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The Role of Communication Intelligence in the American - Japanese Naval War

Volume III

The Solomon Islands Campaign

1. Background of the Landing on Guadalcanal Island and the Battle of Savo Island. (July 1 - August 9, 1942)

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Chart I Map of Solomon Islands

Chart II Map of Battle of Savo Island

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"... We live in days of such tremendous rapidity, what with the telephone, wireless, cables, fast traffic, etc., that our minds receive many thousands of impressions daily. Unless, therefore, contemporary facts are written down fairly quickly they will be wiped off the tablets of our memory and the rush of fast-moving world events will crowd them out. Posterity will then be robbed of the priceless benefit of records such as we have had handed down to us by the sailors of Nelson's day."

Rear Admiral Sir Douglas Brownrigg in Indiscretions of the Naval Censor.

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INTRODUCTION

Preceding Volumes

Volume I of this series discussed the activities of U.S. Naval Communication Intelligence during the period which began with the Nomura-Hull pre-war conversations, and which continued through the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Battle of the Coral Sea, and the tremendous American naval victory at Midway. Volume II completed the eventful story of the above period by giving the background of the Japanese attack on the Aleutians, as well as discussing in detail enemy messages which had been intercepted during the Battle of Midway. In addition, analysis was made of the communication security measures adopted by the Japanese after Midway. These precautions were occasioned by unfortunate publicity leaks concerning communication intelligence which occurred in newspapers and on the radio shortly after the battle. Measures taken by Army and Navy authorities to stop this type of publicity were also reported in Volume II.

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General Plan

The present volume begins a series which will describe the background of operations in the Solomon Islands. No attempt will be made to give a complete account of the six major battles and several minor air and sea engagements which were part of this long campaign. This task must be left for the official historian who will some day describe these important battles in full detail. But it is intended to give in this and succeeding volumes a detailed day by day picture of the information made available to operational authorities by U.S. Navy Communication Intelligence from July, 1942 to the time when the focal point of the Pacific War shifts elsewhere. It is felt that through these volumes one aspect of the part played by the U.S. Navy in one of the most important wars in the history of the nation may be demonstrated.

It is obvious that many elements contributed to the success of the U.S. Navy in the Solomon Islands--aggressive task forces, excellent intelligence,

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ample supplies, good communications, splendid medical care, and numerous other contributory factors. There were many times when some of these aids were missing, and often there was grave danger of an American disaster. But staunch perserverance despite terrible difficulties, and brilliant offensives by our outnumbered and seemingly overpowered fighting ships and planes eventually won the day. It is because of these victories which were won from the enemy in the face of tremendous odds that the story of the Solomon Islands will not easily fade from the memory of the American people. It is fitting then that a systematic account be written (but only for the few who need to know) of the communication intelligence which helped to make possible these victories.

The reader may be interested in knowing the general plan of this and succeeding volumes. Due to the great mass of material available concerning the Solomon Islands campaign, each volume will contain the communication intelligence background of one of the periods which culminated in a major battle as follows:

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Volume III

1. Battle of Savo Island

Night surface actions of August 8-9, 1942.

Volume IV

2. Battle of the Eastern Solomons

Air vs. surface actions of August 23-25, 1942.

Volume V

3. Battle of Cape Esperance

Night surface actions of October 11-12, 1942.

Volume VI

4. Battle of Santa Cruz Islands

Air vs. surface actions of October 26, 1942.

Volume VII

5. Battle of Guadalcanal

Air and surface actions, day and night, November 13-15, 1942.

Volume VIII

6. Battle of Lunga Point

Night surface action, November 30 - December 1, 1942.

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Volume IX

Scattered Naval Actions immediately preceding collapse of Japanese resistance on Guadalcanal, February, 1943.

A. Rennel Island

Air and surface
January 29-30, 1943.

B. Northern Solomons

Air and surface,
February 1, 1943.

C. South of Savo Island

Air and surface,
February 1, 1943.

D. Cape Esperance

Air, PT boat and surface,
February 1, 1943.

E. Kolombangara Island

Air and surface,
February 1, 1943.

F. South of Choiseul Island

Air and surface,
February 4, 1943.

G. Off Rendova Island

Air and surface,
February 7, 1943.

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It is expected that by the time these volumes are completed other battles of great historic importance will have been fought. These will be discussed in turn since it is intended to furnish a complete, well documented history of the activities of our Communication Intelligence organization to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Scope of Each Volume

Each volume will contain a summary, a chapter and an appendix, all three of which will be devoted to the same major battle.

1. The summary is written expresaly for the busy reader who desires to know the general picture in the Solomon Islands as furnished by Communication Intelligence just before each of the major battles occurred. It is comparatively short and contains all the essential information to be found in the succeeding chapter and appendix, but, with a few important exceptions, no attempt is made to furnish references for the statements made.

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2. The chapter gives in chronological order the communication intelligence background of the period just before the major battle, so that the reader will be aware from day to day of exactly what was known from this source by U.S. operational authorities. Each statement is supported by a reference to the actual messages in the appendix which were either intercepted or sent by one of the Communication Intelligence units.

3. The appendix contains a very detailed account of each day's findings, and also furnishes the complete text of every message referred to in the chapter. Though these volumes will be read only by those in the U.S. Navy who need to know, it is desirable that they be written as if they were to be used as source books by professional historians. Therefore, every intercepted enemy message of any importance will be found in the appendices. Some may be rather technical for the general reader, but they have been included to make the record as complete as possible for the expert.

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The reader will also be able to know when a particular dispatch was sent out by American naval units, for the Greenwich Civil time of origin is appended to the text of each message. This is the best check available at the moment on the approximate time at which operational authorities were made aware of certain communication intelligence. Future research into the communication files of our field units at Melbourne and Pearl Harbor should provide more accurate data.

Scope of Volume III

Volume III will begin with the events which led up to the taking of Guadalcanal and the subsequent disaster at the Battle of Savo Island on August 8-9, 1942. Though the scene of principal interest is the Solomon Islands, intelligence concerning convoys coming from the Empire and activities in the Mandates is also reported, since these movements had a great effect on Japanese plans for the South Pacific. The role of U.S. Naval Communication Intelligence in the period preceding the Battle of Savo Island will now be told.

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SUMMARY[1]

Background of the Landing on Guadalcanal Island and the Battle of Savo Island

Part A - July, 1942

As early as July 1, 1942 it was noticed by U.S. Naval Communication Intelligence that the hitherto obscure Solomon Islands had become the center of much Japanese activity. The full significance of the enemy's movements was not lost on Allied naval and military high commands for they well appreciated the strategic importance of these islands. If the Japanese were to gain control of them, it was almost inevitable that the supply lines from America to Australia would be badly disrupted by enemy land based planes. In addition, it was believed that the Solomons would be used as stepping stones for an invasion of the Australian mainland.

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1 - For a day by day resume of the highlights of Communication Intelligence supplied during this period, see Chapter I. Appendix I contains every intercepted enemy message of any importance.

It is interesting to note in retrospect that the communication intelligence, which first informed operational authorities of the presence of the enemy in these islands, was derived from traffic analysis rather than cryptanalysis. This situation continued for several weeks during the early stages of the Solomon Islands' campaign, but strangely enough, despite the anxieties created by the lack of cryptanalytical success, a valuable lesson was learned.

Ten years before war broke out in the Pacific, American communication intelligence experts had foreseen that cryptanalysis would be of little use during periods which immediately followed a major change in an enemy's cryptographic systems. Consequently, a method had been devised which derived intelligence from various external characteristics of the enemy's communication system.

This method, called traffic analysis, was not expected to be as accurate in its forecasts of enemy plans as

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cryptanalysis would be, but the experts hoped that it would have great potential value in time of war.

These hopes were fully realized in the months of July and August, 1942. The Japanese changed their main cryptographic system on May 28, 1942, and none of their messages could be read until some time later. However, traffic analysis was able to reveal the presence of the enemy in the Solomons, which occasioned the landing of the Marines there. Evidence that enemy cruisers were at sea in the vicinity of the Solomons was also discovered a few days before the Battle of Savo Island left four Allied cruisers defeated and destroyed. It is safe to say then that traffic analysis proved its worth during the Solomon Islands Campaign, for without it very little information concerning the enemy could have been furnished operational authorities.

The reader who finds time to peruse Chapter I and Appendix I of this volume will discover there hundreds of items, which had to be pieced together by traffic analysts to ascertain the enemy's plans.

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Dozens of clues had to be examined and, then, they were brought in to complete the picture, which developed gradually with the passage of time.

The narrative of this period is necessarily less interesting than the story of the days before the Battle of Midway, because at Midway the whole scheme of the enemy emerged -- sometimes bit by bit, but at other times great parts of the Japanese battle plan were disclosed by a single message. However, in this account, which leads up to the Battle of Savo Island, the story deals with the day by day drudgery of painstaking traffic analysis. There were no brilliant cryptanalytical solutions to attract the interest of the general reader, though the work involved was no less difficult; there were no statements concerning the enemy's intention which could be made as confidently as was done at Midway; in fine, the period was one of much confusion and obscurity, lightened somewhat by hypotheses of the traffic analysts, which could be proved or disproved only by the passage of time. It is obvious then that

this lack of complete clarity must be reflected somewhat in the text of Chapter I and Appendix I. A theory is never as satisfactory as certainty, and therefore, the results of cryptanalysis are always preferable to those of traffic analysis.

To return to intelligence concerning the Solomons made available to operational authorities in July, 1942, it has already been pointed out that Japanese activity there had become quite noticeable in radio traffic. The Eighth Base Force, the Fifth Air Attack Corps, the Sasebo Fifth Landing Force were all noticed at Rabaul, where fifteen enemy warships and a dozen transports had also been observed. It was known that Cruiser Divisions 6 and 18, as well as some Army and Air Group commanders, were operating in this general area.

It was evident from the first day of July, 1942 that logistic preparations were in progress for a Japanese campaign in the South Pacific. Much airplane radio traffic in the Marshall Islands indicated future operations, and the Sixth Base Force

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at Jaluit and the Sixth Defense Force were engaged in preparations. A special report from Chinese Intelligence stated that Japanese strength had been reduced at Rabaul, Lae, and Koepang, but U.S. Naval Communication Intelligence insisted that enemy activity was increasing rather than decreasing in this area. In fact, it was evident that important operations were about to begin, because there were so many associations of important Japanese units in southern Pacific radio traffic.

Much convoy activity in the New Britain area did nothing to erase this suspicion, and the presence of several enemy submarines in the Marshalls indicated that preliminary scouting was probably going on. One of the most conclusive proofs of Japanese intentions to expand their sphere of influence in the South Pacific came from the fact that heavy air reinforcements were being shipped to this area. This was a significant clue for no important enemy movement had been begun during the war without heavy air protection. A further indication came from the fact that the

Japanese Army units at Rabaul were in constant communication with other Army units at Davao and Palao, which indicated that they were expecting reinforcements from the Philippines.

Documents captured from the enemy in New Guinea confirmed the belief that the Japanese were planning new operations in the New Guinea, Bismarck Archipelago and the Solomon Islands areas. Orders had been issued to the Eleventh and Thirteenth Billeting Detachments to go to Guadalcanal, and the Fourteenth Billeting Force and the Fifth Special Landing Force were directed to land on the east coast of New Guinea. Furthermore, the presence of the Commander in Chief of the Fourth Fleet, who had come down from Truk to Rabaul, was a further reminder that the enemy was planning a new attack. The cruiser strength of the enemy was reinforced, for the TATSUTA rejoined Cruiser Division 18, and the KINUGASA and the FURUTAKA joined Cruiser Division 6. Destroyer Squadron 6 and Submarine Squadron 3 also were actively operating in this district.

Though enemy air reinforcements were arriving in the Rabaul area to replace war worn air units, there was no sign of any aircraft carriers. Most of the air replacements were being made by ferry plane flights from the Marshalls to Truk, Rabaul and New Britain. A very important report on July 13 stated that the Japanese were building a landing field on Guadalcanal Island in the Solomons, and had made another landing on Rekata Bay, Santa Isabel Island.

Although Cruiser Division 6 and 18 were in the Solomons they were operating independently, which meant that both had to be watched carefully for either one could be the nucleus of an enemy striking force. The need for caution in this respect was emphasized by the fact that heavy radio traffic from the Tokyo Personnel Bureau and major commands to fleet commands and individual vessels indicated that fleet units were being regrouped into several task forces. It was also significant that many fleet units, which had recently operated in the north, were returning

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to the Empire for a brief reconditioning before engaging in new operations. Furthermore, it was noted that the enemy air base at Guadalcanal was now ready for action, that additional air units had been sent to Gasmata in New Britain, that an aircraft assembly plant had been established at Kavieng, and that cruisers and destroyers were frequently present in the Tulagi area.

The presence of so many Japanese Army engineering and supply units as well as the arrival of many new warships and supply ships all throughout July supplied evidence that Japanese high naval commanders were very interested in the New Britain-Solomons area. The movement of many submarines in the south Pacific suggested their use in scouting expeditions and in the preliminary assault stages of a new operation. An estimate of the total submarine strength of the Japanese Navy declared that there were between fifty and sixty submarines, several of which were operating in the southeastern Australian waters.

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A shifting of enemy air strength from Rabaul to the vicinity of Lae, New Guinea, in addition to a heavy concentration of Japanese submarines along the Truk-Rabaul supply lines were other indications of danger. Cruiser Division 18 was also operating in the vicinity of Lae and Salamua, and Cruiser Division 6 was near Kavieng. It was estimated that in future actions the Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet would command the Solomons-New Guinea-New Britain area, while the Commander in Chief of the Fourth Fleet would maintain jurisdiction over the Truk area.

On July 24 a long expected change in the Japanese Navy and shore radio and high command call signs occurred, which was in accordance with the enemy's policy of increased communication security. It was apparent that enemy radio intelligence units were constantly on the alert, since frequently direction finder bearings on American planes operating from Port Moresby were intercepted.

A resume made at this time of forces associated with the Fourth and Eighth Fleets estimated

that eight heavy and two light cruisers had been probably assigned to the Rabaul area. These included the already mentioned Cruiser Divisions 6 and 18, plus the CHOKAI, SUZUYA and possibly the KIYA. It was noted that no additional carrier support had been assigned this large concentration of heavy warships, though now that the bases at Guadalcanal and Tulagi had been made ready, shore based enemy planes were operating from there in search of Allied ships.

The activities of Japanese radio intelligence units were watched very closely for any indication of their success in deciphering our cipher systems, but there was none, except that they were able to read some U.S. aircraft radio transmissions. As the end of July approached, many enemy messages were of an operational type. It was believed that much of the traffic was devoted to efforts of the Japanese naval radio intelligence units to locate U.S. forces prior to launching an attack.

The Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet, who had arrived at Truk aboard the CHOKAI, had

relieved the Commander in Chief of the Fourth Fleet of command in the New Britain-Solomons area on July 25, and Destroyer Division 16, another unidentified Destroyer Division, as well as Cruiser Division 18 were assigned to his jurisdiction. A joint bulletin issued by the Chiefs of Staff of the Fourth and Eighth Fleets indicated that a decision concerning future operations had been made. The Commander in Chief of the Fourth Fleet had changed flagships, for he no longer used the KASHIMA, which was enroute to Truk. Cruiser Division 6 appeared to be preparing for future actions in the New Guineas by keeping in close communication with the Japanese Bureau of Aeronautics.

Many Marus were observed in the Rabaul area, and this information was passed on to U.S. naval operational authorities, for knowledge of this type was of great advantage to our Pacific submarine commanders. Many attacks on Japanese ships in the far Pacific were made possible by this information. Moreover, a plan of the enemy to attack in the vicinity of Buna on July 29 was disclosed by decipherment.

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Carriers, which were of much concern to Allied operational authorities, were discovered on July 28 to be practicing in southern Empire waters, where a major reorganization of Japanese carrier divisions was in process because of the great losses suffered at Midway.

Jurisdiction over South Pacific waters had been divided between the commanders of the Fourth and Eighth Fleets, and on July 29 the Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet arrived at Rabaul to take over his command, where he was to operate under a cover radio call sign. The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet was very anxious concerning the success of his subordinates in this area, and for that reason kept radio traffic in the South Pacific at a very high level in his efforts to keep in close communication with them at all times. The Commander of Cruiser Division 18 was also disclosed to be the Commander of the RZJ (Buna) Occupation Force.

Every day brought new Marus and new transport units into the Rabaul area, and though the presence

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of a battleship in the New Guinea area was suspected, there was no further confirmation of this in enemy radio traffic. By the end of July enemy air strength had been tremendously increased in the territory around Rabaul, and new air deliveries were enroute constantly from the Empire to southern waters. The Commander of the Fifth Air Attack Force, who was in charge of the Tulagi-Guadalcanal area, received many of these additional planes.

Not only were plane, cruiser and supply units in the South Pacific being strengthened, but additional destroyers were also being sent to this region. This was also true of the enemy submarine force, and so every indication was present that a new assault would be made by the enemy at an opportune moment.

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Part B - August 1-9, 1942

New air units were discovered at many strategic locations in the Solomons area as well as in New Britain and New Guinea, and heavy radio traffic between Yokosuka and enemy aircraft factories and assembly plants in the western Mandates proved that further plane reinforcements would be shipped into the Rabaul area. It was indicated that the probable route of the planes flying down into this region from the Empire would be Chichijima, Saipan, Truk and Rabaul.

Enemy airplanes and submarines maintained close liaison near the New Guinea area, where because of the move of the Commander of Pacific Submarine Force towards the Malaya area, the Commander of Submarine Squadron 3 was raised to Force Commander status. Sudden activity in the Bungo Channel on August 3 suggested that the aircraft carriers which had been operating in the Kyushu area were now enroute to the Empire. The strengthening of their destroyer guard clearly indicated that new duties would be assigned to these carriers.

An estimate of the location of Japanese submarines on August 3 indicated that the Commander of the Submarine Force was enroute from Yokosuka to Jaluit; two divisions of Submarine Squadron 1 were in the Empire, and one division was in the 8th Fleet area; one unit of Submarine Squadron 2 was near Kiska, four in the Empire, and one near Saipan; one and a half divisions of Submarine Squadron 3 were in the Solomons, and one and a half divisions in the Empire; one division of Submarine Squadron 5 was divided between the Saigon area and the Empire, with another division unplaced; one division of Submarine Squadron 6 was in the Bonins area, and it was possibly scheduled for removement to the Mandates; two divisions of Submarine Squadron 7 were in the Fifth Fleet area, and one division in the Solomons; two divisions of Submarine Squadron 8 were located at Saigon, and one division at Yokosuka.

After observing a new Japanese call sign for several days, American traffic analysts on August 4 revealed that the Japanese service call was similar to the used by the U.S. Navy. This

method, which concealed the identity of the originator, was only one of many secret measures adopted by the Japanese after publicity concerning the success of U.S. Naval Communication Intelligence at Midway had received widespread attention. Traffic analysis disclosed also that a reorganization of the Japanese carrier divisions had taken place, and that Carrier Division 1 included the ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU and ZUIHO, and Carrier Division 2 included the RYUJO, HIYATAKA and HITAKI plus three plane groups from the AKAGI and SORYU and an unidentified ship. The HOSHO and KASUGA MARUS were not identified definitely with either Carrier Division 1 or 2.

It was noticed that enemy convoys in the Penang, Singapore and Kamranh Bay areas were being protected by air squadrons, and that enemy aircraft patrolled the Ocean Islands. On August 4 the Japanese announced that three Allied planes had been observed over the Air Base at Tulagi.

An American summary of the position of Japanese units on August 4 disclosed among other things, that Cruiser Division 6 was believed to be in the New Britain-

Solomons area, as was the TENRYU and TATSUTA of Cruiser Division 18. In the light of this information issued prior to the battle of Savo Island, it is evident that operational authorities were aware of the presence in the Solomons of the enemy cruisers which were eventually to destroy four Allied warships on the night of August 8-9. The daily bulletin which was issued by the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet to all his subordinate task force commanders on August 4, and which was based directly on Communication Intelligence, stated in part that:

> "... Crudiv 6, Crudiv 18 and Desron 6 remained in the New Britain-Solomons area. ..."

All during this period Japanese diplomats in Lisbon, Berlin and Rome were sending Tokyo much information about Allied movements and troop transports. A very important statement from Tokyo was sent to Berlin which cautioned Germany that Japan did not intend to open hostilities with Russia, unless it was forced to do so by extraordinary circumstances. Active measures had been taken to repel any Russian attacks, but Japan had no intention of weakening

her efforts against England and the United States by extending her battle front. Thus, they rejected Germany's proposals to begin war with the Russians.

The Japanese, however, did speak of the necessity of destroying the influence of Chungking, which was the center of Anglo-Saxon activities against Japan everywhere throughout East Asia. Japan intended to continue the struggle to subjugate the Britain, but in spite of glorious victories, resistance of the United States, the ally of Great Britain, was still formidable. Furthermore, there was also the question of the procurement and use of raw materials in the Southeast area. Von Ribbentrop in reply to this stated that Germany was in no condition to say anything, and that the Japanese government had to decide for herself. Osima, the Japanese Ambassador at Berlin, reassured them that Japan was using every available means to win the war.

On August 4 it was stated that Cruiser Division 18 was in New Britain-New Guinea waters, and on August 5 it was announced that the CHOKAI and

the AOBA were at sea in the Rabaul area.[1] This was an indication that important Japanese operations were about to take place, since the CHOKAI was the flagship of the Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet. Notice was given once again on August 6 that the CHOKAI, flagship of the Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet, and Cruiser Division 6 were at sea in the Rabaul area.[2] The Bulletin issued by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet to all his task force commanders on August 6 stated:

> ... Crudiv six in Rabaul area ...
> Crudiv eighteen Solomon Islands ...
> CHOKAI in New Britain area.[3]

Communication Intelligence gave detailed estimates of the Japanese units present in the Solomons Islands area during the days preceding the actual invasion of the American Forces on August 7, 1942. Specific references were made to the air units which were operating under the direction of the Fifth Air Attack Force in this area, as well as the submarine units under the jurisdiction of the Commander of

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1 - Appendix I, Nos. 636-637, 646-647.
2 - Appendix I, Nos. 675-676.
3 - Appendix I, No. 704.

Submarine Squadron 3. Analysis had long since been made of the enemy's cruiser and destroyer strength in this region, and as early as July announcements had been made of the great movement of tankers and aircraft supply ships from Truk and Rabaul to the Solomon Islands.

Although very few of the enemy's messages could be deciphered at this time, there was little enemy activity unnoticed by American traffic analysts. Certainly, the invading American troops knew a great deal about the opposition they were to meet in this territory because of the success of communication intelligence. Captain Forrest Sherman, Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. WASP, who took an active part in the action at Tulagi and Guadalcanal stated in an official report on August 14, 1942 to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, via the Commander of Task Force 18 that, in addition to the work of his own Air Force officers:

> Supplementary radio intelligence and the results of the photographic reconnaissance on August 2, 1942, made the familiarity of pilots with the area as complete as may normally be expected in the case of a position held by the enemy. (Pg. 2, A16-3(8)/CV 7, Doc. #62701.)

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It is evident that American landing troops completely surprised the Japanese at Guadalcanal since no contact report was sent by the enemy until the actual attack on Guadalcanal and Tulagi had begun. Then the Japanese radio station at Tulagi sent out urgent operational messages announcing the beginning of the Solomons campaign, which was to lead to some very decisive sea battles. Fortunately, during later stages of the campaign, Communication Intelligence was able to intercept dispatches, which informed operational authorities of many facts concerning the battles which otherwise would never have been known, or would have been very much delayed in transmission.

The first indication of Japanese alarm at Tulagi came at 0435 (-9) on August 7. Thereafter, a steady flow of messages came from Tulagi until it went off the air some hours later. A Japanese estimate of the Allied Forces attacking in the Solomons disclosed that they thought there was one battleship, three light or heavy cruisers, fifteen destroyers and a number of merchant ships assigned

to the landing forces. Warning was flashed to the Marshall Islands and to the Empire that Allied forces were attacking, and enemy radio intelligence units went on guard to intercept the calls of the Allied Striking Forces.

Many aircraft contact reports were made by the Japanese who sent all their available air strength to defend the Tulagi area. Numerous requests for plane reinforcements were sent to the Mandates and to the Empire while air patrols were set up to watch for the Allied Forces. Several air raids were announced during the morning of August 7. Despite the fact that there was no indication of enemy carriers in radio traffic for this day, a U.S. Army plane announced the sighting of what appeared to be a carrier. This was thought to be the KASUGA MARU or a sister ship. These were converted Marus with flight decks which were used only for the ferrying of planes, and not as combatant carriers.

Submarine Squadron 3 and the Fifth Air Attack Force were carrying on most of the defense activities

in this area, to which reinforcements of every type were being sent—planes, submarines, cruisers and destroyers. All were noticed in the traffic of August 7, and it was obvious that they were receiving urgent operational orders.

The actual operations of August 7 can be summarized briefly.[1] Task Force 62, under the direction of Rear Admiral Turner approached the Tulagi area from the south and west on the night of August 6. All preparations had been concluded, extensive landing exercises in the Fiji Islands had been practiced and a large number of ships and men had been trained to perform the tasks set out for them. Fortunately, both the extensive preparations and the approach to the area were well concealed, for in spite of the fact that the Japanese had radar, they were taken by complete surprise when the American forces, proceeding between the Russell and Guadalcanal Islands, struck from the flank and the rear.

Bombing and strafing of the Tulagi-Guadalcanal area was accomplished at dawn by American carrier

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1 - Preliminary Report, Solomon Islands Operation, Document 59661.

planes, which resulted in the sinking of a small schooner, the only vessel present, and eighteen seaplanes, which were caught on the water. At 0610 (-11) the Screening Force commenced heavy bombardment which silenced most of the Japanese shore defenses. Mine sweeping was started to clear the shallow waters, and landings were begun at 0720 (-11) in the Tulagi area, and at 0910 (-11) on Guadalcanal, five miles east of Lunga Point.

There was no opposition at Guadalcanal, so that by the end of the day about 10,900 men had been ferried ashore, along a three mile beach front, and had penetrated inland about a mile and a half. But though there was very slight resistance at first on Tulagi, the Japanese fought back furiously as the day progressed, and at nightfall they still held a part of the Island. Halavo on Florida Island and Gavutu were captured on this day, but not until the next morning was Tanambogo taken after heavy losses.

At 1520, twenty-five Japanese heavy bombers passed over Guadalcanal at an altitude of eight

thousand feet in search of our carriers. Some dropped bombs on the landing area with no results, but most of them saved their bombs for the carriers, which they were not able to locate. Two were destroyed and two were damaged by anti-aircraft fire from our ships, and two were later shot down by our carrier fighters. The next attack was delivered soon after 1600 by ten enemy dive bombers who succeeded in dropping a two hundred and fifty pound bomb on the U.S.S. MUGFORD, which resulted in considerable damage and in the loss of about twenty men. However, two of the bombers were shot down by naval anti-aircraft guns.

Several engagements took place between our carrier planes and the Japanese bombers, resulting in the loss of several of our own fighters as well as some of the enemy. However, the first day ended in favor of the Allies for most of the objectives had been seized, our losses had been moderate, and enemy losses in planes, men and advantageous positions were considerable.

On August 8 another warning was sent that enemy cruisers were at sea in the Rabaul area, and the supposition was confirmed that the Commander in Chief Eighth Fleet was aboard the CHOKAI.[1]

The Fleet Intelligence Summary issued by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, on August 8, 1942 stated that:

> As was to be expected, the primary interest of ORANGE was in his force in the Bismarck and Kiska areas, and primary activity concerned tactical distribution of the forces in these two areas. In both places, <u>except for movements of Crudiv 6 and 18 in the former area</u>, ORANGE was dependent entirely on aircraft and submarines.

The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet was in constant communication with all his major commanders in the South Pacific, and it appeared evident that Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet, who had been actively concerned in the recent operations in the Rabaul-Solomon Island area, was to become the Commanding Officer in the outer South Seas.

The Tulagi area continued to be very active, and much of the radio traffic consisted of enemy

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1 - Appendix I, Nos. 776-777.

intelligence reports. The TATSUTA announced that it was being attacked by Allied aircraft. Orders were sent to the patrol boats in Empire waters to reform their lines, since the Japanese were very much concerned about the possibility of an attack on their home land by an Allied striking force. Meanwhile, reports from Kiska indicated that an attack by five American cruisers, one carrier and three destroyers was being made on Kiska Island, which was bombed for thirty minutes.

No enemy carriers were associated with either the Southern or Northern forces on August 8, although warning was issued that they might accompany Destroyer Division 17 from the Empire to Rabaul. However, the enemy was drawing air reinforcements from the Mandates into the danger zone, and it was evident that all available air strength in the South Pacific would be thrown into the attempt to repel the Allied invaders.

The Fifth Air Attack Force was mainly responsible for the Solomon Islands, and, consequently, most of the orders to attack were coming to and from

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this organization. On the other hand Allied air forces were attacking various Japanese bases, and the enemy was forced to announce that the bombing of Vanakanau by thirteen Flying Fortresses had made necessary the curtailment of air protection which they were accustomed to give their convoys.

Enemy submarine activity increased tremendously in the region of the Solomons after the attack on Tulagi. The Commander of Submarine Squadron 3 was in charge, and the Commander of Submarine Squadron 7 was given the responsibility of getting together as many units as possible from the Mandates area to reinforce their submarine strength in the Solomons.

It is regrettable that one message intercepted on this day was undecipherable until August 23, 1942. If the information it contained had been known in time by United States operational authorities, it seems most probable that the disaster of Savo Island on August 8-9 would have been definitely avoided. However, several warnings had been issued before this that enemy cruisers were no longer at Rabaul

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and were probably at sea somewhere in the New Britain area. The message mentioned above was sent by the Commander in Chief, Eighth Fleet at 0800 on August 7, and stated that at 1300 on this day the CHOKAI, Cruiser Division 18 and another unidentified unit would depart from Rabaul for a rendezvous with Cruiser Division 6 in the vicinity of Bougainville, and would then proceed to Guadalcanal where subsequent operations against the enemy convoy would be based on reconnaissance reports.

The actual operations in the Solomons on August 8 were a continuation of activities begun on the preceding day.[1] Unloading continued all during the night at Guadalcanal and, though the beach was seriously congested by morning, there were no ill effects since the enemy was not in a position to take advantage of the confusion. However, enemy air attacks had disrupted procedure so much that only limited amounts of essential supplies and equipment had gone ashore. Many difficulties had been experienced in locating those things which were needed

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1 - Preliminary Report, Solomon Islands Operations, Document 59661.

first, and if enemy resistance had been stronger, the success of the landing might well have been jeopardized.

Warning was issued soon after 1100 that a large number of enemy planes had been sighted flying southeast over Bougainville. Immediately, the transport group and screening force got under way, and thus, when forty or more enemy torpedo bombers swept in at low altitude from behind Florida Island, our ships were ready for them and were able to maneuver at maximum speed. Twelve of the Japanese planes were shot down by our ships and fighters, and two others by shore batteries. Several others were destroyed to the westward by our fighter planes in combats which cost us seven of our own planes. Another air raid alarm was given that afternoon, but no attack followed.

Our losses after two days of attack by all the Japanese air strength available in that area consisted of nineteen planes, and one transport, the U.S.S. ELLIOTT, which had been destroyed by fire

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and sunk by our own torpedoes. Two destroyers, the JARVIS and the MUGFORD, were also damaged. On the other hand, our forces had increased the area under their control on Guadalcanal to include the airfield, and heavy casualties had been inflicted on the Japanese in Tulagi and Tanambogo.

Since our carrier fighter strength had been reduced by twenty-one planes, and fuel was running low, it was considered advisable to withdraw the carriers immediately, in view of the large number of enemy torpedo and bombing planes in the vicinity. This withdrawal on the night of August 8 left all the AP's and AK's to unload without air cover. It is interesting to note that reconnaissance had evidently failed to keep track of the enemy force, whose position at 1127 of that day was reported by Melbourne radio station at 1821. The message stated that at 1127 on August 8 three cruisers, three destroyers and two seaplane tenders or gunboats were at Latitude 05-49 south, Longitude 156-07 east, on course 120, speed 15. The Commander Task Force 62

informed the Commander Aircraft South Pacific that this force might operate torpedo planes from Rekata Bay, Santa Isabel Island, and recommended that strong air detachments strike there next morning. This was the force which was to successfully attack the Allied screening force near Savo Island during the night of August 8-9.

BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND - NIGHT OF 8-9 AUGUST (-11)

The Allied Screening Force had been divided into two groups consisting of the following:

AUSTRALIA GROUP

AUSTRALIA
CANBERRA
CHICAGO
SELFRIDGE
PATTERSON
BAGLEY
BLUE
TALBOT

VINCENNES GROUP

VINCENNES
QUINCY
ASTORIA
HENLEY
HELM
MUGFORD
JARVIS (Badly damaged, left before battle)

Each of the two separated groups of cruisers was steaming in column at ten to twelve and one-half knots around a five mile square patrol route near Savo Island. Two destroyers were 1500 yards off each bow of the leading ship in each group. The RALPH TALBOT, patrolling to the north of Savo Island, reported at 2345 on the TBO and TBS that a low flying plane was proceeding eastward over the Island. Several ships heard the report and the BLUE, which picked up the plane by radar also heard the engines, as did the QUINCY. Neither the first report by the RALPH TALBOT, nor the later one by the BLUE, reached the Commander Task Force 62.

At 0140 the BAGLEY, stationed on the starboard bow of the CANBERRA, sighted some unidentified ships, which were very near to her and slightly to port. The destroyer swung about in an attempt to fire her torpedoes, but missed the opportunity because the primers could not be inserted in time. She passed the enemy at 1500 to 2000 yards and was thus able to identify them as two heavy cruisers of the ASHIGARA type, and two light cruisers of the TENRYU type.

Other estimates made after the battle were those of the Commander Task Force 62, who stated that three Japanese cruisers and four destroyers had probably been present, and that of the Commander South Pacific Force, who estimated that there had been three heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and five destroyers.

The PATTERSON, which was on the port bow of the CANBERRA, also sighted the enemy formation. Either she or her friendly destroyer, the BAGLEY, sent a warning signal, which was not received by Commander Task Force 62. However, since neither destroyer fired a gun or rocket, or turned a searchlight on the enemy's ships, the Japanese Striking Force steaming at high speed had all the advantage. Fully prepared and ready to open fire instantly, the enemy struck our ships, which were proceeding at slow speed and were not at general quarters.

At 0145-0150 the Japanese opened fire with their main batteries and torpedoes at a range of about 3000 yards or less, and concentrated their fire on the CANBERRA, which was hit by an early

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salvo. A heavy fire was started, other hits from shells and torpedoes struck the bridge and boiler rooms, and within a minute twenty-four hits were received before the CANBERRA's gun turrents could be trained on the enemy. The CHICAGO, which was in the same group as the CANBERRA, was also struck.

Meanwhile, the cruisers of the VINCENNES group continued on course 315 at a speed of ten knots, which was later increased to fifteen. General Quarters was sounded soon after gun fire was observed, but battle stations were not fully manned when the enemy crossed over from the port quarter, and opened fire on three of our cruisers silhouetted by Japanese search lights. Our three cruisers, the VINCENNES, QUINCY and ASTORIA, suffered innumerable eight-inch and five-inch shell hits, so that power and A.A. directors failed them very early in the battle. The Japanese received some hits from our cruisers, but no great damage was observed.

Firing ceased for a short time, but was resumed at 0210 when the Japanese formation, passing out to

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sea two or three thousand yards to the northeast, reopened fire. Sometime between 0210 and 0217, as the Japanese force retired westward, the RALPH TALBOT was illuminated and fired on by friendly ships, probably two screening destroyers, the HELM and WILSON, which had been ordered by the VINCENNES to attack the enemy. Two men were killed and a torpedo tube disabled by this fire, which ceased when the identity of the TALBOT was established by TBS. The TALBOT suffered serious damage from a later hit by Japanese gunfire, but was still able to fire four torpedoes at the fleeing enemy, one of which may have taken effect.

The shattered Allied cruisers were not able to delay the end much longer, for both the QUINCY and VINCENNES sank within an hour. The ASTORIA burned all throughout the night and sank the next morning, and the burning CANBERRA was sunk by our own torpedoes about 0830 on August 9. Since the American carriers had departed the previous evening to refuel, there were no planes to harry the enemy

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striking force. They seemed to have used all their energy in this quick triumph, for no major aerial or surface force appeared at Tulagi for the next few days.

The Allied transports continued unloading during daylight of August 9, but eventually one group retired in the afternoon, and the other early in the evening. Both groups were escorted by combatant units. Thus the opening operation of the Solomon Islands came to an end. During the first two days, it was evident that the preparation for and the actual landing on Guadalcanal had been thorough and well conducted. The performance of our troops and all of our ships' personnel had left little to be desired, and our operations up to the night of August 8 had proceeded as satisfactorily as could be expected, although some difficulties had been encountered in the unloading of our transports. Then disaster befell our forces. It must not be forgotten, however, that the enemy had all the advantages during the Battle of Savo Island. He knew that our ships would

be in a certain area, his crews were much fresher than ours after forty-eight hours of consecutive operations in support of the landing, and our forces were dispersed to cover the two transport groups, whereas the enemy was concentrated, and knew that any ship outside of his formation could readily be attacked as an enemy.

It is interesting to note that no immediate warning could be given by United States Communication Intelligence that the enemy cruisers were going to make a sweep around Savo Island, for the message which announced the intention of the CHOKAI and Cruiser Division 6 and 18 to go into that specific area was not deciphered until much later. Traffic analysis had discovered that enemy cruisers were at sea in the Solomons area, but the maintenance of strict radio silence by these units made it impossible to estimate their every move. Very little information about the attack, which took place during the night of August 8-9, could be obtained from enemy communications at that time. Later on, however, after

American cryptanalysts had solved the new Japanese system, many important details concerning the surprise attack were discovered.

Thus, August 9 was marked only by some occasional enemy contact reports announcing the presence of Allied warships and transports between Tulagi and Guadalcanal. It was also noticed thatmany messages were forwarded to the Chief of Staff of the Eighth Fleet from Rabaul, which was another indication that the Commander in Chief, Eighth Fleet was no longer in that port. Warning had been sent as early as August 5 that the CHOKAI and AOBA were possibly at sea, and from this it had been presumed that the Commander in Chief, Eighth Fleet was aboard the CHOKAI.

This ends the summary of the highlights of communication intelligence which were made available to operational authorities during the month of July and the first few days of August, 1942. Certainly the intelligence picture in the Solomons was not as clear as was the situation just before the Battle of Midway, but in spite of some obscurities, the period

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was noteworthy for the development of traffic analysis as a major wartime instrument for acquiring intelligence concerning the enemy. It is regrettable that the complete success at Midway could not have been duplicated at this time, but there was still much value in what Communication Intelligence was able to offer. Complete details will be found in Appendix I.

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CHAPTER I

Background of the Landing on Guadalcanal Island and the Battle of Savo Island

The U. S. Marines aided by the U. S. Navy landed on the Solomon Islands on August 7-8, 1942 and in retaliation Japanese warships slipped around Savo Island on the night of August 8-9, and inflicted very severe damage on an Allied screening force. This was the first naval engagement of the Solomons Campaign - a campaign which was to include six major naval battles and many other scattered naval actions. Much has been written of the heroic exploits of American land forces on Guadalcanal Island, and this praise has been well deserved. But it takes nothing from their glory to point out that the fate of the Solomons rested finally in the hands of the U. S. Navy. Had not the enemy been constantly beaten back in their attempts to reinforce their garrisons, and had not our task forces destroyed Japanese naval units which were often superior in number and in fire power, the Solomons long since would have been once

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again under enemy control.

But everything did not go smoothly on all occasions. Confusion and disaster at one time obscured the tremendous accomplishments of our forces there. Much criticism arose because of a defeat which occurred at Savo Island just after American troops had landed on Guadalcanal and on some of the other islands. This chapter deals with the information U. S. Naval Communication Intelligence was able to supply our forces before the Savo Island battle occurred. Unfortunately, despite general warnings of the presence of Japanese ships in this area, the enemy was able to achieve a surprise, and before the attack was finished several Allied cruisers were destroyed.

The events leading up to the actions of early August, 1942, will now follow.

JULY 1, 1942

As early as July 1 it was reported by U. S. Naval Communication Intelligence that there was noticeable Japanese activity in the Solomon Islands.[1]

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1 - See Appendix I, Message No. 1 for more details. Hereafter, all references to Appendix I will be noted in the following fashion — I, No. 1.

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These islands had been relatively obscure before this time since the attention of the world had been focused on other more important battle fronts. But full appreciation of their strategic importance in any attack on Australia had long been felt by members of Allied naval and military commands. They knew that if the enemy controlled these islands and was able to establish strong air bases on them, there would be grave danger that the American supply lines to Australia would be cut. Furthermore, it was not too unreasonable to suspect that these air fields might be used as advance bases for an invasion of the Australian mainland.

JULY 2, 1942

It was with great interest then that further reports were received of the presence of at least fifteen enemy warships and a dozen transports in the Rabaul-Tulagi area.[2]

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2 - I, Nos. 2, 3.

JULY 3, 1942

It was evident by now that important enemy operations were about to commence, and issuance of orders to a Japanese Special Landing Force to proceed to Rabaul proved the fact.[3] The Eighth Base Force and the Fifth Air Attack Corps were associated at Rabaul with the Sasebo Fifth Special Landing Force mentioned above.[4] Other Japanese units noticed in this area were an air group commander at Kavieng, an army detachment at Rabaul, Cruiser Division 6 and 18, several supply ships, two air tenders, and an unidentified warship.[5]

JULY 6, 1942

Practically all of the communication intelligence which was furnished to operational authorities during July and August was derived from traffic analysis rather than decipherment. It will be recalled

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3 - I, Nos. 4, 5.
4 - I, Nos. 6- 8.
5 - I, Nos. 9-13.

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that on May 28, 1942, just a few days before the attack on Midway, the Japanese had changed the code from which American cryptanalysts had been deriving their most important intelligence. Fortunately, such a situation had long been foreseen, and a well planned traffic analysis system had been devised to estimate the location of enemy units, and to anticipate their plans by a close study of the external features of the enemy's communication procedure. Thus, without being able to decipher Japanese messages of July and August, 1942, with the exception of a few fragmentary passages, U. S. Naval Communication Intelligence experts were able to inform operational authorities of the status and plans of the enemy.

Some examples of the reasoning done by traffic analysts may be of interest. A steady stream of dispatches from the Commander-in-Chief Second Fleet to Marus disclosed logistic preparations for a campaign in distant waters;[6] much airplane radio traffic in the Marshall Islands indicated future operations there;[7] and the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit and the

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6 - I, No. 14.
7 - I, Nos. 16-18.

Sixth Defense Force in the Marshall Islands were also very active.[8] A special report from Chinese Intelligence stated that Japanese strength at Rabaul, Lae, and Koepang had been reduced, but in the light of its own observations U. S. Naval Communication Intelligence pointed out that enemy activity was increasing rather than decreasing in this area.[9]

The suspicion that the enemy was about to begin operations in the Southern Pacific was confirmed by many associations of important units in radio traffic from that region.[10] It was evident also that a reinforcing movement of enemy troops from Davao to Rabaul was contemplated.[11]

JULY 7, 1942

Much convoy activity in the New Britain area suggested Japanese preparations for a campaign,[12] and the presence of several enemy submarines in the Marshalls indicated that preliminary scouting was going on.[13]

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8 - I, Nos. 20, 21.
9 - I, No. 22.
10 - I, No. 23.
11 - I, No. 24.
12 - I, Nos. 26-28.
13 - I, No. 29.

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JULY 8, 1942

There were further indications noted that Cruiser Divisions 6 and 18, plus Destroyer Squadron 6, were either in or proceeding to Rabaul,[14] and that the Yokohama Flying Boat Squadron had arrived to support the Base Force at Tulagi in the Solomons.[15] A Personnel Bureau dispatch from Tokyo to various air units demonstrated that air personnel would be sent as replacements to the Fifth Air Attack Force which was operating in the Truk-Rabaul area.[16] Increased air activity was an important clue to Japanese intentions, for during the war no important enemy movement had been begun without heavy air protection.

The Nineteenth Division of the Fourth Fleet, as well as the Chief of Staff, Seventeenth Army,[17] were observed to be in or near Rabaul.[18] Several erroneous contact reports by the Japanese in this area gave rise to the suspicion that the enemy was very anxious about the success of his new operations.[19]

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14 - I, No. 30.
15 - I, No. 31
16 - I, Nos. 32, 33.
17 - I, No. 35.
18 - I, No. 34.
19 - I, Nos. 36, 37.

This led to the belief that the Japanese were aware that they had sent insufficient forces for a very important assignment, and were doubtful of the outcome.

JULY 9, 1942

Heavy radio traffic between Army authorities at Davao and Rabaul continued on this day,[20] and the presence of a fleet tanker in southern waters was also noticed.[21]

JULY 10, 1942

The Commander-in-Chief of the Third Fleet shifted flagships in the Dutch East Indies area,[22] and in the more active region of the Solomon Islands two enemy destroyer divisions, an air tender and several Marus were observed.[23]

JULY 11, 1942

There was no doubt by this time that the Japanese were planning new operations in the New Guinea, Bismarck Archipelago, and Solomon Islands

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20 - I, No. 39.
21 - I, No. 38.
22 - I, No. 40.
23 - I, No. 41.

areas. Documents captured from the enemy in New Guinea confirmed this belief for they indicated that orders had been issued to the Eleventh and Thirteenth Billeting Detachment to go to Guadalcanal. The Fourteenth Billeting Force and the Fifth Special Landing Force were directed to land on the east coast of New Guinea.[24] The Commander-in-Chief Fourth Fleet had come down from Truk to Rabaul,[25] and the presence of this high ranking naval commander plus the indications of constant troop movements into this area were further reminders of the dangerous potentialities of the enemy.[26]

The TATSUTA rejoined Cruiser Division 18, and the KINUGASA and the FURUTAKA joined Cruiser Division 6, thus increasing the enemy's cruiser strength in the Solomons.[27] Destroyer Squadron 6 and two Marus were thought to be in the area between Rabaul and Tulagi,[28] and Submarine Squadron 3 was actively operating in the same district.[29] War worn air units were being

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24 - I, No. 42.
25 - I, No. 43.
26 - I, Nos. 44-48.
27 - I, Nos. 56, 57.
28 - I, Nos. 58, 59.
29 - I, No. 60.

replaced and additional units were being supplied by the Japanese prior to the opening of a new air campaign.[30] So numerous were the responsibilities of the officer in charge at Rabaul because of the new forces that it was thought a division of authority would be effected in this area.[31]

JULY 12, 1942

Many details of the Japanese plans in the Solomons, which had been supplied by Communication Intelligence, were confirmed after enemy documents captured in New Guinea had been thoroughly studied. (See No. 42) The unit names of enemy forces in the Solomons, the schedule of their arrival, the table of their organization, the assignments of their aircraft support, the duties of their various units—all these were found itemized in the captured documents.[32] Rabaul, Tulagi and New Britain appeared to be focal points of the enemy's activity.[33]

There was much Radio Intelligence activity on the part of the Japanese, which seemed to indicated that information on Allied positions was being sought

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30 - I, Nos. 49-53.
31 - I, Nos. 54-55.
32 - I, Nos. 62, 63.
33 - I, Nos. 64-72.

before the beginning of their new campaign.[34] A message from Tokyo Registered Publications was thought to be the forerunner of a change in Japanese call signs or a modification of the code used by their submarines.[35] Estimates of the location of some of the Japanese naval commanders were now made since the presence of high ranking officers in an area was usually an indication of impending action. It was noticed that an extraordinary amount of traffic was being originated by the Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff, Fourth Fleet, both of whom were in the Rabaul area.[36] Admiral Kajioka, who was considered to be the Commander Eighth Base Force, was shown to be at Rabaul also,[37] and the Commander-in-Chief Third Fleet was thought to be at sea in the Dutch East Indies area.[38]

JULY 13, 1942

Though enemy air reinforcements were arriving in the Rabaul area, there was no sign of aircraft carriers.[39] The Yokosuka Landing Force was interested

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34 - I, No. 73.
35 - I, No. 74.
36 - I, Nos. 75, 76.
37 - I, Nos. 77, 78.
38 - I, No. 79.
39 - I, No. 81.

in affairs in this area,[40] but the principal activity on this day was by air units at Rabaul, Truk, New Britain and the Marshalls, where many replacements were being added by ferry plane flights.[41] In addition to air support, the enemy was increasing his cruiser and destroyer strength.[42]

Reports were received on this day which stated that the Japanese were building a landing field on Guadalcanal Island in the Solomons,[43] and had made another landing at Rekata Bay, Santa Isabel Island.[44]

JULY 14, 1942

There were some indications that carrier planes would operate in the New Guinea area,[45] and it was also thought probable that the Eighth Fleet would be used in this district.[46] An estimate of the Eighth Fleet suggested that it was made up of air units and was either the Combined Air Force or the organization of tenders and supply ships assigned to serve the

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40 - I, No. 82.
41 - I, Nos. 84-86.
42 - I, Nos. 87, 88.
43 - I, No. 89.
44 - I, No. 90.
45 - I, No. 91.
46 - I, No. 93.

Combined Air Force.[47]

Preparations for changing Japanese communication procedure, which had been noticed before, were still in progress.[48] Identification of various Japanese units at Rabaul and Wake provided some helpful information, especially the fact that Cruiser Divisions 6 and 18 were operating independently.[49] An estimate of the location of enemy aircraft carriers disclosed their absence in the Solomons at this time,[50] but it was expected that enemy submarines would soon operate in the New Britain area.[51] Heavy radio traffic from the Tokyo Personnel Bureau and major commanders to fleet commands and individual vessels indicated the regrouping of fleet units into several task forces. It seemed apparent also that many fleet units recently operating in the North were returning to the Empire for brief reconditioning periods before engaging immediately in new operations.[52]

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47 - I, Nos. 94, 95.
48 - I, No. 96.
49 - I, Nos. 97-100
50 - I, No. 101.
51 - I, No. 102.
52 - I, No. 103.

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JULY 15, 1942

Traffic analysis was able to outline some of the Japanese units in the Guadalcanal area, and it was pointed out that the enemy used the designator "R" to describe the area which included the Solomons, New Britain, New Guinea, New Ireland, Ocean Islands, and British Samoan Islands.[53]

Proof that the enemy air base at Guadalcanal was now ready was available.[54] The gathering of additional air units at Gasmata,[55] a place situated on the south coast of New Britain at 151° E., 07° S., and the establishment of an aircraft assembly plant at Kavieng were further signs of Japanese plans for a major campaign.[56]

JULY 16, 1942

Cruisers and destroyers continued to manifest their presence near Tulagi,[57] though enemy radio traffic was heaviest in the Rabaul area. It was deemed probable that the Commander-in-Chief Eighth Fleet would be in charge of this region, though normally it was controlled by the Commander-in-Chief, Fourth Fleet.[58]

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53 - I, Nos. 104-108.
54 - I, No. 109.
55 - I, No. 110.
56 - I, No. 111.
57 - I, Nos. 112-116.
58 - I, Nos. 117-119.

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The prevalence of Japanese Army Engineering and Supply units foretold a major campaign,[59] and the location of so many warships and supply ships in the New Britain-Solomons area could lead only to the conclusion that the drive of the enemy would begin from there.[60] The growing interest of Japanese high naval commanders in southern waters only strengthened this belief.[61] An estimate of Japanese submarine locations demonstrated that many were either moving to or were in the South Pacific.[62] Such action generally proceeded enemy operations, for they had made great use of submarines in scouting expeditions and in primary assault stages all during the war.

JULY 17, 1942

Many enemy supply ships were enroute to the South Pacific at this time,[63] and an unidentified warship was also on the way to Rabaul.[64] A cruiser which had received a severe battering at the hands of American forces defending Midway, and which was once again active in radio traffic was still at Truk.[65]

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59 - I, Nos. 120, 121.
60 - I, Nos. 122-124.
61 - I, Nos. 125, 126.
62 - I, No. 127.
63 - I, Nos. 128-130.
64 - I, No. 132.
65 - I, No. 131.

The Commander-in-Chief Eighth Fleet was very much involved in messages to and from Rabaul, and, as has been previously reported, it was thought that the Commander-in-Chief Fourth Fleet would have his headquarters at Truk while the Commander-in-Chief Eighth Fleet would exercise independent control of the Solomons-New Guinea-New Britain area.[66]

JULY 18, 1942

The Commander-in-Chief Eighth Fleet remained prominent in South Pacific dispatches.[67] Captured enemy documents confirmed some suppositions as to the patrol and supply routes of the enemy in the Rabaul area,[68] and traffic analysis disclosed the expansion of Japanese construction as well as the presence of several new enemy units in the area south of Rabaul.[69]

JULY 19, 1942

Japanese radio traffic was most active in the Southern area, and emphasis was shifting from administrative to the preoperational type of message.[70]

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66 - I, No. 133.
67 - I, Nos. 134-137.
68 - I, No. 138.
69 - I, Nos. 139-147.
70 - I, No. 148.

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Constant attention was paid to the route of the Commander-in-Chief Eighth Fleet for his arrival in the Solomons would mean that operations were about to begin.[71] A jurisdictional division of the South Seas Area into "Inside" and "Outside" Precincts was apparent, but what areas or forces were contained therein were not known.[72] Further indications of the presence of transport and supply ships in the Rabaul area were noticed,[73] as the southward movement of important Japanese warships, men and munitions continued.[74] Ferrying of aircraft and constant shipping of aviation supplies from the Empire to southern waters seemed to indicate future enemy action.[75] Though the other carriers had not left the Empire, the ZUIKAKU was thought to be on its way to Singapore.[76]

JULY 20, 1942

Japanese radio traffic continued to be very heavy, and especially noticeable was the activity at

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71 - I, Nos. 149-152.
72 - I, No. 153.
73 - I, Nos. 154-158.
74 - I, Nos. 159-165.
75 - I, No. 166
76 - I, Nos. 167-168.

Rabaul, Singapore and Yokosuka.[77] Merchant ships and warships were moving all along the supply line from the Empire through the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Truk, and eventually reaching Rabaul,[78] where the Japanese Army was just as active as was the Navy.[79] Japanese espionage reports concerning American preparations for the defense of Australia came from agents in the United States, and went to Tokyo via Madrid. Other details in these reports dealt with the precautions taken by our ships in convoy, and the construction of torpedo boats in New Orleans.[80] It was suspected that the enemy was attempting radio deception,[81] but American traffic analysts disclosed the scheme, and in addition identified many important Japanese units.[82] There could be no doubt, however, that the Japanese Radio Intelligence was operating in the Rabaul area.[83]

JULY 21, 1942

Great interest was demonstrated in Japanese aircraft and air supply movements, since these would build up enemy striking forces.[84] Similar attention

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77 - I, Nos. 169-172.
78 - I, Nos. 173-174.
79 - I, Nos. 175-178.
80 - I, No. 179.
81 - I, No. 180.
82 - I, Nos. 181-189.
83 - I, No. 190
84 - I, Nos. 191-192.

was paid to routes of enemy cruisers and destroyers on their way to southern waters, for by this means it was possible to estimate the course of their convoys.[85] A Japanese report of an American air raid on Lae was intercepted, and another stated that twelve of their ships had been sighted by Allied planes in the vicinity of Salamaua.[86]

JULY 22, 1942

Enemy documents, which had been recovered from a canvas handbag thrown from a Japanese naval bomber shot down at Gaille, New Guinea, confirmed some information known about the enemy's weather code and his method of reporting contacts with Allied forces.[87]

Destroyers and cruisers continued their convoying of Japanese Army forces into the Solomons area,[88] and although Cruiser Divisions 6 and 18 were quite prominent in radio traffic, they still operated independently of each other.[89] Cruiser Division 18

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85 - I, Nos. 193-197.
86 - I, Nos. 198, 199.
87 - I, Nos. 201, 202.
88 - I, Nos. 203-208.
89 - I, Nos. 209-211.

was believed to be in the vicinity of Lae-Salamaua, Cruiser Division 6 at Kavieng. Destroyer Squadron 6 had two units in this area--Destroyer Division 29 near Tulagi, and Destroyer Division 30 near Rabaul, together with two destroyers of Destroyer Division 34. The Japanese Southern Expeditionary Fleet was reported to be in Netherland East Indies waters.[90] A special analysis of the make-up of Cruiser Division 7 was made at this time for operational authorities by U.S. Naval Communication Intelligence. It gave reasons for the assumption by traffic analysts that Cruiser Division 7, after the sinking of the KIKUMA, consisted of the KUMANO, the SUZUYA and the MOGAMI.[91]

There were several more indications that the Commander-in-Chief Fourth Fleet, who had just changed flagships,[92] was about to resign jurisdiction over the southern waters to Commander-in-Chief Eighth Fleet.[93] A number of new Japanese units were shown by traffic analysis to be in the Rabaul-Guadalcanal area,[94] and

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90 - I, Nos. 212, 213.
91 - I, No. 214.
92 - I, No. 215.
93 - I, Nos. 216-218.
94 - I, Nos. 219-223.

the presence of enemy submarine squadrons was also noted.[95]

JULY 23, 1942

Japanese radio traffic was most active in the Rabaul area,[96] and though the messages seemed to be mainly of an administrative type there were several operational dispatches.[97] An Allied air attack on Japanese transports was now reported by the enemy, but the brief messages gave little information as to the outcome.[98] The enemy's Radio Intelligence organization proved its alertness at this point by intercepting Allied reports which announced the sighting of enemy warships.[99]

It was learned from traffic analysis that the Kure Third Special Landing Force had a detachment at Guadalcanal,[100] that part of Cruiser Division 18 was escorting Davao Army units from the Mandates to the south,[101] and that the Commander of Cruiser Division 6 was still at Kavieng.[102] Some new Army

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95 - I, Nos. 224-228.
96 - I, No. 229.
97 - I, Nos. 230, 231.
98 - I, Nos. 232, 233.
99 - I, Nos. 234-236.
100 - I, Nos. 237, 238.
101 - I, Nos. 239-241.
102 - I, No. 242.

units were discovered at Rabaul, which was a further confirmation of the belief that heavy Army reinforcements were being brought in from the Philippines.[103] Some units at Tulagi were apparently of great importance, but their identity was not known at this time.[104] However, the progress of some destroyers and transports from the Empire to Rabaul was reported,[105] and the identification of some important Japanese call signs was achieved.[106] A shifting of enemy air strength from Rabaul to the vicinity of Lae, New Guinea,[107] in addition to a heavy concentration of Japanese submarines along the Truk-Rabaul line were dangerous signs.[108] An important resume of the location of various enemy units in the Solomon Islands area was now issued.[109]

JULY 24, 1942

It had been believed that the Japanese were about to change their call signs or ciphers,[110] and

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103 - I, Nos. 243, 244.
104 - I, Nos. 245, 246.
105 - I, Nos. 247-249.
106 - I, No. 250.
107 - I, Nos. 251-253.
108 - I, Nos. 254-257.
109 - I, No. 258.
110 - I, No. 259.

on this day a change of the enemy's major shore radio and high command call signs occurred.[111] Among other duties, Japanese Radio Intelligence was taking direction finder bearings on American planes operating from Port Moresby.[112]

The great number of Marus enroute to the South Pacific indicated the enemy's intention of building up strong bases in this territory[113] to which the Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Fleet was also proceeding aboard the CHOKAI.[114] A resume of the forces associated with the Fourth and Eighth Fleets disclosed that eight heavy and two light cruisers had been probably assigned to the Rabaul area. These included Cruiser Division 6, 8, and 18, plus the CHOKAI, SUZUYA, and possibly the MAYA. It was interesting to note that no adequate carrier support had been assigned this large concentration of heavy units.[115] The Commander of Cruiser Division 18 was quite prominent in this day's traffic, as were some of the units associated with him.[116] It appeared that

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111 - II, No. 260.
112 - I, Nos. 261-263.
113 - I, Nos. 264-269.
114 - I, Nos. 270-272.
115 - I, Nos. 273, 274.
116 - I, Nos. 276-278.

an Allied attack was in progress, and that Cruiser Division 18 was much concerned.[117]

Cruiser Division 6 was associated with Cruiser Division 18 in a rendezvous with a fleet tanker in the Rabaul area.[118] The cruiser JINTSU[119] and Cruiser Division 7 were enroute to southern waters, and the progress of the latter was watched carefully for there were some indications that a carrier force together with additional destroyers would join it.[120] Evidence of liaison activities between all the Japanese commanders in the south was noticed,[121] though direct communications to all enemy units in the area had not yet been achieved.[122] Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Fleet was still associated with the Kure Third Special Landing Force as well as two destroyer divisions.[123] A radio call sign frequently used by the enemy was thought to identify units which were assigned to the jurisdiction of the Commander-in-Chief of the EighthFleet after they had

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117 - I, Nos. 279-281.
118 - I, Nos. 282, 283.
119 - I, No. 284.
120 - I, Nos. 285-289.
121 - I, No. 292.
122 - I, No. 293.
123 - I, Nos. 294, 295.

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been detached from the Fourth Fleet,[124] A newly commissioned unidentified enemy warship was steaming south, and it was reported that its destination was Rabaul.[125]

Shore based planes were operating from the Japanese bases at Guadalcanal and Tulagi in search of Allied ships.[126] Conferences over air power were being held at Tenian at this time, and as a result, six enemy heavy bombers were transferred from the Second Air Corps.[127] A very large number of Japanese submarines were either in, or enroute to the Rabaul area, and it was noticed that their activity had increased in southeastern Australian waters.[128] An estimate of the total submarine strength of the Japanese Navy showed it to be between fifty and sixty submarines.[129]

JULY 25, 1942

The center of Japanese radio activity remained in the South Pacific,[130] to which the Commander-in-

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124 - I, No. 296.
125 - I, No. 297.
126 - I, Nos. 298-300.
127 - I, Nos. 301, 302.
128 - I, Nos. 303-309.
129 - I, No. 310.
130 - I, No. 311.

Chief of the Eighth Fleet was heading aboard the CHOKAI,[131] presumably accompanied by the new unidentified warship ....[132] The Tainan Air Group was busy at Lae,[133] and the ZUIKAKU and SUZUYA were also active.[134] A Japanese cruiser damaged at Midway was once again ready for action,[135] and though Cruiser Division 18 was sending much operational traffic, there was no indication of the presence of Cruiser Division 6 at Kavieng where it was believed to be.[136] The association of Japanese Army units in Davao with Rabaul was becoming more noticeable,[137] and though enemy submarines were maintaining radio silence, many orders were being sent to them. It was quite evident that several enemy submarine division were operating in Australian waters.[138]

An important resume of recent Japanese Radio Intelligence activities was issued at this time, which

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131 - I, Nos. 312-314.
132 - I, No. 315.
133 - I, Nos. 318, 319.
134 - I, Nos. 320, 321.
135 - I, No. 322.
136 - I, Nos. 323-326.
137 - I, No. 328.
138 - I, Nos. 329-331.

disclosed that Japanese shore stations were originating many reports of intercepted Allied radio transmissions. An enormous amount of traffic was devoted to these reports which seemed to contain principally call signs, bearings of U. S. aircraft radio transmissions and deductions therefrom. There appeared to be no sign of an enemy decipherment of our cipher systems, or of their compromise through capture.[139]

JULY 26, 1942

A new day brought no change in the Japanese radio situation since the Rabaul area continued to be the most active.[140] The arrival of the Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Fleet at Truk disclosed that many of his subordinates were there also.[141] A bulletin was issued jointly on this day by the Chiefs of Staff of the Fourth and Eighth Fleets, which seemed to indicate that a decision concerning future operations had been made.[142] It was thought that Kure Fifth Special Landing Force had accompanied the Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Fleet,[143] and that a tanker

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139 - I, No. 332.
140 - I, No. 333.
141 - I, Nos. 334-337.
142 - I, No. 338.
143 - I, No. 339.

would refuel some of his units.[144] Part of the Fourth Fleet was engaged in convoy work,[145] possibly escorting some of the important Army commands which were destined to reinforce the landing forces at New Guinea.[146] Probable identifications were made of some Japanese aircraft units in the Rabaul area,[147] and though cover calls hid the identity of a few ships, Cruiser Division 18, despite its disguise, was known to be there.[148] An organizational outline of the Japanese Second Fleet was provided for U. S. Navy operational authorities on this date,[149] and a warning of possible danger was issued because of the radio silence of several enemy warships.[150]

JULY 27, 1942

Further evidence confirming the belief that an important enemy naval action was about to begin was found in the very heavy Japanese radio traffic

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144 - I, No. 340.
145 - I, No. 341.
146 - I, Nos. 343-348.
147 - I, Nos. 350, 351.
148 - I, Nos. 352-354.
149 - I, No. 355.
150 - I, No. 356.

in the southern area. Many of these messages were of an operational type, and it was believed that much of the traffic was caused by Japanese Radio Intelligence's efforts to locate United States forces prior to launching an attack.[151] Dispatches issued jointly from Truk by the Chiefs of Staff of the Fourth and Eighth Fleets indicated that the Commander-in-Chief Eighth Fleet, who had arrived at 1030 on July 25, had relieved the Commander-in-Chief Fourth Fleet of the command in the New Britain-Solomons area.[152] It was evident too that Destroyer Division 16 and Destroyer Division MAN 55 were assigned to the Eighth Fleet,[153] as was Cruiser Division 18.[154]

More Army units were being brought in to reinforce Japanese bases in the Solomons,[155] and after a silence of several days, Destroyer Squadron 6 was again noticed. Reconnaissance and operation reports indicated that the YUBARI, flagship of Destroyer Squadron 6, had been engaged in supporting operations at Buna on July 22,[156] which accounted for its silence.

151,- I, Nos. 357-361.
152 - I, Nos. 362-364.
153 - I, No. 365.
154 - I, Nos. 366-368.
155 - I, Nos. 369, 370.
156 - I, No. 371.

The cruiser SUZUYA was still near Truk despite previous indications of a move into the Malay area,[157] but the KASHIMA was enroute to Kure. This proved that the Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Fleet had shifted flagships, since he was no longer aboard the KASHIMA.[158] Though Cruiser Division 6 was not playing an active part in the New Guinea operations, it appeared to be preparing for more direct action, since it was communicating with the Japanese Bureau of Aeronautics. The supplying of aircraft replacements has always been a prelude to Japanese campaigns.[159]

Traffic analysis disclosed the presence of several new warships and Marus in the Rabaul area[160] and much shifting of enemy air strength southward.[161] An important assignment of the aircraft was to conduct reconnaissance against enemy forces.[162] A contact with Allied planes was reported in the Mandates area in which the Fourth Air Attack Corps Commander had jurisdiction.[163]

Enemy submarine squadrons were still in the Eighth Fleet area, and a Japanese diplomatic message

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157 - I, No. 372.
158 - I, No. 373.
159 - I, Nos. 374, 375.
160 - I, Nos. 376-378.
161 - I, Nos. 379-383.
162 - I, No. 383.
163 - I, No. 384.

which complained of the great number of enemy submarines in Kamranh Bay was an indication that American submarines also were not idle. In fact, so great was the anxiety of the enemy that the departure of the TOZAN MARU was delayed until more protection could be supplied to it by the Japanese Navy. The information disclosed in these intercepted messages was of great value to U. S. Navy operational authorities, because sailing dates were furnished.[164] It may be pointed out here that many successful attacks of American submarines on Japanese ships in the Far Pacific have been made possible through information furnished by U. S. Navy Communication Intelligence.

The probable organization of a Japanese Striking Force was furnished at this time, and this provided much valuable information as to the makeup of Carrier Division 2. It appeared that the HAYATAKA, HITAKA and possibly the RYUJO formed part of this group.[165]

A message which revealed that operations were to take place on July 29th was now deciphered. It

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164 - I, No. 386.
165 - I, Nos. 387, 388.

was originated by the Commander of the RZJ Occupation Force, and was addressed to various addressees in the New Britain Area. Though the place, RZJ, was not definitely known, it was presumed to be in the vicinity of Buna.[166]

JULY 28, 1942

The Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Fleet and the Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Fleet of the Japanese Navy had parted company by this time,[167] and the Commanders of Cruiser Division 18 and Destroyer Division 16 were in touch with the Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Fleet, who was on his way south to Rabaul.[168] Enemy Engineering Detachments in the Marshall Islands were thought to be receiving orders for the construction of new air bases in the New Guinea-Solomons area.[169] Army reinforcements were still pouring into this area, and as usual most of them seemed to be coming from Davao.[170]

Several enemy call signs were not fully understood at this time, but some tentative identifications

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166 - I, No. 389.
167 - I, No. 390.
168 - I, Nos. 391-393.
169 - I, No. 394
170 - I, Nos. 395, 396.

were made.[171] Two auxiliary ships were discovered in action; one at Soerabaja, and one at Kavieng.[172]

It will be remembered that indications of carrier activity had been noted previously, and on this day four carriers were practicing in the southern Kyushu area.[173] It was thought that a major reorganization of Japanese carrier divisions was in process, because of the great losses suffered at Midway.[174] Air reinforcements from the Empire were being sought for the Truk-Rabaul area, and heavy radio activity in the Marshalls area suggested that a transfer of aircraft from that area to the south was in progress.[175]

Submarine activity was considerably increased on this day, and some of the units noted now in southern waters were Submarine Squadrons 3, 6, 7, and 8.[176]

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171 - I, Nos. 397-399.
172 - I, Nos. 400, 401.
173 - I, No. 402.
174 - I, No. 403.
175 - I, Nos. 404, 405.
176 - I, Nos. 406-409.

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JULY 29, 1942

An important tentative outline of the Japanese First Fleet organization was issued,[177] and the location of many of the enemy units was also supplied.[178] Traffic analysis was the source of this information, and once again the value of such a method in the absence of cryptanalysis was demonstrated. An estimate of the location of these units was also of great value to U. S. Navy operational authorities.

Finally, the Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Fleet arrived at Rabaul,[179] and it was noted that Kavieng appeared to be the new control point on the route from Truk.[180] It was quite evident by this time that jurisdiction over the southern territories had been divided between Commanders-in-Chief of the Fourth and Eighth Fleets.[181]

It seemed to be the Japanese plan to leave the Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Fleet as Senior Officer Present in the Mariannas, Caroline, Marshalls area, and to establish an entirely new sphere of command, which would be centered at Rabaul, and which

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177 - I, Nos. 410, 411.
178 - I, Nos. 412-417.
179 - I, Nos. 419-422.
180 - I, Nos. 423, 425, 426.
181 - I, Nos. 427-430.

included the New Guinea-Solomons area. This probably explained the phrase "Outside South Seas Force", which had appeared so very often in enemy traffic in the southern area during the previous week.[182] The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet manifested his interest in the progress of activities in the southern waters, although the area was under the direct supervision of the Commanders-in-Chief of the Fourth and Eighth Fleets.[183]

The southern trend of many Marus continued to be very noticeable,[184] and Japanese aircraft carriers were still practicing off Kyushu.[185] These were the signs of imminent action usually noticed by U. S. Navy Communication Intelligence before every major Japanese campaign of the war. Air reinforcements continued to come into Rabaul, and some of the new units were identified.[186] Doubt as to the location of the carriers SHOKAKU, and ZUIKAKU, brought a request that an estimate of their approximate positions be made, though it was believed that both of them were in home waters.[187] A decryption revealed that an enemy

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182 - I, No. 427.
183 - I, No. 431.
184 - I, Nos. 433-435.
185 - I, Nos. 436, 437.
186 - I, Nos. 438-440.
187 - I, Nos. 441, 442.

occupation force was in the Rabaul area, and that an offensive movement would be in operation soon, if it had not already begun.[188]

A disturbing incident now occurred, which if continued, might have seriously interfered with communication intelligence activities. Allied Army forces in Australia-New Guinea area were jamming one of the Japanese circuits. Although the execution of this plan was theoretically advisable, in practice it shut off an important source of intelligence.[189]

JULY 30, 1942

Certain types of Japanese Radio Intelligence traffic decreased on this date, but direction finder traffic increased. Normal administrative and operational traffic remained high especially in the Southeast Asia areas.[190] It was suspected that new registered publications were to be used by enemy forces in the Rabaul area.[191] Though the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet continued to demonstrate his interest in the New Guinea area,[192] it was apparent

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188 - I, No. 443.
189 - I, No. 444.
190 - I, Nos. 445, 446.
191 - I, No. 447.
192 - I, No. 448.

that the Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Fleet was now in sole charge.[193]

The Commander of Cruiser Division 18, who had been at Rabaul for some time under the cover of a different call sign, was now perceived to be the Commander of Landing and Occupation Forces in Buna and the other parts of New Guinea.[194] Destroyer Squadrons 6 and 29, plus troops of the Eighth Guard Force, were known to be in the Tulagi area.[195] Several warships and Marus were noted at Rabaul, and other enemy units were said to be enroute to this area.[196] The presence of a battleship in the New Guinea region was suspected, but there was no further confirmation of this in enemy radio traffic.[197]

Valuable intelligence concerning the number and course of enemy warships and Marus along the Asiatic coast was furnished to American submarines.[198] A partially deciphered dispatch of June 17 confirmed

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193 - I, No. 449
194 - I, Nos. 450, 451.
195 - I, Nos. 452-455.
196 - I, Nos. 456-462
197 - I, No. 463.
198 - I, Nos. 464, 465.

the reports of American traffic analysts, who had been issuing warnings of the strengthening of Japanese air power in the territory around Rabaul,[199] that new air tenders were enroute from the Empire to southern waters.[200] It was also disclosed that the Yokohama Air Group, a part of the Fifth Air Attack Force, was at Guadalcanal.[201] Despite the fact that a Japanese plane near New Britain had been heard using a submarine frequency, there was no other sign of direct communication between planes and submarines in that area.[202]

Associations between the Army group in New Britain and the Philippines indicated that Army reinforcements were still of major interest.[203] Allied planes were making reconnaissance flights, for a report of theirs, which stated that aircraft had been sighted, was intercepted by the Japanese.[204] An important discussion concerning the identification of Japanese Fleet units now took place between American traffic analysts, and some very important

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199 - I, No. 466.
200 - I, Nos. 467, 468.
201 - I, No. 469.
202 - I, No. 470.
203 - I, No. 472.
204 - I, No. 471.

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details were contained in the dispatches relating to this discussion.[205]

JULY 31, 1942

Part A - Messages Appearing in the Summary of July 31, 1942

Japanese radio activity in the Southwest Pacific was so heavy that it was believed that operations would begin very soon.[206] Enemy forces northwest and northeast of Australia were maintaining close liaison.[207] The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet originated very little traffic on this date, but it was interesting to discover that he was south of home waters.[208]

The Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Fleet, who was using the cover call of Rabaul still appeared in traffic, but the Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Fleet was much more active and maintained close touch with the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet.[209] Several enemy units were advancing toward the Solomons-New Guinea area, and it was noticed that the TATSUTA

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205 - I, No. 473.
206 - I, Nos. 474, 475.
207 - I, No. 476.
208 - I, Nos. 477, 478.
209 - I, Nos. 479-482.

was operating independently of the other ships of Cruiser Division 18.[210]

There was a great deal of radio traffic between the planes and carriers exercising in Southern Empire waters, but no change or shift of their location was noticed. Furthermore, a major portion of the Japanese heavy units were in home waters. A great number of messages between the carriers and planes seemed to indicate that intensive training exercises, especially in communications, were being practiced by the great number of new and comparatively inexperienced fliers who had been assigned to the carrier groups.[211] Japanese Radio Intelligence units were very busy in an effort to acquire as much information as possible concerning the Allied forces.[212]

Japanese place name designators were identified at this time as follows: The "R" area comprised the Solomon Islands, New Britain Island, Gilbert Islands, Ellice Islands, Louisiade Archipelago and Eastern

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210 - I, Nos. 483-491.
211 - I, Nos. 492-494.
212 - I, No. 495.

New Guinea. "RY" area contained the Gilbert Islands, Ellice Islands and areas to the South. "RX" referred to the Solomon Islands and "RZ" covered Western New Guinea as well as islands off the shore. "RR" meant New Britain.[213]

It appeared fairly certain that at least part of the Fourteenth Air Corps had been moved to the Rabaul-New Britain area. It was evident that the increase of enemy air strength in this region had been achieved at the expense of other districts.[214] Intercepted contact reports seemed to indicate that Allied units were active in southern waters.[215] A constant stream of weather reports proved that the enemy was taking advantage of the facilities of the world-famous Manila Observatory, which they had seized in their invasion of the Philippines.[216]

Japanese diplomats in Lisbon, Berlin and Rome were sending Tokyo much information about Allied ship movements and troop transfers.[217] An unusually

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213 - I, No. 496.
214 - I, Nos. 497-499.
215 - I, Nos. 501, 502.
216 - I, No. 503.
217 - I, Nos. 504-506.

important statement of Japan's future world strategy was issued from Tokyo. It informed Berlin that Japan's intentions were not to open hostilities with Russia unless it was forced to do so by extraordinary circumstances. It pointed out that active measures had been taken to retaliate decisively in case the Russians should take the initiative, but it insisted that it had no intentions of thwarting the effort against England and America by moving their forces to the North, and, thus, greatly extending their battle front. They definitely rejected all of Germany's proposals that Japan should open an offensive against the Russians.[218] Immediately, a reaction was experienced from Osima, Japan's ambassador to Germany, who was a strong supporter of the Axis, and, in addition, a fervent militarist. He informed Tokio that it was absolutely necessary to inform Germany of the outlines of Japan's strategic plan so that they might be aware of what Japan intended to do, and he stressed the need for close cooperation in the future.[219]

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218 - I, Nos. 507, 508.
219 - I, No. 509.

Part B - Messages Sent Out on July 31st but Published in the Summary of August 1st

The Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Staff of the Eighth Fleet were still operating under the cover of a Rabaul call sign,[220] and an Army Commander, who had been noticed in previous traffic, was also there.[221] It was observed that the Japanese Army was in constant communication with Davao and Palao, which indicated that they were still interested in obtaining reinforcements from the Philippines.[222]

Following several days of radio silence, which indicated that it had been engaged in operations, Cruiser Division 6 was observed at Rabaul.[223] An unidentified enemy Man of War left Truk and announced that it would arrive at Kavieng on August 2nd.[224] The Commander of Cruiser Division 18 had many responsibilities, for he was also the commander of the RZJ (Buna) Occupational Force, when the Commander-

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220 - I, Nos. 510, 511.
221 - I, No. 512.
222 - I, No. 513.
223 - I, No. 514.
224 - I, No. 515.

in-Chief of the Eighth Fleet ordered him to proceed to a certain rendezvous on August 4th.[225]

Destroyer Divisions 3 and 17 were thought to be escorting the aircraft carriers practicing off the Kyushu area.[226] Destroyer Division 30, a very active unit of Destroyer Squadron 6, moved from Buna to Lae, and since it had been associated in recent weeks with the Fifth Air Attack Force under the Commander of the RZJ Occupation Force, as well as the Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Fleet, it was evident that movements of this destroyer division were indicative of enemy operations in the Buna-Lae area. The destroyer strength of the enemy in the Rabaul area had evidently been reinforced for Destroyer Division 16 of Destroyer Squadron 2 was now there.[227]

Nine Marus carrying supplies were coming South from the Empire at this time,[228] but no radio traffic was observed from the aircraft carriers which had been practicing off Kyushu.[229] Urgent enemy contact

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225 - I, Nos. 516-518.
226 - I, No. 519.
227 - I, Nos. 520, 521.
228 - I, Nos. 522-524.
229 - I, Nos. 525, 526.

reports sent out by the Japanese in the Lae-Buna area were proof that Allied airplanes had been sighted.[230] Direction finders showed that the Commander of Submarine Squadron 3 was in the vicinity of Southeast Australia and that Submarine Squadron 6 was sailing from the Empire via Truk.[231]

The Bulletin issued daily by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, which contained a great deal of valuable communication intelligence, stated on July 31st that there were indications of further advances in the Solomons-New Guinea area, and that Destroyer Squadron 6 and Cruiser Division 18 were still in the Solomons.[232]

AUGUST 1, 1942

All messages discussed after August 1, 1942, will be arranged according to time of origin. Thus, some messages which were sent on August 1st to operational authorities, but which did not appear till August 2 in the Communication Intelligence Summary, Navy Department, will be discussed under the

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230 - I, No. 527.
231 - I, Nos. 528, 529.
232 - I, No. 530.

heading of the day on which they were originated.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Fleet at Rabaul, maintained constant communication with forces he had sent to Kieta, Bougainville Island.[233] It was suspected that a new Japanese Operations Force, called "D", might invade western or northwestern Australia, while a Striking Force had been created to disrupt Allied supply routes from India.[234] A warship enroute to Rabaul was still unidentified,[235] but Cruiser Division 6, which only recently had been at Rabaul, was now thought to be in the Truk area.

The newly arrived Destroyer Division 6 was now assigned to Destroyer Squadron 10,[236] two other destroyers were escorting some Marus and a tanker in the vicinity of Saipan,[237] and several other Marus were seen in the Rabaul area.[238] Japanese Army traffic between the Philippines and the Solomons continued to be heavy. All evidence pointed to the fact that the Japanese were sending troops and supplies

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233 - I, Nos. 531, 532.
234 - I, Nos. 533, 534.
235 - I, No. 535.
236 - I, Nos. 536-538.
237 - I, No. 539.
238 - I, Nos. 540, 541.

into this threatened zone in increasing numbers[239] though enemy aircraft carriers had not changed their positions within Empire waters.[240]

The Commander of Air Squadron 25 was shown to be at Lae and a detachment of the Yokohama Air Group was discovered at Truk.[241] Heavy traffic between Yokosuka and enemy aircraft factories and assembly plants in the western Mandates proved that further plane reinforcements would be shipped into the Rabaul area.[242] The probable route of the planes flying down into this region from the Empire indicated that Chichijima, Saipan, Truk and Rabaul were the principal control points.[243] A contact report revealed that the Japanese had sighted Allied cruisers and destroyers in the Solomons,[244] where the Fifth Air Attack Force carried on most of the enemy's air operations.[245] An Air Tender, formerly noticed at Rabaul in July, was now identified at the Lae Seaplane Base.[246]

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239 - I, Nos. 542, 543.
240 - I, No. 544.
241 - I, Nos. 545, 546
242 - I, Nos. 547.
243 - I, No. 548.
244 - I, No. 549.
245 - I, No. 550
246 - I, Nos. 551, 552.

Enemy submarine traffic was rather heavy on this day for Tokyo sent weather reports to Submarine Squadron 2 near Yokosuka, and also to the Commander of Submarine Squadron 6, who was thought to be in the South Pacific. Submarine Squadron 3 was operating in eastern waters, and Submarine Squadron 7 had last been heard of at Truk. In addition to this, estimates were made of locations of other submarine units.[247] It was evident from some of the traffic intercepted that enemy airplanes and submarines maintained close liaison in the New Guinea area.[248]

AUGUST 2, 1942

The Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet was sending numerous messages to air commanders in his area, and the Eleventh Air Fleet seemed to be receiving most of the attention. It was thought that the office in direct charge of the Outer Area Southern Force was neither the Commander in Chief

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247 - I, Nos. 553, 554.
248 - I, No. 555.

of the Fourth or Eighth Fleets, but the Commander of Destroyer Squadron 6.[249] Most of the traffic in the Fourth Fleet area seemed to be concerned principally with the administration of bases and the movement of the supplies, though the Commander of the Fourth Fleet was thought to be at sea.[250]

The Fifth Special Landing Force mentioned so frequently in July dispatches was now found to be the Sasebo Fifth Special Landing Force under the jurisdiction of the Commander, Cruiser Division 18, who also was responsible for the success of the Buna Occupation Force. Other units noticed at Rabaul were a battalion of engineers and the Eighty-Second Guard Force.[251]

The Commander of Cruiser Division 7 was still busy in Southeastern Asia, and the Commander of the Nineteenth Division was noticed in the vicinity of the Northeastern Marshall Islands. The composition of the Nineteenth Division was unknown at this time although it was very active in the Rabaul-Tulagi

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249 - I, Nos. 557, 558.
250 - I, Nos. 559, 560.
251 - I, Nos. 561, 562.

area.[252] A Maru was enroute in the Kavieng area, and another Maru was enroute from Tulagi to Rabaul.[253]

Much activity marked this day in the Rabaul area, and although the Eleventh Air Group was definitely known to be in the Marshall Islands, it was very evident that a part of it had come to the Rabaul-New Britain region.[254] Planes from the AKAGI were operating near Palao, and a detachment of the Yokohama Flying Boat Squadron was at Guadalcanal and Tulagi.[255]

The Japanese announced that they had sighted one Allied battleship, two carriers, some cruisers and destroyers, and a check-up of British forces indicated that this report might have been accurate.[256] Submarine Squadron 8 was expected to leave the Malaya area and to put in at Kure for an overhaul. The movement of the Commander of the Submarine Force towards Malaya explained the elevation of the Commander of Submarine Squadron 3 to Force Commander

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252 - I, Nos. 563, 564.
253 - I, Nos. 565, 566.
254 - I, Nos. 567-569.
255 - I, Nos. 570, 571.
256 - I, Nos. 572, 573.

status in the southwestern sector.[257]

AUGUST 3, 1942

It appeared that plans had been made to coordinate operations by Japanese Southern and Southwestern Forces.[258] The Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Fleet seemed to be concerned solely with administration of his bases in the Marshall-Truk area.[259] The First Base Force at Jaluit and the Seventh and Eighth Base Forces at Rabaul were active, but nothing unusual was observed. However, the increasing prominence of enemy movements in recent weeks in the Malaya area was worthy of comment.[260]

The identification of some unciphered call signs revealed that the designator PY meant Jaluit, and that PX referred to the Marshall Islands.[261] However, there were still some unidentified call signs. It was noticed that the YUBARI and Destroyer Division 16 attempted to conceal their identity under the call sign as did several other units.[262] Three other call signs which occasioned

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257 - I, Nos. 574, 575.
258 - I, Nos. 576, 577.
259 - I, Nos. 578, 579.
260 - I, Nos. 580-582.
261 - I, Nos. 583, 584.
262 - I, Nos. 585, 586.

comment were known to have originated from Kavieng, and tentative identifications were made.[263] A new Japanese Fleet was discovered at Maizuru and it was thought to be enroute to the South.[264]

The Japanese seemed to be planning an attack upon the Nauru and Ocean Islands from the north and west simultaneously. Three enemy tankers were heard in the Ambon area, and the Air Squadron 11 was thought to be in the Marshall Islands.[265] Sudden activity in the Bungo Channel suggested that the aircraft carriers which had been practicing in the Kyushu area were now returning to the Empire. Destroyer Squadron 10 had been engaged in escorting the carriers, and its strengthening by the addition of Destroyer Division 16 led to the assumption that new duties for future carrier operations would soon be assigned to them.[266] Destroyer Division 16 was escorting the SUZUYA in the South Pacific from the Empire, while one destroyer of Destroyer Division 30

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263 - I, Nos. 587, 588.
264 - I, No. 589.
265 - I, No. 590.
266 - I, Nos. 591-595.

was found at Singapore and another at Truk.[267]

The KAKO of Cruiser Division 6 was thought to be in the general area of Kavieng,[268] the MAFUTO MARU arrived at Lae, and another ship, tentatively known as either a tender or a hospital ship, was enroute to Rabaul.[269] The Yokosuka Air Station was sending a new air group to Rabaul, a detachment of the Fourteenth Air Corps was operating with the Yokohama Air Group at Tulagi, while the Tenian Air Group was at Lae.[270]

An estimate of the position of Japanese submarines disclosed that the Commander of the Submarine Force was enroute from Yokosuka to Jaluit, and that Submarine Squadron 1 had two divisions in the Empire, and one division in the Eighth Fleet area; one unit of Submarine Squadron 2 was near Kiska, four were in the Empire, and one near Saipan; Submarine Squadron 3 controlled one and a half divisions in the Eighth Fleet area, and one and a

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267 - I, Nos. 596, 597.
268 - I, Nol 598.
269 - I, Nos. 599, 600.
270 - I, Nos. 601-604.

half divisions in the Empire; while Submarine Squadron 5 kept one division divided between the Saigon area and the Empire, with another division unplaced; Submarine Squadron 6 maintained one division in the Bonins area, which was possibly scheduled for an early movement to the Mandates area; Submarine Squadron 7 directed two divisions in the Fifth Fleet area, and one division in the Eighth Fleet area; two divisions of Submarine Squadron 8 were located at Saigon, and one division at Yokosuka.[271]

AUGUST 4, 1942

The Commander-in-Chief, Eighth Fleet, communicated with the Chief of Staff of the Fourth Fleet,[272] and Naval General Staff sent to several Chiefs of Staff what was thought to be an operational plan for the Southeastern area.[273] A destroyer of Destroyer Division 30 was noticed in Kavieng,[274] and the SUZUYA, after a long delay, appeared to be moving

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271 - I, No. 605.
272 - I, No. 606.
273 - I, No. 607.
274 - I, No. 608.

to Sasebo.[275] Movements of ships from Rabeul to the Netherlands East Indies, or vice versa, by way of Northern New Guinea were indicated at this time.[276]

Traffic analysis disclosed that a very important security measure had been adopted by the Japanese. Service call ___ which had been first noticed on August 1 was now considered to be a call similar to the ___ used by the United States Navy. The use of this method of concealing the originator was only one of the many secret measures adopted by the Japanese after the publicity concerning the success of United States Naval Communication Intelligence at Midway had received widespread attention.[277]

The One Hundred and Eighth Air Group and the Eleventh Pioneer Forces were known to be at Lunga,[278] and many Marus were either in, or enroute, to the Rabaul area.[279] The repair ship AKASHI, having made the SUZUYA ready for action, was now returning to

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275 - I, No. 609.
276 - I, No. 610.
277 - I, No. 611.
278 - I, No. 612.
279 - I, Nos. 613-616.

Kure,[280] and the NARUTO MARU was also departing from this region, accompanied by the AKIKAZE.[281]

Although a great reduction had been noticed in carrier aircraft traffic during the preceding two weeks, the activity of Destroyer Squadron 10 had increased considerably. This suggested that more destroyer guards were being acquired previous to the beginning of a new operation.[282] A reorganization of carrier divisions left the ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU and ZUIHO in Carrier Division 1, and the RYUJO, HIYATAKA and HITAKI plus three plane groups from the AKAGI and SORYU, and an unidentified ship in Carrier Division 2. The HOSHO and the KASUGA MARUS were not identified definitely with either Carrier Division 1 or 2.[283]

An estimation of the location of some Japanese air units found a detachment of the Chief of the Air Group at Gasmata, the Commander of the Tainan Air Group at Lae, and the Commander of the Yokohama Air Group at Tulagi.[284] The Eleventh Air Fleet seemed about

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280 - I, Nos. 617, 618.
281 - I, No. 619.
282 - I, No. 620.
283 - I, Nos. 621-625.
284 - I, Nos. 626-628.

to change its headquarters from Tenian prior to the commencement of new operations,[285] and a section of the Sixth Air Attack Force was enroute to Rabaul in company with an air tender.[286] Enemy convoys in the Penang, Singapore and Kamranh Bay areas were being protected by air escorts,[287] and enemy aircraft were patrolling the Ocean Island sector.[288] However, Allied planes were just as busy, for the enemy sent a contact report announcing that three Allied planes were sighted over Tulagi.[289] It was presumed that the Commander of the Japanese Submarine Forces was still in the Malay area for he was receiving traffic via Jaluit.[290]

A summary of the position of Japanese units mentioned in the regular traffic of this period disclosed, among other things, that Cruiser Division 6 was believed to be in the New Britain-Solomons area, as was the TENRYU and TATSUTA of Cruiser Division 18.

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285 - I, No. 629.
286 - I, No. 630.
287 - I, No. 631.
288 - I, No. 633.
289 - I, No. 634.
290 - I, No. 635.

This was important intelligence for it indicated that considerable enemy cruiser strength was available to operate as a striking force at any moment deemed opportune.

In the light of these and other dispatches sent prior to the Battle of Savo Island, it is evident that sufficient warning had been given of the presence of the cruisers which were eventually to inflict tremendous damage on the Allied screening forces at Savo Island on August 8-9.[291]

Traffic in the Marshall Islands and the Eighth Fleet area was confined to administrative, rather than operational messages.[292] Another important communication security measure of the Japanese took place at 0000, August 5, when all their major commands and shore radio call signs were changed.[293] The Bulletin, issued by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to all his subordinate task force commanders on August 4, stated in part that

... "Crudiv 6, Crudiv 18, and Desron 6 remain New Britain-Solomons Area" ...[294]

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291 - I, Nos. 636, 637.
292 - I, No. 638.
293 - I, No. 639.
294 - I, No. 640.

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AUGUST 5, 1942

The missing part (2) of the message from Tokyo to Oshima in Berlin was now made available. It spoke of the necessity of making tremendous efforts to destroy the influence of Chungking, which was the center of Anglo-Saxon activities against Japan everywhere throughout East Asia. The Japanese Empire was going to continue her fight to make Great Britain come to her knees, but in spite of glorious victories so far, the resistance of the United States, the ally of Great Britain, was still formidable. Not only would the Japanese have to fight the United States harder than ever, but there was also a question of the procurement and use of the raw materials in the Southeast area.[295] Von Ribbentrop's comment on this message, as forwarded to Tokyo by Ambassador Oshima, was that the Japanese government had to decide for herself in this situation, and that Germany was in no position to say anything. However, he seemed worried about the question of Japanese joint warfare with its two Allies, and Oshima

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295 – I, No. 641.

had to reassure him that Japan was using every available ways and means to bring the war to a victorious conclusion, and that she was determined to continue to so do.[296]

There was nothing unusual noted in the Fourth and Eighth Fleet areas at this time, though the movements of construction and aircraft supplies still continued.[297] Enemy units which had been associated with the "D" Operations Force were active in the Southwest Pacific.[298]

Very important intelligence was issued which stated that the CHOKAI and AOBA were at sea in the Rabaul area. Since the CHOKAI was the flagship of the Commander-in-Chief, Eighth Fleet, it was thought that some important Japanese operations were about to take place. Radio silence appeared to be maintained by some of the units of the Commander-in-Chief, Eighth Fleet, because traffic in his area was very much below par in volume.[299]

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296 - I, No. 642.
297 - I, No. 643.
298 - I, No. 645.
299 - I, Nos, 646, 647.

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A review of enemy radio traffic indicated that the Commander-in-Chief First Air Fleet was subordinate only to Commander-in-Chief Combined Fleet, and that, in addition to his usual chain of command, which included Cruiser Division 7 and 8, many units of Destroyer Squadrons 2 and 10 reported to him. Thus, it was assumed that the Commander-in-Chief, First Air Fleet, instead of the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, would command future enemy striking forces wherever major fleets were involved.[300]

Destroyer Division 30 and Destroyer Squadron 6, together with Destroyer Division 8 in Destroyer Squadron 4, were in the vicinity of Truk, and Destroyer Division 16 of Destroyer Squadron 2, which had been at Rabaul, was escorting the SUZUYA from Truk to the Empire.[301] There were many Marus as usual sailing the route from the Empire to the Truk-Rabaul area,[302] and tankers were proceeding from Tokoyama to Jaluit via Chichijima and Saipan, escorted by units of Destroyer Squadron 4 for at least part of the way.[303]

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300 - I, No. 648.
301 - I, Nos. 649-652.
302 - I, Nos. 653-658.
303 - I, No. 659.

Radio traffic between Yokosuka Aircraft Factory and assembly plants at Saipan, Ruotto and Truk indicated that a continuous flow of aviation material and replacements was coming from the Empire.[304] An air group of the Fourth Air Attack Force was searching for Allied submarines in the vicinity of Ocean Island,[305] and the Fifth Air Attack Force at Rabaul was also patrolling certain sectors.[306] Two enemy seaplanes from Rabaul reinforced the air units at Tulagi.[307]

A compromise of certain enciphered Japanese call signs located several enemy units in the New Britain-Guadalcanal area.[308] Submarine Squadron 6 was believed to be proceeding to the New Guinea-New Britain area, and a Maru subtender of Submarine Squadron 3 was about to move from Jaluit to Truk.[309]

AUGUST 6, 1942

There were many routine enemy reports intercepted on August 6, but the messages announcing the

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304 - I, No. 661.
305 - I, No. 662.
306 - I, No. 663.
307 - I, No. 664.
308 - I, Nos. 665, 667.
309 - I, Nos. 668-678.

arrival of American forces in the Solomons and the beginning of the assault on Guadalcanal were received in the evening of August 6. The difference in time between Washington, D. C. and the South Pacific made it possible to received on August 6, messages from Guadalcanal, which had been sent on the morning of August 7. The routine reports will be discussed first.

The Chief of Staff of the Oki Army Detachment was discovered at Rabaul,[310] and the Man-of-War NITU 9, formerly reported as enroute from Truk, also arrived there.[311] The possibility existed that a battleship was about to move South,[312] but the actual sea strength of the Japanese in the South Pacific consisted of their Cruiser Divisions, which were at sea in the Rabaul area at this time. It should be noticed once more that warning was given here that the CHOKAI, Flagship of the Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Fleet, and Cruiser Division 6 were at sea in the Rabaul area.[313]

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310 - I, No. 672.
311 - I, No. 673.
312 - I, No. 674.
313 - I, Nos. 675, 676.

Destroyer Division 4 of the Destroyer Squadron 10 was near Saipan, and a unit of Destroyer Squadron 2 was south of Truk.[314] Several Marus arrived at Truk,[315] two others were observed in the Rabaul area, and a convoy destined for the South Pacific was forming in Yokohama.[316] A battalion of construction engineers was associated with the Sasebo Special Landing Force in the Rabaul area, which was still another indication that the enemy was making every effort to build air bases in that area.[317]

Air reinforcements for the Sixth Air Attack Forces were sailing via Truk for service at Tulagi.[318] The reorganized Carrier Divisions 1 and 2 had replaced the former Carrier Divisions 4 and 5 under the jurisdiction of the Commander of the First Air Fleet.[319] Radio traffic to the Yokosuka Aircraft Factory from the First Air Fleet bombers at their base in Taroa indicated that reports of defects or requests for immediate replacements were being made.[320] The Fifth

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314 - I, Nos. 677, 678.
315 - I, Nos. 679-682.
316 - I, Nos. 683, 684.
317 - I, No. 686.
318 - I, Nos. 687, 688.
319 - I, No. 689.
320 - I, No. 690.

Air Attack Force which was responsible for the defense of the New Britain territory originated most of the traffic on this day.[321]

The destroyers AKIKAZE and were in the vicinity of Rabaul,[322] the KAMOI, a seaplane tender, was in the Marshall Islands,[323] and though the ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU seemed to be operating in company, they were not in the South Pacific.[324] An estimate of the location of other units revealed that the Tainan Air Group was at Lae, the First Air Group was at Taroa (Marshall Islands), the Fourth Air Group was in the Solomons-New Guinea area, and the Commander of the Japanese Submarine Force was still at sea in the Malay area.[325]

There were several enemy contact reports of "aircraft sighted" from Lae on the afternoon of August 6 at 1300, 1600, and 2212. With the exception of these contact reports, there was no unusual activity in any Japanese area up to 2000, August 6.

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321 - I, No. 691.
322 - I, No. 692.
323 - I, No. 693.
324 - I, No. 694.
325 - I, Nos. 695, 696.

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However, at 0435 (-9), August 7, Japanese radio stations at Tulagi began issuing urgent operational dispatches, which stated that an Allied striking force of twenty ships was attacking the base. A report at 0700 (-9) announced "Enemy landing in progress".[326] These were all the enemy operational reports available on August 6, but many more were intercepted on August 7.

The Bulletin issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet for August 6 announced that Cruiser Division 6 was in the Rabaul Area, Cruiser Division 18 was in the Solomons, and the CHOKAI was in the New Britain area.[327] It is evident that sufficient warning had been given of the presence of these dangerous ships in the area in which Allied forces were to operate.

AUGUST 7, 1942

Many enemy operational reports were intercepted on August 7, for American forces were landing in the Solomons. Before the operations began, United States Naval Communication Intelligence had supplied much

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326 - [redacted], Nos. 701-703.
327 - I, No. 704.

valuable intelligence concerning the enemy units present in the Solomon Islands. Captain Forrest Sherman, Commanding Officer of the USS WASP, who had taken an active part in the action at Tulagi and Guadalcanal, stated in an official report on August 14, 1942, to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet via Commander of Task Force 18 that, in addition to the work of his own Air Intelligence Officers:

> "Supplementary radio intelligence and the results of the photographic reconnaissance on August 7, 1942, made the familiarity of pilots with the area as complete as may normally be expected in the case of a position held by the enemy." (Ps. 7, A16-3(8)/CV 7, Dec. No. 62701)

American landing troops surprised the Japanese at Guadalcanal completely for no contact report was sent by the enemy until the actual attack on Guadalcanal and Tulagi had begun. Then, the Japanese radio station at Tulagi began transmitting urgent operational messages, and so began the Solomons campaign which was to lead to some of the nation's most important sea battles in World War II. United States Naval Communication Intelligence was able to inform operational authorities of many facts concerning

the battles, which otherwise would never have been known, or would have been very much delayed in transmission.

Many Japanese routine messages were intercepted on this day in addition to operational dispatches. Therefore, the messages have been divided into two categories - Part A - Operational Messages, and Part B - Routine Messages.

Part A - Operational Messages

Enemy radio traffic on August 7 came almost exclusively from the Eighth Fleet area. The Japanese sent word that "All enemy ships have commenced firing. Landing operations begun."[328] As the hours passed, the enemy reported that there was no decrease in the intensity of Allied heavy bombing attacks, and a Japanese estimate of the Allied forces disclosed that they thought that there was one battleship, three light or heavy cruisers, fifteen destroyers, and a number of merchant ships assigned to landing forces.[329]

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328 - I, No. 705.
329 - I, Nos. 706-710.

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The Tulagi radio station went off the air early in the morning on August 7 and remained silent from that time, which indicated that American forces were having some success.[330] Warning that Allied forces had attacked Tulagi was sent by the Japanese Fourth Fleet to the Marshall Islands,[331] and enemy Radio Intelligence was on the alert for it announced that the call signs of the Allied striking forces had been intercepted.[332]

Aircraft contact reports were issued frequently by the Japanese[333] who were sending out their bombers and fighter planes to destroy the raiding Allied forces. Eighteen Zeros and seventeen bombers were among the enemy air groups sent into action in the Tulagi area.[334] The Sixth Air Attack Force which also had been ordered into action was requesting plane reinforcements from Rabaul.[335] Meanwhile, planes from the Misawa Air Group were proceeding to

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330 - I, No. 711.
331 - I, No. 713.
332 - I, No. 714.
333 - I, Nos. 715-717.
334 - I, Nos. 718-724.
335 - I, Nos. 725, 726.

Rabaul.[336] Both the Fourth and Fifth Air Attack Forces were patrolling certain sectors of the Solomon Islands at this time,[337] when an air raid at an unknown position was announced.[338] No doubt existed that enemy carriers were not present in the Solomon Islands, but, undoubtedly, communication liaison was in progress between enemy air units and enemy submarines.[339]

Despite the fact that no enemy carriers were noticed in the Solomon Islands radio traffic, a United States Army plane reported the sighting of what appeared to be a carrier.[340] It was thought that the plane had sighted the KASUGA MARU or a sister ship. These were converted Marus with flight decks which had been used to date only for the ferrying of planes, and not as combatant carriers.[341]

An analysis of the Japanese counter measures to the Allied attack disclosed that Submarine Squadron 3 and the Fifth Air Attack Force had been

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336 - I, No. 727.
337 - I, No. 728.
338 - I, Nos. 729, 730.
339 - I, Nos. 731, 732.
340 - I, No. 733.
341 - I, No. 734.

the principal agents of the defense.[342] The Commander of Submarine Squadron 3 was acting as Commander of the Southeastern Submarine Force and heavy traffic to two of his submarines indicated that they were being ordered to attack the United States Task Forces.[343] Submarine reinforcements were leaving the Empire to proceed to the South Pacific,[344] for two divisions of Submarine Squadron 3 were ordered to Tulagi as was Submarine Squadron 7, whose previous orders had been cancelled because of the emergency at Guadalcanal.[345] Direction finder bearings located other enemy submarines in Northeastern Australian waters and in the Gilbert Islands.[346]

Immediately after the attack on Guadalcanal, the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet issued a series of dispatches to all his major commanders in the South Pacific,[347] who ordered Cruiser Division 5 and several destroyer units to the Southeast.[348]

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342 - I, No. 735.
343 - I, No. 736-738.
344 - I, No. 739-742.
345 - I, No. 743.
346 - I, No. 744.
347 - I, Nos. 746-748.
348 - I, No. 749.

It was believed that Cruiser Division 6 and the CHOKAI were not at Rabaul, and this important information was made available to operation authorities.[349] The light cruiser TATSUTA was noticed in the vicinity of Rabaul, as was an unidentified warship which was escorting a Maru to that base.[350]

It was believed that Destroyer Division 17 and Destroyer Squadron 10 were soon to report to the Commander-in-Chief Eighth Fleet for duty.[351] Rabaul was the center of activity on this day, because Cruiser Division 6 was notified that it was to pick up supplies at this port, to which many merchant ships were ordered to proceed.[352]

It is regrettable that one dispatch intercepted on this day was undecipherable until August 23, 1942. If the intelligence it contained had been known in time by United States operational authorities, it seems most probable that the disaster of Savo Island on August 8-9 would have been definitely avoided. As early as August 4, several warnings had

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349 - I, No. 750.
350 - I, Nos. 751, 752.
351 - I, No. 753.
352 - I, Nos. 754, 755.

been issued that enemy cruisers were no longer at Rabaul and were probably at sea somewhere in the New Britain area. But the message sent by the Commander-in-Chief Eighth Fleet at 0800 on August 7 stated that at 1300 on this day, the CHOKAI, Cruiser Division 18 and another unidentified unit would depart from Rabaul and rendezvous with Cruiser Division 6 in the vicinity of Bougainville, and would then proceed to Guadalcanal where subsequent operations against an enemy convoy would be based on reconnaissance reports.[353]

Part B - Routine Messages

A conversation between the Japanese and German ambassadors was now reported to Tokyo, which indicated that the Germans were anxious to kill any rumors which might have reached the Japanese concerning a treaty of peace between Germany and Russia. The Germans also took this opportunity to point out that many advantages would accrue, if Japan were to attack Russia at this time.[354] Though there was no sign of the Russians waging war against them, the Japanese were not

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353 = I; MS. 736.

unmindful of the fact that Russia was a bitter enemy and, therefore, kept close watch on Soviet Naval activities in Vladivostok.[355]

A large amount of enemy shipping was available in the Marshall-Truk and Rabaul areas, and dozens of Marus were plying sea lanes between the Empire and the South Pacific.[356] Engineering units were being sent into the South Pacific to construct enemy bases,[357] and a tanker and a hospital ship were also noticed enroute to the South.[358] It was thought that the Commander of the First Fleet was aboard the SHOKAKU, and it was noticed that the ZUIHO was not associated with Carrier Division 1.[359]

A sub tender announced that it would arrive at Truk after the thirteenth, which indicated further activity by enemy submarine forces in the Solomons area.[360] No submarines were heard at this time, other

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355 - I, No. 758.
356 - I, No. 759.
357 - I, Nos. 760-766.
358 - I, Nos. 767, 768.
359 - I, Nos. 769, 770.
360 - I, Nos. 771, 772.

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than one enroute from Jaluit to the Empire, and another in Northeastern Australian waters. This radio silence was significant for it indicated that enemy submarines in the Solomon Islands area were ready to operate against the Allied forces.[361] A continuous stream of dispatches from the Eighth Fleet Commander, the Eighth Base Force and the Fifth Air Attack Force, was going to Cruiser Division 6 and 18, Submarine Squadrons 3 and 7, Destroyer Division 29 and various Marus.[362]

AUGUST 8, 1942

Part A - Operational Messages

Warning had been issued by U. S. Naval Communication Intelligence as early as August 4th that enemy cruisers were at sea in the Rabaul area, and the supposition that the Commander-in-Chief of the Eight Fleet was aboard the CHOKAI was now confirmed.[363] Important dispatches were passing between the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet and all his major commanders in the South

361 - I, No. 773.
362 - I, No. 774.
363 - I, Nos. 776, 777.

Pacific.[364] The Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Fleet, who had been actively concerned in recent operations in the Rabaul-Solomon Islands area, seemed to be assuming the duties of commanding officer in the Outer South Seas area.[365]

The Chief of Staff and Operations Officer of the Japanese Fifth Fleet were believed to be at or near Kiska, but after 2000 August 8th, the Aleutians Occupation Force Commander took charge of that area.[366] An urgent contact report from the light cruiser TATSUTA operating in the New Britain-New Guinea area possibly indicated that it was being attacked by Allied aircraft.[367] Destroyer Division 17 and 34, and Destroyer Division 27 of Destroyer Squadron 1; Destroyer Division 4 of Destroyer Squadron 10; and Destroyer Division 9 of Destroyer Squadron 1 were ordered south to reinforce the Japanese South Pacific Fleets.[368] Enemy radio traffic in the Tulagi area

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364 - I, Nos. 778, 779.
365 - I, No. 780.
366 - I, No. 781.
367 - I, No. 782.
368 - I, Nos. 783-786.

continued to be very voluminous and seemed to consist principally of intelligence reports.

The Commander at Saipan was in communication with the Commander of the Seventeenth Army at Rabaul, while the Commander of the Aoba Detachment at Davao was in touch with the Oki Detachment at Rabaul.[369] The Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Fleet issued orders to Special Landing Forces, which indicated that reinforcements were to be sent to the beseiged Japanese units on the Solomon Islands.[370] The Japanese were now reforming their patrol lines in Empire waters for they were very much concerned about the possibility of an attack on the Homeland by an Allied Striking Force.[371] An urgent operational report from Kiska indicated that the attack of the Allied Forces in that area was in progress. The enemy reported that five American cruisers, one carrier and three destroyers bombed Kiska Island for about thirty minutes and then retired.[372]

Enemy Radio Intelligence was still active,

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369 - I, Nos. 787, 788.
370 - I, No. 789.
371 - I, No. 790.
372 - I, Nos. 791, 792.

for it reported hearing signals from the Commander of the Allied Striking Force.[373] Destroyer Division 29 in the Tulagi-Rabaul area announced that an Allied air raid was taking place in an unidentified spot.[374] Destroyer Squadrons 2 and 4 and parts of Destroyer Squadron 1 were noticed to be associated in radio communication with the Eighth Fleet, and Destroyer Division 29 of Destroyer Squadron 6 was observed at Rabaul, while Destroyer Division 30 was near Truk.[375] The Commander of the Tainan Air Group was now at Rabaul, and the air unit RITI 6 was thought to be at the New Guinea Air Base.[376]

No enemy carriers were associated with either the southern or northern forces on August 8th, although warning was issued that they might accompany Destroyer Division 17 from the Empire to Rabaul.[377] The AKIKAZE was active as an integral part of the Fifth Air Attack Force which was responsible for the defense of the Rabaul-Solomons area.[378]

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373 - I, Nos. 793, 794.
374 - I, No. 795.
375 - I, Nos. 796-798.
376 - I, Nos. 799-801.
377 - I, Nos. 802, 803.
378 - I, Nos. 804, 805.

The Commander of the Fifth Air Attack Force estimated his available strength for August 8th in a partially decipherable message as follows: 21 bombers at Vanakanau; between 10 and 20 fighters on an airfield near Rabaul, and some other planes at the Rabaul-Bougainville area.[379] Furthermore, additional planes were flying into Vanakanu to help repel the Allied invasion.[380]

Nine enemy bombers had arrived at Lae on August 7th, and the Fourth Air Group was operating with the Tainan Air Group.[381] The air unit RITI 6, of the Sixth Air Attack Force, had disemborked somewhere in New Guinea, possibly at Lae. It was thought that the Sixth Air Attack Force, which had been in constant touch with Rabaul just prior to the attack on Kiska, would furnish additional air reinforcements for the Fifth Air Attack Force.[382] The Commander of Air Squadron 25 was very active at this time and was associated with Air Squadrons 22, 23, 24 and 26. Since Air Squadron 26 was associated with the Eighth Fleet, it was thought

379 - I, Nos. 806, 807.
380 - I, Nos. 808-810.
381 - I, No. 811.
382 - I, Nos. 812, 813.

that additional air strength in the Tulagi area was to be furnished by these squadrons.[383]

Enemy operational orders commanding the Fifth Air Attack Force to attack the American Occupation Force at Tulagi were now intercepted.[384] Other air units were ordered to proceed to Rabaul to participate in coming attacks.[385] American seaplanes were sighted at Lae on August 8th at 1700, according to an intercepted enemy contact report.[386] The bombing of Vanakanau by thirteen Flying Fortresses made necessary the curtailment of enemy air protection usually given to their convoys.[387]

It was suspected that the Commander Tainan Air, the Commander Fifth Air Attack Force, the Commander Air Squadron 25 and an air unit of the Sixth Attack Force were all using the same radio guard ship.[388] Evidence that enemy Radio Intelligence units were on the alert continued to pour in.[389]

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383 - I, No. 814.
384 - I, Nos. 815-817.
385 - I, Nos. 818, 819.
386 - I, No. 820.
387 - I, No. 821.
388 - I, No. 822.
389 - I, Nos. 823, 824.

An increased volume of submarine traffic in the Eighth Fleet's operating area indicated that every effort was being made by the enemy to intercept United States Task and Occupation Forces.

The Commander of Submarine Squadron 3 was the most active, but the Commander of Submarine Squadron 7 had the responsiblity of gathering together the remaining submarines in the Mandates to augment the forces of Submarine Squadron 3 in the New Britain area.[390] A unit of Submarine Squadron 3 was ordered to attack an Allied carrier, and it was evident from the heavy radio traffic that other Japanese submarines were in advantageous positions to attack Allied ships.[391] Many units of Submarine Squadrons 6 and 8, in addition to those of 3 and 7, were being ordered into the Solomon Islands region.[392] Some submarines, heretofore in the Aleutians, and a subtender, which had been at Jaluit, were now available at Truk.[393]

The Traffic Intelligence Summary issued by the Combat Intelligence Unit of the Fourteenth Naval

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390 - I, Nos. 825, 826.
391 - I, Nos. 827, 828.
392 - I, Nos. 829-835.
393 - I, Nos. 836, 837.

District on August 8, 1942, stated in part that:

> ...Commander in Chief 8th Fleet on 7 August shifted back aboard his flagship "Unidentified" from Rabaul and commenced originating under concealment. ...Comcrudivs 6 and 18 were addressed in most headings and Comcrudiv 6 was found masquerading under the cover. The only hint as to location was the inclusion of Kavieng Base (OA 6) in the headings of this dispatch. ... (Pg. 2, Morning)[394]

Attempts to place him aboard a known vessel were still unsuccessful; the CHOKAI not having sent many intercepted traffic since May. ...

An item in the Evening Summary stated:

> "Crudiv 6 and 18 were addressed. No indications as to their exact locations at the present time". (Pg. 3, Evening)[395]

The Fleet Intelligence Summary issued by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, on August 8, 1942 stated that:

> As was to be expected, the primary interest of ORANGE was in his force in the Bismark and Kiska areas, and primary activity concerned tactical distribution of the forces in these two areas. In both places, <u>except for movements of Crudiv 6 and 18 in the former area</u>, ORANGE was dependent entirely on aircraft and submarines.[396]

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394 - I, No. 838.
395 - I, No. 839.
396 - I, No. 840.

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Part B - Routine Messages

The cruiser SUZUYA and the repair ship AKASHI were to be escorted to the Empire by Destroyer Division RIYA 77 and a unit of Destroyer Squadron 4.[497] The Seventh Base Force, which formerly had been at Chichijima was now at Rabaul, together with the Commander of the Thirty-Fifth Brigade.[398] A great number of Marus were bringing in supplies for the air units in the Solomons,[399] and two fleet tankers were noticed in the vicinity of Truk.[400]

AUGUST 9, 1942

Very little cryptanalysis was being done on enemy messages during this period, so most of the burden of supplying intelligence concerning enemy operations fell to traffic analysis. Consequently, though many important details of the enemy's plans were made available, there were many things left undiscovered.

An enemy contact report of this day stated that four Allied warships and a number of transports had been sighted between Tulagi and Guadalcanal.

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397 - I, No. 842.
398 - I, Nos. 843-844.
399 - I, Nos. 845-849.
400 - I, Nos. 850-852.

Allied aircraft were also sighted.[401] An operational message from the Chief of Staff of the Eighth Fleet disclosed what was believed to be the approximate location of the CHOKAI in the South Pacific.[402] Rabaul was forwarding messages to the Chief of Staff of the Eighth Fleet, which was a positive indication that the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Staff of the Eighth Fleet were no longer in that port. Warning had been sent as early as August 5th that CHOKAI and AOBA were possibly at sea, and it had been presumed that the Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Fleet was aboard the CHOKAI.[403]

The Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Fleet kept in close touch with the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, while directing operations in the Tulagi area.[404] Japanese traffic on this day seemed to be centered on Radio Intelligence,[405] and it was evident that the Japanese were observing communication security measures, for Rabaul was issuing operational

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401 - I, Nos. 853-855.
402 - I, No. 856.
403 - I, Nos. 857-858.
404 - I, Nos. 859, 860.
405 - I, Nos. 861, 862.

messages without giving a specific address.[406] Two unidentified men-of-war were in the Rabaul area, and further reinforcements were considered probable, for it was believed the Cruiser Division 7 would be ordered to return from Malaya.[407] Other enemy warships were enroute to the south, and among them were noticed Destroyer Division 4 and two fleet tankers.[408] Fragmentary decipherment of an enemy message disclosed that the Japanese were planning a movement to Guadalcanal.[409]

Aircraft supplies were being shipped to all air units in the southern waters, and the Mandates were especially active since they were supplying reinforcements directly to the threatened zones. The AKIKAZE, which had been assigned to the Fifth Air Attack Commander to carry supplies in his area, went from Rabaul to a place in the vicinity of Bougainville.[410]

Communication arrangements were made for the planes flying from the Empire to the Marshall Islands,[411]

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406 - I, Nos. 863, 864.
407 - I Nos. 865, 866.
408 - I, Nos. 867-869.
409 - I, No. 870.
410 - I, Nos. 871-874.
411 - I, No. 875.

and although it appeared that enemy carriers had not yet moved from the Kyushu area, the orders of Destroyer Division 4 to go south created a suspicion that the carriers might also sail for the Solomons.[412] It was discovered that the RYUJO and not the ZUIHO was in Carrier Division 2, and it was stated that no units of this organization were in northern or southern waters.[413]

The Fifth and Sixth Air Attack Forces were receiving reinforcements in the Solomon Islands, and it was indicated that the Second Air Attack Force would also send planes.[414] The Chief of Staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet, who had been at Guam, now shifted his headquarters from Tenian to the Rabaul area,[415] and it was also believed that the Tainan Air Group was about to move from its New Guinea location.[416]

The Japanese Second Fleet, consisting of Cruiser Division 7, Destroyer Squadron 3, Destroyer

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412 - I, Nos. 876, 877.
413 - I, No. 878.
414 - I, Nos. 879-882.
415 - I, Nos. 883-888.
416 - I, Nos. 889, 890.

Division 2 and 15, and several Marus, was operating in the Malaya area and was frequently engaged in convoy duty.[417] The schedules were now discovered of an enemy Maru enroute to Truk, and a Fleet Tanker moving southward from Truk to the Solomons.[418] A Submarine Division of Submarine Squadron 2, which had been in the Aleutians during July, was now in the vicinity of Truk,[419] and many other submarines, several of which belonged to Submarine Squadron 3, were observed operating in the Tulagi-Rabaul area.[420] Since the Jaluit radio station was handling dispatches for certain enemy submarines, it was assumed that some of them were in that general area.[421]

An estimate of enemy units in the New Britain-Solomons area, based only on the day's traffic disclosed the presence of the Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Fleet, Commander-in-Chief of the Eleventh Air Fleet, the CHOKAI, Commander of Cruiser Division 18, Commander of Cruiser Division 6, Nineteenth Division, the AKIKAZE,

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417 - I, Nos. 891, 892.
418 - I, Nos. 893, 894.
419 - I, Nos. 895-897.
420 - I, Nos. 898, 899.
421 - I, No. 900.

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a new Fourth Fleet unit ..... a Fleet Tender, units of Destroyer Division ..... and the Commander of a Destroyer Division of Destroyer Squadron 6.[422] It was also confirmed that the Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Fleet was aboard the CHOKAI.[423]

The Bulletin issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet for 090119 August, stated in part:

> Part of 6th Attack Group in New Britain. Indications Desron 6 has one Desdiv in Rabaul area, and another vicinity of Truk. ... Cinc 8th Fleet aboard flagship CHOKAI probably in Solomons area. Cinc Fourth Fleet at Rabaul. CruDiv 5 plus DesDivs may proceed Solomons from Homeland.[424]

This ends the information supplied by U. S. Naval Communication Intelligence from July 1, 1942 to August 9, 1942. It helped a great deal to prepare the way for the invasion of the Solomon Islands, but as stated above, it could shed little light on the Battle of Savo Island until sometime later. However, Communication Intelligence was to take a very active part in succeeding battles of the Solomon Islands campaign, and further details will be given in succeeding volumes of this series.

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422 - I, No. 901.
423 - I, No. 902.
424 - I, No. 903.

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APPENDIX I

Background of the Landing on Guadalcanal Island and the Battle of Savo Island.

JULY 1, 1942

Our story begins as far back as July 1, 1942 when U. S. Naval Communication Intelligence reported that there was much Japanese activity going on in the hitherto obscure Solomons Islands:

No. 1

RO (tentative Kavieng) becoming noticeably active in dispatch headings. One dispatch originated Cinc 4th at 1520 29th to (Collective for 4th Fleet), Info: To enciphered address Lieut. Comdr. Nomura at RO. Maru at RO. Cinc Combined Flt. Escort Unit? and (Tokio) may concern transportation movements to or from Kavieng. (BEL-300735-TI)

It was commented:

RO is not a Kana character but Roman letters "R" and "O". This would

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JULY 1, 1942 (Continued)

No. 1 (Cont.)

make RO an area designator, and is questionably Ovan (Solomons Islands). (Summary, 010600, July, No. 39)[1]

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1 - Summaries of operational intelligence derived from enemy communications are issued twice daily by U. S. Communication Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, D.C. for the use of Cominch. Similar bulletins are issued by field units at Pearl Harbor for Cincpac, and in Australia to General MeArthur and Cinc 7th Fleet (formerly Comsowespac).
Messages of July, 1942 have been classified under the date of publication in the C. I. Summaries, but beginning with those of August 1, 1942 all messages are classified according to time of origin.

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JULY 2, 1942

Definite indications of the presence of at least fifteen warships and a dozen transports in the South Pacific demonstrated that the enemy was busy making elaborate preparations to erect an impregnable barrier across the Allies' supply lines to Australia. Heavily fortified bases in the Solomons would have provided excellent bases for attacks against Australia.

No. 2

Our latest analysis show Escort Force includes at least 15 Fleet units in four division plus minimum of 10 to 12 Marus. (COM14-012206-TI)
(Summary, 020600, July, Pg. 11, No. 37)

No. 3

Indications are that increased activity in Tulagi area is expected shortly.
(Cincpac - 020215-Bull.109)
(Summary, 020600, July, Pg.11, No. 38)

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JULY 3, 1942

Important operations evidently were afoot in the Rabaul area, and due notice was taken of the wide distribution of a certain dispatch:

No. 4

Rabaul Base Force again active, originating apparent directives to Collective all units Rabaul Area(?) Comdr.82nd Guard Force in Rabaul Area originated long operational type dispatch at 0530, 1st, to Rabaul Base Force info Comairron 25 This apparently concerns important operations in view wide distribution later given this dispatch. (BEL 020752-T.I.)

It was remarked:

Airron 25 appears to be in Rabaul Area.
(Summary, 030600, July, Pg. 7, No. 20)

Orders to a Special Landing Force were proof that some operation was about to occur:

No. 5

Secretary 4th Fleet, at 1330 on 2 July, addressed 82nd Guard Force info 8th Base Force. At 0800 on 2 July, the Guard Force Comdr. addressed 8th Base Force, info Chief of Staff 4th Fleet and enciphered Sasebo 5th Special Landing Force Commander. (COM14 022008-TI)

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JULY 3, 1942 (Continued)

No. 5 (Cont.)

It was observed:

Bel TI on 18 June stated: "Basebo 5th Special Landing Force which was apparently a unit of the Midway Force may be the section destined to proceed to Rabaul."
(Summary, 030600, July, Pg. 7, No. 21)

It seemed clear by now that the 8th Base Force and the 5th Air Attack Corps of the Japanese were concerned in the movement towards Tulagi via Rabaul:

No. 6

Noted that Tulagi is becoming more active in association 8th Base Force. Both this Base Force and 5th Air Attack Corps frequently addressed by Air Units. (COM14-021938-TI)
(Summary, 030600, July, Pg.7, No. 22)

No. 7

#8 Base Force, Rabaul replies to Comdr. Basebo #5 Special Landing Force shown to be at Truk and at unknown shore station info Desron 6 Communication Officer

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JULY 3, 1942 (Continued)

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No. 7 (Cont.)

Lt. Komai on board Maru _ and 2nd Guard Force, Rabaul at 1100, July 3. (GT #331-I.I.) (Summary, 031400, July, No. 32)

No. 8

(new or recommissioned man-of-war?) shifted from Saipan to Truk Communication Zone at 2000. 2nd. This vessel included with Sasebo #5 Special Landing Force as action addressee in urgent message from Cinc 4th at 0830, 2nd. Suggests way be convoying the landing force. Dispatch was for information to Cinc Combined Com-bined Air Force Airron 24 Airron 25 and Vice Chief Naval General Staff Inclusion Airron 25 suggests ultimate destination Rabaul Area, which further augments units already associated with that area. (COM 14 030703-II.) (Summary, 031400, July, No. 33)

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JULY 5, 1942

Knowledge of the location of various Japanese units was important in foretelling their future use. Notice that all of the following units are moving south:

No. 9

From enciphered address Comdr. of 4th Chuutai (group of 9 planes) at Kavieng (BEL.-040640-TI)
(Summary, 050600, July, No. 58)

No. 10

6433 Akatsuki (Army) Detachment is shown at Rabaul. (BEL.-030650-TI)
(Summary, 050600, July, No. 59)

No. 11

No originator #225 5 July/1210
Tentative translation: "Concealed originator Comcrudiv Six Force reported by Yokosuka Airplane at 1200 this Force."
(COM 14-050832-DI)

It was commented:

The routing of urgent operational traffic originated by Tulagi on 29 June suggest two ships of Crudiv 6, KAKO and KINUGASA, are not in Mandates, since a dispatch was sent by Truk to Tokyo for delivery to these vessels. On 30 June dispatch headings indicated cruiser KAKO

No. 11 (Cont.)

leaving Kure via Bungo Channel. On 1 July a Tulagi originated dispatch was relayed to KINUGASA and KAKO of Crudiv 6, to call [redacted] of Desron 6, also to Crudiv 18. COM 14 remarks these ships may be operating as a force. The above dispatch was sent information to the 5th Air Attack Force and Yokohama Air. The word Yokosuka above might possibly be confused with the word Yokohama. On 8 May fighters of the Yokosuka Air Group were included in operational type message originated by the 5th Air Attack Force. On 30 June traffic indicated that all vessels of Crudiv 6 are in Truk area. TI on June 30 indicated repeated associations of these calls and Crudiv 18 with Rabaul Base Force plus 1 message from Tulagi Base Force information to [redacted] and [redacted] (both believed Cruisers in Crudiv 6) indicate this Crudiv and Crudiv 18 will operate in New Britain area and may now be enroute there. (Summary, 051400, July, No. 17)

No. 12

[redacted] (2nd Fleet Escort Force) shows increasing association with ships known to be in Rabaul area including FUJIKAWA Maru [redacted] Maru Air Tenders [redacted] and plus unidentified Maru [redacted] and New men-of-war in 4th Fleet [redacted] is also enroute to Rabaul probably from Truk. (COM14-050721-TI) (Summary, 051400, July, No. 25)

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JULY 5, 1942 (Continued)

No. 13

/is enroute from Truk to Rabaul as indicated by encoded Communication Zone shift at 1400 on 4th.
(BEL-050721-TI)
(Summary, 051400, July, No. 26)

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JULY 6, 1942

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It will be observed that much of the information gathered in this pre-invasion period was derived from analysis of Japanese radio traffic. Much valuable information was obtained merely by studying the origin and destination of important dispatches. All the following messages pointed to impending activity:

No. 14

Cinc 2nd persistent dispatches to Marus indicates logistic preparations for Campaign in distant waters. (COM 14 060600-TI) (Summary, 060600, July, No. 26)

No. 15

Traffic routing indicates Maru tanker and Naval auxiliary enroute Saipan to Truk.

It was remarked:

Maru tanker was associated in traffic with Yokosuka Landing Force, BRAZIL MARU two Marus Comdesrons 2 and 4, Chichijima and Saipan Base Forces on 27 June. July 4th, originated a dispatch to Chief of Staff 2nd Fleet, information to 4th and

JULY 6, 1942 (Continued)

No. 15 (Cont.)

5th Base Forces at Truk and Saipan respectively, a cruiser of Crudiv 6
Chief of Staff 5th Fleet, and Comdr Yokosuka Landing Force.
(Summary, 061400, July, No. 16)

Heavy air traffic in the Marshalls indicated that enemy air reserves were being built up for an emergency:

No. 16

Air traffic between units of the 4th and 5th Air Attack Forces continues heavy.
(COM 14 052046-T.I.)

It was stated:

COM 14 suggests that association of Cinc 4th Fleet with 4th Fleet Task Force, Comdrs. 4th and 5th Air Attack Forces, info Cinc Combined Fleet, Comsubfor, and Comdr. 11th Air Fleet, is indicative of impending operations by Marshall's Command.
(Summary, 060600, July, No. 40)

No. 17

Desdiv 34 active with air units in Marshalls. (Cincpac Bull#113-060219)
(Summary, 060600, July, No. 42)

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JULY 6, 1942 (Continued)

No. 18

Activity of Desdiv 34 with Marshalls Air Units is increasing. Possible that Desdiv 34, which has been with 11th Air Fleet, is plane guarding and fueling seaplanes. (COM 14 052116-T.I.)

It was pointed out:

Desdiv 34 appears to be in the Marshalls area with Airron 24, and is active with 4th Air Attack Force. The SHIRETOKO, a tanker, has been associated with Desdiv 34 and Airron 24 in the Marshalls.
(Summary, 060600, July, No. 43)

A Cruiser division was also ready for action:

No. 19

All of Crudiv 6 now believed in Truk area. (Cincpac Bull #113-060219)
(Summary, 060600, July, No. 45)

Close attention was paid to the focal points of Japanese radio traffic, for from these centers would move the enemy's Striking Forces:

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JULY 6, 1942 (Continued)

No. 20

Comdr. 6th Base Force also very active with 6th Defense Force (COM 14 052046-T.I.)

It was noticed:

6th Base Force is at Jaluit. The 6th Defense Force appears to be distributed in the Marshall Islands, with in Wotje and another part at Utirik. (Summary, 060600, July, No. 46)

No. 21

Escort Force, Southeast Asia, and Marshalls-New Britain, continue to be focal points of traffic. (COM 14 052008-T.I.) (Summary, 060600, July, No. 49)

Chinese Intelligence sources reported that Japanese strength in Rabaul had decreased, but in the light of evidence supplied by U. S. Naval Communication Intelligence, this statement was doubtful:

No. 22

Reports British Special Intelligence, Chinese source believes strength of

JULY 6, 1942 (Continued)

No. 22 (Cont.)

Japanese Rabaul, Lae, Koepang area reduced to approximately 150 craft. Withdrawals representing those damaged and remainder concentrated Formosa.
(Comsowestpacfor-060055)
(Summary, 060600, July, No. 50)

Surmisals that Japanese operations were in process in the Southern area received tentative confirmation from the following comment:

No. 23

Seven part dispatch from Cinc 4th at 1740, 5th, for action Cinc Combined Fleet and Naval General Staff information All Southern Commanders Comdrs Subforce Combined Air Force Airron 24 and Airron 25 may contain detailed report of operations in 4th Fleet areas.
(BEL-060625-TI)

It was noted:

has been tentatively identified by Opnav as a 4th Fleet Task Force.
(Summary, 061400, July, No. 17)

Enemy dispatches to Army units at Rabaul

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JULY 6, 1942 (Continued)

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aroused the interest of American observers, for it was clear that some movement of enemy troops was in the offing:

No.24

Army addresses in Rabaul area continue actively associated with 17th Army and OKI composite Division Commanders at Davao plus Commander 35th HOSHII Brigade at Palao.
(BEL-060625-TI)

It was mentioned:

Previous association of Rabaul and 17th Army were noted on 25 June and 5 July. Likewise, Rabaul was associated with the OKI Detachment on June 19th and 27th.
(Summary, 061400, July, No. 18)

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JULY 7, 1942

More associations of important units in enemy operational dispatches lent credence to the statement that the Japanese were about to make a new move:

No. 25

Cinc 4th under various calls for parts of lengthy 7 part message originated 1740 on July 5th, addressed tentative Cinc Combined and Naval General Staff info 4th Fleet detached Comsubfor (under several calls) also 11th Air Fleet, plus Comdrs. 4th and 5th Air Attack Forces. Apparently report of past operations or future plans.
(COM 14 062120-T.I.)

It was indicated:

The 4th Air Attack Force is indicated in the Marshall area and the 5th Air Attack Force is indicated in the Rabaul area. The 4th Fleet Task Force ... has been mentioned previously and its association with the same units listed above caused COM 14 to remark that this association was indicative of impending operations by Marshall commands. There are no definite indications as to the composition of this task force.
(Summary, 070600, July, No. 23)

Frequent references in radio traffic to convoys were further indications of imminent action:

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JULY 7, 1942 (Continued)

No. 26

Much convoy activity indicated by dispatches from Sasebo involving Escort Force and Southeastern Asiatic Bases. (COM 14-070622-TI)

It was observed:

There has been a great deal of convoy activity of late which has been frequently reported by all Stations. (Summary, 070600, July, No. 32)

No. 27

SHIRETOKO enroute to Marshalls. (Cincpac-070119-Bull #114) (Summary, 071400, July, No. 10)

No. 28

FUJIKAWA, KIYOKAWA and NOTORO (all Maru AV's) believed in New Britain area. (Cincpac-070119-BULL #114) (Summary, 071400, July, No. 12)

The presence of several enemy submarines pointed to the beginning of a campaign, since the Japanese had consistently used this type of vessel for scouting and harassing American defenders in

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JULY 7, 1942 (Continued)

previous operations:

No. 29

At least two Subdivs in Marshalls.
(Cincpac-070119-BULL #114)
(Summary, 071400, July, No. 11)

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JULY 8, 1942

The process of reasoning used by United States naval radio traffic analysts in deciding the probability of their assumptions may be observed in the following dispatches:

No. 30

Further indications noted that Crudivs 6 and 18 plus Desron 6 either in or proceeding to Rabaul area in two dispatches at 0900 and 2030 on 6 July from Rabaul (might be concealed originator) addressed to Comcrudiv 6 | Comcrudiv 18 Comdesron 6 enciphered R (Rabaul) area and unidentified (BEL-C70714-TI)

It was pointed out:

Previously reported by COM14 who believed originator was Rabaul and not concealed originator. was previously (21 May) thought to be Torpedo Boat Division 6, but both BELCONNEN and COM 14 now think it is Desron 6. Crudivs 6 and 18 and Desron 6 have been associated in traffic with the Rabaul area at various times since June 29th and the reported sighting of 2 CAs off Guadalcanal Island plus the possible significance of the Japanese contact report of 4 CAs on 6 July gives added weight to the probability BELCONNEN's assumption that these units are proceeding to Rabaul area.
(Summary, 080600, July, No. 23)

JULY 8, 1942 (Continued)

No. 31

Traffic headings indicate Comdr. Yokohama Flying Boat Squadron at Tulagi Comdr Tulagi Base Force and unidentified Maru at Kavieng Association of with Rabaul Base Force may indicate that vessel may go to Rabaul. (Hospital Ship?) apparently scheduled to proceed to Rabaul probably from Palao. OKITSU MARU at Kure. Air Tender at (Singapore?). At least part of Crudiv 5 in Ominato area and part of Desron 2 in Yokosuka area. Traffic routing indicates Comdr. Yokosuka Landing Force in Saipan area. not yet in company with Comcrudiv 6 (BEL-070738-070755-TI)

It was commented:

On 28 June traffic for Yokohama Air Group was relayed to Rabaul. On 6 July MARU traffic from Kavieng to Rabaul. On 6 July Hospital Ship in Palao Communication Zone. On 29 June COM14 stated this vessel appears to be making rounds in the Mandates; Base Forces, Palao, Truk, Saipan, Rabaul and Jaluit concerned. On 26 June traffic indicated OKITSU MARU enroute Truk to Tenian. On 6 July COM14 ventured: MARU may take air supplies or planes from 1st Air Attack Corps in S.E. Asia to 3rd Air Attack in Hokkaido area. on 4 July was Sasebo ? (Summary, 080600, July, No. 25)

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Messages from the Japanese Personnel Bureau usually indicated where reinforcements were being sent, and the following dispatches dealt with air personnel. Since the Japanese never went into important operations without furnishing as much air protection as possible, such messages provided valuable indications of impending action:

No. 32

In another dispatch Tokyo Personnel addressed Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo and Maizuru Personnel Bureaus info Tainan Air Kasumigaura Air
Sukugawa Air Oita Air
Omura Air Yokosuka Air
Kisaratsu Air Chief of Staff
11th Air Fleet 5th Air Attack
and one garbled call.

It was noted:

Subject may be supplying additional aircraft personnel to Rabaul area from activities listed. (COM14-072224-072228-TI) (Summary, 080600, July, No.28)

No. 33

In connection with Tokyo Personnel message mentioned previously, the 5th Air

No. 33 (Cont.)

Attack Force is associated in 2 dispatches with Tainan Air Group, Kanoya Air Group, (Section of Takao Air Group?) and 1st and 2nd Air Attack Forces. Comdr. Tainan Air Group is on board in Truk-Rabaul area. (COM 14 072246-T.I.)

It was stated:

The Truk-Rabaul area appears as the general operating area of the 5th Air Attack Force. A detachment of Kanoya Air Group was associated with Horomushiro June 29th, and prior to this the Kanoya Air Group was indicated probably in Saipan. Comdr. Air Group appeared at Kendari (Celebes) July 2nd and on July 4th appeared to have joined the KAMIGAWA MARU at Ominato-one of these locations must be bad because time of transit is too short. has also been tentatively identified as Kisaratsu Air Group. 1st Air Attack Force appears to be in Malay-Southeast Asia area, with the Commander possibly at Sabang. 2nd Air Attack Force appeared in the NEI area with headquarters at Jogjakarta. On 26 June, there were indications of a shift of the 2nd Air Attack Force to some other place - possibly Rabaul. There has been no mention of this force since June 26th. (Summary, 080600, July, No. 29)

The identification of another important enemy unit at Rabaul showed increased Japanese strength in that area:

JULY 8, 1942 (Continued)

No. 34

19th Division (what formerly was called Gunboat Division 8) of 4th Fleet _____ using Rabaul cover 7th indicating presence that area. (COM14-072254-TI)

It was remarked:

On 6 July Communication Officer 19th Division _____ was believed in Marshalls exchanging dispatches with activities in Rabaul area.
(Summary, 080600, July, No. 31)

The Japanese Army was also involved in the heavy radio traffic at Rabaul:

No. 35

Enciphered Chief of Staff 17th Army sent 3 dispatches to Chief of Staff 4th Fleet _____ In previous instances this officer associated with army activities at Rabaul. (BEL-070729-TI)
(Summary, 080600, July, No. 32)

Japanese reports of the presence of American forces were erroneous, but they indicated that the enemy was on the alert. Evidently some operation was

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in progress or was about to be undertaken:

No. 36

Evidence of Japanese "jitters" in Marshalls-Rabaul area shown by erroneous contact reports originating from that area lately which were based on sighting own forces. (COM 14 080626-TI)
(Summary, 081400, July, No. 26)

No. 37

On 6th at 1445 Comdesron 6 reported sighting planes. No locations or bearings given. Above believed indicate lack of knowledge of whereabouts of U. S. Forces and nervousness undertaking some campaign with inadequate support. (COM 14 080628-TI)
(Summary, 081400, July, No. 25)

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JULY 9, 1942

The progress of a Japanese fleet tanker was a matter of interest, for enemy ships would be present where oil was available in abundance:

No. 38

Tentative fleet tanker in Truk area on 4 July now indicated as proceeding to Rabaul. (BEL-080832-TI) (Summary, 091400, July, No. 30)

The large volume of Japanese Army traffic also continued to attract attention:

No. 39

Large volume army traffic continues between army authorities at Rabaul and Davao. (BEL-080832-TI) (Summary, 091400, July, No. 31)

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JULY 10, 1942

A shift by a Japanese fleet commander from one warship to another was noticed at this time:

No. 40

Short dispatch in Movement Report form from Cinc 3rd at 1500, 8th, is apparently report of shift of Flag from NATORI to ASHIGARA. Shift probably occurred at Surabaya and NATORI may now be expected to depart for other duties. (BEL-090700-TI)

It was noted:

T.I. indicated ASHIGARA arrived N.E.I. Waters from Home Waters on 30 June and was possibly due Surabaya shortly after 3 July.
(Summary, 100600, July, No. 24)

Tentative identifications of Japanese units were also made:

No. 41

Traffic routing and associations indicate Comdesdiv 29 KIYOKAWA MARU and Maru air tender in Rabaul area. Comdesron 6 may be in Tulagi area. Maru auxiliaries? Kavieng area. (BEL-090805-TI)

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JULY 10, 1942 (Continued)

No. 41 (Cont.)

It was stated:

Identification of as Desron 6 is quite tentative. It has also been tentatively identified in the past as Gunboat Division 8 and Motor-Torpedo Division 6. On July 6th, was associated with Crudivs 6 and 18 in a message from Rabaul. On July 8th, COM 14 reports Comdesron 6 using two new calls and associated with Jaluit and Truk and suggested possibility of activity being resumed in Ocean-Nauru Island area. (Summary, 100600, July, No. 25)

JULY 11, 1942

It was evident by this date that the Japanese were expending great efforts in the New Guinea, Bismarck Archipelago, and Solomon Island areas. Captured documents supplied further confirmation:

No. 42

Operation orders found among documents captured in New Guinea indicates "Combat Section of Escort for 12th Billeting Detachment leaves PT (Truk) about 10th for RO (Kavieng)". Remaining portion of 11th and 13th Billeting Detachment leaves PT for Guadalcanal under separate orders. Same for 14th Billeting Force which will be accompanied by 5th Special Landing Force and will proceed to east coast of New Guinea (possibly Salamaua). Air reconnaissance of eastern section of Admiralty Island and Madang is to be conducted. Documents indicate considerable activity in R area and will be transmitted in later dispatch. All remaining information concerns already completed operations. (BEL-100914-DI)

It was observed:

Madang is on Northeast coast of New Guinea approximately 05° S, 146° E. R area is believed the New Guinea-Bismarck Archipelago-Solomon Island area, initial letter.
(Summary, 110600, July, No. 41)

JULY 11, 1942 (Continued)

Traffic analysis also led to the assumption that a major Japanese campaign was about to commence:

No. 43

One instance noted at 0700 on 10th wherein Truk Radio routed traffic to Rabaul for delivery to Cinc 4th Fleet and Comsubron 7. If this routing is correct it probably indicates preparations are now complete for major campaign. (BEL-100718-TI)

It was remarked:

GT on July 10th stated his belief that Cinc 4th Fleet was at Rabaul. (Summary, 110600, July, No. 46)

Indications of heavy troop movements from the Philippine Islands and China to Truk-Rabaul area were also noted:

No. 44

Traffic headings intercepted in Australia rather indicate probability of at least some troop movements from Saigon

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No. 44 (Cont.)

and Philippine Islands to Truk-Rabaul area.
Traffic includes:
(A) Messages from Army H.Q. Saigon to Officers in charge of anchorages at Palao, Davao and Rabaul and 8th Base Force at Rabaul.
(B) Association of 17th Army and OKI Mixed Division at Davao with 35th Brigade at Palao and with Morimoto and other Army addressees in Rabaul area.
(C) Association of Commanding Officer Detached Force at Natura Island with 10th Base Force, 5th Minelaying Flotilla Base Force at Kamranh Bay.
ACNB NOTE: Natuna Island was used as transport P/V for transports on passage to Java.
(ACNB-10532/8-TI)

It was commented:

Association of Comdr Detached Force at Natuna Island with 10th Base Force (Singapore) and Kamranh Base Force was noted by Belconnen on 3 July.
(Summary, 110600, July, No. 42)

No. 45

Dispatch from Cof? China Fleet
at 1130 on 9th to unidentified commands in southeast Asia plus Chief of Staff 4th Fleet and Escort Force
info General Staff, Bako Comdt. 8th Base Force and in 8th Base Force, an-

JULY 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 45 (Cont.)

phasises likelihood of convoying Army units to Rabaul from China area.
(COM14-102016-TI)
(Summary, 110600, July, No. 40)

No. 46

Volume of army traffic somewhat lighter than for previous 2 days. Enciphered "Central Army" sent one short dispatch at 1807 on 9th for action #6433 Akatsuki Detachment at Rabaul.
(BEL-100718-TI)

It was pointed out:

BEL first reported 6433 Akatsuki Detachment at Rabaul on 2 July.
(Summary, 110600, July, No. 43)

No. 47

From exchange of messages between, and associations of, Davao ... Rabaul 5th Air Attack
Kisaratsu Air at Kavieng
Takao Air air ferry command
and occasionally 4th Fleet
it appears there is considerable transfer of forces from Philippines to the south taking place. (GT 382-OPNAV 111730-T.I.)

It was indicated:

There are indications that the "forces" mentioned above include army units.
(Summary, 111400, July, No. 38)

JULY 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 48

Sasebo #5 Special Landing Force in Truk Area, has been currently associated with 82nd Guard Force and Salamaua Radio Associations tend to indicate this force might move to Rabaul-New Guinea area and operate in conjunction Crudivs 6 and 18, while Airron 25 will furnish air support. (BEL. 100644-T.I.)
(Summary, 111400, July, No. 31)

Reinforcements and replacements of air groups by the Japanese were other instances of elaborate offensive preparations in this area:

No. 49

Exchange between 4th and 5th Air Attack concerning 14th Air and Yokohama Air believed may be forerunner swap of these air groups. Appears to be replacing war worn air groups which have taken battering for several months by fresh units, and also probably preliminary to opening up increased air activity Rabaul area. (COM 14 110716-T.I.)

It was mentioned:

14th Air Corps appears to be operating in the Marshall Islands and Yokohama Air Group appears to be in the Rabaul area. (Summary, 111400, July, No. 33)

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JULY 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 50

Apparent reshuffling of 5th Air Attack units in progress. This includes exchange air for detachment Genzan Air which believe effected by FUJIKAWA MARU last week.
(COM 14 110716-T.I.)
(Summary, 111400, July, No. 34)

No. 51

Dispatches received involving air bases Peleliu, Saipan, Truk, and Rabaul, with 2nd Air unit Tainan Air following previous exchanges between 5th and 2nd Air Attack Corps believed indicate that will relieve Tainan Air. Latter today (Comdr. still in Rabaul area) addressed flight detachment at Truk. Another includes Truk, Saipan Bases, and usual line-up of addresses involving movement of air units to and from Mandates. Therefore, believe Tainan will go to Empire.
(COM 14 110716-T.I.)
(Summary, 111400, July, No. 37)

No. 52

Some indication that Kaga plane group and another air activity will operate in Rabaul area with New Guinea Occupation Force (COM14-102210-TI)
(Summary, 110600, July, No. 49)

JULY 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 53

Maru Air Tender is at Rabaul. (COM14-102210-TI)

It was remarked:

Traffic routing on 9 July indicated the above vessel in Rabaul area. (Summary, 110600, July, No. 50)

The rapid expansion of personnel at Rabaul, and the consequent additional responsibilities brought what appeared to be a reassignment of Japanese commanders in the Rabaul area:

No. 54

FROM: Cinc 4th Fleet Urgent 10 July/1220
TO : 4th Fleet Detached Units
INFO: Indies Force Comdr
Cinc Combined Fleet:
Comdr 11th Air Fleet;
Comsubfor:
Tokyo Intelligence
Enciphered "Officer scheduled to be Chief of Staff 8th Flt."

Latter indicated at General Staff Suggest 8th Base Force at Rabaul will expand its force and Staff and take on increased authority.
(COM14-102206-TI)
(Summary, 110600, July, No. 48)

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JULY 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 55

Another Combined Fleet message at Garbled time on 10th, went to 11th Air Fleet, 4th Fleet, Subfor, infor Operations and enciphered Chief of Staff #8 Suggested in view of other addressees that Mandate area being divided with Southeastern sector going under new command. (COM 14 110718-I.I.) (Summary, 111400, July, No. 35)

The presence of enemy cruisers near Rabaul was assumed from the following messages:

No. 56

Chief of Staff 4th Fleet originated message at 1040, apparently operation order for action Comdrs. Crudiv 18 8th Base Force at Rabaul and Sasebo #5 Special Landing Force infor to Comcrudiv Comairron 25 and Chief of Staff Combined Air Force Comcrudivs 6 and 18 noted closely associated with Rabaul in other traffic. Traffic routing now indicates TATSUTA has rejoined Crudiv 18, which leads to assumption that KINUGASA and FURUTAKA have joined Crudiv 6, since all three ships appeared to be in company while enroute from Empire to Truk. (BAL. 100644-I.I.)

It was noted:

FURUTAKA and Comdesron 6 were reported July 10th, using Rabaul as a cover call. Crudiv 6 and 18 have been associated with

JULY 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 56 (Cont.)

Rabaul recently. There has also been some connection between #5 Sasebo Special Landing Force, Crudiv 18, and Crudiv 6. Documents captured in New Guinea indicate that #5 Sasebo Special Landing Force accompanying the 14th Billeting Force leaves PT (Truk) under separate orders and will proceed to East coast of New Guinea (possibly Salamaua).
(Summary, 111400, July, No. 30)

No. 57

FURUTAKA and Comdesron 6 using Rabaul as cover on 9 and 10 July respectively. Also believe is 4th Fleet and Cinc is at Rabaul.
(GT #378-OPNAV 101950-TI)

It was mentioned:

FURUTAKA is CA of Crudiv 6.
(Summary, 110600, July, No. 44)

Japanese destroyers and merchant ships were farther south in the Tulagi area:

No. 58

Traffic headings indicate that KOTOKU MARU and unidentified MARU ROU 4 if not already at Tulagi may proceed to that area. (BEL-100718-TI)
(Summary, 110600, July, No. 45)

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JULY 11, 1942 (Continued)

No. 59

Comdesron 6 somewhere between Rabaul and Tulagi using both stations as a cover. This command not concentrated.
(COM14-102206-TI)
(Summary, 110600, July, No. 47)

Further confirmation of the intended use of submarines in forthcoming Japanese operations in the Rabaul-New Guinea district now came:

No. 60

Associations indicate Subdiv of Subron 3 will assist units of Subron already indicated as assigned Rabaul-New Guinea area, probably as Submarine Screen against opposing Allied Forces in forthcoming operations. (BEL. 110800-T.I.)

It was commented:

Units of Subron 7 appear to have just returned to Truk area from Yokosuka.
(Summary, 111400, July, No. 38)

JULY 12, 1942 (Continued)

More complete information from the captured documents mentioned in No.42 (July 11) was now forthcoming. Many of the details mentioned herein had already been known through analysis of Japanese radio traffic.

No. 62

Truk, 25 June, Flagship KASHIMA, South Seas Force, Inoue Shigami Commanding.
SOUTH SEAS FORCE ORDERS: The reference to Secret Orders #16 for South Seas Force, covering duties for invasion and escort operations by Pioneer Force and Sasebo 5th Special Landing Force. In addition to the instructions already issued, the following has been decided: This operation (including the establishment of the Base) is to be known as "SN" Operation.
Grouping of Force: Part of 8th Base Force is to be altered to form a supporting unit with 1st and 2nd Escort Detachments.
Organization and Movement Schedule: Point of departure is Truk (PT) in every case).
a) Large part 12th Pioneer Force departs 20 June for Kavieng (RO) arriving 22nd.
b) 11th and 13th Pioneer Force vanguard already arrived.
c) Guadalcanal Naval Landing Party proceed to Guadalcanal via Rabaul (RR) leaving latter place 25 June to arrive about 1 July.

JULY 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 62 (Cont.)

d) The larger section of 14th Pioneers, with portion of 5th Sasebo Special Landing Force, leave about 25 June arriving RZM (Lae) about 30th.
e) 11th and 13th Pioneer, each less one unit, depart for Guadalcanal 29 June, arriving about 4 July (X day).
f) Combat Section of escort for 12th Pioneer Detachment leaves PT (Truk) about 10th for RO (Kavieng).
g) Remaining portion of 11th and 13th Pioneer Detachment leaves PT (Truk) for Guadalcanal under separate orders.
h) Same for 14th Pioneer Force which will be accompanied by 5th Special Landing Force and will proceed to east coast of New Guinea (possibly Salamaua).
i) Air reconnaissance of eastern section of Admiralty Island and Madang is to be conducted.

Table of Organization:

Unit	Com. Officer	Organization	Forces to be Escorted
Supporting Force	Comcru-div 6	Crudiv 6 & 18	(Blank)
1st Escort Force	Comdes-ron 6	YUBARI Desdiv 29 (less ASAGI & YUNAGI) UZUKI, 21st Sub Chaser Force and 23rd Sub Chaser Force (less #23).	11th & 13th Pioneers - Aboard AZUMA, HOKURIKU and KOTOKU MARUS.

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No. 62 (Cont.)

2nd Escort Force	Comdesdiv 3Ø	Desdiv 3Ø (less #2 ships of those under her), 32nd Sub Chaser Force.	14th Pioneers & one Unit of Sasebo 5th Special Landing Force embarked in KENYOO and KINAI MARUS.

Notations to this table follows:
(1) 2nd Escort Force will disband upon arrival of all transports at destination and 32nd Sub Chaser Force will be incorporated in "R" Area Defense Forces.
(2) In case of enemy attack Comdr Supporting Force will take under his command all boats of Torpedo Boat Squadron 6. On arrival at destination each Pioneer Unit, the KENYOO and KINAI MARUS will be incorporated in our district.

Base Air Unit will cooperate during arrival, departure and unloading of transports as follows:

1) At RXM (Lae) and RZL (unplaced) Base Air Unit will maintain Fighter Guard over transports in addition to usual patrol.
2) Cooperate with anti-submarine patrols in RR and RZM areas.
3) Reconnoiter eastern sector of New Guinea, including Madang and area south of Admiralty Islands.

Following is table of assignments of KIYOKAWA MARU aircraft in R area:

At Rabaul: 4 FS planes, Base personnel from KIYOKAWA MARU with 6

JULY 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 62 (Cont.)

ground staff from KASHIMA.
At Salamaua: 2 FS planes with Base personnel from KIYOKAWA MARU.
At Tulagi: 2 FS planes with Base personnel from KIYOKAWA MARU.
At Kavieng: 3 FS planes plus FF/D from Fleet Headquarters with Base personnel from KIYOKAWA MARU and YONE MARU.

Duties are:
Rabaul Unit - Patrol as ordered.
Salamaua Unit - Escort convoys.
Tulagi Unit - Sea and land patrol.
Kavieng Unit - Other duties as specified by Comdr 8th Base Force.

(Meaning of FS, F2/S and F/D unknown, but tentatively assumed to mean Patrol boat plane, twin-float scout seaplanes and transport plane in that order).
Notations at bottom of above table applying to Rabaul, Salamaua, Tulagi, Kavieng groups are as follows:

Rabaul:
1. Continue regular duties.
2. Ground staff from KASHIMA return to PT (Truk) following return of Salamaua Expeditionary Force.

Salamaua:
1. Base personnel leave in FT/D transport by 28 June.
2. Aircraft Units are to proceed by 28 June, and from 29th on carry out duties after convoy leaves Salamaua to return to RR (Rabaul).

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No. 62 (Cont.)

Tulagi:

1. Base personnel proceed to Tulagi in KINRYUU MARU.
2. Aircraft Units are to move on immediately after completion of Tulagi Base.

Kaviang:

1. Continue with work in hand as before and move in to RR (Rabaul) by 25 July as arranged by Commanding Officer Amago Kane.

Translator's Note: Believe "Billeting Detachment" (Setsueitai) rendered more nearly accurate by "Pioneer Detachment".

It was observed:

The author of this document is not clear but he is presumed to be Comdr South Seas Force.

It was also commented:

A decryption reported by Belconnen on 26 May, gave indications that RZL might possibly be Salamaua.
(Summary, 120600, July, No. 25)

JULY 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 63

Name of Commander NANYOO BUTAI given in my 112055 as Inoue Shigemi should be Inoue Shigeyoshi. It is interesting to note that a Vice Admiral Inoue is listed as Commander 4th Fleet in Cincpac Serial 01848 of 28 June. Officer whose number was 44 in 1940 ORANGE Naval Register is a Vice Admiral named as above and was at that time given as Chief of Staff Japanese Naval Forces in China. (BEL-120326-TI) (Summary, 121400, July, No. 21)

There were many indications that Tulagi was to be a focal point of the approaching action:

No. 64

Tulagi apparently to assume important role in impending campaign probably as rendezvous point. (BEL-110852-TI)

It was remarked:

Comdesron 6 has been using Tulagi and Rabaul as covers for his dispatches. (Summary, 120600, July, No. 27)

Movement of new units into the Rabaul-Solomons territory continued strongly as the days slipped past. The Philippines were still a principal source of supply:

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JULY 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 65

Chief of Staff Philippine Fleet
sent one at 1130 9th July
(heading partly garbled) but indicates
close association between Chief of Staff
4th and South China
Fleets plus Director of Transportation
Info addressees include Operations Section, Naval General Staff
and Comdr. 8th Base Force at Rabaul
which may indicate further movement from Philippines to New Britain.
(SEL-110852-T1)

It was noted:

has been identified as 11th
Air Fleet but it is believed it has changed
and may now be South China Fleet.
The call is believed to be an Escort
Force.
(Summary, 120600, July, No. 30)

No. 66

FROM: (Maru) July 11/(?)
TO : (Unidentified)
(Unidentified)
(Truk)

At 0600 11th, will leave Saipan Communication Zone and enter Truk Communication Zone. (GT#384-DI)

It was pointed out:

was reported enroute Rabaul from
Empire on 30 June by Belconnen.
(Summary, 120600, July, No. 23)

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JULY 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 67

Maru air-tender is at Rabaul and indications noted that the following are either going to or are already in Rabaul area;
Maru air-tender
MARUS
Tanker
Unclassified 4th Fleet ships
Base Force also in Rabaul area.
(BEL-110835-TI)
(Summary, 120600, July, No. 32)

No. 68

Two unidentified men-of-war plus auxiliary and MARU appear as new arrivals in New Britain area while auxiliary shifted Comm Zones from Truk to Rabaul.
(BEL-120728-TI)
(Summary, 121400, July, No. 31)

Japanese air strength also continued to be replenished:

No. 69

Associations suggest Air Group 4 (Rabaul Air) may receive additional planes from Misawa Air Group to be

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No. 69 (Cont.)

ferried from Kasumigaura via Chichijima and Saipan. (BEL-110852-TI)

It was stated:

The 4th Air Group is a part of the 5th Air Attack Force and is based at Rabaul.
(Summary, 120600, July, No. 28)

No. 70

Indications of interchange of air units between New Britain area and Marshalls. (Cincpac-120445-Bull. #119)
(Summary, 121400, July, No. 25)

No. 71

Movement of Air units from Indies to Rabaul also indicated.
(Cincpac-120445-Bull. #119)
(Summary, 121400, July, No. 26)

No. 72

Maru Air Tender evidently en-route Rabaul from Empire. (BEL-120728-TI)
(Summary, 121400, July, No. 28)

JULY 12, 1942 (Continued)

Enemy radio intelligence units were very busy at this time trying to learn the strength of Allied defenders before the start of the Japanese campaign in the Southwest Pacific:

No. 73

Rabaul and Truk active with intelligence traffic indicating intensive effort to obtain information on disposition of Allied Forces prior to beginning of campaign New Guinea area. Rabaul was only addressee in one dispatch from Tokyo Radio Intelligence at 1600/10th. (BEL-110816-TI)
(Summary, 120600, July, No. 29)

A very long dispatch from the Registered Publications Section in Tokyo was an omen of a future change in enemy call signs and cryptographic systems:

No. 74

Tokyo Registered Publications originated extremely long 9-part message to Subforce Suspected of being details of call sign change or modification Crypto systems for subs. (COM14-120704-TI)

JULY 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 74 (Cont.)

It was indicated:

has been tentatively identified by Opnav as "All Ships and Stations" instead of Subforce as indicated above. (Summary, 121400, July, No. 3)

Many messages were being sent or received by the Commander in Chief of the Fourth Japanese Fleet, and, thus, he was identified as a leader in the new campaign:

No. 75

Cinc 1st Fleet originated dispatch at 1100 on 11th, action Desron 3 plus Desdivs and less one destroyer info Cinc 2nd Fleet 1), Chief of Staff 4th Fleet Comdesron 6 Director Transportation Chief of Staff Kure and Sasebo Tokyo Naval General Staff and 2 unidentified calls and This may indicate action addressees or units thereof will also take part in 4th Fleet operations possibly as escort units. (ExL-120635-TI)

Further in this connection was dispatch from Chief of Staff Combined Fleet at 2330 on 10th, for action

JULY 12, 1942 (Continued)

No. 75 (Cont.)

Chief of Staff 1st Fleet Comdesron 3 info Chief of Staff 3rd Fleet Comcrudiv 7 and several garbled addressees. This same dispatch was later relayed to Chief of Staff 4th Fleet and Comdesron 6 8). (BNL-120635-TI) (Summary, 121400, July, No.22)

No. 76

Abnormal stack of traffic being originated by Cinc and Chief of Staff 4th Fleet. (COM14-120708-TI) (Summary, 121400, July, No. 23)

Another identification was made of a prominent Japanese naval official stationed at Rabaul:

No. 77

One 4th Fleet message included enciphered Rear Admiral Kajioka as in Rabaul area. (COM14-120708-TI) (Summary, 121400, July, No. 24)

No. 78

Comdr 84th Guard Force is at Rabaul and using the latters radio call for

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JULY 13, 1942

More indications of the enemy's plan to effect communication changes before the approaching conflict were appearing in Japanese radio procedure:

No. 80

In connection with lengthy Registered Publication Section dispatch noted previously and other indications agree with Washington that some communication change imminent, - probably calls.
(COM 14-121856-TI)
(Summary, 130600, July, No. 6)

Another Japanese air fleet entered the Rabaul area, but it was noticed that no air carriers were as yet assigned to the anticipated attack:

No. 81

Flag Secretary 1st Air Fleet today associated in dispatch at 1520/11 July with Flag Secretary 4th Fleet Staff Communication Officer Desron 6 and Tulagi Radio

Rabaul address code to Desron 10 (sent short in 1st Air Fleet), 4th Base Force Truk and Yokosuka Communication Office This is first noted appearance of 1st Air Fleet with present 4th Fleet operations and may indicate

JULY 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 81 (Cont.)

units of Desron 10 will be involved in impending 4th Fleet Campaign. There has been no association of carriers with these operations. (BEL-120658-TI)
(Summary, 130600, July, No. 25)

Another Japanese Landing Force was engaged in radio traffic with Rabaul on July 13:

No. 82

Yokosuka Landing Force Comdr. originated two dispatches. One at 1230 to unidentified Info: 8th Base Force Comdr. Both addressees sent Rabaul for delivery. Second dispatch at 1300 to MYOKO Info: HAKAFU. (COM 14-121904-TI)

It was mentioned:

The MYOKO has been exempted from Crudiv 5 traffic since 14 June. HAKAFU is Yokosuka Chief of Staff. Part of Yokosuka Landing Force was in Saipan area on 7 July. (Summary, 130600, July, No. 26)

An unidentified Japanese unit was evidently present near Tulagi:

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JULY 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 83

Unidentified — — via Tulagi
addressed 8th Base Force. Info: KI-
YOKAWA MARU (COM 14-121904-TI)

It was noticed:

— has been tentatively identified as Ambon. Traffic routing indicated the KIYOKAWA MARU was in the Rabaul area July 9.
(Summary, 130600, July, No. 28)

Continued air activity all through this period was an indication of the impending Japanese campaign:

No. 84

Possible swap Misawa Air from 6th Air Attack and 4th Air of Rabaul Air Forces hinted. However, it may be reinforcement.
(COM 14-121856-TI)

It was observed:

The Misawa Air formerly operated around Marcus Island then appeared in the Hokkaido area, operating under 3rd Air Attack Force.
(Summary, 130600, July, No. 27)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 85

Active areas still Rabaul and Truk. Much air traffic between units in that area and Marshalls. Empire Aircraft Procurement Agencies and Truk indicate attention being given to replenishment that area. Yokosuka Aircraft Factory KEKAYU, at 2040, 11th, sent one to Truk Assembly Plant HOUSO, another to TrukAir address UHIKA, Ruotto and Saipan Aircraft Plants, 19th Air, 6th Base Force and KIYOKAWA MARU

Another dispatch indicates arrangements for a ferry flights: From Sukugawa Air Station to Chitose Air Station, Chief of Staff 11th Air Fleet, information to Communication Officer 4th Air Attack Corps, Saipan Radio, Communication Officer 5th Base Force and Kisaratsu Air Station, time - 1500, 12th. (COM 14-130746-TI) (Summary, 131400, July, No. 2)

No. 86

Exchange of New Britain area air units continues. (Cincpac-130227-Bull. #120) (Summary, 131400, July, No. 23)

Cruisers and destroyers were being added to Japanese forces in the Rabaul area:

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 87

Believe Desdiv 34 now entirely clear of Marshalls and operating with 5th Air Attack Corps. (COM14-130752-TI)

It was remarked:

Desdiv 34 was actively associated with the Marshalls up to 8 July. However, on 9 July one unit of this division appeared in the Rabaul Communication Zone. On 11 July Desdiv 34 was involved in traffic between 4th and 5th Air Attack Corps. 5th Air Attack Corps is tentatively located in the New Britain area.
(Summary, 131400, July, No. 25)

No. 88

Comcrudiv 18 and Comdesron 6 using Rabaul cover. (COM14-130752-TI)
(Summary, 131400, July, No. 26)

Finally, definite reports were received which demonstrated that U. S. naval communication traffic analysts had been able to give a very accurate description of what had been happening in the Solomons region:

JULY 13, 1942 (Continued)

No. 89

Japanese Landing Force and Special Pioneer Battalions clearing area near Lunga on Guadalcanal Island, Solomons apparently for landing field.
(Cincpac-130227-Bull.#120)
(Summary, 131400, July, No. 24)

No. 90

Report received enemy made landing at Rekata Bay, Santa Isabel Island.
(Cincpac-130227-Bull.#120)
(Summary, 131400, July, No. 27)

JULY 14, 1942

Carrier planes were to operate in the New Guinea area, according to the next dispatch:

No. 91

(New Command-Carrier Plane Group?) associated with Comdr. 1st Air Fleet, and other carrier plane groups in dispatch at 1900, July 12th. (BEL. 130617-TI)

It was noticed:

is unidentified. COM 14 says on July 10th, there was some indication that Kaga plane group and another air activity, KESI 7, will operate in Rabaul area with New Guinea Occupation Force (Summary, 140600, July, No. 46)

As has been noted before, cruiser divisions were also in the region:

No. 92

Crudiv 18 is using Rabaul cover. 0910, 12th, addressed 4th Fleet Secretary, and Tokyo Personnel, suffix NEGAT. (COM 14 132202-TI)

It was indicated:

Suffix NEGAT indicates Chief or Head of a Section. (Summary, 140600, July, No. 47)

JULY 14, 1942 (Continued)

The probability that the Japanese Eighth Fleet would be used in this territory was noted from its appearance in radio traffic:

No. 93

Chief of Staff 8th Fleet still subject of dispatches from Chief of Staff Combined to Chief of Staff 4th Fleet. (COM 14 132156-TI) (Summary, 140600, July, No. 48)

A suggestion was now made that the Eighth Fleet was either the Combined Japanese Air Force, or the organization of tenders and supply ships assigned to serve the Combined Air Force:

No. 94

"Officer scheduled to become Chief of Staff 8th Fleet" is now shown at Tokyo Registered Publication Section ___. Enciphered address Cinc 8th Fleet is shown to be in (tentative CHOKAI). Associations suggest that the 8th Fleet is composed of air units and is either the Combined Air Force or organization of the tenders and supply ships assigned to serve the Combined Air Force. (BEL-140634-TI)

ORIGINAL

JULY 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 94 (Cont.)

It was stated:

11th Air Fleet (Combined Air Force) was associated with Chief of Staff 8th Fleet on 9 and 10 July.
(Summary, 141400, July, No. 2)

No. 95

Retransmissions of General Address traffic comprised considerable of intercepted traffic today. Tokyo Registered Publications Section , two 9-part and one 7-part dispatches were circulating, plus new ones from Chief of Naval General Staff , at 0000, 14th, to All Major Commands, and All 1st and 2nd Class Stations. At same time, addressed same lineup with additional dispatch to Comdr Combined , information All Major Commanders and 1st Class Shore Stations, Chief of Staff 8th Fleet enciphered addressed aboard tentative CHOKAI . Above general traffic may concern inauguration 8th Fleet.
(COM 14-140906-TI)
(Summary, 141400, July, No. 1)

An expected change in call signs had not yet been carried out by the Japanese, though it seemed evident that preparations were being made for the revision:

JULY 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 96

Staff 4th Fleet sending communication messages many commands in his area. This may be in line with suspected call change or new frequency plan. (COM 14 132158-TI) (Summary, 140600, July, No. 49)

Locations of various Japanese units, some unidentified, were now made for the Rabaul and Wake Island areas:

No. 97

Following locations noted on dates indicated:

In Rabaul Area:

(unidentified)	July 12.
(unidentified)	July 12.
(Comdesdiv)	July 12.
(unidentified)	July 12.
(unidentified)	July 12.
(4th Air Group)	July 12.

At Wake:

(SHIRETOKO)	July 13.

At Kendari Air Station:

(Comdr. Takao Air Group)	July 13.
(Comdr. Kisaratsu Air Group)	July 13.

(GT #395-Opnav 132005-TI)

JULY 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 97 (Cont.)

It was mentioned:

SHIRETOKO is a tanker. Comdr. Kisaratsu Air Group was indicated at Kendari, July 10, and July 11th, units of the Kisaratsu Air Group were indicated at Kavieng. Comdr. Takao Air Group was indicated at Kendari, July 4th.
(Summary, 140600, July, No. 51)

No. 98

Desdiv 34 working with air forces in Rabaul area. (Cincpac Bull#121-140135)
(Summary, 141400, July, No. 24)

No. 99

Crudiv 18 in vicinity of Rabaul.
(Cincpac Bull#121-140135)

It was pointed out:

Crudiv 18 was using Rabaul Radio as a cover for dispatches 12 and 13 July.
(Summary, 141400, July, No. 26)

No. 100

Tulagi , at 1950, 14th, sent (SAKI) to Comdesdiv 29 , unidentified , and , Marus and information Comcrudiv 6 , #8

JULY 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 100 (Cont.)

Base Force, Rabaul , 5th Air Attack , Truk address , Chief of Staff Combined and unidentified It is noted recently that Crudivs 6 and 18 do not appear to be associated. (GT #401/Opnav-141728-TI)

It was noted:

Crudiv 18 apparently was using Rabaul Radio as a cover on 12 and 13 July. Crudivs 6 and 18 were often associated together in June prior apparent movement to New Britain area. Last association noted in Rabaul area on 10 July.
(Summary, 141400, July, No. 27)

An estimate of the positions of Japanese carriers was also established, since these had played a prominent part in every prior engagement:

No. 101

Best estimate of carriers:

HYUJO may be in Ominato area because of delivery of traffic via that station, ZUIKAKU near Yokosuka by association Yokosuka Patrol, SHOKAKU on shakedown near Kagoshima, HIYO still fitting out in Empire port, ZUIHO probably at Kure thru association Kure Patrol and Navy Yard addresses, JUNYO probably at Kure, HOSHO ? indefinite.
(COM 14-140914-TI)

JULY 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 101 (Cont.)

It was noticed:

On 6 and 7 July HOSHO was associated with SETTSU in two message headings and this may have indicated possible arrangements for training exercises.
(Summary, 141400, July, No. 7)

The arrival of another enemy submarine division in the New Britain area was foretold:

No. 102

A Subdiv expected to operate in New Britain area shortly.
(Cincpac Bull#121-140135)
(Summary, 141400, July, No. 30)

The formation of several new task forces by the Japanese was indicated by the heavy radio traffic between their Personnel Bureau and various commanders:

No. 103

Large number of dispatches from Personnel Bureaus, Tokyo Offices, and Major Commanders to fleet commands, and individual vessels indicate regrouping of fleet units into several task forces. Three or four ap-

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 14, 1942 (Continued)

No. 103 (Cont.)

parent groups in evidence so far. Impression is gained that many fleet units recently operating Northward returning Empire for brief periods reconditioning for immediate future operations.
(COM 14 132154-TI)
(Summary, 140600, July, No. 1)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 15, 1942

Traffic analysis provided further information concerning Japanese units in the Guadalcanal area:

No. 104

Comdr. Yokosuka Landing Force at 1940/ 13 July sent one to , 84th Guard Force, MYOKO , Comdr. 8th Base Force, a Palao Personnel address and Yokosuka . This associates him with Crudiv 5 and Rabaul where yesterday he was more associated 5th Fleet, however believe greater part his Force is in South. (COM 14-142108-TI)

It was commented:

There have been indications that a detachment of the Yokosuka Landing Force went north and this detachment appeared associated with Cinc5th Fleet and units of the Northern Forces. However another part of the Yokosuka Landing Force appears to be still in the Southern area. The #5 Sasebo Landing Force which was also part of the Midway Occupation Force has been operating in the Southern area and was part of the forces involved in the recent SN Operation (occupation of Guadalcanal Island). (Summary, 150600, July, No. 46)

No. 105

Association in heading of a dispatch from Tulagi Radio at 0740/13th July indicates unidentified Comcru-

JULY 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 105 (Cont.)

div 6 and Comdesdiv 30 (to be in Rabaul area and tentative AZUMA MARU , Desdiv 29 plus tentative Sub Chaser Div #23 in Tulagi area. (BEL-140645-TI)

It was remarked:

Comdesron 6, Crudiv 6, Desdiv 30 and AZUMA MARU were mentioned in South Seas Operational Order for "SR" Operation. This operation was for the landing and occupation at Guadalcanal. The AZUMA MARU carried Pioneers. Desdiv 29 (KOSA 8) is in Desron 6. (Summary, 150600, July, No. 53)

No. 106

From enciphered address:
- Not understood, but something in R area. Addressed by Destroyer in Desdiv
(GT #404-Opnav 142320-TI)

It was observed:

"R" area includes Solomons, New Britain, New Guinea, New Ireland, Ocean Islands, and British Samoan Islands.
(Summary, 150600, July, No. 54)

JULY 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 107

From enciphered addresses:
"3rd Division Comdr" at Air Base in New Britain , "4th Division Comdr" on , Flagship of Desron 6.
(GT #404-Opnav 142320-TI)
(Summary, 150600, July, No. 55)

No. 108

At 0630/14 July Tulagi Base sent one to Cinc 4th Info: to Communication Officer 11th Air Fleet , 5th Air Attack Corps and Comcrudiv 6. Previous associations having included Crudiv 18; a move from Rabaul to Tulagi is indicated. (COM 14-142118-TI)
(Summary, 150600, July, No. 57)

The establishment of an air base at Guadalcanal was worthy of attention, for this was to be the main objective of American assault forces in August, 1942:

No. 109

Another enciphered address was "Guadalcanal Air Base" indicating establishment of base at Guadalcanal. (COM 14-142118-TI)

JULY 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 109 (Cont.)

It was indicated:

Guadalcanal is in Solomons.
(Summary, 150600, July, No. 58)

Additional Japanese air units were collecting at Gasmata, a place situated on the south coast of New Britain Island at 151° E., 07° S:

No. 110

Detachment of Yokohama Flying Boat Squadron is shown at tentative Gasmata and consecutive message numbers indicate Comdr. Tainan Air Group is also at that place.
(BEL-140640-TI)

It was stated:

Traffic has been delivered to the Yokohama Flying Boat Squadron via Rabaul. The Comdr. of the unit has appeared at Tulagi several times which may mean a second section there. The Tainan Air Group has been associated with Rabaul area.
(Summary, 150600, July, No. 56)

An aircraft assembly plant, recently established at Kavieng, was still another indication of Japanese plans for a major campaign

ORIGINAL

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JULY 15, 1942 (Continued)

No. 111

Believe Aircraft Assembly Plant established at Kavieng in Rabaul area.
(COK 14-150828-TI) (Summary, 151400, July, No.20)

JULY 16, 1942

The presence of destroyers and cruisers in the Tulagi area was evidence that protection for supply units was being supplied:

No. 112

Comdesdiv 29 using Tulagi Radio as cover. Association of Comcrudiv 6 with Comdesdiv 29 and Tulagi Radio in urgent traffic from Tulagi suggests Crudiv 6 may proceed to Tulagi to act as covering force for units that area. (BEL-150739-TI) (Summary, 160600, July, No.53)

No. 113

Lunga at Guadalcanal associated in traffic with Comdesron 6 Escort Force , Tulagi ., and enciphered Comdr. Ganujo Defense Force and Cinc 8th Fleet. (BEL. 150744-TI)
(Summary, 160600, July, No. 50)

No. 114

AKIKAZE appeared returning to Rabaul from Saipan area. (BEL. 150744-TI)

It was commented:

AKIKAZE is a destroyer of Desdiv 34. (Summary, 160600, July, No. 56)

JULY 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 115

At 1100 Cinc 2nd addressed cruiser , Info: Kure Personnel and Comcrudiv 7. (COM 14-160732-TI)

It was pointed out:

The cruiser of Crudiv 7 has been in Truk area since return from Midway and has been conspicuous in dispatches the past two days. (Summary, 161400,July, No.11)

No. 116

Comcrudiv 18 still using Rabaul cover.
(COM 14 160736-TI)
(Summary, 161400, July, No. 30)

Japanese radio traffic was heaviest in the Rabaul area, where there were many indications that the Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet would be in charge of all forces in this region:

No. 117

4th Fleet area, particularly Rabaul, continues to be most important in traffic. Rabaul Base Force associated with several new calls which are apparently minor defense and billeting detachments employed in Solomons-New Guinea area. Rabaul has consistently been associated with Cinc and Chief

JULY 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 117 (Cont.)

of Staff 8th Fleet since first appearance these officers in enciphered addresses. Association suggests possibility Cinc 8th will have command of all forces in 8th Base Force (Rabaul) area. (BEL-150739-TI)
(Summary, 160600, July, No. 54)

No. 118

Cinc 8th Fleet shown yesterday in CHOKAI is now associated with Desron 4 , ATAGO and TAKAO
This suggests units of Crudiv 4 and Desron 4 may be included in 8th Fleet organization. Desdiv 1 and Desdiv of Desron 4 included this association and are in company with ATAGO and TAKAO at unidentified in (garbled).
(BEL. 150744-TI)
(Summary, 160600, July, No. 55)

The Eighth Base Force was believed to be at Rabaul:

No. 119

FROM: Buka or Bougainville 15 July/1500
TO : 8th Base Communications.
INFO; Base Unit
(COM14-151958-TI)

JULY 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 119 (Cont.)

It was noted:

8th Base Force is believed at Rabaul. (Summary, 160600, July, No. 58)

The Japanese Army as well as the Navy was also very busy in the region of Rabaul, and the prevalence of Engineering and Supply units demonstrated active preparations for a major campaign:

No. 120

"Yamauchi Army Staff" addressed in care of 4th Fleet in "most urgent" dispatch from (YANANO) (Army) on July 15. (GT #404-Opnav 160600-TI)

It was mentioned:

COM 14 believes YANANO is an Army unit with the 5th Fleet and YAMAUCHI is associated with Rabaul Base Force. (Summary, 160600, July, No. 59)

No. 121

Engineering and Supply addresses active with Rabaul area. (COM14-151958-TI)

JULY 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 119 (Cont.)

It was noted:

8th Base Force is believed at Rabaul. (Summary, 160600, July, No. 58)

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ORIGINAL

22 JUN

JULY 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 119 (Cont.)

It was noted:

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No. 121

Engineering and Supply addresses active with Rabaul area. (COM14-151958-TI)

JULY 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 121 (Cont.)

It was noticed:

On 13 July Empire Aircraft Procurement Agencies and Truk indicated giving attention to replenishment that area.

Estimates of the location of some of the units most prominent in Japanese dispatches indicated that many were in the New Britain-Solomon area:

No. 122

FROM: Guadalcanal
TO : Tulagi
MANU indicated in Tulagi area,
Plus 2 garbles.
(COM14-151958-TI)
(Summary, 160600, July, No. 51)

No. 123

Subron 3, less 3 units, indicated en-route Rabaul area, Crudiv 6, and 18 of 4 CA and 3 CL and Desron 6 to which Desdiv 2 (previously) of Desron 4) appears added are all in New Britain-Solomon's area. Desdiv 34 believed operating with 5th Air Attack

ORIGINAL

JULY 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 123 (Cont.)

Force in Rabaul area except one unit escorting FUJIKAWA MARU to Yokosuka.
(Opnav 142205-ONI Bull)
(Summary, 161400, July, No. 29)

No. 124

Address RANDU shown at Kavieng, TOMENI shown at Guadalcanal by enciphered location. 5th Air Attack ad-dressed both of these, Info: 8th Base Force and Communication Officer 11th Air Fleet at 1210, 16th July.
(GT#409-OPNAV 161830-TI)

It was indicated:

5th Air Attack Force and 8th Base Force are currently located at Rabaul.
(Summary, 161400, July, No. 33)

The interest of some of the highest Japanese naval authorities in the progress of preparations in the Solomons area was noticeable:

No. 125

At 1510 Cinc 2nd under no origin addressed MARU at Sasebo, Comdesron 4, Tanker TSURUMI , Info: 2nd Fleet

JULY 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 125 (Cont.)

Force Nos 735, Cinc Combined Maizuru, and Kure. His growing interest in area south of Truk is apparent. (COM 14-130752-TI)

It was commented:

has been identified as the AKEBONO MARU. (Summary, 161400, July, No. 10)

No. 126

At 1000 Chief of Staff addressed Chief of Staff 4th Comdt. Kure, Info: 8th Base Force and of 8th Base Force. (COM 14-130752-TI)

It was pointed out:

has been identified as Combined Fleet. (Summary, 161400, July, No. 31)

The position of enemy submarines was now estimated since their presence in a location was frefrequently an indication of future attacks. The Japanese had made great use of submarines in scouting expeditions all throughout the war:

ORIGINAL

JULY 16, 1942 (Continued)

No. 127

Subron 1 believed moved south to Marshalls from Aleutian Waters with Comsubron 1 at Yokosuka. Comsubron 7 at Truk. At least parts Subdivs 26 and 27 at Yokosuka. Subdiv 33 possibly enroute Saipan. One division Subron 8 enroute Yokosuka from Marshalls. Another believed remains Marshalls and a third in South Pacific.
(Opnav-142205-ONI Bull)
(Summary, 161400, July, No. 36)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 17, 1942

Many enemy supply ships were enroute to the South Pacific at this time:

No. 128

Maru Tanker passed Saipan to Truk Communication Zone, 1000, 16th. (COM 14 162006-TI) (Summary, 170600, July, No. 21)

No. 129

MARU appears Truk bound escorted by ARIKAZE . (COM14-162018-TI)

It was noted:

The ARIKAZE a Desdiv 34 unit, appeared to be returning Rabaul from Saipan area on 15 July. (Summary, 170600, July, No. 22)

No. 130

KOTOKU MARU associated 8th Base Force at Rabaul. (COM14-162018-TI)

It was remarked:

The most recent appearance of KOTOKU MARU or was on 14 July. on that date was an action addressee in a dispatch from Tulagi along with Condesdiv 29,

JULY 17, 1942 (Continued)

No. 130 (Cont.)

unidentified and MARU
, information Concrudiv 6, #8 Base Force, 5th Air Attack Force, Truk, and Chief of Staff Combined Fleet.
(Summary, 170600, July, No. 24)

The presence of additional warships in the Rabaul area was ascertained from traffic analysis:

No. 131

Traffic routine indicates (SUZUYA?) at Truk. (BEL-161328-TI)

It was mentioned:

is the cruiser of Crudiv 7 which has been in Truk since return Midway and has been noticed quite frequently in traffic the past two days.
(Summary, 171400, July, No. 7)

No. 132

Fleet Unit involved in Rabaul-Saipan and Chichijima Communication Zones.
(COM14-162018-TI)

It was noticed:

On 5 July TI indicated a new man-of-war, in 4th Fleet, was enroute to Rabaul, probably from Truk.
(Summary, 170600, July, No. 23)

JULY 17, 1942 (Continued)

The relationship of the Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet with Rabaul still continued to be very close, and it was almost certain that he would take over control of the Solomons area:

No. 133

Enciphered Chief of Staff 8th Fleet continues to appear in dispatches originated by 8th Base Force commands.
(COM14-162Ø18-TI)
(Summary, 170600, July, No. 26)

ORIGINAL

JULY 18, 1942

The Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet continued to be prominent in the dispatches of July 18:

No. 134

Cinc 8th Fleet apparently enroute Rabaul area and being kept informed by Cinc 4th of all activities and decisions concerning that area as noted in dispatch from Tokio Operations Section to Chief of Staff 4th Fleet at 1000, 14th, which Cinc 4th later passed to 4th Fleet, Crudiv 6 and 8th Fleet. Further impression is gathered that Cinc 8th Fleet will relieve Cinc 4th at least insofar as operations in Rabaul area are concerned. Plan may be to assign Cinc 4th with headquarters at Truk, the Mandate area only, with Solomons-New Guinea-New Britain area under separate command of Cinc 8th with headquarters at Rabaul. (BML-161147-TI)
(Summary, 180600, July, No. 36)

No. 135

8th Fleet originated Serial #1, at 1120, on 18th, to Collectives also 1st and 2nd class Shore, Cinc Combined Fleet. Second one, at same time, to unidentified (probably Collective) from (tentative 8th Fleet Communication Officer). Serials 4, 7, 8 intercepted; to mostly unidentified Chiefs of Staff, but two included tentative CHOKAI. Delivery to Cinc Combined indicated as made before dispatch sent on Tokyo broadcast. (COM 14-170822-TI)

JULY 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 135 (Cont.)

It was observed:

is identified by Opnav as "All Major Commands". is identified by Belconnen as "Southern Fleet".
(Summary, 180600, July, No. 37)

No. 136

8th Fleet associations with Tulagi Base, Rabaul Base Force, Comcrudivs 6 and 18 in today's traffic. 8th Fleet almost definitely assigned this area. Traffic addressed to 8th Fleet Command transmitted on Tokyo broadcast which may indicate already at Sea. (CO: 14-170846-TI)
(Summary, 180600, July, No. 38)

No. 137

FROM: (8th Fleet) #011 July 18/1030
TO : #8 Base Force at Rabaul.
INFO: (CofS 4th Fleet)
(CofS 11th Air Flt.)
(Naval General Staff)
(Bureau of Military Affairs)
(CHOKAI)
(CofS Combined Fleet)
(GT #422-Opnav 181730-TI)

It was stated:

This is further confirmation that the 8th Fleet may function in Rabaul area.
(Summary, 181400, July, No. 18)

ORIGINAL

22 [illegible] 1943

JULY 18, 1942 (Continued)

Captured documents confirmed traffic analysis reports as to the patrol and supply routes of the enemy in the Rabaul area:

No. 138

Notes and tracks penciled in charts found among more captured documents, now in hands of RAAF indicate following:

1) Aircraft flights direct to Rabaul from Truk, though some go via Greenwich Island.
2) Grids with single Kana coordinates locating area ten navigational minutes to a side (ten each Latitude and Longitude on Mercator projection).
3) One track originates at Island of Oshima (off Tokyo Bay), and shows route to Tinian via Uracas.
4) Triangular track with base line extending from Wake to Ruotto (Northernmost projection of Kwajalein Atoll) with Pokakku at the apex to Eastward.
5) Many tracks to Empire and Mandate locations originate from a point of departure 4 miles Southwest of the town of Kambe (Western side of Ise Gulf, approximate position 34-51 North, 136-31 East).
6) Penciled note followed by rough sketch on chart of Eastern New Guinea to Northeastern Australia, reads, "For use in Patrol and bombing at Kokoda".
7) Track on bearing 335-155 fades out to Northward in Coral Sea, but extends down to Flinders Reef, thence direct to Townsville.

JULY 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 138 (Cont.)

8) Many patrols from Rabaul covering majority of sector Southeast to Southwest indicate in and out logs 600 miles long with chord at extremity 100 miles long (Mercator projection).
9) Patrols from Lae extend to Cape York and Raimond Reefs.

Another dispatch gives circumstances of capture and description of more important items included. (BNL-170511-DI)

It was reported:

In (5) above, Kanbe appears to be Kanbe, Lat. 34°-52 N., Long. 136°-35 E. In (9) above, Raimond may be Diamond Reign Reefs, 13-12 S., 143-44 E., (H.O. 3462). (Summary, 180600, July, No. 4)

Great activity in enemy construction in the Solomons area did not go unnoticed:

No. 139

4th Fleet activity only serves to emphasize the expansion of construction activity in Solomons-Rabaul-New Britain, preparatory to increase of Occupation Forces. No carriers or Major Units aside from those already associated can be definitely indicated as assigned to that area at present. (COM 14-170826)(Summary, 180600, July, No. 48)

JULY 18, 1942 (Continued)

Traffic analysis again confirmed the presence of several enemy units in the area south of Rabaul:

No. 140

Indication CHOKAI will go to New Britain area. (Cincpac-180247-Bull.#125) (Summary, 180600, July, No. 39)

No. 141

Comcrudiv 6, on 14 July, was using [redacted] 9 as cover. [redacted], by D/F, is near Guadalcanal. Comcrudiv 18 using Rabaul as cover on 17 July. (GT #418/Opnav-180301-TI)

It was observed:

Belconnen identifies [redacted] as Lunga. (Summary, 180600, July, No. 42)

No. 142

Tulagi [redacted] continues active with traffic for Desron 2 [redacted] and Desron 3 [redacted] (BEL-161420-TI)

It was stated:

Desron 2 appears at present to be in the Yokosuka area and Desron 3 is associated with escort duty to the Southern Asia area.
(Summary, 180600, July, No. 40)

JULY 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 143

At 1100, 13th, Comcrudiv 18, using Rabaul as cover, sent message addressed to Tokyo Movement Report Section and Cinc 4th Fleet for action, and info to Chief of Staff 8th Fleet , Comdesdiv 29 and Cinc 11th Air Fleet This looks like Crudiv 18 is moving from Rabaul area. (GT #421-Opnav 181525-TI)

It was remarked:

On July 14th, COM 14 reported possibility that Crudiv 18 would move from Rabaul to Tulagi.
(Summary, 181400, July, No. 19)

No. 144

84th Guard Force Pay Master and unidentified Base Force Comdr are at Tulagi. (EEL-161420-TI)
(Summary, 180600, July, No. 41)

No. 145

Communication Officer Army Command (TUROSU) addressed enciphered "Java #2 Group (?), Chief of Staff (JIYABA.FUTA SHIDAN SATI)". (GT #418/Opnav-180301-TI)

It was commented:

Army Command (TUROSU) was indicated as being at Rabaul on 16 July.
(Summary, 180600, July, No. 43)

JULY 18, 1942 (Continued)

No. 146

FROM: (Maru).
TO : (Saipan),
(Rabaul),
(11th Air Fleet).
(5th Air Attack).
At 0800, 18th, will leave Saipan Communication Zone and enter Rabaul Communication Zone. (GT #419/Opnav-180301-TI)

It was indicated:

has been identified as a Maru in the 11th Air Fleet.
(Summary, 180600, July, No. 44)

No. 147

Traffic routing and association indicates Destroyer enroute Rabaul from Saipan-Truk area. (BEL-161433-TI)

It was pointed out:

A high priority message from Tulagi on 30 June to various addressees associated with the Rabaul area was passed to Desron 6 specifying delivery to DD
(Summary, 180600, July, No. 45)

ORIGINAL

JULY 19, 1942

A resume of Japanese radio traffic disclosed that emphasis was shifting from an administrative to the preoperational type of dispatches:

No. 148

> Traffic picture shifting from administrative to preoperational type since call change. Entire emphasis on Southern areas at present with wealth of significant material requiring caution to avoid jumping at conclusions. Northern Sector continues unchanged. Southeastern definitely hot spot with anticipated delineation 8th Fleet cognizance in next ten days, however, Cru-div 6 and 18 and other Rabaul area units reporting jointly to 4th and 8th Fleet now. Southwestern Units suddenly prominent but organization and direction as yet indefinite. No further traffic concerning ZUIKAKU connection this area since last summary.
> (CCH 14-182038-TI)
> (Summary, 190600, July, No. 8)

Constant watch was kept on the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Eighth Fleet for his arrival in the Solomons would mean that a more dangerous period had arrived:

JULY 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 149

At 2100, 17th, Cinc 4th addressed lengthy 7-part dispatch to Cinc Combined and General Staff, information 8th Fleet Detached Units , 4th Fleet Task Force , Cinc 11th Air Fleet, Comdr 4th and 5th Air Attack, Comcrudiv 6 and tentative Subfor (COM 14-180818-TI)

It was noticed:

Inclusion of 8th Fleet, Crudiv 6 and 5th Air Attack Force continues association of 8th Fleet with the New Britain area. 4th Air Attack Force is placed in the Marshalls but in the past has operated South over the Gilberts. Concerning tentative Subforce in this message heading, the only Subforce Units so far associated in traffic with the 8th Fleet are Comsubrons 6 and 7. On 16 July Comsubron 6 included Comsubron 7 and Cinc 8th Fleet in a message heading which appeared to indicate movement of Subron 6 from the Empire to Truk. Subron 7 had appeared to be at Truk on 13 July. (Summary, 190600, July, No. 2)

No. 150

Cinc 8th Fleet , shown proceeding to Rabaul via Chichijima and Truk, as noted in heading of Communication Zone report originated at 1200, 18th. (BEL. 190235-TI)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

No. 150 (Cont.)

It was mentioned:

The Cinc and Chief of Staff, 8th Fleet, have previously appeared in Empire area.
(Summary, 191400, July, No. 28)

No. 151

Cinc 8th Fleet originated a dispatch at 1120, 16th, bearing code serial 001, and addressed to all Major Commands , all 1st and 2nd Class Naval Stations . Movement Report Office , plus unidentified , and Cinc Combined Fleet . This command is in the CHOKAI and has apparently departed from Yokosuka to assume duties in Solomon area.
(BEL. 170634-TI)
(Summary, 191400, July, No. 29)

No. 152

Staff Communication Officer 8th Fleet addressed one short urgent dispatch to Staff Communication Officer Southern Expeditionary Fleet at 1120, 16th. (BEL. 170634-TI)
(Summary, 191400, July, No. 30)

A jurisdictional division of the South Seas area was noticed in Japanese dispatches.

ORIGINAL

JULY 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 153

Enciphered "All Commanders of the Outside South Seas Force" appeared as information address in dispatch at 0800, 16th, from Rabaul Radio . It has been previously noted that the South Seas Force or area, is divided into "Inside" and "Outside" Precincts, however, of what these areas or forces consist has not been determined. (BEL-180741-TI)

It was noted:

The documents relating to the "SN" Operation were headed "South Seas Force Orders". The term "South Sea Force" was also used in connection with the "MO" Campaign (Coral Sea) in May.
(Summary, 190600, July, No. 35)

It has been already pointed out that many Marus, or transport and supply ships, were in the Rabaul district. Further indications of their presence were noted now:

No. 154

Combatant ship is in Rabaul area and is associated with the AZUMA MARU . (BEL-170658-TI)

22 [illegible]

JULY 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 154 (Cont.)

It was commented:

unidentified. AZUMA MARU was believed one of the ships which was to transport part of the 11th and 13th Pioneer Detachments in the SN Operation.
(Summary, 190600, July, No. 40)

No. 155

Deciphered TOYAMA MARU addressed care Morimoto anchorage Rabaul.
(COM14-182044-TI)

It was remarked:

TOYAMA MARU built 1913, 7090 tons.
(Summary, 190600, July, No. 41)

No. 156

OTOKU and MIYOKAWA Marus in Rabaul area. (COM14-182044-TI)

It was observed:

Traffic routing on 9 July indicated the MIYOKAWA MARU in Rabaul area. The OTOKU MARU is not listed in Lloyds.
(Summary, 190600, July, No. 42)

JULY 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 157

Naval auxiliary made Communication Zone shift Saipan to Rabaul, 0800, 18th. (BEL-180741-TI)

It was stated:

Previously noted by Opnav. has been identified as a Maru of the 11th Air Fleet.
(Summary, 190600, July, No. 43)

No. 158

Unidentified unit used Tulagi cover 11th, serial 135, number 141, time 15ØØ. Serial 136 and 142 at 13/1030. Under Rabaul cover 137 and 143 at 0900/16th.
(COM14-182044-TI)
(Summary, 190600, July, No. 44)

The movement of important Japanese units from Northern and Empire waters to southern waters still continued:

No. 159

Flag Secretary Yokosuka Landing Force . . in Saipan area addressed short dispatch at 164Ø, 16th to MYOKO . . . . in-

JULY 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 159 (Cont.)

formation to Yokosuka address This is second indication in past few days that [redacted] may proceed to Southern Waters. Association suggests HAGURO (NITL 5) and [redacted] have returned to Empire from Northern area. (BIL-170813-TI)

It was indicated:

/is believed the Yokosuka Naval Post Office.
(Summary, 190600, July, No. 43)

Identification of various Japanese assault groups proved that they were concerned in the southern movement:

No. 160

Comdr Sasebo #5 Landing Force shown at Rabaul, while his Force is probably at Salamaua. (BIL-180732-TI)

It was pointed out:

#5 Sasebo Landing Force is concerned in the "SN" Operation. On 13 July Cinc Southwest Pacific area reported that this Landing Force had sailed from Truk on 10 July for eastern New Guinea.
(Summary, 190600, July, No. 45)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

No. 161

Army addresses including enciphered Commanders of the Kawamura Brigade and Horiishi Detachment at Rabaul, and Commander Southern Philippine Division at Davao, continue active. (BNL-180732-TI)

It was noted:

Kawamura Army Detachment was noted by D. I. as being in Mindanao on 24 May - and apparently was preparing to leave from Davao sometime thereafter. (Summary, 190600, July, No. 46)

No. 162

Questionable translation of enciphered address places a section of Yokohama Air Group at Tulagi. (BNL-170658-TI)

It was mentioned:

On 7 July traffic headings indicated Comdr Yokohama Flying Boat Squadron at Tulagi. On 28 June traffic for Yokohama Air Group was relayed to Rabaul. (Summary, 190600, July, No. 49)

No. 163

New unidentified fleet line call in association 8th Base Force, indicating possible movement that area. (COM 14 190224-TI)

JULY 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 163 (Cont.)

It was noticed:

8th Base Force is at Rabaul.
(Summary, 191400, July, No. 41)

No. 164

Enciphered address "Comdr. 1st Covering Force" associated in traffic headings with Tulagi , and Lunga (Guadalcanal).
(BEL. 190235-TI)

It was commented:

Guadalcanal and Lunga have been recently occupied by the Japanese.
(Summary, 191400, July, No. 42)

No. 165

On 9889 kc, at 1540 on 18th, station using Rabaul call , but not Rabaul transmitter. Bearing 254 from Oahu. Traffic intercepted. Identified as from Comcrudiv 6 and own call is :
Serial 229, at 1140, 18th, action information (Saipan), (possible Truk).
Serial 230, at 1200, 18th, used cover origin Kavieng , to Chief of Staff 1st Fleet , information Tokyo Personnel

ORIGINAL

22 JAN 1943

JULY 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 165 (Cont.)

, Kure Personnel . Believe this indicates arrival Comcrudiv 6 at Kavieng today. (COM 14-131012-TI) (Summary, 190600, July, No. 38)

The ferrying of aircraft and aviation supplies from the Empire to southern waters was an interesting omen of future activity:

No. 166

Dispatch from Cinc Combined at 0300, 18th, for action Comdesdiv 7 , and recently commissioned auxiliary (associated with Cardiv 5); information Cinc 4th Fleet , Comdr. Combined Air Force , Naval General Staff (, Chief of Staff Yokosuka Tokyo address , Cinc 8th Fleet , and unidentified , suggest use of to transport aircraft or aviation supplies from Empire for Combined Airforces with Desdiv 7 as escort. (SRL. 170634-TI) (Summary, 191400, July, No. 19)

No. 167

Association ZUIHAKU with Yokosuka Commands continues and that vessel appearing frequently as information addressee. (COM 14-180816-TI)

JULY 19, 1942 (Continued)

No. 167 (Cont.)

It was mentioned:

On 16 and 17 July ZUIKAKU originated two dispatches which gave indications of T.I. of a possible prospective trip to the Southwest Asia area.
(Summary, 190600, July, No. 13)

No. 168

ZUIKAKU appears enroute to Singapore by way of Takao as indicated by dispatch originated at 19ØØ, 16th from ZUIKAKU . Action addressees were Singapore , Takao Radio Sasebo Radio plus unidentified and info to Kure . Association with Desrons 2 , 3 , and 4 may indicate that vessel to be in company with Crudiv 7 and other units possibly enroute Surabaya via Takao. This apparent movement suggests two possibilities: 1st, ZUIKAKU is scheduled for docking at Singapore or, 2nd, Task Force is being formed for use in Indian Ocean or against Australia. Since no direct association has been noted between ZUIKAKU and Crudiv 7, the former assumption appears more logical.
(BdL-180644-TI)
(Summary, 190600, July, No. 14)

ORIGINAL

JULY 20, 1942

Japanese radio traffic was very heavy, and there were many more indications of important movements to the Southern Pacific:

No. 169

Traffic is heavy and filled with important associations and indications of movements to Southern areas.
(GH-424-Opnav-191950-T1)
(Summary, 200600, July, No. 1)

Rabaul, Singapore and Yokosuka were the principal operating centers of the Japanese Navy at this time, and the units probably present at these places were now indicated:

No. 170

Traffic indicates forces being assembled for major operations in Southwest Pacific. Apparently two principal operating areas involved centered at Rabaul and Singapore. Forces assembling Rabaul area believed to be under command new Cinc 8th Fleet and will include Crudivs 6 and 18, 4th Fleet light cruisers, destroyers and smaller craft, one ship of Crudiv 7 which will be joined at Truk by Desdiv of Desron 2. Unusually heavy army traffic over Navy

ORIGINAL
22 JUN 1942

No. 170 (Cont.)

circuits indicates Army units at Davao will be escorted to Rabaul area by vessels of Desron 5, normally operating near Asiatic Coast, and possibly picked up enroute by ships of Desron 6 . These Army units will also be under Cinc 8th as indicated by dozen or more messages from Army at Davao to Cinc 8th and Cinc 5th . (GT#424-Opnav 191930-TI)
(Summary, 200600, July, No. 2)

No. 171

Believe forces at Singapore base will be reinforced by carriers of Cardivs 4 and 5 and vessels of Crudiv 7, now enroute that area, plus Desdiv 2 and 9 . There are some indications that Crudiv 7 plus these two Desdivs are in company with a convoy including HARUS . There are indications that a convoy is being formed at Yokosuka bound for Rabaul, with units of Desron 4 as escorts.
(GT#424-Opnav-191930-TI).
(Summary, 200600, July, No. 56)

No. 172

Cinc Combined issuing directions to Cinc 4th and 8th Fleets on 19-20 July. Noted that Kure #5 Special Landing Force associated, and may be involved in possibly assembly of convoy of Yokosuka destined for Rabaul, as reported on 19th.
(Summary, 201400, July, No. 14)

JULY 20, 1942 (Continued)

Along the line from north to south, all the way from Japan to the Solomons, were observed movements of Japanese supply ships and warships to the Solomons. The Philippine and Truk areas in particular were very active:

No. 173

Traffic headings indicate ships of Desron 5 are acting as escort vessels in the Philippines-Indies-Celebes area and also Saipan area. (BEL-2ØØ635-TI)

It was observed:

TI on 20 July stated Condesron 5 commenced talking to 4th Fleet and Mandates Bases which agrees with Washington's idea of movement from Indies to 4th Fleet area. An urgent dispatch from this command to Koepang and Makassar Bases plus unidentified Combatant vessel , at 2350, 19th, may represent rapid arrangements for change of area. (Summary, 201400, July, No. 23)

No. 174

Traffic headings indicate movement of SUZUYA (?) from Truk will be under escort of Desdiv 8). Point of arrival not definitely indicated but association with Rabaul Base Force and Chief of

JULY 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 174 (Cont.)

Staff 8th Fleet may be some indications. (BEL-200635-TI)

It was remarked:

On 16 July TI indicated at Truk.
(Summary, 201400, July, No. 15)

The Japanese Army was as active in this day's radio traffic as was the Navy:

No. 175

Heavy Army traffic to and from Rabaul involved following: (Enciphered)
1) Chief of Saigon Branch 102nd Supply,
2) 1st Davao Stevedore Force at Palao,
3) Commander 1st anti-Air Artillery Regiment at Ujina Anchorage,
4) 44th Anchorage at Davao,
5) Commander #37 Kii Anchorage Osaka Harbor,
6) Chief of Staff Hiroshima Transports,
7) Commander Hiroshima Transport Communications Regiment. (CON 14-200608-TI)

It was stated:

Ujina Harbor and Hiroshima Bay are located on the Inland Sea Coast of Honshu.
(Summary, 200600, July, No. 49)

JULY 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 176

Rabaul Army Command (TUROSU) exchanged several with Empire Army address (YOHIFU). (COM 14-200608-TI)
(Summary, 200600, July, No. 50)

No. 177

Rabaul Army Commander addressed one message to Comdr. 44th Anchorage at Davao on 19th. (GT#426-Opnav 192042-TI)
(Summary, 200600, July, No. 51)

No. 178

Unidentified YOHIFU sent army traffic to TUROSU at Rabaul, and not understood "HOSANGORYODANTEU" (possibly 35th Artillery Brigade) at Davao.
(GT#433-Opnav-2Ø175Ø-TI)

It was noticed:

TUROSU is identified as Rabaul Army Command.
(Summary, 201400, July, No. 27)

Japanese espionage reports contained some items concerning American preparations for the defense of Australia. It is interesting to note that the next dispatch contains information gathered in America, and transmitted to Tokyo via Madrid:

JULY 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 179

FROM: Madrid #763 July 16/(?)
TO : Tokyo
TO Intelligence. (New York the 15th.)
1. It has been said that a convoy which is scheduled to go to Australia, is taking extra special precautions against torpedoes and machine mines. The escort ships have a flexible net which is dropped to intercept torpedoes. According to the stories of members of the convoy's crew, this net has shown excellent results in actual tests. _____ it is square _____ it is considered finally, to make sailing in a mass _____. The present convoy has 5 (?) nets like those (described?) above, and numbers 2Ø ships _____.
2. According to confidential remarks of an American Officer who recently returned from Australia, fortifications and trenches have been built throughout Australia. If the Japanese army cannot land in Australia and New Zealand without loss of time, and incidentally, all the points of likely landings in both places have been strongly fortified, it will become absolutely impossible. There follows a gist of his report on the defense positions being constructed between Cooktown and Cairns which he saw himself (?). These defenses render the defense of the southern regions firm.

There is a strip of land mines at a point a mile from the coast. It is exploded in sections by an electric current from the encampment in the rear. Tank defenses follow the mined area. They have carried out preparations for (close range flame throwers (?). Back of these is another mine field

JULY 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 179 (Cont.)

and then barb wire entanglements. Then there are trenches, machine guns, pill-boxes, and reinforced gun emplacements. Behind these, we suppose that the enemy has made preparations in the event of a gas attack by setting up gas throwers.
3. In New Orleans they are rapidly constructing torpedo boats which will be sent to the California region after actual tests have been made.
I have passed this on to Germany and Italy.
(GZ/0536-Opnav 192147-DI)
(Summary, 200600, July, No. 7)

It was suspected that the Japanese were attempting radio deception during this period:

No. 180

Due contradictions confusing identifications of many new Major Force calls, suspect some apparently significant headings may be deception. Without proof so far. (COM 14-200646-TI)
(Summary, 200600, July, No. 3)

The reader may be interested in observing the close attention paid to every message emanating from the Rabaul-Solomon Islands area, from which deductions could be drawn sometimes from the location of

JULY 20, 1942 (Continued)

the originators or the addressees. It should be indicated here that, in the present war, traffic analysis has often been the mainstay of U. S. Naval Communication Intelligence during the periods when new ciphers and codes were resisting decipherment.

No. 181

At 1210/19th, Chief of Staff 4th addressed Davao Base Info: Chief of Staff 8th Fleet 11th Air Fleet Combined Comcrudiv 18 and 8th Base Force Rabaul (GT#425-Opnav-192023-TI) (Summary, 200600, July, No. 4)

No. 182

Chief of Staff Yokosuka on 19th addressed Rabaul Info: Maru and Communications Officers 4th and 8th Fleets Rabaul addressed Yokosuka Info: 4th and 8th Fleet Communication Officers and Maru in three messages. (GT#425-Opnav 192023-TI) (Summary, 200600, July, No. 5)

No. 183

Unidentified addressed Rabaul Base Info: Unidentified Yokosuka and Un-

JULY 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 183 (Cont.)

identified .
(GT#427-Opnav 192047-TI)
(Summary, 200000, July, No. 6)

No. 184

Guadalcanal originator , addressed lengthy dispatch to 4th, 8th Fleets, 8th Base Force and 5th Air Attack which is believed to be a report on construction and installations underway.
(COM 14-200658-TI)

It was pointed out:

5th Air Attack Force is located in Rabaul area.
(Summary, 200000, July, No. 52)

No. 185

KOTOKU MARU addressed Chief of Staff 4th Fleet , at 1420/18th. Comcrudiv 18 , Rabaul and Casebo 5th Special Landing Force were passed this message by Truk at 2030.
(GT#425-Opnav 192033-TI)
(Summary, 200000, July, No. 53)

No. 186

Rabaul addressed Comm. Officer Desron 2 , info Comm. Officer Desron 3 , Yokosuka Address

JULY 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 186 (Cont.)

(KUNIWI) and garbled shore address at Ø7ØØ, 20 July.
(CT#432-Opnav-2Ø173Ø & 2Ø183Ø-TI)
(Summary, 201400, July, No. 22)

No. 187

Bomber Group using Gasmata as cover on 20 July. Some part of Misawa Air Group also at Gasmata. (CT#433-Opnav-2Ø175Ø-TI)

It was indicated:

on 12 July was identified as 4th Air Group, in Rabaul area.
(Summary, 201400, July, No. 24)

No. 188

Cinc 8th Fleet in CHOKAI originated encoded movement report at 17ØØ, 19th but heading fails to indicate places involved. (BEL-200625-TI)
(Summary, 201400, July, No. 25)

No. 189

(man-of-war) appears in company with CHOKAI and scheduled proceed Rabaul with Cinc 8th Fleet. This suggests possibility that might be a cruiser,

No. 189 (Cont.)

possibly the KAYA. (BEL-200025-TI)

It was noted:

is evidently incorrect and may be either , a CL, which on 16 June was believed refitting in Singapore, or more likely a CA, which on 18 July was Flag of Crudiv 4.
(Summary, 201400, July, No. 26)

Japanese Radio Intelligence was operating in this area:

No. 190

Rabaul intelligence messages include Comcrudiv 6 , Flagship Desdiv 29 , and Chief of Staff 8th Fleet on 20 July. Also includes Comcrudiv 18 in separate RI message as though subject concerned was different than those to Comcrudiv 6. (CT#451-Opnav-200173-TI)

It was indicated:

Comcrudiv 6 on 19 July was believed aboard AOBA at Kavieng.
Comcrudiv 18 on 18 July was indicated as still using Rabaul as cover.

JULY 20, 1942 (Continued)

No. 189 (Cont.)

possibly the KAYA. (BEL-200025-TI)

It was noted:

is evidently incorrect and may be either , a CL, which on 16 June was believed refitting in Singapore, or more likely a CA, which on 18 July was Flag of Crudiv 4.
(Summary, 201400, July, No. 26)

Japanese Radio Intelligence was operating in this area:

No. 190

Rabaul intelligence messages include Comcrudiv 6 , Flagship Desdiv 29 , and Chief of Staff 8th Fleet on 20 July. Also includes Comcrudiv 18 in separate RI message as though subject concerned was different than those to Comcrudiv 6. (GT#451-Opnav-200730-TI)

It was indicated:

Comcrudiv 6 on 19 July was believed aboard AOBA at Kavieng.
Comcrudiv 18 on 18 July was indicated as still using Rabaul as cover.

ORIGINAL

JULY 21, 1942

Great interest was shown in Japanese air carrier and air supply movements, since these were helping to provide a very potent striking force for the enemy:

No. 191

Carrier traffic 19-20 July shows no further association with Indies Command. ZUIKAKU received two from Yokosuka Air Info: Plane Group Comdrs. and , delivered via Tokyo Broadcast. Also received one from Communication Officer Yokosuka at 1530/19 July delivered by Tokyo at 0600/20th. (GT #435-OPNAV 202015-TI)

It was commented:

Traffic associations on the 17th and 18th July strongly indicated that the ZUIKAKU would move to Southwest Asia. (Summary 210600, July, No. 17)

No. 192

, Serial 65 of July 19: "Arrived Rabaul(?) at 0600/19th."

Comment: Believe questionable Rabaul correct as this call was observed working Rabaul on 17th and was placed in area on that date. (BEL-200845-DI)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 192 (Cont.)

It was remarked:

entered Rabaul Communication Zone at 0800/18 July from Saipan Communication Zone. All associations indicate it is an air tender as partially identified by COM 14.
(Summary 210600, July, No. 31)

Knowledge of the routes taken by enemy destroyers and cruisers on their way to southern waters was of considerable value, since these indicated the paths taken by the convoys they were guarding:

No. 193

Comdesron 2, in no originator dispatch at 1900, 19th, addressed Desdiv destroyer of Desdiv information to Chief of Staff 2nd Fleet Tokyo Transportation Office, Chief of Staff 4th Fleet Chief of Staff Chief of Staff and Transportation Office Yokosuka, 4th, 6th and 7th Base Forces, Maru and Yokosuka Defense Force.

It was observed:

Taken to indicate that destroyer units named are to convoy from Empire to Marshalls.
(COM 14-202002-TI)
(Summary 210600, JULY, No. 27)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 194

Unidentified (probably Indies Commander) addressed Comcrudiv 7 Cinc Southern Expeditionary Force info Desdiv 2 , Base #22 at Balikpapan at 0600, 21 July. This may be indication of route being taken by Crudiv 7 vessels and Desdiv 2 now enroute Southwestern Area.
(GT #439-OPNAV-211645-TI)
(Summary 211400, July, No. 22)

Traffic between various southern stations was watched closely for signs of imminent action by the enemy:

No. 195

Unidentified now in active association in 3rd Fleet Area. This call formerly in 4th Air Attack Corps in Marshalls.
(COM 14-202006-TI)

It was stated:

is tentatively identified as Rabaul Radio.
(Summary 210600, July, No. 38)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 196

Liaison between Staffs 4th and 8th Fleets increasing. (COM 14-210918-TI) (Summary 211400, July, No. 20)

No. 197

By routing, part of Desdiv 34 is at Palao. (COM 14-202006-TI)

It was noted:

On 19 July, traffic intelligence indicated that two ships of Desdiv 34 were in the Rabaul Area. (Summary 210600, July, No. 28)

Allied planes attacked Japanese areas on this day according to a report from the enemy radio at Lae:

No. 198

Lae Radio at 1415, on 21st, in abbreviated contact dispatch addressed to Comcrudiv 18 indicated that air raid was in that area. Reported sighting by Allied planes of 12 ships including probable cruisers 6 hours earlier in vicinity Salamoa plus above indicates Crudiv 18 units involved. (COM 14-211202-MI)

JULY 21, 1942 (Continued)

No. 198 (Cont.)

It was mentioned:

Traffic analysis on 20 July, indicated radio intelligence messages from Rabaul include Comcrudiv 6, Flagship Desdiv 29, and Chief of Staff 8th Fleet. Also includes Comcrudiv 18 in separate radio intelligence message as though subject concerned different than those to Comcrudiv 6 . Comcrudiv 18, on 18 July, was indicated as using Rabaul as cover.
(Summary 211400, July, No. 18)

No. 199

At 1510, Lae amplified contact report to Comcrudiv 18 . . . in short message. (GT #439-OPNAV-211645-TI)
(Summary 211400, July, No. 19)

American submarines had been active along the convoy routes during May, 1942 as the next message belatedly demonstrated:

No. 200

11 May/1150
FROM: (10th Base Force at Ambon)
TO : (Major Shore Station)
INFO: (4th Fleet)

3 submarine torpedoes which were fired at the (- ship) on the 8th were discovered near Olang Cape in Amboina Bay. They were manufactured by the Newport Torpedo Station in 1934. (GZ #2217-OPNAV-202000-DI)
(Summary 211400, July, No. 30)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 22, 1942

Captured Japanese documents confirmed some important information known about the enemy's weather code and methods of reporting contacts with Allied forces:

No. 201

Documents referred to in Kelbunit's 170511, and now being microphotographed, were recovered from canvas handbag thrown from Orange Naval bomber shot down at Gaille, New Guinea, July 10. Included among personal items, photos of Japanese and American Naval vessels at various target angles, bombing and navigation tables, etc., are photostatic copies of (1) weather code, (2) universal position grid, (3) two tables of Kana for use in radio deception, (4) organization of Combined Fleet (which looks suspicious), and (5) most important, a badly tattered code book, not a photostat, of two and three Kana groups. Full details as well as photographs will be forwarded as soon as available. Preliminary translations await development of films

(BKL. 170548-DI)

(Summary 220600, July, No. 1)

No. 202

Microfilm is on the way to Washington and Honolulu, but as prints of code book did not come out as well as expected, additional photographs have been taken

JULY 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 202 (Cont.)

and will be forwarded if any improvement noted. Weather code and position grid do not develop into useful copy because of bad condition of subject and limitations our equipment. Former will be copied and sent. Latter can be reconstructed when it is noted that small kana in each square is repetition of rectangular coordinates and circles mark distances in units of 2 kilometers from center. Title of this grid is "Form for Use in Reporting Enemy Formation," and center is presumed to be center of enemy disposition. Title of Kana tables described as for use in radio deception translates literally as "False Dispatch Protective Signs," freely rendered as "Authenticator Signs". Method and scope of use not clear. Combined Fleet Organization List described as suspicious lacks a 3rd Fleet and appears to correspond to status of mid-1940. (Bel. 190512-DI) (Summary 220600, July, No. 2)

Enemy destroyers and cruisers continued to be active in convoying Army forces into the Solomon area:

No. 203

Army forces believed moving from Davao to New Britain Area, screened by units of Desron 5. (Cincpac 210147-Bull.#120) (Summary 220600, July, No. 48)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 204

Volume of Army traffic over Navy circuits continues to be heavy with addressees at Davao, Rabaul, and Empire involved. (BEL. 210650-TI) (Summary 220600,JULY, No.49)

No. 205

8th Base Force still dominant originator. (COM 14-210922-TI)(Summary 220600, July, No. 52)

No. 206

Comcrudiv 18 was in dispatch which also included Koepang . This considered with heavy Army traffic load between Rabaul and Davao, and association in one instance of Crudiv 18 with Davao Base Force on 19th, suggests that this division may escort Army reinforcements from Davao to Rabaul. (BEL. 210715-TI) (Summary 220600, July, No. 57)

It was commented:

Comcrudiv 18 was addressed in a contact report of enemy aircraft by Lae Radio, mentioned above. It is also believed that Crudiv 18 is involved with the 12 ships sighted in Salamoa Area July 21st.

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 207

Bureau Military Affairs still busy with bases and Base Forces along route to Singapore and NEI Area indicating extent of logistic arrangements being made. (COM 14-220616-TI)(Summary 220600, July, No. 69)

No. 208

Comcrudiv 18, 22 July, using Rabaul cover, addressed Cinc 4th information TUROSU which by D/F is at Ø4 S., 146 E. Previous identification of may be incorrect, and actually Air Base and port in New Guinea (Lae or Salamaua).. Other addressees of message (serial 312) are garbled except Tainan Air and 5th Air Attack (GT #446-OPNAV-221801-TI)

It was remarked:

TUROSU is an Army Command. (Summary 221400, July, No. 12)

Crudivs 6 and 18 figured very prominently in enemy traffic, for each was operating separately in the Rabaul area:

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 209

Comcrudiv 6 at Kavieng 17th to 19th, no indications whether yet departed elsewhere. (COK 14-211902-TI)

It was observed:

On July 20th, Staff Communication Officer, Crudiv 6, appeared at Kavieng. (Summary 220600, July, No. 54)

No. 210

Comcrudiv 6 and Comcrudiv 18 were included as addressees in intelligence dispatches from Rabaul, but both not included in any one dispatch, further suggesting these divisions operating separately. (Bel. 210715-TI)

It was remarked:

The fact that Crudiv 6 and Crudiv 18 appear to be operating separately has been noted previously. (Summary 220600, July, No. 55)

No. 211

In connection with reported sighting enemy force including Cruisers, Salamaua Area, 21st, believed Crudiv 18 escorting transports? to New Britain. (Com-14-211902-TI)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 211 (Cont.)

It was stated:

Allied planes reported sighting 12 ships, including probable cruisers, about 0815, July 21st, in vicinity Salamaua. (Summary 220600, July, No. 59)

An estimate was made as to the location of various Japanese units which had been observed in radio traffic:

No. 212

Crudiv 18 now indicated in Lae-Salamaua Area. Crudiv 6 at Kavieng on 18th. Desron 6: Desdiv 29 in Tulagi Area, Desdiv 30 in Rabaul Area. One Division of Subron 8 in South Pacific. NATORI uncertain having been reported both, remaining in Indies waters and returned to Maizuru. 2 DD's of Desdiv 34 believed at Rabaul. Southern Expeditionary Fleet reported N.E.I. waters. (OPNAV-212201-ONI BULL)

It was indicated:

Traffic analysis indicated NATORI may have been in Mairuru on 10 July, but on 14 July, it appeared that she was returning to the N.E.I. Area. (Summary 221400, July, No. 11)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 213

Urgent dispatch from Comdesron 5 to Comdr. Ambon Base Force and ISUZU Base Force; info Comdr. Makassar suggests ISUZU returning to Southern Area. (BEL. 210650-TI)

It was pointed out:

On June 26th, the ISUZU appeared possibly enroute to Yokosuka. On July 5th, BEL. reported that the ISUZU was no longer the flagship of Desron 5 and was probably enroute Yokosuka.

An analysis of the make-up of Cruiser Division 7 of the Japanese Navy was made for operational authorities by U.S. Navy Communication Intelligence:

No. 214

CRUDIV 7 SPECIAL NOTE FOR F-1

Prior to the Midway engagement, the calls were identified as the four ships of Crudiv 7--KUMANO, MIKUMA, MOGAMI, and SUZUYA. Which call belonged to which ship, however, had not been definitely determined, although it was thought that was the MOGAMI.

During the interval between Midway and July 20, all of these calls were heard

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

No. 214 (Cont.)

in traffic with the exception of SAWA 1, a fact which would indicate that three ships are still afloat, but that the latter has been lost. Assuming the correctness of the information obtained from a prisoner that the MIKUMA actually sank on June 6th, it would appear that was the latter's call. This conclusion also tends to confirm the identification of as the MOGAMI because (a) the prisoner also said that the MIKUMA and MOGAMI operated together independently of the other two ships of Crudiv 7, and (b) the calls and had been associated together prior to Midway to the exclusion of the other two calls.

While there is information from other sources suggesting the possible sinking of the MOGAMI as well as the MIKUMA, the only evidence available to date from radio intelligence sources supporting this conclusion is a single appearance, on July 15, of an enciphered call for the Commanding Officer of the MOGAMI; were the ship still afloat, it would not be usual to address the Commanding Officer in this manner. On the other hand, the call has also appeared subsequent to the enciphered address of July 15. Unless deception is being practiced, or its old call has been assigned to some other ship, the MOGAMI may still be in existence.

Although by no means conclusive, the weight of the evidence indicates that Crudiv 7 now consists of KUMANO 2nd SUZUYA, and possibly the MOGAMI. (Summary 221400, July, No. 19)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 22, 1942 (Continued)

Information concerning the actions of the Japanese Commanders was supplied by traffic analysis:

No. 215

Cinc 4th Fleet indicated as shifting flagships at 0920, 19th. At 0600, 20th (KASHIMA?) previous flagship sent encoded Communication Zone report indicating movement from Truk to Kure via Saipan and Chichijima, followed at 0700 by movement report which also indicated departure for Kure. (BEL. 210650-TI)
(Summary 220600, July, No. 45)

No. 216

8th Fleet command ready assume active participation indicated by present inclusion R.I. headings from Rabaul-Truk.
(COM-14-211858-TI)

It was mentioned:

The 8th Fleet appears concerned with the Southwestern Pacific Area. The Cinc 8th Fleet with CHOKAI as flagship appeared enroute Rabaul, June 20th.

No. 217

Cinc 4th addressed tanker information Cinc 8th Fleet, Comcrudiv 8
Truk Base Saipan Base

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

No. 217 (Cont.)

Rabaul Base Military Stores Section at Truk Rabaul Address at 1320, 22 July. This is first association Crudiv 8 with Southern Area and appears to be strong indication this Crudiv will operate under Cinc 8th Fleet. Also note further association with this Force. (CT #447-CPNAV-221803-TI) (Summary 221400, July, No. 10)

No. 218

Comcrudiv 7 Comdesron 3 Comdesron 5 Comairron 23 Comairron 21 Cinc Combined and Chief of Naval General Staff included as info addressees in dispatch from Cinc 3rd Fleet to Cinc Southern Expeditionary Fleet at ØØØØ, 20th. (BKL. 210743-TI)

It was commented:

Airron 23 appeared at Kendari, July 4th. Airron 21 last placed at Sabang by Colombo on June 2nd. Crudiv 7 and Desron 3 appear enroute Singapore. Desron 5 appears engaged in convoy duty in Balikpapan-Makassar Area.

Locating several Japanese units in the Rabaul-Guadalcanal area was of help to our operational forces:

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

No. 219

At 0820, 21 July, Comdr. TULAGI Base Force addressed 84th Guard Force info Communication Officers 8th Fleet 4th Fleet Rabaul Base Force and enciphered "Guadalcanal Detachment, Kure 3rd Special Force" at (GT #440-OPNAV 211650-TI)

It was remarked:

The 84th Guard Force on 19 July, was indicated in Rabaul Area.
(Summary 220600, July, No. 63)

No. 220

From enciphered address Kure 3rd Special Force is at Guadalcanal.
(COM-14-220644-TI)

It was observed:

Kure #5 Special Landing Force from associations is believed will operate within that area but nothing is known regarding the Kure 3rd Special Force.
(Summary 220600, July, No. 65)

No. 221

Fleet Tanker addressed Chief of Staff 8th Fleet and Chief of Staff 4th Fleet Rabaul Base information Comcrudivs 6 and 18 respectively), at 1650, 21 July.

JULY 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 221 (Cont.)

Obviously this tanker proceeding to Rabaul Area, if not already arrive. (GT #447-OPNAV-221803-TI)

It was indicated:

Tanker appeared to be at Truk on 4 July and on 11 July, T.I. indicated movement to Rabaul Area. (Summary 221400, July, No. 9)

No. 222

Comdr. Tainan Air shown at (GT #447-OPNAV-221801-TI)

It was pointed out:

now tentatively identified as Air Base and port in New Guinea, possibly Lae or Salamaua. (Summary 221400, July, No. 14)

No. 223

FROM: #751, July 21.

Unreadable, but RZ (Blank) Occupation Force is mentioned. Assume "Blank" is either "P" or "Q" which would make it Port Moresby or place in that vicinity. (BEL. - 211505-DI)

It was stated:

is Tainan Air Group which has been placed in the New Guinea area. (Summary 221400, July, No. 15)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN

JULY 22, 1942 (Continued)

According to the next dispatch, the enemy was sending direction finder bearings on American units:

No. 224

Between 1637 and 1850, 22 July, Horo-
mushiro originated series of 11
messages believed to be reports of D/F
bearings. These were the only messages
originated by this station during this
period. At 1809 Marcus Island
originated one message of this type.
(GT #445-OPNAV-221803-TI)
(Summary 221400, July, No. 2)

Enemy submarine traffic was also scrutinized carefully, and the presence of these dangerous obstacles in the path of Allied ships was noted:

No. 225

At 1430, 21 July, Rabaul
addressed submarine unit in SUBRON 3;
info unidentified in operational
type code. (GT #440-OPNAV 211650-TI)

It was noted:

by D/F on 20th, was in 05 S.,
169 E.

ORIGINAL

22 JUN

JULY 22, 1942 (Continued)

According to the next dispatch, the enemy was sending direction finder bearings on American units:

No. 224

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Enemy submarine traffic was also scrutinized carefully, and the presence of these dangerous obstacles in the path of Allied ships was noted:

No. 225

At 1430, 21 July, Rabaul addressed submarine unit in SUBRON 3; info unidentified in operational type code. (GT #440-OPNAV 211650-TI)

It was noted:

by D/F on 20th, was in 05 S., 169 E.

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 226

Dispatches from Combined Fleet Staff concern Subron 8 and Tenders:

At 1430/21st July Secretary Combined Fleet sent one to a Maru of Subron 8, Destroyer of Desdiv 7, Info: Comdesdiv 7 Suggest escort of sub units. A message from a Desron 5 unit may tie in with this one addressed to COmdesdiv 7, info: Kure Personnel Comdr. 10th Base Force at Ambon and Chief of Staff Southeast Asia unit at 1750/21 July. (COM 14-220648-TI)

It was mentioned:

On June 26 DD was in Ominato call up but probably shifted areas since then. Desron 5 has been associated with convoy duties in the Melanesian Area and Cincpac believes it is taking an army unit from Davao to Rabaul.
(Summary 220600, July, No. 62)

No. 227

Comsubron 7 continues to be associated with units in Rabaul-Solomon Area. (GT #441-OPNAV 211655-TI)
(Summary 220600, July, No. 70)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 22, 1942 (Continued)

No. 228

Subron 7 associated both 4th and 8th Fleet detached units. (COM-14-210922-TI)

It was noticed:

On July 19, Cinc 4th addressed Comcrudiv 6 and Comcrudiv 18, Rabaul, unidentified Cinc 11th Air Fleet, 5th Air Attack Force and Kure 11 on

(Summary 220600, July, No. 71)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 23, 1942

Japanese radio traffic in the Rabaul area still remained conspicuously active on July 23, as the following items testify:

No. 229

Administrative types remain much in evidence but more operationals noted. (COM 14-221952-TI) (Summary 230600, July, No. 4)

No. 230

Relatively quiet in all areas except 4th - 8th Fleet where traffic volume definitely overshadows others. (COM 14-221952-TI) (Summary 230600, July, No. 6)

No. 231

Several high precedence seen from Rabaul area. (COM 14-221952-TI) (Summary 230600, July, No. 43)

Allied planes had attacked some of the Japanese Occupation Forces, according to the next dispatch:

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 23, 1942 (Continued)

No. 232

FROM:	[redacted]	(Rabaul Rdo) #312 July 22/0810
TO :	[redacted]	(4th Fleet)
INFO:	[redacted]	(Unidentified)
	[redacted]	(Unidentified)
LESS:	[redacted]	(Unidentified)
	[redacted]	(Crudiv 6)
	[redacted]	(Tainan Air)
	[redacted]	(Airron 25?)
	[redacted]	(Rabaul)
	[redacted]	(Base Force #8 at Rabaul)

From Commander RR Occupation Force to the 4th Fleet. Battle Report No. 2 (July 22). Part 1. At 0710 bombed [redacted]. Part 2. At a point [redacted] five enemy bombers attacked ships attached to (the 4th Fleet ?). (GZ #2224-OPNAV 221940-DI)

It was remarked:

The above originator under Rabaul Radio cover is Comcrudiv 18, which would seem to make him Comdr. RR Occupation Force. RR is Rabaul. This attack may be the result of U.S. reconnaissance reported above. Tainan Air Group shown at [redacted] which is tentatively identified as Lae or Salamaua, air base. (Summary 230600, July, No. 45)

No. 233

FROM:	[redacted]	(Rabaul Rdo) #? July 22/1335
TO :	[redacted]	(Unidentified)
	[redacted]	(Base Force #8 at Rabaul)
	[redacted]	(5th Air Attack Force)
INFO:	[redacted]	(8th Fleet)
	[redacted]	(Tokyo Naval Intelligence)
	[redacted]	(4th Fleet)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

No. 233 (Cont.)

_____(#) enemy plane(s) attacked _____(#) transport(s). (GZ #2223-OPNAV 221942-DI)

It was observed:

See above message. This may be a report of the same or another attack by Allied planes on the force reported July 21st.
(Summary 230600, July, No. 46)

Japanese Radio Intelligence was on the alert at this time, as the following intercepted messages disclose:

No. 234

FROM: (Rabaul Rdo) #553 July 22/0600
TO : (Crudiv 18)
(5th (Air) Attack Force)
(Base Force #8 at Rabaul)

The following radio message was sent from enemy planes.
0530 sighted (?) 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers and 2 transports at Buna.
(GZ #2221-OPNAV 221940-DI)

It was commented:

At about 0815, July 21st, Allied planes reported sighting 12 ships including probable cruisers in vicinity of Salamaua. On July 21st,

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 23, 1942 (Continued)

No. 234 (Cont.)

(Lae Radio) sent the following message to Comcrudiv 18; "Enemy planes sighted altitude 500 meters? at 1415." The same station also sent a 3 group 4 Kana message to same addressee at 1500. The above intercepted message appears to be another attack since this message is dated July 22nd.
(Summary 230600, July, No. 44)

No. 235

FROM: ____ (Rabaul Radio) #550 July 23
TO : (Maru)
(AKikaze)
(5th Air Attack Force)
(Base Force #8 at Rabaul)
INFO: (CofS 8th Fleet)
(Tokyo Naval Intelligence)
(CofS 4th Fleet)
(CofS 11th Air Fleet)

At 1315 an enemy B-17 sighted ____ Maru----and reported to Moresby as follows: 1 destroyer and 1 transport -----. Position -----. (GZ #2231-OPNAV 231737-DI)
(Summary 231400, July, No. 19)

No. 236

Rabaul RI messages were addressed to Destroyer and Maru in addition to usual addressees on 23 July. These two vessels probably at sea in the area. (GT #455-OPNAV 231922-TI)
(Summary 231400, July, No. 21)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 23, 1942 (Continued)

The Kure 3rd Special Landing Force was evidently destined for the Guadalcanal area:

No. 237

Enciphered Guadalcanal Detachment of Kure #3 Special Landing Force is shown at Lunga may be Comdr. of this force and is currently at Kavieng. (BKL. 220809-TI)

It was observed:

The character of this force has not been determined.
(Summary 230600, July, No. 52)

No. 238

Enciphered Kure 3rd Special Force addressed at Guadalcanal 21 July.
(COM 14-230812-TI)
(Summary 231400, July, No. 14)

Comcrudiv 18 was rather prominent in Japanese traffic, and it was indicated that it was in the Solomons area:

No. 239

Comcrudiv 18 under Rabaul cover originated urgent 4-Kana at 0810 22 July to all important Comdrs. Southern Theatre

22 JUN 1943

JULY 23, 1942 (Continued)

No. 239 (Cont.)

including Crudiv 6 and Comdr. Tainan Air at Vunakanau. Several high priorities subsequently sent by units in Rabaul Area to patrol Forces there. (COM 14-221956-TI)

It was stated:

Vunakanau is the airport just outside of Rabaul. Crudiv 18 is believed operating south of Rabaul in the Lae-Solomons Area on 21 July.
(Summary 230600, July, No. 49)

No. 240

Rabaul RI traffic going to Comcrudiv 18 as addressee and some short priority same type going to him, 4th and 8th Fleets Chiefs of Staff and KIMIHI only readdressed to 4th Task Force . (COM 14-221956-TI)

It was indicated:

KIMIHI is Tokyo Radio Intelligence.
(Summary 230600, July, No. 50)

No. 241

Part of Crudiv 18 may escort Davao army units from Mandates southward.
(Cincpac Bull. #130-230435)
(Summary 231400, July, No. 18)

Comcrudiv 6 was believed to be still at Kavieng:

JULY 23, 1942 (Continued)

22 JUN 1943

No. 242

Dispatch from Kavieng with concealed originator Comcrudiv 6 indicates that command still at Kavieng at 2300, 21st. (BEL. 220809-TI)

It was pointed out:

On July 21st, COM 14 reported Comcrudiv 6, at Kavieng 17th to 19th, with no indications whether or not he has departed. (Summary 230600, July, No. 53)

Some information concerning the Japanese Army units in the region of the Solomons was learned from the day's traffic:

No. 243

Army Command apparently divided between (On New Guinea?) and Rabaul Base . (GT #454-OPNAV 231917-TI) (Summary 231400, July, No. 23)

No. 244

"Comdr Ikuta Force", apparently at Palao, addressed "Chief of Staff Oki Force attached to 4th Fleet" on 23 July. Message in Army cipher delivered to Truk but ultimate relay may have been to Rabaul. (GT #454-OPNAV-231917-TI)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 23, 1942 (Continued)

No. 244 (Cont.)

It was noted:

Ikuta Force not previously noted. Oki Army Detachment appeared by T.I. to be at Davao as late as 9-10 July and has been associated with the New Britain area frequently during the past month. (Summary 231400, July, No. 24)

Unidentified calls of some importance were noted coming from Tulagi and Rabaul:

No. 245

Unidentified used Tulagi cover 15-20 July. (COM 14-230814-TI)

It was remarked:

has appeared to be a Major Command or Shore Station call during the past, but it's identity for the current call period is not yet known. (Summary 231400, July, No. 16)

No. 246

Dispatch of highest precedence from Comdr. 8th Base Force at 1530 #122? 22 July? went to unidentified Info: Chief of Staff 8th Fleet Comdr. 5th Air Attack Maru air tender , AKIKAZE and 4th Fleet Communication Officer (COM 14-222046-TI)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 23, 1942 (Continued)

No. 246 (Cont.)

It was indicated:

The 8th Base Force and 5th Air Attack Force is based at Rabaul. is one of the major command Shore Station calls and has not been identified since the last change. It has been an action addressee used on Rabaul dispatches the past few days which indicates it is a major fleet call. (Summary 230600, July, No. 57)

An enemy destroyer division and also a few Marus were noticed enroute to Rabaul:

No. 247

Desdiv of Desron 4 received traffic in care of (8th Fleet) and is probably in company with Cinc 8th in CHOKAI enroute Rabaul Area. (BEL.-220825-TI) (Summary 230600, July, No. 51)

No. 248

Maru addressed by Chief of Staff 4th Fleet ... information Chief of Staff 8th Fleet and Rabaul Base . Possibly this Maru enroute from Empire to Rabaul. (GT #454-OPNAV-231917-TI) (Summary 231400, July)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN

JULY 23, 1942 (Continued)

No. 249

KAMIKAWA MARU believed under escort AKIKAZE indicated enroute from Empire to Rabaul Area.
(COM 14-230814-TI)

It was commented:

May not be KAMIKAWA MARU. Opnav identifies only as a Maru and has for KAMIKAWA MARU. KAMIKAWA MARU appears to be in or near Home Waters while Maru and AKIKAZE are associated with Rabaul Radio in another item on this day indicating probable presence in Rabaul Area.
(Summary 231400, July, No. 20)

No. 250

indicates real meaning of is "All Commanders of Units in (Blank) Force", and as "South Seas Force" rather than 4th Fleet Task Force. Same probably applies suffix 12 used by 5th Fleet. (COM 14-230814-TI)

It was observed:

has appeared frequently in the past month usually as an addressee from Cinc

ORIGINAL

22 JUN

JULY 23, 1942 (Continued)

No. 249

KAMIKAWA MARU believed under escort AKIKAZE /indicated enroute from Empire to Rabaul Area.
(COM 14-230814-TI)

It was commented:

May not be KAMIKAWA MARU. Opnav identifies only as a Maru and has /for KAMIKAWA MARU. KAMIKAWA MARU appears to be in or near Home Waters while Maru and AKIKAZE are associated with Rabaul Radio in another item on this day indicating probable presence in Rabaul Area.
(Summary 231400, July, No. 20)

No. 250

indicates real meaning of is "All Commanders of Units in (Blank) Force", and as "South Seas Force" rather than 4th Fleet Task Force. Same probably applies suffix 12 used by 5th Fleet. (COM 14-230814-TI)

It was observed:

has appeared frequently in the past month usually as an addressee from Cinc

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 23, 1942 (Continued)

No. 250 (Cont.)

4th Fleet and associated with the New Britain area. South Seas Force has been concerned with the "SN" operation.
(Summary 231400, July, No. 22)

Part of the enemy air strength at Rabaul was shifted to the vicinity of Lae, New Guinea:

No. 251

Traffic association suggests replacements or reinforcements for Yokohama Flying Boat Squadron are being drawn from Yokohama Air Station ? and ferried South via Saipan. (BEL. 220809-TI)

It was remarked:

Yokohama Air Group appears to be part of 5th Air Attack Force which is operating in the Rabaul Area.
(Summary 230600, July, No. 54)

No. 252

Comdr. 82nd Guard Force is associated with Lae and Tainan Air Group and appears to remain in the Rabaul Area. (BEL. 220809-TI)
(Summary 230600, July, No. 55)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 23, 1942 (Continued)

No. 253

Between 0800 and 1200, 21st Comdr. Tainan Air shifted from Rabaul to Lae as indicated by traffic routing. (BEL. 220809-TI)

It was observed:

On July 22nd, Tainan Air Group appeared at (Air Base at Lae or Salamaua). (Summary 230600, July, No. 56)

Heavy concentration of Japanese submarines along the Truk-Rabaul line was a noteworthy feature of the day's traffic:

No. 254

Staff Communication Officer 8th Base Force at Rabaul sent operational type dispatch to Comsubdiv 33 at 1430, 21st. This division recently returned to Truk from Sasebo now apparently at or proceeding Rabaul. (BEL. 220746-TI)

It was stated:

Subdiv 33 appeared about to enter Truk harbor July 16th. (Summary 230600, July, No. 48)

JULY 23, 1942 (Continued)

No. 255

Subdiv of Subron 7 is using Truk cover along with Comsubron 7. (COM 14-230808-TI)

It was noticed:

Subdiv arrived in Truk area from Sasebo about 16 July. (Summary 231400, July, No. 32)

No. 256

Subron indicated in Truk Communication Zone today. (COM 14-230856-TI)

It was pointed out:

is identified by OPNAV as Subron 6. (Summary 231400, July, No. 33)

No. 257

Part of Subron 6 may proceed Rabaul shortly. (Cinepac Bull. #130-230435) (Summary 231400, July, No. 34)

In an important resume, U.S. Navy traffic analysts disclosed the probable location of some enemy units in southern waters at this time:

22 JUN 1943

SECRET

No. 258

Locations of Units in Southeast:

Comcrudiv 6 is aboard AOBA probably accompanied by KAKO in Kavieng Area 17-19 July. Second Section Crudiv 6, KINUGASA and FURUTAKA used Rabaul cover on 22nd; (KINUGASA) used Truk cover 4 July and originated one under own call 6 July, indicating probably at sea that date. (FURUTAKA) used Truk cover late June. Comcrudiv 18 using Rabaul cover in spite of fairly definite location in Salamaua Area; KASHIMA in Truk Area; believe TENRYU and TATSUTA are the two cruisers sighted Salamaua vicinity. Comdesron 6 aboard YUBARI was in Tulagi Area using Tulagi cover 10-15 July. Comdesdiv 29 same area 14 July, apparently at sea 18 July. DD Unit in Desron 6, originated operational type traffic 22nd and therefore believed concerned in New Guinea Area action, probably destroyer escort with Crudiv 18. 19th Division used Rabaul cover 7 July and own call 10 July, possibly at sea. (COM 14-230812-TI)

It was mentioned:

is identified as Desdiv 30 in Desron 6.

(Summary 231400, July, No. 13)

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ORIGINAL

JULY 24, 1942

It was believed that the Japanese were about to change their call signs or ciphers, and, in very short order, confirmation of this belief came:

No. 259

Tokyo Naval Communications continues to send long headings. Believe major communication change impending. (COM 14-232306-TI) (Summary 240600, July, No. 4)

No. 260

Major Shore Radio and High Command Call Signs changed at 0000/25 July (-9). (GT #472-OPNAV 241824-TI) (Summary 241400, July, No. 1)

Use of Radio Intelligence by the enemy was very common as the following messages demonstrate:

No. 261

Fragments indicate that on 21 July, Tokyo issued a directive regarding use of (Merchantmen to Navy) Code. (COM 14-240956-DI) (Summary 241400, July, No. 8)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1945

JULY 24, 1942 (Continued)

No. 262

Truk originated highest precedence R.I. report at 2230, 23 July. (GT #461-OPNAV 240310-TI) (Summary 240600, July, No. 30)

No. 263

Fragments indicate that on 22 July Koepang gave D/F bearings of American planes operating from Moresby. (COM 14-240956-DI) (Summary 241400, July, No. 43)

It has been already noticed that a great number of Marus were enroute to the southern area. This heavy traffic was a clear indication of the enemy's intentions to build strong bases in this territory:

No. 264

Maru addressed 34th Defense Force and message passed to Truk for delivery to South Seas Force by Tokyo. Furthers belief this Maru enroute Southern Area. (GT #460-OPNAV 240320-TI)

It was remarked:

34th Defense Force appears to be part of the 4th Base Force at Truk. A movement report from on July 23rd indicated this Maru was enroute Palao to Rabaul via Truk. (Summary 240600, July, No. 31)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1942

JULY 24, 1942 (Continued)

No. 265

Traffic routing and association indicates following: Maru and Naval Auxiliary in Rabaul Area. Detachment of Yokohama Flying Boat Squadron at Gasmata SHINSEI MARU at Ambon (BEL.-230857-TI)

It was noticed:

A detachment of the Yokohama Flying Boat Squadron appeared at Truk on July 22nd. (Summary 240600, July, No. 47)

No. 266

FROM: Cinc 4th Fleet 22 July/1320
TO : Maru
INFO: Cinc 8th Fleet
Comcrudiv 8
Base Force Commanders at Truk
Saipan
Rabaul
Chief of 4th Military Stores Section at Truk
Rabaul address

This is first noted association Crudiv 8 call with 4th Fleet activities and if call is not garbled association may indicate that Maru will service that Crudiv in Truk or Rabaul Area. (BEL.-230816-TI) (Summary 240600, July, No. 53)

ORIGINAL

JULY 24, 1942 (Continued)

No. 267

Maru now appears to be between Saipan and Truk enroute Rabaul; message addressed to Comcrudiv 6 shows this vessel has something for the cruisers.
(GT #467-OPNAV 211442-TI)
(Summary 241400, July, No. 26)

No. 268

BRAZIL MARU indicated for trip to Truk on 23 July. No longer associated with Comdr. Yokosuka Special Landing Force (GT #470-OPNAV-241812-TI)
(Summary 241400, July, No. 32)

No. 269

Fragments indicate on 22 July a Maru who has been associated with 1st Air Fleet departed Palao for Rabaul.
(COM 14-240956-DI)
(Summary 241400, July, No. 35)

The activities of the Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet continued to attract attention, and it seemed certain that he was proceeding southward aboard the CHOKAI:

ORIGINAL

22 JUL 1943

JULY 24, 1942 (Continued)

No. 270

Saipan Radio was in communication with CHOKAI at 0230/23rd on 5375 kcs. Cinc 8th Fleet is in the CHOKAI and evidently proceeding south as scheduled. Slight association also noted between CHOKAI and ABUKUMA
(BEL.-230800-TI)(Summary 240600, July, No. 37)

No. 271

Commander in Chief 8th Fleet is using Saipan Radio as cover originated three long priority dispatches to (General Staff) and Chief of Staff Combined and Chief of Staff 4th. (COM 14-240858-TI)

It was commented:

Cinc 8th Fleet believed in CHOKAI (CA) proceeding south was also in communication with Saipan Radio on the 23rd.
(Summary 241400, July, No. 29)

No. 272

Truk Radio calls 8th Fleet to deliver to 8th Fleet Secretary at 1515/24 July, indicating progress of Cinc 8th in CHOKAI, enroute southward.
(GT #467-OPNAV 241442-TI)
(Summary 241400, July, No. 31)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1942

JULY 24, 1942 (Continued)

An estimate of the forces assigned to the Japanese 4th and 8th Fleets was given in the following dispatches:

No. 273

Association of SUZUYA with Chief of Staff 8th Fleet in heading of dispatch from Chief of Staff Combined Fleet suggests this vessel may be assigned to 8th Fleet. A total of 10 cruisers (8 CA's and 2 CL's) have been associated with Cinc 4th and 8th Fleets and indicated as possibly assigned to Rabaul Area. These include Crudivs 6, 8 and 18, plus CHOKAI, SUZUYA and possibly MAYA . Still no evidence noted of adequate carrier support for such large concentration of heavy units.
(BEL. 230832-TI)

It was commented:

Comcrudiv 6 was indicated by TI in Kavieng Area 17-19 July, 2nd Section used Rabaul cover on 22nd. Comcrudiv 18 using Rabaul cover in spite fairly definite location in Salamaua Area on 22 July, association of Comcrudiv 8 with Cinc 4th and 8th Fleets was first noted here, on 19 July TI indicated belief Crudiv 8 in Empire waters. CHOKAI. Flag of Cinc 8th Fleet, on June 20 with was scheduled to proceed Rabaul. has not been identified here. On 18 July BEL. stated SUZUYA at Truk and might proceed individually to Soerabaya.
(Summary 240600, July, No. 43)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 24, 1942 (Continued)

No. 274

FROM: Truk #055
TO : Cinc 8th Fleet
Comdesron 6
Comcrudiv 6
Comcrudiv 18
Comsubron 7
Division 19
5th Air Attack,
Truk Base Force
Rabaul Base Force
Cinc 4th Fleet
Unidentified

This appears to be complete lineup of combat units of 4th Fleet plus Subron 7 and Base Forces. (GT #457-OPNAV 240310-TI)
(Summary 240600, July, No. 45)

An urgent dispatch, which had been intercepted on July 22nd, indicated that an American attack had occurred in the Solomons area:

No. 275

Urgent contact type codes originated between 1130 and 1530, 22nd, and involving Maru, Salamaua Radio, Desdiv 30, and man-of-war (possibly cruiser of Crudiv 18). May indicate these units were attacked in Salamaua Area. (BEL.-230832-TI)

JULY 24, 1942 (Continued)

22 [illegible] 1943

No. 275 (Cont.)

It was commented:

is tentatively identified here as 11th Air Fleet. COM 14 on 23 July stated DD unit in Desron 6, originated operational type traffic 22nd, and therefore concerned in New Guinea traffic 22nd, and therefore concerned in New Guinea Area action, probably destroyer escort with Crudiv 18. (Summary 240600, July, No. 40)

Comcrudiv 18 still appeared prominently in enemy traffic, and units associated with it were thought to be near Rabaul.

No. 276

Several units using Rabaul cover. Comcrudiv 18 continues as in the past. Unit believed destroyer in Desdiv of Desron 6 was at Tulagi cover on 13 July now at Rabaul. in 19th Division 4th Fleet also under Rabaul cover. His last appearance was on 17th under own call addressing 4th and 8th Fleets Chief of Staff and 8th Base Force. (COM 14-240904-TI)

It was observed:

Division 19 had the OKINOSHIMA (listed as as one of its units. (Summary 241400, July, No. 36)

JULY 24, 1942 (Continued)

Indications of difficulties experienced in the Rabaul region by Commander of Cruiser Division 18 on July 24th were now seen:

No. 279

At 0600/24 July, Comcrudiv 18, under Rabaul cover, originated most urgent to Destroyer [redacted] in Desdiv 30, enciphered "Comdr. Seaplane Force at Salamaua." Info: Chief of Staff 8th [redacted] 4th [redacted] unidentified [redacted] and [redacted] on board [redacted]
(GT #471-OPNAV 241812-TI)
(Summary 241400, July, No. 38)

No. 280

Comcrudiv 18 under Rabaul cover apparently in difficulty all day 24 July, judging from high precedence traffic originated.
(GT #472-OPNAV 241824-TI)
(Summary 241400, July, No. 39)

No. 281

[redacted] (in Division 19) using Rabaul as cover on 24th July, and was associated with Crudiv 18 and others in area.
(GT #471-OPNAV 241812-TI)
(Summary 241400, July, No. 40)

Cruiser Division 6 was also in this area, and the presence of a tanker there led to the conclusion that a fueling rendezvous had or would take place:

No. 282

Second Section of Crudiv 6 was addressed by Rabaul in Weather Report at 0800, 22nd. Message numbers indicate KINUGASA was at Rabaul at 2000 same date. That Crudiv now apparently split with Commander of one section at Kavieng and one at Rabaul. (BEL.-230816-TI)

It was indicated:

TI indicated Comcrudiv 6 aboard AOBA and probably accompanied by KAKO in Kavieng area 17-19 July. Second section Crudiv 6, KINUGASA and FURUTAKA used Rabaul cover on 22nd. (Summary 240600, July, No. 42)

No. 283

Fleet tanker appeared again in dispatch from 8th Base Force to 4th and 8th Fleets; info Crudivs 6 and 18, and Rabaul Supply at 22/1430. Probably in connection fueling rendezvous for those Crudivs. (COM 14-230852-TI)

JULY 24, 1942 (Continued) 22 JUN

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No. 283 (Cont.)

It was pointed out:

On 22 July, Cinc 4th addressed Fleet Oiler RUHI; information Comcrudiv 8, Cinc 8th Fleet, 4th, 5th, and 8th Base Forces, Truk and tentative Rabaul Military Stores. (Summary 240600, July, No. 44)

The cruiser JINTSU also seemed to be in this vicinity:

No. 284

Rabaul Base Communication Officer addressed JINTSU and unidentified combat ship JINTSU was last seen with Comdesdiv on board. (GT #459-OPNAV-240315-TI)

It was stated:

The Cruiser JINTSU appeared in Ominato area July 18th, with one division of Desron 2. On July 21st, the JINTSU was an info addressee from Comdesdiv which appeared enroute Sasebo to Truk. JINTSU appeared to be flagship of Desron 2. This possibly indicates these ships proceeding to Rabaul area.

Cruiser Division 7 was enroute to southern waters, and its progress was watched very carefully.

Units associated with it in radio traffic were also important, for there were some signs present that a carrier force as well as additional destroyers would join it:

No. 285

At 2000, 21st, Secretary Combined Fleet sent one to 1st Air Fleet Tender , care Crudiv 7 , two unidentified shore calls and and flagship Airron 11 (23?). is a tanker, she may be fueling Crudiv 7, but more likely is in company, which gives further indications of carriers of 1st Air Fleet going to Truk. (COM 14-232306-TI)

It was commented:

Crudiv 7 appears to be enroute Soerabaya but the route to be travelled is still uncertain.
(Summary 240600, July, No. 29)

No. 286

Dei Force addressed Crudiv 7 Desron 5 and Kendari Base Force at 1000/24th. Seems possibel Desron 5 units have joined this Force. Kendari Base adds one more step to indicate route of Crudiv 7.
(GT #464-OPNAV 241429-TI)
(Summary 241400, July, No. 46)

ORIGINAL

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No. 287

Unidentified Fleet Secretary probably in Indies - addressed Comcrudiv 7 | Comdesdiv 2 , Unidentified - Fleet Command or Major Shore Radio Stations, Info: Soerabaya Base Communication Officer at 1300/24 July. Appears Crudiv 7 goes to Soerabaya from Kendari. (GT #464-OPNAV 241429-TI) (Summary 241400, July, No. 47)

No. 288

Destroyer originated apparent enciphered communication zone change to Communication Officer Crudiv 7 | Comdesdiv , Tokyo Radio Singapore Radio and Unidentified Radio - probably in Indies - at 2000/23 July, indicating this destroyer setting out after Crudiv 7 and his Division Commander. (GT #468-OPNAV-241542-TI)

It was mentioned:

has not been established as Desdiv Commander but has been established as a part of Desron 2. (Summary 241400, July, No. 49)

No. 289

One Division of Desron 2 escorting to Rabaul area. (Cincpac 240235-Bull. #131) (Summary 240600, July) (No. 54)

JULY 24, 1942 (Continued)

22 JUN 1943

Some traffic associations were indicative of possible battle alignments, and, in addition, they demonstrated that liaison was being carried out by several commanders in the South:

No. 290

Cinc Southern Expeditionary Fleet
addressed Comcrudiv 7
Comdesrons 3 and 5
Comdr. 1st Air Attack Info:
High Command on 23rd July.
(GT 3471-CPNAV 241812-TI)
(Summary 241400, July, No. 44)

No. 291

Fragments indicate on 20 July Cinc 1st Fleet issued a radio order directing movement of a part of Desron 3.
(COM 14-240956-DI)

It was noticed:

Traffic associations have indicated Desron 3 is about to go to Singapore.
(Summary 241400, July, No. 48)

No. 292

Cinc 3rd Fleet (?) addressed extremely long 2-part dispatch to Cinc

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No. 292 (Cont.)

Combined , Info: 3rd Fleet(?)
, Cinc Philippine Fleet)
Southern Expeditionary Fleet)
4th Fleet 8th Fleet)
Navy General Staff and two unidentified Bureaus. Indicates liaison southern commands at present time.
(GT #472-OPNAV-241824-TI)
(Summary 241400, July, No. 50)

However, direct communications between all Japanese units had not yet been achieved:

No. 293

Chief of Staff N.E.I. Force addressed collective (identified as Southern Expeditionary Fleet, but possibly "All Ships Southwestern Area"), Info Chief of Staff All Major Commands)Unidentified and Tokyo Communication Section on 23 July. Tokyo put this message on high frequency broadcast, double-headed to Crudiv 7, Desron 3, and Desron 5 at 1300, 24 July. Apparently direct communications between Southwestern Commands and Crudiv 7, plus ships in company, has not yet been established.
(GT #469-OPNAV-241552-TI)
(Summary 241400, July, No. 45)

It seemed clear that the enemy Destroyer Divisions mentioned in the next dispatch were with the Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet:

1948

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No. 294

Comdesdiv) in Desron 4 and Comdesdiv , both info addressees of Jaluit message to Chief of Staff 8th Fleet and 2nd Fleet) Info: 4th Fleet (indicating both Desdivs with Cinc 8th. (GT #468-OPNAV 241542-TI) (Summary 241400, July, No. 30)

The Kure #3 Special Landing Force was also associated with the Eighth Fleet.

No. 295

Kure #3 Special Landing Force which apparently contributed something to Kiska Occupation, addressed Chief of Staff 8th Fleet on 24th July, in long 2-part message, (GT #470-OPNAV 241812-TI)

It was remarked:

On 22 July BEL. reported "Enciphered Guadalcanal Detachment of Kure #3 Special Landing Force is shown at Lunga." No other detachments of this force have been noted. (Summary 241400, July, No. 42)

The use of a certain heading in Japanese dispatches was explained tentatively:

ORIGINAL

JULY 24, 1942 (Continued)

No. 296

Heading referred to in Part 3 should probably means detached and probably refers to units detached from 4th Fleet cognizance to that of 8th Fleet. (COM 14-230852-TI)

It was commented:

Heading referred to above appeared in R.I. Summary 231400/Q July and is quoted:

and enciphered plus indicates real meaning of is "All Commanders of Units in (Blank) Force", and as "South Seas Force" rather than 4th Fleet Task Force. Same probably applies suffix 12 used by 5th Fleet." (COM 14-230814-TI) (Summary 240600, July, No. 55)

A newly commissioned Japanese warship was moving southward:

No. 297

New fleet unit indicated in Saipan Zone. (COM 14-240906-TI)

It was remarked:

has been indicated as being fully commissioned sometime between 29 June and 1 July. Both BEL. and COM 14 have reported an association with 4th Fleet and Rabaul and believe it is enroute there. (Summary 241400, No. 25, July)

JULY 24, 1942 (Continued)

It was fairly certain that enemy shore based planes were operating at this time in the Solomons:

No. 298

On same frequency, Guadalcanal and Tulagi working planes and each other. No attempt these groups to work each other. Third group on this frequency was command 11th Air Fleet, unidentified and and (COM 14-232306-TI)

It was observed:

Guadalcanal and Tulagi are in Solomon Islands area. The Comdr. 11th Air Fleet appears to command all shore based plane groups. (Summary 240600, July, No. 51)

No. 299

previously called Tulagi Base Force, upon recheck appears to be entirely associated with Kavieng only appearance noted at Tulagi was with . (COM 14-230852-TI)

It was indicated:

is tentatively identified as Tulagi Base?, here. (Summary 240600, July, No. 52)

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No. 300

Fragments indicate on 11 July air searches from Guadalcanal included at least 3 sections. (COM 14-240956-DI) (Summary 241400, July, No. 41)

Conferences over the aircraft situation seemed to have been in progress about this date at Tenian, and, perhaps, as a result, six heavy bombers were transferred from the Second Air Corps:

No. 301

Fragments indicate on 22 July Chief of Staff 11th Air Fleet directed an Air Commander to fly from Rabaul to Tenian for conference. 8th Fleet and 4th Fleet also mentioned as was Tulagi. (COM 14-240956-DI) (Summary 241400, July, No. 23)

No. 302

Fragments indicate on 22 July 6 heavy bombers were ordered transferred from 2nd Air Corps. (COM 14-240956-DI) (Summary 241400, July, No. 51)

There was a decided increase in dispatches concerning enemy submarines, and it was interesting to note that an unusual number were on their way south or were already there:

ORIGINAL

JULY 24, 1942 (Continued)

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No. 303

Enemy submarines resuming activities in southeast Australian waters. (Cincpac 240235-Bulletin #131) (Summary 240600, July, No. 36)

No. 304

Subron 1 Flagship associated Desdiv of Desron 4. (CCM 14-232308-TI)

It was commented:

On 17 July TI indicated at Yokosuka. On 22 July Desdiv of Desron 4 received traffic in care of 8th Fleet and was probably in company with Cinc 8th Fleet in CHOKAI enroute Rabaul Area. (Summary 240600, July, No. 38)

No. 305

Subdiv in Subron 3 addressed Rabaul Chief of Staff 4th 5th Air Attack unidentified info Chief of Staff Subforce and Communication Officer Subron 3 Submarine activity in Rabaul area is increasing. (GT #458-OPNAV 240315-TI) (Summary 240600, July, No. 49)

No. 306

One Division of Subron 7 enroute Rabaul area. (Cincpac 240235-Bulletin #131.) (Summary 240600, July, No. 50)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 24, 1942 (Continued)

No. 307

Jaluit addressed Comsubron 7 , Info: Desdiv in Desron 4. Association this Desdiv with Southern Area previously commented upon.
(GT #471-OPNAV 241812-TI)
(Summary 241400, July, No. 33)

No. 308

Penang Base Force originated three involving Subron 8 and apparently pertaining communications Subron 8 and informing Subron 8 of shipping movements in that area. (COM 14-240904-TI)

It was observed:

(Summary 241400, July, No. 52)

No. 309

Chief of Staff Southern Expeditionary Fleet addressed long dispatch to Subron 8 on 24 July.
(GT #469-OPNAV-241552-TI)

It was observed:

Penang also sent dispatch to Subron 8.

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 24, 1942 (Continued)

An estimate of the total number of submarines in operation with the Japanese Navy was now made:

No. 310

Review of Submarine Force shows that probably between 50 and 60 submarines in Jap Navy today. (COM 14-240908-TI) (Summary 241400, July, No. 54)

JULY 25, 1942

Most of the Japanese radio traffic was centered in the southern area. The Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet was still coming south, and evidence of his approach was found in the routing of messages addressed to him:

No. 311

Chief center radio activity remains southern theatre. Comdr. 8th Base at Rabaul included as addressee with same importance 4th and 8th Fleet Staff. (COM 14-240854-TI)(Summary 250600, July, No. 18)

No. 312

Definite evidence now that Desdiv has left Desron 2 and become attached to Desron 10. Desron 10 engaged in plane guard and carrier escort. apparently on escort job temporarily in southern theater but evidently remaining in organization as Desron 10 was addressed collectively less Desdiv (COM 14-240854-TI)

It was pointed out:

TI on 24 July indicated Desdiv with Cinc 8th Fleet.
(Summary 250600, July, No. 19)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 25, 1942 (Continued)

No. 313

Enciphered service dispatch from Rabaul to Truk Radio states secret calls for Flagship (CHOKAI) of 8th Fleet were (BEL.-240645-TI)

It was mentioned:

This may further the indications of the southward movement of the CHOKAI to the Rabaul area, probably going via Truk or through the Truk Communication Zone. (Summary 250600, July, No. 24)

No. 314

Truk Radio on 9880 kcs and Saipan Radio on 5375 kcs are in communication with CHOKAI . (BEL.-240645-TI)

It was commented:

Cinc 8th Fleet in CHOKAI originated encoded movement report at 1700, 19th and is evidently moving southward to Rabaul area as previously indicated by TI. (Summary 250600, July, No. 25)

It was thought that the new unidentified warship was going south in the company of the Cinc 8th Fleet:

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JULY 25, 1942 (Continued)

No. 315

Man-of-War apparently departed Saipan for Truk and Rabaul at 1300, 23rd, and might be in company with CHOKAI . . . . (BEL.-240645-TI)

It was observed:

Man-of-War first appeared in traffic about 29 June and since 5 July has been shown as enroute Rabaul via Chichijima and Saipan. Previous association to the 4th Fleet has been noted by TI. (Summary 250600, July, No. 26)

An association of Japanese units in the following message revealed the enemy fleets in the South Pacific area:

No. 316

FROM: Comdr. 8th Base Force
TO : Chief of Staff 4th Fleet.
Chief of Staff 8th Fleet.
Tokyo Operations .

This was a three part 5-numeral message, and probably a battle report. (COM 14-242034-TI) (Summary 250600, July, No. 23)

Traffic analysis also disclosed the presence of a Maru at Palao, and the continued activity of the Tainan Air Group at Lae:

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JULY 25, 1942 (Continued)

No. 317

Traffic routing and association indicate Maru is at Palao enroute Mairuzu. (BEL. 240651-TI)

It was noted:

On July 23rd and 24th, Maru appeared at Palao with indications of going south to Rabaul via Truk. She appears to have departed Maizuru July 4th for Palao. (Summary 250600, July, No. 11)

No. 318

Traffic routing and association indicate Comdr. Tainan Air Group at Lae (BEL. 240651-TI)

It was mentioned:

Comdr. Tainan Air Group has previously appeared at Lae. (Summary 250600, July, No. 20)

No. 319

Comdr. Tainan Air originated a dispatch aboard unidentified Fleet line call as well as being addressed at (Lae? Vunakanau?). He may intend to come north as indicated by one at 1430, 24th, to Chitose Air ; info to 4th and 5th Air Attack Corps. (COM 14-250554-TI) (Summary 251400, July, No. 30)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 25, 1942 (Continued)

Surmisals were made concerning the activities of two Japanese aircraft carriers:

No. 320

SUZUYA ... shown to be concealed originator at Truk. Dispatch originated at 1630, 22nd, by this vessel was addressed for action Comdr 1st Air Fleet and Comcrudiv 7 information Chiefs of Staff Combined 2nd Fleet and 4th Fleet Comdesdiv Air addresses at Kure and Tokyo plus Chief of Staff Sasebo and Sasebo Navy Yard This may indicate (1) Planes or aircraft equipment are to be transported to SUZUYA by some unit of 1st Air Fleet or (2) Contrary to previous indications the SUZUYA will return to Sasebo Navy Yard rather than proceed to Rabaul in company with Desdiv (BEL.-240645-TI)

It was noted:

SUZUYA has been placed by TI in the Truk area since July 16th. (Summary 250600, July, No. 12)

No. 321

Nothing to be added remarks of (Washington) and (Belconnen), regarding Crudiv 7 and Desron 3 except to suggest Java area as possible destination of ZUIKAKU through previous association this vessel with Desron 3. (COM 14-250554-TI)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 25, 1942 (Continued)

No. 321 (Cont.)

It was mentioned:

On July 18th and 19th, there were indications that ZUIKAKU was enroute Singapore via Takao possibly in company with Crudiv 7, but since that time there have been no further indications to confirm this movement. To the contrary, the ZUIKAKU still appears to be in Empire waters. (Summary 251400, July, No. 32)

The enemy cruiser damaged at Midway was once again ready for action:

No. 322

Tentative Crudiv 7 unit which has been in Truk since shortly after Midway Battle, originated under Truk cover to Comcrudiv 7 and others. Indications this vessel will soon return to active duty after completions repairs by AKASHI and will probably join Comcrudiv 7 in Malay area operations. (COM 14-242032-242034-TI)

It was remarked:

The status of is still vague. There have been indications that this ship might return to the home yard and there have also been indications that she might go to Rabaul and operate with the 8th Fleet. Crudiv 7 appeared to have retired

JULY 25, 1942 (Continued)

No. 322 (Cont.)

to Truk following the Midway Battle for emergency repairs. After those repairs the ships of Crudiv 7, with the exception of returned to the Empire Navy Yards. This fact suggested that was very badly damaged and could not complete her initial emergency repairs as quickly as the other ships. is tentatively identified as the SUZUYA. (Summary 250600, July, No. 13)

Cruiser Division 18 was sending out much operational traffic, but though Cruiser Division 6 was thought to be in the region of Kavieng, there was no radio indications of its presence:

No. 323

Much traffic under Rabaul calls. With exception of RI reports most of this traffic originated by units covering under Rabaul. These include Comcrudiv 18, Destroyer and possibly Destroyer of Desdiv ORI 3. KINUGASA and FURUTAKA of Crudiv 6 used Rabaul cover on the 22nd. (COM 14-242034-TI) (Summary 250600, July, No. 22)

No. 324

Highest priority operational traffic was originated by Comcrudiv 18 (under Rabaul cover) as Commander of Landing and Occupation Forces in Buna, New Guinea Area. (COM 14-242032-TI)

JULY 25, 1942 (Continued)

No. 324 (Cont.)

It was pointed out:

TI, previously on 24 July, indicated Comcrudiv 18 (under Rabaul cover) apparently in difficulty all day, judging from high precedence traffic originated. (Summary 250600, July, No. 27)

No. 325

Comcrudiv 6 last in Kavieng Area. (COM 14-242034-TI)

It was stated:

To date there has been no definite indication that Comcrudiv 6 has departed Kavieng. Comcrudiv 6 was placed at Kavieng on July 18th, and on July 21st, appeared to be still there. (Summary 250600, July, No. 21)

No. 326

No sign of Crudiv 6. (COM 14-250558-TI) (Summary 251400, July, No. 34).

The Kure Special Force was still active at Guadalcanal, and the traffic of many Army units with Rabaul was noticed:

JULY 25, 1942 (Continued)

No. 327

Kure Special Force is at Guadalcanal (Solomon Islands). (COISEF 1554z/23-OPNAV 251612)

It was indicated:

This is Kure #3 Special Landing Force. (Summary 251400, July, No. 33)

No. 328

Association Army units in Davao area with Rabaul becoming more pronounced. (COM 14-250540-TI)

It was remarked:

This association has been mentioned previously. (Summary 251400, July, No. 31)

Japanese submarines were maintaining radio silence, but many orders were being sent to them. An estimate of their position divulged that several groups were operating in Australian waters:

No. 329

Considerable traffic addressed to submarines but units themselves remain fairly silent. (COM 14-240854-TI) (Summary 250600, July, No. 33)

ORIGINAL

JULY 25, 1942 (Continued)

No. 330

High volume of submarine activity. Subron 2 units indicated by DF bearings to be working down from Alaska-Aleutians toward the Marshalls. Continued associations indicate movement of RO Divisions of Subron 7 into Northern area. Two divisions of Subron 3, and plus Comsubron 3 were very active with bearings indicating them to be operating in Australian waters. (COM 14-242038-TI)

It was stated:

Subron 2 and (Div. in Subron 2) were in 39 N - 174 W, and 40 N - 172 W, respectively, by DI on 23 July. Comsubron 2 had traffic delivered by Ominato on 24 July. On 23 July. TI, indicated Subdivs and both of Subron 7, with the Northern Forces. On 21 July, TI indicated Subron 7 associated with both 4th and 8th Fleets detached units. On 24 July, Subdiv in Subron 3 addressed Rabaul, Chief of Staff 4th Fleet, 5th Air Attack Force, one unidentified, info CofS Subforce and Comm. Officer Subron 3. Comsubron 3 was indicated with Subdivs
(Summary 250600, July, No. 34)

No. 331

Units of Subron 3 believed operating off eastern Australia. (Cincpac Bull. #132-250303) (Summary 251400, July, No. 40)

JULY 25, 1942 (Continued)

A very important resume of Japanese Radio Intelligence activities was now issued by U. S. Naval Communication Intelligence as follows:

No. 332

Numerous Jap shore stations are originating what we identify from addressees (Tokyo Naval Intelligence) and (Tokyo) Radio Intelligence Section) as being reports of intercepted radio transmissions. From translations available during May this identification of subject matter appears to be correct, as messages of this type from Jaluit almost invariably were reports and bearings of U.S. aircraft radio transmissions. If such is the case at present, Allied radio traffic is providing the Japanese with at least a great deal to talk about, for the volume of this type of traffic is enormous, relative to any other particular type. Each station has a fairly stereotyped list of addressees. The following is a partial list of stations originating such traffic with the dissemination from each indicated:

(1) From: Jaluit
To : R.I. Tokyo
Cinc 4th Fleet
4th Fleet Task Forces (or all ships in South Seas area)
ONI Tokyo
Info: Chief of Staff Combined Fleet
Chief of Staff 11th Air Fleet

JULY 25, 1942 (Continued)

No. 332 (Cont.)

Chief of Staff Sub Force
Chief of Staff 5th Fleet
(not always included)
4th Air Attack Force
5th Air Attack Force

(2) From: Palao
To : ONI Tokyo
RI Tokyo
Cinc 4th Fleet
4th Base Force, Truk
Rabaul Base Force
(Cinc 4th almost invariably has this type retransmitted by Truk to all stations in South Seas?

(3) From: Rabaul
To : ONI Tokyo
Chief of Staff 4th Fleet
Comcrudivs 6 and 18
Info: Chief of Staff 8th Fleet
Kendari Base Force
Truk
(This type fairly recent in origin and addressees not as stereotyped as in other cases. This type also broadcast by Truk as directed by Cinc 4th Fleet)

(4) From: Truk
To : RI Tokyo
All Stations South Seas
Cinc 4th Fleet
Info: ONI Tokyo
Palao
Jaluit

JULY 25, 1942 (Continued)

No. 332 (Cont.)

(5)(a) From: Tokyo RI
To : 5th Fleet (or all ships Northern area)
Kiska
Info: Chief of Staff Combined Fleet
Comdt. Cminato

(b) From: Tokyo RI
To : Cinc 5th Fleet
All Major Commands less N.E.I. Force
Info: Cminato
All RI Stations?
Horomushiro
(Tokyo's RI messages seem to be altered as to addressees as circumstances require. However, the above two types are fairly constant).

(6) From: Kiska
To : ONI Tokyo
Chief of Staff 5th Fleet
Cminato Radio
Horomushiro
Info: 5th Fleet

It was commented:

It is not believed that the vast volume of enemy communication intelligence traffic is indicative of a break into any of our cipher systems or of their compromise through capture. Subject matter is chiefly call signs, of above messages, bearings and other items and deductions based on radio intelligence.
(GT #443-CPNAV 251512-TI)
(Summary 251400, July, No. 1)

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The coming of a new day brought no change in the Japanese radio picture for much attention was being paid to southern waters:

No. 333

Rabaul area continues most active.
(COM 14-260718-TI)(Summary 261400, July, No. 17)

The arrival of the Cinc 8th Fleet at Truk, and the presence of some of his subordinates were noted:

No. 334

Cinc 8th Fleet originated under Truk cover at 1030, 25 July. Addressed
Cinc Combined
Cinc unidentified Fleet
Tokyo Movement Report Office
information Comdesron 4
and All Commanders 8th Fleet

It was commented:

Undoubtedly this is report of arrival Truk at 1030, 25th. Further indicates that 8th Fleet has some subordinate Commanders.
(GT #474-OPNAV 251937-TI)
(Summary 260600, July, No. 22)

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No. 335

Cinc 8th Fleet at Truk associated with Comdesron 4 and Tokyo Movements plus several unidentified major commands.(COM 14-251906-TI) (Summary 260600, July, No. 23)

No. 336

Truk Harbor master [redacted] addressed short dispatch at 0800/24th to CHOKAI (Flagship 8th Fleet), Info: Chief of Staff 4th Fleet [redacted] and Staff Communication Officer Truk Base Force which suggests arrangements for entering Truk Harbor. (BEL.-250645-TI) (Summary 260600, July, No. 23)

No. 337

Cinc 8th Fleet appeared today under Truk cover. (COM 14-251904-TI)

It was remarked:

This previously noted by Opnav. Cinc 8th arrived Truk at 1030, 25th July. See No. 334 above. (Summary 260600, July, No. 25)

A bulletin issued jointly by the Chiefs of Staff of the Fourth and Eighth Fleets was a sign that a decision concerning future operations had been made:

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JULY 26, 1942 (Continued)

No. 338

At 1700, 25 July, Chiefs of Staff 4th and 8th Fleets jointly originated a dispatch to Chiefs of Staff all Fleets and "Outside Commanders South Seas Force," info: Naval General Staff, 5th Air Attack Force Comsubron 3 and unidentified

It was observed:

Following arrival of Cinc 8th at Truk at 1030 same date, this is probably an announcement of future command relationship. Who takes charge remains to be seen. (GT #476-OPNAV-260258-TI)

It was thought that the Kure #5 Special Landing Force had come to Truk with the Commander in Chief, Eighth Fleet:

No. 339

Further association of Kure #5 Special Landing Force with 8th Fleet noted in long 2-part dispatch from that Command to Chief of Staff 8th Fleet, at 0800, 23 July. (BEL.-250710-TI)

It was remarked:

The Kure #5 Special Landing Force has appeared in much traffic since 10 July.

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No. 339 (Cont.)

This traffic has been associated with Cinc 4th and 8th Fleets. As yet, the Force has not been located, but may be enroute with Cinc 8th Fleet who is indicated by T.I. as being at, or near Truk.
(Summary 260600, July, No. 28)

A tanker associated with the Cinc 8th Fleet was in the area for a fueling rendezvous:

No. 340

Tanker prominent in correspondence involving 8th Base Force, Comcrudiv 18, Cinc 8th Fleet, and garbled address at Kavieng; suggest fueling rendezvous in that area.
(COM 14-260718-TI) (Summary 261400, July, No. 18)

The Fourth Fleet had to guard convoy operations:

No. 341

On 24 July, Secretary Combined Fleet addressed 4th Fleet Staff Suffix 64, a message in minor cipher which was rerouted on 25th to "Convoy Control Officers" of the Escort Force at Kure, Bako, and unidentified.

It was observed:

Evidently of interest to Convoys to 4th Fleet area. (GT #476-OPNAV-260258-TI)
(Summary 260600, July, No. 40)

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Cruiser Division 18 was noticeable again in the day's traffic:

No. 342

(Destroyer in (Desron 6)) associated Crudiv 18 and addressed with him by Comdr. 8th Base Force in 4-kana at 0700, 25th. (COM 14-251906-TI)

It was mentioned:

At 0600 on 24th, Comcrudiv 18 under Rabaul cover originated most urgent to Destroyer . (Summary 260600, July, No. 38)

Japanese Army traffic continued to be heavy, and a dispatch from an important Army originator was deemed significant because in the past his messages had preceeded other enemy operations:

No. 343

Army address at Tokyo originated 3 messages to Chief of Staff Oki Force at Rabaul enciphered address. (COM 14-251904-TI)

It was observed:

According to TI: "This call has been addressing Army units and was most active in

JULY 26, 1942 (Continued)

No. 343 (Cont.)

period preceding Coral Sea Battle with units in Rabaul Area. Lately addressed Attu Force and others in north. It is suggested that he may be Army Liaison Officer with Navy or Chief of Army General Staff." (Summary 260600, July, No. 4)

An important Army commander seemed to be on his way to Rabaul, and reinforcements from Davao arrived there also:

No. 344

Maru [redacted] under escort 2 destroyers [redacted] in RIYU 7 appears have possible Army command MOKUWA on board. (COM 14-251906-TI)

It was commented:

Associations on 21 July indicated Comdesdiv 8 [redacted] as escorting Maru [redacted] to Rabaul via Palao. (Summary 260600, July, No. 42)

No. 345

Usual volume of Army-type traffic with new addressees including enciphered Commander Adachi and Ineta Detachments at

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JULY 26, 1942 (Continued)

No. 345 (Cont.)

Davao associated with Army Headquarters at Rabaul. Permanent detail in Rabaul of the 17th Army Communication Force also appeared in enciphered address. (BEL.-250710-TI)

It was remarked:

17th Army, at Davao, has been actively associated in radio traffic with Rabaul for the past month. This heading now seems to indicate arrival of at least part of the 17th Army in the Rabaul Area. (Summary 260600, July, No. 44)

No. 346

FROM: Unknown Army Originator (Rabaul or New Guinea).
TO : Davao 1st Landing Force (Army).

It was pointed out:

Evidently some more Amphibious Army to come from Davao. (GT #476-OPNAV-260258-TI) (Summary 260600, July, No. 45)

The reinforcements noted above were destined for the landing forces on New Guinea:

No. 347

Comdr. Yokohama Detachment and Comdr. Sasebo #5 Special Landing Force both at

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No. 347 (Cont.)

new station (believed Buna) as first appeared 23 July. (COM 14-260718-TI)

It was observed:

These detachments were indicated at July 25th.
(Summary 261400, July, No. 13)

No. 348

Comdr. Sasebo #5 Special Landing Force becoming fairly heavy originator, addressing Crudiv 18, Rabaul, 5th Air Attack and unidentified Comdr. Sasebo #5 Special Landing Force addressed unidentified on board Maru info Communication Officers Crudiv 18 , 8th Fleet , Rabaul Base and Maru at 1200, 26 July. was previously believed under escort two units of Desron 2 underway in Palao area destined for Rabaul. Apparently this convoy bringing reinforcements for the landing forces on New Guinea.
(GT #478-CINCAF-261635-TI)
(Summary 261400, July, No. 14)

A dispatch from Guadalcanal to a long list of addressees was considered to be a progress report:

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No. 349

Guadalcanal originator sent 3-parter at 25/0530 to Chiefs of Staff Combined, 4th, 8th Fleets, Combined Air Force; info long list Empire Supply and Construction addresses, 5th Air Attack Force, and 8th Base Force, probably further report of progress.
(COM 14-260718-TI)(Summary 261400, July, No. 15)

Probable identifications were made of some enemy aircraft units in the Rabaul area:

No. 350

A detachment of Yokohama Air Group is shown at Rabaul area Base
(COM 14-242036-TI)

It was indicated:

is believed Airon 25 which was placed by D/F in 6° S, 154° E, in Rabaul area. On July 17 a questionable translation of an address placed a section of Yokohama Air Group at Tulagi.
(Summary 260600, July, No. 41)

No. 351

Officer-in-Charge Seaplane units at Salamaua appeared in address, associated with Comdesdiv 30 in Urgent dispatch at 0600, 24 July.

No. 351 (Cont.)

It was stated:

This was also noted by OPNAV. Reports of possibly Allied action at this time have not yet been received.
(Summary 260600, July, No. 43)

A Maru was acting as a cover in accepting radio traffic for an unidentified unit in the Rabaul Communication Zone:

No. 352

KIYOKAWA MARU in Rabaul Communication Zone accepting traffic for unidentified (BELl-250645-TI)
(Summary 260600, July, No. 36)

Another ship was acting in similar fashion for the Cruiser Division 18:

No. 353

(Combatant ship-tender?) in Rabaul area accepted traffic for Staff Communication Officer Crudiv 18
(BEL.-250645-TI) (Summary 260600, July, No. 35)

An Operational Order of Cruiser Division 18, which was issued under a covering address at Rabaul, outlined some of the Japanese forces in the visinity:

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No. 354

Comcrudiv 18, under Rabaul cover at 1630, 25 July, originated lengthy dispatch Operation Order, to following:

Action: Destroyer [redacted] in Desdiv 29, Sasebo #5 Special Landing Force [redacted] at new shore station [redacted] judged to be in New Guinea.
Comdr. Seaplane Base Force at new station [redacted], also judged to be in New Guinea.

Info: New tactical call [redacted] followed by [redacted] "Senior Commander, Yokoyama," also at [redacted]
Chief of Staff 4th Fleet [redacted]
Chief of Staff 8th Fleet [redacted]
Comdr. 5th Air Attack at Lae (?)

Comdr. Tainan Air Group
Army Commander TUROSU at Rabaul

"All South Seas Commanders 'Outside'."

Rabaul Radio [redacted] in delivering this message on 5375 kcs, called Sasebo #5 Special Landing Force, Destroyer [redacted] Destroyer [redacted], and KIYOKAWA MARU (GT #475-OPNAV-251937-TI)

It was noted:

YOKOYAMA is probably a personal name or force title.
(Summary 260600, July, No. 37)

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JULY 26, 1942 (Continued)

Further information, concerning some of the Japanese forces, was given in organizational outline, which was issued by U.S. Naval Communication Intelligence at this time:

No. 355

2nd Fleet Organization by Names and Calls:

Batdiv 3 - No change from listing given in Organization Bulletin #4 identification as KIRISHIMA has been confirmed in message wherein name is divided into two groups, thus, call signs and names in this division are all correctly associated).

Crudiv 4:
1st Section - CHOKAI , ATAGO
2nd Section - MAYA , TAKAO

Crudiv 5:
HAGURO , MYOKO , HACHI

Crudiv 7:
MOGAMI , KUMANO , SUZUYA
(MIKUMA was Shifted per OPNAV 282228 in lieu of CHIKUMA
COM 14 262336

Crudiv 8:
TONE

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No. 355 (Cont.)

Desron 2:
Flag - JINTSU
Desdiv 15
Desdiv 16
Desdiv __ } Deleted per same.

Desron 4:
Flag - YURA.
Desdiv 8
Desdiv 4
Desdiv 2
Desdiv __

Desron 10:
Flag - NAGARA
Desdiv 7
Desdiv 3
Desdiv 17 } shifted.

It was commented:

Crudiv 4 identifications may appear strange but are believed accurate. There has been definite shift of Desdivs between our old Desron 2 and 4 organizations. Although this shift is difficult to follow accurately, we believe that Division numbers assigned above are good, but we welcome evidence for, and against, and suggestions for blanks. On 20 May, Flagship of Desron 4 was shifted to ship that in June, 41, was Flag of Subron (carried in our lists as).
(GZ Organization Bull. #5)(OPNAV-260031-DI)
(Summary 260600, July, No. 5)

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The radio silence of several groups of enemy warships brought a warning of possible danger:

No. 356

Crudiv 6, Desron 6, Division 19, silent several days and may be engaged in invasion movement, unknown direction. This based only on past performance when lack radio traffic indicated preliminary action. (COM 14-260718-TI)
(Summary 261400, July, No. 19)

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Japanese radio traffic in the southern areas was very voluminous and, thus, the belief arose that an important action was in the offing:

No. 357

Heavy R.I. traffic noted Washingtons 1512 of yesterday, continues. Believe making intensive effort to locate U.S. heavy forces, prior to making another Midway mistake. (COM 14-260708-TI) (Summary 270600, July, No. 1)

No. 358

Area south of Truk quieting down somewhat. Cinc 4th and 8th apparently originating traffic jointly from Truk. (COM 14-262116-TI) (Summary 270600, July, No. 30)

No. 359

Greater part of intercepted traffic still coming from Truk-Marshalls-New Britain area. 8th Base Force heaviest originator as well as being most popular addressee. Nearly all traffic confined to that area hence few new associations found. This activity interpreted to indicate accelerated movements between Truk and Rabaul. Ponape unusually prominent tentative Air Base which may be at Ponape.(COM 14-232302-TI)

It was remarked.

DI on 14 July placed at ø8° N, 153° E. (Summary 270600, July, No. 49)

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No. 360

Heavy traffic volume in all areas except North Pacific where D/F dispatches and RI reports were prominent. 11th Air Fleet heaviest originator but traffic appeared routine. (COM 14-270712-TI)

It was observed:

On 26 July TI indicated a very heavy volume of intelligence traffic from Jaluit, Truk, and Rabaul. Some of these reports, from Rabaul, were in operational-type code, indicating they contained information of operational value connection current activity.
(Summary 271400, July, No. 2)

No. 361

Relatively heavy volume traffic concerning Southeast Asia sector, indicating continued and increased interest in that area. (COM 14-270824-TI)
(Summary 271400, July, No. 36)

The Chiefs of Staff of the Fourth and Eighth Fleets were issuing dispatches jointly at Truk, and it was suggested now that the Cinc Eighth Fleet, who had arrived at 1030 on July 25, had relieved the Cinc Fourth Fleet of the command in the New Britain-Solomons area:

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JULY 27, 1942 (Continued)

No. 362

At 1700, 25th, Chief of Staff 4th and 8th Fleets appeared as joint originators of dispatch addressed to Chief of Staff All Major Commands, All Southern Forces plus "'Outside' Southern Force", information to Tokyo Naval General Staff Operations Section, Comairon 25, Comsubron 3, and unidentified

It was commented:

Cincs of both, 4th and 8th Fleets are apparently at Truk and foregoing dispatch suggests Cinc 8th Fleet has relieved Cinc 4th of Command in New Britain-Solomons area. (BEL.-260612-TI)
(Summary 270600, July, No. 25)

No. 363

Cinc 8th Fleet appeared as concealed originator at Truk of a Movement Report addressed for action Cincs Combined and 2nd Fleet, plus Tokyo Movement Report Office and information to Comdesron 4 and All 8th Fleet Commanders. Dispatch was originated at 1030, 25th, indicating that to be time of arrival of CHOKAI at Truk. (BEL.-260612-TI)
(Summary 270600, July, No. 26)

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JULY 27, 1942 (Continued)

No. 364

Cinc 8th Fleet still under Truk cover at 1800, 26 July. Takes active direction Southern affairs in dispatch to "All Outside Commanders South Seas", Flagship Desron 6 [illegible] ship [illegible] Desdiv 29 [illegible] Maru(?) [illegible] at Rabaul [illegible], garbled [illegible] at Rabaul [illegible], information Cinc Combined [illegible] All Shore Stations(?) [illegible], and Naval General Staff.
(GT #480-OPNAV-262005-TI)
(Summary 270600, July, No. 28)

Two Destroyer Divisions were definitely associated with the Commander in Chief, Eighth Fleet after a period in which they had been only tentatively identified:

No. 365

At 2130, 26 July, Cinc 8th at Truk [illegible] addressed Comdesdiv 16 [illegible], information Comdesdiv [illegible], Rabaul Communications [illegible] and CHOKAI [illegible] Tokyo Broadcast for delivery to two Desdiv Commanders, indicating they are not at Truk. This appears to eliminate any doubt that these Desdivs now assigned 8th Fleet. (GT #480-OPNAV-262005-TI)
(Summary 270600, July, No. 27)

JULY 27, 1942 (Continued)

Cruiser Division 18 was still trying to hide under a cover call at Rabaul, but traffic analysis had penetrated this disguise some time before:

No. 366

Comcrudiv 18 (Rabaul cover) addressed Cinc 8th "Comdr. Landing Party", "Comdr. Seaplane Base Force"; info Comdr. Tainan Air Group at unidentified base and Chief of Staff 4th Fleet "All Outside Comdrs. South Seas Force" at 1250, 26th July. (GT #477-OPNAV 261630-TI)

It was noted:

is tentatively identified as Lae. (Summary 270600, July, No. 38)

No. 367

Crudiv 18 and Subdiv of Subron 7 using Rabaul call. (COM 14-262122-TI) (Summary 270600, July, No. 39)

No. 368

"All Outside Commanders South Seas Force (Lae)" was information addressee of very long 3 part message from Comcrudiv 18 (no originator; action to

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No. 368 (Cont.)

Cinc 8th Fleet, originated at 1600, July 27. Probably battle report to Cinc 8th, but usual Tokyo addressees missing.
(GT #482-OPNAV 271530-TI)

It was noted:

This means all Outside Commanders South Seas Force who are at Lae.
(Summary 271400, July, No. 31)

Messages to enemy land forces were also noticed, and it seemed clear that more strength was being added to their bases in the Solomons:

No. 369

The "#44 Kotei Commander of the 6th Army" shown at unidentified , somewhere near Rabaul, on 25 July.
(GT #479-OPNAV-261945-TI)

It was mentioned:

"#44 Kotei" is not understood.
(Summary 270600, July, No. 41)

No. 370

address Commander Yokoyama Vanguard Detachment appeared in heading of dispatch from Commander Sasebo #5 Special

JULY 27, 1942 (Continued)

No. 370 (Cont.)

Landing Force , at 0600, 24th, associated with Keiyo Maru and Rabaul Base Force . This detachment probably part of Sasebo #5 Special Landing Force aboard KEIYO MARU. (BEL.-260634-TI)

It was remarked:

address "Senior Commander Yokoyama" was noted as one of the information addressees in a message heading reported previously. Message was from Comcrudiv 18 and Commander Sasebo #5 Landing Force was an action addressee. (Summary 270600, July, No. 43)

After a silence of several days, Destroyer Squadron 6 came back into the radio picture:

No. 371

Desron 6 Commander believed using Guadalcanal cover as dispatch from that call at 0700, 26th, to Cinc 4th , information 5th Air Attack Corps, 8th Base Force, Comcrudiv 6 , unidentified Chief of Staff 8th Fleet , Chief of Staff 11th Air Fleet , Comdesdiv 29 of Desron 6 and KIYOKAWA MARU was intercepted. (COM 14-262122-TI)

It was pointed out:

JULY 27, 1942 (Continued)

No. 371 (Cont.)

Desron 6 has previously been silent for several days. Reconnaissance and Operations Reports indicate YUBARI (Flagship of Desron 6) was engaged in supporting operations at Buna on 22 July. Also, T.I. noted that a Tactical Force Commander was on board YUBARI at 2000, 25 July. (Summary 270600, July, No. 47)

The cruiser SUZUYA had remained in the vicinity of Truk, despite previous indications of a move into the Malay area:

No. 372

Chief of Staff included SUZUYA as information addressee on 27th. This ship definitely remains Mandate Area and not accompanying Comcrudiv 7 to Southwest.
(GT #483-OPNAV 271530-TI)

It was remarked:

The SUZUYA appears in Truk area and on July 24th, there were indications that she might join the rest of Crudiv 7 in Malay area.
(Summary 271400, July, No. 23)

The Commander in Chief, Fourth Fleet had changed his flagship:

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JULY 27, 1942 (Continued)

No. 373

A dispatch for KASHIMA from Chief of Staff 4th Fleet was forwarded that vessel by Truk, indicating Chief of Staff not aboard Flagship. (COM 14-262122-TI)

It was observed:

On 22 July, Belconnen reported indications that Cinc 4th had shifted Flagships on 19 July and that the KASHIMA had made a Communication Zone report indicating movement to Kure via Saipan and Chichijima. (Summary 270600, July, No. 37)

Though Cruiser Division 6 was not playing an active part in the New Guinea operations, it was dealing with the Japanese Bureau of Aeronautics. This was probably a prelude to more direct action:

No. 374

Appears Crudiv 6 not taking part in New Guinea operations. (GT #479-OPNAV-261945-TI)

It was commented:

Comcrudiv 6 appeared to be at Kavieng on 19 July and the 2nd Section of Crudiv 6 used Rabaul cover on 22 July. Since that time no traffic originated by Crudiv 6 has been reported. (Summary 270600, July, No. 42)

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No. 378

Heading of Communication zone report at 0600, 25th, indicates man-of-war as proceeding Rabaul via Truk. This vessel recently arrived in Saipan area from Empire. (BEL.-260659-TI)
(Summary 270600, July, No. 36)

There was also much shifting of enemy air strength southward into the Rabaul area. This was usually a certain indication of imminent action:

No. 379

Detachment of 14th Air Corps at Truk Air Station on July 26. (GT #477-OPNAV 261630-TI)

It was noted:

The 14th Air Corps was placed by D/F at 08° N, 172° E on July 21st. On July 18th, there were indications that units of the 14th Air Corps might be enroute Rabaul. (Summary 270600, July, No. 32.)

No. 380

Units Marshalls Air becoming more prominent in traffic with 1st and 14th Air, Chitose Air and Wake Unit on receiving end from 4th Air Attack Corps Commander. (COM 14-262116-TI)

JULY 27, 1942 (Continued)

No. 380 (Cont.)

It was mentioned:

1st Air Group has not been noted in traffic since 11 June. Last indications placed it at Taroa. Transfer of 14th Air Group from the 4th Air Attack Force in the Marshalls, to 5th Air Attack Force in Rabaul, in exchange for Yokohama Air Group appeared to be a possibility on 10-11 June, but there have been no indications that it has happened other than that a detachment of Yokohama Air Group appeared by T.I. to be at Truk on 22 July. (Summary 270600, July, No. 35)

No. 381

Associations indicate that units of the Misawa Air Group may reinforce Airon 4 and Tainan Air in the Lae-Salamaua area. (BML.-260612-TI)

It was mentioned:

On July 24th, traffic routing and associations indicated Comdr. Misawa Air Group was at (an air station in the Marshalls). On 20th July, there were indications that some part of the Misawa Air Group was at Gasmata, New Guinea. (Summary 270600, No. 40, July)

JULY 27, 1942 (Continued)

No. 382

Comdr. Tainan Air shown at "Lae" on 27th, which probably confirms as Lae Base.
(GT #483-OPNAV 271530-TI)
(Summary 271400, July, No. 32)

No. 383

serial 072 of 26 July is "R" Area Defense Force dispatch order number 165 (?) stating RZ (?) (blank) Air Detachment will arrive Rabaul at 0500 (?) tomorrow 27th and starting at 1600 (?) from point 30 miles south of (very questionable) Dampier Island using 2 planes will conduct reconnaissance for unknown purpose possibly involving convoy movements, though wording suggests possibility reconnaissance intended as search for enemy forces. (BEL.-270311-DI)

It was remarked:

is believed the call for the 8th Base Force at Rabaul.

A contact with American planes was reported on this day:

No. 384

Contact report originated by plane call sign at 0700/27th containing kana signal followed by several

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JULY 27, 1942 (Continued)

No. 384 (Cont.)

4-kana groups. Questionable signal translation is "see over (20) enemy planes". Apparent contact occurred in area under cognizance Comdr. 4th Air Attack. (COM 14-270712-TI)

It was reported:

The 4th Air Attack Corps Comdr. has cognizance in the Mandates area. (Summary 271400, July, No. 24)

The presence of enemy submarine squadrons in the Eighth Fleet area was confirmed:

No. 385

Apparent Operation Order from Comsubforce at Jaluit, to Comsubron 3 information Chief of Staff Combined 4th and 8th Fleets, Comsubron 7 and Operations Section Naval General Staff further associates Subrons 3 and 7 with 8th Fleet operating area. (BEL.-260634-TI)

It was indicated:

T.I. indicates that part (Subdivs and of Subron 3 is operating off Eastern Australia. Subron 7 may be divided as two Divisions were associated with the Northern Forces

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

No. 385 (Cont.)

on 23 July, but Comsubron 7 and Subdiv appeared to be at Truk the same day and Comsubron 7 has recently been associated by T.I. with the 4th and 8th Fleets. has now been identified by OPNAV as Combined Fleet.
(Summary 270600, July, No. 57)

On the other hand, American submarines were not idle, as the following Japanese diplomatic message indicates:

No. 386

FROM: Hanoi #796(?) 24 July 1942
TO : Tokyo

Request message.

To East Asia Navigation Company (Toa Kaiun).

As there are a great many enemy submarines in Kamranh Bay we have been ordered to delay the departure of the TOZAN MARU until receiving instructions from the local Navy authorities. Therefore we are waiting.

Please approve.

East Asia Navigation Co.

Relayed to the home office.
(GZ #5505-OPNAV 271750-DI-Jap. Dip.)

JULY 27, 1942 (Continued)

No. 386 (Cont.)

It was stated:

The TOZAN MARU sailed from Hongkong at 0900, 13th, and is to arrive at Haiphong at 1100, 13th, Cargo, 1,062 tons; passengers disembarking, 34. (Summary 271400, July, No. 34)

The probable organization of a Japanese Striking Force was furnished by traffic analysis after the interception of two significant dispatches. The headings of these messages supplied valuable information:

No. 387

Possible exercise group or Task Force suggested in dispatch at 0600, 26 July, serial 137:

FROM: (Unidentified).
ACTION: Cardiv 1 Collective
Cardiv 2 Collective
SETTSU
HOSHO
Unidentified Fleet ship
INFO: Cinc Combined
Cinc 1st Fleet
(Unidentified),
Combatdiv 3
Combatdiv
Comcrudiv 5
Carrier Plane Groups

Air units and in
eare Carrier Group

JULY 27, 1942 (Continued)

No. 387 (Cont.)

It was pointed out:

Belconnen identifies _____ as Cinc 1st Air Fleet, but _____ Collective has been shown to include Crudiv 7 and Desdiv _____ in earlier traffic. Message number series is not that of any identified Fleet Cinc. The composition of new Cardiv 1 is not indicated, but there is much evidence that HAYATAKA, HITAKA and possibly RYUJO have been reassigned in new Cardiv 2. HOSHO does not appear to be in either Cardiv 1 or 2 from above message.
(GT #481-OPNAV-262351)
(Summary 270600, July, No. 4)

No. 388

Fair estimate Major Units now involved carrier tactical exercises Kyushu area, shown in two dispatches originated by tentatively identified Cinc 1st Air Fleet _____ and _____. First message showed lineup of Cardiv 1 _____, Cardiv 2 _____, Crudiv 8 _____, heavy unit or Batdiv ? _____, NAGARA _____, unidentified _____ and _____ all Base Commanders. Second dispatch shows following association: Cardiv 1, ISOKAZE _____, SETTSU _____, CV HOSHO? _____, 1st Fleet unit _____ Batdiv 1 _____, KAGA Plane group, AKAGI Plane group, HITAKA Plane group, and _____ in care of HIRYU Plane group. The above could be viewed as possible Striking Force organization with Cinc 1st Air Fleet as commander.
(COM 14-270822-TI)

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JULY 27, 1942 (Continued)

No. 388 (Cont.)

It was indicated:

There have been indications that Cardivs 1 and 2 are being reformed. The composition of Cardiv 1 is not known. There is evidence that HAYATAKA and HITAKA will be in the New Cardiv 2. Another suggestion for this Cardiv is RYUJO and HITAKA. The NAGARA, light cruiser, is the flag of Desron 10. ISOKAZE is a destroyer of Desdiv 1 of Desron 4. The assignment of the HOSHO is still in doubt, but she appears to be in Empire waters. There have been indications that KAGA and AKAGI plane groups will reinforce the plane groups on other carriers (especially ZUIKAKU, ZUIHO, and SHOKAKU). The HIRYU plane group has not been previously noted.
(Summary 271400, July, No. 9)

A message outlining operations which were to take place on July 29 was deciphered at this time:

No. 389

FROM: #338 26 July/0750

Only fragmentary, indicates as follows: Hidden originator was Commander RZJ (Buna) Occupation Force, addressed to various New Britain addressees. States that "Y"

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JULY 27, 1942 (Continued)

No. 389 (Cont.)

Day is 29th, and outlines operations based on that date. Convoying of certain units and at least one unit passing to North of (New Britain?).

It was mentioned:

Obviously some operations scheduled for July 29. RZJ is not definitely located. The originator of this dispatch was noted by the Washington unit as Comcrudiv 18.
(COM 14-270834-DI-OPNAV Memo 27-1)
(Summary 271400, July, No. 28)

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JULY 28, 1942

The Commander in Chief, Fourth Fleet and Commander in Chief, Eighth Fleet had parted company according to traffic analysis reports:

No. 390

Dual originator message from Chief of Staff 4th and 8th Fleets at 1600/26 July to Rabaul, Palao, Truk, Saipan and Jaluit. Info: Operations Section Naval General Staff, Communication Director Naval Communications and Chief of Staff Combined. Cinc 4th and Cinc 8th apparently not now in company as indicated by traffic routing, sent on Truk broadcast for Cinc 8th with delivery already indicated to Cinc 4th. (BdL-270646-TI) (Summary 280600, July, No. 4)

The Commander of Cruiser Division 18 was in touch with Commander in Chief, Eighth Fleet, who was on his way south to Rabaul:

No. 391

Comcrudiv 18 under Rabaul sent long 4-parter at 0600/27 July to 8th Fleet Commander, Info: Staff 4th and Combined Air Force, Comdr. Tainan Air, shown at Lae, 8th Base Force,

No. 391 (Cont.)

5th Air Attack Commanders, and Collective believed Task Force call for present operations. (CCH 14-271904-TI)

It was commented:

Both the 8th Base Force and 5th Air Attack Corps are based at Rabaul. (Summary 280600, July, No. 35)

No. 392

Cinc 8th Fleet using Rabaul cover at 1430, 28 July. No arrival report intercepted as yet. (CT #492-CHAV-281710-TI)

It was remarked:

On 27 July TI indicated Cinc 8th remained under Truk cover at 1500, July 27th. (Summary 281400, July, No. 17)

The Commander of Destroyer Division 16 also issued a movement report which was sent to the Commander in Chief, Eighth Fleet:

No. 393

Comdesdiv 16 originated movement report possibly arrival Truk at 1240, 28 July, addressed usual Movement Report Offices and Chain of Command

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 28, 1942 (Continued)

No. 393 (Cont.)

(including 8th Fleet) and SUZUYA
Also at 1240, originated urgent to Cinc
Combined , 8th , unidenti-
fied (Cinc?), and Comdesron 2
, info Comdesdiv CHOKAI
Chief of Staff 4th Fleet , and
Rabaul Base . Deduction that Com-
desdiv 16 at Truk somewhat weak since Truk
does not transmit message for about 4-5
hours after origin. However, Truk handles
before Tokyo. Third message from Comdes-
div 16 at 1430, 28 July, addressed to Cinc
8th, info Comdesdiv MAI 55.
(CT #490-OPNAV-281710-TI)

It was commented:

On 26 July, Cinc 8th addressed Com-
desdiv 16 , info Comdesdiv
Rabaul Communications, and CHOKAI. Tokyo
broadcast to two Desdiv Comdrs. indicating
they were not at Truk. Desdiv 16 is be-
lieved in Desron 2. The SUZUYA is believed
by TI as remaining Truk and not accompany-
ing Comcrudiv 7 to southwest.
(Summary 281400, July, No. 15)

Messages involving engineering detachments in the Marshall Islands seemed to indicate that their future assignment was to build new air bases in the Solomons:

ORIGINAL

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JULY 28, 1942 (Continued)

No. 394

Chief of the 4th Civil Engineers at Truk addressed Officer in Charge Transportation Sections at Kavieng, Rabaul, Guam, Lae, Rongelap, Surumi and Utirik.

Officer in Charge Transportation Section at Wake (OTOROISHIMA) associated with Comairron 25 at Rabaul, Tokyo Naval General Staff and Commander Jaluit Base Force . Since a detachment of Chiba Air) is shown today at (Casmata?) foregoing associations may indicate withdrawal of engineers from Marshalls for construction new air bases in New Guinea-Solomons area. (BRL.-270656-TI)

It was remarked:

has been identified as the 14th Air Corps not Chiba Air and at least a section has been transferred from the Marshalls to the Rabaul area since the middle of July.
(Summary 280600, July, No. 31)

The Japanese Army still continued to be interested in the New Guinea area, and heavy enemy reinforcements seemed to be enroute from the Philippines:

ORIGINAL

JULY 28, 1942 (Continued)

22 JUN

No. 395

Army Headquarters Rabaul addressed enciphered Commander Adachi Detachment care of 1st Landing Force at Davao. This, plus other references to 1st Landing Force in headings of Army traffic, suggests this Force being prepared at Davao for use in New Guinea area. (ZBL.-270658-TI)

It was pointed out:

Starting about 25 June traffic between the Army Detachments at Davao and Rabaul became very heavy. It has been noted repeatedly by all stations with the expectation that Army units at Davao would soon be transferred to the Rabaul-New Guinea area. (Summary 280600, July, No. 32)

No. 396

Nanking (Army?) addressed "Comdr. South Seas Gendarmes Detachment". (CT 5490-ONAV-281700-TI) (Summary 281400, July, No. 19)

JULY 28, 1942 (Continued)

No. 397

Routing indicates new in Rabaul area. (BNL-270709-TI)

It was observed:

has been noticed in the Rabaul area since 24 June and appeared more recently in the action reports of the fighting in the Salamaua sector. shifted from Saipan to Truk Communication zone at 2000/2 July and was included with Sasebo 5 Special Landing Force as action addressee in urgent message from Cinc 4th which lead to the belief that might possibly be an escort for the Landing Force. (Summary 280600, July, No. 28)

No. 398

Unidentified addressed aboard YUBARI Flag of Desron 6 believed another Occupation Force Command. (COM 14-271904-TI)

It was mentioned:

Both COM 14 and Washington Unit believe this call is for an Occupation Force Commander. (Summary 280600, July, No. 34.)

No. 399

Believe has been assigned as call for "Outside South Seas Force" as it appears with suffix 35 followed in parenthesis by "All Comdrs. 'Outside' South Seas Force." (GT 8489-CINCAF-281700-TI) (Summary 281400, July, No. 15)

ORIGINAL

JULY 28, 1942 (Continued)

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Two auxiliaries were discovered in active areas of the South Pacific:

No. 400

Auxiliary at Soerabaja.
(BEL-270709-TI) (Summary 280600, July, No. 29)

No. 401

Auxiliary at Kaviang.
(BEL-270709-TI) (Summary 280600, July, No. 30)

Carrier exercises were going on in the Southern Kyushu area in accordance with indications previously noted:

No. 402

What appeared to be four carriers plus at least three plane flights were working on 7110 kcs. using single, double and triple [redacted]. Last two believed represent SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU worked SUKAKU, SIKIKU, SUKUKU with SIKAKU making apparent arrival report "1925 TIYA."
(COM 14-271906-TI)

It was commented:

TIYA abbreviation for Chiyaku - meaning arrive. (Summary 280600, July, No. 15)

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JULY 28, 1942 (Continued)

It was thought that a major revision of Japanese carrier divisions was in process to replenish the strength lost at Midway:

No. 403

Comdr. 1st Air Fleet at 2250/25 July sent short message to Cardiv 1, Cardiv 2, Crudiv 8, NAGARA, Unidentified and All Air Base Commanders at Air Station was previously associated with Cardiv 2. Latter command also appeared as action addressee in dispatch from Tokyo Supply address at 1300/25 July, Info: HITAKA, RYUJO, HAYATAKA plus Chief of Staff Combined and 1st Air Fleets. RYUJO and HAYATAKA have previously appeared with Cardiv 2 without mention of Comcardiv 4. Suggest possibility complete reorganization of Cardivs due Midway losses possibly discontinuing higher number Cardivs and using available vessels to reform Cardivs 1 and 2. (BEL.-270709-TI)

It was remarked:

has not been identified as yet. It was originally guessed as a carrier for Cardiv 2, then a BB and finally a questionable Batdiv.
(Summary 280600, July, No. 17)

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Air reinforcements from the Empire were being sought for the Truk-Rabaul area:

No. 404

Truk Air in Rabaul area at 0430/27 July addressed regular plane flight line-up Empire to Rabaul. Believed arranging reinforcement flight south rather than movement to Empire since fairly recently arrived Rabaul from Truk area. (COM 14-271904-TI)

It was observed:

is identified by COM 14 as Truk Air which appeared in the Rabaul area about 6 July about the same time as the FUJIKAWA MARU. COM 14 further suggested Truk Air replaced Genzan Air. Belconnen claims has a better chance of being Gasmata. The records are very few but seem to favor COM 14's identification. (Summary 280600, July, No. 36)

No. 405

Large amount of activity in the Marshalls area suggesting transfer of aircraft that area to South. Both 4th and 6th Base Forces circulating much traffic in their areas. Air tender NOTORO at unidentified location (COM 14-280802-TI)

It was observed:

JULY 28, 1942 (Continued)

No. 405 (Cont.)

4th Base Force is believed in Truk area. 6th Base Force is believed in Jaluit area. NCTORO noted previously in this place, apparently received traffic from Chinkai on 28 July. Communication Zone is not known except that a movement report on 27 July stated "_____ left Shanghai Communication Zone and entered Communication Zone." (Summary 281400, July, No. 11)

The Japanese High Command was much concerned with its submarine radio traffic, and an estimate of the enemy submarine forces in the Solomons area was now made:

No. 406

Submarine traffic considerably increased in volume. Concerns operations Subrons 3 and one division Subron 7 (Rabaul area) plus Subron 8 (Saigon area) with indications that some of Subron 8 may be operating out of Penang Subdivs 26 and 27 of Subron 7 now apparently in Northern area by traffic routing. (BEL.-270646-TI) (Summary 280600, July, No. 41)

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JULY 28, 1942 (Continued)

No. 407

Submarines in New Britain and Australian waters include one division each Subrons 6 and 7, possibly two divisions Subron 3 and possibly one division Subron 8. (Cincpac Bull. #134-270631) (Summary 280600, July, No. 42)

No. 408

Units of Subron 3 still active in New Britain general area. (COM 14-270832-TI) (Summary 280600, July, No. 44)

No. 409

FROM: Chief of Staff Combined Fleet
27 July/2300
TO : Bullil.
General Staff.
INFO: Chief of Staff Sub Force
Comsubron 2

This and other dispatches to Comsubfor indicate present interest of Combined Fleet Staff in Submarine Operations. (COM 14-280804-TI)(Summary 261400, July, No. 28)

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A tentative outline of the organization of the Japanese First Fleet was also made available:

No. 410

The following organization of the 1st Fleet is the result of research by CINCAF and has been sent to the Field Units for comment and criticism:

1st Fleet
Flag - YAMOTO

Batdiv:
BB
BB

Batdiv:
BB
BB

Crudiv 6:
1st Section
AOBA
KAKO

2nd Section
KINUGASA
FURUTAKA

Desron 1:
Flag - ABUKUMA
Desdiv 6
Desdiv 9?
Desdiv 21
Desdiv 27

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JULY 29, 1942 (Continued)

No. 410 (Cont.)

Desron 3:
Flag - SENDAI
Desdiv 197
Desdiv 20
Desdiv —
Desdiv —

It was commented:

In Crudiv 6 and calls are accurate. The other two may possibly be interchanged. Desdivs assigned specific numbers are believed fairly accurate. At present we are unable to offer more on BB's. Our research fails to disclose anything definite enough to warrant any conclusions as to probable identities. (CL Organization Bull. 46-OPNAV 282212-DI) (Summary 290600, July, No. 1)

No. 411

No changes in 1st Fleet except Desron 3, less one Division, on escort duties from Japan to Malay-Indies waters with at least portion arrived. Desron 4 now believed consist of YURA plus Desdivs 2, 4, 8, and 9 or 24; likewise on escort duties to the south. Desdiv 2 believed in company Cins 8th. Desron 10 believed composed of NAGARA, Desdivs 3, 7, 17 and one other, also on escort duties to the south with Desdiv 17 in Philippine Units and other Units in home waters. (OPNAV-282100-ONI Bull.)

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JULY 29, 1942 (Continued)

No. 411 (Cont.)

It was observed:

Desdiv 2 was associated with Cinc 8th on 26 July. On the 24th and previously, however, this Division was associated with Crudiv 7 in the movements to the N.E.I. - Malay area. (Summary 290600, July, No. 3)

The location of many other enemy units was also supplied through traffic analysis:

No. 412

Batdiv 3 remains home waters, mostly in Kure area. Although new carrier organization formed, old set-up retained pending clarification of assignments. Cardivs 4 and 5 concentrated principally Kyushu waters with SHOKAKU now flying flag of Comdr. 1st Air Fleet. HITAKA fitting out period nearly or entirely completed. Crudivs 4 and 5 believed in home waters, but possible one unit with Cinc 8th. Crudiv 8 in home waters or in company Cinc 8th. Desron 2 now considered consisting of Desdivs 15, 16 and 18; all on escort duties. KASHIMA appears have arrived Kure. ABUKUMA, Flag of Desron 1, returned Yokosuka. Subron 1 believed returned home waters. One division of Subron 8 at Yokosuka. CHITOSE probably Yokosuka. CHIYODA indicated returned home from Aleutians. KAMOI scheduled for Marshalls, still at Yokosuka. NOTORO at Sasebo. FUJIKAWA MARU possibly returning Maizuru from Northern area. GOSHU MARU at Yokosuka. SHINETOKO returned home port. HAYATOMO in Kyushu area. (OPNAV-282100-ONI Bull.)

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JULY 29, 1942 (Continued)

No. 412 (Cont.)

It was remarked:

CHOKAI of Crudiv 4, indicated by T.I. to be Flag of Cinc 8th and to have arrived at Truk 25 July. Crudiv 8 was associated with the 4th and 8th Fleets in a message on 22 July and a future move may be intimated, however, on 25 July Crudiv 8 was associated with the carriers and Comdr. 1st Air Fleet whom T.I. indicated were conducting training exercises south of Kyushu. KOTORO indicated by traffic routing as being at Chinkai on 28 July.
(Summary 290600, July, No. 18)

No. 413

4th Fleet Cinc at Truk. Subron 2 appears in Marshalls. 8th Fleet Cinc in CHOKAI at Truk. Desdiv 34 now believed moved back to Marshalls. KAMIKAWA MARU arrived at Truk. (CINAV-282100-OKI Bull.)
(Summary 290600, July, No. 45)

No. 414

JINTSU, Flagship of Desron 2, and one division believed in Rabaul area. TENRYU and TATSUTA in southeast New Guinea waters. Crudiv 6 last reported with two ships at Kavieng on July 19 and in Rabaul area on July 22. Desron 6: YUBARI possibly in New Guinea waters with Desdiv 30; Desdiv 29

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No. 414 (Cont.)

in Tulagi vicinity. 19th Division in general Rabaul area. Task Force under Comsubron 3 operating southern Pacific with Subron 3 having units still in New Britain area. At least one division of Subron 6, Subdiv 33 of Subron 7 in Rabaul area and one division of Subron 8. (OPNAV-282100-ONI Bull.)

It was mentioned:

Cincpac bulletin of 27 July reported possibly one division of Subron 8 in Australia-New Britain waters, however, no indication of this in T.I. has been noted by OPNAV. (Summary 290600, July, No. 53)

No. 415

Destroyer believed at Buna. New type call identified as destroyer carrying Commander who was shown at on 24 July. Commander Sasebo #5 Special Landing Force also at and "Comdr. Landing Force" shown at enciphered "Buna". Thus probably Buna. (GT #500-OPNAV-291420-TI) (Summary 291400, July, No. 29)

No. 416

Singapore dispatch 2010/28th, to Comdr. Malay Force, Comcrudiv 7 and Comdesdiv is believed an acknowledgment of arrival arrangements. (COM 14-290706-TI)

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JULY 29, 1942 (Continued)

No. 416 (Cont.)

It was stated:

Desdiv [redacted] is believed Desdiv 2 in Desron 4, which on 28 July was believed on escort duty to the south. (Summary 291400, July, No. 34)

No. 417

Traffic for tentative CHITOSE and SENDAI routed via Takao. Probably for relay south since Comdesron 3 in SENDAI believed in company with Crudiv 7. (COM 14-290706-TI)

It was indicated:

On 28 July Man-of-War was indicated by TI in Yokosuka Area. SENDAI was, by traffic routing, in Takao area or further south, on 28 July. Crudiv 7 on 26 July was an information addressee in a dispatch from Saigon addressed to western portion Subron 8. The other info addressees were Comdesron 3, 1st and 2nd Air Attack Forces and Suffix 12 of 3rd Fleet. (Summary 291400, July, No. 33)

There were no new developments noticed in the development of an enemy Striking Force:

No. 418

Nothing further noted regarding the formation of any Striking Force. (COM 14-290658-TI) (Summary 291400, July, No. 2)

JULY 29, 1942 (Continued)

The Commander in Chief, Eighth Fleet had arrived at Rabaul, and it appeared that Kaviang had become the new control point on the route from Truk to Rabaul:

No. 419

Cinc 8th further using Truk cover sent long 3-part dispatch to outer area Southern Force at 1200/27th which may be operational plan or detailed report of command to be exercised by Cinc 8th. (BdL-280750-TI) (Summary 290600, July, No. 8)

No. 420

Cinc 8th Fleet (originator at Truk) sent movement report at 1500/27 July which may be departure from Truk. Dispatch addressed Cinc Combined and 2nd Fleets and , Tokyo Movement report office Info: Cinc 4th Southern Force and Commander Desdiv (Rabaul area). (B.L.-280750-TI)

It was noted:

Cinc 8th Fleet was reported as arriving Truk July 25th and since that date has used Truk as cover until 1430/28 July TI indicated Cinc 8th now using Rabaul as cover. (Summary 290600, July)(No. 6)

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JULY 29, 1942 (Continued)

No. 421

Cinc 8th still under Truk cover and Comcrudiv 18 at Rabaul. (COM 14-281910-TI)

It was mentioned:

Cinc 8th Fleet was noted using Rabaul cover at 1430/28 July. (Summary 290600, July, No. 7)

No. 422

Cinc 8th Fleet shifted cover from Truk to Rabaul radio, indication arrival at latter communication zone. (COM 14-290658-TI) (Summary 291400, July, No. 23)

No. 423

Kaviang appears to be new control point on the route from Truk to Rabaul area. (COM 14-290706-TI) (Summary 291400, July, No. 26)

An intercepted operational message indicated that a division of enemy forces was in the New Guinea area:

No. 424

"South Seas Detachment Commander" and "97th Army"

No. 424 (Cont.)

shown at Rabaul Base at 1700, 29 July. Message from DD addressed Comdr. Tainan Air Comdr. Sasebo #5 Special Landing Force and Comdr. Crudiv 18 was double-headed to above addressees plus Chief of Staff 8th Fleet This message was in operational code and indicates some division of forces in New Guinea area. Probably Comdr. Destroyer is in command some portion of operations. is probably separated from Comcrudiv 16. (CT #499-CINCAF-291410-II)

Several messages were sent from the Commander of Rabaul Base to the Commander in Chief, Eighth Fleet. Kaviang was also active:

No. 425

Rabaul originated to unidentified Collective Info Chief of Staff 8th Fleet at 0830, 29 July. At 1000 to Chief of Staff Combined Info Tokyo Transport Section Comcrudiv 18 and Maru . At 1340 to again, Info CHOKAI Comdesdiv 16 , Comdesdiv and Comdr. 5th Air Attack . At 1530 and at 1610 to

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JULY 29, 1942 (Continued)

No. 425 (Cont.)

Communication Officer 8th Fleet. These messages all from Commander Rabaul Base and not tactical commander covering under Rabaul. They seem to be informative to 8th Fleet Command and Desdivs. In the case of the one at 1000, probably report of movements of Haru - perhaps releasing this vessel from assignment or report of damage to this vessel. (CT #500-OPNAV-291420-TI)

It was pointed out:

On 27 July TI indicated (suspected Army Command) on board Haru escorted by two destroyers, believed in Palao general area. (Summary 291400, July, No. 30)

No. 426

"Kavieng Base Comdr." addressed Comm. Officer Rabaul Base Force, info not understood "RHH", Comm. Officer 8th Fleet in care of Rabaul Base Force, Comdesdiv 16 and Comm. Officer 5th Air Attack at 1000, 29 July. (CT #504-OPNAV-291450-TI) (Summary 291400, July, No. 31)

Other Japanese dispatches were quite important, since they gave further grounds to assume that the jurisdiction over the southern territories had been divided between the Commander in Chiefs of the Fourth and Eighth Fleets:

JULY 29, 1942 (Continued)

No. 427

Naval General Staff at 2000/28 July issued lengthy 4-part directive, or plan, in high command cipher to Chiefs of Staff Combined, 8th, and 11th Air Fleets; Info: Rabaul Base Force , and Commander 5th Air Attack . The 4th Fleet command was notably missing from address. This must be change or modification of plan for operations in South. The replacement of Cinc 4th Fleet as S.C.F. would appear to indicate that it is the Japanese plan to leave Cinc 4th as S.C.F.A. in Marianas, Carolins, Marshalls area and establish an entirely new scheme of command centered at Rabaul, and including the New Guinea-Solomons Area, and possibly more. It may be that the Japanese attempt to express this area has resulted in the phrase "Outside South Seas Force" so prominent in southern area traffic for the past week or ten days. (CX #496-USNAV 282124-TI) (Summary 290600, July, No. 4)

No. 428

Tokyo Radio addressed short 5-numeral to 4th Fleet flagship , Info: Flags of Combined, Subforces, 8th Fleet and 11th Air Fleet. Contain new communication dope for 4th-8th Fleet operations. (CXX 14-291906-TI)(Summary 290600, July, No. 5)

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JULY 29, 1942 (Continued)

No. 429

Comdesdiv at 1600, 29th. addressed Chief of Staff Subforce Comdr. Juluit Base , info Chiefs of Staff 8th , 4th . Previous messages from Comsubforce at Juluit to this Desdiv Comdr. have indicated this Desdiv enroute Juluit. Association with 8th Fleet Command indicates this Desdiv will later go to 8th Fleet area of operations. (CT #501-CPNAV-291430-TI) (Summary 291400, July, No. 19)

No. 430

FROM: Chief of Staff 4th Fleet 27 July/1200
TO : — (Chief of Staff Combined),
INFO: — (Unidentified Chief of Staff),
(Chief of Staff 1st Air Fleet),
Sasebo,
Comdesron 2,
Comdesdiv
(Chief of Staff 8th Fleet),
Cruiser

This may relate to movement of but inclusion of 1st Air Fleet command as associated 4th Fleet may be significant. This sent to Rabaul for and also to Palao. (CCH 14-280808-TI)

It was noted:

On 28 July, Comdesdiv 16 originated a movement report possibly arrival at Truk. (Summary 291400, July, No. 18)

JULY 29, 1942 (Continued)

The Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet was also interested in the progress of activities in southern waters:

No. 431

Chief of Staff Combined sent short one in high command cipher to Chief of Staff 4th info Chiefs of Staff 11th Air and 8th at 1030, 29 July. Apparently Cinc Combined putting his oar in in connection long dispatch from Naval General Staff at 2000, 28 July, reported previously as item No. 427.
(CT 9502-OPNAV-291440-TI)
(Summary 291400, July, No. 3)

Cruiser Division 18 again appeared under a cover call sign at Rabaul:

No. 432

Comcrudiv 18 under Rabaul cover addressed "Commander Seaplane Force at Salamaua", and "Commander Landing Force at Buna, "info: Chief of Staff 8th and 11th Air Fleets and 5th Air Attack at 1810/28 July.
(CT 9495-OPNAV-282124-TI)

It was mentioned:

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JULY 29, 1942 (Continued)

No. 432 (Cont.)

Comcrudiv 18 started using Rabaul cover about 22 July, apparently after returning from the vicinity of Lae. (Summary 290600, July, No. 47)

The southward trend of many Maru continued on this day:

No. 433

AZUMA MARU may be arriving Marshalls. (COM 14-280808-TI)

It was remarked:

This vessel on 24 July associated in dispatch from Cinc 4th Fleet with Comcrudivs 6 and 18, Rabaul Base. Truk, an unidentified Combat ship and 8th Fleet. (Summary 291400, July, No. 20)

No. 434

At 0530, 29 July Maru originated most urgent to Cincs 8th and 4th Fleets Truk Base info unidentified collective . No indication of location this vessel. This dispatch given wide circulation indicating call is "all ships and stations" or similar thereto. (GT 4501-OPNAV-291430-TI)

It was commented:

JULY 29, 1942 (Continued)

No. 434 (Cont.)

Maru — on 23 July was addressed by Chief of Staff 4th Fleet, information Chief of Staff 8th Fleet and Rabaul Base. This association gave rise to assumption this vessel enroute from Empire to Rabaul. (Summary 291400, July, No. 21)

No. 435

KOTOKU MARU — in general Rabaul area 29 July associated Crudiv 18, TATSUTA, 5th Air Attack and others unidentified. (GT #504-CPNAV-291450-TI)

It was observed:

TATSUTA (CL) believed in Crudiv 18 in 4th Fleet. (Summary 291400, July, No. 27)

Japanese air carriers were practicing off Kyushu, and this was another indication of future action. Before every major engagement during the war, the enemy had practiced assiduously for the forthcoming operations:

No. 436

Carriers still believed exercising South Japan. (CINCPAC-290303-Bull. #135) (Summary 290600, July, No. 25)

JULY 29, 1942 (Continued)

No. 434 (Cont.)

Maru — on 23 July was addressed by Chief of Staff 4th Fleet, information Chief of Staff 8th Fleet and Rabaul Base. This association gave rise to assumption this vessel enroute from Empire to Rabaul. (Summary 291400, July, No. 21)

No. 435

KOTOKU MARU — in general Rabaul area 29 July associated Crudiv 18, TATSUTA, 5th Air Attack and others unidentified. (GT #504-CPNAV-291450-TI)

It was observed:

TATSUTA (CL) believed in Crudiv 18 in 4th Fleet. (Summary 291400, July, No. 27)

Japanese air carriers were practicing off Kyushu, and this was another indication of future action. Before every major engagement during the war, the enemy had practiced assiduously for the forthcoming operations:

No. 436

Carriers still believed exercising South Japan. (CINCPAC-290303-Bull. #135) (Summary 290600, July, No. 25)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 29, 1942 (Continued)

No. 437

Continued activity of carriers and ex-AKAGI, KAGA, HIRYU and SORYU Plane Groups (Off Kyushu by D/F and communications with Sasebo Radio) suggests intensive training new carrier pilots and reorganization of carriers under old commands of Cardivs 1 and 2. Possibility of deception considered but no substantiating evidence to be seen. (CCH 14-290658-TI) (Summary 291400, July, No. 14)

The usual air reinforcements were coming into Rabaul, and some of the new units were identified:

No. 438

Continued evidence of air reinforcement flights from Empire to Rabaul area. (CCH 14-290706-TI) (Summary 291400, July, No. 25)

No. 439

Saeki Air Station dispatch 1330/27th to Tokyo Bureau of Aeronautics (SIRONA), Info: Unidentified man-of-war (Rabaul area). Association of this unit with air activities suggests it may be plane tender or vessel transporting aircraft stores. (BAL-280842-TI)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1946

JULY 29, 1942 (Continued)

No. 439 (Cont.)

It was mentioned:

This is the first appearance of
(Summary 290600, July, No. 9)

No. 440

Comairron 25 shown at Las
in dispatch from Rabaul Radio
at 1200/27th. (BNL.-280750-TI)

It was reported:

Comairron 25 shown at Rabaul 27 July.
(Summary 290600, July, No. 48)

Doubt as to the location of the carriers SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU caused a report on their approximate positions to be made:

No. 441

Request opinion on possibility SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU either one or both being in company or joining CHOKAI escorted by two Desdivs, one of which is and possibly
(COMSOPAC-290530-TI)
(Summary 291400, July, No. 4)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 29, 1942 (Continued)

No. 442

Comment on Item No. 441 above, COMSOPAC or 290530.

No evidence whatsoever that carriers SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU are joining CHOKAI, or are under escort by Desdiv [redacted] or [redacted] As previously reported, Comdesdiv [redacted] believed enroute Jaluit, possibly escorting subs or auxiliary vessels under command Comsubfor, as latter corresponding with Desdiv Comdr. It is expected that Comdesdiv [redacted] will proceed to Rabaul area after arrival Jaluit. No information on

ZUIKAKU on 17 July originated almost unmistakable movement report, and in addition, on 16 July, a dispatch to shore radios along the route to and including Singapore. The movement report was addressed to Base Force at Singapore, Cincs 3rd and Southern Expeditionary Fleets, among other usual addressees. Since 17 July there has been nothing to substantiate this movement, and on contrary D/F and the few available associations have indicated ZUIKAKU in Empire waters.

SHOKAKU has not appeared in traffic available CPNAV since 21 July[a] at which time she was associated Empire activities. Possibilities therefore exists that she is underway and silent. However, note that Crudiv 7 and Desdiv 2, which moved to Malay area, received constant stream of messages while enroute from interested commands at destination. Movement of carriers may be better protected from standpoint radio security than is movement heavy cruisers but seems unlikely.

a - COM 14 reports SHOKAKU active on 5910 kcs. on 24 July. (CT #506-CPNAV-291745-TI) (Summary 291400, July, No. 5)

ORIGINAL

JULY 29, 1942 (Continued)

A decrypted message revealed that an Occupation Force was in existence in the Rabaul area, and that an offensive movement would be in operation soon, if it had not already begun:

No. 443

FROM: [redacted] 27 July, 1942
TO :
INFO:

([redacted] Base Force at Rabaul)
(Rabaul address)

Mentions "RXT" Occupation Force. We do not know whether this place already in enemy hands, but if not it is on list for early attempt. Serial 314 of 22nd is Battle Report of Commander "RXT" Occupation Force but context indicates that enemy already there.
(CL [redacted]2260-CINCAF-291515-JI)

It was commented:

[redacted] is unidentified. Bel. calls Rabaul. On 26 July this call was used as cover for a hidden originator (Comdr. Base Occupation Force) and addressed to various New Britain addressees. Mentioned "Y" Day as 29th and outlines operations based on that date.
(Summary 291400, July, No. 24)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

JULY 29, 1942 (Continued)

A disturbing incident now occurred which might well have jeopardized much of the U.S. Navy's frequency coverage plan. Allied Army Forces in Australia or New Guinea were jamming one of the Japanese circuits, and thus, were interfering with Communication Intelligence activities.

No. 444

Deliberate interference again noted on Orange circuit 9860 kcs. presumably caused by Allied Army Forces in Australia or New Guinea area.

Deliberate interference previously noted on 4940 and 11340 kcs. on 20 July. Army informed. (BNL.-280828-T1) (Summary 290600, July, No. 46)

JULY 30, 1942

An analysis of Japanese radio intelligence traffic on this day disclosed that there had been a falling off in certain types, but increases in the D/F type. Normal traffic remained high, especially in the Southeast Asia area.

No. 445

Usual type HI Traffic has fallen off and more short 4-Kana and D/F bearing dispatches seen. (COM 14-300634-TI) (Summary, 300600, July, No. 5)

No. 446

Southeast Asia traffic high with much going between Singapore, Soerabaya and Penang Bases and from Major Commanders that area, to their Commands. (COM 14-300632-TI) (Summary, 301400, July, No. 25)

It was suspected that new registered publications were to be used by enemy ships in the Rabaul area:

No. 447

Dispatch from Kure Registered Publications Section addressed Staff Communication Officers Southern Expedi-

ORIGINAL

No. 447 (Cont.)

tionary , 3rd Philippine
, 4th , 6th , and
8th Fleets, plus Airrons 21
, 23 , 24 , and 25
; information to either these forces collectively at 1940, 26th, may indicate issuance or shipment registered publications to ships indicated.
(BEL. 290812-TI)
(Summary, 300600, July, No. 55)

The Cinc Combined Fleet continued to demonstrate his interest in the New Guinea area:

No. 448

Cinc Combined Fleet originated three dispatches. One at 0920, 29th, addressed Communication Officer 8th Fleet, information to Communication Officer Subron 7. Another at 1030, 29th, addressed to Cinc 8th Fleet, Comdr. 11th Air Fleet, and information to 8th Base Force, Cinc 4th Fleet, 5th Air Attack Corps. At same time Chief of Staff Combined Fleet sent one to Chief of Staff 4th Fleet, information Chief of Staff 11th Air Fleet, and 8th Fleet. At present time the interest of Cinc Combined Fleet appears wholly directed toward New Guinea area. (COM 14 291914-TI)
(Summary, 300600, July, No. 4)

JULY 30, 1942 (Continued)

It was apparent that the Cinc Eighth Fleet was now in sole charge of the Rabaul area:

No. 449

Intelligence traffic from Rabaul is now being sent for action only to Chief of Staff 8th Fleet , Director of Naval Communications , and Tokyo Naval Intelligence thus indicating Cinc 8th Fleet has assumed full command in Rabaul area. (BEL. 290745-TI)
(Summary, 300600, July, No. 42)

The Commander of Crudiv 18, who had been at Rabaul for some time under the cover of a different call sign, was now perceived to be the Commander of Landing and Occupation Forces in Buna and other parts of New Guinea:

No. 450

Comcrudiv 18, under Rabaul cover, addressed TATSUTA and HARU ; info Chief of Staff 8th Fleet in urgent dispatch at 2020, July 29. This is further evidence TATSUTA not in company with Division Commander.
(GT #507-Opnav 291945-TI)

JULY 30, 1942 (Continued)

No. 450 (Cont.)

It was stated:

On July 22nd, reconnaissance identified 2 Japanese warships at Buna as the YUBARI and either the TATSUTA or the TENRYU. The YUBARI is the flagship of Desron 6 and the TATSUTA is a cruiser of Crudiv 18.
(Summary, 300600, July, No. 35)

No. 451

Comdr. RZJ (Buna) Occupation Force is probably Comcrudiv 18 and appears as originator at Rabaul .
(BEL. 290745-TI)

It was pointed out:

On July 24th, Comcrudiv 18 originated highest priority operational traffic (under Rabaul cover) as Comdr. of Landing and Occupation Forces in Buna, New Guinea area.
(Summary, 300600, July, No. 36)

Desrons 6 and 29 were known to be at Tulagi at this time:

No. 452

Comdesron 6 under Tulagi cover and Comcrudiv 18 remains under Rabaul.
(COM 14-300632-TI)
(Summary, 301400, July, No. 20)

JULY 30, 1942 (Continued)

No. 453

Flagship Desron 6 (YUBARI(?)
and Comdesdiv 29 at Tulagi
30th July. (GT #511/Opnav-301901-TI)
(Summary, 301400, July, No. 21)

No. 454

Comdesdiv 29 probably
originator at Tulagi.
(BEL. 290812-TI)
(Summary, 300600, July, No. 52)

Troops of the 84th Guard Force were also in the Tulagi area:

No. 455

Traffic from 84th Guard Force
in Tulagi area involving Yokosuka Landing Force Secretary , 8th Base Force Secretary at Rabaul , and Secretary 5th Base Force at Saipan was delivered on Tokyo broadcast.
(BEL. 290812-TI) (Summary, 300600, July, No.48)

The arrival at Rabaul of several warships and Marus was noted, and other enemy units were perceived to be enroute to that area:

JULY 30, 1942 (Continued)

No. 456

Comdesdiv 16 has arrived at Rabaul as revealed in routing of encoded movement report from that command at 1240, 28th. Remainder of Desdiv 16 (less appears to be in company with SUZUYA , and is probably enroute from Truk to Rabaul. (BEL. 290745-TI)

It was commented:

appears enroute Saigon and remainder of Desdiv 16 has been previously associated with Rabaul area and the SUZUYA. (Summary, 300600, July, No. 37)

No. 457

HIEI sent a dispatch to AOBA information Yokosuka Naval Post Office and Comdr of Transports at 0720, 29th. This association of the HIEI with a ship of Crudiv 6 may be indication of destination Batdiv 3. (COM 14 291916-TI)

It was observed:

Crudiv 6 appears in the Rabaul-New Guinea area.
(Summary, 300600, July, No. 51)

JULY 30, 1942 (Continued)

No. 458

Unidentified Man-of-War enroute or arrived Rabaul area 30 July.
(CT #511/Opnav-301901-TI)
(Summary, 301400, July, No. 24)

No. 459

Rabaul Radio is in communication with man-of-war which is accepting traffic addressed to JINTSU thus indicating presence both these ships in Rabaul area. MARU , originated an encoded Communication Zone Report at 1830, 28th, heading of which included JINTSU , Sasebo , Rabaul , and Tokyo as action addressees. This Maru is apparently enroute from Rabaul to Sasebo and will probably pass through JINTSU Communication Zone. Inclusion of Takao as infor addressee in this message further suggests that vessel will proceed directly to Sasebo, passing through Takao Communication Zone. (BEL. 290749-TI)

It was mentioned:

appears to be a destroyer. This destroyer and JINTSU have appeared as operating together since July 22nd. On July 25th, they were indicated as escorting MARU which appeared to have an unidentified Army Command aboard, apparently enroute Rabaul to Palao. These three ships were still associated July 27th, and were believed to be in the Palao area.
(Summary, 300600, July, No. 34)

JULY 30, 1942 (Continued)

No. 460

CHOKAI believed in Rabaul area.
(Cincpac Bull #136-300257)
(Summary, 300600, July, No. 40)

No. 461

MARU enroute Yokosuka to Rabaul via Palao. (BEL. 290812-TI)
(Summary, 300600, July, No. 53)

No. 462

Slight indication is noted that Comdesdiv of Desron 2 has also arrived at Rabaul. This command originated a dispatch of unusual routing at 1400, 28th; addressed for action Chief of Staff Subforce and infor 6th Base Force at Jaluit, 6th Defense Force at Wotje, Chief of 4th Engineers at Truk, plus Chief of Staff 4th and 8th Fleets. (BEL. 290745-TI)

It was noticed:

appears to be a unit of Desron 4 and has been associated previously with Cinc 8th Fleet.
(Summary, 300600, July, No. 38)

The presence of a battleship in the New Guinea region was suspected, but there was no confirmation of this in radio traffic:

JULY 30, 1942 (Continued)

No. 463

A single bearing from Palmyra of 238 degrees on call , identified as a battleship in Batdiv , would indicate presence of a battleship in New Guinea area, but this is not verified by other bearings or traffic association. (Summary, 300600, July, No. 49)

Intelligence concerning the movements of enemy warships and Marus, which were passing along the Asiatic coast, was of great potential value to American submarines:

No. 464

, Destroyer in Desdiv , Serial ØØ7 of 23 July: "Leave Hainan Communication Zone at 2000 on 23rd and enter Singapore Communication Zone." (GZ #2267-Opnav-301445-DI)

It was remarked:

is identified by Opnav as Desdiv 15 of Desron 2. This division has been connected with Crudiv 7 recently. (Summary, 301400, July, No. 26)

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No. 465

FROM: Tokyo. #581, July 25.
TO : Saigon.

The SUBUJAMA MARU (7,600 tons) will arrive July 30th, to be loaded with cargo for Kushiro. The TEIKA MARU (6,300 tons) will arrive the first part of August, to be loaded for Yokohama.
(GZ #5543/Opnav-301445-DI)
(Summary, 301400, July, No. 27)

A partly deciphered dispatch sent on July 17 contained orders to air units to proceed to Rabaul, thus confirming the opinion of American traffic analysts who had been warning of strengthened Japanese air power in this district:

No. 466

FROM: (11th Air Fleet) #333 July 17.
TO : An Air Station
An Air Tender
INFO: Various addresses in Mandates-New Britain area.
Only partly readable.
Directs the Detached Force of an air unit to proceed to Rabaul at once, and requests report of conditions at either Truk or Saipan. Also orders a ship or unit to proceed to Rabaul. Requests that this message be passed to 5th Air Attack Corps. Message is Radio Order Number 49. (CON 14 292316-DI)

ORIGINAL

JULY 30, 1942 (Continued)

No. 466 (Cont.)

It was noted:

COM 14 reported July 29th, "continuous evidence of air reinforcement flights from Empire to Rabaul area."
(Summary, 300600, July, No. 41)

New air tenders were being sent from the Empire to southern waters:

No. 467

Routing and associations indicate: Maru Airtender is enroute from Yokosuka to Rabaul via Saipan (this vessel is also associated with the).
(BEL. 290812-TI)

It was pointed out:

--- is the KAMOI which although believed in Empire has been indicated as going to the Marshalls in the near future. On 29th, from description, KAMOI indicated possibly enroute Marshalls.
(Summary, 300600, July, No. 50)

No. 468

HARU is indicated as being newly commissioned air tender to operate with Airron 23 in East Indies area.
(BEL. 290812-TI)
(Summary, 300600, July, No. 54)

ORIGINAL

22 JUL 1943

JULY 30, 1942 (Continued)

The identification of Japanese air units at Guadalcanal was valuable for it gave some clues as to what might be expected to be found there:

No. 469

Comdr Yokohama Air Group
at [illegible] in vicinity or at Guadalcanal
[illegible] on 30th, July.
(CF #509/Opnav-301901-ZI)

It was stated:

Yokohama Air Group is part of 5th Air Attack Force.
(Summary, 301400, July, No. 23)

A Japanese plane near New Britain was heard using a submarine frequency, but there were no other signs of direct communication between planes and submarines in that area:

No. 470

Aircraft (probably a flying boat) was fixed by DF in 15 S, 148-30 E, at 0100/K 29th. Although this aircraft was using present Jap submarine frequency (6970 for these

ORIGINAL
22 JUN 1943

No. 470 (Cont.)

waters) it was communicating with a base in New Britain. There has been no evidence of direct cooperation between aircraft and submarines in this area.
(BLL. 280749-TI)
(Summary, 300600, July, No. 43).

An urgent enemy contact report was sent from Guadalcanal or Tulagi on July 29:

No. 471

FROM: (Guadalcanal or Tulagi) July 29.
REBROADCAST: (unidentified)
TO: (All Southern Forces)
Aircraft sighted at 2144, 29 July.
(GT #507-DI)
(Summary, 300600, July, No. 44)

Heavier traffic between New Britain and the Philippines denoted an increase of Army reinforcements enroute to the Solomons:

No. 472

Dispatches between forces in New Britain area and Philippine area are becoming more frequent, signifying a possible closer

JULY 30, 1942 (Continued)

No. 472 (Cont.)

interlinkage between the two.
(COM 14 291912-TI)

It was indicated:

For the past week or so there have been associations between the Philippines and New Britain-Rabaul area, especially involving army units from the Philippines to the New Britain-Rabaul area.
(Summary, 300000, July, No. 47)

An important exchange of information now took place between representatives of U. S. Naval Communication Intelligence:

No. 473

NOTES ON ORGANIZATION BULLETINS

The following explanatory note is offered on the "Fleet" organizations currently being presented in these summaries:

The "Fleet" is a purely administrative organization and, as such, the exact details of its composition are only of academic interest

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22 [illegible] 1943

JULY 30, 1942 (Continued)

No. 473 (Cont.)

Since, however, the amount of research required to uncover all details of the administrative organization would delay the product beyond its period of usefulness, some error in assignments must be accepted. Hence, the organizations as presented should not be taken as perfect ones.

[redacted] the essential thing is the correct identification of BatDivs and battleships, Crudivs and cruisers, Cardivs and carriers, Desrons and Desdivs, the principal seaplane tenders and auxiliaries, etc. Their permanent fleet assignment is of minor importance.

[redacted] The study concerning the 2nd Fleet organization which appeared in Summary, 260600/Q July, No. 5, page 3, was sent out to the R.I. Units in the field for consideration and comment. In reply, COM 14 states:

1) Batdiv 3 is in 1st Fleet, not 2nd Fleet.

2) Identification of Desdivs by num-

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JULY 30, 1942 (Continued)

No. 473 (Cont.)

bers in Desrons 2 and 4 is considered hopeless; some Desdivs have shifted back and forth between these two Desrons at least three times in the past year.

3) The two surviving cruisers of Crudiv 7 are KUMANO and SUZUYA

4) is a vessel newly commissioned in May.

5) Based on good evidence, is believed to be NAGARA, Flag of Desron 10, rather than a Desdiv.

6) Desron 10, specifically organized for plane guard duty, comprises Desdivs

With respect to point 1, Opnav recognizes that Batdiv 3 may still be carried on the permanent Japanese Navy organization list as a part of the 1st Fleet, but believes that this Batdiv is being administered currently by Cinc 2nd.

The difficulty of accurately identifying Desdivs by numbers, and of distinguishing between various vessels of the same type, is also recognized. However, these designations are convenient means of keeping track of units, and even though the identifications may not always be exact, the errors will be relatively unimportant so long as everyone uses the same name or number for the same unit.

Opnav does not agree with COM 14's point 6. It is true that in May 1942, and again during the past few days, Desdiv operated under the command of Desron 10

JULY 30, 1942 (Continued)

No. 475 (Cont.)

However, the inclusion of and in the addresses of dispatches from indicates that is not regularly included in the organization. Moreover, the context of (Desron 4) serial 450 of May 8 reveals that is regularly assigned to Desron 4.

In view of CCH 14's certainty as to the other points, the 2nd Fleet organization set forth in item 5 of R.I. Summary 280600 should be revised as follows, pending further research:

Crudiv 7:

Interchange the calls of MOGAMI and KUMANO.

Desron 2:

Delete "Desdiv

Desron 10:

After "NAGARA" add - -

- - -. Delete "Desdiv

(Summary, 301400, July, No. 2)

No. 474

Associations of Crudiv 7, Desron 5, Desron 3, 1st Air Attack, Subs, and high command in Southwest so numerous that tactical operations must be now or soon will be initiated. (GTF 316-Opnav 311941-TI)
(Summary, 311400, July, No. 13)

ORIGINAL

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JULY 30, 1942 (Continued)

No. 475

Cinc Nei Force addressed Comdesron 5, Cinc Southern Expeditionary Force, unidentified Operations Force," information Comdesron 3, Comcrudiv 7, Comdr 1st Air Attack, All Commanders 3rd Fleet(?), Cinc Combined, and Naval General Staff. Penang Air Base Communication Officer addressed Maru, information Crudiv 7 and destroyers and, both probably in Desdiv 2. Operations in the Southwestern area appear to be imminent, but the difficulty of proper identification and location of High Commands in that area render estimate of objective difficult. The "Tei" of the "Tei Operations Force" is probably "D" of the Japanese A-B-C-D series of designations, but it is not known to what it refers. Penang associations with Crudiv 7 bring up possibility operations are to be to Westward of Malay Peninsula. Development of this operation should be given closest attention. Comment by Belconnen is requested with particular reference to whereabouts Crudiv 7, and Cincs in area. (GT #518-Opnav-311946-TI) (Summary, 311400, July, No. 14)

Close liaison between enemy forces northwest and northeast of Australia was evident in enemy dispatches:

ORIGINAL

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No. 476

Traffic in general from Southwest area indicative of close liaison now existing between forces northwest and northeast of Australia. (COM 14-310542-TI)
(Summary, 310600, July, No. 37)

ORIGINAL

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JULY 31, 1942

Messages from July 1 to July 31, 1942 were classified in this narrative according to the date of their publication in the Communication Intelligence Summaries issued twice daily at the Navy Department. For example, a message appearing in a July 25th Summary has been treated under the heading of that date, even though it was sent out on July 24th. Beginning August 1, however, messages will be classified according to their time of origin, since it is important to know the exact time when certain information was placed in the hands of operational authorities.

The messages, which will be discussed immediately, are arranged as follows:

A - Messages appearing in the Summary of July 31.

B - Messages sent on July 31, but published in the Summary of August 1.

Part A - Messages Appearing in the Summary of July 31, 1942.

There was so much radio activity in the Southwest Pacific at this time that the beginning of operations was assumed to be very near:

JULY 31, 1942 (Continued)

A summary of the activities of the principal Japanese naval commanders on this day brought very little important information:

No. 477

Little of interest originated by Cinc Combined Fleet. Nothing new from 1st and 2nd Fleet Commanders.
(COM 14-310544-TI)
(Summary, 310600, July, No. 3)

It was noticed that the Combined Fleet Staff was now south of home waters:

No. 478

Maru , who has no special call book, addressed "2nd Fleet" CofS, Info: CofS Yokosuka , Yokosuka Stores , #4 Base Force at Truk , "4th Fleet" CofS, and "Combined Fleet" CofS. Message is routed by Yokosuka to Saipan for Chief of Staff 4th and Combined. This is the first indication of Combined Fleet Staff South of home waters. (GT#517-Opnav 311941-TI)
(Summary, 311400, July, No. 8)

JULY 31, 1942 (Continued)

The Cinc Fourth Fleet still appeared in radio traffic, but continued to use the cover call of Rabaul:

No. 479

Fair volume 4th Fleet traffic but appears routine. (ONI 14-310342-TI)
(Summary, 310000, July, No. 36)

No. 480

Code Serial Numbers indicate Cinc 4th Fleet to be concealed originator at Rabaul.
(B.L. 300710-TI)
(Summary, 310000, July, No. 40)

The Cinc Eighth Fleet was very active, and maintained close touch with the Cinc Combined Fleet:

No. 481

Cinc 8th sent a heavy file of dispatches all being addressed to Cinc or Chief of Staff Combined Fleet for action with one exception, associations included Subron 7, Cinc 2nd Fleet, Desron 2, and [redacted] (SUZUYA). Chief of Staff 4th was information addressee on all. May be reporting on stages of his preparations or

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1945

No. 481 (Cont.)

conditions as he finds them.
(COM 14-310604-TI)

It was mentioned:

Cinc 8th Fleet was thought to have assumed full command in Rabaul area on 29th as reported in RI Summary 300600/Q July.
(Summary, 310600, July, No. 41)

No. 482

8th Fleet Staff Communication Officer was shown at Rabaul in dispatch at 0830, 29th, from enciphered Kavieng Guard Force. Same dispatch carried which is apparently relative to 8th Fleet Communication Officer.
(BEL. 300738-TI).
(Summary, 310600, July, No. 55)

There were indications of further advances towards the Solomons-New Guinea area, and traffic analysis disclosed the presence of several enemy units there:

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22 JUL 1942

JULY 31, 1942 (Continued)

No. 483

Traffic indicates Comcrudiv 18 or Comdr. RZJ Occupation Force at Rabaul. (BEL. 300710-TI)

It was remarked:

RZJ appears to be Buna. Comcrudiv 18 has been determined to be the Comdr. of the RZJ Occupation Force, July 24th. (Summary, 310600, July, No. 48)

No. 484

FROM: (Rabaul?) #370 July 30
TO : (TATSUTA)
INFO: (8th Fleet)
(Desdiv 30 in Desron 6)
(5th Air Attack Force)
From Commander RZJ Occupation Force.
Crudiv 18 Operation Order #17.
----------withdraw to the North.
(CZ #2279-Opnav 302134-DI)

It was commented:

Comcrudiv 18 has previously been indicated as Commander RZJ (Buna) Occupation Force, but this translation definitely establishes that fact.
The above is further evidence that the TATSUTA is operating independently of the other ships of Crudiv 18.
(Summary, 310600, July, No. 39)

JULY 31, 1942 (Continued)

No. 485

Units using cover origin were Comcru-div 13 at Rabaul, Cinc 8th Fleet at Rabaul, Comdesron 6 at Tulagi, Comdesdiv [illegible] at Tulagi. (ComH 14-310542-TI) (Summary, 310600, July, No. 44)

No. 486

Apparently two or more arrivals at Rabaul on July 30, covering identity under that station as follows:

(a) FROM: unknown Serial 071, #255 July 30/1500
TO : _____ (Cinc Comb.)
_____ (Cinc 2nd)
_____ (Tokyo Move.Report Office)
INFO: _____ (Comdesron 2)
_____ (Cinc 4th)
Believe this is from destroyer in Desron 2.

(b) FROM: unknown Serial 095, #258 July 30/1520
TO : _____ (CofS 4th)
INFO: _____ (Subron 7)
_____ (Sub unit in Subron 7)
Believe this is sub unit.

(c) FROM: unknown Serial 107, #251 July 30/1510
TO : _____ (Cinc Comb.)
_____ (Cinc 2nd.)
INFO: _____ (Nav. Gen. Staff)
_____ (Cinc 4th.)
(SUZUKA)

All of the above may be from Cinc 8th Fleet,

JULY 31, 1942 (Continued)

No. 486 (Cont.)

but if so he is skipping serial numbers at a great rate. (GT #512-Opnav 310145-TI) (Summary, 310600, July, No. 54)

No. 487

Dispatch from man-of-war (Destroyer in Rabaul area) shows AZUMA MARU at Saipan). This vessel has been currently involved in transport activities in Rabaul-Tulagi area, and presence at Saipan suggests this vessel might be engaged in transporting reinforcements from Saipan to Southern area. (BEL. 300719-TI) (Summary, 310600, July, No. 35)

No. 488

Warships and Merchantmen in Communication Zones of Rabaul , Jaluit , Chichijima , Truk , and Palao , were addressed in dispatch from 4th Base Force at Truk , while Base Forces at Saipan , Jaluit , and Rabaul , plus Chief of Staff 4th Fleet and Tokyo Operations Section were information addressees. (BEL. 300719-TI) (Summary, 310600, July, No. 49)

No. 489

MARU appears scheduled to proceed Southern area. (BEL. 300805-TI)

JULY 31, 1942 (Continued)

No. 489 (Cont.)

It was observed:

has been indicated as a possible tanker and was associated with Rabaul, June 28th.
(Summary, 310600, July, No. 51)

No. 490

Hiska addressed Kure 5th Special Landing Force at 0900/30th. This unit is still in the south as shown by routing of dispatches through Horomushiro, Tokyo and Truk. (COM 14-310604-TI)

It was noted:

The Kure #5 Special Landing Force has been associated with the 4th and 8th Fleets since July 10th indicating that Force might operate 4th or 8th Fleet area.
(Summary, 310600, July, No. 52)

No. 491

Ambon Radio was noted in communication with the ISUZU at 1700, 29th. (BAL. 300738-AI)

It was reported:

The ISUZU was indicated by T.I. as having arrived at Ambon on July 26.
(Summary, 310600, July, No. 56)

JULY 31, 1942 (Continued)

Most of the enemy's heavy units were in home waters, and Japanese aircraft carriers in Southern Empire waters were engaged in exercises similar to those which they practiced before Midway. Much radio traffic went on between planes and carriers, but there was no evidence of a dangerous shift of location by these carriers to a better offensive position:

No. 492

Major portion of Japanese heavy units in home waters. Carriers groups conducting exercises. (Cincpac Full/137-310059-) (Summary, 310600, July, No. 19)

No. 493

Nothing startling has happened: Increased carrier plane activity included use 5010, 6195 (used by 1st Air Fleet Cardivs 1 and 2 in December), 6640 and 50 (new?), 7040 (used at Midway), 7850 (December 7th frequency), 9400 (new). Type traffic plus use [illegible] on some dispatches confirms previous belief that intensive training exercises including communications underway, necessitated by high percentage new fliers assigned carrier groups.

JULY 31, 1942 (Continued)

No. 493 (Cont.)

Characteristics previous carrier communications plan used December 7th and later. Activity subsided after 2120, when unit reported arrival Kanoya. (COM 14 301802-TI)
(Summary, 310600, July, No. 2)

No. 494

Carrier Groups plus (HAYATAKA), (HOSHO?), 1st Air Fleet between 297/304 from Oahu.
(COM 14 301806-TI)

It was noticed:

On July 28th, the SHOKAKU appeared Flagship of the 1st Air Fleet. These ships have appeared in the same general location for the past few days.
(Summary, 310600, July, No. 17)

Japanese Radio Intelligence units, whose efforts seemed to be centered in acquiring as much information as possible concerning the Allied forces, were very busy on this date:

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No. 495

Heavy traffic volume noted during day due to many RI reports and dispatches between Base Force Units both in New Britain-Marshalls area and Singapore area.
(COM 14-310544-TI)

It was commented:

Both of these areas have received a great deal of traffic lately indicating future action. All Stations have noted the continued activity in the Rabaul-Mandate area and the Singapore area - apparently trying to get all information of Allied Forces.
(Summary, 310600, July, No. 4)

References in enemy dispatches to a place name designator (RAF) were the cause of the following discussion:

No. 496

Three references to place name designator RAF. R areas comprise Solomons, New Britain, Gilbert, Ellice, Louisiade Archipelago and Eastern New Guinea. RY area comprise Gilbert and Ellice region and to South. RX cover Solomons, and RZ cover Eastern New Guinea as well as possibly islands off shore. RR covers New Britain. In view of above believe that RZT is on or near Eastern New Guinea, suggest vicinity of Kido near Moresby.

JULY 31, 1942 (Continued)

No. 496 (Cont.)

Regarding RAF, this is only record of RA and could be an extension of RZ areas, indication all 26 ZEDS used up. Last half of DOGS are Australia so don't believe RAF is there. (COM 14 301204-DI)
(Summary, 310600, July, No. 50)

The appearance of several air groups in radio traffic to and from the Rabaul area was another demonstration of increased enemy air strength, which was being built up in this region at the expense of other districts:

No. 497

New dispatch from Combined Fleet at 2100 on 29th, to Plane Tender , care Crudiv 7 , sent by Tokyo to Truk. Probably misrouted, but noted. Also Comdr. 1st Air Group of Marshalls Air traffic sent to 5th Air Attack. If moved to Rabaul area this reduces Marshalls Air strength considerably.
(COM 14 301804-301806-TI)

It was remarked:

Tender appeared in company with Crudiv 7 July 24th, enroute East Indies Malay area. (Summary, 310600, July, No. 23)

JULY 31, 1942 (Continued)

No. 498

Increased importance 14th Air noted. Included in R.I. and dispatches from 5th Air Attack along with 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Air Attack Forces. (COM 14 301806-TI)

It was observed:

The 14th Air Corps appears in the Marshalls Islands. This unit appeared to be a part of the 4th Air Attack Force in the past. About June 10-11, there appeared a possibility that the 14th Air Corps would be transferred to the 5th Air Attack Force at Rabaul in exchange for the Yokohama Air Group, but there were no indications that this was ever accomplished and according to T.I. the Yokohama Air Group appeared at Truk on July 22nd. On July 26th, there were slight indications that a section of the 14th Air Corps appeared at Gasmata? It now appears fairly certain that at least part of the 14th Air Corps has moved to the Rabaul-New Britain area, and this would account for the increase in importance of this unit. (Summary, 310600, July, No. 38)

No. 499

Auxiliary enroute Yokosuka to Rabaul via Truk. (BEL. 300805-TI)

It was reported:

Traffic association suggests that has been used to transport aircraft or aircraft supplies in the past. (Summary, 310600, July, No. 48)

ORIGINAL

12 JUN 1943

JULY 31, 1942 (Continued)

Some urgent enemy contact warnings had been sent by the Japanese on July 19, and later these were included in the Summary of July 31.

No. 500

Urgent contact type code at 1500, 19th, from Comdesdiv 30 who appeared as originator at Buna was addressed to Comcrudiv 18 , TATSUTA , Comdr. Tainan Air Group at Lae , and Sasebo #5 Special Landing Force . This dispatch later routed for further information to Chief of Staff 8th Fleet , and address Comdr. Southern Detachment, and 17th Army Force at Rabaul. Another urgent contact type code from unidentified man-of-war (apparently at Buna) at 1545, 19th, for action Escort Division TATSUTA , and Comdr. Sasebo #5 Special Landing Force . It would appear from these dispatches that escort units in Buna area were attacked probably by aircraft. Lunga also reported sighting enemy aircraft at 2144, but no further reports noted. (BEL. 300710-TI)

It was noticed:

TATSUTA, a cruiser of Crudiv 18, has been indicated as operating independently from the rest of Crudiv 18. The Sasebo #5 Special Landing Force appears to have taken part in the landing at Buna. The 17th Army has been associated with Davao, but there have been indications that part of this Army force has been transferred from Davao to Rabaul during the past 2 weeks.

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JULY 31, 1942 (Continued)

No. 500 (Cont.)

The landings at Buna and Gona were reported as 21/22 July, therefore, the above attacks must have occurred before the actual landing or the date of July 19th on the above message is in error.
(Summary, 310600, July, No. 53)

Contact reports of recent origin were also noted:

No. 501

Urgent dispatch at 0530, from MARU to Cinc 4th and 8th Fleets and plus Comdr. 4th Base Force Truk; info all men-of-war and merchant ships ; may indicate this vessel received an attack in Truk area. (BEL. 300805-TI)

It was noted:

This is the first indication of on record, believe it is , an unidentified collective call.
(Summary, 310600, July, No. 42)

No. 502

Several high precedence contact code dispatches originated by unidentified , commencing 0700, 30th. All went to Tainan Air at Lae. (COM 14 301806-TI)

JULY 31, 1942 (Continued)

No. 502 (Cont.)

It was pointed out:

[redacted] is unidentified but has been placed in the Rabaul area.
(Summary, 310600, July, No. 47)

The Japanese had occupied one of the most important weather observatories in the world when they seized the Manila Observatory:

No. 503

A major weather station "#3 Weather Observer" is placed at Manila by his weather data. Probably installed in observatory formerly operated by Jesuits.
(COM 14-310544-TI)
(Summary, 310600, July, No. 57)

Japanese diplomats were conveying to Tokyo all the information they could gather about ship movements and troop transfers. Here are several results of their espionage:

No. 504

FROM: Lisbon (CHIBA) #581, July 23, 1942.
TO : Tokyo.

According to reports confirmed here by the Portuguese Military Headquarters, the

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No. 504 (Cont.)

British force reported in my wire #568 as putting in at Freetown has disembarked at Pointe Noire. It is a force of 80,000 men and is now heading south. It is predicted that they are bound for Cairo. Three weeks will be required for them to reach Cairo from Pointe Noire. Therefore, although a part of the force is believed to have disembarked at Freetown, it is not expected that they are planning to attack Dakar.
(GZ #5559) (D.I.) Jap. Dip.)
(Summary, 311400, July, No. 2)

No. 505

FROM: Berlin (OSIMA) #941, July 27, 1942.
TO : Tokyo

"D" Intelligence.

According to intelligence received from the Italian Foreign Office, several ships have left South Africa headed for Egypt. The first of these have already arrived at (Port of Sudan?). Among these ships is the QUEEN MARY which is carrying 20,000 troops. This intelligence has not yet been confirmed by the German authorities.
(GZ #5564) (DI) (Jap. Dip.)
(Summary, 311400, July, No. 3)

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No. 506

FROM: Rome, #478, July 27, 1942.
TO : Tokyo.

We have had a report from the Foreign Office that, as Ambassador Homura had expressed a hope that the matter be relayed to Tokyo, a wire was sent to the Italian embassy in Tokyo to the effect that, according to reports from the Italian consul in Lourenco Marques, there are six light British cruisers and one carrier, whose purpose and destination are not known, anchored beyond territorial waters out of the above port.

This is for your information.
(GZ #5565) (D.I.) (Jap Dip.)
(Summary, 311400, July, No. 4)

An unusually important statement of Japan's future war strategy in broad outline was contained in the following dispatches:

No. 507

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) #588, July 27, 1942.
TO : Berlin
(Part 1 of 3[a])
(State secret. Office head's code.)

Japan's immediate objective is to carry through to completion the war with America and England. In order to do this it is ne-

JULY 31, 1942 (Continued)

No. 507 (Cont.)

cessary to strengthen our offensive against America and England, establish a solid organization in the south, and tighten our grip on China. In this there is no change in the determination which the Japanese Government announced to Germany on July 2nd of last year.

At this time it is necessary to maintain peace in the north insofar as possible. We have continuously taken adequate measures to retaliate decisively in case they should by any chance take the initiative, but from a consideration of all the circumstances it seems necessary to put off the idea of slackening our effort against England and America, moving our forces to the north, and again greatly extending our battle front.

Accordingly with this understanding please make a reply to Germany along the following lines:

1. Japan's respect (?) for Germany's sensational achievements in the German Soviet war is unbounded. The Japanese government had heard Germany's views on the new aspects of the German-Soviet war and has considered them with profound concern. Now the Japanese government wishes to express its own views.

2. Since the outbreak of war with England and America last December, Japan's campaign against England and America has tightened the screws on America and England in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. We believe that

JULY 31, 1942 (Continued)

No. 507 (Cont.)

Germany can well understand that we are actually giving grave consideration to the successful prosecution of the united war by Japan, Germany and Italy.

a - One part, probably part 2, not available. Part of other part available and being translated. (GZ/JD #5572) (Opnav-311736-DI) (Summary, 311400, July, No. 6)

No. 508

FROM: Tokyo, #588, July 27, 1942.
TO : Berlin

Part ((3 ?)) of 3[a])

----- ----- ----- now at last it is well underway.

5. Thus of necessity under the present circumstances for Japan to take a definite policy toward Russia would mean the division of our strength. Not only is it definitely an unfavorable opportunity under the present circumstances, but we also greatly fear that it would weaken our effort against America and England in the Far East and greatly increase British and American aid to Russia besides giving America advantageous Bases(?) to use against Japan. It cannot be denied that this would be unprofitable.

Accordingly we confirm that the above policy is not to be desired in the prosecu-

JULY 31, 1942 (Continued)

No. 508 (Cont.)

tion of the Three-County (Japan-Germany-Italy) war. While it goes without saying that Japan is making all necessary preparations in the north ----- ----- (message unfinished). (GZ/JD #5572-Opnav-311739-DI) (Summary, 311400, July, No. 7)

Oshima, Japan's Ambassador to Germany, strong supporter of the Axis governments, and a fervent militarist in addition, expressed his disappointment at the answers contained in Nos. 507 and 508.

No. 509

FROM: Berlin #943, July 29, 1942.
TO : Tokyo.

Re your code #588[a].

1. I am leaving here on the 29th, and by plane from Warsaw on the 30th, for the German Imperial Headquarters, and will transmit the contents of your message the same day to the German Government. (I will telegraph the result to UCHIDA in Berlin.)

Please note that in response to the invitation of the German Government, I then intend to spend about a week on a tour of inspection of the German-Russian front.

JULY 31, 1942 (Continued)

No. 509 (Cont.)

2. If it had not been for the fact that Germany had already made a specific request as communicated to you in my #895[b], your reply (your #588) would of course have been appropriate in making it possible for them to reach certain general conclusions. But you came back stating that the dissipation of our forces would be disadvantageous from the point of view of the general situation; and to use this argument as the fundamental definite reason for our not giving our consent is indeed regrettable.

I realize that from the point of view of our national plans, many difficulties are involved, and it goes without saying that matters of vast strategic importance must be kept absolutely secret. Nevertheless, it is of utmost importance at this time that we inform Germany of the outlines of our strategic plan and let them know exactly what we intend to do and thus to bring about much closer cooperation.

I should like to have such information reported by a Military Commission or by the Military and Naval Attaches, and as far as possible become the subject of military and naval conferences.

The military and Naval authorities agree with me on this question.

a - Japan's reply to Germany's proposal in regard to attacking Russia.
b - Not available.
(GZ/JD #5573-Opnav-311742-DI)

JULY 31, 1942 (Continued)

No. 509 (Cont.)

It was indicated:

One part of three of the reference (Tokyo's #500 to Berlin) is included in this R. I. Summary.
(Summary, 311400, July, No. 5)

Part B - Messages sent out on July 31st, but published in the Summary of August 1st.

The Commander in Chief and the Chief of Staff of the Eighth Fleet were still under the cover of a Rabaul call sign:

No. 510

Traffic routing and association indicate Chief of Staff 8th Fleet at Rabaul. (DNI 31Ø812-TI)
(Summary, 010600, August, No. 29)

No. 511

8th Fleet still under Rabaul cover.
(COM 14 311940-TI)
(Summary, 010600, August, No. 30)

JULY 31, 1942 (Continued)

An Army Commander, who had been noticed previously in radio traffic, was now in the vicinity of Rabaul.

No. 512

Two urgents involving Rabaul area. One 16ØØ, 31st, Rabaul R.I. to 4th-8th Fleet Staff and Tokyo readdressed 4th Fleet Force . Other at 2ØØØ from Chief of Staff 11th Air Fleet to principal Southern activities one of which was (Army Command previously on board HARU and now apparently in vicinity Rabaul. (COM14-311ØØ8-TI)

It was mentioned:

has been identified here as "All Southern Forces." (Summary, 010600, August, No. 31)

The Japanese Army in the Solomons was in constant communication with Davao and Palao.

No. 513

Comdr Tanaka at (Rabaul) addressed Staff 17th Army Davao and Comdr 3rd Infantry Brigade at Palao,

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No. 513 (Cont.)

all enciphered. (COM14-31Ø73Ø-TI)

It was pointed out:

The 17th Army at Davao and Army addresses at Rabaul have been previously associated with 35th Brigade (Infantry, Artillery, Hoshii, or just plain) at Palao. (Summary, 010600, August, No. 38)

After several days of radio silence, Crudiv 6 was observed at Rabaul, which indicated that it had been engaged in operations:

No. 514

Comcrudiv 8 under Rabaul cover at 15ØØ, 31 July. (GT#52Ø-Opnav-31232Ø-TI)

It was indicated:

COM14 reported Crudiv 6, with others, on 26 July had been silent for several days and might be engaged in invasion movement, unknown direction. This was based only on past performance when lack of radio traffic indicated preliminary action. (Summary, 010600, August, No. 45)

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JULY 31, 1942 (Continued)

An unidentified enemy man-of-war left Truk to arrive at Kavieng at 0700 on August 2.

No. 515

FROM: (unidentified)
TO : (8th Fleet),
(ASUMA MARU),
(8th Fleet),
INFO: (8th Base Force).
(Two blanks) leaving "PT" (Truk) for "RR" (Rabaul) via "RO" (Kavieng) expect arrive Kavieng Ø7ØØ, 2nd. (BEL-311152-DI)

It was commented:

an unidentified Man-of-war was on 3Ø July enroute or arrived Rabaul. is belived Chief of Staff 8th Fleet. ASUMA MARU on 3Ø July was indicated at Saipan and believed might be engaged in transporting reinforcements from Saipan to Southern area.
(Summary, 010600, August, No. 36)

The Commander of Crudiv 18 was quite active in carrying out his duties as Commander of the "RZJ" (Buna) Occupation Force. It was evident that some activity was to take place in the New Guinea area for the Commander of Crudiv 18 issued several direc-

JULY 31, 1942 (Continued)

tives to his subordinates there. Furthermore, he was ordered by the Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet to proceed to an unknown destination by or on August 4.

No. 516

Comdr. "RZJ" Occupation Force as concealed originator at Rabaul sent several directives between 0600 and 2300, 30th, to units his command in New Guinea area. These include Comdr. Landing Force at Buna, plus TATSUTA , and unidentified MARU , and call
(BEL. 310750-TI)

It was reported:

The Comdr. RZJ (Buna) Occupation Force is Concrudiv 18. The TATSUTA, a cruiser of Crudiv 18, has appeared for the past few days as operating independently from the rest of the division. Several high precedence contact code dispatches were originated by unident commencing 0700, July 30th, and all were addressed to Tainan Air Group at Lae.
(Summary, 010600, August, No. 40)

No. 517

(5th Special Landing Force)
associated Crudiv 18 in addition other New

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JULY 31, 1942 (Continued)

No. 517 (Cont.)

Britain activities substantiating indications that force part of Occupation Force believed headed by Comcrudiv 18.
(COM14-31Ø73Ø-TI)
(Summary, 010600, August, No. 41)

No. 518

FROM: (Rabaul Radio)
(Originated by Cinc 8th Fleet).
TO : (unidentified but Crudiv 18 in text)
(HOTOKU MARU)
INFO: (8th Fleet)
Barely readable but appears to order Crudiv 18 proceed "RAF" (unrecovered) by or on 4 August. (BEL-311152-DI)

It was observed:

On 3Ø July Comcrudiv 18 or Comdr RZJ Occupation Force (Buna) was believed at Rabaul. On that day this Commander issued an order "Crudiv 18 Operation Order #17", partially recovered which said, "___withdraw to North".
(Summary, 010600, August, No. 39)

It seemed apparent that Desdivs 3 and 17 were engaged in escort or patrol duty off Kyushu, and since Japanese aircraft carriers were practicing in

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JULY 31, 1942 (Continued)

this area, it was thought possible that the two units were associated with these carriers.

No. 519

Indications that Desdivs 3 and 17 engaged in escort or patrol off Kyushu 31 July.
(GT#52Ø-Opnav-31232Ø-TI)

It was stated:

On 3Ø July, COM 14 stated, "Desdiv 3 was associated with several Kyushu Patrol Stations and Sasebo. May tie in with carrier activity on 591Ø kcs to indicate some carriers and plane guards returning port." On 27 July TI reported both the above units closely associated with Escort Force , Bake addresses, and Kyushu Coastal Patrol.
(Summary, 010600, August, No. 12)

Comdesdiv 30, a unit of Desron 6 which had been associated in recent weeks with the 5th Air Attack Force, Commander of the "RZJ" Occupation Force, and the Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet, moved from Buna to Lae. It was evident from

JULY 31, 1942 (Continued)

these associations that any movement of Desdiv 30 would be concerned with operations in the Buna-Lae area. Comdesdiv 16 of Desron 2 was now using Rabaul as a radio cover, which indicated that the destroyer strength of the enemy had been reinforced.

No. 520

Comdesdiv 30 today shown at Lae. This officer was at Buna yesterday. (BEL. 310700-TI)

It was mentioned:

Comdesron 30 of Desron 6 has been associated with the 5th Air Attack Force, Comdr. PBJ Occupation Force, TATBUTA, and Cinc 8th Fleet, who appears concerned with operation in Buna-Lae area. (Summary, 010600, August, No. 42)

No. 521

Concealed originator using Rabaul as cover at 1200, 30th may probably be Comdesron 16 of Desron 2. Dispatch was addressed Cinc Combined , Cinc 2nd and Movement Report Office, info Comdesron 2 . (BEL-310812-TI)

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JULY 31, 1942 (Continued)

It was noticed:

Believe Comdesron 16 above should be Comdesdiv 16. / is believed Desdiv 16. This Commander was believed to have arrived at Rabaul on 28 July.
(Summary, 010600, August, No. 44)

A Maru, which had traveled from Palao, finally arrived at Rabaul by way of Truk. This was another indication that many supply ships were coming south from the Empire into this area.

No. 522

HARU apparently arrived Rabaul.
(BEL-310812-TI)

It was remarked:

On 28 July HARU probable movement schedule originated at 1500, apparently described voyage from Palao to Rabaul via Truk.
(Summary, 010600, August, No. 32)

No. 525

FROM:
"Arrived Rabaul at 1200".
(COM 14-312224-JI)
(Summary, 010600, August, No. 33)

JULY 31, 1942 (Continued)

No. 524

KIYOKAWA MARU in Rabaul Communication Zone. (COM 14 311940-TI)
(Summary, 010600, August, No. 37)

The aircraft carriers, which had been engaged in training exercises with the 2nd Fleet and Empire air stations off Kyushu, were very quiet on this day.

No. 525

Carriers quiet today with one destroyer of Desdiv (which has been escorting carriers during exercises) working with plane groups and Sasebo Radio. (COM 14 311940-TI)
(Summary, 010600, August, No. 9)

No. 526

Traffic headings indicate SHOKAKU still engaged in training exercises associated with 2nd Fleet and Empire Air Stations as noted in dispatch from SHOKAKU Plane Group at 1740, 30th, to SHOKAKU , SETTSU , info Staff Comm. Officer 2nd Fleet and Airron 22 plus Iwakuni Air Station . Dispatch from Comdr. 8th Air Attack Force at Kisaratsu to Detachment of Kanoya Air Group at Kanoya

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JULY 31, 1942 (Continued)

No. 526 (Cont.)

, info SHOKAKU, SETTSU, and Comdr 2nd Fleet Air Base at Iwakuni also indicates this. (BRL-31Ø73Ø-TI)

It was noted:

TI indicated on 29 July SHOKAKU believed to have been at sea since 5 July and thought to be carrying out exercises south of Kyushu.
(Summary, 010000, August, No. 11)

Several urgent enemy contact dispatches sent out by the Japanese in the Lae-Buna area indicated that Allied airplanes had been discovered.

No. 527

Urgent and operational type traffic from Comair Tainan Air at Lae and TATSUTA of Crudiv 18 plus Buna Radio between Ø7ØØ and 133Ø, 3Øth, indicate Allied Air activity in the Lae-Buna area. Unidentified also involved in this activity. (BRL-31Ø73Ø-TI)

It was observed:

On 3Ø July unidentified originated several high precedence contact code dispatches commencing at Ø7ØØ. All went to Tainan Air (Group?) at Lae.
(Summary, 010000, August, No. 43)

JULY 31, 1942 (Continued)

The Commander of Subron 3 was shown by direction finder to be in the vicinity of Southeast Australia, and Subron 6 appeared to be enroute from the Empire via Truk to the New Guinea-New Britain area.

No. 528

Comsubron 3 fixed in vicinity Southeast Australia. No other fixes. (COM 14-311948-TI)

It was reported:

Two Subdivs of Subron 3 (and appear in the Malay area July 31st. On July 31st, Comsubron 3 was placed in the Bass Strait (just North of Tasmania). Previously Subron 3 has appeared in the New Britain-Australia area.
(Summary, 010600, August, No. 34)

No. 529

Further indications noted today that (Subron 6 ?) will move to New Guinea-New Britain area in association that command with Rabaul Base Force and Subron 7 . (BEL-310812-TI)

JULY 31, 1942 (Continued)

No. 529 (Cont.)

It was commented:

On 31 July Subron 6 was believed located vicinity of Malaya. BEL, on 30 July, indicated his belief that Subron appeared to be enroute from Yokosuka to Truk.
(Summary, 010600, August, No. 35)

The Bulletin issued daily by the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, which contained a summary of communication intelligence, stated on July 31, in part:

No. 530

FROM: Cincpac 310059, July, 1942.
TO : Cominch
Opnav
Commaveu
Comsowespacfor
ACNB
Comsopac
NZNB

NCR 3471 J, Bull. #137.

Major portion of Japanese heavy units in home waters. Carrier Groups conducting exercises. Indications of further advance

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No. 530 (Cont.)

from Solomons-New Guinea area. Desron 6 and Crudiv 18 still in Solomons area. ...

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All messages discussed hereafter will be arranged according to time of origin. Thus, some messages which were sent on August 1 to operational authorities, but which did not appear in the Navy Department Communication Intelligence Summary until August 2, will be discussed under the heading of August 1.

The Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet, who was still at Rabaul, was in touch with the forces he had sent to Kieta, Bougainville Island.

No. 531

Cinc 8th Fleet addressed Forces Dispatched To Kieta, this in association with 5th Air Attack Corps., and 8th Base Force. (CCH 14 012106-TI)

It was indicated:

KIETA is on Bougainville Is., in the Solomon Islands.
(Summary, 020600, August, No. 32)

No. 532

Unidentified at 1Ø2Ø/1 August addressed Communications Officer 8th Fleet , Info: Communications Officer

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No. 532 (Cont.)

Unidentified . Both addressees at Rabaul by routing. At 1600 Cinc 8th under Rabaul cover replied to .
(GT#522-Opnav 011424-TI)
(Summary, 011400, August, No. 33)

Some enemy dispatches concerning a "D" Operations Force aroused suspicion that this force might be directed against western or northwestern Australia. It was also indicated that a Striking Force had also been created to disrupt Allied supply routes from India.

No. 533

Dispatch from Cinc 3rd Fleet at 0850/31 July to Comdesron 5 , Cinc Southern Expeditionary Force and Commander "D" Operations Force . Info: Comdesron 3 , Comcrudiv 7 , Commander 1st Air Attack Force at Sabang , Cinc Combined Fleet , all Southwestern Force Commanders and Tokyo Naval General Staff . Identification of and alternate were obtained through compromise of enciphered address . Since letter "D" has been employed as

AUGUST 1, 1942 (Continued)

No. 533 (Cont.)

designator for Australia, it is suggested might be Operations Force directed against western or northwestern Australia. Concrudiv 7 has been currently associated with 1st Air Attack Force at Sabang. Two ships of Crudiv 7 and Desdiv are believed to constitute the force sighted in Malacca Straits on 28th and may be part of Screening or Striking Force designed to intercept or harass possible Allied routes from India. Condesron 5 has been currently in vicinity of Saigon and may furnish escort units for a convoy or Occupation Force to be drawn from that area. (BEL-010713-TI)

It was pointed out:

Belconnen was requested to comment on the above dispatch. Belconnen identifies the call as Commander "D" Operations Force.
(Summary, 011400, August, No. 39)

No. 534

Commander "D" Operations Force originated a long dispatch at 1930/30 July for action of "D" Operations Force plus unidentified and , Info: Chief of Staff Southern Expeditionary Fleet and Chief of Staff 3rd plus Base Force Commanders at Soerabaja and Balikpapan . This may indicate

AUGUST 1, 1942 (Continued)

No. 534 (Cont.)

another convoy or Occupation Force will proceed south through Makassar Straits, possibly escorted by units of Desron 5. "D" Operations Force is apparently a tactical title of which the identity of the true Commander has not been, as yet, ascertained. (BNL-010819-TI)
(Summary, 011400, August, No. 40)

A warship, which was enroute south to Rabaul, was still unidentified:

No. 535

Man-of-War enroute Truk to Rabaul. (BNL-Ø1Ø834-TI)

It was remarked:

DI on 31 July gave following info from which is tentatively identified as a unit in #2 Escort Force: "(two blanks) leaving Truk for Rabaul via Kavieng, expect arrive Kavieng Ø7ØØ, 2nd."
(Summary, 020600, August, No. 26)

Crudiv 6, which had been receiving messages at Rabaul, was now perceived to be in the Truk area.

AUGUST 1, 1942 (Continued)

No. 536

Traffic routing indicated Communication Officer Crudiv 6 in Truk area. (CXM 14 012056-TI)

It was noticed:

On August 1, traffic for Crudiv 6 was transmitted to Truk for delivery. (Summary, 020600, August, No. 20)

No. 537

Rabaul Base addressed Crudiv 6, Info: Kavieng. Transmitted to Truk for delivery to Crudiv 6. (GT#522-Opnav 011424-TI)

It was noted:

Crudiv 6 was in Kavieng about 19 July and believed in Rabaul area about 26 July. Washington Unit reported Comcrudiv 6 under Rabaul cover at 15ØØ/31 July. (Summary, 011400, August, No. 32)

Desdiv 16, which had arrived at Rabaul on July 28th, was now assigned to Desron 10.

AUGUST 1, 1942 (Continued)

No. 538

Desdiv 16 now assigned Desron 1Ø as evidenced by exemption from Collective .
(GT#523-Opnav 011632-TI)

It was mentioned:

Belconnen reported Comdesdiv 16 arrived at Rabaul at 124Ø/28 July. The remainder of the division appeared to be in company with the SUZUYA and probably enroute from Truk to Rabaul.
(Summary, 011400, August, No. 35)

Two destroyers were noted to be escorting Marus and a tanker in the vicinity of Saipan.

No. 539

Traffic associates Destroyers and with Marus and Tanker and indicates they are all in vicinity of Saipan. Possible convoy.
(GT#527-Opnav-Ø1235Ø-TI)

It was observed:

was indicated at Saipan by traffic routing on 26 July. MARU was indicated by TI near Saipan and associated

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AUGUST 1, 1942 (Continued)

No. 539 (Cont.)

Civil Engineering. On 27 July Tanker was indicated enroute Rabaul to Saipan via Truk.
(Summary, 020600, August, No. 22)

Several other Marus were observed in the Rabaul area.

No. 540

MARU arrived Rabaul 1500, 31 July. (BEL-010834-TI)

It was stated:

On 25 July MARU was indicated as enroute Saipan to Truk and on 24 July addressed Comcrudiv 6 indicating this vessel has something for these Cruisers.
(Summary, 020600, August, No. 31).

No. 541

Traffic and routing indicate the following: MARU moving Rabaul area (Kavieng) to Truk Communication Zone. MARU from Ambon to Makassar

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No. 541 (Cont.)

Communication Zone at 2ØØØ, 31st. (BEL-ØlØ834-TI)

It was reported:

MARU was indicated at Rabaul on 28 July.
MARU on July 1Ø was associated with Sime 2nd Southern Expeditionary Fleet.
(Summary, 020000, August, No. 27)

Japanese Army traffic between Davao, Palao and Rabaul continued to be fairly heavy, and now transport movements from the Kure area to the south were indicated. All evidence pointed to the fact that the Japanese were sending troops and supplies into this danger zone in increasing numbers.

No. 542

Army transport address at Hiroshima addressed several dispatches to Chiefs of Staff Combined, 4th and 8th Fleets plus Kure address May indicate transport movement to South from Kure area. (BEL-010819-TI)

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No. 542 (Cont.)

It was commented:

The Army transport station at Hiroshima has been seen in traffic with Rabaul 19 and 20 July. On 28 July COM 14 reported Hiroshima sent dispatches to Commander Morimoto anchorage at New Guinea. (Summary, 011400, August, No. 38)

No. 543

Army traffic between Davao, Palao, and Rabaul continues fairly heavy with enciphered Comdr. Yazawa Detachment at Davao and Comdr. 2nd Army at Palao appearing for first time. (BEL-010834-TI)
(Summary, 020600, August, No. 30)

There appeared to be no change in the position of the carriers, which had been practicing in Empire waters.

No. 544

Carriers and plane groups continue operating on usual frequencies. bearings obtained indicate no change in area. (COM 14-02052-TI)

AUGUST 1, 1942 (Continued)

No. 544 (Cont.)

It was remarked:

CCM 14 on 31 July stated Carrier-Plane Group activity continues but no changes in area indicated. (Summary, 020600, August, No. 49)

The Commander of Air Squadron 25 was shown to be at Lae, and a detachment of the Yokohama Air Group was discovered at Truk.

No. 545

Urgent precedence was given dispatch from Chief of Staff 8th Fleet at 1330/31 July to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and Operations Section, Naval General Staff, Info: Comairron 25 and Chief of Staff 11th Air Fleet (EMI 2). Message is apparently operations report. (BEL-010816-TI)

It was noted:

This probably has reference to Comairron 25 who was shown at Lae 1200/27 July. (Summary, 011400, August, No. 29)

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AUGUST 1, 1942 (Continued)

No. 546

A detachment of Yokohama Air is indicated at Truk Air Station
(COM 14 012056-TI)

It was indicated:

This was also noted on July 22, by COM 14.
(Summary, 020600, August, No. 21)

Heavy traffic between Yokosuka and enemy aircraft factories and assembly plants in the western Mandates indicated that further plane reinforcements would be shipped into the Rabaul area.

No. 547

Traffic between Yokosuka and Aircraft Factory and various assembly plants in Western Mandates indicates further supply of aircraft to Rabaul area.
(COM 14-Ø12Ø54-TI)
(Summary, 020600, August, No. 28)

An operational order gave some clues as to the probable route of air groups which were flying down into the southern area. The route seemed to follow from Chichijima, to Saipan, Truk and Rabaul.

AUGUST 1, 1942 (Continued)

No. 548

Operations Section, Navy General Staff at 2Ø3Ø/31 July addressed Chiefs of Staff 4th, 8th and 11th Air Fleets [illegible] suffix Ø4 and 5th Air Attack [illegible], Info: 4th, 5th, 7th and 8th Base Forces [illegible] and [illegible]. Inclusion of 5th Air Attack Corps indicates possible air movements along route shown. (COM 14-010606-TI)

It was pointed out:

The route indicated is:
Chichijima (7th Base Force)
Saipan (5th " ")
Truk (4th " ")
Rabaul (8th " " & 5th Air Attack For)
(Summary, 011400, August, No. 37)

An enemy contact report disclosed that the Japanese had sighted Allied cruisers and destroyers.

No. 549

[illegible], Serial 007 of 1st. At 14ØØ plane sent following message to RZQ "One enemy blank one cruiser and one destroyer in position blanks". Comment: Blanks are our own. Truk radio broadcast above 4Ø minutes after plane sent original text. If convenient request [illegible] furnish original and state whether in contact code or plain. (GZ/JN#2293-Opnav 011812-DI)
(Summary, 011400, August, No. 31)

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AUGUST 1, 1942 (Continued)

The Fifth Air Attack Force was carrying out most of the air operations in the Solomon Islands area according to enemy operational orders.

No. 550

FROM: ____ (5th Air Attack Force)
TO : _____ (?)
INFO: ____ (11th Air Fleet)
_____ (8th Fleet)
(Cruadiv 18)
?3 Force (one of the 3, or possibly 4, Divisions of (5th Air Attack Force) carry out attack on RZQ in accordance with 5 AB Operation Order #____. ------- rest unreadable ----------.
(CZ/JN#2208-Opnav 011853-ZI)
(Summary, 011400, August, No. 30)

An Air Tender, which had been at Rabaul until about July 22, was now perceived to be stationed at the Lae Sea Plane Base.

No. 551

Air Tender appears to be in or scheduled to proceed to Lae vicinity.
(BEL-Ø1Ø834-TI)

AUGUST 1, 1942 (Continued)

No. 551 (Cont.)

It was mentioned:

/on 23 July was indicated as probably being at sea in Rabaul area on 23 July.
(Summary, 020600, August, No. 35)

No. 552

FROM: (MARU)
TO : (Tokyo Navy Minister)
(Tokyo Naval General Staff)
(Kure Mov't. Report Sect. (B))
(11th Air Fleet (B))
(5th Air Attack Force)
INFO: (?)
(Desdiv 34)

Arrived RZM Ø85Ø?

It was noticed:

has been reported as an air tender but this is not positive. It was at Rabaul until about 22 July; on 23 July it was indicated as being at sea by inclusion as an addressee in Rabaul's RI Report. RZM is Lae Sea Plane Base.
(Summary, 011400, August, No. 34)

Enemy submarines were rather active on this day. Tokyo was sending weather reports to the Com-

AUGUST 1, 1942 (Continued)

mander of Subron 2, who was believed to be near Yokosuka, and also to the Commander of Subron 6, who was thought to be in the South Pacific. Subron 3, operating in the Eastern Australian waters, and Subron 7, which was last heard of at Truk, were also addressed by the Weather Bureau. Estimates were made as to the location of other submarine units as follows:

No. 553

Submarine traffic also fairly heavy and showing Comsubron 1 and Comsubron 2 in Yokosuka area; Comsubron 7 at Truk; Comsubron 8 at Saigon; Subdiv 33 in Rabaul area and Subdiv at Yokosuka.
(BEL-ØlØ834-TI)

It was commented:

Comsubron 2 was indicated at Yokosuka and Comsubron 1 not at Yokosuka on 31 July. Comsubron 7, according to TI on 1 August, was last seen under Truk cover.
On 25 July Subdiv 33 was believed located in vicinity Malaya.
On 24 July Comsubdiv was indicated at Yokosuka by traffic routing and association.
(Summary, 020600, August, No. 45)

AUGUST 1, 1942 (Continued)

No. 554

Tokyo Weather addressed Comsubron 2 who is due shortly at Yokosuka and Comsubron 6 presumed to be in Southeast waters last seen associated with Truk. This at 2ØØØ. At same time, he addressed Subrons 3 and 7 former is SOPA subs operating in eastern Australian waters while latter was last seen under Truk cover. Same heading included Chiefs of Staff Subforce and Combined Fleet and Suffix Ø4.
(COM 14-010608-TI)

It was indicated:

Comsubron 2 believed at Yokosuka 31 July. Associations in the heading of Movement Report by Comsubron 6 16 July indicated this unit might be in the Mandates with part of his Subdivs moving toward the Rabaul-New Britain area. Comsubron 3 in Bass Strait by D/F 31 July. Subron 7 is believed to be operating in the vicinity of Malaya.
(Summary, 011400, August, No. 45)

Enemy airplanes and submarines maintained close liaison in the New Guinea area, since the Commander of Subron 7 was always included in reports from the Fifth Air Attack Force.

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AUGUST 1, 1942 (Continued)

No. 555

Comsubron 7 continues to be included in reports from 5th Air Attack in New Guinea area.
(CT#525-Opnav 011632-TI)
(Summary, 011400, August, No. 47)

It was stated in the Bulletin of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet for August 1:

No. 556

FROM: CINCPAC 010327, August, 1942
TO : ALL TASK FORCE COMDRS PACIFIC FLT
COMSOWESTPACFOR
COMSOPACFOR
COMNORWESTSEAFRON
COMWESTSEAFRON
COMPASEAFRON
COMHAWSEAFRON
COMINCH
OPNAV

NCR 4310 J Bulletin #138

Crudiv 7 (2 CA) plus part of Desron 3 in Indian Ocean. Several Marus in vicinity of Ponape. Kiyokawa Maru in Rabaul area. Brazil Maru enroute and nearing Truk.

ORIGINAL

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AUGUST 2, 1942

The Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet, who was using a cover call in an attempt to keep his identity undisclosed and sending numerous messages to air commanders in this area, was still at Rabaul. The Eleventh Air Fleet seemed to be receiving most of his attention. It was thought that neither the Commander in Chief of the Fourth nor the Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet were in direct charge of the Outer Area Southern Force. The commander of this organization seemed to be the commander of Desron 6.

No. 557

Cinc 8th still under Rabaul and addressed numerous dispatches to air commands in his area, the 11th Air Fleet frequently being addressed for action.
(COM 14 020602-TI)
(Summary, 020600, August, No. 34)

No. 558

Cinc 8th Fleet continues use of Rabaul as cover. Sent several to addressees which include Comcrudiv 6 , CHOKAI

AUGUST 2, 1942 (Continued)

No. 558 (Cont.)

, KAKUMA Escort Force
, Naval Secretary and Outer Area Southern Force
From traffic routing and associations neither Cinc 4th nor Cinc 8th appear to be in direct command of Outer Area Southern Force. Commander may possibly be Condesron 6.
(BEL-020825-TI)
(Summary, 030600, August, No. 21)

The Commander in Chief of the Fourth Fleet appeared to be at sea in the Truk area, and the Commander Submarine Force was near Jaluit. Most of the traffic in the Fourth Fleet area seemed to be devoted to the administration of bases and the movement of supplies.

No. 559

At 2300/1 August Cinc 4th Fleet originated 9-part message addressed to Cinc Combined Fleet and Naval General Staff for action, info: Cinc Subfor, South Seas Force , Cinc 8th Fleet, Cinc 11th Air Fleet, Outside South Seas Force , 4th Air Attack Force , 5th

AUGUST 2, 1942 (Continued)

No. 559 (Cont.)

Air Attack Force . This message was delivered to Cinc Combined Fleet by Tokyo broadcast, to Comsubfor by Tokyo and Jaluit broadcasts, to South Seas Force, Outside South Seas Force, 11th Air Fleet, 4th Air Attack Force, 5th Air Attack Force, by Tokyo broadcast and to 4th Air Attack Force, 5th Air Attack Force direct, from 11th Air Fleet. Cinc 4th appears to be at sea. Comsubforce receiving his traffic on board or at unidentified "FUWA". (GT#526-Opnav 021635-TI)

It was mentioned:

TI has indicated Cinc 4th is in the Truk area. Comsubforce was originating traffic under Jaluit cover 28 July. (Summary, 021400, August, No. 7)

No. 560

The 4th Fleet area traffic was of a tone similar to that previously reported; administration of bases and movement of supplies. (COM 14020602-TI) (Summary, 020600, August, No. 17)

The Fifth Special Landing Force, which was mentioned frequently in July dispatches, was now found to be the Sasebo Fifth Special Landing Force.

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AUGUST 2, 1942 (Continued)

Part of this force was evidently headed by Commander Cruiser Division 18, who was also the commander of an occupation force. Other units noticed at Rabaul were a battalion of Engineers and the 82nd Guard Force.

No. 561

5th Special Landing Force addressed several dispatches to Marus and Base Forces in Rabaul area, addressing Comcrudiv 18 for information, presumably in his role as Comdr. of an Occupation Force? , previously identified as Army from Indies, aboard MARU , is probably a battalion of engineers and is now ashore in the Rabaul area possibly associated with 5th Special Landing Force
(COM 14 020602-TI)

It was noted:

5th Special Landing Force mentioned here, is probably same as Sasebo 5th Special Landing Force which has been previously associated with these same units and the Rabaul-New Britain area. The call is the same call as that used by Sasebo #5 Special Landing Force. Part of this force appears headed by Comcrudiv 18.
(Summary, 020600, August, No. 37)

No. 562

Comdr 82nd Guard Force and
Comdr Base Force at Rabaul.
(BEL. 020906-TI)

AUGUST 2, 1942 (Continued)

No. 562 (Cont.)

It was observed:

was noted several times during July and is identified by COM 14 as a Command in the 8th Base Force at Rabaul. (Summary, 030600, August, No. 26)

The Commander of Cruiser Division 7 was still busy in Southeast Asia, and a vessel of the 19th Division was noticed in the vicinity of the Northeastern Marshall Islands. The composition of the 19th Division was not known at this time, but it was very active in the Rabaul-Tulagi area.

No. 563

Possible operation order went in two parts from to Comcrudiv 7 and Major Commanders of Southeast Asia area. Comcrudiv 7 has been associated today with usual Major Commands plus Comdesrons 3 and 5. (COM 14 020558-TI) (Summary, 020600, August, No. 45)

No. 564

Several apparent contact reports made by planes and a vessel of 19th Division in vicinity Northeastern Marshalls, the type of which is not clear. Reports were addressed

AUGUST 2, 1942 (Continued)

No. 564 (Cont.)

to , believed base at Kwajalein and were not seen passing out of the net controlled by that station. (COM 14 020558-TI)

It was stated:

The composition of the 19th Division is still undetermined. This division appears to be principally in the Rabaul-Tulagi area, although it has been associated with Marshall Islands activities to a lesser extent.
(Summary, 020600, August, No. 16)

The Naruto Maru was in the Kavieng area, and another Maru was enroute from Tulagi to Rabaul.

No. 565

NARUTO MARU under escort AKIKAZE in Kavieng vicinity.
(COM 14-022052-TI)(Summary, 030600,August, No.23)

No. 566

FROM: (Tulagi Base)
TO : (8th Fleet)
Condr. 8th Base Force at Rabaul. Departed Lunga for Rabaul, escorting the MYO MARU. Will pass to Northward of Tulagi (or Guadalcanal). Expect arrive Ra-

AUGUST 2, 1942 (Continued)

No. 566 (Cont.)

baul about 1300 on 1st.
NOTE: Code values this dispatch about forty percent confirmed but believe message correct in essentials.
(BEL. 020309-DI)

It was commented:

is call for Tulagi Base, probably used here as a cover call.
(Summary, 020600, August, No. 36)

There was a great deal of activity between various air commanders in the Rabaul area, and although the 14th Air Group was observed in the Marshall Islands, it was very evident that at least a part of it was in the Rabaul-New Britain area.

No. 567

Traffic was high between air activities in Rabaul area and local commanders.
(COM 14 020558-TI)
(Summary, 020600, August, No. 29)

No. 568

Traffic routing here shows 14th Air in Marshalls area although constantly asso-

AUGUST 2, 1942 (Continued)

No. 568 (Cont.)

ciated in headings with 5th Air Attack and 4th Air Attack Forces. (COM 14-022052-TI)

It was pointed out:

On 27 July, Belconnen noted that a detachment of the 14th Air Group appeared to be at (Gasmata?). 4th Air Attack Force is placed in the Marshalls and 5th Air Attack Force in the New Britain area. (Summary, 030600, August, No. 20)

No. 569

14th Air active, originator to Southern Comdrs. (COM 14 020624-TI)

It was remarked:

At least part of the 14th Air Corps., appears to be in the Rabaul-New Britain area. (Summary, 020600, August, No. 38)

It was also demonstrated that planes from the AKAGI were operating near Palao, and that a detachment of the Yokohama Flying Boat Squadron was at Guadalcanal and Tulagi.

AUGUST 2, 1942 (Continued)

No. 570

Further evidence that AKAGI group may be in Palao area is furnished by dispatch at 1400, 1st, from SETTSU to KAGA, SORYU, HIRYU Plane groups, and group ; info submarine unit of Subron 8. Indicates fairly well that not participating in exercises those units. (CCH 14 020624-TI)

It was reported:

On July 30th, Tokyo called Sasebo and Palao Air Stations to deliver a message addressed to HAYATAKA and AKAGO plane group , which gave indications that one of these addressees was possibly in Palao area. (Summary, 020600, August, No. 15)

No. 571

Detachment of Yokohama Flying Boat Squadron shown at Tulagi. (BEL. -020906-TI)

It was pointed out:

Comdr Yokohama Air Group appeared by T.I. to be at Guadalcanal on 30 July and at Air Base , near Guadalcanal, on 2 August. (Summary, 030600, August, No. 24)

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AUGUST 2, 1942 (Continued)

An enemy sighting report announced the presence of one Allied battleship, two carriers, some cruisers and destroyers. A checkup of British forces at this time indicated that this number of Allied ships might have been in the area.

No. 572

FROM:
TO :

INFO:
(Partly garbled)
"At 14-- (several bad groups)
sighted force consisting of one battleship
(WARSPITE class), two carriers, (Blank)
cruisers, and (Blank) destroyers."
This message was broadcast by (Ominato) to (NORTHERN FORCE).
(BEL-020517-DI)

It was commented:

A check-up of British Forces shows 1 battleship, 2 carriers, 2 cruisers and 2 or more destroyers might have been in the area.
(Summary, 021400, August, No. 10)

ORIGINAL

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AUGUST 2, 1942 (Continued)

No. 573

FROM:
TO :

INFO:
Fragmentary, but a combination of Washington and Belconnen translations:
Part 1) At 1400, 1 August, we sighted near Trincomalee one (1) battleship (WARSPITE class), two (2) carriers, (blank) cruisers, and (2?) destroyers.
Part 2) A force of two (2) enemy destroyers (plus other units) were sighted eighteen (18) miles east of DGP (Trincomalee) and we are anticipating a possible attack.
(GZ #2295-BEL.-020517-Opnav-030251-DI)

It was mentioned:

Opnav's intercept copy of this dispatch shows that it was broadcast by Tokyo to All Major Commands.
(Summary, 030600, August, No. 35)

Subron 8, which was thought to be in the Malaya area, was expected to put in for an overhaul at Kure. The move of Comsubforce towards Malay explained the elevation of the Commander of Subron 5 to Force Commander status in the southwestern sector.

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AUGUST 2, 1942 (Continued)

No. 574

Subron 8 indicated as due for overhaul at Kure. (COM 14 020604-TI)

It was noted:

Subron 8 appears in the Malay area. (Summary, 020600, August, No. 44)

No. 575

Comsubforce indicated underway as Jaluit now broadcasting traffic to this commander whose traffic association with Penang Base and Subron 8 Units may point to his destination. If developments confirm Malaya as destination, this would explain apparent elevation of Comsubron 3 to Force Command status in the Southwestern Sector. (COM 14-021956-TI) (Summary, 030600, August, No. 38)

The Bulletin of the Commander in Chief of Pacific Fleet for August 2 stated in part:

No. 576

FROM: CINCPAC 020321, August, 1942
TO : COMAIRSOPAC
ALL TF COMSOPAC
ALL SF PAC
COMSOWESTPAC
COMINCH
OPNAV
COMNAVEU
ALL FOR ACTION

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22 JUN 1943

AUGUST 2, 1942 (Continued)

No. 576 (Cont.)

... A detachment of Yokohama Air Group at Truk. By direction finder submarine at 155 East, 38 South; 19 South, 176 East; 38 South, 149 East. Enemy continues activity in the waters east of New Guinea ...

ORIGINAL

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AUGUST 3, 1942

Traffic associations on this date seemed to indicate that plans had been made for coordinated operations by Japanese Southern and Southwestern Forces.

No. 577

Traffic association involving Cinc Southwestern Force, Ambon Base Force, Cinc 8th and 8th Base Force at Rabaul may indicate plans for coordinated operations by Southern (East of New Guinea) and Southwestern (West of New Guinea) Forces. Heading associations in traffic from Cinc Southwestern Force suggests convoy including KENJO MARU, unidentified MARU, and Desdiv 22, may be enroute to Ambon or Soerabaya from Kamranh area, via Makassar. 2 MARUS and, which appear to be involved in this activity area, shown in vicinity of Bako.
(BEL. 030635-TI)

It was stated:

On July 29, Seaplane Tender KENJO MARU appeared enroute Truk from Rabaul, escorted by destroyers.
(Summary, 031400, August, No. 49)

The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet seemed to be concerned solely with administration of his bases in the Marshall-Truk area.

AUGUST 3, 1942 (Continued)

No. 578

Cinc 4th Fleet appears to be concerned solely with bases and base forces in Marshalls-Truk area. (COM 14 030712-TI)
(Summary, 031400, August, No. 33)

No. 579

Cinc 4th originated long nine part dispatch at 2300, 1st, to Cinc Combined Fleet , and Tokyo Naval General Staff ; info Comsubfor , Cinc 8th Fleet , Comdr. 11th Air Fleet Comdr. Airrons 24 and 25, plus all Fourth Fleet Comdrs. , and all Comdrs. Southern Force Outer Area .
(BEL. 030658-TI)

It was noticed:

Comairron 25 appeared at Lae, July 27th, Airron 24 appears to be in the Marshall Island area.
(Summary, 031400, August, No. 45)

The First Base Force at Jaluit and the Eighth Base Force at Rabaul were active, but nothing unusual was observed. However, the increasing prominence of enemy movements in the Malay area was worthy of comment.

ORIGINAL

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AUGUST 3, 1942 (Continued)

No. 580

6th and 8th Base Forces continue active but nothing unusual seen. (COM 14-030728-TI)

It was remarked:

6th Base Force is believed at Jaluit. 8th Base Force is believed at Rabaul. (Summary, 030600, August, No. 27)

No. 581

Baseforce activity in Malay area continues with increasing prominence. Chief of Staff 1st Escort Force is indicated at Takao by serial numbers of dispatch sent at 1030, 2nd, addressed to Chief of Staff 3rd Fleet . New call appears to be Radio Station associated with Malay Bases. (COM 14 030712-TI)

It was reported:

has not been identified here. (Summary, 031400, August, No. 50)

The Seventh Base Force was also discovered to be in the Rabaul area.

AUGUST 3, 1942 (Continued)

No. 582

New Command (Base or Defense Force?) used Truk cover at 1200, 2nd, in addressing Staff Communication Officers 8th Fleet and 7th Base Force, both of which are in Rabaul area by traffic routing. (BEL. 030635-TI)
(Summary, 031400, August, No. 34)

Identification of two call signs revealed that the designator "PY" meant Jaluit, and "PX" referred to the Marshall Islands.

No. 583

On July 30th an call "Senior Officer PY Area" was noted.
(GW Memo 8/3-DI)

It was observed:

PY appears to mean Jaluit.
(Summary, 041400, August, No. 39)

No. 584

On July 31st an call "Senior Officer PX Area" was noted.
(GW Memo 8/3-DI)

AUGUST 3, 1942 (Continued)

No. 584 (Cont.)

It was pointed out:

PX appears to mean Marshall Islands. (Summary, 041400, August, No. 40)

There were still some unidentified call signs. The YUBARI and the Commander of Destroyer Division 16 attempted to conceal their identity under the call sign , as did several other units.

No. 585

YUBARI and Comdesdiv 16 are concealed originators at unidentified . Code Serial numbers indicate at least two other units using this same cover; one connected with submarines and other associated Desron 34 and air commands. Traffic routing and associations tend to locate in Rabaul area. (BEL. 030648-TI)(Summary, 031400,August,No.43)

No. 586

Call identified as Cinc Combined now looks better as Comdesdiv Probable this Comdesdiv was aboard flagship

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No. 586 (Cont.)

of Combined Fleet when this identification was made. (COM 14-030632-TI)

It was indicated:

has not been identified here. (Opnav).
(Summary, 030600, August, No. 30)

Three other call signs which occasioned comment were known to have originated from Kavieng, and tentative identifications were made.

No. 587

The following unidentified calls shown at Kavieng August 2nd:

(GT #531-Opnav 030218-TI)

It was stated:

is identified as a Maru in the 8th Base Force. appears to be a new Man-of-War and first began originating traffic on 29 June and has since appeared in the various communication zones on the way south. appears to be a Major Command or Shore Station call and has not been identified for the current period.
(Summary, 030600, August, No. 29)

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AUGUST 3, 1942 (Continued)

No. 588

Man-of-War enroute Truk to Rabaul. (BEL. 030658-TI)

It was mentioned:

On July 25th, Bel. reported as proceeding Rabaul via Truk and that this vessel recently arrived in Saipan area from Empire. On August 2nd, appeared at Kavieng (New Ireland).
(Summary, 031400, August, No. 38)

A new Japanese Fleet unit was discovered at Maizuru, and from its association in radio traffic it was thought to be enroute southwards.

No. 589

New Fleet Unit apparently at Maizuru and associated Rabaul and 8th Fleet Chief of Staff. Possibly this unit to go South. (GT#533-Opnav 031530-TI)
(Summary, 031400, August, No. 46)

Another indication of Japanese plans for an attack upon the Nauru and Ocean Islands from the North and West simultaneously was found. Traffic analysis

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of this dispatch disclosed the presence of three enemy tankers in the Ambon area, and indicated that Airron 11 was in the Marshall Islands.

No. 590

Unidentified, concealed originator at addressed dispatch at 1050, 1st, to CHITOSE , Auxiliary (now en-route Rabaul area), TSURUMI , SHIRI-YA (at Ominato), Auxiliary and Tanker GENOTA MARU which is shown in company with NATORI , probably in Ambon area. This dispatch routed through Comairron 24 for delivery to CHITOSE, thereby suggesting presence Comairron 11 in Marshalls. Comdesdiv places in Jaluit yesterday. DESDIV has in past acted as escort for Airron 11, thereby tending to strengthen foregoing assumption. This being the case, the association of CHITOSE and DESDIV with units in Rabaul area may be indicative of an impending attack upon Nauru and Ocean Islands simultaneously from North and West. (BEL. 050648-TI)

It was noticed:

CHITOSE is a Seaplane Tender. TSURUMI is a Tanker. SHIRIYA is a Tanker. GENOTA MARU is a former Dutch Tanker which was captured by the Japs. COMDESDIV apparently arrived at Jaluit 1300, Aug. 1, from standard movement report to Cinc 4th Fleet. (Summary, 051400, August, No. 44)

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AUGUST 3, 1942 (Continued)

The sudden rise in radio traffic between Bungo Channel Patrol Force, Kure Defense Force and Destroyer Squadron 10 indicated a movement of heavy ships in that region. Since destroyers of Destroyer Squadron 10 had been escorting aircraft carriers in the Kyushu area, it was surmised that the carriers might be moving. The Commander of Destroyer Squadron 10 was noted in association with the Eighth Fleet, but it was thought that this resulted merely from the assignment of his destroyers to escort duty. It was considered likely that Destroyer Squadron 10 had been strengthened by the addition of Destroyer Division 16 for operations with the carriers which were expected to take place in the near future.

No. 591

A flurry of activity between Bungo Channel Patrol Force , Kure Defense Force and Desron 10 , indicates movements of heavy ships in that region. Activity was heaviest between

AUGUST 3, 1942 (Continued)

No. 591 (Cont.)

2ØØØ and 21ØØ, August 2nd. This might be carriers returning to Kure after exercises but no direct confirmation.
(COM 14-030632-TI)

It was noticed:

COM 14 on Aug. 2 stated several priorities originated by Bungo Channel Patrol , commencing around 184Ø, 2 August which may have been due to BLUE Submarine operations or arrangements for escorting Fleet Units in or out of Channel.
(Summary, 030600, August, No. 15)

No. 592

The vague association of Comdesron 10 with 8th Fleet might be only result of the heavy escort duty now being given to destroyers. (COM 14-Ø3Ø728-TI)

It was reported:

has been info addressee on several occasions in dispatches from Comdesdiv to Chief of Staff 4th Fleet and 8th Base Force at Rabaul. More direct association with Cinc 8th has not been noted here during July.
(Summary, 030600, August, No. 31)

No. 593

Activity of destroyers of Desron 10 (Carrier Escorts) couples with recent inactivity of carrier groups on 591Ø kcs

AUGUST 3, 1942 (Continued)

No. 593 (Cont.)

leads to belief that 1st Air Fleet Carriers may be moving. (COM 14-Ø3Ø646-TI)

It was observed:

Destroyers of Desron 10 have been associated with those carriers operating in the Kyushu area and this may be an indication of the completion of exercises and the return to port via Bungo Channel which also appeared in traffic.
(Summary, 031400, August, No. 15)

No. 594

Dispatch from Rabaul at 2100, 2nd, was addressed to Chief of Staff 1st Air Fleet ; info Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and Comdesron 10 . This association of Rabaul with 1st Air Fleet is probably in connection with ships of Desron 10 which normally operate with 1st Air Fleet, but now partially assigned escort duties. (BEL. 030658-TI)
(Summary, 031400, August, No. 37)

No. 595

Chief of Staff 1st Air Fleet addressed Comdesron 10 and Comdesdiv in a personnel dispatch August 3rd. It is still considered likely Desron 10 has been

No. 595 (Cont.)

reinforced by an extra Desdiv for concerted operation with present carriers in near future. (COM 14-Ø31942-TI)

It was commented:

On 1 August TI indicated that Desdiv 16 is now assigned to Desron 10 which in the past has been primarily concerned with carrier plane guard duty.
(Summary, 040600, August, No. 15)

Destroyer Division 16 was escorting the SUZUYA from the South Pacific to the Empire. One destroyer of Destroyer Division 30 was found in the Singapore area, and another was located at Truk.

No. 596

At 153Ø August 2nd, sent code movement report. Addressees in this dispatch indicate this Desdiv will escort the SUZUYA to the Empire.
(COM 14-Ø3Ø632-TI)

It was indicated:

COM 14 on 1 August stated movement report originated by Comdesdiv at 15ØØ, 31 July, indicated this Division will pro-

AUGUST 3, 1942 (Continued)

No. 596 (Cont.)

bably escort SUZUYA in (garbled) direction. This Desdiv Commander was believed to have arrived at Rabaul on 28 July.
is believed Desdiv 16. The SUZUYA has not been definitely placed lately. It was believed by TI to have been probably enroute Truk to Rabaul on 28 July in company with part Desdiv 16.
(Summary, 030600, August, No. 32)

No. 597

Destroyer in Desdiv 30 in Singapore area by traffic routing. Comdesdiv 30 and destroyer in Desdiv 30, at Truk. (GT #533-Opnav 031530-TI)
(Summary, 031400, August, No. 51)

The KAKO of Cruiser Division 6 was still thought to be in the general area of Kavieng.

No. 598

Chief of Staff 1st Fleet addressed a personnel message to Cruiser KAKO in Crudiv 6.
(COM 14-Ø31942-TI)

It was remarked:

KAKO was indicated by TI as being with the AOBA at Kavieng on 17-19 July.
(Summary, 040600, August, No. 18)

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22 [illegible] 42

AUGUST 3, 1942 (Continued)

The NARUTO MARU announced its arrival at Lae and another ship, tentatively identified as either a subtender or a hospital ship, was enroute from Saipan to Rabaul.

No. 599

FROM:
"In company with the [illegible], arrived Lae at 0000." ([illegible] 14 031000-ZI)

It was noted:

[illegible] appears to be the NARUTO MARU (AV) and was last reported, August 2nd, in company with [illegible] in Kavieng (New Ireland) area.
(Summary, 031400, August, No. 42)

No. 600

Hospital Ship [illegible] is enroute Saipan to Rabaul. (CSN 14-Ø31942-TI)

It was observed:

Opnav identifies [illegible] as a Sub Tender. (Summary, 040000, August, No. 19)

The movement of a new air group from the Yokosuka Air station to Rabaul was noted.

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43

AUGUST 3, 1942 (Continued)

No. 601

Comdr unidentified Air unit is aboard the MARU and is associated with 8th Air Attack Corps.
(COM 14-030646-TI)
(Summary, 031400, August, No. 39)

No. 602

Movement of new Air Group to Rabaul area is indicated by series of dispatches. (COM 14-Ø3Ø734-TI)

It was noticed:

On 24 July Comdr Air Activity was believed located at Yokosuka Air Station .
(Summary, 031400, August, No. 40)

A detachment of the Fourteenth Air Corps was operating with the Yokohama Air Group from the Tulagi area, while the Commander of the Tenian Air Group was shown to be at Lae.

No. 603

A detachment of the 14th Air Corps is at Tulagi Air Base

AUGUST 3, 1943 (Continued)

No. 603 (Cont.)

with Comdr. Yokohama Air Group
August 3. (GT #333-Opnav 031530-TI)

It was remarked:

A detachment of the 14th Air Corps transferred to the Rabaul area about July 28th. (Summary, 031400, August, No. 36)

No. 604

Comdr Taipan Air Group shown
at Lae August 2.
(GT #331-Opnav-030218-TI)
(Summary, 030600, August, No. 28)

An estimate of the position of Japanese submarines was now made.

No. 605

General disposition of Subrons follow: Comsubfor enroute Yokosuka for Jaluit. Subron 1 has two Divisions in Empire, and one Division in 8th Fleet area. Subron 2 has one Sub in Kiska area, four Subs in Empire, and one Sub in Saipan area. Subron 3 has one and a-half Divisions in 8th Fleet area, and one and a-half Divisions in the Empire. Subron 5 has one Division divided between Saigon area

ORIGINAL

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AUGUST 3, 1942 (Continued)

No. 605 (Cont.)

and Empire, with another Division unlocated. Subron 6 has one Division in Bonins area or possibly scheduled for early movement to Mandates area. Subron 7 has two Divisions in 5th Fleet area, and one Division in 8th Fleet area. Subron 8 has two Divisions at Saigon, and one Division at Yokosuka. (COM 14-Ø31936-TI)

It was pointed out:

Other fairly recent T.I. indications placed Subron 1 in the Empire, Subron 2 enroute the Empire from the North Pacific, two Divisions of Subron 3 in the 8th Fleet area, and others in general as listed by COM 14 above.

AUGUST 4, 1942

The Commander in Chief of the 8th Fleet under cover of a Rabaul call sign was in communication with the Chief of Staff of the 4th Fleet.

No. 606

Cinc 8th Fleet under Rabaul cover addressed Chief of Staff 4th Fleet , Info: General Staff, Chief of Staff, Combined and Chief of Staff Ist Air Fleet (COM 14-042148-ti)
(Summary, 050600, August, No. 31)

A long message from the Navy General Staff to several chiefs of staff was thought to be an operational plan for the southwestern area.

No. 607

Long 5 part message from Naval General Staff to Chiefs of Staff Nei Force, and Southern Expeditionary Fleet, Comcrudiv 7 Condesron 3 ; info Chiefs of Staff 2ND Fleet, Ist Air Fleet, Penang , unidentified , and - alternate , at 2300, August 3, is doubtless operation plan for southwestern area. (GT #538-OPNAV 041730-TI)
(Summary, 041400, August, No. 55)

The Destroyer of Desdiv 30, formerly noticed at Truk, was now operating under a cover call sign at Kavieng.

ORIGINAL

AUGUST 4, 1942 (Continued)

No. 608

Destroyer was originator at Kavieng at 0800, 2 August. (BEL. 040927-TI)

It was reported:

T.I. indicated DD of Desdiv 30, was in Truk 3 August according to Washington Unit. It has been operating in the Rabaul area on and off for some time. (Summary, 050600, August, No. 35)

The SUZUYA, under observation for a long time, appeared now to be moving to Sasebo. From the length of time taken by the AKASHI to repair the SUZUYA, it was believed this was the most seriously damaged ship of those of Crudiv 7 which survived the Midway Battle.

No. 609

Message from SUZUYA (no originator) serial 162, #244, action Cinc 4th Fleet , Cinc 2nd Fleet , Comcrudiv 7 , info Cos Combined . Cos Sasebo and Kure, Sasebo Dock Yard) and KYUSHU Patrol , and Tokyo at unknown time, appears to be movement this cruiser to Sasebo. (GT #537-OPNAV 041410-TI)

It was commented:

AUGUST 4, 1942 (Continued)

No. 609 (Cont.)

Apparently from the length of time taken by the Akashi to repair the SUZUYA, this ship was the most seriously damaged ship of Crudiv 7 that survived the Midway Battle.
(Summary, 041400, August, No. 22)

A message to communication officers of the 4th Fleet from Ambon was considered to be an indication of movements from Rabaul to the Netherland East Indies, or vice versa, by way of northern New Guinea.

No. 610

Ambon Communication Officer addressed dispatch at 1600/3 August for action 4th Fleet Collectively and Rabaul Communication Officer , Info: Communication Officers Singapore), Soerabaja and Manokwari). This apparently concerns Communication Officers 4th Fleet units with Ambon and may be indicative of movements from Rabaul to NEI of vice versa by way of northern New Guinea (Manokwari). (BEL-041053-TI)
(Summary, 050600, August, No. 47)

AUGUST 4, 1942 (Continued)

No. 610 (Cont.)

A very important discovery concerning Japanese call signs was made at this time.

. Various enemy units were using this call, and it was considered probable that the Japanese had finally adopted another of the U. S. Navy's communication security practices. This was one of the many precautions adopted by the Japanese after their defeat at Midway, and the consequent publicity disclosing the source of intelligence which had made possible the victory.

No. 611

Service call first noted August 1, then tentatively identified as Cinc Combined Fleet, Various originators using this call include Cinc Combined, Comdesdiv , Comsubforce, Commander unidentified air unit at Kiska, and one other unidentified unit. (COM 14 040752-TI) (Summary, 041400, August, No. 4)

ORIGINAL

AUGUST 4, 1942 (Continued)

No. 611 (Cont.)

Some important identifications were made on this day, notably the 108th Air Group and the 11th Pioneer Force at Lunga.

No. 612

Dispatch from Maru at 0900, August 3, was sent with service calls and addresses and later re-sent with equivalents positively identifying as NIKKAI MARU, as 108th Air Group and as 11th Pioneer Force at Lunga. The latter two are apparently important units as their respective Commanders have the same title as Commander 8th Base Force at Rabaul. (B&L. -040950-TI)

It was observed:

is identified as Maru of the 8th Base Force and shown at Kavieng 2 August. and previously identified as "Air activity at Truk," and "activity at Guadalcanal," respectively.
(Summary, 050600, August, No. 41)

Several Marus were in the Rabaul area, and others were enroute there.

ORIGINAL

AUGUST 4, 1942 (Continued)

No. 613

FROM: [redacted] (Maru)
TO : [redacted] (Tokyo Navy Minister)
[redacted] (Tokyo Naval General Staff)
[redacted] (Maizuru)
INFO: [redacted] (8th Base Force, Rabaul)
[redacted] (Truk Air Activity)
[redacted] (Rabaul Address)
[redacted] (4th Fleet)
[redacted] (Tokyo Transportation Section)

Departed Palao for Rabaul at 1200.
(GZ #2310-DI)

It was mentioned:

Com 14's 312224-DI reported serial #218, July 30, "Arrived Rabaul at 1200."
(Summary, 041400, August, No. 43)

No. 614

FROM: [redacted] (34th Guard Force)
TO : [redacted] (4th Base Force, Truk)
[redacted] (unidentified)
INFO: [redacted] (CofS 8th Fleet)
[redacted] (CofS 4th Fleet)
[redacted] (Com. Off. 32nd Base Force, Davao)

Very fragmentary but deals with convoy movements from MD to RR via PP. One arrival

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No. 614 (Cont.)

date at PP is "about 20th." Sometime after this 6 ships will leave that place for RR. (GZ #2311-OPNAV 041750-DI)

It was noted:

RR is Rabaul. MD is Davao, PP is Palao. is identified as 34th Defense Force in Marshalls. (Summary, 041400, August, No. 45)

No. 615

FROM:		(MARU in 11th Air Flt.)
		(AKIKAZE (DD) in 11th Air Flt.)
TO:		(unidentified)
		(Desdiv 34)
		(11th Air Flt.)
INFO:		(8th Base Force, Rabaul)
		(MARU)
		(8th Fleet)
		(4th Fleet)
		(Unidentified)

Departed PS 1200 on 3rd. Scheduled to arrive RR 1300 on 5th. (GZ #2309-OPNAV 041750-DI)

It was stated:

PS is Saipan, RR is Rabaul. (Summary, 041400, August, No. 44)

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AUGUST 4, 1942 (Continued)

No. 616

Staff Secretary Combined Fleet addressed Maru _ (enroute Rabaul with Commander Air Unit aboard), information care of Crudiv 7 and All Major Commands as Special Routing Section has also been shown in care of NATORI (Flagship, Desron 5). (COM 14-042144-TI)

It was observed:

The call has been identified as Special Routing Section at _____, but has appeared in every dispatch available in which GENOTA MARU (a captured Dutch tanker) is mentioned. Belconnen believes ____ is the tanker GENOTA, and reasoned by T. I. that the GENOTA was enroute to Soerabaya with Crudiv 7 on 16 July and was in company with the NATORI in the vicinity of Ambon on 1 August. Maru appears to be enroute from the Empire to Rabaul. Based on the foregoing, there seems to be indication that the GENOTA will carry fuel to Maru possibly in the Rabaul area.
(Summary, 050600, August, No. 43)

The repair ship AKASHI, having completed its assignment in making the SUZUYA ready for action, was now returning to Kure.

AUGUST 4, 1942 (Continued)

No. 617

AKASHI _____ to unidentified Fleet Chief of Staff _____ Info Chief of Staff Combined _____, Saeki Air _____ Kure Defense _____ Chief of Staff Kure _____ "OTU" _____ (Section B of Escort Force _____), and Chief of Staff 11th Air _____. Evidently this vessel returning to Kure.
(GT #537-OPNAV-041410-TI)

It was remarked:

The repair ship AKASHI appeared at Truk since the Midway Battle and is believed to have made emergency repairs to Crudiv 7 prior to its departure for the Empire. The last Crudiv 7 ship to complete repairing was the SUZUYA which appeared possibly enroute to the Empire on Aug. 2nd.
(Summary, 041400, August, No. 23)

No. 618

AKASHI appears associated with Cinc 2nd Fleet, Truk Radio and
(COM 14-042148-TI)

It was commented:

The AKASHI (repair ship) has appeared at Truk since the Midway Battle and is believed to have made emergency repairs to Crudiv 7. _____ is the cruiser SUZUYA of that Division.
(Summary, 050600, August, No. 26)

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ORIGINAL

No. 618 (Cont.)

The NARUTO MARU was also departing from this region, accompanied by the AKIKAZE.

No. 619

NARUTO MARU appears to be departing Rabaul area possibly for Kure probably escorted by AKIKAZE
(BEL-040927-TI)

It was remarked:

Com 14 reported the NARUTO in company with the AKIKAZE at Kavieng, New Ireland 2nd August.
(Summary, 050600, August, No. 32)

A great reduction in carrier aircraft traffic had been noticed for the preceding two weeks, while the activity of Desron 10 had increased. This suggested that more destroyer guards were being acquired previous to the beginning of a new operation.

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No. 620

Coincident with slackening of carrier-air base traffic prevalent for the past two weeks assumed in connection training exercises, is increasing prominence of Comdesron 10 and units suggesting possibility Desron 10 rounding up plane guard destroyers in connection next phase of training.

It was mentioned:

Carriers have appeared in Kyushu area. (Summary, 041400, August, No. 9)

A reorganization of carrier divisions was in progress at this time, and Cardiv 1 was thought to include the ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU and ZUIHO. The first two carriers had formerly been assigned to Cardiv 5. Cardiv 2 was considered to comprise the RYUJO, HAYATAKA, HITAKI and three plane groups supplied by the AKAGI, SORYU and an unidentified ship. The HOSHO and the KASUGA MARU were not definitely identified with either Cardiv 1 or Cardiv 2.

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No. 621

Evidence that carrier division reorganization nearing completion shown in various dispatches concerning carriers.
(COM 14 040752-TI)

It is commented:

Reorganization of carriers under old Cardivs 1 and 2 commands has been indicated.
(Summary, 041400, August, No. 5)

No. 622

Ist Air Fleet dispatch at 1840/3rd, under blank origin, to Staff Communication Officers Desron 10, Cardiv 2 Collective, and Cardiv 1 Collective less ZUIHO shows probable composition of Cardiv 1 to include ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU and ZUIHO (COM 14 040802-TI)

It was remarked:

SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU were formerly assigned to Cardiv 5.
(Summary, 041400, August, No. 6)

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ORIGINAL

No. 623

Message from Staff Communication Officer Cardiv 2 at 1400/3rd, indicates following will comprise units this Cardiv, RYUJO, HAYATAKA, HITAKI, and three plane groups (COM 14 040802-TI)

It was observed:

RIA 3 appears to be AKAGI plane group. RAA 5 appears to be SORYU plane group. appears to be an unidentified group. (Summary, 041400, August, No. 7)

No. 624

RYUJO is indicated as being in reorganized Cardiv 2 by heading of dispatch from Tokyo Supply address at 1700, August 3, to the RYUJO, information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and Ist Air Fleet plus Comcardiv 2 and Kure Navy Yard . (BEL. 041129-TI)

It is pointed out:

There are indications that the other ships of Cardiv 2 are HAYATAKA and HITAKA. (Summary, 050600, August, No 16)

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No. 625

No definite tie-up with either Cardiv is yet shown for and .
(COM 14 040802-TI)

It was indicated:

is identified as the HOSHO.
is identified as the KASUGA MARU; it is not determined whether this ship is a combatant carrier or only a transport carrier, this carrier has to date not been engaged in combatant operations.
(Summary, 041400, August, No. 8)

An estimate of the location of some Japanese air units disclosed the fact that a detachment of the Chiba Air Group was at Gasmata, the Commander of the Tainan Air Group was at Lae, and the Commander of the Yokohama Air Group was at Tulagi.

No.626

Detachment CHIBA AIR at Gasmata . . . (BEL.-041129-TI)

It was commented:

has been identified as Truk AIR and Gasmata. It seems to have air-connections and is located in the Rabaul area. is identified as the 14th Air Corps in addition to Chiba AIR.
(Summary, 050600, August, No. 37)

AUGUST 4, 1942 (Continued)

No. 627

Comdr. TAINAN AIR continues at Lae August 4th. (GT #536-OPNAV-041405-TI)
(Summary, 041400, August, No. 46)

No. 628

Comdr. YOKOHAMA AIR appears to be at TULAGI AIR August 4th.
(GT #536-OPNAV-041405-TI)
(Summary, 041400, August, No. 48)

It was indicated that the 11th Air Fleet was about to shift its headquarters from Tenian prior to the commencement of a new operation.

No. 629

Commander 11th Air Fleet originated long 2-part dispatch addressed for action to Cinc Combined Fleet information to Cincs 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th Fleets, plus Commander 1st Air Fleet, and Minister of Navy
Dispatch is probably relative to projected operations by 11th Air Fleet and may indicate a shift of headquarters of that Fleet from Tenian. (BEL. -040950-TI)

It was stated:

is the Subforce sometimes called 6th Fleet. has been identified as Tokyo Movement Report Office.

(Summary, 050600, August, No. 23)

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No. 629 (Cont.)

A section of the 6th Air Attack Force was aboard an auxiliary, escorted by the YUKAZE, enroute to Rabaul. An air tender was also in this convoy.

No. 630

Associations suggest that a section of 6th Air Attack Force may be aboard auxiliary enroute to Rabaul and escorted by YUKAZE . MARU air-tender is also in company.
(BEL-040950-TI)
(Summary, 050600, August, No. 44)

A message from the commander of a submarine squadron to "Aircraft engaged in sea escort" proved that enemy convoys in the Panang, Singapore and Kamranh Bay areas were being protected by air escorts.

No. 631

"Aircraft engaged in Sea Escort" appeared in heading of dispatch from Consubron 8 and was associated with Base Forces at Panang, Singapore and Kamranh Bay indicating that convoys in these areas are provided with Air Escorts.
(BEL-041053-TI)
(Summary, 050600, August, No. 53)

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AUGUST 4, 1942 (Continued)

No. 631 (Cont.)

The Commander of the 1st Air Fleet was in contact with seven carrier based plane groups. It is interesting to note that he was concealing his identity under the ____ call, which, by this time, was being used by most Japanese ships and shore stations regardless of location.

No. 632

Commander 1st Air Fleet appeared as originator under originating cover call at 1850, 3 August. Dispatch was addressed Collective, for action 1st Air Fleet and seven carrier-based Plane Groups

Appearance of as originator of traffic from concealed originators in widely separated areas, denotes that call to be standard cover call for any Orange ship or Command irrespective of location and used in manner similar to

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ORIGINAL

No. 632 (Cont.)

It was indicated:

Dispatch stated "seven" carrier-based Plane Groups although only six were listed. (old AKAGI Plane Group call and now associated with Cardiv 2) may be the one omitted. (Summary, 050600, August, No. 14)

A report from enemy aircraft patrolling the Ocean Island sector disclosed that enemy reconnaisance was in progress there.

No. 633

FROM: (Comairron 24)
TO : (Comdr. 11th Air Fleet)

Unreadable. Labeled 4AB Operatinns Report August 2nd.

1. Details patrol lines searched.
3. Mentions RYC (Ocean Island) possibly in connection with above patrols.

(BEL. 040918-DI)

It was stated:

4AB is an abbreviation for 4th Air Attack Force.
(Summary; 041400, August, No. 33)

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No. 633 (Cont.)

On the other hand, a contact report disclosed that Allied planes were sighted over Tulagi.

No. 634

Sighting report of 3 planes over Air Station (New Guinea area) was reported by number 3 Planes of the 5th Section of Yokohama Flying Boat Squadron at Ø83Ø/3 August.
(BEL-041053-TI)

It was reported:

has been identified as an Air Base at Tulagi.
(Summary, 050600, August, No. 39)

The Commander of the Submarine Force was still receiving traffic via Jaluit, therefore it was presumed that he was still in the Malay area.

AUGUST 4, 1942 (Continued)

No. 635

Comsubforce still receiving traffic via Jaluit broadcast and heading association with Malaya-Bengal area continues. (COM 14 040808-TI)

It was commented:

Comsubfor was reported Aug. 3rd as enroute Yokosuka for Jaluit. (Summary, 041400, August, No. 41)

An estimate of the position of some of the Japanese units mentioned in regular traffic of this period was now made by O. N. I. as follows. Note that Communication Intelligence disagreed as to the location of Crudiv 6 and maintained that it was in the New Britain-Solomons area.

No. 636

SUZUYA of Crudiv 7 still at Truk.
One Division of Desron 4 believed at Jaluit others probably in home waters on escort duties.
Crudiv 6: Recently indicated moved to Truk area.
One SS of Subron 2 possibly in Saipan area.
Subron6: In Mandates except 1 Division possibly in South Pacific.
Desdiv 34 in Marshalls.

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AUGUST 4, 1942 (Continued)

No. 636 (Cont.)

Combined Air Force: COMAIRON 11 with 1 or 2 CHITOSE class possibly in Jaluit area. KAMIKAWA MARU uncertain but believed in Truk-Rabaul Area.
(OPNAV-Ø4212Ø and Ø42127-ONI BULL.)

It was stated:

Crudiv 6 was believed remaining in New Britain-Solomons Area with possibility that one ship of Crudiv 6 damaged recently being repaired at Truk. TI indicated on 3 August Subron 6 has one Division in Bonins Area or possibly scheduled for early movement to Mandates area.
On August 4th, KAMIKAWA MARU was placed definitely at Sasebo by TI.
(Summary, 051400, August, No. 36)

No. 637

Desron	2:	JINTSU and DESDIV 16 in New Britain-East New Guinea area, and others on escort duties from Yokosuka.
Crudiv	18:	TENRYU and TATSUTA separated in New Britain-New Guinea waters.
Desron	6:	In Melanesia-New Guinea area.
Division	19:	To which OSHIMA added believed in Rabaul area.
Subron	7:	One Division in New Britain area.

22 JUN 1943
ORIGINAL

AUGUST 4, 1942 (Continued)

No. 637 (Cont.)

Subron 3: Comdr. reported in Bass Strait having about half squadron in South Pacific and others in home waters.
8th Fleet : CHOKAI in Rabaul area.
Desron 5: ISUZU and Desdiv 22 in Banda Sea.
Airon 25: KENJO Maru now indicated in Banda Sea. KIYOKAWA Maru in Rabaul area.
(OPNAV-Ø4212Ø and Ø42127-ONI BULL.)

It was observed:

The OSHIMA was from DI concerned with the salvage of the EIFUKU Maru on 1 August.
(Summary, 051400, August, No. 42)

Traffic in the Marshall Islands was confined to administrative traffic, and the 8th Fleet area was also undisturbed by operational messages.

No. 638

Marshalls activity confined to apparent administrative traffic and no operational type was seen emanating from 8th Fleet Zone.
(COM 14 -40808-TI)
(Summary, 041400, August, No. 35)

22 JUN 1943
ORIGINAL

No. 639

Another important indication of the Japanese security measures was noticed at 0000, August 5, when all their major command and shore radio call signs were changed.

Major Command and Shore Radio calls changed at ØØØØ, Aug. 5.
(GT #538-OPNAV 041730-TI)
(Summary, 041400, August, No. 3)

No. 640

The following is taken from the Bulletin of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet issued on August 4:

FROM: Cincpac 040455, August, 1942

TO : U.S. Naval for Sowespac
All Task For Comdrs Pac Flt.
Comsopacfor
All Pacseafron Coms
Comnavforeu
Opnav
Cominch

22 JUN 1943
ORIGINAL

No. 640 (Cont.)

NCR 6421 Bulletin No. 141

Additional air strength moving toward Rabaul area from Mandates. Crudiv 6, Crudiv 18, and Desron 6 remain New Britain-Solomon area. Possible that one ship of Crudiv 6 damaged recently, and will be repaired at Truk. Forces in Aleutians remain same. Submarine locations as follows: Two squadrons in Empire, one in Aleutians. One plus in Truk-Tasman Sea area. One near Saigon. Almost daily enemy aerial reconnaissance last few days of Ocean Island. ...

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22 JUN 1943
ORIGINAL

August 5, 1942

Part II of the very important message from Togo to Osima in Berlin, which was discussed before, was made available on this day. It reads as follows:

No. 641

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)
TO : Berlin
(Part 2 of 3)

3. But on the other hand we Japanese must absolutely expend tremendous efforts in destroying the influence of Chungking which is the heart and base for Anglo-Saxon activities everywhere throughout East Asia. Actually, at present the Chinese continent is a hotbed of direct anti-Japanese activities on the part of England and the United States.

4. The Japanese Empire must continue ever more vigorously her fight to make Great Britain come to her knees. In this she is active in the pursuit of joint warfare with her two Allies; but on the other hand there is the United States. In spite of our glorious victories so far, the resistance of that country is still formidable. Not only must we fight the United States harder than ever, but then too there is the question of raw materials in the South Seas. In the procurement and use of these we must also expend greater energy. Now finally this is well under way.

22 JUN 1943
ORIGINAL

No. 641 (Cont.)

5. Thus of necessity, under the present circumstances for Japan to take a definite policy toward Russia would mean the division of our strength. Not only is it definitely an unfavorable opportunity under the present circumstances, but we also greatly fear that it would weaken our effort against America and England in the Far East and greatly increase British and American aid to Russia besides giving America advantageous bases to use against Japan. It cannot be denied that this would be unprofitable.

Accordingly, we firmly believe that the above policy is not to be desired in the prosecution of the 3-country (Japan-Germany-Italy) war. It goes without saying that Japan is now thoroughly prepared in the North, and has thus had a hand in cramping the Soviet in the East. Hereafter she expects to do so. (GZ #5572-OPNAV-052112-DI) (Summary, 060600, August, No. 3)

A comment made on this message by Von Ribbentrop was forwarded to Tokyo by Ambassador Osima.

22 JUN
ORIGINAL

No. 642

FROM: Berlin (Osima)
TO : Tokyo

1. On the 30th I passed the morning with Foreign Minister Ribbentrop at the headquarters of the Ukraine Command and we talked for three hours or more.

2. Starting out suitably by saying that I was speaking on instructions from the Imperial government, I communicated to him the contents of your #588. Ribbentrop replied that naturally this is something for the Japanese Government to decide for itself, and that Germany was, of course, in no position to say anything, as he had already told me. He seemed worried about the question or our joint warfare with our two Allies and asked me many questions on this point and this is what I declared:

> "Well, as the message I am quoting states, Japan is using every available way and means to bring this war to a victorious conclusion and she is determined to continue so to do. Please believe me when we say that because we are absolutely sincere."

3. Chancellor Hitler was not there so I asked Ribbentrop to inform him concisely and clearly of the contents of your message.
(GZ #5673-OPNAV 052122-DI)
(Summary, 060600, August, No. 4)

AUGUST 5, 1942 (Continued)

There was no unusual activity noted in the Fourth and Eighth Fleet areas at this time. The usual movements of construction and aircraft supplies continued.

No. 643

No significant activity noted from areas or vessels controlled by Major Fleet Commanders. (COM 14-G52016-TI)
(Summary, 060600, August, No. 1)

No. 644

No.unusual activity noted in 4th or 8th Fleet areas. Movement of supplies, construction and aircraft traffic continue. (COM 14-052016-TI)
(Summary, 060600, August, No. 2)

Units which had been reported in the Malay area, and which were also associated with the "D" Operations Force were still active in the Southwest Pacific.

ORIGINAL
22 JUN 1943

No. 645

Comcrudiv 7, Desrons 3 and 5, 1st Air Attack Corps and submarines still included in traffic associated with Southwest area. (CON 14-052016-TI)

It was reported:

These units have been reported in the Malay-Bay of Bengal area and have been very active in radio traffic. They have also been associated with "D" Operations Force. (Summary, 060600, August, No. 46)

Very significant information was issued to all communication intelligence units at this time, for notice was sent that the CHOKAI and AOBA were at sea in the Rabaul area. This was especially important because the CHOKAI was the Flagship of the Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Fleet, and the fact that it was at sea indicated that some important Japanese operations were about to take place. Earlier in the day, August 5, 1942, the Commander-in-Chief Eighth Fleet had been still under his usual concealment at Rabaul.

AUGUST 5, 1942 (Continued)

However, it had also been noticed that traffic in that region was very much below par in volume, which might indicate radio silence was being maintained by some of his units. A message late in the night of August 5 indicated, however, that the CHOKAI and AOBA were at sea.

No. 646

Cinc 8th, still under Rabaul cover, addressed usual addresses in his area with traffic that region very much below par in volume.
(COM 14-050644-TI)
(Summary, 051400, August, No. 39)

No. 647

CHOKAI and AOBA were called by Rabaul on 5368 kcs. at 2340, 5 August indicating these two cruisers at sea in Rabaul area.
(GT 4544-OPNAV 052206-TI)

It was observed:

The CHOKAI is believed to be Flagship of Cinc 8th Fleet. No evidence has been received that the flag has been shifted. Cinc 8th Fleet has been using Rabaul as a cover as late as 5 August.
(Summary, 060600, August, No. 40)

AUGUST 5, 1942 (Continued)

A review of recent radio traffic indicated that the Commander-in-Chief of the First Air Fleet was subordinate only to the Commander-in-Chief Combined Fleet. In addition to his usual chain of command, which included Crudivs 7 and 8, many units of Destroyer Squadrons 2 and 10 reported to him, Thus, the assumption was made that the Commander-in-Chief, First Air Fleet, instead of the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, would command future enemy striking forces wherever major fleets were involved.

No. 648

Cinc First Air Fleet (no originator) addressed Desron 10 , Cardiv 1 , Crudiv 8 , Unidentified , Cardiv 2 , "All Base Commanders" at 1240, 5 August. Review of recent traffic indicates Cinc First Air Fleet has position subordinate to Cinc Combined only and includes Crudivs 7 and 8 in his command. Also noted that numerous destroyer units of Desrons 10 and 2 report to Cinc First Air in addition to usual chain of command. Assumption is that Cinc First Air will command future striking forces of major fleets vice Cinc Second Fleet.
(GT #540 - OPNAV 051715-TI)

(Summary, 051400, August, No. 13)

ORIGINAL
22 JUN 1943

AUGUST 5, 1942 (Continued)

Traffic analysis disclosed that Destroyer Division 30 of Destroyer Squadron 6, as well as Destroyer Division 8 in Destroyer Squadron 4, were in the vicinity of Truk. Destroyer Division 16 of Destroyer Squadron 2 had been at Rabaul in late July, but it now made a movement report which confirmed the suspicion that it was escorting the SUZUYA from Truk to the Empire.

No. 649

Traffic routing suggest Comdesdiv in vicinity of Truk. (BEL-050750-TI)

It was remarked:

Desdiv is believed to be on escort duty in the Mandates and is identified as Desdiv 30 of Desron 6. (Summary, 051400, August, No. 13)

No. 650

Traffic routing and associations suggest destroyer , of Desdiv as shown at Truk. (BEL.-050750-TI)

It was commented:

is identified as Desdiv 8 in Desron 4. (Summary, 060600, August, No. 32)

AUGUST 5, 1942 (Continued)

No. 651

Comdesron 4 indicated in Kure area. Address TAIMO shown aboard in Desdiv . Destroyer , in Desdiv , at Truk. (COM 14-050642-TI)

It was reported:

Desdiv 8) and Desdiv are in Desron 4. Desdiv 8 last appeared to be engaged in Escort Duty between Kure and Yokosuka on 27 July. Desdiv appeared by T.I. to have one Section in Jaluit and one Section in the Truk-Rabaul area on 2 August. The call was first noted in Sasebo and appeared on the destroyer on 16-19 July (apparently in the New Britain area on the latter date). COM 14 believes is concerned with Base construction. (Summary, 051400, August, No. 23)

No. 652

Comdesdiv continues originate under blank originator, is associating with usual addressees and made typical Movement Report without indicating direction except that 4th and 8th Fleet Staffs omitted. (COM 14-050644-TI)

It was remarked:

Desdiv 16 , of Desron 2, appeared by T.I. to be at Rabaul on 28 July and on 2 August made a Movement Report which possibly indicated duty as escort of SUZUYA from Truk to Empire. (Summary, 051500, August, No. 23)

ORIGINAL
22 JUN 1943

AUGUST 5, 1942 (Continued)

An estimate of the location of several Marus indicated that the KENJO MARU and the MARU NOWA were in the Truk area, a MARU of the Eleventh Air Fleet enroute from the Empire was due in Rabaul on August 8, another MARU was enrout Maizuru to Jaluit, and the KATUURA MARU and the GOSHU MARU were in the Palao and Tenian areas respectively.

No. 653

FROM: (KENJO MARU)
TO : (3rd Fleet)
(Base Force at Rangoon)
(#1 Air Attack Force)
(?)

Arrived UR.
(GZ/JN#2319-OPNAV 052026-DI)

It was stated:

UR is believed to be Rangoon. This ship is confused with the KENYO MARU which has recently been in Rabaul area and is now believed at Truk.
(Summary, 060600, August, No. 45)

No. 654

Traffic routing suggest MARU in Truk area. (BEL-050750-TI)
(Summary, 060600, August, No. 37)

ORIGINAL
22 JUN 1942

No. 655

FROM: ,

"Departing Saipan 1200, 3rd, arriving Rabaul 1300 (about), 8th." (COM 14-050256-DI)

It was stated:

This movement also noted by OPNAV. is identified as a Maru in the 11th Air Fleet and appeared by T.I. to be enroute from the Empire to Rabaul in company with Maru and escorted by the YUNAZE of Desdiv 34.
(Summary, 050600, August, No. 45)

No. 656

Traffic routing suggest MARU enroute Maizuru to Jaluit. (BEL-50750-TI)
(Summary, 060600, August, No. 34)

No. 657

Traffic routing suggests KATUURA MARU in Palao area. (BEL-050750-TI)
(Summary, 060600, August, No. 36)

No. 658

Traffic from GOSHU MARU relayed by Combined Air station indicating probably presence of this vessel in Tenian area.
(COM 14-052016-TI)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

NAI

No. 658 (Cont.)

It was indicated:

The GOSHU MARU was last reported in Yokosuka 26 July but since that time has been connected with the 4th Air Attack Force in the Marshalls and seems to be enroute. (Summary, 060600, August, No. 35)

Another dispatch suggested that tankers were proceeding from Tokuyama to Jaluit via Chichijima and Saipan, escorted by units of Destroyer Squadron 4 for at least part of the way.

No. 659

FROM: ____ (Address at Tokuyama)
TO : ____ (Base Force at Saipan),
____ (Base Force at Jaluit),
____ (Tokyo Operations Section),
____ (Kure Address).
____ (Unidentified Mandate shore station) (Tenian or Guam?).
INFO: ____ (CHICHIJIMA Base Force),
____ (Chief of Staff Yokosuka),
____ (Chief of Staff Combined Fleet),
____ (Chief of Staff 4th Fleet),
____ (Unidentified),
____ (Comdesron 4)

]

AUGUST 5, 1942 (Continued)

No. 659 (Cont.)

Appears to be scheduled movements of units not appearing in dispatch heading. This suggests that tanker or tankers are scheduled to proceed from Tokuyama to Jaluit via Chichijima and Saipan probably escorted at least part way by units of Desron 4. (BEL-Ø5Ø7ØØ-TI)
(Summary, 051500, August, No. 34)

A ship, which had been tentatively identified as either a patrol ship or a Maru, announced its arrival at Rabaul on the eighth.

No. 660

Left Tenian (?) 1ØØØ, 3rd, and (blank) (refuel or oil ?) at Rabaul Ø9ØØ, 8th. Remainder indecipherable. (BEL-Ø5Ø512-DI)

It was reported:

is identified as a Hospital Ship by Com 14 TI and was indicated enroute Saipan to Rabaul on 3 August. BEL DI on same date identifies the call as a MARU, whoch on the above date was associated with units believed at Kavieng, Truk, and Guadalcanal.
(Summary, 051400, August, No. 41)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

AL

AUGUST 5, 1942 (Continued)

Heavy radio traffic between Yokosuka Aircraft Factory and assembly plants at Saipan, Ruotto and Truk indicated that a continuous flow of aviation materiel and replacements was coming from the Empire.

No. 661

Dispatches from Yokosuka Aircraft Factory and various Mandates Branches continue heavy, indicating continuous flow aviation material and replacements from Empire. Saipan, Ruotto and Truk Assembly Plants are most often addressed.
(COM 14-050642-TI)
(Summary, 051400, August, No. 32)

A Fourth Air Attack Force air group was ordered to proceed to Ocean Island and search for Allied submarines.

No. 662

Serial 562, on 2 August, from 4th Air Attack Force, is 4 AB's Dispatch Order —— and apparently directs one of his four groups to proceed to RYD on 5th and conduct search against enemy submarines.
(GZ #2315/OPNAV-050005-DI)

AUGUST 5, 1942 (Continued)

No. 662 (Cont.)

It was remarked:

is 4th Air Attack Force which is based in the Marshalls. is Ocean Island.
(Summary, 050600, August, No. 28)

The Fifth Air Attack Force at Rabaul ordered its planes to patrol certain sectors.

No. 663

FROM: (5th Air Attack Force),
TO : (5th Air Attack Force),
INFO: (11th Air Fleet),
(8th Fleet),
(Crudiv 18),

5 AB Dispatch Order:-
Patrols for tomorrow, 5th:
#3 Force - Zones (1), (2) and (3) of "C" Sector.
#4 Force - All of "F" Sector.
(GZ #2314/OPNAV-050005-DI)

It was noted:

is 5th Air Attack Force which is based at Rabaul.
(Summary, 050600, August, No. 36)

ORIGINAL
22 JUN 1943

AUGUST 5, 1942 (Continued)

Two enemy seaplanes left Rabaul for Tulagi on this day.

No. 664

FROM:

"Two seaplanes depart Rabaul for Tulagi at (blank time)."
(COM 14-050256-DI)

It was mentioned:

was identified in June by COM 14 as Truk Air, however, Belconnen has tentatively identified it as Gasmata for the past month.
(Summary, 050600, August, No. 38)

Some Japanese call signs were compromised, and were identified as follows: belonged to the Sulumi Garrison near Gasmata; was believed to be some unit operating in the Marianas; and Air Transport group was located in the New Britain area, and an address was shown to be at Guadalcanal Island.

AUGUST 5, 1942 (Continued)

No. 665

Call was compromised by address and is positively identified as being call assigned to the Sulumi (near Gasmata) Garrison. was also compromised but is identified questionably due to garble in deciphered copy as being 59th Detachment. (BEL.-050750-TI)

It was mentioned:

was believed to be some unit operating in the Mariannas.
(Summary, 060600, August, No. 42)

No. 666

"#6 Transportation Force" addressed in care YOKOHAMA Air on 5 August. This is apparently Air Transport Group. (GT #541/OPNAV-052021-TI)

It was noted:

On 20 July the Comdr. 6th Transport Group was addressed in care of a Detachment of Yokohama Air Group. Yokohama Air Group is part of the 5th Air Attack Force and is placed in the New Britain area.
(Summary, 060600, August, No. 41)

No. 667

address noted at Guadalcanal Island, Solomons. (GW MEMO-4/Aug.)
(Summary, 050600, August, No. 42)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 19[illegible]

Submarine Squadron 6 was believed to be moving into the New Guinea-New Britain area, and a Maru subtender of Submarine Squadron 3 was about to move from Jaluit to Truk.

No. 668

Traffic routing suggests Comsubdiv [illegible] is shown at Rabaul. (BEL-050750-TI)

It was stated:

[illegible] identified as Subron 6? and by associations on 31 July believed to be moving to the New Guinea-New Britain area. (Summary, 060600, August, No. 49)

No. 669

(Subron 6) in Rabaul Communication Zone 4th. (COM 14-052018-TI) (Summary, 060600, August, No. 48)

No. 670

MARU Subtender [illegible] of Subron 3 may move Jaluit to Truk soon. (COM 14-Ø5Ø646-TI) (Summary, 051400, August, No. 35)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

AUGUST 5, 1942 (Continued)

The Bulletin of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet for August 5, 1942 stated in part:

No. 671

FROM: Cincpac (NUBO) 050313, August, 1942
TO : Comhawseafron
Comwestseafron
Comnowestseafron
Compaseafron
Comdrs All TF Pac
Comsopac
Comnaveu
Cominch
Opnav
Comswpacfor

NCR 7094 J Bulletin No. 142

... Carriers remain in home waters, probably in port. ... Possibility landing strips on northern tip of Bougainville about two miles south of Buka aerodrome. ...

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

AUGUST 6, 1942

There were many routine enemy reports interrupted on August sixth, but messages announcing the arrival of American forces in the Solomons and the beginning of the assault on Guadalcanal enlivened the evening hours. The difference in time made it possible to receive in Washington late on August 6 (Zone /4) messages which had been sent from the South Pacific on the morning of August 7 (-9). Routine reports disclosed that the Chief of Staff of the OKI Army Detachment was now at Rabaul.

No. 672

FROM: (Palao Weather)
TO : Rabaul OKI Division
Chief of Staff

(COM14-060712-TI)

It was commented:

On July 18 Chief of Staff OKI Army Detachment was indicated by TI at Tokyo; on 23 July he was indicated attached to 4th Fleet, and on 25 July at Rabaul enciphered address. (Summary, 061400, August, No. 22)

The Han of War , which had been reported as enroute from Truk, also announced its arrival at Rabaul.

AUGUST 6, 1942 (Continued)

No. 673

Association of Man of War with Rabaul Harbormaster suggests arrangements for entering port at Rabaul. This vessel already in Rabaul area and apparently had been escorting MARU whose movement report sent at 1620 5th is probably report of arrival at Rabaul. (BEL-060710-TI)

It was reported:

On 3 August TI indicated Man of War enroute Truk to Rabaul.
(Summary, 061400, August, No. 27)

A message from the Chief of Staff of the 14th Fleet to the Battleship , gave rise to suspicion that the battleship was about to move South.

No. 674

CofS Philippine Fleet, , originated short dispatch to BB Info unidentified . reason for this unusual association not apparent. (BEL-061815-TI)

It was noted:

Unidentified , from association, appears to be a possible Local Defense Patrol in Taiwan, or Philippine area. The association noted here suggests possibility that BB may be moving South.
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 86)

AUGUST 6, 1942 (Continued)

An estimate of the position of the Japanese cruisers in the South Pacific indicated that several cruisers were at sea in the Rabaul area.

No. 675

Rabaul noted delivering traffic to Chokai and Comcrudiv 6. Traffic routing indicates (tentatively identified as AOBA) is now flagship of Crudiv 6. (BEL-Ø6Ø71Ø-TI)

It was observed:

On 5 August CHOKAI and AOBA were called by Rabaul indicating these two cruisers at sea in Rabaul area. On 23 July Comcrudiv 6 believed aboard the AOBA.
(Summary, 061400, August, No. 26)

No. 676

FURUTAKA and KAKO served by Tokyo broadcasts. (COM 14 060708-TI)

It was noted:

FURUTAKA and KAKO are cruisers of Crudiv 6. The FURUTAKA appeared in Rabaul area, July 22nd, and the KAKO appeared in Kavieng area July 17-19th.
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 21)

AUGUST 6, 1942 (Continued)

Desdiv 4 of Desron 10 was in the Saipan zone, and a unit of Desron 2 was south of Truk.

No. 677

Desdiv Tato 3 of Desron 10 is in communication with Saipan. (COM 14-Ø6Ø712-TI)

It was remarked:

On August 5 Saipan was twice noted calling Desdiv 4 indicating vessels of this Desdiv in Saipan Zone. (Summary, 061400, August, No. 17)

No. 678

Destroyer in Desron 2 is in Truk area or further south by traffic routing, August 6th. (GT #553-OPNAV 061915-TI) (Summary, 070600, August, No. 30)

Several Marus arrived at Truk.

No. 679

FROM: (Maru)
TO : (Yokosuka),
(Truk),
(Saipan),
(Chichijima).

At 0600, 7 August will cease communication with Saipan and establish communication with Truk using 7655 kcs. (GT#55Ø-TI) (Summary, 061400, August, No. 20)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

AUGUST 6, 1942 (Continued)

No. 680

FROM: (KOMABASHI) #30,0630,August 5th.
TO :

Arrived Truk 6 (?) 15 on the 5th.
(BEL.-061720-DI)

It was observed:

was associated with the Truk Harbor Master at 0630, 5 August, and is identified by COM 14 as an ammunition ship rather than the KOMABASHI which is a sub tender. is tentatively identified as 4th Fleet. (Summary, 080600, August, No. 34)

No. 681

KOMABASHI, , associated with Truk Harbor Master in dispatch at 0630, fifth. This vessel has been in Truk area and may now be departing for Empire. (BEL. 061815-TI)

It was noticed:

is tentatively identified by OPNAV as the KOMAZAKI. was placed by D/F in 24-00N., 141ØØE., on 30 July. (Summary, 070600, August, No. 35)

AUGUST 6, 1942 (Continued)

No. 682

KENJO MARU Truk area.
(BEL. 061815-TI)

It was stated:

KENJO MARU reported his arrival at UR on 28 July. UR is tentatively identified as Rangoon.
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 36)

The other Marus were observed in the Rabaul area, and a convoy destined for the South Pacific was forming in Yokohama.

No. 683

Routings and association indicate Marus and in Rabaul area, with latter probably departing for Truk.
(BEL. 061815-TI)
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 79)

No. 684

Tokyo Transportation Section addressed Maru MEMI Ø in care Yokohama Transportation Section ; info Rabaul address and others. Suggest convoy for Rabaul forming in Yokohama.
(GT #553-OPNAV 061915-TI)
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 17)

AUGUST 6, 1942 (Continued)

A message from the KINAI Maru was thought to be significant because its addressees indicated that the originator was possibly an Army or Naval detachment commander.

No. 685

Maru , of 8th Base Force, addressed General Staff Operations ; info Southern Force) Collective. Due wide scope this address, suspicion arises that activity larger than Maru may be on board. Possibly Army or Naval detachment commander. (COM 14 061732-TI)

It was remarked:

is tentatively identified as KINAI Maru and was last placed at Rabaul on June 28, by TI.
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 78)

No. 686

Comdr. SASEBO #5 Special Landing Force shown at Buna , TAIMO shown on Maru , previously on Maru and this Maru addressed in care Maru . All foregoing addressed by Comdrudiv 18 under Rabaul Cover. Rabaul using old call , transmitted to all Marus mentioned. (GT #553-OPNAV 061920-TI)

August 6, 1942 (Continued)

No. 686 (Cont.)

It was commented:

_ is identified as a battalion of engineers which were aboard the Maru / and now appears to be ashore in the Rabaul area and associated with the #5 Sasebo Special Landing Force. is a unit concerned with base construction and has previously been reported aboard Maru (possible Air Tender) in the New Britain area. (Summary, 070600, August, No. 80)

A section of the Sixth Air Attack Force was aboard a Maru under way for Truk. It was thought that these air reinforcements were destined for service at Tulagi.

No. 687

Commander Air Unit aboard Maru , still underway for Truk. Probable first stop for this unit is Air Base in Truk area, and later duty at Tulagi under Cinc 8th.

It was observed:

appears to be a section of the 6th Air Attack Force, and has appeared aboard

AUGUST 6, 1942 (Continued)

No. 687 (Cont.)

Maru since August 3rd. There were indications that would be used to transport this air unit as far back as July 17th.
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 28)

No. 688

Maru Air Tender (?) believed between Truk and Rabaul. Very active 6 August with operational traffic.
(GT #552-OPNAV-Ø6161Ø-TI)

It was stated:

Associations suggest that section of 6th Air Attack Force may be aboard auxiliary enroute to Rabaul and escorted by YUKAZE; Maru Air Tender is also in company.
(Summary, 061400, August, No. 28)

The lineup of the forces under 1st Air Fleet Command showed that the reorganized Cardivs 1 and 2 had replaced the former Cardivs 4 and 5. Crudiv 8 was also under this Commander, and there were many indications that Crudiv 7 would eventually be under his jurisdiction.

August 6, 1942 (Continued)

No. 689

Continued association of Crudiv 8 with 1st Air Fleet noted in dispatch from Comdr. 1st Air Fleet at 1240 4th to Cardiv 1 , Cardiv 2 , Desron , Crudiv 8, plus All Base Comdrs. and unidentified Man of War . Above lineup apparently comprises current 1st Air Fleet Command with reorganized Cardivs 1 and 2 replacing former Cardivs 4 and 5. There have been previous indications that Crudiv 7 may also come under jurisdiction of Comdr. 1st Air Fleet. (BRL-060710-TI)

It was commented:

Desron is believed Desron 10. (Summary, 061400, August, No. 11)

No. 690

Bombers of the 1st Air Fleet from their regular base at Taroa sent a long message to the Yokosuka Aircraft Factory, which indicated that they were reporting defects or asking for immediate replacements.

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AUGUST 6, 1942 (Continued)

No. 690

1st Air Bombers addressed long 2-part to Yokosuka Aircraft Factory: info Buaer, Ruotto Assembly Plant, and Chief of Ordnance Bureau at unidentified . May be report performance of defect, or needed replacements planes. (COM 14 061734-TI)

It was indicated:

1st Air Group was at it's regular base Taroa 5 August. (Summary, 070600, August, No. 85)

The 5th Air Attack Force originated most of the traffic in the New-Britain-New Guinea area on this day.

No. 691

5th Air Attack and associated air activities continue originate bulk of traffic in 8th Fleet area. (COM 14 06 1732-TI)

It was reported:

5th Air Attack Force operates in general New Britain-New Guinea area. (Summary, 070600, August, No. 82)

AUGUST 6, 1942 (Continued)

Traffic to destroyers AKIKAZE and YUKAZE was delivered by the 5th Air Attack Force radio, which indicated that both of these ships were in the vicinity of Rabaul.

No. 692

5th Air Attack Radio delivers traffic to Destroyers and on 4715 kcs., indicating both ships in general Rabaul area. (GT #553-OPNAV 061915-TI)

It was mentioned:

appears to be the AKIKAZE and appears to be the YUKAZE, both of these destroyers are in Desdiv 34 of Desron 5. The AKIKAZE has appeared in the Rabaul area for some time, and on August 4th, was indicated as escorting the NARUTO MARU which appeared to be departing Rabaul for possibly Kure. The YUKAZE appeared August 4th as escorting MARU (see above item) and Maru Air Tender which are indicated as enroute Rabaul from the Empire in connection with transporting an unidentified air unit to the Southern area.
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 83)

AUGUST 6, 1942 (Continued)

The seaplane tender, KAMOI, was in the Marshall Islands.

No. 693

KAMOI addressed Naval Post Offices Imeiji, Kwajalein, and Taroa. (COM 14 Ø61812-TI)

It was remarked:

The Seaplane Tender KAMOI, appeared in the Marshall Islands August 6th.

It was indicated that both the ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU were operating in company but they were not in the South Pacific area.

No. 694

At 2140, August 6, SHOKAKU transmitted message originated by ZUIKAKU Suffix 46, which leave some doubt whether message actually originated on board ZUIKAKU. Serial number 161 not good for either carrier, but Number 256 might be ZUIKAKU's. Two deductions possible (1) ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU in company, (2) plane group or staff officer from ZUIKAKU on board SHOKAKU. Believe first most likely. Frequency used (5910) normal for carriers and base. Message addressed to plane group NOTI 9. (GT #553-OPNAV-061920-TI) (Summary, 070600, August, No. 16)

AUGUST 6, 1942 (Continued)

A dispatch from the Kure Personnel Bureau to various units indicated that the Tainan Air Group was at Lae, the 1st Air Group was at Taroa (Marshall Islands), and the 4th Air Group was in the Solomons-New Guinea area.

No. 695

Kure Personnel frequent originator today. One 2-parter associated AOBA and FURATAKA) with Tainan Air, 1st Air bombers , 4th Air bombers and 14th Air Several others to Southern air commanders.

It was stated:

AOBA and FURATAKA are cruisers of Crudiv 6, which appears to be operating in the Rabaul area. Tainan Air Group appeared at Lae, August 4th. The 1st Air Group appears at Taroa (Marshall Islands). The 4th Air Groups appears in the Solomons-New Guinea area, and its heavy bombers group was addressed in traffic on August 4th. (Summary, 070600, August, No. 81)

AUGUST 6, 1942 (Continued)

The Commander of the Japanese Submarine Force was still at sea in the Malaya-Bengal area.

No. 696

Indications are that Comsubforce is still at sea. (COM 14-Ø6Ø714-TI)

It was stated:

On 4 August TI indicated Comsubforce still receiving traffic via Jaluit broadcast and heading association continues with Malaya-Bengal area.
(Summary, 061400, August, No. 33)

There were several enemy contact reports of "aircraft sighted" in the afternoon of August 6th at 1300, 1600, and at 2212.

No. 697

Lae made contact reports "aircraft sighted" at 13ØØ and at 16ØØ, 6 August. (GT #548-OPNAV-Ø616ØØ-TI)
(Summary, 061400, August, No. 30)

AUGUST 6, 1942 (Continued)

No. 698

Lae made contact report "aircraft sighted" at 2212, 6 August. (GT #549-OPNAV-061600-TI) (Summary, 061400, August, No. 31)

No. 699

At 2212 on 6th, Lae sent enemy aircraft report. (COM 14 061808-TI) (Summary, 070600, August, No. 54)

A traffic resume at 2000 declared that there was no unusual activity in any Japanese area except the aircraft contacts reported from Lae.

No. 700

Traffic up to 2000, 6 August normal, with no evidence unusual activity any area except aircraft contacts previously reported from Lae. (GT #551-TI)(OPNAV 061915-TI) (Summary, 061400, August, No. 1)

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AUGUST 6, 1942 (Continued)

However, shortly thereafter at 0435 (-9), the enemy radio station at Tulagi began issuing to all important commanders in that area urgent operational dispatches, which stated an Allied Striking Force of twenty ships was attacking the base. A report at 0700 (-9) announced "Enemy landing in progress".

No. 701

At 0435, 7th, Tulagi Base Force originated most urgent cose to Subforce .., Outer South Seas Force South Seas Force and 11th Air . (GT #555-OPNAV 062045-TI)

It was remarked:

This appears to be contact report. (Summary, 070600, August, No. 55)

No. 702

priority from Tulagi timed 0435/7 August indicated Striking Force hitting that point. Plain language mentions 20 ships: (COM 14-062314-TI) (Summary, 070600, August, No. 72)

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AUGUST 6, 1943 (Continued)

No. 703

FROM: (Tulagi) August 7/0700
Flood of plain language briefly:
"Enemy landing in progress." (COM 14 062314-DI)

It was noted:

Most of the above information has been previously reported. has been the most urgent Japanese designation of priority, but a new one which appears to be a higher priority appears in Tulagi traffic.
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 56)

In view of the disaster at Savo Island on the night of August 8-9, it is important to note the information contained in the Cincpac Bulletin for August 6. It will be observed that U. S. Naval Communication Intelligence announced that Crudiv 6 was in the Rabaul area, Crudiv 18 was in the Solomons, and the CHOKAI was in the New Britain area. It is evident that sufficient warning had been given of the presence of these dangerous ships in the area in which Allied forces were to operate. The dispatch reads as follows:

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AUGUST 6, 1942 (Continued)

No. 704

FROM: Cincpac 060245, August, 1942
TO : Opnav
Cominch
Comnaveu
Comsopacfor
Comsouwespacfor
All Task For Comds Under Your Command
Com Norwest Seafron
Com Wesseafron
Com Panseafron
Com Hawseafron

NCR 7832-J Bulletin No. 143

KAMOI in Marshalls. Estimated location of Cruisers. Crudiv four, five and eight in home waters. Crudiv six in Rabaul area. Crudiv seven (part) Bay of Tengali. One unit now at Truk probably leaving shortly for Japan in company with repair ship AKASHI. Crudiv eighteen Solomon Islands. KASHIMA at Kure. ... CHOKAI in New Britain area. ...

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A great number of enemy operational reports were now intercepted for American forces were landing in the Solomons. U. S. Naval Communication Intelligence had already played a considerable role before the beginning of operations by supplying much information concerning the enemy units present in the area. Captain Forrest Sherman, Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. Wasp, who had taken an active part in the action at Tulagi and Guadalcanal, stated in an official report on August 14, 1942 to Cinpac, via Commander Task Force Eighteen, that in addition to the work of his own Air Intelligence Officers:

> Supplementary radio intelligence and the results of the photographic reconnaissance on August 2, 1942, made the familiarity of pilots with the area as complete as may normally be expected in the case of a position held by the enemy." (Pg. 2, A16-3(8)/CV7, Doc. No. 62701)

Many Japanese routine messages were intercepted on this day in addition to the operational orders. Consequently, it is advisable to divide enemy messages into two categories:

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Part A - Operational Messages; Part B - Routine Messages.

Part A- Operational Messages

Enemy radio traffic on this day came almost exclusively from the Eighth Fleet area with very little from the units in the North. Complete surprise was achieved by the American troops at Guadalcanal for no contact report was sent by the Japanese until the actual attack on Guadalcanal and Tulagi had begun. Then the enemy's radio at Tulagi came to life, and so was begun the campaign of the Solomons which was to loom large in American history as the scene of some of the nation's most important sea battles. Through cryptanalysis and traffic analysis, U. S. Naval Intelligence was able to inform operational authorities of many facts concerning the battles which otherwise would never have been known, or would have been very much delayed in transmission.

AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

No. 705

FROM: (Tulagi)
TO : No definite address (MOST URGENT)
RELAYED: (Cinc Subforce)
(Cinc Combined)
(Cinc 11th Air Fleet)
(Naval General Staff)
(Cinc South Seas Force)

"All enemy ships have commenced firing. Landing Operations begun." Time of intercept 0757 from Palao. (GT #562-MEMO #6-8) (2030/Q-DI)
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 64)

The Japanese reported that there was no decrease in the intensity of Allied heavy bombing attacks. An estimate of the Allied forces disclosed that the Japanese thought that there was one battleship, three light or heavy cruisers, fifteen destroyers, and a number of ships assigned to landing forces.

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No. 706

FROM: Tulagi
TO : No definite address (MOST URGENT)
RELAYED: Subforce
Cinc Combined Fleet
Cinc 11th Air Fleet
Cinc Naval General Staff
Cinc South Seas Force

"Enemy has begun landing operations on Tulagi." Time of relay 0800, 7 August. (GT #556-DI)
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 63)

No. 707

FROM: (Tulagi)
TO : No definite address (MOST URGENT)
RELAYED: (Subforce)
(Cinc Combined Fleet)
(Cinc 11th Air Fleet)
(Cinc Naval General Staff)
(Cinc South Seas Force)

"Enemy now bombing 0450." Time of relay 0804, 7 August. (GT#560-DI)
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 61)

No. 708

FROM: (Tulagi)
TO : No definite address (MOST URGENT)
RELAYED: (Subforce)
(Cinc Combined Fleet)
(Cinc 11th Air Fleet)
(Cinc Naval General Staff)
(Cinc South Seas Force)

AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

No. 708 (Cont.)

"Enemy operations force sighted."
Time of relay 0805, 7 August.
(GT#557-DI)

It was stated:

This message has no time of origin.
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 59)

No. 709

FROM: (Tulagi)
TO : No definite address (MOST URGENT)
RELAYED: (Cinc Subforce)
(Cinc Combined Fleet)
(Cinc 11th Air Fleet)
(Cinc Naval General Staff)
(Cinc South Seas Force)

"Heavy attack of bombs and ------ not yet decreasing." (GT#561-DI)
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 62)

No. 710

All the following originated by (Tulagi) and broadcast by Truk at times indicated addressed (Subforce), (Combined Fleet), (11th Air Fleet) (Naval General Staff) and (Southern Force):

0721 - Enemy vessels bombarding and landing has commenced.
0724 - Heavy aerial bombardment has not abated.
0726 - Enemy striking force sighted.

AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

No. 710 (Cont.)

0730 - Enemy have commenced landing at Tulagi.
0731 - Under heavy enemy bombardment (bombing).
0745 - 1 BB, 3 CA or CL, 15 DD; remainder landing force. (BEL-070055-DI)
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 65)

Tulagi radio station went off the air on August 7 at 0730 (-9), and remained silent from that time.

No. 711

Tulagi Base unheard since 0730, August 7th. (COM 14 072018-TI)
(Summary, 080600, August, No. 49)

A resume was now given of the operational messages heard from the South Pacific since the beginning of the attack on Tulagi. It evidently had caught the Japanese by complete surprise.

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AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

No. 712

Time	Message
0435 -	Tulagi Base Force originated MOST URGENT Code, consisting of 1 signal and 1 code group. Apparently a contact report.
0435 -	August 7, Yokohama Air Group Comdr. originated 6 group operational code and another 8 group code addressed to Comdr. 5th Air Attack; info Cofs Combined, 4th, 8th, and 11th Air Fleets, and Rabaul Base.
0450 -	Tulagi, plain language, "Enemy has started bombing (?).
0500 -	Unidentified , originated operational code to Cinc 8th, info Cinc 11th Air, Outside South Seas Force Comdrs., and 5th Air Attack and Kavieng Base.
0510 -	Rabaul Base operational code to Maru ; info Cofs Combined, 4th, 8th, and 11th Air Fleets, and 5th Air Attack.
0525 -	Tulagi originated short code without address (amplifying report?). This was relayed to Cofs Combined, 8th, 4th Fleets, Subforce, and 5th Air Attack.
0530 -	Cinc 8th, short operational code to Outside South Seas Force; info South Seas Force and Tokyo Communication Sect.
0529 -	Tulagi - short operational code without address (amplifying report?) which was relayed to Cofs Combined, Subforce, 4th, 8th, and 11th Air Fleets, Naval General Staff, and 5th Air Attack.

AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

No. 712 (Cont.)

0530 - Tulagi - Another short operational code which was given same relay as 0529 one.
0535 - Rabaul - Short URGENT intelligence report to same addressees as above.
0545 - Rabaul - 32 group operation code to Cofs Subforce; into Cofs Combined and Comsubron 7.
0545 - Comcrudiv 6 - short operational code to Outside South Seas Comdrs., Kavieng; info Air Tender NERA 7.
(GT#556-MEMO #6-10 (2110/Q)-TI)
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 66)

A warning from the Japanese Fourth Fleet that Allied forces had attacked Tulagi was sent to the Marshall Islands.

No. 713

FROM: (4th Fleet) #931,August 7th,0550.
TO : (4th Fleet Task Force/4th Fleet Collective/South Seas Force).
INFO: (11th Air Fleet)
(8th Fleet)
(Combined Fleet)
(Naval General Staff)

"Inside" South Seas Force Dispatch Order #11:
On 7th, at 0445, the enemy (blank) attacked RXB. Be on the alert? in the PX area.
(GZ#2350/OPNAV-071416-DI)/(MEMO #7-4(1100/Z DI))

AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

No. 713 (Cont.)

It was reported:

RXB is Tulagi. PX is apparently located somewhere in the Marshall Islands. (Summary, C71400, August, No. 21)

Enemy radio intelligence was operating at this time for it announced that it had heard call signs of the Allied striking force.

No. 714

FROM: (Rabaul) #937, August 7/0535
TO : (Outside South Seas Comdrs.)
(Rabaul Base)
(5th Air Attack)
INFO: (Tokyo O.N.I.)
(Cinc 4th Fleet)
(11th Air Fleet)
At 0527 enemy Striking Force call signs (heard?) on 3005 kcs. ----------.
(GZ #2344-DI)
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 51)

Japanese aircraft contact reports had been intercepted frequently ever since the attack on Tulagi.

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AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

No. 715

Lae Air Station sent aircraft sighting report at 0930/6th August which is not quite clear but apparently refers to sighting flight of 26 planes. (BEL-070945-TI)

It was observed:

Lae has been reported as having made aircraft sighting reports at 13ØØ, 16ØØ and 2212 on the 6th and also at 2207 on 7 August. (Summary, 080600, August, No. 54)

No. 716

At 2207, 7th August, garbled reported "Aircraft sighted." Believe this is from Lae). (GT#570 TI) (Summary, 071400, August, No. 15)

No. 717

Aircraft contact reports were received from 5th Air Attack Corps., at Rabaul at 1345. From Lae at 2207. From 5th Air Attack Corps., at Rabaul again at 2325. All on 7th. (COM 14 072018-TI) (Summary, 080600, August, No. 48)

The enemy was sending out his bombers to destroy the invading Allied forces.

AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

No. 718

At 2325, 7th August, Comdr. 5th Air Attack mad contact report:). (not understood. when alone means, "Aircraft sighted." (GT #573/OPNAV-071642-TI) (Summary, 071400, August, No. 16)

No. 719

FROM: (11th Air Fleet) #206, Aug. 7/0636
To : (8th Fleet)
(5th Air Attack Force)
INFO: (All Major Commands)
(All Unit Comdrs., Outer South Seas Force)
(Tokyo Naval General Staff)
(All Unit Comdrs., 11th Air Fleet)

5th Air Attack Force attack the enemy Occupation Force will all available heavy bombers. Apparently designates target as transport and 2 carriers. (GZ#2343-MEMO #6-12 (2230/Q)-OPNAV 070225-DI)
(Summary, 07600, August, No. 67)

No. 720

FROM: (5th Air Attack Force) Aug.7/0900
TO : (11th Air Fleet)
INFO: (?)
(8th Fleet)
(Crudiv 18)
(#8 Base Force at Rabaul)
(Chichijima 7th Base Force)
(4th Air Attack Force)

AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

No. 720 (Cont.)

18 (Zero-1) planes scheduled to take off and attack enemy Striking Force at 07.....27. (GZ #2334-MEMO #6-9 (2050/Q)-OPNAV 070115-DI) (Summary, 070600, August, No. 68)

No. 721

FROM: (5th Air Attack Force) Aug.7/0900
TO : (11th Air Fleet)
INFO: (?)
8th Fleet)
(Crudiv 18)
(#8 Base Force at Rabaul)
(Chichijima 7th Base Force)
(4th Air Attack Force)

----17 type (Ø-1) bombers(?) took off for attack at 0830. (GZ #2346-OPNAV 070712-DI) (Summary, 070600, August, No. 73)

No. 722

(6th Air Attack Force), serial 601, of 7th, at 1240, addressed that force. "Blank in cooperation with the (blank) Force is to concentrate at RRE (Vuakanau) and attack (blank) under the orders of 5th Air Attack Force." (BEL.-071314-DI) (Summary, 081400, August, No. 23)

AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

No. 723

FROM: (Airon 24), #847, 0530, August 7th.
TO : (4th Air Attack Force).
INFO: 8th Fleet,
5th Air Attack Force,
4th Fleet,
#6 Baseforce,
Wake,
Airon 11.

Partially readable, states, enemy shipping in RXB (Tulagi) area to be attacked. #1 (or 5) Force is to concentrate in AA (Wake).

It was stated:

The Wake area designators are confirmed. Meaning such order not understood, but may be that a force previously ordered concentrate Wake are to proceed unrecovered are to Southward. (BEL.-071314-DI)
(Summary, 081400, August, No. 26)

No. 724

FROM: (5th Air Attack For.-Com. of.)
August 7/1230
TO : (?)
INFO: (11th Air Flt. Cofs)
(Cofs 8th)
(Maru-Com. Officer)

-----Dispatch Order #191.
(#5) Force-----(Zero-1) type planes -----.
(GZ#2337-DI)
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 52)

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The Sixth Air Attack Force, which also had been ordered into action, was evidently concerned with plane reinforcements from Rabaul.

No. 725

At 1240, 7th August, Cinc Combined (no originator serial 710) addressed:

ACTION: Chief of Staff 11th Air ,
INFO : Comdrs. 5th and 6th Air Attack Forces , Naval General Staff.
(GT #574/OPNAV-071642-TI)

It was remarked:

5th Air Attack Force is in New Britain-Solomons area. 6th Air Attack Force has been in the Northern Empire area but an unidentified Air Unit appears to be part of the 6th Air Attack Force and is associated with the Rabaul area since Commander appears to be aboard Maru which is shown by T.I. as being enroute or near Rabaul.
(Summary, 071400, August, No. 20)

No. 726

At 0600 Comdr. Fifth Air Attack addressed Operational Code to Tulagi Air Base and Base Force, Info Cofs 8th Fleet, 11th Air Fleet, and Comcrudiv 18. (GT#564-TI)
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 70)

AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

Reinforcements from the Misawa Air Group were ordered to proceed to Rabaul.

No. 727

FROM: (Communication Office 5th Air Attack), #039, Aug. 7.
TO : (Misawa Air).
INFO: (Communication Officer 11th Air Fleet),
(Communication Officer 6th Air Attack).

Desire that - - - -[a] proceed to RR by (?) 1900 tomorrow, the 8th.

a - Translator's Note: Although the "one best" guess for these blanks would be some plane group of Misawa Air Group, there are several other possibilities, many of them of no significance whatever. (GZ #2357/OPNAV-071751-DI)

It was stated:

T.I. indicated Comdr. Misawa Air was in Northern area 4 August, however, on 20-24 July there were associations of Misawa Air with Aron 4 and Tainan Air which were in the Lae-Salamaua area. (Summary, 071400, August, No. 18)

The Fourth and Fifth Air Attack Forces were patroling certain sectors of the Solomon Islands at this time.

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AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

No. 728

FROM: _____ (11th Air Fleet)
TO : _____ (4th Air Attack Force)
(5th Air Attack Force)

(Fragmentary) but search "B", "C" and "H" Sectors to distance probably 7ØØ miles.
(GZ #2347 - OPNAV 070931-DI)
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 74)

An air raid at an unknown position was announced by the Fifth Air Attack Force which was based at Rabaul.

No. 729

FROM: _____ (5th Air Attack Force) Aug. 7/1442
TO : (11th Air Fleet)

Air raid posit /at 1345.
(GT#567-DI)

It was stated:

The Grid position is unknown.
The 5th Air Attack Force is based at Rabaul.
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 69)

A Maru in the Eleventh Air Fleet also announced an air attack at an unidentified place.

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No. 730

FROM: _____ (Maru in 11th Air Fleet)
TO : _____ (Cinc Combined)
_____ (Cinc 8th)
_____ (Cinc 4th)
_____ (Rabaul Base #8)

Air attack --------. (GZ#2341-DI)
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 53)

There were no indications that enemy carriers were present in the Eighth Fleet area, but, undoubtedly, there was communication liaison between enemy air units and their submarines.

No. 731

Nothing seen to indicate presence of Carriers in 8th Fleet area.
(COM 14 072032-TI)
(Summary, 080600, August, No. 45)

No. 732

At 0610 Comdr. Fifth Air Attack addressed Operational Code to Comsubron 7, Info Comsubron 3. Probably report of U.S. attack on Tulagi and directive to subs.
(GT #564-TI)
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 84)

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AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

Despite the fact that there were no indications in radio traffic of the presence of enemy carriers in the Solomon Islands area, a United States Army plane had reported the sighting there of what appeared to be a carrier.

No. 733

> Reported sighting suspected carrier in Rabaul area by Army plane has no radio confirmation aside from following which is purely speculative. Desdiv has been corresponding with 1st Air Fleet to considerable extent and has been seen as exempted addressee in 1st Air Fleet collective along with Comcrudiv 7. (COM 14 070704-TI)

It was stated:

> Refers to GHQ SWPA 0830Z/7, which reports sighting of an aircraft carrier. Desdiv appears to be Desdiv 16. This Desdiv has also been indicated as involved in escort operations for Airon 11. (Summary, 080600, August, No. 46)

It was thought that the plane had sighted the KASUGA Maru or a sister ship. These were converted carriers with a flight deck from which planes could take off and land, but which had been used only for the ferrying of planes and not as combatant carriers.

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No. 734

Subsequent series of operational type dispatches from Maru (in company with AKIKAZE) indicates Allied attack between 1225 and 1235. These addressed to Rabaul Base Force , Cinc Combined Fleet , Cinc 4th Fleet and Cinc 8th Fleet . is transporting Air Group from Kisaratsu and associations indicate point of destination may have been Tulagi , where Comairron 25 was shown as a concealed originator at 2010, 5th. Position of AKIKAZE and during attack not clearly indicated, but apparently in Rabaul-Tulagi area. (BEL. 070830-TI)

It was indicated:

The Maru has been indicated as transporting an air unit of the 6th Air Attack Force to Tulagi via Truk, escorted by YUKAZE. On August 6th, this Maru was indicated by traffic to be between Truk and Rabaul. A Maru Air Tender , has also been indicated as with this group enroute Rabaul area. GHQ SWPA 0830Z/7 reported an aircraft carrier sighted at 03-05 S, 1350-40 E (near Kavieng) at 0330Z/ Aug. 6th. It will be noted that this sighting time coincides with the time of the above message. It is suggested that the dispatches referred to above from the Maru may be air warning reports occasioned by the sighting of the reconnaissance plane or planes.
(Summary, 080600, August, No. 44)

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No. 734 (Cont.)

The KASUGA Maru is a converted carrier with a flight deck from which planes can take off and, probably, on which they can land, but thus far she has been used only for the transportation of planes and supplies from the Empire to outlying bases. She has not been used as a combatant carrier. According to a sighting report by the Captain of the U.S.S. GATO, the KASUGA was described as having "A flight deck similar to the U.S.S. RANGER". It will be noted that the RANGER'S flight deck does not extend completely to the bow. The KASUGA Maru has been associated in traffic with the 6th Air Attack Force recently. Although there is very little evidence to connect the KASUGA Maru with mentioned above, there is a possibility that may be an alternate call for the KASUGA Maru or may be a ship of similar type. (Summary,080600, August, No. 44)

In the Japanese countermeasure to the Allied attack, Submarine Squadron 3 and the Fifth Air Attack Force had been the principal defense agents.

No. 735

Attack on Tulagi provoked burst of Plain Language and 4-Kana dispatches from Tulagi , 5th Air Attack Corps, Comsubfor, (whose bearing is 294 from Oahu), Comsubron 3 (whose bearing is 294 from Oahu), Comsubron 3 (bearing 237 from

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No. 735 (Cont.)

Oahu and 241 from Palmyra), 11th Air Fleet Commander and Rabaul Radio. Attack indicated commencing at 0430 with Plain Language. Later indication of bombardment and landing commenced prior 0700. Active Orange units so far appearing are Subron 3 plus 5th Air Attack. Believed former ordered to Tulagi area while 5th Air Attack sending planes to attack Occupation ships. (COM 14-070702-TI)

It was commented:

The call is believed to be a sub but unidentified. (Summary,071400,August, No.11)

The Commander of Submarine Squadron 3 was acting as Commander of the Southeastern Submarine Force, and his heavy traffic to Submarine Squadron 3 and 7 indicated that they were being ordered to attack United States Task Forces.

No. 736

Current traffic from unidentified is believed to be Comsubron 3 acting as "Commander Southeastern Sub Force." (GT #571/OPNAV-071504-TI) (Summary, 071400, August, No. 14)

AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

No. 737

Southeast Subforce Command includes Subron 3 Units and in traffic addressed 8th Fleet and 5th Air Attack Force, which suggests their location near Rabaul. (COM 14 072032-TI)
(Summary, 080600, August, No. 64)

No. 738

Heavy traffic to Units Subron 3 and 7 from Palao, Jaluit, and Commands in Rabaul-Solomons area indicates every effort being made to get Subs to attack U. S. Task Forces. (GT #572/OPNAV-071504-TI/MEMO #7-5 (1101/Q)
(Summary, 071400, August, No. 13)

Submarine units were leaving the Empire to reinforce the South Pacific Squadrons.

No. 739

Routing and association indicate: A submarine unit from Saipan to Truk Communication Zone at 0600/7th. (BEL-070945-TI)
(Summary, 080600, August, No. 36)

AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

No. 740

Routing and association indicate: Submarine , enroute Yokosuka to Soerabaja via Saigon. (BEL-070945-TI)

It was indicated:

Reported at Sasebo 3 August. (Summary, 080600, August, No. 24)

No. 741

Serial 93 at 1640/5th August, addressed Cinc 8th Fleet in address, Info: Very sketchy but indicates a departure from Kure early morning of 5th (or 7th) arriving Saipan on 12th. (BEL-071535-DI)

It was stated:

is a major command call identified tentatively as Subforce. is identified as Kure Movement Report Section. (Summary, 080600, August, No. 20)

No. 742

FROM: (Truk Radio) #035,1850,August 7/1
TO : (Subron 7),
(8th Fleet Cinc).
INFO: (Comdr. Subron 3),
(Comdr. 5th Air Attack Force),
(All Comdrs. "Outer" South Seas Force),
(Chief of Staff Subforce)
(11th Air Fleet Chief of Staff).

AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

No. 742 (Cont.)

4th Fleet Dispatch Order #____.
(Addressed to 4th Fleet). The (cg SUMORKYO)[a] - - - - - - - RXB. Cancel my #____.

a - Translator's Note: Believe this is a Subdiv, and is being ordered to RXB, but unable to do anything definite with blanks. (GZ#2352/OPNAV-071912-DI/MEMO #7-7)
(Summary, 071400, August, No. 20)

Two divisions of Submarine Squadron 3 were ordered to proceed to Tulagi after they had reported their positions and available fuel. Previous orders for Submarine Squadron 7 were cancelled, and it was directed to report at Guadalcanal.

No. 743

Translations of four Kana messages give following: 2 divisions of Subron 3 directed to proceed Tulagi. Further told to give position and fuel on hand. Also Cinc 4th Fleet has cancelled previous orders for unit of Subron 7 and directed them to proceed to Tulagi.
(COM 14 072048-DI)
(Summary, 080600, August, No. 65)

AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

Other submarine units were located by direction finder in Northeastern Australian waters, and in the Gilbert Islands.

No. 744

Submarine locations remain substantially as reported August 3rd, with vicinity of Sydney, in Northeastern Australia waters, and in mid-Gilbert Islands
(COM 14 072032-TI)
(Summary, 080600, August, No. 63)

Enemy radio traffic on this day came almost exclusively from the Eighth Fleet area, and very little from the units in the North.

No. 745

Traffic load consisted almost exclusively of that related to 8th Fleet area, with little heard from 5th Fleet units in High North. (COM 14 072032-TI)
(Summary, 080600, August, No. 3)

Immediately after the attack on Guadalcanal, the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet issued a series of dispatches to all his major commanders in the South Pacific.

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

No. 746

At 0650 Cinc Combined addressed short Operational Code to Cinc Subforce, Unidentified Cinc , Info Cinc 11th Air, Eighth and Fourth Fleets, and Comsubron Seven; probably directive to Subforce and possible Cinc First Air, First, or Second Fleets. (GT#564-TI)
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 71)

No. 747

Cinc Combined Fleet, using concealed originator, released a series of dispatches beginning at 1010. In one he addressed Cinc 8th Fleet , unidentified Comdesdiv 17 (indicated at Kure;) information Navy General Staff. Another to Cinc 4th Fleet , Cinc 8th Fleet , 5th Base Force Unit , 5th Special Landing Force information Comdr. 11th Air Fleet and Navy General Staff. 5th Landing Force in other traffic is addressed at Buna. (COM 14 072018-TI)

It was reported:

Cincs 4th and 8th Fleets have been prominent originators and addressees in traffic connected with the attack on Tulagi. The call is apparently a Major Command and may possibly be Cinc 4th Fleet. is identified as a Maru attached to 8th Base Force Rabaul. is identified by GT as Sasebo #5 Special Landing Force, and was placed at Buna by TI on August 6th. (Summary, 080600, August, No. 57)

ORIGINAL

21 JUN 1943

No. 748

Code serial numbers indicate Cinc 8th Fleet to be concealed originator at Rabaul. Several other units indicated by heading associations to be destroyers or submarine commands are also concealed originators at that place. (BEL. 070830-TI)

It was observed:

Cinc 8th Fleet has been using Rabaul cover for some time.
(Summary, 080600, August, No. 50)

Cruiser Division 5 and several destroyer units were ordered South by the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet.

No. 749

At 1240, 7th August, Cinc Combined (No originator serial 711) addressed:

ACTION: Comdesdiv Man 55 (at Yokosuka)
Comdesdiv 9 in care Desron 2,
Comdesdiv 27 in care Desron 4,
Comdesdiv 34? (garbled? _____),
Comdesron 4? (Garbled _____,
Comdesron 2 _____,
Comcrudiv 5 .

INFO : Naval General Staff
Cinc 4th Fleet ,
Cinc 8th Fleet ,
Cinc 11th Air Fleet .

AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

No. 749 (Cont.)

This in 5-numeral. Believe addressees are ordered South. (GT#569/OPNAV-071504-TI/MEMO #7-5 (1101/Q))

It was noted:

Crudiv 5 has appeared by T.I. to be in home waters up to now and the various destroyer units have apparently been engaged in escort duty.
(Summary, 071400, August, No. 749)

No. 750

At 0540, 7th, Cinc 8th Fleet, operational code to Comcrudiv 6 and CHOKAI. Relayed to Subforce and South Seas Force. Believe Crudiv 6 and CHOKAI not at Rabaul.
(GT#563-MEMO 6-8 (2030/Q)-TI)
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 77)

The light cruiser TATSUTA was noticed in the vicinity of Rabaul, and an unidentified warship announced that it was escorting a Maru to Rabaul.

No. 751

Comcrudivs 6 and 18 addressed while TATSUTA sent , timed 0930 and addressed to Collective Outer Mandate Force Collective. TATSU received

AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

No. 751 (Cont.)

Davao weather from Rabaul last night is believed probably interested in escort duty from that area rather than Eastern Section of Rabaul Sector.
(COM 14 070704-TI)

It was observed:

TATSUTA is a light cruiser.
(Summary, 080600, August, No. 59)

No. 752

August 7.

FROM: ____ (Unidentified), #014, 1530.
TO : ____ (Crudiv 18),
____ (Unidentified)
(8th Fleet)
INFO: (#7 Base Force at Chichijima),
(#8 Base Force at Rabaul).

Departing PT at ____ on 7th for RR, escorting ____[a].

a - Translator's Note: This blank probably does not represent a convoy of any considerable size. Likely that it is a single ship. (GZ #2353/OPNAV-071712-DI/MEMO #7-6 (0110/Q))

It was indicated:

PT is Truk. RR is Rabaul. Unidentified is thought to be a man-of-war and was previously noted by T.[1]. in the New Britain area with two Marus on 12 July.
(Summary, 071400, August, No. 23)

AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

It was believed that Destroyer Division 17 and Destroyer Squadron 10 were soon to report to the Commander-in-Chief, Eighth Fleet, for duty.

No. 753

At 1020, Cinc Combined addressed 8th Fleet _____ , Comdesdiv 17 _____ , Maru _____ information Movement Report Office. The inference is that Desdiv 17 of Desron 10 (now at Kure) may report to Cinc 8th Fleet for duty.
(COM 14 072018-TI)
(Summary, 080600, August, No. 15)

Rabaul was the center of much activity on this day. Cruiser Division 6 was notified that it was to pick up supplies at Rabaul to which many merchant ships were ordered to proceed.

No. 754

FROM: (Jaluit)
TO : (Eighth Fleet)
INFO: (11th Air Fleet)
(Outer Southern Seas Forces)
(Fifth Air Attack Force)
(Kavieng Base Force)

AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

No. 754 (Cont.)

"From Unit Commander in 4th Fleet, you will leave Saipan (PS) with the blanks (ship) and ____ (proceed to?) Rabaul (RR) and ____ you are to reach ____ ____ ____".
(GZ#2336-OPNAV 070150-DI)

FROM: (8th Fleet)
TO : (Crudiv 6)
INFO: (CHOKAI)

"The ____(ship) will immediately _____ (to) Rabaul (RR)." (GZ#2338-OPNAV 070150-DI)

It was remarked:

The ship in both messages is the same ship.
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 75)

No. 755

FROM: (Rabaul)
TO : (Kure Navy Yard)
(Tokyo Bur Personnel)
INFO: (Kure -Assoc. Military Stores)
(Unidentified)
(Maizuru Personnel)
(Kure Personnel Section)
(Unidentified)
(Unidentified)

(From Comcrudiv 6. Passed to Crudiv 6).
In ____ serial #8007 change "PT" to "RR".
(GZ#2326-OPNAV 070421-DI)

AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

No. 755 (Cont.)

It was observed:

From addressees believe this is changing location at which Crudiv 6 was scheduled to pick up supplies and personnel. (Summary, 070600, August, No. 76)

It is regrettable that one dispatch intercepted on this day was undecipherable until August 23, 1942.

The message read as follows:

No. 756

FROM: (Rabaul Radio), #109, 0800, August 7.
TO : (All Comdrs. "Outer" South Seas Force),
(Chief of Staff Combined Fleet),
(Tokyo Naval General Staff),
(Chief of Staff 11th Air Fleet),
(Chief of Staff 4th Fleet).

From Cinc 8th Fleet. Passed to 8th Fleet. Today, at 1300, the CHOKAI ( ) Crudiv 18 and (- ship or unit) will depart RR (Rabaul) and rendezvous with Crudiv 6 off RXC. After effecting rendezvous will proceed to RX --- RXI area. Subsequent operations will be based on reports of reconnaissance by Base Air Force planes, - - - - - - - - - - enemy convoy - - - - - - - - - - -.

AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

No. 756 (Cont.)

It was commented:

This is the order which set in motion the attempted attack on our convoy group off Tulagi, resulting in the night cruiser engagement of 8-9 August. Unfortunately, it was unreadable in time to be of value. "RXC" appears to be in vicinity of Bougainville, possibly Faisi. "RXI" is Guadalcanal. (GZ #2563 - DI)
(Summary, 231400, August, No. 37)

Part B - Routine Reports

A conversation between the Japanese and German ambassadors in Madrid was reported to Tokyo. It was significant that the Germans were very anxious to kill any rumors which might have reached the Japanese concerning a treaty of peace between Germany and Russia. Incidentally, the Germans did not lose the opportunity to point out that it would be most advantageous if Japan were to attack Russia at this time.

AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

No. 757

FROM: Madrid #842 August 4
TO : Tokyo

Today (the 3rd) the German Ambassador said to me: "The Eastern Front is two or three weeks ahead of schedule. With two more months left there is plenty of time for the reduction of Baku, but recently there have been rumors of a separate peace between Germany and Russia springing up all over this country like mushrooms. Although they say that Russia would cede the Ukraine and the Caucasus to Germany, I have recently received secret instructions from my home country to send flying even the very slightest talks I may hear of peace between Germany and Russia.."

"It would certainly be good if Japan were to attack Russia from the Manchurian border now," he added.

Quite by coincidence the Italian Ambassador also said to me on the 3rd: "If Japan were to postpone China and India and attack Russia now it would speed the conclusion of the war."

For your information. Relayed to Germany and Italy. (GZ/Jap.Dip.#5715-OPNAV 070358 L3W -DI)
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 6)

ORIGINAL

?? JUN 1943

The Japanese, despite all their plans for the South Pacific and the creation of a greater Eastern Empire, were not unmindful of the fact that Russia was a potential enemy. Therefore, close observation was made of Soviet naval activity in Vladivostok.

No. 758

FROM: Tokyo #61 August 1, 1942
TO : Hsinking
(Message from Vladivostok, 7/30)

1. The movements of submarines in the vicinity of the Bay of Amur were more frequent on the 23rd than at any time since the middle of the month. The movements of other ships were less. Today three "L" type ships and on the 23rd only two "Tankan" were observed. At present, submarines leaving and entering this harbor are in the proportion of one of the "S" type to four of the "C(Q?)" type.

2. At present in this harbor and vicinity there are several destroyers of the "L" type and externally all appear to be thoroughly equipped. There are at least about ten "mother" ships. One light cruiser, the ORJONIKIDZI_____(garbled)

3. The movements of high speed torpedo boats are frequent and from time to time high speed boats spread smoke screens over Amur Bay. (GZ/JAP. DIP #5719-OPNAV 072030-DI)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

No. 758 (Cont.)

It was stated:

Jane's Fighting Ships lists an 8,000 ton cruiser ORJONIKIDZE in the war losses section with the comment that the Germans claim that this ship fell into their hands before completion of Nikolaier in August, 1941, but there is good reason to doubt this. Three other ships of same class were built between 1937 and 1941.

The Radio Intelligence Section has noted that prior to outbreak of war, increasingly frequent and detailed reports concerning strength and movement of naval forces in the vicinity of Honolulu, Manila, and Panama were made by Japanese diplomatic representatives. Such reports as the above should be carefully watched in connection with progress of Russo-Japanese relations. (Summary, 080600, August, No. 2)

A large amount of enemy shipping was available in the Marshall-Truk and Rabaul areas, and dozens of Marus were plying the sea lanes between the Empire and the South Pacific, as can be noted in the following:

AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

No. 759

Volume of traffic originated by 6th Base Force in Marshalls and 4th Base Force at Truk involving 8th Base Force at Rabaul, interpreted to indicate large amount of shipping between Marshalls, Truk, and Rabaul.
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 29)

Engineering units were being sent into Southern Pacific areas to construct enemy air bases.

No. 760

FROM: Combined Fleet Cinc #707,1010,August 7.
TO : ____ (8th Fleet),
(Unidentified),
(Desdiv 17 in Desron 10),
(Unidentified)
INFO: (Tokyo Naval General Staff).

The #3 ____ ____[a] will embark on ships of Desdiv 17 (leaving about the 8th for RR) and will be assigned to 8th Fleet
- - - - - - .

a - Translator's Note: Believe this is a civil engineering unit.
(GZ#2355/OPNAV-071751-DI)
(Summary, 071400, August, No. 22)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

No. 761

FROM: _____ (Maru) #? August 6,1800/I
TO : _____ (Unidentified)
(Unidentified)
INFO: _____ (Maru assoc. with #6 Base Force)

At ØØØØ on the 7th leaving #6 Communication Zone and entering #4 Communication Zone.

It was commented:

6th Communication Zone is Jaluit. 4th Communication Zone is Truk.
(GZ #2333-OPNAV 070421-DI)
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 37)

No. 762

FROM: (Maru associated with 6th Base Force), #?, August 6.
TO : (Truk),
(Unidentified),
INFO: (Maru).

Leaving zone of 6th Communication Corps. at ØØØØ, August 7th, and entering zone of 4th Communication Corps.
(GZ #2348/OPNAV-071416-DI)

It was stated:

6th Communication Zone is Jaluit. 4th Communication Zone is Truk. has been identified as #3 SHONAN Maru. Maru likewise made a Communication Zone change report from Jaluit to Truk at 1800, 6 August.
(Summary, 071400, August, No. 10)

AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

No. 763

FROM: ____ (Unidentified), #133,1740,August 6.
TO : ____ (Takao),
____ (Palao),
____ (Rabaul Radio)
____ (Combined Fleet?),
____ (Unidentified),
____ (Chief of Staff 8th Fleet),

- - - - - - -. At 0700, on 16th, will leave Palao Communication Zone and enter #8 Communication Zone. (GZ #2351/OPNAV-071800-DI)

It was commented:

has not appeared in traffic noted here since the middle of April, but at that time appeared to be a ship engaged in Escort Duty. 8th Communication Zone is at Rabaul. (Summary, 080600, August, No. 56)

No. 764

Routing and association indicate: Haru in Bako area 12 July now associated with Cinc 4th and Commander 11th Air Fleet and may be enroute to Mandate area. (BEL-070945-TI)

It was commented:

thought to be Flagship Escort Force was placed by D/F 4 August at 5 N, 98 E. (Summary, 080600, August, No. 25)

ORIGINAL

20 JUN 1943

AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

No. 765

Routing and association indicate:
Maru moving Truk to Rabaul area.
(BEL-070945-TI)

It was reported:

Maru arrived Truk 1030/
4th August.
(Summary, 080600, August, No. 35)

No. 766

Routing and association indicate:
Maru in Truk area.
(BEL-070945-TI)
(Summary, 080600, August, No. 32)

A tanker and hospital ship were also sailing southwards.

No. 767

Routing and association indicate:
SATA Truk Area. (BEL-070945-TI)

It was remarked:

SATA (Tanker) gave indication on 1 August of leaving Empire for Mandates.
(Summary, 080600, August, No. 37)

AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

No. 768

Routing and association indicate: Hospital ship (HOKEN?) appears to have departed Kure for Southern area. (BEL.-070945-TI) (Summary, 080600, August, No. 22)

It was believed that the Commander of the First Air Fleet was aboard the SHOKAKU, and it was noticed that the ZUIHO was not associated with Carrier Division 1.

No. 769

Comdr. 1st Air Fleet , plus carrier plane groups and Sasebo Radio heard working on 5910 kcs during evening August 6th. SHOKAKU called, but unheard answering which suggests Comdr. 1st Air Fleet aboard SHOKAKU and that vessel called instead of through operator's error. (BEL. 070830-TI)

It was reported:

There were indications on August 4th, that Cinc 1st Air Fleet might be in the SHOKAKU (a dispatch addressed Cofs 1st Air Fleet and SHOKAKU was transmitted to Kure for delivery to both addressees. (Summary, 080600, August, No. 18)

AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

No.770

ZUIHO was exempted from Cardiv 1 Collective in recent dispatch. At 1130, on 28 July, ZUIHO addressed (new Air Unit aboard Maru enroute or now in Rabaul area). Above only link between ZUIHO and any unit associated that area. (COM 14-070706-TI)

It was observed:

Exemption of ZUIHO from Cardiv 1 Collective was also noted in traffic of August 4 (Item 622). appears to be a section or Air Group of the 6th Air Attack Force. at 1228, August 7th, Maru sent a message to Cinc 4th and 8th Fleets and Rabaul Base Force which began "Air attack ....." (Summary, 071400, August, No. 19)

A Sub Tender announced its intention of arriving at Truk after the thirteenth, which was an indication of coming activity by enemy submarine forces in the Solomons area.

No. 771

FROM: #907 at 1150 6 August.

"Request information regarding personnel transferred this vessel and who left Yokosuka 22 July, please hold them at Truk as we expect to be there after 13 August. (COM 14 070016-DI)

It was commented:

AUGUST 7, 1942, (Continued)

No. 771 (Cont.)

is tentatively identified as a Sub Tender, and has apparently been participating in efforts to salvage the #2 EIFUKU Maru.
(Summary, 070600, August, No. 27)

No. 772

FROM: (Sub Tender), #190,1000,August 7.
TO : (4th Fleet)
(4th Base Force at Truk).
INFO: (Tokyo Movement Report Office).
(Sub Force)
(Sasebo Movement Report Office).

Leaving PQ at 1000 tomorrow, the 8th, passing 65 -- south of PO at 1200 on the 10th, and plan to arrive outside of PT at - - - on the 12th. (GZ #2354/OPNAV-071800-DI)

It was noted:

A decrypted message from Sub Tender on 6 August, stated that expected to be at Truk after 13 August. PQ is Kwajalein, PO is Oroluk and PT is Truk. (Summary, 080600, August, No. 31)

It was significant that no submarines were heard other than one enroute from Jaluit to the Empire, and two in Northeast Australia vicinity. This clearly indicated that submarines in the Solomon Island were maintaining radio silence, and were ready to operate against the Allied forces.

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

No. 773

No Subs heard other than Comsubro enroute Jaluit to Empire, and Subron 3 (HONI and NIYO) in Northeast Australia in vicinity.
(COM 14-070706-TI)
(Summary, 071400, August, No. 12)

The Traffic Intelligence Summary for August 7, 1942, issued by Communication Intelligence at Pearl Harbor, said, in part:

No. 774

...The 8th Fleet Commander, 8th Base Force, and 5th Air Attack Corps all sent dispatches continuously to units in the Southern area. These included Crudiv 6 and 18, Subrons 3 and 7, Desdiv 29, and Narus. No new units showed up. ...(Page 1)

...As previously noted, Cinc 8th Fleet sent a stream of dispatches from his Rabaul cover. These were to the units already in the area. From the inclusions of the 5th Special Landing Force at Buna in several of his dispatches, it may be indicated that he intends to move that unit...(Page 2 and 3)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

AUGUST 7, 1942 (Continued)

The Bulletin issued by the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet for August 7, 1942 stated in part:

No. 775

FROM: Cincpac 070255, August, 1942
TO : Com Sopacfor
All Task For Coms Pacflt
Coms Nwsf Pasf Wsf
Hawsf
Com Sw Pacfor
Cominch
Opnav

NCR 8509J Bulletin No. 144

1 damaged MOGAMI class CA believed departed Truk for Empire probably with AKASHI (AR) and DDs. By DF submarine at 7 South, 175 East. ...

ORIGINAL

AUGUST 8, 1942

Part A - Operational Messages.

Warning had been issued by U. S. Naval Communication Intelligence as early as August 4 that enemy cruisers were at sea in the Rabaul area. (See No. 636, 637, 646, 647, 675, 676, 750.) The supposition that the Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Fleet was aboard the CHOKAI was now confirmed.

No. 776

Message at 1744 bearing the cover call was apparently originated by Cinc 8th and consecutive station serial numbers plus fact that traffic for Cinc 8th was later routed to CHOKAI for delivery indicates that command has shifted from Rabaul to CHOKAI. (BEL-080855-TI)

It was commented:

The CHOKAI and AOBA were believed at sea in the Rabaul Area at 2340/5th August with a slight indication that Cinc 8th Fleet was not aboard the CHOKAI. Cinc 8th is now believed in the CHOKAI in the Solomons Area. (Summary 091400, August, No. 28)

No. 777

The CHOKAI appears to be originator at 1700/7th August in dispatch action all Outside Southern Forces. (BEL-080855-TI) (Summary 091400, August, No. 31)

AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

Important dispatches were passing between the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet and all his major commanders in the South Pacific.

No. 778

Cinc Combined under blank origin addressed 3 part dispatch to All Major Commands less Dutch East Indies Force ; information to Navy General Staff at 0200, 8th. (COM 14 081848-TI) (Summary 090600, August, No. 4)

No. 779

Cinc 8th originated urgent 4-group operational code at 0910, 9 August to Outer South Seas Force, Cinc's Combined , 11th Air , and 4th Fleets , Naval General Staff and Comdr 5th Air Attack. (GT#586-OPNAV-082230-TI) (Summary 090600, August, No. 45)

The Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Fleet, who had been actively concerned in recent operations in the Rabaul-Solomon Islands area, seemed to be assuming the duties of commanding officer in the Outer South Seas area.

ORIGINAL

AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

No. 760

Cinc 4th Fleet appears to be taking command of operations in Rabaul area. (COM 14 081848-TI)

It was commented:

Cinc 4th Fleet has been actively concerned in recent operations in the Rabaul-Solomon Island area, and is, apparently, the senior officer currently in the South Seas - Outer South Seas Areas. (Summary 090600, August, No. 41)

The Chief of Staff and Operations Officer of the Japanese Fifth Fleet were believed to be at or near Kiska, but after 2000, August 8, the Aleutians Occupation Force Commander took charge of that area.

No. 761

Chief of Staff and Operations Officer 5th believed at or near Kiska though indications exist that Staff is divided. Aleutians Occupation Force Commander appeared to take charge after 2000. (COM14-081846-TI)

It was commented:

On 8 August Cinc and Chief of Staff 5th Fleet were using Kiska for outlet all their traffic. Indications were that KISO or TAMA in that area. (Summary 090600, August, No. 12)

AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

The light cruiser TATSUTA, which was operating in the New Britan-New Guinea area, sent an urgent contact report at 0930, August 7, which possibly indicated that it was being attacked by Allied aircraft.

No. 782

The TATSUTA using secret call , originated urgent contact type report at 0930, 7th, possibly indicating attact by enemy aircraft. (BEL 080928-TI)

It was remarked:

The TATSUTA is a light cruiser which appears to be operating in the New Britain-New Guinea area. (Summary 090600, August, No. 52)

Radio traffic between the Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Fleet and the Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Fleet indicated that several destroyer units would be ordered south to reinforce the Japanese South Pacific Fleets. These units were Destroyer Division 17, Destroyer Division 34, Destroyer Division 27 of Destroyer Squadron 1, Destroyer Division 4 of Destroyer Squadron 10, and Destroyer Division 9 of Destroyer Squadron 1.

ORIGINAL

AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

No. 783.

Cinc 2nd as concealed originator at 1439/7th August addressing the "B" Escort Force collectively for action and Cincs Combined Fleets, Commander 1st Air Fleet, all 2nd Fleet commanders, Desdiv plus Naval General Staff and Naval Minister for information. (BEL-080855-TI)

It was remarked:

was identified as Camranh Bay. is Desdiv 17 which was reported in Kure Area 7th August, but is expected to go to Rabaul for operations with Cinc 8th Fleet.
(Summary 091400, August, No. 13)

No. 784

Communication Officer 4th Fleet addressed Comdesdiv 17, info Communication Officers 1st Air Fleet, Desron 10 8th Fleet Rabaul Base and Saipan Base at 1720, 8th of August. Inclusion of 1st Air Fleet is probably because Desron 10 units have been working for Cinc 1st Air Fleet recently, but it should not be overlooked that Carriers may be associated with movements of Desdiv 17. This message doubtlessly arranges communications for Desdiv 17 enroute to Rabaul. (GT#587-OPNAV-082330-TI)
(Summary 090600, August, No. 34)

AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

No. 785

Large volume originator traffic appeared today. Serial numbers include Comcrudiv 5 , Comdesrons 2 and 4 , Comdesdivs (at Kure) (at Yokosuka) and (in Saipan area) plus AKEBONO MARU and possibly Tankers Association with Cinc 4th and Cinc 8th in these suggests units indicated may be ordered South to reinforce 4th and 8th Fleets. (BEL. 080928-TI)

It was observed:

appears to be Comdesdiv 17 who was indicated as enroute Rabaul on August 8. appears as tentatively Desdiv 34. is tentatively Desdiv 27 of Desron 1, and appears associated with 8th Fleet and 5th Air Attack Force on August 8th. appears to be Desdiv 4 of Desron 10, which was indicated enroute Saipan to Empire on August 8th. appears to be Desdiv 9 of Desron 1.
(Summary, 090600, August, No. 33)

No. 786

FROM: #164 Aug. 8/0700
Not fully readable, but indicates arrival at Guam at about 0600, and departure from there at about 0900 of what appears to be a Destroyer unit, less 4 ships with possibly Ikki Detachment (Army) (BEL. 081320-DI) (Memo #9-3) (Summary, 090600, August, No. 35)

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AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

Enemy radio traffic in the Tulagi area was still very voluminous, and seemed to consist principally of intelligence reports. One urgent message was sent from an Army commander at Saipan to the commander of the Seventeenth Army at Rabaul.

No. 787

Tulagi area traffic continues abnormally high but has appearance of steady flow of reports and intelligence. No high precedence seen other than one urgent from unidentified to Comdr 17th Army at Rabaul intercepted at 1200, 8th. (COM 14-080846-TI)

It was stated:

TI indicated Army Command — shown in care of Desdiv 4 . . . which was in Saipan on 7 Aug. (Summary, 090600, August, No. 42)

The Commander of the Aoba detachment at Davao was noticed communicating with the Oki detachment at Rabaul.

AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

No. 788

Volume of Army traffic considerably decreased. Comdr. Aoba Detachment (at Davao) appeared for first time, associated with Oki Detachment at Rabaul.
(BEL. 080928-TI)
(Summary, 090600, August, No. 36)

The Commander in Chief of the Eighth Fleet issued orders to Special Landing Forces, which was an indication that reinforcements were to be sent to the besieged Japanese units on the Solomon Islands.

No. 789

Special Landing Forces and RE-
8th Base Force, Kavieng
Comcrudiv 18, Fleet auxiliary , 19th
Division Unit Fleet Unit
and Haru associated by Cinc 8th.
(COM 14-080908-TI)
(Summary, 081400, August, No. 25)

Significantly, the Japanese were reforming their patrol lines in Empire waters. Orders were issued to keep on the alert for an Allied striking

AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

force, since the enemy was taking no chances concerning an attack in his home waters.

No. 790

FROM: #266 8 August/22ØØ
The Patrol Boats of Number 3 Patrol Force will immediately come about and reform patrol lines , Keep a sharp lookout for the enemy Striking Force. Any boat sighting the enemy make report by urgent dispatch. (COM 14-082100-DI) (Memo #8-13)

It was reported:

Do not believe this refers to Tulagi Operations. DI on August stated that, "on 7 August at 1800 all ships are to move together along the Patrol Lines (which runs along the line at 149°E. longitude) take up their dispositions at (blank) position. After tomorrow on 8th at 12ØØ, all ships are to leave their patrol sectors and return to (Yokosuka?)". This indicates that there is apparently good reason for the return of the patrol line. (Summary, 090600, August, No. 11)

An urgent operational dispatch was sent by Kiska radio on this day which seemed to indicate that the planned attack of the Allied forces in that area

AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

was in progress. A report from Kiska stated that five American cruisers, one carrier, and three destroyers approached and bombed Kiska Island for about thirty minutes, and then retired.

No. 791

With time of origin 1500 minus 9 Kiska Radio ____ sent urgent ____ followed by dispatch addressed Northern Force __ same origin time_ . This same as used by Tulagi in attack yesterday and apparently means highest urgency contact.
(COM 14 080708-Opnav-Memo #8-4-DI)

It was commented:

Kiska sent this one-half hour before they sent the information regarding cruisers and destroyers reported in Memorandum #8-3, item 4, pages 5, 080600 summary.
(Summary, 081400, August, No. 2)

No. 792

FROM: (Kiska) #242, August 8.
Gist as follows:
About 1500, five enemy cruisers and three destroyers approached Kiska Island and bombarded for about thirty minutes and then re-

AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

No. 792 (Cont.)

tired. Next mentions someone using bombs. Mention made of cruisers and U.S. carrier. One U.S. plane shot down. Japanese losses apparently only planes.
(COM 14-081006-Memo #8-8 - DI)
(Summary, 081400, August, No. 3)

Tulagi had not been heard from since 0450 (-9) on August 7. However, enemy radio intelligence continued to operate for it announced that some time on August 8 it had heard signals from the commander of the Allied striking force.

No. 793

Connection attack on Tulagi last heard 1950(Z)/6th August (0450(I) August) communicating with Rabaul
(BEL-080855-TI)
(Summary, 091400, August, No. 48)

No. 794

Corrected version follows:
FROM: _____ (Jaluit), #365,0600, August 8.
TO : _____ (Tokyo Radio Intelligence),
(Tokyo Naval Intelligence),
(Cinc 4th Fleet)
(All Commanders South Seas Force),

AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

No. 794 (Cont.)

INFO: _____ (Chief of Staff Combined Fleet),
_____ (Chief of Staff Sub Force),
_____ (Chief of Staff 11th Air Fleet),
_____ (Tokyo Naval General Staff),
_____ (Chief of Staff 8th Fleet),
_____ (Comdr 4th Air Attack Force),
(Comdr 5th Air Attack Force),

At 04--, 8 August, we heard signals apparently from Commander of the Striking Force which attacked _____B*, call _____ strength 5, bearing _____° from PY and _____° from PQ (Flagship transmitting on _____kcs.). At 1800, on 7 August, we heard a U.S. warship in _____° South, _____°East.
*Translator's Note: Probably RXB.
(GZ #2361 - Opnav 081346 - Memo #8-6 - DI)

It was remarked:

_____ is _____ or Comtaskforce 62, South Pacific.
(Summary, 081400, August, No. 16)

Enemy destroyers were very active on this day. Desdiv 29, in the Tulagi-Rabaul area, announced that an Allied air raid was taking place in an unidentified spot.

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AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

No. 795

FROM: (Desdiv 29)
TO : (Outer South Seas Force)
Air Raid at 1050/8 August.
(GT #579-DI)

It was indicated:

Desdiv 29 has been operating in the Tulagi-Rabaul area. Its exact position is not known. is apparently a position grid.
(Summary, 080600, August, No. 47)

Desrons 2 and 4, and parts of Desron 1 were associated with the Eighth Fleet in an order from the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet. Desdiv 29 of Desron 6 was using a Rabaul cover call, and Desdiv 30 was believed to be near Truk.

No. 796

Comcrudiv 5 , Comdesron 4, Comdesron 2 and Comdesdivs and of Desron 1 associated with 8th Fleet and 5th Air Attack Force by Cinc Combined. (COM 14-080848-TI)
(Summary, 081400, August, No. 17)

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No. 797

Comdesdiv of Desron 6 using Rabaul cover. (COM 14-080908-TI)

It was pointed out:

is identified as Desdiv 29, and was last noted July 31st at Tulagi. (Summary, 081400, August, No. 18)

No. 798

Traffic routing indicates Comdesdiv in Desron 6, not at Rabaul and may be near Truk. (COM 14-080848-TI)

It was mentioned:

is identified as Comdesdiv 30. (Summary, 081400, August, No. 24)

The Commander of the Tainan Air Group was at Rabaul, and the air unit was believed to be at an air base in New Guinea.

No. 799

Comdr. Tainan Air at Rabaul Air Base (COM 14 081852-TI)

AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

No. 799 (Cont.)

It was noticed:

On August 8th, Comdr. Tainan Air appeared to be embarked on man-of-war KISA Ø. (Summary, 090600, August, No. 57)

No. 800

Air Unit) previously on board
MARU , now at Airron 25 .
(COM 14-080906-TI)
(Summary, 081400, August, No. 22)

No. 801

Air Command previously aboard
MARU is now at Rabaul Air Station
(collateral information indicates
to be 15,000 ton XCV).
(BEL. 080928-TI)

It was commented:

GT believes is an air base in New Guinea. The possibility that may be a converted carrier was mentioned in Item 44, Page 14, R.I. Summary 080600/Q August. (Summary, 090600, August, No. 48)

No enemy carriers seemed to be associated with either northern or southern forces on August

AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

8 though warning was issued that they might accompany Desdiv 17 on its trip from the Empire to Rabaul.

No. 802

No carriers seen associated with either Northern or Southern Commands.
(COM 14 081852-TI)
(Summary, 090600, August, No. 3)

No. 803

Under blank origin, Cinc 1st Air addressed 1st Air Collective _____, less Crudiv 7, Flagship of Desdiv _____, Staff Communication Officer 1st Air Fleet care of _____ information to unidentified
(COM 14 081852-TI)

It was remarked:

The Cardivs appear to be units of the 1st Air Fleet Command. _____ has been tentatively identified as the YAMATO (BB), which was the Flagship of the Cinc Combined Fleet. Desdiv 3 _____ has been escorting carriers during exercises in Empire area. _____ appears to be Combined Fleet. Another

AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

No. 803 (Cont.)

Desdiv (DESDIV 17) which has been associated with carriers and Desdiv 3 appears enroute to Rabaul and, although the carriers themselves are not associated with this area, the possibility that the carriers may be associated with the movements of Desdiv 17 should not be overlooked.
(Summary, 090600, August, No. 16)

The AKIKAZE was acting as an integral part of the Fifth Air Attack Force in the Rabaul-Solomons area.

No. 804

AKIKAZE integral part 5th Air Attack and working directly with him in that area. (COM 14-080908-TI)
(Summary, 081400, August, No. 19)

No. 805

FROM: (AKIKAZE) #198 August 7
TO : (Comm. Officer 8th Fleet)
I have dispatched (or possibly you will dispatch) something on the _____ to the Buka Base.
NOTE: AKIKAZE was convoying unknown vessel or vessels this area recently.
(BEL. 080658-DI)

ORIGINAL

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No. 805 (Cont.)

It was observed:

On August 4, AKIKAZE appeared to be escorting the MARUTO MARU which was indicated as departing Rabaul for possibly Kure. There have also been indications that the YUKAZE and possibly AKIKAZE were escorting (air transport) to Rabaul area, August 6th. On August 8th, AKIKAZE appeared as an integral part of the 5th Air Attack Force and working directly with him in Rabaul-Solomons area. (Summary, 090600, August, No. 51)

A very important report of air strength was issued by the Commander of the Fifth Air Attack Force in the Solomon Islands area. He claimed to have 21 bombers ready for August 8 at Vanakanau and other planes at Rabaul and Bougainville.

No. 806

#444 (4/4)7 August

FROM: (Comdr. 5th Air Attack Force)

TO : (Comdr. 11th Air Fleet)

INFO: (Chief of Staff Comb. Fleet)
(Chief of Staff Subforce)
(Comdr. 2nd Air Attack Force)
(Comsubron 7)
(Chief of Staff Eighth Fleet)

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No. 306 (Cont.)

INFO: (Comcrudiv 18)
(Tokyo Navy Minister)
(Fourther Fleet)
(5th Air Attack Force)
(Comdr. 14th Air Corps?)
(Comdr. 6th Air Attack Force)
(Comdr. Base Force #8 at Rabaul)
(Comdr. 7th Base Force, Chichijima)
(Comdr. 3rd Air Attack Force)
(Comdr. 4th Air Attack Force)

Planes available for use tomorrow:
At RRE (Vanakanau) type Ø (or 1) bombers-21*.
At RRA (Airfield near Rabaul) Type--fighters - **.
At RR (Rabaul)---. Type --, 1.
At RXE (Bougainville?) Type -- flying boats, 1. (-AKIKAZE?) will leave RR (Rabaul) at 1ØØØ for RXC (Near Bougainville?) to----(something in connection with aircraft) ---. (-ship?) will leave RR (Rabaul) at 1535 for RXE (Bougainville?) to ---- (something in connection with aircraft)---.
*This is approximate, but not over 2 or 3 in error.
**Somewhere between 10 and 20.
(GZ #2364-Opnav 081052-Memo #8-DI)
(Summary, 081400, August, No. 20)

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AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

No. 807

Melbunits reading of serial 044, Opnav 081052, gives planes as follows: Type 1 bombers at Vunakanau, 30(about). At RRA, type Zero fighters, in headquarters unit, 14; this unit, 15. At RR, Flying Boats, this unit, 2; Yokohama unit, 1. At RXE, 1 Yokohama Flying Boats. (BEL. 081746-DI) (Memo #9-3)

It was mentioned:

"This unit" is believed to mean 5th Air Attack Force. RRA is an airfield near Rabaul. RR is Rabaul. RXE (Bougainville?) (Summary, 090600, August, No. 69)

Furthermore, additional planes were flying in to Vanakanau to help in the repulsion of the Allied forces.

No. 808

FROM: #31 Aug. 7/1330
Number (1 to 6) _____ planes arrived RRA (Vunakanau?) at 1240. (BEL. 080658-DI)
(Summary, 090600, August, No. 61)

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AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

No. 809

#511 Aug. 8/0700
FROM: (Misawa Air Sta.)
TO : Cinc 8th Fleet.
Northern Air Force.
#5 Air Attack Force.
(Misawa Air)
(5th Air Attack Force)
11th Airron.
INFO: (4th Airron (Torpedo Sqdn?))
(Air Base in Truk area)
17 heavy bombers and 3 _____type departed for Vunakanau. (BEL. 081746-DI)(Memo #9-3)

It was stated:

This is from Misawa Air Station which appears to be in Northern Empire area. (Summary, 090600, August, No. 64)

No. 810

#560 Aug. 8/1520
FROM: (4th Airron (Torpedo Sqdn?))
TO : Northern Air Force.
11th Airron.
25th Airron.
INFO: (Air Base in Truk area)
(Tokyo Radio)
From Commander _____Airron. This force arrived Vunakanau at 1515.
(BEL. 081746-DI) (Memo #9-3)
(Summary, 090600, August, No. 59)

AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

Nine enemy bombers had arrived at Lae on August 7, where the Fourth Air Group was operating with Tainan Air Group.

No. 811

#559 Aug. 7/1640

FROM: (4th Air Group of 5th Air Att. Corps)

TO : ---- (Hahajima Air)
(6th Air Att. Force)
(11th Air Fleet)
(5th Air Att. For)

"Blank time 9 type 1 bombers of blank Air unit arrived." (GZ #2363-Opnav 080727-DI)

It was noted:

4th Air Group is believed operating in Lae with Tainan Air as of 26 July. On 11 July Belconnen noted that the 4th Air Group would receive additional planes from Misawa Air Group from KASUMIGAURA via Chichijima and Saipan. It is not sure which way these bombers are going.
(Summary, 020600, August, No. 55)

The Air unit of the Sixth Air Attack Force had disembarked somewhere in New Guinea, possibly at Lae. It was thought that the Sixth Air Attack

AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

Force, which had been in constant touch with Rabaul forces just prior to the attack on Kiska, would furnish additional air reinforcements for the Fifth Air Attack Force.

No. 812

NARU carrying Air Unit Commander , not seen since originating apparent coded contact reports on 6th. (COM 14 081852-TI)

It was indicated:

The Air Unit , of the 6th Air Attack Force, appeared at an air station , August 8th, along with Comdr. Air-ron 25 and Comdr. Tainan Air Group, indicating that this unit has probably disembarked. This air station appears to be in New Guinea. The Tainan Air Group appeared at Lae on August 4. Air transport may have been the carrier which was reported by reconnaissance on August 6, in the Kavieng area.
(Summary, 090600, August, No. 47)

No. 813

6th Air Attack in pronounced association with Rabaul forces, prior to Kiska contact. Possibly contemplated reinforce-

AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

No. 813 (Cont.)

ments for 5th Air Attack.
(COM 14 081848-TI)
(Summary, 090600, August, No. 39)

The Commander of Airron 25 was very active at this time, and was associated with Airrons 22, 23, 24 and 26. Since Airron 26 was associated with the Eighth Fleet in operations, it was thought that additional air strength for the Tulagi area was to be furnished by these squadrons.

No. 814

Comairron 25 very active, addressing Comdr. 11th Air Fleet ; info Chief of Staff 4th Fleet , 8th Fleet , and Combined Fleet , Comcrudivs 6 and 18 , Comsubron 7 , plus Commanders Airron 22 , Airron 23 , Airron 24 , and Airron 26 . These may be urgent operation reports, but Airron 26 associated with 8th Fleet in operational traffic, which together with above, suggests additional air strength may be drawn these squadrons. (BDL. 080815-TI)
(Summary, 090600, August, No. 58)

ORIGINAL

AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

Enemy operational orders, which commanded the Fifth Air Attack Force to attack the American Occupation Force at Tulagi, were now intercepted.

No. 815

	#041 Aug. 7/2000
FROM:	(5th Air Attack Force)
TO :	(5th Air Attack Force)
INFO:	(11th Air Fleet)
	(4th Air Attack Force)
	(Unidentified)
	(14th Air Corps)
	(8th Fleet)
	(4th Fleet)
	(Combined Fleet)
	(Crudiv 18)
	(Crudiv 6)
	(Subron 7)

Part I.

(a) (Units, time and areas for searching operation)

(b) In accordance with 5AB's dispatch #____; planes? of 5AB ordered to proceed to RXB, on the 8th, to attack enemy Occupation Force. (GZ #2342-Opnav 080015-Memo 7-8-DI)

It was pointed out:

is the 5th Air Attack Force. RXB is Tulagi.
(Summary, 080600, August, No. 53)

AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

No. 816

#347 August 7/(?)
FROM: (Cinc 11th Air Fleet)
TO : (Encip.)(11th Air Flt (Less Spl.Serv.Ships))
(Encip.)(Outer So.Seas For. (Less Spl.Serv. Ships))
INFO: (All Major Commands)
(Cinc Combined)
(Tokyo Naval General Staff)

"In accordance with dispatch #___ ____ _____ 120 miles from RXB advance ____ RXI ____ 5 AB will prepare? for tomorrow's (8th) bombing attack. Outer South Seas Force will cooperate with ___ in __ the RXI area.
(GZ #2360-Opnav 080402-Memo 8-1-DI)

It was noticed:

is 5th Air Attack Force.
RXI is Guadalcanal.
RXB is Tulagi.
(Summary, 080600, August, No. 52)

No. 817

#348 8 August/1550
FROM: (11th Air Fleet)
TO : (5th Air Attack Force)
(Outer South Seas Force)
INFO: (3rd Air Attack Force)
(6th Air Attack Force)
(All Major Commands)
(Tokyo Naval General Staff)
(4th Air Attack Force)

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No. 817 (Cont.)

(Unable to read details, but orders some operations by 5th Air Attack Force against RXI during Ninth (I).)

It was reported:

Several others involving 8th Fleet Units and Special Landing Forces all mention RXI (Guadalcanal).
(GZ #2370-Opnav-082200-DI-Memo #8-10)
(Summary, 090600, August, No. 65)

Other air units were ordered to proceed to Rabaul to participate in coming attacks.

No. 818

FROM: ____ (Yokosuka Comdt).
TO : ____ (Air Group).
INFO: ____ (8th Fleet),
(Tokyo Naval General Staff),

(Combined Fleet)

(Unidentified Air Group(?) ordered proceed to RR). Meaning not clear but believe to mean will be under Cinc 8th.
(GZ #2372-Opnav-082315-DI) (Memo #8-12)

It was remarked:

RR is Rabaul.
(Summary, 090600, August, No. 46)

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No. 819

FROM: (no originator)
TO : (11th Air Fleet).
INFO: (6th Air Attack Force)
(5th Air Attack Force)
(Tokyo Naval General Staff).
From Chief of Staff of this Fleet. (KISAR-AND AIR will proceed to RR to participate in the attack. (GZ #2371-Opnav-[illegible])
(Memo #8-11)

It was commented:

RR is Rabaul.
(Summary, 090600, August, No. 66)

American seaplanes were sighted at Lae on August 8 at 1700, according to an intercepted enemy contact report.

No. 820

FROM: (11th Air Fleet) August 8/1700
TO : (A Major Fleet-Shore Call)
Enemy seaplanes sighted South Seas (Lae) at 1700. (GT #580-[illegible])
(Summary, 080600, August, No. 58)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 194[illegible]

AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

As the result of the bombing of Vanakanau by thirteen Flying Fortresses, the Japanese Fifth Air Attack Force announced that it would have to curtail the protection it usually gave enemy convoys.

No. 821

(5th Air Attack Force), Serial 28 at 1110/August 7th. As result of the bombing of RRE by 13 B-17's at 1030 convoy air cover will be curtailed. This is 5th Air Attack Force dispatch order No. (Blank) (78468). (BEL-080805-DI)

It was observed:

RRE is Vanakanau.
(Summary, 091400, August, No. 42)

An interesting characteristic of the radio traffic originated by the Commander Tainan Air, Commander Fifth Air Attack Force, Commander Airron 25, and an air unit of the Sixth Attack Force, was that all were using the same radio station serial numbers, which indicated that they were either using the same shore radio, or the same radio guard ship.

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No. 822

Comdr. Tainan Air, Comdr. 5th Air Attack Unident Air Unit , which was on board Maru and previously identified Comairron 25 , are all using same radio station serial numbers. Believe is the shore radio and is on New Britain. Peculiarly, Comdr. Tainan Air shown on ship on 8th, August also uses same series, so alternate possibility is that radio guard for the whole group is maintained by ship.
(GT #583-Opnav-Ø8652-TI)

It was stated:

Comdr. Tainan Air Group was also noted by T.I. as being on board Maru on 17 and 24 July.
(Summary, 081400, August, No. 21)

Japanese intelligence reports indicated that there were approximately 800 Allied planes in the Southwest Pacific.

No. 823

(Tokyo General Staff) Serial 261, 1st part of two, of 5 August gives details of Allied Air strength in Southwest Pacific areas and number of U. S.

AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

No. 823 (Cont.)

Vessels in DW area. Total number of planes is about 8ØØ including B-17s, B-24s or (B-25s), P-40s, P-38s, PBY-5s, and PB-25s. (COM 14-081004-DI)

It was indicated:

DW was tentatively identified as Wyndham, Australia. (Summary, 090600, August, No. 44)

It was evident that the enemy's radio intelligence units were on the alert all during this period:

No. 824

Rabaul originated MOST URGENT Intelligence Report at 2000, 8 August, with 8th and 11th Air Fleets action addressees. (GT #586-Opnav-082230-TI) (Summary, 090600, August, No. 43)

A considerable increase of the volume of Submarine traffic in the Eighth Fleet's operating area indicated that strenuous efforts were being

AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

made to intercept United States Task and Occupation Forces. Comsubron 3 seemed to be most active, but Comsubron 7 was addressed in all dispatches, which indicated that he was responsible for rounding up the remaining submarines in the Mandates so as to augment forces of Subron 3 in the New Britain area.

No. 825

Considerably increased volume submarine traffic mostly operational involving units of Subrons 3 and 7 in association with 8th Fleet operating area reflects intensified effort to intercept and attack U.S. Task and Occupation Forces Tulagi area.
(BEL. 080815-TI)
(Summary, 090600, August, No. 65)

No. 826

Comsubron 3 continues occupy chief place in sub activities Southern area but Comsubron 7 being addressed info practically all dispatches and impression is that he has been instructed round up remaining subs in Mandates and proceed with them to New Britain area augment force Comsubron 3.
(COM 14-080846-TI)
(Summary, 090600, August, No. 67)

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AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

A unit of Subron 3 was ordered to attack an Allied carrier, and it was obvious from the heavy radio traffic that other Japanese submarines were in a position to act on the information that was being supplied to them.

No. 827

FROM: #331 7 August
Is an operation order of Subron 3 ordering various Subs to areas. 1 Sub is directed to proceed to an area and attack enemy carrier. (COM 14-081108-DI)

It was pointed out:

On 7 August current traffic from unidentified was believed to be from Comsubron 3 acting as Commander Southeastern Subforce. (Summary, 090600, August, No. 62)

No. 828

Heavy traffic load to Subrons 3 and 8 from New Britain Area Commands continues. Obvious that these Subrons are being given all possible information on U.S. Forces,

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No. 828 (Cont.)

and therefore, their Subs must be in a position to act on this information.
(GT #582 - Opnav 081500 - Memo #8-7 - TI)
(Summary, 081400, August, No. 28)

Many units of Subrons 5, 6, 7 and 8 were being ordered into the Solomon Islands region.

No. 829

Jaluit broadcast to Subron 3, 8th, August. (GT #583-Opnav-081652-TI)

It was noted:

Translations of messages on 7 August show two divisions of Subron 3 directed to proceed to Tulagi.
(Summary, 081400, August, No. 33)

No. 830

Subdiv in Subron 3 apparently not in Southern area as this Division is exempted from message addressed to Subron 3

AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

No. 830 (Cont.)

by Comsubron 5 at Jaluit. It is uncertain whether or not Subdiv in Subron 3 is in Southern area due to inconsistency in address and routing. (GT #584-Opnav-081740-TI)

It was mentioned:

TI last indicated Subdiv in Kure Communication Zone on 15 July, and Subdiv at Kure on 6 August. (Summary, 090600, August, No. 21)

No. 831

Truk broadcasts traffic to Subron 7 8th August. (GT #584-Opnav-081740-TI) (Summary, 081400, August, No. 32)

No. 832

Comsubron 3 with 2 units of that command Subdiv of Subron 7 and Subdiv of Subron 6, associated 14th Fleet operations. (COM 14 081848-TI)

It was noticed:

Comsubron 3 was placed at Jaluit by TI on August 8. Subdivs and 6, of Subron 3, were indicated as at (or

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No. 832 (Cont.)

enroute) Tulagi on August 8, as was Subdiv of Subron 7.
(Summary, 090600, August, No. 68)

No. 833

#257 7 August/0730
FROM: (Truk)
TO : (Subron 7)
(8th Fleet)
INFO: (All Comdrs outside South Seas Force),
(5th Air Attack),
(Subron 3),
(Subforce)
(11th Air Fleet

(From Cinc 4th Fleet. Passed to 4th Fleet). (Unable to read fully, but directs movement of unidentified unit(s) from RR to RXB and another movement from PT to RXN. Latter begins on 7th. Presume that units involved belong to (Subron 7)). (GZ #2367-Opnav-082010-DI-Memo #8-9)

It was reported:

RR is Rabaul. RXB is Tulagi. PT is Truk. RXN is unknown but RXM is Sandwich Islands and RXQ is believed New Caledonia.
(Summary, 090600, August, No. 60)

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AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

No. 834

Following Subs at, or ordered, to Tulagi area:
_____ - Division in Subron 3.
_____ - Flagship NUTU 6.
_____ - Subdiv in Subron 3.
_____ - In NANO 3.
_____ - In NANO 3.
_____ - In NANO 3.
_____ - Division in Subron 7 which has been Rabaul area. Above from dispatch headings, plus possibility other units under command Comsubron 7 mentioned previously. (COM 14-080906-TI)
(Summary, 081400, August, No. 29)

No. 835

Submarines MIKE and HONI within 100 mile radius of 05 S, 166 E, at 0409Z, 8th. Both recently operating Northeast Coast Australia. (BLL. 081320-DI) (Memo #9-3)
(Summary, 090600, August, No. 84)

Some submarines, which had been in the Aleutians, and a sub tender, which had been at Jaluit, were now available at Truk for operations in the South Pacific.

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AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

No. 836

Indicated by routing Comsubdiv of Subron 2 and Submarine of that Division are at Truk. This Division was in Aleutians on 14 July. Dispatch was from Maizuru Personnel at 2000, 8th, to Subdiv of Subron 7, info RO-61 and sub unit of Subron 7 . (COM 14-082008-TI)

It was commented:

On 25 July by D/F, was in 167° W, 39° N.
(Summary, 090600, August, No. 28)

No. 837

Sub Tender at Truk 8 August. (GT #588-Opnav-082330-TI)

It was remarked:

MARU Sub Tender of Subron 3 was indicated by TI on August 5th as probably moving Jaluit to Truk soon.
(Summary, 090600, August, No. 32)

An item from the traffic intelligence summary issued by the Combat Intelligence Unit of the Fourteenth Naval District on August 8, 1942 stated that:

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AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

No. 838

... Commander in Chief 8th Fleet on 7 August shifted back aboard his flagship "Unidentified" from Rabaul, and commenced originating under the _____ concealment. Attempts to place him aboard a known vessel were still unsuccessful, the CHOKAI not having sent any intercepted traffic since May. ... Comcrudivs 6 and 18 were addressed in most headings, and Comcrudiv 6 was found masquerading under the _____ cover. The only hint as to location was the inclusion of Kavieng Base (CA 6) in the heading of this dispatch... (Pg. 2, Morning)

Another item said:

No. 839

"Crudiv 6 and 18 were addressed. No indications as to their exact locations at the present time." (Pg. 3, Evening)

The Fleet Intelligence Summary issued from the flagship of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, on August 8, 1942 announced that:

No. 840

"As was to be expected, the primary interest of Orange was in his force in the Bismark and Kiska areas, and primary ac-

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No. 840 (Cont.)

tivity concerned tactical distribution of the forces in these two areas. In both places, except for movements of Crudiv 6 and 18 in the former area, Orange was dependent entirely on aircraft and submarines."

The Bulletin issued by the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet for August 8, 1942 stated:

No. 841

FROM: CINCPAC 080141, August, 1942
TO : COMSOWESPACFOR
ALL TASK FORCE COMDRS PAC
COMSOPAC
ALL SEAFRONS PAC
COMINCH
COMNAVEU
OPNAV

NCR 9324-J Bulletin #145

One division Subron 7 and units Subron 3 enroute Florida Island area Solomon Islands. By D/F submarines 171 East, 15 South; 165 East, 7 South. Battleships and carriers remain in home waters. One Desdiv of Desron 10 expected to depart Inland Sea for New Britain area shortly. Evidence radar installed at Truk.

AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

Part B - Routine Reports.

The Cruiser SUZUYA and the repair ship AKASHI were to be escorted to the Empire by Desdiv and a unit of Desron 4.

No. 842

Cruiser and AKASHI may be joined by Comdesdiv and escort increased with unit Desron 4. (CCK 14-080846-TI)

It was reported:

(SUZUYA) made a movement report on 5 August indicating destination as Sasebo. AKASHI made movement report same date direction not indicated. The possibility that these two might depart in company was indicated. Comdesdiv on 6 August made no originator type dispatch indicating some of his units due for overhaul or repair Kure Navy Yard. On August 2 TI indicated Desdiv would escort SUZUYA to Empire. (Summary, 090600, August, No. 17)

It was noted that the Seventh Base Force, which formerly had been at Chichijima, was now at Rabaul where the Commander of the 35th Brigade was also observed.

AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

No. 843

Continued indications noted that 7th Base Force) formerly at Chichi-jima is now in Rabaul area. (BEL. 080815-TI) (Summary, 090600, August, No. 53)

No. 844

On August 2 call "Commander 35th Brigade, Rabaul," was noted. (GW Memo 8/7-DI) (Summary, 080600, August, No. 51)

A great number of Marus still continued to follow the supply routes from the Empire to Rabaul via Truk. It was thought that the most important supplies were those for the air units in the Solomons.

No. 845

MARUS
2; auxiliaries
Tanker ; Men-of-war
plus Desdiv in Saipan area.
(BEL-080855-TI)

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No. 845 (Cont.)

It was stated:

MARU August 3rd appeared to be enroute to Truk via Hahajima.
is the KEIYO MARU. It apparently took the Commander of #5 Special Landing Force to Rabaul about 11 July and left Rabaul for Truk about 28 July.
Tanker was scheduled to arrive at Truk 9 August at 1000.
left Truk Communication Zone for Saipan Communication Zone 1 August.
is Desdiv 4 which was in Yokosuka as late as 4 August and noted in Saipan area 7 August. On 8 August COM 14 said made a Movement Report indicating a departure for the Empire. The direction may have been in error and has not been verified as yet.
(Summary, 091400, August, No. 18)

No. 846

AZUMA MARU apparently returning to Truk from Saipan as indicated by association. This vessel believed to be transport and was involved in occupation of Guadalcanal. (BEL. 080928-TI)
(Summary, 090600, August, No. 26)

No. 847

Communication Officer 11th Air Fleet, apparently at Guam , addressed Comdr 6th Air Attack info Comdr 5th Air

AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

No. 847 (Cont.)

Attack | Communication Officer of
11th Air Fleet | at Station in
Rabaul area
and | all shown to be at Yokosuka, and
MARU | This possibly involves movement of Marus from Empire to Rabaul area with planes or supplies. Since Comdr 6th Air Attack is action addressee he may be directed to make the arrangement.
(CT #585-Opnav-082230-TI)
(Summary, 090600, August, No. 38)

No. 848

(4th Fleet), Serial 93Ø of 7th August (very sketchy) but apparently orders a Unit of men
to be sent to Truk with a 3-months supply of something.
(BEL-080805-DI)(Summary, 091400,August,No.21)

No. 849

(Maru), Serial 89 of 6th August at 1ØØØ/8th leave Truk Communication Zone and enter Rabaul's. (BEL-080805-DI)

It was indicated:

This Maru left Yokosuka 25 July.
(Summary, 091400, August, No. 45)

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AUGUST 8, 1942 (Continued)

Two fleet tankers were in the vicinity of Truk.

No. 850

Tanker SATA slated for trip to Mandates near future, by association. (GT #588-Opnav-082330-TI)

It was noted:

On August 7th traffic association indicated SATA in Truk area. (Summary, 090600, August, No. 31)

No. 851

Indications Fleet Tanker , enroute Saipan area to Rabaul area via Truk with possible destination Kavieng , in company with man-of-war . (BEL. 080928-TI) (Summary, 090600, August, No. 37)

No. 852

FROM: #170 24 July
Until further notice please send mail for this vessel to Truk. (COM 14-081108-DI) (Summary, 090600, August, No. 29)

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AUGUST 9, 1942

It will be noticed that very little crypt-analysis could be done on enemy messages at this time. Traffic analysis was the only means of acquiring information, and though many important details of the enemy's plans were thus made available, there were many things left undiscovered.

An enemy contact report stated that four Allied warships and a number of transports had been sighted between Tulagi and Guadalcanal:

No. 853

FROM: ___ (Unidentified) Serial #05
TO : ___ (In Subron 3) Aug.9/0500
(In Subron 7)

" 1 blank (CV or BB), 2 CA's, 1 DD and blank transports sighted between RXB (Tulagi) and RXI (?) (Guadalcanal); 2nd part unrecovered appears give course and speed. (BEL-090845-DI) (Memo #9-5)

It was remarked:

The originators call was garbled. RXI is not definitely identified but seems to be in Guadalcanal area. The 5th Air Attack Force, several 8th Fleet units

AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

No. 853 (Cont.)

and special Landing Forces have been associated in an attack on August. (Summary, 091400, August, No. 49)

Other enemy contact reports announced the sighting of Allied aircraft.

No. 854

FROM: (11th Air Fleet)
Enemy airplanes sighted Lae
Time of intercept 1440, Aug. 9.
(GT #589-Opnav 090635-DI) (Memo #9-1)
(Summary, 090600, August, No. 70)

No. 855

Enemy planes sighted .1.1545 - unidentified. Intercepted at 1550, August 9. (GT #590-TI) (Memo #9-2)

It was observed:

No address was obtained with this report so the area in which these planes were sighted is undetermined.
(Summary, 090600, August, No. 71)

AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

An operational message from the Chief of Staff Eighth Fleet disclosed what was believed to be the approximate location of the CHOKAI in the South Pacific.

No. 856

#__ 1530 August 9 URGENT
FROM: (Chief of Staff 8th Fleet)
TO : (Outer South Seas Force)
INFO: (South Seas Force)
(Tokyo Naval General Staff)
(Unidentified)

Gives a position between 7 and 9 degrees of latitude. Longitude approximately 155 degrees.

It was commented:

Believe that latitude is South and this may be location of CHOKAI.
(GZ #2376/Opnav-091522-DI) (Memo #9-6)
(Summary, 091400, August, No. 32)

Rabaul was sending messages to Chief of Staff Eighth Fleet, which was a positive indication that the Cinc and Staff of the Eighth Fleet were no longer at that port. Warning had been sent as early as

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August 5 that the CHOKAI and AOBA were probably at sea, and since no indication had been noticed that the Cinc Eighth Fleet had changed his flag from the CHOKAI, it was presumed that he was aboard.

No. 857

Rabaul called CHOKAI to deliver message to Chief of Staff 8th Fleet at 1940/9 August. Heretofore believed that 8th Fleet Cinc and Staff were ashore at Rabaul, but not true from above. (GT #594-Opnav 091526-TI) (Summary, 091400, August, No. 30)

No. 857-A

At ØØØ6/1Ø August, Rabaul called CHOKAI to deliver most urgent operational code to Cinc 8th Info: Comcrudiv 6 . 537Ø Kcs. in use by Rabaul to ships. (GT #601-Opnav 091647-TI) (Summary, 091400, August, No. 29)

No. 858

Cinc 8th Fleet shifted from Rabaul to unidentified Flagship on 7th, and began originating under cover. Comcrudiv

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No. 858 (Cont.)

6 also masquerading under . Kavieng only remote hint as to location Comcrudiv 6.

It was indicated:

The cruisers AOBA and FURUTAKA, of Crudiv 6, were placed in Kavieng-Rabaul area by TI on 6-7 August.
(Summary, 090600, August, No. 56)

The CinC Eighth Fleet kept in close touch with the CinC Combined while directing operations in the Tulagi area.

No. 859

Cinc Combined fairly heavy originator to Cincs 8th and 11th Air on 8 August.
(GT #602-Opnav 091715-TI)
(Summary, 091400, August, No. 35)

No. 860

Cinc Combined issued short CP. CODE directive to Cinc 8th Fleet
11th Air Fleet . Info: Subrons 3 and 7 , Cinc Sub Force and at 2045, 9 August.
(GT #600-Opnav 091715-TI)
(Summary, 091400, August, No. 34)

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AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

Japanese radio traffic on this day seemed to be centered on radio intelligence activity.

No. 861

Dominant feature todays traffic is radio intelligence dispatches from all Major Radio Stations. (COM 14-Ø9722-TI) (Summary, 091400, August, No. 1)

No. 862

FROM: (Rabaul) #752 9 August/0910
TO : (unidentified)
(8th)
(Airron 25)
INFO:
(4th)

"At eight (blank) one of our (blank) (specially equipped vessels?) in AD (unidentified) got bearing (blank) on (80 to 360), strength (blank), on what is believed enemy (blank)". (BEL-090840-DI)

It was mentioned:

believed to be Outer South Seas Force. identified as 11th Air Fleet. (Summary, 100600, August, No. 63)

AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

The Japanese were making use of communication security measures, for Rabaul was issuing operational messages without giving a specific address. The Tulagi radio station had used the same procedure in reporting the attacks on August 7.

No. 863

At 1430/9 August, Rabaul originated short Operational Code without address. This procedure used by Tulagi in making reports of attack on 7 August. This message was relayed to Cinc's Combined, 11th Air, and Sub Fleets, Outer South Seas Force, and Naval General Staff by Truk at 1706.
(CT #596-Opnav 091526-TI)
(Summary, 091400, August, No. 44)

No. 864

From Rabaul base to Unidentified Men-of-war and Unidentified (class unknown) and . Info: Chief of Staff 8th Fleet and Unidentified at 2130/9 August. This message transmitted by Rabaul at 2305 to Crudiv 6, CHOKAI, Men-of-War and , and Unclassified . Delay in transmission may indicate time of origin of message is time of subject matter, as message is lengthy

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No. 864 (Cont.)

Operational Code. Addressees indicate number of warships in area in addition those previously identified and located.
(GT #599-Opnav 091622-TI)

It was noted:

arrived at Kavieng 2nd August enroute to Rabaul.
(Summary, 091400, August, No. 33)

There were two unidentified Men-of-War in the Rabaul area, and further reinforcements were considered probable for it was believed that Crudiv 7 would be ordered to return from Malaya.

No. 865

Unknown originator, Serial 184 at 0010/9 August addressed 5-numeral to Unidentified , Info: Unidentified in care Rabaul . Both Unidents are Men-of-War.
(GT #599-Opnav 091622-TI)

It was reported:

was fully commissioned sometime between 29 June and 1 July. It left the Empire about 4 July and apparently

AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

No. 865 (Cont.)

stopped at Chichijima and Truk. On 3 August it was noted enroute Truk to Rabaul. (Summary, 091400, August, No. 46)

No. 866

Dispatch from Cinc Southern Expeditionary Fleet , Action: Comcrudiv 7 , Info: MARUS and , Balikpapen Base , Davao Base , and Tokyo Address is remote indication return trip of Crudiv 7 from Malaya. (GT #595-Opnav 091538-TI) (Summary, 091400, August, No. 51)

Other enemy warships were ordered to proceed South, and in addition DesDiv 4 and two fleet tankers were noticed on their way to the South Pacific.

No. 867

Comesdiv 4 sent apparent Communication Zone change to Palao, Tokyo, Truk, Saipan, Comdesron 1Ø, Info: 1st Air Fleet and unidentified, but probable Combined or 2nd Fleet, (GT #603-Opnav 091715-TI) (Summary, 091400, August, No. 16)

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AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

No. 868

Naval General Staff at 1840, 9th addressed COS 4th [redacted] Info: COS Combined [redacted], 8th [redacted], Truk and Comdesdiv 4 [redacted]. This increases evidence Desdiv 4 ordered south.

It was noted:

Army Command [redacted] addressed in care Desdiv 4 on 8 August.
(GT #600-Opnav 091715-TI)
(Summary, 091400, August, No. 39)

No. 869

SATA [redacted] and another fleet oiler in Mandates and apparently to proceed to New Britain area with Fleet Unit [redacted] possibly destroyer in #2 Escort Force. (COM 14-092518-TI)
(Summary, 100600, August, No. 65)

A fragmentary decipherment of an enemy message disclosed that the Japanese were planning a movement of some sort to Guadalcanal.

No. 870

#218 9 Aug/ 1200
FROM: [redacted] (Base Force #8 at Rabaul).
TO : [redacted] (8th Fleet).
INFO: [redacted] 11th Air Fleet).
(5th Air Attack Force).

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AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

No. 870 (Cont.)

INFO: (Sasebo #5 Special Landing Force).

(Combined Fleet).
(4th Fleet).
(Tokyo Naval General Staff).

Very fragmentary but deals with departure of some unit from RAF on 13th. Also mentions occupation of RZP (but not clear in what regard) and movement of some sort to RXI. (GZ #2382-Opnav-Ø9222Ø-DI).

It was noticed:

Work is being continued on this message and it is expected that it will be further enlarged upon. RAF is not located. RZP is believed Port Moresby. RXI is believed Guadalcanal.
(Summary, 100600, August, No. 71)

Aircraft supplies were being shipped to all air units in Southern waters, and the Mandates Area was especially active, since planes from this region were flying into the zone threatened by Allied forces. The AKIKAZE, which had been assigned to the Fifth Air Attack Commander to carrying supplies in

AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

his area for his units, went from Rabaul to a place in the vicinity of Bougainville.

No. 871

Empire aircraft supply activities were busy with dispatches to all Air Units especially in Mandates area. (COM 14-090748-TI) (Summary, 091400, August, No. 11)

No. 872

AKIKAZE using the cover call was communicating with Comairron 25 on 9430 kcs at 0730, 8th. (BEL-090930-TI)

It was pointed out:

TI on 8 August stated AKIKAZE integral part 5th Air Attack Force and working directly with him in that area. Comairron 25 is interpreted here as Comdr 5th Air Attack Force and the area is believed Bougainville (?). (Summary, 100600, August, No. 64)

No. 873

Further dope from , Serial 44, part 4 on 7 August:
"P 2. AKIKAZE will load with navigation fuel and stores and will depart from Rabaul

AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

No. 873 (Cont.)

for RXC (vicinity of Buka). Crew - - - departed from Rabaul for RXE airfield at 1530." (BEL-090340-DI)

It was stated:

RXC appears to be in the vicinity of Bougainville.
RXE is questionably Bougainville.
(Summary, 091400, August, No. 41)

No. 874

FROM: (AKIKAZE) #206 Aug. 9/1350
TO : (11th Air Fleet)
(5th Air Attack Force)
INFO: (Desdiv 34)
(8th Base Force, Rabaul)
(Tainan Air)
"Arrived at RXC."
(GZ #2374-Opnav 091125-DI) (Memo #9-4)
(Summary, 091400, August, No. 43)

Communication arrangements were made for the planes flying from the Empire to the Marshall Islands.

No. 875

Yokohama Air Station to 14th Air Corps , Info: Communi-

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AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

No. 875 (Cont.)

cation Officers 4th Air Attack
11th Air Fleet , Truk
and Hahajima Air indicates communication arrangements for flight of planes (probably big flying boats) from Yokohama to Marshalls, - not necessarily via Truk. This type message also used preliminary to flights to arrange for weather reports during flights. (GT #597-Opnav 091552-TI)

It was observed:

The 14th Air Group is believed based at Gasmata. A detachment of this Force was believed to be in Tulagi 3rd August. (Summary, 091400, August, No. 50)

It appeared that enemy carriers had not yet moved from the Kyushu area, but the fact that Des-Div 4 was ordered to go south gave rise to the suspicion that the carriers might also head for the Solomons.

No. 876

Comdr First Air Fleet and Plane Groups and active on Carrier circuits but only 1 dispatch was seen involving Carriers. This one at 1730/8 Aug. from

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AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

No. 876 (Cont.)

AKAGI Plane Group) to HITAKA
, HAYATAKA) and KISARATSU
Air . Departure of carriers from Kyushu area still not indicated.
(COM 14-090722-TI)
(Summary, 091400, August, No. 14)

No. 877

FROM: Naval General Staff August 9/1800
TO : Comdesdiv 4
INFO: Chief of Staff 8th Fleet
" " " Combined Fleet
" " " 4th Fleet
" " " 1st Air Fleet
Cinc Sub Force
Truk Base
Chief of Staff 11th Air Fleet
This may be a change of plan for Desdiv 4, and indicates destination this Desdiv as Truk. Note inclusion 1st Air Fleet as in previous directive to Desdiv 17 .
It seems probable that these destroyers are being detached from service with 1st Air Fleet, but again the possibility that carriers are involved should not be disregarded.
(GT #595-OpNav 091538-TI)
(Summary, 091400, August, No. 15)

Traffic analysis disclosed that the RYUJO and not the ZUIHO was in Cardiv 2, no units of which were observed in Southern or Northern waters.

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AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

No. 878

Cinc 1st Air Fleet , Serial #264 at 1110/9 August addressed to Cardiv 2 less RYUJO , ZUIHO shown positively at Sasebo , and SETTSU , Info: 3rd Air Attack , Cinc Combined , Air Group associated with 2nd Air Attack, and Yokosuka Air . Note conclusive evidence RYUJO in Cardiv 2, ZUIHO not in Cardiv 2. Also note administrative nature of message. Appears reasonably safe to assume no vessels Cardiv 2 are in Southern or Northern waters. (GT #605-Opnav 091915-TI) (Summary, 100600, August, No. 8)

Reinforcements were being sent to the Fifth and Sixth Air Attack Forces in the Solomon Islands, and furthermore, it was believed that the Second Air Attack Force would soon take over part of the burden.

No. 879

Association of Airron 26 with Airron 25 and Rabaul Air Station suggests that units Airron 26 will proceed to Rabaul area as reinforcements for Airron 25. One section Misawa Air Group

AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

No. 879 (Cont.)

has joined Airron 25 probably for purpose reen* forcing Airron 4 in Solomon area. (BEL-Ø9Ø93Ø-TI)

It was indicated:

This believed previously reported in RI Summary Ø9Ø6ØØ/Q August, Page 13, Item 59. Opnav has been referring to Airron 25 and 26 as the 5th and 6th Air Attack Forces respectively. Airron 4 was indicated as arriving at Vunakanau at 15ØØ, 8 August. (Summary, 100600, August, No. 70)

No. 880

2nd Air Attack Force prominent in headings air activities Southern area and impression given that unit may reinforce 5th Air Attack near future. Nothing definite noted yet. (COM 14-092316-TI)
(Summary, 100600, August, No. 53)

No. 881

FROM: "Comdr TAMBAKUKAI"
at (Solomon area) 8 August/0910
TO : "Comdr 2nd Air Force",
(Comairron 25).
(BEL-090930-TI)
(Summary, 100600, August, No. 62)

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AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

No. 882

Comdr 6th Air Attack believed in Rabaul area. Probably some units that command due to reinforce Rabaul area.
(COM 14-092318-TI)

It was commented:

Believe this was noted previously on 8 Aug. Previous dispatch stated, "6th Air Attack Force in pronounced association with Rabaul Forces prior to Kiska contact. Possibly contemplated reinforcements for 5th Air Attack Force".
(Summary, 100600, August, No. 47)

The Chief of Staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet who had been at Guam, now shifted his headquarters from the Tenian area to that of Rabaul.

No. 883

(Blank) Serial 4Ø2 at 0720/7th August to 25th Airron. One heavy bomber with Cinc aboard_____departed _____ _____ for Rabaul.

It was indicated:

Believe Cinc 11th Air Fleet is meant as call will easily clear to . Chief of Staff 11th Air Fleet has appeared at Guam for the past couple of days.
(BEL-090340-DI)
(Summary, 091400, August, No. 37)

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AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

No. 884

8 August/1550
FROM: (Comdr. 11th Air Fleet)
TO : (Outside Southern Force less "All Specially Equipped Ships"), (11th Air Fleet) less same address,
INFO: (Movement Report Office), (All Major Commands).
Routing indicates dispatch is report of the shift of 11th Air Fleet Headquarters from Tenian to Rabaul area. Staff Comm. Officer 11th Air Fleet is shown at Rabaul Air Station . (BEL-090930-TI)
(Summary, 100600, August, No. 56)

No. 885

Chief of Staff 11th Air addressed at Guam but late yesterday call was taken over by 5th Air Attack Corps in Rabaul and location confirmed by D/F from Oahu. (COM 14-090748-TI)

It was mentioned:

On 8 August it was noted that staff of 11th Air Fleet received traffic via Guam.
The 5th Air Attack Force operates in the New Britain-Solomons area.
is identified as 11th Air Fleet.
(Summary, 091400, August, No. 38)

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AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

No. 886

At 1450/9 August Commander 5th Air Attack included Chiefs of Staff, 2nd Fleet and 1st Air Fleet among Info addressees of message, to Cinc 11th Air and 8th Fleets.
(GT #596-Opnav 091526-TI)
(Summary, 091400, August, No. 40)

No. 887

FROM: (11th Air Fleet)Serial 407
TO : (5th Air Attack Force) August 9/(?)
; 11th Air Fleet (5th Air Att. For.)
INFO:
(Tainan Air)
Plane carrying Chief of Staff of this Fleet and _____other persons scheduled arrive at _____and will depart P_____ _____at _____ tomorrow the 10th for RR (Rabaul).
(GZ #2377-Opnav 091742-DI)
(Summary, 091400, August, No. 36)

No. 888

Chief of Staff 11th Air Fleet not with Cinc and may have remained at Guam when Cinc proceed Rabaul as retains administration 11th Air net etc.
(COM 14-092318-TI)

AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

No. 888 (Cont.)

It was noted:

COM 14 on 9 August stated Chief of Staff 11th Air Fleet addressed at ____ but late yesterday call was taken over by 5th Air Attack Corps in Rabaul and location confirmed by D/F from Oahu. ____ is identified as 11th Air Fleet. (Summary, 100600, August, No. 45)

It was also believed that the Tainan Air Group was moving from its former location in New Guinea.

No. 889

Commander Tainan Air appeared aboard Tender ____ and may be moving from former New Guinea location. (COM 14-090748-TI)

It was reported:

Commander Tainan Air was believed to be operating in the vicinity of Lae. (Summary, 091400, August, No. 47)

No. 890

FROM: ____ (11th Air Fleet) Serial #406
TO : (Tainan Air) August 9/(?)
INFO:
(11th Air Fleet)
(5th Air Attack For.)

Two (?) bombers of ____ - Tainan Air

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No. 890 (Cont.)

Group?) arrived PST (Tenian) at 1425.
(GZ #2380-Opnav 091742-DI)
(Summary, 091400, August, No. 19)

Information concerning the Japanese Second Fleet in the Malaya area was now made available.

This force had engaged in some convoy duty.

No. 891

Dated 29th from Cinc Japanese 2nd Fleet addresses whole of 2nd Fleet negative 7th Squadron Japanese Cruiser KUMANO, Japanese Cruiser SUZUYA, and 2nd Flotilla of 2nd Destroyer Squadron. Latter force now controlled by Commander in Chief, First Southern Expeditionary Fleet (MALAYA FORCE).

It was commented:

Appears probable that cruisers and destroyers sighted Ø5°32'N, 98°5Ø E, course 34Ø° on 28th, were 7th Squadron and 2nd Flotilla and that these are the only units of 2nd Fleet in that area. No indication of presence of an aircraft carrier. (COISEF-Ø915Z/3Ø)

It was further remarked:

SUZUYA on 29 July appeared enroute Rabaul from Truk. On 3Ø July this vessel was an information addressee in a dispatch from Cinc Combined to AKASHI. On 31 July the SUZUYA was

AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

No. 891 (Cont.)

associated in dispatches from Cinc 8th to Cinc Combined for action along with Subron 7, Cinc 2nd, and Desron 2. (Summary, 010600, August, No. 46)

No. 892

Southern Expeditionary Fleet , Action Chief of Staff Combined Info: Comcrudiv 7 , Comdesron 3 , Comdesdiv 2 Comdesdiv 15 , MARU , and Ambon at 1610/9 August. Association these Fleet Units with East Indies Bases not understood in view previous indications this Force was in Indian Ocean, but may indicate return to Southwest Pacific. At 2540/8 August, Communication Officer Penang Base addressed MARU and Communication Officer Desron 3 , Info: Communication Officer Southern Expeditionary Fleet ; which does not support above theory so far as Desron 3 is concerned. Note that all message to Crudiv 7, Desron 3, Desdivs 2 and 15, include one or more Marus in address, indicating convoy duty by men-of-war, or logistics. (GT #598-Opnav 091554-TI) (Summary, 091400, August, No. 52)

The schedule of an enemy Maru enroute to Truk was discovered at this time.

AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

No. 893

(Unidentified), serial 192 of 8th August addressed Unidentified ____ (#4 Base Truk), Info: and 6th Fleet and 6th Base Force respectively: "Cancel ____ MARU message ____. She will depart Kwajalein at ___ 9th and passing to North of ____ will arrive Truk 0500/13th." (BEL-091950-DI)
(Summary, 101400, August, No. 15)

A fleet tanker was expected to move southwards from Truk into the new danger zone.

No. 894

Message from Truk Communication office to SATA at Ø6ØØ/9 August tends to confirm previous prediction SATA due for trip South.
(GT #597-Opnav 091552-TI)

It was pointed out:

The Tanker SATA was reported in Truk 7 August.
(Summary, 091400, August, No. 23)

A SubDiv of SubRon 2, which had been in the Aleutians during July, was now observed to be in the vicinity of Truk.

AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

No. 895

Subdiv of Subron 2 which was in Kiska area 14 July was indicated by traffic routing in Truk area.
(COM 14-090724-TI)

It was remarked:

This previously reported in RI Summary 090600/Q August, page 10, item 28.
(Summary, 100600, August, No. 37)

No. 896

Subdiv Sita 3 and Submarine are shown at Truk (SOA 5).
(BEL-090950-TI)
(Summary, 100600, August, No. 38)

No. 897

By association Cinc 8th, Subdivs of Subron 2 and Subdiv of Subron 8 may operate in Southern Theater in near future. They are now in Yokosuka area.
(COM 14-Ø92324-TI)
(Summary, 100600, August, No. 73)

Other submarines, several of which belonged to SubRon 3, were observed operating in the Tulagi-Rabaul area.

ORIGINAL

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AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

No. 898

8 August/1000

FROM: (unidentified)
TO : Comsubron 3.
Chief of Staff 8th Fleet,
Comsubron 7.
INFO: 5th Air Attack Force.
This association may place as a sub unit and probably in Rabaul area.
(COM 14-090726-TI)
(Summary, 100600, August, No. 60)

No. 899

Sub originated Op. Code to Comsubron 5 . Info Comsubdiv , Subdiv Cinc Sub Force Comdr. 5th Air Attack , Comsubron 7 and COS 8th Fleet . Believe this Sub may have contact in Solomons area. (GY #600-Opnav 091715-TI)

It was stated:

Sub is a part of Subdiv which with Subdiv are believed operating in Tulagi area. All are of Subron 3.
(Summary, 091400, August, No. 54)

Since the Jaluit radio station was handling dispatches for certain enemy submarines, it was assumed that some of them were in that general area.

AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

No. 900

Comsubdiv to Communication Officer Subron 3 Info: Sub at 0300, 9th. Sub to communication officer Subron 3 Info: Comsubdiv and tender
Both messages handled by Jaluit Radio but is only general indication of area in which Subs operating. (GT #602-Opnav 091715-TI)
(Summary, 091400, August, No. 55)

The Traffic Intelligence Summary issued by the Communication Intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor on August 9 stated that judging only from the day's traffic the following units were in the New Britain-Solomons area:

No. 901

"Cinc Eighth Fleet
Cinc 11th Air Fleet
CHOKAI
Comcrudiv 18
Comcrudiv 6
19th Division unit (under

AKIKAZE
NETU 99 (New Fourth Fleet unit)
KARU 1, a fleet tender
Units of Desdiv of Escort Force ?
Comdesdiv of Desron 6."
(Pg. 3, Morning)

ORIGINAL

22 JUN 1943

AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

The same summary for August 9 reported that:

No. 902

"After a long silence, the CHOKAI(?) and originated a dispatch which fits with the 8th Fleet Station serial; confirming that Commander aboard the CHOKAI." (Pg. 3, Evening)

The Bulletin issued by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, for August 9 stated:

No. 903

FROM: CINCPAC 090119, AUGUST, 1942
TO : COMINCH COMSOWEST PACFOR
ALL TASKFOR COMS PACFLT
COMNOWESTSEAFRON
COMWESTSEAFRON
COMPASEAFRON
COMHAWSEAFRON
OPNAV
COMNAVEU

NCR 9986J Bulletin No. 146

KAMOI and GOSHU Maru in Marshalls. Part of 6th Attack Corp in New Britain. Indications Desron 6 has 1 Desdiv in Rabaul area and another vicinity of Truk. Cinc Eighth Fleet aboard flagship CHOKAI probably in

AUGUST 9, 1942 (Continued)

No. 903 (Cont.)

Solomons area. Cinc Fourth Fleet at Rabaul. Crudiv 5 plus Desdivs may proceed Solomons from Homeland.

This concludes the information supplied by U. S. Naval Communication Intelligence from July 1, 1942 to August 9, 1942. Details of the remaining battles of the Solomon Islands' Campaign will be furnished in succeeding volumes of this series.


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BATTLE MAP OF SAVO ISLAND

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

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