Courtesy Photo | AEF on parade in Vladivostok. These forces were put under the command of Maj. Gen....... read more read more
It’s cold. The Armistice has been in effect for months, yet you’re still thousands of miles from home. Unknown to you, your family has been writing, wondering when you’ll return—letters you never receive. As you stare across the barren Arctic tundra, gunshots and shouts announce the enemy’s approach. Despite peace having been declared in Europe, the fighting here has not subsided. You steel yourself, shoulder your rifle, and step into the frozen wilderness of northern Russia.
Following the Armistice in November 1918, the U.S. Army celebrated its first large-scale victory on the world stage. The Great War had accelerated tactical and technological innovation, and the American Expeditionary Forces had eagerly adopted many of these advances. Yet at home, families wondered “if the war is over, where is my Soldier?”
The answer lay in a different conflict—the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War. In August 1918, President Woodrow Wilson ordered two expeditionary forces to northern Russia and Siberia. Under Maj. Gen. William S. Graves, roughly 8,000 troops of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) landed at Vladivostok. [1] Their mission was to secure vast stockpiles of war materiel, keep the eastern branch of the Trans-Siberian Railway operational, and assist the stranded Czechoslovak Legion. [2] A second force of about 5,500 soldiers—the “Polar Bear Expedition”—deployed to Arkhangelsk (Archangel) under British operational control. [3]
Conditions were brutal: sub-zero temperatures, endless forests, and the presence of multiple factions (White, Red, nationalist, and partisan forces). Combat was fluid and small-scale—ambushes, patrol clashes, and train raids—not the set-piece trench battles of France. Logistical support was improvised; rations, clothing, fuel, and medical supplies often froze before reaching the front. By the time the last Americans sailed from Vladivostok in April 1920, the two expeditions had suffered roughly 400 deaths—even though Europe’s guns had long fallen silent. [4]
Despite their crucial wartime service, the Army’s experiences in Europe and Russia rapidly faded from public memory. Between 1919 and 1922, Congress slashed the Regular Army from nearly three million troops to just over 130,000, leaving approximately 200,000 National Guardsmen available for federal service. This rapid demobilization—and the ambiguous outcome in Russia—ignited a central interwar debate: What should a “professional” American Army look like, and how should it prepare for as-yet undefined conflicts? [5]
The interwar period was defined by dramatic technological advancements and drastic military drawdowns. Hyperinflation gripped the global economy and led to significant budget cuts within the Army. In addition, public fear of maintaining a large standing Army persisted (though that sentiment was gradually fading). Even with a reduced force, the Army struggled to sustain itself in the face of the Great Depression, yet it persevered. [6]
World War I ushered in an era of new military technologies, and the interwar period provided opportunities to refine these innovations. This era saw not only improvements in rifles, tanks, aircraft, and naval vessels but also advances in military doctrine and contingency planning for possible future wars. [7] However, the economic hardships of the 1930s, compounded by lingering post-war disillusionment, resulted in severe cutbacks that affected the Army as much as any other branch. The cost was a difficult price tag to swallow, as it risked a significant reduction of readiness.
During the war, Americans began using tanks and even established their own tank corps. An order for more than 1,000 International Tanks (Mark VIII Liberty Tanks) was placed for domestic production; however, with the war’s conclusion in November 1918, none of these tanks would see service in Europe. [9] Yet between 1919 and 1920, 100 Mark VIII Tanks were manufactured at Rock Island Arsenal at a cost of $35,000 each—about $600,000 in 2022—with production taking 286 days. [10] Due to harsh budget cuts, many units never received a proper tank for training. Instead, smaller jeeps or combat cars (often marked simply with “tank”) were used to simulate maneuvers, sometimes accompanied by cardboard cutouts of machine guns to mimic turrets and anti-personnel defenses. [11]
Aircraft and pilots in the Army Air Corps also faced challenges. Many planes had inadequate armor, limited range, and insufficient firepower. Pilots were poorly trained, and the pool of available civilian aviation struggled in the public eye. Extensive debate over the role of aviation in military strategy meant that emerging air power struggled to be fully integrated into both Army and Navy doctrine. As a result, throughout the 1930s only a few new aircraft were produced, and the number of active-duty pilots remained very low. [12]
In 1923, the General Staff produced the first plan for assembling a peacetime Army. The plan called for six field armies—each of roughly 400,000 soldiers and capable of mobilizing over one million troops within four months if necessary. The nation was divided into zones, with each field army assigned to a specific region: First Army for New England, Second Army for the Mid-Atlantic, Third Army for the Southeast, Fourth Army for the Southern Plains, Fifth Army for the Midwest, and Sixth Army for the West. Units were small, typically composed of a combination of National Guard and reserve components. These mobilization plans received further study following the establishment of the Army Industrial College in 1929.
In 1931, General Douglas MacArthur approved the creation of a new Field Army Headquarters as a preliminary step toward general mobilization. This headquarters was charged with rapidly generating a trained force as needed. Although the peacetime Army was now in place, the challenge of adequately training and equipping soldiers remained—and the economic impact of the Great Depression intensified these difficulties. [13]
First Army was tasked with training soldiers and preparing them for eventual conflict. An initial exercise in late summer 1935, involving approximately 35,000 personnel, highlighted the problem: funding constraints and rationing meant that available materiel was limited, resulting in simulations that were often shaky at best. These exercises were observed by foreign military officers and occurred four years after Japan invaded Manchuria (1931) and four years before Germany invaded Poland (1939). Both Japan and Germany were present at these maneuvers as observers invited by the United States. [14]
Dummy cannons stood in alongside stand-in “tanks” and “machine guns,” a practice that continued well into the early 1940s. Not only was materiel in short supply, but technological advancements abroad had outpaced what was widely available domestically. This multifaceted dilemma over readiness, force generation, logistics, and force projection created a major obstacle for the War Department. In addition, it was faced with the complex challenge of how to mobilize the domestic industrial base for war. [15]
While World War I had shown that the United States could mobilize its industrial base quickly, fielding the materiel remained a slow process. The logistics of transporting materiel overseas were still unresolved on the eve of World War II. On the home front, however, many recognized the importance of maintaining an industrial base that could be activated at a moment’s notice. At Rock Island Arsenal, foremen like William Baumbeck worked diligently to ensure that skilled workers were ready to meet the demands of war materiel production. It was the laborers that Baumbeck rallied for that were working in shops and factories during World War II and providing essential war materiel and expertise. [16]
Like Baumbeck, Lt. Gen. Hugh Drum of First Army was among those who foresaw the inevitability of renewed conflict. He stressed the importance of continuous training exercises, confidently predicting that by 1940, war was rapidly approaching. Over a year after Germany invaded Poland—and shortly after France fell to German forces—the United States instituted its first peacetime draft, calling up approximately 900,000 men. Additional exercises took place in North and South Carolina, extending through December 1941. The writing was on the wall. [17]
Readiness required more than rapid mobilization and equipment; it demanded a coherent strategy to counter threats from every direction. After World War I, the Army and Navy devised war plans aimed at potential conflicts with various nations. Known as the Rainbow Plans, these strategies—first established in 1924 and revised through 1945—were critical in shaping both domestic defense and strategic responses to external threats.
For example, War Plan Black was designed to counter Germany, while War Plan Grey (and occasionally Violet) targeted Central American and Caribbean nations (excluding Cuba). War Plan Brown focused on the Philippines, and War Plan Tan was formulated for Cuba, drawing on lessons from the Spanish–American War. War Plan Red was intended for Britain, with various shades of Red representing different British-held territories. War Plan Yellow addressed potential conflicts in China by incorporating insights from the Boxer Uprising, and War Plan Gold involved strategies against France. Similarly, War Plan Green—formed from experiences in the Punitive Expedition—was prepared for Mexico. War Plan Indigo anticipated the occupation of Iceland, and War Plan Purple covered large portions of South America. Domestically, War Plan Blue detailed defensive operations during peacetime, while War Plan White dealt with civil unrest. The best-known, War Plan Orange, was drafted for Japan, and Red-Orange illustrated America’s integrated approach to coordinating wartime operations in both Europe and the Pacific, although the Orange component ultimately dominated in the Pacific Theater. [18]
On the eve of World War II, Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair stated that the U.S. recognized the eventual need for rapid readiness. While the Army had not focused on the “progressive and logical building” of its forces during peacetime, it was now forced to mobilize quickly. Everyone understood that when the first shot was fired in December 1941, the U.S. military might initially be shaky—but it would soon rise to face its enemies head-on. [19]
In its eventual call to service, the Army responded to the Nation’s needs. Despite the hardships of the Great Depression and the severe resource shortages that paralleled the harsh landscapes of Siberia and the Northern Soviet Union, the Army drew on its humble beginnings. It understood these challenges more intimately than any other force, and as the sun rose again, a grateful Nation rallied to restore its might and protect its future.
[1] “Yanks with Chief Reach Siberia Port.” The Rock Island Argus. Rock Island, Illinois. 4 SEP 1918. [2] Col. House, John M. Wolfhounds and Polar Bears: The American Expeditionary Force in Siberia, 1918-1920. University of Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa, Alabama. 2016. pp15-23. [3] Ibid. pp88-89. [4] GEN March, Peyton C. The Nation at War. Doubleday, Doran, Garden City, New York. 1932. p132. Referenced in Ibid, p174. [5] Millett, Allan R.; Maslowski, Peter. Feis, William B. For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States from 1607 to 2012. Third Edition. Free Press, New York, New York. 2012. pp341-345. [6] Ibid. [7] Ibid. pp345-349. [8] Ibid. pp341-345. [9] Hunnicutt, Richard Pearce (1988). Firepower: A History of the American Heavy Tank. Presidio Press, Novato, California. 1988. pp61-75. [10] War’s Greatest Workshop – Rock Island Arsenal: Historical, Topographical and Illustrative. Arsenal Publishing Company, Tri-Cities, IA/IL. 1922. pp56-57. [11] Dickson, Paul. The Rise of the G.I. Army 1940-1941: The Forgotten Story of How America Forged a Powerful Army Before Pearl Harbor. Atlantic Monthly Press, New York, New York. 2020. pp34-39. [12] Millet et al, 2012. pp340-343. [13] Dickson, 2020. pp122-147. [14] Ibid. pp43-71. [15] Ibid. pp34-39. [16] Baumbeck, William. Chronological History. pp19-24. [17] Dickson, 2020. pp93-96. [18] Millet et al, 2012. pp368-369. [19] Dickson, 2020. p269.
| Date Taken: | 07.07.2025 |
| Date Posted: | 07.07.2025 16:42 |
| Story ID: | 542149 |
| Location: | ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL, ILLINOIS, US |
| Web Views: | 35 |
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