Decisive Point Podcast

Self-deterrence is critically understudied in deterrence theory. Similarly, deterrence practitioners prefer to focus on adversaries’ threats rather than seeking to account for the full scope of fears influencing the decision calculus of policymakers. Through historical case studies, this article identifies where self-deterrence has occurred, highlights the benefits of incorporating the concept in future strategic planning and intelligence assessments, and recommends that policymakers,... read more

Self-deterrence is critically understudied in deterrence theory. Similarly, deterrence practitioners prefer to focus on adversaries’ threats rather than seeking to account for the full scope of fears influencing the decision calculus of policymakers. Through historical case studies, this article identifies where self-deterrence has occurred, highlights the benefits of incorporating the concept in future strategic planning and intelligence assessments, and recommends that policymakers, strategists, and analysts acknowledge self-deterrence as an important factor when preparing for future wars. Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol54/iss1/9/ Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: deterrence, self-deterrence, chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, decision making   show less

This article proposes a new definition of strategy as problem-solving that challenges the focus on goals and assumptions of order within many post–Cold War approaches to strategy. It argues that the military needs strategy to diagnose the complex problems of the twenty-first century before they can be solved. Inspired by practitioners such as Andrew Marshall and George F. Kennan, this new definition clarifies what strategists do and offers a logic for distinguishing the use of the term... read more

This article proposes a new definition of strategy as problem-solving that challenges the focus on goals and assumptions of order within many post–Cold War approaches to strategy. It argues that the military needs strategy to diagnose the complex problems of the twenty-first century before they can be solved. Inspired by practitioners such as Andrew Marshall and George F. Kennan, this new definition clarifies what strategists do and offers a logic for distinguishing the use of the term strategy. Practitioners will also find problem-solving tools and pedagogies they can adopt today. Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: complexity, Andrew Marshall, George F. Kennan, problem-solving, strategy   show less

New strategic art is required to maneuver political economies to meet the demands of future engagements and campaigns. Current discussions of the projection of political-economic power are typically abstract, high-level, and policy-focused or present singular tactical actions as strategic actions, creating a gap for campaign practitioners. This article addresses the gap by drawing on Joint Planning, Joint Publication 5-0, and Joint Campaigns and Operations, Joint Publication 3-0, to further... read more

New strategic art is required to maneuver political economies to meet the demands of future engagements and campaigns. Current discussions of the projection of political-economic power are typically abstract, high-level, and policy-focused or present singular tactical actions as strategic actions, creating a gap for campaign practitioners. This article addresses the gap by drawing on Joint Planning, Joint Publication 5-0, and Joint Campaigns and Operations, Joint Publication 3-0, to further develop the concept and methodologies first introduced in the author’s earlier article “Multidimensionality: Rethinking Power Projection for the 21st Century.” Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol54/iss1/4/ Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: sanctions, political-economic power, Russia, Ukraine, China   show less

If the United States and its allies seek to deny Vladimir Putin an objective victory in the Russia-Ukraine War, they must commit to providing sufficient aid to the Ukrainian army soon because the window of opportunity to provide sufficient resources is narrow—and closing. This article argues that the West must articulate a reasonable strategy for Ukrainian victory now, as a failure in Ukraine will weaken relationships between the United States and Western European states and their global... read more

If the United States and its allies seek to deny Vladimir Putin an objective victory in the Russia-Ukraine War, they must commit to providing sufficient aid to the Ukrainian army soon because the window of opportunity to provide sufficient resources is narrow—and closing. This article argues that the West must articulate a reasonable strategy for Ukrainian victory now, as a failure in Ukraine will weaken relationships between the United States and Western European states and their global partners while emboldening state and non-state actors to threaten the rules-based international order. Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol54/iss1/3/ Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: Ukraine, Russia, NATO, Europe, security force assistance   show less

Retired United States general and flag officers participate politically as individuals and in groups. Purportedly, participation damages civil-military relations. This article argues these activities, including but not limited to endorsements of candidates, do little harm to US democratic institutions and to the nonpartisan reputation of the military institution.

Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss4/15/.

Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article.

Keywords: civil-military relations, general officers, promotions, flag officers, political participation

To compete effectively for global influence, US Army and defense planners should focus on economic globalization in addition to security interests when assessing potential foreign military partners. The results of a quantitative analysis of US-led exercise participants between 1990 and 2016 demonstrate the variety of interests, including economic, that underly a partner’s decision to train or not with US forces. Since the US Army bills itself as the “partner of choice,” this piece will... read more

To compete effectively for global influence, US Army and defense planners should focus on economic globalization in addition to security interests when assessing potential foreign military partners. The results of a quantitative analysis of US-led exercise participants between 1990 and 2016 demonstrate the variety of interests, including economic, that underly a partner’s decision to train or not with US forces. Since the US Army bills itself as the “partner of choice,” this piece will interest military and policy practitioners involved in strategically assessing potential international military partners. Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss4/13/ Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: economic interests, globalization, strategic competition, multinational exercises, bilateral exercises   show less

The China Landpower Studies Center will open in 2024. It is intended to be an approachable organization. It will tackle the complex and pressing questions about China’s emergence as a global power and its implications for the US military and provide senior leaders and practitioners with a better understanding of the strategies, capabilities, and the integration of the PLA into the CCP’s campaign to turn the rules-based international order to its advantage. Further, the Center will share... read more

The China Landpower Studies Center will open in 2024. It is intended to be an approachable organization. It will tackle the complex and pressing questions about China’s emergence as a global power and its implications for the US military and provide senior leaders and practitioners with a better understanding of the strategies, capabilities, and the integration of the PLA into the CCP’s campaign to turn the rules-based international order to its advantage. Further, the Center will share insights and recommendations for developing better deterrence strategies and campaigns for the United States and our allies Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss4/16/ Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: China, Taiwan, Philippines, South China Sea, China Landpower Studies Center   show less

Reflexive control aims to change the other’s perceptions about their utility sets. It contains underlying elements that could help give structure to analyses of strategic behavior by using a nonlinear approach that aims to improve the quality of assessments. This podcast explores the interpretations of the concept of reflexive control, how elements of ref lexive control link to the more widely accepted body of knowledge, and how these elements could be valuable additions to the current... read more

Reflexive control aims to change the other’s perceptions about their utility sets. It contains underlying elements that could help give structure to analyses of strategic behavior by using a nonlinear approach that aims to improve the quality of assessments. This podcast explores the interpretations of the concept of reflexive control, how elements of ref lexive control link to the more widely accepted body of knowledge, and how these elements could be valuable additions to the current work on the analysis of strategic behavior. E-mail usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: reflexive control, strategic behavior, strategic analysis, nonlinearity, complex adaptive system   show less

This podcast enters the debate on American grand strategy by questioning the logic underpinning offshore balancing. It concludes that the United States is an ambivalent balancer due to the stopping power of water. It builds on the relevant literature in international relations, producing a novel set of theoretical propositions that are applied to the contemporary Middle East. There and elsewhere, the United States could fail to maintain the balance of power when it is most threatened.

A change in deterrence thought and strategy is necessary to avoid nuclear escalation in armed conflict with Russia. Traditional threat-based deterrence strategies will not be successful, and a new strategy must address the conditions that might cause Russian leadership to employ nuclear weapons. An examination of the Able Archer 83 exercise using an original framework highlights the ways Russian interests and US actions interact to generate misperception and inhibited deterrence. The US... read more

A change in deterrence thought and strategy is necessary to avoid nuclear escalation in armed conflict with Russia. Traditional threat-based deterrence strategies will not be successful, and a new strategy must address the conditions that might cause Russian leadership to employ nuclear weapons. An examination of the Able Archer 83 exercise using an original framework highlights the ways Russian interests and US actions interact to generate misperception and inhibited deterrence. The US military must execute extremely restrained, deliberate, and empathetic operations that pursue minimalist military objectives to achieve the political goal. Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss4/10/ Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: deterrence, nuclear, misperception, Russia, multidomain operations   show less

The Russia-Ukraine War holds many lessons for the US Army and American policymakers and leaders on the nature and role of reconnaissance-strike complexes in modern combat, especially Ukraine’s development of a battle-management system that uses unmanned aerial systems and satellite reconnaissance to enable the fire coordination for deep strikes into the enemy rear. In the research presented here, open-source analysis and interviews in Ukraine focus on the development and employment of... read more

The Russia-Ukraine War holds many lessons for the US Army and American policymakers and leaders on the nature and role of reconnaissance-strike complexes in modern combat, especially Ukraine’s development of a battle-management system that uses unmanned aerial systems and satellite reconnaissance to enable the fire coordination for deep strikes into the enemy rear. In the research presented here, open-source analysis and interviews in Ukraine focus on the development and employment of reconnaissance-strike complexes with respect to deep strike and the likelihood of mutual territorial attack. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss4/9/ Keywords: unmanned aerial systems, deep strike, reconnaissance-strike complex, electronic warfare, Russia-Ukraine War Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on the genesis article or the podcast.   show less

In February 2022, many observers initially evaluated the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a failure of Western deterrence.That assessment was and is f lawed inasmuch as the West never articulated a clear strategy to deter such an invasion. Engaging with relevant conceptual debates about how deterrence works and relating this information to what the West did and did not do in the run-up to the invasion, this article shows that deterrence efforts were based on problematic assumptions about the... read more

In February 2022, many observers initially evaluated the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a failure of Western deterrence.That assessment was and is f lawed inasmuch as the West never articulated a clear strategy to deter such an invasion. Engaging with relevant conceptual debates about how deterrence works and relating this information to what the West did and did not do in the run-up to the invasion, this article shows that deterrence efforts were based on problematic assumptions about the Kremlin’s motivations. The study concludes with lessons for Western military and policy practitioners with the intention to enable better future thinking about how to deter Russia. Keywords: deterrence, Ukraine, Russia, Putin, NATO Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss4/8   show less

The Antarctic Treaty of 1961 largely prevented conflicts on the continent, but growing pressure on the treaty system could affect the global community and the United States. This article utilizes historical documents and press reports to examine these challenges, which include ice deterioration, unreported and unregulated fishing, resource extraction preparation, and hostilities between treaty members. Given that these challenges involve China and Russia, it is in the United States’... read more

The Antarctic Treaty of 1961 largely prevented conflicts on the continent, but growing pressure on the treaty system could affect the global community and the United States. This article utilizes historical documents and press reports to examine these challenges, which include ice deterioration, unreported and unregulated fishing, resource extraction preparation, and hostilities between treaty members. Given that these challenges involve China and Russia, it is in the United States’ interest to understand them and the potential request for US military intervention to maintain global security and treaty interests. Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss3/12/ Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: Antarctica, Antarctic Treaty, sea levels, unreported and unregulated fishing, global power competition   show less

Due to a global trend toward urbanization and Russian and Chinese aggression toward Ukraine and Taiwan, respectively, urban resistance to occupation merits greater study. The research here presents a much-needed and unique analysis of Dutch-language primary sources on the Netherlands’ World War II urban resistance to occupation. It provides deeper insights into the occupation experiences of a highly urbanized, densely populated country in which clandestine underground and auxiliary... read more

Due to a global trend toward urbanization and Russian and Chinese aggression toward Ukraine and Taiwan, respectively, urban resistance to occupation merits greater study. The research here presents a much-needed and unique analysis of Dutch-language primary sources on the Netherlands’ World War II urban resistance to occupation. It provides deeper insights into the occupation experiences of a highly urbanized, densely populated country in which clandestine underground and auxiliary elements played paramount roles in resistance efforts for most of the occupation period. It also illustrates the feasibility of overt, guerrilla-based activity in urban environments during the final phase of a conflict and offers insights into an understudied Landpower activity that modern at-risk countries should develop and hone. Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss3/14/ Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: resistance to occupation, Resistance Operating Concept, underground, special operations forces, megacity   show less

Taiwan has become increasingly important to the United States and its allies as the Russia-Ukraine War has united democracies against authoritarian expansionism and indeed has developed an international democracy-authoritarianism dynamic in global affairs. Part one of this article clearly outlined the geopolitical, economic, and soft-power reasons why Taiwan is strategically important. Part two reviews the development of US and allied policy statements on Taiwan—from the invasion of... read more

Taiwan has become increasingly important to the United States and its allies as the Russia-Ukraine War has united democracies against authoritarian expansionism and indeed has developed an international democracy-authoritarianism dynamic in global affairs. Part one of this article clearly outlined the geopolitical, economic, and soft-power reasons why Taiwan is strategically important. Part two reviews the development of US and allied policy statements on Taiwan—from the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 to the present—and provides policymakers and military strategists with incremental but realistic recommendations for understanding the current dynamic of the region and fashioning responses to deter further authoritarian aggression. Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss3/11/ Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: Taiwan, China, Russia, Ukraine, National Security Strategy, Biden   show less

The United States must place Russia’s focus on geographic concerns at the center of future strategy development to build a constructive relationship with Russia and achieve US regional goals. This article analyzes Russia’s geography and historical impact on Russian foreign policy, outlines Moscow’s current foreign policy goals, and highlights underlying concerns for US policymakers and military practitioners. By pursuing policies that support Russian goals of economic integration,... read more

The United States must place Russia’s focus on geographic concerns at the center of future strategy development to build a constructive relationship with Russia and achieve US regional goals. This article analyzes Russia’s geography and historical impact on Russian foreign policy, outlines Moscow’s current foreign policy goals, and highlights underlying concerns for US policymakers and military practitioners. By pursuing policies that support Russian goals of economic integration, mitigation of demographic concerns, and security of national borders, the United States can set the foundation for productive engagement on critical issues. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss3/13/ Keywords: US-Russian relations, geopolitics, military strategy, demographics, diplomacy, geography, economic investment Episode Transcript Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: strategic inflection point, Ukraine, multidomain operations (MDO), mission command, large-scale combat operations (LSCO) Stephanie Crider (Host) You’re listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors, and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, The US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m talking today with Major Caitlin Irby, author of “US Russia Foreign Policy: Confronting Russia’s Geographic Anxieties,” (https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss3/13/) which was published in the autumn 2023 issue of Parameters. Irby is an Air Force Intelligence officer currently serving at Fort Liberty, NC. Welcome to Decisive Point, Caitlin. Caitlin P. Irby Good morning, and thanks for having me. Host Your article takes on the topic of the future of US Russia policy. What inspired you to write this piece? Irby Well, I really started studying Russia during my assignment at Special Operations Command, Europe. “I got there in 2015, so it was shortly after the Russian incursion into Crimea and the Donbas. I enjoyed that work so much, I started reading about Russia outside of work and in my free time. And I really started thinking about the fact that the US goal was stated to deter Russia, but we had obviously failed at that a couple of times at this point. And so, I started just sort of thinking about what might actually work in line with all of my reading. And then, unfortunately, we failed again come 2022. So, really, this article is a conclusion of about seven years worth of me thinking about the subject. Host In your article you address two types of geography. What are they? Irby Geography is broken into physical and human geography. In the military, we tend to really focus on physical geography: mountains, rivers, key terrains. But there’s also human geography, which can involve the spatial distribution of human characteristics like ethnicity, industry, or political boundaries. It’s fairly unusual for analysts to group all of these together as part of a geographic analysis, so I really wanted to highlight both sides of the field Host How does geography influence Russian leaders? Irby On the physical geography side, Russian leaders have historically had to compete with Russia’s insecure boundaries. They’re located on the European Plain. That really creates an insecure homeland. As a response, throughout history, they have had to militarily expand to keep their core safe, and this really manifests in trading space for time when an invading army tries to attack them, such as with Hitler and Napoleon. So, that’s one aspect: expansion is viewed as a matter of national survival. The second major physical geographic factor is their lack of access to warm-water ports. This is particularly relevant today in a globalized economy because Russia can’t export their primary exports, so oil and natural gas, like many countries do via the ocean. They have to use pipelines, which forces them to engage in multilateral agreements, as pipelines cross multiple countries. It generally makes them less stable, and you see this throughout the history of the Russian economy. It goes up and down based off of oil prices because, frankly, they’re just less competitive than countries that have access to warm-water ports. And then on the human geographic side, Russia has a shrinking population and has for a while now. And it’s only getting worse because their birth rate remains below replacement rate. When you combine that with the physical geographic factors, that means there’s fewer soldiers to put into their army to defend their expansive borders and fewer workers to run their economy. So, all of these geographic factors combined create potentially regime-threatening effects within the country. And so, that’s why it really preoccupies Russian leaders. Host So what are your recommendations for how the United States can acknowledge and address Russia’s geographically derived anxieties to develop future policy? Irby I broke my recommendations down into three categories. The first one involved economic assistance to enable Russia to develop in a way that decreases their reliance on warm-water ports. I recommended Russia transition from a oil and natural gas export to things that are more viable going into the future, such as renewable energy. Renewable energy is forced via technology to largely be a regional enterprise, which means it’s less competitive than the global oil market, which gives Russia an advantage, at least within its region. I also talked about expanding their agricultural sector because climate change might actually help Russia, they could develop more agricultural land. And then, also, building on their pre-existing manufacturing capability to sort of pivot into manufacturing sectors that are going to remain relevant in the future. They have a highly educated population, a robust industrial base, so they’ll be able to pivot to some of the more advanced manufacturing that is going to be required as the global economy continues to rev up, and that will allow them to remain relevant. My second category of recommendations involves improving governance and investing in advanced technology to address their demographic challenges. Numerous studies have found that the Russian economy is severely hampered by corruption and government inefficiency. And as a counterpoint, countries like Estonia and Latvia started from the same Soviet base, but their per capita GDP now exceeds Russia because they’ve made improvements in these areas. Building on their experience in helping Russia improve in governance areas will help their economy capitalize on what they are doing and not drag them down. Additionally, automation and artificial intelligence could ease the strain associated with the declining population. Germany and Japan already face declining populations, and they are some of the most heavily automated countries in the world. And so, these are US allies that could potentially help a Russian state improve in these areas to make their economy more viable. The third category of recommendations- most controversial category—has to do with giving Russia security guarantees that they’re not going to be invaded so that they don’t need to constantly expand to maintain the security of their state. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US debated a number of ways to expand NATO in a way that wouldn’t antagonize Russia. These included a NATO-Russia charter to have Partnership for Peace be nonbinding. Unfortunately, instead the US just expanded NATO right up to the Russian border, including former Soviet states, and that’s a sore spot for Russia. I sort of recommend revisiting some of those ideas and recommended giving Russia those legally binding agreements of nonaggression that they’ve sought. However, I also recommend that we do that in exchange for limited amounts of denuclearization and demilitarization. Obviously, a heavy cost. It would be difficult to execute. That is sort of the core of getting to the security guarantees. Host Do you have any concluding thoughts you’d like to share before we go? Irby My last bit is just that ultimately, I think an increasingly unstable and aggressive Russia poses a variety of threats to US interests. Whether it’s cyber attacks, interfering in elections, irregular warfare and partner States and the growing relationship with China. I think all of that is bad for the United States, and I think that investing in a stable and secure Russia in the future is the best way to secure our interests, which is why I ultimately make these recommendations. Host Listeners, you can read the article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters Look for Volume 53 Issue 3 (https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss3/). Caitlin, thank you for making time to speak with me today. This was really insightful and informative. Irby Thank you for having me. Host If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, you can find us on any major podcast platform.   show less

Episode Transcript
Stephanie Crider (Host)
You're listening to Decisive Point (https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/mod/67423/details/582).
The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.
I'm speaking with Wilson Jones, author of “The Chechen Kadyrovtsy’s Coercive Violence in Ukraine... read more

Episode Transcript Stephanie Crider (Host) You're listening to Decisive Point (https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/mod/67423/details/582). The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I'm speaking with Wilson Jones, author of “The Chechen Kadyrovtsy’s Coercive Violence in Ukraine (https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss3/15/).” Jones is currently a defense analyst with GlobalData in London. Welcome to Decisive Point, Wilson. You write about the Chechen Kadyrovtsy—pro–Russian Chechens—and Ukraine. What does research say about military inequality and its relationship to coercive violence? Wilson Jones Military inequality theory is something coined by Jason Lyle in his book, Divided Armies. It draws on the ideas of many other researchers who have noticed how if a society has civilian inequalities and civilian divisions, those will be reflected in its military forces. So, if a society has a core ethnic “in” group with special privileges and a minority ethnic group who faces discrimination, then that divided nation will have a similarly divided military. The privileged “in” group is going to have priority for training and the best weapons and equipment and will typically be promoted to powerful leadership positions because they're seen as loyal to the regime. Now, the discriminated group, they'll be treated with suspicion and presumed to be disloyal. And so, they get the worst weapons (and) equipment, and are generally not promoted to leadership positions. They'll also be seen as expendable by their commanders, who typically come from that privileged “in” group. What this contributes to is using these minority ethnic soldiers in high-risk, high-casualty positions as cannon fodder. It also means that minority troops are more likely to experience coercive violence. Now, this term coersive violence refers to when allied soldiers beat torture or execute their own comrades. It's fratricidal violence. It can also involve the threats of these sorts of attacks and is used to enforce discipline or ensure that commands are followed. It can involve, literally, soldiers being forced into battle at the points of bayonets. And Russia and the Soviet Union have a very interesting history with this phenomenon. During World War II, Stalin issued Order 227, which included the infamous phrase “no step back.” It created blocking detachments who had the authority to arrest or execute retreating soldiers. Now, this is not a unique phenomenon to Russian society, and it's documented through many countries throughout history. There are many examples of coercive violence in history, but military commanders will resort to using coercive violence in desperate circumstances when they have few other options to enforce discipline. And when there is military inequality at play, it's more likely that troops seen as expendable will be victims of coercive violence. What's interesting is that soldiers from the discriminated group will produce poor soldiers not for inherent reasons but because discrimination and a lack of training and equipment naturally create demoralized and ineffective troops. So, the idea that one group is naturally superior or inferior often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Host Through this lens, tell us about Chechnya and the Chechen wars. Jones So, Chechnya is a region of the Russian Federation, and its native Chechen society is Islamic and tribal, which is very different from Russia's Orthodox and non-tribal society. In the 1990s, Chechnya tried to cede from Russia in the context of the wider Soviet collapse, and Russia waged two wars to try and prevent this. Chechnya won de facto independence in the first war, but Russia would later reinvade and win the second war, where they installed the Kadyrov family as the local collaborator regime to rule this region. So, Russia's defeat in the first war came at the hands of a very vicious Chechen insurgency. Even though Russia had more troops, overwhelming firepower, and air supremacy, Chechens launched hundreds of guerrilla attacks. They used snipers, IED bombs, and hit-and-run operations. Russian forces lacked human intelligence to selectively target the insurgency and the civilian supporters of the insurgency, which meant Russia resorted to mass violence against the Chechen population, which killed hundreds of thousands of civilians and only increased the insurgency’s strength. Thousands of Russian troops were additionally killed, although casualty counts from the wars are very inaccurate. What did happen is massive anti-war backlash within Russia. After two years, the Russian military had been humiliated by tiny Chechen forces and was ultimately forced to withdraw. Now in the second war, Russia, adjusted its strategy by working with local pro-Russian Chechens, who had their own militia forces. This included the Kadyrov family and their Kadyrovtsy forces, who would eventually become the principal collaborator faction. Having Chechens fighting with Russia solved many of the problems of the first war, and instead of Russian troops dying, who had been drawn from all over the federation, eventually it would only be local Kadyrovtsy fighters who were handling the conflict. This meant that local ethnic minorities who were not official combatants were dying in the war, and these deaths minimally impacted Russian war support. Additionally, Chechen collaborators combined Russia's superior firepower with essential human intelligence on the ground to crush the insurgency. And the Kadyrovtsy and Chechnya, they were both an essential but an expendable force at the same time. Now the Kadyrovtsy, they also engaged in an extensive course of violence to maintain order within their own ranks. Torture is routine and many thousands of Chechens have been forcefully conscripted into these forces. This is especially true of former Chechen insurgents. An infamous practice is a Kadyrovtsy kidnapping an insurgent’s family to force the insurgent to surrender and continuing to hold that family as a hostage. The threat-of-kin punishment against fighter families is a defining tactic of the Kadyrovtsy. This is a very brutal regime in an impoverished area within Russia, and there's now a diaspora of several thousand Chechens who have fled the region. Kadyrovtsy fighters, however, know that if they desert, their families will be killed in retaliation. Coercive Kadyrovtsy behavior challenges some of the earlier writings on coercive violence and military inequality. I proposed in my paper that this is because of the unique regime within Chechnya. Although Chechens undoubtedly face serious discrimination in Russian society today, the Kadyrov regime has also been given extreme autonomy to rule Chechnya. The Kadyrovtsy both have a great deal of flexibility to act as they please within Chechnya and use these kin-based reprisals to maintain order. However, at the same time, their deaths as minority ethnics really don't matter to Russian society at large or the decisionmakers in Moscow. At the end of the day, they’re still a very important collaborative force to Russian control of Chechnya. Host How did the Chechen wars relate to Ukraine? Jones The Chechen wars were the first major conflict in the former USSR, and there's a very strong similarity between Russian warriors in the Chechen wars and in Ukraine today. In both cases, the leadership in Moscow is claiming to be fighting for control of a rightful or historical Russian territory and also to be fighting in the interests of the local population. In Chechnya, this involved a lot of rhetoric about fighting alleged neo-Nazis or Islamic extremists in the area, some of which was based in reality but a lot of which was mostly Russian propaganda. In Ukraine today, we're seeing, again, rhetoric about liberating ethnic Russians in the Donbass from the Ukrainian neo-Nazi government, but this is also a fabrication of Russian propaganda. Since Chechnya has been firmly under Russian control, Kadyrovtsy forces have been fighting in Ukraine for some time. They've been documented since at least 2014 with the initial Russian invasion of Crimea and the war on the Donbas. They've been present in Ukraine since 2014, with the war in the Donbas and the invasion of Crimea, but their presence has significantly expanded since 2022. The Chechen forces that are fighting for Russia in Ukraine are in a central part of Russia's military. They are generally very devoted, very well motivated troops compared to some of the more demoralized Russian conscripts and separatist militias that we observed. What the Kadyrovtsy have been documented doing, specifically, is acting as blocking detachments for Russia. When Russia fights and relies on their demoralized, poorly armed and poorly trained militia men and conscripts, the Kadyrovtsy have been the forces that force these first wave troops into Ukrainian machine guns, effectively. They are corralling masses of Russians and Russian allies into the battle. This is a significant break with military inequality theory. Typically, and this is what Jason Lyle proposed in his book, is that core ethnic troops are the ones dictating orders to minority ethnic troops. Privileged groups give orders to the underprivileged groups. What the Kadyrovtsy are doing in Ukraine is a reversal of this trend. They’re a minority ethnic force, and they are deploying coercive violence against the core ethnic groups. Again, I propose in my paper this is because of the unique regime in Chechnya and the unique relationship between Chechens and Russians. The Kadyrovtsy are a force that have experience applying coercive violence within their own ranks, and because of existing Russian-Chechen ethnic tensions, they're more than willing to beat, torture, and execute Russian conscripts; even though this causes significant Russian casualties, it ultimately helps the Russian army execute their strategy in Ukraine because it lets them extract maximum effectiveness from their poor-quality conscript troops. Host You offer strategic proposals in your article. Please share them with us. Jones So, Russia has fielded this two-tiered military force in Ukraine where Russia's core soldiers, it's crack contract troops, the airborne and armor forces who have great weapons equipment and training, and who are very reliable in combat and generally don't get demoralized. There's a second group of disposable Russian forces, who include the separatist militias from the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, the Wagner mercenary forces and other mercenary forces, and poor-quality Russian conscripts who are disproportionately drawn from poor, rural, and minority backgrounds in Russia. The most efficient use of Ukraine's military resources to fight this two-tiered military that they're facing is to target that first group the—competent head that's effectively leading the rest of this lumbering Russian body. My strategic proposals include exploiting divisions in Russia's forces for further opportunities for Ukraine. Prigozhin’s Wagner rebellion this last summer demonstrated that a large portion of the Russian military is unhappy with Putin's direction of the war, and it seems very likely that other commanders could be enticed to desert with the correct offer of financial reward (as well as amnesties for war crimes and protections from Russian reprisals.) If this were to happen, that would bring essential military intelligence to Ukraine, as well as any possible military units that would desert with their commanders. Individual Russian troops have also been demonstrated to be willing to desert. If Ukraine can facilitate this, then it lets them preserve their limited military resources for more determined Russian enemies. More determined enemies include the Kadyrovtsy, who need to be specifically targeted. This is a group that is forcing unwilling Russians into battle. Disrupting the strategy would seriously impact Russia's ability to conduct the war. The Kadyrovtsy are also what ensure Russia's control of Chechnya. If Chechen commanders or political leaders were to be killed and the group were to be shattered, this would destabilize the situation in Chechnya and effectively open a second front, potentially for Ukraine. Ukraine's already proven that they're able to target Russian targets deep inland, such as in Moscow with drone strikes. Strikes on Grozny against critical infrastructure or military targets may also have a similar impact and force Kadyrovtsy units to redeploy home. However, it seems unlikely that another Chechen war or insurgency against Russia will occur at this stage. More realistically, though, there is a Chechen government in exile, which Ukraine recently recognized. This is a secular and anti-radical organization, which is committed to building a functional democracy within Chechnya. There has been a great focus on sending weapons and material aid to Ukraine, but there should also be an application of international diplomacy to build a coalition against Russian aggression. Host Do you have any concluding thoughts you'd like to share? Jones Within the military and in this academic idea, there's a risk of painting issues in very black and white terms and that troops are either part of the privileged “in” group or the discriminated “out” group. The Kadyrovtsy are an interesting example that demonstrates that these two groups can actually overlap. They're a minority force that's definitely less important than Russia's crack contract troops. But they're much more important than disposable Russian conscripts or Ukrainian militiamen. I think that this highlights a very important area for future research. For Ukraine, understanding Chechnya demonstrates how Russia's sitting government conducts war, and that helps characterize how Russia will act in the ongoing war in Ukraine. In the First Chechen war, as well as in the earlier Soviet-Afghan War, Soviet and Russian forces became demoralized from acceptable casualties. They still retained plenty of military means and resources, but they lacked a coherent strategy for victory and a political will to fight, which prompted a withdrawal. So far in Ukraine, we're not seeing the signs of a comprehensive military victory from either side, but instead, a very slow grinding attrition. Ukraine's ongoing counteroffensive has been played up in Western media as a decisive final battle, but this was always an unrealistic characterization. I think it's more likely that we'll witness a result similar to the Chechen wars in Ukraine, either like in the First Chechen War, Russia exhausts itself and withdrawals, or like in the Second Chechen War, Russia's enemy is exhausted and collapses, and a pro-Russian collaborator regime is installed. Helping Ukraine means recognizing that this conflict is not ending soon, that they'll need support and material to outlast Russia in a long war. Host Listeners, you can find the article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 53, issue 3. Wilson, thank you for making time to speak with me today. Jones Thank you for having me, Stephanie. I appreciate it. Host If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, you can find us on any major podcast platform.   show less

A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force

Fifty years ago, the US Army faced a strategic inflection point after a failed counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam. In response to lessons learned from the Yom Kippur War, the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command was created to reorient thinking and doctrine around the conventional Soviet threat. Today’s Army must embrace the Russo-Ukrainian conflict as an opportunity to reorient the force into one as... read more

A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force Fifty years ago, the US Army faced a strategic inflection point after a failed counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam. In response to lessons learned from the Yom Kippur War, the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command was created to reorient thinking and doctrine around the conventional Soviet threat. Today’s Army must embrace the Russo-Ukrainian conflict as an opportunity to reorient the force into one as forward-thinking and formidable as the Army that won Operation Desert Storm. This episode suggests changes the Army should make to enable success in multidomain large-scale combat operations at today’s strategic inflection point. Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss3/10/ Read the episode transcript below. Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: strategic inflection point, Ukraine, multidomain operations (MDO), mission command, large-scale combat operations (LSCO) Episode Transcript Stephanie Crider (Host) You're listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I'm talking with Lieutenant Colonel Katie Crombe and Dr. John A. Nagl today, authors of “A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force,” which was published in the autumn 2023 issue of Parameters. (https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss3/10/) Crombe is an Army strategist currently assigned to the joint staff. She was the chief of staff of an integrated research project commissioned by TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command) during academic year 2023 at the US Army War College. Nagl is a professor of war fighting studies at the US Army War College and was the director of an integrated research project commissioned by TRADOC during academic year 2023. Welcome to Decisive Point, Katie and John. John A. Nagl Thanks, Stephanie, it's good to be here. Katie Crombe Thanks, Stephanie. Host Katie, please give our audience some background and tell us about the establishment of TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command). Katie Crombe During this study, we went back to the last strategic inflection point that we saw the Army go through. And we recognized that as 1973, following the Yom Kippur War. And so, we began digging a little bit deeper on why that was such an important point for the US Army. What we realized was not only the Secretary of Defense, but the Chief of Staff of the Army at the time, Creighton Abrams, had a revolutionary and evolutionary leader in a guy named General William E. DePuy, who was a combat leader in World War II but also known for being a deep and thoughtful intellectual. They knew that the Army needed to change. They knew that the Army needed to rise to the occasion of the conventional Soviet threat, and they figured that the training and education that the Army had established was not going to get us there. So, they had General DePuy stand up something called Training and Doctrine Command in 1973. And what he did right at the beginning was do a deep study on the 1973 Yom Kippur War through a couple of lenses, both his intellectual lens—you know, he was just deeply interested in that as a curious man— and also, his combat lens, as he lost 100 percent of his battalion in World War II. That deeply affected him, and he wanted to ensure that the US Army never faced this again. So, when he established Training and Doctrine Command, his concept was really to lead training and education and do this through a series of exercises, different ways to train, and also the development of new fighting manuals that the Army would read at echelon. Everyone from the lowest in the squad up to the division commander really could understand how and why people were fighting. And so, we really used that as the genesis. Over the years, TRADOC—as we all know it by now—I think that it's a little bit of a culture thing, but we think of it as more the doctrine side rather than the training side. We don't think of it as a revolutionary kind of think tank–type of organization. And we know now what's going on with Russia and Ukraine and what will (or could, eventually) go on with China, that we need TRADOC to go back to its revolutionary roots and really start thinking about the future. And we think that they have infrastructure and the people and the leadership to do it. It's just that they need to be the drivers of change for the future. Host John, what else can you tell us about the study that this article is based on? Nagl So, this study began when General Funk (Paul E. Funk II), then the commander of Training and Doctrine Command, asked the Army War College, about a year ago, to look at this ongoing war between the Russians and the Ukrainians, the biggest war in Europe since 1945. And General Funk believed, as I do, that the lessons available to us from this rare, horrifying event were so important that we would be sadly remiss if we didn't learn from them. And I was privileged to be able to pull together a team of what ended up being 18 students from the Army War College class of 2023 (and) half a dozen faculty members. The leader of the students was Katie, and we looked across the Army's warfighting functions. But even more broadly, we looked at medical lessons we could learn from this war. We looked at airpower and seapower lessons we could derive, and we came up with a, I think, a pretty extraordinary list of ideas that the Army, we believe, can benefit from as it prepares to deter war with China and as it prepares for whatever other fights it may have to engage in in the years and decades to come. Host Katie, you argue that TRADOC “can lead the Army back to the basics of education, training, and doctrine development at the pace that was founded, a pace that drove ruthless prioritization and reassessment.” Please expand on this idea. Crombe What we were driving toward in that is when General DePuy created TRADOC, he was really trying to bring training out of these abstract and ambiguous threats and more into a real-time training that focused on imminent threats of the day. The Ukraine War is posing such a real-life experimentation lab for us that we can put into training now as we speak. We can put these young soldiers into learning how to move combat outposts, to be more ambiguous in, you know, hiding from the enemy. And we can take so many lessons right now. We do not need to wait for 10 years to compile these lessons, you know, in the back of a library, eventually put them in a SCIF (sensitive compartmented information facility) and then transfer them to some kind of training manual, eventually put them into doctrine, and then 10 years from now, we're actually exercising or rehearsing on these lessons learned. Our priority is to make sure that we get these out there in the unclassified environment as the fight is evolving and let units train to the standard that they will need to hold against a similar enemy, whether it be Russia or China, in the future. Another thing that he was really, really focused on, he being General DePuy, was carefully selecting and training soldiers and leaders and them doing this training together. It's not just sending someone out to a national training center one month a year and grading them on a scenario that they know is coming and that they've rehearsed all year. It's putting them in something that is changing by the minute, by the hour, by the day, and putting these leaders and soldiers together to learn to trust each other at echelon; to know that the person above them and below them is going to make the right decision, regardless of how dispersed or distributed they may be; and really build this trust that they'll need to conduct the kind of large-scale combat operation that we see in our future. Host TRADOC was established to transform the Army into the best-trained, -equipped, -led, and -organized land power in the world. What possibilities do you see for this organization going forward? Nagl I think it still has all those same responsibilities, Stephanie, and what we are doing is calling the organization back to its roots. So, in 1973, the United States Army was coming off of 20 years of not completely successful counterinsurgency campaigns in Asia, and suddenly proxy force for the United States, using American equipment to American doctrine, found itself challenged by the Soviet Union. TRADOC was created in response to that wake-up call, and we think there's a similar wake-up call today in a very similar historic situation in which the United States is again ending, at least for now, 20 years of counterinsurgency efforts in greater Asia. Thinking anew about large scale combat operations, we think TRADOC has the responsibility to learn those lessons, but we have another organization that's being created in the Army, just in the past five years or so. General (Mark A.) Milley, when he was Chief of Staff of the Army, created something called Futures Command. I'm actually just back from a session at Futures Command. General Jim Rainey (James E. Rainey) and his team are very interested in this study that we've been doing and in what it says about what the Army should look like in 2040. We've been sharing these lessons with him, with Futures Command, and thinking hard about how the Army adapts to this new era of what appears to be persistent surveillance, Katie talked about that a little bit, and increasingly, the artificial intelligence, robotics, human-machine pairing. Those are some of the technologies that we're seeing in their early phases being used in this current war, and we think they have huge implications for what the Army and the entire Department of Defense should look like in the decades that we're preparing for now. Host Katie, what lessons from the ongoing war in Ukraine should the American Army be paying particular attention to? Crombe I'll give you kind of our top five lines that emerged from this study, the first one being that organizational culture really needs to embrace this change coming in the Army. And what we mean at the root of that is mission command. It's not just talking to talk, but it's walking the walk with mission command. We've talked about that for the better part of two decades. It's much easier to exercise mission command when you have stadium-sized JOCs (Joint Operations Centers), perfect communication, a perfect sight picture of what's going on in the air and on the ground. That trust does not need to emerge as quickly when you have this perfect communication. So, mission command, although we say we've been practicing that, in reality, we probably are not as good as we could be, and, going forward, it's this trust that is going to be at the core of mission command. It's this training and rehearsing that we need to do together. It's understanding our fighting manuals at every echelon. It's knowing what your boss two up is doing so that if he goes that we can execute. That's what happened in World War II. And we would trust a battalion commander to become a division commander overnight because that person understood the training and the doctrine, and they trusted those around them. And that's the kind of fight that we might see in the future. So first, organizational culture needs to really adopt this mission command and walk the walk with it. The second part, and it's tangential to that, is that we believe the command-and-control nodes will be the first things targeted, and we've seen that throughout this conflict, repeatedly. The Ukrainians have adapted very quickly to this. They have very small command posts, and they move them every hour, every minute. They move them when they need to. They pick up and go. We need to do that. We need to rehearse that at every level across the Army. Along those lines, we need to make sure that our electronic signature is very small. We don't want to be able to be targeted by the enemy. And so, it's just trying to figure out how to, kind of, scramble that and make it more difficult for the adversary. The third one is that large-scale combat operations is going to produce casualties that would make our eyes water, right now, on things that we have not seen since World War II. The two decades of the fight against terrorism have not produced anywhere near the kind of casualties that we would see. So, it's not only moving casualties from a logistics perspective, but it's figuring out how our culture would accept that and the political-military connection—what we would be willing to absorb as a nation? The next one goes with that and it's just really understanding our IRR (individual ready reserve), our regular ready reserve and our retired reserve and how we can ensure that it is a more robust system that we have access to. Everyone hears about the recruiting challenges that the US Army faces right now. It's much broader than recruiting and retention. It's if we did go into this fight, we would need to replace casualties at a rapid rate, and our system is just not built for that. And then, finally, is there's been a fundamental change in the character of war overall. Artificial intelligence and machine learning have changed the way that every military is fighting. It changes the way that we operate as humans in society. Our kids. Us. It's changed everything. And that is especially true in combat. So, we need to embrace that. That's a big part of our article is that we are at a strategic inflection point because of that. We're not going to stop this evolution. It's coming. And so, we need to rapidly figure out how to incorporate these technologies into our combat and our battle formations and make the best use of them. Akin to that is really understanding the defense industrial base, and also the commercial sector and figuring out how we link better up with them knowing that Elon (Musk) can put a satellite up whenever he wants. And so, it's how do we leverage that for our good and make sure that the adversary does not use it for theirs? Host John, what lessons from the ongoing war in Ukraine should the American Navy and Air Force be learning? Nagl We started off planning to do just an Army study, but we had a Navy civilian who wanted to join the project. And I was interested in the naval implications, and retired Navy Captain Al Lord was working on the project with me. So, he took that young man under his wing. And, really, we see a lot of applications. What Katie was just talking about with artificial intelligence, unmanned systems, we're seeing that playing out very quickly, very dramatically, in the seas around Ukraine. In fact, while we've been talking, I just received a note from Al pointing out that the world's first specialized explosive naval drone unit has just been formed in Ukraine. So, we're literally seeing this all happen in real time, as we talk. I think there's an awful lot that the Navy can learn from that. If we had the Navy, I felt bad and thought we probably needed to include airpower, as well, and reached out to Maxwell to the Air War College, where a State Department officer, actually, was doing some really interesting work and wrote what may be one of the best papers in the entire project—a paper called “Potemkin on the Dnieper: The Failure of Russian Airpower in the Ukraine War.” The big surprises of this war, for me, have been Russian failure to establish and maintain air superiority and Russian failure to use cyber in a way that really brought Ukraine to its knees. Neither of those things have happened. And Sean examines why in that Small Wars and Insurgencies journal article already published. And I think the implications of what we've seen there in the air and the sea have huge implications not just for the Russo-Ukrainian War but also for any possible future conflict with China. Host Katie, do you have any concluding thoughts you'd like to share? Crombe What Dr. Nagl just brought up about the air and the sea is so important. There are some lessons on not only sustainment and logistics, sea lines of communication, but the things that we're learning that the Russians have attempted to do in the Black Sea and have maybe not been as successful as they imagine are lessons that we can take forward for the China fight. If the supply lines are interrupted on the Black Sea, there's land to go across to supply. That's not going to be true in the Pacific. So, these kinds of lessons are even more important. How do we attack ships from land? It’s kind of an old-school thought. And I think people are thinking more about it now—shore-based artillery that can get after some of these moving targets. Can the Army use HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System)? How can we be creative so that we're not so reliant on single services to approach the adversary in certain ways? So, I think that's a big thing. The other big lesson air-wise, I think, is air superiority was a given or a guarantee for us for the better part of 20 years, and no one has air superiority right now between Russia and Ukraine. And I think that's why the conflict is in the state that it's in right now after two years. No one can gain air superiority. And I think if the Russians had gained that early on, if the Ukrainians hadn’t been so creative and gotten after them with Stingers, we would be in a much different place than we are right now. So, it's making sure that our allies and partners in the future have those kinds of weapons (and) know how to employ them to ensure that no enemy can gain your superiority like that because that's the kind of fight that we're going to have. (My) final conclusion is just, you know, rapid learning is the way of the future. That's how people are approaching learning right now. It's the more knowledge, the better. I think that TRADOC really needs to embrace that and not wait to have a perfect body of work that comes out of the Russo-Ukraine conflict, but really take the lessons as they come and immediately transfer them into national training centers, into field manuals, and into doctrine that can be updated later and when necessary. But don't let perfect be the enemy of good. Host John, concluding thoughts? Nagl This study has just been an extraordinary gift. I got to work with Katie and 17 of her very talented classmates. We presented at the Army War College's Strategic Land Power Conference in May. I was invited to present our work at a joint NATO-Ukrainian conference in Poland in July, and that work is continuing to build and grow. And I'm just delighted that we're continuing the work this coming year. I am recruiting students from the Army War College class of 2024 to look at this current war. We had to knock off most of our research toward the end of 2022, and so we've got another full year of data, of history, of experience to learn from, to take advantage of the contacts I've made now, as this study has spread out across a number of armies and militaries around the globe. And my hope is that the Army War College can continue to take advantage of the talent we have in the faculty, in the student body, our friends, and our contacts, literally around the globe, to learn as much as we can from the courage of the Ukrainians, who are fighting a force that is absolutely evil, and help them find ways (to the extent that we can) to help them succeed in their efforts. But also, from their courage and from their experience, find ways to save American blood and treasure from the future wars that are inevitably going to occur. Host Listeners, you can read the article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 53, issue 3. Katie John, thank you so much for making time to speak with me today. Crombe Thanks, Stephanie. Nagl Thank you, Stephanie. Host If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, you can find us on any major podcast platform.   show less

This podcast analyzes the US Army’s successive recruiting crises, identifying their consistent patterns and the efforts to resolve them, and makes three provocative arguments. First, there is a long-standing institutional tension between recruiting personnel for the combat arms and technical and administrative specialists. Second, many of today’s talent management problems were first identified in a 1907 General Staff report and reiterated in subsequent studies. Third, the Army has... read more

This podcast analyzes the US Army’s successive recruiting crises, identifying their consistent patterns and the efforts to resolve them, and makes three provocative arguments. First, there is a long-standing institutional tension between recruiting personnel for the combat arms and technical and administrative specialists. Second, many of today’s talent management problems were first identified in a 1907 General Staff report and reiterated in subsequent studies. Third, the Army has pursued innovative recruitment strategies, but much of their success depended on factors outside the service’s control. The podcast concludes with four history-based recruiting lessons and an affirmation that the 2019 Army People Strategy recognizes the need for the Army to revise its talent management approach. Read here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss3/9/ Keywords: recruitment, US Army history, personnel policy, talent management, Army People Strategy   show less

This podcast offers a preview of the latest Parameters demi-issue and full issue. Read the issue here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss3/7/

Keywords: recruiting, Ukraine, Taiwan, Antarctica, Russia, Chechen Kadyrovtsy

This episode showcases the understudied institutional Army, the generating force, as a critical prerequisite for overall strategic success. Competition, crisis, and conflict require more than the manned, trained, and equipped units that deploy. This podcast analyzes six case studies of institutional Army reforms over 160 years to examine adaptation in peace and war. The conclusions provide historical insights to inform current practices and fulfill the Army’s articulated 2022 Institutional Strategy.

https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss2/14/

Keywords: institutional Army, generating force, Department of the Army staff, Army Futures Command, adaptation, innovation

In 1944, Third US Army created a cohesive and flexible system for managing information and denying it to the enemy that aligned operational concepts with technological capabilities. The organization’s success in the European Theater highlights its effective combined arms integration. An examination of the historical record shows the creative design of the Signal Intelligence and Army Information Services enabled Third Army to deliver information effects consistently and provides a useful... read more

In 1944, Third US Army created a cohesive and flexible system for managing information and denying it to the enemy that aligned operational concepts with technological capabilities. The organization’s success in the European Theater highlights its effective combined arms integration. An examination of the historical record shows the creative design of the Signal Intelligence and Army Information Services enabled Third Army to deliver information effects consistently and provides a useful model for considering the dynamics at play in fielding new and experimental multidomain effects formations. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss2/14/ Keywords: World War II, Third United States Army, military effectiveness, force design, information advantage About the author: Major Spencer L. French, US Army, is a military intelligence officer currently assigned as the operations officer for the 704th Military Intelligence Brigade at Fort Meade, Maryland. His research interests focus on historical military innovation and force design.   show less

This podcast presents four factors to consider in evaluating Taiwan’s strategic importance to the United States and its allies and answers a question often raised at forums concerning the Indo-Pacific: “Why should the United States care” about this small island in the Pacific? The response often given is simply US credibility, and while this is an important factor, this podcast reviews a wider array of possible factors to consider when answering that question. The study of these... read more

This podcast presents four factors to consider in evaluating Taiwan’s strategic importance to the United States and its allies and answers a question often raised at forums concerning the Indo-Pacific: “Why should the United States care” about this small island in the Pacific? The response often given is simply US credibility, and while this is an important factor, this podcast reviews a wider array of possible factors to consider when answering that question. The study of these factors should assist US military and policy practitioners in accurately evaluating the related strategic environment. Through a survey of official US policy statements and strategy documents across administrations, part two of this article (to be featured in a future issue) will examine the evolving US perception of Taiwan throughout the aggressive strengthening of China and during Taiwan’s domestic political development into a full-fledged democracy. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss2/11/ Keywords: Taiwan, geopolitical, credibility, democracy, authoritarian About the author:Luke P. Bellocchi, JD, LLM, MSSI, MBA, served in senior and senior executive positions throughout his government career and is now an associate professor of practice at National Defense University, where he teaches strategy and a China elective at the Joint Advanced Warfighting School. His recent work, “The U.S. One China Policy: A Primer for Professional Military Education,” can be found at https://jfsc.ndu.edu/Media/Campaigning-Journals/.   show less

National security practitioners need to understand the motives, mindsets, and intentions of adversaries to anticipate and respond to their actions effectively. Although some authors have argued empathy helps build an understanding of the adversary, research points to its cognitive component of perspective taking as the more appropriate skill for national security practitioners to have. In this podcast, Dr. Allison Abbe synthesizes previous research on the development and application of... read more

National security practitioners need to understand the motives, mindsets, and intentions of adversaries to anticipate and respond to their actions effectively. Although some authors have argued empathy helps build an understanding of the adversary, research points to its cognitive component of perspective taking as the more appropriate skill for national security practitioners to have. In this podcast, Dr. Allison Abbe synthesizes previous research on the development and application of perspective taking in analysis and decision making and recommends four ways strategists and practitioners can enhance their ability to gain insight into adversaries. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss2/9/ Keywords: perspective taking, strategic empathy, political psychology, military education, cognitive bias Episode Transcript: Understanding the Adversary: Strategic Empathy and Perspective Taking in National Security Stephanie Crider (Host) You’re listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m talking with Dr. Allison Abbe today, author of “Understanding the Adversary: Strategic Empathy and Perspective Taking in National Security,” which was published in the Summer 2023 issue of Parameters. Abbe is a professor of organizational studies at the US Army War College. Her research focuses on the development of leadership and intercultural skills in national security personnel. Welcome to Decisive Point, Dr. Abbe. Dr. Allison Abbe Thanks for having me. Host Your article synthesizes research on perspective taking in analysis and decision making and recommends four ways strategists and practitioners can enhance their ability to gain insight into adversaries. Will you please explain perspective taking in the context of strategic empathy? Abbe Sure. So, strategic empathy has been talked about in terms of understanding adversaries and competitors and being able to better anticipate their actions. And in psychology, the topic of empathy has been more in the context of helping relationships between clinicians and patients, or clinicians and clients in the context of mental health. And so, there’s a rich literature on empathy but in a slightly different context than in the national security arena. In psychology, empathy is talked about in terms of empathic concern for the other person or party, motivation to engage in empathy, and then perspective taking. So those three components are not as equally applicable in the national security arena as they might be in a one-on-one relationship—an interpersonal relationship like in a romantic relationship or a patient-practitioner medical kind of context. So, focusing on perspective taking allows us to pull just the really relevant skills about empathy that can be applied in the national security context and focus more on how it is people can go about understanding the cognitive perspective of someone else without taking on the emotions of another party or really wanting to help the other party. You can maintain your own interests while understanding the perspective of the adversary, or even a partner. Host How can leaders and strategists develop perspective taking as a skill? Abbe So, perspective taking as a basic ability develops in childhood. We know from the developmental psychology literature that we’re capable of it as small children. But it’s a very cognitively demanding skill, and so people don’t automatically engage in it. Your default is to use your own perspective, and then you only take on someone else’s perspective with additional cognitive effort. And so, even though people have the capability to do it, they aren’t necessarily applying it in day-to-day life. And so, it takes a lot of intention to use perspective taking and to get better at understanding other people’s perspectives. You can really only take on someone else’s perspective if you understand their context and you understand the person. And so, it’s important to have the background knowledge that would enable you to really understand their perspective. You have to have that information available to be able to do that effectively. So, study of another party’s decision-making patterns, the influences—cultural or regional influences—on their decision making would be important, as well as having the time and energy to engage in that perspective-taking skill. Host What unique challenges and opportunities are there in the national security context of perspective taking? Abbe One of the unique challenges is the distance often from the other party. And so, you’re trying to take on the perspective of somebody that you don’t have an opportunity to interact directly with. And so, you could watch their speeches, you can read what they’ve published, what they’ve written (or at least what their speech writers have written for them). But in the national security context, you don’t necessarily have the opportunity to ask them questions so you can better understand their perspective the way that you would if you were a doctor interviewing a patient (or in an interpersonal relationship) to try to better understand the other’s perspective. And so, that distance and the lack of opportunity to interact directly is certainly one limitation or challenge. So, then you have to use other sources of information to try to gain that perspective. I think one of the unique opportunities that we haven’t always engaged in this context is that perspective taking can really help make better decisions and choose among courses of action. So, if you understand the other party, whether it’s an individual foreign leader or it’s a local population in a village, and you’re trying to help them counter terrorism influences in their community, you have to understand what they care about, what they’re motivated by, what their interests are . . . in order to make better decisions about how to interact with them and how to advance US interests. Host Are there any research gaps or challenges that we need to consider regarding this topic? Abbe One of the research gaps is we’ve had difficulty in psychology, at least, in developing measures of perspective-taking ability. So, that’s one limitation. The typical way to go about measuring it is to use a self-report questionnaire, which is really good for assessing people’s motivation to engage in perspective taking. But it’s not as good at measuring their accuracy and doing it as a skill. As a really important cognitive skill, we should have better tools to go about measuring how well people are engaging in perspective taking (and) how accurate they are in engaging perspective taking. And so, that’s one research gap that could be addressed in the behavioral sciences. Another one is just on the development and application of perspective taking. How is it that we can encourage practitioners to engage these skills as they’re acquiring other skills at the same time? I’ve talked about it in the article in terms of its relationship to systems thinking, which is another important cognitive skill set. Cross-cultural competence is another area where there’s intersection. And so, then, how do we develop this skill in practitioners at the same time that they’re developing these other important skills that are applicable to their work? Host I think we have a few extra minutes if you have any concluding thoughts that you’d like to share before we wrap it up. Abbe One of the interesting areas for further research is looking at various tools to develop perspective-taking skill. There’s some interesting research, in college students, at least, that shows that reading literary fiction is one way to develop perspective taking. Literary fiction helps you take on the perspective of the characters in the novel and can help people develop perspective taking. And it doesn’t develop from just watching movies or reading popular fiction. There’s something about the challenging nature of literary fiction and requiring cognitive effort and really diving into characters that seems to help. There’s limited research on that, but that’s really one interesting avenue. Studying history, of course, is one way to develop better perspective-taking skills. So, there might be some interesting research avenues for that as well. Those are two good ways of potentially developing that people can use in their own free time, as reading is, you know, one common hobby. So, directing people to the kinds of sources that might help them develop the skill set and understanding how that develops would be an interesting area for further research. Host You can read more about perspective taking and empathy at press.armywarcollege.edu. Look for volume 53, issue 2. Dr. Abbe, thank you so much for making time for me today. This was really interesting. Abbe Thank you so much. Host If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, you can find us on any major podcast platform. About the author: Allison Abbe, PhD, is a professor of organizational studies at the US Army War College. Her research focuses on the development of leadership and intercultural skills in national security personnel. She previously worked as a research psychologist and program manager in defense and intelligence organizations and holds a PhD in social and personality psychology from the University of California, Riverside. Her work has appeared in the Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, Joint Force Quarterly, Government Executive, War Room, Parameters, Military Review, and Police Practice and Research.   show less

Scholars have been using the wrong card games to analyze Carl von Clausewitz’s analogies in On War, which has led to errors in understanding his ideas. This podcast identifies the games Clausewitz discusses, allowing for a more accurate interpretation of his original meaning for the study of war. Since Clausewitz’s ideas underpin strategy development within service education systems, it is critical his ideas are fully understood in context.

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Scholars have been using the wrong card games to analyze Carl von Clausewitz’s analogies in On War, which has led to errors in understanding his ideas. This podcast identifies the games Clausewitz discusses, allowing for a more accurate interpretation of his original meaning for the study of war. Since Clausewitz’s ideas underpin strategy development within service education systems, it is critical his ideas are fully understood in context. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss2/12/ Episode Transcript: Geniuses Dare to Ride Their Luck: Clausewitz’s Card Game Analogies Stephanie Crider (Host) You’re listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m talking today with Dr. Nicholas Murray. Murray designs and runs war games for the Secretary of Defense Strategic Thinkers Program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and Professional Military Education. He also translates the works of Carl von Clausewitz and other theorists. He’s the author of “Geniuses Dare to Ride Their Luck: Clausewitz’s Card Game Analogies,” which was published in the Summer 2023 issue of Parameters. Welcome to Decisive Point, Nick. Nicholas A. A. Murray Thank you very much for having me. It’s a pleasure. Host Your article asserts that scholars have been using the wrong card games to analyze Clausewitz’s analogies on war, which has led to errors in understanding his ideas. Please expand on that. Murray The reason I got into this . . . I think a bit of background might help . . . is the card games we use, which are typically blackjack, poker, or games like chess and bridge and things, didn’t seem to line up with what else I was reading and finding in his histories in terms of how he understood luck. And so, as I dug into it, the question struck me, which was what games would he have actually been familiar with, and what would he have played? And except for chess, the other games weren’t popular or even invented at the time of his life or writing. So, I started to look into that. What I found was that the games that he had in mind and actually discussed often—sometimes explicitly—were different stochastically in terms of luck. And they were different in terms of player interaction. And they were different in terms of things like cheating, which was an inherent part of almost all the games with which he was familiar. Taking that into account, it meant that contemporary analogies, using, say, blackjack, where one can card count, you can change the strategy of playing against the casino in your favor, for example. That simply didn’t exist. And so, he wasn’t thinking about something like that. He was thinking about something far more chance ridden than we have in mind. Host Which card games was Clausewitz likely talking about? Murray The three I’ve been able to identify, along with something called würfel, which is a version of a variety of different dice games, which is simply you roll a dice and bet on it. Sort of like craps, I suppose. But the three main ones are games called faro, skat, and ombre. And these were games that were familiar to Clausewitz. He explicitly references two and implicitly references skat via phrases that occur within that game. These card games are much different from the ones we would think about in terms of blackjack or poker. I think it’s worth the reader just having a quick understanding, if that would be helpful, I think, of what these entail. Faro is often described as little better than playing dice. It’s a banking game based on an older game called basset. Multiple players can play. The banker turns over a card, and you bet on a number. And if your number is matched by the card that turns up, you can win. And then the bets, depending on how you play, typically, you can win 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 times your stake, depending on the way the bank is set up. So, it’s enormously risky. It’s inherently wonderful for the banker. It’s typically known as one of the most fraudulent games . . . across cultures I found, as well, which is quite interesting. It’s all on the turn of a card. It’s essentially all about luck. There’s really no skill involved. And there’s no player interaction, either, which is one of the things that current scholars often, when they talk about card games, talk about the interaction between players. So, one of the main games that Clausewitz explicitly references has virtually no interaction with players and is almost exclusively luck based. It’s fundamentally different from often how we look at and interpret what he’s saying. Skat is a trick-taking game that originated in Thuringia, just near where Clausewitz was living. It was popular at the time. It typically involves three players. Good luck or bad luck can overcome a bad hand or good hand, respectively, irrespective of the skill of the player. But skill is definitely required, as is a good strategy. And then the third game, again, this is one of the two he explicitly references, is ombre, which was the (probably) card game of the seventeenth and early–eighteenth centuries. It requires an enormous amount of luck. Daring play is often celebrated and rewarded, even if it leads to losses. And so, it‘s the nature of the game, and how you play it is as important as the fact that it‘s a trick-taking card game, that’s inherently luck based. You can have a strategy, but players are celebrated for being exceptionally daring when they play, and that’s something to take into account when we’re thinking of context about how he and his contemporaries would have thought about what this means. Host Clausewitz writes about the relationship between risk and chance. Examining his writings through the lens of these card games you just told me about, how might this alter the meaning of previous interpretations of his work? Murray I think it’s profound. We tend to see and we tend to think about Clausewitz as, you know, making sure you understand what it is you’re getting into before you start anything. And I don’t think that changes, but it really drives home that if it’s as chance ridden as he is implying with the type of games he has in mind, then that behooves us really to emphasis that question, which is what is it you’re trying to achieve here? What do you think it’s going to take? Because chances are, as soon as you start, it’s going to be far more costly, far more difficult, and far less likely to match any of your preconceptions or ideas. And so, when we think about it today, what we often see is, if we just do enough analysis (sometimes you’ll see if we’re using the example of whether it’s chess or bridge or things like this, if we count cards, if we play skillfully) we can pretty much guarantee X outcome or Y outcome. And what Clausewitz is saying is, “No, that may help us in terms of if luck is on our side. But in reality, luck plays such a big role, and emotion plays such a big role” particularly if the other side is cheating, and that’s something that’s often not taken into account when we think about this. With the idea that if we can’t really predict these things, and one of the things that he tells us about this— and it gets often mentioned but ignored—is he talks about (Leonhard) Euler and (Sir Isaac) Newton, two of the greatest mathematical minds of the previous four or five centuries, I should think, and certainly the previous two centuries for Clausewitz. If they can‘t figure this stuff out, these are equations that are beyond them, as he puts, essentially, how are we meant to, sort of, as mere mortals actually figure this stuff out? And so, one of the points that he’s driving home here is you’re always betting against the odds. And the bank essentially is the opponent or luck or whatever it is . . . fate. And he’s not necessarily always exactly clear about this. So, if that’s the case and we’re always betting against the odds, and luck plays a role, we have to be daring because we can make a series of small bets and hedge our bets or be cautious, but at the end of the day, we can make losses on each of those small bets and we’ll never win big. Even if we win the occasional bet, we’re not going to actually win the war or win that particular part of the campaign or whatever it is that we’re trying to do at that particular moment. So his argument, to a certain extent, is if you believe you’ve made all the right choices, you’ve amassed your force, you’ve done the things you’re meant to do, you need to commit and you need to dare to win, essentially. So when he’s, then, looking at historical examples, he looks at Frederick. He looks at Napoleon. And he’s often sarcastic, as well, with both of them—but particularly with Napoleon. But one of the things he really highlights is how important daring is and the moral courage to make a bold decision. And he frequently excoriates those historical commanders who fail to do that. He’s absolutely scathing, “feeble minded beetles,” he calls the Austrian generals “scurrying around on the battlefields in 1796.” He’s really trying to drive home this connection between this moral courage, luck, and, obviously, his concept of genius. Host What do we need to consider, then, going forward? Murray It’s tough because I’m not necessarily 100 percent sure. Partly because, obviously, for me, I’ve been sort of in the middle of this, but also, I’ve been teaching PME (professional military education), and Clausewitz is fundamental to PME instruction, pretty much across the globe. The standard translation is the Howard and Paret translation, and it’s important because they downplay the role of luck. And they emphasize and actually enhance (far more than Clausewitz does) the role of rationality. There’s a number of reasons for that. A number of scholars that Professor (Antulio) Echeverria, Professor Hugh Strachan, and, I mean, a number of scholars, have looked at this and talked about these issues. What this tells us, to a great extent, is, actually, that’s, in many respects, not only wrong, but fundamentally misleading that Howard and Paret have emphasized this. We understand why they did it. The Cold War was going on and they’re trying to de–risk catastrophic thermonuclear war, essentially. Or reduce the likelihood of it. But the problem we have for scholars is that we’re teaching service personnel to make decisions in the future using this. Well, if he’s not actually talking about something that’s fundamentally predictable in a way that we’ve often implied, if not explicitly stated, what does that mean for the types of decision making, the types of officers or officer education? And I think for the services, it’s profound because I think we really have to emphasize decision–making ability moral courage, which, to a certain extent, is an ethics question, as well, not just physical courage. We really have to emphasize that first part there, and that’s something I know that’s built into the service education systems. But I also think we have to think about what does that mean for the way we conceive of prewar planning . . . prewar strategy in–war planning and in–war strategy? Do we hedge, constantly, our bets—as we’re often wont to do? But if Clausewitz is right, I’m not saying he is, but if he is, I do think we fundamentally need to reconsider how we think about those big, particularly prewar and planning, questions. Or certainly planning questions within a conflict and the way that we actually train officers and educate officers, right down through the entire decision–making command structure of the armed services in terms of what is it we’re trying to get out of this and what’s the best way of approaching this if Clausewitz is right? And I happen to think he probably is, which then means do we need to reconsider the entire education structure of the armed services in terms of what we emphasize within decision making, within the theoretical part of the courses the officers take—particularly JMP levels one and two And I think, with that in mind, we also need to think about do we provide enough context within the education system to explain what he’s getting at? And I’d argue with what I’ve learned in researching this is any indication, we don’t provide necessarily enough context for the officers and decisionmakers to actually fully understand what the philosophers or theorists were talking about for the officers to extract the most utility out of what they’re learning. And, that’s ultimately what we need them to do. It’s not just developing their brains. It’s extracting utility from their education as well. Host Do you have any concluding thoughts you’d like to share? Murray I do think we need to relook at the version of On War that we use in PME. There are other versions out there, whether they’re ideal or not I don’t know. Chris and I, who’ve done three volumes of Clausewitz, we’re working on a fourth, and I won’t give the names, but we’re already starting to retranslate and we’re finding a number of things like this within the new translation that come up that are not necessarily the same but similar to what I found with the issue with just the one question of card games. I do think that going forward, we need to reconsider, as well, the use of decision exercises, war games . . . not necessarily ones that lead to practicing and exercise but ones that allow the officers to make multiple decisions in an uncertain environment against a live opponent. And I think in PME we have some absolute centers of excellence where that occurs, but I don’t think it’s built into the curricula in the way that it could or should be because I think having officers, in particular, and NCOs as well, practice decision making on a regular basis in an environment, ultimately, that it’s only ever little wooden blocks or pixel people that get killed, but allowing them to learn and grow from something that ultimately is low–threat in terms of actual life allows them to develop that ability to rapidly make and practice things like bold decision making, which, of course, comes with consequences. And I’ll give a quick example. I had a board game about 12 years ago at Command and General Staff College. It’s the Battle of Battle of Frœschwiller from the Franco–Prussian War. One of my officers was doing exactly what he should be doing, which was being very bold and aggressive with the Prussian army attacking the French position and (this is from 1870) and after about two hours of fighting, in terms of game terms, he said, “I’ve lost several of these units. How many casualties is that doc?” And I said, “Well, you’ve actually taken about 8, 000 to 10,000 casualties in about 2 – 3 hours of fighting.” And he just paused and said, “That can’t be right.” So I said, “No, no, that’s absolutely right. And if you keep pressing on, what you’re doing, actually, is incredibly successful. It’s incredibly bold.” He did press . . . credit to him. Because I’ve had officers go, “I can’t do that,” even though they’re little figures on the table. Mentally, that’s sometimes too much. So, he pressed on, and he absolutely crushed the French even more catastrophically than what happened historically. It was one of the best results in terms of that particular battle of war game that I’ve seen, but it was one of those that that moment of sudden recognition. Now of course, we want that to happen in a war game. We don’t want that to happen in real life, but if it does happen in real life, we want it to lead to a devastating success. And so, that would be one of those things, I think, that perhaps if we could build more of that into the education system, I think it would benefit all of us. (The web group has the wargame rule set for the scenario for the Battle of Frœschwiller. Owner Christoper Pringle is making this available for free for a limited time. There are many other free scenarios for war games here as well. https://groups.io/g/bloodybigbattles) Host Listeners, you can dig into the article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 53, issue 2. Nick, thank you for making time to speak with me today. This was a real treat. Murray Thank you. Host If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, you can find us on any major podcast platform. About the author: Nicholas Murray, D.Phil. F.R.Hist.S., is the author of four books: The Rocky Road to the Great War (Potomac Books, 2013), examining the development of trench warfare prior to 1914, and three translations (with commentary) of Clausewitz’s histories covering the French revolutionary campaigns in 1796 and 1799–1800. He is currently working on further translations of Clausewitz and other theorists. He designs and runs wargames for the Secretary of Defense Strategic Thinkers Program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and professional military education. He has advised and assisted the Office of the Secretary of Defense with policy regarding military education and wargaming, and he has received numerous awards, including the Exceptional Public Service Award—the office’s highest medal. Keywords: card games, luck/chance, genius, gambling, daring, probability, trinity, cheating   show less

In an evolving and expanding biothreat landscape caused by emerging biotechnologies, increases in global infectious disease outbreaks, and geopolitical instability, the Department of Defense now faces challenges that alter its traditional approach to biothreats and prompt the need for modernized, improved preparedness for—and response to—potential biothreat scenarios. These challenges further complicate specific weaknesses revealed by the COVID-19 pandemic, including the Department’s... read more

In an evolving and expanding biothreat landscape caused by emerging biotechnologies, increases in global infectious disease outbreaks, and geopolitical instability, the Department of Defense now faces challenges that alter its traditional approach to biothreats and prompt the need for modernized, improved preparedness for—and response to—potential biothreat scenarios. These challenges further complicate specific weaknesses revealed by the COVID-19 pandemic, including the Department’s inability to sustain the military mission while meeting intragovernmental expectations to assist with civilian public health resources and services. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss2/8/ Episode Transcript: “Responding to Future Pandemics: Biosecurity Implications and Defense Considerations” Stephanie Crider (Host) You’re listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Drs. Diane DiEuliis and James Jordano, authors of “Responding to Future Pandemics: Bio Security Applications and Defense Considerations,” which was published in the Summer 2023 issue of Parameters. DiEuliis is a distinguished research fellow at the National Defense University, and Giordano holds several distinguished titles, including the Pellegrino Center professor in the departments of neurology and biochemistry. Thank you for joining me today, Drs. DiEuliss and Giordano. Dr. James Giordano Thank you. Dr. Diane DiEuliis Thank you. It’s great to be with you today. Host Your article addresses three primary factors that have complicated the evolving landscape of biodefense threats. What are they? Giordano Let me take the first. The first one that we mentioned is emerging biotechnologies across a spectrum of potential applications in recent developments. These include, but certainly aren’t limited to, things such as gene editing. Probably the one most people are most currently familiar with is the use of a particular gene scissoring tool called CRISPR CAS9. But realistically, what that does is that just adds to our current armamentarium and makes our current armamentarium more facile and far easier to both acquire and use with regard to the existing techniques and technologies for gene editing to modify the genome and perhaps direct various phenotypes (expressions of physical characteristics). Going right along with that is the vast field of synthetic biology. Synthetic biology ranges everything from the molecular to the mass effect to the subcellular all the way to those things that can produce social change and a variety of different applications. Certainly, we’re concerned about those things that directly affect humans, but realistically, there’s a number of things in synthetic biology that can disrupt and affect the ecologies and the environments upon which humans are dependent and interact. And this can then have ripple effects. And, really, I think the potentiator, and as Diane and I both have argued in print, the force multiplier for these is the use of big data coupled with forms of machine learning that are iteratively becoming forms of artificial intelligence. You put all these things together and you got yourself a juggernaut of biotechnological capability with a broad, broad range and field of different applications and uses and potential misuses. Diane? DiEuliis Thanks, Jim. Tagging on to that as a second concern is the fact that we may be looking in future at an increasing incidence of emerging infectious disease. And as the world’s population grows, we see more and more infringement of human populations into natural habitats. And as you know, much of emerging infectious diseases that appear in human beings comes from what are called zoonotic jumps, or a jump from a disease pathogen in an animal that then becomes adapted to human populations. And then we could see pandemics resulting from that. As we move into the future, we may see more incidences of zoonotic jumps, but also, we see things like people living in more close spaces in urban environments, which in some cases could just be an incubator for spreading diseases in a pandemic fashion. So, this is also a reason for why we need to reexamine the biothreat landscape. Jim, did you have more to add to that? Giordano If you take a look at the second and the first, in other words, the increased incidence and perhaps prevalence of infectious diseases, both in humans and in other species upon which humans are dependent—and the use of biotech—one thing is not mutually exclusive from the other. As the COVID crisis brought into stark relief, many of our emerging biotechs are prompted by, if not in direct response to what may be seen as biological risks and/or threats such as COVID. But more than that, I think, what tends to happen is that you do get this march along, whereby the biotechnology is beginning to address more and more areas that are so representative of human susceptibilities and vulnerabilities. And in so doing, that interface between those things that are environmental, from the microbial level all the way to the geopolitical level, become the targets of those things that we can use biotechnologically to assess those risks and threats, and to engage those risks and threats, in a variety of different ways. Diane? DiEuliis Those are really interesting points, and one of the things that we talk about in the paper is this sort of irony in emerging biotech in that some of these tools and the emerging capabilities that are offered by biotechnology are sort of the same tools that we want to use in order to mitigate things like pandemics, things like COVID-19. The goal is going to be moving forwar how to balance that how to balance the potential emerging threats that can come from these expanded capabilities while at the same time safely leveraging these technologies for the benefits that we can get out of them. And there’s a wide swath of benefits that could be used both by DoD and the community writ large that could be used to combat bio threats into the future. Host How do you see these factors playing out against the changing landscape of bio threats? Giordano I think we’re seeing an increased ecological disruption, everything from that writ large, climate change, for example, and the total human footprint over a period of time, particularly over the 19th, 20th now to the 21st century. And, I think writ small, as Diane noted, what we’re seeing is urban and suburban spread and sprawl, but also an increased level of commercialization and technologization of various environments that then disrupt those environments in those ways that make those environmental niche factors far more feasible, viable, and, therefore, accessible to humans and human populations. So, these two things work together, both as respective of human progress and perhaps also as intentional disruption. I mean, seeing the ecology and the environment as a battle space, whereby disruptions of that ecology can then prompt individual and collective notions of dread and threat, forced migration, and/or in some cases, various responses, I mean, true responses, particularly in the psychological operations base, can be seen very, very importantly as a domain of perhaps non kinetic engagement, which then gets us directly into kinetic engagement. The use of these bio threats and bio risks as weaponizable entities on a variety of scales, from the individual all the way to the international. Host So, through this lens, what should the Department of Defense consider when it comes to maintaining readiness and preparing for the next pandemic? DiEuliis I really have two areas of response to that, and the first one is . . . of course, we learned quite a bit in responding to COVID-19. That entire experience really highlighted a number of things that DoD needs to be concerned with moving forward. The first of which is DoD obviously does defense support of civil authorities. Sometimes we nickname that DSCA. That’s an expected role that DoD has played for a long time is supporting civilian authorities in responding to disasters, or, in this case, a pandemic of global proportion. But at the same time, DoD needs to protect the warfighting force from whatever it is that’s happening and needs to maintain readiness in the warfighting force. So, one tension that was revealed during COVID-19 is that our civilian response to the pandemic was leaning heavily on the DoD for logistical and other kinds of support. So that may not be the ideal situation moving forward because DoD quickly learned that extending itself to support the civilian response had some drawbacks on the DoD side. We were quickly depleting some of our stockpiles of response materials in the way of PPE and other kinds of things as simple as nitrile gloves and other things that are involved in that. That is one thing that DoD will have to strike a balance. How much can they lean forward in supporting the civilian response versus how much to continue to maintain their protection of the forces internally. The second piece of that gets to more of some of the things that we cover in more detail in the paper. And that is this sort of overlap space between the general health and welfare of warfighters versus protecting war fighters from very specific intentional bio threats. Let me describe that in a little bit more detail. It’s general purpose is keeping a healthy fighting force keeping people from getting sick, helping when they’ve been sick, get back to health and get back into the fight. These are just general considerations of health and wellness that the Department of Defense utilizes the same kind of medical advice, treatments, therapeutics that everybody else uses. And they rely on whatever is considered best practice in general public health to maintain the readiness of the fighting force. But DoD has to worry about specific biothreats. So, by this we’re talking about things like the potential of, say, an anthrax attack or someone who may try to recreate a smallpox and infect warfighters with something like that. So, we have a program that’s devoted specifically just for nasty things that war fighters might be exposed to in their daily work or their deployments. And so Dod has full control of this latter program, the investments, and what they do to develop those kinds of therapeutics. On the other side of it, on just the health and wellness side, they’re completely at the mercy of the public health community in the US. What COVID-19 demonstrated is that readiness was somewhat compromised because DoD had to wait for the CDC, for general public health authorities, to provide them with things like test kits and diagnostics, whereas in the other category, DoD develops their own diagnostics and their own medical countermeasures. So, looking forward, in addition to balancing this DSCA problem and how much should DoD lean forward in helping defense support of civil authorities, they’re also going to have to navigate this space in terms of how much should they rely on the public health community to provide them with what they need if they cannot provide it rapidly enough in the case of a pandemic or other kind of bio threat. Giordano It sort of does get into the idea of this interface between what is cooperation and what is competition, not only with regard to intranationally, in terms of what are they cooperative domains and what are the competitive domains for resources, services, and goods during these times of crisis. But more broadly, and I think as COVID, once again, has illustrated quite well, is that this is multinational. I mean, let’s face it, at its core, science and technology have a strongly cooperative bend. I mean, realistically, what we find is that these things coming together under a convergent scientific approach utilizes technology to advance science and utilizes science to advance technology, and certainly intranationally, or within allied economic and scientific groups, that’s very much, de rigueur. But very often it’s some kind of overarching or undergirding competitiveness that provides the prompt, in other words, to get to some proverbial metaphorical finish line first—to a new cure or new treatment, some advancement. And those things can have a variety of different pay offs from the financial all the way to the idea of international power, and even perhaps military leverage. So, what we found is that when that competition gets too stripped, too dense, as COVID has shown, that can be a zero-sum equation. And no one wins because there’s not that necessary sharing of resources, knowledge, capabilities. By the same token, we do recognize both macro and microeconomic factors, and that frank openness of that level of gross cooperation can very often stultify competitive drives and, therefore, can be problematic in the same way. So, if we’re looking more of a plus some possibility, what we’ve entertained is this idea of cooperative competition or coopetition because what it really does is it defines key areas of dependencies. One group may be dependent upon another group to establish and maintain relative dominion within a particular niche or milieu or field. But what it actually does is it leverages leverage, and in so doing, creates balance, whereby these domains of capability and power are decided upon through some process of deliberation, discourse, and dialect. And there are actually ways that we discussed both in the paper and elsewhere about how this may be entertained. But then ultimately this reaches some form of an equilibrium whereby A, whatever A may be, cannot be achieved without B, and B cannot occur and be achieved without A. So that mutuality accents and very often brings to the fore the cooperative necessity and the competitive domain. And we view that as a realistic sight picture, particularly in strategic ways, in light of the genuine and authentic risks and potential benefits that can be yielded through science and technology going forward. Host Do you have any final thoughts you’d like to share before we go? DiEuliis First and foremost, I want to thank my colleague, Jim. It’s always a pleasure to work with you and it was great writing this paper together. And thanks to Stephanie for hosting us for this podcast. I encourage folks to take a look at the paper. And I would say that one thing to keep in mind as we are all coming out of this COVID-19 experience is that just about everybody … federal agencies, state, and local public health authorities, international forums, the WHO, the Biological Weapons Convention. Everyone is scrambling now to understand the ramifications of the COVID-19 pandemic in terms of what did we do well, what did we not do so well, and many, many efforts are going to be focused on what should we do in future to do a better job. And there’s going to be a lot of investment, a lot of churn, a lot of activity in the space. And so, I encourage people to really think carefully and to not just have sort of knee-jerk responses to the aftermath of COVID-19 but to really sort out some of these issues in a thoughtful way so that we can really carefully plan and prepare for next time. Giordano I agree. And thanks very much both for your interest in our work and your attention to it and providing this wonderful forum, and we would encourage the listeners of the podcast to get in touch. Our emails are available at the end of our paper and certainly has our contact information. A lot of the work that Diane and I are engaging, both that which is funded by the DoD and other federal agencies and that which has been sort of representative of our long-standing careers in this space, address not only this issue in particular, but the broader field of issues of balancing the apparent benefits of bioscience and technology and also recognizing, appreciating, and addressing those burdens, risks, and harms that can occur if you do certain things or if you don’t do certain things. And once this begins to occur on the multicultural, multi-natural global stage of the 21st century, I mean that multinational stage by itself, I think, produces particular opportunities and challenges. And so addressing these things in that forum and it with those realities is going to be an ongoing focus of our work. So again, thanks to the listening audience for your attention and your interest. And uh, thanks to you as well, it’s been a pleasure. Host Listeners, I echo what my guests just said. I suggest you read the article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 53 issue 2. You can get into so much more detail here. This was a really great time. Thank you. Giordano Thank you. DiEuliis Thank you If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, you can find us on any major podcast platform. About the authors: Diane DiEuliis, PhD, is a distinguished research fellow at the National Defense University. Her research focuses on emerging biological technologies, biodefense, and preparedness for biothreats. Specific topic areas under this broad research portfolio include dual-use life sciences research, synthetic biology, the US bioeconomy, disaster recovery, and behavioral, cognitive, and social science as it relates to important aspects of deterrence and preparedness. DiEuliis has several research grants in progress and teaches various foundational professional military education courses. Prior to joining National Defense University, DiEuliis was deputy director for policy and served as acting deputy assistant secretary for policy and planning in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), Department of Health and Human Ser vices. She coordinated policy in support of domestic and international health emergency preparedness and response activities, such as Hurricane Sandy and Ebola outbreaks. She was responsible for the implementation of the Pandemic All-Hazards Preparedness Act, the National Health Security Strategy, and the Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise (PHEMCE). James Giordano, PhD, MPhil, is the Pellegrino Center Professor in the Departments of Neurology and Biochemistry; chief of the Neuroethics Studies Program; director of the Cyber-SMART Center’s Program in Biotechnology, Biosecurity, and Ethics; chair of the Sub-Program in Military Medical Ethics at Georgetown University; and senior bioethicist of the Defense Medical Ethics Center (DMEC) and adjunct professor of psychiatry at the Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences. Giordano is senior fellow of the Project on Biosecurity, Technology, and Ethics at the US Naval War College; Stockdale Distinguished Fellow of Science, Technology and Ethics at the United States Naval Academy, and senior science advisory fellow of the SMA Branch, Joint Staff, Pentagon. He has previously served as Donovan Senior Fellow for Biosecurity at US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM); as an appointed member of the Neuroethics, Legal and Social Issues Advisory Panel of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA); as research fellow and task leader of the EU-Human Brain Project Sub-Program on Dual-Use Brain Science; and as an appointed member of the Department of Health and Human Services Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Human Research Protections (SACHRP).   show less

The US military, intelligence, and diplomatic communities have overlooked a key vulnerability in their assessment of a potential military conflict between China and Taiwan—Taiwan’s growing reliance on agricultural imports and its food stocks (except for rice) that could endure trade disruptions for only six months. This podcast assesses Taiwan’s agricultural sector and its ability to feed the country’s population if food imports and production are disrupted; identifies the food... read more

The US military, intelligence, and diplomatic communities have overlooked a key vulnerability in their assessment of a potential military conflict between China and Taiwan—Taiwan’s growing reliance on agricultural imports and its food stocks (except for rice) that could endure trade disruptions for only six months. This podcast assesses Taiwan’s agricultural sector and its ability to feed the country’s population if food imports and production are disrupted; identifies the food products that should be prioritized in resupply operations, based on Taiwan’s nutritional needs and domestic food production; and outlines the required logistical assets. These findings underscore the urgency for US military planners to develop long-term logistical solutions for this complex strategic issue. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss2/10/ Episode Transcript: “Taiwan’s Food Resiliency—or Not—in a Conflict with China” Stephanie Crider (Host) You’re listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Today, I’m chatting with Captain Gustavo Ferreira and Major Jamie Critelli, authors of “Taiwan’s Food Resiliency—or Not—in a Conflict with China.” Ferreira is a senior agricultural economist with the US Department of Agriculture and serves as an agricultural officer at the 353 Civil Affairs Command, US Army Reserves. Critelli, US Army Reserves, is a civil affairs officer serving as an agricultural officer in the 353 Civil Affairs Command. He’s a seasonal farm business owner and has worked globally in agriculture on five continents. Welcome back to Decisive Point, gentlemen. Jamie Critelli Thank you for having us here, Stephanie. Gustavo Ferreira Thank you, Stephanie. Happy to be here. Host Your article . . . it focuses on Taiwan’s food resiliency. Please give us an overview of Taiwan’s agricultural sector. Ferreira I would like to start by emphasizing how recent supply chain disruptions, crop failures in some key producing countries, as well as the war in Ukraine, have pushed global food prices to record high levels and also reminded many countries about the risks associated with the dependency on food imports to feed their populations. In the case of Taiwan, as this country industrialized its economy and developed key manufacturing sectors such as the semiconductor sector, its agricultural production had been declining for decades. As a result, Taiwan’s ability to feed itself has decreased, and food imports now cover about 2/3s of its annual caloric intake. What’s problematic with this is that contrary to what we’ve seen in Ukraine(where the) United States and other NATO allies are being able to supply Ukraine with massive amounts of supplies through a vast shared land border. A similar effort will not be possible for Taiwan because of A). Taiwan being an island and B). China’s Liberation Army Navy and Rocket Force have now the capabilities of denying freedom of movement to any adversary naval force in the air. In the context of a conflict with China; it will be extremely difficult and risky for cargo ships and airlift to reach Taiwan. Another challenge will be the fact that China will likely attempt to capture major operational ports to use them to dock their own merchant civilian ships to supply its invasion of Taiwan. As a response, the Taiwanese military will almost certainly try to deny China’s access to these ports via obstacles such as sea mines or sunken ships. With all main ports no longer operational, we believe the United States and its allies will struggle to transport and unload critical food supplies to Taiwan. Nevertheless, it’s important to note that Taiwanese authorities are well aware of these vulnerabilities, and the build-up of public food stocks have been a central component of the country’s food resiliency strategy. And I’ll give an example, during the COVID-19 crisis the Taiwanese government shared that the population that the nation had enough Food and Agriculture commodity stocks to handle disruptions in agriculture trade for six months. That was their promise. Our own analysis also shows that Taiwan has enough food reserves to feed its population for about six months. After that, the island will have to import food products to meet its nutritional needs. Host In the event of a naval blockade enforced by China, which food products should be prioritized in early stock build-up efforts or resupply operations based on Taiwan’s nutritional needs and domestic food production? Critelli: Taiwan, population 23 million, is actually the 16th largest food-importing country in the world. As you heard from Gus, it’s heavily reliant upon food imports to meet its needs, and certainly, any naval blockade will disrupt these flows. Food products must be prioritized in any efforts to build up stockages pre-conflict and should be included in US and allied resupply operations during a conflict. Specific food products we consider are prioritized based upon two factors. First is widespread consumption of the food product already by the Taiwanese population, so we know that they eat it. And number two, a large volume of Taiwan imports due to the inability of domestic production to meet the demand nationally. When we look at the food that the Taiwanese are eating, about 50 percent of the calories come from grains. A large chunk of this is covered by domestic rice production, so we can exclude that, but wheat, corn, and soy are almost completely imported to meet the needs because there is no domestic production. In fact, the imports of wheat, corn, and soy amount to some 9 million metric tons annually. Wheat is used for them to produce flour, while corn and soy are almost exclusively used as livestock feed, predominantly for poultry and hogs. Next up on the list would be animal protein, 50 years ago, the average Taiwanese citizen derived 75 percent of their protein needs from plant sources and 25 percent from animal sources. The new mix is now nearly 50/50. A third of this animal protein comes from fish. The grains that I mentioned earlier are used to feed poultry and hogs. There is barely a domestic beef sector in Taiwan, so all beef is imported. With fish, however, the coastal and deep sea fishing industries provide it, but in the event of any naval action, these industries will be limited as well. So to produce fish, it will need to move on to shore into aquaculture facilities. Both fish and chicken are remarkable at transforming their rations into protein and should be prioritized in production to reduce the grain import needed to provide protein sources to the population in the first place. Finally, while it isn’t a food stuff, do not forget about chemical inputs. These would include fertilizers and pesticides needed to grow plants as well as any chemical inputs and antibiotics needed for increased levels of dry land aquaculture. Despite whether the country needs to transition to a higher level of domestic production or it needs to start eating lower on the food pyramid due to a naval embargo, it will still need the means of sustaining itself with increased domestic agriculture. Host What logistical assets would be required to strengthen Taiwan’s food resiliency? Ferreira In this study, we developed three scenarios that assess the ability of Taiwan’s food system to endure a partial or a total Chinese Navy blockade. These scenarios are not intended to be exhaustive. We started with scenario number one, which assumes that China effectively denies US and Allied food resupply operations. So, in other words, Taiwan becomes completely cut off from the rest of the world. Under this scenario, Taiwan will not be able to get external assistance. They will need to have sufficient food supplies at hand right at the beginning of the conflict. This is because while the current food stock levels may sustain Taiwan for six months, they will be insufficient in the event of a much more prolonged naval block. And let’s not forget it has been a year and two months since Russia invaded Ukraine, so nothing is certain about how long any military operation will last. So Taiwan will be better off being prepared for a longer-term scenario. To do so, we proposed two particular strategies. The first one is to increase its food reserve levels, and the second one is to increase its domestic food production. But we gotta say that, unfortunately, these two options also come with their own challenges and limitations, and we’ll cover those in a minute. Starting with the first one, increasing food reserve levels for that, Taiwan will have to make major investments in storage capacity and strengthen its strategic stockpiles of key materials to include foodstuff. The problem here is the large storage facilities, and you can think of grain silos or cold storage warehouses; they’re also very vulnerable targets. Therefore, you know, Taiwan’s military will have to, at the same time as they build this infrastructure, they will also have to think about developing protective systems to defend this critical infrastructure from either kinetic or cyber attacks. The second option, which will be to increase domestic food production in order to make Taiwan more resilient, will come with also some problems. So first, in order to boost more traditional agricultural production, that will take time, and it will require significant changes in the country’s rather antiquated agricultural system. The other thing is the island will be also capped by its limited farmland and agricultural labor, so if we want to go the traditional route, there are those limitations. We propose to circumvent those constraints that Taiwanese authorities consider two options. The first is to develop a victory garden program. Back in World War I and World War II, the US developed this program, and just as an example, by the end of 1944, about 20 million victory gardens in the United States accounted for large shares of the country’s total annual fruits and vegetable production. So they were instrumental in maintaining food security during a major conflict. The second strategy will be well placed for a country that is as densely populated as Taiwan. And this would be the use of hydroponics which will allow many households to produce leafy greens within their own houses. There are some issues here, too. Hydroponic vegetable production has a steep learning curve and also requires considerable upfront investments. While these new surpluses will be dispersed throughout the country and, therefore more resilient to Chinese attack. They’ll also only partially mitigate the problem, and this is because they will produce food categories in where Taiwan’s already highly sufficient, and that’s vegetables, fruits, and roots. Nevertheless, it will provide some relief to the population, at least in the short run. The second scenario contemplates the United States and its allies, anticipating that they can sustain limited resupply operations to Taiwan, even within the context of a Chinese naval embargo. And the rationale for this, we think along the lines of what’s happening currently at the Black Sea and Ukraine and Russia. So Ukraine and Russia agreed on the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which has kept critical grain corridors open to international buyers. We think that China could also allow limited maritime traffic to bring essential food products to Taiwan in order to avoid a major humanitarian crisis. So under this scenario, however, it’s unclear whether commercial shipping companies will be willing to operate (in) that region. And that’s due to the elevated risk and high operational costs. Think about really prohibitive insurance rates and even the difficulty obtaining things such as shipping letters of credit. In that case, the US and allied navies may need to ensure the arrival of critical food supplies to Taiwan using their own logistical assets. This raises another question, (which) is whether the US military and the Allies can replace those commercial operations. And this is because this will include all different classes of shipping vessels to bring bulk cargo and containers and ranging from small vessels to very large ones. So think about what it would take to bring the volume of soybeans imported by Taiwan in 2021, which amounts to 2.6 million metric tons. So that will require about 47 Panamax-sized vessels. This is the largest ship that can cross the locks of the Panama Canal. Because of such large import volumes, that also will rule out completely a Berlin Airlift-type of operation, especially if China contests the airspace surrounding Taiwan. Still, under this scenario, other logistical considerations include, that most agricultural imports arrive to Taiwan through four main ports. So it would be essential for those ports to stay operational and even to expand their capacities to sustain full supplier operations. Another issue is that about 90 percent of agriculture imports that arrive to Taiwan come through sea routes, and out of that, 85 percent comes through shipping containers. So why is this important? Taiwan’s heavy reliance on shipping containers is a vulnerability because China is the world’s top producer and exporter of shipping containers. The recent supply chain disruptions during COVID highlighted that issue. The last scenario looks at the situation where the United States and allies foresee an impending Chinese naval blockade and begin to quickly coordinate food resupply operations before the blockade is in force. In this situation, it will involve the United States first anticipating the imminent invasion and naval blockade, and then we’ll have a limited window of opportunity to start resupply operations and try to bring as many foodstuffs as possible before maritime traffic to the islands is completely disrupted. Because time is essential, it will be challenging for allies to contract and mobilize the additional civilian maritime and military maritime transportation assets that can quickly bring the additional food supplies before the conflict begins. Also, in that situation, like Major Critelli mentioned, the United States and allies will have to prioritize transportation of certain food products, those should be upfront in those operations before that window is closed. Finally, on the receiving end, Taiwan would need to have sufficient infrastructure and the supply chain channels to receive, absorb, store, and distribute the sudden spike in imports of such large volumes of food commodities. Otherwise, what might happen is that the food products make it to the island, but they end up getting spoiled or go waste due to waiting longer periods at the shore or improper handling, or inadequate storage capacity. Host What conclusions can we draw from this? Critelli The global focus at the moment is on Ukraine and the Black Sea Grain Initiative and the relative food insecurity of several countries around the world appearing as a result, but we can also draw lessons from that conflict that would apply to a potential conflict involving Taiwan. Ukraine is a major global food exporter, so the bulk of impacts are felt outside of Ukraine. Taiwan as a major food importer, will feel the impact inside the country. Taiwan focused on economic development instead of focusing on ag development, so the global impacts we will feel in the event of a Taiwan embargo, would be felt downstream. Globally, they would be felt within the supply chains of semiconductors, for example in other items, and there would be third order impacts appearing elsewhere that we haven’t even thought about. As Gustavo mentioned, Taiwan is very different from Ukraine due to its geography. So in many cases the response in the event of a conflict must be very different as well. We must consider novel approaches to ensuring Taiwan can meet its nutritional needs over a long time horizon. We must look at Taiwan strengths and weaknesses and see how we can pivot a weakness into an opportunity to meet their needs based on what they already do well. We, therefore, propose more aquaculture and hydroponics and more of a closed-loop production network with local production as much as possible. We can reduce the impact of an invasion by drastically reducing dependency on imports. We must do everything we can to prevent a conflict from happening in the first place. A war in this part of the world, involving the countries who could be parties to it would be absolutely catastrophic. NATO doesn’t exist in the Pacific. We need to pursue a diplomatic approach with a group of nations to best position Taiwan to prevent or to speedily deescalate emerging conflict. Ferreira As we got deeper in our research, it became really clear that US and allied efforts to break the blockade will very likely be unsuccessful or difficult at best, and in this matter, China could endure the consequences of a prolonged confrontation much better than Taiwan could. And going back to what Major Critelli said, the time to prepare is now, in order to increase that resiliency to the island. Host Thank you so much for making time to speak with me today. Ferreira Thank you, Stephanie, for giving us the opportunity to talk about our paper. Critelli Thank you for having us, Stephanie. Host Listeners, you can read the article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 53, issue 2. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, you can find us on any major podcast platform. About the authors: Captain Gustavo F. Ferreira is a senior agricultural economist with the US Department of Agriculture and serves as an agricultural officer (38G) at the 353rd Civil Affairs Command, US Army Reserves. He holds a PhD in agricultural economics from Louisiana State University, and prior to joining the federal government, he was an assistant professor in agricultural economics at Virginia Tech University. He has published numerous research articles in top-ranking economics and military journals. Major Jamie A. Critelli, US Army Reserve, is a Civil Affairs officer serving as an agricultural officer in the 353rd Civil Affairs Command. He is a seasonal farm business owner and has worked in agriculture on five continents. He also serves as the director of the Operational Excellence Department at Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center. He graduated with honors from Cornell University with a degree in horticulture and holds an MBA in supply-chain management from ETH Zurich.   show less

In contemporary military operations, some problems are so complex they do not give way to linear solutions but require problem management instead. Combining the fundamentals of Dao De Jing philosophy with the US military design process offers a new perspective to analyze complex security problems, devise management strategies, and plan military operations. Applying this new approach to the complex security environment in Syria allows for a nonlinear mapping of long-term goals and a new... read more

In contemporary military operations, some problems are so complex they do not give way to linear solutions but require problem management instead. Combining the fundamentals of Dao De Jing philosophy with the US military design process offers a new perspective to analyze complex security problems, devise management strategies, and plan military operations. Applying this new approach to the complex security environment in Syria allows for a nonlinear mapping of long-term goals and a new perspective on relationships between key actors, environmental factors that restrict changes in the security environment, and where planners should focus their attention. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss1/12/ Episode Transcript: “Daoism and Design: Mapping the Conflict in Syria” Stephanie Crider (Host) You’re listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Joining me today are Colonel Ned Marsh and Dr. Heather Gregg, authors of “Daoism and Design: Mapping the Conflict in Syria” from the Spring 2023 issue of Parameters. Colonel Marsh is a US Army Special Forces officer and a current garrison commander within the Installation Management Command. Dr. Gregg is a professor of irregular warfare at the George C. Marshall Center for European Studies and is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Welcome to Decisive Point, Ned. Welcome back, Heather. Dr. Heather S. Gregg It’s great to be here. COL Ned B. Marsh Thanks for having us on. Host Your work says combining the fundamentals of Daoist philosophy from the ancient literary work of the Tao Te Ching with the US military design process offers a new perspective with which to analyze problems, devise management strategies, and plan military operations. Tell me more. How so? Marsh The Dao’s what we see as an alternative perspective to a Western mindset. The Western mindset tends to see life as linear, objective-based, a realm of cause and effect. Instead, the Dao sees life as a constant flow of events with some things that are in our control and most that are out of our control. The philosophy emphasizes the continuous nature of being that people flow through life around obstacles like water would around a stone in a river. I think the simplest summary is that we should worry about the things we can control and not worry about the things that we cannot. There’s four fundamentals. The first is that there’s no permanent reality. So, our reality is an endless continuous stream of interactive situations. The second is that every event is the result of the interaction of all the preceding events. It’s never-ending. It’s a ceaseless development of new context. And this limits the value of concepts such as linearity, cause and effect, and prediction. Third is that we only see life from the perspective that we are in it. We’re the water in the river. We’re not standing on the shore looking at the water. Those fundamentals, they describe the reality. The fourth describes how we fit into it. The good news is that we have agency. Our path isn’t predestined. Our actions can shape the future and influence our environment. So, we recognize these realities. And then we cultivate ourselves, our organizations, and our environments to foster success. We can create emergent opportunities, and we can be successful. Host Heather, did you want to weigh in on this too? Gregg Thinking in these terms is particularly useful for complex problem management. So many of the problems that we see in foreign policy today are so complex that they don’t give way to easy solutions, and that thinking linearly and thinking that things have an immediate or near-term end state is not helpful. So, when you can’t think in terms of military end-states or objective end-states, what do you do? What’s a mindset that can help you think about problem management? And I think the Dao does just that. Host Let’s apply this to Syria, which includes intertwined politics, culture, economics, information, and more, as well as several types of conflict. Marsh The key is probably . . . how do we integrate . . . design is you go from where you are, you look at the problem as to how you want to get there. And you design a solution. And a lot of times that becomes very linear. It leads to lines of effort. It includes objectives. It provides a definitive definition of victory, articulates a military end state. Design is meant to be done multiple times, but a lot of times it’s done sequentially. It’s done once and we come up with an operational approach, and then we get frustrated when our operational approach doesn’t create the solution which we want in the timeline which we want. I think the easiest analogy which I’ve come up with is if you think of child raising. I have a child and I want my child to have a successful life and be a successful adult and I can design a solution with an operational approach and try to execute that strategy. And the odds of it happening are pretty low. But if I take the philosophy of the Dao, and I think, OK, it’s endless. So, you don’t ever stop raising your child. Success has to be produced continuously. I don’t really have any knowledge. So, everybody’s a first-time parent. You only get one shot at being a parent. That your child goes through endless interactions, both internal and external. That they have their own agency. The parent has to balance risk and understanding. We have to recognize that control is an illusion, and we have to have the long game. We have to be positional. Where do I put myself to best influence? And then, ultimately, I cultivate them. I cultivate myself. I cultivate my family. I cultivate the environment to foster emergent success. You take a structured design process to get there—ends ways means. Let alone if I step outside of childbearing and I go to a military problem like Syria, where you have adversaries who are trying to keep you from achieving your goal, your future vision. The Dao allows you to take those two things and combine them together so you can iterate. You can adjust. You can be in the flow. I wanted to kind of get that out before we dove into how do we apply the philosophy and design together when you talk about a problem like Syria, which doesn’t really have set solutions because the interdependency. I’ll pause there. I’m not sure, Heather, if you want to add a little context to that. Gregg What’s so fascinating about the conflict in Syria is how intractable it seems right now. I’m sure most of our listeners are well aware that there’s been a civil war since 2011. You had the emergence of the Islamic State within Syria. But then also in Iraq you had the decline of the Islamic State, or the demise of the Islamic State, but you still have ISIS present. You have Turkish interests. You have Israeli interests. You have Iranian interests and Iraqi interests and United States all in there. And Russia, I think, as I mentioned, all competing for security control, competing for resources, competing for bases and populations, and access. So how to address these problems and understand what can we change and what can’t we change becomes crucial. We don’t want to waste resources and time. We also don’t want to make the situation worse. And so, thinking in these terms that Ned outlines are particularly important for thinking about what we can influence and what we can’t. Marsh There’s three interdependent problems which constrict solutions in Syria. First, the Assad regime has survived; they continue to survive because of external support. Two, the United States were unable to help the Syrian Democratic Forces establish dominant positions because Turkey, a NATO ally and ally United States, they’re steadfastly anti-SDF for their significant support for the Assad regime that they have Iranian support, that they get Russian support. Those are also super interdependent with regional and global geopolitical implications for the United States. And Kurdish fracturing internal is a significant problem. And so, the United States can’t solve the solution of keeping the Syrian Democratic Forces in position and appeasing allies . . . the ally Turkey, that’s gotta be managed . . . anymore than it can push Iran or Russia out of Syria because that’s interdependent with other problems, which it can’t solve there. And so instead of frustrating ourselves on those, the Dao would seek to foster an environment which you can influence. And manage that problem. The Dao planner should recognize what you can control and what’s not, what can be influenced and what can’t. Success is not a one-time proposition, like I stated. Anything which we would do in Syria, we would have to continue to do. There would have to be a solution in there. We would have to recognize that there’s no knowledge. That despite our limited understanding that we still can manifest success even if we don’t necessarily know how. And that ultimately that there’s no end-state in Syria. So, planners have to view that as an opportunity. What can the US government do? If you look at it from the perspective of how the Middle East coordinator Brett McGurk has described it, it is avoiding maximalist goals, timelines, and objective end-states, and then getting back to basics of partnership, alliance, and patience and understanding that through the use of hard and soft power across time and space and throughout the Middle East, they can reinforce neutral goals. By creating an environment in Syria, you protect Iraq, you help Lebanon, you protect your allies in Jordan and interests in Saudi Arabia. And your integrated strategy becomes more holistic. Host You just answered my next question. How would Daoism and design work in Syria? Heather, did you want to add to that? Gregg This article has taught me that these are practices we’re not particularly good at in the United States. Things like patience, things like realizing that we can’t fix the problem in the near term and waiting for emergence, waiting for an opportunity that might change the dynamics and might allow us to take other actions. I particularly want to underscore the point that Ned made about building partnerships, getting back to the basics, and working with partners and allies because certainly this is a conflict that we can’t unilaterally fix. And that’s deeply important. Marsh It really is a merger of philosophy, a way of thinking with a methodology. Design doesn’t just lead us to the solution, it’s a great tool to get us to think conceptually, but you have to have an aligned philosophy with it. Some problems are linear. You can see a solution. I can design. I can apply resources. I can get there. Other problems are much more complex and complicated. And interdependence requires that you be a little bit more agile, a little bit more flexible with things like timelines. That sometimes you balance action with inaction. Sometimes maybe I don’t want to do something somewhere because I don’t know what the effect is going to be. Let me allow things to develop in due course, and then ultimately that I have some humility in what I know and what I think I know and what I can do and what I can’t do. But if you cultivate yourself, you cultivate your organization, you cultivate your relationships, and you cultivate the environment to become a place where things can grow, that can foster emergent success, that you can be successful. Host Any final thoughts you’d like to share before we go? Marsh I just want to say thanks. Thanks for the opportunity to have this in Parameters. Thank you for your time here today. And I want to say thanks to Dr. Gregg for all her guidance and mentorship as we’ve worked through this and her hard work, as well. Gregg I want to say thank you too for this opportunity and, Col. Marsh, for all that you’ve taught me in this process. I would just close by saying that we’re in an age of strategic competition where things like victory and near-term end-states just aren’t viable. This is not the kind of security environment we’re in. And so, applying tools like Daoism with design helps us to think about what does problem management look like in the age of strategic competition and what should we be focusing our attention on? How should we be building partnerships and alliances, practicing humility? All these things that Colonel Marsh said, I think are just deeply important in an age of strategic competition. Host Listeners, you can download this and dig into all the details at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 53 issue one. Ned and Heather, thank you so very much today. This was really interesting and all the effort you put in to actually coming together to make this happen is much appreciated. Marsh Thank you, Stephanie. Gregg Thanks, Stephanie. Host If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, you can find us on any major podcast platform. Author information Colonel Ned Beechinor Marsh is a US Army Special Forces officer and garrison commander within Installation Management Command. His previous Army and Joint assignments include 1st Special Forces Group, US Army Special Operations Command, and Special Operations Command Europe. He has served throughout the Central Asian, European, and Indo-Pacif ic geographic areas. He is a graduate of the US Army War College, the School of Advanced Military Studies, and the Naval Postgraduate School. Dr. Heather S. Gregg is a professor of irregular warfare at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany, and is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. She holds a PhD in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. She is the author of Religious Terrorism (Cambridge University Press, 2020), Building the Nation: Missed Opportunities in Iraq and Afghanistan (University of Nebraska Press, 2018), and The Path to Salvation: Religious Violence from Jihad to the Crusades (University of Nebraska Press, 2014).   show less

This podcast offers a preview of the latest Parameters demi-issue and full issue.

Read the demi-issue: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss2/1/

Episode Transcript
Stephanie Crider (Host)

You’re listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any... read more

This podcast offers a preview of the latest Parameters demi-issue and full issue. Read the demi-issue: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss2/1/ Episode Transcript Stephanie Crider (Host) You’re listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I have Dr. Conrad C. Crane, acting editor in chief of Parameters, with me today to talk about the summer demi-issue and the forthcoming full summer issue of Parameters. Thank you for being here, Dr. Crane. Dr. Conrad C. Crane Glad to be here. Host Always glad to have you. So, the Demi issue—this is a relatively new product for the Army War College Press. It’s released about a month before the full issue of Parameters, and it addresses unfolding current events and topics critical to our readership. It generates interest in the forthcoming full issue, and it tackles the big questions being asked today in the fields of military strategy and defense policy. What does the summer demi-issue have in store for our audience? Crane We’ve got a couple of very interesting articles. The first is an In Focus special commentary responding to future pandemics, bio security implications, and defense considerations by a couple of civilian PhDs—Diane DeEuliis and James Giordano. They look at the expanding bio threat landscape, and they look at the experience of COVID-19 and the challenges that put on (the Department of Defense) DoD, especially. And (they) argue for a modernized improved preparedness and response system. They contend that the COVID-19 experience revealed a bunch of weaknesses, including the Department Defense’s inability to sustain the military mission while dealing with intra-governmental expectations to assist with other pieces of the government. And it’s really going to challenge how we balance our resources. So, it’s an interesting look at the future, perhaps, of these future pandemics. The second piece is a piece of a Taiwan Forum where we’re taking a look at Taiwan in this issue and it’s on Taiwan’s food resiliency—or not—in a conflict with China. The authors there, Gustavo Ferreira and Jamie Cartelli, are both reserve officers. They deal with some military issues in their normal work, but they really talk about the dilemma that we face with Taiwan is if it gets cut off, it’s got about six month’s worth of food. So, the question is, how do you deal with the possibility that the Chinese may blockade or somehow degrade their ability to sustain themselves? And they really look at the potential scenarios and findings that underscore the urgency for US leadership and for military planners to really develop long-term logistical solutions before this crisis happens. So two very insightful articles, (going in) a little different directions, but really should give our readers something to think about. And then, of course, there’s more articles coming in the full issue when it comes out about a month later. Host Speaking of the full issue, what can we expect? Do you have any idea what we can look forward to? Crane We’ve got a set of very interesting articles scheduled for the full issue, starting out with Dr. Allison Abbe, who’s one of the faculty here at the War College. The title of her piece is called “Understanding the Adversary: Strategic Empathy and Perspective Taking in National Security,” and she looks at this whole issue of how do you gain insight into the motives and mindsets of adversaries and partners? She looks at a number of different scenarios. It’s interesting that she talks a lot about this idea of strategic empathy, but in her conclusion, she says that the security practitioners don’t really need to aim for full empathy but for what she calls perspective and perspective taking, for her, is the most fruitful piece of strategic empathy. And she says that, basically, that that skill requires shifting in and out of other people’s perspectives, not adopting them. So, you just gotta kind of understand what the other side is doing and shift. This frame shifting aligns with developmental approaches to systems thinking and how one views the system from the perspective of multiple actors. It’s an interesting discussion, again, to try to figure out how to look at these situations and come up with our own solutions. It’s very detailed. It also looks at how practitioners should use feedback to improve (and) how to use teams to make the effort better. I like her last recommendation (which) is that empathy researchers recommend maintaining humility and recognizing uncertainty. Even with all of this, where we end up is with a situation that we may end up being wrong, but we’ll do the best we can with it. The next one is another Taiwan piece. Luke Bellucci has given us an initial introduction to what will probably be a two-part presentation by us. This will be the first part, which basically talks about Taiwan’s strategic importance to the United States and its allies, and he focuses on Taiwan’s location is obviously geopolitically important to the US and its allies. But it’s even more important to relative to China. He also talks about the commercial significance of everything that Taiwan does and how it’s a beacon of democracy for people of China and other people around the world. The loss of Taiwan’s democracy to authoritarian China would undermine our credibility with our allies and obviously have long-term implications in the region. So that’s really what he looks at in this first chunk of his work. Part two, which will come in a later issue, will review recent changes to the strategic environment current responses, including a hard look at our own national security strategy. Next, Nicholas Murray has a piece that’s called “Geniuses, Ride Their Luck: Clausewitz’s Card Game Analogies.” And the interesting thing about his piece is he talks about (how) the scholars talk about Clausewitz’s use of card games in On War and in other places. But they use the wrong card games. They use our own modern card games as examples, whereas Clausewitz, obviously, is writing a couple 100 years ago, and he’s not looking at the same card games that we are. He looks at the different perspective that you get with Clausewitz if you use these older card games. The main games that Clausewitz really references are faro, skat, and ombre, and one of the things is you can cheat a lot more. There’s a lot more uncertainty in results, and he says, you know, the degree of cheating in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century, gambling and card games undermines any claims that Clausewitz’s card game analogies represent any kind of reasonable degree of calculable probability in war. Basically, these were kind of very unpredictable card games because there was so much cheating that went on. And once you’ve got that, that these are far chancier games, it really changes a lot of the ways that people have to look at Clausewitz. If you use the right card games that Clausewitz used, then the perspective on Clausewitz changes somewhat. It’s a very interesting discussion. The thing that really struck me going through it was he talks about how much cheating went on in these games, and, for him, it makes it very clear the commanders had to be willing to gamble and take a lot of risks in in their approaches to warfare. So it’d be interesting to see how other people perceive it, and I’m sure there’ll be some pushback from some other researchers. But one of the points he makes is, you know, if chance and luck in war is far more extreme than was thought, and players struggle to make rational decisions because of the extreme emotion involved, then scholars must revise the way they might use game theory to model behavior. Furthermore, if there is no baseline expectation of honesty, then the raw luck and emotion is enhanced, then genius as Clausewitz describes it, becomes even more critical. So, I thought those were really interesting conclusions out of that article. We’ll see what kind of comments we get back. John Bonin and Jim Scuderi, a couple of researchers here at the War College, have done a piece on the institutional Army—six case studies and changing innovation. They’ve gone back and they’ve looked at some historical case studies of institutional army reforms over the last 160 years and done an evaluation of how they (the Army) operated. And they tried to provide some historical insights to inform current practices to fulfill the Army’s articulated 2022 Institutional Strategy. They end with a very hard look at Army Futures Command and predicting how that might go. I mean, they look at the Calvary Bureau and the Civil War. They look at the peacetime habits and wartime changes in the Army after the Spanish American War in 1898, looking at the next couple decades, including World War I—that’s a very detailed study. They look at General Marshall and the development of Army headquarters for World War II and how that evolves. They look at Secretary McNamara and the development of the Army Combat Developments Command and the evolution of that particular process. They look at General Abrams and his 1973 reorganization of the army after Vietnam. They look at the role of some of his key assistants like William Depuy, and then they close with this look at Futures Command and try to speculate on some of the lessons from the early cases and how it might reflect on how Futures Command develops. It’s a very interesting study. It says a lot about implications for the Army for today. One of the interesting things I thought . . . in their conclusion, they talk about one of the problems with a lot of these changes is that substantive change and adaption have to outlast the specific secretary and chief of staff. The problem is we lose a lot of these innovations because the country goes to war or something happens (a different commander changes priorities). That the dilemma is how do we keep these changes active? How do we keep the Army from going back to the way it was as soon as there’s a change in commander or some situation happens to make the army change its focus? For the last full article, Spencer French has a piece on innovation, flexibility, and adaptation—keys to the success of Patton’s information and signal intelligence services in 1944. Patton had this image as this combat commander and we talk about this very pugnacious Patton, but he was a very competent and systematic organizer. And the way he adapted 3rd Army for the operations they ran into in Europe, he had successful integration of informational resources, a very consistent operating concept for information and available technology combined with his organized mobility and flexibility and these are the same elements that modern commanders are also wrestling with. French argues pretty well that they could benefit from viewing patent strengths and 3rd Army’s accomplishments and how they organized this really cohesive and flexible system for managing information not only for managing our information but denying it to the enemy and how that aligned operational concepts or technological capabilities. So it’s a very interesting piece. We have a new director of strategic research at the Strategic Studies Institute, and he’s going to take a little different perspective than George Shatzer did. George would provide some book reviews or some other things. Eric Hartunian, who is the new Colonel in charge of strategic research is trying to explain research possibilities, and he wants to focus on, particularly in his first effort, the Republic of Korea and the situation there. It’s the 70th anniversary of our alliance. He looks at the quick region with key points, looks at threats in the peninsula and, he looks at the little bit of the implications of the current war in Ukraine on Indo-Pacific security concerns. His essay is not meant to cover every contingency opportunity that the US Korea Alliance represents. It is intended to set the stage for important research into the known and unknown opportunities that leveraging the US-Republic of Korea alliance may present as a joint force continues to March into very decisive decade. And, in the meantime, we’ve also tried to expand some things. We’ve added a whole number of book reviews. We’ve had quite a backlog of book reviews, and we’re trying to get rid of them. So, there’s going to be more book reviews in the issue itself, but we’re also initiating an online book review section. We’ll post book reviews there as well. We also need to highlight there’s a new SSI website coming . . . late summer, early fall. We need people to keep an eye out for that. It’ll be the same kind of place, but it’ll be a new look and have new capabilities and new things for people to see. And we think it really will enhance our ability to get information out to our readers that they really need to get. Host There’s a lot going on at the Press. Crane We’re busy. We’re busy. Host Listeners look for the demi-issue at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Doctor Crane, thank you so much for your time. Crane Thanks for having me. Host If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, you can find us on any major podcast platform.   show less

Contesting Paul Scharre’s influential vision of “centaur warfighting” and the idea that autonomous weapon systems will replace human warfighters, Sparrow and Henschke propose that the manned-unmanned teams of the future are more likely to be minotaurs—teams of humans under the control, supervision, or command of artificial intelligence. They examine the likely composition of the future force and prompt a necessary conversation about the ethical issues raised by minotaur... read more

Contesting Paul Scharre’s influential vision of “centaur warfighting” and the idea that autonomous weapon systems will replace human warfighters, Sparrow and Henschke propose that the manned-unmanned teams of the future are more likely to be minotaurs—teams of humans under the control, supervision, or command of artificial intelligence. They examine the likely composition of the future force and prompt a necessary conversation about the ethical issues raised by minotaur warfighting. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss1/14/ Episode Transcript: “Minotaurs, Not Centaurs: The Future of Manned-Unmanned Teaming” Stephanie Crider (Host) You’re listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Today I’m chatting with Rob Sparrow, professor in the philosophy program and an associate investigator in the Australian Research Council Center of Excellence for Automated Decision-making and Society at Monash University, and Adam Henschke, an assistant professor in the philosophy section at the University of Twente, Netherlands. Sparrow and Henske are the authors of “Minotaurs, Not Centaurs: The Future of Manned-Unmanned Teaming,” which ran in the Spring 2023 issue of Parameters. Welcome to Decisive Point, gentlemen. Set the stage for us, please, including Paul Sharre’s perspective. Robert J. Sparrow We’ve seen drones and teleoperated weapon systems play an increasing role in contemporary conflict. There is lots of enthusiasm for autonomy in weapon systems in the military, as I think 20 years ago, there was a paper in Parameters arguing that in the future the tempo of battle would increase to such a point that only computers would be capable of making the decisions that are required to win battles. So for a long time, there’s been a debate about the relationship between human beings and unmanned systems in warfighting. Recently, Paul Sharre has argued that we don’t need to worry about autonomous weapon systems taking over all the combat roles because, actually, the future of warfighting involves manned-unmanned teaming, and Sharre suggests that we should think of this on the model of what he described as a Centaur. A centaur is a mythical creature with the head and upper body of a human being and the lower body of a horse. And that’s a really nice image. You’ve got the human being in command and in control and the machines doing the physical work involved in warfighting. We think that’s perhaps optimistic for a number of reasons, and that what we’ve seen, is really in applications, is it’s often easier to get machines to be making decisions than it is to get machines to do physical work. And so, for that reason, we think that the future of manned-unmanned teaming might be better imagined as what we call a minotaur. And so, rather than the human being in charge of the team, we suspect that in many roles, actually, the AI will be in charge of the team. And the human beings will be effectively under the command of the AI and doing the physical work, where the mental work will be performed by artificial intelligence. Henschke One way to think of Paul Sharre’s approach is, as Rob said, he’s advocated this view of centaur warfighting, and there the human is generally seen as the head, the decision-making part of the warfighting operation. And the robots and the machines, they do the, kind of, the grunt work. They’re the things that do the stuff on the ground. So, the way in which this manned-unmanned kind of vision is put forward in Sharre’s work is humans do the deciding and the robots, or the machines, do the fighting Host But you disagree. Will you expand on that please? Sparrow We do think that in many domains and in many situations it’s more likely that the machine will be in charge—or effectively in charge. We think that it’s quite hard to get machines to do something like move a gun into place or walk up the stairs or talk to these people and ask them where the insurgents are. Those roles, we think, will still need to be carried out by human beings. But, for instance, wargaming or identifying and tracking targets, those tasks machines can outperform human beings already in lots of circumstances. If you are considering the team, we think a lot of the executive and cognitive tasks will actually be handed over to artificial intelligence, and the human beings will be left doing what the AI says. And so, in that context, you should think of this as a minotaur team, as a kind of cyber with an artificial intelligence head and the body made-up of human beings. Henschke On this, Rob came up with the idea of flipping the central view to suggest that we might instead think of these robot/human teams like minotaurs, where the thinking is done by the machine and the fighting, or the grunt work, is done by the humans. So, the robot becomes the head, and the human becomes the body, kind of flipping it from the central vision. The idea is that we ought to think of these more as unmanned-manned teams, like a minotaur rather than a centaur. Host I love that visual. Would you walk us through the key technical dynamics and the particulars of minotaur war fighting? Sparrow When people started thinking about artificial intelligence, they thought the hard task was going to be getting machines to do the things that we find difficult—playing chess, calculating, looking for patterns in data. But when people started building robots, what they discovered was the machines were quite good at that stuff. Machines were able to calculate . . . were able to do scheduling tasks. They were able to, in the end, play chess reasonably easily and very, very well. Where machines struggled were doing things that children and animals can do, and so we don’t recognize as requiring sophisticated capacities— things like walking into a room and recognizing where the chairs in the room are or simply being able to walk up steps or pick up a cup. Those tasks actually turn out to be incredibly difficult for machines. We still don’t have robots that can, for instance, walk into your office and find your coffee cup. Machine vision systems are much better but in complex environments, and where there’s a need to recognize context and maybe move around the cluttered environment, machines fail very quickly. If you’re looking for tasks to automate, if you’re looking for tasks that machines can perform, often where people end up employing machines is in these executive or cognitive roles. For instance, scheduling which offices get cleaned and making sure that there are people to clean them . . . that task can be outsourced to a machine scheduling system. Actually walking into the office and emptying rubbish bins, setting for the next vacuuming, that still needs to be done by human beings. Host Let’s talk about ethics. What are the ethical implications of minotaurs and minotaur warfighting? Henschke Well, one of the main things in the notion of the minotaur warfighting as we describe it in the paper is that you’ll have the machines, computers, and AI in a combination of technologies, directing and guiding how humans engage in a conflict zone. And as result of that, you’ve got decisions being made by machines carried out by humans. And this has quite a few ethical implications. One of the most interesting ones, or at least one of the first ones that we want to point out, is in these situations there might actually be a strong case for minotaur warfighting. If this would either decrease the likelihood of military mistakes, would decrease the likelihood of fratricide, and/or put your own soldiers at unnecessary risk, we might want those decisions to be made by the computers, by the machines. And so, there is a bit of an argument in favor, first, of minotaur warfighting, and, picking up from what Rob had just said, there might also be a case for minotaur warfighting in many situations over centaur warfighting. So, if you think of what Rob was saying about navigating physical terrain, when we think of terrestrial warfighting—warfighting on land, for instance—that’s really really complex, really complicated physical environments. You might have sand. You might have water. You might have trees. You might have humans or equipment moving through these complicated environments. And in that sense, the centaur is probably gonna face a whole lot of trouble. Whereas the minotaur system, or minotaur unmanned-manned system, that might actually have a far better capacity to operate in these sorts of complicated, complex, terrestrial environments. So, there we might see that there’s actually a case for the minotaur warfighting if it’s going to increase both the likelihood of success and decrease the chances of making military mistakes. Sparrow We also think that people might be quite horrified by that prospect. I mean, really, the idea that you were just following a list of tasks or strategic objectives given to you by a computer system, I think people are going to really struggle with that. And there’s an understandable sense that human beings are valuable in a way that machines are not and that placing machines in authority or giving machines effective power over human beings is getting that relationship backwards. We think there’s a relationship here with the debates about autonomous weapons systems, where critics of autonomous weapons systems have often insisted that machines shouldn’t be given the power to take a human life, that there’s something about the value of human life that suggests we shouldn’t let a machine make a decision about taking a human life. That intuition also, I think, counts against minotaur warfighting, because minotaurs, therefore AI systems, will be placing warfighters in harm’s way. They may sometimes have to put people into combat that they’re unlikely to survive, and I think people will balk at that, despite the fact that there are these very powerful arguments to suggest that might actually reduce the average risk to warfighters. There’s some questions here also about what we expect when we give reasons to each other. And you know, it’s a really important ethical principle that when you are relating to someone, you should be able to provide reasons for the way that you’re treating someone. And there’s some problems with the idea of machines giving reasons. Nowadays, machine systems can spit out reasons. I mean they can give you what looks like a reason, but they don’t have skin in the game in the same way that human beings do. They don’t stand behind their words in a way that a human being does when they explain why they have ordered you to take on this very difficult task. So, there’s some questions here again, about whether it’s ethically acceptable to have machines effectively ordering people into battle. Host I read one of the potential scenarios in your article about what if AI uses humans, basically, as fodder to achieve a larger goal or greater objective. That rattled me somewhat, I’d never considered it. Henschke I was going to say exactly that point. One of the other really fundamental principles in ethical theory goes back to the work of Immanuel Kant. And one of the things he said is that we shouldn’t treat people as tools. We should treat them as ends in themselves. And if you’ve got a machine that, as Rob had said, lacks the capacity to morally reflect on decisions telling humans what to do and to go on and do things, there is a really significant concern that the humans there become like a tool. They become fodder. And that is something that goes against a really, really core set of foundational principles in ethics. So that’s something that is problematic, definitely for the minotaur warfighting (and) probably also for centaur warfighting in various forms that that might take as well. Host What should we consider going forward? This obviously isn’t going away. Sparrow So clearly a key question here is whether or not we can intervene to prevent minotaur warfighting from emerging, or perhaps control the sorts of tasks where machines are given effective power or authority over human beings. We worry about an arms race here. We think that minotaur warfighting will evolve because in lots of circumstances, we think these systems will win battles . . . that, essentially, a military force that leaves too many decisions up to human beings may struggle to compete with a military force that is more willing to hand over certain sorts of decisions to AI. So, there’s a potential for something like an arms race. If you did want to try to prevent or slow down the development of minotaur warfighting, one obvious way of going about it is trying to build better robots . . . is to think about how we can build robots that actually can take on these sorts of physical tasks that are currently very difficult for machines. And we think one of the real problems there is the source of technologies that you would need to develop in order to get machines that can handle the complexity of the physical and the uncertainties of the physical environment might actually also make it easier for machines to work in other command roles. Henschke One other thing, too, that seems possibly quite obvious—there would have to be significant changes to training, education, and other ways in which the culture and practice of militaries operate. So, if we are going to go down some kind of minotaur route, then we’d need to recognize that the soldiers who are placed under the command of these machines, that they would have to receive particular training relevant to that. And also, quite importantly, the people who have the capacity to make the decisions about the minotaur warfighting . . . they would also have to undergo really specific training and education, understanding what the manned-unmanned systems are for, what their weaknesses are, what their limits are, what the implications are because there would be shifts in responsibilities, moral responsibility, who we assign moral responsibility to, and the training and probably some of the legal responsibilities would have to change as a result of that as well. So, one of the big important things would be to have a cultural shift in the militaries that recognize not just the practices of minotaur warfighting but a lot of the ethical, legal, and perhaps even social and cultural issues that might come around as well. Sparrow If people are freaked out by this vision. If people don’t want to see command roles handed over to AI, I also think that means that they should think again about autonomous weapons systems. There’s a lot of enthusiasm for autonomy in our armed forces for understandable reasons, indeed. The same reasons we think minotaurs will emerge . . . reasons that other people have been arguing that more and more tasks will be handed over to autonomous weapon systems. But machine autonomy here looks problematic in both cases, or neither. If you think it’s wrong to have a machine sending your troops into battle where they might be killed, it’s quite hard to explain how it can be OK to have a machine making decisions about which of the enemy to kill. So, there are some connections here between debates, we think debates that need to happen about so-called minotaur warfighting and debates that are going on at the moment about autonomy in weapon systems. Host Definitely lots of food for thought, here. Listeners you can really dig deep in this and get into a lot of detail. Download the article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters, look for volume 53, issue 1. Rob and Adam, thank you so much for making this happen. I know we’re on three different continents. It took a little bit of effort. I really appreciate you making the time for this. Henschke Thanks very much, Stephanie. Sparrow Thank you, Stephanie. Host If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and. Would like to. Hear more? You can find us on any major podcast platform. About the authors: Robert J. Sparrow is a professor in the philosophy program and an associate investigator in the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Automated Decision-making and Society (CE200100005) at Monash University, Australia, where he works on ethical issues raised by new technologies. He has served as a cochair of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Technical Committee on Robot Ethics and was one of the founding members of the International Committee for Robot Arms Control. Adam Henschke is an assistant professor in the philosophy section at the University of Twente, Netherlands. His research is concerned with ethics, technology, and national security, and he is interested in ethical issues having to do with information technologies and institutions, surveillance, cyber-physical systems, human military enhancement, and relations between social information technologies, political violence, and political extremism. He recently coedited the 2022 Palgrave Handbook of National Security.   show less

The US Army is unprepared to occupy and stabilize territory because it does not adequately educate active-duty officers to do so. One way to professionalize the Army’s ability to carry out military government and stability operations is to develop active-duty functional area officers who can advise commanders and integrate staff planning for these operations. In this episode, author Andrew Colvin analyzes case studies, doctrine, and commentary to envision specialized staff officers with... read more

The US Army is unprepared to occupy and stabilize territory because it does not adequately educate active-duty officers to do so. One way to professionalize the Army’s ability to carry out military government and stability operations is to develop active-duty functional area officers who can advise commanders and integrate staff planning for these operations. In this episode, author Andrew Colvin analyzes case studies, doctrine, and commentary to envision specialized staff officers with foreign language proficiency, cultural skills, advanced academic abilities, and a strong professional ethic. These officers would enhance the Army’s competence in stabilizing territory to achieve American policy objectives. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss1/13/ Episode Transcript: “The Case for an Army Stability Professional” Stephanie Crider (Host) You’re listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Today I’m talking with Andrew Colvin, an active-duty engineer officer in the commissioned corps of the US Public Health Service and author of the “Case for an Army Stability Professional,” which was published in the Spring 2023 issue of Parameters. Andrew, thanks so much for joining me today. I’m glad you’re here. Tell me what inspired you to write this article. Andrew Colvin So, I wrote this article because of my experiences as a civil affairs and engineer officer in the Army, and it left me convicted that we were missing something very critical to winning our nation’s wars. So, I began my research and discovered that I wasn’t the only one who thought this way, so I’ll start by stating the obvious. War is about exercising power over people and territory. It’s political at its core, but the army really struggles to translate violence into, say, a stable political arrangement that furthers American interests. And doctor Nadia Schadlow does a great job explaining this in her book War and the Art of Governance. But as an Army, we have words for this concept—stability, operations—in military government. We have doctrine for this concept. We even have recent experience trying to implement this concept. What we don’t have and what we’ve never really had is the right kind of education for leaders who can guide the Army to success. So, I wrote this paper to propose a solution to this problem, and I want to prepare conventional forces for stability operations during and after large-scale combat. And in a world of finite resources and time, stability operations are never going to get the attention they need from the Army. I recognize that. I think a workable solution is to invest in staff officers—leaders who are selected and educated to advise commanders and integrate staff planning for stability at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. Host You recommend the Army develop stability professionals. Can you expand on that, please? Colvin I envision an active-duty functional area, a specialized officer career field to professionalize the Army’s ability to carry out stability operations, and military government. And I use the word “professional” in its highest sense in the Samuel P. Huntington sense of people who serve society as members of a distinct group with skills that require a lifetime of education practice to master. So this person I envision, the stability professional, is defined by three skills. One is their cultural awareness and foreign language abilities. Two is their advanced academic education. And three, is their military ethic and experience. And so I’ll elaborate on each one of those a little bit more. First, for cultural awareness and foreign language skills, a stability professional practices their profession outside the United States by definition. They need a professional level of cultural awareness and foreign language proficiency. And again, when I say “professional level,” that’s not a buzzword. I have in mind the DoD standards of competence for both culture and language that are contained in DoD I 5160.70. The Interagency Language Roundtable Scale gives us ratings from zero to five. Zero being no skill and five being functionally native. A level three is called “general professional proficiency,” and that’s the minimum proficiency I believe a stability officer needs. And the Army can only get people with this level of proficiency in one of two ways. They either recruit them directly or they send them to spend a year or more in an immersive language education program like the Defense Language Institute. Next is their academic knowledge. I believe full-time graduate study at a civilian institution is important to a stability officer for a few reasons. Stability operations are some of the army’s most complex and intellectually demanding missions. We’re talking about telling army officers to develop, implement, and manage government functions in a foreign country. That’s hard. And that’s not something most people in the Army know anything about; (it’s) not something any Army training institution is capable of teaching. Of course, there’s more to it than just sending people to grad school. We need to make sure that the knowledge these officers receive is relevant to the Army’s mission. To do that, I believe the Army should partner with civilian graduate schools that can align officers’ academic studies with the Army’s stability operations tasks. These schools should expose officers to different ways of thinking and solving problems and giving them an intellectual foundation for stability operations. Ideally, this immersive graduate school experience helps officers make connections with leaders in academia and government who are working on peace and stability issues, and those are the kinds of relationships that can help the army pursue unified action in its future stability operations. Finally, a stability officer’s military experience and ethic is an important part of this stability professional I envision. So-called civilian expertise by itself is not the solution. This is about officers who can apply academic knowledge in a military context. They are active-duty officers with years of military experience who are permanently assigned to conventional army units to manage a staff and advise commanders on stability operations, and these professionals need an ethic. This is especially true for the military. Without an ethic, you’re just a guy with a gun. One of the things that struck me about the Army’s successful stability military government operations as I researched it through history was that the successful ones all seemed to have officers with this notion of diligent compassion at their center. When you look closely at these successes, the Mexican-American War, World War I, to an extent, and World War II, you find a handful of leaders who go against the conventional military wisdom that says all the Army is supposed to care about is lethality, killing the enemy, and publishing body counts. The successful ones approach the human welfare of civilians as a military necessity, something that they plan for meticulously. And I don’t think it’s a coincidence that instability operations when the Army stands for humanity, we tend to be successful—when we don’t, we have a hard time achieving lasting strategic results. Host Once we get these stability professionals resourced and trained, what would that look like? Colvin It would look like a functional area. So officers in a specialized career field. And they would be assigned at all levels through the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war and command. So you’re talking about brigades, talking about divisions, corps, and combatant commanders. And there is a position for this on staffs already that the S9, G9, or J-9, depending on the echelon. The challenge is manning it in conventional forces and fielding the right people who can be there when a conflict starts because currently most of those in the conventional forces are slated to be staffed by reserve officers, and they’re going to face significant obstacles mobilizing and manning those positions in time for a large-scale combat operation. Host You know that there are some arguments against this idea. Will you walk me through them, please? Colvin Well, first, there’s the “not my job” argument. Some people say that the Army isn’t supposed to be involved in nation-building wars. My rebuttal is that because the objective of war is to make political change by force, all wars are nation-building wars, whether the US Army likes it or not. Some say that other US government agencies, principally the State Department and USAID, are the country’s nation builders, and that’s correct in a sense. The 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review reaffirmed the concept that DoD has a supporting, not leading, role in stabilization. But while other government agencies can lead these efforts by implementing policies and programs, the wartime experiences of the United States, going back to our beginning as a nation, shows that the Army is going to have to shoulder a significant share of the burden for setting stable conditions during and after large-scale combat. And if we fail to do that, we’re going to have a bad time. The second major argument is that “we’ve already got one” argument. There are certainly some people out there who would say the army already has what it needs for stability operations. They’d say, look, we have some active-duty civil affairs people. They get a few days of governance training. We’ve got some reserve civil affairs forces that have civilian jobs, and we’re even standing up a team of experts in the military government program in the reserve. So, we’ve got it covered. But if you accept my criteria for stability professional, there’s a very simple way to test this claim. Get the commanders of all those units together and ask them to pull out their list of officers that, number one, speak a strategic language at an IR three level or better. Number 2, have a graduate degree that aligns with the Army stability operations, tasks, and, number 3, are permanently assigned on active duty to the staffs of conventional force units. I imagine those lists are not going to be long enough to sustain us in a protracted, large-scale combat operation. Host Give us your final thoughts before we go. Colvin A theme of my proposal is the importance of education over training. Training is what you do to prepare people to respond to predictable stimuli. You can train people to perform at a high level in very challenging circumstances, like jumping out of airplanes or fighting in urban terrain, but these circumstances and the actions soldiers ought to take are fairly predictable, nonetheless. Education is what enables people to find solutions to problems they’ve never seen before. Education is what soldiers need to prevail in situations that are so complex you cannot possibly train them for it. Officers doing stability operations with all their political, social, economic, and ethical complexities need the right education to succeed. I believe the concept of the stability professional I’ve laid out here unifies ideas that are fragmented across conventional and special-operations commands and the active-duty and reserve components. I believe it’s important because stability operations should be a whole-of-Army effort. We currently do not have officers with the right skills where they need to be to make those operations. Host Thanks so much for sharing your insights on this. Colvin Great. Thanks for having me. Host Listeners, you can download “The Case for an Army Stability Professional at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters look for volume 53, issue 1. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, you can find us on any major podcast platform. About the author: Lieutenant Andrew B. Colvin, PE, PMP, served on active duty in the US Army for nine years, including multiple assignments as an Engineer and Civil Affairs officer and two deployments to the US Central Command area of responsibility. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy and is currently on active duty as an Engineer officer in the Commissioned Corps of the US Public Health Service.   show less

In this episode: Global powers, regional hegemons, and non-state actors engaged in a perennial state of competition dominate today’s security environment. In response, the Department of Defense has adopted the competition continuum model of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. The military could significantly improve its efforts to compete along this continuum and achieve national security objectives by leveraging the Women, Peace, and Security global policy... read more

In this episode: Global powers, regional hegemons, and non-state actors engaged in a perennial state of competition dominate today’s security environment. In response, the Department of Defense has adopted the competition continuum model of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. The military could significantly improve its efforts to compete along this continuum and achieve national security objectives by leveraging the Women, Peace, and Security global policy framework that supports gender equality and values women’s diverse roles in global security. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss1/9/ Episode Transcript: “Enhancing US Global Competitiveness through Women, Peace, and Security” Stephanie Crider (Host) You’re listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m talking with Brenda Opperman today, associate professor in the College of Leadership and Ethics at the US Naval War College and author of “Enhancing US Global Competitiveness through Women, Peace, and Security” from the Spring 2023 issue of Parameters. Welcome to Decisive Point, Brenda. I’m delighted to chat with you today. Brenda Oppermann Hi, Stephanie. Thanks so much for inviting me to speak with you today. I’m really happy to be here. Host Your article opens with “Women, peace and security (WPS) is a global policy framework that supports gender equality and values women’s diverse roles in conflict and security.” Lay the groundwork for us, please, and explain WPS as a national security issue. Oppermann Thanks, Stephanie. I think a little bit of history might be helpful to understand what women peace and security is and kind of its genesis. So, in October 2000, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security, linking gender equality and international peace and security. It also recognized the importance of women’s full and equal participation in all peace and security activities, which have been, and, of course, as you know, continue to be male-dominated. Since Resolution 1325 was adopted, the WPS Framework has continued to evolve. There are now nine more WPS-related resolutions. And 100 countries have developed WPS national action plans, which is the primary mechanism to implement the framework. In our own interests, the US adopted two national action plans. The first one was in 2011, followed by a revised what we call NAP in 2016. And then in 2017, the US passed the WPS Act of 2017, now called the WPS Act, becoming the only country in the world to codify its commitment to WPS principles. As a follow on to the Act, or required by the Act, I should say, the US also created a WPS strategy in 2019. And in 2020, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, USAID, and the Department of Homeland Security each developed a WPS implementation plan. DoD’s is called the “WPS Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan.” That’s a lot of words, so we call that the SFIP for short. WPS . . . it’s a national security issue since it broadens our understanding of national and global security by highlighting the role of women in the context of conflict, peace, stability, and security, as well as the impact of gender equality in creating and maintaining security and stability. So more than 15 years of research shows that countries with greater gender equality are less prone to violent conflict and are more secure and stable. Host Let’s talk about the joint concept of integrated campaigning (JCIC). What is it, and how does it relate to this topic? Oppermann Yes, another mouthful. The joint concept for integrated campaigning, right? So, it provides an intellectual framework to help us conceive of today’s continually changing security environment—so, addressing any new challenge, to include security, calls for first thinking differently. In my mind, you can’t “do differently” unless you “think differently.” And the JCIC helps us to think differently about our complex evolving security environment by offering an alternative to the obsolete peace and war binary. So, I like the JCIC because it proposes the notion of a competition continuum, which is a whole different way to think about security and how we maintain peace and security. And so the JCIC’s competition continuum is a new three-part model of competition. It involves cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. I think this is really important because it reminds us that there are many ways to compete in the context of security. Those of us working in DoD essentially have many tools in the toolbox to compete more effectively. So having worked on women, Peace, and Security for decades, it’s kind of natural for me to start questioning how this framework and its principles were reflected in the competition continuum. Basically, I was thinking about how could WPS be leveraged to enhance our ability to compete? So I’ve watched over the years as efforts to implement WPS and DoD have steadily increased. I’ve seen how more and more people in defense and other places are becoming aware of women’s direct involvement in peace and war—the old binary. We know that women have been aggressors. They’ve been peacebuilders and have served as early warning signs of impending conflict and increasing conflict. So, while there’s been a distinct increase in situational awareness about women’s diverse roles in peace and conflict, I haven’t heard much discussion about women’s agency in the context of global competition. So I decided to look into it. I looked at women’s participation and the role of gender norms in the context of global competition— specifically, looking at the three ways to compete outlined in the JCIC. And so, my article discusses these using examples from Syria, North Korea, and China. Host What is the WPS conceptual framework and how can the Department of Defense leverage it in the context of armed conflict? Oppermann It’s just really important. I know DoD is generally focused on armed conflict, but the reason for the JCIC again is to have us think differently in order to face today’s challenges. And so, we can compete in other ways. As well. As mentioned earlier, WPS makes us think about the gendered aspects of security, to include things like women’s participation, the role of gender norms (very important), and gender equality. By using a gender lens to analyze the security environment, we conceive of it very differently. The gender analysis helps to overcome biases that can limit operational effectiveness. And by exposing the impact of women in conflict-affected areas, which is generally overlooked, a gender analysis reveals a security landscape that’s much more complex than we often assume. So we saw this in Afghanistan, for instance. Once the army realized that the Afghan women were supporting the insurgents, it changed its tactics, techniques, and procedures, and reaped significant benefits. So as an example, while I was working in Afghanistan, the Army finally began to include female soldiers on raids in Afghan compounds. So, during a 2011 raid, on a compound in Kandahar Province, a female American soldier discovered a hollowed-out Koran tucked into an infant’s swaddling while she and other female soldiers were searching Afghan women. So, the Koran contained cell phones with the names and numbers of insurgents, handwritten lists of names, and other incriminating documents. So, this discovery improved counterinsurgency efforts directly and was a wakeup call of sorts for battalion commanders, who assumed that insurgent activity was solely a male domain. Another example of how WPS principles serve to enhance our ability to compete at the level of armed conflict was US support of the homegrown defense forces in the Kurdish areas of Syria. The People’s Protection Units, known as the YPG, and its all-female People’s Protection Force (the YPJ), played a key role in the military defeat of ISIS. The Kurds enhanced their combat operations, right, by leveraging the talent, knowledge, and abilities of both men and women in their security forces, and so this enabled the US to successfully compete through armed conflict there by working closely with the all female force that displayed exceptional leadership, discipline, and combat effectiveness. And so another important WPS-related aspect of working with the Kurds in Syria was their deep support of gender equality, which was evident in their armed forces, as mentioned, with the two, all-male and all female forces that worked together and separately, as well as their democratic form of governance. And, as mentioned, research shows that countries that are more gender equal are less violent and more stable. Consequently, by partnering with the Kurds, we not only competed effectively through combat, but we also engaged in effective follow through. The JCIC emphasizes that follow-through after armed conflict is a key component of the competition continuum because we all know from experience that winning a battle doesn’t equate with winning the war. Essentially, without critical follow-through, we don’t achieve our policy aims. So, in short, we’ve seen that supporting those who support gender equality translates to a greater chance of success when it comes to promoting long-term security and stability. And I think it’s really important for DoD to recognize that adopting what I’ll call a “WPS mindset” is the first step to doing this. Host Do you have any final thoughts you’d like to share before we go? Oppermann Yes. If you don’t mind, Stephanie, I’d really like to give a shoutout to the many people in the DoD who are doing exceptional work to operationalize and institutionalize WPS. While this work helps us to be a better force, I also want to highlight the importance of WPS as a means to help us improve our thinking—not just our doing. So, the notion of a competition continuing with three distinct elements was developed to help us expand our thinking about how to compete effectively in today’s complex security environment. Women, Peace, and Security does the same thing. It’s also an intellectual framework, a conceptual framework, a mental model that enables us to see the global security environment as it is, which is something that is created and impacted by men and women in equal measure. So, adopting what I’ll call a WPS mindset would go a long way toward helping the DoD realize its full potential as an organization as well as its ability to envision and operationalize the competition continuum. Host Thank you. Listeners, you can download “Enhancing US Global Competitiveness through Women, Peace, and Security” at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 53, issue 1. Brenda, thanks so much for your time today. It was a real pleasure talking with you. Oppermann Stephanie, thank you so much for having me. I really enjoyed the conversation. Other Resources about Women, Peace, and Security DPPA Women Peace and Security Policy, New York 2019. UN DPPA (2020), Opening the Doors to Women’s Meaningful Participation, New York: United Nations. [7 pages] Poster also available. DPPA: Guidance on Gender and Inclusive Mediation Strategies. New York 2017. Online: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/1.%20English%20-GIMS.pdf DPPA: Guidance for Mediators. Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Ceasefire and Peace Agreements. New York 2012. Online: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GuidanceAdressingConflictRelatedSexualViolence_UNDPA%28english%29_1.pdf UN DPPA (2020), From Words to Action: The Experience of UN Political Missions in Colombia on Women, Peace, and Security. UN DPPA and UN Women (2020), COVID-19 and Conflict: Advancing Women’s Meaningful Participation in Ceasefires and Peace Processes, New York: United Nations. UN DPPA (2021), Women Peace and Security (WPS) & Youth Peace and Security (YPS) Complementarities of the two agendas, New York About the author: Brenda Oppermann, JD, MA, is an associate professor in the College of Leadership and Ethics at the US Naval War College. Before joining the Naval War College, she conducted stability operations in conflict-affected countries in Africa, Central Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.   show less

Since achieving victory in World War II, the United States military has a less than enviable combat record in irregular warfare. This exchange provides differing perspectives on where past decisions and doctrines have led to defeat and where they may have succeeded if given more time or executed differently. This episode responds to John A. Nagl’s article, “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars,” published in the Autumn 2022 issue of Parameters (vol. 52, no. 3).

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Since achieving victory in World War II, the United States military has a less than enviable combat record in irregular warfare. This exchange provides differing perspectives on where past decisions and doctrines have led to defeat and where they may have succeeded if given more time or executed differently. This episode responds to John A. Nagl’s article, “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars,” published in the Autumn 2022 issue of Parameters (vol. 52, no. 3). Read the review and reply here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss1/16/ Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Episode Transcript: Review and Reply: On “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars” Stephanie Crider (Host) You’re listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m here with Alexander, special operations NCO, and Dr. John Nagle, author of “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars,” which was published in the Autumn 2022 issue of Parameters. Welcome to Decisive Point, gentlemen. Dr. John Nagl It’s good to be here, Stephanie. Alex Thank you for having me, Stephanie. Host John, please give us a brief recap of your original article. Nagl The article argued that the United States has a somewhat acceptable record of conventional war since it became the greatest power on Earth, sometime over the course of the Second World War. Not just the greatest power on Earth but the greatest power the world has ever seen, with a power differential unknown in human history. But it does not have a similar record in irregular wars. In fact, our absolute abject defeat with helicopters off the roof of the embassy in both Vietnam and Afghanistan. And while Iraq, arguably too soon to tell for sure, does have costs that far exceed any possible gain, I argued in the article that our record in irregular wars since we became the greatest power on Earth is 0 and 3. And I asked why that was and suggested that in the future, enemies of the United States would be very unlikely to confront us conventionally in what the Pentagon is now calling large-scale combat operations, but instead would fight us in ways where they know they have a chance of winning . . . in irregulars, wars, insurgencies, terrorism, the sort of wars that have stymied us for the last 20 years. And therefore, I argue that as the Pentagon focuses on preparing for war with China—to deter and, if necessary, to defeat China—it should spend at least a little time trying to understand why we keep losing irregular wars and more than a little time trying to make sure that we don’t lose the next one. Host Alex, you took issue with John’s piece. Please explain your perspective. Alex So, I really appreciated John’s analysis, and I absolutely agree that we definitely need to start with why and seek understanding in that. Where I disagreed the most was with his conclusion that if a country is important enough to fight over, it is important enough to stay for generations. I think there are some conditions on that—the most important being that a cultural climate must first be gauged in order to assess how successful or worthwhile a commitment will be. The duration of the commitment really doesn’t matter because if the cultural climate will not support a country’s efforts in war, that country is wasting its time unless it’s willing to colonize whoever it’s fighting. It’s like trying to grow coffee in Alaska. Unless the climate in Alaska changes to support coffee growth, you’ll never be able to grow coffee there. Afghanistan was and is entrenched in tribalism and never fully developed into an industrialized nation state. Added to that, it is a culture that is generally hostile to anything originating from non-Muslim Western societies. So how long would be long enough to overcome those two deeply ingrained cultural dimensions to produce the functioning nation state that so many hope to achieve? I personally believe that there is no length of time that would have been sufficient to produce a fully functioning, self-sustaining democratic nation state with a strong national identity. Because the current cultural climate will not support it. Host Your thoughts John? Nagl I’m not sure I disagree with anything Alex said. And I’d like to congratulate him on his eloquence and on the coffee in Alaska analogy, which is absolutely terrific. I think the root of our disagreement focuses on Afghanistan, where I know Alex has spent some time, and I spent a little time. My argument is that the Afghanistan case is very similar to the Vietnam case. That by the end of American involvement in both of those wars, we had achieved what is, broadly speaking, the best outcome we can hope for when fighting a protracted irregular war—that is a country that still is deeply troubled. It’s only deeply troubled countries that face protracted insurgencies. Those countries that have terrific government, where the population all gets along tend not to have those sorts of things. In countries like Afghanistan and Vietnam, the best you can hope for is a government that has a foreign policy that is, broadly speaking, in accordance with the interests of the United States (US is the intervening state) that is developing its own security forces and can with a relatively small number, (some thousands of American advisers, supported by American air power), can keep the threat at Bay. My argument is that that’s what the United States achieved in Vietnam, and it’s also what we achieved in Afghanistan. And I think we should be prepared if we’re going to fight a counterinsurgency campaign in a country to understand that we’re going to have American troops there, not for a generation as we did in Vietnam and Afghanistan, but for generations. And I can understand that people can disagree with that assessment. World War Two was . . . coming up on 80 years ago. And we still, four generations ago, and we still have American troops in Germany, Italy, and Japan. And will, in my estimation, for at least a century to come. And second, those troops are . . . they’re at some risk, of course. But in the 15 months prior to the American departure from Afghanistan, when, of course, we lost 13 in a horrific incident, we had lost no American soldiers. And I believe that the benefit of maintaining a government in Afghanistan that is in US interests, precluding the Taliban from regaining power, maintaining control of Bagram air base (an absolutely invaluable lilypad in a very dangerous part of the world), and perhaps most importantly, preventing the radical Islamic extremists (who still threaten us and our interests around the globe) from having what analyst Peter Bergen called their best day since September 11th, the day that the Afghan government fell. I think that’s worth keeping a couple thousand American troops and a couple billion dollars in American aid flowing to the Afghan government, to infinity and beyond. Host Final thoughts before we go, Alex? Alex It’s interesting you brought up World War II, John, because I’ve definitely spent some time thinking about, well, what set apart nations like Japan and Germany from countries like Vietnam and Afghanistan? And I still come back to the cultural aspect, which in many strategic analyses is overlooked. Both Japan and Germany had a more organized nation state that was willing to accept defeat and allow the victor, I suppose, to rebuild a nation that was already a fully industrialized nation state. So, it’s just the cultural mindset in Afghanistan and Vietnam was totally different. And it’s interesting to me that Vietnam became a communist country, and yet it’s a very different flavor from China today. And, in many ways, it is politically somewhat hostile to China’s actions. So it’s curious that Vietnam didn’t quite turn out the way that the domino effect might otherwise have indicated it would. Nagl Terrific points, Alex. I appreciate your strategic empathy and your appreciation for different cultures. Japan and Germany were, of course, pretty completely destroyed by the end of the Second World War. Fortunately, in neither Vietnam nor Afghanistan did the wars have that sort of immediate impact on society, although they did over time in both countries. I think, in particular, in Vietnam, I would argue, as a result of our misguided counterinsurgency strategy. And so, I think the question is, for political decisionmakers, because both Vietnam and Afghanistan—those pullout decisions—what are you hoping to achieve? And if what you’re hoping to achieve is a country that looks like the United States, you’re obviously never going to get there. But if you believe that America has security interests in the region, which I very strongly feel it does in both Southeast Asia and in the Hindu Kush, then it may well be worth . . . I believe it strongly is worth . . . keeping a couple thousand American troops supported by air power there indefinitely. And Alex is certainly right that history is an unusual thing that the future is unknowable. That it takes twists and turns, and that Vietnam is now closer to the United States than anyone could have predicted almost 50 years ago when that horrible war came to an end. Nonetheless, the suffering that happened in between in Vietnam and Cambodia with the Khmer Rouge and here in the United States in the aftermath of a lost war, which as Alex noted, may be one of the reasons why the United States turned away from irregular war, sort of subcontracted that out to our special operating forces. I think that damage could have been avoided. More lives could have been saved, and Vietnam could be wealthier and safer, and a closer US ally now had we made some different choices, and, in particular, had we lowered our expectations and done a really hard calculation about our national interests. So I hope as we go forward that politicians will first understand that wars aren’t going to go the way they think they’re going to. They’re going to be longer and more costly, both for us and for the enemies we confront. And also, achieving an end state—a successful end state—in those wars is likely to require a multi-generational commitment of American troops as it has in Germany, Italy, Japan, and Korea. Host I think we have time, Alex, if you want to reply. And then last word to John. Alex I’ll reply. Thank you. I do agree with what John said about lowering the expectations or adjusting the expectations of what is it exactly that you hope to achieve and is that too grandiose of an expectation, given the culture? I suppose my main thrust with my points is that culture in the larger calculus seems to be largely ignored, and it should be given much more weight than it currently does. Nagl I agree with that. I was the Minerva Research professor at the US Naval Academy for a couple of years. Secretary Gates appointed me to that position in order to try to increase our understanding of cultures and societies in the wars that we were fighting then, when I was serving in that role about a decade ago. And I’m continuing to advocate for that kind of understanding today. And I’d just like to close by thanking Alex for reading my stuff. You’re the one. I’d always hoped I’d meet somebody who would. And then engaging with me, both in writing and now in words, in a very thoughtful way that, hopefully, will help our army and our nation make better national security choices for many years to come. And I’d like to close by thanking him for his service. As a fat, old, retired guy, it’s men like you who keep us safe and able to get fatter. And I’d like to close by pointing out that round is, in fact, a shape. Host What a treat to talk with you both today. Thank you for your contribution to Parameters, and thank you for your time. Listeners read the review and reply in its entirety at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 53, issue 1. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, you can find us on any major podcast platform. About the authors: Dr. John A. Nagl is an associate professor of warfighting studies in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the US Army War College. He is the author of Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice (Penguin Books, 2014). Alex is a special operations NCO.   show less

US military practice neither considers the gendered effects of kinetic actions in the planning and executing operations nor tracks and measures them. The Department of Defense’s implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 instead focuses on the role of women in preventing armed conflict and resolving it. The implementation of the Department of Defense’s new Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan, however, provides an opportunity to close this gap in an... read more

US military practice neither considers the gendered effects of kinetic actions in the planning and executing operations nor tracks and measures them. The Department of Defense’s implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 instead focuses on the role of women in preventing armed conflict and resolving it. The implementation of the Department of Defense’s new Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan, however, provides an opportunity to close this gap in an operationally relevant way. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss1/4/ About the author: Colonel Jody M. Prescott (retired) served as an active-duty judge advocate for 25 years and taught at the US Army Command and General Staff College and at the US Army Military Academy. He is now a lecturer at the University of Vermont, where he teaches courses on cybersecurity law and energy law. His most recent book is Empirical Assessment in IHL Education and Training (Anthem, 2021). COL Prescott also spoke on this topic at the Women, Peace, & Security Ninth Annual Symposium hosted by the US Naval War College. His portion begins at 42:30 in this link: https://youtu.be/NTw-UeR_ibA?t=2550   show less

In the fifth installment of the SRAD Director’s Corner, “Afghanistan: The Logic of Failing, Fast and Slow,” George Shatzer focuses on the failure of the US-led war and reconstruction campaign in Afghanistan. He reviews The Forty-year War in Afghanistan: A Chronicle Foretold by Tariq Ali and The Fifth Act: America’s End in Afghanistan by Elliot Ackerman. He brings personal experience to bear in his review, painting a picture of why the United States failed in Afghanistan and posing... read more

In the fifth installment of the SRAD Director’s Corner, “Afghanistan: The Logic of Failing, Fast and Slow,” George Shatzer focuses on the failure of the US-led war and reconstruction campaign in Afghanistan. He reviews The Forty-year War in Afghanistan: A Chronicle Foretold by Tariq Ali and The Fifth Act: America’s End in Afghanistan by Elliot Ackerman. He brings personal experience to bear in his review, painting a picture of why the United States failed in Afghanistan and posing these failures as lessons that must be learned before the next war. The books also provide insights for strategists attempting to plan for security in the region. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss1/4/ Episode transcript: “Afghanistan: The Logic of Thinking Fast and Slow” Stephanie Crider (Host) You’re listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army, War College, or any other agency of the US government. In your SRAD Director’s Corner series you review books of possible interest to contemporary military strategists, especially those serving in US Army and Joint positions. The spring issue contains the fifth installment of this series, and the focus is on Afghanistan. Thanks for joining us again. Colonel George Shatzer Thanks as always for having me. I enjoy discussing these important issues. (Host) Each of you articles in the series include a personal component. You have had direct experience in dealing with the issues and strategies discussed in the books you review. That’s true again with the topic of the US war in Afghanistan. Shatzer Yes, very true. I don’t claim to be an expert on Afghanistan but that country and the US war there have factored significantly in my Army career. The terror attacks of 9/11, emanating partly from Afghanistan, inspired my interest in national security and strategy and were a big part of the reason I chose to become an Army strategist in 2005. As a much younger officer then, I felt strongly that the so-called Global War on Terror should have remained centered on Afghanistan and the terror groups operating there. My views on that have changed some over the years, but the issue of our commitment to campaigning in Afghanistan remained the vital question all the way to the collapse of the campaign in 2021. And, I know we’ll take more about that later. I was also a student at the Army’s Command and General Staff College in ’05 and decided to write my master’s thesis on proxy warfare which led to me to research and write a lengthy case study on the Soviet-Afghan war of the 1980’s and the subsequent Afghan civil war that led to the development of the foreign terrorist base there. And while I would continue to follow events in Afghanistan closely, it would be another nine years before I actually served there in country. The experience was probably the most difficult of my entire career. That tour challenged me the most intellectually and was personally and professionally very trying. Host So, an easy question then – why did the US war in Afghanistan fail? Shatzer Oh boy. Joe Collins’s article in the same edition of Parameters does a great job at answering this. I offer many reasons why in my article as well. The reality is that the array of problems in Afghanistan is vast and their nature is so complex as to almost be alien to us as Americans. But if I had to select the one issue that set up the US campaign for failure it would be the mismatch in the aims of US political leaders and those of the US military. For the Department of Defense, and especially the Army as the lead service in the campaign, there was a deep-seated reluctance to fully commit to a war in Afghanistan. Even years before 9/11, the DoD and the Army actually did a fair job of examining the British and Soviet experiences in Afghanistan and concluding that operating there was a dead end – a graveyard of empires as the phrase goes. So many books like the Bear Went Over the Mountain by Les Grau, The Bear Trap by Mohammed Yousef, and post 9/11 works like Soldiers of God by Robert Kaplan were very popular and all played on the same theme: that powerful militaries go into Afghanistan and cannot deal with the terrain, the culture, and myriad other issues, and only end up wasting years and precious resources. So, DoD and the Army planned what amounted to a very large-scale raid of Afghanistan beginning in October 2001 to punish and oust the Taliban and to capture and kill as many Al-Qaeda and other terrorists as possible – and, critically, to not become so decisively engaged with a large footprint of conventional forces that would only lead to a long-term and aimless campaign vulnerable to failure. But US civilian leadership had a different view. While they recognized what history had to say about major powers entering Afghanistan, they were rightly aggrieved by the Taliban’s treatment of its people, especially women and children and the internal violence that had gripped the country since at least the mid-1970’s. To US political leaders, 9/11 was proof that a deep commitment to and investment in Afghanistan was needed to end the decades of conflict there and eliminate so-called “ungoverned spaces” – the underdeveloped and seemingly chaotic hinterlands of Afghanistan that gave bad actors like terrorist groups free range to operate. So, while DoD and the Army were thinking “in and out with some training to get the new Afghan security forces up and running so they could quickly take over,” the US civilian authority was thinking, “nation-building, democratization, remaking Afghan society and bringing it into the modern era.” This fundamental misalignment of views set the stage for what followed – a never-resolved tension between a “realist” view (held mostly by the military) and an “idealist” view (held mostly by civilian authority. The military, imbued with a can-do mission first attitude, dutifully followed orders but never fully committed to Afghanistan because it assessed the country as beyond help. The civilian reconstruction mission was deeply committed to the future vision of Afghanistan but failed to be cleared-eyed about the profound difficulties there. Unfortunately, this created a tendency by both camps to overstate progress year after year. This disconnect in views, aims, and assessments created a dynamic that badly undercut the campaign and made it much less able to deal with the whole host of other problems in Afghanistan that it faced. Host So, from a very high-level view there were serious issues. During your tour in Afghanistan you experienced how that played out day-to-day. Describe that. Shatzer Sure. Expanding on what I mention in the article, what I experienced even preparing for deployment to Afghanistan demonstrated the limits of our commitment. I should say that I deployed to Afghanistan as an individual augmentee to the mission, not as part of a deploying unit. The Army’s individual augmentee deployment preparation was geared almost exclusively toward training service members for personal self-protection while in country and refreshing on basic tactical soldier tasks. To the extent that there was training on Afghan culture or on the US campaign, it was barely more than what you might find on Wikipedia. Even as a senior lieutenant colonel who had done serious study on Afghanistan in the past, and did another round of my own professional study before deploying, I felt grossly unprepared to deal with the tough operational and strategic issues facing the plans team that I joined at NATO headquarters. On top of that, as I mention in the article, the turnover in personnel in the NATO headquarters was tremendously disruptive. Most personnel were on six-month long tours with a small minority assigned for a year. In my year-long tour, the plans section had four US colonels serve as the chief of plans. Two different British brigadiers would serve as the plans director. It seemed every month there was an officer either joining the section, leaving the section or going on R&R leave. This contributed to a pervasive sense that many were just putting in their time – doing their reports, delivering briefings, engaging with Afghans – but at the same time detached from it all as they anticipated the next drawdown or going home. For most of my tour, LTG John Campbell commanded the mission and he recognized this short-timer attitude and approach. He tried to combat it. He frequently said, “Make the days count, don’t count the days.” Too many individuals were just counting the days. Institutionally, the Army was doing much the same. Host That’s a major point that Elliot Ackerman makes in his book, The Fifth Act. Shatzer Yes, he does. He relates how after nearly a decade in Afghanistan that the US Combined Joint Special Operations Task force headquarters was still made from plywood – a fact noted by our Afghan partners in the observation that “wars are not won with plywood.” Ackerman extends this point into a metaphor. The Afghan army was a plywood army, effective for some things but foundationally unsound in so many ways for trying to win an actual war. His point of course, is that our short-timer, always partly-preparing-to-leave approach undercut the effectiveness of everything we tried to do. We were always dealing with expedients, trying this and that for “quick wins,” but frequently shifting means and methods when priorities invariably shifted as people passed through the mission. Ackerman recounts how he, like many other veterans of Afghanistan, tried in August 2021 to coordinate the evacuation of former Afghan allies as the Taliban completed taking control of the country once again. He describes doing this while on a family vacation to Italy, making frantic phone calls and direct messaging with people to try to arrange passage for Afghans through the chaos swirling around Kabul’s airport to get these people on flights out of the country. As a story-telling device, Ackerman doing this while on vacation is a great illustration of how we treated the entire mission in Afghanistan – doing what we could, constantly at the spur of the moment, while trying to get back to what we would rather be doing. What seems so strange to me is the lack of concern or attention the failure in Afghanistan seems to garner from the American public. One really has the sense that after nearly 25,000 US deaths and causalities in Afghanistan, 20 years and over $2 trillion spent, that no one seems to care much. One would think the American people would be demanding more in terms of examining our actions in the war and holding people to account. But it seems we’re just not interested. On one level, this isn’t surprising. Most Americans were never invested in the war. It was something a small group of volunteers were dealing with in faraway backwards country. Americans went about with their daily lives. Perhaps they knew somebody that deployed or was hurt in the war, but probably not. On another level, Ackerman worries that the American character has weakened and we’re unwilling to hold ourselves to account. He attributes these to a number of mostly partisan and societal factors that he sees as threatening the very integrity of the United States. What worries me more immediately is that the Army itself also seems uninterested in studying its conduct of the war. We used to pride ourselves as a learning organization, deeply committed to the after-action review process and to professional study. So far as I know, the Army is not conducting any major study of the war. In my list of other books to consider, I include a two-volume study that the Army published that looks at the war through 2014. The Army really needs to write volume three through 2021. I worry that the Army’s unwillingness to learn from Afghanistan is a sign of something lost professionally within the service. Host What does Tariq Ali’s book, The Forty-Year War in Afghanistan add? Shatzer Well, like Ackerman’s book, Ali publishes this collection of his writings very soon after the fall of Kabul in late summer 2021. The collection pulls together some of his writings since 1980 on the conflicts in Afghanistan. The subtitle of his book is “A Chronicle Foretold.” And his writings since the beginnings of the Soviet invasion do indeed seem to hit the mark across the decades in nearly every instance. Ali, a Pakistani-British political activist, clearly has an anti-American bias, but it’s hard to fault his conclusions about the results of foreign intervention in Afghanistan since they all unfold much as he predicts. Oddly, the thing that’s remarkable about Ali’s book is that it really says nothing new about the failures in Afghanistan that many others, including Ackerman, haven’t already said. That’s the point – here is yet another work, written over the course of four decades that arrived at the same conclusions as those coming to the subject thirty or forty years later. It speaks to a fundamental lack of understanding about what Afghanistan is and what we were doing. This is beautifully illustrated in a reprinted series of letters from 2003 between Ali and the UK minister for trade, investment, and foreign affairs. In the letters, Ali is hypercritical of what he sees as abject US and NATO failures even in year one essentially. The UK minister takes him to task noting there has been positive progress made. Ali counters that the Soviets claimed the same things while ignoring just how bad the situation truly was. This links back to my earlier point about the split between realists and idealists. Both camps turned a blind eye to the true difficulties. The realists were numb to them, expected them and so didn’t take any new actions. The idealists would minimize these issues, trying to convince themselves and others that the Afghans were improving their ability to deal with them when they really weren’t. Either way, the US never substantially altered its strategy or campaign in twenty years. Host You make very brief reference to two other books at the end of your article. Shatzer Yes, The Logic of Failure by Dietrich Dörner and Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow. Dorner makes a very convincing case that failure is not accidental. That there are real, substantive shortcomings in logic and attitudes that cause us to make bad decisions when dealing with complex problems. Similarly, Kahneman’s work explains the different logical processes (especially in deliberate and instinctive thinking) that we use in decision-making and how that often leads us to have too much confidence in our judgment. Neither book is about Afghanistan. But, for my money, both books nail the logical failures that to campaign failure in Afghanistan. The point is we have to make deliberate study of our logic in order to avoid repeating the same mistakes. And, again, I don’t see us doing this with respect to our conduct of the war in Afghanistan. The DoD and US Army are understandably very concerned about building the capability to deter, and if necessary, win a future war with powerful nation-states like China. But, that can’t come at the expense of being ready for wars like we experienced in Afghanistan. Failure to learn from them today will set us up for failure again. Host It’s always a pleasure working with you. Thanks so much for making time for this today. Shatzer I appreciated the opportunity to discuss this today. Host Listeners, if you want to learn more, read the article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 53, issue 1. About the author: Colonel George Shatzer is the chairman of the Strategic Research and Analysis Department in the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College.   show less

Policy initiatives in the Trump administration and the Biden-Harris administration significantly accelerated the Taliban victory in Afghanistan. This podcast supports the conclusion that the major factors in this defeat were the historical difficulty in governing Afghanistan, the Afghan republic’s two inefficient and corrupt governments, an ineffective US strategy, operational shortcomings by US forces, an ineffective Afghan military, Pakistan’s duplicitous policy, and the strength and... read more

Policy initiatives in the Trump administration and the Biden-Harris administration significantly accelerated the Taliban victory in Afghanistan. This podcast supports the conclusion that the major factors in this defeat were the historical difficulty in governing Afghanistan, the Afghan republic’s two inefficient and corrupt governments, an ineffective US strategy, operational shortcomings by US forces, an ineffective Afghan military, Pakistan’s duplicitous policy, and the strength and determination of the Taliban. This podcast rejects the claim that the United States nation-building effort was a major factor in its defeat and concludes with a discussion of lessons encountered. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss1/3/ Episode transcript: “Defeat in Afghanistan: An Autopsy” Stephanie Crider (Host) The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. You’re listening to Decisive Point. I’m talking with Joseph J Collins today, a retired Army Colonel and civil servant whose service has included tours in the Army and Joint Staffs, and OSD Collins is the author of defeat in Afghanistan and autopsy. And in the spring, 2023 issue of Parameters. Welcome, Joe. Joseph J. Collins Thanks, Stephanie. With everything going on in Ukraine and worries about Taiwan, I’m glad that we can dive back into it for a bit here today. Host Let’s jump right in, you noted at the beginning of your article, and I’m quoting you here, “the United States failed to accomplish its objectives, whether judged in terms of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, or nation building. This outcome represents a significant unforced error in American National security policy.” What prices did Afghanistan and America pay In this venture? Collins You’re correct. I think we failed in all of our major tests in Afghanistan. We failed overall, but in each of those tasks you mentioned, we failed in varying degrees. In counterterrorism, we finally did get bin Laden, and afterward, his successor, Ayman Zawahiri. We did prevent further attacks on our nation. But we left behind in Afghanistan a significant ISIS problem, as well as, perhaps, as many as 500 al Qaeda fighters who remain closely associated with the Taliban, Pakistan, and al Qaeda’s best friend, Saraj Haqqani. A US- and UN-designated terrorist, is now the old powerful interior minister in Kabul. In the main counterinsurgency effort, US forces held their own but never decisively defeated the Taliban. We passed the baton to the Afghanistan Army in 2014, but, in the end, they lost ground, could not succeed and, finally, sensing Western abandonment or what they thought would be Western abandonment, they quit the field and nation building. We did much great work, but we were inefficient. We fostered corruptions, and our failures there were costly in the main, though I don’t see nation building and the nation building effort as a significant source or cause of our defeat. There, we talked about costs. We paid a steep price—nearly 2,500 US deaths, 1,200 allied deaths, and over 25,000 wounded over a two-decade period. We spent $2 trillion on this effort when all things are considered. But with all of that, Afghans suffered much more—66,000 dead soldiers, airmen, and police officers (and) 50,000 civilians perished. Most of them at the hands of the Taliban, which is a horrible toll for a nation of not much more than 35 million people. As a result of our defeat, Afghans lost civil rights and personal freedom. The country’s economy is in worse shape than ever. The clock in healthcare, education, and economic opportunity has been turned back to the terrible days of the 1990s. The women of Afghanistan are essentially under house arrest. That’s a steep price for that country. Host How did the Bush and Obama presidencies shape the war? Collins This is a 20-year experience for the United States. Bush and Obama each managed the war effort for eight years. Neither was able to put together a winning effort, but neither was willing to give up altogether. Both Bush and Obama, in varying degrees, were distracted by the war in Iraq. Team Bush came in country in 2001 looking to avenge 9/11. Their initial objective was to destroy al Qaeda in Afghanistan and remove the Taliban from power. President Bush quickly added nation building to the mission, knowing that if we failed to stabilize Afghanistan, extremists would just take over again. The first few years under Bush were quiet, but Iraq took first priority, even as the Taliban regained strength. By 2008, the last year of the Bush administration, team Bush realized that the Afghanistan effort needed help, and so did team Obama. Obama campaigned on Afghanistan as the “good” war and argued that it would be first priority. As we were beginning to leave Iraq after an agonizing set of meetings over a few months, President Obama decided to surge in Afghanistan, raising our troop strength for the second time. This time to nearly 100,000, with the Allies adding troops as well. Afghan forces were reinforced, and an army of over 300,000 cops and soldiers was in the field. It was a promising start, but President Obama was true to his word. He gradually turned off the surge, beginning at the 18th month. By the end of his term, a few years later, U.S. forces were down to about 8,400 personnel. In summary, Bush and Obama muddled through, presiding over a deteriorating battlefield situation, but at the same time keeping faith with our allies. Host And Trump and Biden? How did they impact the effort in Afghanistan? Collins In contrast to their predecessors, presidents Trump and Biden worked for a total troop withdrawal. In the end, they broke faith with our Afghan allies, demoralized Afghan forces in the field, and opened the door to the final Taliban offensive. While our failure in Afghanistan really was 20 years in the making, presidents Trump and Biden bear special responsibility for the defeat. Trump came into office as a skeptic of the war effort. But encouraged by his national security adviser, Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster and the theater Commander General Mick Nicholson, he stepped up efforts and made a modest trooper reinforcement. About a year later, he entered into direct negotiations with the Taliban without our allies at the table. In February 2020, his envoy signed the Doha Accords, promising a full US withdrawal by spring of 2021. Trump did not insist on a ceasefire or force the Taliban to come to the table with the Kabul government. Trump lowered our troop strength to 35,00 personnel. The bare minimum contractors at that time declined from nearly 10,000 to about 6,000. That’s after the Doha Accord up to the beginning of the Biden administration. For their part, the Taliban made a series of promises, but the only one they kept was not to kill American advisers until the withdrawal was complete. Team Biden came in intent on a full withdrawal. They slid the withdrawal date to August, but they failed to read the situation. Their withdrawal plan, (was) marked by the embassy closure, the recall of our last and highly respected commander General Scott Miller, and the abandonment of our central base at Bagram Airfield. All of these things together drowned out our pledges of lasting support. For the Kabul regime, the Afghan army, who had sacrificed 66,000 dead to the war, lost the will to fight, and by the time we executed a single-point evacuation from Kabul Airport, the adjacent neighborhoods were under Taliban control. One hundred twenty thousand people, mostly Afghan, were withdrawn, but 70,000 of our allies in the special visa pool were left behind. As General Milley noted in his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, the withdrawal was a logistical success and a strategic failure. Host You note that the major factors that brought about the victory of the Taliban over Afghanistan and its partners are complex, but few. Please expand on that. Collins Decisive factors (in my mind), and this is certainly subject to argument—and indeed in the more than 50 things in the few books that I’ve written about Afghanistan, I’ve realized that the truth has been elusive and that perceptions matter. This is my arrangement of the decisive factors, and I hope your listeners and the readers of Parameters will come back and tell me where I went wrong and what their list is. The first thing that I always mentioned is the difficulty of governing Afghanistan. This was not a showstopper, but it provided a very difficult context. Our leaders and modern Afghan leaders had to deal with a nation, Afghanistan, that was at war since 1978. Institutions were completely destroyed—public and private. Extreme poverty and underdevelopment was a given. Ethnic rivalries between the major groups (Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara) were a major part of Afghan history, and they continued to be a real problem for the government. There were also religious rivalries, (not only a Shia–Sunni divide, with the Sunnis being in the great majority) but there was also a difference in those who believed in the most primitive and fundamentalist aspects of Islam and those who had a more modern approach in the 20th century. In Afghanistan, most leaders were deposed, exiled or executed in office. The only really good time of significant peace in Afghanistan was from the mid (19)30s up until 1978, which were dominated by the monarchy. But Afghanistan in 2021 was not a lost cause. Other factors carried more weight in determining our defeat. Clearly, the Karzai and Ghani governments left a lot to be desired. They seldom rose above ineffectiveness and corruption. The lack of modern institutions compounded this problem. The US also failed to develop and execute an effective strategy that you would unite all coalition efforts and chart a course to success. The Iraq effort compounded this problem. From 2003 to 2008, the time when Afghanistan and the war in Afghanistan was spiraling downward, conditions in Iraq were often much worse. It wasn’t just a question of material resources. It was, more importantly, I think, a question of the imagination and the decision-making time of Americans, senior officers and civilian officials. Throughout all this, the United States armed forces also bears a share of the blame for how the war was fought. Our armed forces showed brilliance in logistics and tactics, but much less skill and operational and strategic planning. We never achieved unity of command and never harmonized our counterterrorist and counter insurgency efforts. We built up the Afghan army and police, but we made them in our mold. They were large, slow, bureaucratic. They were also a complete shareholder in Afghan corruption. The Afghan Air Force was slow rolled in the beginning and it never caught up. Only Afghan commando units, advised by coalition special operators, were predictably good and reliable in the field. A major factor also can be found in Pakistani policy. They played the United States like a fiddle. They exploited their status as an ally, essential to our logistical effort, while at the same time effectively supporting and providing a safe haven for the Taliban. One finally one has to give credit to the Taliban themselves. They fought valiantly and consistently. Again, this is part of an old irregular warfare pattern. The insurgents had more motivation and constancy than the forces of the national government. Host What lessons learned can we carry forward? Collins We did a book at the National Defense University called Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War. It was about Afghanistan and Iraq, published in 2015. We preferred (the title) Lessons Encountered to Lessons Learned because quite often when we found that we have learned the same lessons many times before and just not absorb them. It’s always a tough question. “Lessons encountered” is a more neutral term and one full of hope that people will study examples of this war. And again, this is something that I put forward to start the discussion, certainly not as the last word. The first and foremost, and what my army buddies used to call a BFO (blinding flash of the obvious), the United States of America should avoid being a third party in an insurgency where the insurgents have safe havens and strong foreign support, particularly from adjacent nations. That was a factor in Vietnam. It was a factor here in Afghanistan. You have to deal with that foreign support, or you’re making counterinsurgency almost impossible when you have a motivated enemy, as you did here in this case. Secondly, we have to remember (that) neither Iraq nor Afghanistan began as an insurgency. We have to be careful to keep our eye on the changing character of a conflict where we’re preparing for great-power conflict. That’s the first priority. But irregular warfare may not be far away, and we have to be able to make those assessments. And to change both in Iraq and Afghanistan, we were probably slower than we might have been to adapt to counterinsurgency. Some of our earlier commanding generals, I would remind you here that a number of people in the Pentagon were not eager at all, particularly in the beginning, to bill Afghanistan as an insurgency at all, A third lesson: long, irregular wars (even if they are small wars) by some description will be expensive. Policy inertia and some costs will tend to keep us deployed for long durations. Large land deployments will be costly. The key decision I think, and this is another lesson, is when to commit to it and how to commit to them? It’s hard to break contact once you’re in a fight, but while raiding and air strikes have their place, they seldom create lasting results. By, with, and through is a useful technique, but there will be many cases where the presence of our forces on the ground will be necessary. Finally, it’s hard to avoid nation building as part of a long-term commitment. It would be nice if we could match a troop presence with simple counterterrorist operations. That was our hope at the beginning, but while it’s an attractive notion, it’s not practical. You have to help your allies out as we found in President Bush’s terms. Host Care to share your final thoughts before we go? Collins The wiser sleuths among the readers of the Parameters article will be able, between the lines, perhaps, to see some emotional reactions. I’ve been writing on the war in Afghanistan since November 1980, and it’s the end of Afghanistan in 2021. The way it ended was clearly a significant downbeat for me. I worry about our veterans who fought so hard there. And so many like General Campbell, General Nicholson, Scott Miller. Those who had so many multiple tours—people, particularly in the special operations community—who had spent so many different tours there. I feel for them even more. I feel for the people in Afghanistan. Their immediate future is bleak. Some good news for us, but not for the Taliban, is that the nation, the country that the Taliban conquered, is not the same one that they conquered 1996. Half the Afghan population is under 25 and did not know the old Taliban. The Taliban, of course, despite their protestations, appears to be about as dumb as they were in 1996. It’s just an amazing combination of ignorance and arrogance. They will turn around and put all of their policy issues to a religious test. There’s no system of government and no religion that tells you that life is a suicide pact, and that’s in some ways where they are. Women are now not just forbidden to attend high school and college, but they’re also forbidden to work independently for foreign humanitarian, nongovernmental organizations. Most of them had large-scale female staff because they were dealing with infants and children and healthcare and education. And Afghan women tend to dominate there. Mixing Afghan men and women is difficult, so the NGO’s wisely turned toward the female population in Afghanistan, which is so underutilized already. We have unrest. In some of the non-Pashtun areas of the countryside there remains, of course, huge problems with ISIS. We have to keep an eye on ISIS and al Qaeda elements that are in the country. Sadly, I think this validates Clausewitz’s observation that. The results of war are never final. Afghan is an area of such strife that the export of conflict from conditions inside of Afghanistan is likely. At the same time, the Taliban today is much better armed and supported because of their victory against the Afghan army than they’ve ever been before. And so, when you look inside your own crystal ball for the immediate future of (Afghanistan), it looks bleak. And undoubtedly, as bleak as it was in 1996 when the original Taliban leadership took over. Host Thanks for your insights on this topic, Joe. And I echo your desire for feedback. I’ll make sure we have an e-mail address in the show notes. Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or on the genesis article. Collins Thanks for paying attention to this, Stephanie. Host Listeners, if you want to learn more, read the article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 53, issue 1. About the Author: Joseph J. Collins is a retired Army colonel and civil servant. His 46 years of service included tours in the Army and Joint Staffs and OSD (Policy). From 2001–04, he served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for stability operations. He has taught at the United States Military Academy, the National War College, and Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program. Collins holds a doctorate from Columbia University and is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations.   show less

In this episode, Parameters acting editor-in-chief offers a preview of the upcoming Parameters Spring demi-issue and touches on what the full Spring issue will include.

Read the 2023 Spring issue of Parameters: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss1/

Episode transcript: Parameters Spring 2023 Preview
Stephanie Crider (Host)

You’re listening to Decisive Point, a U.S. Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs.

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In this episode, Parameters acting editor-in-chief offers a preview of the upcoming Parameters Spring demi-issue and touches on what the full Spring issue will include. Read the 2023 Spring issue of Parameters: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss1/ Episode transcript: Parameters Spring 2023 Preview Stephanie Crider (Host) You’re listening to Decisive Point, a U.S. Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m here with Parameters acting editor-in-chief and Strategic Studies Institute historian and researcher, Dr. Conrad Crane. Thank you for being here today, Con. Dr. Conrad Crane Oh, always glad to talk to you, Stephanie. Host Let’s talk about the spring demi-issue of Parameters that’s due out in the next few weeks. This issue includes a substantial piece by Afghanistan expert Joseph Collins. I hope to talk with him in detail later, but I’m curious . . . from your perspective, what does Collins bring to the Afghanistan conversation? Crane I’ve known Joe for a lot of years. We are at West Point together, teaching in different departments. He’s a long-serving Army officer. He’s been a deputy assistant secretary of defense, he’s watched Afghanistan for decades. He’s written three books on it and about 40 articles. There are a few people I trust more to really analyze what went wrong in Afghanistan than Joe Collins. Host Why are you focusing this demi-issue on Afghanistan? Crane When I got my first assignment in the Strategic Studies Institute over 20 years ago, one of my first research projects was to look at the Army’s response to losing in Vietnam. And I ended up doing a monograph entitled Avoiding Vietnam: The US Army’s Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia, which can actually be downloaded from the SSI publications website. What I found was that, basically, the Army as an institution ran away from Vietnam. They really didn’t do any systematic institutional study of the defeat. They immediately focused on the Yom Kippur War and large-scale combat operations. And what significant discussion analysis did occur in an Army venue occurred in the pages of Parameters. That’s about the only place you could find it. Right now, it kind of looks like deja vu all over again. We have the service that is not doing any systematic studies that I know of of why we failed in Afghanistan. I feel that Parameters needs to step up again and become the forum for discussion about that. The service really needs to analyze what went wrong in Afghanistan, because we have never been able to never do this again. Again, we are focused on major combat operations, large-scale combat operations looking at Ukraine. But we can’t just forget about Afghanistan. We need to really take a hard look at what went wrong there and get what lessons and insights we can for the future. Host So continuing the Afghanistan theme, for SRAD Directors Corner, Colonel George Shatzer plans to review and comment on two books—The Fifth Act, America’s End in Afghanistan by Elliot Ackerman and The 40-Year War in Afghanistan: A Chronicle Foretold by Tariq Ali. These really round out the issue. Care to comment? Crane Let me talk about all three of the items that are going to be in this demi-issue. We’ll start with Joe. You know, Joe Collins is looking at the long-term focus on what went wrong in Afghanistan. He’s going to focus on the historical difficulties in governing there the Afghan republics two inefficient corrupt governments, ineffective American strategy, operational shortcomings by American forces, an ineffective Afghan military, Pakistan’s duplicitous policies, and the strength and determination of the Taliban. So he’s looking at it with a very broad scope but basically from an American perspective. The two books that Colonel Shatzer is going to analyze come at it from a little different direction. You’ve got one book, the Ackerman book, that really looks at the end game and focuses on the actions by particularly the Trump and Biden administrations and how those impacted on the debacle of the closeout. Tariq Ali also, like Joe Collins, he’s looking at a long-term analysis and in fact Lee goes back 40 years and he’s looking at it from a little more of an outside perspective. Not purely American. And a lot of other different dynamics involved in Afghanistan. So between Joe and then George’s analysis of these other two books, it’s going to give readers a lot to think about about what went wrong in Afghanistan. Host So the Demi issue usually offers a taste of what readers can look forward to in the next full issue, which is due out at the beginning of March. What are some of the topics covered in the full issue? Crane There’ll be more in Afghanistan. John Nagl’s piece “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars” has got a lot of response, as we intended it to. And we are going to print two of the more eloquent ones, along with John’s replies, in the issue to continue this discussion of how America’s Army can be more effective in these kinds of conflicts. There’s some really provocative ideas on both sides in those discussions. You’re also going to get to taste of some other items as well. We’re going to look at the role of civilians and gender and influencing policy; enhancing global competitiveness through women, peace and security; mitigating civilian harm by factoring gender and kinetic operations. (It’s) a little different perspective on how gender can influence future operations. We’re also looking at some strategic issues looking at responding to climate change and also looking at the conflict in Syria. Again, some different ways to look at these strategic problems. We are going to look at some of the aspects of the future force. Should there be an army stability professional and also you know we’ve seen a lot about the use of drones and robots and combat and we’ve got a nice piece on the future of manned and unmanned teaming and how that will influence the future battlefield. So it’s going to be, yes, a heavy focus on Afghanistan, but also some other topics out there that kind of will expand the interest of the volume and hopefully appeal to our devoted set of readers out there. Also, we’ve got quite a backlog of book reviews, and so we’re also going to try to get a lot of those book reviews out. We’ve had a lot of very dedicated reviewers for us give us a lot of very useful commentary and a lot of important publications, and we could also expand our book review section a bit, too. So there’s going to be a lot in there for readers to find. Host Well, that’s fantastic to hear. Thank you so much for making time for this. It’s always a treat to talk with you. Crane Stephanie, it’s always a joy, thanks. Host Listeners keep an eye out for our publication announcements on Facebook, LinkedIn, or Twitter. Or check out our website at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Thanks for listening. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, you can find us on any major podcast platform. About the Authors: Dr. Conrad Crane is the acting editor-in-chief for Parameters, the US Army War College Press quarterly journal. He is a retired Army Colonel and a researcher and historian at the Strategic Studies Institute.   show less

In this episode, the authors argue senior officers may fail in character because their rate of character development throughout their careers typically decreases as environmental stressors rise. They conceptualize character as an open system with both gains and leaks over time and integrate existing scholarship on personality and ethical development to create the Leaky Character Reservoir framework and then explain how it applies to Army officers’ careers. Military leaders will gain a new... read more

In this episode, the authors argue senior officers may fail in character because their rate of character development throughout their careers typically decreases as environmental stressors rise. They conceptualize character as an open system with both gains and leaks over time and integrate existing scholarship on personality and ethical development to create the Leaky Character Reservoir framework and then explain how it applies to Army officers’ careers. Military leaders will gain a new understanding of character and find specific actions officers, units, and the US Army can undertake to strengthen the character of its senior officers. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss4/15/ Episode transcript: Why Do Senior Officers Sometimes Fail in Character? The Leaky Character Reservoir Stephanie Crider (Host) You’re listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Colonels Everett S.P. Spain, Katie Matthews, and Andrew L. Hagemaster, authors of “Why Do Senior Officers Sometimes Fail in Character? The Leaky Character Reservoir.” Spain is the head of the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the United States Military Academy. Matthew is an Academy professor in the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the United States Military Academy. Hagemaster is a clinical aeromedical and operational psychologist in the Army. Thank you for joining me today. I’m really excited to talk to you. Your article argues senior officers may fail in character because their rate of character development throughout their careers typically decreases as environmental stressors rise. Give us some background and maybe an example or two of failed character. Everett Spain Thanks, Stephanie. This is Everett Spain. So, this started when I was helping with the Battalion Commander Assessment Program at Fort Knox a few years ago—maybe three years ago—and a friend and colleague of mine from the surge in Iraq from 2007–08 days was Major General Matt McFarland. At the time of the conversation (he) was commander of 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, and he invited me to lunch. After we caught up a little bit personally, he said, “Hey, there’s something I’ve been wondering (that) I’d like your thoughts on.” I said, “What’s that, sir?” He said, “Well, I’ve noticed that back in World War I and World War Two, a lot of senior officers were getting relieved due to lack of battlefield competence directly related to leadership or their tactical abilities.” He said, “But now all the reliefs I see of senior officers is due to character. Do you know what’s going on?” And so we talked about it back and forth a little bit. And we flowed some hypotheses. But in the end, I said, “Hey, sir. Let me look at this a little bit and see if I can engage some of my teammates and circle back to you with a more thoughtful perspective.” So when I got back to West Point, I queried my faculty for anyone who was interested in diving into this with me. Colonel Katie Matthew raised her hand. I think her quote was “put me in coach.” And Col. Andrew Hagemaster volunteered, as he always does, as a great teammate. And so, over the last few years, we looked into this from a variety of perspectives. And what we kind of discovered is a new way to look at character, for all of us—since we’re probably considered senior officers as well—is that character is not a permanent gain. When you have character, there are losses as well. And the bottom line that we’ll talk about a little bit more throughout this podcast is that we’d better increase our rate of character inputs faster than our rate of character losses is going. And that’s the leaky character reservoir. And the theory behind it is to build up our character faster than it’s leaking. Host What are the four drivers of potential character? Andrew Hagemaster This is Andrew Hagemaster. We identified four drivers of potential character. The first is heredity and experiences growing up. The second is the Army’s deliberate character development. The third is the environmental influences of Army life, and the fourth is ethical fading or erosion. The first driver of character is heredity and experiences growing up. Our character and personality are the results of the combination of our genetics and the experiences we have growing up, particularly across early childhood development. A lot of us have seen this in our own children—raised in the same household but often have different personalities. The interaction of heredity and experiences also help explain differences in personality traits, including extroversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. But when we consider character, additional personality traits come into play, including resilience, judgement, perseverance, and integrity. The second driver of character is the Army’s deliberate character development found across Officer Education School, starting with our commissioning sources and continuing through the Officer Basic Course, Career Course, and Senior Service College. We looked at deliberate character development in terms of hours of education where character is the primary learning objective and the curriculum is testable through papers, exams, or exercises. We were really stringent in this criteria as some schools incorporate character as a secondary learning objective that is woven throughout the curriculum. The same can be said of the core psychology and leadership course that I taught at West Point. Even though our determined goal is to produce leaders of character through each lesson, not all lessons met that strict criteria as having character as primary learning objectives. And, generally, we found in our research that the trend is that officers receive less character education over time throughout an officer’s career. The third driver of character is Army life’s environmental influences. We talked earlier about how our personality is formed during our childhood while our environment continues to influence us as adults, particularly with character-related behaviors, and that we’ve all been part of organizations that encourage us to be better each day, and some that led us to just focus on surviving. Environmental influences include the climate of the organization set by the supervisors, peers, and even subordinates. The fourth driver of character is ethical fading or erosion. Our ethical standards may drift over time. Small deviations from our ethical azimuth can go unnoticed by officers, especially during times of stress. And so that’s why we need supervisors and peers that know our baseline and can challenge us to be our best. Host Everett mentioned something a few minutes ago about the leaky character reservoir. I’d like to circle back to that. What is the leaky character reservoir? Katie Matthew Hi Stephanie, Katie Matthew here. So the leaky character reservoir stems from our idea that if character can have gains, it can, in theory, have losses. In our paper, we actually diagram this out (on page 130). It’s a metaphorical reservoir that you build up and basically store up through your personal experiences and growth, through training, through your experience in communities both in and out of the Army. But they’re stored up for future use when needed. Hence why our officer education system is structured the way it is to build up early on. But as a reservoir, leaks are going to be present. That’s just something to accept about life. And the potential to lose some of that character exists for all of us through some of those drivers that Andrew mentioned, that ethical fading, erosion, and then the stresses can all potentially drain on those resources. So if at any time the level in the reservoir dips below the demand signal to do the right thing, we expect that is when a failure in character and/or unethical behavior will occur due to that gap or shortage. In simple terms, it’s not having enough in the tank when you need it. Those drivers that Andrew was talking about work both ways. Some add to our reservoirs, and others don’t. Some are deliberate character development, both personally and through organizations in our units. And much of our experiences, both with our units and communities, can bolster that reservoir or start to let some of that fade out. The leaks are present, and our argument is that the goal should be to maintain our character as we do our physical readiness. And for the Army, that’s daily, deliberate, and an investment by the individual and the organization to continue to keep that level in the reservoir up above the needs. Host You recommend in your article some mechanisms to increase deliberate character conditioning and mitigate character losses. What are they? Hagemaster One of the mechanisms to increase deliberate character conditioning and to mitigate character loss is requiring mid-grade and senior officers to engage in deliberate self-reflection. This deliberate self-reflection is designed to examine our character strengths, vulnerabilities, and risk. This is currently happening as part of the four-day selection process with the Command Assessment Program, where candidates for battalion and brigade command are encouraged to engage in deliberate self-reflection. And this is built into the Command Assessment Program assigned by the Army Talent Management Task Force. Candidates take their self-reflection notes over several days, and they meet with an operational psychologist at the end. They both discuss the candidate’s personality, self-awareness, empathy, self-regulation, and potential areas of unproductive leadership behaviors. It’s not just about the candidate as an officer, it’s also about how the candidate is gonna influence others as a leader and the next level of the organization. And what I like about this is that specific, actionable items can come out of these discussions that encourage officers to build on their strengths and mitigate their character leaks. The outcome of this deliberate self-reflection is that we’ll have officers who are more aware of their strengths, vulnerabilities, and areas of risk. And this awareness and purposeful conversation can help senior leaders to withstand ethical stressors. I met with many leaders during the feedback process at the Command Assessment Program. And for many, it was the first time they’d even heard of some of their vulnerabilities. Other leaders that came from organizations that engaged in this deliberate self-reflection that we’re talking about were already aware of their strengths and vulnerabilities, and they were able to discuss in-depth how they’re mitigating their character leaks as a regular process. These conversations can also happen at the brigade level. Brigade commanders can have their brigade psychologists meet with their battalion and company commanders to help them engage in deliberate self-reflection that’s designed to identify their character strengths, vulnerabilities, and strategies to become more aware and an effective leader. Matthew One of the other things that we recommended is these peer accountability groups. And this is going off of those same things that you learn about your strengths and weaknesses at BCAP and CCAP. As a battalion commander, I was in a stand-alone assignment and was fortunate enough to unofficially have a peer accountability partner—a fellow logistician in another unit where we could just sit and relax, have meals together, and watch each other’s backs, keep those checks and balances and be able to have that honest conversation that isn’t related to the fact that we’re in the same unit. Taking that experience and what we’re seeing happening already through those assessment programs that Andrew was discussing, we’d like to see that made more official, where those partners and those groups are built during those assessment programs so that you have long-term accountability partners throughout your career and command as a senior officer. Someone who can tell when you’re starting to fade, when things are not quite right with you, and can call you out on it. We also suggest that those groups not only have those regular forced conversations, but that there’s a coach, an actual Army coach, associated with those groups so that they can continue to build each other up, but also catch each other when there’s a potential for failure on that one, rather than waiting for that tank to dip below the need. Spain I’ve got one to add from the perspective of the character driver Army life and the environment that officers kind of live and operate in. When battalion commanders are selected for command and they complete their command, they go into a series of years of what a couple of my friends call “the five years of pain.” And I said, “what do you mean? Say more.” They said, “Well, Everett, the problem is, you could have three or four one-year PCS (permanent change of station) moves following battalion command. And, also, you’re restricted to a series of jobs that are usually pretty intense called ‘former battalion commander jobs,’ so you have a little less say in where you’re going as well.” One of those years might be a war college, but you don’t know which one, and you don’t find out until three or four months before you get assigned there. And this is all happening at the same time you have high school-age children that it’s a little more sensitive to have some stability for and spouses that oftentimes have non-transferable certifications for their profession. So, it’s really just a challenging time in an Army officer’s life, and in their family’s lives, specifically. And they have the most unpredictability then. So, one way to reduce environmental stressors would be for principal selects at battalion command after the Battalion Command Assessment Program. For all of them, let them lock in at least three of their next four or five years. Let them pick their war college date and location. Let them pick their follow-on assignment. Maybe we line up all the ROTC battalions as possibilities. Of course, some of them enjoy the dynamic process of a different assignment every year or two, but most leaders I know would like to lock that stuff in early, thereby reducing the stress on their families. So, that’s one way to reduce the environmental stressors on these officers and make some of those leaks of character a little less during this time. Host Any final thoughts? Hagemaster President Truman said, “To be able to lead others, a man must be willing to go forward alone.” And while we know that leadership can be lonely, it doesn’t have to be. I regularly talk with senior leaders about mentorship, and I’ve had several senior officers tell me that while they engage in mentoring others, they themselves don’t have a mentor anymore as a senior leader. It was surprising at first because we always can benefit from having a mentor and being a mentor to others. So, I encourage everyone to seek mentorship, regardless of how senior you are as an officer, and develop peer relationships that help fill your character reservoir, and minimize our character leaks. Thank you. Matthew Just off of that is not only just the not going it alone but actually investing in each other in our units at the get-go. But more importantly, as senior leaders, we tend to really focus down. We want to set them up for success and recognize that it’s looking to our left and right and continuing to set each other up for success. Because we didn’t get to that position without the help of each other. And sometimes that help is calling each other out. Sometimes that help is just saying, “hey, what a great job you’re doing.” Spain One last perspective to kind of summarize all of this is a friend of mine; when I shared this on social media (the article), one of them wrote, “I know why senior officers are occasionally failing in character. It’s because they’re human.” And Katie and Andrew and I couldn’t agree more. The concept of being human is reflected in the open system of the character reservoir. Our argument is “hey, let’s make sure we’re putting in more deliberately than is leaking out, because if we don’t tend to that then we might not have what we need when we need it.” My son Josiah, is a Second Lieutenant. He was commissioned recently, and when he read a draft of the article, he said, “Hey, Dad, that’s simple. Your whole paper should be about one page.” I was like, “Why is that?” He said, “Well, inputs have to be greater than outputs or leaks. That’s it. That’s it with character. It’s simple. I said, “Thanks, son. Couldn’t agree more.” Host I love it. Spain I’d add just, Stephanie, thank you for interviewing us today. Thank you to listeners for caring about character development—for caring about our Army. And let’s work on this together. Myself and Katie and Andrew would all argue none of us have perfect character, and we all have situations where we need each other’s help. So, let’s organizationally and interpersonally work on this together. And thank you all for investing in my character as well. Host Thank you all so much. This is such a treat to talk with you, especially on such an interesting topic. To learn more about why officers fail and the leaky character reservoir, read the article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 52 issue 4. The authors are interested in your feedback. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, you can find us on any major podcast platform. About the Authors: Colonel Everett S. P. Spain, US Army, is the head of the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the United States Military Academy. He has served with the 82nd Airborne Division, US Army Europe, and US Army Special Operations Command. He holds a bachelor of science degree from the United States Military Academy and a DBA from Harvard University. Colonel Katie E. Matthew, US Army, is an academy professor in the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the United States Military Academy. She has served as a logistician at home and on deployment with the 1st Theater Sustainment Command, 1st Infantry Division, 82nd Airborne Division, and Joint Special Operations Command, and most recently commanded the Brigade Special Troops Battalion and Camp Buehring, US Army Central. She holds a bachelor of science degree from the United States Military Academy, a master of business administration degree from Kansas State University, and a PhD in sociology from George Mason University. Colonel Andrew L. Hagemaster, US Army, is a clinical, aeromedical, and operational psychologist in the Army. He is a consultant for senior military leaders on behavioral health and leader development. At the United States Military Academy, he served as the director of the General Psychology for Leaders Course in the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership, installation director of psychological health, and residency director of training. He has served with the 25th Infantry Division, the 1st Infantry Division, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and multinational force and observers. He holds a master of arts degree from Reformed Theological Seminary and a PhD from Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences.   show less

Leaders who have personally experienced the aftermath of a suicide-related event can provide important lessons and recommendations for military leadership and policymakers. This podcast executes a thematic analysis of interviews with leaders, chaplains, and behavioral health providers who responded to garrison suicide-related events and explores leader decision-making related to memorials, investigations, and readiness

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Leaders who have personally experienced the aftermath of a suicide-related event can provide important lessons and recommendations for military leadership and policymakers. This podcast executes a thematic analysis of interviews with leaders, chaplains, and behavioral health providers who responded to garrison suicide-related events and explores leader decision-making related to memorials, investigations, and readiness Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss4/14/ Episode Transcript: Leader Perspectives on Managing Suicide-related Events in Garrison Stephanie Crider (Host) You’re listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point Welcomes Major Thomas H. Nassif and Captain George a Mesias, co-authors of “Leader Perspectives on Managing Suicide-related Events in Garrison” with Dr. Amy Adler. This article was featured in the Parameters Winter 2022–23 edition. Nassif, a research psychologist at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR), serves as the Institute’s lead on mindfulness training research efforts with the US Army War College and the US Army Training and Doctrine Command. He’s also the principal investigator on a military suicide research grant funded by the congressionally directed medical research programs. Mesias is a licensed clinical social worker and researcher at WRAIR. He’s advised commands and planned behavioral health operations across the Korean theater of operation and served as behavioral health officer for a Stryker Brigade. He is an Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training master trainer and a graduate of the Army Social Work Child and Family Fellowship Program. Dr. Amy B. Adler is a clinical research psychologist and senior scientist at the Center for Military Psychiatry and Neuroscience at WRAIR. She’s had numerous randomized trials with Army units, published more than 180 journal articles and chapters, and served as lead editor of Deployment Psychology and Anger at Work, both published by the American Psychological Association. Your article opens with, “In the last decade, suicide has become a leading cause of death for service members, claiming more lives than combat and transportation accidents.” This is a hard topic to ease into. What else do we need to know about service members and suicide for this article? MAJ Thomas H. Nassif Suicide is a difficult topic for a number of reasons. And many, if not all of us have been touched by it in some way, and the ripple effects across the unit and community when there’s a suicide-related event. It’s a really important topic, and there are many initiatives that the Army is engaged in that address risk factors and prevention. Our paper tackles a different part of the problem. you probably heard of prevention. What we’re going to talk about today is postvention, in other words, what leaders do in the aftermath of a suicide-related event. First some terminology. So we define a suicide-related event as death by suicide, suicide attempt, or suicide intent. And by leader, we’re referring to chaplains, behavior health providers, and unit leaders. And the leaders that we focused on in the article were chaplains, behavior health providers, and unit leaders. Although postvention has been studied in a deployed setting, we focused on garrison settings, which run the risk of being overlooked. CPT George A. Mesias This is Captain Mesias. I’m a licensed clinical social worker. As a social worker, I’ve served as a therapist for soldiers, and I’ve served as a behavioral health officer for a Brigade combat team. Suicide is an often-discussed topic due to ACE training requirements that everybody has every year, but I’ve seen how different it is to be exposed to suicide directly. Experiences with suicide leave a lasting impression, and I’ve spoken to many people who’ve shared as much. And I’ve felt that way, as well. So, I was happy to be part of this manuscript because I feel like those experiences often aren’t shared enough. Host Your piece reports some results from a thematic analysis of interviews with leaders, chaplains, and behavioral health providers, and you touched on several points. I’d like to walk through them briefly, please. Nassif We interviewed more than a dozen chaplains, behavioral health providers, and unit leaders. And each of them had dealt with a suicide-related event in the previous five years. These were individual, semi-structured interviews. And we wanted to hear from these leaders what the experience was like for them—where they struggled, and what advice they had for others. We were not only interested in what leaders did in the aftermath of a suicide-related event, but also how it affected them. Our article also sought to illustrate real-world experiences that might be useful for leaders who may have to manage a suicide-related event in their unit. Host Let’s just start with one of the first things listed in the article. Confronting personal emotions about suicide—what do we need to know? Nassif Well, by recognizing rather than avoiding personal emotions in response to a suicide-related event, leaders appear better able to respond effectively. And additionally, leaders in our study reported that engaging in productive coping strategies, such as connecting with family for support or partaking in enjoyable activities outside of work, were useful. Host What do we need to know about managing stress around blame? Mesias Well, a lot of leaders discussed this. Whether it’s being blamed by family members for the death of a loved one or experiencing the strain of required investigations, and important ones as well. I mean, investigations are administratively just part of the process. But leaders often find themselves juggling blame attribution as an additional source of stress during a difficult time. Furthermore, while those affected by suicide may seek answers as to why it occurred, it’s not always possible to identify a root cause. Very often not. It’s a lot of factors and just . . . there’s no easy answers. Host One of your other themes was caring for individual soldiers and sustaining unit readiness. Nassif Well, the health of an organization’s climate and culture begins with the leader’s commitment to being visible to, open with, and compassionate toward soldiers. So, by striking a balance between empathy and discipline, leaders can both support the needs of individual soldiers and maintain unit morale. Striking this balance was difficult for leaders, as they remarked in the interviews, but many felt this was an essential aspect of successful leadership. Host You also addressed leveraging communication channels. Mesias Well, this is important because the leader can’t be everywhere at once. Chaplains and behavioral health providers can support leaders’ efforts in fostering open communication channels before, and definitely following, a suicide. In addition, empowering subordinate leaders to monitor their soldiers and keep an eye on them for potential behavioral health concerns or just life problems that can pose a challenge. This can help leaders identify unit members in need of additional support both before and, definitely after, a suicide-related event. There’s also risk reduction tools to help identify and support soldiers, but keeping dialogue open and relationships is key. Host You also talked about planning the postvention response. Would you address that for us? Nassif So, through the interviews, leaders reflected on their past experiences with postvention. And they offered a number of actionable strategies that could be provided during the postvention process, such as normalizing help-seeking behavior, offering a variety of behavioral health services, coordinating suicide awareness, and prevention training events. And collectively, these actions were aimed at reducing the risk of additional suicide-related events and also establishing a culture that proactively supports the behavioral health of unit members. Host You also addressed building a supportive climate to reintegrate at-risk soldiers. Nassif Determining what actions to take to support our soldiers can be very difficult, and leaders may find certain tools helpful to assess risk factors in their unit. One example that we talked about in the article was the Leader’s Suicide Risk Assessment Tool. By assessing risk factors, leaders can monitor their units viable health, foster a sense of unit connection, strengthen camaraderie, and take proactive actions to build a safe and supportive climate. And in some (cases), these actions can help leaders successfully reintegrate the soldiers in their unit. Host Honoring the life of the soldier, not the suicidal act. Mesias So, leaders talked about wanting to be careful in planning memorial ceremonies to recognize the life and the service of the soldier rather than focus on the suicidal act. And this is so that memorial services can support unit members, family, and friends in the coping process . . . provide a sense of closure for those affected by the suicide, but also discourage future suicide-related events. Host How can leaders put this information to good use? Nassif Leaders, chaplains, and behavioral health providers should build strong relationships and frequently interact with each other. They should also prepare for worst-case scenarios by discussing how would they respond to a suicide-related event and work as a team. Also leader training on suicide postvention could incorporate frank discussions on personal feelings and biases regarding suicide, including how much time is needed to mourn, when should military training resume, how do we handle memorial services, and how can we best manage attitudes about blame and ways to engage in self-care? And this includes subordinate leaders and just up and down the chain of command. Another recommendation would be to prepare leaders to be adaptive, tuned, and responsive to unit members and foster a nonjudgmental culture in the aftermath of a suicide. Related event. Mesias We also discussed how leaders may benefit from having mentorship support from senior leaders who’ve been through this themselves. Mentors can help validate the challenges of postvention and provide practical guidance to leaders following a suicide in their unit. They can also provide a level of understanding and emotional support. So many gray areas exist in the suicide postvention decision-making process, and leaders can choose from a number of strategies to mitigate potentially negative impact on themselves, their unit, and the wider community. Not every suicide is the same. So we’re trying to explore some of those gray areas and the challenges that leaders may face that they hadn’t expected. Host Give us your your. Final thoughts on the topic please. Nassif Our goal is to provide leaders, useful perspectives and support so that they can respond appropriately and work through the psychological challenges (that come with suicide-related events). And, you know, there are toolkits available to further support leaders through the postvention process. One of them is the Defense Suicide Prevention Office toolkit, the Postvention Toolkit. It’s really valuable. This resource provides additional perspective on postvention with guidance and recommendations. One thing that struck us from the interviews was the way in which leaders were able to take tactical pause to assess the situation and adapt with novel responses to help guide their unit through postvention. I’ll share a few examples from our article. One leader realized that timing was critical in the aftermath of a suicide, but moving from a period of mourning to refocusing on training had to be carefully timed. So this particular leader decided to shift training a week later to build an additional time for mourning, which ended up helping unit morale. And by reengaging unit tasks, he was still able to maintain unit discipline. Other leaders came up with creative ways to work within the constraints of chaplain confidentiality to keep communication channels open. One leader asked their chaplain to provide weekly anonymous stats to the command on the overall health of the unit, such as marital problems, suicidal ideations. By reporting the number of suicidal ideations each month, this provided the leader a useful way of highlighting the overall risk facing the unit while also maintaining confidentiality. And in one last example, another leader responded to a suicide in his unit by generating positive messaging up and down the chain of command to normalize help-seeking behavior as an act of strength and courage rather than a sign of weakness. And it was a way to not only emphasize the physical health but also mental wellness to soldiers in the unit. And I just wanted to close by saying that we’re really grateful for those who participated in the interviews and spoke so candidly with us. This is still an evolving topic, and we’re learning more about it all the time. Suicide-related events have ripple effects. We hope that our paper offers some support to leaders moving forward. We’d like to thank the Military Operational Medicine Research Program for funding this study, Dr. Amy Adler, our senior science consultant and author on the manuscript, for conceptualizing this qualitative study on postvention, and CPT Mesias for his expertise as a licensed care social worker for providing that expertise. We’d like to think WRAIR. We want to also thank the Army War College for taking an interest in our article and also giving us the opportunity to speak on this podcast. Host What a pleasure to have you and to have you included in Parameters. We’re glad to provide a platform for this conversation. Thank you so much, both of you for sharing your insight on this important topic today. Mesias Thank you. Host Thank you if you’re interested in learning more about this topic, read the article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 52, issue 4. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, you can find us on any major podcast platform. Author information: Major Thomas H. Nassif, a research psychologist at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR), serves as the WRAIR lead on mindfulness training research efforts with the US Army War College and the US Army Training and Doctrine Command. He is also principal investigator on a military suicide research grant funded by the Congressionally Directed Medical Research Programs. Captain George A. Mesias is a licensed clinical social worker and researcher at WRAIR. He has advised commands and planned behavioral health operations across the Korean theater of operation and served as a behavioral health officer for a Stryker brigade. He is an Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training master trainer and a graduate of the Army Social Work Child and Family Fellowship Program. Dr. Amy B. Adler is a clinical research psychologist and senior scientist at the Center for Military Psychiatry and Neuroscience at WRAIR. She has led numerous randomized trials with Army units, published more than 180 journal articles and chapters, and served as lead editor of Deployment Psychology and Anger at Work, both published by the American Psychological Association.   show less

Security force assistance brigades can enable multi-domain convergence in competition in the US Indo-Pacific Command. Rather than focusing on conventional Joint force capabilities, this podcast analyzes recent US Army operational experience in security force assistance and security cooperation in US Indo-Pacific Command and identifies capability gaps and opportunities for competition. Finally, military leadership and policymakers will find recommendations on how US Army security force... read more

Security force assistance brigades can enable multi-domain convergence in competition in the US Indo-Pacific Command. Rather than focusing on conventional Joint force capabilities, this podcast analyzes recent US Army operational experience in security force assistance and security cooperation in US Indo-Pacific Command and identifies capability gaps and opportunities for competition. Finally, military leadership and policymakers will find recommendations on how US Army security force assistance and security cooperation can shape environments and deter conflict in the US Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss4/11/ Episode transcript: Security Force Assistance Brigades and US Indo-Pacific Command Multi-domain Competition Stephanie Crider (Host) You’re listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Major John T Pelham IV, author of “Security Force Assistance Brigades and US Indo-Pacific Command Multi-domain Competition,” which was featured in the winter 2022–23 issue of Parameters. Pelham is an armor officer currently serving as Deputy Chief 5 for the First Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas. His Master of Military Arts and Science thesis, “Examining the Security Force Assistance Brigade’s Role in Future Army Strategic Deterrence,” was published by the Institute of Land Warfare in September 2021. His article “Examining Capability Gaps in the SFAB Cavalry Squadron” was published in the July 2021 issue of the Cavalry and Armor Journal. Welcome to Decisive Point. I’m really glad you’re here. Major John T. Pelham IV Well, thank you for having me. Host You take a step back in your article from Joint force capabilities and focus instead on analyzing recent US Army operational experience and security force assistance and security cooperation in US Indo-Pacific commands. What problem in the Indo-Pacific does your article address? Pelham I think it’s a couple of problems ma’am. First of all, I think it’s how do we compete with the pacing threat as outlined in the interim National Security Strategy and the recently published National Security Strategy in terms of how do we compete with China and other adversaries in Indo-Pacific Theater—preferably below the level of armed conflict? Moreover, how do we as an army contribute to the Joint force in a theater that is roundly dominated by the air and maritime domains? This project actually came about from a conversation with Brigadier General Lombardo of Army G 3 5 7 Training. When I was writing my SAMS monograph, I had written my Master of Military Arts and Science thesis on the role of the SFAB and future Army strategic deterrence. And from that conversation, he said, “You know what I would be interested to know is what is the Army’s contribution to multi-domain competition, particularly in the Pacific theater?” And that stems also from a conversation I had with the Chief of Armor, in a Q&A session with him. I said, “You know, hey, sir, what do you feel is the armor branch’s role in the Indo-Pacific given the physical constraints of that domain for land force, particularly heavy mechanized forces?” And he said something to the effect of, well, most of our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific Theater, they have armies, and most of those armies have a competent mechanized component. That is where the armor branch can make its contribution because even if it’s not our armor that is serving as a flexible deterrent or enabling competition in the theater below the level of armed conflict, we can leverage our expertise and our ability to work by, with, and through those allies and partners. And that’s what got me thinking as an SFAB advisor, then what contribution might the SFAB offer in helping the Army do that beyond mechanized forces or land forces—but really, for the entire Joint force across all domains? Host You suggest the US Army reexamine its role in the region. What would that look like? Pelham I think this is a question that the Army has really been analyzing, especially in-depth ever since the “Pacific pivot” between 2012 and 2014 under the Obama administration with Secretary of State Clinton, in which the strategic focus of United States was beginning to shift from the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan and CENTCOM, in which the Army was the supported force, to a completely different theater with a completely different threat, in which the Army, (under most circumstances) would act as the supporting force as opposed to the supported force. And now, obviously, the Army has some enduring and very clear contributions and responsibilities in terms of sustainment via Army support to other services via its executive agent responsibilities. Obviously, the Army fires enterprise figures prominently into the Joint Fires capabilities that the INDOPACOM commander can bring to bear in the theater and also contributions with theater, air, and missile defense—and then also the conventional, regionally aligned forces that we provide to the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere. But what these advisor forces allow us to do is really bring to bear the full multi-domain capabilities that already exist there in the region that are inherent in the allies and partners. Which, again,it optimizes what the Army can do for the Joint force in that theater, in which more often than not, they are going to be the supporting arm as opposed to the supported service. Host Pull it all together for us. How can the Army make full use of Security Force Assistance Brigade capabilities? Pelham I think, ma’am, they need to expand the paradigm beyond just simply using the SFABs as a tactical-level advising force to allied and partnered land components. I know that the images are popular of SFAB advisers conducting live-fire training with allies and partners with enabling joint multinational exercises. And these things are all vitally important, both in terms of demonstrating our commitment to allies and partners but also in demonstrating our resolve to our adversaries. But I think that they have so much more potential to offer in terms of operational-level and even strategic-level outcomes, as well, because they’ve got the ability to embed with allies and partners in a way that creates an enduring presence within enemy A2/AD networks that negates the need to penetrate those networks in a conventional fashion oftentimes. But they serve, again, as the hub that connects those multinational partners to the overall joint force to allow command and control beyond just the formal command-and-control hierarchy, whether that be a lead nation. Whether it be a parallel coalition structure, what have you, but also to integrate the multi-domain capabilities that those allies and partners have as well. Because they don’t just have to be embedded with the land component. They could be augmented and embedded with allied partners’ cyber capabilities. They could be embedded with air component, maritime component. Because they don’t necessarily have to be subject matter experts in that, as long as they’re properly augmented, but either way, due to the fact that they are natural and doctrinally trained LNOs, they still serve as the connective tissue, or that hub, that can tie those capabilities and those organizations back to the Joint force commander. Host Give us your final thoughts on it. Pelham I am not offering up this thesis as a cure all or a one-size fits all solution. I’m just merely offering these thoughts as a suggestion to the Army at the institutional level, and really, the Joint force overall as a way to really maximize the Army’s contribution to multi domain competition. And in the Indo Pacific theater, ma’am. Host Thank you. Pelham Thank you ma’am. Host If you enjoyed this topic and would like to learn more, read the article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 52, issue 4. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, you can find us on any major podcast platform. About the author: Major John T. Pelham IV is an Armor officer currently serving as deputy G5 for the 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas. His master of military arts and science thesis, “Examining the Security Force Assistance Brigade’s Role in Future Army Strategic Deterrence,” was published by the Institute of Land Warfare in September 2021. His article “Examining Capability Gaps in the SFAB Cavalry Squadron” was published in the July 2021 edition of the Cavalry and Armor Journal.   show less

A concept of positive strategic shock would benefit the US Department of Defense’s planning processes. Some US doctrine demonstrates awareness of the need to plan for negative strategic shocks but lacks consideration of positive strategic shock—any shock with a non-zero-sum outcome—which could create a situation where the Department of Defense misses opportunities. This podcast clarifies the term “positive strategic shock,” provides a brief review of where and how planning for any... read more

A concept of positive strategic shock would benefit the US Department of Defense’s planning processes. Some US doctrine demonstrates awareness of the need to plan for negative strategic shocks but lacks consideration of positive strategic shock—any shock with a non-zero-sum outcome—which could create a situation where the Department of Defense misses opportunities. This podcast clarifies the term “positive strategic shock,” provides a brief review of where and how planning for any sort of strategic shock currently occurs, and makes recommendations based on three methods for thinking about strategic shock. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss4/12/ Episode transcript: Planning for Positive Strategic Shock in the Department of Defense Stephanie Crider (Host) You’re listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Colonel Benjamin W Buchholz, author of “Planning for Positive Strategic Shock in the Department of Defense,” which was featured in the winter 2022–23 issue of Parameters. Buchholz is a foreign area officer and recent Army War College distinguished graduate. He’s published four books—The Tightening Dark, Sirens of Manhattan, One Hundred and One Knights, and Private Soldiers, as well as numerous articles and shorter works. Thanks for joining me today, Colonel Buchholz. I’m glad you’re here. Col. Benjamin W. Buchholz Thank you, I appreciate it. Host You talked about positive strategic shock in your article. Please expand on that concept. Buchholz Positive strategic shock is not a new term, but it is a term that I’m using in a different way than has been used previously. In the planning literature that’s out there right now, there is a thing called positive strategic shock, but it’s used to identify the delta between when a negative shock occurs and then an organization catches back up to status quo or to a median level of performance. And that delta is called, sometimes, positive strategic shock. In my opinion, that’s not actually positive, that’s just making up for a negative. So I wanted to look at the case where something truly positive happens in an environment, and so I define that as an incident that is non-zero-sum—something that’s good for all parties—a win win situation. Host Can you give me some examples of negative and positive strategic shock? Buchholz I think it’s important to mention, you know, that this paper is about strategic shocks. So, we can all think of a lot of tactical- and operational-level shocks which are more on the weapons systems and that sort of thing, but for something to be really strategic it needs to change doctrine, change the way cultures think about things, change the world order in a way. So, we’re talking about real igh-level stuff. The paper goes into a lot of detail on that. Maybe an unfortunate amount of detail. Probably the more interesting portion of this is what’s the difference between negative and positive, and that can be kind of a subjective answer. So, in order to make it an objective answer, the way I define it is that negative is zero-sum thinking, whereas positive is a non-zero-sum. And that’s a complex way to say a win-win situation. Where all parties benefit. Where rising water, you know, floats all boats. There are lots of ways to say that sort of thing. I think in DoD we overly fixate, and for good reason, on negative shocks. So, the adversary has developed some new system, some new methodology, some new culture, even, that we saw in the Cold War with communism. Whereas, what I’m really trying to say in this paper is that there’s an opposite end of this spectrum that sometimes things happen in the culture that are positive in a non-zero-sum way. Examples of that would be things like, even though it’s sort of a political football right now . . . vaccines, I think you can really say across the board, have had a positive strategic shock. Another good example is refrigeration. I think that’s a really good one. You know, who has not benefited from having the ability to have food be refrigerated? You know there’s really no a lot of losers in that. The last one would probably be the Internet. That’s been pretty much a positive across the board. And where this really goes is if the DoD is not postured to gain from positive strategic shocks, it could be to the detriment of the organization and America, as a whole if, we’re really not thinking about that and how to ride those wave tops. Host Give us a brief overview, please, of where and how planning for any sort of shock currently occurs. Buchholz Well, strangely enough, as I dug into this topic, it turns out the DoD doesn’t do a lot of planning against strategic shock. We plan against all kinds of different scenarios. The planning apparatus in DoD is very strong—branches and sequels everywhere and all kinds of plans on the shelf and contingency planning. However, we’re most comfortable planning against what Donald Rumsfeld and strategic planners before him called the “known unknown,” which is basically this safe middle area of things that we can plan against because it’s not too speculative. However, those things are not actually where most of the growth and change in the world comes from, at least according to Nassim Nicholas Taleb, who wrote The Black Swan (and who I rely on pretty heavily in some of the arguments in this paper). Most of the growth happens on the speculative ends of shock. Either negative shock that no one sees coming or positive shock, and he talks about both of those. And that is really more of an unknown unknown. And generally, planners look at the unknown unknown as too wildly speculative to want to plan against it. And I totally agree with that. I think you can’t expend limited planning resources and budget and stuff against speculation. However, Taleb and other scholars have techniques for planning against both of those ends—the negative end and the positive end. And I think we do OK against the negative end because those techniques are to have a organization that’s robust against shock, and that means that it has redundant systems and that those systems are survivable. And because the Army and the DoD, as a whole, has dealt with negative strategic shock throughout its history, it’s become good at those things. However, on the positive side, redundancy and survivability and having a conservative mindset, an organizationally conservative mindset doesn’t actually do any good because if everybody leaps ahead and the organization is designed to pull back towards a status quo, we actually lose a little bit of the benefit of the positivity. So, what Nassim Taleb argues for is that we really need to be exposed to positive shock. We need to have lots of little feelers and sensors out there and then let those feelers and sensors matriculate upwards some of the benefits that they’re experiencing when something happens in the environment. Host What are your recommendations for thinking about strategic shock? Buchholz One organization that we do have within the military is the Center for Army lessons learned. They do something like this where elements out in the field can trickle up good ideas, and then as those ideas take root they can be propagated across the domains in DoD. One particular recommendation is to replicate that structure more broadly. Another thing that is an easy win-win is to just include both in the planning processes and in any DoD-chartered analysis (like out through Rand Corporation or others who do thought work) a requirement to consider positive and negative strategic shock in planning rather than just plan against known trend lines against that known unknown space. So, looking at the far ends where the growth in the change occurs would be a good thing to mandate. And then the third recommendation that comes out of the paper is really to incorporate a concept of strategic shock in various levels of education in JPME-type courses. There is an interesting way, as well, to identify when an environment is ripe for disruption, for shock, and, you know, several different things identified by researchers that can point you in a direction to look in that direction for or that environment for strategic shock to emerge. And those characteristics are trust within scientific communities, the emergence of scientific anomolies, the development of new instrumentation, increases in ineffective communication, and the presence of a political and economic culture that values science research. So those criteria, I think, could be woven into an approach that is taught, that is mandated into planning processes, and that is mandated into contracts for organizations who are doing planning on behalf of the DoD. Host Have any final thoughts before we go? Buchholz One thing that was really interesting to me in this work was just trying to define what positive is and look at positivity through a DoD lens because we’re not necessarily an organization that’s geared to do that. We’re geared to look at worst-case scenarios. To be prepared for contingencies. Emergencies. For war. But I think that there is a benefit to looking at the positive and cases where a non-zero-sum event like vaccines, refrigeration, the Internet lifts everybody up around us and make sure that DoD as an organization doesn’t miss important benefits when something like that happens. Host I do have one more question, if you’ll entertain it. I’m curious what inspired this article. Why did you decide to write it? Buchholz Well, that’s a good question. I think I was really interested in looking at DoD culturally. This question of DoD as a conservative organization, which it should be because it’s designed to protect and be robust and survivable. But how does that interface in an environment where society could take, you know, a very positive leap forward, as an inherently conservative organization well-poised to enjoy the benefits of something like that? Or does it become a drag on that situation? And this was one way to get into that overall larger theoretical idea. Host Well, thank you so much. There’s definitely a lot to think about here, and I really appreciate you sharing your insights on the topic. Buchholz Thank you, ma’am. I appreciate you having me on the podcast. Host If you’d like to dig deeper into the topic of planning for positive strategic shock in the DoD, visit press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters, look for volume 52, issue 4. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, you can find us on any major podcast platform.   show less

To buttress stability in the Indo-Pacific, the United States must understand how India sees the region and the world. The theories and ideas of Kautilya, a leading but little-studied Indian philosopher, provide significant insight into Indian perspectives on strategic partnerships and silent war. India has lived out Kautilyan perspectives in its recent foreign policy; therefore, a US understanding of the Indian perspective could advance the national security interests of both countries,... read more

To buttress stability in the Indo-Pacific, the United States must understand how India sees the region and the world. The theories and ideas of Kautilya, a leading but little-studied Indian philosopher, provide significant insight into Indian perspectives on strategic partnerships and silent war. India has lived out Kautilyan perspectives in its recent foreign policy; therefore, a US understanding of the Indian perspective could advance the national security interests of both countries, clarify recent Indian security responses around the world, and provide a basis for a mutually beneficial pursuit of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss4/10/ Episode transcript: Indian Perspectives: Insights for the Indo-American Partnership Host You’re listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Colonel Tyrell O. Mayfield, author of “Indian Perspectives: Insights for the Indo-American Partnership,” which was published in the Winter 2022–23 issue of Parameters. Mayfield is the deputy foreign policy advisor to the chief of staff of the US Air Force. He holds a master’s degree in international relations from the University of Oklahoma and master’s degrees from the Naval Postgraduate School and the US Army War College. He’s the co-editor of Redefining the Modern Military: The Intersection of Profession and Ethics, published in 2018. Your article discusses Indian philosopher Kautilya. I look forward to hearing about this. But first, thanks for being here, Ty. COL Tyrell Mayfield Thank you, Stephanie. It’s my pleasure, and I’m glad to join you. I just want to open by making sure, it’s clear that our conversation here today reflects my own thoughts and not the policy or position of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the government. But I’m very happy to be here, and I look forward to talking with you. Host We’re glad to have you. Let’s just jump right in and get started. Please briefly explain Kautilya’s perspectives. Mayfield Sure, so the writings of Kautilya . . . first of all, he’s a leading Indian philosopher, and I find them a useful lens for understanding India’s pursuit of national interests. Kautilya was an Indian statesman and a political advisor who emerged around 300 BCE and provided a realist outlook on geopolitics through his foundational work. Importantly, Kautilyan theory provides a culturally and historically informed construct for thinking about Indian behavior and Indian interests and Indian foreign policy. And his logic continues to influence strategic thought today. And I think it’s manifest in some of India’s national security interests in its assessment of its geography and its international relations, which I hope we get to talk a little about. Host You assert in your article that the United States needs to understand how India sees the region and the world. And you suggest that the theories and ideas of Kautilya might lend some insight here. Give us some context. What’s the situation in the Indo-Pacific right now as it applies to this topic. Mayfield Sure, well, the United States is clearly identified the PRC, China, as its pacing challenge. And the US has been trying desperately for a number of years, maybe a decade now, to pivot away from Southwest Asia, pivot away from Europe, and to focus on the Pacific with an eye on controlling, or at least shaping and influencing the rise of the PRC. India is central to advancing American interests in that region. It’s an enormous state and a huge player in the area. But it’s been a difficult partner for the United States to approach. This concept of kind of strategic autonomy and independence—it’s deeply embedded in Indian culture—has made it a difficult partner to approach. But I think it’s worth noting that India has like three core national security interests that I’ve identified in this article, and that they align with US interests in the Pacific. So, I think the first one there important to note is that Indians are interested in sustaining the international system, which has helped give rise to their power and influence. And sustaining this international system—something that the West and the United States is very interested in—allows India to continue to develop economically and address its societal development and economic development. And those are the things have given rise to Indian power. And the second interest is deterring Pakistan, clearly, and trying to avoid that conflict from reigniting. But this links Pakistan and China, these are two state actors whose futures and interests in the area have become deeply intertwined, which also leads us to a third national interest for India, which is maintaining hegemony and its traditional sphere of influence. Chinese encroachment into the Indian Ocean region is a complex issue. It’s something a lot of states are dealing with, and it’s something that the United States is trying to help those states address and control. And so I think these are the three areas where US interests are definitely aligned with Indian interests. Host Let’s talk about the mandala theory. You use this to address strategic partnerships and silent war. Will you expand on that for us? Mayfield So, the mandala theory is just really how Kautilya envisions the geography around him and neighboring kingdoms and how he saw it and how he thought about it. And so just trying to maintain their influence in that region, Kautylia described this kind of as emanating from the subcontinent, which we think of as India today west through what was then Persia (today, modern-day Iran), north to what is modern-day Afghanistan, and then east to kind of the Bay of Bengal. That region. Thdose basically comprise the eight member nations of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. That geography really hasn’t changed for India, though I think now they’re looking much further South right into the Indian Ocean, where maritime competition has certainly become a more modern aspect of the situation. And the mandala theory, basically, it’s adjoining states become kingdoms or states which need to be addressed or controlled. And Kautilya was a little bit of a realist, or actually very much a realist, and so those adjoining states either have to . . . He is a classical realist in his assertion that states have to, you know, either seek or suffer conquest. So India sees itself in realist terms relative to Pakistan and China and then those states which are adjacent to them—kind of if you think of it as like a checkerboard or concentric circles would be another way to think of it—are states which India can find alignment with and support to pursue its national interests. So that’s where these ideas of strategic partnerships come in, which are really just a Cold War relic. Something of the Soviet Union began, and it allowed the Soviet Union to work bilaterally, kind of outside of the international system—the construct to bilateral agreements. And I think the example that I used in the paper here is India’s strategic partnership agreements with Afghanistan, which they’ve had two of them. But because they’re an alignment tool, they are nonbinding, and they don’t force India to act militarily in any way. And when they no longer served the purpose or weren’t useful, India was able to abandon them. Host Did you want to talk about silent war? Mayfield Yeah, so I think this concept of silent war is really just a way for states to . . . perhaps competition is the best word for this, right? For states to compete short of conflict. When Kautilya, would think of an adjoining Kingdom that was a strong kingdom or a dominant kingdom, a dominant power adjacent, when direct confrontation isn’t the tool then it’s just a long-term campaign of kind of in Kautilyan parlance to be harassment and weakening. But I think today we talked about that in terms of competition. And I think that alignment, again, plays a huge role here versus alliances, and so I think the Quad is an interesting kind of a lens to view Indian alignment through. And so the Quad has kind of been revitalized here in the last few years. It had two in-person meetings and has fielded this new maritime Domain Awareness Initiative, which is a great construct and really shows Indian interest in aligning with other powers in the region to help balance against China, which is obviously what a lot of the states in the Indo Pacific are trying to do right now. Host I’m glad you brought up China. What are your recommendations for how the US can gain Indian partnership and address US National Security interests of managing a rising China? Mayfield Persuading India into a full security partnership with the United States is probably unlikely. It certainly wouldn’t be easy. I also don’t believe that it is necessary. India’s use of these bilateral strategic partnership agreements is consistent with Kautilyan foreign policy and the logic, and so I think if you think of it that way, then it’s not necessarily surprising that the Quad rests, kind of at the center of India’s foreign policy under Prime Minister Modi. Kautilyan logic drives India to avoid alliances and seek alignment, and so I think the United States, we have to exercise a certain amount of strategic empathy here and just understand India and how India sees the world. And if alignment is the tool which they display a preference for, then I think addressing that with them and finding places where we can seek alignment and our interests are aligned. So one of those is at the National Security Council. I’m sorry the United Nations Security Council. Obviously, there’s a lot in play right now. There has been some talk for reform at the United Nations Security Council. And India is one of the states which is very much interested in seeking a permanent seat at the UN on the Security Council there. And so an interesting kind of aspect in their strategic partnership agreements that they sign is that when they sign these with other states, one of the bylines in there is that they will support India’s pursuit of a permanent seat at the Security Council. So Security Council change or change to the UN Charter would take a very long time. But I think it’s something that the United States could put forward or at least begin to have the conversation. And even if it didn’t go anywhere, it would highlight India and kind of give a nod to their power and influence and their importance on the international stage. And then lastly, I think I’ll come back to the Quad, and I think it’s important to understand the Quad is a diplomatic tool and alignment of diplomatic and information and, in some instances, an economic instrument of national power. And I think it’s really important that the United States be very deliberate in not militarizing the Quad because I think once that does that, then the Quad would take on an aspect or kind of a tone or tenor, which the Indians would be very much disinclined to participate in because what they don’t want to do is antagonize China militarily. And so I think we, as the United States have to be disciplined in letting the Quad be what it is; it’s a very powerful diplomatic and information tool, and it shows a great deal of alignment. So I just think as it pertains to the Indo-Pacific, South Asia, and American foreign policy, the United States, we have to be patient here. And we have to break our reactive approach to foreign policy there and just be purposeful about our engagement with India and work hard on securing a partnership that demonstrates alignment and is beneficial to both states. Host Do you have any final thoughts? Mayfield You know this is an interesting area, obviously . . . an area of foreign policy that’s of interest to the United States, and I think that it’s important and useful to look at it through the lens of another state that we want alignment with that we want to partner with. And a lot of times, I think India is misunderstood, and that is in some ways understandable. And they can be a difficult partner to approach, but this idea of strategic autonomy and independence that India has always maintained doesn’t mean that they can’t be partnered with. And it doesn’t mean that we can’t find areas of alignment, and I think the first step to that is understanding India. Understanding how India sees the world and then just rethinking our approach to that. Host Thanks so much for sharing your insights on this topic. Very interesting. Mayfield Yeah no, I appreciate it, and I appreciate the opportunity. Thank you very much. Host Learn more about Kautilya, his perspectives, and what they might mean for the Indo American partnership at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 52, issue 4. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, you can find us on any major podcast platform.   show less

Despite its desire to achieve cognitive dominance for multi-domain operations, the Army has yet to develop fully and adopt the concept of cognitive performance enhancement. This article provides a comprehensive assessment of the Army’s efforts in this area, explores increasing demands on soldier cognition, and compares the Army’s current approach to its adversaries. Its conclusions will help US military and policy practitioners establish the culture and behaviors that promote cognitive... read more

Despite its desire to achieve cognitive dominance for multi-domain operations, the Army has yet to develop fully and adopt the concept of cognitive performance enhancement. This article provides a comprehensive assessment of the Army’s efforts in this area, explores increasing demands on soldier cognition, and compares the Army’s current approach to its adversaries. Its conclusions will help US military and policy practitioners establish the culture and behaviors that promote cognitive dominance and success across multiple domains. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss4/13/ Episode transcript: Cognitive Performance Enhancement for Multi-domain Operations Stephanie Crider (Host) You’re listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Colonel Dan Herlihy, author of “Cognitive Performance Enhancement for Multi -domain Operations,” which was published in the winter 2022–23 issue of Parameters. Herlihy commands the 20th Engineer Brigade at Fort Bragg, NC, and has a background in airborne and Special Operations engineering. He holds master’s degrees in civil engineering and strategic studies from Missouri S&T and the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, respectively. Welcome to Decisive Point, Dan. Colonel Dan Herlihy Hi Stephanie, thanks for having me. Host Cognitive performance enhancement for multi-domain operations—where does the army currently stand on this? Herlihy The army is somewhat quiet on cognitive performance, particularly cognitive performance enhancement, and does not address the topic directly in its warfighting doctrine. So, the new FM, 3-0, operations, our Army’s capstone doctrine, discusses the pursuit of decision dominance and briefly mentions cognitive effects, while describing defeat mechanisms later on in the text. But 3-0 does not touch on the cognitive domain in a deep or meaningful way. The Army research and medical community is much more in tune with the importance of cognitive performance enhancement. In fact, Army Futures Command, TRADOC, and the Army Resilience Directorate have a number of programs and initiatives aimed at exploring this concept. Many of these stakeholders played a part in the development and publication of FM 7-22, the Army’s Health and Holistic Fitness Manual. And that does a much better job describing the cognitive domain and introducing the topic of cognitive enhancement. Even so, 7-22 describes cognitive skill as one of five factors associated with mental readiness and features a far less prominent role in the writing than physical readiness does. Host You say in your article that there are increasing demands on soldier cognition. Please explain. Herlihy As we’ve seen warfare evolve and now bringing in the space domain and cyber domain, there are clearly more cognitive demands for our soldiers than there were in the past. Warfare has always been cognitively demanding, but as we add nearly limitless streams of information and data through the cyber and space domains—all the way to the soldier and leader level—this becomes more and more prominent. On top of that, we see the speed of combat increasing, so our leaders are expected to make decisions more quickly and without hesitation to exploit brief windows of convergence against our adversaries. With that, we also see more complex war fighting systems, as our technology continues to grow and become more capable. All that combined just puts more of a cognitive load on our soldiers. Host How does the US’ approach compare to its adversaries? Herlihy I would say the US takes a less direct approach than our adversaries do. Particularly China and Russia. As we look at China, China has had several leaders in the PLA clearly described the domain of consciousness as one of the key operating spaces in the future. The Chinese, like a civil-military fusion approach towards exploiting the cognitive domain and trying to enhance the cognitive performance of their soldiers. The Chinese are not bound by ethical constraints that we in the West impose on ourselves. And what that means is the Chinese are much more willing to experiment with things such as gene editing to edit human embryos in ways that could enhance cognitive performance. Similarly, the Russians see the information domain and the cognitive domain as key in the future of warfare. And as we’ve seen in Ukraine, Russian disinformation is ubiquitous on the battlefield, and Russian leaders attempt to saturate the information space to confuse and slow the decision-making of their adversaries, which they do so with some success, as we’ve seen. Host What are your recommendations for the US Army? Herlihy My recommendations are that we must continue to pursue revolutionary advances in neuroscience and technology that are ongoing, and we must continue to do that in an ethical manner and not be tempted to veer from that to try to keep pace with our adversaries. But at the same time, we must also capitalize on practical and near-term opportunities to improve individual soldier and cognitive performance. And that could be done through a number of ways that are outlined in the writing—indirect approaches that affect our cognition through things such as talent management, dietary intervention, sleep modification, exercise, pharmacology, and other resilience, training. Or direct approaches that more immediately target the structural and functional mechanisms underlying our perception, cognition, and emotion. So, we have to take an integrated approach to that across the .mil pf, and ultimately drive towards a culture of cognitive performance enhancement across the Army. That means we have to leave behind some myths about multitasking, some myths about operating on little to no sleep, and really take a look at what the science says and make some simple modifications to the way we do business that can help us achieve higher potential in the cognitive domain. Host Give us your final thoughts on the topic before we go. Herlihy I would just close with, you know, while there’s a lot of exciting research and technology emerging in the cognitive domain, we all have an opportunity to educate ourselves on the basics of brain function, how we think, how we decide, and in doing so capitalize on some quick wins that are already available for us with modest investment. And we can set conditions for even greater advances in the future. And the great part about that is we can do so while keeping our values intact and not stepping into any ethical gray space—and continue to serve the way that we have—and we’ll continue to do so in the future. Host I’m curious. You’re an engineer. What inspired you to write about this topic? Herlihy That’s a great question. I think for me, I’ve just always been fascinated with the way our mind works, and I had some exposure in the special operations community with the early days of what’s now the health and holistic fitness program, and in that learned a little bit about cognitive performance. And to see the huge amount of untapped potential that’s there, as in the army, it’s easy to focus on the physical domain, and we can see results from exercise and nutrition in that domain with our very eyes. And we can see it because it’s easy to measure on PT tests and other assessments. But the cognitive domain often goes unmeasured or unnoticed. I just think there’s a lot of potential there, and I was excited to have the opportunity to do some research on that area and learn that we have a lot of really bright individuals in the army and across DoD that are taking a hard look at this for us. But in the end, it’s us as leaders that are going to have to take the next step to really change the culture of our army to embrace cognitive performance optimization in the same way we’ve embraced physical performance optimization. Host Well said. Thanks for taking that one on. And also, just thank you for sharing your time and your insights today on this topic. Learn more about cognitive performance enhancement for multi-domain operations at press.armywarcollege.edu. Look for volume 52, issue 4. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, you can find us on any major podcast platform. Author Information: Colonel Dan Herlihy commands the 20th Engineer Brigade at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and has a background in airborne and special operations engineering. Herlihy holds masters’ degrees in civil engineering and strategic studies from Missouri S&T and the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), respectively.   show less

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the long-term energy dependencies on Moscow that Europe will neither be able to resolve quickly nor without great sacrifice. Russia’s hybrid warfare—a combination of kinetic strikes against key infrastructure, information manipulation, malign finance, economic coercion, and cyber operations—has used Ukraine to target the heart of Europe’s energy security. This war has forced the Continent to consider how to realize its economic,... read more

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the long-term energy dependencies on Moscow that Europe will neither be able to resolve quickly nor without great sacrifice. Russia’s hybrid warfare—a combination of kinetic strikes against key infrastructure, information manipulation, malign finance, economic coercion, and cyber operations—has used Ukraine to target the heart of Europe’s energy security. This war has forced the Continent to consider how to realize its economic, environmental, and geostrategic energy goals on its own. This study found systemic dependencies and cyber vulnerabilities in critical energy infrastructure throughout the European continent could impact the Alliance’s political stability and threaten military effectiveness. Forward mobility and troop readiness are affected directly by energy shortfalls and increasing cyber vulnerabilities across NATO. The main findings related to cyber and malign influence provide a sobering view of the challenges of hybrid warfare on energy security in NATO nations. Read the monograph: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/956/ Episode transcript: What Ukraine Taught NATO about Hybrid Warfare Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Sarah J. Lohmann, editor and author of What Ukraine Taught NATO about Hybrid Warfare, which was published by the US Army War College Press in 2022. Lohmann is an acting assistant professor in the Henry M. Jackson School for International Studies at the University of Washington and a visiting professor at the US Army War College. Her current teaching and research focus on cyber and energy security, counterterrorism, and emerging and disruptive technology. She received her PhD from the Universitat der Bundeswehr, her masters from American University, and her bachelors from Wheaton College. Hi Sarah, welcome to Decisive Point. Dr. Sarah J. Lohmann Thanks for having me. Host Let’s talk about What Ukraine Taught NATO about Hybrid Warfare. How did you get involved in the research for this book? Lohmann Thanks for asking. That’s a great question. We, that is NPS based in Monterrey, and I, focused on this particular topic around energy security. We’ve both been doing research in our own areas. And then we went to NATO headquarters, and we launched a research map, inviting scholars from across NATO countries to brainstorm with us. This was about three years ago, and we launched it right there from NATO headquarters. NATO did bless the project, and then Army War College brought me on to work on this specific research. Host What were your main takeaways on what’s defined hybrid warfare during the Ukraine War, specifically as it pertains to energy security and critical infrastructure? Lohmann So, there are three main landmarks. It’s targeting the emerging tech environment. It’s using cyberattacks and kinetic attacks as two sides of the same sword. And it’s leveraging information operations and malign influence to create greater impact. So let me talk a little bit more about what that looks like in the energy security environment. What does it look like with emerging tech? Basically, this creates a lot of new vulnerabilities to the energy critical infrastructure environment during hybrid war because malicious cyber actors, whether nation states or cyber criminals, are taking advantage of the vulnerabilities created by the Internet of Things environment. When I say that I mean things like smart grids, renewable energy sources, and the IT and operational technology environment. They can be compromised remotely and that sometimes switches off the lights and the heat for an entire city or region. This landscape has been tested and attacked in the early months of the war in both the Ukraine as well as NATO member states. We’ve seen Russian-backed hacker groups who’ve targeted everything from satellites to wind turbines and technology for distribution of coal and thermal power plants. We saw in the years and months in the lead-up to the war that the Russian FSB have actually previously carried out malicious cyber intrusions into grids in places like the US and Germany. This is publicly known information, but this was just preparation for what’s happening now. Secondly, if we look at how it is targeting energy security through cyber means in tandem with kinetic attacks, we often see the timing happening pretty simultaneously—so within a 24-to-48-hour time range. Thirdly, as we look at information operations, there’s a lot of malign influence going on, and there’s a partnership with China. China has helped to soften the impact of sanctions. They’ve also helped Russia to track technology. So, for example, in Ukraine, the Ukrainians are using drones that have parts made by China. China has given Russia the means to track those drones on the battlefield. In addition, China has laid the foundation by controlling critical infrastructure and the supply chain in many NATO countries. This, in turn, is impacting food security and the supply chain across NATO as well as transportation and logistics. And, ultimately, it affects our national security. Host What solutions are there for cyber secure energy independence on military installations? Lohmann We looked at three different solutions. One we analyzed was small modular reactors. The second we looked at was micro gridding, and the third was cyber early warning. Small modular reactors have the ability to provide resilient, independent energy delivery to installations in the event that connections to an electrical grid are compromised. The great thing about SMRS are that they’re power plants based on these that require refueling only every three to seven years in comparison to between one and two years for conventional nuclear plants. There are some SMR’s out there that are designed to even operate for up to 30 years without refueling. But, of course, there are a lot of challenges, as well, in terms of security. You’re not going to want these anywhere close to the battlefield for obvious reasons because you’re dealing really with nuclear energy, so the transport can also be a challenge, and licensing. NATO is not super excited about this option right now just because of all the regulation and licensing that goes along with it, how long it’s going to take, and some of those security issues. On the other hand, this could be ready for deployment on US bases by 2026. So, because of the large amount of energy it could provide, it really could be a great independent energy solution that’s not vulnerable to cyberattack. The second thing we looked at was microgrids. Now I looked at a lot of different bases in terms of how successful microgrids are in islanding, so that they are cyber secure, but also in terms of providing that energy resilience needed during blackouts. It really depends on each base and their needs in terms of how successful these microgrids have been. Right now, the aim is to use renewables to power them, but what we found is the technology isn’t there yet. Basically, they remain fully resilient on fuel, but that can be a problem in forward positions near the battlefield because of the footprint that leads, and also, is often difficult to access fuel when you’re in a battlefield era. Secondly, only with the right kind of storage and batteries can this kind of micro gridding and islanding be successful. What we found is that in some of the islanding tests, the storage of the batteries actually caught on fire because the technology is not there yet. But it’s predicted to be there technologically within several years. SMR will likely get there faster, but both of these things are a political game, as well, in terms of what will be supported by NATO, what will be supported by the different countries. And then finally we looked at cyber early warning. Now what’s out there right now in terms of cyber early warning is basically anomaly detection. They’re looking to the past at what kind of attacks have already occurred. But in terms of the future and the environment in which you have Internet of Things and emerging technology, much of that is not taken into account when it’s looking at energy critical infrastructure. So, a colleague and I brainstormed about how we could make this better. One thing that we’re looking at is virtualization of energy critical infrastructure, for example, of a natural gas pipeline, and then combining that with machine learning to protect that critical infrastructure. The great thing is here you can also combine it with the machine learning so that it’s constantly learning from the new attacks. And it can use a sophisticated network of behavioral analysis models that can at the same time conduct network monitoring to ensure security .That then can be used to build a next-generation early warning system. So, we do believe this technology can soon be developed and soon be finished. We’re not quite there yet, but those tools will soon be available. Host Why is this book so important for NATO and our commands in Europe? Lohmann We really do believe that the information we found and the general policy recommendations that we analyze are crucial for those commands because it provides actionable information. There’s not a lot of awareness out there about how the Internet of Things and the general emerging technology environment impact their military installations. Right now, it is making them more vulnerable because the cybersecurity does not yet exist for a lot of the energy critical infrastructure, so our hope is that this will make them aware of the vulnerabilities as well as make them aware of the innovation that’s being created and could be used very soon on military installations to help repel these kinds of cyberattacks. Host Thank you so much for your time. This was a. Real pleasure Lohmann I appreciate it, and thank you so much for your great questions. Host If you’d like to learn more about What Ukraine Taught NATO about Hybrid Warfare, visit press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs. Author Information: Sarah J. Lohmann is a visiting research professor of security studies at the US Army War College, an assistant professor of international studies at the University of Washington, and a nonresident fellow with the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies at Johns Hopkins University. She is a co-lead of the NATO Science and Technology project “Energy Security in an Era of Hybrid Warfare.” She holds a bachelor’s degree in communications and German from Wheaton College, a master’s of international service from American University, and a doctorate in political science from the Universität der Bundeswehr.   show less

In the fourth installment of the SRAD Director’s Corner, Shatzer focuses on the Taiwan/China relationship. He reviews The Trouble with Taiwan: History, the United States and a Rising China by Kerry Brown and Kalley Wu Tzu-hui and Taiwan Straits Standoff: 70 Years of PRC–Taiwan Cross-Strait Tensions by Bruce A. Elleman and shows how these books might help strategists better understand the contentious and violent history of cross-strait relations between Taiwan and China so they can deal... read more

In the fourth installment of the SRAD Director’s Corner, Shatzer focuses on the Taiwan/China relationship. He reviews The Trouble with Taiwan: History, the United States and a Rising China by Kerry Brown and Kalley Wu Tzu-hui and Taiwan Straits Standoff: 70 Years of PRC–Taiwan Cross-Strait Tensions by Bruce A. Elleman and shows how these books might help strategists better understand the contentious and violent history of cross-strait relations between Taiwan and China so they can deal with the problem today and in the future. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss4/16/ Episode Transcript: SRAD Director’s Corner: Taiwan as Strategic Imperative Stephanie Crider (Host) You’re listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Colonel George Shatzer, director of the Strategic Research and Analysis Department in the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College. Schatzer is the author of SRAD Directors Corner. In this issue, he focuses on preserving Taiwan as strategic imperative. In your SRAD Directors Corner series, you review books of possible interest to contemporary military strategists—especially those serving in the US Army in joint positions. The Winter issue contains the fourth installment of this series, and the focus is on Taiwan. Thank you for joining us again. Col. George Shatzer Well, it’s great to be back, and I appreciate the opportunity to discuss these important issues. Host You profiled the security challenge from China in your first review article in the series. Well, that article mentioned Taiwan. It had a broader focus. Maybe you could briefly summarize the key points from that first article and then describe why you decided to narrow in on Taiwan, this time. Shatzer The first article appeared in the spring edition of Parameters this year and reviewed The Long Game by Rush Doshi and The Strategy of Denial by Elbridge Colby. You are right that both books took a wider or grand strategic look at what the People’s Republic of China’s global ambitions are and what the United States should do about them. Doshi argues that the PRC has patiently planned for decades to overtake the United States as the world’s dominant power. He describes how the PRC has first sought to blunt the US’s control of affairs, regionally, and then attempted to build its own control over the region and then how the PRC has expanded those blunting and building efforts globally. Doshi speaks to all aspects of national power when he recommends how the US should essentially follow its own blunting and building strategy to curb the PRC’s growth. Colby, though, focuses on just military power in his book, but still from a strategic perspective, and doesn’t get deeply into any operational matters. He suggests the US overtly build an anti-hegemonic coalition to check PRC advances. Both authors, of course, mentioned Taiwan, but their books include far more than that. I always planned to come to Taiwan as its own topic in the article series. And with the events this past summer following US Speaker of House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan and the violent PRC reaction, it was clearly the right time to do that. The potential for armed conflict between the US and the PRC might well be the highest it’s been since the Korean War era and the first Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954 to 1955. This is no theoretical or purely academic problem, either. The PRC has attacked Taiwan and held territory several times in the past. The US has intervened many times, and the PRC has been very clear and vocal about its willingness to attack again. Even though some argue the true potential for war over Taiwan is low, it would still be a war between the world’s two most powerful nuclear armed states. Such a conflict would be a catastrophe and have devastating consequences for millions of people around the world. That’s a problem set that deserves very careful study and attention. Host Let’s talk more about the likelihood of a war over Taiwan. I take it from the article that you believe that a war is more likely today. Shatzer That’s right. I’m very concerned, actually. I don’t say this explicitly in the article, but I believe the trajectory of the military situation around Taiwan has entered a dangerous new phase following what some have called the 4th Taiwan Strait crisis from this last summer. In earlier straight crises, the US took very concrete military and diplomatic steps to respond and intervene to warn off the PRC and prevent a larger conflict. In this year’s crisis, three factors appeared to have changed very substantially since the last crisis in 1995 and 96. First is Taiwan’s ability to defend itself. Taiwan military capacity has decreased significantly since 1996. Taiwan’s military is much smaller. It hasn’t kept pace in key areas of modern combat systems technology, and most of its conscripted service members are required to only serve four months. Yes, that’s months. The second factor is the massive growth in PRC military power. Today, most point to the 95-96 straight crisis in which the US deployed two naval carrier strike groups in response to PRC military actions as a major driver in convincing the PRC to modernize its military because it realized it had no real means to respond to the US carrier deployments. I first became seriously involved in examining the PRC’s People’s Liberation Army, or PLA forces, in 2008. From 1996 to 2008, the growth in PLA capability was remarkable. Subsequent growth in PLA capability since 2008 has been at least as significant, if not more so. Relative to Taiwan and US military capability since 1996, the PLA is vastly more capable and dangerous today. The third differences are pure C perceptions of itself and its perceptions of the United States. This is less clear cut than the other two factors, but I think it’s very likely that the PRC is much more confident in its military capability to seize Taiwan by force today. Additionally, the PRC has seen a much more muted response from the US to this year’s straight crisis. That might well have been a sensible way for the US to defuse tensions, but what signal did it send about US resolve to defend Taiwan? Yes, the US has made public statements reaffirming commitments to Taiwan security, but lacking a clear set of military moves, I’m concerned that the US may have fostered the PRC belief that the US might not back up its words with deeds. So, taken together, I’m generally worried that the PRC has a much greater capacity to at least isolate Taiwan by force and that the PRC believes it has much greater latitude to do so. Host What you’re describing, then, is a major break from past history with the Taiwan Strait crisis. This history is the focus of the first book you reviewed. What does this book offer for strategists today? Shatzer Bruce Elleman is one of the foremost experts on Chinese warfare, especially maritime operations. But his book, Taiwan Straits Standoff, does a great job of examining each past crisis in all dimensions. Understanding history is key to understanding PRC perspectives on warfare and on Taiwan, so Elleman’s book is mandatory reading, in my view, for anyone engaged in this problem. The book was published prior to this year’s crisis, which is actually good in that the book provides a clean perspective on everything that’s come before. The short book is stuffed full, though, of valuable strategic insight about the importance of Taiwan, the past thinking of US policymakers, patterns of PRC military behavior, and even how Russia factors into the equation. I thought the most valuable aspect of the book was the discussion of the various problems the PRC has faced in trying to act against Taiwan in the past and the range of problems the PRC faces today. All of these are suggestive of strategic options the US could use today to frustrate PRC aims. To mention just one is the fixation that the PRC has about Taiwan, and how the US historically leveraged that, especially during the Korean War, to influence PRC behavior. Elleman also reminds us that for much of Cross Strait history, the PRC has viewed war with the United States over Taiwan as being pointless. The PRC has traditionally believed that they could gain control of Taiwan through propaganda and subversion. This “win without fighting” mindset is still fundamental to Chinese military thinking, and it holds great deterrent value. If the United States can encourage the PRC to cling to this idea, then maybe war can be avoided. Unfortunately, growth of PRC nationalism and impatience to “reunify” with Taiwan threatens to erode this barrier to conflict. It’s worth noting too, that Elleman recounts in great detail the US Army LED noncombatant evacuation operation from outlying Taiwan Islands in 1955. It was a massive operation. Eventually evacuating nearly 30,000 people, military, civilian from the threat of PRC attack. I mention this because many questioned what role the US Army could really play in a Taiwan conflict today. Host Speaking of nationalism in China and impatience over the Taiwan problem, the other book you reviewed brought a unique perspective to these questions. What was that? Shatzer Correct, The Trouble with Taiwan by Kerry Brown and Kalley Wu Tzu Hui offered a fresh, compelling take on the PRC–Taiwan problem. The authors approached the issue through the lens of identity— how history, internal politics and a host of other factors shape the way peoples define themselves and others. In fact, the authors assert that identity is, today, the key driver of the PRC–Taiwan Rift and for the potential for war. They wade through some very complex cultural dynamics in a way that makes the core issues easy to understand for a Western audience. Put simply, the PRC views itself as the rightful and only legitimate leadership of the Chinese nation. And because the Chinese Communist Party has so clearly and forcefully proclaimed its historical and cultural right to control and re empower the Chinese nation, the status of Taiwan is deeply and symbolically now a key component of the party’s legitimacy. In effect, Taiwan is a test case for the party itself. If it were to give up on Taiwan or fail to gain control of it, this would call into question every other sovereignty claim the PRC makes to places such as the South China Sea, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Relinquishing or failing on these claims would mean breaking up the Chinese nation, something the party simply can’t permit. The authors further argue that because the PRC has grown wealthier and more powerful, it feels its status has increased. And because the PRC believes it is more capable of forcefully seizing Taiwan, the PRC’s desire for so-called reunification with Taiwan is now more urgent. The authors also stress that notions of China as a civilizational force and mother culture amplify a strong Confucian sense of the PRC being an elder sibling to Taiwan and, hence, deserving of its respect. So, for the PRC, its own identity as the elder prevents any possibility that Taiwan could be of equal status or be sovereign. For all these reasons, the authors conclude that this is an intractable problem where “to be fully China, to have the status it wants to rank as a great global power, the PRC needs Taiwan to be part of it.” Host What hope then, is there that the Taiwan dispute can be resolved peacefully? Shatzer Brown and Wu Tzu Hui offer that Taiwan status as a democracy is actually a powerful defense because it means that Taiwan can always say it isn’t ruling out joining with the PRC. That reunification is a possibility because its people may elect to do just that. They also point out that the growing sense of a unique Taiwanese identity—as is distinct from a Chinese identity—while concerning to the PRC, also has a deterrent value. The PRC should be concerned that a firm Taiwan resistance to a PLA military operation to seize the island will result in a quagmire and undercut the party’s claim to legitimacy. I’m not sure how much these factors deter the PRC, though, especially for the long term or when tensions spike again. I do agree with the authors that the problem is intractable in the sense that there is no real way the Chinese Communist Party can give up its claim to Taiwan. Persistent competition with the PRC may well be the best the US can do, by maintaining a credible deterrent through forward posture and demonstrating the clear will to defend Taiwan. But like with the Soviet Union in the end of the 20th century Cold War, I think the only way the PRC threat to Taiwan ends is if the party in Beijing collapses or experiences a revolution that completely remakes it. That’s something that will only result from internal forces and popular action. Host You also point out that US will to defend Taiwan is not clear, at least in the minds of some. Shatzer That’s true, unfortunately. Despite the US being very clear in its statements and actions about its commitment to Taiwan since 1955, I think most that question US will do so because they don’t understand the importance of Taiwan to the United States. In the article, I discussed various aspects of that importance, particularly the economic, geographic, and military advantages the PRC would gain from seizing control of Taiwan, enabling the PRC to dominate its neighbors in the rest of the region. But really, the risk even greater than the growth of PRC power would be the damage to US power and prestig—in the region and globally. If the US permitted the PRC to terminate a democratic nation of almost 24 million people, how could the US credibly claim that it would stand with any other democracy in the face of a similar threat? And if the US can’t be counted on to defend other democracies, why should they look to the US for leadership on anything? US power starts from the idea that its form of democratic government is superior to all others, especially authoritarian ones. If the US is unwilling to defend that ideal from predators, then it effectively cedes global leadership to any other power willing to seize it. That turn of events might not be an existential threat to the United States in the short term, but it would greatly undermine US influence, wealth, and security in the long run. Host Run how does the US prevent that outcome? Shatzer Through a serious and unambiguous commitment to maintaining a credible capability of defeating military aggression against Taiwan, by working closely with Taiwan to do just that, and by convincing the PRC that military force will not work, that they must resort to a long game of trying to win without fighting. Fundamentally, the PRC must be made to fear that the risk of an operation to seizeT aiwan is simply too great, and then a failure in that operation will threaten the very existence of the Communist Party. I think only by holding at risk the party’s grasp of power in Beijing will they be deterred from acting against Taiwan. All this is much easier said than done, but it’s what we must do. Host Lots of food for thought here, like always, and plenty of resources to dig into. Thanks so much for your time. Shatzer Well, thanks again for the opportunity to discuss this today. Host If you’d like to dive deeper into the contentious and violent history of the relationship between the PRC and Taiwan, and how it impacts today’s situation, read the article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 52, issue 4. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, you can find us on any major podcast platform. Author Information: Colonel George Shatzer is the director of the Strategic Research and Analysis Department in the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College.   show less

Now that Vladimir Putin has chosen a path of escalation in his unnecessary war of aggression against Ukraine, it is imperative Western policymakers know the consequences and how he might escalate further. This podcast examines recent events on the battlefield; the implications of the announced annexation of territory, mobilization of forces, and threats to employ “all means” to defend Russian territory; the domestic ramifications and Russian thinking on “hybrid warfare”; and the... read more

Now that Vladimir Putin has chosen a path of escalation in his unnecessary war of aggression against Ukraine, it is imperative Western policymakers know the consequences and how he might escalate further. This podcast examines recent events on the battlefield; the implications of the announced annexation of territory, mobilization of forces, and threats to employ “all means” to defend Russian territory; the domestic ramifications and Russian thinking on “hybrid warfare”; and the possible weaponization of food and energy as Putin determines future escalatory steps. It will assist American and European leaders in determining policies to deal with the ongoing crisis at this moment and prepare for an uncertain future. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss4/4/ Episode transcript: “Putin Chooses between a Series of Bad Options” Stephanie Crider (Host) You’re listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government, Decisive Point welcomes doctor Jeffrey McCausland, author of “Putin Chooses between a Series of Bad Options,” which was featured in the winter 2022–23 issue of Parameters. McCausland is a visiting professor at Dickinson College and a retired US Army Colonel, a national security consultant for CBS Radio and television. He’s the founder and CEO of Diamond 6 leadership and strategy and the author of Battle Tested! Gettysburg Leadership Lessons for 21st-century Leaders, published by Post Hill Press in 2020. Welcome to Decisive Point. I’m really glad you’re here. Dr. Jeffrey McCausland Stephanie, it’s great to be with you. Host Your article, “Putin Chooses between a Series of Bad Options” addresses Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent escalation in his war against Ukraine. In what three ways did Putin escalate the war? McCausland We have to consider, Stephanie, that escalation occurs vertically as well as horizontally, and he’s actually done or threatened to do both. You know vertically it’s the use of more and more sophisticated military equipment. As the war progressed to use thermobaric weapons, he attacked civilian population as his situation on the battlefield deteriorated, he’s threatened to use nuclear weapons, and he’s mobilized additional military forces, as well as the economy. But then there’s also a horizontal explanation. Moving, if you will, in that direction, and here we see the Russians using hybrid warfare. And, therefore, using the food weapon, shutting off the export of grain to around the world. I’m fully convinced the Russians were behind the attack on the Nord Stream pipeline and effort to intimidate Europeans about the possible use of energy and the use of overall energy as a weapon as he has done that to manipulate particularly Western Europ ean public opinion potential. Potential threats and nuclear power plants like around Zaporizhya, which he can kind of press or not as he sees fit. And if he were to cause a major disaster there, he could have similar effects to a nuclear weapon with, perhaps, not exactly as much international backlash. He could try to blame it on the Ukrainians. And recently, he’s made threats to go after US and European satellites. So he’s escalated both vertically with more weaponry as well as horizontally. Host So, given all this, what are his options now? McCausland Those options are to, again, further process horizontally or as well as vertically–the recent suspension of the food export was an example of that. It now seems to be back online. There is some suggestion he may try to expand the war to Belarus. Move Russian military forces into Belarus and use that as a geographic location to attack Ukraine. Even threatening to do that has already forced the Ukrainians to a degree to move some military forces to the north to, in fact, prepare for that. Should that aggression, in fact, occur. Sure, he could strike NATO territory, particularly those points that are key to the importation of military hardware coming from the United States or our European Allies in an effort to restrict that. Or they can do is think as most likely right now, which is hunker down as winter progresses, hoping to stabilize the battlefield as the ground freezes as snow arrives. And by depriving Europeans of a lot of energy, hope that the European population in the West will become more and more disenchanted with the war, causing social unrest, and they’ll force their leadership to put pressure on the Ukrainians. Furthermore, of course, his ongoing campaign to strike Ukrainian energy infrastructure may have a similar effect in Ukraine, forcing more refugees as people in the eastern part of the country, in particular, are now faced with a long winter with the possibility of no energy. Host In your opinion, what’s the probability of Putin using nuclear weapons? McCausland I think the probability is low, but it certainly isn’t zero, and we need to keep that in mind and be clear-eyed about it. You know it’s sort of ironic that we are experiencing what I would argue is the greatest nuclear confrontation we’ve had since the Cuban missile crisis, which was almost exactly 60 years ago this past October. He could use a strategic nuclear weapon. He has a large arsenal. There’s no two ways about that. But obviously that would have, I don’t think it necessarily military effect. It would make him a global pariah. Make him, in essence, North Korea. Even the Chinese would not support that. He could use a tactical nuclear weapon, a smaller nuclear weapon, on the battlefield. And there are reports out even today that the Russian military has considered that. But again, I find that doubtful he would do that. Russian military doctrine has always talked about using such weapons for two reasons. Reason number one. In an effort to break through a stalemate on the battlefield and then exploit those opportunities with large scale mechanized advance. He doesn’t have the mechanized forces left to do that. And #2, if in fact, the very existence of the Russian Federation was at risk. That’s certainly not the case right now, though he could say the territories he had next, which are Russia are, in fact, being invaded by the Ukrainians now, which is sort of an odd turn of events. But I think he would, again, lose a lot of international support. He would not have the battlefield effect, and he also has to understand, of course, that nuclear weapons, once used, raise the possibility of escalation with the United States, which he doesn’t want either. And finally, of course, even localized effects like radiation affects his forces as well. As it turns out, most wind in that particular portion of eastern Ukraine blows from west to east, so the large-scale radiation patterns would endanger not only his own forces, but perhaps even Russian territory. Host You note that it’s critical the West adopt policies to deter or respond to potential future escalation by Moscow. What would that look like? McCausland Well, it looks like is unity of effort, of course is key and this year Putin made the assumption of the very onset of this war that two things would happen. One, the war would be over quickly, the Ukrainians would collapse. That didn’t happen. Second of all, the West, NATO, and the United States would not get their act together. They would be complaints, but we would basically accept this like we did in 2014. That has been untrue. And NATO is a lot more powerful today than, I would argue, it was back in February. As somebody pointed out, you know in a matter of a couple of weeks, Mr. Putin managed to undermine about two centuries of Swedish neutrality and about four decades of German pacifism in one fell swoop. So that unity of effort in the West is key. Now Putin has got to be comforted by social unrest he see sees in France, a new government in the United Kingdom, a new government in Italy, perceived as quiet even in Germany on the nature of this war going for a long period of time. And even recent comments here in the United States by senior Republicans about, we can’t give retrain a blank check and progressive Democrats sending a letter to Mr. Biden urging negotiation, which they subsequently, by the way withdrew. I think the second thing we gotta do is we gotta continue to emphasize that Putin is committing war crimes. The attacks on civilians, the attacks on civilian infrastructures, are by any definition, war crimes. We cannot allow him, in essence, to use the same tactics the Russians and the Syrians did against Syrian civilians in the Ukraine. We’ve got to continue not only to provide military assistance, which will change and has evolved from stingers and javelins to longer range artillery to high Mars and now more sophisticated air defense, as this relentless attack by the Russians continues. But we also have to provide humanitarian assistance and economic assistance to the Ukrainians. And I fear this winter may see a second refugee crisis. And last but not least, I say we need to continue to tailor our military assistance and coordinate it with our European Allies to make sure we have maximum effect and consider, I think doing things much more bold. For example, I think we need to consider, if not direct military assistance in Ukraine, at least contractor support in Ukraine to train Ukrainian forces on their territory and repair equipment on their territory that can more quickly then be returned to the battlefield. Host Unfortunately, we’re running out of time here, give us your final thoughts though, please before we go. McCausland My final thoughts would be these. First of all, Putin’s lost. By any measure, he’s lost. I mean, consider the effect on the economy. He has lost highly skilled young people. Perhaps as many as 750,000 have fled the country following the initiation of the war and the mobilization. He’s had over 100,000 casualties. Some estimate as many as 40,000 dead. The long-term effect on your Russian economy is inestimable, and people estimate, who follow economies, that it will drop by 5% this year and 10 to 15% next year. If you were an extraction economy, which Russia is, the one thing you don’t want to be described as is unreliable. The second thing we need to keep in mind is he still thinks he can win. And he thinks he must because he knows only two Soviet leaders left office still standing up. That was Khrushchev and Gorbachev. The rest of them all were carried out the front door of the of the Kremlin. Defeat, therefore, for him may be existential. So he has to think about the 3 variables that will make that possible. One is, does his army continue to fight? That, I think, may be increasingly problematic. Second of all, will the Russian people put up with this as the economy constricts? And thirdly, what does the economy actually do in Russia, and how precipitous does that in fact happen? Finally, I think when you keep in mind that this is not a war between Ukraine and Russia per se. The stakes here are far, far larger. I think we all agree that democracy around the world is threatened. Therefore, it’s more than just a war between Ukraine and Russia, and we cannot afford to lose this. To do so would encourage every desperate from Iran to North Korea to China, seeking to take over Taiwan, et cetera, that the international norms established at the end of World War II, whereby territory was not seized by military aggression, are no longer in place and they can do willy nilly what they think is necessary and the opportunities they think now present themselves. Host Thanks for sharing your insights on this topic. It was a real treat to talk with you. McCausland My pleasure, Stephanie. Host To read the article visitpress.armywarcollege.edu/parameters, look for volume 52, issue 4. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, you can find us on any major podcast platform. Author Information: Dr. Jeffrey McCausland is a visiting professor at Dickinson College and retired US Army colonel. During his military career, he served as the dean of academics at the US Army War College, a combat battalion commander during the Gulf War, and a member of the National Security Council staff in the White House during the Kosovo crisis. A national security consultant for CBS radio and television, he is regularly interviewed on US national security policy issues. He is the founder and CEO of Diamond6 Leadership and Strategy and author of Battle Tested! Gettysburg Leadership Lessons for 21st Century Leaders (Post Hill Press, 2020).   show less

To illustrate the logic and grammar of coercion, this analysis relies on decision-theory methods, such as game theory, that examine the strategic decision-making process in interactions with adversaries and partners. The intent here is not to offer predictive models of rational-actor behavior. Rather, the intent is to use game theory and similar approaches to understand how coercion works better. This analysis considers competitive interactions between actors that have discrete and... read more

To illustrate the logic and grammar of coercion, this analysis relies on decision-theory methods, such as game theory, that examine the strategic decision-making process in interactions with adversaries and partners. The intent here is not to offer predictive models of rational-actor behavior. Rather, the intent is to use game theory and similar approaches to understand how coercion works better. This analysis considers competitive interactions between actors that have discrete and qualifiable, if not quantifiable, preferences and who behave rationally, though this analysis acknowledges the behavior that is considered rational is frequently informed by nonrational social, cultural, and psychological factors. Considering these competitive interactions allows one to identify “rules of thumb” that can orient and guide actors as they compete. This analysis emphasizes coercion does not depend simply on imposing costs; rather, it depends on placing adversaries in positions in which they must act and their most rational option is the one most beneficial to one’s own cause. To achieve this result, actors must carefully calibrate their demands to ensure their adversary’s cost of concession is as low as possible. To prevent challenges in the first place, actors should convince the adversary acting on a threat is one’s most rational response. If convincing the adversary is not possible, then one must find ways to decrease the value of the adversary’s challenge. When none of those options are possible, preparing for conflict is likely one’s rational option. This analysis then applies the rules of thumb to US relations with China, Russia, and Iran. Read the monograph: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/952/ Episode Transcript: Coercing Fluently: The Grammar of Coercion in the Twenty-First Century Stephanie Crider (Host) You’re listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff, author of Coercing Fluently: The Grammar of Coercion in the Twenty-First Century, which was published by the US Army War College Press in August 2022. Pfaff is the research professor for strategy, the military profession, and ethics at the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute and a senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. A retired Army foreign area officer for the Middle East and North Africa, he has a doctorate in philosophy from Georgetown University. Welcome back to Decisive Point, Tony. (C. Anthony Pfaff) Hey, thanks. Very happy to be here. Host Why did you take on this topic? (Pfaff) It had been kind of, I think, boiling for a little while. In fact, one of the topics of the year, when we started it about two years ago, was, you know, rethinking coercion and competition. And that, I think, came from a strong sense of frustration over the way the United States was competing globally at the time. China was not only asserting itself in the South China Sea and getting more aggressive over Taiwan, as it is still doing now, but it was also building relations globally—particularly, in continents like Africa—that was threatening to displace US influence. And then you had Russia. You know, you got the invasion of Ukraine, which is a very obvious failure of deterrence. But even before the invasion, Russia was a . . . very much a destabilizing influence—particularly, in Europe—already having seized Crimea, supporting Ukrainian separatists, while at the same time using sort of gray zone means, like social media and others, to sow domestic instability or uncertainty within United States and, uh, its European allies. Then you always have Iran. Iran’s really good at this, you know, using . . . Host Yes. (Pfaff) Their proxies. They were pretty much able to attack US forces—especially, in Iraq, but, also, elsewhere—with relative impunity. And whenever we struck back, we always found ourselves in a worse position than if we hadn’t struck back. And that kind of quagmire is very frustrating. And what was really frustrating, from a lot of the practitioners that we talked to, is there was no theory of the case on what to do about it. We study war. We know how to use and apply military forces in war, and so our deterrence thinking is often shaped by the idea that as long as we have the right kinds of capabilities, we’ll get the right kinds of deterrence. That’s part of the equation, but it’s not the whole thing. And that’s why I kind of started looking at grammar as a way of thinking about this. You know, (Carl von) Clausewitz famously said, you know, “Apply the idea of grammar to war,” saying war has a grammar of its own, but its logic is peculiar to itself. So if war has a grammar of its own, why wouldn’t coercion have a grammar of its own? Host In your work, you talk about compellence, deterrence, and coercion. What are the differences between the three? (Pfaff) Very little, actually. Well, so, compellence and deterrence are forms of coercion. As the theory goes, coercion is about getting somebody to do something that you want them to do (compellence) or getting them not to do something you don’t want them to do (deterrence). I like doing . . . calling them, you know, they’re two sides of the same coin. As (Thomas C.) Schelling argues, you can see the difference between deterrence (and) compellence kind of lies in the timing and initiative, determined by who makes the first move and whose initiative is tested. But there are differences where deterrence is obviously kind of more of a passive activity. You could draw a line, and you tell people, “Don’t cross the line. If you do cross the line, I’m gonna do this.” Whereas compellence is a lot more active, “Stop this now. Uh, you have exactly five minutes.” So, you have to specify time and space where, you know, the compellent threat will be enacted. And so, it’s kind of got a timer on it. Where deterrence is open ended, compellence is a lot more limited. Host Game theory and coercion: How are they related? (Pfaff) Trying to figure out, given the problem, how do you compel and deter—particularly, against adversaries who seem to be, you know, doing a little bit better than we are. What’s the method by which we sort of analyze these things? Basically, we’re talking about an interaction, and that’s kind of what game theory does. It’s probably more accurate to say that we’re using sort of the structure of the game theory to kind of help understand the interactions under the specific conditions of international competition. You know, having said that, even though we . . . you know, this project doesn’t have quite the mathematical rigor you normally associate with a lot of game theoretic analysis, it gives us a way to discipline and structure our thinking about a problem so we can increase our understanding of it. So whether they’re looking at any kind of predictive or even descriptive reliability, it’s kind of trying to look at those interactions, pull out the logic of them, and discern, “What are some rules of thumb that follow from, uh, these interactions, you know, in the real world, can apply when engaged in a competitive interaction?” Host How would that work? (Pfaff) You have to identify who the relevant actors are; what their interests and goals are; what they can do in pursuit of those interests and goals; and, just as importantly, what they know and believe about other actors—particularly, how they might respond. And these factors boil down to preferences actors have for cooperation, concession, or conflict because that’s basically the . . . you know, that’s basically the shape of the choices that both or however many actors are in play are making. And so, when we’re looking at these interactions, we’re looking for equilibrium. What do we learn from studying these kinds of interactions? So now we’re thinking putting yourself not in the shoes of the other person in a way. You understand the credibility’s less about how they perceive your resolve as much as how they perceive what’s your interest in doing something? If the Russians, for example, believe that we would be worse off if we intervened on behalf of the Ukrainians, they would not take our deterrence, our deterrent threat, as credible because we would be worse off if we applied it. It also has to be capable. But here, capability isn’t measured in terms of balance of power necessarily. It’s more measured in terms of if the deterrent or compellent threat is triggered. If they don’t comply, if they don’t cooperate, are they going to be worse off if you apply that threat? Russia, believing that yes, it might be subjected to sanctions and, perhaps, you know, trade restrictions and things like that, felt that no, given the deterrent threat, as they understood it, they would not be worse off if they had invaded Ukraine. I think we’re seeing they were wrong about that. And a lot of times, in game theory, you talk about rational actors. We talk about rationality. But rationality in this sense just really means knowing what you want and how to get it. Couple of other things fall out, particularly regarding compellence and deterrence. Compellence may not always work out quite the way you think it would in real life—in particular, because the possibility of future interactions and iterations impacts how other actors are going to respond. First, for the one who’s doing the challenging, doing compelling, it offers, you know . . . offers you an opportunity to, uh, test your opponent. So you might be logical—and you see this sometimes—to open up with a very high demand. Even though you don’t expect that they’ll concede, you want to test the waters. And that’s particularly true in stronger/weaker interactions where the stronger actor can afford failure, as a result, might make a very high demand but not be willing to go all the way through to achieve it. Because on the other side, the weaker actor’s incentivized to resist, even where the demand might actually be reasonable if this were a single iteration sort of thing. Because of a fear of future demands, they’re incentivized up front to really dig in. And you kind of see this with the Iranians, right? You know, we make lots of demands. They dig in because they fear there’s going to be another one. Host How can it be applied when it comes to, say, China, Russia, Ukraine? (Pfaff) There’s three things that you can get out of it. One is helping understand the outcome of an interaction. One is then maybe prescribing effective strategies—at least, things you can try as well as assessing strategies relative to others. Why does something work, and why does something else not work? So, for example, a key advisor to President Xi (Jinping) of China, Jin Canrong, made a bunch of speeches in 2016 where he really laid out a detailed strategy on how China was going to achieve global hegemon status. And that strategy is comprised of six sequential moves that involve, first, a lot of cooperation, intertwining US and Chinese interests, while establishing alternatives to the United States for other countries like the Belt and Road Initiative that would eventually displace US influence while constraining what the US can do because that cooperation, that status quo they’ve created is now too valuable for the United States for it to, you know, just easily walk away from. It’s a strategy based of “Let’s cooperate in some areas, maybe as many areas as possible, so we’re in a better position to challenge in others.” Now compare that to the US maximum pressure campaign against Iran. Which one’s more likely to work? Well, maximum pressure just raises the stakes for Iran as well as raises concerns that if they give in to one demand, others will follow. Logically, you know, they should dig in and absorb whatever cost short of war the US is willing to impose and while imposing some costs on their own. It’s a strategy that gives them little to lose. That point doesn’t mean that a maximum pressure campaign was necessarily a bad idea. It’s just not going to alter Iranian behavior. So if that’s his point, it’s going to fail. But in this context, we can also take a step back and look at what this analysis will tell you is “What’s the space for changing that behavior?” And it’s probably very little. There’s very little room for cooperation, so a strategy that denies Iran resources and makes it harder for them to compete might be the best move. And then, when it comes to Russia, uh, its interests are limited. Where it has success is with countries where we have little interest. And there’s probably a little we . . . very little we can do about that other than sort of change those other countries’ interests. But let’s look at, um, Ukraine real quick, just to kind of wrap things up. NATO was criticized in the United States for not signaling resolve. For (Vladimir) Putin to be deterred, he had to believe that the deterrent threat was both credible and capable, which meant that we would “out-escalate” him. There was just really no good reason for him to believe that. And even though the United States, prior to the invasion, basically said, “We’re gonna impose really high costs,” there was enough caveats in the way people were presenting things. There was, uh, an appearance of, uh, lack of consensus among NATO nations on what to do. And in a situation like that, that’s going to signal to the other actor, and it’s time to act. But Putin made a mistake too, I think, uh, or may have. Well, not only did he not get that right. Uh, apparently the resolve was there, despite how he interpreted the signals. He also probably caused that a little bit or incentivized it. In December of 2021, he issued an ultimatum. He said, “Okay, we’ll back off. We won’t invade Ukraine.” But he demanded no further enlargement of NATO to the east; all cessation of military cooperation with post-Soviet countries, which includes a lot of NATO allies; a withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Europe; and cessation of many military activities in Ukraine. It also demanded a withdrawal of NATO forces all the way to the borders of 1997, which would leave, basically, all of Eastern Europe, you know, vulnerable ’cause that’s the 14 Eastern European and Baltic states that joined after that date. Not only would exceeding these demands prevent any kind of military intervention in Ukraine, it would impair the alliance’s ability to meet its defense obligations under article V. It would essentially kill NATO—probably, the unraveling of the alliance. As we talked about before, that raises the stakes, which is likely to increase resolve. ’Cause, you know, it went from “Do we just defend a single country,” or are we now worried about the alliance? Now, he’s put it on the alliance. Now what you could say is that this might’ve been used as a separating strategy. “This is a really tough demand. What’s NATO gonna do?” That might’ve been the case, but when you do those, you kind of have to have a plan to walk it back if they stand. And he didn’t walk it back. So it wasn’t that, and it certainly backfired and increased the resolve of NATO, to the point that it doesn’t look like he’s gonna get any kind of outcome that he’s going to want. The stakes are very high for him. He’s gonna resist all the way down, however many nodes you’d want to go. So if we don’t want to escalate the war, the math says, basically, there has to be some kind of accommodation, or the conflict continues and will continue to escalate. Now, whether that means nuclear weapons—this is where the . . . you know, you leave the analysis. ’Cause the analysis says, yes, that, you know, there’s no limit. Whether or not he’s going to do it is going to depend on a host of other reasons that might fall outside this. And that’s another lesson is that, what this also does for you, you sort of bound that but give you a direction to go look for the other things that’ll fill in your knowledge gap so that you can make better-informed decisions. Host So, last question before we go: The way forward—what do we need to keep in mind? (Pfaff) The competition’s generally open ended and, you know, coercive failures can sow the seed for future success. In fact, some strategies might integrate failure into the plan in order to get more information. But then, what it tells you is you’ve got to be sufficiently opportunistic, agile enough to take advantage of the things that arise out of that particular interaction. So coercive failure’s not also a bad thing. And there’s a couple other things. So, like, regarding forced postures, it says you should favor those that are flexible and create ambiguity, may be more productive than those that signal overmatch and overcommitment. There’s a lot that it says about how to collect, what to collect regarding intelligence and gearing it towards understanding adversary preferences, their thresholds, as well as, most importantly, their assessment of you. Because as we talked about Putin, he assessed us a certain way. He got it wrong. But knowing he assessed us that way should inform how we respond. Do we want to retain that ambiguity? Do we want to signal more clearly? And then, third is finding more space to compete in and be out there. So, for example, the United States’ contributions to peacekeeping operations went from a high of 115 to 34 in 2020. And so, we’re not really resourcing those. But those are places where there is a lot of competition going on. When we withdrew our observers out of, uh, Congo, for instance, Russians and Chinese filled it in. That gives them leverage . . . and that gives them leverage and access in those places that we now don’t have. Now maybe we don’t want to do this, but now we need to understand when we withdraw from these sort of inter- and intranational sort of things, we’re ceding space to the other guys. And yes, you’ll have to take into account, you know, whatever agreements or cooperation. There’s always cheating. Know that your adversary’s building that into their costs. Build that into yours as well. And that’s it. Host Thanks, as always, for your time. (Pfaff) Thank you. Much appreciated. Host You can learn more about Coercing Fluently: The Grammar of Coercion in the Twenty-First Century at press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs. If you enjoyed this episode and would like to hear more, you can find us on any major podcast platform. Author Information: Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff is the research professor for strategy, the military profession, and ethics at the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute and a senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. A retired Army foreign area officer for the Middle East and North Africa, he has a bachelor’s degree in philosophy and economics from Washington and Lee University; a master’s degree in philosophy from Stanford University, with a concentration in philosophy of science; a master’s degree in national resource management from the Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy; and a doctorate in philosophy from Georgetown University.   show less

After Russia’s unprecedented seizure of Ukraine’s nuclear plant at Zaporizhzhya, the United States needs to adjust its military planning and policies to cope with hostile military forces’ targeting, seizure, and garrisoning of armed forces at large, operating nuclear plants and clarify its policies regarding possible US targeting of such plants. This podcast analyzes these concerns. It compares Russia’s assaults with previous strikes against research reactors and nonoperating nuclear... read more

After Russia’s unprecedented seizure of Ukraine’s nuclear plant at Zaporizhzhya, the United States needs to adjust its military planning and policies to cope with hostile military forces’ targeting, seizure, and garrisoning of armed forces at large, operating nuclear plants and clarify its policies regarding possible US targeting of such plants. This podcast analyzes these concerns. It compares Russia’s assaults with previous strikes against research reactors and nonoperating nuclear plants in the Middle East and clarifies what new military measures and policies will be needed to cope with military operations against large, operating nuclear plants. US Army and Pentagon officials, as well as military and civilian staff, will discover ways to mitigate and reduce future military harm to civilians in war zones and understand the operational implications of military assaults on and seizures of civilian nuclear facilities. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss4/3/ Episode Transcript: “Present Danger: Nuclear Power Plants in War” Stephanie Crider (Host) You’re listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Henry D. Sokolski, author of “Present Danger: Nuclear Power Plants in War,” which was published in the winter 2022–23 issue of Parameters. Sokolski is the executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a Washington-based nonprofit organization founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues among policymakers, scholars, and the media. He teaches graduate-level classes on nuclear policy in Washington, DC. He’s also a senior fellow for nuclear security studies at the University of California in San Diego’s (University of California, San Diego’s) School of Global Policy and Strategy. Welcome back to Decisive Point, Henry. It’s great to chat with you again. (Henry D. Sokolski) Well, thank you for having me. Host Absolutely. My pleasure. In your article, you note that Russia’s seizure of Ukraine’s nuclear plant in Zaporizhzhya should inspire the US to adjust its military planning and policies when it comes to hostile military forces and operating nuclear plants. What about this situation inspired your article? (Sokolski) Well, I think what got me going was something halfway around the globe in Taiwan. The election of the current president in 2016 came with a pledge to shut down their nuclear power plants. They had three and one partially constructed. And when I went and visited, it occurred to me that one of the strongest arguments in support of the government’s position was not being made, and that was that these plants were targets, and . . . uh, the more I looked into that, the more I discovered that, indeed, the Chinese were targeting those plants and planning to target them and that the radiation releases, depending on the time of the year, could be quite remarkable and devastating. And I . . . I worked that, and then I started looking around the world. By the time Zaporizhzhya occurred, I was ready. So that was six years of research that I had been doing on this topic and . . . and problems there. Host So this isn’t the first nuclear plant to be attacked. How is this situation different from other attacks? (Sokolski) Well, it’s different in several ways. First of all, this is the first nuclear power plant to be attacked . . . uh, we have lots of history in the Middle East of plants being attacked, but they either weren’t operating, or they weren’t power plants. Power plants are big. Power plants present radiological release dangers that are significantly higher than small research or production reactors. That’s one difference. I think, in addition, attack was not seized by the enemy. We have Russians running . . . trying to run this plant and trying to steal it. That had never happened ever before. Also, we’ve never had strikes against plants with anything akin to drones that are precise. All the attacks before were done by, you know, gravity bombs or by planes flying over the target or inaccurate missiles. Why does that matter? With accurate strikes, you can pick specific things, rather than decimating the whole plant. And that’s exactly what’s been going on at Zaporizhzhya, and it is unprecedented. Before, it was all or nothing at all in the way of an attack. Yet another way in which the strikes against reactors in the Middle East really don’t tell a tale similar to what’s going on at Zaporizhzhya is none of those plants in the Middle East were surrounded by cities or population. I mean, Zaporizhzhya, Oblast has 1.7 million people living there. Now, admittedly, there are far fewer now. But you’re talking about hundreds of thousands still, and the ability of a population to protect itself against radiation if one of these plants produces a massive release is pretty limited. And that’s something folks striking reactors in the Middle East really did not have to worry about or think about much. And then, finally, none of the reactors previously targeted in the Middle East were adjacent to treaty parties to a security pact with the United States, whereas you have NATO nations—Japan, South Korea—located close to or having . . . themselves have reactors. And that’s important because in the case of, uh, Zaporizhzhya, if radiation wafts over into NATO territory, it’s not clear what that will or will not trigger in the way of a response, and that’s totally different and unprecedented as well. Host You had some specific recommendations for the Pentagon. Will you share those with us? (Sokolski) Sure. There are three. The Pentagon needs to start looking at these plants in war zones as stationary, potential, slow-burning, radiologically dispersing nuclear weapons instead of simply another portion of the civilian infrastructure. If they look at them that way, then the deterrents and security alliance implications of waging war anywhere near these plants has to be thought out. That includes in Europe, the Middle East, and in Asia. And they . . . they have to start asking what they’re going to do under different circumstances and what, if anything, they are going to plan around themselves. Are we going to strike these plants? Hope not, but, you know, right now, that’s an open question. They need to close that question in some fashion or another by doing some planning. The second thing that they need to do is they have to take a more active role in the US nuclear export license application process. They need to be giving their view as to how vulnerable proposed plants that are going to be built by the United States, supposedly—again in Ukraine, in Poland, and in Romania, to say nothing of other places in the Middle East—how vulnerable they would be to being attacked. They have a statutory requirement to do this already. I don’t think they are doing enough to take that statutory requirement seriously. Now they have cause to. I think in addition, they have their own military reactor program that they claim they’re going to base overseas, so they have a real stake in trying to be clear about what their thinking is. And then, finally, the department needs to clarify and strengthen its current guidance with regard to targeting nuclear plants in a war. We are signatories to a protocol in the Geneva Convention (Geneva Conventions) that strongly discourages targeting electrical power-generating plants. And when you take a look at how the military interprets this obligation, the Pentagon ultimately comes down on the side of freedom of action, such that if a commander in the field thinks it’s important to hit a nuclear power plant, he’s given authority to do it. I think that may need to be reexamined. And then, the presumption against hitting these things is much stronger in the protocol that we’ve signed than what the guidance and interpretation of that protocol says. I think that that is an invitation for mischief. We are the . . . perhaps amongst the only country other than Russia that hasn’t ratified this agreement. Now, Russia pulled out of it, but even China and North Korea have ratified the darned thing. All of our allies have, so we need to consider how we interpret this. I’m not saying we need to ratify it, but I think we need to come to terms that it’s time to take another look after Zaporizhzhya on how we view that obligation. Host I so wish we had more time. There’s so much to unpack here. I just want to thank you, though, for sharing your time and for sharing your insight. It’s always a treat when I get to talk with you. Thanks, Henry. (Sokolski) Well, thank you. Host To read more about nuclear power plants and more, visit press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 52, issue four. If you enjoyed this episode and would like to hear more, you can find us on any major podcast platform. Author information: Henry D. Sokolski is the Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a Washington-based nonprofit organization founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues among policymakers, scholars, and the media. He teaches graduate-level classes on nuclear policy in Washington, D.C. He is also a Senior Fellow for Nuclear Security Studies at the University of California at San Diego’s School of Global Policy and Strategy.   show less

The US military must create standing, numbered, and regionally aligned Joint warfighting headquarters— American Expeditionary Forces (AEFs)—around a command council and a staff organized into Joint centers and cells. Calls for standing Joint force headquarters are not new, but the demonstrated military effectiveness of the Joint Task Force (JTF) model coupled with increasing service-specific resource requirements and tightening fiscal constraints have resulted in little evolution in... read more

The US military must create standing, numbered, and regionally aligned Joint warfighting headquarters— American Expeditionary Forces (AEFs)—around a command council and a staff organized into Joint centers and cells. Calls for standing Joint force headquarters are not new, but the demonstrated military effectiveness of the Joint Task Force (JTF) model coupled with increasing service-specific resource requirements and tightening fiscal constraints have resulted in little evolution in joint force headquarters construction since the end of World War II. Analysis of the historical record has shown that joint warfighting is best conducted with a Joint warfighting command subordinate to the geographic combatant commands. However, the Joint Task Force model is problematic because the ad-hoc, post-crisis activation of JTFs, along with their antiquated command and control structure, inherently puts the United States at a strategic and operational disadvantage. In the future, the US military will primarily maintain its competitive advantage, especially in great-power competition, by being a superior and sustainable joint force sooner than its adversaries. The proposed AEFs draw on generations of hard-earned experience to maintain and grow American supremacy in Joint warfighting in an increasingly dangerous world Read the monograph: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/953/ Episode Transcript: The Future of the Joint Warfighting Headquarters: An Alternative Approach to the Joint Task Force Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Thomas Bruscino and Louis Yuengert, coauthors of The Future of the Joint Warfighting Headquarters: An Alternative Approach to the Joint Task Force, with Colonels Eric Bissonette, Kelvin Mote, Marc J. Sanborn, James Watts, and Commander Matthew B. Powell. Bruscino is an associate professor of history in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the US Army War College. He holds a PhD in military history from Ohio University. Yuengert is a retired Army colonel and an associate professor of practice in the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management at the US Army War College. He holds a master’s degree in operations research from the Georgia Institute of Technology and a master’s degree in strategic studies from the US Army War College. Welcome to Decisive Point, gentlemen. (Thomas Bruscino) Happy to be here. (Louis Yuengert) Yeah, it’s great to be here. Host Great. Let’s just jump right in here. Your work offers an alternative approach to the Joint Task Force for Joint warfighting headquarters. Give our listeners some background. Why the need for change? (Yuengert) So Stephanie, Tom and I were teaching—this was two years ago—in the Carlisle Scholars Program. And in the scholars program, there’s a requirement that the students do two additional research projects. The reason we have the program is so that they have the space to do that. And in this case, one of the student committees for the Military Strategy and Campaigning course that Tom teaches identified that how we are organized for Joint warfighting was a vulnerability—and, especially, in near-peer competition. And so they asked Tom if they could explore this further after they had given their presentation as part of their research. And this paper was the result of that research effort. So, Tom, if you could talk about the need for change? (Bruscino) Yeah, so the work they did was they had multiple committees. And they had worked on Joint Task Forces and the formation of one, and they sort of got into the problems that are inherent in that: extensive delays in getting our warfighting headquarters; a lot of disorganization; some off-cycle training cycles; the need for what we have in the Joint Force, called the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command, which has to go and flies all over the world, filling in gaps. So they saw all this need with this. Another committee was doing the Joint planning process, sort of looking at how we do the fighting, planning for fighting. And a lot of the Joint planning process is focused on sort of the day-to-day activities, the competition activities, campaigning activities of combatant commands and maybe doesn’t apply as well to the dilemmas of Joint Task Forces or Joint warfighting commands. So this really kind of drove the thinking and the kind of the problem set that they were looking at, that we were looking at when we started researching and developing this monograph. (Yuengert) Yeah—just to add to that, we encourage the students as part of their research, if possible, to write something that could be published to have an impact. Either do it for a client—in this case, we did not enlist a client—or to do it so that it could be published and have some kind of impact. And in this case, I think it will. Host And what you all came up with was American Expeditionary Forces (American Expeditionary Force). What would this look like? (Bruscino) Yeah, so, American Expeditionary Forces: We chose that one because it has historical resonance, right? So, in World War I, it was American Expeditionary Forces (American Expeditionary Force) that General (John J.) Pershing commanded; World War II, it was Allied Expeditionary Forces (Allied Expeditionary Force). And our idea was we’re going to focus on this sort of American and Joint aspect of it, with an idea of if we can get that better, it can become combined down the road and work with allies. And then maybe it would transition to becoming an Allied Expeditionary Force. Either way, that was the idea of it. Now what distinguishes this is that there have been lots of calls for—and there used to be, and sometimes there still kind of are—standing Joint Task Forces. But we felt like that wasn’t quite sufficient. We needed something that was a little more regionally aligned. We needed something that was more flexible and allowed to deal with the sort of the problems that have always gotten in the way of standing Joint Task Forces working. We don’t flesh out the exact examples of what these would look like in this. We talk about sort of what they would look like generally in any sort of combatant command region, the geographic regions where they’d be. But the idea would be, sort of, we do have forces that are regionally aligned already in all of the services or literally in the regions. And the idea was that we would build the (American Expeditionary Force or) AEF headquarters out of the commanders and some key staff out of those to build these sort of standing AEF headquarters. Kind of have to read it to get into the details of what that looks like. We certainly hope people do that. But it doesn’t require as much sort of force generation as standing Joint Task Force headquarters do. So it’s a little bit more flexible. And one of the sort of major innovations in it is kind of a callback to sort of the way we’ve often ended up doing things, which is that the AEF headquarters is run by the AEF commander but not really run by the commander with the staff, but run by the commander with the different component commanders as part of what we call a “command council.” And so we sort of set up a whole bunch of ways that they could operate and they could do the detailed planning in each of the components and that a lot more of the conceptual ideas of how they’re going to operate as a Joint Force allow for better interoperability will happen because the conceptual stuff will be happening among these commanders who are thinking about this sort of bigger picture. And they’re really working together and knowing what their components are specifically able to do. It’s very difficult—and we say this in there—it’s very difficult for even the best, most Joint-educated Army officer or (US) Air Force officer to know how an Air Force wing operates if you’re an Army officer or how an Army corps operates if you’re an Air Force officer. And throw in fleets and (Marine Air-Ground Task Forces or) MAGTFs and all of that, and you can see how confusing it gets. And it’s only going to get more. So when we start bringing in (US) Space Force assets, cyber force assets, we need the people who do that for their business to be able to sort of talk to the commanders and think about how they’re going to work together instead of having a sort of spun-up Army staff become a Joint Staff and try to run these formations. Host How would this concept increase the likelihood of Joint Force interoperability and enable effective maneuver in all domains, including, like you mentioned, operating environments like space and cyberspace? (Yuengert) Well, Stephanie, I think some of the things that Tom talked about and the fact that the AEF would be a standing task force within each combatant command . . . so it would be regionally aligned; it would have the service component commands that are important to that combatant command. So, in (United States Indo-Pacific Command or) INDOPACOM, the (US) Navy staff of that component command is very robust because it’s mostly a Navy headquarters. So they would have those capabilities within the service component command. And the fact that the service components, the people who own the forces, have such a robust staff—they would be able to do, as Tom said, the detailed planning that came into any concepts for an operation that the command council would come up with because those commanders and some key members of their staff would be part of that command council in the first place. And so I think that the standing nature of the AEFs coupled with the opportunity to exercise it during Joint concept development, Joint war games, and experiments would help to solidify that concept of the AEF and the teamwork that those combatant commands and those staffs would have to do. One of the things that is highlighted in the paper is that currently, there is no Joint headquarters that is, in the concept development, there to test out Joint concepts very well. And you take a service headquarters or you throw together a Joint headquarters that doesn’t usually work together to test those concepts, and now you would have a Joint headquarters that was used to working together that could come together. There’s no ad hoc nature to it, which is one of the major problems with the current concept. I think that as we mature and we have space forces that have their own component commands for combatant commands and a cyber force that has some plug into a combatant command staff, we’ll have the expertise in those domains to do the same kind of thing that we’re used to doing in the more traditional domains. (Bruscino) Yeah. To build on that, as it stands right now, when it comes to sort of the warfighting concepts, we try to figure out great-power competition, large-scale combat operations, what those would look like. The individual services are all doing their own concept development, and those are not necessarily aligned as well with the Joint concept. So, being kind of forced together, what’s great about this idea is that there’s good reason for the services to develop their own concepts because the dilemmas in the land domain are different than what’s in the space domain and different than what’s in the air domain, what’s in the maritime domain. And they should develop their own concepts. What this allows is for us to sort of sort and stack, have a better idea to go and exercise those things and work on those things and then say, “Hey, what really fits together and what doesn’t? What should a Joint concept look like that actually has real buy-in from the different services because they’ve worked on it together, and they see the importance of doing it together?” There’s an additional aspect of this, too. To the degree that we test Joint concepts—and we do—to the degree we test them, it’s sort of they’re temporary, kind of ad hoc. Like we say, almost all of this is ad hoc. We describe our Joint warfighting as it’s mostly done with pickup teams. And hey, they’re really good pickup teams. It’s a whole bunch of all-stars. It’s a whole bunch of all-pros, really. Our services are great at what they do, and so we can get by with that. But we could do so much better, especially as competitors get better themselves. And we should always be trying to get better. We could do so much better if we’re working together in these headquarters. And then part of this, too, is that not only do they exercise it together, they’re gonna be the ones who fight it together, if necessary. This is extremely powerful, just on the most basic sense of having already well-developed relationships, standard operating procedures. We allow for room in this; it’s not a very rigid concept that we’ve developed in here. We allow for a lot of room for them to develop their own best practices. And we would imagine those would be tailored to the particular domains. There’s gonna be a different dilemma in INDOPACOM than there is from (United States Central Command or) CENTCOM, than there is for (United States European Command or) EUCOM. That was our sort of major focus on this, and we think it’s very important because it has all kinds of implications that would resonate throughout the force: warfighting and, then, for force development along the way, too. So we think it’s a pretty important one, and we would love if everything we said was adopted. But if we just get people talking about this, about these issues, we’ll be pretty happy. And we give some people some different ammunition to bring to the discussions that are out there because we’re not the first people to think of this stuff. But we were sort of stunned about how many inefficiencies we have in our current system, how much disorganization we’ve had, how much we’ve had to kind of patch these things together and do things on the fly. We think it’s vitally important that, as we look to the future, we get better about how we go about Joint warfighting. And bottom line on this, too, you know: We’re not alone in that issue. We did get guidance signed by all the Joint Chiefs of Staff saying we need to look at dilemmas of Joint warfighting, and that really was a lot of the motivation for doing this, too. So this is our modest contribution to a very, very big problem, and we hope it has some effect. Host Definitely a lot of great food for thought here today. And I just want to thank you both very much for your time. This was very insightful. (Bruscino) Thank you. (Yuengert) Thanks. Host If you’d like to learn more about the American Expeditionary Force, visit press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/953. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, and any other major podcast platform. About the Contributors Colonel Eric Bissonette is a US Air Force pilot assigned to United States Forces Korea as the deputy commander’s executive officer. He holds a bachelor’s degree from the US Air Force Academy and master’s degrees from the Touro University Worldwide, the US Air Force Air Command and Staff College, and the US Army War College. Dr. Thomas Bruscino is an associate professor of history in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the US Army War College. He holds a PhD in military history from Ohio University. He is the author of A Nation Forged in War: How World War II Taught Americans to Get Along (University of Tennessee Press, 2010), Out of Bounds: Transnational Sanctuary in Irregular Warfare (CSI Press, 2006), and numerous book chapters and articles on operational warfare. Colonel Kelvin Mote, a US Army information operations officer assigned to United States Forces Korea, holds a master’s degree in national security from the University of Maryland Global Campus, a master’s degree in strategic studies from the US Army War College, and a doctorate in organizational leadership from Creighton University. Commander Matthew B. Powell is a US Navy submariner who currently serves as the commanding officer of the PCU Iowa. He holds a bachelor’s degree from the Georgia Institute of Technology, a master’s degree in engineering management from Old Dominion University, and a master’s degree in strategic studies from the US Army War College. Colonel Marc J. Sanborn is a US Army engineer officer assigned to the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq at the US consulate in Erbil, Kurdistan Region of Iraq. He holds a bachelor’s degree from the United States Military Academy, a master’s degree in engineering management from the Missouri University of Science and Technology, a master’s degree in civil engineering from the Georgia Institute of Technology, and a doctor of philosophy in structural engineering from the Georgia Institute of Technology. He is a distinguished graduate of the US Army War College and holds a master’s degree in strategic studies. Colonel James “Jimmy” Watts (US Army) is a graduate of the US Army War College and the Carlisle Scholars Program. He is board-certified in cardiovascular medicine and is a fellow of the American College of Cardiology and currently serves as the consultant to the surgeon general for cardiovascular medicine. Professor Louis G. “Lou” Yuengert (colonel, US Army retired) is an associate professor of practice in the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management at the US Army War College, where he specializes in defense management and talent management. He holds a master’s degree in operations research from the Georgia Institute of Technology and a master’s degree in strategic studies from the US Army War College.   show less

This podcast argues the more trauma endured by a population, the more civil war the country will experience in the future. Drawing on mental health, trauma, and neurobiological research, it builds a new theory of civil war that fills existing gaps in current civil-war literature, and then tests the theory via statistical analysis of a large sample size (large-n statistical analysis). The conclusions will help policymakers and US military leadership better understand civil wars and the limits... read more

This podcast argues the more trauma endured by a population, the more civil war the country will experience in the future. Drawing on mental health, trauma, and neurobiological research, it builds a new theory of civil war that fills existing gaps in current civil-war literature, and then tests the theory via statistical analysis of a large sample size (large-n statistical analysis). The conclusions will help policymakers and US military leadership better understand civil wars and the limits of American power to end them. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss3/7/ Episode Transcript: “Linking Trauma to the Prevalence of Civil War” Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Erik W. Goepner, author of “Explaining the Prevalence of Civil War,” which appeared in the autumn 2022 issue of Parameters. Goepner has a PhD in public policy from George Mason University. A retired US Air Force colonel, he currently works as a civil servant in the federal government. Welcome to Decisive Point, Erik. Thank you for being here. (Erik W. Goepner) Hi, Stephanie. It’s nice to be with you. Host Let’s get started. Your article argues the more trauma endured by a population, the more civil war the country will experience in the future. Lay the groundwork for us, please. (Goepner) Sure. The trauma theory kind of has its origins in the experiences and observations of my Provincial Reconstruction Team. We were in southern Afghanistan in 2010—height of the surge, give or take—and the president had said words to the effect of “You have 18 months to get it done.” So we were busy iterating. If we found something that worked, we would do as much of it as we could—kind of channel your Will Ferrell, “more cowbell” here. And if we were doing things that weren’t achieving objectives, we tried to, as dispassionately and quickly as we could, jettison them and just stop doing them. Not long into our deployment, we started to see different evidence that suggested trauma was having a huge, negative impact in Afghanistan and a significant impact on our ability to kind of achieve an enduring peace in the country. We’re in a culture—particularly, with the Pashtuns—where emotional control is like a really big deal. We’d go to shĹŤrās, which are Afghan meetings where they have 20, 30, 40 village elders and government officials, and we’d see men going into hysterics. We would see examples of towns that were firmly under the control of insurgents rise up very briefly; push the insurgents out; and then, just as soon, kind of kowtow and capitulate to the insurgents again. But, perhaps most importantly, we’d see violence used frequently in everyday settings. You know, think of the idea of normalizing the use of violence in your everyday life. So we’d be with a district chief. The district chief would get angry at another official in the public setting, would just smack the official in the head—like, really hard. You’d have middle-aged, field-grade officers in the Afghan police or the Afghan army. And when they would have a dispute, instead of debating it or just maybe flipping each other the bird, they would actually get into a full-blown brawl, you know, right there at the police headquarters. And so that normalization of violence is kind of what got me thinking about this. Then, when I got back from my deployment, I had a chance to do some more focused research. And it turns out that the civil-war literature tends to ignore the threshold at which citizens will use deadly force against each other. And in the case of civil war, when they would use deadly force against their own government, it kind of gets either ignored or it gets treated as a constant, as if it doesn’t change from culture to culture or time versus other times. And despite any headlines that we’re reading, it’s really rare for one human being to take the life of another human being. The military’s done really interesting studies that show that even in combat, warfighters will go to fairly great extents at times to not kill in combat. So they’ll try to make it look like they’re participating, but they’ll take lengths to not actually discharge their weapon or discharge it in the direction of the enemy, hoping not to kill. So if you’re a wannabe rebel leader, you’ve got a lot of problems, obviously. One of the big problems is you need recruits for your rebel movement. But, more importantly, you need recruits who are willing to kill their fellow human beings. You know, very specifically, you need people who are willing to attack their own government, to include their government security force. And that’s not an easy task. So that’s kind of the background of the “hurt people hurt people” trauma theory of civil war. Host You talk about three ways trauma might increase the prevalence of civil war. I’d love to hear more about this. (Goepner) So first and most importantly is how trauma itself may be a cause of civil war. And so the theory in a nutshell is that people become more violent as they’re exposed to severe and repeated traumatic stressors. And if listeners are wondering what a traumatic stressor is, the most notable or most severe would be things like torture or being assaulted with a weapon. Those have really profound, negative impacts on people. So as people are exposed to repeated and severe traumatic stressors, it lowers the threshold at which they’ll use deadly force or which they use violence to kind of achieve their goals or to resolve their problems. And the pathway from the person to the trauma to the increased use of violence will typically go along three different dimensions. One, if you’re heavily traumatized, the likelihood that you’re gonna be a substance abuser increases, the likelihood that you will meet the criteria for one or more mental illnesses increases, and the likelihood that you will suffer from something called “diminished impulse control” also increases. And diminished impulse control: easy example, you drive into work, you get cut off. Somebody with good impulse control doesn’t do anything, or they mutter under their breath. Somebody with diminished impulse control does something really unwise like chases after the person or actually sort of hits their car in response type of thing. And I’d like to share a cool example if I may. Host Absolutely. Please. (Goepner) Alright. So for Doctor Strangelove (Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb) fans, instead of the war room, think of the Afghan Operations Center. It’s the summer of 2010, and you have two Afghan colonels in a heated debate. One is the chief of police for the province, who all the Americans love. And the other is the chief of the (National Directorate of Security or) NDS, which is kind of like legacy KGB. So two Afghan colonels, both in their middle age, having a heated debate. And the colonel that we all loved—it’s worth pointing out that we also assessed that he had a substance abuse problem. He had spent all of his life in a war zone either receiving or meting out war-related trauma. And so he was like self-medicating was our interpretation. But we loved him. He was bold, daring, brave, and low on the corruption scale. So unfortunately, in this exchange, he, the colonel that we loved, is kind of getting skewered by the other colonel. And so, there in the middle of the Afghan Operations Center, the one that we all cared for, Colonel Jelani, kind of got to the end of his rope. And so they’re in front of his subordinates. He removes his firearm, ostensibly because he’s gonna kill the other colonel. And then, thankfully, there was a American officer that was there, and he really bravely stepped in between the two of them. The officer didn’t speak much Pashto. Colonel Jelani didn’t speak much English. But the American was able to use kind of gentle hand gestures and kept repeating, “It’s OK, Colonel Jelani. It’s OK.” And Colonel Jelani eventually holstered his weapon. And so that kind of became like my North Star for the research in terms of what trauma can do to somebody and how it normalizes violence in their life for a variety of reasons. The other two pathways: The traditional arguments for civil war have to do with grievance—like “I’m so angry with my government. I’m gonna take up arms against them.” And then, the other main theory is feasibility: “I’m gonna rebel against my government because I have the ability or the opportunity to do that.” And so trauma helps make those theories more robust. For instance, if somebody’s been heavily traumatized, it’s obvious that they have grievances. And those grievances typically can be focused at a particular person or a particular group. So that’s one argument. And then the second argument regarding feasibility or the opportunity for war is that when you think about a traumatized state like Afghanistan, and you think about how they recruit their security forces, they’re largely pulling from a really traumatized population. So the likelihood of getting an incompetent security force member’s pretty high. And so that makes civil war more feasible because it’s easier for a rebel force to fight against an incompetent security force than a competent one. Host Thank you. How does your paper test the trauma theory of civil war? (Goepner) So we’re gonna kind of geek out a little bit. I spent 23 years in the world’s greatest air force, so I may be a little geek, but I also have a little cool stuff in the history as well. Host I love it. (Goepner) First, I developed a trauma index, and I used four categories of variables. The first category relates to the most pernicious form of trauma, which is torture. The second category measured the amount of rape. Third category was war-related—and, here, we’re looking at like the length of wars; the breadth of wars across the country; and then, the intensity of those wars. And the fourth category of variables was more general forms of trauma, to include things like natural disasters. And so I looked at the universe of countries from 1990 to 2014 and basically assessed scores that could have been as low as zero for essentially no trauma to as high as 100 for, essentially, “you couldn’t have any worse or more trauma in your country if you tried” type of thing. Not hard to imagine, but countries like Finland and Iceland: very low trauma scores. For that 25-year period, their score averaged under five. And then you compare that to the average country, which was about 27, and then you compare that with trauma states like Sudan, Somalia, and Afghanistan, who were all up in the 70s. And so one of the interesting things that the research showed is that when you have a low amount of trauma, the risk of civil war is negligible. It’s almost nonexistent. And that low probability of civil war stays until it dramatically increases as a trauma score approaches around 50. At that point, a country has about a one in 10 chance that year of going into civil war. And then just bumping it up from the 50s into the 60s, that one in 10 chance becomes one in five. And so it’s kind of a parabolic curve where low to moderate amounts of trauma do not seem to be associated with much civil war, but, once that trauma intensifies, you really see a rapid increase in the probability of civil war. Stephanie, I’m gonna hit one more thing there, if that’s OK, on the testing. Host Yes. Please, absolutely. (Goepner) And so, in the actual testing, developed the index; kind of did correlations to show the different numbers and how they related to probability of civil war; and then, really kind of geeked out and did various statistical analysis. And I’m not gonna spend long on this because it doesn’t interest me much, and I can’t imagine it interests your listeners too, too much either. But the first analysis I used was logistic regression with something called “lagged variables.” And, basically, that’s just kind of the industry standard. So if you’re a civil-war researcher, you tend to use logistic regression with lagged variables. And so that’s kind of why I used those. But if you’re looking at what the best or optimal statistical technique is, it would be something called “instrumental variables,” which I also used. And, basically, that helps get rid of the circular argument. It’s obvious, noncontroversial to say that civil war causes a lot of trauma, and, here, I am arguing that trauma causes a lot of civil war. And so it gets very hard to disentangle that relationship, and instrumental variables, in a sense, helps you bypass that because the variable you use is only related to trauma. You can demonstrate that it has no relationship to civil war, and that’s the way to kind of break the circular argument. Host Got it. So in that same vein, talk to me about conclusions. What conclusions can we draw from this study? (Goepner) So five conclusions. The number one, which would be “foot stomp, foot stomp, footstomp,” is that the United States should not intervene in the civil wars of trauma states because countries with high rates of trauma—and Afghanistan would be the poster child—are going to likely experience more civil war because of those high trauma rates because the trauma has institutionalized or normalized the use of violence in daily life. And that use of violence is a critical threshold for rebel leaders when they seek to recruit their rebels. So those countries are susceptible to increased future civil war because that normalization of violence is kind of at the ready and is accessible to rebel leaders. The second one is “OK, if, failing number one, political leaders decide we still need to go in, then let’s estimate and plan for the negative effects of trauma on the host country before we intervene.” We do great planning as military warfighters, and so let’s incorporate that mental health angle, not in a soft kind of helping-agency perspective, but thinking about it from a security perspective. And that’s the third recommendation is that, yes, we all respect and have high empathy for mental illness trauma. But, in this context, we can treat trauma as a security concern because it does appear that trauma will have a certain impact or a certain effect on our ability as we conduct the war to achieve US goals. The fourth conclusion would be to deploy mental health capabilities to the trauma states if we do go there. And this would be directed towards kind of the key government or security force leaders to try and minimize or mitigate the negative consequences of trauma on them. Because when you think of like an Afghanistan or Iraq, we were there in large part to build up those indigenous forces and capabilities, and it’s going to be very difficult to get them to a certain level of performance absent some type of mental health intervention. And then the fifth is more predictive, and it’s the idea of including the trauma index in predictive models. So organizations like the CIA, (Department of Defense or) DoD, Department of State have a history of using predictive models to anticipate flash points across the globe. And my argument in the paper is that if we added the trauma index, that would help to predict potential hot spots—specifically with civil conflict, civil war—that the United States might find itself in in the future. Host I’m sorry—we’re almost out of time here. Can you give us your final thoughts on this topic? (Goepner) So two final thoughts. The first one is going back to recommendation one: The United States should not intervene in the civil wars of high-trauma states. It’s not a guaranteed losing proposition, but it’s really difficult, and there’s only so much that US efforts can achieve when you’re dealing with a population with high trauma rates, and the likelihood that they’re gonna slip back into future civil war is much higher than if they were a low-trauma state. And then the second and final thought is that we need to continue maximizing the use of America’s combat experience. We have 20-plus years of warfighting in different theaters, which has given us a lot of experience. When you think about warfighting, there’s a huge difference between the theory of warfighting. There’s a huge difference even in doing exercises related to warfighting as compared to the actual warfighting. So to the extent that we can get increasing numbers of America’s war veterans to share their stories, and, then, potentially, to combine those operational experiences with additional research and publish, I think America will benefit. Host Thank you for your time today. This was a really tough topic, but it was an absolute pleasure talking with you. (Goepner) Thanks so much, Stephanie. I appreciate it. Host If you enjoyed this episode and want to learn more about the connection between trauma and civil war, check out the article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 52, issue 3. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, and any other major podcast platform.   show less

The skill and capacity of Army cyber forces have grown in the decade since their creation. This podcast focuses on needed structural changes to the Army’s portion of the Cyber Mission Forces that will enable their continued growth and maturity since the Army’s past organizational and structural decisions impose challenges impacting current and future efficiency and effectiveness. This assessment of the current situation highlights the areas military leadership must address to allow the... read more

The skill and capacity of Army cyber forces have grown in the decade since their creation. This podcast focuses on needed structural changes to the Army’s portion of the Cyber Mission Forces that will enable their continued growth and maturity since the Army’s past organizational and structural decisions impose challenges impacting current and future efficiency and effectiveness. This assessment of the current situation highlights the areas military leadership must address to allow the Army’s cyber forces to continue evolving to meet the needs of multi-domain operations. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss3/8/ Episode Transcript: “Assessing the Army’s Cyber Force Structure” Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guest and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the United States government. Decisive Point welcomes from the United States Military Academy Major John Fernandes, Lieutenant Colonel Todd Arnold, and Dr. Jan Kallberg, who coauthored “Assessing the Army’s Cyber Force Structure” with Major Nicholas Starck, Captain Richard Schmel, and Major Charles Suslowics. The article was published in the autumn 2022 issue of Parameters. Welcome to Decisive Point. Your recent Parameters article discusses assessing structural divides in the Army cyberspace force for better support operations. Lay the groundwork for us here and give us some background, please. (John C. Fernandes) Hi, this is John. I guess I’ll get started. So the Cyber branch and the cyber units have been around for about 10 years now. And so, we thought it would be a good time to look at some of the decisions we made initially and see if the decisions were the right ones and at what challenges may have arisen and how we might need to change things as we move forward to make sure that we’re the most effective force that we could be. So that’s the basis of the article. (Todd Arnold) This is Todd. And to add onto what John was saying, really a good time to do that reassessment now because the entire Cyber Mission Force and the Army’s teams have all been operating for the last three years as fully mission capable. So all the teams across all of the different services are now built and working and then doing their missions fully for a few years. And it’s a good point to actually go back and reassess them with “OK, did all those decisions we were making when we were rapidly building the force—do they still make sense?” Host Can you briefly explain the offense/defense split and your considerations for mitigation? (Arnold) Yeah. I’ll start with a little bit on why there’s a split. So when we were initially building up the Cyber branch, it was built kind of piecemeal. Some of the offensive teams started getting built first. And the two previous branches that had been doing a little bit in each of the offensive and defensive work started building units separately. The Army tasked them to build those separately. And nobody was really doing it fully. (Military Intelligence or) MI was doing a little bit in the offensive side, and Signal Corps was doing a little bit in the defensive side. And the Army said, like, “Hey, start building these things up.” And so those two separate branches started building the offensive and defensive teams. And then we formed a branch because we were looking at how the other services were doing it, and we felt like building a branch was really going to get it to the point where we are moving forward, we have a full career path for people dedicated in this space because it’s not good to do it piecemeal. But, at the same time, we already had units established that were building up these teams, and so we just kept those units, one brigade for offense and one for defense, and they just kept rolling with building the teams. And so that’s how it’s played out for the last 10 years. (Jan E. Kallberg) Jan going to join in here, more from a broader perspective. It’s really tricky to get us doing defensive cyber operations and being siloed in that environment without, really, help. Of course, where is the threat intelligence coming from? If you always get your threat intelligence from how you get hit, it’s like a tank that doesn’t know really what’s coming except what’s already in the air. That’s not good. Of course, then, we just wait for the terminal effect. We’re also seeing that how you bridge this overlaps to avoid that you get one-eyed or—worst-case scenario—blind and how you sort of, say, have a proper knowledge and talent management through the force. Host John, did you have anything to add to this one? (Fernandes) Yeah. So I can start talking a little bit about what some of the challenges that then arose from the split. So now that we have this legacy division, we started to form almost silos within offense and defense where people who only saw one side or only saw the other or maybe didn’t understand how the other side works. And there’s benefit in being specialized, but we also noticed that there’s some challenges that come with that: not understanding necessarily what’s feasible, what’s realistic, what the costs are for doing things. And then just, sometimes, the . . . the normal human tendency to see inequity of one side looked like it’s more interesting mission or getting better funding or things like that. We thought that those are some of the challenges we’ve seen over the last couple years with this division. Host Something else you mentioned: divided chains of command—another structural challenge. What are your suggestions for resolving this one? (Arnold) As part of that buildup, the Army deliberately said, “These organizations are gonna run and do the operations, and these organizations are gonna be in charge of just building up and creating and training up the teams.” That was good for the buildup. But now, that’s caused that rift that you mentioned that there’s a split between the people that, like, just maintain administrative and training versus the people that are doing actual operations. And that kind of really takes away from the whole point of command and the way the Army sees command. And so at whatever level the Army decides to do it at, I think we need to reassess that split. And what we should really start doing is like “OK, who is in charge of, say, a CPT or Cyber Protection Team? Who should be in charge of that? What level of command should that be?” And start actually putting those people in charge of the command, giving them a little bit of a staff to take care of some of their administrative things, and actually planning, like, this is how the Army does things. And making the officers and leaders in charge of some of those traditional Army tasks, but within the Cyber branch. (Kallberg) So, yes—Jan here. Now, of course, we . . . we’re talking to the war college. We can’t leave the discussion without the strategic outlook. So we’re also thinking, you know, as things may be more reactive—how we see things, the (observe-orient-decide-act or) OODA loops get shorter, and we have a more mission command driven with intent out there going. And also that we maybe see it’s better to have more cohesion to be able to steer the organization quicker. (Fernandes) So, ultimately, I don’t know if there’s a simple solution for this one because a lot of the things we’re talking about are normal Army principles that we should be applying. We just think that we need to make sure we’re doing it very deliberately now, now that we’ve identified it as a challenge. Making sure we’re keeping unit integrity to the greatest extent possible, that we’re clearly just delineating who has what roles as we talk support relationships, command relationships, and that we are . . . we’re looking at how we deconflict as we have competing requirements. Are we doing deconfliction by time? Are we doing a deconfliction by priority? And making sure that those are very clearly understood because as the branch has grown, we can’t solve those with only five people in a room. We have to have a little bit clearer processes moving forward. (Kallberg) Also, as Colonel Arnold and Major Fernandes hinted—Arnold spelled it out more—I mean, we got data. I mean, we’ve been running this machinery now for 10 years. Why not put these data to use and hone it and make it better? Host So, going forward—give us your recommendations. (Arnold) I think it’s a good time to sit back and have the Cyber branch and leadership reassess some of those previous decisions and start looking at “OK, we made those decisions up-front. Do they still make sense?” And having deliberate, well-thought-out discussions on “Where should we go from here?” For instance, do we start integrating more of the command . . . mission command stuff that the Army traditionally does into the force and how it’s supposed to be done. What is that level of specificity or focus that individuals need in their mission? Should we have people that are a little bit more general? How many people need to be more focused on, like, offensive or defensive? Or what is that right balance between specialization and generality? So we need to make some deliberate decisions here in order to keep moving things forward. Ten years of building up all these forces. It was a very large task, and, now that we’ve got them built up, we need to stop, look at it again, and reassess like “OK, we’ve been operating for a little bit. We have the data. How do we move forward and continue making progress?” (Kallberg) I think it’s also important to think about retention. When things happens in the commercial world, in the corporate world, it only takes one big verdict . . . multimillion-dollar verdict; everybody start to hiring defensive guys. So we also have these outer forces that we can move talent within the organization and be—to use a really 2020 word, agile—and match up the incoming threats. (Fernandes) And I think this is an important point in time to really be thinking about this because the Cyber branch is growing as we incorporate electronic warfare. And the 915th Cyber Warfare Battalion (915th Cyberspace Warfare Battalion), stood up not that long, is growing. So taking the lessons we learned with the 780th (780th Military Intelligence Brigade [Cyber]) and the (Army) Cyber Protection Brigade and making sure that we’re incorporating those lessons as we continue to grow so that we’re growing in the most effective way is important. This idea of “Do we specialize or do we generalize?” As we start talking about another area, electronic warfare becomes more important because we can’t specialize in three things. We have to pick one maybe, or we have to decide that some people are gonna be generalists. And as we expand the branch, we need to really be thinking about these things to make sure that we don’t have to do another look in another 10 years because we missed the mark on something. (Kallberg) And also, if we really specialize, we also are gonna end up with a problem that we can’t ramp up the organization. Of course, people are so specialized that there is no overlap. Remember 1942, when the Army has had to go big. And so to increase this organization, we have to watch, as Major Fernandes says, that balance. Host I hate that we only had this short time because, like you said, Major Fernandes, very timely topic. And your article really does give a lot more details about it. This is a great overview, and I would encourage our listeners—if this is interesting to you at all, check out the article. Thank you so much for your time and for your insight. This was a real treat. (Kallberg) Appreciate it. Thank you. (Arnold) Thank you very much. (Fernandes) Thank you very much. Host If you’d like to learn more about the Army’s cyber force structure and the authors’ suggestions for a path forward, you can find the article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 52, issue 3. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, and any other major podcast platform.   show less

The special operations community could best address the perceived ethical crisis it faces by professionalizing as an institution. While earlier assessments have attributed special operations forces’ ethical issues to a focus on mission accomplishment that led to a broken force generation process and a high operations tempo, such diagnoses obscure a more comprehensive solution. Using sociologist Andrew Abbott’s work on professions as a framework, this article explores the benefits of... read more

The special operations community could best address the perceived ethical crisis it faces by professionalizing as an institution. While earlier assessments have attributed special operations forces’ ethical issues to a focus on mission accomplishment that led to a broken force generation process and a high operations tempo, such diagnoses obscure a more comprehensive solution. Using sociologist Andrew Abbott’s work on professions as a framework, this article explores the benefits of building the kinds of institutions that can claim a jurisdiction, develop and certify expert knowledge, and establish and apply a code of ethics that addresses special operations unique concerns so that it builds trust and better serves the American people. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss3/10/ Episode Transcript: “Professionalizing Special Operations Forces” Stephanie Crider (Host) (Prerecorded Decisive Point intro) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff, author of “Professionalizing Special Operations Forces,” which appeared in the autumn 2022 issue of Parameters. Pfaff is the research professor for strategy, the military profession, and ethics at the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute and is senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. He holds a doctorate in philosophy from Georgetown University. Alright. It’s always nice to chat with you, Tony. Thank you for making time for this today. (C. Anthony Pfaff) My pleasure. Great to be back. Host Let’s cut to the chase. Your article opens with this sentence: “Special operations forces (SOF) appear to be experiencing an ethical crisis.” Diagnose the problem for us, please. (Pfaff) Yeah. This article got its start when I was asked by, actually, a couple of members of the special operations community to weigh in on what they were characterizing as a crisis. And if you recall, in 2020, they were in response to a number of very high-profile ethical failures. Congress, on two occasions, asked special operations to do an ethics review. I’m not going to be able to tell you the extent of the crisis or what its current status is now. But I will tell you, if Congress—who’s, in some way, your client—is asking for reviews, you have a problem. It’s a professional problem because it’s saying your client—in this case, Congress—doesn’t trust you. At least a little bit. And while it’s never all or nothing, that’s just still not a good thing. So in response, in terms of the diagnosis, you know, special operations did do a comprehensive review, which was a good start. It left much of the blame to external factors like a high (operations tempo or) optempo that was leading to breakdowns in leadership. I think it mentioned also training and so on that set conditions for ethical failure. It also pointed out interestingly that . . . and some of the services from there was an emphasis on physical fitness and, I think, specialized skills and, among other things, led to a sense of entitlement among some of the operators that also contributed to ethical failures, which I think is also something important to note. Another part of the problem might be—they didn’t connect the dots all the way, but—special operators start off in another service. And it’s that service that trains them to be special operators. Then they move off into the special operations community and (United States) Special Operations Command, and they may or may not continue to get professionalized in their original service. Special operations just doesn’t have that. I think they’ve got some of that infrastructure, but they don’t have a professionalized career path where officers, (noncommissioned officers or) NCOs, and others get certified, you know, as they progress in the same way the other services do. And so I thought that was kind of interesting, and it suggested to me that there’s really an opportunity here, which is what this article is really about. The idea here is at some level, these problems arise, maybe for the reasons that you’ve said, but there’s a solution to them. If you do the kinds of things that will make special operations more of a profession than what I think it is now, where it is a group of very highly skilled people who basically worked for the other services or the Joint Staff. And so here, it’s important to understand the concept “profession” being applied here. In the vernacular, we use “professions” in a lot of different ways. It can mean I got paid. I’m not using it in that sense. It can mean I’m really good at what I’m doing. Here I’m using the sense in which a profession involves an expertise that gives professionals this exercise over jurisdiction that gives professionals the autonomy to use that expertise. For example, in the medical profession. In the medical professions, their jurisdiction is the health of the client. Their expertise is being able to see to the health of the client. And as a result, they have the autonomy over that jurisdiction to do things like prescribe drugs or conduct surgery that a nonprofessional would not be allowed to do. So this idea of having a jurisdiction around which you exercise your expertise, that you kind of own. You have the autonomy to decide what the right and wrong thing to do is within that jurisdiction. And another ingredient is a code of ethics that sort of governs how you go about doing that because, ultimately, it’s maintaining the trust of the client is critical for that profession’s status. If you do that, if you start building that and building the institutions that can . . . and not only just build that expertise, certify it and others as well as govern, then you’ve got a profession. And my argument would be you’ll see better results. One reason I also thought this was kind of the right way to go was I also looked at what the special operations community themselves were saying about ethics. And that’s when I looked at things like the field guide (A Special Operations Force Ethics Field Guide: 13 Ethical Battle Drills for SOF Leaders). And that’s when I looked at some of the things that I found in blogs and quotes. And you do have a sense where seeing a profession the way I just described it would actually change the way the members would think about things. So, for instance, if you look in the field guide, they frame these dilemmas. The field guide is a set of 13 dilemmas that they navigate, and much of it is very good. Don’t get me wrong. However, from a professional perspective, framing these dilemmas as “right versus right” misses the point. So here’s a good example. One of the dilemmas is your special operations (commanding officer or) CO sees a friend of his stealing thermal sights from the arms room, and they say he now has a dilemma. Turning in his friend will do him harm, and he owes him a special obligation because he saved his life at one point. On the other hand, he’s stealing thermal sights. And so what does he do? This is actually not a dilemma. A pretty different professional perspective: Professions are stewards. They care for the resources that, in this case, for the military, the American people have given them. You turn in the person stealing thermal sights. As a steward of the profession, you turn them in. If that person had a shred of professional identity left, the thief would understand why. Because as a professional, you’re obligated to do these things. So, poof, something that actually may have seemed like a real problem goes away. Now how that impacts behavior, I don’t know. But if you start conceiving yourself as a steward, you’re probably gonna make decisions, and that gets ingrained in your identity because you now have an educating, training, and certification process that builds all that into you. You’re more likely to get people who aren’t going to tolerate these kinds of activities, and that will have good effects down the lane. And the other thing that . . . the kind of thing that came out is this idea that special operators are asked to do something unethical. And then, there’s a confusion when they leave that environment. Well, it shouldn’t be, right, because that goes against my point about the concept of professions. Professionals don’t do unethical things; they do things it would be unethical for nonprofessionals to do. So reconceiving things that way, I think you’ve got a better way of conceiving of special operations in the community, I think you’ve got a better way of thinking about ethical problems. I’m not gonna call them “dilemmas” because a lot of them aren’t. And also, if we look at the jurisdiction piece, there’s an opportunity here. Where does special operations operate? They were designed to operate below the threshold of war. I will tell you that that is largely ungoverned space. For a lot of the things that we do, there’s not a lot of international law. And there’s not a lot of reciprocity. And, for the most part, there’s no one taking responsibility for that in the way a profession would in terms of creating and implementing a coherent way to respond to the problems within that jurisdiction. That’s not exactly an ethical thing. But, again, if you have that, all this other stuff builds around it, and you’ve got now the institutional resources to A: Do good things, but also resolve a lot of the problems you have now. Host So let’s take it a step further. What are your recommendations then for professionalizing special operations forces? (Pfaff) So that’s a great question. The first thing to stress is that this isn’t all or nothing. No one’s recommending that, overnight, we stand up special operations as an independent service now competing with the other services for resources, over things the other service is gonna do. Whatever happens, there’s going to have to be an evolution. And so, what I think this framework does is point in what direction that evolution should go. So what else can they do? Well, A: Let’s start looking, at an institutional level, what it means to have a jurisdiction. What is that thing (special forces or) SF does? One of the challenges for them is gonna be is SF is a pretty diverse group. You’ve got your special operators on the kinetic side or you got your Green Berets, your (US Navy Sea, Air, and Land teams or) SEALs, et cetera; you’ve got civil affairs; you’ve got information operations; you’ve got a lot of things. All these things are invaluable, are things that, you know, have to be brought together to have a coherent effect in conflict below the threshold of war. So let’s own that jurisdiction first. I don’t think they do. I think they they’re a force provider for other people who do that. But let’s own that jurisdiction and start figuring out what that means. And that will mean changes in curriculum at Joint Special Operations University and other institutions. But start figuring out what it means to own that jurisdiction and build that over time. And as you’re doing it, part of building that expertise is understanding how the exercise of your skill within that should be governed. So let’s solve one problem now, which is the concern raised by special operators who have written about this: that they’re being asked to do unethical things. Let’s actually start looking at what SF code of ethics would look like in that environment, under that jurisdiction and start developing that. So now you’ve got a professional identity, and now you’ve got an ethic governing the behavior that they previously saw as unethical. So that’s gonna actually help with your transition to other domains. So that’s a start. And then you build from there, and where you build—that’s gonna depend on what other folks are doing. One thing about this concept of professions is we’re drawing on Andrew Abbott. He sees professions as in competition. So there’s going to be a little bit of that. We also see that competition is kind of healthy. I would argue that that jurisdiction’s underserved. Sure, it’d be great if somebody kind of picked that up. Yes, there’ll be some competition as the different services sort out how they do things. But the point here isn’t this. To claim a jurisdiction doesn’t mean there’s not a role for other services any more than the fact Army claims Landpower is its jurisdiction doesn’t mean there’s not a role, even in high-intensity conflict, for special operations forces. It’s just who’s building the institutional capacity to operate in that environment and exercise expertise in service of the client. And, right now, I would say that’s not happening in that space. And as things evolve, I would work to evolve them in the sense of strengthening the institution to be able to do the things that I discussed earlier regarding governing behavior in that space. Host You note that your recommendations also raise several concerns. Can you talk about those for me? (Pfaff) Sure! I’ve actually kind of previewed it. One way to interpret it—not the way I wanted to interpret it, necessarily—is do we make special operations a separate service? With all the things that brings on, that will really sharpen the competition that could lead to resources being diverted in ways that they really shouldn’t. It actually may be too big a lift right now for special operations forces to get from here to there. I’m not arguing that . . . like I said, none of this is all or nothing. This is more road map than an end state because no profession’s fully professionalized. No profession’s without its bad actors and ethical issues. In order to be fully professionalized, expertise has to continually evolve. The competition never ends. But I could see someone saying these recommendations entail dedication to resources and formal authorities and so on—which, it might in the future. It may in some ways. That’s not the starting point I think you need in order to get to where you want to go. Host Gotcha. Well, your conclusion kind of sums this up with a statement that I really liked, actually. “Divorced from the calling, individuals will have little reason to take the hard right and avoid the easy wrong and certainly little reason to hold themselves accountable for attaining the professional ideal.” Final thoughts? (Pfaff) So my point here is simply that having a professional identity, which only happens when you have a profession, is institutionally deep, makes ethical behavior less of an accident. And without it, you’ll see the kinds of things you’re seeing now where, without that professional identity, other factors, other reasons, other rationales for acting and acting badly make sense. A strong professional identity would make those reasons and factors, et cetera, not make as much sense as well as create a community of people within that profession who see it the same way, making these bad outcomes less likely. Host Well said. Thank you. This was a good time! (Pfaff) Alrighty! Bye bye! Host Bye. If you’d like to dig deeper into the concept of professionalizing special operations forces, you can find the article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 52, issue 3. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, and any other major podcast platform.   show less

The remarkable life of early-twentieth-century British adventurer Gertrude Bell has been well documented through her numerous travel books and biographies. Bell’s role as a grand strategist for the British government in the Middle East during World War I and the postwar period, however, is surprisingly understudied. This monograph offers insights into the role women play as grand strategists. It shows how Bell helped to devise Great Britain’s military strategy in the Middle East during... read more

The remarkable life of early-twentieth-century British adventurer Gertrude Bell has been well documented through her numerous travel books and biographies. Bell’s role as a grand strategist for the British government in the Middle East during World War I and the postwar period, however, is surprisingly understudied. This monograph offers insights into the role women play as grand strategists. It shows how Bell helped to devise Great Britain’s military strategy in the Middle East during World War I and its creation of the modern state of Iraq. Studying Bell as both a military strategist and a grand strategist offers important insights into how she helped to devise British military strategy in the Middle East. These insights include Britain’s efforts to work through secret societies and saboteurs to undermine the Ottoman Empire during the war as part of the Arab Bureau and the country’s attempts to stabilize the region after the war through the creation of the modern state of Iraq. As importantly, studying Bell offers a glimpse into how this extraordinary woman was able to become one of the principal architects of British strategy and the exceptional set of skills and perspectives she brought to these efforts. Bell’s education, firsthand knowledge of the region, fascination with archaeology, and, above all, her ability to make and maintain relationships with key individuals were invaluable tools for shaping and promoting British efforts at retaining influence as a great power in the postwar era as well as Britain’s aims to secure key resources for the empire, including military bases and oil. Ultimately, Bell helped to shape British strategy in the region from 1915–26 because she was a woman, not in spite of it. She had access to both men and women within the local population, she used her social skills to connect and influence key actors in the region, and she brought decades of learning and firsthand experience traveling through the region and speaking with its people to inform and shape her grand strategy. Additionally, Bell’s grand strategy offers important lessons for the challenges of creating peace and stability after war. Britain’s efforts at stability operations in Iraq following World War I demonstrate the inherent tensions in balancing an intervening country’s objectives and priorities with those the intervening country is trying to stabilize—especially, the challenges of creating transitional governments and including the population in stability operations. Bell’s unique legacy offers insights into the roles women have played and continue to play as influencers of grand strategy in male-dominated contexts and the importance of including diverse perspectives in strategic thinking. Read the monograph: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/950/ Episode Transcript: The Grand Strategy of Gertrude Bell: From the Arab Bureau to the Creation of Iraq Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Heather Gregg, author of The Grand Strategy of Gertrude Bell: From the Arab Bureau to the Creation of Iraq, which was published by the US Army War College Press in July 2022. Gregg is a professor at the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute. She’s the author of The Path to Salvation: Religious Violence from the Crusades to Jihad and Building the Nation: Missed Opportunities in Iraq and Afghanistan. Welcome to back to Decisive Point, Heather. (Heather S. Gregg) Great to be here. Thanks so much for having me. Host Oh, absolutely. Let’s talk about your new monograph. Strategic Studies Institute Director Dr. Carol Evans notes in her foreword to your work that “The contributions women have made in devising both military strategy and grand strategy are surprisingly understudied and in need of greater attention.” What a treat to read about Gertrude Bell. Please give our listeners an overview. Who was she? (Gregg) Yeah, so Gertrude Bell was this fascinating woman. She was born in Britain during the Victorian era in the late 1800s. She was born to a wealthy family. She was one of the first women to go to Oxford University. She was the first to get a first class in modern history, and she was fascinated with the Middle East. She started traveling there at a relatively young age. She traveled extensively. She learned the languages. She wrote travel books. She was even an avid hiker and a mountain climber, which is fascinating to me. But it was her language and her experience in the Middle East that got the attention of the British military. And she became very useful to helping devise both British military and grand strategy in the Middle East from World War I through the end of the war to the middle war period. Host When and where did she work, and how and why were her contributions important for British strategy? (Gregg) Yeah, so she became part of a small group known as the Arab Bureau that was stood up in 1915 in Cairo. And she worked with between seven to 14 people, very small group, including T. E. Lawrence that we know as “Lawrence of Arabia.” And she helped devise an unconventional warfare strategy, which was a strategy designed to frustrate and undermine Ottoman authority in the British Empire—I’m sorry, in the Middle East—and on behalf of the British Empire. So she was very instrumental in helping to devise that strategy and work with local leaders. And Lawrence of Arabia became famous because he went out and actually executed the strategy, but she was a part of a small group that formed that strategy. And then, after that, she went to what was known as Mesopotamia at the time—what we now know as Iraq—and she helped devise the military occupation of Iraq after the British government and the British military seized it at the end of World War I. And then, she actually helped create the modern state of Iraq, and that included putting the first king in power in Iraq, who she knew personally and who T. E. Lawrence had worked with. So she had a huge influence on both what happened during the war and then what happened after the war. Host So what were some of the techniques that Bell used to operationalize her strategy? (Gregg) Yeah, so she had a really interesting tool kit that I think shows that being a woman is actually an asset in certain circumstances. So, for example, she was very, very good at building friendships, and she built friendships that lasted a lifetime, both in the Middle East, but also back in Britain. And so one example of this is there was a bit of a fight that broke out between the Cairo office and the office in Delhi about who should control the Middle East. Should it be the government of India, the British government of . . . in India, or should it be Cairo, or should it be London? And Gertrude Bell happened to be lifelong friends with the viceroy at the time, who was who was in India. And she was dispatched to go to India and to smooth over this problem, which she did. So I think that’s a fascinating example of how this relationship she had had for a long time—she was able to work quiet diplomacy, friendship diplomacy, and resolve that problem. She also built lifelong friendships with people in the region, and this included King Faisal (Faisal I), the first king of Iraq. She was his trusted advisor for several years, and he put her in charge of antiquities. And she helped create laws for Iraq that protected their antiquities from Western archaeologists coming in and taking antiquities. So her relationship building was just phenomenal and, I think, very important. The second thing she did which I thought was really interesting was she was very good at throwing parties. And this might sound very superfluous, but it actually isn’t. She threw parties in a strategic way. She would put certain people in the room together so they could talk and meet one another. She was very instrumental in throwing parties for the wives of influential men. So she knew that wives had their husband’s ears, and so she was able to build relationships with those women, and then they, in turn, would help influence their husbands. So she did a lot of very interesting things, not in spite of being a woman, but because she was a woman. And I think that’s really interesting. Host How was Bell able to have such influence and hold the positions she held as a British woman during and after World War I? (Gregg) Yeah, I think this is a really interesting question, and it’s something that I still am not entirely sure I know the answer to. But I think that one of the things that’s very interesting is that it seemed to me that the British government saw her as useful, and that was the priority—that they knew that she had on-the-ground experience. She had language experience; she understood tribal dynamics and key leaders and their relationships to one another. And they saw this as useful. So it’s surprising how little conversation there was about her being a woman and how much that her expertise was valued. I would also say that once again, her friendships were very important. So the fact that she knew T. E. Lawrence mattered. He was at the Arab Bureau first in Cairo. The first director of the Arab Bureau was actually not in the military. He was an academic and archaeologist, and they had also met on a dig, and so she knew him. So I think that was important too. But I think overall, this is a fascinating story about seeing someone as an expert first, and then seeing their gender second. And so that’s very interesting and, I think, important contribution that her legacy has made. Host Let’s talk more about her legacy. What would you say Bell’s legacy is today? What can we learn from her? (Gregg) Yeah, I think there’s just a lot of things that are deeply relevant for today. I’ve already mentioned that, you know, building friendships is incredibly important. A second thing I would add to this is that building the right team matters for creating good strategy. So the Arab Bureau drew from academic experts, from civilians, from military. They would add experts and remove them, depending on the problem that they were looking at. But it wasn’t just the military having a conversation about what to do. They really built a team, a table that included a wide array of voices and perspectives. And I think that was legacy, and I think it’s really important. Another thing that Bell leaves for us today is just how difficult it is to stabilize a country or region in the wake of war. So she had tremendous expertise. Her loyalties were to the British government and to the Crown, and her priorities were not to Iraq per se. But she was a British subject, and her loyalties were to Britain. I think she cared deeply about Iraq, but, still, the decisions that she made and the team made have lasting consequences and, frankly, many of those decisions, in retrospect, were probably not the right ones. And so I think it’s a very humbling story for me about someone with all this expertise and passion for the region, and things still didn’t go well when it came to stabilizing the country. I would say also that she had a real emphasis on working through the local population to shape dynamics. And, again, Bell is a very confusing person to me because she cared deeply about the local population and cared deeply about the region. But then, she would she would pick and choose when she listened to the local population. So when they chose to put King Faisal on the throne, make him the leader of Iraq, he was not Iraqi. He had never been to Iraq. He was the leader that Bell knew and that the British knew, not the Iraqis. And so she didn’t listen, I think, as well as she should have in that instance. But in other places, she did, and she cared deeply about the local population. So I think, yeah, for me, the big lasting takeaway is that stabilizing a state is very, very difficult to do in the wake of war. Host That’s fair. Do you have any final thoughts before we wrap up? (Gregg) Just I’d like to take a moment to thank the press for this opportunity to write about this fascinating woman. This was a (coronavirus disease or) COVID project for me. Gertrude Bell’s letters and documents are all digitized. They sit on the University of Newcastle’s (University of Newcastle upon Tyne’s) website in Britain. They’re excellent. They’re easy to navigate, and it was just a tremendous opportunity to learn about this woman and learn from her. Thank you for this opportunity, Stephanie, to speak with you about Gertrude. And I hope that our listeners will download the manuscript and read it. Host I hope so too. I read it and really enjoyed it. So, well thank you so much for being here. This was a real pleasure. (Gregg) Thank you so much, Stephanie! Host If you enjoyed this podcast and would like to learn more about Gertrude Bell, download the monograph at press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, and any other major podcast platform.   show less

Nuclear weapons have vastly raised the stakes and potential costs of crisis, making leadership and related human qualities of judgment and temperament crucial. This podcast analyzes one exceptionally dangerous US-Soviet confrontation, which barely averted war. Military and policy professionals will see how understanding the perspectives, incentives, and limitations of opponents is important in every conflict—and vital when facing crisis situations like nuclear war.

Read the article:... read more

Nuclear weapons have vastly raised the stakes and potential costs of crisis, making leadership and related human qualities of judgment and temperament crucial. This podcast analyzes one exceptionally dangerous US-Soviet confrontation, which barely averted war. Military and policy professionals will see how understanding the perspectives, incentives, and limitations of opponents is important in every conflict—and vital when facing crisis situations like nuclear war. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss3/11/ Episode Transcript: “The Cuban Missiles Crisis: Miscalculation, Nuclear Risks, and the Human Dimension” Stephanie Crider (Host) (Prerecorded Decisive Point intro) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guest and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Arthur I. Cyr, author of “The Cuban Missile Crisis: Miscalculation, Nuclear Risks, and the Human Dimension,” which was featured in the autumn 2022 issue of Parameters. Cyr has served as the vice president of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and president of the Chicago World Trade Center (World Trade Center Chicago). He taught at the University of Chicago, University of Illinois, Northwestern University, and Carthage College and is the author of After the Cold War: American Foreign Policy, Europe and Asia, published by New York University Press in 2000. Welcome to Decisive Point, Art. I’m glad you’re here. (Arthur I. Cyr) Well, thank you for your kind invitation and for the opportunity to do the article for Parameters. Host Of course. We’re excited to have you. Your article talks about the Cuban missile crisis. Give us some context, please. What makes this crisis distinct from others? (Cyr) It was particularly close—a particularly close call. It was particularly increasingly evident with the passage of years after the October 1962 confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union. It was geographically close. We and our allies had put lots of weapons, including nuclear missiles, in Turkey and Italy, close to the Soviet Union. But this was only 90 miles away from the US, and the communist threat 90 miles away was a major theme in the legendary presidential campaign between John Kennedy and Richard Nixon. Kennedy, in effect, outflanked Nixon on that. Host Will you please briefly walk us through the highlights of the Cuban missile crisis? (Cyr) Yes. Cuba had become an increasingly intense focus in American politics. At the very beginning of the Kennedy administration, uh, the administration stumbled badly with the disastrous and total failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion—CIA effort to land anti-Castro . . . heavily armed anti-Castro exiles at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba and launch an insurgency, which they confidently told the president would be successful. That, it’s clear now, not only fed controversy in the US, but encouraged Nikita Khrushchev to place the missiles in Cuba following a very steady buildup of conventional forces there. Host Let’s talk about some of the lessons learned. Some of these weren’t even evident for years. Can we talk about that? What were they? (Cyr) Yes, indeed. Well, the problem of perception and, especially, misperception of the other side, always a great and perhaps principal challenge in international relations, which is why diplomas . . . diplomacy is such an important and, also, difficult occupation—Cuba, Castro, the US, Kennedy, Soviet Union—that they’re very reckless. Nikita Khrushchev had very different perceptions of what would be accepted and what was possible in international relations. The Americans, interestingly enough, were obsessed with not Cuba, but Berlin, where it was . . . anything that happened in the world, including in Laos and Vietnam—anywhere, literally, was related to Berlin. And, in fact, the evidence is clear that after the announcement of the missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev and associates hoped to use that dramatic change in the strategic landscape to apply new pressure and successfully force the Western allies out of West Berlin, which was another island, metaphorically, surrounded by East Berlin, East Germany, and the heavy and very powerful Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe. I hope that’s clear. But it made the stakes very high. But the basic lesson is how easy it is to misperceive what the other side is planning to do. Nobody around Kennedy, with the single exception of CIA Director John McCone—not a government professional, not an intelligence pro, but a Republican businessman—was brought in to succeed Allen Dulles (who’d been discredited), the longtime head of the CIA and was basically a fall guy for the Kennedy brothers after the Bay of Pigs disaster. With the single and very courageous exception of McCone, the Americans simply persuaded themselves the Soviets would never try to do this. Host How are some of these lessons still relevant today? (Cyr) Well, we still have a nuclear-armed world. I don’t believe. But it’s important to keep in mind what I just said about misperception. I think partly because of the lesson of the Cuban missile crisis and partly because nuclear weapons since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the bombings which finally brought a thankful end to World War II in the Pacific and the surrender of Japan—nuclear weapons are so horrific that they continue to operate as a deterrent on the other side. But, thanks in part to the Cuban missile crisis, we’re no longer so inclined to engage in wishful thinking, I believe, collectively and assume the other side is not going to act. And communication: Kennedy and Khrushchev, to their great credit, established the so-called “hotline,” which was not a cell phone, it was not a landline, it wasn’t even initially a satellite phone, but it was a very complicated telecommunication system, an old-fashioned, big, clunky teletype machine. One was placed in Moscow, and one was placed in Washington. And the two sides were able to communicate much more readily than before. Today, telecom is no longer a problem, but miscommunicating, misunderstanding what the other side is going to do and wants to do is as dangerous as ever. Roberta Wohlstetter (W-O-H-L-S-T-E-T-T-E-R) is the single, I think, most important analyst well worth reading. She did a classic book in 1962—Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision—analyzing and explaining the US intelligence failures regarding the Japanese surprise attack on our naval base on December 7th, 1941. She also did an article for the fine journal Foreign Affairs in 1965, applying the same lessons to the Cuban missile crisis. She’s extraordinarily durable. Host Thank you. Do you have any final thoughts for us before we part ways? (Cyr) We’re very much into quantitative analysis, and hard data and hard information is important in our military (quite rightly) from the start of warfare. But, certainly, the US Army and military services today give a tremendous amount of attention to data analysis. Our military is also quite valuable and fortunate in the sense that leadership is essential in academia, but also in government circles. I do believe—and I don’t think it’s just old age—I do believe that with the end of the Cold War, we’ve become more and more obsessed with what we like to do: analyze data. You see it in all walks of American life, including business. But leadership intuition, the human dimension, has never stopped being important, and it’s more important than ever before. (John F. Kennedy or) JFK looks better all the time. Whatever shortcomings may have been—and, obviously, his ineffectiveness early in his administration—he played a singular and decisive role in holding off nuclear war. The advisers he brought together when we first learned about the missiles in Cuba uniformly wanted to attack Cuba. We know now that there was some sense, especially on the part of Defense Secretary (Robert) McNamara, that the Soviets had some sort of short-range nuclear weapons in Cuba, but they had far more than Americans estimated at the time. And in a moment of insanity, Nikita Khrushchev had quite privately given one . . . his principal commander in Cuba the OK to use nuclear weapons without asking Moscow if the Americans invaded. The Soviet submarine—the B-59 under command of Valentin Savitsky—harassed by US surface ships dropping hand grenades and signaling depth charges, which the Soviets assumed were lethal, trying to force them to the surface, finally did so. American aircraft were busy shooting tracer bullets around the submarine. Savitsky ordered the torpedo tubes open, including one that held an atomic torpedo. He was going to destroy the American flotilla around him. He was gonna destroy his own submarine and launch a nuclear war. Vasily Arkhipov—by good fortune, a Soviet fleet staff officer happened to be on the submarine, and he literally physically prevented Savitsky from carrying out that order. Commander William Morgan, the captain of the US destroyer USS Cory, as described in the article, went out of his way to make sure that by, uh, searchlight signaling, Ensign Gary Slaughter apologized to the Soviets, who were, by that time, standing out on the deck of the surface submarine. We apologized. Commander Morgan brilliantly kept the atmosphere down. He kept telling his men “Let’s keep those Russian bastards happy. Let’s reassure them as much as we can.” Those courageous and very sane gentlemen literally prevented a nuclear war. Kennedy, at the top, crucial US and Soviet military people confronting one another deserve a lot of credit. It was far closer than anyone realized at the time, even though everyone knew it was a dangerous situation. Host I can’t even imagine. Thankful for clear heads, right? Calm demeanor. (Cyr) At that time, yes. More important than ever. And the more we go on after the Cold War without, thank God, a general war, I think the more easy it becomes—especially for intellectuals, I must say, but also some military people—to be very casual about the risks these kinds of weapons involved. I meant one final point without getting too personal. I was working at a supermarket after school and on weekends in October of 1962 in Los Angeles, California, my hometown, which was a prime target area. President Kennedy, the evening of October 22nd, made a public speech readily available on YouTube—and people should watch and listen to it—announcing the not attack, but quarantine, blockade of Cuba. When I showed up for work the next morning, Alexander Supermarket in Hollywood, California, was totally jammed with people. It wasn’t a riot. As far as we could tell, people paid for things. But, for the first time in my life, I really not only saw, but smelled, fear—a very curious, primordial kind of animal sense that arises when people and other creatures are terrified. It was an exhausting experience. It was a tiring, sort of monotonous job. But for the first time at work, I was completely exhausted. At the end, one poor woman—I took her out to an elegant Lincoln Continental. She had two shopping carts full of nothing but bottled water and toilet paper. It was really a very sad as well as scary time. We should all keep it in mind because, thankfully, Americans have not had to experience anything like that since. Very, very close, and don’t believe anyone, especially some professor who uses game theory and abstract conceptualization to argue that it never really was that dangerous. Host Oh, my goodness. Thank you for sharing that story. I appreciate your time so much and your insight. It was such a pleasure talking with you, Art. Thank you. (Cyr) Well, thank you, ma’am. Anytime. I’m always available to Parameters and the US Army War College. Host If you’d like to learn more about leadership and the human dimension as viewed through the Cuban missile crisis, you’ll find the article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 52, issue 3. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, and any other major podcast platform.   show less

Although the People’s Liberation Army is not yet a global expeditionary force on par with the US military, the former has nevertheless significantly expanded its ability to operate abroad. Through enhanced technological capabilities, robust relationships with foreign militaries, increased access to overseas military bases and dual-use facilities, and the implementation of major structural reforms, the People’s Liberation Army has built a more integrated joint force capable of conducting... read more

Although the People’s Liberation Army is not yet a global expeditionary force on par with the US military, the former has nevertheless significantly expanded its ability to operate abroad. Through enhanced technological capabilities, robust relationships with foreign militaries, increased access to overseas military bases and dual-use facilities, and the implementation of major structural reforms, the People’s Liberation Army has built a more integrated joint force capable of conducting a wider and more complex array of missions. This volume advances the understanding of the People’s Liberation Army’s capability to conduct overseas missions by examining China’s military relations with Europe, Africa, and Latin America; the country’s military activities in the Indian Ocean, polar regions, and Pacific Island countries; and the emerging roles of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force and the Joint Logistic Support Force. This volume finds the People’s Liberation Army is engaged in a wide range of activities throughout the world, including port calls, joint exercises, seminars, and personnel exchanges. China sells weapons to some parts of the world and seeks to acquire military and dual-use technology from others. In addition, the People’s Liberation Army seeks to increase its capability to operate in parts of the world, such as the Indian Ocean, Pacific Island countries, and polar regions, where the organization has only had a minimal presence in the past Read the monograph: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/951/   show less

In this episode, Colonel George Shatzer focuses on North Korea and the Kim family regime. He reviews Becoming Kim Jong Un: A Former CIA Officer’s Insights into North Korea’s Enigmatic Young Dictator by Jung H. Pak and Rationality in the North Korean Regime: Understanding the Kims’ Strategy of Provocation by David W. Shin and shows how these books might help readers better understand North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-Un and the implications of his actions for US foreign and military policy in the region. The books also provide insights for strategists attempting to plan for security in East Asia.

Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss3/5/

Claims that China has taken “Russia’s side” in the Ukrainian War oversimplify Sino-Russian relations. Garcia and Modlin contend Sino-Russian relations are a narrow partnership centered on accelerating the emergence of a multipolar order to reduce American hegemony and illustrate this point by tracing the discursive and empirical foundations of the relationship using primary and secondary materials. Furthermore, they highlight how the war has created challenges and opportunities for... read more

Claims that China has taken “Russia’s side” in the Ukrainian War oversimplify Sino-Russian relations. Garcia and Modlin contend Sino-Russian relations are a narrow partnership centered on accelerating the emergence of a multipolar order to reduce American hegemony and illustrate this point by tracing the discursive and empirical foundations of the relationship using primary and secondary materials. Furthermore, they highlight how the war has created challenges and opportunities for China’s other strategic interests, some at the expense of the United States or Russia. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss3/4/ Episode Transcript Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guest and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Zenel Garcia and Dr. Kevin D. Modlin, authors of “Sino-Russian Relations and the War in Ukraine,” which was featured in the autumn 2022 demi-issue of Parameters. Garcia is an associate professor of security studies in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the US Army War College. His research focuses on the intersection of international relations theory, security, and geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific and Eurasia. Modlin is an instructor at Western Kentucky University, where his research interests focus on security studies and international political economy. He holds a PhD in international relations from Florida International University and a master’s degree in economics from Western Kentucky University. He also served as a senior legislative aid for retired congressman Ron Lewis. Welcome to Decisive Point, Zenel and Kevin. I’m really glad you’re here. “Sino-Russian Relations and the War in Ukraine”—please give us some background on this. Where does China weigh in so far? (Zenel Garcia) Thank you, Stephanie, for having us. There’s a couple of things in the background that are important to know. Right now, China’s position towards the conflict in Ukraine, the war in Ukraine is complicated by the fact that it simultaneously wants to maintain a stable relation with the Russian Federation. It sees the Russian Federation as a key partner in a possible, emerging, multipolar order. And at the same time, it kind of needs Russia to continue to play a security guarantor role in Central Asia in particular. This is very important for China because, historically, having negative relations with Russia would usually undermine stability along China’s frontiers. So, on that side, right, it has every incentive in the world for the moment to not place itself diametrically opposed to Russia. At the same time, China’s trying to portray an image of being a responsible stakeholder in the international system, being a champion of sovereignty and territorial integrity in the international system, and it’s basically avoiding having to call Russia’s actions an act of aggression. So you can see that this connect there kind of places China in a very difficult position. Host Thank you, Zenel. Kevin? (Kevin D. Modlin) As part of this emphasis on the multipolar order, what we’re seeing is that it includes elements of agreement and disagreement throughout all that. That’s not uncommon in any state relation dynamic. But it seems that their articulation of multipolar orders emphasizes their autonomy in operations, that there’s not as much coordination behind that. Host Your article talks about Sino-Russian relations and promoting a multipolar order, as you just mentioned. Can you expand on that piece for us a bit? (Garcia) Sure. China and Russia have had a pretty rough relationship throughout the twentieth century. They went from the Russian Empire having been one of the countries that the Chinese government . . . the Republic of China before the (People’s Republic of China or) PRC was founded had identified the Russian Empire as one of the culprits of unequal treaties that had basically carved up Chinese territory during the nineteenth century. You fast forward and the Russian Revolution, you know, creates a (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or) USSR. But the Republic of China then begins to try to negotiate some of these treaties over time. Most of this goes into the sidelines as China’s kind of falling apart through civil war. But once you have the PRC formed, one of the things that was supposed to be a very positive development for the PRC was that it had established a close relationship with Russia, the Soviet Union, and that this actually translated into one of the largest technological transfers of the twenty-first century from the Soviet Union to China. And it doesn’t even last a decade before the two countries end up in a Sino-Soviet split, fighting skirmishes along the borders. All of this results in thousands of incursions, according to Chinese sources, by Russian-backed militias into Chinese western frontiers. And so, they don’t have a very positive relationship. Most of this gets settled, however, through a rapprochement of sort during the late 1980s. And by the 1990s, they were able to solve the majority of their territorial disputes. And it is here . . . that relatively positive process of settling the border, where you have the Chinese and the Russian leaders articulate that their aims are to play a role in the emergence of a new, multipolar order. Why do they want this? Because from their perspective, the unipolar moment is inherently detrimental to their interests. In other words, the United States can act as it wishes without necessarily having to take their interest into account. And if you’re sitting in Beijing and Moscow, of course, this is not a positive development. (Modlin) Going forward from that point, these relations continue. So they’re articulating a similar sense of an order. In contesting that sense, they’ve built somewhat of a foundation. We see this through the Shanghai Cooperative Organisation (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) and their interactions. So it has some substance to it at this point—that this is both the path they’re choosing and accepting with each other. But it involves this flexibility as well. So it’s a very different framework from us in the US when we think about relations and agreements—that they seem to usually embed some type of obligations to each other, and these are much more restrained. So there are agreements, but they usually entail less commitments to each other. Host What challenges and opportunities does the Russian-Ukrainian war pose for China? (Garcia) I think the biggest problem that China’s facing right now is that the Russians committed themselves to a conflict, and nobody expected them to perform this poorly. My guess is that if the Russians have been successful in all of their original aims, even if the Chinese would have had some trepidations about the spillover second- and third-order effects across the world, at bare minimum, the Russians can at least be seen as having played a key role in demonstrating their capability as a capable pole in the international order. Their poor performance here kind of makes it difficult for the Chinese because they can’t see Russia unilaterally fail because, if it fails, then who else is left to play this other role in a multipolar order? India could potentially fill that role. But the Chinese and Indians don’t necessarily get along. They have their own territorial disputes to deal with. The EU is certainly a big actor for the Chinese, mainly as a trade partner, but they’re dedicating a lot of resources to try to make sure that the EU is autonomous from American foreign policy because it . . . fundamentally, they don’t think it is, in a sense that the United States and its NATO allies, they don’t necessarily see everything eye to eye. But when push comes to shove, in this case of Ukraine, there’s a sense of greater unity. And so if Russia’s not playing this role of a pole, then that’s a significant challenge. They cannot see Russia inherently lose everything in this conflict. That’s probably the number-one challenge that they have along with, of course, that this conflict is a very clear act of aggression. There’s no way that you could paint this in any other way. And the Chinese are refusing to make the argument that this is in fact an act of aggression. They’re basically calling on all sides to kind of play a constructive role in settling the disputes. We clearly know who started this conflict. And so that kind of undermines China’s long-standing position of being a champion of sovereignty and territorial integrity. That’s not a good look because this is something they’ve tried to promote. As far back as Mao (Zedong), this is one of the key foreign policy principles. Host Conclusions and implications. What do we need to know? (Modlin) Building from this point, I think it presents an opportunity for us to think about a framework of relations among states that have some interactions, but not the degree of interactions that we anticipate. And by “interactions,” I’m emphasizing the aspect of commitments. Some countries are willing to incur cost to help other countries in the system, and this is a mutually beneficial aspect to an agreement. But they also involve costs, and we have not seen that element in the relations between Russia and China, so they’re avoiding long-standing commitments to each other, especially when it entails security risks. So how does that look conceptually? I think it’s going to be a really important way to organize our thinking going forward in Russia-China relations. Because again, we come to the table making assumptions of relations that are a little more different than what we’re seeing here. So they could still articulate this idea and rally other followers in this concept. And from our experience watching the relations among NATO, we would say, “Oh, well, there’s commitments that are following here. And it’s possible that that could evolve at some point, but, as history suggests and as Zenel outlined, there is not a pattern of that at this point. Again, it’s coming back to these concepts that I think will help us organize in a slightly different way so that both we’re realistic in what’s going on between Russia and China and we’re not overly pessimistic or optimistic. So it’s both the lens of realism and constructivism. (Garcia) I wanted to add on to Kevin because I think that nuance is very important. We hope that the article brings that out. This notion that, well, what we’re hearing China say sounds very pro-Moscow. Therefore, they basically have already thrown their lot entirely with Moscow. But when you actually begin to unpack “What is it that they’re doing,” it doesn’t look that way. Because the Chinese have other interests. In other words, they’re navigating a very different strategic environment than we are, right? Our expectation is “Look, this is a clear act of aggression. These are the things that we are trying to do to compel the Russians to change their behavior. So, get onboard or you’re clearly not onboard. Clearly, you’re on the opposite side.” And I’m not entirely sure that that kind of approach really works in an international order that is becoming more multipolar—meaning if you were still in the Cold War, where there’s two clear camps, so to speak, foreign policy can definitely look a bit more binary—very black and white I meant in regards. I’m not saying that’s also positive, but that’s what it looked like. It’s a little bit more different now, and you definitely see this play out in the global south. And I think this is one of the important takeaways, in my view, for American policymakers, which is: Number one, we already have other kinds of interests and conflicts with China as it is. And so, we actually need to understand how the Chinese are viewing these particular problems, even if we don’t necessarily like how they respond to them. Because that helps us design policy towards China and elsewhere more effectively if we’re actually able to see the problem more clearly. And so, if we can obviously see that there’s a lot of discursive agreement between Moscow and Beijing, but that, in practice, they’re both trying to avoid serious commitments to each other—especially security commitments, as Kevin was outlining—then that means that there’s always room there to negotiate. There’s always room there to kind of shape behavior. That’s one of the things that we concluded with. We actually do have a relatively successful history of shaping Chinese behavior. The problem is that we assume that if they don’t entirely take up our preferred position on an issue automatically, that’s a loss. And I don’t think that’s necessarily true. If you’re able to kind of keep moving the needle forward over time, then I would call that a successful approach to shaping another country’s behavior, especially if they’re becoming more relevant in the international system. The fact that you still have that kind of influence to shape Chinese behavior means quite a lot. So it’s not necessarily doomsday, so to speak. There’s room there for us to improve things. Host Do you have any final thoughts or anything that you would like to address before we go? (Modlin) One additional aspect that I think is going to mold this dynamic between Russia and China, that’s just as consequential as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, is the shifting economic outlook for China. So this is going to have them less outwardly focused. They seem to be much more inward in consumption production and policy focus. And so, this is gonna make a big deal for China’s economic growth and how this projects influence. So we may have a situation where both China and Russia are articulating this idea of multipolarity in this decade, but maybe not in as strong a position relative to last decade. I think an outstanding question that we do not know the answer to is “Will that mean that they will coordinate more, or will they coordinate less in that type of a scenario?” This is, of course, speculative. (Garcia) And to kind of back Kevin on this, too, all foreign policy starts domestically. And if you’re looking at what’s going on in China right now, you have the 22nd party congress (20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party), which should be coming up in October. We know for a fact Xi Jinping’s gonna go up for a third term. But China is having significant economic issues that it needs to deal with. So it’s not entirely falling apart, as some people will try to assess. But China does have a lot of economic issues. It has a banking issue, it has a real estate issue, it has a regulatory problem that it’s slowly trying to mature. And so all of these are major policy things that are gonna cause significant domestic pain for the party. And they really haven’t encountered this level of discomfort economically since the late 1990s, when they were trying to reform the state-owned enterprise system that produced about 50 million unemployed people in China—all of this so they could accede to the (World Trade Organization or) WTO. They’re definitely trying to grapple with a lot of domestic pain from the economic spillover of the conflict of their own policies domestically and, of course, the global supply chain issues that are affecting the global economy today. So all of that to say, “That actually allows us to have a greater role in shaping Chinese behavior.” Why? Because their corporations are not exposed to the Russian economy the same way. The Sino-Russian trade is minimal. But their companies are extremely exposed to American and European markets, and they want that access. That’s what keeps the machine going, so to speak. That’s an area where you could definitely negotiate, and you could definitely try to establish a better working relationship. I highly doubt that we’re gonna skip into the sunset and kumbaya, so to speak. But you can’t ignore that China exists and that it is a great power. Therefore, you’re gonna have to figure out a working relationship with them in the twenty-first century. (Modlin) And we may be seeing elements of that right now with the Biden administration revisiting tariffs and sanctions on China. And we’re expecting discussions between Xi and Biden. This is in the context of China not committing as much to Russia as we had anticipated. So maybe there is this opening as a result of that arrangement. I don’t know if anyone would have expected that these trade negotiations may be accelerated as fast if there hadn’t been the context of the war in Ukraine. Host What a pleasure. Thank you, gentlemen, for your time and your insight. Also, thank you for your contribution to Parameters. (Garcia) Thank you, Stephanie. (Modlin) Thank you very much. Host Listeners, if you’d like to learn more about the war in Ukraine and China’s role or lack of it, check out the article. You can find it at press.armywarcollege.edu. Look for volume 52, issue three. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, and any other major podcast platform.   show less

Since achieving victory in World War II, the United States military has a less than enviable combat record in irregular warfare. Through a detailed historical analysis, this article provides perspective on where past decisions and doctrines have led to defeat and where they may have succeeded if given more time or executed differently. In doing so, it provides lessons for future Army engagements and argues that until America becomes proficient in irregular warfare, our enemies will continue... read more

Since achieving victory in World War II, the United States military has a less than enviable combat record in irregular warfare. Through a detailed historical analysis, this article provides perspective on where past decisions and doctrines have led to defeat and where they may have succeeded if given more time or executed differently. In doing so, it provides lessons for future Army engagements and argues that until America becomes proficient in irregular warfare, our enemies will continue to fight us at the lower levels of the spectrum of conflict, where they have a good chance of exhausting our will to fight. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss3/3/ Episode Transcript: “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars” Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guest and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Dr. John Nagl, author of “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars,” which was featured in the autumn 2022 issue of Parameters. Nagl is an associate professor of warfighting studies at the US Army War College. He is author of Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice. Welcome to Decisive Point, John. Thank you for being here. (John Nagl) It’s terrific to be here, Stephanie. Thanks for having me. Host Let’s talk about “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars.” You note in your article that since achieving victory in World War II, the United States military has a less-than-enviable combat record. Ouch. Give us a brief overview of where past decisions and doctrines have led to defeat. (Nagl) Yeah, I think “ouch” is the right word. And, of course, I love the Army dearly and care about the well-being of the nation. I’ve seen what happens when wars go badly. It’s very painful to write that, but it’s intended to be tough love for an organization that really matters. And for the most important country in the world, I might add. What I argue in the article is that the United States government is one, three, and one in our nation’s wars, and I’ll go through them quickly. Korea (the Korean War), the first war after World War II, where the United States was decisive and won decisively: Korea ended in an armistice. The important lesson for that, I think, is the United States was unprepared for conventional combat in Korea. It was unprepared to be the global hegemon that the international order yearns for and so desperately needs. And we learned from that. We created a state of readiness. The 2nd Infantry Division in Korea’s motto is “Fight tonight,” and they’re ready. And that readiness for combat—for conventional combat—is something that the American Army, I think, can be enormously proud of. But, since Korea, with Vietnam (the Vietnam War); the first Iraq war (the Persian Gulf War); Afghanistan (the Afghanistan War); and the second Iraq war (the Iraq War), Operation Iraqi Freedom, our record is decidedly not as good. We are, I would argue, one and three in those wars, with (Operation) Desert Storm being a clear win, but Vietnam and Afghanistan being decisive losses, and the second Iraq war, the current Iraq war—it’s still too soon to tell, but it’s hard to put it in the win column. So I looked for—as I thought about the combat record of the United States military since World War II, I tried hard to isolate what it was that led to that less-than-enviable combat record. That’s really the point of the article. Is there something in common with the wars that we don’t do well in that provides lessons for the Army as it thinks to the future? Host Let’s unpack that a little bit. What, in your opinion, was the biggest misstep? (Nagl) After the Korean War misstep of being unprepared for combat full stop, the United States decided to focus on a particular kind of war. And this argument draws very heavily from the late Russell Weigley. He wrote a book called The American Way of War (The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy), which argues that since the United States became capable of conventional combat—conventional great-power war, according to the standards of the day—that is the kind of war for which it has chosen to prepare. And that worked well for the United States—and the United States Army, in particular—in the First World War, in World War II, after initial readiness problems in the Korean War and in (Operation) Desert Storm. But there is another kind of war: irregular war—an ironic name because the world has seen much more irregular war than it has seen so-called regular war over the course of human history. Irregular war is called the war of the weak, war of the flea. It’s a war in which the opponents of a great power choose to fight in ways that minimize the advantages of the great power and maximize the advantages of the lesser power in particular—generally, greater staying power for the lesser power. And the United States has chosen not to prepare for that kind of war. I give the Army in particular something of a break on that prior to Vietnam (the Vietnam War). And I argue in my doctoral dissertation—became the book Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife—that the Army learned and got better over the course of the Vietnam War at counterinsurgency, a particular type of irregular war. So I give the Army sort of half marks for that. But in the wake of the Vietnam War, the United States turned away from irregular war, decided those were bad wars, wars that we weren’t gonna fight anymore. And, unfortunately, the enemy gets a vote. And the real crux of my argument is that no sane opponent of the United States, having seen the extraordinary conventional capability of the United States military, would choose to fight that tooth to tooth, nail to nail. Our enemies are going to choose ways to try to achieve their political objectives without confronting the full might of the American military. That’s what the Viet Cong and, largely, the North Vietnamese did during the Vietnam War to our dismay. It’s also the path that . . . after the initial reasonably successful invasions, efforts to topple the government of Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq after those conflicts, our opponents chose to fight us in an irregular manner. And that presents a whole series of challenges for the United States military for which we are not optimized. And that may be okay because the cost of losing one of those wars is far, far less than losing a conventional, great-power-versus-great-power war. But it’s still not good. And so I argue, certainly with passion, and I hope with some degree of resonance that the United States military—an enormous organization, the most powerful organization on the face of the Earth—ought to be able to walk and chew gum at the same time, ought to be able to deter conventional war and, at the same time, increase its ability for irregular wars’ capability, its capacity, its understanding of irregular war so that we present our enemies with no chinks in our armors, no Achilles’ heel, and no place to take us on where their chances of success are any kind of good at all. Host Where could we have succeeded if given more time, or maybe if things were executed differently? (Nagl) Counterfactuals are always difficult, of course. I’m a big fan of a man named Lewis Sorley who goes by Bob, a retired Army lieutenant colonel, student of the Vietnam War, and biographer of Creighton Abrams, who believes that a choice as simple as one that the President Lyndon Johnson confronted when he was choosing the commander in Vietnam as that war heated up, as we moved toward full engagement in the Vietnam War, when he chose General (William) Westmoreland rather than General Abrams as the commander—Bob argues that a choice as simple as that might have made a difference in the Vietnam War, in an extraordinarily costly war. Bob has studied Vietnam (the Vietnam War) more extensively than I have. He served in it. I’m not willing to argue with him. I do think there are a number of points during the Vietnam War which we could have made choices that would have rendered that campaign more successful. The bitter irony is that by the end of the war, under Creighton Abrams, we had achieved what looked like success in these irregular wars—that is, a host-nation security force that is able to confront the forces that oppose it with some degree of American support—in particular, American airpower—and that combining and Joint force of host-nation security forces, American airpower, American advisers on the ground can guarantee the survival of the government against any conceivable enemy. We had actually reached that point by the end of the Vietnam War. But it didn’t matter. The American people had lost faith in the war. For some reason, it’s connected to the war; for other reasons, connected to the Nixon administration. And so we ended that advisory effort, and unbelievable suffering resulted in Vietnam, but also in Cambodia next door, as a result of our failures to learn and adapt rapidly enough to the demands of counterinsurgency in Vietnam. Therefore, recent counterinsurgency campaigns—there’s a whole lot we could have done. We could have prepared better for that part of the spectrum of conflict, we could have created host-nation security advisory forces earlier than we did, both in Iraq and in Afghanistan. But that begs even earlier questions, right? We could have not invaded Iraq in March of 2003, which was not just the critical error in Iraq in Operation Iraqi Freedom, but it was also the critical failure for the Operation Enduring Freedom, the war in Afghanistan. The United States didn’t have the capacity to fully resource extensive counterinsurgency campaigns both in Iraq and in Afghanistan at the same time, or at least chose not to mobilize the nation to fight both of those wars at once. And so, the critical mistake, I think, for both the Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom was choosing to invade Iraq in March of 2003—an Iraq that had nothing to do with the attacks of September 11th; an Iraq that did not have any significant (weapon of mass destruction or) WMD capability; an Iraq that was an important counterweight to Iran—our greatest threat, our greatest rival in the region. And so, as I noted in the article, Tom Ricks, student of the war in Iraq, argues in the first line of his book Fiasco (Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003 to 2005), the American invasion of Iraq in March 2003 may well be the most profligate act in American history. It was an unforced error. It was a war of art. Richard Haass of the Council on Foreign Relations compares (Operation) Desert Storm—my first war—and Operation Iraqi Freedom—my second war—with the book titled, War of Necessity, War of Choice (War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars). It’s even more damning to make mistakes in a war of choice because we chose when it was going to happen. We chose the hour it was going to happen. We had the opportunity to walk away from that war. We chose not to, and, again, huge suffering in Iraq, but, also, unbelievable and continuing suffering both in Iraq and in Afghanistan as a result of that misguided decision to invade. And then, a whole lot of subsequent mistakes were made as well. Host How can we avoid things like this going forward? Do you have any suggestions? (Nagl) The obvious answer is to be more careful about the wars in which we choose to engage. This is a super-important lesson. And, to be fair, the Army and significant parts of the Department of Defense leaned in hard against the invasion of Iraq in March of 2003. Lieutenant General Greg Newbold, the J3 on the Joint Staff, pushed back hard on Secretary (Donald) Rumsfeld’s war plans for the invasion. General Eric Shinseki, the chief of staff of the Army, argued convincingly in congressional testimony that it would take far more troops to pacify Iraq after invasion than it would have, and did, to topple the government there. The military expertise was present, but it was not listened to. And so part of the story here is that civilian leaders elected by the American people may make choices that are not to the benefit of the American nation. So voting matters. Those choices really, really matter. But also, there are civil-military questions here. That is, we have to ensure that our elected leaders value the military judgment of those who are chosen to advise them. But also, the military doesn’t get to decide what wars it fights. And so, in particular, in Parameters, in an article directed at the strategic leadership of the US military and, particularly, the strategic leadership of the US Army, this article is a plea not to do what we did after Vietnam (the Vietnam War), not to step away from really hard learned lessons in counterinsurgency and irregular warfare, but hold onto those lessons, hold onto the force structure. The advisory force structure, the combat adviser units that we built way too late in these wars, 15 years into these wars, but that we have finally built and that will help us to remember will help us to build a doctrine for, will help us to understand that success in these wars ultimately depends upon building host-nation security forces that can pick up the ball and carry it with fairly minimal American and allied assistance. So there are responsibilities for the military, regardless of the decisions our civilian leadership makes, that can make these wars less likely, less costly, and make it more likely that America is going to achieve its long-term strategic objectives in this kind of war. Host Before we go, do you have any final thoughts? (Nagl) aI’ve had the privilege of serving in uniform in two of our nation’s wars and Operation Desert Storm as a tank platoon leader and in Operation Iraqi Freedom as an armor major in a tank battalion task force. So, I’ve seen both conventional combat and irregular war, and I understand deep in my soul why the American military wants to prepare for the first of those wars, wants to prepare for (Operation) Desert Storm, and doesn’t want to prepare for irregular warfare. As we saw in Vietnam, the later stages of Iraq (the Iraq War) after Saddam was toppled, and the later stages of Afghanistan (the Afghanistan War), I understand why it makes those choices and wants to make those choices. But, for the well-being of the Army and of the nation, it is absolutely essential that we dig deep and look very honestly at our failings as a military; also, at the American government and mistakes that led to these hugely costly and, in many ways, counterproductive wars. And we gather those lessons and learn from those lessons. We look hard at ourselves in the mirror and ask ourselves “What have we shown the world about how to attack the United States?” And we need to repair our armor and prepare ourselves for anything the world throws at us because the cost of not doing that is paid for in the blood of our sons and daughters. This is as important as it gets. Host Thank you so much for sharing your insight. Like you noted, an important topic indeed. (Nagl) Thanks. Thanks, Stephanie. It’s a privilege to work with your team, and I hope we do it a whole lot more in years to come. Host If you’d like to take a deeper look at “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars,” check out the latest issue of Parameters at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 52, issue three. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, and any other major podcast platform. Author information: Dr. John A. Nagl is an associate professor of warfighting studies in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the US Army War College. He is the author of Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice (Penguin Books, 2014).   show less

The military profession needs to be redefined by examination of its expertise and jurisdictions of practice, whereas previously the focus was on securing its professional identity. Twenty years ago, the original Future of the Army Profession research project responded to growing concerns among officers that the Army was no longer a profession in light of the post–Cold War drawdown and the onset of global operations including Iraq and Afghanistan. Today, the profession faces recurrent... read more

The military profession needs to be redefined by examination of its expertise and jurisdictions of practice, whereas previously the focus was on securing its professional identity. Twenty years ago, the original Future of the Army Profession research project responded to growing concerns among officers that the Army was no longer a profession in light of the post–Cold War drawdown and the onset of global operations including Iraq and Afghanistan. Today, the profession faces recurrent challenges raised by the changing character of war, the renewal of great-power competition, crises surrounding issues of sexual harassment and assault, the effects of a major global pandemic and associated social and political unrest, and the growing societal distrust toward professions in general. Richard Lacquement and Thomas Galvin propose that the questions of professional identity, while still important, are now less salient than those about the professions’ jurisdictions of practice and domains of expert knowledge. Clarifying them will help better prepare US military professionals to exercise discretionary judgment effectively. They also propose a new Future of the US Military Profession research effort that addresses these jurisdictions across service, joint, and defense enterprises to clarify the divisions of professional work and responsibilities. This is a must-read for any steward of the military profession. Read the monograph: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/945/ Episode Transcript: “Framing the Future of the US Military Profession” Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes, Dr. Richard Lacquement and Dr. Thomas P. Galvin, authors of Framing the Future of the US Military Profession, published by the US Army War College Press in January 2022. Lacquement is a research professor at the (US Army) War College Strategic Studies Institute, and Galvin is an associate professor at the (US) Army War College. Welcome to Decisive Point, Richard and Tom. I hear your piece won the Madigan award at the (US) Army War College. Congratulations! That’s really exciting. (Richard Lacquement) Thank you. (Thomas Galvin) Thank you. Host I’m really glad to have you here today. Let’s talk about your monograph. This piece builds on previous work. Give our listeners some background and tell us about the original project from 2002 and 2005, please. (Lacquement) Sure. I want to shout out to one of our former professors here at the (US) Army War College, Dr. Don Snider, who had also worked at West Point (Academy) for many years, who was the lead of what was called the “Future of the Army Profession project.” It ended up with two edited volumes that came out in 2002 (first edition) and then in 2005. And I had been fortunate to join a group: probably about two to three dozen scholars who all worked on different elements of what is the US Army profession, partly dealing with the post-Cold War challenges coming out of the 90s and right about the time we went into what became the Global War on Terror (war on terrorism). And I had been part of that project, and, looking back on it with Don Snider a few years ago, we thought it could use an update based on . . . it’s been over 15 years, and—oh, by the way though, the project was focused on the US Army—our sense was that it really applied to the entire US military; we wanted to broaden the scope to do that. So, once I got the chance to go on sabbatical, I sort of took that as my sabbatical project to help build it out and recruited Tom. I’m a political scientist, and then Tom worked in our Department of Command, Leadership, and Management and studied the sociology more. And I really needed that perspective on how to understand the evolution and how professions are understood and studied to help flesh out how we would apply that going on 15 to 20 years after the Future Army Profession project, which had used a cortex by Andrew Abbott out of the University of Chicago. That’s very solid but couldn’t do everything we would like it to do as we thought about the whole profession. Host Thanks, Richard. Tom? (Galvin) I came into the project at Richard’s invitation because I had done some work in studying Abbott and also other related works in organization theory, management science. So that’s the lens that I’m coming into this. There were some . . . what I had always felt were some gaps in the previous work. The previous work is absolutely fantastic in terms of laying out a way of thinking about expert knowledge and how the professions compete, but there were some other things that were not as robustly represented, such as how do the various parts of the military collaborate? Because, at the same time we’re competing, we’re also collaborating. And there was, uh, opportunities to bring in a wider sociological framework to think about the totality of how the military serves as a profession, serves as an organization, and help address some of the emerging problems and challenges that the military faces today. Host What gaps does your work seek to fill? (Lacquement) So I wanted to identify a few things that we were trying to get at. Tom just talked about some of the literature and how to frame it. But, more importantly, I think in terms of what are the challenges to the US military profession in the United States today? Part of it was the evolution of things that had happened over the last 15 to 20 years—particularly, some of the technological changes bringing in domains of cyberspace and sort of maturity or for the way our understanding of how space affects military operations—how that’s matured. Challenges in terms of actual strategic performance. Looking at events in Afghanistan and Iraq, Syria and Libya, and unsatisfying strategic outcomes to say the least in what we could do to better articulate what the military should have known better. What should we learn from that, and how do we understand what the expertise of the military is and how that’s evolved because of the changing character of war and the changing international environment? And how to do a better job at sort of, again, expanding from just the Army to the entire US military, but looking at those particularly daunting challenges in the changing character of war, changing strategic context, and also some of the societal demands—diversity, equity, inclusion, gender roles, for example—and how those have evolved. And what does that mean for the military profession going forward? (Galvin) I would add that a gap is that the previous work had focused heavily on the operational aspects of the military profession—you know, the expertise in fighting and winning wars—much less on the institutional side. And there’s a lot of important professional work that’s done in terms of running and resourcing the military that hasn’t been as appreciated. There’s also some elements from the research agenda that the 2005 project left, such as, “Should there be a joint profession?” Well, I think, 15 years later, we’re in a better position to answer those kinds of questions. And so, we want to look at not just the services, but also what is the role and function of the Joint layer? What about defense agencies? How does the existence, the growth of those entities put pressure on the services? On the Army as a profession? And I also believe an important gap, getting back to the point about collaboration, is about how professions . . . we do a lot of boundary spanning. So, we have the Army as a profession, but we also have different communities of practice, which handles certain requirements that the military needs to be able to sustain itself or to be able to perform its mission that cross professional boundaries, such as resource management; such as the special operations community; such as the special professions of military doctors, military lawyers, military chaplains. Those, I think, deserve a treatment because they are a very, very important part of the profession, but their role has not really been explored as much as it could be. Host The monograph maps a way forward to three practical outcomes. Will you please briefly explain them for our listeners? (Lacquement) Sure. If I were to put a gloss on all three of them, it’s what I described sometimes being kind of an owner’s manual of how to understand the military. My sense is that the word “military” is a pretty big and amorphous one that is misunderstood by many. Either there’s an assumption about a very narrow view of maybe just battle or combat or a very broad one, which gets to that three-million-person organization, the Department of Defense, and everything it does, which goes way beyond just battle and combat. So articulating sort of what it is that the US military does do. What is its expertise? What expertise is kind of unique to the military as well as ones it shares with other professions or other segments of society? So, helping US citizens and members of the military understand what is the military and who are military professionals. Secondly is civilian leaders—particularly, the ones in the federal government or the government, meaning legislative as well as executive branch. And, really, at the state and national level, to sort of help them understand what that expertise is, what the profession does. And so, since they’re the ones who ultimately put it to use, civilians decide how to use it, helping those leaders understand what it does and how to use it. And then, also, the flip side of that for the military leaders: that they understand how to be good stewards of the profession, which includes helping civilians understand what we do. But I think a lot of it is we tend to internally and externally be very vague about or have common misunderstandings about precisely what we do or should do or what we think we should do and to be open to the fact that this evolves over time and that that’s a negotiation between civilian and military leaders and the military and society as a whole. To clarify what we do for the country. Host What are the objectives you hope this will accomplish? (Lacquement) Well, I think that first off is to get people talking about this, we’ve been expanding the circle. I think Don Snider did a wonderful job. And his group expanded within the Army, and there are some touchpoints with folks beyond the Army. But I sense that those principles and, though he scoped it to the Army, this principle certainly apply well beyond. We’ve talked to some folks in the Air Force, Navy communities, and trying to expand that discussion, partly thinking this framework is a strong one that should be used more broadly to understand how we really respond to things that change. So, you mentioned gaps earlier, but, frankly, one of the main things that drives this is this is a living profession, and the needs that the profession, you know, meets evolve over time. And so a lot of this is just a renewal, but I think also extending the way that Don Snider and others helped us talk about the Army profession so that we socialized that more broadly. So an edited volume probably is the concrete product within the next couple years that we would like to see with a lot of contributors. But, really, to generate more importantly, you know—try to shift the conversation a bit onto these terms of professions and their communities of practice in understanding the expertise in jurisdictions that we perform for American society. (Galvin) Yeah, I would add that this is an opportunity to really get more in depth about what stewardship really means because that means a lot of things to a lot of people. One of the things that I think we as a profession overlook is the responsibility to maintain and make useful our domains of expert knowledge. We don’t spend as much time doing that. We spend a lot more time trying to turn the crank at the bureaucratic machine. What does it mean to be a steward? Is it worth further exploring? Because it tends towards the skewing towards particular functions of maintaining the norms and values of the organization, but not as much about, say, some of the professional responsibilities that Abbott cites in his work. Another main outcome of this, we hope, is that, uh, we will sustain and strengthen society’s trust in the military profession. Now for some time, the military has been cited as one of the most trusted of institutions within the United States. It’s still one of the most trusted, but those trust numbers are declining, and some of it is not necessarily what the military is doing. But it also was reflective of changes that have happened, say, in the past few years. And so, there’s always room to do some introspection and think about what it is that we as a military profession should be doing better, especially given the pressures that we anticipate coming in terms of increasing budgetary pressures about what we’re going to be able to do and increasing demands for using the military in ways that may be outside of what we consider to be our professional jurisdictions. It’s a conversation that needs to continue. It’s time to renew that conversation, and it’s time to do another inward look. See what it is that we are doing well, not doing well, what we should be doing better. Host Final thoughts before we go? (Lacquement) I was thinking if I were gonna shelve this somewhere, you know, in a bookstore or library, where would I stick it? And I’d probably put it on the shelf for American civil-military relations . . . is that, although we’re talking about professions, it sounds maybe a little bit esoteric and sort of inward looking and just about what the military profession is. Ultimately, the most important contribution I we’ll contribute to—I don’t think we solved the issue—is trying to support healthy civil-military relations, which really starts with clarity about how we understand. I mean, if there’s broad assumptions about you, we will serve civilians. That is an American foundational principle: that civilians are in charge. But the civilians mean leaders in the executive branch, Congress, and society more broadly; all the American people. And being able to help both members of the military—understand that servant role and how the leaders are stewards of that profession on behalf of American society—requires that we be, I think, clearer about how we articulate that, how we understand and discuss. Because the military can’t just declare, “This is what we do.” We have to negotiate that this is how we serve society, and society, civilians, decide. And so, I think that element of capturing it, pulling it all together, this is important to, I think, healthier civil-military relations through better understanding of roles and responsibilities. (Galvin) And I would say that we’re titling this Framing the Future of the US Military Profession, but a very sizable chunk of the work that we’ve already done and the work that we will continue to do in this applies to any military in a democratic society. Just because it’s labeled as for the US military profession . . . I think that the monograph that we’ve written and the project that we’re undertaking—there’s a lot of room for how this can be useful for other militaries or militaries of other nations. Host What a treat to talk with you today. Thank you so much for sharing your time, sharing your insight. (Lacquement) Thank you. I enjoyed it. (Galvin) Same here. Host If you’d like to dig a litter deeper into this topic, you can find this publication at publications.armywarcollege.edu. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, or any other major podcasting platform.   show less

Strategic leaders must possess a range of skills to work successfully in complex environments. To use those skills to best effect, they rely on character traits that enhance the likelihood of their effectiveness as leaders and maximize their success when working in teams. Certain character traits facilitate work in demanding settings that rely heavily on communication, integration, and cooperation. Programs designed to educate senior leaders must help future national security professionals... read more

Strategic leaders must possess a range of skills to work successfully in complex environments. To use those skills to best effect, they rely on character traits that enhance the likelihood of their effectiveness as leaders and maximize their success when working in teams. Certain character traits facilitate work in demanding settings that rely heavily on communication, integration, and cooperation. Programs designed to educate senior leaders must help future national security professionals identify these character traits and then practice and hone them. Highlighting individuals with challenging roles in World War II, this podcast analyzes the character traits that enabled them to succeed in their work. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss2/14/ Episode Transcript: Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Tami Davis Biddle, author of “Character Traits Strategic Leaders Need,” which was featured in the Parameters summer 2022 issue. Biddle retired as the Elihu Root chair of military studies at the US Army War College, where she’s now a distinguished fellow. She’s written extensively on military history, airpower, and strategy. The author of Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare (2002), she is currently writing Taking Command: The United States in the Second World War for Oxford University Press. Welcome to Decisive Point, Tami, I’m really glad you’re here. (Tami Davis Biddle) I’m delighted to be here, Stephanie. Thank you. Host Let’s talk about your article. You open with a statement that might not occur to many people. Security professionals engage in activities that are intensely analytical, but also intensely human. Students of strategy, therefore, must develop an understanding of decision making and its pathologies and must comprehend the role of cognitive psychology in that process. What does this look like in real life? (Biddle) This comes out of my experience and teaching for a long time and teaching war college-level students for two decades. And I realized that they have an opportunity at . . . especially at the beginning of the year to stop and really do some intentional thinking about how they process information and about how they think and how they articulate ideas. And one of the things that I think is terribly important is for them to understand the background influences on their thinking; the institutional influences on them; even the influences of other individuals, mentors, family the way that they’ve been brought up to see the world and the way that their experiences have shaped their perception of the world. Because if they can understand that, they’re in a much better position to think clearly, to think analytically, and to understand where their biases or their predilections or their . . . even their prejudices might be influencing the way that they think about the world and therefore interfering, potentially, with strategic thinking and strategic decisions or analytical thinking. So I felt it was really important to start students off with a emphasis on greater self-awareness and greater self-awareness about the process of thought and discussion. Understanding those and being able to be aware of those is super important, I think, for students and for helping them to understand how to interact with others and how to do the best possible strategic thinking that gets them sometimes out of their own heads and enables them to see the perspectives of others and develop empathy and to not simply be prisoners to their own biases or their own predilections. Host There are so many rich examples in your article. Let’s hit some of the highlights. (Biddle) Sure. Host Who’s Harry Hopkins? And what qualities did he exemplify? (Biddle) Oh, Harry Hopkins is such an interesting character. He was the leading adviser, the closest adviser, and the most trusted adviser to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR). They met in 1928 during, basically, FDR’s campaign for the governor of New York, and then they worked together pretty much consistently from that time onward. And of course, when FDR became president, it was in the height of the Great Depression, and the most important thing to do, or he felt that he had to do, was to improve the lives of Americans. To help people who were destitute, who didn’t have work, to try to find useful work to restore their pride, to get the economy back up and on its feet and going again, and to help Americans just basically regain their self-confidence. And Harry Hopkins was, it turned out, exactly the right man to do that. He thought like the president. He had been basically a social worker. He went to Grinnell College, he came to New York City, he saw people who were struggling on the Lower East Side of Manhattan. He became committed to helping them, and then, when the financial crisis occurred, he had some experience. So he was in a perfect position to help the president understand how to move forward. He became head of the Works Progress Administration and was crucially important in that role, and, also, this was kind of a first for the country. Really, the idea that a state has responsibility for its citizens was still pretty new in the 1920s and 1930s, but it’s an idea that FDR promoted and believed in deeply, and Harry Hopkins shared that belief. And so, they were a great team and they worked together on the New Deal. They tried to restore American confidence and American dignity for working people. And then, when (Adolf) Hitler became the chancellor and then became increasingly powerful in Germany, and then when the Second World War began in Europe, they worked together as a team once more. And they were working in a realm that was fairly new to Hopkins. In particular, he didn’t start out as a foreign policy analyst, but one of his great strengths was to learn quickly and to know exactly what is most important. And he recognized the crisis facing the world because of Hitler and because of fascism was the most important issue. And he helped FDR keep that uppermost, and then he became a tremendous . . . basically, communicator for FDR. Because the president had polio and because he had limited mobility, he couldn’t often go and do the things that a modern president who has full mobility can do. So Harry Hopkins became the eyes and ears and the arms and the legs of FDR. And he went and met with very important people. He met with (Winston) Churchill early on in January of 1941. This was right after—obviously, Britain had been fighting alone in 1940, and Britain was in pretty desperate straits. The US wasn’t in the war yet, and we were trying to figure out ways—at least, FDR was—trying to figure out ways to help the British. And Hopkins ended up playing a really crucial role in that—figuring out, first of all, that Britain was in fact going to stay in the fight. Essentially, when FDR sent Hopkins over to Britain in 1941, early in ‘41, it was to find out if Britain was going to manage, if Britain was going to be able to stay in the fight, because many Americans like Joseph Kennedy were saying, “No, Britain’s gonna be overrun” or “Britain’s gonna make a deal.” And so, the first thing that Hopkins had to ascertain was is Churchill going to keep this country together? Is it going to keep it fighting? And if we send them materiel, will they be able to use it in the long run? And Hopkins determined that, in fact, Churchill was going to stay in the fight. Britain was going to stay in the fight. And yes, if we sent materiel and became essentially the arsenal of democracy, that Britain would survive. And this became kind of the keystone of this tremendous alliance between the British and the Americans in the Second World War. So, in a way, he was discerning, like we’ve lately been discerning if Ukraine was going to survive and stay in the fight, and whether it was worth our sending materials and support or whether it would just be taken up by the Russians after a short fight. But, in fact, Churchill and Hawkins formed a very tight bond, and one of the things that Churchill appreciated so much about Hopkins was that he stayed focused on the key issues. He knew what was salient, he knew what was most important, he didn’t waste time. He went right to the key issues, and he figured out how to move forward on those key issues. When I was evaluating my students, one of the things that I was often looking for was a sense of their ability to discern what is most important. Can they separate the wheat from the chaff? Can they really zero in on what’s key and what’s crucial and move forward and bring others on board and keep them focused on what is most important? And Hopkins did that in spades, and he did it over and over and over again. He traveled with FDR, he went to all the major international conferences and helped the president keep everyone on track. Even when there were huge differences, Harry Hopkins found a way to get people to agree and to simply create good outcomes through determination and through, I think, a certain optimism that he shared with the president. The president had a confidence that was, oh, just winning and contagious, and this is why I think he was such a successful president in the Depression, when people were feeling so ill at ease and so anxious and so demoralized. He lifted them up, and Harry Hopkins was able to do that too. He brought this optimism—focused optimism to all the tasks that he undertook. Host You also speak specifically about some of FDR’s qualities. (Biddle) Yeah. Host Can you expand on them here? (Biddle) Well, I talked a little bit about that infectious optimism that he had. And that made him a winning personality, a successful politician. and I think if you just have charisma, if you come into a room and you sort of own it, you have a huge advantage politically. And FDR had that. He had this kind of sparkling quality to his personality. But you have to have more than that. You have to have an imagination to think up initiatives, an instinct for what’s going to work, and then a degree of shrewdness in the political world to be able to see it through—to make sure that you’ve got the right people in place to push it forward, the right words to articulate it so that you can sell it to the people who need to understand it and then implement it. And I think FDR had this combination of real optimism and charisma and leadership ability—but, also, political instincts and shrewdness and a sense of what needed to be done to take an idea to reality. So, for instance, I talked a little bit about, recently, Hopkins and providing weaponry. FDR conceived of what became the Lend-Lease Plan (Lend-Lease Act) of 1941, which gave aid to our allies—particularly Britain early on, but then, after the Soviets were attacked by Germany, also to the Soviet Union. And Lend-Lease became an incredibly important instrument of victory in the Second World War. But it was largely the president’s idea. He conceived it, basically, on a fishing trip after the 1940 election. So he had the imagination to come up with it, but then he had to have the shrewdness and the political skill to figure out how to get it passed through Congress, which was no easy trick, and then how to persuade the British that we would in fact provide this aid and that we would be reliable partners and we were going to make a big investment and make sacrifices ourselves to help them. And this was Lend-Lease, and it was just crucially important to the war effort, prior to the American entry after Pearl Harbor. And you know, that’s just one example of the way that FDR was able to combine a huge creative imagination with the practical skill of being a politician; has to work with Congress, has to work with interest groups, has to persuade people, and has to set up bureaucratic administration to make things actually happen. Host You write about Dwight Eisenhower as well. What qualities of character did he bring to the hard choices of World War II? (Biddle) Many. Eisenhower intrigues me. You know, he’s got this sort of baby face, and he’s . . . he’s got this kind of charisma in a way that FDR had. He had an ease with people, and he had a sort of instinctive and apparent leadership quality that made him stand out. So when he walked into a room, you had a sense there was a real presence there and an important person. He was also attentive to scholarship, to learning, to knowledge. He had a real interest in history, an interest in people, in how they think and how they behave. He also, I think, had great integrity. He was a man who understood the important roles that he held for the country when he held them, and he wanted to do his best. He wanted to put his best foot forward at all times. He wanted to give as much of himself as he possibly could. And he also had a great sense of balance—even though, like all people who, I think, are great leaders, he had an ego. He had a strong sense of himself, but he also had balance. So, when he was working, for instance, with his allies, he understood that even though they weren’t going to agree with him all the time, that finding common ground was terribly important, and he could set his own ego aside to find ways to go forward. And, again, I think Hopkins could do this, FDR could do this, all of them could do it—to find destinations . . . sort of strategic ends that they were seeking and, in order to get there, could work with other people and could find ways of compromising, accommodating different cultures, accommodating different perspectives, and still keeping their eye on the ball and moving forward to the destination while not being so brittle as to insist that it had to be done “my way,” which I think is terribly important. I read a letter that Eisenhower wrote to (George) Patton early in World War II. It probably was 1942, but he was basically saying, “Look, you’ve got to get over your tendency to think that the Brits don’t know what they’re doing or that they’re not doing it your way or that they are inferior. They’re not. They are very capable. What you have to do is respect them. Recognize this, and move forward in a strong sense of alliance and relationship.” And it was actually a very forceful and, in some ways, a fierce letter because he was mad at Patton. Patton had basically upset Anglo-American relations, and Eisenhower was mad. But he wrote this in such a way that it was a magical wording where he was forceful and yet he never humiliated Patton. He brought him onboard, and he was very forceful, and he was very directive. But he did not humiliate him. And I think that’s sometimes a fine line to walk, but it’s terribly important when you’re dealing with subordinates and when you’re trying to get people to work with you. Host That’s a great point. Unfortunately, we have to end it here. Thanks for your time today; this was a real pleasure. Listeners, if you would like to explore even more about the qualities of character that strategists need, visit https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/. Look for volume 52, issue 2. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, or any other major podcasting platform. Author information: Tami Davis Biddle retired as the Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies at the US Army War College, where she is now a Distinguished Fellow. She has written extensively on military history, airpower, and strategy. The author of Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare (2002), she is currently writing Taking Command: The United States in the Second World War for Oxford University Press.   show less

Distilling lessons from the author’s book, The Media Offensive: How the Press and Public Opinion Shaped Allied Strategy during World War II, this podcast provides applicable suggestions for the US military today. As in World War II, the press is both a weapon and a possible vulnerability in modern warfare.

Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss2/15/

Episode Transcript

Stephanie Crider (Host)

Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College... read more

Distilling lessons from the author’s book, The Media Offensive: How the Press and Public Opinion Shaped Allied Strategy during World War II, this podcast provides applicable suggestions for the US military today. As in World War II, the press is both a weapon and a possible vulnerability in modern warfare. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss2/15/ Episode Transcript Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. The guests in speaking order on this episode are: (Guest 1: Alexander G. Lovelace) Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Alexander G. Lovelace, author of “Tomorrow’s Wars and the Media,” which was featured in the summer 2022 issue of Parameters. Lovelace is a scholar-in-residence at the Contemporary History Institute of Ohio University. His first book, The Media Offensive: How the Press and Public Opinion Shaped Allied Strategy during World War II, is being published by the University Press of Kansas in 2022. (Host) It’s great to have you on Decisive Point, Alex. Thanks for making time for us. (Lovelace) Thank you for having me. (Host) Let’s jump right in. Your essay offers practical suggestions for how the press can be used by public affairs officers, commanders, and policymakers to achieve victory in coming conflicts. You say these lessons are applicable for today’s wars, even when they’re fought on TikTok. So give us some historical context. How did we get here? (Lovelace) The Second World War was a media war for two big reasons. The first one is that all sides really tried to harness the media as a weapon during that conflict. This really came out of the philosophical and technological mindset of total war. There’s a real philosophical shift where warfare is suddenly not so much something you do to the enemy army, but also has to involve the enemy population. That grows from the French Revolution up to World War II, and it’s accompanied also by a technological shift. Warfare is becoming much more deadly, particularly for civilians. At the same time, the media is also part of this change. You have technology such as telegraphs and photography which has a military use but also has a civilian use and a media use for civilian press. So by World War II, which is the first total war, at least the first one that is openly fought as such, the media is going to play a big role in that. So that’s one reason. The second reason is even as commanders are trying to use the media as a weapon, they’re also being susceptible to it influencing their decisions on the battlefield. You have these two things: the media as a weapon and the media being used by commanders, influencing commanders’ decisions, and it creates a model of military-media relations which survives total war. We haven’t fought many total wars lately, but, in the era of limited war, the media is still a big factor. Vietnam becomes a television war, and there’s a big debate over how much that influences. But you see this throughout the war on terror (war on terrorism) and up to the current conflict in Ukraine, which some commentators have called a TikTok war because a lot of Americans and a lot of news is being shared on the latest information-sharing platform. (Host) Can you explain in a little bit more detail how the news influences commanders’ battlefield decisions? (Lovelace) The news really influences commanders’ decisions in, I would say, three big ways. The first one is maybe the most obvious to Hollywood. It’s the general who’s media-obsessed, wants publicity, wants to make a name for himself, and that’s probably a little less common than one would suppose, but it does happen. The second way that commanders use the press is to create political support for a policy or their theater or campaign. And the third type of influence the press can extract from a commander is more insidious, and that is the commander doesn’t really know it’s happening, or he’s letting it happen because he thinks he has to. (Host) Today’s media is different from the press of, let’s say, World War II. And you say that’s OK. How so? (Lovelace) I would say there’s two main factors. The first is methodology. The press during World War II is often seen as somewhat more subservient or respectful of authority. Many reporters and news organizations today see themselves as international companies, not necessarily American companies. Exxon’s a massive, worldwide company. CNN is too, so there’s that shift when it comes to methodology. The second real difference is technology. Today you have 24-hour cable news. You now have a plethora of blogs and Internet sites. The media is very different. I think one way technology really changes how news is reported was the onset of television where editors and paper owners and media company stockholders have a lot less influence when it comes to the editorial opinions of, say, anchormen. Suddenly, Walter Cronkite has a lot more editorial freedom than he might have had if he was just writing for a newspaper and having to get his stories past editors. So that’s one of the big changes. That’s even more different than today; there’s many different news sites, and they tend to be more focused towards specific audiences. There’s a very interesting study the RAND Corporation put out a couple years ago that talked about the focus of how news is becoming more focused towards select groups. However, one of the big things is that the problems are different, but a lot of the issues are not. One of the big myths of the Second World War is that the press was kind of a lapdog of the government or the military, America was all united, and that wasn’t true at all. There was an opposition press to the Roosevelt administration before and leading up to the entry of the United States into World War II. That doesn’t go away. A lot of military journalists were also free to question the military. I mean, there was censorship, but censorship was not used to prevent criticism. The press wasn’t necessarily always promilitary during the war. Another thing is that commanders during World War II were also dealing with new technology. They were dealing with radio. They were dealing with newsreels. They were dealing with magazines that dealt with photographs, and they had to learn to adapt to this kind of new technology. Likewise, the speed of news increases during the war. (Host) Talk to me about the press as a weapon and TikTok wars. (Lovelace) Well, during World War II, the US military tried to use the press as a weapon in several ways. First, they understood that a democracy at war had to have an informed public. They did a lot to encourage reporters. They have accreditation. They do have censorship, but it does tend to be of a fairly mild variety. So an informed population is one. An informed soldiery is another. A lot of commanders believe American soldiers fight better, particularly when it’s a draft Army, when they know what they’re fighting for. So there’s also a big effort to get news to soldiers. Some commanders, George Patton is one, also tried to get news of ordinary soldiers back to hometown papers and to praise subordinates in the press in a big way. And the Army near the end of the war eventually catches on and begins institutionalizing that. And there’s some attempts to use the press for deception during D-Day. It’s funny to see how the final announcement is worded: “Landing has begun on the northern coast of France.” Well, what does that mean? There’s another way that the press is used and that is to not necessarily always give good news. By 1943, George Marshall and others in the military are worried that the American people are going to take the war for granted—that it’s already been won and we can sort of slack off. And Marshall and the Pentagon begin trying to make sure that bad news isn’t hidden. Mid-1943, they begin releasing pictures of dead American servicemen to show that the war’s still pretty serious. Now, that’s World War II. Let’s talk about TikTok. TikTok is, first of all, not a social media app. There’s not a whole lot that is social about it. It’s an information-sharing platform. Now, the information might be goofy videos, but it also can be news, and some of it, I would argue, is somewhat sinister. And I would say that for three reasons. Last September in 2021, the schools across the United States were hit by something called a TikTok challenge called ”devious licks,” in which the challenge was to vandalize your school’s bathroom or steal something and then videotape yourself doing this on TikTok. I couldn’t find any estimates of how much damage this caused. It must have been well within the millions of dollars. There were many arrests of children. It shows just how powerful this app is, and it’s powerful for a number of reasons. How it works is it’s trying to figure out what you like so you can go on and you see these short little videos. And if you linger on one, TikTok knows it. It will try to feed you more videos like that. Out of professional obligation, I opened TikTok for an hour. I decided I was going to try to see how fast I could get on stuff with Ukraine. It opens up, you see a goofy video. You see another goofy video. I found something with gas prices, I lingered there. I found something else on gas prices, I lingered there. 15 to 20 minutes in, I was getting all Ukraine stuff. One of the things this algorithm does is that it also tends to be addictive. You’re seeing things you like in a way that is flashing at you, kind of like a (Las) Vegas slot machine. So it’s really hard to get off. And, finally, TikTok is a company that is run by a regime which is fairly hostile to the United States. And I don’t think that it was any accident that the third or fourth video I found on Ukraine was also the Chinese foreign minister explaining the Chinese position on the war. To tell you the truth, I’m concerned about TikTok. It may be a little too late to ban it. I think it’s harmful in ways that go well beyond armed conflict. But it is something that policymakers and military commanders are going to have to be aware of. It also has been used in a good way in Ukraine. President (Volodymyr) Zelensky has used it incredibly well to rally international support and promote the legitimacy of his cause, and I don’t think this war would be the same without it. So that’s a good thing. At the same time, the next war may not be the same situation. (Host) You offer several suggestions, though. What can US military officers and policymakers do to prepare for tomorrow’s media war? (Lovelace) First, I think policymakers and officers need to understand that media is going to be used as a weapon, and they are susceptible to having their own decisions influenced by media pressure. I would say one of the best things you can do is try to understand how the media has worked in the past and how the media works today. One of the things I do in this article is talk about how things that seem like they are public opinion actually are not. Twitter is a great example of this. A lot of times, you’ll see news articles saying Twitter blew up over, I don’t know, Johnny Depp or something like that, and you’ll read it and you’ll just see a bunch of Twitter posts from people you’ve never heard of. And that’s the news story. It’s just what some people said on Twitter. That’s something, and it lends to elite policymakers, such as if a US senator or a US president is on Twitter—that’s going to make news, and that’s going to influence other news outlets. But at the same time, just because a lot of loud people on Twitter does not necessarily represent public opinion, commanders need to basically train themselves that they probably have a better understanding of what is happening on the ground. They have to make judgments based on the best military training and just sometimes ignore public opinion. I do not want anyone to walk away thinking that wars are won in the media. Wars are won on the battlefield and through violence. The media is just one area of what commanders have to deal with. And I guess one final lesson to take away is for commanders to try to take time to create good relations with reporters and news outlets. I think the military actually doesn’t do such a bad job of that these days, and I think it’s well worth the time. (Host) Thank you, Alex. This was a really good time. (Lovelace) Thank you so much, Stephanie. (Host) Listeners, if you’d like to dive deeper into this topic, the author offers interesting insights and examples in the article. You can read it at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 52, issue 2. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, or any other major podcasting platform. Author information: Dr. Alexander G. Lovelace is a scholar in residence at the Contemporary History Institute of Ohio University. His first book, The Media Offensive: How the Press and Public Opinion Shaped Allied Strategy during World War II, is being published by the University Press of Kansas in 2022.   show less

This podcast discusses drone swarms, which can be used at sea, on land, in the air, and even in space, are fundamentally information-dependent weapons. No study to date has examined drone swarms in the context of information warfare writ large. This article explores the dependence of these swarms on information and the resultant connections with areas of information warfare—electronic, cyber, space, and psychological—drawing on open-source research and qualitative reasoning. Overall, the... read more

This podcast discusses drone swarms, which can be used at sea, on land, in the air, and even in space, are fundamentally information-dependent weapons. No study to date has examined drone swarms in the context of information warfare writ large. This article explores the dependence of these swarms on information and the resultant connections with areas of information warfare—electronic, cyber, space, and psychological—drawing on open-source research and qualitative reasoning. Overall, the article offers insights into how this important emerging technology fits into the broader defense ecosystem and outlines practical approaches to strengthening related information warfare capabilities. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss2/13/ Episode Transcript Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guest, and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. (Guest 1: Zachary Kallenborn) (Host) Decisive Point welcomes Zachary Kallenborn, author of “InfoSwarms: Drone Swarms and Information Warfare,” which was featured in the summer 2022 issue of Parameters. Kallenborn is a policy fellow at the Schar School of Policy and Government, a research affiliate of the Unconventional Weapons and Technology program at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism), a senior consultant at ABS Group, and a self-proclaimed US Army “mad scientist.” He is the author of publications on autonomous weapons, drone swarms, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction. Zach, I’m glad you’re here. Thanks for making time to chat with me today. (Kallenborn) Thanks for having me. (Host) Your article explores the dependence of drone swarms on information and the resultant connections with areas of information warfare—electronic, cyber, space, and psychological warfare—drawing on open-source research and qualitative reasoning. Put this in context for us, please. (Kallenborn) The context of the discussion is looking at drone swarms—a rapidly emerging technology that numerous states are developing. Obviously got the big players—China, Russia, the United States are all developing this technology. But even smaller powers, like South Africa. And this technology is even already being used in combat. We saw just last year that Israel used a drone swarm in combat in the fight against Gaza. Now, before jumping into these sort of larger issues of information warfare, it’s important to understand briefly what we mean by “drone swarm” here. We’re not necessarily talking about simply large numbers of drones used en masse, which is often how the term is used within media, but really what we’re talking about is drones that have some level of communication and coordination between them so that they’re operating effectively as a singular unit instead of, say, 10, 15 individual drones. Now, what that means is there’s potentially a range of capability within that. Because if we’re talking about simply coordination and communication at the basic level, that’s a pretty simple thing. So in the case of like the Israel example, likely all they’re really doing is just doing some coordinated searches over an area to help identify a target. It’s not anything all that fancy or unusual, but we can imagine in the future how artificial intelligence and autonomy may make coordination communication fairly significant. You could imagine, for example, a drone swarm that’s made up of multiple different types of drones operating in different domains with different types of payloads where they’re intelligently selecting, like, “Alright, let’s use this antitank weapon against this identified tank over here, and we’re going to send our antipersonnel weapons to this infantry unit over here,” and collectively sort of adapt and engage with the reality on the ground working across multiple domains, and all autonomously. But the important thing, and what we’re going to get at in this article, is that regardless of that complexity, one of the key issues when it comes to drone swarms is information warfare, and, particularly, their dependence on those various subsets: electronic, cyber, space, and psychological warfare. (Host) Let’s start with electronic warfare. Electronic jamming: What do we need to know? (Kallenborn) We can start with individual drones because that’s the simple example here. One of the things that we’ve seen is that electronic jamming has been a really common form of attempting to defeat that system—namely, because drones typically rely on some sort of communication signal between the operator and the actual drone platform itself. So the idea is if you sever that communication link, then the drone may not necessarily be able to operate at all. And that problem scales extensively when we talk about drone swarms because, necessarily, you have that same problem. You have an operator who has to send links and information to that swarm. But it becomes more complicated because to get at that point, the key issue of swarming is that communication and coordination between the different drones, which means you have another opportunity to jam, and, particularly, that inner-swarm communication. Because if you break down that communication, the notion of a swarm stops being meaningful. Now one of the open questions, though, is how exactly that works in practice. Based on the way that the algorithms work from having, say, a dedicated leader—that sort of helping organize things to massively decentralized approaches—to having different communication pathways through a complex network. So how exactly jamming might work in practice may vary a lot. And of course, if we’re talking about multidomain swarms where you start getting undersea drones interacting with surface vehicles, that becomes more complicated. But, nonetheless, the notion of jamming signals is equally appropriate there. (Host) What about cyber? What do we need to know? (Kallenborn) There is sort of a silly depiction, but I think it has some seriousness to it, of drones as sort of flying computers. And in a sense, that’s what they are. They’re kind of onboard systems that manage all aspects of the drone’s flight from specific flight controllers that manage the propellers and the various movement and the habitation of that system. And when we start talking about drone swarms, that’s even more the case because you now have algorithms and systems to manage that broader communication, that coordination, the broader behavior of that swarm, so that at a very basic level, you may have—say, for example, task allocation algorithms to say, like, “OK, these drones are going over here, these drones are going over here, these drones are going to do this, those drones are going to do that.” And that’s a very cyber-based system, which of course means that it also creates vulnerabilities in the cyberspace for those systems. So what happens if you have cyberattacks aimed at the systems that control the flight controllers? What happens if you attempt to manipulate those? You could get all sorts of problems, from the drones not operating correctly to crashing into one another, and you can imagine other types of cyber activities. So, for example, if you’re using artificial intelligence-based machine vision in the swarm to help navigate the world around it, that could potentially be manipulated through cyber means by, for example, it manipulating the training data that goes into creating those machine vision systems through what are called, “(artificial intelligence or) AI poisoning attacks.” Conversely, you can also imagine using cyber to, say, again, break that link between the operator and the actual system itself. Except, rather than using . . . jamming the actual signal, you are manipulating the system that is actually responding and taking in those orders. And then, at an extreme level, you could imagine cyber being used to actively take control of and manipulate the swarm, which is perhaps the scariest, where your friendly swarm is now turned against you and destroying your own military forces, which could be quite bad. (Host) What about space warfare and the Global Navigation Satellite System? How do they relate to drone swarms? (Kallenborn) Yeah, so, there’s a couple dimensions to it. Firstly, there’s obviously the communication element. At the moment, most of the drone swarms are very sort of tactical, very short-range type operations. But as we start scaling, you could potentially look and need satellite-based communication to relay some of those signals. Likewise, we know that, at least at the moment, many of these drone swarms are heavily dependent on global position navigation, a positioning system for navigation timing. Basically, they need to understand where are they potentially located in space? Now that’s one place where technology is developing, and there has been work on using a more autonomous, image-based recognition to help the swarm actually navigate. But, at the moment, there’s a close dependence on (the Global Positioning System or) GPS. But how exactly that works is again going to be very dependent on the nature of the swarm. So, an interesting example of this is undersea swarms where you know GPS navigation is pretty difficult to get to those units. Instead, what researchers are doing are things like creating buoys on the surface that can access GPS signals and then use acoustic signals from the drones to the buoy, and then using that to sort of figure out where the drones are located in space and time to orient themselves to accomplish their missions. (Host) You say drone swarms have the least relevance for psychological warfare. How so? (Kallenborn) When we think about psychological at the more strategic aspect, we’re talking about shaping society’s perceptions and that type of thing. And in that case, you’re not really going to have much real use there. It’s pretty difficult to imagine, like, drone swarms spreading much propaganda pamphlets. And I suppose you could do that. But I don’t really know why you would want to. I think where the relevance starts is drone swarms as an object for mis- and malinformation. There’s been broad global interest in placing bans on autonomous weapons. A big example of that, of course, is the Stop Killer Robots movement that wants complete bans on all autonomous systems. Now, personally, I think some of that is a little bit ridiculous, but, nonetheless, there is certainly a public concern about autonomous weapons generally. Many NATO countries have concern about this. So the concern is if we have all these drone swarms being used on the battlefield, well, what happens if some adversary says, “Oh, these are autonomous weapons, and they have all of the concerns that those systems do”? From escalation concerns to risk to civilians to accidentally targeting third, neutral parties to a conflict—that type of thing. And so, in that way, it can become a little bit relevant in which people create those concerns. And that’s exacerbated that many of the autonomous systems is a matter of programming and how the system is set up. So, if the United States is accused of using some concerning system, how does the United States disprove that without showing directly the code? And that’s going to be something both probably very sensitive and—because we’re talking about potentially classified software systems—and, also, difficult to understand because your average person on the street—they’re not going to understand at all some complex coding of how the system works. (Host) How do you see AI and robotics shaping the future of drones? (Kallenborn) So technology advances hit on all of these aspects of information warfare for both good and bad. So, if we talk about electronic jamming, for example, a significant development is autonomy for drones in general. That is, if a drone doesn’t necessarily require human input, then they don’t really care that much about jamming, right? Similarly, if we talk about GPS satellite information used to help navigation, if you have advanced AI and autonomy that can read and understand the area around them so that they can navigate by themselves without having GPS, then that dependency goes away. Conversely, we can imagine on the other direction as well, where artificial intelligence and robotics may improve some of these capabilities. So say, for example, using . . . combining artificial intelligence to improve electronic jamming capabilities to more effectively attack and defeat swarms. Alternatively, you can imagine swarms incorporating some of those same capabilities. What if a drone has a payload that has a jammer on it, perhaps to attack another swarm to make it more difficult to operate? That can then support the use of other types of payloads that are more directly destroying the actual platform. (Host) Let’s kind of pull it all together here. What are your recommendations going forward? (Kallenborn) The biggest picture is more conceptual . . . being commanders and military leaders needing to think seriously around the interconnections between drone swarms and information warfare. Now to an extent, of course, information warfare is relevant to all forms of warfare. Even regular human beings need to communicate between one another. But unlike human beings, drones do not necessarily have the complex cognition to make decisions where they can potentially operate without that human control. And so, being aware of that, I think, is really critical. That of course comes across multiple aspects of conflict that starts with simply drone swarm acquisition phases, to understand, “What are the potential vulnerabilities that these systems may have,” that then extend potentially to use on the battlefield as well as training with that system to understand how it might be used or some of the risks. And then, when you actually use it in the battlefield, understanding, “What are the information warfare risks that come into play in that particular context?” And then, likewise, I think there’s, at a bigger-picture level, the necessity to consider the broader information space. Because there has been at least some evidence, albeit a little bit mixed, that the United States has had some issues when it comes to information warfare from not using capabilities as much as they should or potentially having, in the case of cyber, widespread vulnerabilities, as was identified in a recent Government Accountability Office report. Now I’ve seen some pushback on those, but, nonetheless, I think there’s a broader need to the extent that drone swarms are part of the battlefield and, more broadly, drones generally are part of the battlefield to think through that sort of complex information environment and think through what gaps might the United States have, and where might they create vulnerabilities, and how might we plug them to be successful in the future. (Host) It was a treat to talk with you. Thanks for your time. (Kallenborn) Yeah—thanks for having me. (Host) Listeners, if you’d like to learn more; get some rich details; and get some relevant, current-day examples of “InfoSwarms: Drone Swarms and Information Warfare,” I urge you to read this article. You can find it at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 52, issue 2. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, or any other major podcasting platform. Author information: Zachary Kallenborn is a policy fellow at the Schar School of Policy and Government, a research affiliate of the Unconventional Weapons and Technology program at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, a senior consultant at ABS Group, and the officially proclaimed US Army “mad scientist.” He is the author of publications on autonomous weapons, drone swarms, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction.   show less

This podcast examines faits accomplis—how states attempt to seize disputed territory using military force, hoping to avoid war in the process—and offers suggestions for how to deter them. Since 1945, faits accomplis have become the most common means by which states attempt to take over territory, even though they frequently result in armed conflict. US deterrent efforts, however, often focus on stopping invasions, not limited land grabs. This study combines the traditional literature on... read more

This podcast examines faits accomplis—how states attempt to seize disputed territory using military force, hoping to avoid war in the process—and offers suggestions for how to deter them. Since 1945, faits accomplis have become the most common means by which states attempt to take over territory, even though they frequently result in armed conflict. US deterrent efforts, however, often focus on stopping invasions, not limited land grabs. This study combines the traditional literature on deterrence with Dan Altman’s recent research on faits accomplis to suggest Department of Defense leaders should frame territorial disputes as a real estate market they can both analyze and manipulate. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss2/12/ Episode Transcript Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guest and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. The guests in speaking order on this episode are: (Guest 1: Brandon Colas) (Host) Decisive Point welcomes Mr. Brandon Colas, author of “Defining and Deterring Faits Accomplis,” which was featured in the Summer 2022 issue of Parameters. Colas is anArmy officer [unintelligible] currently embedded with the United Kingdom Strategic Command Intelligence Center in London as a liaison officer for the Defense Intelligence Agency. Welcome to Decisive Point, Brandon. It’s great to have this chance to chat with you. Let’s talk about your article, “Defining and Deterring Faits Accomplis.” This study combines the traditional literature of deterrence with Dan Altman’s recent research on faits accomplis to suggest Department of Defense leaders should frame territorial disputes as taking part in a real-estate market that they can both analyze and manipulate to discourage our opponents from conquering without conquest. What does this look like? Please give us an outline here. (Colas) So when I started this research, I began with Tom Schelling (Thomas C. Schelling) and his 1968 classic and, in a lot of ways, Schelling—even though his book is breezy, it’s academic lectures that he’s talking about. It really has defined the US deterrence discussion ever since. And so Schelling talks about brute force and coercion. And so, brute force—we used to think like (Adolf) Hitler, Poland 1940, right? And coercion would be just building up those forces on the border until the other side caves and gives up their territory or makes those concessions that you’re wanting. So again, going back to Hitler, you think about him entering Denmark unopposed, right? So those are sort of the two classic examples. But more recent international relations research, especially led by Dan Altman, who’s at Georgia State (University), has looked at small, limited territorial seizures. He calls them faits accomplis, so there’s limited territory that’s disputed. There’s the use of military force, but the aggressor statement still attempts to avoid war in the process. And what’s interesting, Altman goes back from 1945 to present, and he discovers that there’s only four cases of brute force actually being used to seize territory since then. And so that’s when one state again uses their military to completely absorb another state. And those cases—some of them succeeded, like North and South Vietnam. Some of them failed, like Iraq and Kuwait, but it’s actually not that common. And he finds that coercion for seizing wholesale seizure of territory is actually even less common. So you have this sort of contradiction where you think about words as being caused by territorial conflict, and yet major territorial conflict doesn’t take place. And that’s where Altman looks at faits accomplis and discovers that there’s 65 cases post-1945 of limited use of military force to seize limited territory, like land grabs. So the classic example is Russia in the Crimea in 2014. It’s just striking, looking back on it, how much Ukraine loses there: It’s 10,000 square miles of territory, two million citizens, pretty much all of their navy. And yet there’s only one Ukrainian casualty. And so yes, there was some violence involved. All the violence was latent, but it was there. But at the end of the day, this is not a traditional invasion that we think of. It was a fait accompli. Or we think about China in the South China Sea or the East China Sea that’s like building islands in the middle of nowhere to expand their territory again. There’s violence involved there. They have military defenses placed on these, and yet we don’t really know quite how to deter this or how to handle it. And so that’s what I wanted to study in this article is: How do we frame these limited uses of the military to seize limited pieces of territory, and then how do we deter them? It doesn’t seem like it’s big enough to go to war over, and yet it’s still something that needs to be stopped. (Host) That leads right into my next question: Explain the calculus of determining the desirability of faits accomplis. How do states seize territory? (Colas) I wanted to think about why they would seize territory at a particular time. A fait accompli might be something gradualist and slow, or it might be something really kind of quick, like Russia in the Crimea. But what are the factors that would make a state want to seize a piece of disputed territory? And in the article, I came up with the idea of this territory as a sort of real-estate market where you have two opposing states that are looking at this territory, and each state values the territory a little bit differently. But what they have in common is that they don’t want to go to a full-scale war to seize the territory. That’s why the territories are disputed. But that’s also why it isn’t resolved yet. And so, as I was thinking about that, I wanted to also ask the question of what factors could change to make a state decide, “Now is the time to risk going to war to seize this territory” or “Now still isn’t the time.” And so that’s where I looked at the idea of states factor in the cost of war if they’re going to seize the territory, and I think states would be planning for the worst-case scenario: What happens if they try to seize the territory and end up losing? The second is just the probability of war. Can they actually move in like Russia did in Crimea and not go to war? And then the probability of victory gives them war. So if it does come down to a fight, are they going to win and get this territory at the end? And so the market model isn’t really asking how they see the territory so much as why they seize the territory at a particular time. What are those factors? (Host) Can you talk a little bit more about the model that you offer in your article and just walk us through how that works? (Colas) Thinking about how states are looking at the probability of war, the probability of victory, and then also the cost of war, I thought of four factors that states both influence for themselves and try to shape for other states’ perceptions. The first is going to be historical claims. States make historical claims on territory in order to show that they value the territory. You look at like China’s claims for the South China Sea. They end up going back to this kind of questionable 1947 map. And then, in 2016, they ended up saying they actually found a book that was 500 years old that really proved this has always been Chinese. And then, when the BBC tried to go interview the person who had found the book, they actually had lost the book. So there’s all these crazy historical claims, but states still make them because it’s a signal. It doesn’t convince anybody. I mean, it might convince people within the state itself; it doesn’t convince anybody else though. But it’s a signal that things matter. And you look at (Vladimir) Putin’s crazy essay in July of last year where he talks about how Russia and Ukraine have always been one people. It’s this horrifically boring tone. You can’t follow his logic or his reasoning, but it’s a signal that this matters to Putin. And so, states do this all the time. And one thing we should think about, too, is even with our allies, if they’re not making claims about these territories that they are in dispute over, like Japan and the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) against China—if our allies aren’t making the same sort of kind of tedious, tendentious historical claims, it’s a signal that perhaps it’s not actually that important to them. So these historical claims do matter not because they convince people, but because they show a measure of conviction by a state and its leaders. The second and third both affect the cost of war for a state. The first is obviously military modernization and military developments. If you have a better military, the cost of war is likely to go down for you. It’s likely to increase for your opponents. So that’s something that states need to watch: As another state increases the quality capabilities of its military, it could make them more likely to be aggressive because the cost is less for them. Another way we can affect the cost of war is looking at the possibility of broadening the quarrel. The focal point here is disputed territories. But when a state brings in other matters into the quarrel, it can make it a lot harder to justify war for this particular territory. So by one example—this is just speculation obviously; this not US government policy; it probably never will be—but if the US tied Chinese student visas and linked that to Chinese expansion in the South China Sea—sorry, started cutting Chinese student visas—on the one hand, these are not related issues. On the other hand, by expanding the quarrel, it forces China to take a step back for their aggression. And so that’s one way that states are able to affect the cost of war: by bringing in matters that are unrelated. And then the last thing: Thinking about how states affect the probability of war, recent research has been pretty clear that troop placement is a major factor in whether or not territory gets seized. Altman’s research shows that post-1990, when you’re looking at faits accomplis, the majority of them take place in territories that are not garrisoned. And there’s different speculations as to why that is. Part of it is if the territory’s valuable, you probably already have troops there. Part of it is if you have troops there, they could serve as a trip wire and escalate matters. But regardless, I think the case of the matter is, if it’s a disputed territory, especially for our allies, and they don’t have a garrison there, or they don’t have troops nearby, the signal that they’re sending is that it might not be that important to them. So again, four different areas—historical claims, military developments, broadening the quarrel, and troop placement—they’re all ways that states can use to shape the value of this disputed territory—both for themselves, and then you can try to shape it for your opponent as well. In an ideal situation, if you want the status quo—so you just want to keep the territory disputed, you agree to disagree? You want to keep the value about the same for you, and if your opponent’s value is going up, you try to raise your value. If your opponent’s value is going down, you’re cautious about raising yours because you don’t want your own population to try to increase it. On the other hand, if you want to seize the territory yourself, you’d be wise to lower the value in your opponent’s perception and raise the value of your own. (Host) How can the market model be used to deter faits accomplis? (Colas) Even thinking of relatively simple steps that the (the Department of Defense or) DoD is already doing—joint training and exercises with allied forces—what that’s going to do is help their military improve our military improve as we have interoperability like that. So when it comes time to dispute a territory—again, thinking back to like the South and East China Seas, as the US does joint operations with the Japanese Self-Defense Force and improves that capability and we improve our own capability, the cost goes up for China at the same time if they wanted to try to seize the territory. So the relatively simple things, a lot of which we are doing, can affect the value of territory. Where I think that matters is that we’re intentional about why we’re doing it and that we focus that attention especially on these geographically disputed areas where war could happen at any time. (Host) Do you have any final thoughts before we part ways? (Colas) Yeah, just two things. The first is that I think contested issues are issues of value. And so, the article that I wrote about focused on territorial disputes and, like, deterring our opponents—obviously, we have to ask, “Deterring them from what?” But if we’re able to shape their values and shape our values, I think that can make a difference in how we choose problems. The second is that our opponents’ tactics, what they use—that’s a means of communication. So, uh, Thomas Schelling talks about the idiom of military action, and the idea behind that is that the means that they use to pursue an end are telling us something, whether or not they want to tell us it. So when we look at a fait accompli, the state is seizing the territory, they’re using the military, they’re risking war—at the end of the day, they’re doing this because they don’t want to go to war for the territory. And so, this signal is they’re going to risk war, but they’re not exactly there yet. And so, one thing that Altman’s researchers showed is that a vigorous military response to a fait accompli when it’s happening often is enough to make it fail. And it can stop there. And so I think one takeaway from this article is we have to listen to what our opponents are saying. We have to listen to what they’re not saying as well. We’ve been hearing different Russians screaming about red lines ever since February. At the end of the day, we’ve crossed a lot of those red lines so far, and Russia hasn’t done anything, so the real message here that Russia is implicitly sending, whether they want to or not, is that they don’t have the capability or the will to stop what we’ve been doing so far. So I think that’s another important takeaway from this article. (Host) This was a real pleasure. Thank you so much for taking time today. (Colas) Oh—thanks so much for the chance, Stephanie. (Host) Listeners, if you’d like more details about defining and deterring faits accomplis, you can read the article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 52, issue 2. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, or any other major podcasting platform. Author information: Major Brandon Colas is a US Army foreign area officer currently embedded with the United Kingdom Strategic Command Defence Intelligence in London as a liaison officer for the Defense Intelligence Agency.   show less

This podcast argues shortfalls in the international institutions governing the Arctic have allowed Russia and China to expand control over the region. It provides an overview of regional governance and power dynamics, outlines a three-part approach to correcting deficiencies, highlights attempts by Russia and China to circumvent international governance, examines how the Arctic’s governing institutions address Russian and Chinese growth in the region, and focuses on the institutional... read more

This podcast argues shortfalls in the international institutions governing the Arctic have allowed Russia and China to expand control over the region. It provides an overview of regional governance and power dynamics, outlines a three-part approach to correcting deficiencies, highlights attempts by Russia and China to circumvent international governance, examines how the Arctic’s governing institutions address Russian and Chinese growth in the region, and focuses on the institutional failures that have allowed Russia and China to expand—failures academic scholarship and US policy have not adequately addressed. Practitioners will find specific steps for rectifying issues with Arctic institutions to support the United States’ interests in the region. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss2/11/ Episode Transcript Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. The guests in speaking order on this episode are: (Guest 1: Mark T. Vicik) (Host) Decisive Point welcomes US Army Captain Mark T. Vicik, author of “Strengthen Arctic Governance to Stop Russian and Chinese Overreach,” which featured in the summer 2022 issue of Parameters. Vicik is a student at the Military Intelligence Captains Career Course at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. He holds a bachelor-of-arts degree in international relations and Middle East and North Africa studies from the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University. He conducts research on and writes about Arctic great-power dynamics and security issues and is the author of “The Future Arenas of Great Power Competition,” which was published in The SAIS Review of International Affairs. Mark, I’m glad you’re here. Let’s talk about Arctic governance. Observers often credit effective intergovernmental organizations like the Arctic Council and universally respected international agreements like the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with maintaining this prolonged period of cooperation in the Arctic. American policymakers have consistently relied on the maintenance of this rules-based order as foundational for their national security strategy in the Arctic. How does Arctic governance currently work? (Vicik) Yeah, so, first off, thanks so much, Stephanie, for having me on and letting me share my work. It’s been such a privilege working with you and the teams at Parameters and Decisive Point. So the broad umbrella of what we call Arctic governance includes a variety of agreements that regulate activity in the region. The two that I highlight in my work are the ones that are most often cited by policymakers and academics as indicative of this spirit of cooperation that I look at kind of critically assessing questions about my work. But those two are the (United Nations or) UN Convention on the Law of the Sea or UNCLOS and the Arctic Council. Looking in some detail at those two institutions, in 2008, in Ilulissat, Greenland, the five Arctic littoral states—Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the US—met and pledged to adhere to the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) to regulate territorial claims in the Arctic. This would give countries the right to exercise sovereignty to 12 nautical miles off their coastline as well as rights to exploring and exploiting resources up to 200 miles off their continental shelf and their exclusive economic zone. Any disputes to these territorial claims are supposed to be resolved through the UN Convention on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf). Looking at the Arctic Council, it’s a multinational organization focused on improving conditions in the region. It provides a platform for Arctic states, indigenous groups, and interested observers to discuss issues like environmental protection, sustainable resource use, and human development. Russia, as an Arctic state, is one of the permanent members—and, as of 2021, is actually the chair, a position that rotates permanent members every two years. So, they’ll be in seat from 2021 to 2023. And China holds observer status. Again, it’s frequently cited as one of the defining features to suggest this region’s atypically successful multinational governance. (Host) It looks like things might be changing, though. How do Russia and China fit into the Arctic dynamic looking forward? (Vicik) Speaking generally, Russia has a deep cultural connection to the region and has historically been one of the major players in international Arctic politics. To state the obvious, it has the largest Arctic territory of any state. It’s a key member of the Arctic Council and has historically had a pretty effective military capacity in its far north. Since 2001, though, it’s really been rapidly expanding its military and economic presence in the region. It established the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command in 2014, and its 2008 (Foundations of the Russian Federation’s) State Policy for the Arctic (until 2021 and beyond) identified Arctic energy and mineral deposits as its strategic resource base for the future. China, on the other hand, is lacking that historical connection to the region, so it’s been scrambling to artificially craft a foothold there as it increasingly acknowledges the region’s potential for future commercial activity. It’s been referring to itself as “a near-Arctic power,” which, I should note, the US government has referred to this title as nonsense (rightfully so). More concretely, it’s been trying to work its way into Arctic governing institutions, primarily through scientific research. So it established the Yellow River Scientific Research Station on the Svalbard Islands in 2004, and, in 2013, that helped it get observer status in the Arctic Council. They’ve been using this scientific footprint to increasingly expand their economic—and, potentially, in the near future, military—capacity in the region. It’s been funding large infrastructure projects in various Arctic states, to include, in large part, Russia. Talking specifically about my work, I argue that over the last decade or two, Russia and China have been deliberately exploiting shortfalls in Arctic governing institutions in order to increase their control in the region. Regarding the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea), there are two major, unresolved issues, the first being the Lomonosov Ridge, the second being the status of the North Sea Route (Northern Sea Route)—both of which Russia and China have been capitalizing to increase their control of the region. Looking at the Lomonosov Ridge, it’s a roughly 1,100-mile-long underwater feature on the Arctic Sea floor that is likely quite resource-rich. In 2001, Russia submitted their first claim for its inclusion into their exclusive economic zone under UNCLOS. Since then, its claims have been rejected multiple times as scientifically insufficient. The ridge’s status still remains in dispute between various Arctic powers. In a 2007, though, we saw Russia send a deep-sea submersible to plant the national flag on the seabed there, which was an early indication that, without a clear ruling from the UN, they consider that space to be Russian territory—or, at the very least, space that they can and will attempt to exploit for resources. The second issue pertains to the North Sea Route (Northern Sea Route), which is one of the key maritime transitways through Arctic waters, along with the Northwest Passage and the Transpolar Sea Route. It runs along Russia’s northern coastline. And with year-round ice coverage in the region increasingly shrinking due to climate change, it offers a potentially critical new commercial artery between East Asia and Europe. Currently, the route’s status—that is, whether it’s classified as international waters or as a Russian internal waterway—remains ambiguous under UNCLOS. But Russia has been increasingly imposing constraints on foreign vessels attempting to navigate through the passageway. And additionally, they’ve been developing infrastructure fairly aggressively along that route, often with significant support from China via their Belt and Road Initiative. Looking at the Arctic Council, its charter bans any discussion on military matters. Forums like the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable and the Northern (European) Chiefs of Defense used to partially fill this gap. But since 2014, Russia has been excluded from those venues based on their aggression in Crimea. And of course, China plays no role in them either. Economically, the Arctic Council has a pretty well-established norm of focusing on safe and noncontroversial issues, which has left these massive Sino-Russian infrastructure projects that increasingly define activity in the region as outside the purview of the Arctic Council. So you can see that as developing military capacity and large-scale commercial operations increasingly define our adversaries’ activities in the region, Russia and China are able to continue to participate in following this rules-based international order while continuing to expand control of the region largely unchecked and outside the lens of multinational organizations. (Host) In your article, you suggest a plan to strengthen Arctic governance. What would that look like? (Vicik) Yeah, so, I offer up three areas of focus to supplement these existing Arctic governing structures to prepare for this increasingly competitive environment with our adversaries. The first is a proposal to supplement the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) to resolve specific Arctic maritime disputes—particularly, the ones that I highlighted earlier. The second proposal is for a new military and economic forum to fill the gaps in the Arctic Council. I genuinely appreciate the good work the Arctic Council has done. When Russia took over the chairmanship in 2021, it identified its priorities as promoting sustainable development, supporting indigenous populations, and protecting biodiversity. These priorities are pretty indicative of what we see on new countries taking over the chairmanship, and they’re good progressive goals that the US should be supporting. But we can see that there’s a pretty glaring lack of mention of the massive economic projects and increased military activity that’s starting to form the foundation of Russian strategy in the region. We need a forum in place so that the US can continue to support those good, cooperative goals at the Arctic Council, but it has a venue to address and manage Chinese and Russian military and economic activity in a multinational setting. Finally, I suggest the formation of the new northern security alliance that focuses on collective monitoring and security throughout the European and North American Arctic—like a (North American Aerospace Defense Command or) NORAD that would be extended to our European Arctic powers. A lot of scholars talk about NATO as the potential future for multinational security alliances in the Arctic, but it really is falling short of being able to put forward a comprehensive plan for Arctic security. In 2016, NATO issued a general commitment to deter and defend threats to the North Atlantic. But, again, it’s fallen short of a comprehensive Arctic security policy. It’s a great alliance, but they’re just too many members with too limited an interest in the High North to really form an effective foundation for our security in the European Arctic. We need a more proactive, more streamlined, more focused northern security alliance to monitor and preempt Russian and Chinese incursions into the region. (Host) Do you have any final thoughts? Can you pull this all together for us and put a bow on it? (Vicik) I have two final thoughts, if you don’t mind: one focused and one a little less focused. First off, I mean, whether or not everyone agrees with all of my assessments or recommendations, I hope that, at the very least, getting my work out there helps better frame the way we look at the strategic balance between cooperation and competition in the Arctic. Since I started research for this paper, we’ve already seen some increased acknowledgement of the competitive aspects that our adversaries are bringing into the region. And the Army’s newly released Arctic Strategy, I think, does a really good job of acknowledging the changing competitive environment in putting forward some really good tactical- and operational-level changes to build our capacity to compete with our adversaries up there. That being said, as we build this capacity to confront overreach by our competitors, I think it’s important to acknowledge that there’s good cooperation occurring in things like science and sustainable development and support to indigenous populations. And we need to be putting structures in place to separate the cooperative successes from the competitive necessities. My second piece—and if you don’t mind me taking just a quick step back from the Arctic for a moment—I think it is worth noting, I have the privilege of being probably one of the more junior officers who’s had the privilege of contributing to this podcast. And I wanted to take a moment just to encourage my generation of young officers to think and write more critically about these strategic-level issues where we’re stepping into a highly complex strategic environment. Based on all the junior officers and (noncommissioned officers or) NCOs I’ve had the opportunity to work with, I know we have teams in place that are more than capable of meeting those challenges. But I think we owe it to the American public that we’ve taken the oath to defend to continue to engage with these issues and prepare ourselves accordingly. (Host) Thank you for taking that little side step, and thank you also for your contribution to Parameters. (Vicik) I appreciate you giving me the opportunity to get my voice out. (Host) Listeners, if you’d like to learn more about Arctic governance, you can read the article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 52, issue 2. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, or any other major podcasting platform. Author information: Captain Mark T. Vicik, US Army, is a student at the Military Intelligence Captains Career Course at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. He holds a bachelor of arts degree in international relations and Middle East and North Africa studies from the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University. He conducts research on and writes about Arctic great-power dynamics and security issues and is the author of “The Future Arenas of Great Power Competition,” which was published in The SAIS Review of International Affairs.   show less

This podcast assesses the American-Russian economic relationship, identifying how Russia exploits strategic asymmetries to gain advantage in the space below armed conflict and how the United States can modernize its economic statecraft. It draws upon a wide range of comparative research, from US-Russian military thought to the American-Eurasian economic interrelationship, to evaluate the full range of economic statecraft within a single dyad of countries in the context of coercion theory.... read more

This podcast assesses the American-Russian economic relationship, identifying how Russia exploits strategic asymmetries to gain advantage in the space below armed conflict and how the United States can modernize its economic statecraft. It draws upon a wide range of comparative research, from US-Russian military thought to the American-Eurasian economic interrelationship, to evaluate the full range of economic statecraft within a single dyad of countries in the context of coercion theory. This analysis will assist American policymakers in reforming priorities and processes according to principles of economic statecraft to sustain ongoing American coercion and set conditions for advantage upon the return to bilateral competition. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss2/10/ Episode Transcript Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. The guests in speaking order on this episode are: (Guest 1: Ryan J. Orsini) (Host) Decisive Point welcomes Major Ryan J. Orsini, author of “Economic Statecraft and US-Russian Policy,” which was featured in the summer 2022 issue of Parameters. Orsini is a US Army infantry officer assigned as a student at the Command and Staff General College (Command and General Staff College) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds a master of public policy degree from Georgetown University. Ryan, I’m glad you’re here. Thanks for joining me today. Let’s talk about the US, Russia, and economic statecraft. Please lay the groundwork for us. What is your working definition of economic statecraft for this scenario? (Orsini) Thank you for the question. Thank you for having me. So, put simply, economic statecraft is the use of a nation’s economic means in pursuit of either geopolitical or domestic goals. That’s everything from trade policy, industrial policy, sanctions—it’s a big bucket. Now, here, I address a small portion. So I’m speaking, specifically, the US-Russian dyad and a particular spot on the conflict spectrum: the gray zone, the space between peace and war. But, really, I’m addressing two fundamental questions: first, how Russia uses its economic means, both licit and illicit, to sort of punch above its weight class and garner international influence, extracting these gains despite US deterrence policy and overall advantage in economic means. And then I ask, “What can the US do to leverage the economic instrument and really achieve the coercion it desires?” So I put forward the policy recommendation of domestic coordination, international cooperation, and transatlantic transparency. (Host) Well, let’s break it down. Walk us through them. Let’s start with domestic coordination. What needs to happen here? (Orsini) So US economic statecraft—it often lacks unity of effort. Its authorities and its resources are spread across branches of government and the interagency. What does this look like in practice? Well, first, it’s organization. Identifying a lead agency or task force. There are lots of options. I propose some, but, really, this agency serves a couple critical roles: assessing the changing Russian vulnerabilities to US economic leverage over time, evaluating the effectiveness of US policy over time, and ensuring that coordination across the interagency of the statecraft. Second is priority. Unlike in the defense community, there is no overriding document. There’s no national defense strategy guiding the economic tool. And also it’s about economic lines of effort. For instance, in this new era of great-power competition, how do we prioritize counterauthoritarian influence operations versus counterthreat finance? These are guiding principles that can really help guide the overall economic instrument. And, finally, it’s process: creating the legal mechanisms that the interagency can use to enforce antimoney laundering in the modern age to protect both privacy and access to data that it needs to be effective on today’s global stage. (Host) International cooperation: What does that look like in your plan? (Orsini) I’m looking in particular since the 2014 Crimean crisis. And if you look in the snapshot, the US economic statecraft has often lacked the broad international enforcement or has failed to maintain it over time. And, ultimately, this dilutes or nullifies intended effects of economic statecraft. So what does this look like? Really, it’s working with like-minded international bodies, political, economic, intelligence agencies. And the key is to work within the current overall Eurasian politic. So I offer a mix of positive and negative economic inducements. We often forget that economic statecraft is also positive inducements—how to prioritize sanctions and sanctions relief. And, ultimately, the big goal here is to align the incentive structures and build resilience for other states from Russian influence. (Host) Your final point was transparency, and I need to point out it’s not just about dollars and rubles exclusively. This included Bitcoin, (Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges or) INSTEX, the central-bank digital currencies, and you also mentioned the US Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020. Can you walk us through this part of your plan? (Orsini) So data might not quite be the new oil per se, but it really is the key to understanding Russian influence as well as how effective American statecraft can be against it. And you offered a bunch of mechanisms by which Russia can exploit these blurry legal and financial structures. And that starts here in the US. We have a myriad of antimoney-laundering laws that help define beneficial ownership across economic transactions. I point to plenty of potential legislation or legislation that is in execution right now. And why is it transatlantic? Well, the hub of international finance still runs a lot through New York City, London, and Brussels. So at end state, it’s about building actionable attribution and accountability. And these mechanisms within the international community—we can really garner a lot of influence just within our like-minded partners. (Host) Before we go, do you have any final thoughts? (Orsini) Knowing the readers of Parameters, I’d like to bring this idea of consolidating gains to making temporary advantage enduring. And, you know, there is a nonmilitary aspect to the American way of war. The economic tool usually shapes, and it usually translates advantage into some enduring outcome. But we often build it around a military action. I’d encourage the listeners, wherever you are in the interagency and whatever instrument you are a part of—think about how your piece can support this economic tool. It’s not normally how we think of it, but in a world where deterrence is really our largest contribution, it may be how we focus going forward, and this is a place where Russia has had success. It’s a playbook that they can bring off the shelf and utilize. And so, pending the results of ongoing conflict, it’s something they might likely go back to. It behooves us to look at this environment and shape it while there is a policy opportunity here now. (Host) Thank you, Ryan. Listeners, you can read this article, “Economic Statecraft and US-Russian Policy,” to get details about how Russia exploits strategic asymmetries to gain advantage in the space below armed conflict and how the United States can modernize its economic statecraft. Visit press.armywarcollege.edu. Look for volume 52, issue 2. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, or any other major podcasting platform. Author information: Major Ryan J. Orsini, US Army, is an infantry officer assigned as a student at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds a master of public policy degree from Georgetown University.   show less

In this podcast, Colonel George Shatzer, director of the Strategy Research and Analysis Department of the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College, discusses books of relevance to US Joint planners and strategists, as well as those of allies and strategic partners. He applies his experience and education as a US Army senior strategist to extract insights useful to anyone contemplating how to confront the challenges of today’s strategic environment.

Read the article:... read more

In this podcast, Colonel George Shatzer, director of the Strategy Research and Analysis Department of the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College, discusses books of relevance to US Joint planners and strategists, as well as those of allies and strategic partners. He applies his experience and education as a US Army senior strategist to extract insights useful to anyone contemplating how to confront the challenges of today’s strategic environment. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss2/16/ Episode Transcript Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guest, and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. The guests in speaking order on this episode are: (Guest 1: George Shatzer) (Host) Decisive Point welcomes Colonel George Shatzer, director of the Strategic Research and Analysis Division in the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College. Colonel Shatzer authors the (Strategic Research and Analysis Division or) SRAD Director’s Corner in Parameters. In the 2022 summer issue, he covers Russia and Ukraine. SRAD Director’s Corner is relatively new to Parameters. In it, you review books of possible interest to contemporary military strategists—especially, those serving in US Army and Joint positions. The summer issue contains the second installment of this section, and the focus is on Russia and Ukraine. Thanks for being here. (Shatzer) Well, thanks for the opportunity to discuss the article and this important issue. (Host) This conflict has not unfolded the way many people thought it would. Your piece emphasizes the value of knowing your enemy, and how it’s a pathway to understanding oneself and the kind of war on which we’re embarking. It’s through this lens that your reviews are written. (Shatzer) That’s right. As I mentioned in the article, the day-to-day demands of commanders, leaders, and strategists to ensure our nation’s security can be all-consuming. There are endless demands on time when you are preparing to deter war or to be ready for it, and those demands are mostly internal or focused on ourselves. Even with the assistance of very dedicated intelligence professionals, it can be easy for decisionmakers and strategists to lose sight of the adversary’s views or motivations. So, taking the time to read works such as those that I profile in the review series can help us build insight on what the adversary is thinking. (Host) How does Oscar Jonsson’s The Russian Understanding of War: Blurring the Lines between War and Peace inform this topic? (Shatzer) Jonsson’s book was fascinating. I really appreciated how thoroughly he built a case through his review of pre-Soviet, Soviet, and modern Russian military writings and doctrine. He argues that the current Russian view of the very nature of war, not just its character, has fundamentally changed. In brief, Jonsson asserts that Russian leaders and security professionals believe that the US and the West have become so expert in information and psychological warfare that the nature of war is no longer defined by armed violence. Instead, they believe that the nature of modern warfare is defined by political and social subversion and that these means now have effects akin to those of armed force, when you consider what subversion campaigns have done to governments recently. And what the Russians are referring to, of course, are the so-called “color revolutions” in the early 2000s, particularly in countries such as Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, and Belarus, but also in the Arab Spring events in the Mideast in 2011. What most in the West saw as populist grassroots movements by oppressed peoples to demand a voice in their otherwise corrupt governments, the Russians saw as coordinated subversion campaigns engineered by the US and the West to overthrow legitimate governments and trample traditional social values in those countries. And, more broadly, the Russians view these movements as the opening moves of a campaign—an undeclared war, in effect, by the US and the West intended to destroy the Russian state and nation as they exist today. So understanding this perspective is important for a couple of reasons, I think. First, it clarifies the motivations for the current Russian war in Ukraine. From the point of view that Russia is defending itself against an undeclared US and Western war, then most any action is justified. In fact, Russia has been very open for many years now, well before its 2014 intervention in Ukraine (the Ukraine crisis), that Ukraine is in essence a vital national interest for Russia. And Russia has been clear that it would act to defend its security interest there—namely, the ethnic Russian people that live in Ukraine and the territory of Ukraine that borders the Russian state, which is also, in Russia’s view anyway, actually the land of the larger Russian nation. There are also a host of other factors that make Ukraine important to Russia that I mentioned in the article—chiefly, the agricultural and industrial capacity there as well as the Black Sea coast. So this all gets to the second reason why the Russian perspective is important to consider: It gives us a better sense of Russia’s commitment to their so-called “special military operation” there. A lot of attention has been paid so far in the war to the Ukrainian will to resist, but we should also be gauging the potential Russian will to persist. Accepting that Russia views its vital security interests as bound up in Ukraine to the point that those security concerns are even existential for Russia, then it would seem to suggest Russia will not end their invasion readily. When we also consider that Russia has been trying to destabilize the Ukrainian government for at least 10 years at this point through support to rebel groups in the eastern regions of Ukraine and even with the direct, unconventional intervention of its own soldiers in 2014, then we see even more clearly the depth of Russia’s investment. Russia will not give up in this conflict quickly. (Host) Neal Jesse’s Learning from Russia’s Recent Wars: Why, Where, and When Russia Might Strike Next was your next choice. What does it add to the conversation? (Shatzer) Neal Jesse’s book brings in an additional layer of analysis on past Russian modern interventions and aggressions since the end of the Soviet Union. Particularly, he focuses in on the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute in Azerbaijan; the civil war in Tajikistan; the Transdniestria conflict in Moldova; the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts in Georgia; the wars in Chechnya; but, especially, the 2014 intervention in Ukraine (the Ukraine crisis). Jesse’s commentary on Russia’s actions in Ukraine in 2014, which he wrote in 2020, I think, are particularly insightful. Despite corruption issues and other problems in Ukrainian government, Jesse contends that Ukraine actually did a fair job at dealing with the resistance groups and Russian infiltrations. He argues that it managed to stabilize the security situation and largely forwarded Russia’s primary aims. His analysis makes one wonder what lessons Russia might have failed to learn in 2014 about Ukrainian resilience, actually. Additionally, from his assessment of past Russian interventions, Jesse lays out a pattern of operations that Russia might use in a future conflict with Ukraine, and those assessments actually seem to hit the mark exactly with what we see going on there today: subversive activity to destabilize the situation, deployment of regular military forces, information campaigns, eventual violation of borders, seizing terrain, and the threat of nukes as strategic blackmail. As Jesse correctly concludes, quote, “The Russian threat to Ukraine is the most obvious and the most constant.” (Host) There’s no shortage of books on this topic. In fact, you very kindly suggest some at the end of your article. Why did you choose these two to focus on? (Shatzer) What I try to do with the article series is review one work that has a more, you know, theoretical, policy, or strategic focus and pair it with a review of a second book that is still strategic but offers a deeper look at theater, strategic, or even operational questions. I did that in the first article, with reviews on two excellent books examining the security challenge China poses to the US. So Jonsson’s Blurring the Lines and Jesse’s Learning from Russia’s Recent Wars are a very good companion set of books. They’re both concise, at about 200 or fewer pages each. Both still managed to pack in an impressive amount of detail and some thoughtful analysis that I find very relevant to understanding what’s happening in Ukraine today. And together, the two books do a great job of encompassing theory, policy, strategy, and operations in a way that I think leaders and strategists will find useful. There are plenty of other books worth considering on this topic, and I do list a few of those at the end of the article, but I recommend these two as fine places to start if someone is looking for short, insightful works. (Host) I wish we had more time. I need to wrap it up, though. What are your final thoughts before we go? (Shatzer) So there’s been a fair amount of attention in the media recently about the upcoming 9 May Victory Day (V-E Day) celebrations in Russia and whether or not President (Vladimir) Putin will take the opportunity of those celebrations to declare war on Ukraine. I don’t think Jonsson’s or Jesse’s book really provides any direct insight into that. Who knows what Putin may decide to do on a particular day? But if their books are any kind of guide, I think we can be fairly confident that Russia will only deepen its commitment to the war in Ukraine. And the other point I think I would make in closing is returning to the earlier aspect about understanding the enemy and the difficulties in doing so, I argue that even understanding the enemy, as a concept itself, is sometimes misunderstood. It’s a mistake to think the goal is to somehow predict what the enemy will do; not even the enemy knows what they will do in a particular situation. Instead, we should be trying to build an appreciation for knowing enemy habits and weaknesses—you know, identifying real vulnerabilities. The other point is to understand the motivations so that the limits of their will is made clear. If we know where the enemy is vulnerable and the limits of their endurance, we will have a major edge in competition in conflict with them. Understanding the enemy is also a pathway to understanding ourselves because it frees us from our limited perspectives. And because war is fundamentally defined by those involved in it, then this knowledge goes a long way towards understanding the kind of war on which we are embarking. (Host) Thanks so much for joining me today. It was a real pleasure. (Shatzer) Thanks again for the opportunity to talk about this today. (Host) Listeners, if you’d like to learn more and check out Colonel Shatzer’s other book recommendations, visit press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 52, issue 2. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, or any other major podcasting platform. Author information: Colonel George Shatzer is the director of the Strategic Research and Analysis Department in the Strategic Studies Instituteat the US Army War College.   show less

In this podcast, Colonel George Shatzer, director of the Strategy Research and Analysis Department of the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College, discusses books of relevance to US Joint planners and strategists, as well as those of allies and strategic partners. He applies his experience and education as a US Army senior strategist to extract insights useful to anyone contemplating how to confront the challenges of today’s strategic environment.

Read the article:... read more

In this podcast, Colonel George Shatzer, director of the Strategy Research and Analysis Department of the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College, discusses books of relevance to US Joint planners and strategists, as well as those of allies and strategic partners. He applies his experience and education as a US Army senior strategist to extract insights useful to anyone contemplating how to confront the challenges of today’s strategic environment. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss2/9/ Episode Transcript Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guest, and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. The guests in speaking order on this episode are: (Guest 1: George Shatzer) (Host) Decisive Point welcomes Colonel George Shatzer, director of the Strategic Research and Analysis Division in the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College. Colonel Shatzer authors the (Strategic Research and Analysis Division or) SRAD Director’s Corner in Parameters. In the 2022 summer issue, he covers Russia and Ukraine. SRAD Director’s Corner is relatively new to Parameters. In it, you review books of possible interest to contemporary military strategists—especially, those serving in US Army and Joint positions. The summer issue contains the second installment of this section, and the focus is on Russia and Ukraine. Thanks for being here. (Shatzer) Well, thanks for the opportunity to discuss the article and this important issue. (Host) This conflict has not unfolded the way many people thought it would. Your piece emphasizes the value of knowing your enemy, and how it’s a pathway to understanding oneself and the kind of war on which we’re embarking. It’s through this lens that your reviews are written. (Shatzer) That’s right. As I mentioned in the article, the day-to-day demands of commanders, leaders, and strategists to ensure our nation’s security can be all-consuming. There are endless demands on time when you are preparing to deter war or to be ready for it, and those demands are mostly internal or focused on ourselves. Even with the assistance of very dedicated intelligence professionals, it can be easy for decisionmakers and strategists to lose sight of the adversary’s views or motivations. So, taking the time to read works such as those that I profile in the review series can help us build insight on what the adversary is thinking. (Host) How does Oscar Jonsson’s The Russian Understanding of War: Blurring the Lines between War and Peace inform this topic? (Shatzer) Jonsson’s book was fascinating. I really appreciated how thoroughly he built a case through his review of pre-Soviet, Soviet, and modern Russian military writings and doctrine. He argues that the current Russian view of the very nature of war, not just its character, has fundamentally changed. In brief, Jonsson asserts that Russian leaders and security professionals believe that the US and the West have become so expert in information and psychological warfare that the nature of war is no longer defined by armed violence. Instead, they believe that the nature of modern warfare is defined by political and social subversion and that these means now have effects akin to those of armed force, when you consider what subversion campaigns have done to governments recently. And what the Russians are referring to, of course, are the so-called “color revolutions” in the early 2000s, particularly in countries such as Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, and Belarus, but also in the Arab Spring events in the Mideast in 2011. What most in the West saw as populist grassroots movements by oppressed peoples to demand a voice in their otherwise corrupt governments, the Russians saw as coordinated subversion campaigns engineered by the US and the West to overthrow legitimate governments and trample traditional social values in those countries. And, more broadly, the Russians view these movements as the opening moves of a campaign—an undeclared war, in effect, by the US and the West intended to destroy the Russian state and nation as they exist today. So understanding this perspective is important for a couple of reasons, I think. First, it clarifies the motivations for the current Russian war in Ukraine. From the point of view that Russia is defending itself against an undeclared US and Western war, then most any action is justified. In fact, Russia has been very open for many years now, well before its 2014 intervention in Ukraine (the Ukraine crisis), that Ukraine is in essence a vital national interest for Russia. And Russia has been clear that it would act to defend its security interest there—namely, the ethnic Russian people that live in Ukraine and the territory of Ukraine that borders the Russian state, which is also, in Russia’s view anyway, actually the land of the larger Russian nation. There are also a host of other factors that make Ukraine important to Russia that I mentioned in the article—chiefly, the agricultural and industrial capacity there as well as the Black Sea coast. So this all gets to the second reason why the Russian perspective is important to consider: It gives us a better sense of Russia’s commitment to their so-called “special military operation” there. A lot of attention has been paid so far in the war to the Ukrainian will to resist, but we should also be gauging the potential Russian will to persist. Accepting that Russia views its vital security interests as bound up in Ukraine to the point that those security concerns are even existential for Russia, then it would seem to suggest Russia will not end their invasion readily. When we also consider that Russia has been trying to destabilize the Ukrainian government for at least 10 years at this point through support to rebel groups in the eastern regions of Ukraine and even with the direct, unconventional intervention of its own soldiers in 2014, then we see even more clearly the depth of Russia’s investment. Russia will not give up in this conflict quickly. (Host) Neal Jesse’s Learning from Russia’s Recent Wars: Why, Where, and When Russia Might Strike Next was your next choice. What does it add to the conversation? (Shatzer) Neal Jesse’s book brings in an additional layer of analysis on past Russian modern interventions and aggressions since the end of the Soviet Union. Particularly, he focuses in on the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute in Azerbaijan; the civil war in Tajikistan; the Transdniestria conflict in Moldova; the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts in Georgia; the wars in Chechnya; but, especially, the 2014 intervention in Ukraine (the Ukraine crisis). Jesse’s commentary on Russia’s actions in Ukraine in 2014, which he wrote in 2020, I think, are particularly insightful. Despite corruption issues and other problems in Ukrainian government, Jesse contends that Ukraine actually did a fair job at dealing with the resistance groups and Russian infiltrations. He argues that it managed to stabilize the security situation and largely forwarded Russia’s primary aims. His analysis makes one wonder what lessons Russia might have failed to learn in 2014 about Ukrainian resilience, actually. Additionally, from his assessment of past Russian interventions, Jesse lays out a pattern of operations that Russia might use in a future conflict with Ukraine, and those assessments actually seem to hit the mark exactly with what we see going on there today: subversive activity to destabilize the situation, deployment of regular military forces, information campaigns, eventual violation of borders, seizing terrain, and the threat of nukes as strategic blackmail. As Jesse correctly concludes, quote, “The Russian threat to Ukraine is the most obvious and the most constant.” (Host) There’s no shortage of books on this topic. In fact, you very kindly suggest some at the end of your article. Why did you choose these two to focus on? (Shatzer) What I try to do with the article series is review one work that has a more, you know, theoretical, policy, or strategic focus and pair it with a review of a second book that is still strategic but offers a deeper look at theater, strategic, or even operational questions. I did that in the first article, with reviews on two excellent books examining the security challenge China poses to the US. So Jonsson’s Blurring the Lines and Jesse’s Learning from Russia’s Recent Wars are a very good companion set of books. They’re both concise, at about 200 or fewer pages each. Both still managed to pack in an impressive amount of detail and some thoughtful analysis that I find very relevant to understanding what’s happening in Ukraine today. And together, the two books do a great job of encompassing theory, policy, strategy, and operations in a way that I think leaders and strategists will find useful. There are plenty of other books worth considering on this topic, and I do list a few of those at the end of the article, but I recommend these two as fine places to start if someone is looking for short, insightful works. (Host) I wish we had more time. I need to wrap it up, though. What are your final thoughts before we go? (Shatzer) So there’s been a fair amount of attention in the media recently about the upcoming 9 May Victory Day (V-E Day) celebrations in Russia and whether or not President (Vladimir) Putin will take the opportunity of those celebrations to declare war on Ukraine. I don’t think Jonsson’s or Jesse’s book really provides any direct insight into that. Who knows what Putin may decide to do on a particular day? But if their books are any kind of guide, I think we can be fairly confident that Russia will only deepen its commitment to the war in Ukraine. And the other point I think I would make in closing is returning to the earlier aspect about understanding the enemy and the difficulties in doing so, I argue that even understanding the enemy, as a concept itself, is sometimes misunderstood. It’s a mistake to think the goal is to somehow predict what the enemy will do; not even the enemy knows what they will do in a particular situation. Instead, we should be trying to build an appreciation for knowing enemy habits and weaknesses—you know, identifying real vulnerabilities. The other point is to understand the motivations so that the limits of their will is made clear. If we know where the enemy is vulnerable and the limits of their endurance, we will have a major edge in competition in conflict with them. Understanding the enemy is also a pathway to understanding ourselves because it frees us from our limited perspectives. And because war is fundamentally defined by those involved in it, then this knowledge goes a long way towards understanding the kind of war on which we are embarking. (Host) Thanks so much for joining me today. It was a real pleasure. (Shatzer) Thanks again for the opportunity to talk about this today. (Host) Listeners, if you’d like to learn more and check out Colonel Shatzer’s other book recommendations, visit press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 52, issue 2. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, or any other major podcasting platform. Author information: Colonel George Shatzer is the director of the Strategic Research and Analysis Department in the Strategic Studies Instituteat the US Army War College.   show less

While propaganda and disinformation have been used to destabilize opposing forces throughout history, the US military remains unprepared for the way these methods have been adapted to the Internet era. This article explores the modern history of disinformation campaigns and the current state of US military readiness in the face of campaigns from near-peer competitors and proposes education as the best way to prepare US servicemembers to defend against such campaigns.

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While propaganda and disinformation have been used to destabilize opposing forces throughout history, the US military remains unprepared for the way these methods have been adapted to the Internet era. This article explores the modern history of disinformation campaigns and the current state of US military readiness in the face of campaigns from near-peer competitors and proposes education as the best way to prepare US servicemembers to defend against such campaigns. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss1/9/ Author information: Dr. Meghan Fitzpatrick, a strategic analyst with Defence Research and Canada (DRDC) Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (CORA), is a widely published author on trauma and resilience. Her current work looks at how militaries are navigating the increasing importance of the information environment. Since joining DRDC, she has received recognition for her research, including the CORA Award for Outstanding Achievement in Defence Analysis. Dr. Ritu Gill has a PhD in social psychology from Carleton University and is currently a section head with DRDC. Her resea rch examines online influence activities, specifically, how the Internet and social media influence the information environment, including the analysis of online audiences, and how deception techniques employed by adversaries, such as disinformation, impact audiences. She has been part of international defence research collaborations and was co-lead for the NATO Human Factors and Medicine Research Task Group “Digital and Social Media Assessment for Effective Communication and Cyber Diplomacy.” Major Jennifer F. Giles, US Marine Corps, is currently a communication strategy and operations officer, a foreign area officer who advises commanders’ strategic and cultural engagement plans in the Pacific theater, and an instructor at the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Staff Training Program. She wrote Disrupting Disinformation: Force Protection through Media Literacy Training and recently spoke on media literacy and adversary disinformation for the Defense Information School “DINFOS Live.” If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, or any other major podcasting platform.   show less

The root cause for the defeat of the Armenian forces in the second Nagorno-Karabakh War was flawed military doctrine inherited from the Soviet Union. This article analyzes the major problems faced by Armenia, uncovers the main reasons for unsuccessful innovation, tests empirical findings against some of the most authoritative theories in the field, and outlines current research on the conflict, while substantiating the analysis with established scholarship in the field of military... read more

The root cause for the defeat of the Armenian forces in the second Nagorno-Karabakh War was flawed military doctrine inherited from the Soviet Union. This article analyzes the major problems faced by Armenia, uncovers the main reasons for unsuccessful innovation, tests empirical findings against some of the most authoritative theories in the field, and outlines current research on the conflict, while substantiating the analysis with established scholarship in the field of military innovation. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss2/10/ Author information: Colonel Zhirayr Amirkhanyan is currently a PhD candidate at the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. He was the head of defense policy planning branch of the Defense Policy Department at the Ministry of Defence of Armenia.   show less

Current events warrant a review of US civil-military relations doctrine. This article examines eight principles of military subordination to elected civilian officials and addresses the fundamental question at the heart of civil-military relations theory and practice—what options, if any, does the military have when civilian leadership disregards military advice? Examples drawn from US history provide an important framework to understand the complex interrelational dynamics at... read more

Current events warrant a review of US civil-military relations doctrine. This article examines eight principles of military subordination to elected civilian officials and addresses the fundamental question at the heart of civil-military relations theory and practice—what options, if any, does the military have when civilian leadership disregards military advice? Examples drawn from US history provide an important framework to understand the complex interrelational dynamics at play. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss2/3/ Episode Transcript Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. The guests in speaking order on this episode are: (Guest 1: Patrick Paterson) (Host) Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Patrick Paterson, author of “Civil-Military Relations: Guidelines in Politically Charged Societies,” featured in the spring 2022 issue of Parameters. Paterson is a professor of practice of national security studies in the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. He completed his PhD in conflict resolution at Nova Southeastern University. His latest book, The Blurred Battlefield, published in 2021, addresses the need for hybrid doctrines on the use of force for Latin American militaries combating violent crime groups. Thank you so much for joining me today, Dr. Paterson. Your article lays out eight standard practices for military officers regarding civil-military relations in a politically charged society. Please, briefly walk us through them. (Paterson) Sure, I’d be happy. Thanks for the opportunity to speak about it. I’ve studied civil-military relations here at National Defense University very, very closely, both in foreign countries as well as in the United States. And what I realized is that there’s lots of material available, and you could look at Samuel Huntington or Thomas Bruno and Peter Feaver and Eliot Cohen and all the top scholars on civil-military relations. But what we’re missing, in my opinion, is clear guidance, practical rules that military officers should follow when they’re trying to adhere to the expectations of civil-military relations. And so what I tried to do was provide a succinct description—what I believe are the eight practices that are the most important for senior military officers as they interact with their civilian counterparts. The first key principle is perhaps the most important characteristic of a professional armed force. It’s to remain apolitical. Take, for example, the posture of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the president’s annual State of the Union address. The chairman, the vice chairman, and the chiefs of staff of each of the armed forces sit near the front row of Congress, but they don’t respond. They don’t applaud. They don’t react in any way, sitting unemotionally in their chairs, because any sort of reaction would be construed as political advocacy. Number two is to provide candid military advice. Senior military officers are required to provide the objective truth about military policy. It should be nonpartisan, nondeliberative, and oftentimes must include advice that’s contrary to what the politicians want to hear. Or there’s something that goes against the current policy. So the rule is to advise on how to use the armed forces not to advocate for a specific course of action. Number three, civilian authorities retain extensive control over all aspects of defense policy. This is contrary to a lot of the conventional thinking that I encounter. The belief among many students of US national security are that there’s two distinct spheres of authority between civilian and military officials. Civilian officials will oversee the larger, strategic interests of the country, including when to deploy the military, whereas the armed forces, on the other hand, make the operational and tactical decisions on how to use the military if it’s called to action. But scholars today disagree with that conventional thinking, and most civil-military relations scholars like Dr. Richard Kohn or Dr. Peter Feaver believe that civilians have extensive control over nearly all aspects of military policy. Civilians have most of the authority and can make decisions about the employment of the military. The fourth rule is that senior military officers must be very cautious when providing congressional testimony. The military has a dual responsibility to both the executive and the legislative branches. According to the Constitution, the military serves at the direction of the president in his role as commander-in-chief and certain designated officials, such as the secretary of defense. However, to maintain the checks and balances that are so critical to our system, Congress also provides oversight, identifies the military budget, determines the size of the armed forces, and has the authority to declare war. For these reasons, senior military officers oftentimes are called before the elected leaders of Congress to testify on military strategy and operations. This can be very tricky though, serving these two coequal branches of government: the executive branch represented by the president; the legislative branch represented by the Armed Services Committee. So then the question is what should senior officers do when they’re required to testify before Congress on a policy that they may have disputed with the president or the secretary of defense. And the answer is follow the institutional requirement to provide candid advice and options on using the military. The fifth rule is to never publicly criticize defense policy or civilian officials. To do so is a form of insubordination and disrespect that may undermine the authority of civilian leaders or the confidence that other servicemembers have in him or her. The sixth principle is perhaps the most debated. Should military officers remain apolitical once they retire from active-duty service? Retired senior military officers are normally held in very high esteem, according to public opinion polls. They continue to wield a lot of political influence. And the conventional thinking is that retired officers should avoid criticizing defense policy or civilian defense officials, just as they did while they were in uniform. It’s also against the Uniform Code of Military Justice, even though these prosecutions for this kind of stuff are rare. The seventh and eighth of the principles of civil-military relations both concern how to respond to legal and illegal orders. And these are the last two. When given a legal order, either from a civilian or military officer or from a civilian official, military servicemembers are expected to comply with the order without delay. The last: Military personnel must not abide by orders that are illegal. That sounds very simple, very straightforward. However, what constitutes illegal is often ambiguous and confusing. Subordinates who received dubious orders may find it challenging to determine if the order is truly contrary to an established legal precedent. Most military officers do not have a lot of legal background and may not be privy to all the decisions that went into that command, and therefore they may not know that it’s actually illegal to do what they’ve been instructed to do. So what does a senior military officer do if he or she is confronted with an illegal order? What are their options? I think they have three choices. First, comply with the illegal order. Second, agree to follow the order but move slowly; do some foot dragging or shirking of the order and hope somebody intervenes to correct the situation. And third and last, refuse to follow the order and keep a clear conscience. So this concludes the eight practical guidelines that I’ve identified for civil-military relations in the United States. It’s really important that we teach these topics to our rising senior officials so that when they are in front of Congress or facing dubious commands from their senior civilian counterparts, they know exactly what guidelines they must follow. (Host) Why are these sometimes difficult to apply? (Paterson) Yeah, that’s a great question, Stephanie. First of all, we had . . . the constitutional loyalty of senior military officers is to the Constitution, not to the secretary of defense or to the president. And that’s why we have two coequal branches of government to provide oversight of the military. Most people believe that the senior military officers’ allegiance should be straight to the commander-in-chief. But that’s not true. You have to respond to Congress and the congressional figures as well. In addition, it’s also difficult because the courses of action that the military may prefer—that they feel very strongly about—may be contrary to what the president or the secretary of defense prefer. Hence, therefore, they have to abide by orders or by commands that they don’t personally agree with. But part of their military discipline and part of the subordination to civilian officials that’s so important in our system is for senior military officers to abide by those commands from the civilian leadership without question. (Host) Please tell us a little bit about how officers can find a balance or strike a balance in this arena. (Paterson) Yeah, that’s another great question. Knowing these rules and having specific examples of how to apply them based upon our history, I think, is the most useful. At National Defense University, we teach about these issues all the time. There’s lots of examples to draw from. It’s one thing to sit in our ivory towers and talk about how important it is to do this, but to actually put it into practice on the ground, under stress, under time limitations is an entirely different thing. Using those examples, many which I cited in my article, I think, are the most useful. It’s almost like a tabletop exercise of sorts for a senior military officer to be presented with this ethical or legal dilemma and then asking them and seeing how they would respond, seeing what their decision process is, and then advising them if their decision was appropriate or inappropriate. These days, in Washington, really the motivation for me to write this article, Stephanie, was because of the very controversial civil-military relations tensions that we saw during the last couple years of the Trump administration. The June 1st, 2020, Lafayette Square incident; the civil rights protests over the murder of George Floyd; the question about the use of the military and domestic law enforcement support was another very delicate issue that was raised; and then, finally, the January 6th insurrection on the Capitol—the first time that our Capitol has been attacked by a mob since the War of 1812. All these are perhaps indicative of what senior military officers must wrestle with in the future. Our society is very, very divided at the moment over the political issues, and I don’t see that getting any better, unfortunately. So senior military officers must understand what their guidelines are, what their rules are on how they abide by these orders. For example, if the military had been ordered to support National Guard and police during the domestic disputes, for example, if the Insurrection Act had been activated, would the military have complied with that? That’s a very dangerous situation because generally most of our military are not trained in police law enforcement tactics, escalation-of-force tactics. And as many senior military officers said after the Lafayette Square incident, they recognize that it was very, very dangerous to use the US military in that sort of role. So these kind of questions come up. And then, at the end of the last administration, when General Milley had to decide if he was going to perhaps support a diversionary attack by the president, when he contacted his Chinese counterpart to confirm that there was no military operation underway—is really an extraordinary event in the US civil-military relations history. It’s unlike anything we, I think we’ve ever seen since the very tumultuous days of the Vietnam War, when the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, and President Johnson were trying to use the military and means and methods, which they disagreed. And if you read the book Fourth Star, there was almost a point in 1967, I believe it was, when the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff were about to resign in protest over the policies of the secretary of defense. I don’t think we’ve reached a point as bad as that until recently. And for these reasons, it’s really important to understand and revisit not just a theory, but also the practical guidelines of civil-military relations in the United States. (Host) This was a real pleasure. Thank you for joining me. Thank you for your contribution to Parameters. Listeners, if you’re interested in diving a little bit deeper into “Civil-Military Relations: Guidelines in Politically Charged Societies,” I urge you to read the article. Paterson includes quotes, insights, and examples that we did not cover in this episode. You can find it at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 52, issue 1. Author information: Dr. Patrick Paterson is a professor of practice of national security studies in the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. He completed his PhD in conflict resolution at Nova Southeastern University. He has a master’s degree in national security studies from the Naval Postgraduate School, a master’s equivalent from the Argentina Naval War College in Buenos Aires, and a master’s degree in political science from American University. His latest book, The Blurred Battlefield (2021), addresses the need for hybrid doctrines on the use of force for Latin American militaries combating violent crime groups. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, or any other major podcasting platform.   show less

Does it matter if more countries have nuclear weapons? Will the weaponization of space make nuclear weapons less of a threat or even obsolete? In this podcast, author Henry D. Sokolski gives an overview of his monograph, Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future, and explores potential future nuclear trends.

Read the monograph: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/933/

Episode Transcript

Stephanie Crider (Host)

(Prerecorded Decisive Point intro) Welcome to... read more

Does it matter if more countries have nuclear weapons? Will the weaponization of space make nuclear weapons less of a threat or even obsolete? In this podcast, author Henry D. Sokolski gives an overview of his monograph, Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future, and explores potential future nuclear trends. Read the monograph: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/933/ Episode Transcript Stephanie Crider (Host) (Prerecorded Decisive Point intro) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. The guests in speaking order on this episode are: (Guest 1: Henry D. Sokolski) (Host) Decisive Point welcomes Mr. Henry D. Sokolski, author of Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future, published by the US Army War College Press in 2018. Sokolski is the executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Washington, DC. He previously served in the Senate as a nuclear military legislative aide, in the Pentagon as deputy for nonproliferation policy, and as a full-time consultant on proliferation issues in the secretary of defense’s Office of Net Assessment. Welcome, Henry. Let’s dive right in. In your 2018 book Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future (Second Edition), you cover a lot of ground. Please give our listeners a brief overview of the book. (Sokolski) The reason I wrote the book was, you know, any serious social scientific field—economics, demographics, political science—they all use what they know about the past to give you a bird’s-eye view of what they think the future will be. And I noticed that there was really no book that took the matter of nuclear weapons and projected into the future. The military science, if you will, of nuclear proliferation was a blank sheet. I took it upon myself to try to take a look at maybe, you know, a half-century, a little more than a half-century, and asked, you know, “What trends do we see?” And based on those trends, and assuming they continue, where are we going to be, you know, in 10 or 20 years? So, I focused on, detailed, four trends. And the trends that I found that were interesting is that the difference between the largest and smallest nuclear weapons arsenals has gotten much, much smaller. It used to be that what we had, which was at one point, during the Cuban missile crisis, 25,000 nuclear weapons, was easily an order of magnitude more than what the Russians had, which was 2,500, and what they had was again another order of magnitude more than the British had—actually two orders of magnitude. So there was, like, a thousandfold difference between the largest arsenal and the smallest at the time. Now the difference is about one order of magnitude. Russia and the United States have thousands. The smallest arsenals that we know of now are about 100 or thereabouts. Another trend is that the amount of surplus weapons and civilian materials that could be quickly converted into bombs—that’s highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium—there used to be almost zero. Everything that we had and the Russians had went immediately into weapons. There was very little civilian activity in the way of power reactors. And so, there wasn’t a civilian stockpile or any surpluses. Everything went into weapons. Or naval reactors. Well, that’s changed. Now there’s tens of thousands of bombs’ worth of highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium. Not only in military stockpiles on reserve in the United States, Russia, France, and Great Britain, but there is civilian stockpiles of separated plutonium in places like Japan. And you can change or convert this material into weapons reasonably quickly. And you’re talking about thousands of weapons’ worth. Well, that’s different, and that’s new. The third trend was the ability to make this stuff. It used to be there was only two places: Russia and the United States. Well, three. And Great Britain. Well, now there’s lots of places, comparatively, that are separating plutonium or enriching uranium. The ability to make a large amount of this stuff reasonably quickly with these machines and plans is totally new compared to half-century or so ago. And then, finally, the number of states that have long-range, nuclear-capable missiles has changed. It used to be Russia and the United States were the only ones that had them. And now 31 nations have them. And if you take the range yards of these missiles, and you just draw them from where they’re based, it’s very disturbing where they overlap. They overlap in places where there’s a history of war or fear and loathing of wars: Eastern Europe, Middle East, Pakistan, India, and East Asia. Well, that’s new as well. So reviewing these trends I sort of concluded that it was a mistake to celebrate how relatively fewer nuclear weapons there are, and there are a lot fewer. I mean, we got rid of, and the Russians got rid of, at least for deployed weapons, we had up to, together, something like 70,000 weapons. Well, today that number is several thousand. So there’s a big reduction. And a lot of people celebrate that, and they should. And people say, “Well, OK, there are a few more nuclear states than there were in 1950.” There are now nine, but that’s not too bad. I think emphasizing those points may be less than a complete thought. The reason why is this could change far more quickly today than at any time previously. You know those trends that I mentioned suggest that it only takes a few short years for the countries that have nuclear weapons to get a whole lot more, and countries that don’t have nuclear weapons to get not just, like, one or two, but, you know, maybe several score of them relatively quickly. Let’s add to this. They have a way of delivering these things to trouble spots and getting dragged into wars in trouble spots. And then you can add, there are some trends towards launching on warning, and certainly we’ve read about this recently in the case of China, and I think it’s been our policy in the US for at least a decade or two or three to probably do that ourselves. There certainly are doctrines for early use of nuclear weapons in places like Russia and Pakistan, possibly North Korea. Now all of this kind of makes you a little worried, I think, or it should, and I thought, “Well, this is an important message.” Now I don’t think any of the worst nuclear use or spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable. And I made some recommendations in the book principally focused on China, which at the time was considered a little edgy. I originally wrote this book about a decade ago. When I say, “the book,” or at least those two chapters—I wrote a version of it in an article or two. What really stunned me is how little attention my arguments had or got. At the time, going to zero was all the rage. So I decided to do another chapter on what other people thought. And there are three categories of thinkers. There are arms controllers who oppose nuclear weapons and see their spread as destabilizing. They want these things to be eliminated. The next group are the supporters of nuclear weapons. I guess you would call these people “hawks.” And they see the weapons, at least in current hands, as somehow stabilizing because deterrence. And they oppose the spread as well, but they say, “Well, if they’re friends, maybe it’s OK.” Then, finally, there’s academics. This group sees the spread of nuclear weapons to all nations either as stabilizing or inconsequential. The other thing that was odd was that it didn’t matter which group you looked at; none of them really said the commonsensical thing. And I think anyone would say, if they were untutored in these matters, and what would they say? Well, fewer weapons in fewer hands is better, but it’s really risky. You got to know what everyone’s doing. And if you don’t, you might not want to get rid of yours. (Host) What in the book has held up well? (Sokolski) Well, I guess the short answer is a lot. Quite an extensive discussion in the book about two trends that needed practical policy attention and were focused upon in the recommendation section. One of the trends that I highlight is this spread and the further building of facilities in support of what’s called “a fast reactor.” And these machines are designed to use fast neutrons. It is a terrific machine if you want to make weapons. I noticed that this idea was something that the Chinese were toying with, the Russians had played with a lot. We have put it aside until recently, and it has enormous military applications. You get into this, and the breakout period and the amount of material that you can convert into bombs, in the first instance, will be very short. And there’ll be a lot of material. Do you really want to go down this route unless it’s clearly economic, which it clearly is not. I then focused a little bit on China. If you get the latest copy of China Military Power from the Pentagon—they do this annually—it cites a Western think tank that did a study pointing out just how many nuclear weapons China could have in about eight years if it exploited its civil nuclear program with regard to fast reactors and the recycling of the material. Well, the numbers were stunning, even under conservative assumptions. And they cited those numbers and took them on and made them official. And the number was at least 1,000 nuclear weapons by 2030, which is not that many years from now. That puts China roughly with the United States and Russia, as far as the number of deployed strategic warheads, possibly. And of course, we’ve seen, recently, photographs where they’ve made 350 silos. We’re now worried about this, so that projection of that concern in the book from a decade ago turned out to be pretty good. (Host) What has changed since then that deserves mention? (Sokolski) In the second edition, I touch upon forms of diplomacy that might make sense. I’m not sure how viable those forms of diplomacy are now, given the bad relations with China and with Russia. Maybe that’s wrong. I think you’re still going to have to have diplomatic positions on the controllers. Strategic weaponry, if only to have a position that you and your allies can unify around and to identify bad behavior that even if the Russians and Chinese don’t agree to, they will know that we will take umbrage if they go over certain lines. More important than what may or may not be found is what was missing. There was some discussion in that diplomatic section of what would constitute bad behavior in space. You know, maybe we want to start saying, “You can’t get your satellites very close to our most important military satellites.” Maybe we need safety zones, or they sometimes call them “keep-out zones” or “defense zones.” I don’t think it was a complete thought in the book though. And what wasn’t a complete thought was—let me be clear—was that space technology and missile technology has become very accurate and very plentiful and very widely available in the form of drones, if not ballistic missiles. Those developments, I think, may be really important to thinking about the future of nuclear weapons. Let me explain. In 1915, at Passchendaele, the killer app, the strategic weapon par excellence, was chemical weapons. Seventy-five years later, it was so far into the background—we have them, but nobody thought we would use them that much . . . was not considered to be the top-dog strategic weapon anymore. During the 20s, we imagined that chemical weapons would be dropped by airplanes and decide the war overnight. None of that ultimately was the case. Similarly, in 1915, battleships were the thing. But certainly, after the Second World War, battleships were nothing as compared to aircraft carriers. So what happens is military science changes what is militarily or strategically important as a weapon. And the question is: Could that happen with regard to nuclear weapons? I think, to some extent, it’s actually happening. In the case of space, what’s happening is the front lines of strategic deterrence are gravitating away from the surface of the Earth into space. Our eyes, ears, voices, and our nervous system for both our civil and military systems on the ground are all based in space. If we lose access to those things or those things are disabled, it doesn’t matter what our military strength on the ground is, nuclear or nonnuclear. And so I think the opening rounds of combat in the future may very well be in space. Now, you could say that’s kind of good news because, first, we have an advantage there that I think we can exploit. But, in addition, you’re not killing people. The model for nuclear weapons, after all, came from the air-war series of the 1920s. And that was if you could bomb away the military capital; the industrial capital; and maybe, literally, the capital—political capital—of the country, and do that quickly with bombers, you would win. And if you could threaten to do that credibly, you could get your way without fighting. Well, we’re moving toward new forms of warfare where you could disable a nation without doing that level of decimation. We’re seeing this a little bit in the Ukraine war, although the Russians are behaving as though it’s medieval period and they’re in siege tactics. But the Ukrainians are taking out individual generals with drones; they’re taking out tanks and armor with individual drones which are highly precise. And they’re using intelligence to maintain control of the narrative of the war. It is far less destructive a war. If we are moving in that direction, precision and space-based advanced systems and control of space become terribly important in a way that might make nuclear weapons about as relevant as the top weapon as chemical weapons became after the Second World War, which is to say a lot less. Now, that’s a pretty optimistic view, but I think it has to be articulated, and I don’t think it was before. (Host) You’ve written several things on new-generation warfare and precision strike. How might they alter the key points of your book? (Sokolski) Yes. One article was “Doctor Strangelove’s New Passion: Precision-Guided Mayhem,” which talks about the revolution in precision guidance and how original theories about it may have been a little off. And the second was something called, “Are We Ready for the Next Convulsion?” I don’t think the book did justice to any of those things because I don’t think I had those thoughts. (Host) It’s incredible how quickly these things evolve. (Sokolski) The Russians were writing about new-generation warfare for some time. What’s odd is that we thought they were masters of disinforming, spooking folks, using precision-guided munitions to take out certain nodes and that they would show this in the war against Ukraine. Well, that didn’t happen. But they had been writing about that for some time. I was not familiar with that literature, and I think, to be honest, it was a little confusing when I did read it, and so it was easy not to understand it, but I think maybe we didn’t pay enough attention to it ourselves, and now we are. (Host) The clock has run out on us, I’m afraid. This was a pleasure, Henry. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, and any other major podcast platform. Author information: Henry D. Sokolski is the executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, Washington, DC. He previously served in the Senate as a nuclear and military legislative aide, in the Pentagon as Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy, and as a full-time consultant on proliferation issues in the Secretary of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment. Mr. Sokolski also served as a member of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Senior Advisory Group, on two Congressional nuclear proliferation commissions, and has authored and edited numerous volumes on strategic weapons proliferation, including Best of Intentions: America’s Campaign against Strategic Weapons Proliferation. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, or any other major podcasting platform.   show less

Early in academic year 2018, a group of US Army War College faculty and students came together in pursuit of an integrated research project devoted to an examination of contested deployment and the growing realization the US homeland can no longer be considered an inviolable zone in preparing for war. Expecting free movement of forces in mobilization, movement to ports of embarkation, and deployment against the nation’s adversaries is beneath reason. Two oceans and benevolent neighbors to... read more

Early in academic year 2018, a group of US Army War College faculty and students came together in pursuit of an integrated research project devoted to an examination of contested deployment and the growing realization the US homeland can no longer be considered an inviolable zone in preparing for war. Expecting free movement of forces in mobilization, movement to ports of embarkation, and deployment against the nation’s adversaries is beneath reason. Two oceans and benevolent neighbors to the north and south can no longer be considered a significant buffer against internal and external enemies. Adversaries of the United States will seek to disrupt or disable the movement of its forces long before they can be placed in combat against foes overseas, and the nation must be prepared for this opposition. Read the IRP: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/948/   show less

The lessons of counterinsurgency have deeper implications for cyber conflict than previous research has identified. Two decades of experience in Iraq and Afghanistan provide insights into the cyber strategy of defending forward including treating major cybersecurity and technology companies as host-nation partners and focusing on winning the hearts and minds of global netizens.
Read the original article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol50/iss3/9/

Episode... read more

The lessons of counterinsurgency have deeper implications for cyber conflict than previous research has identified. Two decades of experience in Iraq and Afghanistan provide insights into the cyber strategy of defending forward including treating major cybersecurity and technology companies as host-nation partners and focusing on winning the hearts and minds of global netizens. Read the original article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol50/iss3/9/ Episode Transcript Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Jason Healey, author of “A Bizarre Pair: Counterinsurgency Lessons for Cyber Conflict,” featured in the autumn 2020 issue of Parameters. Healey is a senior research scholar at Columbia University School for International and Public Affairs, specializing in cyber conflict, competition, and cooperation. This episode of Decisive Point reexamines Healey’s article through the lens of Russia and Ukraine. The guests in speaking order on this episode are: (Guest 1: Jason “Jay” Healey) (Host) Welcome back to Decisive Point, Jason. Let’s talk about your 2020 article “A Bizarre Pair: Counterinsurgency Lessons for Cyber Conflict.” That is a bizarre pair. Can you lay the groundwork for us, please? (Healey) Sure, absolutely. Cyber has long been realized, back to at least the early 90s, as an interesting method of irregular warfare. Some of the very first writing on this—people like John Arquilla and Dorothy Denning and Winn Schwartau—would write about how technology-dependent societies are going to be open to asymmetric attack because of these cyber vulnerabilities and cyber capabilities—especially the United States, which has historically had these oceans, and we didn’t have to worry about direct attack—that adversaries could use cyber as irregular warfare to affect us. In fact, we could use cyber as irregular warfare against them. We could have advantages by being a high-tech power. And so that aspect had been relatively well written about. The effects of it were maybe exaggerated; we thought maybe cyber would have more impact then, in the 90s, than we do 20-odd years later. But the ideas were relatively well baked. What I was trying to do with this article is to flip that around—to say, we’re 20-plus years into fighting irregular warfare ourselves, especially counterinsurgency and civil wars, so what can we take from those hard-won lessons? To think and apply them to fighting and winning in cyberspace. (Host) You laid out some pretty specific lessons. Can you walk us through those? What lessons can cyber take from counterinsurgency? (Healey) The lessons that I took—of saying, “Boy, what can we learn about how to win in cyberspace based on the lessons from irregular warfare”—really fit in three areas. The least interesting, I thought, was on deception: For both cyber and irregular warfare, the attackers are relying on deception to succeed. That was a parallel, but I wasn’t quite sure what we take from that. The other two, I thought there were stronger recommendations. First is that cyber conflict really depends on the host nation. Now, the host nation in this case isn’t an actual nation; it is the technology companies, the main cybersecurity companies that are out there. And they are creating and maintaining the terrain of cyberspace. I had helped set up the very first cyber command back in 1998. One of my friends from there went on to Verizon. And he said, “Jay, every day at Verizon and the other big tech companies and carriers, we are creating new cyberspace. We can bend cyberspace if we need to.” And governments and militaries can’t do that. The US military is great at spying and shooting back and maybe sharing information that we’ve learned from spying. But that’s about it. Whereas these companies—the Verizons, the AT&Ts, Deutsche Telekom, PCCW, CrowdStrike, Mandiant, Microsoft, Google—they have this incredible role that they can play that is really—you could think about it as supported command, or, with a different mindset, as the host nation. They can do things. And it’s almost always better for them to do it than for the military to do it themselves. So one lesson was on deception. The other was the role of the private sector as host nation. The third was to me less clear, but, I think, suggestive. And that’s the role of firepower. In a normal military fight, such as in Ukraine in 2022, more firepower is a pretty good thing. For example, for the Ukrainians, more firepower leads to better battlefield outcomes. And yet we’ve learned over 20 years that’s not always true when you’re in a civil war or you’re in an insurgency. Applying more firepower might create more enemies than you’re taking off the battlefield. It’s not always true; we don’t always know where it’s true or not. And that may be true for cyber conflict. It might be true that if we say, “Oh, look at what the Russians are doing; look at what the Chinese are doing. This is unacceptable”—our unleashing the military, our giving fewer rules or looser rules of engagement, fewer points and fewer reasons for them to have to check into the White House for oversight, less having to check back to say, “Hey boss, I’ve got this shot. Do you want me to take it?”—that might help us impose friction on our adversaries, which is the current military strategy. Defend forward, persistent engagement: That might be successful in winning particular tactical engagements. But it might not be correlated to actually winning in cyberspace. And in fact, past a certain point, it might be negatively correlated, and, by taking these shots, we are causing them to just build back better. Because in cyberspace, it looks like offense is relatively inexpensive. So by pushing back hard, it might just engender a reaction where they come back worse. Or we’re taking these shots, and the shots we’re taking are on allies. We’re taking down Russia, but they happen. Now, in the military, we call it gray space. But gray space means computers in Germany and Amsterdam and Thailand and Japan or in India—countries that we would like to be on our side. But by using the euphemism of gray space and applying military power, by taking these shots and by defending forward, we might not be convincing these countries that we have their best interests at heart. (Host) Thank you. You also offered several recommendations for going forward. Can you address those for us here? (Healey) The first one is a point that I’ve been making for a while. I had written the first military history of cyberspace, the kind of thing I would have liked when I was a military officer. One of the ways we learn how to be good at what we do is by learning history. I mean, that’s what makes institutions like yours so great: We look back at history to teach officers today. What would you do if you were walking the fields of Gettysburg? How would you handle this? So, I did this military history of cyber conflict, and it astounded me that almost zero cyber conflicts were ever decisively resolved by government—any government anywhere, much less by militaries. The only exceptions were where it was only the military or government itself that was being affected. Every other case where it was a larger cyber conflict, it was always the private sector—and I’ll stick by the word “always”—that was able to decisively resolve the issue. So, to me, we’ve got a significant lesson to learn: How can the military, if it wants better solutions than this, how can it work with buy-in through the host nation of these technology companies that are in the position? To switch the metaphor, there are nine players on the field; when the ball is hit, it’s almost always going be a company in the private sector that’s in the position to make the play. Now they might not be able to see the ball very well when it’s hit to them. We can help with intelligence. They might not have the skills to make the play. We can help with that. We can do exercises. We can help. They might not have a glove. That’s OK. We can help them with capabilities. But what we shouldn’t do—and this is what (the National Security Agency or) NSA did for years and (United States) Cyber Command did for years—was trying to push them out of the way and say, “I’ve got it. I’ve got it. The US government, the US military is here. And we will make the play. This play will be made at Fort Meade, Maryland, and your job is just to share information with us and tell us about the problem.” Now, that gets to a big civil-military relations issue. Because in the military we are not trained to think about civilians, the private sector, in a way that says they play a critical role in fixing this. It just doesn’t fit into that (Samuel P.) Huntington role of what a professional officer does and what the role of the military does. So we’ve got this substantial civil-military issue to try and get our enlisted, our officers, and especially our general officers to see this issue differently and to see the private sector as allies; to not denigrate them as just, “Well, they only want profit. But we in the military, our values are better because we’re out for national security, and they’re just out for profit.” It’s not a helpful attitude. (Host) Let’s apply your article and all the things that we’ve talked about to Russia and Ukraine, China and Taiwan. What are your thoughts on that? (Healey) The article, I think, is a bit less useful for Russia and Ukraine. Because there, it’s not irregular war; it’s real war. So, we have to switch to the mindset of saying, “OK, under what circumstances can cyber be effective on the battlefield? What missions is it able to do well, and what can we expect next?” Many of my colleagues have been a bit mystified that cyber hasn’t played a better role, more of a role, on the Russian side. And for the most part, I think that mysticism of why the Russians haven’t been better at cyber is pretty similar to why they haven’t been effective at anything. It’s not like they’ve been so great in Ukraine, and their air forces work, and their armor is working. Well, no, they’ve been suboptimal—which is academic speak for “They stink”—across almost every single one of their missions. Maybe artillery would be an exception. And so, perhaps it’s no surprise that cyber hasn’t been as effective as we would have thought. They didn’t do the preparation necessary for cyber capabilities to have the effect. They didn’t do that preparation because many of them didn’t know a war was coming. And even if they did think a war was coming, they thought it was going to be fast. So now where I think you’re seeing many of the cyber experts looking is, “OK, we’re waiting for the other shoe to drop,” now that the sanctions are hitting, now that Russia’s economy is disentangled from that of the West. Beforehand, why would Putin ever want to disrupt the energy markets of the West or the financial system of the West? Well, now, he might as well do it. Because there’s not going to be any blowback on him. So, I think if we don’t see those kinds of attacks in the next three to six months, we’re going to have to really question whether cyber has the potency that we thought it did—at least in 2022. Now, for those that argue cyber is irregular warfare or for cyber as irregular warfare, boy, there’s a ton to learn on this. The Ukrainian (information technology or) IT army, one of their digital ministers is daily coming out and nominating targets for Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians to attack. And many of those targets aren’t just Russian; they’re grocery stores that are still operating in Russia. Wow, a lot of lessons for people that want to study cyber as a tool for asymmetric warfare! (Host) What about China and Taiwan? (Healey) Well, I think the arguments that I make in that article are best under certain geopolitical conditions. Because whenever we look at “OK, is cyber escalatory or not? Is cyber effective or not? Does it help you coerce an adversary or not?” It comes down to “OK, well, are you in a state of crisis or a state of relative peace?” And I think we as scholars haven’t been good at analyzing those conditions. So I think there’s a lot of case there on how China has been using cyber as a tool of asymmetric warfare against Taiwan. Are there lessons based on my article for can Taiwan succeed, you know, being informed by irregular warfare and how they respond? Possibly. I think the argument, for example, about the host nation—they have got a different relationship with their companies than we do. A lot of the companies that matter in this space are American and not Taiwanese, though the Taiwanese have a lot in that space. So yeah, I do think there would be quite a bit in the article to study that. (Host) Do you have any final thoughts before we go? (Healey) Yes, and this gets down to firepower. Remember I said, “I think it’s pretty definite, on the evidence, that we can see the private sector as the supported commander, as the host nation.” That’s pretty established. What’s less established is whether or not there’s a point where more firepower leads to worse national security results. And I think this really comes into how the White House and others can look at (United States) Cyber Command’s missions of defend forward, of persistent engagement. If I were back at the White House, I would have said, “OK, we’ll will give you these additional authorities. We’ll give you the agility you ask for so that you can defend forward. But you have to tell us, you have to be very clear, how will we know this is winning? If we give you these new authorities, this new agility, these looser rules of engagements, what are the results going to look like? And are we going to see the results in two years? Are we going to see the results in four years? Are we going to see the results in 20 years?” Because it has been four years. This happened in 2018. I suspect they ought to have something to show for it by now and not just successful engagements, not just “We took this action, and we disrupted this adversary operation,” right? We’ve learned from 28 years of Iraq and Afghanistan, you can win all the tactical engagements you want; that doesn’t relate to the national security results that you promised the policymakers. And so, I think we really need to do better. (United States) Cyber Command needs to do better, at least than it seems to be, about what’s the criteria for success. How long should we expect results? And that way, we can more definitively answer, “What’s this impact of firepower, of increased cyber capabilities, on the national security results of security and stability that we said we were going to do this for? We said we were going to do this to defend forward for persistent engagement.” (Host) Thanks so much, Jay, for your time and for sharing your insights on this topic. This was a real pleasure. (Healey) Hey, thank you. (Host) If you have enjoyed this podcast and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, and any other major podcast platform. About the author: Jason Healey, senior research scholar and adjunct faculty at Columbia University’s School for International and Public Affairs, is the editor of A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, or any other major podcasting platform.   show less

his article provides background and context for regional trends and historic agreements focused on the Nile River Basin, offers a comprehensive assessment of security challenges, and presents focus areas for future investment and cooperation. The policy recommendations will serve American interests better and improve agricultural practices in the region. Without a marked alteration of existing aid from Western countries, the water scarcity situation will continue without producing the... read more

his article provides background and context for regional trends and historic agreements focused on the Nile River Basin, offers a comprehensive assessment of security challenges, and presents focus areas for future investment and cooperation. The policy recommendations will serve American interests better and improve agricultural practices in the region. Without a marked alteration of existing aid from Western countries, the water scarcity situation will continue without producing the required infrastructure improvements. Read the original article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss1/8/ Episode Transcript Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The guests in speaking order on this episode are: (Guest 1 Gerald J. Krieger) (Host) Decisive Point welcomes Colonel Gerald J. Krieger, author of “Water Wars of the Future: Myth or Reality?,” featured in Parameters’ Spring 2022 issue. Krieger works at US Army Forces Command. Previously, he served as an associate dean of strategic studies at the National Defense University of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He has published several articles on wide-ranging topics and is primarily interested in international relations, with a focus on the greater Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and the South China Sea and US foreign policy in these regions. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. First, I really just want to thank you for joining me today. I’m glad you’re here, and I’m excited to talk about your article, “Water Wars of the Future: Myth or Reality?” It dials in on the Nile River basin and the security challenges there. It offers policy recommendations that will serve American interests better and improve agricultural practices in that region. Can you lay the groundwork for us? How do things like population growth and climate change affect this topic? (Krieger) Well, when most people think of the Nile River basin, or NRB, water scarcity is not something that comes to mind. It almost seems counterintuitive that there would be areas . . . and water is going to be an issue in the basin because it’s the second-longest river in the world. However, that’s not quite true. Egypt, for example, is one of the most arid countries. And some around the region get very little—up to 10 millimeters a year—of rainfall. So, climate change is exacerbating water access issues in already-arid regions. In addition, population growth around the planet is going to approach nine billion by 2050, based on UN estimates. That Nile River basin is expected to double and approach nearly one billion people in that region alone. Egypt’s population, with 100 million people, is expected by 2030 to hit 128 million. So all of these things are contributing factors. Just seven years ago, for instance, in sub-Sahara (sub-Saharan) Africa, not necessarily just the Nile River basin, there were 783 million people without access to clean drinking water, which adds to health and nutrition issues and things like that. And climate change, irregular rainfall patterns, can cause floods, which, obviously—loss of life and devastating consequences. So then droughts, multiyear droughts in particular, in the Nile River basin alone, there’s 300 million people living on less than a dollar a day. So, they’re on that cusp of existence, you know, where little things kind of add up and make a huge difference over time. And, in particular, if you look at climate change and projected patterns and different models, temperature in Egypt . . . expected to increase about two degrees Celsius over the next century. So there are patterns where people are living right now that it’s going to be more challenging in the future. And then, millions of tons of carbon dioxide and greenhouse gases in the atmosphere only contribute to these patterns, making things less predictable, impacting the level of the Nile River. These variability water levels impact the livelihoods of people. People up and down the river for generations have relied on fishing, for instance, and that’s gone away. If you look just from a holistic standpoint, there are rivers that are drying up. And Africa, as things are changing . . . we’re talking about dams in this. And that’s one thing that impacts the water levels—sediment, things like that. We’ll talk about that. But these annual cycles and, you know, rainfall patterns that originate in Ethiopian Highlands—they generate about 80 percent of the Nile’s total flow. The White Nile originates in Lake Victoria, and the Blue Nile, in Ethiopia. And both meet in Khartoum. And 97 to 98 percent of Egypt’s water supplies come from the Nile. And we haven’t done enough studies about the silt that has come down for centuries that have kind of provided some fertilizers and things for some of the farming areas that’s been changed, right, because there are a number of dams. (Host) So there are some other things that kind of come into play here, maybe some historic agreements that play a part and shape what’s going on in the Nile River basin. Can you walk us through the most relevant of those? (Krieger) In 1929, they guaranteed a certain amount of water from the Nile for Egypt to use for cotton because cotton was a huge industry when the British controlled the region, and they fed the textile mills in London. So the Nile water agreement of 1929, British-Egyptian treaty, stipulated no project would take water away from the Nile to prejudice the interests or reduce the quantity of water arriving into Egypt. And that’s key. However, when Sudan gained independence in 1956, it was concerned that Egypt’s second dam, the Aswan High Dam, wouldn’t abide by the agreement. So tensions between Egypt and Sudan escalated. In 1959, they resolved it, signing a full utilization of the Nile agreement, and they specified that Egypt would receive 5.5 billion cubic meters a year, and Sudan, 18.5. More recently, in 1999, all of the riparian communities came together—Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (the Congo), Egypt, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya—and they created a Nile Basin Initiative to promote constructive dialogue, training, education for farmers, sustainable water practices, and they wanted to cooperate. But this is built on trust, and this broke down very quickly. Egypt and Sudan never signed the agreement because they wanted a special veto to make sure international law was enforced. They want that veto power because they’re trying to protect their historic rights and things like that. So, they’re not going to sign. Although they still participate. But the key in all of this is trust. And I think that underpins both the NBI and then the use of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Sustainable practices impact the entire community. It’s not just one country. So the community does recognize that. They just get bogged down in some of these details and control. They do recognize the need for better water agricultural practices, but I think if we push the NBI, getting that foundation or springboard—and, again, Egypt and Sudan are kind of key—it can help us as we negotiate with Ethiopia. Sudan is kind of caught in the middle, but between Ethiopia and Egypt on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam about coordinating discharges during droughts because there are multiple dams. And then, once you recover from a drought, obviously, you’ve got to fill, so you’re going to have to retain some of those waters, which is going to impact everyone else downstream. (Host) So you’ve mentioned the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam a couple times now. Explain it to us. (Krieger) The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, or GERD, was completed in July of 2020. It is significant for a couple reasons. It’s the tenth-largest dam in the world. Thirteen turbines can produce five gigawatts of electricity, which is 2.5 times larger than the US Hoover Dam, just by scale. It’s a big project, it’s got a big impact. Egypt currently operates the Aswan Dam and the High Aswan Dam, and Sudan has six other dams on the Nile River basin. By far, obviously, this one is the largest. And one question that keeps coming up is: Will Ethiopia be willing to release enough water downstream to mitigate droughts in long term? But on the other side of it, it’s going to be when they’re recovering after a multiyear drought, and they’ve got to get their water levels back up in the dams to produce electricity and things. You know, who’s going to have priority, and how is that process going to go? They’ve got to coordinate this, and now is the time to get the agreement before it’s too late, because it’s going to cause friction. (Host) The future and regional, strategic implications here: Is there anything else significant that we need to address about that? (Krieger) There are probably three key areas that could be instrumental for the next century. The first is the effective use of dams to control water during floods and provide electricity, but, more importantly, serve as an insurance policy against drought in times of climatic stress. The second is better agricultural practices. And the last includes stewardship policies and infrastructure to manage water as a resource. Along with these changes, the US can encourage the riparian states to sign the Nile Basin Initiative to work on better use of, and management of, the water in the future. This can provide a springboard of trust between Egypt and Ethiopia that can help get an agreement between the GERD and, you know, establish a framework that can be used in the future. Dams can provide water and security for people in the Nile River basin. It’s clean. We don’t have to worry about contributing to the environmental impact. Two hundred fifty-seven million people in 2016 didn’t have access to electricity, you know, and it’s going to grow to 650 million by 2030. Ninety percent of these are going to be in sub-Sahara (Sub-Saharan) Africa. So, we’ve got opportunities for green solutions. And I do think dams can be one way that they do that, but it’s just got to be part of a comprehensive system, coordinated among everyone impacted, which, in the Nile River basin, there are a number of countries. (Host) Do you have any final thoughts to wrap this up? (Krieger) I think that Africa has got so much land that’s not being utilized. They require rain, you know, to sustain so many of their crops. If we just flip that—I don’t remember off the top of my head, but I think probably 80 to 90 percent of their agriculture is all rain-fed, and if we can switch that and get some irrigation systems, I think we can get their yields up. Once you have the yields up, you can produce more. But they have more land, agricultural land, that’s untapped, and it just could provide a number of countries with food sources. And you do know that there are different regions and countries, you know, you’ve got the (United Arab Emirates or) UAE and Saudi Arabia that are getting crops imported from there. But we’ve just got to look at the overall practice and make sure that we don’t use water-intensive crops in regions that can’t, where it’s not sustainable long-term. So, when we look at whatever we’re introducing, we’ve got to look at the next 10 to 20 years down the road as we introduce different agricultural products. (Host) We just really scratched the surface of such a broad and important topic. Thank you again for your time. Thanks for your contribution to Parameters. Listeners, if this topic interests you, I encourage you to check out the article. (Krieger) Thank you for having me. I appreciate it. (Host) If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, or any other major podcasting platform.   show less

As women assume more combat roles in the US military and continue to operate in austere environments with varied mission sets, the Department of Defense must rethink its approach to equipment and uniform development to accommodate female anatomical differences. This podcast analyzes the results of a study conducted during the Sandhurst Military Skills Competition at the United States Military Academy to determine the effectiveness of commercial off-the-shelf products the Army has adopted to... read more

As women assume more combat roles in the US military and continue to operate in austere environments with varied mission sets, the Department of Defense must rethink its approach to equipment and uniform development to accommodate female anatomical differences. This podcast analyzes the results of a study conducted during the Sandhurst Military Skills Competition at the United States Military Academy to determine the effectiveness of commercial off-the-shelf products the Army has adopted to aid female urination—products used by competition participants that may not be the best or healthiest options for women. Read the original article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss1/5/ Episode Transcript Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. (Guest 1 Andrea M. Peters) (Guest 2 Michael A. Washington) (Guest 3 Lolita Burrell) (Guest 4 James Ness) (Host) Decisive Point welcomes Lieutenant Colonels Andrea M. Peters, Michael A. Washington, and Lolita Burrell, and Colonel James Ness—authors of “Rethinking Female Urinary Devices for the US Army,” featured in Parameters Spring 2022 issue. Peters serves in the United States Military Academy Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership. She holds a PhD in industrial engineering FOS human factors engineering from University of Miami. Washington serves in the United States Military Academy Department of Chemistry and Life Science. He holds a PhD in emerging infectious disease from the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences. Burrell serves in the United States Military Academy Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership. She holds a PhD in medical psychology from the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences. Ness serves in the United States Military Academy Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership and holds PhD in developmental psychology from Virginia Polytechnic Institute. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m glad you’re here. Our topic today is female urinary diversion devices, also known as FUDDs. Help us understand the issue (Peters) Absolutely, thanks Stephanie. The background of this study first came about when I was an (second-in-command officer or) XO for a engineer battalion with a infantry brigade. And so, during that time, when we were on convoys or we were jumping to a different site and we stopped within those locations, it was always a fight to find a place to urinate. And I had not felt that feeling of—not necessarily in that training environment—the lack of safety. But if I would have been deployed forward and how to do that, it would definitely be a sense of uncomfortableness, lack of safety, and then just concerned with what I was doing within that space of urinating in a host nation. And it kind of goes back to some of the pilot studies that I ended up doing later on in life for my PhD, which started around 2018. And some of my colleagues were actually talking about how when they were in Iraq, they were exposing themselves in the middle of a busy street—how there weren’t facilities around. And, so, putting together from 2015 up into that 2018–2019 timeframe, where I was doing some of my pilot studies, I really didn’t know if it was just a “me” problem and . . . and very specific to the units that I was in, or did this problem span across the Army for women, whether they were in combat zones or whether they were in training-type sites. And because of the feedback that we received, it was not just an exclusive, “me” problem. And, so, I desired to make it a little bit better for the women coming behind me. And so, with that, I’d like to pass it over to Colonel Ness if he’d like to jump in and hit the background as well. (Ness) Yes, I had the pleasure of being on Dr. Peters’s dissertation committee. She came and spoke with me, and she had numerous ideas. And then she came on and said, “Well, you know, the Army has the FUDD.” And I said, “Did they do field sanitation on this, or they just pull it off the shelf and give it to you?” And she said, “Oh. I don’t believe they did.” And then she just took it from there and did a phenomenal job. (Host) So, in your article, the study team leveraged the United States Military Academy fall squad competition (autumn squad lane competition), Sandhurst, to address the lack of systematically focused field tests regarding female urination tools and practices. The annual competition consists of 36 teams who face challenges that closely mimic real combat situations, and there’s usually one female cadet per team. What were your findings from this? (Washington) Yes, Colonel Peters approached me. I’m a microbiologist from the Department of Chemistry and Life Science at West Point. And she asked me if we can develop a study to look at whether or not pathogenic bacteria grow on these devices during military exercises. As you mentioned, the Sandhurst is a two-day event. So, it encompasses a wide variety of military skills, including ruck marching, marksmanship, obstacle courses—so, it’s very physically intensive. We took a group of female cadets. We issued them the FUDD devices. We swabbed them prior to use to determine what type of bacteria are normally present on the devices, and then we swabbed them after use to determine what type of bacteria grow on them in this intense physical environment. And what we found was that, initially, there was very few bacteria on the surface of the devices. There was, mainly, normal skin bacteria that you would expect on something that’s being handled by people. And then, after usage, we found a lot more bacteria, and some of those bacteria were potentially urogenital. (Peters) That was the microbial side, but I’d love for Colonel Burrell to hit on the survey that we also use. (Host) Absolutely. (Burrell) Thank you. So, after they complete it—Sandhurst—they fill out a survey regarding their thoughts about the devices—specifically, factors that may encourage or discourage use and that ultimately play a role in health readiness and performance. So, did they find them to be easy to use and clean? What about storing them? Were they durable? Was the design compatible with the unisex or alternate trouser? So, all of these things matter ’cause if the device exists, and they don’t feel comfortable using them for whatever reason, then they will sit on the shelf. And, thus, the health, the readiness, and the performance issues will continue to persist. And so, Colonel Peters, I think you were going to talk a little bit more too about the survey findings. (Peters) Yeah, absolutely. One . . . one of our major takeaways from the survey—obviously, the qualitative side of understanding some of the experiences of the women. I know my (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics or) STEM folks out there, they are wrapped around numbers, right, always want to hear numbers. But I think we’re—we really start understanding the problem is when we start listening to people. That ties into what we do here at the academy and engineering psychology. And it’s not just about engineering a device, but it’s about knowing what the person is going to actually use and how that’s going to accommodate them and relieve whatever issue it is that we’re trying to address. And so, within the survey, we had a seven-point Likert scale, and it went from extremely satisfied to extremely dissatisfied. And this talked about KPI—so, “key performance indicators”—related to the device. So, it could have been the ease of use, it could have been the carrying case—you know, multiple different things as it concerns the device. And what we found was overarching. Women wanted the device versus not having that device. But they were dissatisfied with the device based off of the basin size being too small because there was overflow when they attempted to use it. Also, the carrying cases with the two devices that are in the (General Services Administration or) GSA inventory leave a bit to be desired, based off of them being places to grow bacteria more than not so. Again, the size. Anything that deals with something below the belt—and, especially, in this realm, people want something that is smaller and compact, but it’s also easy to get to. And there was no place really to carry these devices, which also turned into somewhat of an issue. And the last thing that I’ll hit on is as we looked at the trousers—so, we have the unisex trouser and we had the alternate trouser. Well, prior to actually doing this study, the fly on the unisex trouser was actually shortened. Which makes it a whole lot harder to use a device like this that is now in the inventory. If we are further being limited—if you would, like, if you could hit on—one is a most concerning bacteria that we actually found on this device that would be great. (Washington) Yeah. So, one of the most concerning pathogens we found was this pathogen known as a Pseudomonas aeruginosa. That can cause urogenital infections, so it can ascend in the urogenital tract, and it can actually cause bladder infections. Uh, we also found an organism known as Proteus that’s concerning because Proteus has flagella, so it could actually swim. So, there’s a potential that if the device comes into contact with the skin, that it can migrate into the urogenital tract. Those are the two of the most concerning pathogens we found. But we also found the variety of normal skin flora and bacteria that are present in the soil. (Host) What recommendations did you come up with for the Army and its leaders? (Peters) We kind of took this a few different ways. You know, if the Army wanted to continue to move forward with the devices, there’s definitely certain things that we can do because we don’t believe that the devices need to be pulled off the shelf or anything like that. We’re definitely not saying that. What we do want people to understand is that there’s an increased risk as you use these devices if you’re not cleaning them correctly. So, some of the recommendation is that, yes, these devices be issued to women. And it might be—the best place that this may be appropriate for is basic training. And then, also the women who are currently in the military right now, that becomes an issued item where they can go to (the Central Issue Facility or) CIF and pick it up. But with those issued items, they also need to have appropriate cleaning protocol for the devices. There’s another piece that we talk about in the article and that’s really wrapping our heads around urination needs and really normalizing that this is a normal occurrence in a male or a female. And Colonel Ness is going to hit on this a little bit more, but there has to be a change in the attitude towards, I would say, hygiene, in regards to field sanitation as it relates to urination. It happens. We do it. But how do we make it a little bit easier for women to be able to do so and not feel as though people are judging them because they’re using this device? And I will surrender my time to Dr. Ness. (Ness) We have to embrace diversity. That’s really what the overall point is, because it provides us a tactical advantage of adapting to emerging, tactical environments. And the reason why I say that is because Mother Nature can’t predict the future. She does it with diversity. With species and within species. You just can’t have a, sort of, poster child, whatever, right? That’s not how it works. And so, if we expect to meet the challenges of the future, which we can’t predict, we need diversity ‘cause it is our necessary and sufficient cause for winning future things. So, diversity of soldiers means that groups of soldiers will have unique experiences. And those experiences have to be put to words, and, sometimes, they’re hard. We have to attend as leaders to the health and well-being of the soldiers. That’s foundational for our readiness. It’s also foundational for us to be able to then meet those environmental types of things ’cause they all have special types of accommodations, physiologically. Like, in particular, women generally aren’t as prone to high-altitude pulmonary edemas as men are. And, so, let’s say you have to do a quick recon in the Hindu Kush. I’ll send the women—until we get the men to work the acclimation. But that helps us with being agile. And we can’t make it a woman problem or whatever, you know, the . . . the group of individuals are. We need to listen, we need to get them involved. And this is an Army problem because the Army needs diversity to win. (Peters) I’ll finish up with—in the article, we have a lot of recommendations. And those recommendations were very thought out. And it is to help the Army not to beat up the Army, but to help us move forward and to help women be force multipliers versus reducing that force that, you know, that we always talk about. And it’s also to build that cohesion. And so, I’ll echo as well with what Colonel Ness is saying that this is an Army problem. This is not a female problem, and we have to embrace this along with many other things that we need to begin to look at that, in the past, has been taboo. And it needs to be addressed. And the education needs to be there, and people need to become more comfortable with this topic. Let’s normalize it, and let’s make sure that we take care of all of our soldiers. (Host) I’m afraid we have to end it here. Thank you so much, though, for joining me today and for your contribution to Parameters. (Peters) Thank you so much, Stephanie. (Host) If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, or any other major podcasting platform.   show less

In this podcast, COL Maximillian K. Bremer and Dr. Kelly A. Grieco apply concepts from their 2021 article “Air Littoral: Another Look” to current events in Russia and Ukraine.

Read the original article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss4/7/

Episode Transcript

Stephanie Crider (Host)

Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security... read more

In this podcast, COL Maximillian K. Bremer and Dr. Kelly A. Grieco apply concepts from their 2021 article “Air Littoral: Another Look” to current events in Russia and Ukraine. Read the original article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss4/7/ Episode Transcript Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Colonel Maximilian K. Bremer and Dr. Kelly A. Grieco, authors of “The Air Littoral: Another Look,” featured in the winter 2021–22 issue of Parameters. Bremer is the director of the Special Programs Division at Air Mobility Command. He’s a 1997 distinguished graduate of the US Air Force Academy. He has an (master of public policy or) MPP from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and an (master of applied arts and sciences or) MAAS from the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. Grieco is a resident senior fellow with the New American Engagement Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, which focuses on challenging the prevailing assumptions governing US foreign policy and seeks to develop effective solutions that preserve US security and prosperity. She received her PhD in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The guests in speaking order on this episode are: (Guest 1: Maximilian K. Bremer) (Guest 2: Kelly A. Grieco) (Host) Welcome back, Max and Kelly. The last time you were here, we talked about your 2021 article “The Air Littoral: Another Look.” For our listeners who maybe haven’t heard that episode or read the article, please just give us a brief recap on that piece. (Bremer) OK, Stephanie, thanks. And thanks for having us back for this follow-up. We’re both very excited to have this chat and really appreciate you and Parameters reaching out to us. Our original Parameters article talked about the area between the ground and the blue skies, and we refer to that as the air littoral—this region of transition that could be accessed from, and give access to, both the ground and the blue skies. It discussed what we saw as a progressively contested zone of transition, with this contestation coming from the increasingly democratized technology which allows improved access, persistence, and lethality in and through the air littoral. We then went on to ask what that meant for the future Joint Force. (Grieco) I think the important thing here is that this article was really about the changing character of conflict and identifying that this convergence of threats, new threats to air superiority in the air littoral, meant that we need to update doctrinal concepts. So, in the past, air superiority was either won or lost in what we’re calling “the blue skies.” And the blue skies are really where high-end fighters and bombers typically operate. And if you won air control—you won that battle for the blue skies—it typically conferred control at all altitudes. But what we’re seeing increasingly is that even if you win in the blue skies, it doesn’t mean that you’re going to actually have control of lower-altitude airspace. And as a result, we really need to update doctrinal concepts around air control and not just think of it in terms of being localized in time and lateral space, but also think about vertical control as well. And that’s really important, I think, for both the Air Force and the Army to be thinking about—to conceptualize this air-control challenge as a vertical dimension—and will actually be more challenging, I think, for the Army and Air Force, than some of the traditional air superiority challenges because it’s going to be in a space that both Air Force and Army are going to be increasingly operating in and therefore interacting and need to have a common concept of operations. (Host) Let’s look at this through the context of current world events in April 2022. Russia and Ukraine: What are the takeaways here for the US military as it relates to your article? (Bremer) Well, failure is an excellent instructor. And I personally prefer to learn from the failure of others rather than from my own failures and experience. So I think what we should be learning from is what failures we’ve seen—and, specifically, the Russian experience and the failures that they’ve seen as a result of the changes in the character of warfare, not necessarily the failures that we’re attributing to organizational or technological problems. In other words, we have to learn the right lessons from this. And I think there’s a few key ideas related to the air littoral that are worth fleshing out. First, the dominant narrative is that Russia’s early ground failures grew out of Russia’s failure to control the blue skies and take out Ukraine’s IADS, their integrated air defense system. And it’s true they didn’t follow the Western model and achieve traditional air superiority. But we don’t think that their problems would have been solved by doing so. Even if they had essentially unfettered access to the blue skies, they’d still have to address Ukrainian doctrinal innovations in the air littoral. Russian forces would still be coming under attack from . . . specifically, drones, but other things within the air littoral. The technologies allowing access to and persistence in the air littoral and the increasing spread of these technologies have changed the character of war by uncoupling littoral supremacy from the technologies that allow access to and persistence in the air littoral. And the increasing spread of those technologies has changed the character of war by uncoupling territorial superiority from the status of the airspace above, whether or not there’s air superiority above the air littoral. (Grieco) To echo what Max is saying, I think this war is really showing a smart actor, the Ukrainians, who are really innovative and smart about how they’re using the air littoral. And one of the things that I would just emphasize is a lot of the Western media coverage of the air war over Ukraine is very much focused on the blue skies and Russia’s failure to achieve air superiority in the blue skies. But if we imagine Russia had gained blue-skies air superiority, as Max was just saying a moment ago, there would still be a tremendous amount of competition in this air littoral which would be posing a threat to Russian Ground Forces. And so that’s really important because they still would not be able to deliver effective close-air support to protect their forces on the ground. There’s really, I think, two ways that we’re seeing the Ukrainians, in particular, maximize their competitive advantage in the air littoral. And the first is that they’re using their long-range, surface-to-air missile systems to essentially pose a constant threat in the blue skies. And so, it’s forcing Russian aircraft to fly lower into the air littoral to avoid that threat. But as soon as they fly into the air littoral, then they’re presented with a multitude of threats from the air littoral—particularly, these (man-portable air defense systems or) MANPADS, these shoulder-fired missiles. And they’re actually luring the Russians into that air littoral so they can take out aircraft. I think the second way that we’re also seeing it is it’s not just that they’re denying airspace, right? You know, Russians are flying a very small number, but about 200, sorties per day in open source. And most of those sorties are being flown, as a result, outside of Ukrainian territory, which is quite interesting. It’s not just that they’re denying airspace to the Russians; the Ukrainians are actively exploiting that littoral as well. They’ve been using these Turkish-made (Bayraktar) TB2 drones to really wreak havoc on Russian forces, using them to attack the Russian convoys and Russian ground troops. And we’ve seen, as we predicted a bit in the article, that detecting that drone threat is really hard; the Russians are really struggling with it. They can’t seem to detect these drones. And, as a result—this is something that I find particularly interesting—because they’re having so much trouble finding these, it’s another reason Russian aircraft are sometimes flying low. Those TB2 drones are almost luring them in. (Bremer) I completely agree. It’s fascinating that they’re sort of forcing Russian high-end fighters—the very expensive, exquisite capability that’s not easy to replace—down into a range where they can be addressed with relatively cheap weapons. And they’re doing it, as you point out, in two ways. First, they’re forcing them down to avoid the threat, the S-300s that are still kicking around out there. But they’re also luring them down there to find the TB2s and other things that they can’t see either from the ground or from the blue skies. So they have to go down there in order to support the ground forces. (Grieco) And I would just also note that these air littoral threats, they’re having so much trouble finding these mobile S-300s. Imagine the challenge of trying to find these MANPADS, these stingers that the United States and other countries are sending. These air littoral threats are even harder to sort of detect and be able to destroy in terms of trying to gain air superiority at those lower altitudes. (Host) It’s so interesting to me to hear the excitement in your voices at being able to apply all your theories and research to a real-world, although definitely tragic, event. Any final thoughts before we go? (Bremer) I think it’s important that we understand that just because the air littoral and the blue skies are becoming somewhat decoupled does not mean that they’re not interdependent. Air littoral control and blue-skies control must be addressed in different ways, and one doesn’t necessarily lead to the other. But they’re both of critical importance. We’re not arguing that we should drop the idea of air superiority in the blue skies—but rather, think about how that will interact with the air littoral. (Grieco) I think Max said that really well. And the only thing I would add is, just echoing you, Stephanie: This is a really tragic war. I think one caution, though, I would offer is that it’s easy right now, just given how badly the Russians have performed, to think that everything is about Russian failure and that there aren’t necessarily any lessons here. And I think it’s going to be challenging moving ahead because their performance has been so bad, but we want to really look at it and discern what are things that may be attributable to Russian organization problems, and what actually might be about a more fundamental change in the character of war. This is what Max and I are really trying to argue about the air littoral. (Host) Great point. Thank you both. It’s always a pleasure to chat with you. (Grieco) Thank you. (Bremer) Thanks, Stephanie. (Host) If you enjoyed this episode of Conversations on Strategy and would like to hear more, you can find us on any major podcast platform.   show less

In this podcast, Tor Bukkvoll revisits his 2016 Parameters, article and examines Russian Special Forces and their potential use in Ukraine today.

Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol46/iss2/4/

Episode Transcript:

Stephanie Crider (Host)

Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs.

The views and opinions expressed... read more

In this podcast, Tor Bukkvoll revisits his 2016 Parameters, article and examines Russian Special Forces and their potential use in Ukraine today. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol46/iss2/4/ Episode Transcript: Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. [Decisive Point] welcomes Dr. Tor Bukkvoll, author of “Russian Special Operations Forces in Crimea and Donbas,” featured in Parameters’ 2016 summer issue. Bukkvoll is a senior research fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. He’s a specialist on Russia and Ukraine, particularly in the areas of defense and security policy. The guests in speaking order on this episode are: (Guest 1: Tor Bukkvoll) (Host) Thank you so much for joining me, Tor. I’m really glad you’re here. We’re here to talk about your 2016 article, which opens with this sentence: “This article investigates the roles special operations forces (SOF) have fulfilled in Russian warfare against Ukraine—both in Crimea and in Donbas.” Please give us some background. Russian Special Operations Forces in Ukraine in the past—what do we need to understand here? (Bukkvoll) So what we need to understand, in terms of the role these forces have played in Russian policy towards Ukraine, is that they played a major—maybe the most important—role in the annexation of Crimea. And then, secondly, they played an important (but not so important) role in the warfare in Donbas. There may have been Russian Special Operations Forces in Ukraine, also, prior to the events of 2014. But I think it makes sense to start with the annexation of Crimea, because these forces played such an important role there. And that was, first of all, in terms of the so-called SSO, which in Russian stands for Sil Spetsial’nykh Operatsiy. This is a relatively new Russian special operations force that was firmly established in 2013 but had been built up for a number of years before that. What you should know is that in Soviet times, special operations forces tended to be more like what in the West would be called light elite infantry. So, the famous Spetsnaz forces that we heard so much about, they are more like the US (Army) Rangers than the US special operations forces like (First US Special Forces Operational Detachment) Delta and the (US Navy) SEALs and so on. But this new force, SSO, was particularly built on the example—or was supposed to be—the Russian “Delta Force.” Specifically, the Russian military referred to “Delta” when they talked about SSO. And in Crimea, this SSO force, they started their annexation by taking over the buildings or the parliament and the government in Crimea. And then they occupied those buildings for 24 hours—basically, it seems to me, from the sources I’ve seen, to check out what the Ukrainians would do at that time. Would they try to stop the annexation, or would they not? And the Ukrainians, for a number of reasons, did nothing or very little. And that became the first step in the annexation of the whole peninsula. And the SSO continue to play a big role here in cooperation with Spetsnaz GRU, which is the special operations forces of the Russian military intelligence. These are the “Rangers” forces I talked about before that then worked in tandem with the SSO to take over most of the Ukrainian military infrastructure on that peninsula. So this operation, taking place on 27th of February 2014, is today one of the most important operations that Russian Special Operations Forces have ever done. And President (Vladimir) Putin even named the 27th of February as the day of special operations forces in Russia for the years to come. That’s a relatively long answer on the role they played in the annexation of Crimea. Then later, special operations forces also played a significant role in the warfare in Donbas. So the warfare in Donbas from 2014 and onwards was partly a local initiative, but also very much a Russian government and Russian military initiative. In the warfare in Donbas that took place up until the current war, special operations forces did basically two things. They trained and fought together with the local forces. That’s the one thing. And then they also had the more special tasks. The empirical data for these is a little bit uncertain, but it seems that the special operations forces of the GRU also had as their job to liquidate commanders of the different units of the anti-Kiev opposition that the Russians did not like anymore. So, in the beginning, there were a lot of local commanders in Donbas that were kind of marionettes for the Russians. But then, gradually, these commanders became more and more dissatisfied with the line coming from Moscow. Russia just needed to get rid of them and put in other commanders of the rebellion, and that seems also to have been a job of the Spetsnaz GRU. So that’s broadly what they did both in Crimea and later in Donbas. (Host) How might Russian special forces be playing a role in what’s happening in Ukraine now? (Bukkvoll) Yeah, so it’s early to say. I mean, the empirical data we have so far are very scattered, scarce—and you don’t know really what to believe. Russia has closed down everything that consisted of independent reporting. Ukraine has much more of that. But at the same time, Ukraine is a party to the conflict, so you can’t really trust those sources either. The first answer will be that we don’t know much. But we know a couple of things. For example, we do know that the initial Russian aggression against Ukraine was supposed to happen very fast and with little use of kinetic force and that Russia expected Ukraine to fall, basically, in just a matter of days. The most important operation in all of this was the plan to take the airfield in Hostomel, north of Kiev, to bring Russian airborne forces to that airfield, and then to use that airfield as a springboard to go into the very center of Kiev and capture or even take out the political leadership of the country. And this was done by the airborne forces—or this was attempted by the airborne forces—and especially with the airborne forces’ own 45th Spetsnaz special operations forces brigade. So what they tried to do in Hostomel was to bring in Spetsnaz from the 45th brigade with helicopters to the airfield, take control of the airfield. Then the rest of the airborne forces or other parts of the airborne forces would follow on and land bigger troops with planes on the airfield. And then they would take Kiev from there. And it’s quite interesting. I found an article from one of the progovernment newspapers in Russia that actually described the whole operation and presented it as a victory. Obviously, that article had been written before the operation took place, assuming that everything would be OK. But then it wasn’t. Because the Spetsnaz that took the airfield, they lost the airfield; the airborne forces couldn’t land. And from there on, everything seems to have gone a bit south for the Russians. So that’s an important part of special operations forces used in this war. We know that they tried something similar also with other airports. And we should also mention that this attempt to take Kiev through the airport at Hostomel—that operation is very similar to, for example, how the Soviet Union took over control of Prague in Czechoslovakia back in 1968, and also somewhat similar to what the Russians did in Pristina, in Kosovo, in 1999. But I think, apart from that operation, the Spetsnaz in this war have basically been working in what in Ukrainian is called “DRGs”; that’s diversionary and intelligence-gathering groups. So they dress in civilian clothes and enter the different Ukrainian cities to do sabotage missions there and to bring intelligence back to the main forces. I think that’s more or less what we know about the role of Russian Special Operations Forces in this war at the moment. (Host) You made several points at the end of your article. There’s two of them that I was hoping we could talk about today. The first one is that we don’t want Russia to export its SOF model to other countries. What are your thoughts on that? (Bukkvoll) I wouldn’t say that Russia has done this a lot. Actually, the SOF model to some extent is—at least in the beginning and especially with the SSO—they tried to imitate your model. But they did help Ethiopia establish special operations forces in 2002 and 2003. That was probably more of a somewhat commercial endeavor; basically, the Ethiopians were ready to pay for this, and that was money that the Russians could use. But I think a more somber and problematic example is the cooperation between the SSO—the Sil Spetsial’nykh Operatsiy, this Russian “Delta Force”—and the Tiger division of (Bashar al-)Assad in Syria. Again, it’s hard to get details, but it does seem like the SSO has had a special responsibility for training, and also fighting with, Assad’s Tiger division in Syria. And that Tiger division seems to have been one of the most brutal of the Assad forces in that war. So I think this is something really to look into, if it’s possible to find more data on that. And I’m also thinking here, in this respect, that one thing is that Russia is using special operations forces to train forces like Assad’s Tiger division, but there you may also have the effect that the extreme brutality we’ve seen in the civil war in Syria—especially with this Tiger division—may also have a kind of an influence back on the Russians. I wouldn’t be surprised if Russian Special Operations Forces, as a result of what they have done in Syria, come back home, let’s say, more brutal and less disciplined than when they left. We don’t know this for certain, of course, but it is imaginable that will happen. I think those are the two main examples: the Ethiopia mission, which was more commercial, and then the Syria mission, which has been much more important and also sinister in a way. (Host) I’d like to bring up another point here. Unless there’s regime change, Russia’s relationships with many countries look like they will be be challenging for years to come. What are your thoughts here? (Bukkvoll) It depends on whether we have a regime change in Russia or not. But even if we have a regime change in Russia, it doesn’t necessarily lead to a Russia that is more easy to deal with than the one we have at present. So I am fearing a very difficult period for both the West and many other countries in how to deal with Russia. This is especially in terms of willingness to challenge both the West and to challenge other countries, which is obviously very strong at the moment. And I think we’re going into a different world than the one we had before the 24th of February this year. But another side of this is that they are not doing a good job in Ukraine. They are losing a lot of military capability. They may continue to lose a lot of conventional military capability simply because if they continue the war—and if the Ukrainians continue to fight as well as they have done so far, and we continue to provide them with weapons—we might actually grind down their Russian military capability to a significant degree. And also, if the sanctions continue after this war is over, it’s going to be difficult for Russia to have the money to rebuild that military capability quickly. So in terms of your question, I think that we should be very concerned, on the political side, in terms of Russian willingness to challenge the West. It will be very difficult for us. On the other side, the war in Ukraine may actually make Russia somewhat of a weaker military power then it used to be before the war in Ukraine started. (Host) I appreciate your time and your thoughtful analysis on this topic. Thanks, Tor. (Bukkvoll) Thank you. (Host) If you enjoyed this episode of Conversations on Strategy and would like to hear more, you can find us on any major podcast platform.   show less

In this podcast, Pfaff argues understanding the ethical logic available to one’s adversaries will allow US leaders and planners to leverage China’s behavior and optimally shape US policies and actions.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss1/7/

Episode Transcript: Chinese and Western Ways of War and Their Ethics

Stephanie Crider (Host)

Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and... read more

In this podcast, Pfaff argues understanding the ethical logic available to one’s adversaries will allow US leaders and planners to leverage China’s behavior and optimally shape US policies and actions. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss1/7/ Episode Transcript: Chinese and Western Ways of War and Their Ethics Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The guests in speaking order on this episode are: (Guest 1 Anthony Pfaff) (Host) Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Anthony Pfaff, author of “Chinese and Western Ways of War and Their Ethics,” featured in Parameters Spring 2022 issue. Dr. Pfaff is the research professor for strategy, the military profession, and ethics at the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College and a senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Welcome, Dr. Pfaff. I’m glad you’re here. Let’s talk about China and the West, war, and ethics. Your thesis for this piece posits how one fights shapes how one governs that fighting. The article relies on traditional and contemporary scholarship from both East and West to describe differences in how each views the practical and ethical aspects of war and how they can interact. Understanding the ethical logic available to one’s adversaries allows one to better understand their behavior as well as how to better shape one’s own actions and policies to avoid misunderstanding. Some people think China is unethical. Let’s just start there. In fact, you note that in December of 2020, then-Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe claimed the Chinese government has “no ethical boundaries” in their pursuit of power. Please expand on that. (Pfaff) Yeah. Sure. This is a common refrain. A big theme in it is that the other side—they’re unethical. And I wanted to write this because it’s not true. Now, they may be doing some things which by our own lights are unethical; they may be doing some things that are unethical by their own lights. What I’m not doing in this paper is adjudicating. And I’m not saying that there is a moral equivalency between the kinds of things China does and the kinds of things the United States does. I’m not saying there’s a moral equivalency between the kind of aims that the United States has and China has. I think we can make arguments that a lot of what the Chinese do is in fact unethical. However, it is wrong to say they aren’t considering it. There is a fairly rich conversation even in their own People’s Liberation Army (PLA) journals and think tanks and conferences, and all that, where they do raise these kinds of concerns. So what I wanted to do is kind of map out: How do these concerns arise, and what shapes how they get expressed in Chinese policy in Chinese thinking as well as our own? And I thought it was important to contrast it with how we do it so a reader can understand, “Oh, this is sort of a natural process that all security communities, states—however you want to define it—do.” These are almost unavoidable categories but do affect not how we just think about fighting, but how we think about the norms governing that fighting. To say the other side just doesn’t have any is to oversimplify and to miss a lot. It risks misinterpreting what in fact the other side actually thinks it’s doing and thinks it’s responding to. (Host) Let’s talk about the ways and ethics of war. What do you mean by this, and how are the Western and Eastern ways of war different? (Pfaff) In terms of what I’m talking about here, in terms of what a way of war is and how it relates to the ethics of war, I’m basically employing the idea the way Colin Gray and Martin Shaw kind of articulated. We’re just really talking about how we organize the fight. In this case, that way of war is how you organize to fight against what you think is your most serious adversary. Again, it doesn’t mean to have a way of war that’s aimed at a peer competitor doesn’t mean that you don’t use your military for other things. But what it does mean is that you think that—the way I characterize the Western view—if you think that defeating an adversary requires imposing your will on that adversary, then that’s your logic of your way of war. And it’s going to have a grammar to it, borrowing from Clausewitz. And so how do you impose your will? Well, you eliminate the other side’s ability to resist. And once you achieve the military objective, which is eliminating that resistance, you pretty much achieved your political objective, which is to defeat the adversary. There’s another way of thinking about it, and I think this characterizes the Chinese way. And this is explicit in a very old book, very famous, written by two Chinese colonels (now one’s a general) called Unrestricted Warfare. I think they really do capture . . . they’re kind of explicitly comparing Sun Tzu and Clausewitz. And they’re saying, hey, where the Americans want to impose will, we have to do something else because we can’t really resist it. They’re writing right after the Gulf War, and they’re saying, “Hey, we’ve got to figure out something else.” The way they describe their logic is, “We’ve got to get them to accept our interests because we’re not going to be able to impose our will.” Rather than eliminating resistance, you’ve got to change minds. And changing minds is a lot more complicated because now there’s no necessary connection between the force you use and the outcome you get. Because now the target of your coercive efforts gets to decide how much punishment they will take. So you can’t know in advance. It’s a little bit more complicated, but you can now see where the ethics comes in, right? If I’m imposing will and I’m eliminating resistance, I’m going to assume a just cause—so that gives me already a moral imperative to win. So that eliminating resistance comes as its own imperative. But I have other imperatives too: (a) to avoid harming those things that are not necessary to eliminating resistance. We have rules about not harming noncombatants, avoiding destruction of monuments, historical sites, etc. Any civilian infrastructure that’s not directly related to warfighting generally is off limits because it’s not central to the logic of warfighting, which is eliminating that resistance in order to impose your will. The other way of thinking about it, it works a little differently. You end up getting a different kind of ethics. Because it’s more complicated, the cultural references that I mention in the paper include Sun Tzu, but, also, a lot of Confucian thinkers who were thinking about military policy and what we would consider national security. What they were thinking of—just from a practical perspective, there is an emphasis on precision and avoiding destruction. And in some sense that’s just simply instrumental because you want to assimilate the other side and be able to use what they have. But it’s also a sense that what warfighting is about is really—we would use the language of aligning interests, but, in the text, they use the words like “harmony”—they want to harmonize. And it’s not that I need to eliminate the other side; I need to harmonize the other side. This was certainly the way during the Warring States period that I talk about. It was very formative in Chinese versions of just-war theory that this was sort of really what was going on. It ended up being about consolidating power, but as a way of aligning everybody’s interest so they were all focused more or less in the same direction, often using words like harmony to describe what they were doing. But that doesn’t mean these wars weren’t very brutal, and they were certainly wars of conquest. But it’s interesting that in a lot of literature, those get condemned, and the ones that were less destructive—and the ones that were more about aligning interests and not just seizing territory—get kind of lifted up as “this is just,” where This other way is just brutal takeover. So I kind of zero in on Sun Tzu’s articulation of this because he’s got this great passage where he talks about, you know, it’s better not to destroy the city; it’s better not to destroy the army. The less destruction you commit in order to get your goal, the better off you are. So what does that do? Well, it opens up other ways of going about things. And, so, what’s very effective? Things like deception, trickery, and so on. Even things that we would look at and go, “Oh, that’s treachery” become a way of minimizing the actual damage you have to inflict in order to align your interests. Their expressions obviously get more complicated than that, but what you end up with is something that on the outside can look kind of utilitarian. And by utilitarian, I mean that’s a way of thinking about ethics where you maximize a certain set of consequences that are good. So generic utility theory might say what the right thing to do is to maximize happiness. The problem with theories like that is that they become very ”Means justifies the ends.” So, if you’re running a group of people, and you want to maximize happiness of the group, and six people in the group of 10 are unhappy, how do you make them happier? Well, you could make the six people happier, or you could just kill them. Either way, now you have 100 percent of people in your group, once they’re gone, are happy. You win, right? So we use utility theory here sort of as “You need more than that in order to come up with a full, robust ethic.” So the Chinese appear like that sometimes, particularly because of the Marxist-Leninist influences. The good of the party is what matters. And it’s not that that doesn’t give you an ethic; it actually motivates a lot of sacrifice and does shape the kinds of things that you do and don’t do in order to maximize the good of the party. But, as we’ve seen throughout history, it also enables a lot of things we would think of as pretty horrible. So again, I’m not trying to argue some kind of moral equivalency. But, on the other hand, as you look through the literature, there’s this idea that . . . the Confucian literature and even pre-Confucian literature, they talk about the mandate of heaven. And the mandate of heaven is, basically, that’s your legitimacy to rule. It depends on the ruler embodying the virtues of justice and benevolence. That can get a little circular in practice, but you can kind of see how that’s going to impact decision making. So I might be like a Sun Tzu who is motivated to limit destruction just because he wants to use it later on, but it’s still going to shape the kinds of reasons one uses to go to war, the kinds of adversaries one takes on, and the kinds of ways you go about fighting it. But it’s not going to look as principle-based as the way we tend to go about it. It’s going to be more found in the character of decisions made and the character of how decisions are made regarding who to fight and how to go about changing their minds while still ensuring that one maintains the character of doing this in a just and benevolent way. And that might mean deception if the alternative is destruction. (Host) Your article offer s a discussion of ideals within two rich and complex traditions. Please, pull it all together for us. What are your conclusions? (Pfaff) Really, the whole point of the article, in a lot of ways, was just to introduce audiences on both sides, really, to “Hey, regardless of how we actually behave and how well we measure up to our own ethics—or anybody’s ethics for that matter—both sides, if we want to look at it that way, are having these conversations. And they’re having these conversations in roughly the same way: They’re doing it through journals and conferences, arguments, debates, op-eds. I think, to wrap it up, I would say both sides are having these conversations. It’s useful to get to know what the terms are and the resources they use. These aren’t final conclusions. Ways of war evolve. So do ethics of war. And that’s also part of the debate. What I hope to do is show the relationship so you can kind of map out how those do occur and can evolve. (Host) Thanks for joining me today. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, or any other major podcasting platform.   show less

In this podcast, strategist David Katz argues American military strategists must incorporate multidimensional power projection into their planning processes to counter adversarial actions by gray-zone actors. By developing a more complete concept of power projection, the United States can apply its resources more effectively.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol48/iss4/5/


Episode Transcript: Multidimensionality: Rethinking Power Projection for the 21st... read more

In this podcast, strategist David Katz argues American military strategists must incorporate multidimensional power projection into their planning processes to counter adversarial actions by gray-zone actors. By developing a more complete concept of power projection, the United States can apply its resources more effectively. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol48/iss4/5/ Episode Transcript: Multidimensionality: Rethinking Power Projection for the 21st Century Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The guests in speaking order on this episode are: (Guest 1 David Katz) (Host) Decisive Point welcomes David Katz, author of “MultiDimensionality: Rethinking Power Projection for the 21st Century,” featured in Parameters’ Winter 2018–2019 issue. Katz works as a senior analyst at US Special Operations Command, J35 Transnational Threats Division, Counterthreat Finance. A West Point graduate, he served in the US Army as an infantry officer and Green Beret captain. He also worked as an institutional investor and advisor before founding his own firm that provided advanced analytics on more than $3 billion dollars of clients’ private equity investments. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Your 2018 Parameters article argues that American military strategists must incorporate multidimensional power projection into their planning processes to counter adversarial actions by gray-zone actors. Let’s start there. Please briefly walk us through the basic concept of your article. (Katz) Well, when you stand on the shoulders of giants—in this case, two senior (People’s Liberation Army Air Force or) PLA Air Force political officers who wrote Unrestricted Warfare: (Two Air Force Senior Colonels on Scenarios for War and the Operational Art in an Era of Globalization), I think we should start with that, which was published in 1999. I think it opened up an entire, new range of military operations. In this case, it was unrestricted—hence the title, Unrestricted Warfare. So that’s where I start from in order to develop multidimensionality. I think that as a critique, the US strategy community has tended to gravitate from unrestricted warfare into what they call “informationalized warfare,” where it’s really the principal child, as they see it, of unrestricted warfare. But philosophically, I think there’s a profound question to consider. And that is, “What is warfare if it’s unrestricted?” What isn’t warfare? In fact, let me restate that. If warfare is unrestricted, as the PLA Air Force political officers, Colonel Qiao Liang (pronounced “Crow”) and Colonel Wang (Wang Xiangsui) wrote in 1999, if warfare is unrestricted, what isn’t warfare? We need to consider that, which led me down a path to multidimensionality. Now, two questions I typically get are: “What’s the difference between multidimensionality and multiple-domain operations, or MDO?” And, “What’s the difference between multidimensionality and concepts like (diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement or) DIMEFIL?” And we’ll get there. But I think let’s just go down sort of the nuts and bolts of multidimensionality. Multidimensionality is really just a strategic framework where we, as US strategists, consider every available dimension of power projection or engagement, and we pick those from that available universe where we possess a usable advantage, whether it’s strategic or tactical, whether it’s persistent or transitory. For example, a single instance of power projection can range from a scaled, macro power projection, like multiple nuclear strikes, to the most micro and granular, which could be a single instance of a single person conducting a single credit card transaction or making a single phone call. That counts as power projection as well. So, the instance of power projection that we’re looking at, through the dimension we select, may be bilateral, that source to target, which is the way we typically consider power projection. But it can also be indirect, or perhaps even intermediated: intermediated projection, like his power projection traversing through a network with multiple intermediate entities. So, the bottom line is that we must expand our concept of power projection and campaign planning to both encompass all of the operational advantages that we possess and to integrate them coherently and comprehensively into the actions that we take. So that’s kind of the nuts and bolts of multidimensionality. The next question I typically get is, “How do you do it? What are the mechanics of multidimensionality?” Well, so the obvious question is: “Why do we even have mechanics in multidimensionality?” And so, the question then becomes when warfare is unrestricted. In the 19th century, definitions become unmoored. Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security—we need a precise means to describe what we intend to do and how we intend to do it. Let’s get down to the brass tacks. Power is something that you apply to a target in order to bring about a desired change in its state. Power is described, I think, by its behavior against the target, and it could be grouped into classes. In other words, class defines the behavior of power against the target state. For instance, “kinetic” is a class of behavior with multiple subclasses that can range from lobbing artillery rounds to tackling somebody. So power has a behavior. That behavior is classified. And power must come from someplace, so, consequently, it must have a source, and it must deliver something that acts against the target. So, you have a payload. Power projection is really the process of delivering an instance or instances of power within a single dimension. And the means of delivery, the path of delivery, is called a vector. So, at its bottom, the mechanics of multidimensionality is projecting power is really described through four essential elements: the class or behavior; the source where it comes from; the payload that it delivers; and the vector or path that it utilizes to deliver that payload, from where it came from to where it’s going. And that, in a nutshell, are the mechanics of multidimensionality. (Host) So, your piece addresses multidimensionality in the South China Sea and in the Middle East. Let’s apply it to Russia in the Ukraine. (Katz) That is a great question. One of the things we should consider regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is to nonkinetically extend the tactical, kinetic Ukrainian battlespace into strategic areas where we hold structural advantages. We have structural advantages in strategic maneuver. We have a blue-water navy, we have a blue-water coast guard. We have a permanent presence along Russia’s perimeter. We also have structural advantages in the political economy. As the world’s largest developed economy, we exert a geo-economic gravity that skews the world political economies into our orbit. We are the largest and most lucrative market for anyone to sell into. The US shepherds the global maritime commons, which is a globally scaled, integrated system of shipborne freight distribution, economic trade, and financial risk management whose physical passage is guaranteed under US stewardship. But the US shepherds other systems of international diplomacy and commerce and law that arose from the wreckage World War II that have facilitated worldwide economic growth. In short, the USA currently is the world sysadmin or systems administrator. Now the interesting thing about systems is that, once created, they tend towards stability as a means of preserving the benefits that they deliver to their participants or constituents. And they can react against changes that pose a risk to their purpose in their transformative processes, just like an immune system reacts to a viral infection. So, consequently, the US, I believe, can harness systems of international commerce, diplomacy, and law and their tendency to maintain a present state for our advantage. So, specifically: How about a nonkinetic, maritime exclusion zone exercise in the Bering Straits (Bering Strait) as an example? It would integrate law enforcement through the Coast Guard with United States and Canadian special operation forces, perhaps, and perhaps US Navy assets. It would demonstrate capability, capacity, and strategic depth by extending the Ukrainian battlespace thousands of miles and beyond Russia’s capability and capacity to respond quickly. It would demonstrate localized US escalatory dominance. But most importantly, nonkinetically, it threatens core Russian and Chinese economic interests because it threatens the Northern Sea Route. For folks that are not familiar with the Northern Sea Route, it goes from Murmansk all the way over into the Arctic Oceans (Arctic Ocean), down the Bering Straits (Bering Strait), and goes from there to Dalian and Shanghai and all of the factories on China’s coast. So by threatening the North Sea route (Northern Sea Route), just demonstrating the capability to conduct a chokepoint operation in the Bering Straits (Bering Strait), we could force Russia to use alternative routes like a land route and the use of the Suez Canal, which could add 10 or more days to transit to whatever it is they want to move to market. This threatens Russia’s commercialization of its vast mineral and oil wealth in its far north. It threatens Russian and Chinese energy and commodity trading shipping routes. To right now, Russia wants to develop the billions of dollars of mineral wealth stuck in their Murmansk peninsula (Kola Peninsula) and sell it and ship it to Chinese factories on the Chinese eastern seaboard. And in order for that to happen, it has to transit the Bering Straits (Bering Strait). So that’s a quick and dirty example of how you would use multidimensionality to extend a battlespace and to force your adversaries to respond in dimensions where they are not expecting it. (Host) Here’s a quote from your conclusion in 2018: “In an era of coercive gradualism, nuclear provocation, and gray zone competition that purposefully occupies the space between war and peace, dimensionality might offer a better, more innovative, and imaginative way to respond to some of the world’s worst actors, while reducing risk and promoting peace.” Final thoughts? (Katz) The rule in warfare is to never telegraph your moves. Never come where your enemy or adversary is expecting you. By expanding the dimensions through which we project power, we can come at our adversaries in ways and with means that they are not expecting at all. So when you face the salami slicing that China is doing in the South China Sea, they set it up specifically so that if you engage them, and it did mention that they want you to engage them, which is physical kinetic action, they already have an escalatory dominance against whatever you can do. It’s a lose-lose proposition for the United States. But we can bypass all of China’s missiles and fleets and submarines by phoning in a purchase order to the headwaters of a supply chain inside China. Buying out an entire production cycle worth of a critical component. Warehousing it. The next company on that supply chain would have to scramble for parts at higher prices and a latency that would cascade down that supply chain, growing like a snowball going downhill into an avalanche. And then you wait for the next production cycle and dump those same critical components into the supply chain at below cost. So you’re creating a bullwhip effect where everyone on the supply chain doesn’t know what price it is, they don’t know what the supply is, and they don’t know what the duration of what they’re doing. Eventually, that supply chain falls apart. You can do that all nonkinetically. And that’s just a one-dimensional approach that could augment the 7th Fleet going into the South China Sea or could be done to the exception of the 7th Fleet driving their boats around the South China Sea. So, we need to be a lot more inventive on what we’re doing. And as both a strategist, a campaign designer, and an operator, I get to practice some of these tools and techniques. So, it’s like Yogi Berra’s old quote that in theory, theory works in practice, and practice, not so much. I get to do both. So I may have an unfair advantage against other strategists and can campaign designers on it. But we cannot fight a twenty-first-century war with nineteenth-century definitions. We need to expand what we consider to be warfare. The Chinese brought it up first. It’s unrestricted. We need to play in that ball game. (Host) Thank you, David, for sharing your insight on this topic. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, or any other major podcasting platform.   show less

This article delivers a novel economic analysis of US dependence on China for rare-earth elements and sheds light on how Western nations may exploit the limitations of limit pricing to break China’s global monopoly in rare-earth element production and refinement. This analytical framework, supported by a comprehensive literature review, the application of microeconomic and industrial organization concepts, and two case-study scenarios, provides several policy recommendations to address the... read more

This article delivers a novel economic analysis of US dependence on China for rare-earth elements and sheds light on how Western nations may exploit the limitations of limit pricing to break China’s global monopoly in rare-earth element production and refinement. This analytical framework, supported by a comprehensive literature review, the application of microeconomic and industrial organization concepts, and two case-study scenarios, provides several policy recommendations to address the most important foreign policy challenge the United States has faced since the end of the Cold War. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss1/6/ Episode Transcript: Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The guests in speaking order on this episode are: (Guest 1 Gustavo Ferreira) (Guest 2 Jamie Critelli) (Host) Decisive Point welcomes Captain Gustavo Ferreira and Major Jamie Critelli, authors of “China’s Global Monopoly on Rare Earth Elements,” featured in the Parameters Spring 2022 issue. Ferreira holds a PhD in agricultural economics from Louisiana State University. He’s a senior agricultural economist with the US Department of Agriculture and serves as an agricultural officer at the 353rd Civil Affairs Command, US Army Reserves. Critelli is a civil affairs officer serving in the 353rd Civil Affairs Command, US Army Reserves. He’s an independent farm business owner and has worked globally in agriculture supply-chain rules on five continents. He holds a master of business administration and supply chain management from ETH Zurich. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Gustavo [and] Jamie, thanks for joining me. Let’s jump right in. Your article sheds light on how Western nations may exploit the limitations of limit pricing to break China’s global monopoly on rare-earth element production and refinement. What’s the working definition of “rare earth elements” here? (Ferreira) Good morning, Stephanie. Thank you for having us. So rare-earth elements are a set of 17 different metallic elements that fall into two different categories. You have the heavy and the light based on the separation process (once they get mined and get processed), which tends to be rather complex. And contrary to what the title suggests, rare-earth elements are abundant in the Earth crust. They have their rarity status coming from being typically highly scattered and mixed together with other minerals, and they’re rarely found in concentrations that make it profitable to extract. Oftentimes, they are a byproduct of other mining activities. It’s important to understand rare-earth element reserves tend to be geographically more concentrated than other natural resources, such as oil and gas, but they’re also in line with other key mineral resources, such as copper, where they’re concentrated in one or two countries at the global scale. In terms of uses, it’s important to highlight they’re desired because they have unique characteristics, such as magnetic strength, and, consequently, they’re used in a wide range of ubiquitous consumer goods, such as flat-screen TVs and cell phones. Other important industrial applications include wind turbines and electrical vehicles. And one that’s typically a very visible application of this resource is in the military space. These minerals are key inputs for many weapons systems, such as jet fighter engines, missile guidance systems, satellites, ammunition, and so on. It’s always good to put a number on it to emphasize the current demand for these inputs. An F135 fighter jet (engine) requires about 920 pounds of rare-earth minerals—just to put it into perspective. Also, looking forward, as the global economy continues to transition to lower-carbon, renewable energies, analysts estimate that the demand for these minerals will continue to grow at a very rapid pace. That is because cleaner energy technologies such as electrical vehicles, electrical batteries, generators, and wind turbines will consume close to half of all the rare-earth element production. They are going to be a major driver for these resources. And lastly, one thing that must be emphasized is the heavy environmental cost that goes along with producing these minerals. They produce an enormous environmental footprint, and that’s the reason why it’s concentrated in certain countries, such as China. They generate waste gas, acid-containing sewage water, radioactive wastes, and so on. It’s a pretty high environmental cost. (Host) Thanks, Gustavo. How did we get here, and what is the state of rare-earth elements? (Ferreira) To truly understand how this industry has evolved to what we see today, we must understand the paths that China and the United States have followed for the past three or four decades regarding rare-earth elements. In the case of the United States, this country was once self-reliant and the world’s leading producer. From the 1960s to the 1980s there was a mine, the Mountain Pass mine, located in California. It was the world’s primary source of rare-earth elements. However, following decades of neglect, underinvestment by the US government, and a lack of interest by the academic community in this field, we had a gradual loss of know-how and the skilled labor force that’s required for this industry. Altogether, this led to a slow decline of this industry in the United States. This trend culminated in the shutdown of that Mountain Pass mine in 2002, following some regulatory issues and an environmental incident that involved a pipeline spill carrying contaminated water. So, there was kind of the nail in the coffin for that particular operation. It confirmed the decline of this industry in the United States. Because of that, we lost nearly all our rare-earth production capacity, and we became gradually a net importer of these minerals—with, now, China becoming the main supplier, accounting for 80 percent of our imports. Which is a good segue to how China was able to fill that gap. This didn’t happen overnight. This was a long-term effort by the Chinese government. It was a concerted effort that involved high-profile investments in national programs, the development of teams, and labs that will exclusively focus on studying production of rare-earth elements. And this long-term focus definitely yielded significant results and set the conditions for China to expand its production from the 1970s and 1980s. As the US started to decline, China picked up that slack. Then, China also made the decision to declare these minerals a strategic resource. So, they kind of set the political tone. They recognized the importance of this going forward, and they even were able to endure and accept the environmental degradation that would entail. They were willing to take that cost, given the national strategic importance of this resource. As a consequence, they started producing and exporting more and more throughout the 1990s and 2000s. That expansion of production had an impact on global markets in the sense that they flooded the market with large amounts of rare-earth minerals. They plunged the global prices, which resulted in many Western producers no longer being able to compete at those low costs and filing for bankruptcy, further reducing production in the West. Another key shift in China was once they secured production and became the global powerhouse, they started shifting towards developing a more integrated supply chain. What I mean by this is they no longer were just simple raw-material producers, but they started investing in processing. And so, they could control the entire supply-chain process from mining all the way to the final products, such as magnets or oxides that are used by the final end users in the West. So, they created a whole supply chain, to include all value-added products, and now they control about 80–90 percent of that value-added refinement capacity. Even the United States or other Western countries that still mine rare-earth minerals—they have to export them to China in order to be refined there and processed to the way it could be used by the final end users. (Host) That leads right into my next question. China dominates the rare-earth element global market. How can we overcome that? Or maybe I should be asking you: Can we overcome that? (Critelli) Well, the short answer is “yes.” Thank you again for having us, Stephanie. China did not arrive at a point of rare-earth element market leadership overnight. Once they realized how valuable these materials were, they set a decades-long course to arrive at the position they’re at today. Unfortunately, we can’t rely on market forces alone to correct this. In the short term, we only have two levers. We either become better at recycling or repurposing existing rare-earth elements or we stockpile these items, regardless of price, so we’re not supply-constrained by a foreign power. So, in terms of recycling or repurposing, this of course is hampered by the limit-pricing efforts done by the Chinese and by the complete lack of a domestic rare-earth element recycling stream. We just don’t have it. We would have to build it up. And as Gustavo mentioned, there’s quite a bit of waste involved with this that we would need to address as well. As far as stockpiling, those efforts are a good strategy, but they would also be hampered by limit pricing. A lengthy discussion on the stockpile framework is also needed. What portion is for military use versus domestic use? How large of a stockpile? What mechanism would there be to extract an item from the stockpile? Because it can’t just be cost alone. And this would be to prevent inequities and to promote the national defense. But if we were looking at a longer time horizon, say five to 10 years, then we do have many more options. First and foremost, we can build out the rare-earth element smelting, refining, and processing industry. Basically, build it back. This would be to process domestic and foreign sources of (rare-earth element or) REE concentrates. Most likely, it would have to be vertically integrated though to attract the capital investment needed to build and sustain it. And it quite possibly would have to be carved out as a legal monopoly. Another option is to have continued Department of Defense collaboration with our allies and their businesses by employing mechanisms such as reciprocal defense procurement for the security of supply arrangements. More (research and development or) R&D is an option you hear all the time, but here there’s a couple of different avenues. One is more R&D investment to improve the processing yield on turning those concentrates into final products or to minimize the waste stream. And this is akin to how fracking revolutionized the gas-drilling industry. If you could figure out a way to get a better yield with less input, it’s cheaper. Continued focus on recycling: As I mentioned earlier, I believe we could leverage American ingenuity to recycle the world’s REEs. Problem solved. And then, finally, there should be a change in procurement strategies domestically—and this would be to cement the fix—focusing less on costs and focusing more on balancing cost with supply disruptions. Perhaps there could be local content rules considered for key items such as REEs, much like Brazil has put into place. You know, I’m left thinking that we bail out many other industries, but one that is at the heart of so many other critical industries hasn’t seen the investment required by government to address the issue. This is an industry that is marginally profitable and requires substantial capital investment. And, therefore, America needs to front the investment to help realize our national security and assist with the collective global security as well. (Host) Gentlemen, if you could pull it all together for us, what are your conclusions on this topic? (Critelli) As we sit with you today, Stephanie, the world is pulling itself out of (coronavirus disease 2019 or) COVID. And it is watching itself, in dismay, become involved with the unfolding situation in Ukraine. These are not dissimilar issues, though. Both events stood or stand to impact our supply chains on an unprecedented scale. Both COVID and the Russian invasion disrupt the availability of key products and commodities. Both continue to have second- and third-order impacts we didn’t plan for—and, unfortunately, these impacts could have been averted to a degree with more preparedness. I’m encouraged in our post-COVID world. People now talk about decoupling Chinese and American supply chains for the first time in a generation. I wonder what conclusions people will come to when they contemplate ongoing scarcity events, well in the future, involving tiny amounts of key elements that the mighty US military-industrial complex can no longer obtain—or the reality that it will now take several decades to get ourselves back onto a sound footing. The question will be whether we have the political will now to address this challenge head on, much as China has done over the past few decades. Sun Tzu is attributed the following statement: “take advantage of the enemy’s unpreparedness; travel by unprepared routes and strike him where he has taken no precautions.” Thank you for letting us speak with you today. (Ferreira) And I would like to add, just as a concluding remark, that, perhaps, we have a window of opportunity to overcome this dependency. It’s all because while in the past China was capable of flooding the market with cheap supplies and flushing out all competitors, they got to the point that, now, they are such large consumers themselves of those resources that they no longer can afford to apply those same tactics. They’re constrained on their end, which presents an opportunity for us to reinforce our industry and support the development of our domestic processing industry. And the political will is there. There has been a series of executive orders that have been recently approved, which signal the political support going forward, which is key. These are 10- to 20-year-long investments, and we’re going to need that to continue in the political arena so this project can materialize and we can soften our dependency. Because at the end of the day, the Chinese do think this is a critical issue. So, our political class should think the same as well as our military. So again, thank you for having us here. It was great having this conversation with you. (Host) I’m delighted to have you. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, or any other major podcasting platform.   show less

This article addresses the impact of diversity, equity, and inclusion on talent management. It explains how systemic bias impairs the US Army’s ability to harness cognitive diversity. It stresses the value of cognitive diversity among teams and senior leadership and how cumulative bias impacts the entire career cycle of an individual. It concludes by offering practical suggestions to reduce bias in the assignment, promotion, and selection processes.
Read the article:... read more

This article addresses the impact of diversity, equity, and inclusion on talent management. It explains how systemic bias impairs the US Army’s ability to harness cognitive diversity. It stresses the value of cognitive diversity among teams and senior leadership and how cumulative bias impacts the entire career cycle of an individual. It concludes by offering practical suggestions to reduce bias in the assignment, promotion, and selection processes. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss1/4/ Episode Transcript: Stephanie Crider (Host) (Prerecorded Decisive Point intro) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. (Guest 1 Danielle Holt) (Guest 2 Susan Davis) (Host) Decisive Point welcomes Lieutenant Colonel Danielle Holt, US Army, and Colonel Susan Davis, US Army, authors of “Interrupting Bias in Army Talent Management,” featured in Parameters’ Spring 2022 issue. Holt is a general surgeon assigned as deputy chief, Department of Surgery at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center and Uniformed Services University. She’s a graduate of the US Army War College and holds a doctor of medicine degree from Vanderbilt University School of Medicine. Davis is a physical therapist assigned to the People First Task Force. She’s a graduate of the US Army War College and holds a doctor of physical therapy degree from Baylor University. I’m happy you’re here, Sue and Danielle, welcome. Let’s talk about your article. In it, you say, “Army Talent Management must include development of a more innovative and inclusive culture to meet future threats.” There were some significant changes to the system in 2020, let’s start there. What changed? (Davis) Hi, this is Sue, and thanks for having us. Absolutely, I’d say 2019 and 2020 were huge changes in the Army, in the talent management arena, and it was very exciting. The Army is trying to keep up with contemporary practices and modernize the system, if you will, and they had been working for several years on many initiatives. And there were some big ones that were rolled out in 2019 and 2020. Specifically, the ones that we talk about a little bit—and that are probably the most well-known as well—is, first, the Army talent alignment process—which really simply is a new way of determining where officers go for their next assignment. It essentially is a electronic platform that generates a market-style hiring system. Much like the civilian side, resumes are exchanged, interviews may occur, and you can exchange information, etcetera. And then, officers that are slated to move and units that may have an open position indicate their preferences, and they run an algorithm, and this then determines where an officer goes next. That was a very big change in the legacy system. It was more just a conversation with a career manager or—if you’re in the (Army Medical Department or) AMEDD—a consultant. And so, this was a big change. And so, we talk about it a little bit. And the other one was the Command Assessment Program. And this was a new initiative to do a very thorough assessment of the candidates who are potentially going to be commanders at the O-5 and O-6 level. And instead of just reviewing their written record and evaluations and where they had been, they brought them in for four or five days of a battery of assessments and interviews and gathered much more information and data on them. So, we talk about these specifically, one, because they’re very impactful—they represented really big changes—but also because, like all personnel management processes, whether in the military or civilian, they can be vulnerable to unconscious bias creeping in if it’s not mitigated. So, since that was the topic of our paper, unconscious bias, we did take a closer look at those two. (Host) You also make the case for diversity, equity, and inclusion as part of this process. Will you please expand on that for our listeners? (Holt) Sure. Hi, this is Danielle, and I really appreciate this opportunity. Let me start by saying, you know, I’m not in—an (human resources or) HR professional, I’m actually a general surgeon. And I started this project back in 2020, during Army War College, to really get a better standing of the tensions that our country has currently been facing. And so, the case for diversity, equity, and inclusion ultimately lies in the Army as a values-based organization, and that . . . the fact that we work in teams. So, our servicemembers come from a variety of backgrounds. Really, as work has sort of moved from this Industrial Age to the information age, where we’re competing in this knowledge economy, not only has work changed, but our future threats have really blurred these lines between competition and conflict, and then also between, you know, the physical, informational—you know—and cognitive warfare. And so, this means that our teams really need to rapidly assess these changing conditions. And kind of a key foundation to that is creating shared understanding. So, we have to take a diverse group of people, rapidly understand the situation, and then innovate to be able to meet these threats. On top of that, we are also competing for talent. So, we have to attract people to an all-volunteer force. We have to retain those individuals through their career life cycle. And, in addition, we’re competing with the private sector, so, particularly, in these technical fields. But we also have to maintain a technical and economic advantage over our near-peer adversaries. And so, ultimately, innovation, I think, requires cognitive diversity to kind of tap into this collective knowledge of the team. And so, what I mean by that is each team member has different strengths and weaknesses and, ideally, we can sort of offset each other’s strengths and weaknesses. In more general terms, the literature kind of describes this as the idea that a team, made up of average performers—if all of the performers contribute—will often outperform teams where you have one top performer that’s driving the team. Really a go-to reference for me for this is the Diversity Bonus: (How Great Teams Pay Off in the Knowledge Economy) by Scott Page is a great book. And so, really, the key for cognitive diversity—for that to work—you need an inclusive environment, you know, so all the team members can pitch in. And ultimately, I would argue this ability to sort of create an inclusive team, it’s probably one of the top competencies for Army leaders, you know, and really contributes to this process for diversity, equity, and inclusion within talent management. (Host) Your article talks a bit about unconscious bias. What is it, and how does it constrain cognitive diversity? (Davis) Unconscious bias is—it’s really the way you automatically feel about something: in favor or not in favor. It’s your very quick judgment or assessment of something, and, sometimes, it’s shaped by your emotional state or situational cues. But it’s the collective experience of your brain; everything you’ve been exposed to, the way you were raised, your culture. And your brain shapes your bias and that . . . that can have a little bit of a negative connotation. So, just a neutral way to explain it is System-1 and System-2 thinking in your brain. System-1 is shortcuts, or it’s when your brain, again, uses all . . . everything it’s been exposed to and comes up with a heuristic. And System-2 is much more thoughtful, analytical, methodical. And, just to be clear, System-1 is not necessarily bad in many situations—it actually helps us get us through the day. So, if you go to a restaurant: “What should I order?” You know, you don’t need a decision matrix, you don’t need 20 minutes. It’s OK to just go with System-1 thinking. And it’s important to note our brain does these nice shortcuts for us unconsciously. So, for the most part, you are really unaware, except maybe retrospectively, and it’s very tempting to think that we can control it, but we really can’t. It’s just part of human nature and the way our brains work. So, with human resource processes or personnel management processes where humans are involved, unconscious bias and that System-1 thinking is not helpful. And it actually can be quite detrimental, both to candidates being considered for various things, but it can be really detrimental to the organization if they’re trying to build a cognitively diverse force. So, bottom line is, if you don’t embed some processes to counter unconscious bias within personnel processes, then leaders are subject to this bias. And the most common one is, like, an affinity or familiarity bias, and you’re going to favor officers you know or that look like you or that you maybe went to the same school with. And then, ultimately, along the way, you end up having less cognitive diversity on the teams or in the senior level—where you really need it to be able to interpret and analyze and offer solutions quickly to the Army’s toughest challenges. (Host) Your article also mentions structural models for diversity, equity, and inclusion, including assignment distribution, evaluations, and psychological safety. Can you please give us a synopsis of your recommendations on this? (Holt) I would think of structural models as really just frameworks for how you approach this very complex, you know, challenging problem of diversity, equity, and inclusion. But I think, for me, it really boils down to insider and outsider group dynamics. In this paper, we focus primarily on the practical changes that can be made at the system level and focus on those changes in assignments, command selections, and evaluations. But also really highlighted some of the best practices that have already been implemented during this Army talent management transformation. I really appreciate Brené Brown’s perspective on diversity, equity, and inclusion and say much of the challenge that surrounds this topic really stems from a sense of belonging and belonging to that insider group. You know, in the military, we would call that camaraderie, and I feel like this is really the essence of our organization. Belonging, you know, happens at multiple levels—but, really, it can be simplified down to the individual or interpersonal level and, then, at the group or organizational level. And so, I would say at the individual level, belonging requires trust—trust between your teammates, trust with your leaders. And then, at the organizational level, you need to develop this sense of psychological safety. And so, those two components, at the individual and at the group or organizational level, allow us to get back to developing the shared understanding and mutual trust. And these are really the entire foundation for mission command, and this is really what drives our ability to meet our mission and to face our future threats. I think if we can generate a sense of belonging, then you can allow people to fully commit to this greater sense of service for something bigger than themselves. And I think it’s ultimately rooted in our Army ethic, and that’s what separates us from our adversaries. We have to be careful as we implement this market-based approach that we don’t encounter some of the same problems that the private sector has had with respect to diversity, equity, and inclusion. But I think, ultimately—I’ll close out by saying I think if we can create this sense of belonging, we can really foster this greater purpose. I think our doctrine is really some of the best and the most comprehensive guidebooks thought that’s out there on leadership. Our ethic is, essentially, codified in our country’s founding documents and these notions of freedom and liberty and justice, you know—it’s really what inspires people of all backgrounds to volunteer for our organization, you know, and, ultimately, self-sacrifice for our country. Thank you again for, you know, allowing us to discuss our paper. (Host) It was a pleasure. I’m so glad you could join me. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, or any other major podcasting platform.   show less

This commentary responds to Matthew Valasik and Shannon E. Reid’s article “The Alt-Right Movement and US National Security” published in the Autumn 2021 issue of Parameters (vol. 51, no. 3).
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss1/16/


Episode Transcript:
Stephanie Crider (Host)
Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security... read more

This commentary responds to Matthew Valasik and Shannon E. Reid’s article “The Alt-Right Movement and US National Security” published in the Autumn 2021 issue of Parameters (vol. 51, no. 3). Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss1/16/ Episode Transcript: Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The guests in speaking order on this episode are: (Guest 1 Dr. Shannon Reid) (Host) Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Shannon Reid, coauthor of “The Alt-Right Movement and National Security” by Dr. Reid and Dr. Matthew Valasik, featured in Parameters’ Autumn (Fall) 2021 issue. Retired US Air Force Major General Charles J. Dunlop replied, disagreeing with Reid and Valasik’s articles. His thoughts as well as Reid and Valasik’s reply are in the Parameters Spring 2022 issue. Reid is an associate professor in the Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. She is the lead author of Alt-Right Gangs: A Hazy Shade of White. Valasik is an associate professor in the Department of Sociology at Louisiana State University. He’s the coauthor of Alt-Right Gangs: A Hazy Shade of White. Dunlap retired from the Air Force in 2010, after more than 34 years of service. He currently teaches at Duke Law School and is the executive director of its Center on Law, Ethics, and National Security. His 1992 essay “The Origins of the Military Coup of 2012” was selected for Parameters’ 40th Anniversary Edition. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Shannon, thanks for joining us. I’m glad you’re here. Your article talks about the white-power movement and its history with the military from the Civil War to today. What was the overarching goal of your original article? (Reid) So the overarching goal of the main article is to really bring attention to the fact that we have a white-power/far-right issue in the military, and it’s not a new problem. As you mentioned, we go back all the way to the Civil War. But it is an area of focus that needs attention and cannot continue to be pushed out of the way as something we don’t want to focus on. (Host) Military-affiliated citizens supporting DVEs (that’s domestic violent extremists)—how bad is it? (Reid) Part of the problem is we really don’t have any idea. The issue with not studying something is that we only have anecdotes and guesses. While Major General Dunlap said we’re overestimating, the truth of the matter is we really don’t know if it’s an overestimation or underestimation because all we’re seeing is when somebody either commits a violent crime or gets in trouble for supporting white-power messaging and is removed from the military. So all we are seeing is a very tail end of what the problem is. But if we continue to say either (a) we don’t want to look at this because we feel like it does a disservice to the image of the troops or (b) assuming that we’re overestimating, because it’s only a proportion of the individuals who are part of these groups really does not allow us to tackle the actual problem, but rather allows it to continue fairly unfettered. Because they know that no one is really interested in looking into it in a more in-depth way. (Host) Dunlap, in his reply to you, gave an example illustrating how, he says, the numbers are small. And he also notes that exaggerating the problem beyond what data shows dangerously erodes public confidence in the armed forces. It diminishes the propensity of minorities to join, and it gives succor to America’s enemies around the world. You say your position is concentrated on the need for the US military to finally confront this problem head on. What would that look like? (Reid) It’s sort of a multistage process. As you look at people who have talked about their involvement, either in the white-power movement generally or in the intersection of the military and the white-power movement, a lot of it has to do with personal, individual, and group vulnerability. The same way we talk a lot about gang membership or mental health risk, (posttraumatic stress disorder or) PTSD, and suicide—just because it’s potentially a small portion of the population doesn’t mean that there are people who are not at risk for long-term consequences from this action. So when we think about “OK, what would studying this really look like,” a lot of people are bringing these ideologies or beliefs in with them, and it continues once they’re there. Or are they sort of becoming—and I use the word “indoctrinated” very loosely—but, you know, sort of becoming wrapped up in this movement while in the military because of either what they’re seeing or what they’re being exposed to? Because that really impacts how we intervene and how we move to prevent further polarization or further extremism. But the bottom line is we don’t know. So if we can get surveys or research done as people are coming in or coming back from deployment—so, figuring out those points of inflection where risk is the highest—then we are able to develop prevention programs the same way we do for others. Again, probably small numbers, but large impacts. So we don’t dismiss suicide risk amongst the military because it’s only going to be a small proportion, right? We take that seriously, or we hope people take that seriously. We tried to take PTSD seriously. We take veteran homelessness seriously. And, so, dismissing something simply because it’s a small number, potentially, is to give the people who are at risk for this behavior no support and put them on a path that leads to a lot of risky behavior and can really change their lives in a negative way. (Host) There was some commonality in your views, and Dunlap does agree. In fact, I’ll quote here. He says, “Let’s be clear about something. The military, like American society in general, needs to stamp out racism and white supremacy. In this respect, I believe, Valasik and Reid have some ideas worth pondering.” Do you have any final thoughts? (Reid) Because they are the military—similar to the police, where we’ve seen this issue in law enforcement generally—we are giving them extra skills and assets and a belief system that the far right is trying to exploit. They bring something to the table that potentially an average citizen doesn’t. And, so, it becomes more imperative to really root out this problem. Because it’s more than just racism. It’s beyond, you know, “I don’t like so-and-so.” And I know he talks about, you know, “We don’t want to cause distrust in the military.” But the problem is that distrust exists because these people are showing up on the news and are being seen at things like the Capitol riot or Unite the Right or Portland protests. I think it erodes trust more not to be doing anything about it than it does to try to expose a problem and say, “We’re going to move forward to deal with this in an efficient and effective manner.” (Host) Thanks for joining me today, Shannon, and for sharing your thoughts on this topic. (Reid) Thank you. (Host) If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, or any other major podcasting platform.   show less

Assessing threats to the air littoral, the airspace between ground forces and high-end fighters and bombers, requires a paradigm change in American military thinking about verticality. This article explores the consequences of domain convergence, specifically for the Army and Air Force’s different concepts of control. It will assist US military and policy practitioners in conceptualizing the air littoral and in thinking more vertically about the air and land domains and the challenges of... read more

Assessing threats to the air littoral, the airspace between ground forces and high-end fighters and bombers, requires a paradigm change in American military thinking about verticality. This article explores the consequences of domain convergence, specifically for the Army and Air Force’s different concepts of control. It will assist US military and policy practitioners in conceptualizing the air littoral and in thinking more vertically about the air and land domains and the challenges of domain convergence. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss4/7/ Episode Transcript: Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production, featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. Decisive Point welcomes Colonel Maximillian K. Bremer and Dr. Kelly A. Grieco, authors of “Air Littoral: Another Look.” Colonel Bremer is the director of the Special Programs Division at Air Mobility Command. He is a 1997 distinguished graduate of the US Air Force Academy, he has an MPP from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and an MAAS from the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. Dr. Grieco is an assistant professor of military and security studies in the Department of International Security at the Air Command and Staff College. She received her PhD in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Max. Kelly. Thanks for joining me today. I’m really glad you’re here. Your research looks at air littoral, which is the space between ground forces and high-end fighters and bombers, and how the US military thinks about its verticality. What has changed in recent decades that makes this a priority? Colonel Maximilian K. Bremer Well, Stephanie, first, thanks for having us on. And thanks to Parameters for publishing this paper. It’s really a privilege. So you’re asking what’s changed? Well, in a nutshell, democratization and technological advancement have led to increased access and persistence in the space that we’re calling the air littoral. Basically, more users with more technology are driving innovation both in the military and civilian realms. Changing the way that we access and persist in any domain will alter the way we contest that domain–the way we seek dominance. The air littoral, until recently, was mostly a realm of transit to and from the blue skies. Persistent access within the air littoral was just not tenable. But it is now, and that drives a change in how we utilize the domain. Before, we could think about airspace as layered flat maps, and now we have to understand the interaction vertically and persistently from the ground all the way to the edge of space. Dr. Kelly A. Grieco As Colonel Bremer suggests, what has changed is increased access and persistence to the air littoral. Russia in eastern Ukraine, for example, has been able to access the airspace and deny it to the Ukrainian Air Force mainly using not manned aircraft but a combination of air defense and electronic warfare systems. And they have then been able to exploit this airspace using multiple drones flying simultaneously at different altitudes over target areas to spot for artillery rockets. This example illustrates two important changes in my mind. First, manned aircraft are no longer essential for accessing or exploiting the airspace, or at least parts of the airspace. And second, increasingly, both nonstate actors and strategic competitors will use small unarmed systems–things like drones, low flying missiles, and loitering munitions to gain persistent access to the air littoral and then exploit it. Host What is the working definition of air superiority? And where does the United States fall on this topic? Do we still rule the skies? Grieco No. At least not the same way we did 10 or even five years ago. In joint doctrine, air control exists on a spectrum based on the degree to which an adversary can interfere with friendly military operations. On that spectrum, air superiority refers to a level of air control in which friendly forces are able to operate at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. Air supremacy goes even further than that. It refers to a degree of dominance in which the opposing force is incapable of even effective interference. And that’s anywhere in the entire theater of operations. I would argue, and many others, that based on those definitions, for the last 30 years, the United States has had air superiority, if not air supremacy in all its major conflicts. Today, however, that’s no longer a given and in fairness, both the Air Force and the Army have increasingly recognized this in recent years. To emphasize that point, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Brown, has said on numerous occasions that air dominance is not an American birthright. But attempts to maintain or regain that air superiority have mainly centered on developing and acquiring sixth-generation fighters and bombers. So those aircraft that operate in the blue skies. As we point out in our article, this focus on the blue skies runs the risk of missing that adversaries are increasingly able to access the airspace between the ground and the blue skies, that is the air littoral. Bremer So to address this new reality, we have to recognize that air control exists in a volume rather than a flat bounded plane. In the past, control the air was won or lost in the blue skies. If you obtained air superiority over a theater of operations, it was generally imparted to control over all altitudes, but that assumption no longer holds. Control of the air littoral is rapidly decoupling from that of the blue skies, which means our concept of air control has to evolve. It must account for a third dimension—that of vertical space. Critically, conceptualizing air control as a volume calls attention to key differences between the blue skies in the air littoral. Compared to blue skies, the air littoral is becoming much more highly dynamic, threat-intensive in a more important environment. In Iraq, as General Raymond Thomas noted, the adversary was able to operate, quote – right overhead and underneath our air superiority – unquote. If the enemy is in the air above us, do we actually have air superiority? Host Here’s a quote from your article. Most worrying for the United States is the potential curtailing of the military’s ability to provide effective support to US, Allied, and partner ground forces from the skies above. Can you expand on US adversaries contesting control of the air littoral and your answer to it? Bremer In the US military, the services are aligned with the physical domains, the mediums through which they primarily operate. They’re charged with the duty to organize, train, and equip forces to be experts in and dominate those domains to the benefit of the joint force. Yet the fuzzy border between physical domains creates a seam. And this seam is where services contest with each other for authorities and funding. Our adversaries are watching, and they could potentially exploit that seam. What is the airspace? Who has responsibility for control of the airspace, and what does control mean? These are some fundamental challenges that the democratization of the air littoral creates. For example, you know, a bullet fired from an M-4 is traveling through the air. Is that in the airspace? What about a mortar that travels up to 1,500 feet and then comes back down? Or HIMARS? Or what about a small loitering drone that doesn’t go above 400 feet but sticks around for several hours? GRIECO And currently, the focus is really on counter-system ideas–counter UAS, counter mortar, counter cruise missiles, counter aircraft. But these all operate in the same physical realm and only vary by propulsion, systems speed, persistence, and range. And those characteristics, especially speed, persistence, and range are converging. And our adversaries are very aware of this and responding to these developments. And as they innovate their capabilities and operational concepts, the Air Force is increasingly at risk of failing in his primary job—winning in the air to allow the army to occupy and win the ground. Host How does vertical reciprocity play into this? Grieco The air littoral, like the maritime littoral, is fundamentally a trans domain environment. This requires vertical reciprocity between air and ground forces. It also means more interactions and interdependencies between the air and ground. And the Army, for example, plans to exploit this vertical space with joint all-domain operations, emphasizing presenting the enemy with multiple dilemmas. The Army has an emerging vision of simultaneously, both horizontally and vertically, enveloping the enemy. Of course, US adversaries also seek the same advantages. Bremer Yes, but bringing the air war close to the ground will also lay bare the differences in the army in the Air Force’s concept of control. Control of the land domain has traditionally been a function of the persistent occupation of territory. Armies, as Clausewitz said, can stand fast, as it were, rooted to the ground. In contrast, the Air Force concept of control in the air domain centers on responsive presence, not persistent occupation. Air Forces may occupy airspace for a time but it’s ephemeral. What it offers instead is a rapid but not necessarily persistent presence, the ability to quickly mass and deliver fires. The growing mission overlap will cause a clash of these air-centric and land-centric concepts of control. Closing this seam is critical to the future success of the joint force. The Air Force will need to address control the air literal from the blue skies just as the army will have to address it from the ground. Each service is going to have to support the other in this evolving trans domain environment. Host In conclusion, is it technology that’s going to be the answer here? Bremer No, I don’t think technology is going to be the answer, not in the general way that we use the term. The artifacts, the things that we create, are simply part of the environment. But the art and craft of understanding how to employ those things, which is the original Greek meaning of the term technology, that will play a significant role. The democratization and innovation that created access and persistence in the air littoral is also driving a significant maturation of the domain. We have to adapt to this new environment by understanding it differently–no longer as planar maps stacked one atop another statically, but rather as a fluid with temporal, vertical, and horizontal dimensions. Then we can apply technology, the craft of employing our tools, to the contestation and dominance of the air literal. Grieco I agree wholeheartedly. And I would just add that the answer is really doctrinal innovation. The technology is hardware, but doctrine is the software. It’s that application piece. And as we argue in our article, gaining a competitive advantage in the air littoral requires the joint force to develop a new conceptual framework, and it’s one that needs to be grounded in both horizontal and vertical spaces. And if we don’t, America might not just lose this technological advantage, but its operational edge. Host This has been great. It was very enlightening. Grieco Thank you for having us. And it was a pleasure to do this. Bremer Thanks, Stephanie. Host If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple podcast, Stitcher, and any other major podcast platforms.   show less

Critics of the Afghan war have claimed it was always unwinnable. This article argues the war was unwinnable the way it was fought and posits an alternative based on the Afghan way of war and the US approach to counterinsurgency in El Salvador during the final decade of the Cold War. Respecting the political and military dictates of strategy could have made America’s longest foreign war unnecessary and is a warning for the wars we will fight in the future.
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Critics of the Afghan war have claimed it was always unwinnable. This article argues the war was unwinnable the way it was fought and posits an alternative based on the Afghan way of war and the US approach to counterinsurgency in El Salvador during the final decade of the Cold War. Respecting the political and military dictates of strategy could have made America’s longest foreign war unnecessary and is a warning for the wars we will fight in the future. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss4/3/ Episode Transcript: Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Todd Greentree, a former US Foreign Service officer who served as a political military officer in five conflicts, including El Salvador and Afghanistan. He’s a member of the Changing Character of War Center at Oxford University and teaches in the Global and National Security Policy Institute at the University of New Mexico. Greentree is the author of “What Went Wrong in Afghanistan,” featured in Parameters Winter 2021-2022 issue. Welcome, Todd. I’m so glad you’re here. Let’s talk about your article. Some people would argue the Afghan war was unwinnable. You assert it was unwinnable the way it was fought. What do you mean by that? Dr. Todd Greentree Thank you, Stephanie. Great to be here. The idea that it was unwinnable the way it was fought is really tied to the purpose, sort of the reason why I was writing it, which is not just about what went wrong in Afghanistan, what lessons can be derived about counterinsurgency. This is really an article about US strategic behavior. Afghanistan was my fifth war. And I like to write what I know. So really, the origin of the article is from my own story. I got the idea that we were maybe not doing this right, sort of when I stepped off the helicopter at Bagram in 2008. My first war had been El Salvador in the early 1980s. And so everything I learned were all from guys who had been in Vietnam. There’s more about that in the article. For the next four years, though, I served with people who were…most of the people were from the 9/11 generation, and I was a political adviser to combat units out in the field and was super impressed with the astuteness that everybody was showing. So first, I was in Regional Command East, where General Mark Milley was the deputy commander for operations. But there was a problem with the entire effort in Afghanistan. We were on economy of force. But that economy of force was not being exercised for a strategic purpose, just to minimize the cost, because Iraq had sucked up all the attention and the bulk of the resources. Then I moved to Regional Command South into Taliban home country, and they had been raging there since 2006. It took three years for the US to adapt. I came back to Kandahar in 2010, at the height of the surge, with the 10th Mountain Division. They were in command of Regional Command South. And this was the main effort at the height of the surge. It was a strong coalition team. They knew what to do, how to partner with the Afghan army. They took it seriously. They were serious about aligning political and military strategies, which was my part of this. The overall strategy of the US, by 2009, was coming into focus, we’d had Stan McChrystal’s math, the idea, here’s our most experienced Special Operations commander who had come to the realization, as had many of the SOF guys, that attrition generates more insurgents. This led to a shift in the understanding of focus on the population rather than exercising firepower. General Petraeus, following McChrystal with Field Manual 3-24 and counterinsurgency doctrine and all of that. The problem was that when Obama announced the surge, he time-limited at the same time, which was a strategically incorrect thing to do because, for the Taliban, all they had to do was wait it out. And for them, jihad was forever. But by 2011, when the surge was peaking and then over, that was 10 years into the war. It was just way too long to be fighting and to get it right. My big point is that military operational excellence was essentially what we were exercising–a series of operations in a context of strategic incoherence. So, there was warfighting, but it was associated with this wildly ambitious nation-building that was very well-intentioned and made a lot of progress, but it was far too complex for the United States to sustain at that level. We certainly can’t blame the Afghans. In the end, I arrived at the same conclusion that Bob Komer did in 1973, when he, as the head of counterinsurgency in Vietnam, wrote this incredible paper called “Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: US Performance in Vietnam.” That conclusion was: if you find yourself doing Big COIN, it’s too late. Host Let’s talk about accidental guerrillas and accidental counterinsurgents. How did this happen in relation to Afghanistan? Greentree Accidental Guerrillas was this great book that Dave Kilcullen wrote–one of his first books. And he had this idea that the Pashtuns, who make up most of the Taliban, were fighting us because we were in their space. My idea with accidental counterinsurgents is merely to hold up a mirror on that idea and say, “well, that’s right.” And the only reason that we were fighting the Taliban was because they helped al-Qaeda, who got into our space by attacking us on 9/11. The strategic problem with this was that we confused the two. The Taliban were insurgents. They were not international terrorists. They didn’t like the Arabs in al-Qaeda very much, most of them. And they weren’t threatening the US in any way. So, in the end, we were hunting these extreme conservative Islamists, on their home ground, who were fighting jihad against us, the foreign troops who were in combat in the middle of their own people. So you had this incredible conflict, incredible clash, between two warrior cultures–one on their home ground and one on the sort of the “away team” that really didn’t understand this dynamic very well. Host Let’s circle back for a minute to your comment about if you’re doing big COIN, it’s already too late. Was there really any other option? What were they going to do? Small COIN? Greentree In El Salvador, small COIN was the model because the Vietnam War had ended less than a decade earlier. So early 1980s. Saigon was evacuated in 1975, so there was no way that the US military or the American public would support involvement in major counterinsurgency. So there was a political imperative that limited the presence of US forces on the ground. But there was more to it than that. It was also part of the policy to balance political and military strategy. They were in sync with each other. To take that lesson away, keep foreign troops–keep ourselves–out of direct conflict, out of direct combat. Focus on training, assisting, and advising. And one way to put it is to change one word in Article 15, of the famous article by Thomas Edward Lawrence, T. E. Lawrence of Arabia, the article was titled “27 Articles,” and it was about supporting and fighting with the Arabs in World War I in 1917. Article 15, with one word change (changing Arabs to Afghans) reads, “Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Afghans do it tolerably than you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them. Not to win it for them. Actually, also under the very odd conditions of Afghanistan, your practical work will not be as good as perhaps you think it is.” I think that just applies 100% to what was going on in Afghanistan. To take that a step further, is, rather than taking the war over, we should have been doing all along what we were doing at the end, which was keeping the size of our forces small and focusing on training, assisting, and advising rather than combat itself. The second part of this looking at options and alternatives, though, is equally if not more important. We should have listened to the Afghans. We often treated them and thought of them as our proxies, but we were fighting in their country. They weren’t proxies. They were really joint venture partners in which both sides, both participants, shared strengths and shared risks and shared costs. Just building on that, there’s a lot of blame to go around. That was a culminating point of victory. And we should have entered war termination with them, even while we continued counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda. The reason I’m talking about this as an option, as an alternative, was because a new President Karzai, and his fellow Pashtuns and government, had a strategy that was in accord with the Afghan way of war. The Taliban were streaming in to recognize the new winner and swear fealty to President Karzai. The government side was ready to disperse them back to their communities in southern Afghanistan and separate out those leaders who led the Pakistan from the Taliban, but at the same time to bring Taliban representatives, who had sworn fealty and were willing to reconcile, and include them at the table at the Bonn conference, where the new government was being formed. It was all thought out. The Afghans seemed to know what they were doing. They proposed this, and the Bush administration, principally Secretary defense, Rumsfeld said “no way, we’re not having anything to do with these Taliban people.” And so we ended up taking over the war with our own set of Afghan warlords, conducting counterterrorist methods by hunting the Taliban, capturing them, killing them, sending them to Guantanamo, and searching around for combat to continue combat–conducting the American way of war. By bringing up this option, it suggests that it may have been possible for the Afghan war to have been entirely unnecessary. Host We packed a lot into a few short minutes. Thank you so much, Todd for doing this with me. I enjoyed all of it. Greentree Okay, my pleasure, Stephanie. Host If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple podcast, Stitcher, and any other major podcast platforms.   show less

A titan of modern strategic studies, Colin S. Gray distinguished himself from other scholars in the field with his belief that grand strategy is indispensable, complex, and inherently agential. This article identifies key themes, continuities, conceptual relationships, and potential discontinuities from his decades of grand strategic thought. Gray’s statement that “all strategy is grand strategy” remains highly relevant today, emphasizing the importance of agential context in military... read more

A titan of modern strategic studies, Colin S. Gray distinguished himself from other scholars in the field with his belief that grand strategy is indispensable, complex, and inherently agential. This article identifies key themes, continuities, conceptual relationships, and potential discontinuities from his decades of grand strategic thought. Gray’s statement that “all strategy is grand strategy” remains highly relevant today, emphasizing the importance of agential context in military environments—a point often neglected in strategic practice. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss4/8/ Episode Transcript: Stephanie Crider (Host) Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Lukas Milevski, an assistant professor at the Institute of History at Leiden University. He’s published The West’s East: Contemporary Baltic Defense in Strategic Perspective (2018) and The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought (2016). He is the author of “The Grand Strategic Thought of Colin S. Gray,” featured in Parameters Winter 2021-22 issue. I’m glad you’re here, Lukas. Thanks for joining me today. Let’s talk about your article. “The Grand Strategic Thought of Colin S Gray.” Colin Gray, a Titan of modern Strategic Studies, often referred to grand strategy as equivalent to statecraft. War is more than a simple military contest, it inherently involves nonmilitary forms of power. Gray’s, conception of grand strategy contradicts the mainstream interpretation, particularly favored in the United States, in which grand strategy is identified as the Master of Policy. Walk us through Gray’s basic views on grand strategy. Dr. Lukas Milevski OK, well first of all, thank you for inviting me. Now there are four key features of Colin’s basic understanding of grand strategy which are worth emphasizing. First grand strategy was in some ways a compromise, particularly between strategic studies characterized by the study of strategy, understood fairly strictly as military strategy, and security studies, which encompass security beyond military security— economic, environmental, human, etc. So grand strategy, therefore, was a compromise between the necessity to focus on war in strategic studies and the recognition that war, and indeed security, is more than just warfare as waged by militaries. Second, his personal definition of grand strategy is, and I’ll quote here. “The direction and use made of any or all among the total assets of a security community and support of its policy goals as decided by politics.” Which he followed up by asserting that the theory and practice of grand strategy is the theory and practice of statecraft itself. So, for Colin, grand strategy was clearly rather enormous concept in both theory and in practice, and one which did actually go beyond war itself. Given that he stated that grand strategy and statecraft are essentially synonymous. Third, grand strategy will still be strategy despite its enormity, means that it could be, had to be, and was understandable via the general theory of strategy, which he, throughout his career, sought to clarify ever further. This means, among other things, that as much as military strategy needs to be conducted, performed, or whatever word you prefer. So too does grand strategy. So there’s performance and economic or financial sanctions. For example, just as much as , if quite different from, that found in military strategy. That said, Colin didn’t really ever actually delve into how and nonmilitary power performed in application. Fourth, and finally, grand strategy is indispensable. Any military strategic judgment is inherently a grand strategic judgment. And often judgments needs to be made which are grand strategic rather than narrowly military strategic. You know, not every threat or every policy problem is necessarily solvable with armed force. Or even if it is, that task may be more easily done in combination with other instruments. Host Gray noted grand strategy undoubtedly is so close to policy that the two can seem indistinguishable. Can you clarify? What is the difference between the two? Milevski I’ll try, certainly. So the first thing to note about the distinction between grand strategy and policy, or even more broadly between strategy and policy, is that conceptual distinctions are rarely born out in organizational structure. And this in turn means that organizational structure should not and cannot be used as an argument for or against particular conceptual distinctions. Otherwise, we can’t share concepts with other analogous organizations like within that the DoD or with other European ministries of defense, or even with our own past or our probable future and our organizations in those time periods. So there is value in conceptual clarity, even if we also acknowledge that practice is liable to be messier. Because then we can develop theory, which both maintains clarity and is still useful in messy situations. So, for example we can develop theory which embraces the ideal. That strategy should serve policy while acknowledging and incorporating the fact that often strategy can shape policy, and that this is, to some degree inevitable and not even necessarily bad. Or even that some might attempt to practice strategy in a policy vacuum and why those attempts are a bad idea. So real-world might messiness can actually be very useful in developing and annunciating theoretical clarity. So then coming back to the distinction between grand strategy and policy, Clausewitz observed that at higher levels, strategy slowly transforms into policy. Quoting from the Howard and Paret translation, “. . . the conduct of war in its great outlines is therefore policy itself, which takes up the sword in place of the pen.’ And he noted elsewhere that there’s no such thing as purely military advice, even though that sort of notion is quite attractive to military professionals. Then we might add in the context of grand strategy, there’s similarly no such thing as purely economic, financial, diplomatic, or whatever, advice either. This means that in considering and employing the instrumental value of these forms of power, policy is always present because these instruments are used to achieve policy. So, policy may arguably be felt less in tactics than strategy, and even that’s not necessarily true, but fundamentally still present in one way or another. So the question is then, what does this mean for the distinction between grand strategy or even strategy in general, and policy, if policy permeates the whole conduct of war? So the difference in conception, I would say between grand strategy and policy, is that the former does not set political goals to be achieved, whereas in the latter does. Moreover, it is through policy that politicians demonstrate a political preference for particular instruments to be used, but it is up to grand strategy to determine first the details of that use in as much as that use is tactically viable and politically acceptable. And second, ultimately, determining whether it is possible to fulfill the desired political goals using the instruments preferred by policy–or not–as the case may be. Ultimately, theory needs to recognize that there is a dialogue, even if it is unequal, between grand strategy and policy. The difference in practice, of course, is that organizations are not necessarily structured in ways which reflect these sorts of conceptual distinctions. So when you look at practice, I would suggest that the main difference is really based on degrees of engagement with the particular responsibilities of grand strategy or policy. That is, the more one engages in deciding political direction and political preferences concerning the conduct of war, the more one is engaging with policy. Conversely, the more one engages with reconciling tactical details in whatever field whether that’s military, economic, financial, whatever, with given political limitations, with imagining the political meaning of actions and in providing feedback from real practice back to policy as necessary, then one is doing grand strategy. And, of course, a single individual or single set of individuals can be doing all of this together. But that’s not really a problem, because they can still be conceptually distinct. So sort of to sum it up, grand strategy is still a relational. It’s still relates tactical actions and the details of the many forms of power to policy and political consequence. Policy, on the other hand, is the director and to say it quite inelegantly, the “related to,” as it were. Host Let’s end with this quote from your article Grays's interpretation of grand strategy contains much potential conceptual depth yet to be explored, but which may further develop grand strategy as an idea. Can you give us an example? Milevski Sure. So one example is the orchestration and combination of military and nonmilitary forms of power together into a single grand strategic effort. What does it look like? How do we do it? Here in the West, we don’t really have that many good ideas on this issue. Now, this is something Colin didn’t explore in his writings, as I mentioned my article. And in fairness, it’s partly because it’s incredibly difficult to do so effectively. It requires understanding, even if not necessarily mastering, all the various forms of power–military, economic, financial, diplomatic, disinformation, etc. And then on top of that, imagining how they can fit together. And this is an issue which has actually plagued grand strategy as a concept for more than a century. So this is not something which is unique to Gray’s thinking about grand strategy, although it’s certainly a part of it. We can go back to the British maritime strategic theorist Julian Corbett or the British military thinker Basil Little Heart–both of whom emphasized the importance of multiple forms of power. But both of these men also did not explore how they actually work together. And the grands strategic literature since their day has consistently, I think, avoided the topic even while invoking it as core to the very concept of grand strategy. And, indeed, we see this, you know, this expansive dimension appear even in numerous definitions of strategy per se, let alone grand strategy. But we are not good at thinking about it, and therefore we’re not good at doing it. And both of these are demonstrated by our repeated reinvention of grand strategy to suit particular contexts. So first, a couple decades ago, we reinvented grand strategy as the comprehensive approach in this specific context of counterinsurgency. And then arguably failed to do it effectively. And then we reinvented it again in 2014 as hybrid warfare, when it turned out that the Russians had a pretty solid idea of how it worked and a pretty solid idea of how to do it. And they did it pretty well in Crimea. And in the process. They quite surprised us. We know and can do combined arms. We know why it’s a good thing to do. We know how to do it, etc. Similarly, if we take one step up, we know and can do joint warfare. We know why it’s a good thing to do. We know how to do it. But when we take another step up to grand strategy and combining multiple forms of power rather than multiple forms of purely military power, we’re kind of lost. We have the sense of why it’s good in principle. But we have little idea of how to do it. In part because we, at this stage, have little idea of how to think about it. Because we have no real theory on how to combine these quite dissimilar forms of power together into a single effort. So this is something which both deserves and requires a good deal more attention than it has gotten in the past more than a century now. Host I enjoyed our time today. Thank you for chatting with me.   show less

This article explores the current debate about service and Joint operating concepts, starting with the Army’s multi-domain operations concept. It argues for adaptations to an old operational design technique—defeat mechanisms; updates to Joint and service planning doctrine; and discipline regarding emerging concepts. Rather than debate over attrition versus maneuver, combinations of a suite of defeat mechanisms should be applied to gain victory in the future.
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This article explores the current debate about service and Joint operating concepts, starting with the Army’s multi-domain operations concept. It argues for adaptations to an old operational design technique—defeat mechanisms; updates to Joint and service planning doctrine; and discipline regarding emerging concepts. Rather than debate over attrition versus maneuver, combinations of a suite of defeat mechanisms should be applied to gain victory in the future. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss4/6/ Episode Transcript: Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Frank Hoffman, author of “Defeat Mechanisms in Modern Warfare,” featured in Parameters 2021 – 22 Winter issue. Dr. Hoffman is a distinguished research fellow at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. His latest book, Mars Adapting: Military Change under Fire, was published this year. Frank, I’m glad you’re here. Thank you for joining me. We’re here to talk about your article that was published in Parameters Winter 2021 – 22, “Defeat Mechanisms in Modern Warfare.” Your article assesses several conceptual efforts to better posture US military for success and future wars. Specifically, you explore the debate between service and joint operating concepts and the opportunities and vulnerabilities of cyber-enabled systems to produce decisive effects at the operational level of war. Please set the stage for our listeners and explain the current debate. Dr. Frank Hoffman Sure, thank you. Great to be here today. It’s just interesting that, you know, in the literature right now, we’re going back to fundamentals about how we in the military conceive of, plan for, and conceptualize obtaining victory. And there seems to be quite a fervent debate going on both in the military literature and in the academic literature. In the current issue of “Survival,” published by double I double S in London, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Franz-Stefan Gady challenges American concepts and thinking about maneuver versus attrition, which is an age-old debate that goes back in the Army and the Marine Corps back to the 1980s. And Gady suggests that we need to reemphasize attrition, since maneuver, both in the sense of movement and mobility across the battlespace, is going to be much harder because of persistent surveillance, attacks from drones, drones as a source of ISR. His reading of future technology suggests that maneuver is going to be very hard and that we need to focus on buying capabilities to attrit the adversary. And this is also taken up by Michael Kofman from the Center for Naval Analysis, who argues that the Army and the joint world need to let loose their embrace of strategic or operational paralysis, you know, attempting to confuse commanders. And we need to reembrace attrition and firepower to destroy enemy capabilities, not by combinations and not by the way we currently think about it. And this is also then taken up by Dr. Heather Venable, who’s a professor at the Air University. And she also argues that most of our thinking in the Army and the Marine Corps is based upon some rather thin historical cases drawn largely from either 1916’s infiltration tactics or the theories of John Boyd and the OODA loop and this notion of cognitive paralysis and outmaneuvering the enemy in the broader sense through combinations of forces in modern combine arms. Those are the critics. In the service literature, in the joint world, and in the United States, we do seem to have this emphasis now on what in the Army is described as creating multiple dilemmas for the opponent as a theory of victory. I found in the Air Force’s doctrine the same kind of theory of victory. And I’ve also found it in the latest British integrated operating concept that we’re predicating our ability to win and to defeat the adversary by somehow generating multiple dilemmas. And that there’s this perception that if we come from different directions with different cross-domain capabilities, our opponents will be cognitively constipated or somehow operationally paralyzed and unable to defend themselves. Or they’ll just make a lot of mistakes. And I do have some problems with this notion of cognitive paralysis. So I’m glad that the critics have pointed up this particular debate, but I’m not sure that attrition, particularly against peers, is really the way to go about it. So I’ve been exploring some old concepts that I learned from General Wass de Czege in the 1990s, that I think need to be reintroduced. They need to be updated to account for the cyber and information strike capabilities we have now. We just don’t rely upon physical strikes. We have offensive capabilities in cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum capability as well. As do our adversaries. So I think a refreshing look at defeat mechanisms, a terminology that I learned from the Army a long time ago, more than two decades ago, just needs to be refurbished and made more contemporary. And that’s what the essence of the article is about. Host Your article says the real issue is the construction of concepts or operational plans that have a historically demonstrated or testable theory of victory. What are some possible defeat mechanisms that might contribute to a solution? Hoffman Well, I do have to say that the critics are right, that attrition, or the phrase I use that I think is more preferable is destruction–the use of firepower to destroy either capabilities or the capacities of the size of the enemy forces–is a component. But I think in the cyber realm, we also need to think about disorientation or disruption through both deception through information operations and through cyber capabilities. There is certainly this physical and nonphysical means that we have of both destroying and disorienting the adversary to gain an operational advantage. That is where I think the future lies. I do believe that maneuver in its tactical sense, you know, the movement of forces, can create the options of dislocation, and again, this is where seizing a positional advantage or making an opponent’s defense irrelevant by moving around them or over them or coming from a sudden direction, still has some utility–even in a period of massive surveillance capability. We can still blind somebody, disorient them first, and then conduct the maneuver and dislocate them. So disruption disorientation, dislocation, and destruction are the for defeat mechanisms that in different contexts against different adversaries, can be combined and sequenced and orchestrated in time and place to gain an operational advantage and achieve a degree of systems disruption over the adversaries operating system that makes them far less capable relative to us. I think that’s where the future lies in creating overmatch or creating a competitive advantage in the battlespace in the future. I don’t believe that we can paralyze an enemy commander, I don’t believe that we can stupefy them. But I do believe that their system disruption, through the combination of disorientation, dislocation, and disruption, is still feasible in the twenty-first century. And I think our concepts, our military planning, should define some of these terms. And I’m only offering my definitions to begin the debate. Let the joint doctrine world find the best terms. But this isn’t a big lift for us intellectually, but it does put us on, I think, more solid ground both in terms of what has worked in the past, what worked in World War II, what has worked in contemporary conflict, and what will work in the future in a world in which command systems are operating at great ranges–in which everybody has some space parity and some operational aviation capability. We’re dealing with a much more contested space; I think we need to reconceptualize victory and defeat mechanisms to deal with this twenty-first century. Host Can you give us any final thoughts or any concluding thoughts on this topic? Hoffman I think this is very, very critical. It’s particularly critical for our concepts. It’s particularly critical for us to imagine and understand what it is to be in a competitive environment with a peer–someone whose space capabilities and aviation capabilities, and their C-2/AI-enabled capabilities may approach our own in some senses. We’ll have edges and some areas and not. I think it’s very important for us to rethink our operational art and refocus. After 15 or 20 years of focusing on the lower half of the conflict spectrum, the scale, the pace, the role of destruction, also, but the role of deception and disorientation and dislocation is still relevant, I think, in the 21st century. I think we need to rejuvenate our thinking about this. Host Thank you for joining me. I had a blast and learned a lot. Hoffman I’m really pleased to work with the Army War College Press.   show less

Deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan without recklessly threatening a great-power war is both possible and necessary through a tailored deterrence package that goes beyond either fighting over Taiwan or abandoning it. This article joins cutting-edge understandings of deterrence with empirical evidence of Chinese strategic thinking and culture to build such a strategy.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss4/4/

Episode Transcript:
Stephanie Crider... read more

Deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan without recklessly threatening a great-power war is both possible and necessary through a tailored deterrence package that goes beyond either fighting over Taiwan or abandoning it. This article joins cutting-edge understandings of deterrence with empirical evidence of Chinese strategic thinking and culture to build such a strategy. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss4/4/ Episode Transcript: Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Jared M. McKinney, co-author of “Broken Nest: Deterring China from Invading Taiwan,” written with Dr. Peter Harris and featured in Parameters’ 2021 – 22 Winter issue. Dr. McKinney is the chair of the Department of Strategy and Security Studies at the eSchool of Graduate Professional Military Education, Air University, and reviews editor of the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs. Dr. Peter Harris is associate professor of political science at Colorado State University and Indo-Pacific Perspectives editor of the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs. Jared, I’m so glad you’re here. Thanks for joining me today. Let’s talk about your article, “The Broken Nest.” Would the People’s Republic of China invade Taiwan even if it meant risking war with the United States and its allies? Your article says there’s no doubt that the United States has a strong interest in deterring a Chinese takeover of Taiwan but relying on the latent threat of a great power war is the wrong approach. Please elaborate on this. Dr. Jared M. McKinney Yeah, it would be my pleasure to walk you through the argument. Just as I get going, I’ll note that my opinions, conclusions, and recommendations are solely my own and that of Peter Harris, my coauthor, and we don’t represent the views of the Air Force or the Department of Defense. The Taiwan issue is really hot right now not just because of provocations or perceived provocation, but also because the strategic environment has changed. The historical position of the United States has been that the Navy could deter a Chinese invasion by denying it the possibility to succeed. This is how the 7th Fleet responded in the 1950s to various Taiwan Straits crises. And as recently as 1996, the US Navy again was deployed to the region around Taiwan in an act of deterrence against perceived Chinese aggression at the time. In 2021, the question really is, is this possible anymore? And pretty much everyone agrees that the status quo is inadequate. One camp says that we need to double down on deterrence by denial, and we need to do more much more quickly. This is in a response to the recognition that China’s capabilities have developed very quickly. The PRC of this decade is radically more powerful than (the) PRC of previous eras. And so, in this environment a posture of deterrence by denial seems much less credible because it’s quite possible that the United States would not have the ability to effectively deny a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The question therefore becomes, does this create an opportunity for a Chinese invasion, and what would the United States do? In our article, we argue that simply doubling down on deterrence by denial is foolish and not sufficient in the long run. Because even if deterrence by denial could be reinvigorated for this year or next year, it’s not going to be possible to do so in the long run due to imbalances in valuing Taiwan, and in geography. The United States is located on the other side of the world. In this environment. There is an increase in risk because if the United States policy is to deter such an invasion, but it no longer has the capability to do so, there’s the potential for a real crisis. We develop an argument that deterrence is still possible, but we need to rethink how we go about it. Because deterrence by denial has succeeded for so long. It’s our default approach today. But we need to start thinking of the situation in new terms, and so we suggest a deterrence by denial [should be deterrence by punishment as corrected by author post-taping] approach. The bottom line is that because of shifts in the balance of power, and because of Taiwan’s trajectory further away from China, mainland China is becoming increasingly aggressive in a way to signal its dissatisfaction with the status quo. Deterrence by denial [should be deterrence by punishment as corrected by author post-taping] seeks not to stop an invasion from occurring, but to inflict such costs after an invasion has occurred that the costs of invasion outweigh the benefits. The U.S. has, to some extent, a de facto policy of deterrence by punishment such that automatically US sanctions would probably be inflicted on China in response to an invasion, regardless of any other military decision. However, we can actually think ahead about the economic response, and we can design a strategy that makes the economic costs of an invasion very, very high. And that is what we have called the “Broken Nest” approach. Host If Taiwan fell to China, a successful democracy would be snuffed out, and Beijing’s geopolitical position in East Asia would be enhanced at the expense of the United States and its allies. What are the costs and the risks attached to abandoning Taipei to China? McKinney The most basic cost is that 23.5 million people who live in Taiwan would no longer live under a free and democratic government. And that’s a real and significant cost. To some extent, we need to be aware that U.S. policy has at least partially accepted this cost in the sense that from 1954 to 1979 the United States had a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan, including sometimes tens of thousands of soldiers deployed to Taiwan. We severed this mutual defense treaty in 1979, despite knowing the risks that China would successfully invade Taiwan. We have lived with the ambiguity of the “one China” policy and taking no stance on the sovereignty of Taiwan since 1979 and the earlier years when the agreements were negotiated. That being said, there are also geopolitical costs in that China’s position would be marginally improved in terms of power projection. There’s also image costs in that a successful Chinese invasion would send a great victory to China’s communist regime, and it would certainly come at the expense of American credibility. So, the costs are real, and for that reason, just a blanket “abandon Taiwan” position is not prudent, and that’s why it has not been US policy. Host Are there options to the Taiwan-China issue that don’t involve a great power war? McKinney So this is the problem: deterrence by denial, if it can’t succeed, the tendency would be to escalate it. Because if you can’t succeed in the Taiwan Straits or over Taiwan, then there’s concepts of AirSea battle, which call for strikes on the Chinese mainland and the horizontal escalation of the war. Very quickly a local war could become a global war, and the costs are essentially incalculable. So, that’s actually part of the problem, because incalculable costs indicate that America’s current posture may not be credible. A Chinese proverb asks, “Beneath a broken nest, how can there be any whole eggs?” and we work with this metaphor to suggest that Taiwan, so long as the status quo is maintained, should be an unbroken nest in that it is mutually beneficial in its ties with China and with the United States and the region. However, were China to invade Taiwan, it’s possible that a strategy could be set up beforehand that would inflict very high costs on a Chinese invasion. And these costs would be from the United States economically. But from Taiwan, they would have to be worked domestically. At the center of Taiwan’s economy, and actually the region’s economy and the global economy, is the semiconductor industry. Were Taiwan’s semiconductor manufacturing to be destroyed as a result of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, the costs would be very significant. Beyond that, were this strategy to be joined to a wider economic sanctions and interdiction campaign against advanced semiconductor trade with China and Taiwanese attacks on Chinese manufacturing capability in Shanghai, it’s possible that a Chinese invasion would trigger a semiconductor and economic crisis in China, which would have no resolution for the short term. The costs would be very high. There would also be costs the global economy, but the costs would be distributed principally to China. Now this isn’t in itself likely to deter a Chinese invasion. However, a “broken nest” approach, which could combine serious harm to the semiconductor industry with a well-planned resistance to a Chinese occupation to a significant defensive effort before the invasion succeeded and to a regional coordinated regional response which takes the Taiwan issue as an assessment of China’s relative belligerency could create a package of tailored deterrence by punishment that would make the invasion of Taiwan very costly. The Chinese Communist Party is not going to abandon its long-term ambitions. However, we can approach the issue not from the possibility of definitive resolution, of which there may be none, but from the possibility of maintaining stability in the short term, by which we think of the short term being approximately the next 10 years. And so, really, we’ve come up with a plan that we think could create significant incentives to maintain peace between Taiwan and China, probably for the next decade. Host So the plan you came up with—you’re talking about the broken nest approach, right? Do you want to walk us through that? McKinney For years Pentagon planners have pushed for Taiwan to adopt what someone in the Naval War College called a “porcupine strategy” more than a decade ago, and the porcupine strategy is to make the cost of invading very high. It acknowledges that invasion probably won’t be prevented, but by investing in anti-access area denial capabilities, Taiwan can inflict significant costs already at the step of invasion. That’s the status quo. We say accept the status quo. Double down on it. And as part of that, if Taiwan is serious about defending itself, it also could double down on its defense budget. The Liberal Democratic Party in Japan is talking about doubling Japan’s national defense budget in response to the changing security environment. I think Taiwan should do the same thing. And it has the capability to do so, given that it’s spending at approximately two percent of GDP is relatively meek compared to the threat with which it is faced. But beyond spending more and spending it on the right things, a tailored deterrence package would have to be planned ahead of time. There would have to be a resistance operating concept developed and integrated across Taiwan’s society. Taiwan’s people would have to be willing to fight and suffer and die for their freedom. And Taiwan would have to be willing to develop a device that automatically destroyed the physical capital in the semiconductor foundries. And a mechanism would also be needed to be developed to evacuate as much of Taiwan’s human capital in this sphere as well because physical capital can in fact be rebuilt, though it takes time. But human capital is key to doing so. So, this approach can only work if it’s absolutely assured that a Chinese invasion 1) is going to be costly, 2) it’s going to spark a resistance, 3) it’s going to result in the destruction of Taiwan’s technological production, and 4) it’s going to have significant regional security consequences. These costs would not make an invasion impossible, but it come at such a cost that Beijing’s leadership would have a significant incentive to put off the issue as long as possible. And probably putting off the issue as long as possible is the only realistic strategy for both sides at this point. Host I’m afraid that’s all we have time for, Jared. Thanks so much for your time today. Listeners, you can read the entire article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, and any other major podcast platform.   show less

PROLOGUE: In the wake of the Battle of Mogadishu, Somalia, on October 3-4, 1993, in which 19 American servicemembers were killed and 73 injured, I was tasked to lead an effort to discern the strategic lessons to be learned from the ill-fated US intervention. The study highlighted several shortfalls: the absence of a clear US strategy and whole-of-government plan for the operation, the onset of mission creep as the operation evolved from a humanitarian mission into a manhunt for a notorious... read more

PROLOGUE: In the wake of the Battle of Mogadishu, Somalia, on October 3-4, 1993, in which 19 American servicemembers were killed and 73 injured, I was tasked to lead an effort to discern the strategic lessons to be learned from the ill-fated US intervention. The study highlighted several shortfalls: the absence of a clear US strategy and whole-of-government plan for the operation, the onset of mission creep as the operation evolved from a humanitarian mission into a manhunt for a notorious Somali warlord, the lack of coordination across the US government agencies and other coalition partners involved, and the failure to maintain proper oversight of execution as one presidential administration transitioned to the next. The study’s recommendations, which were briefed to the secretary of defense, the national security adviser, and other key participants, ultimately led to a more integrated US approach to planning for US operations in Haiti in 1994 as well as a new Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56), Managing Complex Contingency Operations. In this context, Len Hawley, a retired Army colonel, who as a civilian served as the director of multilateral affairs, became the National Security Council’s (NSC) point person to lead the implementation of PDD-56. Throughout his tenure in the Clinton administration, Len oversaw the drafting of more than 40 political-military plans for contingencies ranging from East Timor to Kosovo. These plans sought to incorporate the costly lessons of Somalia in an effort to improve the outcomes and reduce the risks associated with US contingency operations overseas. After 25 years in the Army, Len continued to serve his country as a civilian leader in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the NSC staff, and the 9/11 Commission staff. This article is the last piece Len wrote before he died of complications from leukemia in 2020. It is full of the insights and wisdom of an unsung hero who was an extraordinary public servant, strategic thinker, and beloved mentor and colleague to many. Click here to read the article. Michèle Flournoy Cofounder and Managing Partner of WestExec Advisors Chair, Center for a New American Security Board of Directors   show less

Statistical evidence suggests that Army battalion commanders are significant determinants of the retention of their lieutenants—especially high-potential lieutenants. Further, this so-called Battalion Commander Effect should be included in brigadier general promotion board assessments and used to inform officer professional military education curricula.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss3/10/

The reemergence of great power competition, conflict with near-peer competitor states below the level of armed conflict, and persisting threats from nonstate actors with transnational ambitions and global reach pose challenges for strategists planning, executing, and assessing military operations and strategy. Building on current visualization tools, two proposed models—the National Strategic Risk Abacus and the National Strategic Risk Radar Chart—address these challenges and better depict how the US military may inadvertently contribute to risk at the national strategic level.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss3/5/

Global health engagement, an underutilized strategy rooted in the strengths of soft power persuasion, can lead to more military-to-military cooperation training, help establish relationships that can be relied on when crises develop, stabilize fragile states, and deny violent extremist organizations space for recruiting and operations. Examining Chinese efforts worldwide to curry favor and influence and the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, this article shows health as a medium is a very compelling and advantageous whole-of-government approach to national security policy concerns.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss3/7/

The concept of hybrid war has evolved from operational-level use of military means and methods in war toward strategic-level use of nonmilitary means in a gray zone below the threshold of war. This article considers this evolution and its implications for strategy and the military profession by contrasting past and current use of the hybrid war concept and raising critical questions for policy and military practitioners.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss3/11/

Looming budget cuts will necessitate adept management to retain a military capable of competing and winning by avoiding the mistakes made in prior drawdowns. This article presents a framework for government and defense leaders to prepare for the coming drawdown and plan for the necessary capacity of tomorrow across the diplomatic, information, military, and economic framework.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss3/6/

Drawing on Samuel P. Huntington’s three phases of self-regulation used to determine if an occupation qualifies as a profession, this article focuses on the third phase of policing and removing those who fail to uphold the standards set forth in the first two phases. It reviews how the Army implemented this phase following the Civil War through the post–Vietnam War years and the implications for the officer corps.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss3/9/

Identifying the January 6 insurrection at the US Capitol as an inflection point, this article analyzes the historical relationship between White supremacy and the US military from Reconstruction after the Civil War to the present. The article posits causes for the disproportionate number of current and former members of the military associated with White power groups and proposes steps the Department of Defense can take to combat the problems posed by the association of the US military with these groups.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss3/3/

Using US military aid as a lever to achieve human rights reforms has proven only marginally effective. This article examines the approaches employed by the Obama and Trump administrations to US military aid to Egypt and proposes practical steps that can be taken by policymakers and military personnel on the ground to advance US human rights values.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss3/8/

While unmanned aerial systems can serve as a force multiplier for militants, these systems do not embody a transformation in modern insurgent warfare or enable militants to engage regularly in strategic coercion. Instead, drone use is consistent with a militant group’s relative capabilities and broader strategic objectives. Consequently, these groups are likely to employ drones primarily for theater and tactical military purposes.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss2/8/

The failure of liberal internationalism in the post–Cold War period requires the United States to adopt a clear-eyed approach to competition that promotes regional balances of power, emphasizes reciprocity, and creates mission-driven coalitions.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss1/10/

Growing Sino-Russian coordination necessitates greater security cooperation between US Allies in Europe and East Asia. US Allies in both regions face remarkably similar threats requiring similar operational concepts, capabilities, and technologies. Further, these Allies must hedge against the specter of US abandonment. An exploration of the links between the two geographically distant US Alliance networks illustrates the Allies’ perspectives on US extended deterrence and highlights opportunities to devise better policies for cooperation. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss2/7/

Shortfalls and inefficiencies in traditional planning and campaigning have become increasingly clear in the current hyperconnected security environment. US military planners can mitigate these deficiencies by embracing integrated planning and campaigning approaches including the development of new organizational structures and processes. These improvements will give senior leaders increased options as the US military and US Allies and partners address complex problems with better effect and to greater advantage.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss2/10/

The rapid decline of the Peruvian left-wing insurgent organization Sendero Luminoso was not only the result of the arrest of its leader. An analysis of the precipitous weakening of the organization using two social movement theories finds other factors were involved in the demise of the organization as well. These factors—participatory politics, support for the military among the rural population, and alienation of the population by Sendero Luminoso—provide insights to effective counterinsurgency tactics.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss2/5/

Counterinsurgency does not increase the legitimacy of, or support for, central governments engaged in internal conflicts. Recent research shows quantifiable degrees of government legitimacy, national identity, and population security are necessary precursors and accurate predictors of a government’s ability to outlast a civil uprising. Because the first two predictors—government legitimacy and national identity—can be measured and do not increase during a conflict, the probability of government failure in most cases can be accurately predicted when the conflict starts.
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Predoctrinal deliberations about the employment of the US armed forces, captured in Joint Doctrine Notes, remain critically understudied. Using comparative text analysis, this article identifies changes in recent Joint Doctrine Note depictions of military strategy. These changes risk distorting the logic of military strategy, sacrificing means-ends integration to organizational impulse, and raising the prospect of future shortfalls in US strategic effectiveness.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss2/9/

Army General Matthew Ridgway’s actions throughout his career provide a valuable example of the appropriate time and place for serious dissent by military leaders. Ridgway demonstrated the importance of selectively and pragmatically expressing open disagreement in response to operational decisions a military leader deems unnecessarily risk American lives and economic resources.

Read the original article, “Matthew Ridgway and the Value of Persistent Dissent“, by Dr. Conrad C. Crane: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss2/3/

In an era of great power competition centered on warfighting domains other than land, the US Army faces difficult and likely painful choices. This reality, coupled with looming budget cuts, means the Army must reconsider its approach to capabilities and total force structure, its role in homeland security, and the relationship between its active and reserve components.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss1/6/

As the European Union deals with yet another crisis— the COVID-19 pandemic—it must adopt a grand strategy based on unity, policy, and proportionality: cohesion over inaction, policy over process, and regional imperatives over global ambitions. An analysis of past strategy documents and a study of current international trends stress the need for a Union capable of shaping its own environment rather than reacting to it. The pandemic should accelerate Europe’s journey toward power maturity and responsibility.
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In 1971 Colonel Duane H. Smith analyzed the unified command structure, examined an existing proposal for change, and suggested improvements. He illustrated how this structure must account for the challenges of the contemporary strategic environment and balance several tensions, such as effectiveness versus efficiency, flexibility versus focusing on a specific mission, and forward-deployed versus home-station forces. Many of Smith’s insights remain applicable to the unified command structure and global force management processes today.
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In 1971 Dr. John R. Thomas documented the involvement of the Soviet Union in the Middle East from the start of the Cold War. Like its name and borders, the motivations for that country’s involvement in the region have changed. Russia today promulgates relationships with the governments of the Middle East in a nonideological, more limited manner primarily through economic relationships, in energy and arms sales in particular, and in efforts to mitigate terror threats to the homeland.
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Writing in 1971, economist Dr. John P. Hardt assessed the trajectory of the Soviet economy arguing the need for reform and evaluating the willingness of key actors in the Soviet bureaucracy to support such policies. Fifty years later, Hardt was remarkably prescient with regard to structural difficulties such reform posed and the costs of delay. The pervasive role of internal and external security concerns in the following decades, however, resulted in economic decisions that defied traditional economic analysis.
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A look back at F. Gunther Eyck’s assessment of reforms enacted under US Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson may reveal as much about the historiography of the early 1970s as it does about Stimson’s reform efforts themselves. Eyck’s 1971 evaluation, among the first in a decade of scholarship examining successes and failures of Progressive Era Army reforms, raises important issues but avoids broader considerations of the sociopolitical realities of the United States at the turn of the twentieth century.
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Differences between the academic and military communities and the dysfunction that occurs when these communities comingle can have disastrous consequences for foreign policy. Donald Bletz, writing on the subject in 1971, details this dynamic as it related to the Vietnam War. His observations can be applied to wars since and suggest the need for a balanced relationship characterized by independence and mutual respect.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss1/13

The dilemmas posed by coalition warfare were a subject of academic interest in the inaugural issue of Parameters in 1971. Lieutenant Colonel James B. Agnew examined the unified command model pursued by the Allies during the First World War. Agnew’s assessment of the challenges faced by French Marshal Ferdinand Foch speaks to challenges NATO faces today including questions of national sovereignty, national security goals, and developing a joint strategy.
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Regaining the military advantage in the Indo-Pacific region requires renewed thinking about the US military footprint there, particularly the role of the US Army. The Army’s deterrence and partnering capabilities will be best utilized by engaging its long-range and precision-strike capabilities in a regional “Ring of Fires” concept and further enhanced as part of a broader revitalization and expansion of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss1/5/

Regaining the military advantage in the Indo-Pacific region requires renewed thinking about the US military footprint there, particularly the role of the US Army. The Army’s deterrence and partnering capabilities will be best utilized by engaging its long-range and precision-strike capabilities in a regional “Ring of Fires” concept and further enhanced as part of a broader revitalization and expansion of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss1/5

Today, two-thirds of soldiers depart the US Army with a disability rating. Unfortunately, some soldiers are exploiting a generous disability system overextended beyond its original purposes and potentially damaging trust in the military, jeopardizing Army readiness, and encouraging a culture that erodes the Army’s notions of selfless service.
Read the Monograph: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/922

The novel coronavirus is only the latest in a series of global crises with implications for the regional order in the Middle East. These changes and the diverging interests of actors in the region have implications for US strategy and provide an opportunity to rethink key US relationships there.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol50/iss4/10

The stability achieved by the US military in the European Theater of Operations after D-Day was the direct result of good military governance concurrently deployed with combat operations. The role of civil affairs in securing this stability has been under-emphasized in analyses of these operations. But an examination of the historical record of these events reveals the necessity of a skilled, effective civil-military effort through civil affairs/military government detachments, civil affairs specialty pools, and G-5 staff sections.
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US military Joint and Army civil affairs doctrine have failed to consider the operational relevance of gender, posing a risk to mission accomplishment and force protection. A comparison of NATO and Australian Defence Force doctrine reveals gender considerations have been included in Allied doctrine in recent years. US land-force operational planning can provide an example of how a focus on civil affairs doctrine could jump-start the process to address the larger doctrinal gender deficit quickly and effectively.
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Statistics behind reported suicide rates in the military are often insufficiently analyzed and portray a distorted picture of reality. Several models for identifying individuals at risk for suicide have been proposed but few show adequate predictive power to be actionable. Instead, a collaborative and consistent effort to address core drivers at the individual level may be more useful.
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US security force assistance missions to Arab partner states have had limited success, due in part to a tendency to impose American doctrine, which embodies American cultural values and norms, on Arab armed forces. Accordingly, US security force assistance missions should train Arab partners to fight in a manner better suited to their own cultural preferences and operational requirements.
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The theory of social stigma provides a context for the subjective experience of African American servicemembers in World War II. Those experiences reveal the paradox the military faces when addressing racial discrimination. An examination of these experiences suggests only a collective response by African American servicemembers will solve this problem.
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Technological revolutions affecting state power are either open or closed. The precursor to the digital age is not the twentieth century, with state-controlled programs yielding nuclear weapons, but the late nineteenth century, when tinkerers invented the radio, airplane, and high explosives—all crucial to subsequent wars. To avoid strategic surprise, the US government must take a broader view of how today’s open innovation is changing society, and adapt.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol50/iss3/8

The framework of Enduring Information Vigilance will help ally and partner governments deny advantages adversaries gain through their use of information operations in our new global perpetual information environment. This approach recognizes the persistent threat, unifies responses within and between governments, and resolves societal fissures toward a more global democratic information environment.
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The DoD can exploit weaknesses in Chinese military attempts at political warfare, or “enemy disintegration,” most recently observed in PLA media on the subject of the pandemic. Targeted information efforts will signal the United States’ refusal to be intimidated, expose untruths in Chinese government messaging to its citizens, and reassure relevant third parties of US military resolve.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol50/iss3/3

The lessons of counterinsurgency have deeper implications for cyber conflict than previous research has identified. Two decades of experience in Iraq and Afghanistan provide insights into the cyber strategy of defending forward including treating major cybersecurity and technology companies as host-nation partners and focusing on winning the hearts and minds of global netizens.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol50/iss3/9

The US military has a historical precedence for dealing with a pandemic while simultaneously conducting large-scale combat operations. Two twentieth-century examples assess the extent to which the military adapted operations following an influenza outbreak, and make clear military and civilian leaders must balance strategic objectives when facing threat multipliers such as COVID-19.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol50/iss3/5

Racialized structural inequalities and related social biases in US society and replicated in the military hinder diversity and inclusion efforts necessary to maintain a ready force. Examining the history of Blacks in the military through a social science lens helps explain this challenge and reveals the military must both promote relationships that challenge power imbalances and assess the impact of cultural imperialism on standards and evaluations.
Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol50/iss3/7