick, Massachusetts, with the intent of gathering input for modernization efforts at the Soldier Support Institute, Fort Jackson, South Carolina.

Two perimeter intrusion detection systems—both supplied by Senstar®, Inc—were also assessed during MSSPIX 19. The FlexZone® is a security system that enhances the existing fence security by turning the barrier into a "smart fence." It can be attached to various types of fencing and barriers (including Hesco bastions) or concrete walls. The system detects attempts to cut, climb, or otherwise break through the barrier and then sends the data concerning the exact location of the activated alarm to the TOC, where it is displayed on a graphic overlay. UltraWave is a security system that creates an invisible detection zone which alerts TOC personnel in the same manner as the FlexZone system. The two capabilities differ in that FlexZone is mounted to an existing barrier, while UltraWave is

Soldiers attaching the FlexZone to a facility perimeter

A generator mechanic from the 89th Military Police brigade working with the Mobile Electric Hybrid Power Source

a standalone system. During the assessment of these capabilities, a team of Soldiers portraying an opposing force attempted multiple breaches of the areas protected by the two systems, with no success.

TOC personnel assisted in the assessment of two alternate power systems—the FeatherLight-14 and the Mobile Electric Hybrid Power Source. The FeatherLight-14, provided by Ascent Solar Technologies©, Inc., is a compact, portable, durable, user-friendly solar-power solution. The system is meant to be used for charging multiple types of batteries, including batteries for cell phones or Nett Warrior (hand-held radio communication device) systems, at the squad and platoon levels. During MSPIX 19, the FeatherLight-14 was used to charge cameras, hand-held radios, and some personal electronic devices. The Mobile Electric Hybrid Power Source is a trailer-mounted generator system with a solar array and battery storage onboard. This system powered the entire area used for the MSSPIX 19 event, which included the TOC, two classrooms, and the MSSPIX 19 operations cell.

The military police Soldiers were also employed to assess two decision support software programs—the Protection Planning Visualization and Assessment Tool and the Threat Mapped Protection Assessment and Simulation Tool. These technologies are designed to be used primarily at brigade-and-above staff levels to enable leaders to make informed decisions about threat planning and threat mitigation. The Protection Planning Visualization and Assessment Tool and the Threat Mapped Protection Assessment and Simulation Tool assist users in creating base camp or operational area protection/security plans through the use of multiple tools that allow development of an overlay depicting the locations of facilities such as guard towers, entry control points, and TOCs. To assess these capabilities, military police Soldiers were assigned responsibility for locations on Fort Leonard Wood and tasked to create their own protection schemes.

If you are a military member or a DOD civilian employee and would like a copy of the MSSPIX 19 report, please submit a request to <usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.msspix@mail.mil>. Planning for MSSPIX 20 is currently underway. Due to a directed change, the execution window for MSSPIX 20 has shifted from April 2020 to September 2020.

The MSSPIX 20 plan currently calls for a maneuver support and protection capabilities assessment at Fort Leonard Wood, with sustainment capabilities concurrently assessed at Fort Lee. There are currently 20 technologies scheduled for assessment in MSSPIX 20. The proposed technology call for MSSPIX 21 is in the final stages of approval, and proposals should be accepted from March through May. Interested technology providers will be able to access the technology call at the System for Award Management Web site located at <https://beta.SAM.gov>; search criteria should include the phrase "MSSPIX 21."

Screenshot of information displayed on the Protection Planning, Visualization and Assessment tool.

Endnote:

[1]The *Federal Business Opportunities* Web site, which was available in November 2017, is now known as "Contract Opportunities" and is available at <https://beta.sam.gov/>, accessed on 26 February 2020.

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

The 591st Military Police Company: Support to the Southwest Border

By Captain Matthew R. Bigelow

In October 2018, U.S. officials determined that a new threat was approaching the southern border of the country. A caravan that had originated in the Northern Triangle of Central America had already stormed the Guatemala-Mexico border on its journey to the United States. As a result, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) requested assistance from the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) for support at ports of entry (POEs) and at locations with infrastructure along the border. This marked the start of a border mission for the 591st Military Police Company. Given the threat of a security breach on the southern border, the availability of training resources, and the opportunity to increase training proficiencies in key military police tasks, the 591st and other supporting DOD units augmented DHS personnel in an effort to secure the southern border. The mission not only improved border security, but also resulted in increased capabilities and stronger partnerships with DHS and DOD.

The 591st Military Police Company began training to support the homeland defense mission, which, according to Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities,* refers to "the protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President."[1] Training efforts focused on civil disturbance and critical-site security collective tasks, with external evaluations. In October 2018, the company conducted an expeditionary deployment operation, which is a collective training event. The 591st Military Police Company and other assigned units performed a Level III deployment readiness exercise, which required the units to receive a deployment alert, marshal, and deploy to support homeland defense operations as a part of Vigilant Shield, Fort Knox, Kentucky.[2] However, conditions changed as soon as the 591st landed at Godman Army Airfield, Fort Knox.

Upon landing at Fort Knox, the 591st Military Police Company, consisting of 110 personnel assigned to support the homeland defense mission, received a notification to prepare to deploy to Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas, the staging area for future operations to support and enable DHS personnel along the border at Donna, Texas. The homeland defense exercise had suddenly morphed into a real-world mission. Prior to actual deployment, the 591st received additional training on nonlethal capabilities and refresher training on civil-disturbance drills, formations, and emergency commands—especially at the platoon and company echelons.

Shortly after the unit's arrival in Texas, the 591st Military Police Company played an integral role in helping to form Camp Donna, a base camp located adjacent to the Donna POE along the U.S.-Mexico border. The company then contributed to the homeland defense mission by providing additional force protection to Army engineer units while they made improvements to the border wall by adding concertina wire and building/hardening barriers. The company also worked jointly with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel and the closed-circuit television workforce at the Donna POE and assisted with security details during visits from the U.S. Secretary of Defense and U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security. The experiences at Camp Donna allowed the company to practice expeditionary deployment operations and increase training proficiencies in critical-site security and force protection operations.

After a few weeks of supporting the southwestern border mission at Camp Donna, the main effort of the mission shifted from Texas to California due to the direction of caravan travel through Mexico. Consequently, the 591st Military Police Company repositioned to Imperial Beach, California, where it was reunited with its organic battalion—the 93d Military Police Battalion; several other enablers consisting of U.S. Marine Corps support units were also added. The company conducted pack-out, load-out, and deployment operations for the third time during the short span of its deployment operations.

Upon arrival at Imperial Beach, the 591st Military Police Company continued focusing on civil-disturbance training and additional force protection for the engineer units who were hardening the border wall. The company continued its training missions while also building positive relationships with CBP personnel at the Otay Mesa POE, located near San Diego, California. The 591st conducted training and performed drills with the CBP Mobile Field Force 3–4 days/nights per week, which resulted in improvements in tactics, proficiencies, and relationships. With each training event, the level of confidence increased; cohesion and overall camaraderie between the 591st and the CBP grew

Soldiers from the 591st Military Police Company prepare for an exercise in support of their mission at the southwest border of the United States.

especially high during riot control training. Consistent instruction and increases in the number of training scenarios involving DHS and the 591st greatly enhanced CBP tactics and procedures for riot control and closure of POEs. CBP and military police learned from one another during each civil-disturbance and site security drill.

The 591st Military Police Company participated in several exercises with CBP personnel at the Otay Mesa POE and the San Ysidro POE (also located near San Diego)—the two POEs that served as sites for training on port closures and demonstrations of a show of force to citizens on both sides of the border. At the Otay Mesa POE, civil-disturbance training scenarios progressed from situations involving squad or platoon size tactics and drills to those involving multiple military police companies. Marine engineers were included in the scenarios; they moved concertina wire and other obstacles, replicating the conditions of a real-world POE closure.

The scenarios also included simulated CBP/military injuries and medical personnel, who practiced casualty evacuation procedures. CBP personnel included nonlethal capabilities (such as the deployment of smoke or gas) into their training and drills in order to increase confidence and proficiencies in preparation for POE closures.

Some of the most important aspects of the mission were preparing synchronized communication plans, implementing proper messaging, and informing the general public of the increased chaos associated with emergency services and training procedures while the operation progressed. CBP was the lead agency managing the support units and organizations during civil-disturbance training and port closure exercises. The 591st Military Police Company served both as an enabler and in support of the CBP. Soldiers demonstrated their military police skills as they assisted the CBP throughout the mission. By continuously participating in judge advocate general staff briefings and scenario discussions, the 591st was able to focus on understanding the legal aspects of the special rules for the use of force and the military police role in supporting the southwest border mission.

The training opportunities and experiences afforded to the 591st Military Police Company greatly enhanced its capabilities and the partnership between DHS and DOD. The countless hours spent on training of civil-disturbance scenarios with the 591st Military Police Company CBP partners established enduring procedures for security and force protection operations at the Otay Mesa and San Ysidro POEs. The additional concertina wire, barriers, and hardened security systems helped to increase safety and the security of the southwestern border. The CBP and 591st Military Police Company enhanced training proficiencies and improved unit collective task performance. Military efforts helped provide readiness for the CBP at the Otay Mesa and San Ysidro POEs, and the continuous training, drills, and learning had a positive and enduring impact throughout the mission.

Endnotes:

[1]ADP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, 31 July 2019.

[2] Level III deployment is further described in Army Regulation 525-93, *Army Deployment and Redeployment*, 23 October 2019.

Captain Bigelow is the company commander of the 591st Military Police Company, Fort Bliss, Texas. He enlisted in the U.S. Army and later earned a commission through Officer Candidate School.

From Motown to Megacities: Preparing for America's Worst Day

By Corporal Samantha L. Hall

There is a gap concerning operations in dense urban terrain (DUT) within U.S. Army doctrine. The 46th Military Police Command of the Michigan National Guard is seeking to fill this gap through the unifying power of a simulated 5-kiloton nuclear detonation.

The 46th Military Police Command, one of only two military police command units in the entire country, created the Command and Control Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Element–B (C2CRE-B), which serves as Task Force 46. When directed by the President of the United States or the U.S. Secretary of Defense during a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) attack on U.S. soil, Task Force 46 coordinates lifesaving responses and resources in support of civilian authorities.

The preparation for such an attack—a catastrophic event that the Soldiers of Task Force 46 hope never to experience—is conducted through rigorous training exercises in the most complex situations imaginable and the most dangerous terrain possible—large cities.

Where: The Rise of Megacities

According to a 2014 Chief of Staff of the Army Strategic Studies Group report, more than half of all people live in cities and an estimated 180,000 people around the world migrate to cities each day—and that rate is increasing.[1]

As a result of this trend, "megacities," or cities of 10 million or more occupants, are emerging. In his 2013 book *Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla*, counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen states that global megatrends such as population growth, urbanization, littoralization, and increased economic globalization will be forces with which to contend in the coming years.[2] "In the next century, the urban environment will be the locus where drivers of instability will converge," Kilcullen says.[3]

Despite this rapid urbanization, current Army doctrine doesn't account for large urban centers. "We, as an Army, as a joint force do not really get practical training opportunities to execute operations in these dense urban [areas]," said Colonel Chris A. McKinney, the Task Force 46 Director for CBRN Response Planning, "Historically, everything the joint force has done has largely been rural."

According to the Strategic Studies Group report, the scale and complexity of emerging megacities defy historical methods of operation, which rely on isolating and shaping an operational area to meet operational needs. Physically or virtually controlling these emerging complex landscapes is impossible, and the training facilities needed to accurately evaluate these scenarios do not exist. The largest urban training facility is the Muscatatuck Urban Training Center, Butlerville, Indiana, which is managed by the Department of Defense.

According to Colonel McKinney, "About every city that would be the target for a weapon of mass destruction or CBRN response where Task Force 46 will be directed to execute a response that we would be required to do, under our mission, is going to be in a major metropolitan area. If we are really going to train to do this, we need to replicate that aspect of it and any environment that we can."

What: The Explosion

The Ambassador Bridge, spanning from Detroit, Michigan, to Windsor, Canada, served as the proving ground for a 13–15 August 2019 DUT exercise, when a simulated 5-kiloton nuclear weapon was "detonated" in the middle of the bridge. The exercise was headed by Task Force 46, in support of its training needs for the C2CRE-B mission.

The simulated detonation was instigated by a fictitious domestic terrorist group called the Universal Opposition Collective, headed by a disgruntled and equally fictitious character named Dr. Samuel Artemis Johnson. The terrorist group had obtained a nuclear missile and detonated it in an attempt to cause destabilization throughout the region. The powerful blast destroyed the Ambassador Bridge and toppled nearby buildings. It also created an extreme flash of heat, widespread radiation, and a pulse of electromagnetic energy that destroyed surrounding electronics. Following the event, several fires, including a flaming oil spill from a freighter and another from a fuel terminal, raged across the blast area. There was also a several-mile-long plume of radioactive debris along the river.

Why: The Response

Following the simulated disaster, Task Force 46 used a unified incident command system to coordinate with units to provide notional support, including chemical decontamination, firefighting, communication, logistics, and medical assistance. Response activities included establishing chemical decontamination facilities, cleaning up hazmat, connecting communication avenues, clearing routes, providing transportation, providing food and potable water, determining evacuation plans, providing medical care, managing mass care, recovering remains, and coping with civil disorder.

A situation of this magnitude and complexity demands successful collaboration. Task Force 46 had spent the previous 2 years building and strengthening relationships with more than 50 organizations, including local, state, federal, and international, entities. These relationships are critical; in the event of a catastrophe like this one, Task Force 46 would support civilian agencies and—as rapidly as possible—fill capability gaps wherever they might appear.



A member of the U.S. Coast Guard standing watch during DUT exercise operations

"We're working with our state and local partners to understand their job [and] their role in the event an emergency does occur," said Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Rossiter, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Personnel (G-1), 46th Military Police Command, and exercise lead planner. "Our exercise is an attempt to improve our understanding of what our partners are doing so that when we come in, we can integrate more readily into their response effort," he added.

According to *Out of the Mountains*, the complicating factors of DUT include the presence of a complex vertical axis that involves high-rise and subterranean environments, limited maneuverability around immoveable structures such as buildings and streets, and the inability of modern weapons and communications systems to compensate for the complex environments that these factors create.[4] Real-world examples of these complicating features are present in Detroit, which has an irregular street pattern and limited aerial maneuverability, complicating navigation. Despite the absence of a subway system, Detroit has a variety of subterranean environments, including sewer systems, steam tunnels, salt mines, parking garages, train platforms/tunnels, Prohibition Era smuggling tunnels, and more.

Local partners have a practical knowledge of the safety equipment available, the terrain, and the communication difficulties associated with the unique high-rise and underground environments of a city because they operate in incident command situations every day.

The city of Windsor, Canada, was also in the "blast zone," creating similar difficulties for Canadian emergency services to resolve with their U.S. partners. Working with Canadian partners was beneficial—and visa-versa. "We [are] affected by the same scenario, so we should be working together to resolve it," said Canadian armed forces Captain Nicolas Coutu, decontamination unit commander of the 2d Service Battalion, "Just looking at the way U.S. agencies work together gives us ideas on how ours work together."

The 46th will again join its Canadian partners in a collaborative response to a simulated disaster; the exercise, which is scheduled to take place in New York City next year, is part of a cumulative effort to train in DUT environments.

Our participation in training exercises such as those in Detroit, Canada, and New York will ensure that the U.S. Army is ready for the challenges to come.

Endnotes:

[1]"Megacities and the United States Army: Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future," Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, June 2014, <https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/351235.pdf>, accessed on 6 February 2020.

[2]David Kilcullen, *Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla*, Oxford University Press, 1 October 2013.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid.

Corporal Hall is a mass communication specialist with the 46th Military Police Command, Lansing, Michigan. She holds a bachelor's degree in biology from the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor and is attending Michigan State University College of Veterinary Medicine.

A Military Soldier's Journey From SAMS to USFOR-A Staff

By Major Christopher A. Evans

"Midway on our life's journey, I found myself in dark woods, the right road lost."
—Dante Alighieri[1]

Dante Alighieri (better known simply as Dante) uses the metaphor above to open the timeless "Inferno," describing a traveler who, though fearful, retains an unshakeable faith that transcends the dangers ahead to find internal peace. I (somewhat) jokingly equate the traveler's journey through the nine circles of hell to my circuitous path as a military police officer—a path along which I entered the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), then worked in the plans directorate (J-5) and, finally, served as the deputy of the operations directorate (J-3) of a joint staff, managing U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Operation Resolute Support missions. This article describes the aim of AMSP, the risks and challenges that I faced as an Army major midway through my military career, and highlights of my journey through the "dark woods" on the USFOR-A staff and lists the top five key lessons that I learned.

Aim of AMSP

AMSP is the SAMS graduate level education program, which is designed for approximately 140 majors and junior lieutenant colonels who have completed the Intermediate-Level Education course requirements. The instructors consist of a successful battalion commander and a civilian with a doctorate degree. The curriculum is history-centric, overlaid with theories from multiple disciplines of thought, and grounded in doctrine. The intention is to prepare students by providing them with a broad education to call upon when faced with challenging (ill-structured/unconventional) problems. Graduates craft innovative solutions by drawing analogies from historical vignettes and considering theories from other disciplines. The training aims to create professionals who can identify problems, think critically and creatively to develop solutions, and persuasively communicate those solutions to strategic leaders.

Risks and Challenges of AMSP

The AMSP workload is intentionally stressful. I read an average of 150 pages of text per day in preparation for class discussions, which were always dynamic and occasionally heated. For those who are not extreme extroverts, it is difficult to speak up in a room in which 16 other students are jockeying to argue their points. In addition to daily assignments, students must also write a 50-page monograph (referencing primary sources) on a particular topic related to operational art. Graduates then serve a 1- (occasionally 2-) year SAMS utilization tour, where they work long, tedious hours on a division or corps staff. After the SAMS utilization tour, there is a very narrow time frame in which to serve 24 months as an executive officer/battalion or brigade operations staff officer (S-3) prior to the lieutenant colonel primary board selection.

My Journey Through the "Dark Woods"

I graduated from (survived) AMSP and immediately deployed to Bagram, Afghanistan, to serve as a J-5 planner for the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and to help support Operation Resolute Support (a follow-on mission to the International Security Assistance Force) and supported the NATO-led mission created to train, advise, and assist troops in Afghanistan. Due to sheer luck and good timing (as I was the only new planner with longevity), I had the opportunity to lead an operational planning team (OPT) that optimized the force structure across Afghanistan and realigned enabler support from two partially manned brigade combat teams into one fully operational brigade combat team without losing combat capabilities. My OPT planning meetings were attended by all division staff sections and brigades as well as regional train, advise, and assist commands and task force personnel. As the OPT leader, I served as an editor more than anything else. My goal was to synthesize OPT information for presentation to military officials with



Some of the required reading materials for AMSP

Operation Resolute Support and the USFOR-A command. Over the long months, the operating environment continuously changed and we continuously updated the products. (There were 56 versions of one briefing.) None of the planners wanted to be unprepared for the briefing or to brief outdated information.

Moving on to serve as the USFOR-A deputy J-3 officer, I helped plan operations and synchronized enablers (fixed-and rotary-wing aviation, fires, medical, and surveillance personnel). I managed all USFOR-A and NATO Operation Resolute Support orders and U.S. Central Command tasking orders. During my first month in this capacity, I made a poor decision to realign equipment, which could have degraded the operational tempo. I attempted to brief my boss on all the facts and variables that led to my error; but when I finally took a breath, he told me to stop relaying all the trivial details and just get to the point so that he could fix the problem. I never forgot that lesson. My boss built his team based on mission command. He was very specific about what types of decisions were his, and he trusted us to use our best judgement on less-serious, time-sensitive issues. Each challenge provided another chance to build shared understanding, competence, and confidence. My boss trusted me to refine and synthesize complex issues and recommend solutions grounded in history, doctrine, and theory.

Lessons Learned

The top five lessons that I have learned along my journey are—

- Success is based on luck, timing, and preparation. You should be ready to "hit a home run" when you get an "at bat" with a senior leader.
- When dealing with a challenging problem, it pays to broadly research similar historical examples or theories that can provide a starting point of reference for the development of a solution.
- Shared understanding is critical since senior leaders are incredibly busy. It is important to know which decisions to make and which ones should be made by your boss.
- OPT leaders are editors who can refine and synthesize the work of the team and create a short information paper and approximately three to seven slides.
- When senior leaders ask "what time it is," they don't want anyone to "build them a watch." They don't want every trivial detail in response to their questions. Instead, subordinates should give them a direct answer using three essential facts for that specific question/problem and then wait for a response.

Conclusion

Do you still want to attend AMSP? If so, start preparing by reading military history and catching up on the news months in advance. Tailor your application to demonstrate your critical and creative thinking, communication skills, and ability to build a team. Ask your Intermediate-Level Education course instructor to write a letter of recommendation. There is a 2-hour admissions test that includes multiple-choice questions on military history, current events, and doctrine as well as an essay assignment. The most important admissions requirement is an interview with a faculty member, who will assess your ability to respond intelligently to tough questions under stressful conditions. For the interview, know the definition of operational art. Have a well-prepared answer on how attending AMSP will have a positive impact on the Army, your organization, and you. Be able to have an in-depth discussion about a book that you are reading, and be able to link the book to doctrine.

For Dante, the journey was spiritual; he confronted a sinful world, came to terms with his own sinful nature and, in the end, found peace with God. My journey was one of maturing and broadening, facing new expectations and finding peace with ambiguity. My graduation from AMSP opened doors for me to lead a high-profile OPT. The AMSP "stamp of approval" imparted credibility and gave me routine chances "at bat" to brief general officers—chances that very few other military police officers receive. More importantly, it provided me with a broad foundation of historical examples and theories upon which to draw when I am facing challenging/unconventional problems with no defined parameters. Dante relied upon his guide Virgil, who represented reason and wisdom, to help him navigate through hell. I relied upon books on the history of Afghanistan, doctrine, and theories of civil war resolution to guide me through my tour on the USFOR-A staff.

Endnote:

[1]Dante Alighieri, "Inferno," *Divine Comedy*, 1320, <http://purgatorio.com/divine_comedy/inferno1.html>, accessed on 9 December 2019.

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Talent Management:
The Key to Military Police Modernization

By Major Kurt H. Boehm

In 2028, U.S. Army Soldiers will deploy, fight, and win our Nation's wars. Eight years from now, the purpose of the Army will likely be the same as it is today but the operational similarities will stop there. Soldiers and leaders of the future will simultaneously operate across the full range of military operations and conflict continuum in more complex, chaotic, violent, and uncertain environments against increasingly dangerous and capable threats.[1, 2] To further complicate matters, threats will contest Army forces, as an element of the joint force, in all domains: land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. In these contested domains, the multi-domain operations (MDO)-capable force of 2028 will require a modernized and reformed Military Police Corps that is able to protect the force, enable maneuver, and shape the security environment. The 40th Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General James C. McConville, believes that the means to an MDO-capable Army is the people; he states, "We win through our people, and people will drive success in our readiness, modernization, and reform priorities."[3] *The Army People Strategy* and its doctrinal hierarchy represent an Army talent management strategy that manages Soldiers' talents to increase readiness, rapidly modernize, and effectively reform.[4] Embracing of talent management by military police leaders is key to modernizing the Military Police Corps in support of the 2028 MDO-capable Army.

Talent management refers to the systems and processes that the Army uses to acquire, develop, employ, and retain individuals based on their talent or their unique intersection of knowledge, skills, behaviors, and preferences.[5] The systems include current and future data-driven platforms such as Assignment Interactive Module 2.0 and the Integrated Pay and Personnel System–Army. The processes support data generation, analysis, and implementation; examples include the Army Talent Alignment Process (ATAP) and the Battalion Commander Assessment Program. Studied for years and codified in the 2018 *The Army Strategy*, talent management reform refers to the effort to move the Army's personnel system from the industrial age to the information age or from interchangeable Soldiers on similar career paths to uniquely talented Soldiers filling the right job at the right time.[6] *The Army Human Dimension Strategy* further emphasizes the need to change by highlighting the requirement "to build effective teams and meet Army needs."[7] U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (Pam) 523-3-1, *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028*, incorporates talent management into warfighting concepts by describing the necessity to maximize human potential in building and sustaining multidomain formations.[8] The *Talent Management Concept of Operations for Force 2025 and Beyond,* the *U.S. Army Talent Management Strategy Force 2025 and Beyond*, the *2019 Army Modernization Strategy: Investing in the Future,* and *The Army People Strategy* specifically lay out the Army's talent-focused way ahead with a desired end state of a ready, professional, diverse, and integrated MDO-capable Army by 2028.[9, 10, 11, 12] Finally, Public Law 115-232, the *John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019* provides the exact authorities needed to implement overarching changes.[13] Soldiers remain the focus throughout the new doctrine, but these strategies and concepts also empower units to increase readiness through talent management.

Despite the immense amount of recent focus and new publications, talent and talent management are not new to Army doctrine. Army doctrine publications (ADPs), Army doctrine reference publications (ADRPs), and Field Manuals (FMs) describe talents as unique skills or abilities, including language proficiency and creative thinking, or as a measure of effectiveness.[14] Likewise, talent management encompasses a leader's ability to select and develop Soldiers according to their individual knowledge, skills, abilities, behaviors, and potential or a leader's ability to attract, manage and retain talent.[15] Talent, as a measure of ability, also refers to a Soldier's compilation of attributes and competencies. In the latest talent management publications, descriptions of talent and talent management expand previous definitions, concepts, and measures. The primary difference in descriptions is in the amount and use of data; the transformation from old to new systems and processes has resulted in data-poor to data-rich environments and performance-based to talent-based management.[16] Soldiers must still possess the required leadership attributes and competencies, but the Army will

now manage Soldiers by their self-rofessed talents, validated by assessments—not as in the current systems, which focus primarily on performance and potential. Understanding and embracing today's Army talent management allows organizations to achieve the desired end state: total Army readiness.

Achieving readiness and modernization through talent management is crucial to the Military Police Corps. Similar to the Army at large, the Military Police Corps is undergoing comprehensive reform and modernization.[17] Across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policies, the Military Police Corps is transitioning to a Regiment that can support the 2028 MDO-capable force while maintaining excellence in policing, corrections, and investigations. Military police Soldiers have always exhibited unique knowledge, skills, and behaviors as a requirement for the conduct of military police competencies. Military police leaders have always managed Soldier specialties as a part of large and diverse formations. However, the level of reform and modernization necessary to operate in the operational environment of 2028 will require that military police leaders implement new talent management strategies in their formations. From nonthreat variables represented by competitive labor markets and shifting generational values to increasingly adaptive and lethal near-peer threats, the expected MDO 2028 environment implies that current and past successful practices in talent management will not lead to successful or capable formations in the future.[18]

The Army's talent management strategies and implementing documents place the primary responsibility of talent management with commanders. For example, as part of ATAP, commanders bear the responsibility of accurately describing vacancies and attracting talented Soldiers.[19] Considering that the assignment market of fiscal year 2020 Assignment Interactive Module 2.0 consisted of nearly 15,000 officers, the burden of talent management is immense.[20] However, part of the cultural shift in the Army and Military Police Corps has to do with recognizing that talent management is (or continues to be) a priority line of effort in unit operations. The increase in commanders' authorities, including attracting talent through direct communication and incentivizing critical positions with brevet promotions, allows them to better apply resources and manage risk as they execute their activities with the support of staff, career managers, assignment officers, and professional-development noncommissioned officers throughout the operations process or by whatever means they choose to accomplish talent management. The added transparency from Assignment Interactive Module 2.0 and direct communication with officers provides commanders the opportunity to weigh talent against priority operations and missions or build teams with specific attributes. Part of talent management in support of the 2028 MDO-capable force involves understanding the unique knowledge, skills, behaviors, and preferences requirements of organizations and balancing the benefits of talent management with current organizational requirements.

The Army People Strategy requires drastic shifts in Army culture and recognizes that the benefits of talent management do not come without risks. Talent management in 2028 will not be egalitarian, nor will it reward loyalty.[21] Soldiers with certain knowledge, skills, and behaviors will be offered opportunities that others are not. If the selection of an individual were based on loyalty, then loyalty to that individual could negatively impact development and, subsequently, career progression if the assignment does not align with the Soldier's knowledge, skills, and behaviors. Additionally, the increased consideration for Soldiers' assignment cycle preferences has drawn criticism as a program intended only to appease new generations. To some extent, this criticism is valid in that the millennial cohort values individual recognition and treatment.[22] However, the Army must compete in a high-demand, high-skill labor market, where individuals have greater choices of careers and prefer employers who do not treat them interchangeably.[23, 24] The *U.S. Army Talent Management Strategy Force 2025 and Beyond* not only calls for fielding an all-volunteer Army in a changing society, but it also states that all volunteers must maximize readiness in MDO-capable formations.[25] By focusing on readiness through a balance of the Soldiers' assignment cycle preference and unit requirement, the talent management strategy does away with the perception that the needs of the individual and the Army are never aligned. Finally, Army culture includes a healthy amount of cynicism—and Soldiers are skeptical of any new system or program until they see results. For instance, if the Department of the Army (DA) Pam 600-3, *Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, indicates that officers will be promoted on flexible career paths alongside peers on a more traditional path, those officers will remain skeptical until promotion results provide the evidence.[26] Skepticism is a cultural obstacle if talent management is not embraced by leaders.

There are risks associated with all the new strategies, potential opportunities, and alternate solutions under consideration by the Army Talent Management Task Force, but the benefits can help the Military Police Corps Regiment support the 2028 MDO-capable force.[27] The future of the Military Police Corps aligns with the future of the Army. Army leadership embraces the Army talent management strategy that will affect all officers, noncommissioned officers, and junior enlisted Soldiers and will lead to increased readiness, modernization, and reform. Likewise, military police modernization hinges on the extent to which leaders educate, embrace, and implement talent management. More succinctly, "We equip people; we do not man equipment."[28]

Endnotes:

[1]FM 3-39, *Military Police Operations*, April 2019.

[2]FM 3-0, *Operations*, October 2017.

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[6]*The Army Strategy*, U.S. Army, 2018, <https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/the_army_strategy_2018.pdf>, accessed on 10 January 2020.

[7]*The Army Human Dimension Strategy*, U.S. Army, 1 June 2015, <https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/20150524_Human_Dimension_Strategy_vr_Signature_WM_1.pdf >, accessed on 10 December 2020.

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[9]*Talent Management Concept of Operations for Force 2025 and Beyond*, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, September 2015, <https://usacac.army.mil/pubs/Force-2025-and-Beyond-Human-Dimension>, accessed on 10 December 2020.

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Revision of FM 3-63, *Detainee Operations*

By Sergeant Major Douglas M. Loggins (Retired)

Future operations can be expected to occur in a more complex, uncertain, chaotic, and violent operational environment than past operations. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, published in October 2017, reintroduced the U.S. Army to a doctrinal approach for its brigades, divisions, corps, and theater armies, addressing the challenges of peer and near-peer threats.[1] Augmenting the Army's capstone doctrine, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Operations*, describes how the Army, as part of a larger joint force, assists in shaping the operational environment, preventing conflict, conducting large-scale ground combat operations, and consolidating gains.[2] This refocus on unified land operations, with emphasis on large-scale ground combat operations, led the Military Police Doctrine Team, Maneuver Support Center of Excellence, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, to conduct an analysis and determine requirements for revising the April 2014 version of FM 3-63, *Detainee Operations*.[3]

Detainee operations involve the detainment of a population or group that poses some level of threat to military operations. It is necessity to prepare for and conduct detainee operations as an integral part of decisive action. Modern military actions, including offensive, defensive, and stability operations in contiguous or noncontiguous environments result in the capture of many and varied detainees. During large-scale ground combat, enemy prisoners of war are the primary focus of detainee operations. As Army forces transition to consolidate gains, setting conditions for a stable environment, detainee operations must continue to focus on enemy prisoner-of-war activities. Irregular forces and criminal actors that take advantage of a lack of civil control following conflict must also be detained to eliminate the threat that they pose to military operations.

Detainee operations in every major U.S. military action of the 20th century (World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and Operation Desert Storm) have followed a similar pattern: U.S. forces have grossly underestimated the number of captured or detained enemy combatants, the character of the detained population, the number of untrained/limited guard personnel, and the lack of resources. The United States did not anticipate having custody of a half-million German soldiers in World War II. In Korea, the need for what was essentially a city for detainees was not part of the planning requirements; however, U.S. forces captured nearly 100,000 prisoners just shortly after landing at Incheon and tens of thousands of additional Chinese troops later. During Operation Desert Storm, U.S. military forces captured more than 71,000 enemy prisoners of war in a 6-week period. The lack of strategic-level planning and guidance continued as U.S. forces launched into Iraq and Afghanistan.

While the number of detainees was significantly lower in Iraq (reaching only around 25,000), a new requirement to develop a plan for housing special populations of detainees (juveniles, women, religious extremists) was identified. Again, following the historical pattern of late identification of the total number of detainees to be housed, there was a hasty scramble for resources during the initial crisis management phase, followed by an eventual effort to try to improve operations and implement programs to influence prisoner populations.

Prior to a conflict, U.S. forces must develop a plan to provide for the care and custody of detainees. Policymakers and planners need to closely monitor the size of the detainee population and prepare to fund needed resources and expansions. The 2004 Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal in Iraq serves as a powerful example of how detention operations are not merely the coincidental product of a conflict; rather, they are a central part of shaping the ongoing counterinsurgency campaign and postconflict outcomes with long-lasting operational and strategic effects.[4]

The latest revision of FM 3-63 (January 2020) reorients detainee operations to large-scale ground combat while simultaneously addressing detainee operations in support of contingency operations.[5] It is aligned with FM 3-0; FM 3-39, *Military Police Operations* (the keystone military police field manual),[6] and Joint Publication (JP) 3-63, *Detainee Operations*.[7] The new FM defines the objectives and principles of detainee operations and describes U.S. policies that contain information on detainee protection and care. It emphasizes the fundamental requirements of the humane treatment of persons who are captured, held, assisted, or otherwise under the control of Department of Defense personnel (military, civilian, contractor), regardless of their individual status. The revision emphasizes why clear command and control are essential for the seamless conduct of detainee operations, provides an overview of the roles and responsibilities of each agency (and staff) accountable for conducting detainee operations, and highlights command responsibilities at different echelons.

FM 3-63 indicates that the conduct of detainee operations begins at the point of capture and continues through movement to a detainee collection point, detainee holding area, or theater detention facility until the transfer, release,

repatriation, death, or escape of the detainee (see Figure 1). The number of detainees held by U.S. armed forces at any given point can range from one to thousands, depending on the scope of the operation and the elements involved. The manual emphasizes that planning is critical; while one or two detainees may not create a major logistics or accountability challenge, a larger number of detainees requires a larger number of guards and significantly more resources. Larger numbers of detainees increase the security risks to Soldiers and detainees. Detainees must be safeguarded and provided with adequate space, food, and means of waste disposal. These requirements are manpower-intensive, can cause significant delays in onward movement, and can divert unit assets from the primary mission.[8]

The revision of FM 3-63 builds on the collective knowledge and wisdom gained through recent operations, numerous lessons learned, and doctrine revisions throughout the Army. It is rooted in time-tested principles and fundamentals, while also accommodating new technologies and organizational changes. The new FM 3-63 includes significant changes; it—

- Identifies revised detainee categories (see Figure 2, page 29).
- Discusses the conduct of detainee operations in support of large-scale ground combat.
- Provides additional considerations for planning detainee operations.



Figure 1. Detention movement from the point of capture through the theater detention facility



Figure 2. Detainee categories

- Provides greater detail on critical considerations for planning, constructing, and operating detention facilities.
- Presents organizational charts and a detailed discussion about military police detention capabilities by formation.
- Describes the facility information cycle and synchronizes it with police intelligence operations.
- Expands on the discussion of host nation corrections training and development.

FM 3-63 is intended to be the Army manual that guides how Soldiers perform detainee operations in support of the Nation's wars. The publication serves as the starting point for thinking about how to plan, direct, execute, and assess the conduct of detainee operations. FM 3-63 enhances operational effectiveness, provides a coherent vision and common frame of reference, and presents professional language (which Soldiers must know) for detainee operations. It highlights military police support and contributions to detainee operations in support of the four Army strategic roles within unified action. Soldiers must not only read FM 3-63, but must also understand it. FM 3-63 has been revised for Army leaders and professionals who are tasked with planning, directing, and executing detainee operations at all echelons.

Endnotes:

[1]FM 3-0, *Operations*, 6 October 2017.

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[6]FM 3-39, *Military Police Operations*, 9 April 2019.

[7]JP 3-63, *Detainee Operations*, 14 November 2014.

[8]FM 3-63, 2020.

[9]Ibid.

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The brigade and above and battalion level command list is now available separately at the following Website address:

<https://home.army.mil/wood/index.php/download_file/view/7725/678S>

DOCTRINE UPDATE

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence G-3/Directorate of Training and Doctrine			
Publication Number	**Title**	**Date**	**Description**
Current Publications			
FM 3-39	Military Police Operations	9 Apr 19	A manual that describes the military police support provided to Army forces conducting unified land operations within the framework of joint operations; increases the emphasis on simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks; and contains a critical discussion of the defense support of civil authorities. **Status:** Current.
FM 3-63	Detainee Operations	2 Jan 20	A manual that addresses detainee operations across the range of military operations and provides detainee operations guidance for commanders and staffs. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-37.2	Antiterrorism	3 Jun 14	A manual that establishes Army guidance on integrating and synchronizing antiterrorism across the full spectrum of conflict and into the full range of military operations. It shows how antiterrorism operations nest under full spectrum operations, the protection warfighting function, and the composite risk management process. **Status:** Under revision. Projected publication in 1st quarter (Qtr) fiscal year (FY) 21.
ATP 3-39.10	Police Operations	26 Jan 15	A manual that addresses each element of the military police law and order mission, including planning considerations, police station operations, patrol operations, police engagement, traffic operations, and host nation police capability and capacity. **Status:** Under revision. Projected publication in 1st Qtr FY 21.
ATP 3-39.11	Military Police Special-Reaction Teams	26 Nov 13	A manual that serves as a guide for commanders, staffs, and trainers who are responsible for training and deploying military police special-reaction teams. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.12	Law Enforcement Investigations	19 Aug 13	A manual that serves as a guide and toolkit for military police, investigators, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID) special agents, traffic management and collision investigators, and Soldiers conducting criminal and traffic law enforcement (LE) and LE investigations. It also serves to educate military police commanders and staffs on LE investigation capabilities, enabling a more thorough understanding of those capabilities. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.20	Police Intelligence Operations	13 May 19	A manual that addresses police intelligence operations that support the operations process and protection activities by providing exceptional police information and intelligence to support, enhance, and contribute to situational understanding, force protection, the commander's protection program, and homeland security. **Status:** Current.

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G-3/Directorate of Training and Doctrine

Publication Number	Title	Date	Description
ATP 3-39.30	Security and Mobility Support	30 Oct 14	A manual that provides Army military police commanders, staffs, and Soldiers at all echelons a foundation for the conduct of security and mobility support in support of decisive action. The tasks in this manual are primarily focused on applying military police combat power in support of the movement and maneuver and protection warfighting functions. **Status:** Under revision. Projected publication in 3d Qtr FY 20.
ATP 3-39.32	Physical Security	30 Apr 14	A manual that establishes guidance for all personnel responsible for physical security. It is the basic reference for training security personnel and is intended to be used in conjunction with the Army Regulation 190 (Military Police) series, Security Engineering Unified Facilities Criteria publications, Department of Defense directives, and other Department of the Army publications. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.33	Civil Disturbances	21 Apr 14	A manual that addresses continental U.S. and outside the continental U.S. civil-disturbance operations and domestic unrest, including the military role in providing assistance to civil authorities. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.34	Military Working Dogs	30 Jan 15	A manual that provides commanders, staffs, and military working dog (MWD) handlers with an understanding of MWD capabilities, employment considerations, sustainment requirements, and the integration of MWDs in support of full spectrum operations. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.35	Protective Services	31 May 13	A manual that provides guidance for protective-service missions and the management of protective-service details. **Status:** Current.
TC 3-39.30	Military Police Leader's Handbook	11 Aug 15	A manual that is primarily focused on military police operations at the company level and below. It provides an overview of fundamental guidelines and is a quick reference guide to help commanders, leaders, and Soldiers successfully execute key military police missions in support of unified land operations through the three disciplines of security and mobility support, police operations, and detention operations. **Status:** Current.
TM 3-39.31	Armored Security Vehicle	20 Aug 10	A manual that provides military police forces with the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and related information necessary for the employment of the armored security vehicle. **Status:** Current.
Note: Current military police publications can be accessed and downloaded in electronic format from the U.S. Army Military Police School Web site at <http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/>. Comments or questions about military police doctrine can be e-mailed to <usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.mpdoc@mail.mil>.			
Emerging Publications			
ATP 3-39.21	Tactical Employment of Expeditionary Forensics	To be published	A multi-Service forensics TTP that will support planners and warfighters by establishing TTP for tactical-level commanders, staffs, small-unit leaders, and Skill Level 1 collectors. This publication will detail the six forensic functions of recognize, preserve, collect, analyze, store, and share in support of operations and exploitation activities across the force. **Status:** Under development. Projected publication in 2d Qtr FY 20.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 705th Military Police Battalion (Vigilance)

Lineage and Honors

Constituted 1 February 2005 in the Regular Army as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 705th Military Police Battalion.

Activated 16 March 2006 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Campaign Participation Credit

War on Terrorism

Iraq:

- National Resolution
- Iraqi Surge
- Iraqi Sovereignty

(Additional campaigns to be determined)

Decorations

- Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered IRAQ 2006–2007
- Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered IRAQ 2009–2010
- Army Superior Unit Award, Streamer embroidered 2012–2013

CID Seeks Military Police Investigators to Join Warrant Officer Ranks

By the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command

As part of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID) effort to recruit "the best of the best" as special agents, the organization is seeking skilled Career Management Field 31—Military Police Investigators (MPIs) to become CID special agent warrant officers.

"The MPIs possess valued training, investigative skills, and experience," said the CID Command Chief Warrant Officer, Chief Warrant Officer Five Joel E. Fitz, who served as an MPI early in his Army career. "These Soldiers will undoubtedly bring a lot to the fight and have a positive impact on CID's highly-skilled teams by providing what they have learned from the Military Police Corps. MPIs are strongly encouraged to take the next step and take advantage of this career-growing opportunity by applying now," he added.

The application time frame began in December 2019 and runs through May 2021. Approved applications will be considered by warrant officer accession boards convening in fiscal years 2020–2021.

Eligible applicants must be Regular Army Soldiers in Military Occupational Specialty 31B—Military Police or 31 E—Internment/Resettlement Specialist with a rank of staff sergeant, staff sergeant (promotable), or sergeant first class (nonpromotable). They must also have Additional Skill Identifier V5—Military Police Investigation and at least 2 years of investigative experience in the past 4 years.[1] Upon completion of the required military and law enforcement training and experience, Soldiers are qualified for appointment to warrant officer, special agent. Agents receive training at the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) and advanced training in a wide range of specialized investigative disciplines. More information about the training and qualification standards can be accessed at the USAMPS Web site located at <https://home.army.mil/wood/index.php/units-tenants/USAMPS/MPOrganizations/directorate-training-education/usamps-courses>.

"CID agents are sworn federal law enforcement officers who investigate felony crimes with an Army nexus," said Mr. Thomas Seaman, Chief, Special Agent Management Division, and retired CID special agent, "Our highly trained special agents receive some of the most state-of-the-art law enforcement training in the world today."

CID special agents routinely work closely with local, state, and other federal law enforcement agencies to solve serious crimes of corruption, fraud, homicide, sexual assault, cybercrimes, and drug trafficking. They also provide protective services to high-ranking Department of Defense and Army officials.

Once individuals become CID special agents, they may then become forensic science officers, digital forensic examiners, or polygraph examiners. There are also many other professional opportunities for career growth within CID.

Qualified MPI applicants are encouraged to contact the CID Special Agent Management Division Recruiting Operations Cell via email at <USArmy.Join-CID@mail.mil> or via telephone at (571) 305-4348/4369/4337/4112 to ask questions and to start the application process.

Additional information can also be obtained from Military Personnel Message 19-346, *MPI Application Requirements for Appointment to CID Warrant Officer (MOS 311A)*.

For more information about CID, visit <www.cid.army.mil>.

Endnote:

[1]Military Personnel Message 19-346, *MPI Application Requirements for Appointment to CID Warrant Officer (MOS 311A)*, 25 November 2019, <https://recruiting.army.mil/Portals/15/MILPER%20Message%20Number%2019-346.pdf >, accessed on 12 December 2019.

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