The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor



VOLUME II
APPENDIX

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

VOLUME II

APPENDIX

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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APPENDIX II

PART A—HULL-NOMURA CONVERSATIONS
(May 12, 1941 — August 6, 1941)

No. 1

FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 295.

Part 1 of 6.

The Government of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement disposing the resumption of our traditional friendly relations.

Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment among our peoples should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

It is our present hope that, by a joint effort, our nations may establish a just peace in the Pacific; and by the rapid consummation of an entente cordiale, arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. Both Governments, therefore, desire that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general agreement which would bind, meanwhile, both governments in honor and in act.

It is our belief that such an understanding should compromise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated at a conference and appropriately confirmed by our respective Governments.

Trans. 5-14-41

No. 2

FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 295.

Part 2 of 6.

Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to with:

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and character of nations.
2. The attitude of both Governments toward the European War.
3. The relations of both nations toward the China affair.
4. Commerce between both nations.
5. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.
6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

Accordingly, we have come to the following natural understanding.

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.

The Governments of the United States and of Japan jointly acknowledge each other as equally sovereign states and contiguous Pacific powers.

Trans. 5-14-41

No. 3

FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 295.

Part 3 of 6.

Both Governments assert the unanimity of their national policies as directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of respectful confidence and cooperation among our peoples.

Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present, concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interest regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of backward nations.

Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order in national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.

Trans. 5-14-41

No. 4

FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 295.

Part 4 of 6.

2. The attitude of both Governments toward the European war.

The Government of the United States and Japan make it their common aim to bring about the world peace; they shall therefore jointly endeavor not only to prevent further extension of the European war but also speedily to restore peace in Europe.

The Government of Japan maintains that its alliance with the Axis powers was, and is, defensive and designed to prevent the nations which are not at present directly affected by the European war from engaging in it.

The Government of Japan maintains that its obligations of military assistance under the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy will be applied in accordance with the stipulation of Article 3 of the said pact.

The Government of the United States maintain that its attitude toward the European war is, and will continue to be, directed by no such aggressive measures as to assit any one nation against another.

The United States maintains that it is pledged to the hate of war, and accordingly, its attitude toward the European war is, and will continue to be, determined solely and exclusively by considerations of the protective defense of its own national welfare and security.

Trans. 5-14-41

No. 5

FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 295.

Part 5 of 6.

3. The relations of both nations toward the China affair.

The Governments of the United States, acknowledging the three principles as enunciated in the Konoye statement and the principles as enunciated in the Konoye statement[a] and the principles set forth on the basis of the said three principles in the treaty with the Nanking Government as well as in the joint declaration of Japan, Manchukuo and China and relying upon the policy of the Japanese Government to establish a relationship of neighborly friendship with China, shall forthwith request the CHIANG KAI-SHEK regime to negotiate peace with Japan.

4. Commerce between both nations.

When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other to mutually supply such commodities as are, respectively, available or required by either of them. Both Governments further consent to take necessary steps to the resumption of normal trade relations as formerly established under the treaty of commerce and navigation between the United States and Japan.

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[a]The repetition in the text actually occurred.

Trans. 5-14-41

No. 6

FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 295.

Part 6 of 6.

5. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.

As Japanese activities in the Southwestern Pacific area shall be carried out by peaceful means, American cooperation shall be given in the production and procurement of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs.

6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

a. The Governments of the United States and Japan jointly guarantee the independence of the Philippine Islands on the condition that the Philippine Islands shall maintain a status of permanent neutrality. The Japanese subjects shall not be subject to any discriminatory treatment.

b. Japanese immigration to the United States shall receive amicable consideration—on a basis of equality with other nationals and freedom from discrimination.

ADDENDUM

The present understanding shall be kept as a confidential memorandum between the Governments of the United States and of Japan.

The scope, character and timing of the announcement of this understanding will be agreed upon by both governments.

Trans. 5-14-41

No. 7

FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #294.

Re your #214[a].

The English text, complete, my #295[b] (six parts), is not in Government Code. Therefore, please exercise great care.

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[a]Matsuoka suggests revision of the text.
[b]Text of proposal.

Trans. 5-14-41

No. 8

FROM: Tokyo May 13, 1941
TO: Washington #219.

(In 3 parts—complete).

Strictly secret. Separate message.

"The governments of Japan and the United States accept joint responsibility for the negotiation and conclusion of a general agreement concerning the resumption of our traditional friendly relations.

"Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment between our peoples should be prevented from recurrence and arrested in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

"It is our earnest hope that, by a joint effort, the two nations will establish a just peace in the Pacific, and by the rapid consummation of an amicable understanding, arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

"For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. We, therefore, suggest that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general agreement which would bind, meanwhile, both governments in honor and in act.

"It is our belief that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which would be deliberated at a later conference and appropriately confirmed by our respective governments.

"We presume to anticipate that our governments could ----- relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit

"1. The concepts of Japan and the United States respecting international relations and the character of nations.

"2. The attitudes of both governments toward the European war.

"3. The relations of both nations toward the China Affair.

"4. Commerce between both nations.

"5. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.

"6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific.

"Finally we have come to the following mutual understanding:

"1. *The Concepts of Japan and the United States respecting International Relations and Character of Nations.*

The governments of Japan and the United States jointly acknowledge each other as equally sovereign states and contiguous Pacific powers.

Both governments assert the unanimity of their national policies as directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of respectful confidence and cooperation between our peoples.

Both governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.

"2. *The Attitudes of Both Governments toward the European War.*

It being the common aim of both governments to establish world peace, they will join forces with a view to preventing the extension of the European War and restoring peace speedily.

The government of Japan maintains that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was, and is, defensive and designed to prevent the participation of nations in the European War not at present involved in it.

The government of Japan declares that there is no question that the obligation of military assistance under the Tripartite Pact comes into force in the case stipulated in Article 3 of the said Pact.

The government of the United States declares that so far as its attitude toward the European War is concerned it does not and will not resort to aggressive measures aimed to assist any one nation against another. The United States maintains that it is pledged to the hate of war, and accordingly, its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, determined solely and exclusively by considerations of the protective defense of its own national welfare and security.

"3. *The Relations of both Nations toward the China Affair.*

In appreciation of the three principles set forth in the Konoye Statement and the treaty concluded with the Nanking government upon the basis of the said Statement and the joint declaration of Japan, Manchukuo and China and also in reliance upon Japan's policy of friendship and good neighbour toward China, the government of the United States will immediately request the Chiang Kai-Shek regime to negotiate peace with Japan.

"4. *Commerce between both Nations.*

When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by both governments, Japan and the United States shall assure each other to supply mutually such commodities as are, respectively, available or required by either of them. Both governments further consent to take necessary steps to the resumption of normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Navigation and Commerce between Japan and the United States. If a new commercial treaty is desired by both governments, it could be elaborated as soon as possible and concluded in accordance with usual procedure.

"5. *Economic Activity of both Nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.*

Noting that Japanese expansion in the direction of the southwestern Pacific is declared to be of peaceful nature, American cooperation and support shall be given in the production and procurement of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs.

"6. *The Policies of Both Nations affecting Political Stabilization in the Pacific.*

(a) The governments of Japan and the United States jointly guarantee the independence of the Philippine Islands provided that the latter observes perpetual neutrality and accords to the Japanese subjects a treatment equal to the Commonwealth citizens.

(b) Japanese immigration to the United States shall receive amicable consideration on a basis of equality with other nationals and freedom from discrimination.

ADDENDUM

The present understanding shall be kept as a confidential memorandum between the governments of Japan and the United States. The scope, character and timing of the announcement of this understanding will be agreed upon by both governments."

Trans. 5–14–41

No. 9

FROM: Tokyo — May 13, 1941
TO: Washington — # 218.

In writing up separate message # 219[a] (English text) we have made use of the text in your message # 256[b] as much as possible. However, it was necessary to revise certain parts, in order to conform more closely to the Japanese text (our revised proposal). When presenting the above (# 219) to the Secretary of State please eliminate these portions -----.

[a] See II, 8.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 5–14–41

No. 10

FROM: Tokyo — May 9, 1941
TO: Washington — # 206.

(3 parts—complete) (Secret outside the department).

Regarding my message # 204.

Main reason for the revision and other points to be noted:

(1) Clause 2 of the "Understanding Agreement" # 2 was revised, despite the fact that no further provision should be required in view of the obvious nature of Japan's partnership in the Tripartite Pact, because we felt that our position in relation to the aforesaid pact should be made clear before adopting a provision of this nature.

(2) Each clause in "Understanding Agreement" # 3 was struck out, because, to seek a U.S.-Japanese understanding on the basis of such itemized provisions appears too much as though these questions were dictated by the United States.

The clause relative to migration of our nationals to China was eliminated because it may give a mistaken impression to our countrymen who from the beginning resented emigration to the United States, that the U.S. is directing even our immigration in China.

Although it might be said that there should be no objections to this so long as it is kept secret, matters such as this have a way of leaking out occasionally, therefore we should be prepared for such an event.

We wish to obtain the United States' assurance, in a separate secret clause, to the effect that she will stop aiding Chiang Kai-Shek in the event that Chiang accepts our peace suggestion. However, if for any reason this is unacceptable to the United States, we are willing to have merely the responsible parties adhere to this provision.

(3) "A" and "C" of #4 was eliminated because we consider it more realistic to wait and see the effect of the "Understanding Agreement" on the strained U.S.-Japanese relations before taking up this matter.

"B" should be considered as a separate item of understanding and a great deal of thought should be given to determining the time, method and intentions regarding its fulfillment.

Please bear in mind that we must consider the effect of such matters as these on our allies.

(4) #2 and #5 (Revised proposal #4) was eliminated on the same ground, as "A" and "C" of #4.

(5) "A" of #7 (Revised Proposal #6). At present Japan has given assurance regarding the Philippines, however, we cannot commit ourselves to assume the responsibilities implied in this clause.

The phrase "and the southwest Pacific" in "C" of #7 was eliminated for the reason that, when necessary, we will carry on negotiations in these parts independently of others.

(6) We have eliminated the entire reference to the hope of holding U.S.-Japanese conversations. In its stead we wish to make an arrangement whereby desires of both sides will be expressed by exchange of notes, to hold a conference between the President and the Premier or their respective representatives when it is deemed necessary, after the present proposal has been in effect.

(7) Please take note that the draft for the establishment of the present proposal will be drawn up by us and sent to you.

Trans. 5-12-41

No. 11

FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) May 10, 1941
TO: Washington #206.

ADDENDUM

Insert the addendum incorporated in this wire as paragraph 5 immediately following paragraph 4. Please move paragraph 5 down in its proper order.

(5 and 6) (Revised draft of paragraph 5).

The reason the statement "there shall be no recourse to armed force" has been deleted is that in the Imperial peace plans, Premier KONOYE and this Minister have frequently found it necessary in the past to use armed force. The Imperial Government's most ardent wish is that the Southwestern Pacific question, as it applies to our expansion, be peacefully concluded; but, in the light of the current international situation rampant with unprecedented confusion, no one can say what changes will have to be brought about. In the future developments of the international situation, the Imperial Japanese Government, should it ever be provoked beyond

endurance will not be able to avoid exercising military force and that she give a guarantee not to do so would be very difficult. However, regardless of the future developments of this situation, it is very clear that Japan alone could not determine such a course. I believe that on this point now is the time clarification should be made rather than to wait until difficulties have arisen.

Trans. 5-13-41

No. 12

FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 297.

Separate wire.

The three principles of Prince KONOYE as referred to in this paragraph are:

1. Neighborly friendship.
2. Joint defense against communism.
3. Economic cooperation—by which Japan does not intend to exercise economic monopoly in China nor to demand of China a limitation in the interest of Third Powers.

The following are implied in the aforesaid principles:

1. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.
2. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming a Far Eastern nucleus contributing to world peace.
3. Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China.
4. No annexation, no indemnities.
5. Independence of Manchukuo.

Trans. 5-16-41

No. 13

FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 296.

Re your # 205[a].

When I talked with Secretary of State HULL on the 12th, he demanded a formal explanation of the three basic principles outlined in Premier KONOYE's statement contained in the third paragraph (on the relationships of the two governments to the China incident), as well as the Premier's statement regarding the proclamation of the treaty based upon these three principles. But there being the matter of instructions from you, I made presentation of the explanation of my plan as outlined in my # 297 . I wonder, though, whether it might not be a better plan to explain to him that there is virtually no difference between this and the various provisions of paragraph 3 of the original proposals made in my # 256[b] (having to do with organized immigration). Therefore, I would like to make formal explanation in any case along a line which we feel to be most advantageous to us. Please wire me any comments that you have on this subject.

[a]Containing Matsuoka's revisions to the text of the proposal.
[b]Not available.

Trans. 5-16-41

No. 14

FROM: Washington — May 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 299.

I met with Secretary Hull last night (the 12th) and I submitted my explanations and the revised proposal contained in your message # 214[a].

He glanced through the papers. Then, while looking at the paragraphs regarding our southward expansion and the China Affair—on which the most importance is placed by Japan—he implied that there was nothing further to be guaranteed in the case of the former and made inquiries concerning the realistic values of the latter. This is as I reported to you in my earlier message # 296[b].

I told the Secretary that Japan had absolutely no aggressive ambitions in the southern area. However, it is natural, I explained, to avoid tying the hands of one's own country, and that country only, in the event of unexpected misfortune in the future. For example, I said, in the event that the United States puts a powerful navy in the Pacific, Japan does not want to be placed in such a position which would prevent her from doing anything about it.

Translator's note: Following paragraph garbled, contains guesswork.

The Secretary replied that there would be no reason for the United States herself to do something which she can have Japan do for her. As a matter of fact, the United States would prefer to have some other country do it for her, if said other country can do it to the same extent.

With regard to the matter of security, the Secretary said that every precaution was being taken to protect the secret, and that there was absolutely no danger of any leakage.

---

[a]See II, 17.
[b]II, 13.

Trans. 5–15–41

No. 15

FROM: Tokyo — May 13, 1941
TO: Washington — # 216.

Please transmit separate message # 217[a] to the Secretary of State without delay.

---

[a]Not available.

No. 16

FROM: Tokyo May 13, 1941
TO: Washington #213.

Regarding my #206[a].

Please have it understood that the attitude of the United States government towards the European war, as stated in the provision "The Attitude of both countries towards the European war" in Clause 2 of the "Understanding Agreement" represents merely the declaration of attitude on the part of the United States government and is not to be taken to imply Japan's approval of present acts and attitude of that government towards the European war.

[a]See II, 10.

Trans. 5-13-41

No. 17

FROM: Tokyo May 13, 1941
TO: Washington #214.

In presenting the revisions contained in my message #205[a] I assume that it was necessary to reword some of the parts of the English text in your #256[b]. While I feel certain that you have already made appropriate rephrasing for instance, of Clause 6 where it relates to economic activities of both countries in the southwest Pacific, I feel that the following might be acceptable, "Having in view that the Japanese expansion in the direction of the southwestern Pacific is declared to be of peaceful nature".

I am suggesting the above because of the importance of this point. (The original text's "without resorting to arms", etc., alone is unacceptable. If I think of any other changes which should be made I will let you know.

In view of the importance of this negotiation please call on the Secretary of State this evening (?) and obtain his decision regarding it (?).

---

[a]Not available.
[b]Not available.

Trans. 5-13-41

No. 18

FROM: Tokyo May 13, 1941
TO: Washington #215.

Re my #214[a].

In matters as important as this, it is necessary to include the original Japanese text as well. Will you please, therefore, give the United States a copy of the Japanese version of the text revised by us immediately.

We are at present drawing up the English version of the above text and we will probably cable it to you sometime on this, the 13th. Upon its receipt, will you please deliver it to the Secretary of State.

[a]See II, No. 17.

Trans. 5-13-41

No. 19

FROM: Tokyo — May 13, 1941
TO: Washington — Unnumbered.

Your "very urgent" dispatch of the 13th (May), cannot be decoded after the 15th letter. Please verify and repeat.

Trans. 5-14-41

No. 22

FROM: Washington — May 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo — Unnumbered.

Special.

Your message[a] of the 15th cannot be read. Please verify and reply.

[a]See II, 27.

Trans. 5-19-41

No. 23

FROM: Tokyo — May 13, 1941
TO: Washington — # 221.

Regarding your message # 302[a].

Please add on to Clause 4 of my message # 205,[b] which relates to "commerce between two nations", the following paragraph which was accidentally left out in enciphering the message:

"If a new commercial treaty is desired by both governments, it could be elaborated as soon as possible and concluded in accordance with usual procedure."

[a]Not available.
[b]Not available.

Trans. 5-14-41

No. 24

FROM: Tokyo — May 13, 1941
TO: Washington — #222.

In the fourth paragraph, which relates to trade between the two countries, of our revised proposal, contained in my message #205[a], will you please correct the words reading "(at ? subsequent to ?) the Japanese-U.S. conference" to read "(as soon as possible?)".

[a]Not available.

Trans. 5-14-41

No. 25

FROM: Washington — May 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #302.

Re your #222[a]. In the 4th paragraph of our revised proposal, contained in your message #205[b], the paragraph headed "Trade between the two countries" ends with the phrase "shall consider ways and means". There is no such phrase as "at the Japan-U.S. conference".

Please check and advise immediately.

[a]Not available.
[b]Not available.

Trans. 5-15-41

No. 26

FROM: Washington — May 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #305.

Personal to the Minister.

All of us are overwhelmed with gratitude at your giving us your support in the matters pertaining to the "Understanding" pact.

As you are aware, only the President, Secretary of State, and the Postmaster-General are concerned in this "Understanding" pact on the U.S. side. Not even the other Cabinet officials nor officials of the State Department are being consulted in this matter.

In view of this fact, I feel hesitant to handle this matter in a too business like manner as yet. Moreover, I have already handed over the rough draft of the proposal to the U.S. aide and have made all of the general explanations.

If we continue to submit minor revisions from time to time, I am afraid that the United States may get the impression that we have entered into this business without being too well prepared. This, naturally, reflects upon my integrity and may give rise to doubts in the other parties concerned as to my sincerity. This could lead the negotiations into a failure.

It is, therefore, my fondest hope that you will limit all further instructions and cautions to me. Please allow me to exercise my discretion on all the minor details.

Trans. 5-16-41

No. 27

FROM: Tokyo — May 15, 1941
TO: Washington — # 228.

(Badly garbled)

Re your extra (message).

This understanding is "bind both governments in honor and in act". (Please note that this is to be carried in the English (text?).)

Trans. 5–19–41

No. 28

FROM: Tokyo — May 15, 1941
TO: Washington — # 229.

Re your # 305[a].

I took careful note of the various items you set forth.

Please change the words "entente cordiale" in paragraph I of your message # 295[b], to "amicable understanding". Please use the wording as used by me (in my message # 219[c]) with regard to part 2, paragraph 4, of your message # 295[b] (the proposal concerning the prevention of the entrance into the war by those countries which are not already in it).

I presume that the corrections I asked for in my message # 221[d] have already been made.

Since your English text and my English text are identical in so far as the gist is concerned, I see no reason for making a special effort to revise them at this time. However, whenever the opportunity arises while discussing the matter, please revise to approximate my text. (The words "at a conference", as used at the end of paragraph 1 of your # 295[b], should be changed to a simple "later" at the first opportunity. Also change that part of paragraph 5 of your message # 295[b], concerning the Konoye principles, etc.,

(*Translator's note:* garbled from here to end, guesswork used) so as to place emphasis on the said principle and that all alliances and agreements will have to be based thereon.

Please give these points your consideration.

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[a] See II, 26.
[b] See II, 1.
[c] Not available.
[d] See II, 23.

Trans. 5–16–41

No. 29

FROM: Tokyo — May 13, 1941
TO: Washington — # 217.

Separate telegram.

Strictly confidential.

I feel it hardly necessary but in order to leave no room whatever for any misapprehension, I wish to put the following on record at this juncture. It must have been clear from what I have often stated publicly or otherwise that my decision to follow the Pour Parler between Your Excellency and Ambassador Nomura and open the present negotiation was based on the promises that the United States would not enter the European War and that the United States government agree to advise Chiang Kai-shek to enter into a direct negotiation with Japan with a view to bring about peace between Japan and China at the earliest possible date. Of course, it must have been plain from the start that on no other promises would or could Japan possibly come to any understanding of the sort held in view in the present negotiation.

Trans. 5-14-41

No. 30

FROM: Washington — May 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 304.

Re your # 217[a].

The talks (as Secretary Hull has said, we are still in the stage of "off-the-record private talkings" and have in no way entered into official negotiations as yet. As you are well aware we are conducting the talks along the general lines set forth in the "Understanding" agreement.) are being carried on with the two points you mentioned in your message, i.e., prevention of the U.S. entrance into the war, and the matter of urging Chiang to make peace, as the focal points. I, myself, have constantly kept these points in mind in all the efforts I have been making.

During the night of the 11th, I submitted our revised proposal and am, at present, awaiting their reply. At a time like this, I fear that if we submitted such writings (setting forth our two focal points) it would make further talks exceedingly difficult, and may even interfere with the establishment of the "Understanding" pact.

For this reason, I did not hand the papers over. I shall, at an opportune moment during our talks bring up the subjects of prevention of U.S. entrance into the war and immediate U.S. recommendation for (Japan-China) peace.

I shall appreciate your giving approval to my procedure.

---

[a]See II, 29.

Trans. 5-16-41

No. 31

FROM: Washington — May 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #310.

(In 3 parts—Complete.) (Part 1 of 3.)

Last night (the 14th) I called on Secretary Hull and explained to him—in accordance with your message—that all of the items listed in the section on the China Affair in the first draft were to be included with the exception of the matter pertaining to emigration.

In reply to this, the Secretary implied that there was a need to have some sort of a preliminary understanding with China and with England.

Following this, we discussed the various phases of the matter at hand. This was done in a conversational tone throughout, and at no time did we assume what could be termed an argumentative attitude.

First of all, the subject of American security was brought up. I stated that there wasn't another country which was so fortunately situated as was the United States from the viewpoint of safety of the nation. There is practically no possibility of an invasion from foreign countries, I said. For this reason it was exceedingly difficult to see from the Japanese viewpoint, I continued, why there was so much sentiment in the U.S. favoring U.S. entrance into the war.

In reply to this, the Secretary asked me if I had read the speech he made at the meeting of the members of the American Society of International Law on the 24th of April. He followed this up with the explanation that he was one who placed much importance in South America. Should Hitler succeed in completely subjugating Europe, and should he extend his grasping hands in the direction of South America, there is a grave danger that several of those countries would be immediately conquered.

Of course, he continued, he realized that before he could do that, he would have to have the control of the seas. But, he added, such an eventuality could be possible if an English Quisling develops at the time that Germany succeeds in conquering England. Such a Quisling could conceivably hand over the British navy to the Germans, the Secretary said, keeping a very straight face while so saying.

I, therefore, countered by saying that I had understood that the British had promised not to turn their navy over to the Germans under any circumstances. Furthermore, I said, wasn't the Secretary just dreaming up possibilities.

The Secretary replied: "No, no. France, though promising many times that she would not turn over her fleet to Germany -----.

(End Part 1.)

Trans. 5-17-41

No. 32

FROM: Washington — May 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #310.

(In 3 parts—complete.) (Part 2 of 3.)

In spite of these French promises, Darlan and Laval are apparently about to transfer the French fleet to Germany. Taking into consideration the possible materialization of such a move, the United States has no alternative than to aid the Churchill government. This step would not be taken merely for the protection of democracy as a whole. It is, as a matter of fact,

imperative for the United States to do so to protect the United States, the Secretary of State said.

(I take this opportunity to report that Colonel Iwakuro[a] is making various indirect approaches in attempting to have the United States abandon its convoy project.)

Apparently it is Japan's policy to prevent the United States from aiding Britain. Minister Matsuoka, it is said, (Secretary Hull continued), even went so far as to threaten war in his conversations with Ambassador Grew. Not even Ambassador Grew has been advised of the conversations being carried on here, he said.

The Secretary seemed to be of the opinion that though there would be considerable difficulty in the attempt to invade England, he did not believe that the possibility could be discounted.

I asked him if Hess' flight to Scotland had any implication of peace overtures. The Secretary replied that he had been made aware of absolutely no such motives. He added that though he knew of nothing definite with regard to Hess' trip to England, he looked upon it as an indication that a portion of the German government was crumbling.

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[a]Aide to the Military Attaché in Washington.

Trans. 5-19-41

No. 33

FROM: Washington May 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo #310.

(In 3 parts—Complete.) (Part 3 of 3.)

I, therefore, pointed out that should the U.S. Fleet come into the Pacific, Japan's hands would be tied against protecting herself because of the terms of the "Understanding Agreement". You made reference to this possibility in your conversations with Ambassador Grew as I also did on one previous occasion.

However, due probably to the medicine's having reacted on the patient too vigorously, he apparently was not thoroughly convinced regarding the possibility of an armed southward expansion. I, therefore, told him that Japan absolutely would not take the soldiers, upon being relieved of their task in China upon the conclusion of the China Incident, and use them for a southward expansion program, thereby breaking her promise (to the United States).

However, I apparently did not thoroughly convince him, for he said that Hitler, for example, has been signing treaties only to break them ever since 1933. The Munich agreement was one of these, he said. Napoleon was likewise an untrustworthy treaty signer, for he too merely signed them to break them immediately.

The way I look at it, the thing for us to do now is to strive to have the Secretary become thoroughly convinced of the Japanese government's sincere intentions. Now that we have submitted our proposal, we should sit back calmly and watch the next moves from the United States.

I firmly believe that we should enter into this Understanding while the United States is interested in the proposition and before any outside interference enters into it. Towards this end, I am making every possible effort. All the persons concerned in this matter are of the same opinion.

Trans. 5-17-41

No. 34

FROM: Tokyo May 15, 1941
TO: Washington #230.

In 2 parts—complete.

Re your message #304[a].

The other signatories of the Tripartite Pact, Germany and Italy, are affected by the proposed Understanding Pact between Japan and the United States. Furthermore, it affects their domestic policies as well as ours.

Therefore, I had the Chief of the Europe and Axis Section explain the proposal to the Ambassadors from those two countries. The explanations touched only upon generalities, and no details were divulged. He carefully pointed out that this proposal was originated by the United States and went into some detail of how this came about. They were also told that the United States was handling this matter with the utmost secrecy and that only the President, Secretary of State, and two or three of their colleagues were even aware of its existence. This being the case, the Ambassadors were cautioned to divulge this information to Dictator Hitler, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, Premier Mussolini, and Foreign Minister Ciano. They were further requested to exercise every precaution against its leaking out.

At the same time, it seemed unwise from various viewpoints to keep our Ambassadors in Germany and Italy uniformed concerning this matter, as there is a possibility of misunderstandings arising from such ignorance in the future. Moreover, I even had an inquiry from our Ambassador in Germany about this on the 10th, I dispatched a cable worded in the same manner of my message #231[b]. (The serial number of this cable to Germany was my message to Germany #396[c].) The above are the circumstances and because of our relations with Germany and Italy ----- (Many groups missed here).

For these reasons, I believe that there is a necessity for us to put our request that the United States stay out of war, and also that the United States promote peace between China and Japan, in a written form.

I am aware of the great importance of this matter, and appreciate your standpoint. However, will you please make arrangements in accordance with my message #217[d].

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[a] See II, 30.
[b] Not available.
[c] Not available.
[d] See II, 29.

Trans. 5-16-41

No. 35

FROM: Tokyo May 17, 1941
TO: Washington #234.

Re your #310[a].

Of course, there is no way for me to know what was in the report received by the government of the United States from Ambassador Grew. However, it is a fact that I had neither the intention or a cause to threaten or intimidate the Ambassador. I merely replied to his questions in a conversational tone.

The Ambassador is one who easily becomes excited. Moreover, as you are well aware, he is quite hard of hearing. Therefore, there is a possibility that he misunderstood my words.

Should an opportunity present itself, please explain this matter to the Secretary of State.

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[a]See II, 31-33.

Trans. 5-23-41

No. 36

FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #314.

This morning's New York Herald Tribune carried an article written by NEWMAN from Tokyo with a headline "Japan Asks United States to Mediate Sino-Japanese Conflict", a summary of which I am sending in my #315[a]. This being not in accordance with our past policy, please see to it that special measures are taken to prohibit articles of this type being reprinted in Japan.

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[a]See II, 37.

Trans. 5-20-41

No. 37

FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #315.

The New York Herald Tribune of the 16th quoted a telephone conversation with NEWMAN of the 16th which, though it was unofficial, quoted a responsible source as having disclosed the authoritative information that, in order to sound out American opinion, a Japanese-American understanding proposal had been presented to American authorities here. It continued in the following line:

The United States was to lend its assistance between Tokyo and Chungking toward the settlement of the Sino-Japanese Incident.

The United States recognized Japanese position of leadership in China.

Japan guarantees not to use military force in the South Seas.

The United States recognizes Japan's rights in the South Seas of carrying on enterprises and economic endeavors (including loans).

Japan will revise her declaration to the effect that she would not deal with CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

Japan guarantees to revise her declaration that she will not brook the interference of third powers in the China Incident.

Japan will clarify her intentions with regard to her place in the Far East.

Japan guarantees not to take hostile measures against the United States dictated by the Axis Alliance.

Furthermore, NEWMAN added that though there were strong expectations of a settlement being brought about of the China Incident through Japan-American negotiations, in

view of Ambassador FONDA's[a] return to Japan and the strong local military and naval authorities support of the WANG CHING WEI Regime, he thought that an understanding between Japan and the United States would be made impossible.

Relayed to New York.

[a]Ambassador to Japanese Puppet Government in Nanking.

Trans. 5-20-41

No. 38

FROM: Tokyo — May 17, 1941
TO: Washington — #235.

Re your #314[a].

Although they do not cover all of the points contained, it is true to a considerable degree. The leak seems to come from (New York) Japanese circles to local financial circles. These have given rise to numerous rumors.

We are doing everything to check these leaks and would appreciate your doing likewise.

[a]See II, 36.

Trans. 5-17-41

No. 39

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — May 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) — #330.

(In 2 parts—complete.)

Part 1. I am advised that ----- requested a statement from (Your Excellency?) with regard to Hull's plans for the post war economic set-up.

The policy outlined by the Secretary deviates considerably from the economic policy which the United States has actually pursued heretofore. There have, no doubt, been various reactions to the Hull statement of policy in Japan. Many opinions were expressed here.

I called on the Secretary of State last night, the 20th (Tuesday). He said at that time that after the Understanding Agreement was entered into, there would be a need to explain matters to business circles, so that trade between the two countries could be promoted. Japan must consider the development of the Far Eastern economic bloc and at the same time must constantly be striving for economic development of various areas. There is, therefore, absolutely no reason why we should express any disapproval to the policy outlined by the Secretary. On the contrary I am of the opinion that it should be supported.

Part 2. Immediately following the Hess incident, peace talks have cropped up in Paris and in Vichy. In this country, too, there is a minority such as the Anti-war involvement advocates, the Hearst newspapers, Senator Wheeler, and others, who support a peace movement.

When your good friend ----- also said that he knew of nothing definite, he was aware that there was some peace talk in the air. Permit me to express my humble opinion that this is a very critical time.

The Secretary of State also said that if, upon the establishment of the "Understanding", the first step in the direction of a permanent peace on the Pacific is built, then much will have been done in behalf of general peace.

Trans. 5-23-41

No. 40

FROM: Washington — May 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 320.

At present, while on the one hand we are trying to feel out the other party's intentions through undercover channels, I am continuing my conversations with Secretary Hull. The nucleus of the entire matter is British aid by the United States, our relations to our treaty partners, the China Incident, and Japanese southward expansion. You are already aware of this through my earlier reports.

There are as yet considerable differences of opinion between us, so there is no room for too much optimism. In the meantime, I am working in close cooperation with the military and naval (attaches ?), in order to carry out the spirit of your instructions to the maximum degree.

Trans. 5-21-41

No. 41

FROM: Tokyo — May 24, 1941
TO: Washington — # 250.

Part 2 of 3[a].

----- the fact that ----- made a ----- that ----- presented to the Emperor ----- would probably agree. Although this was the strictest of secrets, I believe that in the meantime you must have learned it. For this reason, although the intelligence has every indication of being correct, I can hardly bring myself to believe it readily. What went awry, or through what circumstances all this happened, is beyond my powers to surmise. But howsoever all this may be, there are indications that Secretary HULL got the aforementioned impression also from conversations with Your Honor. Will you, therefore, at the earliest possible opportunity, clear Secretary HULL's mind of this misconception. You, yourself, Ambassador NOMURA, know that all through my life up to the present day I have been a zealous advocate of amity between Japan and the United States. You never could have had any doubt about that. In a wire which I recently sent HOWARD[b], I expressed great grief over the tragedy rife in the world today. I said that some method ought to be devised to stop this horrible war which threatens to lead our civilization downward into chaos, and that something ought to be done to stop the havoc of this conflict.

(Rest of message missing.)

[a]Parts 1 and 3 not available.

[b]Roy Howard, President of Scripps-Howard Co.

Trans. 5-29-41

No. 42

FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo No number.

I have respectfully perused your message. It is absolutely baseless. My! My! To say the least I was surprised. When the President and the Secretary of State have questioned me with regard to Japan's procedure in establishing diplomatic policy, I have told them that Japan's diplomacy was in the hands of the Foreign Minister. However, when important questions having great bearing on diplomatic policy which are within the scope of Army and Naval Ministers arise, those ministers, as a matter of course, participate in these deliberations. Then, too, it naturally follows that the Premier wields enormous influence. I have told them, too, that as far as Japan's officialdom is concerned, they function in an advisory capacity to the Foreign Minister; also, that Dr. MATSUNAMI and other men of incomparable ability function in a similar capacity (the Secretary of State occupies a position which is virtually the same). When I told the President this, he said that in the United States practically the same procedure was followed. The Secretary of State's position does not differ in the slightest degree.

Further, when the Secretary of State asked me the same question, I replied in the same manner, and these replies are just as I have told you in each of my wires.

Now, should I have voiced erroneous statements which in themselves are incredible, then by that fact alone I deserve punishment. Had I, as a military man, made any such statement, after it be proven, I believe that I should not be permitted to continue my existence. I am convinced that I have absolutely made no such statement. And as far as the Secretary of State is concerned, I do not believe by any stretch of the imagination that he labors under any misunderstanding. However, as you have requested in your wire, I shall outdo myself in extending my best efforts.

Regardless of the impressions imparted by newspaper dispatches from Japan, I am quite cognizant of Your Excellency's fundamental feelings with regard to the Japan-American questions, and do not entertain a single doubt with regard to it. I have even told the Secretary of State as much one or two times.

Trans. 5–27–41

No. 43

FROM: Tokyo May 26, 1941
TO: Washington No number.

It is clear that what happened is as you guessed in your message of the 24th. I am very much relieved, but there is no doubt whatever that the American officials entertain the misimpressions mentioned in my previous message, so please be sure to clear the matter up for them.

Either some Japanese or an American caused all this and created this impression in the minds of the American officials. Will you please try to find out exactly what happened and take the proper measures.

Trans. 5–29–41

No. 44

FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #345.

The newspapers are playing up the fact that the other day our army is said to have seized some goods destined for CHIANG KAI SHEK, said to belong to Americans. It is widely held that this is in connection with RAEDER's recent statement, and that the Axis countries are going to exert pressure in unison, and Secretary HULL, himself, in a press interview, brought up this question. Therefore, for my information, please let me know the facts and what steps you anticipate taking.

Trans. 5-29-41

No. 45

FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #354.

Regarding the President's speech:

1. The tone of the speech, insofar as Japan was concerned, was very mild. There was not a single direct reference to Japan by name, and even that part concerning China was touched upon very lightly. These are points in the speech which are worthy of noting.

Apparently there was considerable difference of opinion on these points among the leaders of the Congress who were quietly advised of the contents of the speech before its delivery over the radio. Their replies to questions by newspaper men have given rise to numerous rumors. The Chief Executive's office is letting it be known that it was done "designedly". Before the speech was broadcast, the Secretary of State, through a certain foreigner, reported that special attention was paid with regard to U.S. relations with Japan, in drafting this radio speech.

From all these indications, I come to the conclusion that the President wished to avoid exciting this Ambassador unduly and was anxious to have the Japanese-U.S. negotiations continued.

2. As I pointed out in my message #350[a] the United States is bent on self defense. This was made clear in the President's speech and his words were very flexible (insofar as the methods of carrying out this defense are concerned).

[a]Not available.

Trans. 6-2-41

No. 46

FROM: Washington May 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo #356.

(In 3 parts—complete)

Subsequently, I met and talked with Secretary of State Hull on the 16th (Friday), 20th (Tuesday), 21st (Wednesday), and the 27th (Tuesday). However, we have not as yet reached any concrete agreement.

The Secretary said:

(1) That he would like to have the people in general come to recognize the meaning of maintenance of peace on the Pacific. As long as there is a shadow of a doubt in the people's minds, the plans cannot be successfully carried out. (He, on one occasion, expressed himself in favor of maintaining the status quo on the Pacific, including the southwest Pacific area. At that time, I advised him that that would be unacceptable to us. It is our hope that we are to take the (leadership ?) in the economic development of the southwestern area with U.S. cooperation and support. The Americans, on the other hand, wish to put this in a bilateral form, placing both countries on an even basis and give each country equal opportunities.)

The Secretary again asked me about Article 3 of the Tripartite Pact. I replied that I was sure that even if I made inquiries on this point to (Tokyo ?), (Tokyo ?) would only reply that Article 3 has no (hidden implications ?). I added that I was sure that there would be no need for any clarification of the meaning contained therein. Apparently the Secretary's colleagues, referring to various dispatches from (Tokyo ?), make numerous inquiries of the Secretary.

(2) With regard to China, the Secretary apparently does not want to put Chiang Kai-shek in a tight spot. In this he is receiving the support of his colleagues. The Secretary further insists that before the United States will assume the role of mediator, we must list the peace terms. Moreover, it would be impossible, from the U.S. government's standpoint, to make any reference to Japan's agreement with the Wang government or to the Tripartite (Japan, Manchukuo, China (Wang) ??) Declaration. (Translator's note: Following sentence slightly garbled; contains guesswork). Outside of these points, there are indications that the United States is willing to make considerable concessions.

The Secretary seemed to be of the opinion that to cooperate in anti-communism and ----- were inconsistent and made several inquiries concerning them. I replied that the general aims of ----- could clearly be seen in the agreement signed with the Wang government. Such matters as anti-communism and garrisoning of troops would be taken up in the direct negotiations between China and Japan that would take place later.

Translator's note: One sentence here garbled, impossible to read.

What we desire is to have some mediator such as Dunn and Denby in the Sino-Japanese War and Theodore Roosevelt in the Russo-Japanese War. We must in this war carry on a direct negotiation with Chiang. Chiang at present is in a difficult spot and is depending entirely on the United States for necessary aid. I told the Secretary that in my opinion it would be of interest to China should the United States suggest mediation to Chiang.

Translator's note: Next paragraph badly garbled, can only guess at contents.

The Secretary said that he did not want to use the term "communism" because of U.S. relations with the U.S.S.R. and China. Instead, he would prefer some such expression as "subversive", adding that an instrument such as the one being discussed now could not be kept a secret for long. He further told me that the United States government has no secret agreement with any other country.

Since receiving your instructions, I have met with the Secretary seven times already and on each occasion, we discussed matters, off the record and informally, for from one to two hours. However, we seem to be repeating the same things over and over, and are unable to get anywhere. Last night I asked if he had any other suggestions, and he said that he did have two or three minor ones and added that he expects to have it done in two or three days. (Apparently the United States is taking into consideration the effect that this "understanding" agreement will have upon the other Cabinet members and bureau officials.)

I, therefore, said that after all, the real motive of this "understanding" agreement is to change the war psychology which exists in both countries, to one of peace. There is a danger that while we are dickering about the use of a certain word, some untoward incident will break out sending all of our efforts up in smoke. The Secretary seemed to be in agreement with me in this respect.

It is natural that the United States should take Japan into serious consideration in any of her political or militaristic moves. That she is doing so, may be seen by the way the President handled the situation in his speech night before last.

Trans. 6-4-41

No. 47

FROM: Tokyo May 31, 1941
TO: Washington # 262.

Translator's note: message badly garbled.

Re your # 356[a].

You apparently are comparing Japan with some of the small countries which were born as a result of the war. It is true that Japan asked Minister Dunn to mediate in the Sino-Japanese War and that Theodore Roosevelt's good offices were requested in the Russo-Japanese War. However, Japan's position in the world today is very different from that of the earlier times mentioned above.

I wonder if it is wise to even compare Japan today with Japan of those days in discussing the issues with the United States. The only thing that this Minister would have the United States do with regard to mediating in the China affair, would be for her to tell Chiang Kai-shek: "Negotiate with Japan. If you refuse, we shall stop all aid to you."

I am sure that you are well aware of my intentions in this matter through my previous messages. However, because of the brevity of cables, you may have missed the point. Will you carefully bear it in mind in the future.

[a]See II, 46.

Trans. 6-4-41

No. 48

FROM: Tokyo May 30, 1941
TO: Washington # 257.

(Very urgent)

Secret outside the Department.

A Domei wire of the 26th, quoting statements made in the Times and Herald Tribune of that day, referred to the declarations of Senator GEORGE and others in the Senate to the effect that the reason Japan was not referred to in the Fireside Chat was that Japan's ardent backing of the Tri-Partite Alliance was perceptibly cooling and the tendency in Japan to anticipate her southern penetration by means of military force was definitely waning. Now,

as you know, the Imperial Government's and this Minister's policies have been minutely innumerated to Your Excellency. This dispatch has not been publicized here as there can be no guarantee that this sort of news would not cause dissension within the country. Therefore, as soon as you have immediately made an investigation as to how this got out, should they not ——, please arrange to file a "demand" for ——— ——— ———.

Trans. 6-2-41

No. 49

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

May 31, 1941
260.

Re my # 257[a].

Probably through the channels mentioned in my message # 235[b], there are many persons in various circles in this country who seem to have proof (though they are vague) that a Japanese-American negotiation is underway. They have given rise to numerous and varied unfounded rumors which has led to the need of taking some measures domestically. It was under these conditions that the incident involving (HETATUGU? Henning ?—(garbled)) arose.

I, therefore, issued a statement for publication, a copy of which is being cabled to you as my separate cable # 261[c].

Please do everything in your power to prevent the recurrence of such an incident on the U.S. side.

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[a] See II, 48.
[b] See II, 38.
[c] Not available.

Trans. 6-2-41

No. 50

New York Times
June 6, 1941
(Page 1, Column 4)

JAPAN ASKING U.S. FOR NO-WAR PACT

SHE URGES ACCORD LIKE THAT BETWEEN TOKYO AND MOSCOW

WASHINGTON COLD TO IDEA

By Hallett Abend

Washington, June 5.

For nearly 2 months Japan has been attempting to induce the U.S. Government to conclude with her a neutrality and non-aggressive pact similar to that recently concluded between Tokyo and Moscow. So far the reactions of the State Department have been unenthusiastic and at present there appears little likelihood that Japanese hopes will be fulfilled.

The Japanese overtures have been made through Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, Tokyo Ambassador here. The continuing talks between Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Admiral

Nomura have been entirely informal and off the record, so that if the preliminaries which Japan hoped would result in formal negotiations, break down entirely, neither side will officially have to bear the blame for failure.

Although it is learned that the first approach was made by the Japanese ambassador, the Japanese Embassy does not acknowledge this. Spokesmen there say vaguely that the informal talks seem to have sprung from a mutual desire to find some means of preventing a heightening of the concededly dangerous tension between Japan and the U.S.

To the chagrin and disappointment of the Japanese Government the response of the State Department to the overtures has been—in what the Japanese term "an excessively formal and stilted manner", that the value of the kind of treaty proposed would be extremely dubious for two reasons:

1. The responsibility of the leaders of the Japanese Government is subject to grave doubt and their ability to carry out agreements questionable.

Time after time since the outbreak of the "China incident" almost 4 years ago, Japanese leaders individually, and the Japanese government officially have reiterated promises to respect the Open Door in China and to assure "equal opportunity for all" but these promises have never been kept.

This sensational Japanese attempt to effect a formal reapproachment with the U.S. has aroused the liveliest speculation in the small circle here that is aware of Tokyo's proposals. Of particular interest is the bearing that such a pact, were it ever concluded, would have upon Japanese formal adherence to the European Axis agreement between Germany and Italy.

The Axis pact entered into by Japan late in September 1940 binds her to go to the assistance of Germany or Italy if either is attacked by any three powers not engaged in hostilities with the Axis at the date of signing. Seemingly this pact would bind Japan to make war upon the U.S. if this country became involved in hostilities with Germany or Italy.

But Japan, it has been long conjectured here, has sought a loophole of escape from the obligation, and she thinks she has found it in the word "attacked". If, for instance, Germany were to shell or bomb a U.S. patrol ship in the Atlantic and if war were to result, Japan might legalistically plead that she would not have to fight this country since Germany would have "attacked" the U.S.

The Moscow-Tokyo Accord signed in Moscow on April 13 of this year or about the time Admiral Nomura first approached Secretary Hull for a neutrality and non-aggressive agreement—consisted of only four articles and a "frontier declaration".

The third article specifies that the life of the agreement shall be for 5 years, renewable automatically for 5 years more if neither party denounces the agreement one year before the expiration date. The fourth article provides for immediate ratification and the frontier declaration relates to the "inviolability and integrity" of Manchukuo and the Mongolian People's Republic.

It is Articles I and II that Japan would like to duplicate in a treaty with the U.S. These read as follows:

Article I—Both contracting parties undertake to maintain peaceful and friendly relations between them and mutually respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the other contracting party.

Article II—Should one of the contracting parties become the object of hostilities on the part of one or several third powers, the other contracting party will observe neutrality throughout the duration of the conflict.

Proposals of this kind from Tokyo where Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka continues to proclaim that loyalty committments to Germany and Italy is the "immutable basis" of Japan's foreign policy comes as a great surprise here. In view of some observers they mean

either that Mr. Matsuoka and the Cabinet of Prince Fumimaro Konoye are ready to scuttle the Axis agreement, or that Japan is trying to lull the U.S. into a false sense of security by concluding a pact that she does not mean to live up to.

Translated into working world politics in view of the present international situation, the agreement that Admiral Nomura is seeking to negotiate would bind Japan not to attack the U.S. if this country should become involved in war with Germany and Italy. The obligation would be absolute and would not hinge on any interpretation of the words "attacked" or "attacker".

Conversely, if the U.S. were to sign such a pact with Japan this country would be honor bound not to fight Japan if she became involved in a war with Britain or the Netherlands. In practical terminology this would leave Japan free to attack Singapore or to seize the Netherlands East Indies without fear of U.S. intervention either to protect those areas or to protect this country's own vital sources of supply for rubber and tin for which it looks almost exclusively to Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies.

As a problem in practical diplomacy the Japanese move for a treaty with this country raises several grave questions:

First, if the move is sincere, is the U.S. Government entitled to consider Foreign Minister Matsuoka's statements as a bluff to frighten this country into negotiations at the same time that he deceives Reichfuerheaer Hitler and Premier Mussolini.

Secondly, if the move is insincere, is it perhaps an effort to lull the U.S. into a sense of security under which it might transfer a greater part of its fleet from the Pacific to the Atlantic.

Thirdly, if the Japanese advances for an undertaking are made with the foreknowledge of Berlin and Rome what kind of new betrayal are the Axis powers planning as a group.

Finally, if the advances are sincere would it mean that the Japanese Navy, doubtful of the outcome of a war with this country, has finally persuaded the firebrands of the Japanese Army that conditions necessitate a policy of appeasement toward the U.S.

The reaction of Berlin and Rome to the revelation of the Japanese attempt to reach a neutrality accord with the U.S. will be watched with keenest interest here as will Mr. Matsuoka's explanation to the Japanese Army and public of the reversal of his "immutable" policies of loyalty to the Axis agreement. The Japanese Army, it is reported, is now convinced, that Germany will be triumphantly victorious over Britain, while the Japanese Navy is said to be troubled by waivering and doubts.

When Mr. Matsuoka concluded his Moscow negotiations in April, he exultantly declared that he had no doubt that the new neutrality pact with the Soviet Union "laid a foundation for the solution of all outstanding Soviet-Japanese problems" and would be followed soon by a new trade treaty, a new fishery accordance and the settlement of other troublesome questions.

It is believed here that probably Mr. Matsuoka has had hopes that if he could obtain a neutrality treaty with the U.S. such a pact might be followed by a new trade treaty, for the abrogation of the old trade agreement by this country in the summer of 1939 was a terrific blow at Japan's economic and financial stability. Disappointment of these bright hopes it is believed would be another staggering blow.

No. 51

FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 368.

On the 6th the New York Times, in an article by ABEND[a], states that Japan has been considering a neutrality pact with the United States similar to the one she has contracted with the Soviet, and that I am conferring thereon with Secretary HULL.

Therefore, I have advised the Government of the United States to do the proper thing about this.

[a]ABEND, in an article in the New York Times, states Japan is considering a neutrality pact with the U.S. The U.S. Government has been requested to do the right thing about this.

Trans. 6-10-41

No. 52

FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 371.

Strictly secret.

With regard to ABEND's article in the New York Times on the 6th, I called A.P., U.P., Tribune[a], Domei and Asahi correspondents together and categorically denied that there was any truth in this article. This is for your information alone.

Furthermore, this morning, the 6th, the President in his press conference in answer to questions on this matter said that he knew nothing about it. And continuing he said, "Though the Ambassador and the Secretary of State occasionally have interviews, these conversations concern ordinary matters and have no connection with this matter."

[a]Ambassador Nomura calls a conference of A.P., U.P., Tribune, Domei and Asahi to deny the truth of ABEND's statement in the N.Y. Times to the effect that Japs are considering a neutrality pact with the U.S. The President stated at his press conference on the 6th that he knew nothing about it.

Trans. 6-10-41

No. 53

FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 375.

(Part 1 of 4)

I have perused your message.

At the risk of a certain amount of repetition, I am reporting for you the substance of subsequent developments:

Since I presented our final draft, I have held conversations several times a week. Finally, an American plan was offered me unofficially in which two or three questions concerning the China incident were left pending. I thought that if this were left up to a drafting committee of

both countries, it would be a good thing from the point of view of convenience in phrasing the clauses, so after getting their approval, on the 4th it was discussed in a joint committee. But, to my surprise, this was seized upon by various quarters in this country for demagogical and estranging propaganda. Every letter and every phrase was the object of suspicion and speculation, so this only goes to show how delicate international relations are today. So Saturday afternoon I went to see Secretary HULL and talked with him for an hour and a half.

Trans. 6–10–41

No. 54

FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #375.

(Part 2 of 4)

He has always insisted on the following:

1. The maintenance of peace in the Pacific is the basis of this understanding and it is not desired that this point be glossed over in such a manner as to deceive anyone. As soon as it is put into effect, suitable negotiations can take place with industrial circles to provide for Japanese and American financial and economic cooperation. On two or three occasions he has told me this.

2. In considering the Pacific question, the matter of Japan's and the United States' own relations with the European war, and their relations to the Japanese-Chinese incident have to be considered. The United States is worried about the Chinese question and wishes to improve Japanese-American relations, American-Chinese relations and Japanese-Chinese relations. Consequently, the United States does not, by any means, wish to do anything that will cause the Chinese to harbor ill-feelings toward them. That is what he always says.

During the course of our conversation I said, "Well, then, for the sake of peace in the Pacific and for the sake of rehabilitation of the human race, could not the President, himself, go ahead and advise China to make peace?" He replied, "Well, don't you think that depends, after all, on whether or not we can see eye to eye on this agreement?"

Trans. 6–10–41

No. 55

FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #375.

(Part 3 of 4)

In speeches and in newspaper articles, a number of times, he has repeated in effect the following statement with respect to the European war:

"HITLER is planning to conquer the world, and if England goes under, the Atlantic will be under his domination, South America will be his supply base for raw materials and the Western Hemisphere will become an armed camp. It does not make sense to wait until he invades our sphere before we take action. America does not want to repeat the mistake made by so many other nations." (I know just how much danger there is of the United States entering the war. Along the lines you have pointed out, I have done my best to reason with the Americans and to correct some misapprehensions which you think they have. But after all, it

is now not a question of correcting their way of thinking. Our future diplomatic relations with the United States will center around the question of whether or not we are able to keep them out of this war.) Furthermore, the time has not yet come to harp on peace. Many peace rumors have been afloat lately with the return of WINANT, but the President has squelched all, as you know.

Trans. 6-10-41

No. 56

FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #375.

(Part 4 of 4)

He (the Secretary) said that the United States regards the principle of commercial non-discrimination as important in the Pacific, and that the United States practices this principle toward the American States, if Japan is willing also to use this principle, the United States intends to do nothing to hinder the progress of Japan. He said that if we will not accept these promises, he has no interest in either of the proposals.

Well, I feel that it will be very difficult to get anywhere by outright dealings and feel the need of conducting some other sort of activities which might be more direct. Well, I and my associates are certainly not optimistic, but on the other hand, we are not pessimistic. We will do our very best to carry out your instructions. Unless something unforeseen happens within the next ten days, I think that the points now pending will so crystallize that I will be able to let you know something more or less definite. I do not doubt his zeal in the matter at all. I call on him two or three times a week. We confer until late at night and when I leave he always says, "Come back to see me anytime you wish."

It is evident that the President and the Secretary now view things identically, so I have asked him to let me know just exactly what the attitude of both is.

Trans. 6-10-41

No. 57

FROM: Tokyo June 7, 1941
TO: Washington #277.

Regarding your #356[a].

The United States' reply seems to be unreasonably delayed. Isn't quicker action possible? If not, how long do they expect it will take? Please let me know by telegram. We do not intend to rush them, so please take care not to convey the wrong impression.

[a] See II, 46.

Trans. 6-11-41

No. 58

FROM: Tokyo June 9, 1941
TO: Washington # 281.

Re your # 375[a].

Please telegram the entire text of the socalled "Unofficial American Proposal" which you received on May 31st (?).

[a]See II, 53.

Trans. 6-11-41

No. 59

FROM: Washington June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 377.

Re your # 281[a].

This consists of the American proposal, the Annex and the Explanation for the proposal, each designated as "Unofficial, Exploratory and without Commitment". I am sending you the entire text (as follows).

(1) The American proposal— # 378[b].
(2) That portion of the Annex intended as a statement by Japan— # 379[c].
(3) That portion of the Annex intended as a statement by the United States— # 380[d].

Excerpts from Hull's speech of the 24th relating to the "attitude of both countries towards the European war"— # 381[d].

(4) Explanation— # 382[d].

[a]See II, 58.
[b]See II, 60.
[c]See II, 66.
[d]Not Available.

Trans. 6-11-41

No. 60

FROM: Washington June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 378.

(Part 1 of 6)

Extra Secret.

Strictly confidential.

Unofficial, exploratory and without commitment.

The governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement of understanding as expressed in a joint declaration.

Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment between their countries should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

It is our present hope that, by a cooperative effort, the United States and Japan may contribute effectively toward establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and, by the rapid consummation of an amicable understanding, arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. Both Governments, therefore desire that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general understanding which would bind, meanwhile, both Governments in honor and in act.

It is the belief of the two Governments that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated at a conference.

Trans. 6-11-41

No. 61

FROM: Washington June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo #378.

(Part 2 of 6)

Both governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit:

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitudes of both governments toward the European war.
3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.
4. Commerce between both nations.
5. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.
6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.
7. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

Accordingly, the government of the United States and the government of Japan have come to the following mutual understanding and declaration of policy:

Trans. 6-13-41

No. 62

FROM: Washington June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo #378.

(Part 3 of 6)

1. *The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.*

Both governments affirm that their national policies are directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation among our peoples.

Both governments declare that it is their traditional, and present, conception and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of other nations.

Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.

Trans. 6-13-41

No. 63

FROM: Washington June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 378.

(Part 4 of 6)

Extra Secret.

2. *The attitudes of both governments toward the European war.*

The government of Japan maintains that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was, and is, defensive and is designed to prevent the participation of nations in the European war not at present involved in it. Obviously, the provisions of the Pact do not apply to involvement through acts of self-defense.

The government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European hostilities is and will continue to be determined solely and exclusively by considerations of protection and self-defense: its national security and the defense thereof.

3. *Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.*

The Japanese government having communicated to the government of the United States the general terms within the framework of which the Japanese government will propose the negotiation of a peaceful settlement with the Chinese government, which terms are declared by the Japanese government to be in harmony with the Konoye principles regarding neighborly friendship and mutual respect of sovereignty and territories and with the practical application of those principles, the President of the United States will suggest to the government of China that the government of China and the government of Japan enter into a negotiation which is mutually advantageous and acceptable for a termination of hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations.

Trans. 6-12-41

No. 64

FROM: Washington June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 378.

(Part 5 of 6)

Note: The foregoing draft of section 3 is subject to further discussion of the question of cooperative defense against communistic activities, including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory.

4. *Commerce between both nations.*

When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by both governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other mutually to supply such commodities as are, respectively, available and required by either of them. Both governments further consent to take necessary steps to resume normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan. If a new commercial treaty is desired by both governments, it would be negotiated as soon as possible and be concluded in accordance with usual procedures.

Trans. 6-13-41

No. 65

FROM: Washington June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 378.

(Part 6 of 6)

5. *Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.*

On the basis of mutual pledges hereby given that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, the Japanese government and the government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other toward obtaining non-discriminatory access by Japan and the United States to commercial supplies of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which each country needs for the safeguarding and development of its own economy.

6. *The policies of both nations affecting peace in the Pacific area.*

----- ----- ----- ----- ----- (several lines garbled ----- that it is their fundamental purpose, through cooperative effort, to contribute to the maintenance and the preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and that neither has territorial designs on the ----- in the area mentioned.

7. *Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.*

The government of Japan declares its willingness to enter at such time as the government of the United States may desire into negotiation with the government of the United States with a view to the conclusion of a treaty for the neutralization of the Philippine Islands, when Philippine independence shall have been achieved.

Trans. 6-13-41

No. 66

FROM: Washington June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo #379.

Extra Secret.

Annex and Supplement on the part of the Japanese Government.

3. *Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.*

The basic terms as referred to in the above section are as follow:

1. Neighborly friendship.
2. (Cooperative defense against malicious communistic activities—including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory.) Subject to further discussion.
3. Economic cooperation—by which China and Japan will proceed on the basis of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations.
4. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.
5. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming a Far Eastern nucleus contributing to world peace.
6. Wit -----.

(Message incomplete)

Trans. 6-11-41

No. 67

FROM: Washington June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo #380.

(In 3 parts—complete)

Extra secret.

(Part 1)

Annex and supplement on the part of the United States.

1. *The attitudes of both governments toward the European war.*

The position of the government of the United States toward the military movement of conquest inaugurated by Mr. Hitler is set forth in a public address made by the Secretary of State on April 14, 1941. Some extracts which are directly in point and which are basic in relation to the entire situation are as follows:

(Part 2)

The foregoing statements make it clear that the attitude of the government of the United States is one of resolve to take measures of self-defense in resistance to a movement, which, as has been made unequivocally clear by the acts and utterances of Hitler, is directed to world conquest by force from which no country and no area are excepted. This attitude is based upon a most fundamental consideration—that of the inalienable right of self-defense. The only other attitude this government could assume would be the suicidal attitude of some fifteen countries in Europe which also were told, as our country is being told, that they would not be molested[a]; but if they should undertake to resist beyond their own boundaries they would be charged with being aggressors and with having assumed the offensive.

A similar course by this nation from the standpoint of effective defense against the Hitler movement of world conquest would be absurd, futile and suicidal from the standpoint of reasonable precaution for its safety.

(Part 3)

In the light of existing situation, Hitler is the one person who can promptly remove the necessity for efforts at effective self-defense by this country and other countries similarly situated, whereupon for any other nation to request that the United States desist from any such resistance would in its actual effect range the country making such request on the side of Hitler and his movement of aggression by force. Hitler is therefore the person who should be addressed in support of peace, rather than those whom he is attacking for the purpose of bringing about their complete subjugation without color of law, or of right, or of humanity.

"Yes, it makes a difference who wins—the difference whether we stand with our backs to the wall with the other four continents against us and the high seas lost, alone defending the last free territories on earth—or whether we keep our place in an orderly world."[a]

[a]In a later message, Washington to Tokyo, Gogai, dated June 9th, See II, 68, the following corrections were made:

"In the middle of Part 2, 'molested, but if' should be corrected to read 'molested but that if'.

'Also, will you please add the following to the end of the same message:'

'Annex and supplement on the part of the government of the United States.'

'4. *Commerce between both nations.*'

'It is understood that during the present international emergency Japan and the United States shall each permit export to the other of commodities in amounts up to the figures of usual or pre-war trade, except, in the case of each, commodities which it needs for its own purposes of security and self-defense.' "

Trans. 6-13-41

No. 68

FROM: Washington — June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo — No number.

Gogai

Re my # 380[a], part 2:

In the middle, "molested, but if" should be corrected to read "molested but that if".

Also will you please add the following to the end of the same message:

"Annex and supplement on the part of the United States.

"4. *Commerce between both nations.*

"It is understood that during the present international emergency Japan and the United States shall each permit export to the other of commodities in amounts up to the figures of usual pre-war trade, except, in the case of each, commodities which it needs for its own purposes of security and self-defense."

[a]See II, 67.

Trans. 6-13-41

No. 69

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

June 9, 1941
382.

(In 5 parts—complete)

Extra secret.

(Part 1)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
May 31, 1941
NONOFFICIAL, EXPLORATORY AND WITHOUT COMMITMENT ORAL EXPLANATIONS OR SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO THE JAPANESE DRAFT

Introductory statement.

A few minor changes have been made in phraseology with a view to clarifying the meaning.

In the list of points enumerated on page two of the Japanese draft, the title of Section 3 has been altered to conform more accurately to the subject matter; the word "southwestern" has been omitted from point numbered five and, in view of the new subject matter under point six (for explanation see INFRA), part of the subject matter under point six incorporated in an additional Section, the title of which is therefore listed, and part of the subject matter in Section 6 of the Japanese draft has been omitted (for explanation see INFRA).

1. *The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.*

The first paragraph has been omitted in as much as the statement of the fact is as ----- (remainder of Part 1 missing).

(Part 2)

2. *The attitude of both governments towards the European war.*

The first paragraph of the Japanese draft has been omitted in order to avoid any implication of inconsistency with statements made by the President to the effect that the present is not an opportune time for the American government to endeavor to bring about peace in Europe.

To the second paragraph of the Japanese draft a new sentence has been added to emphasize the aspect of self-defense.

The third paragraph has been omitted inasmuch as the text of the Tripartite Pact has been published and no purpose would appear to be served by express reference to any of its provisions.

The fourth paragraph of the Japanese draft has been revised to emphasize the protective and self-defense character of the attitude of the United States toward the European hostilities.

A statement in the annex and supplement on the part of the government of the United States contains an elaboration of this government's viewpoint toward the military movement of conquest inaugurated by Chancellor Hitler.

(Part 3)

3. *Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.*

As already stated, the title has been altered to describe more accurately the contents.

The statement in the Japanese draft has been rewritten to keep the underlying purport and at the same time to avert raising questions which do not seem fundamental to the basic

subject and which are controversial in character and might present serious difficulties from the point of view of the United States.

The statement in the Japanese annex and supplement in regard to this section has also been revised in a few particulars in conformity with the considerations mentioned in the preceding paragraph. In addition, point numbered three in regard to economic cooperation has been rephrased so as to make it clear that China and Japan intend to follow in their economic relations, the principle to which it is understood the Japanese government and the Chinese government have long subscribed and which principle forms the foundation of the commercial policy of the United States. As it is assumed that the term "troops" in point numbered six is meant to include all armed forces, the language of this point has been slightly rephrased to avoid possible ambiguity.

As already stated, the question relating to communistic activities, including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory, is subject to further discussion.

(Part 4)

4. *Commerce between both nations.*

A statement is included in the annex and supplement on the part of the United States clarifying the point that as a temporary measure during the present international emergency it is understood that each country may restrict export of commodities which it needs for its own purposes of security and self-defense.

5. *Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.*

The language of this section has been rephrased to make the provisions thereof applicable equally to the United States and to Japan.

6. *The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.*

This section has been revised to make it consist of a clear-cut statement of the fundamental purpose of the understanding. The thought in mind is to give emphasis to this purpose so that the document may speak for itself on this all-important subject.

The statement of fundamental purpose has been assigned a section by itself in order that it may gain added emphasis.

The statement in the Japanese draft in regard to the Philippine Islands has been dealt with in a new section bearing number 7.

The statement in regard to Japanese immigration has been omitted in view of the established position of the United States that the question of immigration is a domestic matter. For that reason, to attempt to include a statement on this subject would stand in the way of the underlying purposes of the agreement.

(Part 5)

7. *Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.*

The phraseology of this section has been altered so as to bring it into conformity with the language of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, approved March 24, 1934.

ADDENDUM.

In view of the traditional policy of the United States and various practical considerations in the United States, important difficulties would be presented should the government of the United States endeavor to keep secret the understanding under reference together with its annexes. This government could probably arrange to keep the understanding secret for a period of a few weeks, during which time it believes that the two governments should work out procedures covering the scope, character and timing of the announcement of the understanding and of at least the definitive substance thereof.

Trans. 6-13-41

No. 70

FROM: Washington June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo #384.

(Part 1 of 3)

There were many points unacceptable to me in the proposal of the United States which I am transmitting to you this date (message #377[a]). At the same time, this proposal being unofficial, the American side expressed its desire to go over the objectionable parts with me before submitting it to Japan. However, I am asking for a preliminary draft which will approximate as much as possible the final proposal, which I intend to submit to you for your consideration.

[a]See II, 59.

Trans. 6–11–41

No. 71

FROM: Washington June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo #384.

(Part 2 of 3)

1. Among the main points relating to the European War:
   a. Eliminating the phrases regarding the right of self-preservation.
   b. Eliminating Secretary Hull's speech in the Annex.
2. Regarding the China Incident:
   a. In accordance with your telegraphic instructions, the suggestion to China to be made by the President;
   b. The working out of a mutually satisfactory phraseology regarding the desire for peace.
3. In place of a statement regarding justice and non-discrimination, the inclusion of a clause regarding peace in the Pacific.

Trans. 6–12–41

No. 72

FROM: Washington June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo #384.

(Part 3 of 3)

In addition to the foregoing, the inclusion of stipulations relating to the prevention of the spread of the European war, to efforts for future world peace, and peace in the Pacific.

Also, in an Annex, stipulations that Japan and the United States mutually recognize Japan's national aspirations in the Far East, including the southwestern Pacific and those of America in the Western Hemisphere; and that Japan plans no military bases in the Western Hemisphere and the United States none in the Far East.

Your telegraphic instructions are requested regarding the admission of manufactured goods.

The mediation proposal be acted upon in three days. Secretary Hull has been indisposed since the night before last, and an end should be put to the too numerous delays.

Trans. 6-12-41

No. 73

FROM: Washington — June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 385.

The contents of the American proposal and the present condition of negotiations are as reported in my # 377[a] and # 384[b], but in the American proposal there are many points which still require further deliberation and for this reason they are reluctant to report to Japan. However, I expect that the report will be sent in a few days. In the meantime please accept the preliminary proposal for your study.

[a] See II, 59.
[b] See II, 70, 71, 72.

Trans. 6-11-41

No. 74

FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) — June 10, 1941
TO: Washington — # 286.

To Counselor IGUCHI from Secretary TERAZAKI.

Officials, as well as outsiders returning to Japan from Washington, report that harmony is lacking among the members in the Embassy there. I have been sensing this for quite a while and lately it seems that the sneers are gradually getting more and more unbearable. I have also heard that Ambassador NOMURA called the members of his staff together and begged them to keep peace. I have just received a report that Consul General MIURA felt terribly ashamed for an outsider like Ambassador NOMURA to find matters in such a regrettable state. Now, when the world situation is in such a critical state, will you, as the Counselor, advise all the staff to please conduct themselves in a more seemly fashion.

Trans. 6-11-41

No. 75

FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) — June 10, 1941
TO: Washington — # 284.

Strictly Secret.

To Counselor IGUCHI from Secretary TERAZAKI.

In the telegrams concerning the adjustment of Japanese-American relations such as secret message # 377[a] on the 9th, there are some sentences which do not seem to make good sense

and I am at a loss at times to know just what is being said. It is not that I insist on your troubling yourself with a perfect job of drafting, but please wire me back just why it is that clearer messages cannot be sent.

[a]See II, 59.

Trans. 6-11-41

No. 76

FROM: Washington — June 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 396.

Re your # 284[a].

Hereafter, we will try to correct our shortcomings.

[a]See II, 75.

Trans. 6-17-41

No. 77

FROM: Washington — June 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 392.

To Bureau Chief Terasaki from Iguti.

Many of the messages connected with this subject have been drafted by the Ambassador himself and although before they are sent they are submitted to Colonel Iwakuro, the Naval and Military Attaches and to me and other officials for consideration, we have been sending them whenever possible as nearly as originally drafted as possible in order to convey better the feelings of the Ambassador who has discussed the matter with the Secretary of State.

The tone of your message # 285[a] is very disconcerting in view of our Ambassador's supreme effort to promote adjustment of American-Japanese relations. Therefore, I trust that you will take a more sympathetic view of the matter.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 6-17-41

No. 78

FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 424.

(Part 1 of 2)[a]

Re my # 384[b].

1. As I said in my caption message, I have repeatedly negotiated with them on their former proposals for an understanding, on the basis of your instructions. On the 15th I talked with the Secretary while he was sick in bed. (Since the 8th he has been up and about, and I understand that he is soon going to Hot Springs.) The Secretary said: "According to our reports, in Japan there are influential people who do not wish an understanding between Japan and the United States, so I don't suppose that, after all, Japan considers the composure of the relations of our two countries as so important." "Could you not, he hopefully asked, "at your discretion, once more report all the details to the Imperial Government and find out whether the Imperial Government is really in favor of composing relations between our two countries or not?" I replied: "Well, such concessions as the American Government has made are really not worth our consideration. I must repeat that I am negotiating entirely within the limits of the instructions of my Home Government. So long as you do not give us a concrete and fair proposal, there is no sense in requesting instructions, at least on the basis of what you have offered us so far." Since then I continued with my negotiations and on the 22nd(?) the Secretary handed me the Oral Statement in my # 426[c] preliminary to making the proposal in my # 425[d].

The latest American proposal which contains the following excuse, "unofficial, exploratory and without commitment", is far from being in accord with your instructions and I must say that I am myself thoroughly dissatisfied but still, in view of the preceding facts, I am sending it to you for what it may be worth. In connection with this American talk of self-defense and peace terms relative to the Chinese Incident (commercial non-discrimination), they stated that they would like for us to inscribe in official letters and documents our accord with what they have insisted on all along. However, the Imperial Government could not by any means recognize some of these terms, so last night, the 23rd,(?) I sought an interview with the Secretary and told him frankly that I could not submit this to my Government.

---

[a] Part 2 of 2 follows, (See II, 79).

[b] See II, 70, 71, 72 in which Nomura tells Tokyo that he has requested a preliminary draft, which will approximate as much as possible the final proposal, which he intends to submit to Tokyo for their consideration.

[c] See II, 87, 88, 89.

[d] See II, 90.

Trans. 6-27-41

No. 79

FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 424.

(Part 2 of 2)

2. I have told you in several messages that there are three important discrepancies in the demands of both sides:

(1) When it comes to the European war, Anglo-American self-defense rights, and the Tripartite Pact, they will not yield to anything we advocate.

(2) When it comes to the question of our stationing of troops for protection against Communists, they strangely enough declare that they cannot interfere with Chinese-Japanese peace terms, but in the same breath show considerable ire, declaring that this interferes with the sovereignty of a third power.

(3) Secretary HULL's pet principle is that of commercial non-discrimination. He repeats that the Pan-American policy of the United States consists in this. He often says that if we applied the principle of non-discrimination to China and all the Pacific, we would have nothing to lose and it would, as a matter of fact, be to our material interests.

These have all been very hard points but they took the attitude that if they were absolutely certain that Japan actually and earnestly desired to compose relations between the two countries, there was room for negotiations. However, when we talk peace with CHIANG KAI SHEK, points two and three will be among the peace terms and we do not believe that the United States would support us on those points. The United States, furthermore, strongly insists that it is against her principles to counsel CHIANG KAI SHEK to accept our demands on these matters.

3. We were exempted from the order freezing foreign assets; the affair involving naval officers has been settled amicably; and the Secretary of State, while in bed, interviewed me three times. These things and others lead me to think that the President, his immediate associates, and the Secretary of State have not cooled any in their zeal to adjust the relations of our two countries but, judging from reports coming from the American Embassy in Tokyo and from financial quarters in New York, I think that some American officials of the United States are by some means endeavoring to cast suspicions on the sincerity of the Japanese Government. There are, indeed, many indications that this is true.

4. Thus, though it can be seen that there are discrepancies between the views of our two countries, I would not say that there is no room for negotiations. There are various reasons why I think it would be to our advantage not to break off negotiations; however, if our high officials in Tokyo think that the time has come to stop these talks, let them remember that the United States Government will freeze our credit, strengthen the embargo, and by every other sort of oppressive measure crowd us more than ever. If they decide to rupture these negotiations, let them begin immediately to take every possible measure to prepare for the worst.

Translator's Note: Messages dictated by Ambassador NOMURA are extremely poorly phrased and difficult to translate.

Trans. 6-27-41

No. 80

FROM: Washington — June 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 388.

Strictly Secret

Of the three secretaries in this embassy, as you know, one is worked to death on a special assignment and has no time at all to devote to general work here. One or the other of the other two is always sick or something, so I find it absolutely impossible to do things right with just one secretary. True, I do have three or four aides, but they are either totally inexperienced, just having graduated from school, or up to their necks in telegraphic work. None of them can take

the place of secretaries. I feel this shortage most keenly now that this country is gradually turning toward war, because I have to send these men here and there both within and without the country on various missions and have very much work to do in connection with our business in South and Central America. You can well imagine my difficulty. I know that our whole department is short of men, for that matter, but I feel constrained to request that you send to me two third class secretaries immediately. If you do not have any suitable men in Tokyo at the moment whom you could send, we here would prefer Secretary AOKI now at Vichy, because he knows general embassy work as well as commercial and economic conditions in Central and South America, or Business Official TAKAGI, who is now touring South and Central America along with Minister YAMAGATA. We would like you also to have Consul INAGAKI, now in San Francisco, sent here. We will be very greatful if you will accommodate us in this matter.

Trans. 6-13-41

No. 81

FROM: Tokyo June 10, 1941
TO: Washington # 285.

(Part 1 of 3)

Re your # 375[a].

Needless to say, I am glad that you have without the loss of time submitted to our Government a proposal, even though it be unofficial, on such an important matter as this. Furthermore, this matter, in view of our relations with Germany and Italy which are the axis of our diplomacy and in view of world events, is very important. I also think that you fully realize how delicate it is. A thing of this nature is first and foremost a matter to be handled primarily by the Government. It is certainly lacking in propriety for you and the Secretary of State to get together and submit the proposal to a drafting committee of both countries. As for the points which the committee is to consider (superfluous or non-essential phrases are quite beside the point), only after the Imperial Government and the Government of the United States have reached an understanding between themselves, and after instructions have been received from this Foreign Minister, is re-action to take place. That is the formula. You tell me that there were some important points on which both committees disagreed. But in any case, the time has not yet come to submit the matter to such a committee. Any matters presented to a committee under the present circumstances should be distinctly understood as without commitment but it would already seem that you have made some commitments which will be difficult to explain away.

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[a]Ambassador NOMURA informs Foreign Minister MATSUOKA that he and Secretary HULL have submitted a proposal for the adjustment of Japanese-American relations to a joint drafting committee which disagreed on important points.

Trans. 6-10-41

No. 82

FROM: Tokyo June 10, 1941
TO: Washington # 285.

(Part 2 of 3)

As soon as I have received the full text of the unofficial American proposal, we will discuss it in Government circles, and until you get some further instructions from me, please stop these committee talks. Of course, I know that you will have to do so in a friendly and inoffensive manner, but I will leave that up to your tact.

I do, as you know, and have always considered good relations between Japan and the United States as important. However, no matter how urgent this adjustment might seem, it is not so important as the Axis Pact, and no bad effect must be brought to bear on that Pact. Therefore, our first and foremost objective is to maintain the integrity of the Japanese, German, Italian Alliance and to do everything we can to keep the United States from entering the war, or at least to prevent her from taking any more direct anti-Axis measures than she has up to the present day. I feel that our dauntless attitude has already achieved much in this direction. When you left Tokyo I told you this by word of mouth and you agreed with me, but unfortunately there are many outsiders who seem to think that even though the United States fights, we Japanese will not necessarily do so.

Trans. 6-10-41

No. 83

FROM: Tokyo June 10, 1941
TO: Washington # 285.

(Part 3 of 3)

As a matter of fact, the impression is imparted that the Japanese-American negotiations are centering around that very impression. The President of the United States and the Secretary of State are scheming to include in this proposal for an understanding the basis for giving to the American people and to the world at large such a false impression. From the point of view of our intention to cooperate with the three powers, we must therefore be ever on the alert. I think that I have informed you on this matter through my various instructions. When we come to take this matter up, this is one point which we must carefully consider, and on which we must allow no error to be made. Summing all this up, if the United States fights Germany, no matter what sort of agreement exists, after all it will inevitably have to be broken. That is clearer than the light of day. The important thing today is for us to maintain a relentless attitude. Even though it is beyond our power to make the United States feel friendly toward Germany, we must keep her from making an outright attack. Compared with this, any advice that the United States might give CHIANG KAI SHEK to make peace with us is of secondary importance. I think we all know that by now.

I will wire you more later.

Trans. 6-10-41

No. 84

FROM: Tokyo — June 13, 1941
TO: Washington — # 289.

Regarding your # 384[a].

Since reading your telegram I feel that I understand better the development of the discussions between you and the other party. If the "committee" is the type of which you speak, we may authorize the instruction to -----.

We are now studying the unofficial American proposal (your # 378[b]) which you received from the Secretary of State on *April (?)* 10th. Please bear in mind that our opinion regarding it will be sent to you.

Although the proposal in question may be of the sort you mention, it nevertheless is useful to this Minister when making translation of notes to be exchanged and for this reason it should have been telegraphed to him without delay.

Please bear in mind in the future that a proposal of this nature is also very important in finding out just how the President's and the Secretary of State's, minds work, which is useful to our government's deliberation on this matter.

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[a] See II, 70, 71, 72.
[b] See II, 60–65.

Trans. 6–17–41

No. 85

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — June 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 401.

On the ----- I called on the Assistant Secretary, WELLES (HULL is at present ill) and requested that the TACHIBANA incident be dealt with from the standpoint of the general political trend. WELLES agreed to do so.

Trans. 6–30–41

No. 86

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — June 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) — # 405.

It goes without saying that Japanese-American relations being very delicate, we must be ever on the alert.

There are a number of influential persons who are advocating placing a general embargo on oil. However, due to diplomatic reasons, both the Secretary of State and the State Department are exercising restraint. They are also said to have advised the press to maintain a calm attitude regarding questions affecting Japanese-American relations.

Trans. 6–19–41

No. 87

FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 426.

(Part 1 of 3)

Strictly secret outside the Department.

(To be handled in Government Code)

ORAL STATEMENT—June 21, 1941.

Oral Statement.

The Secretary of State appreciates the earnest efforts which have been made by the Japanese Ambassador and his associates to bring about a better understanding between our two countries and to establish peace in the Pacific area. The Secretary of State appreciates also the frankness which has characterized their attitude throughout the conversations which have been held. This Government is no less desirous than the Japanese Ambassador to bring about better relations between our two countries and a situation of peace in the Pacific area, and in that spirit the Secretary of State has given careful study to every aspect of the Japanese proposal.

The Secretary of State has no reason to doubt that many Japanese leaders share the views of the Japanese Ambassador and his associates as indicated above and would support action toward achieving those high objectives. Unfortunately, accumulating evidence reaches this Government from sources all over the world, including reports from sources which over many years have demonstrated sincere good will toward Japan, that some Japanese leaders in influential official positions are definitely committed to a course which calls for support of Nazi Germany and its policies of conquest and that the only kind of understanding with the United States which they would endorse is one that would envisage Japan's fighting on the side of HITLER should the United States become involved in the European hostilities through carrying out its present policy of self-defense.

Trans. 6-26-41

No. 88

FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 426.

(Part 2 of 3)

Strictly secret outside the Department.

The tenor of recent public statements gratuitously made by spokesman of the Japanese Government emphasizing Japan's commitments and intentions under the Tripartite Alliance exemplify an attitude which cannot be ignored. So long as such leaders maintain this attitude in their official positions and apparently seek to influence public opinion in Japan in the direction indicated, it is not illusory to expect that adoption of a proposal such as the one under consideration offers a basis for achieving substantial results along the desired lines?

Another source of misgiving in the Japanese proposal relates to the desire of the Japanese Government to include in its terms for a peaceful settlement to be offered to the Chinese

Government a provision which would permit the stationing of Japanese troops in certain areas in Inner Mongolia and North China as a measure of cooperation with China in resisting Communistic activities.

Trans. 6-26-41

No. 89

FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 426.

(Part 3 of 3)

(Strictly secret outside the Department)

While this government has given careful thought to the considerations which have prompted the Japanese government to make such a proposal, and while this government does not desire to enter into the merits of such a proposal, it feels that the liberal policies to which the United States is committed, as explained on numerous occasions to the Japanese Ambassador and his associates, would not permit this government to associate itself with any course which appears to be inconsistent with these policies. Furthermore, although in matters affecting only this country, there might be some latitude of decision as to the qualifying of rights, the matter under discussion affects the sovereign rights of a third country, and accordingly it is felt that this government must be most scrupulous in dealing with such a matter.

The Secretary of State has therefore reluctantly come to the conclusion that this government must await some clearer indication than has yet been given that the Japanese government as a whole desires to pursue a course of peace such as constitute the objectives of the proposed understanding. This government sincerely hopes that the Japanese government will manifest such an attitude.

Note: In order to bring the current discussions up to date as far as the American attitude is concerned, there is being handed the Japanese Ambassador separately a revision, bearing the date of June 21, of the document marked "Unofficial, exploratory and without commitment", which was handed the Japanese Ambassador on May 31.

Trans. 7-7-41

No. 90

FROM: Washington June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 425.

(In 2 parts—complete)

(Secret outside department).

(Chief of Office routing).

Re my # 424[a].

The U.S. text of the 21st consists of the following changes made in the text of May 31st. An annex is being sent separately in # 427[b].

Add at the end of Paragraph 1 of the Preamble: "For the resumption of traditional friendly relations".

Change "present" to "earnest" in the first part of Paragraph 3 and insert next to "understanding" the three words "encourage world peace".

Insert "deliberated" next to "later" in Clause 5.

In Clause 1 (national rights) at the end of Paragraph 1 change "among" to "between". In Paragraph 2 insert "living under the ideal of universal concord through justice and equity" next to "one household". At the end of the same paragraph change "nations" to "peoples".

In Clause 2 (European war), in Paragraph 1, substitute "to contribute to the prevention of an unprovoked extension of the European War" for the phrase between "to present" and "self defense".

In the May 31st text eliminate the entire phrase beginning with "obviously".

No revisions made in Paragraph 2.

In this Clause, the following paragraph, "There is appended a suggested draft of an exchange of letters as a substitute for the annex and supplement on the part of the government of the United States on this subject which constituted a part of the draft of May 31, 1941", has been added as *Note;* please refer to my # 424[a] regarding this.

Clause 3 (China affair), no revisions, but note "The foregoing draft of section 3 is subject to further discussion of the question of cooperative defense against communistic activities, including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory, and the question of economic cooperation between China and Japan. With regard to suggestion that the language of Section 3 be changed, it is believed that consideration of any suggested change can most advantageously be given after all the points in the annex relating to this section have been satisfactorily worked out, when the section and its annex can be viewed as a whole," has been added.

Clause 4 (trade relations), no revision.

Clause 5 (economic activities in the Pacific), no revision.

The beginning of the paragraph dealing with political activities in the Pacific has been changed to "both governments".

Clause 7, no revision.

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[a]Amb. Nomura wires Tokyo that in an interview with Secy. Hull he made the statement that there seem to be influential people in Japan who do not desire an understanding with the U.S., so, after all, does Japan consider the composure of relations between the two countries so important. Nomura replies that such concession as the U.S. has so far offered are not worthy of consideration.

[b]See II, 91.

Trans. 7-1-41

No. 91

FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 427.

(Part 1 of 2) Separate wire.

To be handled in Government code.

Strictly secret outside the Department.

Annex and supplement on the part of the Japanese Government.

2 (or 3?). Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.

The basic terms as referred to in the above section are as follows:

1. Neighborly friendship.

2. Cooperative defense against injurious Communistic activities—including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory. Subject to further discussion.

3. Economic cooperation. Subject to agreement on an exchange of letters in regard to the application to this point of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.

4. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.

5. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming an East Asian nucleus contributing to world peace.

6. Withdrawal of Japanese armed forces from Chinese territory as promptly as possible and in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China.

7. No annexation.

8. No indemnities.

9. Amicable negotiations in regard to Manchukuo.

Trans. 6-26-41

No. 92

FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 427.

(Part 2 of 2) Separate wire.

To be handled in Government Code.

Strictly Secret outside the Department.

Annex and supplements on the part of the Government of the United States.

4. Commerce between both nations.

It is understood that during the present international emergency Japan and the United States each shall permit export to the other of commodities in amounts up to the figures of usual or pre-war trade, except, in the case of each, commodities which it needs for its own purposes of security and self-defense. These limitations are mentioned to clarify the obligations of each Government. They are not intended as restrictions against either Government; and, it is understood, both Governments will apply such regulations in the spirit dominating relations with friendly nations.

Trans. 6-26-41

No. 94

FROM: Tokyo — June 25, 1941
TO: Washington — # 309.

Secret outside the Department.

Regarding paragraph 1 of your message # 425[a].

It is not clear to us just how the phrase "encourage world peace" in (1) is to be fitted in. Please send the revised text.

[a]Changes to be made in the U.S. text of the "understanding agreement."

Trans. 7-3-41

No. 95

FROM: Washington — June 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 439.

Re your # 309[a].

Secret.

Before the third paragraph of the text reading as follows: "It is our earnest hope that, by a cooperative effort, that the United States and Japan may contribute effectively toward the establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area and by the rapid consummation of an amicable understanding, encourage world peace and arrest, if not dispel the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization", please insert a comma after "if not dispel".

[a]"It is not clear to us just how the phrase "encourage world peace" in (1) is to be fitted in. Please send the revised text."

Trans. 7-3-41

No. 96

FROM: Tokyo — June 26, 1941
TO: Washington — # 312.

Secret outside the Department.

Concerning part 2 of your # 427[a] in your last sentence, repeat immediately all the words following, "it is understood."

[a]See II, 91 which gives the annex and supplement on the part of the Japanese and United States Governments to the Oral Statement.

Trans. 7-1-41

No. 97

FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #443.

Re your #312[a], as follows:

It is understood that both governments will apply such regulations in the spirit dominating relations with friendly nations.

---

[a]See II, 96.

Trans. 6–30–41

No. 98

FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) No number.

For the information of the Foreign Minister.

Believing that the question of reestablishing better Japanese-American relations is one of the important phases of our national policy today, since my assumption of this post, I have devoted all my time, putting aside all personal considerations, to its promotion. However, some time past Your Excellency saw fit to question my motive and I trust that it was made clear at that time that any suspicion regarding my motive was unjustified. However, since then I have been quietly making inquiries to locate the source of such suspicion.

On the other hand, in the "Oral Statement" which was handed me together with the U.S. proposals, there are many indications that the United States government doubts the good faith of our government. Thinking that there might be some complicated reasons behind this attitude I made inquiries and obtained from various reliable sources the following facts, in general, regarding the true status of the American proposals.

As I have already reported the proposal for American-Japanese understanding was, originally, being handled only by the President and a few heads of the government secretly. Subsequently, it became necessary to disclose some phase of it to other members of the Cabinet and certain officials of the State Department. It appears that two or three members of the Cabinet (probably Morgenthau, Ickes, and Jackson) are not in favor of Japanese-American understanding and some of the State Department officials oppose it as a matter of course. Adhering to their traditional views they are trying to attach ulterior meaning to the proposal. These officials also resent the fact that the negotiations were being carried on over their heads.

It is also clear that both in America and Japan there are those who do not view with sympathy the idea of closer relationship between America and Japan. And these groups are submitting unfavorable reports to their respective Ambassadors, or Foreign Offices, with intent to wreck this plan. They are also working through the New York financial circles to influence unfavorably a certain member of the Cabinet (presumably Morganthau), and it appears that Secretary Hull is at times confused by these reports submitted to him by his colleagues and subordinates.

On several occasions I have been asked by the Secretary whether it is not true that certain influential groups in Japan are opposed to the American-Japanese understanding. (It goes

without saying that each time I have strongly denied this allegation.) In this manner, those who wish to see our plans wrecked are using all sorts of means to give the unfortunate impression that my views do not represent the true views of the Japanese government.

Although it is to be regretted that I have not always been able to carry out your instructions fully, Your Excellency may be assured that I will not do anything that transcends the limits of Your Excellency's instructions. I trust that my clear record of the past, our friendship extending to more than 26 years, and the circumstances of my appointment to the present post, are sufficient evidence of my good faith. And I have no doubt that Your Excellency will accept them as such.

I submit the above for Your Excellency's information.

Trans. 6-30-41

No. 99

FROM: Washington June 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo #452.

(In 2 parts—complete)

I am awaiting your instructions regarding my message #313[a], but as I assume that the German-Soviet war, which broke out since my message in question was dispatched, is causing you a great deal of anxiety, I submit herewith my humble opinion.

The United States does not desire a two-front war, and it goes without saying that for this reason she desires peace in the Pacific. However, as you already know, she is feverishly preparing to meet any eventuality. Although the United States is trying to assure greater freedom of action regards the European war, through the proposed American-Japanese "understanding", actually it is unlikely that she will join the war for some time to come, and there is some possibility that after the proposals for the Japanese-American "understanding" have been adopted, we can restrain America's war attitude through diplomatic manipulations. The United States is watching Japan's action very closely since the declaration of the German-Soviet war and the opinion here is that although Japan's position is improved in the Far East by lessening of the Soviet pressure, Japan will not be able to conduct a large scale operation in Siberia so long as the China Affair remains unsettled. Also, that her southward advance, checked by the consorted air and submarine defense efforts of the Netherlands Indies, Britain, and the United States, and increasing determination of these countries to protect these areas, are driving Japan to an attitude of watchful waiting rather than to risk a large scale war involving herself with Britain and Australia.

It has already been reported to you that the United States intends to give aid to Russia, but I doubt very much whether she is prepared to effectuate her intention.

Now then, if the United States government loses interest in the proposed Japanese-American "understanding", it may be said that all efforts towards better American-Japanese relations have come to a standstill. This means decisive economic action leading to our southward expansion which, in turn, is replete with danger of collision with Netherlands (?). In the event of the above, not only will it be difficult to maintain trade relations with the Americas and the British Empire, but it will mean eventual severing of diplomatic ties with these countries.

It is my belief that our adherence to the Tripartite Pact should in no way affect the preservation of peace in the Pacific by virture of the American-Japanese "understanding" agreement.

For reasons given above, I feel that broadly speaking, this "understanding" agreement will prove advantageous to Japan and as I am of the opinion that the three proposals supplementing my message can be made acceptable in some way, I await your instructions.

I wish to emphasize the importance of proving to the United States government that the Japanese government is truly interested in the proposed Japanese-American "understanding".

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*Dod comment: Should be message number 424 (II, 98). Ambassador Nomura wires Tokyo that in an interview with Secy. Hull, he made the statement that there seems to be influential people in Japan who do not desire an understanding with the U.S., so, after all, does Japan consider the composure of relations between the two countries so important. Nomura replies that such concession as the U.S. has so far offered are not worthy of consideration.

Trans. 7-10-41

No. 100

FROM: Tokyo — June 30, 1941
TO: Washington — # 1367.

(Circular)

As present conditions indicate a critical period, it is necessary to bring to the attention of all of the administrative personnel the regulations concerning fiscal matters. Furthermore, the previous conditions have already been -----, it is hoped.

1. All of the (confidential ?) reports and intelligence reports are to be dispatched as soon as possible. In case of withdrawal, the reports in the process of preparation are expected to be sent out.

2. The documents having relation to the (confidential ?) reports and intelligence reports should already be destroyed by fire.

3. Before withdrawing, the notice should be given as provided in leases for the disposal of the rented property. You are to consult either this office or the nearest diplomatic post concerning the remaining amounts to be paid and other obligations which must be carried out.

4. Japanese Government-owned properties shall be placed in the custody of the proper administrative representatives.

5. The furnishings are to be sent (to Japan), or if it is not practical to store them, they are to be sold in such a manner as not to give the appearance of closing the establishment.

6. The local personnel of the offices, in case of withdrawal, shall be discharged. Those of third countries shall be paid in the amount which has heretofore been the rule. Payments shall be made to Japanese corresponding to the lowest amount of freight charges necessary for their return. Enemy members of the personnel shall receive no payment whatsoever.

7. Although inevitably a certain amount of public funds designated for miscellaneous expenditures will be lost ----- ----- ----- ----- -----, and (differentiation?) of private and official documents will be -----.

Trans. 7-9-41

No. 101

FROM: Washington July 1, 1941
TO: Moscow # 041.

(Washington Circular # 143.)

Retransmission. # 445 to the Minister.

Acting Secretary of State Welles explained America's attitude toward the German-Soviet war in his press conference on June 23rd. He said that America is equally opposed to a Communistic dictatorship or a Nazi dictatorship, but the problem at present is the destruction of Hitlerism throughout the world and to that end aid to Russia had been ordered. The following day the President declared in his press conference that as far as possible America would aid Russia but that as yet Russia had made no request for aid and therefore he did not know what materials Russia stood in need of and inasmuch as aid to Britain would receive preferential treatment, he did not know to what extent aid to Russia would be possible. As one step in the aid to Russia program, Russia was exempted from the order of the Secretary of the Treasury of the June 14th freezing of all funds of European countries here, and thus the $400,000,000 that Russia has in America was made available for the purchase of American materials. On the 25th, the President announced that the Neutrality Act would not be invoked in the present conflict. (The excuse given for not applying the Neutrality Act in the present German-Soviet war is that this act is not necessary for the preservation of American lives and the public peace.) The question of whether the Lend-Lease Act would be applied to Russia or not is being given study. For the present all efforts are being concentrated on aid to Britain in the hope that she will be able to deliver a knock-out blow to Germany.

America at this time is paying particular attention to Japan's attitude. There are, no doubt, arguments for a northern advance or for a southern advance. For the present the situation is being kept under observation.

That Japan will exercise a restraining influence as to whether America enters a state of war or not goes without saying. At any rate, public opinion is becoming more settled and decisive action only awaits the completion of preparations. This may be only a matter of a few months. I have heard persons of influence discuss the inevitability of war. Preparations are all in terms of a long war. Plans are being laid for two years or more in the future. Not a few influential persons are saying that the European war will result in anarchy and bankruptcy and plunge Europe into a state of chaos paralleling the Dark Ages.

Trans. 7-9-41

No. 102

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 457.

The New York Times and other papers on the 26th published the views of Premier KONOYE as expressed to U.P. reporters. The Postmaster General ----- ----- ----- ----- -----, so it seems that he, too, was perturbed.

Yesterday in his press conference the President made it clear that he hoped the United States could keep out of the war. I think that the President and the Postmaster General

conferred and decided, as an indirect reply to Prince KONOYE, to allay Japan's worries concerning any possible conflicts between a Japanese-American understanding and the Axis pact.

Trans. 7–7–41

No. 103

FROM: Tokyo July 2, 1941
TO: Berlin # 1390.

Circular. (Part 1 of 2) (National Secret.)

At the conference held in the presence of the Emperor on July 2nd "The Principal Points in the Imperial Policy for Coping with the Changing Situation" were decided. This Policy consists of the following two parts. The first part "The Policy" and the second part "The Principal Points" (I am wiring merely the gist of the matter.) Inasmuch as this has to do with national defense secrets, keep the information only to yourself. Please also transmit the content to both the Naval and Military Attaches, together with this precaution.

The Policy.

1. Imperial Japan shall adhere to the policy of contributing to world peace by establishing the Great East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity, regardless of how the world situation may change.

2. The Imperial Government shall continue its endeavor to dispose of the China incident, and shall take measures with a view to advancing southward in order to establish firmly a basis for her self-existence and self-protection.

Trans. 8–8–41

No. 104

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 2, 1941
TO: Washington # 1390.

(Circular)

(Part 2 of 2.)

The Principal Points.

For the purpose of bringing the CHIANG Regime to submission, increasing pressure shall be added from various points in the south, and by means of both propaganda and fighting plans for the taking over of concessions shall be carried out. Diplomatic negotiations shall be continued, and various other plans shall be speeded with regard to the vital points in the south. Concomitantly, preparations for southward advance shall be reenforced and the policy already decided upon with reference to French Indo-China and Thailand shall be executed. As regards the Russo-German war, although the spirit of the Three-Power Axis shall be maintained, every preparation shall be made at the present and the situation shall be dealt with in our own way. In the meantime, diplomatic negotiations shall be carried on with extreme care. Although every means available shall be resorted to in order to prevent the United States

from joining the war, if need be, Japan shall act in accordance with the Three-Power Pact and shall decide when and how force will be employed.

Addresses to which this message is sent: U.S., Germany and Soviet Russia. From Germany transmit to Italy.

Note: The system used in this message is considered to be of the highest type of secret classification.

Trans. 8–8–41

No. 105

FROM: Washington — July 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 463.

(Part 1 of 2.)

At this time when the changes in international situation, brought on by the declaration of the German-Soviet war, has placed Japan in an extremely delicate position, her stand against Russia, whether it be by use of force or by collaboration with Germany, will tend to worsen the relations between Japan and the United States and may drive the United States that much closer to war.

However, if Japan took an independent action against Russia, onthe pretext that the dislocation of political situation arising out of the German-Russian war, necessitates her stand in order to preserve peace in the Far East and to fulfill her obligation towards China, it might help somewhat in alleviating this trend. I wonder how it would be, in the event that we decide on a definite stand against Russia, if we were to hasten the consummation of the proposed Japanese-American understanding so that this traditional question of self-preservation will become a question common to both Japan and America.

Trans. 7–9–41

No. 106

FROM: Washington — July 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 463.

(Part 2 of 2.)[a]

Now that Germany and the Soviet are at war, if we are definitely determined to make a military stroke southward, there is absolutely no way to adjust our relations with the United States.

My studied judgement concerning the status of Japanese-American relations being thus, I consider it of the greatest urgency that whatever policy the Imperial Government takes, we must play our hand immediately with the United States; therefore, I await your advice. I have received your Circulars # 1366[b], # 1367[c], and your # 321[d] and we know full well that they imply a serious decision on the part of the Japanese Empire. We are all tense and on our

toes, and doing our best to get everything in readiness for whatever may happen, so let your mind be at rest so far as that is concerned.

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[a]Part 1 of 2.

[b]MATSUOKA directs that every precaution be taken in readiness for any emergency that might arise in order to assure the safety of documents contained in the official buildings.

[c]See II, 100.

[d]Not available.

Trans. 7-9-41

No. 107

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 470.

(Part 2 of 3)[a] Very urgent.

I said: "Yes, I glanced over that newspaper. I have not received any reports on this, but your country is assisting CHIANG, giving him economic help, sending him airplanes and munitions, and lending him pilots. Under these circumstances it is absolutely necessary for Japan to take measures to offset such acts. This has been going on already for a long time. Some time ago your fleet cruised to Australia. You have placed attaches everywhere. It is reported that you have conferred with the military officials of the Netherlands and British Indies and the military preparations in those areas have increased. In addition, you are strengthening the defenses in the Aleutians and it is even reported that you are going to work out a reciprocal assistance agreement with Soviet Russia. I could go on enumerating such things and they are all military steps aimed at Japan. Furthermore, there is a report that you are going to extend the embargo to oil. As this tendency progresses it becomes more and more difficult to maintain peace. That is why I am trying so hard to establish an understanding between Japan and the United States."

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[a]Parts 1 and 3 of 3 not available.

Trans. 7-8-41

No. 108

FROM: Washington July 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 476.

(In 3 parts—complete.)

Tokyo to Berlin as Circular # 1471 on 9 July.

Note: Italic words in the following translation were omitted from Washington's message when it was circularized by Tokyo.

1. About one month ago we learned from Source "A" that America was already putting into practice the convoy system *but the information was not complete enough to warrant a*

report on it. Recently, this report has been indorsed indirectly from Source "B" and we have the following to report:

The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator George, said recently that although the Lend-Lease Act had been passed with the understanding that there would be no convoys or at least that convoys would not be instituted without the consent of the Senate, the President has been "misleading" us. Immediately following this Senator George on the 28th of last month, made his first speech attacking the government since his assumption of the Chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee. Since that time the attitude of his Committee toward the President has stiffened.

In answer to this opposition, President Roosevelt gave expression to his resolute determination through Knox's speech in Boston on the 30th of last month, in which Knox said that the American Navy should take action in the Atlantic immediately. (As heretofore, Roosevelt will leave it up to men like Stimson and Knox to impose his definite decision on an indecisive Congress.)

In the above-mentioned speech, because of the opposition of public opinion, a desire for a Senate investigation to determine whether or not convoys were being used was expressed. In his press conference on July 2, Knox denied the existance of convoys. But as a matter of fact, the government is employing convoys.

Roosevelt's attitude toward the Orient and Europe in general is summed up in the fact, that we have verified, that last fall the President instructed influential members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to seize upon one of the incidents that were occurring between the U.S. and Japan and use it as a pretext for war. However, the members of the Committee opposed this attitude and the President dropped the matter. However, since January of this year, the President has entirely changed his attitude and is now earnestly desiring an adjustment of U.S.-Japanese relations.

The President's attitude toward Germany has also undergone revision. At first he had hoped through aid to Britain to be able to lead Britain to victory without entering the war, but Germany's astonishing victories in the Balkans and Crete have caused him to change his policy and as yet he has not formulated a new policy *and due to the problem of regulation of relations with Japan his fireside chat was postponed two weeks.*

On the one hand Roosevelt's aid to Russia which he declared upon the outbreak of the Russo-German hostilities got off to a bad start. The American First Committee, which claims 10,000,000 members made a direct frontal attack on the government, and this was not the only obstacle placed in the path of his desire for war. (Roosevelt's calling Lindberg a "copperhead" turned out to be a great failure.) In addition to the American First Committee, the following religious organizations also adopted resolutions opposed to war: Methodists, 8,000,000; Baptists, 7,000,000; Presbyterians, 7,000,000; Congregationalists, 2,500,000; Disciples, 1,500,000. In considering the attitude that should be adopted toward Germany and Japan it was necessary to take into account the above arguments for peace.

Since there was not a background of united public opinion Roosevelt was perplexed as to how to dispose of his dagger. Influential Senators were divided in opinions and the government is at present in a dilemma. Roosevelt will decide his policy in the next two or three weeks. He desires to advance toward some definite action and finds it very difficult to support the present ambiguity. *(This is similar to Japan's position.) The thing that concerns America most at the present time is Japan. One way of breaking the present dilemma is regarding the Japanese-American understanding. Even though Roosevelt's and Hull's fervor may not change they still doubt Japan's sincerity. If Japan expands toward the south (even though the army isn't prepared) America will use the navy which is prepared to open war on Japan and thus popular*

opinion will be unified. (America does not wish to fight on two fronts but in view of the German-Soviet war she can neglect the Atlantic) and thus the present dilemma would turn out as America desires.

Trans. 7-15-41

No. 109

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo #455.

(Foreign Office Secret.)

Although we are unable to definitely ascertain it, a certain person who is very prominent in political circles in this area, told a person connected to this office that Germany has dispatched an agent in secrecy to the United States to discuss peace. Our informant says that this German is at present in touch with persons in U.S. governmental circles. It is said that the gist of the peace proposal is that Germany will leave the British Empire untouched.

I forward the above information to you just as I heard it and for whatever value it may have to you.

Trans. 7-5-41

No. 110

FROM: Washington July 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo #477.

Recently there has been a great deal of rumor concerning American intervention for German-British peace negotiations, according to information obtained from financial circles. A German secret emissary, SUTAARUFERUTO, (said to be an American-born German), entered the United States by way of Mexico sometime ago bringing with him a letter from the heads of the German government, with the intention of making overtures for German-British peace. But because the general atmosphere in the United States at that time not being favorable and also because of the harshness of the peace terms he returned to Germany without broaching the subject.

However, he reentered the United States just about the time of the Hess incident and since then he has been working secretly to accomplish his mission.

Through the efforts of the -----[a] he became acquainted with Secretary Hull's friend -----[a] who in turn introduced him to Hull. Since then, he is said to be carrying on secret meetings with the Secretary of State and is continuing his efforts with somewhat modified peace terms.

I had a certain influential person in Washington (name kept secret) ascertain the above, and he confirmed the circumstances of the negotiations. However, it is believed that although neither the President nor those who are close to him are considering any move in this direction, there are a number of persons in his Cabinet who are in favor of it.

I cannot vouch for the accuracy of the above information but I submit to you for whatever it may be worth.

[a]DoD Comment: Names withheld.

Trans. 7-11-41

No. 111

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 8, 1941
TO: Washington # 345.

Strictly Secret.

1. I am very much interested in reports like you mentioned in your # 455[a], so please continue to keep me advised on this matter.

2. As I understand it, as a matter of form, the Oral Statement will not be an integral part of this proposal for an understanding and that, as a matter of fact, this question has been settled according to my # 329[b]. However, so that I may be sure, wire me back your views.

[a]See II, 109 in which NOMURA tells of rumors that Germany has dispatched an agent in secrecy to the United States to discuss peace. The gist of the peace proposal is that Germany will leave the British Empire untouched.
[b]Not available.

Trans. 7–10–41

No. 112

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 506.

(Part 1 of 5)

Secret outside the Department.

To be handled in Government Code.

Re the matter of my # 477[a].

The points learned since last I wrote you are as follows:

1. Early in February of this year -----[b], accompanied by -----[b], and -----[b] had an interview with the Secretary of State in his apartment in the Carlton Hotel here in Washington.

[a]See II, 110 in which NOMURA tells Tokyo of the rumor concerning American intervention for German-British peace negotiations and of a German secret emissary entering the United States with the intention of making overtures for a German-British peace.
[b]DoD Comment: Names withheld.

Trans. 7–18–41

No. 113

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 506.

(Part 2 of 5)

2. On that occasion, according to what -----[a] tells me, he being an American of German extraction, from 1920 to 1939, resided in Berlin as the representative of a certain American financial interest (since then I have ascertained that he has underwritten the Japan Electric Company through the New York organization of -----[a]) and while there he became very

intimate with HITLER, GOEBBELS, and GOERING. Especially the fact that during the early days of the Nazi movement he gave them financial assistance gives evidence to his considerable faith in the current leaders of Germany. (Incidentally, the -----[a] has underwritten this man's entire family because it was through his efforts that the -----[a] rights and properties in Germany were saved from encroachment.) However, during the latter part of last year this man returned to the United States by way of Mexico and on that occasion the leaders of the Nazi Party made him an offer of a European peace plan. Furthermore, in order to certify this man's position, HITLER and GOEBBELS gave him a written document and this he offered to Secretary HULL for his perusal. According to the peace proposals this man carried, HITLER is of a mind to open peace negotiations with Great Britain at any time. In order to do this, he hopes for the good offices of the United States. The preservation of the integrity of the British Empire is naturally one of the essential points of that peace proposal. France, Belgium and Holland are guaranteed their existence. Poland and Czechoslovakia alone are to be eliminated. The fates of Norway and Denmark are not to be touched upon in the discussions.

[a]DoD Comment: Names withheld.

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 114

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #506.

(Part 3 of 5)

(Secret outside the Department. To be handled in Government code.)

3. Though Secretary of State HULL looked at these representations, he entertained some doubt of their authenticity, but on the 15th of February this year, the first meeting of this group was held in the State Department. -----[a] making up one group; the Secretary of State, the head of the European Division, other competent heads of departments, as well as two members of the Intelligence Section, making up the State Department group, participated in these conversations. At the opening of this meeting, -----[a] presented HITLER and GOEBBELS' letter and at the same time, in order to substantiate his authority, he requested that telephone communication be made possible for him from the State Department to the Nazi authorities by international telephone. On the afternoon of that day in the presence of the State Department officials, telephone connections were made with GOEBBELS, and this man's position was satisfactorily substantiated.

4. Until the 10th of April last (during the interim this man lived in New York), conversations were carried on on four occasions. On the basis of propositions made by this man in those conversations, the State Department gave him a diplomatic passport on April 11. Accompained by one member of the State Department staff, this man boarded a clipper for Berlin by way of Lisbon. After having conferred with the Nazi officialdom, he returned to the United States under an assumed name on board the same clipper May 27. At the present time, negotiations are continuing, and he has already talked with the President.

[a]DoD Comment: Names withheld.

Trans.

No. 115

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 506.

(Part 4 of 5)

5. When he went to Germany, he was charged with negotiating the sale of German ships to the United States, as well as with the peace proposals. As a result, a purchase arrangement had been worked out before the President's order expropriating these ships was issued. The procedure for the transfer of the purchase price to German funds abroad evolved.

6. At the time the aforementioned representative of the State Department and HESS, GOERING, and GOEBBELS with the heads of the Army conferred together, HESS stressed that the group of German leaders were persistent in their desire for peace. In order to bring this about, if necessary, it was hinted that the retirement of HITLER would be effected with the mitigation of the Jewish problem.

7. Besides -----[a], a secret German Army representative is now negotiating in Washington. I understand that the State Department is now in a perplexed state, and that there are great discrepancies of opinion.

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[a]DoD Comment: Names withheld.

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 116

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 506.

(Part 5 of 5)

8. The Germans, in order to guarantee their supply of internal foodstuffs and petroleum, made demands upon Russia. They expected America to assist in this, but it is clear that they could not be obtained. The United States and Great Britain were of the opinion that the massing of troops on the border was a form of bluff. It can be said that they were in error on this point. At the same time the Germans figured that any help to Russia from England or the United States was beyond possibility. Influential persons in the Government are now asking if a miscalculation was not made.

9. It has lately begun to become evident in this connection that one of the reasons for the standstill of American-Japanese negotiations toward improvement of relations is that the Americans mistakenly harbored the idea that there was a connection between the German peace movement and the Japanese negotiations.

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 117

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 8, 1941
TO: Washington No number.

Secret within the office.

In the Oral Statement referred to in your message # 326[a], the words "his associates" are used. Please find out in a casual manner just exactly what is meant by these words and wire me back.

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[a]See II, 87, 88, and 89—text of Oral Statement dated June 21, 1941.

Trans. 7-9-41

No. 118

FROM: Tokyo July 9, 1941
TO: Washington # 345.

(Secret outside Department)

Regarding your # 424[a].

As the text of the United States government's communication regarding the question of the "Right of Self-defense" and peace conditions relative to China Affair, which you have been asked not to transmit to this office, may be very useful in sounding out the American point of view, therefore, please send the text upon receipt of same.

---

[a]Amb. Nomura wires Tokyo that in an interview with Secy. Hull, he made the statement that there seems to be influential people in Japan who do not desire an understanding with the U.S., so, after all, does Japan consider the composure of relations between the two countries so important. Nomura replies that such concession as the U.S. has so far offered are not worthy of consideration.

Trans. 7-10-41

No. 119

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 489.

(In 2 parts—complete)

(Chief of Office Routing.)

(Very secret)

The Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador:

In Section 2 of the joint declaration which was entered into today on behalf of our two governments, statements are made with regard to the attitude of the two governments toward the European war. During the informal conversations which resulted in the conclusion of this joint declaration I explained to you on a number of occasions the attitude and policy of the

government of the United States toward the hostilities in Europe and pointed out that this attitude and policy were based on the inalienable right of self-defense. I called special attention to address which -----.

(Part 2)

The Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State:

I have received your letter of June.

I wish to state that my government is fully aware of the attitude of the government of the United States toward the hostilities in Europe as explained to me by you during our recent conversations and as set forth in your address of April 24. I did not fail to report to my government the policy of the government of the United States as is therein explained to me, and I may assure you that my government understands and appreciates the attitude and position of the government of the United States with regard to the European war.

I wish also to assure you that the government of Japan, with regard to the measures which the government of the United States may be forced to adopt in defense of its own security, is not under any commitment requiring Japan to take any action contrary to or destructive of the fundamental objective of the present agreement.

The government of Japan, fully cognizant of its responsibilities freely assumed by the conclusion of this agreement, is determined to take no action inimical to the establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific Area.

Trans. 7-11-41

No. 120

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 490.

Strictly secret outside the Department.

(To be handled in Government Code.)

1. Does the term "economic cooperation" between Japan and China contemplate the granting by the Government of China to the Japanese Government or its nationals of any preferential or monopolistic rights which would discriminate in favor of the Japanese Government and Japanese nationals as compared with the Government and nationals of the United States and of other third countries? Is it contemplated that upon the inauguration of negotiations for a peaceful settlement between Japan and China the special Japanese companies, such as the North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company and their subsidiaries, will be divested, insofar as Japanese official support may be involved, of any monopolistic or other preferential rights that they may exercise in fact or that may inure to them by virtue of present circumstances in areas of China under Japanese military occupation?

2. With regard to existing restrictions upon freedom of trade and travel by nationals of third countries in Chinese territory under Japanese military occupation, could the Japanese Government indicate approximately what restrictions will be removed immediately upon the entering into by the Government at Chungking of negotiations with the Government of Japan and what restrictions will be removed at later dates, with an indication in each case insofar as possible of the approximate time within which removal of restrictions would be affected?

3. Is it the intention of the Japanese Government that the Chinese Government shall exercise full and complete control of matters relating to trade, currency and exchange? Is it

the intention of the Japanese Government to withdraw and redeem the Japanese military notes which are being circulated in China and the notes of Japanese-sponsored regimes in China? Can the Japanese Government indicate how soon after the inauguration of the contemplated negotiations arrangements to the above ends can in its opinion be carried out?

Trans. 7-11-41

No. 121

FROM: Washington July 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 478.

(Part 1 of 3)

Re my # 424[a] and your # 329 (?)[b].

Well, since I asked you for instructions already considerable time has passed and still I get no decision. In their Oral Statement they make it clear that they entertain misgivings concerning our real intentions. The instructions in your caption message clarify the intentions of our Government and did something to mitigate this, but did not succeed in dispelling their suspicions. We are delaying a reply and, thinking of this in connection with certain other circumstances, they consider that this mistrust is justified. Gradually they are losing hope of ever seeing an improvement in Japanese-American relations. Gradually they are beginning to believe there is no chance of these negotiations ever amounting to anything. A certain Cabinet member confidentially told a man connected with our Embassy that unless we immediately resume our conferences, it will be too bad and that he is worried because the situation is taking a turn unfavorable to the parleys.

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[a]Ambassador NOMURA discusses the attitude of the United States towards the proposal and the three important discrepancies in the demands of both sides.

[b]Not available.

Trans. 7-9-41

No. 122

FROM: Washington July 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 478.

(Part 2 of 3)

I am sorry that in my negotiations, I have been unable to drive home your instructions, but since hostilities broke out between Germany and the Soviet the tendency is to closely scrutinize the moves that Japan makes or seems about to make. Some say that Japan will now try to realize the hopes she has entertained for many years of expanding northward and that she will not put much stress on the Japanese-Soviet treaty. Others say that she will now continue to move southward and that this coincides with the desire of Germany. There are even some who say that it does not matter which or what Japan does, and that the thought of her disturbing the peace of the Pacific or broadening the theater of war is merely an illusion because, after all, she is worn out and has no international credit. The Secretary of State has talked

with me altogether seventeen times because he regards the Japanese-American question as very grave. Every time we have talked on this subject he has repeated this fact twice. Those working on the flank have ceaselessly contacted Cabinet members with whom they are intimate. The President also is just as much concerned, so I have heard.

Trans. 7–9–41

No. 123

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 478.

(Part 3 of 3)

By and large, Navy quarters also take the same view. This, I think, would be only natural because of the political situation here as well as this country's defense program. I must say that I cannot believe, if we stick to our present adamant attitude, that they will finally give in. Everything I read in the newspapers and magazines leads me to believe that the Government of the United States would not show a softer demeanor. I rather think that there is a great danger that they will break off the negotiations at the first opportunity. The main thorny points in the pending proposal are the right of self-defense, the stationing of troops, and the principle of non-discrimination in commerce, and I am completely at my wits' end, but still I feel an urgent impulse not to break off contact with them. If you want to send me another definite proposal, I will present it to them, but cannot you possibly reach some decision on their proposals which I have already sent you? I am sorry to keep troubling you with this matter.

Trans. 7–9–41

No. 124

FROM: Tokyo July 10, 1941
TO: Washington # 350.

At present there are some things under discussion concerning Japanese-American matters for which I cannot depend too much on telegrams; and as there are certain reports I want to get first-hand from Consul General WAKASUGI, please send him home immediately.

Trans. 7–11–41

No. 125

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 495.

Re your # 350[a].

Immediately following the opening of the war between Soviet Russia and Germany, I noticed that the United States was eager to adjust Japanese-American relations before it was too late. Information received since then seems to indicate that she is very suspicious of Japan's attitude. If we negotiate quickly, it may be said that the possibility of a settlement

is not entirely hopeless. However, under the present circumstances there is no time for you to recall a man, get from him the facts of the situation, and then appoint him to carry on the negotiations. There is no reason to believe that an understanding could be arrived at by doing so. It is my opinion that circumstances which would necessitate severance of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States are much more imminent than we think they are and so my remaining here would avail nothing. Since I believe that I should personally report to you the facts and, also, that my leaving would have no serious effect on the United States, I would like to have you permit my returning to Japan and making a report.

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[a] See II, 124 in which Tokyo requests Washington that Consul General WAKASUGI be recalled to report first hand.

Trans. 7-11-41

No. 126

FROM: Tokyo — July 11, 1941
TO: Washington — # 356.

Regarding your # 495[a].

As U.S.-Japanese relations become more critical, it becomes increasingly necessary for you to stick to your post to represent Japan. It goes without saying that you should remain there and do everything in your power to improve conditions.

I realize, of course, that there could be nothing better than to hear you report on the situation in person. However, because of the above consideration, I ordered Minister Wakasugi home immediately in place of yourself.

Even if we do not refer to our Emperor's wishes, your return home at this time cannot be countenanced from the standpoint of public opinion. Even assuming that a successful conclusion of a U.S.-Japanese understanding seems hopeless, I am convinced that you should remain at your post to the last and attempt to figure out ways and means of making the best of the situation. (If I were to express myself bluntly on this point, I would say that it would be of more importance for you to do so, if circumstances do not allow any optimism.)

For these reasons, this Minister cannot grant your request to return home at this time.

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[a] Jap Amb. Nomura wires Tokyo requesting that he be allowed to return to Tokyo instead of Minister Wakasugi, stating his reasons therefore. See II, 125.

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 127

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo — No number.

Re # 356[a].

I am extremely sorry ----- ----- and I wish to apologize for having caused you displeasure on account of my lack of experience, though, in obedience to your instructions, my intention was to remain here and do my utmost until the present critical situation reached a stage of

possible solution. Quite contrary to my original intention, it seems that my successive telegrams have had much to do with the decline of our country's honor in the eyes of the people within and without the country. I will, in the future, be especially cautious and endeavor to avoid errors even in small matters. However, in view of the fact that the bringing up I have had was in a society in which I was allowed to use my own judgment more or less freely even in matters which I have been ordered to carry out, and so to exercise my judgment has become my second nature, I cannot be sure of not troubling you again and thereby doing harm to my country. Therefore, no matter from what angle I regard the question, I cannot help but keenly feel that I should resign as soon as possible for the good of the country. In view of the political situation, I earnestly hope that you will not hesitate in transferring my duties to ----- person whom you have selected as being more in accordance with your desire. I fully realize that I am not the right man. I am, in fact, no more than a temporary stop-gap. As I have assured you previously, I have no intention whatsoever of bringing any degree of disaster to this position before my return to Japan. I most earnestly hope that you would consider this point carefully.

The matter that was discussed recently and for the transmission of which the return of WAKASUGI[b] became a question, was an off-the-record discussion of a private nature, and since it had chiefly to do with political matters, I personally assumed the responsibility. However, it was not a matter of such importance that it requires reporting personally in part, that is, in addition to what has already been communicated to you by telegram. As I have already wired you, I cannot help but advise you against recalling WAKASUGI and settling the matter discussed after you have heard the details from him. WAKASUGI was sent here to assist me in the performance of my duties. He wishes to remain here so long as I am at this post. Will you, therefore, reconsider the matter? However, if you insist on his returning to Japan, I have no more to say in regard to this question. In that case, I would like to have you wire me your decision.

---

[a]See II, 126, MATSUOKA, replying to NOMURA's wire requesting that he be allowed to return to Tokyo instead of WAKASUGI, says it is absolutely necessary that NOMURA stick to his post.

[b]Consul General, Japanese Embassy in Washington. Chief Advisor to Ambassador NOMURA.

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 128

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 479.

Re my # 426[a].

The word "associates", I have been given to understand refers to all persons who have conferred with them upon orders from myself, that is, WAKASUGI, OKUMURA, MATSUDAIRA, IWAKURO, and IKADA.

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[a]Text of Oral Statement dated June 21, 1941. See II, 87-89.

Trans. 7-10-41

No. 129

FROM: Tokyo July 11, 1941
TO: Washington #355.

(In 5 parts—complete.)

Strictly confidential.

Re your #479[a].

It should be needless to say that they are on your "staff" and are not your associates. The only exception to this rule is when the Foreign Minister names a person to a specific commission. Hence, unless Colonel Iwakuro is specifically named to some post by this Minister, he is in no position whatsoever to be considered an associate.

With regard to IKAWA, I am sure that you will recall that I sent you a cable in considerable detail before I embarked on my tour of Europe, that he is in no way connected with the Premier or with any other member of the Cabinet. He was brought up in the Finance Ministry, and, as you will find out if you make inquiries of persons in that Ministry, he is held in low esteem by them.

You must be aware of the fact that a person of that sort should not in any way, either directly or indirectly, be connected with a matter of such vast importance as the one in hand.

It is obvious from the text of the oral statement that the United States is of the opinion that these men are your associates. This is a point which this Minister considers exceedingly regrettable, and I request that you take immediate steps to correct this misconception.

(Part 2)

Moreover, the "oral statement" implies that as long as there are questionable persons in the Konoye Cabinet, the "Understanding Pact" cannot be put into effect, even presupposing that such an instrument is signed. In other words, as it must have become apparent to you upon reading over the "oral statement" once, the wording of that statement is tantamount to demanding that we reorganize the personnel of our Cabinet.

Under these circumstances, it should be plain to see that not only the government of Japan, but those persons representing it, have the perfect right to reject the "oral statement". However, keeping in mind the condition of U.S.-Japanese relations as well as the general outlook on the world, I, for one, made a decision to suffer in silence.

I, of course, assume that you, realizing the importance and gravity of the contents of the "oral statement" insisted upon fully discussing the various points. You no doubt pointed out that you were requesting the detailed explanation on the grounds that the instrument has had only a very few, if any, comparable parallels in the history of the world.

For your reference, I bring out the following points, with the request that you explain them fully to the other side in order to correct whatever misconceptions they may harbor:

(Part 3)

1. You will recall that Premier Konoye was interviewed by newspaper men on a train subsequent to the signing of the Tripartite Pact. You will also remember that the greater part of that interview was falsely reported by the press, as was made clear at the time.

2. The greater part of the interview published, which I allegedly gave to an American magazine writer, was also false. The magazine writer even broke his promise to submit a copy of the interview before it was dispatched. Moreover, he even went so far as to release the information to the United Press without obtaining any permission to do so.

The gist of what I actually said at that time was that Japan has every intention of being loyal to the terms of the Tripartite Pact. I added, however, that should the United States go to war, forcing a clash between Japan and the United States, there would be, without a doubt, a horrible effect on all mankind. For this reason, I explained, every effort should be made to prevent its being brought about.

As I reported to you at the time, that was as far as I went in my interview. If all of the statements that I have made to Parliament and to all other persons and groups are read carefully and in a calm atmosphere, it will be found that I have never once gone beyond the limit described above.

While on this topic, although it does not have a direct bearing on the subject at hand, I wish to say that the published report of Menken's interview with Premier Konoye, the effects of which you recently reported, was false, almost in its entirety. Menken brought along a letter of introduction from a certain prominent American, and requested that he be permitted to take pictures of the Premier. The Premier gave his permission and while they were being taken, Menken and the Premier conversed (while standing) for a matter of possibly two or three minutes. Menken wrote up a story and released it to the United Press; (probably sold it to them).

This is another example of exceedingly unethical and damaging acts. Even if it is true that it had little or no effect in the United States, the very unfavorable reaction in Germany and Italy is one which cannot be lightly discounted. The Premier feels very strongly about this case of libel and is determined to act with more caution in the future.

In view of my past experience, I have adopted a policy of refusing to grant any interviews except to persons whose characters are guaranteed by the United States Ambassador and for whose acts and words the U.S. Embassy agrees to be held responsible.

I mention this for your information.

(Part 4)

3. The explanations made by Chief of the Information Section Ishii who is frequently termed "the spokesman for Japan", to the Approval Committee did not go beyond the bounds described above.

If the United States expects Japan to double-cross her Axis partners or even wishes Japan to assume a lukewarm attitude towards them on the basis of any of these public statements, the United States is being unreasonable, and is in for a disappointment. I am convinced that if the United States were in the same position as we, she would assume the same, or possibly even stronger, attitude.

4. If it is generally believed that there is a split within the Japanese cabinet, the so-called "lying reports" must be responsible for the misconception. As you will have no difficulty in guessing, these reports are probably based on rumors started by those who have not been able to make the grade into the Cabinet.

When confronted with a matter as important as the one at hand, any country's government would thoroughly discuss it from all possible angles. That is all that we are doing, and any report of dissatisfaction within the Cabinet is coming from without.

(Part 5)

It is true that the United States and British Ambassadors in Tokyo have a tendency to seize upon these rumors and place considerable weight on them when reporting on them to their home governments. It may be that the President and the Secretary of State have an entirely misrepresented picture of Japan because too much credence has been given to idle rumor.

Since this is an exceedingly grave matter we are discussing, please make every effort to correct such erroneous opinons, if indeed they exist, for as long as they exist, we cannot hope to ever reach a successful agreement.

There is absolutely no truth in the rumor that Premier Konoye and I do not see eye to eye on matters. (These rumors have died down in Japan of late.) The truth is that the Premier and I are in complete agreement where improvement of U.S.-Japanese relations is concerned. In other words, we both are anxious to bring about an "Understanding Pact" between Japan and the United States as I have made clear to you right from the beginning. The War and Navy Ministries, also, are in complete accord in this matter as are all of the other Ministers.

Since this is an exceedingly important point, please explain it to the President and the Secretary of State so that they can make no mistake about it.

See II, 128.

Trans. 7-12-41

No. 130

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

July 11, 1941
357.

From Chief of American Bureau, Terasaki, to Counselor Iguti:

Message # 355[a] from Tokyo to Washington contained the Minister's immediate reactions upon receiving the "oral statement". Please bear that in mind.

With regard to message # 356[b], please be advised of the fact that the official Japanese attitude concerning the U.S. proposal will be cabled to you very shortly.

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[a]Matsuoka wires Nomura that the U.S. "oral statement" implies a misconception on the part of that country as to Japan's motives and attitude toward the "understanding pact". In a four-page message, he clarifies various points in this connection. See II, 129.

[b]See II, 126.

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 131

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

July 14, 1941
508.

Part 1 of 8.

Re your # 356[a].

1. I agree with you upon the importance of their Oral Statement, but I do not think we could go so far as to say that they were trying to bring about a revision of our Cabinet. I think that all they were trying to do was to find out how sincere we were in our apparent desire to improve Japanese-American relations. What Your Excellency complains about was naturally the result of a one-sided misunderstanding on their part. All too often did the American Embassy in Tokyo send in malevolent reports and all too often did your so-called friends, who wished

to thwart these negotiations, engage in damaging activities (take the words of the Americans as they stand). Another trouble was that Germany (who originated the broadcast containing rumors of Your Excellency's resignation) and China engaged in every sort of activity possible to thwart us. There are many indications that this is the case. All along I have repeated to them two or three times what you have told me in your instructions. Each time they were persuaded but ere long they received reports from financial circles which upset everything I said and suspicions were again aroused.

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[a]See II, 126 in which Matsuoka, replying to Nomura's request that he be allowed to return to Tokyo instead of Wakasugi, says it is absolutely necessary that Nomura stick to his post.

Trans. 7-17-41

No. 132

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 508.

Part 2 of 8.

2. I believed and never once doubted that it was at this stage the serious policy of the Imperial Government to improve Japanese-American relations. But, since then Oh, how often have I met with opposition! How often have I lost faith in my subordinates! But, in spite of that and enduring it all, to this day I have held to my post and while enduring every sort of bitterness I have stuck to my ideal; that is because I have had faith in what I conceived to be the primary policy of our Government. As I reflect upon the general atmosphere in this country when I took office, I can see how relations between our two countries were following an ever roughening road. I thought that perhaps I could make our two countries each understand the position of the other; but, alas, I can see that that was only an airy story told in a dream.

Trans. 7-17-41

No. 133

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 508.

Part 3 of 8.

In order to begin negotiations under the conditions I have described above and seeing how much dissatisfaction there was over the content of the negotiations (it is clear that there is a limit to dissatisfaction), naturally I had to make ready. So, I came to entertain the view that it would be hopeless to deal with the Secretary of State alone and thus try to bring about the desired results. (On this point the Postmaster General, PURA-TO[a], and other well-known men of my acquaintance agreed with me.) When I began the unofficial negotiations which I am now conducting, members of the Embassy and the Military and Naval Attaches were consulted by me and we decided to use underhanded means to feel our way here in Washington and to hurry along the unofficial negotiations. (As you requested I have reported to you on this matter.) Since then, under my direction, the negotiations have been progressing and I have been having reported to me the details of how the underhanded schemes are working

out. Thus, I have been trying to coordinate the work of the people concerned. I can assure you, however, that in this connection I have overlooked nothing and nothing has gone amiss.

[a]Kana spelling, probably PRATT.

Trans. 7-17-41

No. 134

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 508.

Part 4 of 8.

Furthermore, it is perfectly evident that in making our proposals, as well as in countering theirs, especially in all important matters, I personally conferred with the Postmaster General. I naturally expect that you are aware of this, also, in the light of the fact that I have negotiated with the Chief[a] as many as seventeen times. Then, there is the fact that I have assisted the negotiations in no small way by conferring again with the Postmaster General. In the meantime, as it became clear from your telegram that Germany had sent a secret agent and also that T. V. SOONG and other Chinese agents had been sent and had been actively negotiating in secret, I became increasingly certain that, resorting to under-cover methods in carrying on these negotiations, I had chosen the right method. Naturally, I came to appreciate your wisdom in having used MATSUMOTO and NISHI in this connection. For this reason, I was secretly expecting that I would be given your approval.

[a]Probably HULL.

Trans. 7-17-41

No. 135

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 508.

Part 5 of 8.

The word "associates" which appears in the Oral Statement they gave us was used also in the Oral Statement which I handed to them in accordance with instructions (?). The word simply means HULL's cooperators, namely, such persons as HAMILTON, BALLANTINE, and the Postmaster General, and it should be taken in a very light sense, for in both cases it is not a word having a strictly limited legal sense, so I would like to have the word understood simply as meaning cooperators. There is absolutely no such misunderstanding on their part as to believe that Colonel IWAKURO and IKAWA and others were authorized by our Government to represent us. Because of the fact that the Postmaster General is truly desirous of seeing these negotiations brought to a successful end, he is naturally one through which we could carry on our undercover campaign. Whenever any matter is brought up, the responsibility of which is clearly defined, he always says, "Go and ask HULL about it." Please, therefore,

understand that both of these men have a clear-cut conception as to how far they may exercise their respective authorities.

Trans. 7-17-41

No. 136

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #508.

Part 6 of 8.

Before Colonel IWAKURO came here as my assistant, I requested the Army and Navy to send a competent man. I suppose that an understanding was reached between the Foreign and Military officials as to his duties. Thank you for your caution concerning IKAWA. For a time, since the last of last month, there was a misunderstanding between him and the members of our Embassy concerning the handling of intelligences and telegrams. However, since the beginning of this month, under the supervision of IWAKURO, he has been acting as an interpreter and in his contacts with American agents of the inner circle he has been quite zealous and has achieved a great deal. He is continuing his work along these lines. I can assure you that all rumors concerning the undependability of this man are false.

Trans. 7-17-41

No. 137

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #508.

Part 7 of 8.

The foregoing is the explanation of how the word "associates" has been used in connection with our undercover activity. Personally, I saw nothing wrong with the word and was very much grieved to find unexpectedly that in using it I acted against your wishes. The most pressing question before them is whether Japan at this critical moment should adjust her relations with the United States or give up all attempts in this direction for she must at this moment choose either one of these two alternatives. Moreover, if the matter is decided too hastily, the situation is so pressing that a good opportunity might be lost forever. I, therefore, do not wish to waste time at this critical moment bickering over the question of procedure. Besides, for compatriots to be arguing over details and to be casting suspicion on one another in the face of a serious crisis threatening the country would cause the enthusiasm and courage of those who are sincerely working in this matter to wilt, and would interfere with the progress of the negotiations. Since I feel this very keenly, I do not wish to go further into a discussion of details.

Trans. 7-17-41

No. 138

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 508.

Part 8 of 8.

If, in the negotiations and measures which naturally come within the sphere of my responsibility, you have any faults to find, after negotiations are broken off, since you have not yet seen fit to order me back to Japan, I am determined to exercise my own judgment as to how the final details are disposed of. On these points, at least, I hope that you will trust me for a while. This request is not based upon any willful or dogmatic determination to have my own way in carrying out the high policies of our government, nor is it that I am unwilling to listen to good advice. As I have told you in many telegrams, I have not dealt in any secret talks in the negotiations. On all the proposals I presented them, beforehand I always conferred with the members of the Embassy staff and with the Military and Naval Attaches and got their assistance. I want you please to bear these points in mind.

Trans. 7-17-41

No. 139

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 507.

While Secretary HULL is away recuperating from an illness at a summer resort where the air is better than here in Washington, on the 13th I sent him my good wishes for a quick recovery. On the 14th HAMILTON came to see me on the Secretary's behalf. He said that Mr. HULL thanked me for my solicitude and continued that if there was anything on my mind, whatever it might be, to let him know. I replied: "Well, Premier Konoye and Foreign Minister Matsuoka both equally hope that relations between Japan and the United States can be harmoniously settled. The Ministers of the Army and Navy and other Cabinet members are all agreed on this. Among them there is no difference of opinion. Irresponsible high officials have spread rumors and perhaps officials in the American Embassy in Tokyo have sent in reports which have done harm." HAMILTON then said: "While HULL considers peace desirable between Japan and the United States, he also hopes that Japan will not make war upon other countries." I retorted: "Well, when it comes to that, aren't there rumors that the United States is also getting military bases in other countries?"

For your information.

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 140

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 14, 1941
TO: Washington # 364.

(Part 1 of 4)

I have not yet received a reply but in any case, whether they intend this Oral Statement which you have sent me to be a part of the proposal for an understanding or not, it is a detestable document beyond any doubt. For one country to tell another totally independent power

how its Government should be organized and criticize important elements in that Government and to suggest that this person or that person be eliminated, is unheard of. Under these circumstances, even if we would conclude this understanding, its result would be nil. I might say that it would be a mere phantasm. In the last paragraph just before the note there is something abominable written. They ask that we change the set-up of our Government and its attitude. Such a thing belongs to the realm of the fantastic. If my memory serves me rightly, during the summer of 1905, in connection with the Tangiers Incident, the German Kaiser asked the French to banish THEOPHILE DELCASSE, but France did not listen, of course, and the incident was never settled harmoniously. A country can only tell its dependencies and protectorates such things as that. If you will carefully scrutinize this Oral Statement, you can well see that so far as the present government of Japan is concerned, it is enough to cause a rupture in the negotiations.

Trans. 7-15-41

No. 141

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 14, 1941
TO: Washington # 364.

(Part 2 of 4)

I, the Foreign Minister, have confidence in the majesty of the Empire of Japan and its basis as an independent nation and I have worried night and day, thinking of every angle in this case because I have hoped to settle the matter pleasantly and without harshness, but this Oral Statement is something which strikes me to the very heart and which I cannot bear. Note the following:

1. This Oral Statement: You, Sir, and your so-called fellow travellers have an attitude which is entirely at variance with the attitude of our present Government and the horrible thing about it is that you have willingly allowed the United States to mold your opinions. Saddest of all, here in Japan you have a few adherents. For the representative of a country to directly oppose the Government he represents is almost unforgivable and I know of no precedent for it in our history. For a representative of a given country to allow foreign leaders to influence him and for him, in turn, to try to influence his Government belongs not only to the realm of the preposterous, but also to that of base rudeness.

2. This Oral Statement! Had I been a proud man on my dignity, when I received this Oral Statement on 8th, Sir, I would have flashed back to you my resentment, but the reason why I have waited until now is that I did not wish to cause hard feelings and wished to avoid offending the Americans in the least. Hopeless as it seemed, I still wished to see something achieved in these negotiations, but when this Oral Statement came, you may be sure that we examined it from every angle. I do not doubt that you have been put out through waiting so long for instructions, but we, too, have had our worries over the matter here.

Trans. 7-15-41

No. 142

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 14, 1941
TO: Washington #364.

(Part 3 of 4)

3. Do you not know that, if the Imperial Government had presented an Oral Statement like this to the American Government, their indignation would have been unimaginable.

4. In my opinion, although it is possible that Japanese-American relations may be adjusted at some time in the remote future, for this sort of hideous document to stand like a shadow between our two nations, would bode neither of us ever any good.

5. For the American Government to even hint that so long as the present Government is not changed in its constituency probably an understanding cannot be established, is inconceivable. The present Cabinet is not by any means ready to consider this proposal seriously. I do not think that the Secretary of State thought quite that far, but, depending upon whether he is sincere and upon how sincere he is, the Imperial Government is disposed to draw up a proposal which we hope will bring a solution to the problem.

Trans. 7-15-41

No. 143

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 14, 1941
TO: Washington #364.

(Part 4 of 4)

Proceeding from this point of view, if the United States will not rescind the Oral Statement, the Japanese Government cannot proceed to consider a plan for an understanding. I feel sure that the American Government would not like to break off with us. I want you please to go to the American officials and tell them that this Oral Statement is extremely hateful to us. Explain to them the position of the Imperial Government and see if you cannot show them what we are trying to have them understand. Most of all, without any delay, be sure to send the Oral Statement back to them with our veto. Tell them that the reason why we waited so long in doing this was because we felt a little delicacy and did not wish to hurt their feelings, and hoped that the matter could be settled without any wrangling.

Well, I am thinking this matter over seriously indeed and in a day or two I will send you a revised proposal of ours, accompanied by a list of why's and wherefore's. Will you please explain this to the Secretary of State.

Trans. 7-15-41

No. 144

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 14, 1941
TO: Washington # 365.

(Part 1 of 6)

Secret outside the Department.

Re your # 424[a].

Though their proposals along many important points are extremely divergent from our own, in view of the great importance of Japan-American relationships, we have plumbed the depths in endeavoring to bring about some sort of conciliatory proposals. Making repeated profound studies, we have at long last finally drawn up a series of proposals which have been discussed in secret conclave lasting several days. Through these we have hit finally upon a solution which is in keeping with the plans of the Imperial Japanese Army. This is incorporated in my # 366[b]. These proposals reflect the maximum limit to which we can comply with the purport of the American proposals. In spite of the fact that the phraseology and gist of the preface, clauses 1, 4 and 6 differ greatly from our proposals, we have decided to adopt them as they stand. However, the other clauses in their proposals, not being in accord with the Empire's fundamental national policy are impossible to accept as they stand, much as I regret it. We have, however, gone to great pains in order to make our revised proposals in detail and in form as closely similar to theirs as is possible. After your Excellency has given those points due consideration, I would like to have you do your very utmost to bring about their acceptance of these proposals. The reasons underlying our revisions are as follows.

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[a]Ambassador NOMURA wires Tokyo that in an interview with Secretary HULL he made the statement that there seem to be influential people in Japan who do not desire an understanding with the U.S., so, after all, does Japan consider the composure of relations between the two countries so important. Nomura replies that such concessions as the U.S. has so far offered are not worthy of consideration. Nomura also discusses the three important discrepancies in the demands of both sides.

[b]Japan's revisions of the original text.

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 145

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 14, 1941
TO: Washington # 365.

(Part 2 of 6)

2. The attitude of the two countries with regard to the European war.

(a) They will object doubtless in principle to the gist of clause 1 of our original proposals; i.e., that we, together with the United States, would do our utmost to bring about international peace by an early restoration of peace in Europe. We feel that it is absolutely essential that the spirit and object of our activities shall be for the restoration of such a peace, and through from considerations of internal politics this clause should by all means remain in the final text, after considering all possible conciliation to their views, it is felt that the words, "At a fitting opportunity in the future," be inserted in the phrase, "assist in the bringing about of a settlement of the European war". Thus, we will make it easier for them to accept it.

(b) With regard to clause 2 of our original proposals, as long as we do not abrogate the Tripartite Alliance between Japan, Germany, and Italy, we must insist upon its remaining in the proposals. Further, clause 3, as the United States pointed out, since the agreement has already been publicly announced, it is necessary that this be retained, and there should be no objection to this. It isn't that the Tripartite Alliance is at variance with Japan-American understanding and that this should be made absolutely clear is a major issue in the stand of the Japanese Government. Though I believe that they will permit clauses 2 and 3 to remain in the text, after giving due consideration to the position of the United States, in the light of the temper of their proposals, we will take the first part of clause 2 of those proposals intact and place it in the preface of our revised proposals. Thus, the substance of clause 3 of our first proposal will be incorporated in that clause. We, therefore, can let clause 3 go.

Trans. 7–16–41

No. 146

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 14, 1941
TO: Washington # 365.

(Part 3 of 6)

(c) Reviving the fourth clause of our original proposals, that clause being so dependent on (a) and (b), we shall make it the third clause of our revised proposals. In the past, this clause has found its place in the American proposals. With regard to this, since it is tantamount to demanding the revision of the phrase, "that we will not take an aggressive stand," though they may continue to oppose this revised proposal to the bitter end, I do not think that they will. I want you to take steps so that in the minutes of these negotiations, it will be noted that we have again and again, as on this occasion, assumed the position of not approving the unfriendly steps taken by the United States in the past against Germany and Italy.

3. The steps for the bringing about of peace between Japan and China.

In referring to these articles and clauses which are of the essence of the Imperial Government's policies toward China, as well as for the establishment of the new order in East Asia, they have consumed much of our attention. It is hard for us to accept the American proposals which would drastically revise the gist of our original proposals. The American proposals reject the tenor of our statements in our original proposals with regard to the fundamental agreement between Japan and China and the tenor of the joint declaration by Japan, Manchukuo, and China. In view of the fact that in the statement, "Peace negotiations shall be carried out with the Chinese Government" (It is clear that they mean the CHIANG regime), they demand that we nullify our achievements thus far, as well as our policy of regarding the Chungking Government as merely a regional regime. On the other hand, though it is thought that much confusion would be brought about by leaving out such important matters as joint anti-Communistic endeavors, the independence of Far Eastern countries, (?) and other things which make for the survival of the people of the Far East and the safety of our Empire, we have deleted phrases and clauses from our original proposals with little consideration. Thus, we have, by incorporating limited revisions of their proposals, tried to bring about a conciliatory settlement.

Trans. 7–18–41

No. 147

FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) July 14, 1941
TO: Washington # 365.

(Part 4 of 6)

Thus, the statement in the revised proposal "regulations and terms already put into effect on the basis of this principle" means comprehensively, an agreement between Japan, and a joint declaration on the part of Japan, Manchukuo and China. But since we saw that if we made this too obvious we could not get their approval, we decided to put it into less conspicuous phraseology.

Furthermore, in our revised proposal we are avoiding using the title "Chungking (?) Government," which the Americans did not like in our first proposal. You know how we, on the other hand, detest the phrase "Government of China;" so that is why we have chosen to use such a simple and vague expression as "the CHIANG regime." We hope that this will be agreeable to both sides. Finally, in our first proposal, we merely wished to inform the United States that we earnestly desired peace negotiations with China. We merely asked them to intervene with CHIANG KAI-SHEK. That did not mean that we wished to conclude an agreement with the United States concerning peace with China. The Chinese Incident cannot and must not be decided through the intervention of any third country. That has been, is, and will always, be our irrevocable policy. Thus, the "annex" to the American proposal must all be eliminated.

I want you to be sure to get a promise from the United States that if CHIANG will not listen to their warning, they will stop assisting him in any way.

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 148

FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) July 14, 1941
TO: Washington # 365.

(Part 5 of 6)

4. Commerce between both countries.

In the revised proposal we accept this clause bodily from the American proposal. Our own first proposal will be entirely forgotten. However, if we let that "annex" stand, our commercial dealings with the United States might fall back into the same state they were before the incident. We need, for our National Defense and for the development of our industries, military goods and other important commodities from the United States, and if the "annex" stood, these could not be obtained and they might lay further embargoes and limitations against us. This would stand as a great obstacle in the way of an improvement in the commercial relations between our two countries. That is why we eliminated it.

5. Economic activities of the two countries in the Pacific area.

We have changed the Pacific Area which they mention in their proposal to "Southwestern Pacific" (in the preface we made the same change), thus restoring our first proposal. That is because the area where we feel the need of cooperation is specifically the Southwestern Pacific. That is the area where we need to cooperate as I say, but that does not mean that we desire or need any pact concerning this matter. Therefore, the American proposal is totally and abso-

lutely at variance with our own. Thus, we will insist upon our first proposal. However, your message # 234[a] reveals some changes which the United States already seems willing to make, so I do not suppose that they will object very much.

[a]The text of the Proposal for an Understanding between the United States and Japan dated (April 17, 1941).

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 149

FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) July 14, 1941
TO: Washington # 365.

(Part 6 of 6)

6. The policy of both countries relative to the political stability of the Pacific Area.

We have revised our first proposal concerning the Philippines, mentioned in clauses 1 and 2 of the 6th article of the American proposal. The question of Philippine independence is a question concerning the United States alone. We are not in a position to interfere in this matter, but yet that area comes under our East Asia Area of Co-prosperity. Therefore, they must guarantee the independence of these Islands and friendly treatment to Japanese residents. It is our mission to see that the various races of East Asia prosper and receive good treatment. Therefore, we wish assurance from the United States on these points. As I said, while we do appreciate the position of the United States, if this understanding is to be concluded, it is only natural that the United States must also consider our point of view. As for clause 3 concerning the immigration question, we have restored our proposal. That is because we cannot disregard the welfare of our own country in order to adjust our relations with the United States. We consider the position of the United States and know that such matters as this have to be submitted to Parliaments. Therefore, we have changed the expression "will give indiscriminatory treatment" to "the American Government will endeavor to give indiscriminatory treatment."

ADDENDUM

We have restored our first proposal. However, we do not think that any explanation is necessary.

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 150

FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) July 14, 1941
TO: Washington # 366.

(Part 1 of 3)

(To be kept secret within the Department).

1. Above "Tiaheiyo Chiiki" (Pacific Area) in the 5th article listed in the beginning of the American proposal, we will add the two words "nansei" (Southwestern) and clause 7 of the American proposal will not be an independent section, but it will rather be made (b) of clause 6. (See clause 6 of the basic proposal.)

2. Clause 2. The attitude of the Governments of the two nations concerning the European war.

(a) We will make a number of revisions in the first clause of the first Japanese proposal and restore it as the first clause. It reads "The Governments of Japan and the United States will have as their joint objective the bringing about of world peace and when a suitable opportunity comes to prevent the expansion of the European war, both countries will work together for the restoration of an immediate peace."

(b) We will revise the second clause of the first Japanese proposal and leave it as the second clause. We will eliminate the first clause of the American Proposal. Thus: The Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of the Tripartite Agreement was and is defensive and designed to prevent the participation of nations in the European war not at present involved in it, but if unfortunately the European war expands, the Japanese Government will carry out its treaty obligations and, with solely the safety and welfare of the nation in mind, decide upon her attitude.

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 151

FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) July 14, 1941
TO: Washington # 366.

(Part 2 of 3)

(c) We eliminate clause 3 of our revised proposal.

(d) We restore clause 4 of our revised proposal and eliminate clause 2 of the American proposal.

(e) We eliminate the note at the end of the American proposal.

3. Article 3. Steps for the restoration of peace between Japan and China.

We will revise this and eliminate the statement under Article 3 and also "The Japanese Government wishes to point out clearly that the basic principles relative to the settlement of the China incident do not conflict either with the principles revealed in Premier KONOYE's statement or with agreements and other measures which Japan has already effected. The President of the United States will request that the CHIANG KAI SHEK Regime, in order to bring about an amicable settlement to the war and peaceful relations, begin negotiations with the Japanese Government," and -----.

4. Clause 5. The economic activity of the two nations in the Pacific Area.

This will be revised as follows: "Inasmuch as it has been clearly indicated that economic activity of the United States and of Japan in the southwest Pacific should be carried on by a peaceful means and in accordance with the principle of non-discriminatory treatment in international trade, the Japanese Government and the United States Government shall cooperate in the production and acquirement of natural resources in that area which the two nations desire (such, for example, as petroleum, rubber, tin, and nickel).

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 152

FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) July 14, 1941
TO: Washington # 366.

(Part 3 of 3)

5. Article 6. The policy of both countries with reference to the political stability of the Pacific Area.

(1) We will make the American revised proposal the first clause as it stands, and place (a) at the heading.

(2) Concerning the Philippines, we will revive our first proposal and place (b) at the heading.

(3) Third clause ((c) The Government of the United States will consider the Japanese immigrants in the United States in a friendly manner, and endeavor to grant them the same non-discriminatory treatment as other nations). This stipulation may be made a separate agreement.)

Article 6. *ADDENDUM.*

The last sentence in the last paragraph of the addendum to our first proposal (i.e., The scope for the application of this agreement, ----- and the period of validity will be agreed upon by the governments of both nations) will be appended to the revised proposal.

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 153

FROM: Tokyo July 16, 1941
TO: Washington No number.

To Counselor IGUCHI from Chief of American Division of Foreign Ministry, TERASAKI.

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, who understood the American Oral Statement to mean that the United States is demanding that we revise our present cabinet, wrote my # 364[a] as well as # 365[b] with his own hand. How about asking Ambassador Nomura to wire him back this explanation immediately: "There are many rumors at present to the effect that the Secretary of State and the other officials did not mean the Oral Statement to be taken in such a way as that. Its object was only to dispel opposition to an adjustment of Japanese-American relations within the United States. The Oral Statement was designed purely and simply to route opposition. It had no other meaning."

Let this matter be between you and me because I have taken it upon myself to wire you this.

[a] II, 140-143.
[b] II, 144-149.

Trans. (Not dated)

No. 154

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 520.

On the evening of the 15th, both HAMILTON and BALLANTINE called on me. Saying that they had come in compliance with the desire of the Secretary of State who is now convalescing,

they stated: "We are now having a series of conferences to discuss questions centering on maintenance of peace in the Pacific. However, we are in receipt recently of information to the effect that Japan is going to acquire naval and air bases in French Indo-China. We would like to know the truth of all this." I replied: "I, too, know nothing about this question except what I have read in newspapers. By assistance being given by both Britain and the United States to Chungking; by the cooperation effected between the United States and Soviet Russia, Japan is gradually being encircled. Under such circumstances it is not at all surprising to me that such rumors are current at this time. When you realize that the United States has actually occupied Iceland and when it is rumored that she is about to put her hand on Dakar and the Azores, it would not seem strange at all if Japan should do what she is reported to be planning. However, I will give you a reply after I have asked my Government about it." They next asked: "Has Japan, in addition to the Alliance Agreement, a special understanding with Germany and Italy whereby she will fight against the United States in case the latter enters the war?" To this I replied: I don't think there is such an agreement, but in such an event, the duties specified in the third clause of the Alliance Agreement will come into effect and as to what these duties really are, I don't see that there is any need of asking Tokyo about them; they are included in the agreement. I once told Secretary HULL that the Japanese Government will not be able to tell whether what the United States will do in the future will be entirely in the nature of self-defense, and, so, would have to consider each move individually. The United States is, from the standpoint of national defense, the safest of all countries and has little danger of being invaded by another country. Having a special relation with Canada; with Mexico in a position similar to Manchukuo; and with the countries north, as well as south of Panama coming under her influence, the question of safety from the viewpoint of national defense is not such that can be discussed in comparison with that of Japan."

I then repeated what I had once discussed with Secretary HULL, whereupon they spoke of ----- of Secretary HULL.

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 155

FROM: Tokyo July 16, 1941
TO: Washington #377.

Re my #365[a].

It has been confidentially decided that the present cabinet must go; therefore, before it is dissolved, I desire that you dispose of the matter of the Oral Statement and put this question to an end without a second's delay. Please carry out my instructions.

[a]See II,144-149, inclusive.

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 156

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 529.

(Strictly Secret).

To the Vice-Minister from WAKASUGI, concerning the Japanese-American conversations here in Washington. In glancing through your various messages, I can see that the home office entertains certain misconceptions concerning the nature of these talks. The worry you seem to entertain over the associates on the drafting committee and the oral statement seems to be based upon these misconceptions. So that things may proceed better in the future, I mention the following for your information. These are the facts, so please make them known to the Foreign Minister also. When we began these parleys, in view of the internal situation here, we saw that we could not make progress or get the desired effects by official diplomatic negotiations. Therefore, we took what might be called the "nimble road" and enlisted the cooperation of influential Americans in undercover activities, at the same time having Ambassador NOMURA carry on a number of entirely unofficial talks with Secretary HULL. These talks were entirely off the record, and opinions were freely exchanged. We were agreed that as soon as we found ourselves on common ground to turn these conversations into official negotiations. We thought that if no unanimity could be attained, it would be as though these talks had never existed. Secretary HULL, himself, said that these exchanges of opinion were not negotiations. As for the scene where they took place, the State Department was avoided and, as you know from various messages from here, the meetings took place in Secretary HULL's apartment. What I say is further clarified by the fact that at the head of all the proposals advanced by both sides, the words "Unofficial, Explanatory, and without Commitment" were clearly written. You gentlemen seem to have made the mistake of thinking that these written memoranda constituted what is tantamount to official negotiations. In Part 2, paragraph 4 of your # 365[a], you say "Please have this written down in the minutes of the negotiations." This shows that you did not understand. It seems that you also misinterpreted the explanatory statement contained in my # 528[b]. In order to sound out the outlook, in addition to members of your staff, we did use under-cover agents. If we view this from the standpoint of normal diplomatic procedure, this may have been a questionable activity, but as I told you earlier in this message, in view of circumstances we were forced to take the "nimble road." I must say, however, that in view of the way things have turned out, no advantage has accrued to us. I would further say that in view of the present Chinese situation, we could not hope to get anywhere.

Well, that is how it is. Dissatisfied as you may be over certain phases of what has taken place, though I am sorry, we did the best we could, and it is too late now to retrace our steps, so please give us due consideration

[a]See II, 144–149 incl., in which MATSUOKA gives the reasons underlying Japanese revisions of the American proposal.

[b]Not available.

Trans. 7-22-41

No. 157

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo #540.

(In 5 parts—complete.)

(Foreign Office Secret.)

1. I assume, of course, that there is no change of policy in the new Cabinet in so far as its desire is to improve Japanese-U.S. relations on a fair basis. I would, however, appreciate your giving your attention once again to my messages pertaining to this matter as well as the points listed below. In that light, I would appreciate your giving the matter your consideration and instructions.

2. I have given my undivided attention to the matter contained in your message #366[a]. Through discussions and thought we have given this problem it is now clear to see that there is a wide gap between the viewpoints of the two countries. In view of this fact, we doubt that the proposal referred to above will lead to an understanding.

Bearing that in mind, will you please advise me of your opinion on the following points.

(a) The matter pertaining to the attitudes of the two countries concerning the war in Europe.

(1) Joint mediation to bring about the return of peace in Europe:

They claim that the President does not wish to say at this time that the two countries wish to mediate in the European war to bring about peace. For this reason, he opposes the insertion of this into the "understanding" as an expression of the attitude of the two countries.

After discussing the matter with them several times, we finally came to an agreement to delete that part (paragraph 3) and insert in its place the words: "Encourage world peace". With this compromise, that point was settled for the time being.

I do not believe that it would be wise to bring up the matter again for I feel that we would encounter considerable difficulty in gaining our point. (It is quite possible that this point could be left out entirely without impairing the main objective of improving Japanese-U.S. relations.)

(2) The rights of self defense:

They wish to make the wording of the paragraph on self defense as elastic as possible so that it may be applied on any one of various possible developments in the war in Europe. It is apparently their intention to utilize this paragraph to prevent us from fulfilling our treaty obligations.

We cannot, of course, permit the possibility of leaving room for such an interpretation of self defense. They insist that the term "aggressive military action" is too ambiguous. We, on the other hand, have been insisting that the simple expression "self defense" was insufficient, for in this day and age an all out war may be launched in the name of self defense. The Understanding Agreement cannot contain expressions which can be given such interpretations, we have been claiming.

On the other hand, neither the United States nor Japan wants restrictions placed on its maneuverability in behalf of a real defensive action, because of the Understanding Pact. I believe that it would be to our country's interest to compromise on some wording which would prevent aggressive action but at the same time would in no way hinder action in behalf of self defense. It is clear, of course, that the interpretation given by the United States to date is entirely unacceptable to us.

(b) Matters pertaining to the China Incident.

Translator's note: from here to Paragraph 3 badly garbled.

With regard to this point, they ----- ----- as may be seen clearly by their proposal, they insist that unless we come to an agreement with regard to the contents of the "annex" it would be just wasting time to discuss the contents of the actual proposal. It is clear that they will refuse to accept our suggestion that the annex simply be deleted and that we plunge into discussions on the actual formula of the proposed agreement.

They take the position that as long as they are asked to advise China to negotiate a peace, they (the United States) should be advised of the basis on which a peace settlement is to be made.

I do not believe that we will be able to continue the discussions if we insist upon deleting the annex. Furthermore, if we do begin discussion on the contents of the annex, I expect to be asked some difficult questions with regard to the stationing of anti-Communist troops and the nondiscrimination among business firms. I expect this to be particularly true of the former question and would appreciate being advised of the government's attitude once again.

3. You are aware, of course, difficulties are to be expected during the discussions on our deleting the annex to the paragraph on trade between the two countries; giving our nationals the same treatment in the Philippines as the Filipinos, as was demanded in our proposal in the paragraph pertaining to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific; and the matter pertaining to our U.S. emigration.

It is my opinion that we could find a way to agree on the matter pertaining to self defense. At the same time, the matter pertaining to our garrisoning troops to combat communism, which is an essential point to us since it is one of our basic principles, is going to be a harder problem. The crux of the situation is to find just the wording in both instances, to make them acceptable to both parties concerned. I feel that those are going to be the most difficult points to agree upon.

If we are able to make a peaceful penetration of French Indo-China, I do not believe that it will cause undue excitement here. If, on the other hand, we have to resort to military force, these negotiations will undoubtedly come to an end.

Secretary Hull is expected back on about next Sunday. I plan to visit Admiral Pratt's home in Maine, at his invitation. I, therefore, would appreciate your advising me of your opinions on the matters contained in this message, during next week.

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[a]List of deletions, additions, and revisions in the Jap & U.S. proposals for an Understanding Pact, to which the Jap Foreign Office has agreed.

Trans. 7-22-41

No. 158

FROM: Washington — July 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 545.

At the request of Acting Secretary of State Welles, Wakasugi called on him on the 21st. (The Ambassador is expected back in Washington tomorrow morning.) Welles said that he has been giving careful study to recent world conditions. He had asked Wakasugi to come to his

office, he said, so that he could express the opinions reached by Secretary Hull and himself, in the light of recent world developments, regarding the unofficial discussions which have been taking place for the past several months between the Ambassador and Secretary Hull.

After thus prefacing his remarks, the Undersecretary said that the real objectives, set up by the Ambassador, Wakasugi, et al., of the Japanese-U.S. conversations, were identical to those towards which the Secretary was striving.

According to information received from various sources in various areas, he continued, there are definite indications that Japan is planning to take some steps very shortly which would upset the peaceful status of certain areas. If these reports are based on fact, he said, there would be a conflict between Japanese acts and the gist of the Ambassador's intentions expressed during the conversations.

Recently when the Ambassador met with him, Welles said, Japan's position was discussed. In the course of those conversations, the Ambassador claimed that Britain, the United States and other nations were applying the pressure on Japan, and described this as an "encirclement" of Japan. This expression is identical to that employed earlier by Germany, he pointed out.

As a matter of fact, the Undersecretary continued, the above was clearly a misunderstanding on the part of Japan, because the United States has no such intentions as those Japan apparently feels. It is because the United States wishes to maintain peace between the two countries that she has been continuing the talks.

He went on by saying that the advices received were to the effect that Japan would take the southern portion of French Indo-China by force within the next few days. Such an act would definitely be in violation with the spirit of the Japanese-U.S. conversations which are being conducted in behalf of maintaining peace in the Pacific.

That is the American viewpoint, he said, but he would appreciate being advised of the Japanese viewpoint.

Wakasugi, therefore, replied that he was well aware of the fact that the Ambassador and the Secretary were conducting negotiations aimed at improving U.S.-Japanese relations, and that he, himself, prays that they will succeed. By "a reliable source of information", Wakasugi asked, did the Undersecretary mean the U.S. Embassy in Japan? To this, avoiding a clear answer, Welles merely replied that the report was an accurate one.

Wakasugi then said that he would relay the information contained in the report referred to to the Ambassador. In the meantime, he said, he would like to make an inquiry, as one emanating purely from himself and one which in no way should be considered an official one. Assuming, Wakasugi said, that Japan is planning to make a move in the manner described by the Undersecretary in some direction, what effect would that have on the U.S.-Japanese discussions which were being conducted?

Welles replied that such an act on the part of Japan would be in direct conflict with the spirit of the discussions. So saying, he implied that further discussion would be in vain. On the other hand, he continued, he had been led to understand that the new Foreign Minister of Japan was a close friend of Ambassador Nomura. Moreover, in view of the fact that very little time had elapsed since the new Cabinet was installed, probably it had not decided upon any definite policy as yet. In view of this fact the United States would patiently await developments before taking any steps to halt the discussions.

Wakasugi told Welles that he would report this conversation to the Ambassador in detail, and withdrew.

Trans. 7–25–41

No. 159

FROM: Washington July 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo #555.

(In 2 parts—complete.)

Since Wakasugi had called on the Acting Secretary of State, as reported in my message #545[a], I called on Welles myself this afternoon. I explained to him that our southern occupation was absolutely essential from the standpoint of national security and economic safety. I further pointed out the impossibility of Japan to pursue a "do nothing" policy in the face of the embargoes being clamped down against her by various countries, for such a policy would lead to national suicide.

After carefully explaining the above situation, I said that according to press reports the French Indo-China affair was apparently being carried out peacefully with the full approval of the Vichy government. I added that in view of those circumstances, it was my hope that the government of the United States would restrain itself from jumping to hasty conclusions, and instead would watch the trend of further developments for a little while yet.

I told him that I feared considerable repercussions among the general public, if measures such as an export embargo on oil is put into effect at a time such as this.

The new Cabinet in Japan, I advise the Undersecretary, is as anxious to bring the U.S.–Japanese "Understanding Pact" to a successful conclusion, as was the previous cabinet.

To the above, the Undersecretary replied that he would not reiterate his statements to Wakasugi. He could not, he said, reconcile the Japanese policy with regard to French Indo-China with the basic principles of the plans being discussed by Secretary Hull and myself. Neither Great Britain nor the United States had any intention of attacking French Indo-China, he said. The concensus here is, he said, that Vichy's submission came as a result of pressure from Hitler and that Japan intends to use French Indo-China as a base from which to make further southward moves.

The U.S. Government, he continued, has not for the past many years made any hasty conclusions. Her actions are governed by Japan's policies.

Although he did not mention what steps the United States is planning to take in the future, he did say, as I was about to depart, that Secretary Hull was expected back at his desk very shortly and that he would no doubt welcome an opportunity to discuss matters with me.

In reply to my inquiry, the Undersecretary said that traffic through the Canal has been indefinitely suspended while it is undergoing repairs. He asserted that no particular nation was suffering discriminatory action.

(Time at present: 2130.)

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[a]Acting Secretary Welles, in a requested interview with Japanese Minister Wakasugi, states that the reported aggressive move by Japan toward F.I-C. would violate the basis of proposed understanding with Japan. Requests Japanese statement of intentions. Wakasugi asks for source of Welles information and is told that "it is accurate".

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 160

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

July 23, 1941
396.

(Foreign Office Secret.)

Re my # 368[a].

As the result of our negotiations with the Vichy government, we were able to come to an understanding on the 24th, with regard to jointly defending French Indo-China. Under these terms, we are to peacefully occupy the southern part of French Indo-China on or about 28 or 29 July. (These dates are for your information only.)

Please, therefore, advise the government of the United States along the lines contained in my message referred to in the heading and that you have been informed by this Minister that in spite of this occupation,

(1) The territorial sovereignty of French Indo-China will be respected by Japan;

(2) There will be no interference in the domestic administration of French Indo-China;

(3) There has been no letup in interest on the part of Japan in the discussions concerning U.S.-Japanese understanding being conducted unofficially between the Secretary of State and yourself. Rather, it is because we desire it so highly, that we make this report.

Please make these points clear to the government of the United States.

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[a]Tokyo informs Washington of the contemplated negotiations with France for establishmment of Jap naval and air bases in F.I-C.

Trans. 7-24-41

No. 161

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

July 23, 1941
397.

Regarding your message # 545[a].

1. You were correct in assuming that I have not as yet determined upon a definite policy because of the fact that I have not been in office very long.

As was pointed out in my message # 368[b], our occupation of French Indo-China was unavoidable. This step had been decided upon by the Cabinet even before I assumed office. It is to be carried out peacefully for the purpose of jointly defending French Indo-China. It is my intention to continue to make an effort to decrease the friction between Japan and Britain-U.S.

Should the U.S., however, take steps at this time which would unduly excite Japan (such as closing of ----- for all practical purposes and the freezing of assets), an exceedingly critical situation may be created. Please advise the United States of this fact, and attempt to bring about an improvement in the situation.

2. Please carefully reread messages Nos. 368[b] and 396[c], and make an effort to improve the situation.

3. With regard to your message # 536 ----- (last 13 groups garbled).

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[a]Wakasugi reports conversation with Under-secretary Welles.

[b]Tokyo informs Washington of the contemplated negotiations with France for establishment of Jap naval and air bases in French Indo-China.

[c]See II, 160.

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 162

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 24, 1941
TO: Washington # 401.

(Secret outside the Department.)

Re my # 396[a].

The Imperial Government will issue the statement contained in the separate telegram # 402[b] at noon of the 26th, Tokyo time (10:00 P.M. of the 26th your time). A statement will be given to the United States Ambassador in Tokyo at 9:00 A.M. on the same day, so will you confidentially transmit the statement to the United States Government at 6:00 P.M. on the 25th.

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[a]See II, 160.

[b]Tokyo wires Washington the increasingly intimate relations between Vichy and Tokyo, see II, 164.

Trans. 7-28-41

No. 163

FROM: Tokyo July 24, 1941
TO: Washington # 403.

Re my # 68[a]

Representations were made to the Vichy Government on July 14, and again on July 20. The French accepted all of the Japanese demands on July 21, with final arranging of details and the signing of the agreement at Hanoi on July 23. The public announcement will be made on July 26, noon (Japanese time). You will be advised of the contents of the agreement by special message # 404[b].

This message has also been separately sent to England.

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[a]In which Tokyo informs Washington that within the next few days, commercial negotiations between Japan and the Vichy Government will begin.

[b]II, 165.

Trans. 7-28-41

No. 164

FROM: Tokyo July 24, 1941
TO: Washington # 402.

Secret Outside the Department.

Statement of the Imperial Government:

Beginning with the conversations which began between Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and Ambassador HENRI last August, several agreements have been reached between Japan and France whereby recently Franco-Japanese relations have quickly become more intimate. Now, once again concerning the joint defense of French Indo-China, the Governments of the two nations have agreed on a friendly policy.

The Imperial Government is determined to maintain the various understandings existing between Tokyo and Vichy. The responsibility of the Imperial Government, based upon its solemn promise to support the territorial integrity and sovereignty of France, will be maintained and hereafter we will endeavor to increase a relationship of amity between our two countries and thus strive to achieve joint prosperity for both.

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 165

FROM: Tokyo July 24, 1941
TO: Washington # 404.

Separate Message.

(Part 1 of 2)

1. On the 14th Ambassador KATO interviewed Foreign Minister DARLAN and presented to him the demands of the Imperial Government concerning joint protection of French Indo-China and military cooperation, saying that we would like to have the French reply by the 19th. Then on the 15th Ambassador KATO interviewed PETAIN and transmitted to him a message from Premier KONOYE, making the same request. Again, on the 16th, he interviewed DARLAN and requested an immediate reply from Vichy.

2. On the 19th, at the request of DARLAN, Ambassador KATO had another meeting with him. At that time the French reply was that this demand on the part of Japan, because of its very nature, required contact and consultation with Germany, with whom France has an armistice agreement and that unless this took place France herself was not in a position to make any decision. DARLAN replied that within a few days he would be in a position to submit a definite answer.

3. Regarding this as a design to hold us off on the pretext of France's armistice agreement with Germany and Italy, on the 20th we had Ambassador KATO return to DARLAN and demand that he accept our proposals in toto. After this conversation he held another talk with BUNOIR-MESSIEN and, as a result, discovered that France was inclined to accept the demands of Japan. On the 21st at noon DARLAN submitted an official reply.

4. In this official reply it was stated:

(1) The French Government cannot but submit to the demands of the Japanese Government.

(2) The French Government guarantees joint defense of French Indo-China on the basis of cooperation with the Japanese Government; however, she will not participate in aggressive war.

(3) As soon as informed of the locales wherein Japanese troops will be stationed, France will evacuate them.

(4) The Japanese Government will make public a declaration that she will respect the territorial integrity of Indo-China and French sovereignty over the Indo-Chinese Federation, and will make this statement at the earliest possible moment.

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 166

FROM: Tokyo July 24, 1941
TO: Washington # 404.

(Part 2 of 2)

5. When he submitted this reply, DARLAN stated: "The reason why we used the words, 'cannot but submit to the demands of the Japanese Government,' is this: We are now resisting the British forces in Syria and, if it appeared that Japan was taking advantage of this situation to grab French Indo-China, criticism both at home and abroad would be heaped upon our heads and we merely wished to avoid this. Another important point is this: Japan must not demand the retirement of French Indo-Chinese troops now in French Indo-China, nor confiscate the material the French troops are now using, nor must she demand their complete withdrawal. If at present it were ordered that French troops withdraw from the areas where they are now stationed, they would be infuriated and, as a result, unfortunate incidents would probably ensue. This point must be given special consideration."

6. Regarding this as an acceptance in toto, Ambassador KATO handed the Foreign Minister a memorandum which he had prepared and stated that he would like to send in news to Tokyo that France had accepted our proposition and that he would like to have this accord written down in black and white in an official document. Thereupon he also handed DARLAN a protocol proposal and the suggested text for a public announcement. This correspondence was finished on the 22nd, but before that, on the 21st at noon, the text of the French reply was affixed and we accepted the following incidental terms and desires of the French:

(1) Support on the part of the Japanese Government for supplementary defensive measures of the French Indo-China troops.

(2) Continued use of the existent military facilities by the French Indo-Chinese forces.

(3) A statement as early as possible from the Imperial Government to the effect that the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and French sovereignty will be respected.

(4) The term concerning the temporary evacuation of French Indo-Chinese troops shall be eliminated.

We affixed these four terms and began detailed negotiations in French Indo-China. As a result, an agreement was signed in Hanoi on the 23rd in the presence of Rear Admiral (?) SUMITA and Governor General DE COUX.

(Our army is scheduled to move in on the 28th and 29th. This is for your information only.)

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 167

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 24, 1941
TO: Washington # 405.

(Secret outside the Department)

Re your # 550[a].

As I have reported to you in my # 368[b], the steps we have taken in regard to French Indo-China were not taken with the intention, as the United States Government alleges, to occupy that country; it was really a matter of necessity for the fact of peace in the Pacific. Is it not clear that we are endeavoring to maintain peace in that area from the peaceful attitude our government took in the face of the fact that the negotiations with French Indo-China, long-drawn-out affair that it was, had ended unsatisfactorily and as a result caused public opinion to be excited considerably? To say, as the Americans are saying, that we had informed the Axis powers that the Japanese-American negotiations were only a side-talk which was the last until Japan completed her southward advance is indeed far from the fact (my # 329[a]). This is all the more true in regards to the allegation that Japan was intending to wreck these negotiations. This is carrying falsehood to the limit. Although those who want to profit by falsehood make the insinuation that the recent political change in Japan was due to United States pressure (the Oral Statement is implied), the Japanese Government has become, as it were, one body and as such is eagerly wishing that the Japanese-American negotiations would be continued. On the basis of my past telegram and ----- telegram, I gave the time in my # 401[c] as 6:00 P.M. of the 25th, but I would like to have you explain *at once* to the United States Government our real intention in regard to the French Indo-China question as well as the purport of my # 406[d].

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[a]Not available.
[b]Tokyo wires Washington the reasons for and intentions of her demands on Vichy.
[c]See II, 160.
[d]See II, 168.

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 168

FROM: Tokyo July 24, 1941
TO: Washington # 406.

Secret outside the Department.

Re my # 397[a].

That the leaders of the United States Government will at this time display a high degree of statesmanship is what I am secretly hoping for the sake of maintaining peace in the Pacific. The Japanese Government would do likewise and would like to reciprocate. However, according to information received by us lately, especially according to newspaper reports, there is the possibility of the United States freezing Japanese funds or of instituting a general embargo on petroleum, thus strongly stimulating public opinion in Japan. Should this plan of freezing Japanese funds be put into effect, it would have an adverse effect on many aspects of our domestic life and might compel us to resort to diverse retaliatory measures. This would lead to a

breakdown of Japanese-American economic relations and we cannot be certain that it would not in turn hasten the development of the worst situation. Will you please get in touch with Finance Official NISHIYAMA and, in accordance with the contents of the caption telegram, request the United States Government to favorably treat this question.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 7–25–41

No. 169

FROM: Tokyo July 25, 1941
TO: Washington # 408.

(Separate cable)

Financial Ministry message # 34.

Because relations between the United States and Japan have become exceedingly critical recently, the Foreign Minister instructed Ambassador Nomura, last night, to request the government of the United States to act with the utmost caution where any application of pressure, such as freezing of assets, against Japan is involved. Will you please be advised of the various points listed below and, after establishing close connection with the Ambassador, take appropriate steps.

Recently, when the assets of Germany and Italy were frozen, Japan was excepted from this ruling. Although, in view of the present trade conditions between the two countries, there was absolutely nothing extraordinary in this attitude of the United States, still we wish to express our appreciation because we feel that the government of the United States acted in an exceedingly courteous manner.

Once again, however, rumors of freezing of Japanese assets have flared up of late. We are of course in the dark as to whether there is any basis of fact in these rumors. If by any chance, these rumors are found to be well based, we shall be forced, though reluctantly, to take retaliatory measures. These will include the non-payment of principal and interest on debts in the United States as well as to freeze all of the American property in Japan. (Refer to Financial Ministry Message # 33[a].) This will, of course, lead to exceedingly unfavorable economic conditions between the two countries, and, depending on subsequent developments, may lead to complete collapse of Japanese-U.S. economic relations. If the trend in that direction continues, it is hard to even imagine what the ultimate outcome will be.

In view of the possibilities of exceedingly grave consequences of effectuating this move, will you please urge the leaders of the Treasury Department, which will be responsible for any such move, to give this matter their deep consideration. We pray that through cooperative action we shall be able to prevent Japanese-U.S. relations from becoming any worse.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 7–26–41

No. 170

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 565.

(Part 1 of 2)

Feeling the urgency of the situation on the occasion of a luncheon alone with the Chief of the Operations Section, I asked him to procure for me a conference with the President. Today at 5:00 P.M. I had a secret meeting with President ROOSEVELT. In conformity with your several instructions, I explained that because of economic considerations and the necessity of stabilizing the situation in that area, the measures we took were absolutely necessary. I pointed out that our intentions are to respect territorial integrity and sovereignty and said that the present cabinet also is eager for a Japanese-American understanding. Finally, I urged him for the sake of maintaining peace in the Pacific, to exercise a high order of statesmanship. The President replied, "Already the people have been strongly insisting that an embargo on oil should be put into effect against Japan, but in spite of this, I urged them to keep calm, saying that it was necessary in order to keep peace in the Pacific, but now I can no longer use this thesis." The President then hinted that an embargo on oil might be imminent.

(This message sent at 8:00 P.M.)

Trans. 7-26-41

No. 171

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 565.

(Part 2 of 2)

The President told me the gist of the statement issued by the State Department today, the 24th, and clarified the views of the American Government. Prefacing his statement by declaring that there is a feeling that the time is already late and that he had not already conferred on this matter with the State Department, he continued, "if there is some method whereby French Indo-China can be evacuated and if the various countries can (as heretofore) guarantee its neutrality and if all countries can equitably have free access to materials from French Indo-China, I will spare no effort. I myself am extremely sympathetic with Japan in her need of procuring materials." Well, I got the impression that some economic pressure is going to be exerted immediately. Undersecretary WELLES and the Chief of the Operations Section were invited and sat with us.

Trans. 7-26-41

No. 172

FROM: Washington July 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 566.

During my conversation with the President yesterday, the following points were brought out:

1. The President said that world subjugation was Hitler's aim. (When I saw the President on 14 March he said the same thing. On that occasion the opinion of the Secretary of State who

was also present was sought. The Secretary replied that was indeed the truth of the matter.) After Europe would come Africa, the President said, and after that there would be no stopping him. That being the case, the time may come when Japan would be fighting on the same side as the United States, he said.

In reply to this, I told the President that there is an old Japanese proverb which goes as follows: "If a country likes to fight, it is already on the brink of being destroyed". I added that the sword is purely an instrument with which to prevent damage or destruction.

2. Since the President's tone seemed to imply that our occupation of French Indo-China was done under pressure from Germany, I advised the President that there had been no German pressure, and that Japan had acted entirely on its own accord.

On the surface, the President accepted this explanation. However, as you are aware, the general public in the United States is convinced that Japan in cooperation with Germany, or independently of her, is awaiting the opportunity to move southward and northward.

Trans. 7-30-41

No. 173

FROM: Tokyo July 27, 1941
TO: Washington #413.

Please report on your conversation with the President of the 24th in further detail.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 174

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #589.

(Part 1 of 5)

Re your #413[a].

When I talked to President ROOSEVELT, I held in my hand a memorandum which I had prepared in Japanese. I spoke with the President as follows in English, in which OBATA had carefully coached me before my visit.

1. "The reasons why we occupied French Indo-China are:

(a) To obtain the foodstuffs of French Indo-China which are necessary to the economic existence of Japan. When we think of the economic measures which the various nations are now taking (waxing of the economic war) and of the new order to come, if we Japanese stood idly by with folded arms, we would be crushed while sitting down.

(b) From the point of view of our own security, if French Indo-Chiar the sphere of influence of some third country, we would be in danger. Therefore, we are preparing jointly to defend it and thereby stabilize our Empire's relations with its homeland.

(c) The occupation of French Indo-China will take place peaceably, and Japan will respect territorial integrity and sovereignty. It is desirable that the United States recognize these facts and take no too extreme attitude.

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[a]II, 173.

Trans. 7-31-41

No. 175

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #589.

(Part 2 of 5)

2. The kind of understanding which I have been negotiating with HULL, of course, had the maintenance of peace in the Pacific as its object. During the negotiations I said:

"(1) I am very sorry to note that you doubt the sincerity of our Government but the fact is that the Japanese Government is all the time desiring it and the present cabinet has already on two different occasions issued instructions for this purpose.

"(2) Among the difficult points, as regard to the question of self-defense, we continue to hope that somehow the difficulties involved will be overcome and a compromise arrived at. While it is logical for a country to exercise its legitimate right of defense when it has been unjustifiably reproached, the question as to what constitutes exercise of the right of self-defense, I believe, would naturally have to be decided after a peaceful relation has been restored."

Trans. 7-30-41

No. 176

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #589.

(Part 3 of 5)

"The stationing of troops in a part of China is not of a permanent nature and will be based upon an agreement with the Chinese Government. The question of freedom of commerce is on the road to a spontaneous settlement. In short, in the larger view I think that there is a way to let everything settle itself."

The President replied: "As I have already told you, popular appeal for an oil embargo against Japan was clamorous. The reason why, in spite of this, I toned it down, was that I wished to keep peace in the Pacific." Changing the subject to French Indo-China, he went on: "In Japan's need for procuring materials I have ample sympathy for her, but now I do not know but what the opportunity has already been lost. First, let me say that I have not previously conferred with the State Department on this matter, but if it is possible for troops to be evacuated from French Indo-China, for the several countries to guarantee its neutrality as before, and for the several countries to procure an equitable share of its goods freely—for example, Japan obtaining rice and foodstuffs, and the United States, rubber—I will spare no efforts."

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 177

FROM: Washington July 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #589.

(Very urgent)

(Part 4 of 5)

I went over the principal points which the President brought out and he confirmed them. Then he turned his head toward WELLES as if to see what WELLES had to say, but the latter,

maintaining a humble attitude, did not mention a word. It was about this time that the President took out his cigarette case and offered it only to me. (The withdrawal which the President spoke of is strange in one sense and yet not so strange in another sense. His "good neighbor" policy is one in which military power is not used. At one time, after ordering troops to -----, he cancelled the order and did not allow the troops to land. Also, in his policy toward Mexico he has never landed troops at Vera Cruz or mobilized forces on the border, but he managed to bring about a normal condition by reconciliation. This avoidance of using troops and the principle of nondiscriminatory freedom of trade are two points which the President himself spoke of at the time of our second conversation and are what both the President and the Secretary of State strongly advocate.)

Trans. 7-30-41

No. 178

FROM: Washington July 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #589.

(Very urgent)

(Part 5 of 5)

The President spoke disapprovingly to the effect that the recent southward advance of Japan was a result of German pressure and that Japan had gone too far in it. So, I explained that it was not so and that Japan acted on her own initiative and independently. To this statement the President replied lightly. I then said: "Previously you said that Japanese-American relations were deteriorating. I have ever since been endeavoring to improve the relations and although my efforts have not yet been rewarded, I have not yet given up hope and intend to carry on to the finish." Whereupon the President said: "HITLER is determined to conquer the world. After Europe he will conquer Africa and so on, not knowing when to stop. Ten years from now Japan will find an enemy against whom she will fight on the same side with us." I countered this statement, as I have reported to you in my telegram, by saying in effect that from ancient days it has been said that those who take the sword will fall by the sword and Japan is doing nothing of the sort.

Trans. 7-30-41

No. 179

FROM: Washington July 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo #574.

Regarding your #396[a] and #401[b].

I carried out your instructions on the occasion of my interview with the President (The Acting Secretary of State was also present) on the 24th.

On the 25th, I had Wakasugi call on Hamilton and had him hand over a copy of the English text of the statement which is to be published tomorrow by the Imperial Government concerning the Japanese-French accord on the French Indo-China affair. Wakasugi asked that the Secretary be advised of the contents of the statement.

Taking this opportunity, Wakasugi pointed out that even after the Japanese occupation, the sovereignty and integrity of French Indo-China would be preserved and that Japan would in no way meddle in the domestic politics of French Indo-China. Wakasugi said that these two points were clearly brought out in the text of the statement.

Wakasugi then handed Hamilton our revised note concerning the halting of traffic through the Panama Canal.

Then the two men unofficially discussed the Japanese-U.S. relations and exchanged opinions on the possibility of finding ways and means of countering its increasingly unfavorable trend. Hamilton said that there was probably not another person who has worked as hard as Secretary Hull in an effort to maintain friendly relations between the United States and Japan. In spite of the fact that he has been the target of protests from the public as well as from his colleagues in the Cabinet, he has patiently strived toward that end. He did so because both the President and he were convinced that it would be to Japan's interest not to resort to force of arms but instead pursue a policy of peace.

However, even he could not approve Japan's resorting to the force of arms to carry out an expansion program in the Hitlerian manner. As long as Japan does not renounce such a policy, there is no hope for the continuation of the unofficial Japanese-U.S. discussions which were being conducted, Hamilton said.

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[a]Occupation of Southern F.I.C. will take place 28 or 29 July.

[b]Official statement re F.I.C. will be published 26 July.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 180

FROM: Washington — July 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 571.

Apparently Admiral Pratt had put in a good word for me to the Chief of (Naval) Operations, for even since I assumed this post, I have been shown many courtesies by him. His opinions concerning U.S.-Japanese relations coincide with mine; he once told me that the only result of a war between the two countries would be mutual exhaustion.

Once while conversing with the Admiral (Stark) I happened to mention that it seemed to me that the higher officials in the Navy Department here seemed to be men of excellent character and qualifications.

To this, the Admiral replied that both the Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of War Plans were exceedingly able men. The same is true of the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. As for the fleets, he continued, both Kimmel and King were recommended by him, and both are of the highest caliber. Although Hart had reached the age of retirement, he had been kept on in active duty because of the critical times, he added.

Please relay this information to the Navy.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 181

FROM: Washington — July 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 572.

(Official code message.)

I would like to have Minister Wakasugi and Colonel Iwakuro return home on the first available sailing for the purpose of reporting on the state of things in this country. The approval of the Minister of War should be secured in the case of Colonel Iwakuro.

We have counselled together over the question of having one person of the Navy return too, but with the shortage of personnel there seems to be no one to send, and therefore we would like to have the Navy receive the reports of the Minister and Colonel Iwakuro.

In this connection we are asking that Obata be left here a little longer.

We have conferred with both the Military and Naval Attaches.

Trans. 7-31-41

No. 182

FROM: Washington — July 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 567.

Foreign Office Secret.

We have been having him[a] make some undercover investigations in an attempt to discover what economic moves against Japan are being contemplated by the government of the United States.

He reports as follows:

1. A secret conference was held this afternoon by Cabinet members to discuss measures to counter Japan's southward move. The majority of them were of the opinion that the present move on the part of Japan was instigated by Germany. The step was taken as a supplementary measure of the next maneuver in Europe, they believe. There is also a strong belief among them that the continuance of U.S.-Japanese discussions would be useless because it would be meaningless. He says that regardless of what excuses he tries to make for Japan, his hands are tied. It is unfortunate, but that is the situation.

2. Up to now, he states, he has been able to prevail on Secretary Hull and others to keep the government from freezing our assets and from clamping on an oil export embargo. Now, however, he believes that these measures will be adopted. Moreover, there is a good possibility that the "freezing" phase will be put into effect at an unexpectedly early date. Confidentially, however, he is trying to prevail upon the U.S. government to restrain itself until he has had an opportunity to thoroughly discuss the matter with Secretary Hull who is expected to return to Washington this Sunday. (The truth of the matter is that, probably due to the fact that he is a new member of the Cabinet, he was ignorant of the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China last year. Upon being advised of this today, he asked me why we were making such an issue of our latest move. He stated that he has difficulty in trying to reconcile himself to that.)

3. He says that the persons who have really been put "on the spot" by recent developments are Secretary Hull and himself. He says that he recently held quite a long discussion with President Roosevelt who is going to his home in Hyde Park after granting me an interview this evening. On the occasion of that talk the President expressed his hope that some means

could be found to make Japan reconsider her policy so as to enable the continuance of peace on the Pacific. My informant, therefore, has not given up in despair as yet, but instead, would continue to put forth his best efforts in an attempt to smooth things over. His main hope is that Japan will respond favorably to these overtures on his part.

4. Germany's attempts to bring about peace through the good offices of the United States is still being continued. Japan is in no way involved in the terms being proposed by Germany. It is interesting to note, he said, that though he and some of his colleagues are against the terms being proposed by Germany, some of those who are against the U.S.-Japanese "understanding" are in favor of the terms being offered by Germany.

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[a]The third person referred to throughout this message is not identified.

Trans. 7-28-41

No. 183

FROM: Los Angeles (Nakauchi) July 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #132.

At 6:00 P.M. on the 25th, the local Yokohama Specie Bank and the Sumitomo Bank branch offices were given a thorough inspection by bank examiners, and all safes were sealed. At 1:00 A.M. on the 26th, a general license was granted the Yokohama Specie Bank. Business was conducted as usual during the examination of the books. Becuase the Sumitomo Bank deals largely in drafts rather than in deposits, a general license was not granted to that firm.

Trans. 10-6-41

No. 184

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #534.

On the 25th when WAKASUGI conferred with HAMILTON, he asked frankly as follows: "As you know from newspaper reports, Japanese ships, fearing seizure by the American authorities are hesitating to enter American ports. Is it the intention of the American Government either to tie up or seize Japanese ships?" HAMILTON replied: "The State Department has nothing to do with this; in fact, it is hard to understand why Japanese ships are afraid to enter American ports; so much so that some people even telephoned the State Department to find out the reason, and so I am not in a position to reply to your question." Then Wakasugi stated: "If the United States Government has no intention of tying up Japanese ships, would not an assurance to that effect be useful in eliminating any such doubt?" To this HAMILTON replied: "I see no necessity for the Government to guarantee to ships whose avoidance of entering American ports is an enigma, whether it would seize those ships or not." Thus our conversation availed nothing. However, I am sending this much for your reference.

I understand that a man acting on behalf of the Secretary of the Treasury stated at a press interview on the 26th that the freezing of funds does not apply to Japanese ships, but that it is not certain whether their departure from ports will not be interfered with in case the

emergency regulations issued by the Treasury Department are applied to them. I will report on this subject again after getting more information on the matter from the Government.

Trans. 7-30-41

No. 185

FROM: Tokyo July 27, 1941
TO: Washington Circular # 1622.

In retaliation for the steps taken by the British and United States by which our assets were frozen, the rules restricting foreign business transactions in Japan which are included in the rules governing foreign exchange, shall be put into effect on the 28th by order of the Finance Ministry. Manchukuo will also take similar steps, while in China proclamations by the Consulates will be made subsequently. As an emergency measure, the above regulations will be announced by the Consulates as a bulletin and will be made effective for all practical purposes. (All transactions involving Britain and America will be placed on a license basis.) At the same time, the Chinese will receive instructions to put similar measures in effect.

With regard to the Customs, all exports to countries which have frozen our assets, shall have to receive licenses in accordance with orders issued by the Financial Bureau. Guidance will be given to settle all complications which accompany the materialization of these regulations.

Ample study has been made so as to make these measures counter whatever measures the opposition should choose to actually take.

This message addressed to London and Washington.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 186

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 597.

Re your # 412[a] and # 418[a].

The ruling promulgated by the Treasury Department for critical limitations might be called a recapitulation of the actuation of the President's orders for the freezing of the assets of Japan, Germany, Italy, and other foreign countries (see my # 579[a] and my ordinary letter message of June 17 this year, # 312). 2 c. of clause 130 of this ruling under the freezing order includes among the properties of foreign countries whose activities are forbidden, ships, cargoes, bills of lading, etc. The legislation upon which this step taken by the United States is based, as I have pointed out in numerous telegrams, on the following acts. Please refer to them again.

1. The Espionage Act of July 15, 1917 (my # 100[a]).
2. The law authorizing the commandeering of ships (my Nos. 373[a] and 374[a]).
3. The law stipulating the order of priority of commercial shipments for the sake of national defense (my Nos. 344[a] and 519[b]).

[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-31-41

No. 187

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) July 28, 1941
TO: Washington # 419.

(Secret outside the Department)

On the 25th I asked Ambassador GREW to call on me, and I handed him a memorandum giving the purport of what is contained in my # 368[a] and then explained the principal points therein as follows:

1. It is an undeniable fact that in the areas covered by Burma, Singapore, and centering on French Indo-China, a line of encirclement against Japan is being formed. Naturally, Japan is afraid that French Indo-China will meet the same fate as Syria has met, and Japan's recent action in French Indo-China has for its object nothing other than the joint defense of that country.

2. Judging from the statement which Assistant Secretary of State WELLES made on the 25th at a press conference, he seems to think that the occupation of northern French Indo-China is only a preliminary step looking toward a further southward advance; but this is clearly a misunderstanding of the truth. This step was taken with a view to bringing the China incident to a close. The reason why I had informed the American Government of our steps before they were taken is that the Ambassador and I are on friendly terms.

The Ambassador regarded with a great deal of importance the point, in the memorandum, concerning the fact that Japan has no intention of making southern French Indo-China a base for advancement into the territories adjacent to that country. He said that this was the very point which the United States Government wanted to know about, and now that he has my assurance regarding it, he was extremely happy and would transmit the news at once to his government.

[a]In which Tokyo informs Washington of the negotiations to be begun between Tokyo and Vichy for the establishment of naval and air bases in southern Indo-China in the name of mutual defense.

Trans. 8-2-41

No. 188

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) July 28, 1941
TO: Washington # 420.

Secret outside the Department.

(Part 1 of 2)

Re my # 419[a].

On the 26th I again requested Ambassador GREW to come to see me and I talked over this matter with him. The Ambassador read the entire copy of the telegram giving the conversation which had taken place on the 23rd between you and Assistant Secretary WELLES. I spoke frankly to the following effect:

(1) Judging from Mr. WELLES' opinions, he seems to be under the impression that recent action on the part of Japan toward French Indo-China was a result of pressure exerted by Germany; but this is far from the truth. Japan took that action as a result of the conclusion of a treaty in a friendly manner between Japan and France for the purpose of defending

French Indo-China. In fact, the authorities in French Indo-China themselves were fearing, not being sure that French Indo-China will be able to escape the fate which befell Syria.

(2) Mr. WELLES believes that the recent occupation of French Indo-China by Japan was accomplished with the intention of securing bases from which Japan may advance to other places. This, too, is an entirely mistaken view of the matter. As I have repeatedly pointed out, the recent action of Japan has had no object whatsoever other than the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. Therefore, that ----- ----- had resorted to the means which she did, is to me a very regrettable fact.

(3) I am extremely chagrined over the fact that relations between Japan and the United States have reached such a stage in less than two weeks after the formation of the new cabinet. This is entirely due to United States' misunderstanding of the real intention of the Japanese Government.

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*See II, 187.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 189

FROM: Tokyo July 28, 1941
TO: Washington # 420.

(Part 2 of 2)

(4) I am afraid that if the United States should adopt further measures which will be provocative to Japan a most unfortunate situation will be brought about between the two countries. The Imperial Government has been by every means endeavoring to quiet the resentment which the people have been harboring against the United States' giving aid to CHIANG and against other actions. Therefore, if the situation is made worse, the Government will find it more difficult than ever to suppress their emotions. Furthermore, among what Assistant Secretary WELLES stated to you were these words of Secretary HULL, "was unable to see that any basis for continuing the talks which Admiral NOMURA and Mr. HULL had been conducting." Do these words signify that the negotiations now being carried on with a view to adjusting Japanese-American relations should be dropped?

The Ambassador avoided giving a definite reply by saying that he was not at all familiar with the conversation on this question. No doubt, in accordance with the instructions sent to you, you have made explanations regarding this question; however, I would like to have you emphasize at every opportunity you may get the fact that Japan's action was one which could not have been avoided in the light of the situation prevailing internally and externally.

Trans. 7-30-41

No. 190

FROM: Washington July 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 600.

(In 2 parts—complete.)

On the 28th, yesterday, I saw WELLES. On that occasion reference was made to the statement that during the past ninety years, peace has been maintained between the United

States and Japan without one single break. Unless, however, some way out is found from the policies being pursued by the two countries today, our relations shall become increasingly critical, causing justifiable anxiety. If this dark abyss cannot be circumvented through statesmanship, then, indeed, a great crime on mankind cannot be prevented, I said.

To this WELLES replied that the proposals recently made by the President were sound and that considerable importance should be attached to them. In spite of this, in his conversations with Ambassador GREW, the Foreign Minister implied that he was ignorant of them.

I therefore replied that at that time I reported only the gist of the proposals, but a detailed report was dispatched today.

WELLES expressed the same attitude as the President: That the United States would in no way interfere with the accessibility of American materials to Japan on an equal basis as to other nations on condition that Japan makes no conquests through the use of force. Moreover, no threat to the safety of French Indo-China exists, he said.

If we look at the trend in a detached manner, we find that we are moving alone, heading toward the worst possible eventuality in East Asia, and may come up against Britain, the United States, the Netherlands East Indies, and China, and probably the U.S.S.R. as well.

Our duty to restrain the United States in behalf of Germany ----- (two badly garbled lines) ----- the United States and Germany are avoiding armed conflict. In the meantime, and unconsciously, we are rushing towards a war against Great Britain and the United States; a war in which we would have to stand alone against them.

I beg of you to give careful considerations before you take any steps. It may be true that circumstances may arise which need immediate local attention from the military. Politically, however, I beseech you to take a broad view, consider all of the angles, before making a move. It is my undying hope that you proceed in behalf of the everlasting glory of our country.

Trans. 8-1-41

No. 191

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #614.

Re my #611[a].

When I expressed to WELLES that we hoped for a certain degree of magnanimity regarding ship loadings, in view of the famous "fair play" and "square deal" policy advocated by the United States, he prefaced his remarks by saying he was pleased to receive a straightforward expression from me and would also give a clear statement of opinion. He said that for the last four years the United States has been long-suffering in the overriding of American interests in China by the Japanese. He added that he, himself, still desired, for the improvement of Japanese-American relations, that there should be an adjustment along the lines of the conversations held between Secretary HULL and myself. This is given for your reference.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 192

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #604.

I communicated with the Secretary of State in accordance with your instructions. On the 29th, I received a reply by (note?) saying that in view of the great increase in the number of Japanese living in New York on a diplomatic status, in the future only the ranking Commercial Attache and Financial Attaché would be placed on the diplomatic list.

In the case of Financial and Commercial Consuls and Secretaries already on the diplomatic list permission to increase the number or to replace them would not be given, in accordance with the policy decided upon in 1939; therefore, although the United States Government has no objection to Assistant Financial Attache YOSIMURA residing in New York as a Japanese Government official, it is impossible to put him on the diplomatic list.

Trans. 8-12-41

No. 193

FROM: Washington July 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #608.

On the 30th the Acting Secretary of State requested me to call on him. WELLES handed me the memorandum contained in my #606[a] and, with an extremely austere look and prefacing his statement by saying that he spoke in the name of the President, proceeded:

"1. When the Panay incident happened the President got a guarantee that such a thing would not recur, so why did the present incident happen?

"2. Under what sort of orders did the Japanese forces and responsible officials permit such a deed?

"3. The American Embassy in Chungking and the gunboat are on the other side of the city, supposedly in a safe place, so how did this incident come about? Now, I want to get an immediate explanation from the Japanese Government."

To this I answered, "Well, Sir, personally I cannot bring myself at all to believe that an act like this was perpetrated intentionally. I myself am quite familiar with the geography of Chungking. The river there is narrow, to say the least, and novices when they let bombs fall are quite apt to make this sort of mistake. I don't know what we can do in order to do away with such untoward events unless we either stop bombing Chungking or you move the American Embassy and the gunboat. In any case, I want to report this to my Government and then answer you later on."

Thus our conversation ended.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-31-41

No. 194

FROM: Tokyo — July 31, 1941
TO: Nanking, Hankow, Shanghai, Tientsin, Peking & Hsinking — Circular # 1683.

(Message from Washington # 605.)

It seems that one of our naval planes damaged an American gunboat, the TUTUILA, at Chungking. On the 30th, the Acting Secretary of State asked me to call on him and told me that it was a very grave incident. He handed me a memorandum contained in my separate message # 606[a] and asked me to get an explanation from the Japanese Government. I will wire you the details immediately. However, this is a serious matter, and it is necessary to take immediate steps.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 8-2-41

No. 195

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — July 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 609.

Re my # 608[a].

Today I knew from the hard looks on their faces that they meant business and I could see that if we do not answer to suit them that they are going to take some drastic steps.

During my first conversation with Roosevelt after I took office the President, referring to the Panay incident, said that at the time he cooperated with the Secretary of State and succeeded in restraining popular opinion but that in case such a thing happened a second time, it would probably be quite impossible to again calm the storm. The latest incident brought all this back to me and I can see just how gravely they are regarding it. Think of it! Popular demand for the freezing of Japanese funds was subsiding and now this had to happen. I must tell you it certainly occurred at an inopportune moment.

Things being as they are, need I point out to you gentlemen that in my opinion it is necessary to take without one moment's hesitation some appeasement measures. Please wire me back at the earliest possible moment.

[a]Welles summons Nomura and demands explanation of Tutuila bombing immediately, see II, 193.

Trans. 8-2-41

No. 196

FROM: Washington July 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #612.

Re my 609[a].

I think that the best possible step we could take at the present is to stop bombing Chungking for a while and to publish this without delay.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-31-41

No. 197

FROM: Tokyo July 31, 1941
TO: Washington #429.

Before receiving your #605[a] I had Vice Minister Yamamoto call on the American Embassy as my representative even though we had had no official word from the American Embassy as yet. I sent word to the effect that if the injury to the Tutuila was an actual fact it was a most unfortunate occurrence. The said Minister had a confidential chat with the American Ambassador who said that as yet he had no instructions from his government but that he thanked the Minister for his visit. Furthermore, the Minister of the Navy sent an official to call on the American Naval Attache ----- (last 2 lines garbled).

[a]Not available.

Trans. 8-1-41

No. 198

FROM: Tokyo July 31, 1941
TO: Washington #435.

Re my #429[a].

At 2:45 p.m. I requested Ambassador Grew to call on me and at that time I expressed my regrets and the Ambassador presented the official text corresponding to your telegram #606[b] (?). I said that I was sure the incident was simply a mistake on the part of the aviator and that without doubt there was something wrong with the "release gear" of the bomber. I told him that I had previously had experience with aircraft and that I could well understand such a thing occurring. However, no matter what the cause may be it is very regrettable that such a thing should have occurred for we have been exercising the greatest caution to prevent the recurrence of such incidents and have issued strict orders concerning them. Not only that but according to my recollection orders have been issued very recently again regarding this. As a military man myself I know that the military men are accustomed to give absolute obedience to instructions. I will do the utmost within my power to see that a recurrence of this does not eventuate, I said.

[a]See II, 197.
[b]Not available.

Trans. 8-1-41

No. 199

FROM: Tokyo — July 31, 1941
TO: Washington — #434.

(Utmost secrecy, Chief of Office routing.)

Re your #612[a].

In regard to your proposal, please tell the President immediately that in view of the general state of relations between Japan and America, bombing of Chungking will be suspended for a time. In view of these relations between Japan and America this step which you suggested would be a very serious one indeed and if it were publicly announced in America it would give an unnecessary shock to one section of public opinion in Japan. This would defeat the very purpose of the step itself. Please call the attention of America to this point particularly.

My #435[b] is an answer to the three questions (of Welles) brought up in your #608[a].

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[a]Nomura recommends that as the best possible step Japan could take in the Tutila matter, Japan stop bombing Chungking for a while, and publish this fact immediately, see II, 196.

[b]See II, 198.

[c]See II, 193. Welles summons Nomura and demands explanations of Tutuila bombing immediately.

Trans. 8-1-41

No. 200

FROM: Washington — July 31, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #623.

(Strictly Confidential. Chief of Office Routing.)

Re your #434[a].

I called on Welles on the afternoon of the 31st and told him that I wished to have the gist of my separate telegram #624[b] conveyed to the President.

Welles expressed his gratitude and said that he would make arrangements immediately.

I said further that in case there was anything the President did not understand, I desired an opportunity to explain it to him, and closed the interview.

(Time 8:10 p.m.)

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[a]Nomura is directed to inform the President that bombing of Chungking will be suspended for a time; requesting that this action not be publicly announced.

[b]See II, 201.

Trans. 8-3-41

No. 201

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

July 31, 1941
624 (or # 622).
(Separate telegram).

Strictly confidential. Chief of Office routing.

I have come to convey to you personally the regret of my government over the Tutuila incident. I am instructed to inform promptly the President of the U.S. that the Japanese government has decided to suspend for the time being all bombing operations over the city area of Chungking. Let me say that this is a step I myself recommend to be taken in the interest of Japanese-American friendship. And I feel that this decision of my government should be held confidential inasmuch as publication of it would arouse unnecessarily a section of public opinion in Japan ----- defeat the very purpose for which the measure has been adopted.

I am fully convinced that the Tutuila incident was an accident pure and simple. This, I believe, was made entirely clear to Ambassador Grew by our Foreign Minister, Admiral Toyoda, at the time when he offered his government's apologies, and it seems scarcely necessary for me to give detailed explanations. I should like to add that the Japanese Government will be prepared to pay indemnities for any damages to American property upon the completion of the necessary investigations.

Trans. 8-6-41

No. 202

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

July 31, 1941
526.

Re my # 623[a].

During the evening of the 31st, Welles announced that the United States has accepted Japan's apology in connection with the Tutuila incident and that the matter was now closed.

[a]See II, 200.

Trans. 8-5-41

No. 203

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

July 28, 1941
591.

(Secret)

According to information emanating from ----- office, AP reports from ISTANBUL concerning British-German peace negotiations are not entirely without foundation. However this may be, the President and the Acting Secretary of State have intimated that Mayor LA GUARDIA of New York, former National Defense Head, has let something slip.

As a matter of fact, the German Government has recently again added to its personnel and is successfully engaging in undercover work. This is being fervently supported by Americans of German extraction.

Trans. 7-31-41

No. 204

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 31, 1941
TO: Washington #433.

(Part 1 of 4)

(Message to Berlin #708)

From time to time you have been sending us your various opinions about what we ought to do to help Germany who desires our assistance now that she is at war with Russia. After a conference with military, at the risk of a certain amount of repetition which may cause you some ennui, I am wiring you the Imperial Government's policy and views. Hereafter, will you please act accordingly.

1. In a cabinet meeting during the forenoon of July 2, the broad outlines of our decision concerning our future policy were drawn. You were informed of it by Circular #1390[a]. Ever since then the Government has been and is devoting every effort to bring about the materialization of that policy.

2. The China incident has already extended over a period of four years, and the Imperial Government's general trend, particularly its military trend, has hitherto been to expend the greater part of its energies in an endeavor to bring a conclusion to the incident, and now a new situation faces us from the north and from the south. In order to meet it, there is more reason than ever before for us to arm ourselves to the teeth for all-out war.

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[a]See II, 103, 104.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 205

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 31, 1941
TO: Washington #433.

(Part 2 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708)

It seems that Germany also understands this position of ours fairly well. The German Embassy people here in Tokyo are already quite aware of it. And yet I fear that their homeland is not yet as well informed as they are on our position.

3. Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and the United States, are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas. Our Empire must immediately take steps to break asunder this ever-strengthening chain of encirclement which is being woven under the guidance and with the participation of England and the United States, acting like a cunning dragon seemingly

asleep. That is why we decided to obtain military bases in French Indo-China and to have our troops occupy that territory.

That step in itself, I dare say, gave England and the United States, not to mention Russia, quite a set-back in the Pacific that ought to help Germany, and now Japanese-American relations are more rapidly than ever treading the evil road. This shows what a blow it has been to the United States.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 206

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 31, 1941
TO: Washington # 433.

(Part 3 of 4) (Message to Berlin # 708)

Needless to say, the Russo-German war has given us an excellent opportunity to settle the northern question, and it is a fact that we are proceeding with our preparations to take advantage of this occasion. Not only will we have to prepare, however, but we must choose well our chance. In view of the real situation facing our Empire, this should be easily understood. If the Russo-German war proceeds too swiftly, our Empire would inevitably not have time to take any effective symmetrical action.

5. I know that the Germans are somewhat dissatisfied over our negotiations with the United States, but we wished at any cost to prevent the United States from getting into the war, and we wished to settle the Chinese incident. We were working toward those objectives. Let him who will gainsay the fact that as a result we have indelibly impressed upon the United States the profoundness of the determination of the Empire of Japan and restrained her from plunging into the conflict against Germany.

It should be understood that we started these talks at a time which seemed opportune to us, and on the assumption that there was complete trust between Japan and Germany. For that matter, did not Germany start a war with Russia because of her military expediency when it was least desirable on our part? Now we have not only to settle the Chinese incident but have to meet a new challenge in the north as well as in the south, and this is quite inconvenient.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 207

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 31, 1941
TO: Washington # 433.

(Part 4 of 4) (Message to Berlin # 708)

We are expending our best efforts to cooperate with Germany. She knows it and ought to understand our action.

6. Well, the formula for cooperation between Tokyo and Berlin, in order to realize the fundamental spirit of the Tripartite Pact, should be for each country to have a certain flexibility in its conduct. What I mean to say is that each should understand that real cooperation does not necessarily mean complete symmetry of action. In other words, we should trust each

other and while striving toward one general objective, each use our own discretion within the bounds of good judgment.

Thus, all measures which our Empire shall take will be based upon a determination to bring about the success of the objectives of the Tripartite Pact. That this is a fact is proven by the promulgation of an Imperial rescript. We are ever working toward the realization of those objectives, and now during this dire emergency is certainly no time to engage in any light unpremeditated or over-speedy action.

Please send to Rome. Have sent to Washington.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 208.

FROM: Tokyo August 2, 1941
TO: Washington # 438.

Re your # 566[a]. Secret outside the department.

(Part 1 of 3)

We are now considering the proposal very carefully, although as you may well imagine, it would require considerable amount of time before the Japanese Government will be able to express its opinion regarding it because of the fact that the political situation at home and abroad is critical and the matter under consideration is of great importance. However, I would like to have you tell the President that we, realizing the seriousness of the present situation, are giving consideration to our reply and tell him so by covering the following points:

1. The method of disposal referred to in my # 434[b] is an unusual one. It goes to show, in part at least, how eager the Japanese Government is to bring about an equitable adjustment of Japanese-American relations. (This method of disposal excludes the area outside of the Chungking city limits and, therefore, does not apply to military establishments, airfields, etc., in the suburbs. Furthermore, it goes without saying that it is a temporary measure.

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[a]Conversation between NOMURA and ROOSEVELT regarding HITLER's war aims and Japanese-German cooperation, see II, 172.

[b]Informing ROOSEVELT that Chungking bombing will be temporarily suspended in view of Japanese-American relations, see II, 199.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 209

FROM: Tokyo August 2, 1941
TO: Washington # 438.

(Part 2 of 3)

2. As soon as I received the report of damage having been done to the American gunboat by our bombing, I sent to the American Ambassador the memorandum prepared by the former Vice Minister YAMAMOTO, and immediately upon receiving official wire, I personally met the American Ambassador. I have already wired you this fact. In addition

to doing these things, I arranged to offer every facility to American newspaper correspondents and at the same time I had the report banned here so as not to unnecessarily excite public opinion. All this was done simply because we wish to deal with Japanese-American relations in as calm an atmosphere as possible.

Furthermore, in order to avoid the recurrence of such unpleasant incidents as the one in question, it is my earnest desire that the United States would free herself from mere legal theories and cooperate with Japan to eliminate by means of friendly conversation those matters which constitute the cause of disputes between the two countries. For example, inasmuch as the removal of Tutuilla to safe waters at this time would have a beneficent effect on future Japanese-American relations, will you suitably inform the American authorities to take this opportunity to do so.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 210

FROM: Tokyo — August 2, 1941
TO: Washington — # 438.

(Part 3 of 3)

If we are to avoid disruption of Japanese-American relations, it would be necessary to mutually exercise a high degree of statesmanship. It is in consideration of this fact that we are taking the aforementioned attitude. However, if the Japanese Government is to continue to maintain such a cool-headed attitude and if the public opinion in Japan is to follow the Government more perfectly with a view to improving Japanese-American relations, I believe firmly that it is necessary that the United States Government reciprocate our attitude by refraining strictly from behavior of fault-finding and maintain instead an intelligent and constructive attitude. Will you therefore persuade the President to consider this point carefully. As I have already told you in successive telegrams, it is my intention to have the Japanese-American diplomatic negotiations continue in the future. Will you, therefore, take every opportunity to enlighten the American authorities, along the lines set forth in my telegrams, on the French Indo-China question as well.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 211

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — August 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 649.

(Strictly Secret)

In view of the fact that Japanese-American relations are constantly growing worse with prohibitive limits set on export of oil, today, the 1st, during the forenoon, I secretly called on a member of the cabinet and asked him for the latest news. At the same time I told him the reasons for our having occupied French Indo-China. It appeared that he had already heard of Japan's arguments from IWAKURO. I said, "It seems that it was clearly stated in the Japanese-French agreement regarding French Indo-China that the occupation was made necessary by the present general situation. It is not of a permanent nature. Do you not think

it a good plan to conclude an agreement which promises to uphold the integrity of the adjacent countries, waters, colonies, and the Dutch East Indies and to continue the negotiations that have been carried on and thus to facilitate supply of material?" Then he asked the question: "Is not Japan preparing to occupy Siberia?" showing that his interest had not been aroused to any extent. Incidentally, he said "Since Hull was so intensely interested in adjusting Japanese-American relations, he is greatly disappointed. Although he is expected to return on Monday, he is 'very sick'." Then he said, "We are now being ridiculed by our colleagues as having been 'easy men' for having played into the hands of the Japanese, but there will come a time when we will be quite active."

He spoke further, saying, "You are well aware of the fact that the President does not want war."

Now this is the way I look at the matter: The United States is trying to restrain Japan, first of all, by waging an economic war, although the government authorities claim that they are merely taking counter-measures against Japan's policy. But, that the United States is at the same time making military preparations against the possible eventuality of a clash of arms is a fact with which you are already familiar. Furthermore, it seems that in order to attain her object, the United States is endeavoring to get Soviet Russia and China, to say nothing of Great Britain and the Dutch East Indies, to fall in line and cooperate with her. That the Russo-German war is lasting longer than expected has proved to be an advantage to the United States.

However, the aforementioned cabinet member did not speak so optimistically as the President, in a newspaper interview yesterday, is reported to have alleged his confidant HOPKINS to have spoken (*sic*). The cabinet member believes firmly in the necessity of this war lasting for several years for the reason that due to destruction of her man (*sic*) and materials, and due to the shortage of oil, Germany would not be able to do anything on a great scale even after the fighting on the Eastern Front has come to an end, and that since the United States will be able in the meantime to rapidly increase her production, the trend will be in favor of her.

Trans. 8–7–41

No. 212

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 2, 1941
TO: Rio, Bogota, Mexico #221.

(Circular)

(Message to Tokyo #643)

1. The recent petroleum embargo exercised by the United States is attracting attention as the first measure taken to back up the freezing of funds. Its motive has not the slightest connection with the bombing of the Tutuila and is taken to be a warning to Japan against further penetration southwards. It is reported that the United States will not relax this sort of economic pressure until it become clear that Japan is going to put an end to her policy of aggression. All the newspapers print a London report that Japan is continuing to make new demands including military bases in Thai and the press contains comments to the effect that Japan is further increasing her military forces.

Simultaneously with the petroleum embargo the Chief of Production and Management stopped the sale of silk to the public at large; consequently, stocking manufacturing throughout the whole of the United States, depending upon whether or not they can use substitute materials, can employ but 20% of their former workers. Great unemployment will be the result, in fact, it is said that 175,000 people are out of jobs.

2. On the 2nd, the Government of the United States issued a statement to the people that the fact that Japanese aggression in French Indo-China was not stopped constitutes a threat to the security of the United States, whose attitude towards France will be determined hereafter by whether or not Vichy surrenders her territory to the Axis. On the same day, WELLES, the British Ambassador; the Australian Minister; and the South African Minister, (doubtless concerning Dakar) held a conference on measures to be taken in the worst eventualities.

The activities of HARRY HOPKINS in Moscow are receiving notice and these activities are being referred to in connection with Russo-American cooperation in case Japan strikes northwards.

Relayed to -----, Mexico, Panama, Rio. Relay from Rio to -----, Buenos Aires.

Trans. 8-15-41

No. 213

FROM: Los Angeles (Nakauchi) August 4, 1941
TO: Washington Circular # 15.

(Part 1 of 2)

(Message to Tokyo # 142) Re my # 132[a].

a. Since then, the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Sumitomo Bank have continued to be under surveillence by two Treasury Department inspectors each. Incoming and outgoing wires and mail have to have their details "checked" by these inspectors. Insofar as the Yokohama Specie Bank is concerned, though the account books and bank balances are "checked" daily, domestic business is allowed to proceed much as usual.

1. Since the freezing legislation went into effect, all individuals must present affidavits of continued residence since June 17th of last year before they can make first withdrawals from deposits. (There have been occasions when the inspectors have demanded that passports be submitted as evidence.)

2. Though statements are made that these measures are not as a result of the freezing legislation, when withdrawals are in excess of $500., the Treasury Department inspectors make investigations as to what purpose these funds are to be used.

3. When drafts are requested for dispatch to dependents in Japan, actual proof must be submitted that drafts have been sent to these same dependents within the last six months.

The Treasury inspectors see to it that Treasury Department watchmen are sent to both banks to stand guard each night.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 10-6-41

No. 214

FROM: Los Angeles (Nakauchi) August 4, 1941
TO: Washington Circular # 15.

(Part 2 of 2)

(Message to Tokyo # 142)

b. NYK, Mitsui and Mitsubishi branch offices are now making applications for general licenses through their respective branch offices in San Francisco. (Temporary licenses have already been issued. Routine office expenses can be paid.) However, Mitsui and NYK branch offices were visited by Treasury Department inspectors for the three days of August 2 to 4, inclusive, at which time their disbursement account books were thoroughly investigated. Though the Osaka Chosen maintains a branch office, since it is an American agency with an American manager, it has no direct bearing in the present situation. The Asano branch office is making application for a general license.

c. Permanently established Japanese firms, maintaining partners in Japan, and to whom money is sent regularly, because of the freezing legislation, may not be able to send funds accumulated since June 1st to their respective sponsoring organizations in Japan. All of these firms are now making applications for general licenses. However, none of these licenses, as yet, have been issued.

Trans. 10-6-41

No. 215

FROM: Tokyo August 5, 1941
TO: Washington # 445.

Re your # 621[a].

1. There are no objections to your negotiating regarding the three points you mentioned.

The British Ambassador has already made a proposal regarding their foreign diplomatic establishments and consulates in Japan, in harmony with the principle of reciprocity, to the effect that these be exempted from the rules recently put into effect regulating the transactions of foreigners. Also regarding America's foreign diplomatic establishments and consulates, if America does not apply the rule freezing assets to Japanese foreign diplomatic establishments and consulates and their staff members in America and her possessions, then the Japanese government will in turn exempt American diplomatic establishments and consulates and their staff members in Japan (including Manchuria, Taiwan, and Chosen) from the regulations governing transactions by foreigners. There is no objection to your negotiating in harmony with the above.

2. There has been no proposal of any sort from the American Ambassador in Japan regarding the order freezing assets.

3. Please handle this whole matter there.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 8-6-41

No. 216

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #646.

Yesterday, Sunday, all the newspapers discussed the Japanese-American problem in large headlines, supporting the government's stiff attitude. According to the Gallup Poll, hostility toward Japan is running rather high, but on the other hand, the press does express the opinion that the door has not been entirely closed. I would say that the Americans at present consider their relations with us as surpassing in importance their relations with Germany. As the days pass, I expect the situation to quiet down more or less. However, much will depend upon the course of the European war, and no man could do anything but guess what the future has in store. IWAKURO and WAKASUGI will make their report to you in Tokyo, but do not forget that things change rapidly these days. Now I am in a responsible position. Though I could not offer any excuses, if I made a miscalculation now, there might be regrettable consequences. Furthermore, my astuteness is quite limited. Therefore, as soon as there is a means of transportation available, I would like for you to send me some such Foreign Office expert well versed in all affairs at home and abroad as Ambassador KURUSU to work with me for awhile.

I know nothing at all about the government's high policy which is shrouded in secrecy, so how can you expect me to take any action whatever when my hands are thus tied? Please think this over, and send me a man immediately.

Trans. 8-7-41

No. 217

FROM: Washington August 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo #652.

(Parts 1, 2, 3 of 4) (Division of parts not indicated)

Strictly confidential.

Wakasugi talked with Undersecretary Welles for over one and a half hours on the 4th. They left no stones unturned in their exchanges of frank opinions. The following is the gist of their discussion:

Wakasugi said that on the eve of his departure for home to report to his government, he would like to get a clear idea of the attitude of the U.S. Government. Also, if there was anything that the U.S. Government would like to have relayed to his home government, he would like to be advised of it, Wakasugi said. After that, Wakasugi continued, he would like, (1) to be advised of what the United States wants of Japan in connection with Japanese-U.S. relations; and (2) to exchange opinions on the set-up of the world following the termination of the European war.

Welles replied that both Secretary Hull and he were exceedingly interested in maintaining and promoting friendly relations between the United States and Japan, and the Secretary has told the Ambassador so on many occasions.

Over a long period of time, he continued, peace has been maintained between Japan and the United States. The friendship which has bound the two together over those years is, indeed, a rare phenomenon in the history of international history. The United States is very anxious that some means be found to make possible the continuance of this happy situation. The United States has absolutely no desire to take aggressive or oppressive steps against Japan. At present, however, the U.S. policy towards the conquered countries sometimes clashes with

what the United States really wants to do with regard to other countries, which causes some critical situations.

He has had much adoration for Japan since he had a post there 25 years ago, Welles said. He has never experienced as critical times as these, he said. The only remaining hope now is the displaying of extraordinarily brilliant statesmanship, (meaning, not resorting to force of arms).

Wakasugi said that Welles had described the present situation correctly and asked him what sort of statesmanship the United States had in mind. He went on to point out that Europeans and Americans would not or could not comprehend Japanese actions in the Far East. The basis of the differences is that European and American territorial penetrations and applications of economic pressure of recent years conflicted with the ideals for the Far East that Japan—as the mainstay of the Far East—is striving for. The European and American policy described above does not harmonize with the Japanese program of national security which has a direct bearing on Japan's very existence.

To this Welles replied that he well understood Japan's aspirations and that the only point that was objectionable was the resorting to arms to gain these aspirations ----- (one line missing) ----- that which was proposed to the Ambassador was done so from this point of view.

At the request of Wakasugi, he explained that proposal in the following manner: Fundamentally, French Indo-China was occupied by Japan, the Japanese say, (1) to counter the danger of joint action by Great Britain and China (probably including the United States) against Japan; and (2) as a means of being assured access to raw materials.

Now, upon the evacuation of Japanese troops, if Japan, United States, Britain, and China (and possibly the Netherlands) could agree not to threaten French Indo-China's territorial integrity, and set that area up as a strict neutral, Japan's aim No. 1 would be automatically satisfied. Incidentally, as was reported to the Ambassador recently, Thailand is to be included in this area.

With regard to Japan's argument regarding the assurance of accessibility to raw materials, Welles said that he could hardly believe that French Indo-Chinese production would satisfy the demands of Japan. However, if Japan agrees to the terms set up above, the President is prepared to insist to all the nations concerned (including Britain, Netherlands, and China, it is alleged) to grant Japan's desires of putting her on an equal basis.

Welles added that the United States awaits Japan's reply to this proposal with much expectancy.

"By the above explanation," Wakasugi then said in effect, "do you imply that the United States is prepared to conduct negotiations with Japan concerning the Japanese demands, and that the United States is willing to use her good offices to discuss them with the other nations referred to above if Japan does not resort to force of arms?"

Welles replied that that is exactly what he had meant.

Wakasugi continued along the following lines: "Under the national policy of 'Western Hemisphere solidarity', the United States has seized control of the Western Hemisphere for her own benefits. However, from all outward appearances, she is unsatisfied with that for it seems as if she is trying to participate in Far Eastern affairs on the pretext of having special interests there, in spite of the fact that the said special interests date no farther back than fifty or sixty years at the most. This makes one think that the United States is trying to seize the police powers of the world."

"There is very little justification for the United States having that power," Wakasugi said. "Why doesn't the United States limit her sphere of influence to the Western Hemisphere? Why can't she leave the Orient to the Orientals?"

Welles admitted that the special privileges of the United States in the Orient (most of which are in China, he said) dates back only fifty or sixty years. "However," he continued, "U.S.

actions are not based on those. The United States is prepared to give up those special privileges at any time. The point on which the United States places the most emphasis is her opposition to the use of force of arms. World peace and order cannot possibly be brought about if a power such as Japan is permitted to convert the small countries in her vicinity into her protectorates one by one in the Hitlerean manner." (At this point, Wakasugi interrupted by saying that the occupation of French Indo-China was carried out on a peaceful basis with the full accord of the French Government. Welles retorted that the Vichy Government did not have a free will and that the above mentioned "Full accord" was forcefully foisted upon it).

"When two countries such as the United States and Japan," Wakasugi then said, "which are surrounded by entirely dissimilar circumstances and which are based on different policies, insist on adhering to their respective arguments and wants, an armed clash between them cannot be avoided. If, however, the prevention of such an eventuality is sincerely desired, the actions of each must be geographically, or by some other means, limited. In the light of that, what is the scope of U.S. demands upon Japan? What are the limits of the wants of the United States herself?"

Welles avoided making a clear reply to these questions. Instead, he said, in effect:

"We are in receipt of reports that Japan is preparing a further southward move into Thailand. I greatly fear that conditions will become worse."

"The United States for one," he went on, "is convinced that wealth and good fortune would come Japan's way if only she would pursue and adhere to a strictly peaceful policy."

Trans. 8-18-41

No. 218

FROM: Washington — August 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 652.

(Part 4 of 4—Parts 1, 2, and 3 translated 18 August).

With regard to the peace set-up, subsequent to the conclusion of the war, Welles had something to say. The occasion was the dedication of the addition to the (Swedish ?) Legation here, at which time he said in his speech that the basic principle would be the equal accessibility of raw materials by all the countries of the world, and the establishment in one form or another of a league which will include the entire world. (Unlike the present League of Nations, the one under consideration will have arms to enforce order). He enlarged upon that speech now, in his talk with Wakasugi. After strongly promoting the above two points, he went on to say that talk of disarmament would almost certainly be brought up. He pointed out that nothing but disillusion could come of disarmament talks without first settling upon the accessibility of raw materials.

Wakasugi then brought up the subject of the Stimson policy as it was expressed at the time of the Manchurian Incident at which time Stimson said that the United States would not recognize any gains which were made by the use of arms. "Isn't it a fact, though," Wakasugi asked, "that most of the world is what it is today, such as —for a glaring example—the U.S. Policy with regard to the Caribbean, the fruits of armed warfare? You may say that by maintaining this status, you are maintaining a status quo. However, from the eyes of a historian, it is merely a matter of the time element, isn't it?"

Welles replied that he himself could see points which were objectionable in the past of the United States. However, the United States has since been striving to correct those wrongs.

Certainly, if history is permitted to repeat itself, forever, no progress could be made in mankind. He went on to point out that one had to change one's policies in accordance with the times.

I shall not go into the other points they discussed.

Trans. 8-22-41

PART B—JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE IN DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES

No. 219

FROM: Washington — May 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #319.

Re your #45[a] and #180[b].

I have had Terazaki[c] of Intelligence make an official trip to New York for the purpose of keeping in touch with the Consul-General[d] there, and we have come to the following conclusions.

1. We are of the opinion that Roosevelt's dictatorial attitude is becoming more pronounced and the government is leaning toward all-out war. Therefore, we desire that you remit immediately as large an amount as possible so that we may have funds with which to carry on intelligence work in the emergency created by America's entry into the war. For this purpose we assume that Japanese-American relations will continue as at the present.

2. The duties of an intelligence office are becoming increasingly difficult. Because of the existence of the Dies Committee and of the application of the regulations regarding Americans in foreign employ and regarding foreigners resident in America the gathering of accurate secret information is far from easy. This is only one example and there are many other "delicate" problems, so please understand the delay in my answering telegraphic (requests for information).

3. We wish to make Washington and New York one unit and have a unified policy for it. Therefore we wish to get your approval before Terazaki starts for his post. We wish to have Consul Inagaki come here to serve. We feel that we should have here at least one-third of the personnel that they have in Shanghai for intelligence. Therefore, we are looking for temporary employees, (non-career clerks). Furthermore, we wish to have the officer in charge of intelligence visit New York about the 10th of every month.

4. The title of the officer in charge of intelligence will be that of "press attaché". His duties will be as decided in the business conference on March 4th, Article 61 (1), as follows:

A. Ordinary investigations and,

B. The development of intelligence.

"A" will of course include the investigation and gathering of secret information on the division in American public opinion regarding the rapprochement in Japanese-American relations based on the peace movement. But we wish to preclude such policies as the strategy being employed in the present negotiations.

5. A summary of the present state of the policy is as follows:

We are making personal contacts on every hand. However, at this place and in New York we are continuing the existing formal contacts and gathering secret information. In addition, to this, the officer in charge of intelligence has contacts with:

(A) J, and W, who are in close touch with the President and his wife.

The President is cultivating power through the "relief workers" and the "W.P.A." and other agencies. In addition to this, since his third term anyone who opposes him becomes the target of his attacks and his dictatorial tendencies are becoming more marked, therefore it is natural that we should pay special attention to those in close touch with him.

One or two items regarding Roosevelt's position: Evidence was brought out in the Senate to the effect that the former Ambassador to England, Kennedy, had not paid his 1932 income tax, but the President maintained silence. According to other secret information, Willkie had

a secret understanding with Roosevelt and attacked him in his public speeches more than was necessary as a Presidential candidate and enjoyed scandalizing public opinion, however, had he by any chance become President he would have become a mere puppet of Roosevelt. Again, ----- told Terazaki that originally he was an isolationist, but that now in view of the opposition he was keeping silent. Six months from now if he said he were an isolationist he would not be able to go about in safety.

(B) W of the State Department.

When Terazaki was a student at Brown University he became well acquainted with W.

(C) G of the Senate.

When Terazaki was in Brown University he was greatly helped by this G.

(D) The relationship of the "America First Committee" to Lindberg and W.

Every time Lindberg makes a speech the German newspapers approve and American newspaper reporters in Germany write it up and American newspapers make a big thing of it so that the impression is conveyed that Lindberg is an agent of Germany. Because of this, Lindberg and the Committee are very perplexed and according to W, Lindberg has been cautioned by the German Embassy. Since then he has been in touch with W.

(E) D, an Irish American.

D told our intelligence officer that a Jewish American Justice of the Supreme Court, Frankfurter, was packing the key posts of the government with Jewish Americans. But that American antipathy toward Jews is increasing to such an extent that eventually anti-Jewish influence would prevail.

(F) Persons with religious affiliations. (1) Catholic. (2) Protestant. (3) Undecided.

The Catholics are the ones who are concerned in the present negotiations.

(G) The Brown University Club.

This meets regularly once a month and at other times at which times he (Terazaki) is present.

6. Concerning the salary for employing nationals and foreigners. The future is another matter; however, judging from the past unless our general funds are increased it will be impossible to move. We wish to have you cognizant of the actual situation and when the opportune time comes we wish to take decisive action.

7. Looking at the funds for general intelligence, of the $30,000 income, only about $3,900 a year is available for actual development of intelligence and about $1,800 a year for entertainment and receptions. However, in the decision of the committee held on March 4th of this year regarding intelligence business, and the stipulations of the policy regarding propagation of intelligence, it was variously affirmed that of course the utmost effort would be put forth and that we would need no small sum for expenses. According to the present allotment we will need for the present year the sum of $500,000 for the development of intelligence. We respectfully request this.

[a]"In view of our decision to deemphasize propaganda and concentrate on Intelligence, as directed in my dispatch # 44, please make recommendations for ensuing propaganda allotments.

[b]Not available

[c]Especially assigned to U.S. for intelligence and propaganda work.

[d]Morishima; he had long experience in intelligence work in Manchuria and China; Counselor of Embassy, Washington, until March 1941.

Trans. 5-21-41

No. 220

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) May 16, 1941
TO: Singapore # 120.

According to a telegram from our consul in Colombo, a New York Reuters dispatch states that it is reported that the United States has already stationed a fleet in the Indian Ocean. Please pay great attention to the movements of American warships.

(Strictly Secret)

Trans. 7-23-41

No. 221

FROM: Washington June 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 386.

(To San Francisco, Los Angeles, & Seattle, Cir. # 121)

Secret.

Because of the suppression exercised against our Naval representatives (Language Officers) by the United States authorities in a series of recent incidents, our Navy has, for the time being, stopped stationing these officials by limiting the personnel. Inasmuch as in the light of the relations at present prevailing between Japan and the United States, observation of the movements of the American Navy is one of the most important matters, will you observe the movements of ships and gather other information that may be of interest to our Navy and wire us the required information as it comes to you?

Trans. 6-25-41

No. 222

FROM: Seattle (Sato) June 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 056.

(1) Ships at anchor on the 22nd/23rd (?):
(Observations having been made from a distance, ship types could not be determined in most cases.)

1. Port of Bremerton:
   1 battleship (Maryland type)
   2 aircraft tenders (one ship completed and has letter "E" on its funnel).
2. Port of -----:
   1 destroyer
   11 coast guard cutters
   (Ships under repair):
   1 destroyer
   11 (appear to be) minesweepers
   3 coast guard cutters

3. Sand Point:
   2 newly constructed hangars
4. Boeing:
   New construction work on newly built factory building #2. Expansion work on all factory buildings.

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 223

FROM: San Francisco (Muto) June 5, 1941
TO: Washington #022.

Action Tokyo as #092. *(Abstract)*

Report to Washington and Tokyo on announcement on the 4th by the Maritime Commission that 28 ships are to be pressed into service for the Army and Navy (7 to Army, 21 to Navy), etc.

Trans. 6-19-41

No. 224

FROM: Hollywood (Los Angeles) June 2, 1941
TO: Washington #7.

(Circular)

Message to Tokyo #83.

On the 20th, the Saratoga, and on the 24th, the Chester (?), Louisville, the 12th Destroyer Squadron and Destroyers #364, 405, 411, 412, and 413 entered San Diego, and all of them left on the 31st.

Trans. 6-20-41

No. 225

FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 2, 1941
TO: Panama #16.

Please find out if the aircraft carrier, Lexington, has passed through the canal recently from the Pacific Ocean.
Secret.

Trans. 6-20-41

No. 226

FROM: Panama (Izawa) June 6, 1941
TO: Washington # 13.

Message to Tokyo # 48.

Movements of American warships as I have observed them:

The following ships were observed to move from the Pacific into the Atlantic through the Canal:

1. On May 1st, four destroyers (four funnels, # 100, large size); on June 3rd, a destroyer # 436; on the night of the 4th one light, one heavy cruiser and five destroyers (their type was not ascertained); on the 5th the army transport ship "Republic".

2. The following ships were observed moving from the Atlantic into the Pacific:

On June 1st, a transport ship which appeared to be also a repair ship (two funnels, two masts, extremely high sides and bridge, two turrets, directly behind the foremast there was one ----- -----, one winch amidship and one on the stern. On the afterdeck, there were three scouting planes). On the 5th, three naval special service ships.

Furthermore, at about ----- o'clock on the 30th of May, while sailing along the Central American coast, it seems that the Sagami Maru observed five ships, apparently destroyers, moving off to the north.

3. On the 2nd, two naval special service ships came to anchor off the Balboa piers. These were seen to come from the Atlantic. One of these is discharging anti-aircraft shells. At the same anchorage, an army transport "John R. R. Hanna" is unloading bombs.

Relayed to Washington.

Trans. 6-19-41

No. 227

FROM: Panama (Izawa) June 17, 1941
TO: Washington (Koshi) # 19.

(Part 1 of 2)

Action Tokyo as # 62.

The Italian Minister showed me many secret charts made by the Canal Zone Administration, showing the locations of equipment, guns and other military establishments in the Canal Zone.

I glanced through them, and found them to be extremely detailed. In considering the process by which these charts were obtained, I feel that it would be absolutely impossible to obtain them in the future. Accordingly, I approached the Italian Minister regarding them. It appears that he has no objections to our making copies of them, provided that this is done in Tokyo, after we have delivered them to the Italian Embassy there. However, as all ports here are being very closely watched, there is no other way of taking these charts out except by plane.

I wonder if it would not be possible to have some Japanese merchant in South America, who is either returning to Japan, or is being transferred to some other country, take these charts out; or to have one of our office-staff deliver them to a designated place? At present, all the places where recent defense operations are being carried out are being marked on these charts. This work is estimated to take about one week to finish.

The Italian Minister stated that if *(handling)* of this in Japan caused too much delay, there is no other way than to take them by plane from ----- to *Washington (?)*. In this case, he stated that he would want to have it *(copied ?)* at *(Washington ?)*. Please send instructions without fail.

Secret.

Note: Translation doubtful. Part 2 of 2 unavailable.

Trans. 6-25-41

No. 228

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) June 23, 1941
TO: Mexico (Koshi) # 106.

Regarding the plans for procuring maps of the Panama Canal and vicinity, please have career attaché, Kihara, make an official trip to Panama. It might be well to have secretary Yoshimizu accompany him.

Have the maps taken out by plane, and then have Sato, the Naval attaché, bring them to Tokyo with him when he returns.

Furthermore, since the Panama Legation, in their report # 62[a] of 17 June from Panama to me, mentioned the question of a trip, get in touch with them regarding date and time of arrival. (American surveillance will unquestionably be vigilant. There are also some suspicions that they read some of our codes. Therefore, we wish to exercise the utmost caution in accomplishing this mission. Also, any telegrams exchanged between you and Panama should be very short for security, or be in innocuous plain language.)

[a]See II, 227.

Trans. 6-24-41

No. 229

FROM: Panama (Izawa) June 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 67.

From Minister YAMAGATA.

Re message # 219 from Mexico to the Foreign Minister[a].

There is also the matter of Minister MIURA's admonitions. When he inquired as to the method of handling baggage upon arrival in Guatemala he was told that as a general rule only baggage that would be taken into a hotel would have to be examined upon departure. Therefore, each person's hand baggage as well as suitcases containing diplomatic documents, at the present time, cannot be taken out without being opened or going through customs. ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----. Our idea is that the Customs authorities should merely place a seal on the suitcases without giving them a thorough examination. Then on departure there would be no need to demand investigations of the contents of these bags and, of course, each person's hand baggage similarly sealed.

Relayed to Mexico.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 10-1-41

No. 230

FROM: Mexico City — June 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 230.

Re my # 219[a] and Panama's # 60[a] to the Foreign Minister.

In the case of Minister Yamagata as well, with the exception of the "sealed" suitcase containing diplomatic documents, they insisted that it was necessary to inspect his baggage as usual. Only, as a matter of fact, at the time of departure, the inspection was not carried out. On the other hand, in my case, in view of the fact that in Guatemala, a country to which I am accredited, rights that ordinarily are recognized by international law were violated by an aviation company with U.S. affiliations, and in view of the fact that this violation was tolerated by the Guatemala government, I think this ought to be made the subject of appropriate steps either in Washington or in Tokyo. It may be that independently of this a protest should be presented to the Guatemala government, with demands for assurance that such a situation will not arise a second time. If the said government, because of pressure from the U.S., should refuse to comply, I think we should give serious consideration to further counter measures.

Please give me your opinions by return dispatch.

Your # 110[b] was relayed the 24th. ----- This has been relayed to Washington.

Note: Above appears to be explanation for delay in taking out SECRET MAPS from Panama by plane.

---

[a]Not available.

[b]See II, 231—Tokyo directs Mexico to transmit a former message to Washington; as it bears a relation to the postponement of instructions pertaining to the procuring and forwarding to Tokyo of charts of the Panama Canal and Canal Zone.

Trans. 7–3–41

No. 231

FROM: Tokyo — June 27, 1941
TO: Mexico — # 110.

Please transmit your message # 210[a] to Washington. The substance of that message has a relation to the postponement for awhile of the putting into effect of my message # 106[b].

---

[a]Not available.

[b]See II, 228. The Jap Foreign Minister wires the Jap Amb. at Mexico City, directing procedure to be followed for procuring maps of the Panama Canal and vicinity, and forwarding to Japan by Naval Attache Sato. Directs utmost caution in carrying out this mission and in exchange of any telegrams between Mexico City and Panama.

Trans. 6–30–41

No. 232

FROM: Washington July 1, 1941
TO: Mexico # 008.

Action Tokyo as # 453.

Regarding your # 317[a].

On the 20th, I sent Iguiti to the office of the chief of the Far Eastern Section to protest the unlawful treatment shown to Minister Miura by the officials of the Pan American Airways and also to request that the company in question be instructed as to the proper method of handling hand luggage of our diplomatic officials and couriers hereafter.

However, since the acts committed concern the procedure of the aviation company alone in its effort to assure the safety of flight and to avoid the air accidents, it is questionable whether we can rightfully make demands on the United States government on the grounds of diplomatic and consular prerogative. (Sometime ago when similar questions came up in the Philippines, I understand that it was decided not to handle this question on the basis of diplomatic and consular prerogatives).

I am inclined to believe that it should be considered more rightly as a question of courtesy. Furthermore, if we are to claim diplomatic prerogative, based on international law, it would be more proper, just as was stated in Minister Miura's telegram, to make representations to the Guatemala government. For this reason, in dealing with the State Department, we avoided bringing up the question of diplomatic prerogative.

---

[a]The violation of our rights by the P.L.E. (P.A.A. ?) Co. is unjust and the continued toleration of this by the U.S. is viewed by Japan as an unfriendly attitude which might affect our future relations. See also II, 230.

Trans. 7-3-41

No. 233

FROM: Tokyo July 2, 1941
TO: Mexico # 113.

Re your # 230[a].

Will you please file a written protest to the Guatemalan Government through its Ambassador in Mexico. I have already issued instructions to have a protest submitted to the State Department of the United States. Please transmit this message to Washington.

---

[a]See II, 230. Mexico asks Tokyo to take steps to protest the violation by an aviation company in Guatemala of rights ordinarily recognized by international law. This message refers to a message pertaining to the procuring and forwarding to Tokyo of charts of the Panama Canal and Canal Zone.

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 234

FROM: Panama (Izawa) June 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo No. number.

The Legation is now old and insecure, so we have discovered a suitable furnished house to let with three stories and an extensive garden. The third floor consists of three bedrooms and a wide verandah; the second has a dining room, guest rooms, and porches in various places, while the first floor is chiefly a storeroom and a gymnasium. It is probably capable of accommodating two hundred people at a reception. I believe we can obtain a two year lease at $400 on it beginning July 15th. Since there is a scarcity here of rentable houses and since we have an option on it only until the 25th, please answer immediately, and in the meantime I shall put in an application.

Trans. 7-2-41

No. 235

FROM: Panama (Izawa) June 26, 1941
TO: Rio #1.

Due to the sudden change in the international situation, our mission here will probably be given up. This is for your information.

Relay to Buenos Aires.

Trans. 9-20-41

No. 236

FROM: Tokyo July 4, 1941
TO: Panama No number.

To Consul-General YAMAGATA.

I would like to have you remain in Panama for awhile and work on our flanking policy as a consultant to IZAWA. As to your trip to Chile suggested in my #47[a] there is no objection to your visiting that country on your way to your post, and to your giving up your trip to Columbia.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 8-26-41

No. 237

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 4, 1941
TO: Panama #49.

Please transmit this to Minister YAMAGATA.

You are ordered to Chile as of the 4th.

Trans. 7-23-41

No. 238

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 10, 1941
TO: Panama # 51.

To Minister YAMAGATA.

Your credentials and Minister SHIOZAKI's release will be issued in two or three days. As it will be impossible to deliver them before your arrival, a translation is being sent immediately by telegraph. Please accept this, as its presentation in lieu of credentials has already been discussed with the Chilean Government.

Trans. 8-5-41

No. 239

FROM: Mexico (Miura) July 8, 1941
TO: Los Angeles # 10.

The Diet party inspecting Central and South America is scheduled to leave Los Angeles on the Panama plane. Please let me know by telegraph if arrangements for seat reservations have been made.

Trans. 7-20-41

No. 240

FROM: Buenos Aires (Usui) July 10, 1941
TO: Mexico City # 203.

To Secretary USUI.

As Minister YAMAGATA has been relieved, they are very busy at that office. Therefore, please go to your new post by air. Please acknowledge this by return telegram.

Trans. 7-23-41

No. 241

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) July 12, 1941
TO: Panama # 3.

If Minister YAMAGATA and party are still at Panama, please convey the following to them. If they have already left, please transmit it to their forwarding office.

1. To Minister YAMAGATA. I have received reports that your tour to Central and South America has been given up. Please let me know if this is true, as it has a bearing upon my preparations.

2. To Secretary USUI. If the tour of Central and South America has been given up, please return immediately to your station by air and let me know by telegraph when you will arrive.

Trans. 8-5-41

No. 242

FROM: Panama (Izawa) August 4, 1941
TO: Washington #35.

(Message to Tokyo #110)

According to intelligence emanating from a close relative of the President, it is understood that in the last cabinet meeting he stated that in the event of American participation he could see no course but for participation on the part of his country in keeping with the terms of agreement. Until such time, however, he continued, the current neutral stand will be maintained and the country will avoid taking discriminating measures against belligerent countries as well.

Relayed to Washington.

Trans. 10-11-41

No. 243

FROM: Havana (Nanjo) August 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo

(Strictly secret)

Between the 16th and the 24th of July, the following American warships were anchored in the naval harbor of Guatanamo:

2 battleships; 4 light cruisers; 4 destroyers; 2 Coast Guard cutters; 2(long range ?) heavy bombing planes.

Trans. 10-13-41

No. 244

FROM: Manila (Nihro) June 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #315.

Concerning the cargo ship referred to in the last part of my secret letter #467[a], we have in the meantime had no reports; however, one of my spies informs me that facts concerning the ship in question are very vague. However, the transport "Washington", after docking here on May 8th, went immediately to the port of Olongapo and disembarked troops of an uncertain number who are ostensibly to keep watch over Subic Bay[b].

The eight destroyers and four submarines anchored here left port on the 2nd.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] In Philippine Islands.

Trans. 6-6-41

No. 245

FROM: Manila (Nihro) June 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 326 (?).

Ships in port on the 7th:
(1) MANILA:
TON
MATTO
BUKKU
8 destroyers
PASU
14 Submarines
BECK
HON
2 target towing ships
2 supply ships

Transport Henderson left the 5th, destination uncertain.
(2) CAVITE:
None.
The REI left port, date and destination uncertain.

Trans. 6-12-41

No. 246

FROM: Manila (Nihro) June 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 335.

Re my # 326[e].

It has been ascertained that the two supply ships were mine layers.

On the 9th, two more ships of the same class entered port. They were both direct from America.

On the 11th, an oiler, TURITEI, entered port.

[e]See II, 245. Lists ships in Manila and Cavite.

Trans. 6-17-41

No. 247

FROM: Tokyo June 21, 1941
TO: China Net Circular # 1289.

Action Manila as # 176.

According to a Tokyo Nichi-Nichi dispatch from your place on the 17th, an officer of the American aviation force, a Major KONROO, together with 10 others, arrived there by clipper

on the 16th, and left the following day for Chungking via Hongkong. Please wire as to the actual circumstances.

Trans. 6-24-41

No. 248

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 1, 1941
TO: Manila (Riyoji) # 191.

According to a reliable source of information the United States Navy in your territory is desirous of requisitioning half of the American Consulate office space in the Tourist Bureau Building until September 1st, for vigilance and anti-espionage work.

The above may be a part of the plan to establish a special service organ for the British-American-Chinese military liaison chain. Therefore, please verify the above report and watch the conduct of the Navy personnel and reply information.

As the source of this information is strictly secret, please exercise caution in making investigations.

Trans. 7-5-41

No. 249

FROM: Manila (Nihro) June 28, 1941
TO: Washington # 51.

Re my # 343[a] to the Minister.

At present, not only are there a great many questions pending, but there are also numerous persons who, for the sake of convenience, entered the country as temporary tourists, and whose period of sojourn in the country is about up. Since I think their representations, as indicated in my caption message, are probably not more than a matter of mere formality, I would like to have you bear in mind, in addition to this, the considerations for an immediate settlement of this matter now. Please wire results. I have transmitted this to the Minister.

[a]Not available.

Trans. (Not dated)

No. 250

FROM: Davao July 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 86.

Secondary intelligence.

According to a spy, it seems, in view of the rapid turnover of Americans having charge of stevedores who are being used in customs duty, as well as by us here for observation of American submarines entering port, that investigation and collection of intelligence regarding Japanese vessels and Japanese persons in this area is being carried out by

British and American authorities ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----. On the whole, it seems that this is being done through the British Honorary Consul BROWN (Ker Company). This man is understood to pass information along to the M--gda Hongkong continually.

Passed by cipher letter to Manila.

Trans. 10-11-41

No. 251

FROM: Manila — July 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 399.

Re your Circular # 1408[a].

According to a check up at the Immigration Bureau, there were 1013 (some of whom are reentry) Chinese immigrants who arrived during the month of June. This is a tremendous increase over the past monthly average of 250 persons. The greater portion of the above immigrants appear to have been summoned by those already residing here and they do not appear to be contract laborers, referred to in your message. (I am checking up on the sex, age, etc., of these summoned immigrants.)

According to our informer, these immigrants have nothing to do with military construction projects and their migration is thought to be due to our policy in China. However, I will make further investigation.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-19-41

No. 252

FROM: Tokyo — July 5, 1941
TO: Manila — # 203.

Re my message # 160[a].

In view of the changed conditions after that message, please wire your opinion regarding sending Negishi to look into the present tenant farm conditions.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 253

FROM: Manila — July 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 390.

Re your # 203[a].

It is quite true that under present conditions it is exceedingly difficult to conduct cultural propaganda. However, Negishi has many friends among persons in newspaper circles in

this area. We would like to have him make contacts with various persons in the area as an individual, and through such contacts engage in gathering intelligence.

(The Japanese people of this area have become very fearful of being looked upon with suspicious eyes by U.S. officials of late. For this reason, they become very evasive and defensive when I or any of my staff try to get in touch with them. You are aware of this state of affairs and of the consequent difficulty we are encountering in collecting intelligence data.)

At the same time, we would like to have Negishi do some solid ground work for the opening of the Cultural Hall which, according to plans, is to take place shortly.

For the above reasons, will you please send him here as previously planned.

It is an absolute certainty that upon his arrival in Manila, he will be bombarded with questions concerning the international situation as seen from Japanese standpoint as well as on various domestic issues. Please, therefore, have him well versed on all the answers before he departs from Japan.

---

[a]See II, 252.

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 254

FROM: Manila — July 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 401.

BARYOTTO[a] and JOSE LEIDO have both come to this office requesting financial assistance for the purpose of running in the general election for the districts of Aatwn[a] and Mindoro respectively. In addition, OPUSU[a], whom we are now using in our schemes within the Assembly, too, has come to us asking that we (contribute toward?) the campaign fund of his followers. With regard to the possibilities of their nomination as candidates to the offices held by retiring members of the Assembly, we are continuing our secret investigations in regard to these three men, but since there is also the matter of our replying to their requests, after you have perused this, I would like to have you wire me for my own personal information whether it is possible for us to make those apportionments.

1. The necessary amount of OPUSU's use is 15,000 yen. BARYOTTO and LEIDO together require 25,000 yen, making a grand total of 40,000 yen. This disbursement should be made by the end of July when the Nationalist Party is scheduled to open its Convention here for the purpose of deciding its candidates. Therefore, I would like to have you let me know by then what the possibilities are.

2. With regard to the request made by OPUSU, I would like to have you comply with it from the point of view of increasing his party affiliations and establishing his influence in the Assembly.

3. Now, BARYOTTO, as you know, is an intimate friend of PAREDESU[a] who is the publisher of a Sulu native-language newspaper which we subsidize and which professes Pan-Asiaism (the paper is strongly supported by some of the up-holders of Pan-Asiaism). Though he ran for Governor last year, he failed to be elected. It seems that PAREDESU has privately promised to do his best in order to help him win the election.

LEIDO now holds the office of the Chief of the Income Tax Bureau in the Treasury Department. ARASU[a], former Secretary of the Treasury, and RUNK[a], a former member of the Assembly from the district of Mindoro, strongly support him.

Though there is a possibility of these two men being elected, because of the confused situation within the local convention, it is extremely hard to predict whether their chances of winning the election are good or bad. However, both of these men are simple fellows and are said to be men of dependable character.

4. No direct aid has been requested by RAWURERU[a], our legal advisor, who is running as a candidate from BATANGASU[a] (he is the son of RAWURERU, Judge of the Supreme Court); by MAGARONA[a], at present member of the Assembly and Chairman of the Labor Immigration Commission—a man connected with this office; and by BAMENTA[a], now a member of the Assembly. Should events necessitate, I believe we should assist them at this time. We are continuing our private investigation with regard to the above-mentioned BARYOTTO and LEIDO's supporters. Now, should we feel that their chances of nomination as candidates are slim, then I think that it would be appropriate for us to delay aid at such a time. Therefore, please arrange to transfer the sums of money requested above before that time.

---

[a]Kana spelling.

Trans. 8-13-41

No. 256

FROM: Manila (Nihro) July 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo #396.

1. The United States ship, American Leader (10,000 ton class) entered port today and unloaded what appeared to be ten some odd coast guns (length about 18 feet), also ten some odd gun platforms of what appeared to be such and twenty some odd light tanks.
2. The Trinity (?) left port yesterday; destination unknown.

Trans. (Not dated)

No. 257

FROM: Manila July 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo #398.

The requisitioned ship, President Taft, arrived in harbor on the 10th, with from 800 to 1000 soldiers on board for the Philippines. All vessels in port put to sea for about three weeks on the 17th, it is rumored. This will be investigated further.

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 258

FROM: Manila (Nihro) August 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #474.

1. Anchored warships—Dfionomi[a].
2. There is (are) anchored Danish ship(s) ----- garbled ----- after loading at Webu[a] (Ebu ?) will leave for America. In addition two ships touched port on the 1st and 2nd from Orongabo[a].
3. Harrison and Coolidge entered port on the 31st and 1st respectively.

[a]Kana spelling.

Trans. 8-5-41

No. 259

FROM: Manila (Nihro) July 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo #433.

The United States is making a concentrated effort to strengthen Philippine defenses. There are at present 460 planes, and about 1300 pilots. Army force numbers 10,000 and an effort is being made to increase this number. The Philippine Army numbers about 130,000 including those on active duty, reserve lists and the gendarmerie. In an emergency, about 100,000 men could be turned over to U.S. officers to command, it is estimated by the bureau concerned.

Trans. 8-1-41

No. 260

FROM: Manila July 31, 1941
TO: Tokyo #465.

There are differences between my telegram *#4?8 (?)*, paragraph (2), and my report #75 on the number of Philippine Army aeroplanes to be included in the American Army.

However, the first figures were taken from a newspaper without further verification. At present we are making investigations relative to the number of aeroplanes and aviation officers and men.

Trans. 8-14-41

No. 261

FROM: Manila (Nihro) August 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 476.

Re your # 245[a].

In observing planes on practice flights, I notice that the color of military and naval planes has not been changed and that they are not camouflaged. However, I have heard that among the naval planes there are those which have been observed to be painted a light green. Though I am making additional secret investigations, that is all for the time being.

Furthermore, in recent times, the number of planes flying above the city has decreased considerably.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 8-7-41

No. 262

FROM: Manila (Nihro) August 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 480.

Intelligence of primary order.

1. Two destroyers sailed on the fourth. All the war ships at anchor have sailed. There are, however, several small destroyers in the neighborhood of Corregidor[a]. (This was observed by the crews of the Koden Maru and the Kaischu Maru.)

2. About six-hundred American soldiers have arrived in Manila on the Coolidge. (This was learned from the crew of the Coolidge.)

[a]An island in Cavite Province at the entrance of Manila Bay.

Trans. 8-7-41

No. 263

FROM: Manila (Nihro) July 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 407.

On the morning of the 13th, the master electric dynamo was struck by lightning and put out of commission, and electricity is being supplied by an auxiliary system, however, consumption of electricity is to be curtailed in every way, it was announced in the newspapers. Repairs will take about three weeks. This is having a grave effect in the U.S. Navy and military preparations at Cavite.

Trans. 7-23-41

No. 264

FROM: Manila (Nihro) July 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 422.

Very Secret. For Official Code Handling.

As there is serious likelihood of orders being enforced for freezing of assets and for strict investigation of all funds connected with foreigners, we have decided to keep the larger part of this office's funds in cash, but when this is used up it will be difficult to secure remittances of secret funds for this office, and if the situation becomes serious, there is danger that much trouble may be incurred. Therefore, after conferring with branch manager Yamamoto of the Specie Bank, we have decided to be ready against such time by some such arrangement as described in the last part of his message to the Specie Bank. Please have this in mind and do your best to secure their consent to this. The amount involved, unless some very special emergency should arise, will be as heretofore, and of course we will use it only within the limits of approval received from the Foreign Office and we will take the responsibility of its custody in this office.

Trans. 7–29–41

No. 265

FROM: Manila July 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 438.

(Request Message)

From MATSUKAWA to the President of the Tokyo Branch of the ISHIWARA Produce Company:

Money frozen this morning. For time being stop all remittances. Cannot hope to continue business as before, but can only take necessary measures to preserve existence of firm until things get better. Think it best policy to endeavor to bring about elasticity in quota system. Please get in touch with Home Office and work out counter policy.

Trans. 7–31–41

No. 266

FROM: Manila August 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 477.

55 from this office to the Ambassador in the United States.

Re your # 203[a].

The High Commissioner here has advised me that Washington would grant permits and if this is done it will be very fortunate as you well know. With regard to this matter, we would be able to keep Davao advised of details which we have collected.

1. As you know, the secret funds used here are relatively high because of the status of the office. Consequently, in addition to paying monthly allowances to members of the staff we apportion personal entertainment allowances to them as designated in paragraphs of your # 4[b].

These monies, after they have been received at this office, are immediately handed over to the members of the staff. Should you have no objection, we would like to have you arrange so that essential secret funds other than for purposes mentioned above can be utilized by us.

2. Subsidy monies for conferences we would like to apportion as heretofore providing you have no objections. (It is our intention to apportion hospital subsidy funds as well as monies for the use of companies in outlying sections.)

The above mentioned two points doubtless will prove of interest to other offices in the United States. Please send me your reply.

---

[a]See II, 252.
[b]Not available.

Trans. (Not dated)

No. 267

FROM: Manila July 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 449.

Some of the reactions and measures taken in this area in connection with the French Indo-China affair are described below:

1. For some time past, the people in this area have been convinced that Japan has had her hands full with the China affair. Moreover, it was popularly believed that a difference of opinion arose in Japan itself following the outbreak of the German-Soviet war. For these reasons it was firmly believed here that Japan would make no southward move which would risk the necessity of a military campaign.

When our final note regarding French Indo-China was published and when subsequently our forces showed signs of actually moving into French Indo-China, the people here were caught more or less flat-footed and there were indications of some confusion.

2. In view of the locale, considerable attention was centered on the attitude the United States would take regarding our move. With the issuance of Welles' statement of the 24th, and the President's speech of the 25th, it was reported that the United States was going to take strong retaliatory actions against Japan.

Particular attention was paid to that part of the President's speech which promised that retaliatory action against Japan would be taken within twenty-four hours, and also to Welles' statement that developments in French Indo-China will have important bearings on the fate of the entire Pacific including the Philippine Islands.

As soon as the order freezing our assets was announced, it was predicted here that that was only the first retaliatory step. It was further predicted that under certain circumstances an export embargo will be placed on shipments of oil and other war materials to Japan from the United States. (In his speech, the President stated that the reason no export embargo had been placed on oil shipments to Japan was because he took Japanese reaction over such a step into consideration. Men here refer to this part of the speech and point out that the President put all of it in the past tense, and thus, indirectly the President suggests a different future policy.)

Other probable steps, they claim, are the seizure of Japanese vessels. (This was rumored in the Customs circles); and the closing of Japanese consulates in the United States.

3. With regard to the recent agreement with French Indo-China, it is locally claimed that it was only as the result of application of pressure by Japan that it was agreed upon. Thus, the lack of resistance on the part of France was strongly censured.

There are indications that the local people are considerably confused by various and varying rumors, such as reports to the effect that as a consequence of this agreement, the Japanese have obtained military bases; that Japanese vessels regularly coming to this area have been requisitioned or will cancel this service; that Japan is mobilizing at home on a gigantic scale; that foreigners may no longer travel, etc.

These have given rise to much confusion, wishful thinking, and anxiety, among the people here.

Trans. 7-30-41

No. 268

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) June 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 099.

Regarding the cable from San Francisco # 92 to the Foreign Minister, which was interrupted.

The President Pierce took on about 900 soldiers and 100 pilots on the 11th and sailed for the Philippines on the 12th.

Trans. 6-19-41

No. 269

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) June 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 100.

On the 11th, (?) two English converted cruisers entered Pearl Harbor and are at present undergoing repairs at the old (?) dry docks.

Trans. 6-30-41

No. 270

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) June 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 101.

Re my message # 100[a].

Upon inquiry, I learned that it was not a converted cruiser but was a two-funnel, 5,000 ton old light cruiser.

This message has been transmitted the same as the caption message.

[a] See II, 269.

Trans. 6-21-41

No. 271

FROM: Manila — July 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 417.

(Reliability A).

1. Four destroyers left port on the 18th. Six submarines (type 140) entered port on the same day.

2. Ships in port on the 19th:

(A) Manila:
BUKKU
6 submarines

(B) Cavite:
REI

(Reliability B).

(C) We have heard that there is a British light cruiser lying at anchor in Cavite (see my # 415[a]) with two holes in the side. It has put into port to have these repaired.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-23-41

PART C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

No. 272

FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 15, 1941
TO: Berlin (Koshi) #093.

(Circular)

Action Tokyo as #311.

Opinion is divided in government circles regarding the problem of convoys and that is the reason that President Roosevelt has maintained silence concerning it. It appears that on the 13th he interviewed King, the Commander of the Atlantic Fleet, and on the 14th, Forrestal, Undersecretary of the Navy recently returned from an investigation tour of Britain, and got their opinions on the matter. However, Roosevelt himself wishes to avoid the danger of warfare in the Atlantic with Germany and therefore hesitates to put convoys into use. He would rather lend part of the destroyer flotilla to Great Britain and let her do her own convoying. However, Secretary Knox in particular and the Navy Department in general are opposed to lending U.S. ships to Britain and thus weakening their own naval strength. For one thing they are thinking of Japanese relationship and if worst comes to worst and England goes down then the United States would have to face Germany with a weakened fleet.

On the 15th the New York Times, under the caption "Let's have a showdown with Germany", after giving the figures of the shipping losses of England for several days, said that if the United States would provide England with 200 long range bombers, they would have the same effect as a "patrol" and would serve to hold the activity of the submarines in check. This summarizes the opinion in U.S. government circles that there is no immediate need of convoying.

For your information.

Relayed to Germany and England.

Trans. 5-20-41

No. 273

FROM: Rome May 30, 1941
TO: Washington No number.

Message to Tokyo as #333.

1. The Italian method of handling Roosevelt's speech is as I have told you in my #330[a], but the local American correspondents here are warning the Italian people against the tendency of considering this speech as the handwriting on the wall. In addition, it is understood that they are propagandizing the statement that the declaration of an unlimited national emergency is not just another way of saying full mobilization.

2. Furthermore, in view of the fact that Roosevelt in this speech stated that, should the Azores and the Cape Verde islands fall into the hands of Germany, the freedom of the Atlantic and the safety of the United States would be directly threatened, there are many here who say that this is a manifestation of America's aspirations for the occupation of these islands.

Relayed to Washington and Berlin.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 6-3-41

No. 274

FROM: Shanghai — May 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 882.

According to AK, Chungking is disappointed in President ROOSEVELT's fireside chat because it did not refer to Japanese-American relations. (U.P. reports that on the 29th ____ also referred to this point, stating that this encouraged Japan's ambition and that even when viewed from the standpoint of military strategy the United States could better win absolute victory if she would first settle her war in the Pacific). The chat was especially disappointing because it gave the impression that China's political set-up was an anti-Nazi defense line, whereas in fact Chungking wished to preserve the German-Chinese Cultural Association organized by SHUKAKA[a] as an instrument through which to negotiate with Germany in case Germany wins. Chungking avoided any reference to this organization and had its Foreign Minister WANG issue a mere perfunctory statement (please refer to my # 872[b]); aside from this, as an oriental nation she has kept silent.

On the other hand the Chinese Communist Party regard that the fireside chat was a blow to those Chinese who have been expecting aid from the United States and that it had a beneficial influence on the investigation now being carried on for the adjustment of Chinese-Russian relations and consequently for the adjustment of the relation between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party. The Communist Party also is of the opinion that the United States purposely avoided reference to her attitude towards Japan at this time when she is pressed with the necessity of making that clear and also making her attitude in regard to China-Japan incident equally clear, and that the United States if following the policy of sounding out the possibility of peace with Chungking on the one hand and on the other hand preparing for cooperations between her and China, at the same time endeavoring to estimate the actual fighting strength of the Chungking regime[c].

On the 28th, SINKA NIPPO[d] expressed the view that the fact that no reference was made to United States-Japanese relations and no criticism was made of Japan is indicative of the United States' intention of stressing the war in the Atlantic and paying little attention to developments in the Pacific. This paper, furthermore, referred to a Reuter dispatch expressing disapproval of labor strifes in the United States and of suppression of the peoples' rights.

Relayed to Peking, Tientsin, Nanking, Hankow and Hongkong.

---

[a]CHU CHIU-HUA—Member of the Central Executive Yuan; also formerly the Head of the Educational Department.

[b]Not available.

[c]Sentence as translated (Dod comment).

[d]A Chinese newspaper.

Trans. 6-4-41

No. 275

FROM: Lisbon — June 4, 1941
TO: Washington

Message to Tokyo # 93.

The fact that in his Fireside Chat, ROOSEVELT referred to the Azores, gave Portugal a severe shock. The Brazilian Ambassador told me that in case England and the United States win the

final victory the domineering manner of the United States will be much more difficult to endure than that of Germany and that henceforward the position of the extreme pro-British and pro-American wing will weaken and a strong anti-American sentiment will sweep the country.

From the 28th to the 31st hostile editorials appeared in the newspapers, but since then no comment has appeared. I have received a report to the effect that condemnation of the speech which was to have been published in the Government organ on the 1st has been withheld. I got in touch with the German Embassy to find out what had happened in the meantime and the German Embassy informed me that on the evening of the 31st a special envoy arrived in Lisbon by plane bearing a message from Secretary HULL to the effect that the United States does not now intend to occupy the Azores. The German Embassy said they got that information from two places in their communications net. On the 2nd, an official, second in attendance on the Premier, confidentially told me that within the Government there is a mounting cry for the Premier to make a tour of the Azores and to proclaim sovereignty thereover to the Portuguese and to the outside world.

Trans. 6-14-41

No. 276

FROM: Lisbon (Chiba) June 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 105.

(Intelligence report).

On the 14th the President's son, Captain ROOSEVELT, stopped here on his return to the United States. The censorship authorities of this country, being anti-American, the newspapers were not permitted to publish this as front page news. The local government also maintained an indifferent attitude toward him and there is no evidence that he was dined by any of the higher-ups.

Relayed to Washington and Berlin.

Trans. 6-28-41

No. 277

FROM: Lisbon (Chiba) June 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 103.

(Report of Primary Importance).

Re message # 63[a] from our Ambassador in Madrid to Your Excellency.

It has been discovered that a group of anti-SALAZAR[b] plotters in Mozambique[c] recently proposed to the Portuguese Government that in case England and the United States take over the Azores, they will assist the Portuguese Government in occupying Mozambique. All of those involved will soon be taken to Lisbon under guard.

In the face of this situation, the loyalty of the people of this country has apparently vacillated to a certain extent so that the government news organ published an editorial now when the country is in such dire straits, and warning them against plotting and subversive activities.

In any case, it does not appear that the present government is in any great danger. Relayed to Washington and Madrid.

[a]Not available.
[b]Premier of Portugal.
[c]Portuguese colony in S.E. Africa.

Trans. 6-26-41

No. 278

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) June 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 92.

(Message to San Francisco # 15).

On the night of the 5th, a local broadcast reported that the Tatsuta Maru, which left San Francisco on the 2nd (?) took on one or two Germans of very dubious character. The ship's captain, on the assumption that there would be no British warships in the vicinity of San Francisco, permitted these men to board his ship. This is for your information.

Trans. 6-19-41

No. 279

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 095.

For the head of the department.

A German named Mehner Toklaus, 35 years old, resident here, has reserved a room on the Tatsuta Maru sailing from here on the 10th. He has been an instructor of history at the University of Hawaii for the past four years but has resigned recently. He says that Ambassador Ott is cognizant of his resignation and of his trip to Japan. The matter of his embarkation, etc. should be handled by the ship's authorities ----- in accordance with telegram # 246[a] of last year from your Minister to San Francisco.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 6-30-41

No. 280

FROM: Washington June 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 395.

Bishop Walsh[a] sailed from San Francisco, May 5th, aboard the Tatsuta Maru. He is well known to Matsuoka and is continually working for Japanese-American diplomatic friendship. He is travelling to the Orient. Please extend every courtesy.

[a]James E. Walsh, Superior General, Catholic Foreign Missionary Society in America, headquarters Mary Knoll Mission, N. Y.

Trans. 6-17-41

No. 281

FROM: Tokyo — June 7, 1941
TO: Berlin — # 487.

Regarding your # 635[a].

During your conversation with Hitler and Ribbentrop, the other day, what impression did you get as to the German government's opinion regarding the probable date of the United States' entry into the war? Please reply at once.

---

[a]Ambassador in Berlin reports conversations with Hitler and Ribbentrop on 3 and 4 June. (See Section C, Japanese Axis Relationship.)
See II, 282.

Trans. 6-9-41

No. 282

FROM: Berlin — June 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 655.

Ribbentrop believes that so long as member nations of the Tripartite Pact maintain a firm attitude, the United States will hesitate to enter into the war, and the war can be brought to an end in the meantime.

He is convinced of this even in the face of the threatening German-Russian war, as already reported in Paragraph 1 of my message # 64?[a].

---

[a]Possibility of a Soviet-German war was reported in Paragraph 1 of Berlin's # 638.

Trans. 6-9-41

No. 283

FROM: Vichy (Sato) — June 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 309.

Part 2 of 2[a].

3. Without a searching inquiry, it would be difficult for me to say whether or not a German invasion of the British Isles is imminent, but since the beginning of this month the activity of submarines in the Atlantic has been waxing fiercer and fiercer. The North Sea is so beset with mines and the danger of bombing is so great that already any activities on the part of the British fleet in that area are impossible. I believe that Germany is ready to make a considerable sacrifice, and if she can get a foothold in part of England, say on the Thames, the British army could not withstand the onslaught. Great Britain, I think is continuing to repeat her recent series of errors, for I doubt if the United States will enter the war. It appears that she is already taking her maximum measures. It is probably true that she is keeping England going, and the fact that the war still continues is probably due to the United States alone, but even if she does fight, all she can possibly do will be to prolong the war a little longer. I know that there

are various reports to the contrary, but I do not believe that when the issue arises the United States will fight.

[a]Part one, not available.

Trans. 6-18-41

No. 284

FROM: Havana — June 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 27.

To be kept secret within the department. Intelligence of primary importance.

A certain person close to the President, and a newspaper correspondent told me that early last month INDALECION PRIETO[a] had a secret conference with President BATISTA and said that if either the United States or Spain enters the war, the United States will cease to recognize the FRANCO regime, and will recognize at once the former Red regime. At that same time, it seems that Cuba likewise will be asked to do the same, and to effect the return of the Spanish ambassador and consuls. This interview was held at the instigation of the American officials. It seems that the United States plans to coerce the Western Hemisphere as a whole to take parallel action.

[a]Ex-Minister of Spain; head of Aid to Spanish Refugees.

Trans. 6-25-41

No. 285

FROM: Rome — July 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 478.

Secret Intelligence.

According to secret information received from Vatican circules, TITTOMAN, the Papal representative in the United States,[a] on the 16th reported to the Papal authorities, that the United States Government, on the basis of information received from the U.S. Embassy in Japan, is of the opinion that there is increased likelihood of an agreement being reached soon between Japan and the United States, and that when the United States enters the European war, Japan can be prevented from interfering. The said agreement would include a decisive settlement of the Japan-China incident, providing that if the Chiang regime does not accept the conditions submitted by the United States, American aid will no longer be received. Great Britain would also participate in an adjustment of all problems involving the South Seas, the Pacific Ocean, and the Far East. Japan's desires for a victorious settlement of the incident would be satisfied in a peaceful and advantageous manner, and thus any reason for Japan's interference by force would cease to exist. It seems to have been suggested that if as a last resort the influence of the Vatican is found necessary in this matter, their mediation will be sought.

[a]Mr. Tittman was an American representative in Rome.

Trans. 8-7-41

No. 286

FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 389.

Re your # 279[a].

On the 10th, IGUCHI[b] called on the Far Eastern Section Chief HAMILTON and spoke to him concerning the harsh treatment given to Lt. Commander OKADA by the police. He said that there was a great discrepancy between that and the treatment being accorded United States Naval language officers in Japan; that not only the Japanese Navy especially was displeased over the successive occurrences of incidents related to it, such as the OKADA incident, the TACHIBANA incident and the TAIEI MARU incident, but also that this incident being likely to arouse Japanese public opinion considerably is a bad thing when regarded from the standpoint of Japanese-American relations. For this reason, he would like to get an expanation of the matter from the State Department and requested that steps be taken to prevent similar occurrences in the future.

I understand that HAMILTON replied to the effect that, since he was not informed on this matter, he would first of all address inquiries to the authorities concerned and then make his reply.

It seems to me that there is ground for suspecting that this incident was made use of by such organizations as the F.B.I. and the Dies Committee for finding a pretext whereby witnesses may be found so that they could interfere with Japanese propaganda policy just as these organizations have done with Germany and Italy. Inasmuch as this is likely to spread to other personnel than that of the Navy, in my opinion it would be well for us to take every precaution.

---

[a]In which the Japanese Government complains of the mistreatment accorded Lt. Commander OKADA, who was arrested for speeding and requests an explanation from the State Department. See II, 287.

[b]Japanese Embassy Counselor in Washington.

Trans. 6-12-41

No. 287

FROM: Tokyo June 9, 1941
TO: Washington # 279.

Refer to Los Angeles' # 85 to Foreign Minister[a].

Regarding the case of Lieutenant Commander Okada, who is charged with speeding. The American government should consider the social status of Japanese naval officers. The extremely unpleasant attitude of the American authorities in this matter, if not discontinued, would result in similarly unpleasant results for American officers in this country, and would create a Japanese-American quarrel.

The American authorities should make adequate explanations, and promise that similar incidents will not occur in the future. Please request the State Department to consider this matter carefully and request appropriate promises. Telegraph the results of your representations.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 6-9-41

No. 288

FROM: Tokyo (Koshi) June 9, 1941
TO: Washington No number.

Regarding Los Angeles to Tokyo #89[a].

As circumstances referred to in the above message must also be considered, we must exercise a great care in making representation to the United States government regarding this matter. Therefore, when presenting our note (my message #279)[b] to the State Department, please ascertain all facts concerning this matter and reply result.

[a]Not available.
[b]See II, 287.

Trans. 6-9-41

No. 289

FROM: Hollywood (Nakauchi) June 10, 1941
TO: Washington #36.

Secret.

To the Naval Attaché from TERAI.

1. Our lawyer is of the opinion that KONO[a] should be (kept in the country for thirty days ?) in view of the danger that he might give evidence unsatisfactory to TACHIBANA[b]. It would be wise to subsidize him. Furthermore, as KONO has no funds, the lawyer has suggested that the Navy be responsible for paying this man a subsidy of $25,000 and all court costs. In order that the Navy be kept out of the picture, some of KONO's friends should be selected to appear to be supporting him. We are in the process of making these arrangements. Should you have any objection to this manner of procedure, please advise us.

Furthermore, in view of the fact that ----- is a good friend of the Intelligence Chief and in cahoots with the investigating authorities, it would be wise for the Navy to have little to do with the matter.

2. Though our lawyer would not predict the outcome of this incident, as the hearings will be complicated, at the very earliest it will be tomorrow, the 11th, before counter-schemes can be developed.

It is going to be necessary for TACHIBANA to have frequent communication with the lawyer; therefore, we believe that it would be ill-advised for TACHIBANA to go to Washington at the present time.

[a]TACHIBANA's chauffeur.
[b]Japanese Naval Language Official who has been held on charges of espionage.

Trans. 6-25-41

No. 290

FROM: Hollywood (Nakauchi) June 18, 1941
TO: Washington # 44.

Secret.

Re wire # 99[a] to the Minister.

At noon on the 18th, the immigration official stated that there was no relationship between this and the incident in which Commander TACHIBANA was subpoenaed. Though he stated that he would make a detailed report of the results of his investigation, he has no objection to the condition that this man has resided in the country (a period of twelve months beginning the month of -----) and has gone to and from Mexico without having secured a visa from the American Consul in Mexico. Though it is felt that in order to establish an excuse for his violation of the immigration law, which should appear to have no direct connection with ----- incidents, we should make it appear to be of similar nature to the cases of Lieutenant Commander OKADA[b] and Secretary WAKATSUKI.

Relayed to Tokyo.

---

[a]Not available.

[b]Japanese Naval Language Officer.

Trans. 6-25-41

No. 291

FROM: Tokyo (Jap Foreign Minister) June 21, 1941
TO: Washington (Koshi) # 307.

Regarding my # 294[a]:

Although we have not yet received a reply, please let us know, at once, the facts and the background of this incident.

While it is time that the United States did make a friendly gesture in connection with the TACHIBANA affair, we are constantly watching the restrictions placed on gasoline exports to Japan as a sort of barometer to evaluate the sincerity of the United States toward us.

---

[a]Tokyo requests Washington to wire his opinion regarding the order prohibiting loading of lubricating oil on the Azuma Maru at Philadelphia, and prospects of future supplies of kerosene, etc.

Trans. 6-25-41

No. 292

FROM: San Francisco (Muto) June 21, 1941
TO: Washington # 026.

Commander Tachibana sailed[a] from here without mishap on the 21st by the Nitta Maru.

---

[a]By request! Dod comment: footnote as in original translation.

Trans. 7-1-41

No. 293

FROM: Los Angeles (Nakauchi) June 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Agimudaijin) # 098.

On the 17th, courier Yamazaki is sailing for Japan on the Nitta Maru with various documents, wherefore, please see to it that he meets no difficulty with the customs inspection.

Trans. 6-19-41

No. 294

FROM: San Francisco (Muto) May 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 86.

(Part 1 of 2)

Strictly Secret.

While the Nichi Shin Maru, of the Pacific Whaling Steamship Company, was coming into Port Costa (approximately 20 miles from San Francisco) in order to take on petroleum, under suspicion of carrying contraband drugs the interior of the ship was searched by customs officials about noon on the -----. In order to burn them, should the need arise, Naval "SA" code, secret Naval documents in the custody of the captain, secret wireless telegraphy documents in the custody of the Chief Radio Operator, meteorological codes belonging to the Central Meteorological Bureau, planning board codes, and other secret documents, under pretext of passing inspection were taken away. As soon as I had been informed of this by telephone, I immediately filed a protest with the local customs officials and demanded the return of these documents. They replied that they had decided to return these documents at a later date to the fishing vessel after an investigation had been made into the facts of the case.

Trans. 6-11-41

No. 295

FROM: San Francisco (Muto) May 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 86.

(Part 2 of 2)

I think that it is necessary, in addition to immediately stopping the use of these codes, to take drastic emergency measures to prevent the recurrence of this sort of thing.

Furthermore, according to the report made by the captain who presented himself at this office immediately after the incident had occurred, these documents had been placed for safe-keeping in the Chief Radio Operator's room because of the great inconvenience of keeping them in the captain's room. While the Chief Operator was alone in the room six customs officials burst in in order to search it. Upon finding these documents, they laid hands on the Chief Operator and by brute force took them from him.

Trans. 6-11-41

No. 296

FROM: Tokyo — May 31, 1941
TO: Washington — # 263.

Re messages # 86[a] and # 87[b] from San Francisco to this office.

We understand that our Naval Attache made a representation to the U.S. Navy Department concerning this matter. Regardless of what the official reasons were, it seems apparent to us that it was done at Britain's request. It was done in the hopes of obtaining some definite proof that Japanese ships on the "black list" prepared by Britain were aiding Germany.

Even if we put aside the legal aspect of the incident, in which such extreme measures were taken with the vague excuse of searching for narcotics, the effect this incident has upon the already critical U.S.-Japanese relations is very serious. In view of this fact, will you make appropriate representations to the bureau concerned of the State Department?

---

[a]Available, See II, 294 and 295.

[b]Concerns seizure of papers on West Coast by narcotics agents.

Trans. 6-2-41

No. 305

FROM: Tokyo — July 2, 1941
TO: Washington — # 325.

Re my # 319[a].

On the 20th of June, the Office of the Governor General of CHOSEN submitted a telegram saying that if the State Department or the mission headquarters will arrange to have this missionary removed to his native land, the Governor Generalcy is prepared to settle the matter in the manner described in part 1 of my caption message. Will you immediately go and ask the State Department to have this missionary brought home. Please wire me back the results.

---

[a]In which the Governor General agreed to cancel the prosecution of missionaries alleged to have distributed dangerous literature on condition that they are ordered home.

Trans. 7-5-41

No. 306

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — July 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 458.

Re your # 325[a].

Will you please wire me back the names of an memoranda concerning the Americans in question?

The State Department says that the appellants are only accused of distributing disturbing printed matter and that this is not enough to warrant our demanding the removal of all fourteen of them.

---

[a]See II, 305.

Trans. 7-5-41

No. 307

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #472.

Re your #332[a].

None of the names of those concerned are known at the State Department either. Please repeat, giving the full names in English.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-10-41

No. 308

FROM: Tokyo July 8, 1941
TO: Washington #344.

Re my #325[a].

We have received the following advice from the office of the Governor General of CHOSEN:

The trial of OKADA was finished on July 4th, and the verdict will be passed on the 21st. The United States has put it up to us that, if we expect a lenient decision, an indispensable term will be that the defendant must be taken out of the country. Now, the prayer meeting incident is a parallel case; so, will you please negotiate with the American Government to have the accused likewise evacuated.

In spite of what you said in your #458[b], we do not wish the question of the evacuation demanded by the office of the Governor General to be left pending for a long time now that Japanese-American relations are so strained. Therefore, we think it quite proper that you return to the State Department and inform the officials that we wish them to comply with our request.

[a]See II, 305 in which Tokyo requests Washington to ask the State Department to have the missionary brought home.

[b]See II, 306 in which Nomura wires Tokyo that the State Department does not think the accusation of distributing disturbing printed matter is enough to warrant demanding the removal of all 14 of the Americans in question.

Trans. 7-9-41

No. 309

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #480.

Re your #344[a].

On the 8th, IGUCHI[b] informed Section Chief HAMILTON of the contents of your instructions, saying that he hoped all of the accused would be evacuated. HAMILTON replied, "The State Department knows that BOTT (?), etc., are charged with distributing pamphlets advocating peace which were distributed in various countries throughout the world. The crime is very slight and the deportation of all people concerned would be a severe punishment. Furthermore, the Church authorities are also undesirous of seeing these people evacuated. In exchange for

the friendly manner in which we handled the TACHIBANA incident, don't you think you could drop this matter in some way or other? Now, with respect to DeCAMP and ROWE (?), you are pressing us very hard. If possible, I would like for you to have this matter discussed with the Church officials in Korea." IGUCHI replied: "The Chosen authorities, in view of their policy of a political solution, are combining the two incidents into one and, unless those involved in the prayer meeting incident are also evacuated, it may be difficult to show any leniency to DECAMP and ROWE (?); however, I will report all you say."

Will you please report this to the Governor General and take what measures you deem proper? Please wire me back.

---

[a]See II, 308 in which Tokyo tells the advice received from the Office of the Governor General of Chosen and asks that the State Department be informed that they wish them to comply with Japanese requests for the evacuation of the accused missionaries.

[b]Japanese Embassy Counselor in Washington.

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 310

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo #491.

Re my #480[a].

On the 9th, Representative HOOPER of the Presbyterian headquarters in New York came to Washington and I had IGUCHI interview him. HOOPER said: "Our branch in Keijo will first decide upon whether or not the missionaries are to be evacuated from Chosen and then seek the concurrence of the main headquarters. Now, if as a result of representations made by the Governor General to our representative in Chosen, HERBERT BLAIR, the latter should request the headquarters to agree to the evacuation of DeCAMP and ROWE (?), we will wire them back our approval immediately." Furthermore, with respect to the prayer meeting incident, HOOPER presented the following plea: "When the accused translated into Korean the English text, they did so in such a manner as to prevent any misunderstanding on the part of Japan. They even first submitted them to the Police. They are endeavoring to cooperate with the Japanese and since Dr. Clark, Miss Covington and Mrs. Moore have already decided to leave Korea, cannot the matter be dropped at that?"

I think that it would be a good idea for us to agree to this as a friendly gesture for the way they have settled the TACHIBANA incident.

---

[a]July 8, 1941; II, 301.

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 311

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 14, 1941
TO: Washington # 363.

Special.

The "prayer-meeting incident" comes under the Army-Navy Criminal Law and the Law for the Provisional Control of Disturbing Literature. In connection with this important event, the Procurator's Office has started investigation of 16 of the approximate 30 persons concerned. As a result of the prosecutor's investigation, four, BUTTS, BLAIR, POLLARD and MOORE, are regarded as ringleaders. Others considered to be deeply involved in the incident are BERNHEISELL, HILL, CLARK, DELMARTER, ROSS, COVINGTON, COOK, BERGMAN and CROTHEGS. Magnanimity is shown in the requirement, along lines of fixed policy, that the above-mentioned 13 persons must withdraw to their home country. The others are being overlooked (disregarded).

The sentence of the two involved in the Oasa affair will be postponed until the 11th. In regard to this withdrawal (return), with the consent of the Executive Committee of the Northern Presbyterian Church in the Eastern district, it was advised that guarantee of withdrawal be given. This will be submitted after the urgently convoked resolution of the committee.

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 312

FROM: Tokyo July 17, 1941
TO: Washington # 380.

We have settled the incident mentioned in the Director of the Foreign Section Suwa's telegram # 50 to Tokyo by having two members of the legal committee of the American Presbyterian Mission in Chosen, Miller and RAINA give guarantee that RO and DEKINYANPU would be evacuated.

Regarding the prayer meeting incident there has been a request to have the matter "dropped" with the return of three members, however the authorities concerned are doing their best from a legal standpoint to settle the matter as leniently as possible but they desire to have arrangements made with the other party immediately for the return of the 13 persons most seriously involved, (excluding Clark who is returning on account of illness).

Furthermore, Mrs. Moore is a Methodist missionary and is not a member of the Northern Presbyterians. The members at the New York headquarters of the Northern Presbyterians said at first that they would have the English translated into Korean and then before distributing the literature they would send it to the police station. However, there is no evidence of their ever having done so. In spite of the fact that this point concerns the publication we are willing to overlook that point, and merely treat the question as matter of seditious literature. Please convey this to the New York head office.

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 313

FROM: Tokyo — July 17, 1941
TO: Washington — # 370.

Re my # 362[a].

The government-general sent word again as noted in my separate telegram # 380[b]. In reply, I told the government-general that it was impossible to show any more leniency than had been shown. Please make strong representations to America to make settlement along the lines of my separate telegram and wire the result.

[a]Not available.
[b]See II, 312.

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 314

FROM: Washington — July 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 533.

Re your # 380[a].

The State Department has taken the position from the first that this matter was not a request from the State Department but rather an appeal to Japan's "goodwill". Moreover, the church headquarters say that conditions are such that it is very difficult to advise the return of the missionaries. The State Department goes a step further and says it cannot interfere in the matter and while it regrets the matter it cannot act as an intermediary in the return of the 13 missionaries. (It requested that it be informed upon the settlement of Matsuo incident). Again, the church representative Hooper was summoned by Iguchi, who made an earnest statement regarding the government-general's kind intentions. (Indicating your telegram # 380[a]). Hooper expressed his thanks for the government's kind intentions and at the same time explained that the church, from matters of policy, could not return the missionaries living in Korea in connection with the prayer meeting incident, nor issue orders for their return.

In regard to the RO incident he said that he thought there was no other way to handle it than to confer directly with the local church authorities on the spot. Please arrange to have this done immediately. If this does not result in a solution to the problem I think there is nothing to do but drop the matter of the return of the 13 persons.

Furthermore, inasmuch as the pamphlets concerned in the prayer meeting incident were translated directly from the English to Japanese in Tokyo and then distributed, I do not see how there could be any problem in this connection.

[a]The authorities concerned are doing their best to settle the prayer meeting incident as leniently as possible, but they desire that arrangements be made for the return of the 13 persons most seriously involved. July 17, 1941, II, 312.

Trans. 7-24-41

No. 315

FROM: Tokyo July 19, 1941
TO: Washington # 386.

Re your # 472[a].

The full names of those whose evacuation the Governor General demands, are as follows:

1. Miss Alice Mabel Butts
2. Mr. H. E. Blair
3. Miss H. E. Pollard
4. Mrs. J. Z. Moore (Ruth Benedict)
5. Mrs. C. F. Bernheisel (Helen K.)
6. Mr. H. J. Hill
7. Mr. C. A. Clark
8. Miss J. Delmarten
9. Miss L. Ross
10. Miss H. Covington
11. Mrs. W. T. Cook (Maude H.)
12. Miss G. O. Bergman
13. Mrs. J. Y. Crothers (Ellen Ann McClung)

[a]Ambassador requests a repetition of names from Tokyo. July 8, 1941; II, 299.

Trans. 7-21-41

No. 316

FROM: Washington (No signature) June 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Oimatu)

HUDENANA

As Japanese Embassy has already been informed in regard to Kokuyo Maru, should Japanese government wish to establish for Toei Maru the full status of public naval vessel further information with regard to the ships is desired by this government[a]. If, in the meanwhile, Toei Maru should enter Los Angeles as commercial vessel, no objection is perceived to such visit.

[a]U.S. Government.

Trans. 6-16-41

No. 317

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 13, 1941
TO: Washington (Koshi) # 290.

Re my letter # 84 under date of 16 May.

We have been advised by the Navy Ministry that the movements of the Iro (commanded by Naval Captain Jyoe Mizuguti) have been changed to arrive Los Angeles, 9 July, and to depart the 14th. Please arrange accordingly.

Also please make the following changes in the schedule pertaining to the same cruise:

Eliminate "Sada 7 July", and under Oudo change "23 August" to "30 August" (Saturday), and under Siriya change "30 August" to 9 August" (Saturday) respectively.

Trans. 6–20–41

No. 318

FROM: Tokyo — July 1, 1941
TO: Washington — # 329 (?).

Translator's note: Several bad breaks in text of latter part of this message. Not too sure of reading.

Please convey the following to New York.

(1) Please instruct the various Japanese steamship firms in your city as per the following: We wish all ships to observe strictly the following schedule for passing through Panama:

Tokai Maru — the 16th
Amagisan Maru — the 17th
Awajisan Maru — the 18th
Tozan Maru — the 19th
Kiyozumi Maru — the 20th
Kirishima Maru — the 21st
Norfolk Maru — the 22nd
Asuka Maru — the 22nd

(2) To Kawasaki S.S. Co. as follows:

Unload all discharge freight at New York, and tie up at the ore berth at Baltimore. Assuming that it will take three days to unload ore, I think it should be possible to reach Colon on the 21st, but how about it? The generator(s) will be loaded on the Asuka Maru. Count not the 1000 tons of Boston asbestos be loaded with the New York freight -----.

(3) To the Kokusai S.S. Co. as follows:

Kiyozumi Maru freight will be unloaded at the one port of New York, the instructions from the main office re freight for the return trip are entirely cancelled and she will proceed from New York directly to Panama ----- as soon as possible. If there is any time during unloading operations, there would be no objection to loading some return voyage freight at New York. Rush the loading and unloading at Cristobal as much as possible, whatever the expense may be. The Kirishima Maru ----- as per instructions from the home office. ----- please try -----.

(4) To Mitsui Co. as follows:

You will please take such measures as may be necessary to shorten up ----- as there may be decrease in freight loading on the Awajisan Maru and Amagisan Maru.

(5) To Osaka Shosen Kaisha as follows:

The Tokai Maru and Tozan Maru will proceed as per dispatch from the home office on the 28th.

(6) To Nippon Yusen Kaisha as follows:

Asuka Maru ----- freight for return trip to New York. ----- besides machinery loaded at Genoa. ----- cotton and Boston imitation asbestos in as large quantities as possible, cut out the stop at New Orleans, and go directly to Panama ----- (garbled out) (incomplete).

Trans. 7–3–41

No. 319

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 460.

Separate telegram # 267 from New York to Tokyo.

1. I have seen telegram # 52 from the Japanese steamship company. The Asuka Maru's schedule and tonnage to be discharged are as follows:

Arrive Philadelphia, June 30
Depart Philadelphia, July 2
Discharge 4135 tons of ore. Load nothing.
Arrive New York, 4th
Depart 7th
Discharge 400 tons miscellaneous goods, and, including
New Orleans discharge, 1900 tons of palm oil
Load 500 tons of machinery and 1000 tons of raw cotton and 11 tons of miscellaneous goods
Boston, arrive the 8th
Depart the 12th
Discharge, miscellaneous 199 tons, sugar 2500 tons
Load asbestos, 1000 tons
Cristobal, 20th

Please wire as to whether it will be necessary to go to Los Angeles on business on the return voyage.

2. From the Mitsui shipping department.

Arrangements have been made for loading of the 1589 kiltons of cargo on hand by July 1 on the Awajisan Maru to be completed during July 2 and the boat will sail by the morning of July 3 at the latest, for Los Angeles.

The Amagisan Maru will sail for Tampa from New York on the evening of July 2 and will sail from New Orleans by July 11th.

3. From the Kawasadi Steamship Company:

Since there is no asbestos to load in New York, the unloading of the 550 tons of ----- will be completed and the unloading of the ore in Baltimore should be completed in 3 days (or on the 3rd). Hence the boat is scheduled to arrive in Colon on 20th.

Trans. 7-7-41

No. 320

FROM: Washington June 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 394.

Re letter # 21, dated April 23 and addressed from Manila to me and also telegram # ----- addressed by you to Manila.

I had IGUCHI[a] negotiate with the State Department along the line set forth in the last part of the previous letter. It seems that they are contemplating according the same treatment to Japanese entering the Philippines as we would accord Filipinos entering Japan as international

traders; for the State Department has sent us a note inquiring what arrangements we are making in order to accord favorable treatment to Filipinos going to Japan as international traders.

Will you kindly wire me in regard to this matter?

Relay to Manila.

[a]Consul in New York.

Trans. 6-14-41

No. 321

FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 396.

Re my # 394[a].

On the 13th, when IGUCHI called on the Chief of the Far East Section, he asked the latter if circumstances made it necessary for Japan to inform the United States Government exactly what Japan is doing about this matter. The Section Chief replied that it would be well for the Japanese to include in a note to be submitted by the Embassy, a clause stating, in effect, that the Japanese government shall accord to Filipinos who are international traders the same kind of treatment and privileges in Japan as are accorded Japanese international traders in the Philippines.

I believe that this is an attempt to get from us a written promise in view of the fact that Japanese-American Trade Agreement is no longer existant.

Relayed to Manila.

[a]In which Washington tells Tokyo that the State Department is contemplating according Japanese entering the Philippines the same treatment as the Japanese accord Filipinos entering Japan as international traders. June 12, 1941; II, 312.

Trans. 6-18-41

No. 322

FROM: Manila (Nihro) June 16, 1941
TO: Washington # 48.

Message to Tokyo # 342.

Re my # 340[a].

Based on instructions from Washington, I have been informed that a decision has been reached to discontinue granting permits on scrap iron. Therefore, though we continue our current negotiations, I believe that it will take a considerable time before a settlement is reached. In order to lessen losses incurred by stoppage of ships and lighterage costs, providing I have not received instructions to the contrary by 5:00 P.M. on the 17th, I plan to have part of the ships unloaded and to instruct the Bordeaux Maru to sail for Mashin[b] Rock.

Furthermore, in view of the current shortage of shipping, it is too bad, though it may be national policy, that Japanese vessels be utilized only in the transportation of American

essential products. Therefore, in view of America's unfortunate policy of applying the permit system, I think that it would be wise to consider the rerouting of our ships in order to impress upon the American authorities the need of reconsideration.

After you have given this due consideration, please wire me your opinion.

---

[a]Not available.

[b]Kana spelling.

Trans. 6-19-41

No. 323

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 18, 1941
TO: Manila # 172.

Re your # 342[a] and # 344[b].

Regarding the above report, the situation is now such that we will have to dispatch the Bordeaux Maru per schedule to take on a cargo of chrome. However, we are now hurriedly conferring with the competent heads as to our attitude with reference to undertaking shipments of materials to the United States. As soon as a decision is reached I will wire you.

---

[a]Manila wires Tokyo that in view of America's unfortunate policy of applying the permit system, it would be wise to consider the rerouting of ships in order to impress upon the American authorities the need of reconsideration. June 16, 1941; II, 322.

[b]Not available.

Trans. 6-20-41

No. 324

FROM: Manila (Nihro) July 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 380.

Re your # 365[a].

When I went to see the President on the 2nd for the purpose of introducing former administrative official KOYAMA, I spoke to him about the report that some Japanese fishermen had run off with fishing boats of Philippine registry and expressed regret over the matter, going on to say that we are doing our best to locate the absconders.

However, I tried to impress him with the fact that the Philippine authorities have been overly severe in their control measures over people like these, and that as a result Japanese fishermen have found it extremely difficult to engage in business at all. I talked along the lines outlined in your caption message and asked him if he did not think that under such conditions their own business would not suffer as well?

The President replied that he would like to have a special conference on the subject a little later on.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-9-41

No. 325

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) July 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 250.

Re your # 108[a].

According to what the captain of the Awajisan Maru told me on the (*date*), it will be impossible for him to secure permits for his ship to enter the harbor at ----- (*date*). Therefore, after he has detoured by way of Cape Horn, he would like authorization to proceed immediately to Japan. Please transmit the foregoing to -----. This ship is to leave this harbor on the morning of the (6th ?).

[a]Not available.

Trans. 8-28-41

No. 326

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 3, 1941
TO: New York # 115.

(Strictly secret outside the department.)

(Request message.)

After you have duly paraphrased the following, please convey the message to the Export-Import Branch of the Mitsui Company located in your city. This is from the home office of the Mitsui Company.

1. Please advise us from day to day concerning the Awajisan Maru which we would like to have go through the Panama Canal.

2. Should it be impossible to pass through the Panama Canal, we have no objections to her passage around Cape Horn through Magellan Straits. However, in the event passage is made through Magellan Straits, the Ministry of Communications will send instructions to ----- at -----. Ambassador TOMII in Argentina has already been advised of the possibility.

Trans. 9-8-41

No. 327

FROM: Panama (Izawa) July 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 52.

The Army and Navy Canal authorities have prohibited the entrance and exit to and from the Canal during the night from the 5th on, and say that a rigid investigation is being conducted to determine the responsibility.

Trans. 7-26-41

No. 328

FROM: New York (Morishima) July 14, 1941
TO: Washington Circular # 40.

(Message to Tokyo # 291.)

According to reports from Japanese steamship companies, surveillance of Japanese boats by American authorities on the East Coast has lately become more stringent. The following actual examples are given for your information.

1. On the 11th, at Boston, the N.Y.K. boat ASUKA MARU was boarded and searched by a party of about 20 Coast Guardsmen, and on the following day its bottom was inspected by divers.

2. On the 11th, the KAWASAKI boat NORFOLK MARU was scheduled to leave Baltimore but was delayed until the afternoon of the following day because of divers inspecting its bottom. (Meanwhile, the Embassy was negotiating with the authorities.)

3. On the 13th, the YAMASHITA boat YAMATSUKI MARU entered Cristobal and took on fuel. It has been waiting permission to transit the canal since the 13th, which permission has not been received this morning. (This incident is being taken up with authorities in Washington at present.)

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 329

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 525.

The British Embassy in Washington announced that from July 15th, all "transit" going by way of England will require import permits. (In case "transit" had been dispatched to England prior to the 15th, or in the event it had been transported by the same ships, this would not hold.) In the event that no permit is obtained, they will seize the freight.

Trans. 7-30-41

No. 330

FROM: Panama (Izawa) July 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 102.

According to various newspaper reports concerning the closing of the Canal to Japanese ships, the Defense Commander, General VAN VOORHIS, made the following statement on the 21st to the United Press: The delay in allowing ships to go through the Canal is a temporary measure due to the emptying of the locks for repairs. During this period many ships will be delayed due to being stopped in the harbor or between the locks. Others, like the Japanese, are changing their course and going around Cape Horn or the Cape of Good Hope.

Trans. 7-26-41

No. 331

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) July 24, 1941
TO: Panama # 59.

From Ministry of Overseas Affairs to special officer SAKATA, in charge of immigrants aboard Buenos Aires Maru; In regard to your future route, follow decision of ship's captain. Also cooperate with FUNAGAWA and do everything in your power to keep the immigrants from becoming excited.

Trans. 8-13-41

No. 332

FROM: Manila (Nihro) July 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 441.

The Canges Maru left Davao on July 22nd and has not yet reached Cebu. She is carrying a total of 94 passengers, 6000 bales of hemp and ragee (?) and 20,000 board feet of lumber. At Cebu she is expected to pick up 11 passengers and 3000 bales of hemp and at Manila 84 passengers and 1500 bales of hemp.

The passengers are all Japanese. All of those who expect to leave from Cebu and Manila have their permits but since attached to these permits is the reservation that they may be cancelled there is danger that their ship will not enter port on the pretext that it might be seized.

If your judgment based upon the general situation there is danger of seizure, I wish you would arrange, especially with the naval authorities, so that this ship may sail directly for Japan at all speed, and also send instructions to NAGAO with regard to customs procedure.

Trans. 8-13-41

No. 333

FROM: San Francisco (Muto) July 30, 1941
TO: Washington # 126.

(Circular) (Message to Tokyo # 143.)

This afternoon, the 30th, I was informed that the Tatsuta Maru was to enter port. In keeping with Your Excellency's wire to the Foreign Minister # 593[a] the local Nippon Yusen office, doubting that even though the Tatsuta should enter port and though WELLES had made a statement that permit to leave port would be granted, in the light of the current situation and the manner in which the American authorities occasionally load and unload vessels, and because the American authorities avoided making any commitment when Ambassador NOMURA called at the State Department the other day (29 ?), not only wired but also telephoned the captain of the vessel to delay entry temporarily. They were in constant contact with -----. Repeatedly they requested a definite reply in this connection from the State Department, but no guarantees were forthcoming with regard to the freight carried by the vessel. This morning at 9:30 A.M., upon instruction from the central authorities (the Chief of the San Francisco Customs Office ?) ----- ----- told the Nippon Yusen branch office that when the Tatsuta entered port, though she was not to unload, permit would be issued for her return home. With regard to loading and unloading, he said that he could not guarantee the

results but that he would immediately consider such an application. After making telephone contact with ----- immediately ----- ----- the possibility of leaving port ----- ----- -----.

Relayed to Washington, New York and -----.

---

*In which WELLES assures NOMURA that ships entering port would be allowed to refuel, take on supplies, and leave again.

Trans. 8-7-41

No. 334

FROM: New York (Morishima) July 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 272.

(Strictly secret.)

Please communicate the following to the home office of the Kokusai Steamship Company. The Kirishima Maru, upon leaving Boston, is scheduled to sail from (New York ?) on the (*date*); (Baltimore ?) on the (*date*); and from ----- on the (*date*). It is scheduled to load a cargo of 4,000 bales of American cotton goods. The Kiyosumi Maru, having completed loading in -----, has taken on 2,700 bales of American textiles, 100,000 tons of asbestos, and proceeded to New York. She will leave that port on (*date*) and should leave ----- no later than (*date*).

Furthermore, she is scheduled to take on several hundred additional bales of American textiles in the port of -----.

Trans. 8-28-41

No. 335

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 3, 1941
TO: New York # 116.

(Strictly Secret.) Request Message.

From the head office of the Mitsubishi Company to the branch office manager in your city.

Because of the urgent need for ships here in Japan and the consequent shortage of bottoms, the chances of dispatching ships to the Atlantic coast of North America are very slim. However, there will be no change in the movement of ships to the Pacific coast. Please wire an acknowledgment of this message after you have ----- ----- possibilities ----- transcontinental -----.

Trans. 9-8-41

No. 336

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) July 14, 1941
TO: Caracas #91.

(Circular) (Sent to Rio as Circular #89 on July 6th.)

Message from Tokyo as Circular #1427 on the 4th.

(Part 2 of 2)*.

2. Recently the United States took over German and Italian ships and we are not without fear that similar steps may be taken toward our own vessels. There is much Japanese shipping in American harbors and these vessels should, at as early a date as possible, return to Japan, avoiding the Panama Canal in so far as possible.

3. Recently the Philippine Islands have granted permits for the export of military goods to Japan. Since it is hardly fitting in view of such a pass that Japanese vessels be used for the transportation of military goods between the Philippine Islands and the United States, we have decided to take some of the Japanese vessels off the Philippines-United States run.

4. For the reasons given above, henceforth, on the basis of my instructions, before their departure, please acquaint the captains of the Japanese vessels now in American harbors of the steps to be taken. Japanese ships on the west coast run will be increased and such American products as are taken on will be loaded at those ports.

This is for your information.

---

*Part 1 of 2 not available.

Trans. 9-18-41

No. 337

FROM: Rome (Horikiri) July 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo #447.

On the 9th, various newspapers here reported ISHII (spokesman) as saying that Japan has decided to withdraw all her commerce ships from the Pacific. Please wire at once if this included all ships plying regularly between North and South America.

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 338

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 12, 1941
TO: Rome #1498.

Circular. Secret outside the Department.

1. Ships plying between Japan and the Philippines shall continue as at present (1,512 ??).

2. Ships plying between the Philippine Islands and the east coast of North America will be taken off. I do not know but what freight steamers plying between the Philippine Islands and the west coast of North America may make return trips on occasion.

3. Ships plying to the east coast of South America shall continue as at present through August. It will become impossible to dispatch ships after the first of September. Of the ships now on the east coast of the South American continent run one part we plan to have operate around the Horn (9).

4. From the first of August ships on the east coast of North America will be completely taken off that route (11).

5. Three ships will be added early in September to the South American west coast run. After that time, two more ships will be placed in that service (9).

6. From August one ship will be added to the North American west coast run.

The figures within the parentheses represent the number of ships now on those runs.

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 339

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) July 14, 1941
TO: Sao Paulo, Caracas and Lima #92.

Circular. Message from Tokyo as Circular #1428.

Figures within parentheses represent the number of ships on the respective runs.

1. From (September 1st ?) all ships are to be taken off the run to the North American east coast (11).

2. Navigation will continue as heretofore to the east coast of South America (8). Later on we hope to add additional ships to this run ----- ----- -----. A portion of the ships now sailing off the east coast of South America are scheduled to sail homeward by way of the Magellan Straits (8).

3. From September, one sailing will be maintained to the west coast of North America (4).

4. Three ships will be maintained on the run to the west coast of South America after -----. Later on, two additional ships are expected to be in operation (8).

5. Navigation between Japan and the Philippine Islands will continue as heretofore (1-2).

6. Navigation from the Philippine Islands to the east coast of North America is to be discontinued. We do not know but what we may decide to operate more vessels on the run from the Philippine Islands to the west coast of the United States.

Trans. 8-27-41

No. 340

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #499.

Message from New York #285.

(Part 1 of 2).

Please transmit to the Foreign Minister.

Re your #321.

Relative to the recent order issued with regard to disposal of merchant ships, the Japanese ship companies here are cooperating with us wholeheartedly and doing everything possible

to enable the ships here to pass through the Canal by the date specified in the order. For this purpose they have cancelled contracts for loading the ships (of course, because of this cancellation the consignors will file claim against the shipping company; and due to the fact that this country also suffers from insufficiency of ships, there is a danger of Japanese ships being forbidden to leave the ports when the worse comes to the worst) and unloading the ships during the night, as well as during the day. At the same time, they have been offering to Americans the explanation we had ordered them to offer, and so on this account newspaper reports on this subject have not been sensational (please refer to my #274*). In the meantime, an instruction was wired to the Naval Attache in Washington signed by both the Chief of the Office of Naval Operations and the Chief of the Naval General Staff, that "as regards the recent order issued by the Government, there was some slight misunderstanding in the procedure. For this reason, it may have had the effect of being alarming. The real purpose was to ----- ----- on account of shortage of ships in the seas near Japan and on account of circumstances which preclude loading on the eastern coast of the United States," etc., and asked that the truth of the matter be broadcast. On the 8th, the Naval Inspector here communicated this message to the Japanese shipping firms. As regards this communication, insofar as the shipping firms are concerned, they said that it was not a question inasmuch as it goes without saying that it is no more than an explanation to be given to Americans and, furthermore, that they have already taken steps in this direction.

*Not available.

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 341

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #499.

Message from New York #285.

(Part 2 of 2)*.

B. If there has been an administrative mix-up, (the united opinion of superiors and subordinates as well as that of the Department of Communications and others has been questioning the insufficiency of connections) in the issuance of strict orders, it is not the intention of those sincerely cooperating to become informed of the superior policies of the Government, but, nevertheless, they are not convinced by the explanations given out to the Americans. (With all the hurry about the Panama Canal and the possibility that it may be closed, they are questioning why only the west coast ports and ports in Central and South America would be safe under such conditions.) In spite of the present orders given out by the Navy, confidence in the Government is weakening and furthermore, doubts are becoming stronger. Continuing along this line, together with keeping secret that each one in his own way is seeking explanation, the control over nationals resident in this country has a displeasing influence. (Although proper business men should be led along as indicated in your successive instructions) in connection with present conditions, there are sufficient connections there in Tokyo so the orders should only come through the Ministry of Foreign Relations. Please make special arrangements.

*Part 1 of 2, See II, 340.

Trans. 7-17-41

No. 342

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

July 7, 1941
367.

Received from Manila on 5th.

Gogai.

Re your Tokyo-Manila # 195.

381. According to representations from local shippers here, the Bordeaux Maru (of the Kawasaki Line) and the Kyushu Maru (of the O.SK. Line) were recently ordered to discharge American-bound cargoes at Kobe, while the Nojima Maru (N.Y.K.) which was enroute to this port also received instructions to discharge her American-bound cargo, and proceed homeward at once, and it is said that many of the ships that regularly come here, have cancelled their calls. Influenced, likely by a succession of representations which the Filipinos have been receiving from us, on the 1st, the President and Cabinet members concerned met with Sayre and urged that as far as consistent with the needs of U.S. national defense, steps be taken to avoid untoward results coming to the economic situation in the Philippines through the application of the export license system. (Just prior to this meeting permits had been issued for the exports of 13,800 tons of iron ore). It is planned that from now on the conclusion of contracts for shipping goods to the U.S. will be prohibited or restricted, unless goods are loaded for Japan, and the steamship companies will be directed to determine the allocation of ships to these ports always with a view to shipment of goods to Japan. This will make the operation of the export license system work out for the advantage of Japan, but ----- if we go as far as to unload cargoes that have already been loaded for America, it will cause the Filipino shippers to hesitate or even to abandon the use from now on of our ships, and it will not only become impossible for us to make use of the Filipinos in the operation of the export license system, but also the U.S. in retaliation may place obstacles in the way of the issuing of permits for export of such goods as are at present permitted or may even go so far as to prohibit the export of iron ore, or resort to the freezing of assets. Accordingly, unless we have resolved upon, and have made thorough preparations for, a show-down economic warfare with the U.S. there is a danger that we will find ourselves in an unexpected predicament. (In the case of the Nojima Maru, the local U.S. Naval "neutrality officer" says that if the freight is to be reloaded at Kobe, sailing permit cannot be issued, unless there is an export permit.) Therefore, in order that goods already loaded might be allowed to be shipped to the U.S., I wish you would work with the authorities involved, referring to my # 382[a]. Also for my information, I wish you would advise me by return dispatch as to reasons for deciding upon these measures.

[a]See II, 343.

Trans. 7-8-41

No. 343

FROM: Manila (Nihro) July 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo No number.

Gogai.

(Retransmission of Manila-Tokyo # 382.)

(I) The securing of permits as well as the loading operations have been going along fairly smoothly for some time and we have managed to keep at least three or four vessels in the Philippine territorial waters at all times. However, while Sydney Maru was taking on manganese ore, she was ordered not to leave port, as a reprisal, and the whole matter is again in danger of becoming bogged down.

In accordance with measures referred to at the end of this message (within parenthesis) the departure of Nozima Maru has also been held up, and it will take a considerable time to unload the chrome ore. Therefore, it would be a better plan to substitute another vessel and allow Nozima Maru to proceed to America.

(HA) Sugar and hemp which were to be taken on Aobasan Maru, whose scheduled sailing has been cancelled, have already been paid for by the Mitui Co. However, although we might forego the shipment of hemp, to permit approximately 800,000 pesos worth of sugar to remain in the Philippines will mean that our countrymen will be the losers.

(NI) As the affair in question took place originally simultaneously with the Imperial Conference held on the 2nd, there are all kinds of speculations as to its reason. Therefore, I am making every effort to explain that it is due to the shortage of bottoms and to the extreme reduction of exports of goods to Japan and is not due to sudden change in international situation. However, if this situation persists, there is a great danger of its developing into a desperate economic war (as explained in my # 381) which will bring extreme hardship to people in general.

(HO) I feel that the important thing now is to either accept the principle referred to in my # 369[a], making it applicable to both the contracting agencies and to all vessels prior to their departure from Japan, or to enter into a general agreement with the United States regarding this matter. I feel that to order the cargo to be unloaded in this instance is carrying matters a bit too far.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-15-41

No. 344

FROM: Tokyo July 7, 1941
TO: Washington # 336.

Action DML (Manila ?) as # 204.

Re your (Manila's # 382[a]):

(1) Our handling of this matter is as stated in our (Circular) # 1427[b], and our measures for meeting the shortage of shipping, as well as our means of precaution as regards the U.S. have early been decided upon; therefore, you will please explain to the American and Filipinos along the lines of your # 382[a], paragraph 2.

(2) We have made inquiry of the N.Y.K. in regard to the freight loaded on the Nojima Maru, which has now been requisitioned, and it is reported that there is every prospect that a satisfactory understanding will be reached with the consignors, by assuming the expense of loading and unloading, and therefore, it has been decided that it will be unloaded. Although no understanding has been reached with consignors in the cases of the Bordeaux Maru and Kyushu Maru, the freight is being unloaded just the same. It will likely give rise to complications, but we will do all we can to persuade the firms concerned to ship the freight that is to be reloaded, to the U.S. west coast within the shortest possible time. Therefore, if the Americans and Filipinos have any misgiving on this point you may give assurances as may be necessary.

(3) Besides the above mentioned loadings, there are still some 22,000 tons of Filipino goods for which shipping contracts have been made, and for this there will be nothing to do but to cancel the contracts "by government order" due to changes in ship dispositions as per our # 1428[c]. However, there are precedents for such cancellations among the nations, and there will likely be no great trouble over it.

Have relayed this together with your reference message to Washington.

---

[a] See II, 343.
[b] See II, 336.
[c] See II, 339.

Trans. 7-8-41

No. 345

FROM: Manila — July 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 387.

(Manila to Tokyo # 369, 26 June.)

Re your # 202[a].

Please understand that I am retransmitting my message of 26 June as follows:

369. Re my # 359[b].

(1) At present the Philippine Islands have a shortage of bottoms for loading sugar and other products for the United States, and apparently due to the President's having taken it up with them, on the basis of my reference message, Rojas and Vargas divulged the fact to some of the Japanese dealers, on the 25th, that they are greatly concerned over the question of ships, and that they will make an effort to secure an easing up of the restrictions on exports of hemp, etc., to Japan.

(2) The steamship companies have told their local representatives that because of the lack of export to Japan and the likelihood of a reduction in the number of ships allocated, they should either refrain from accepting goods for export to the United States, or at least reserve the right to cancel the shipping in case of changes in the allocation of ships. As the Kokusai and Kawasaki companies do not have Japanese representatives resident here, please arrange for the main offices to send instructions directly to their agents here in regard to accepting shipments.

(3) I think it would be productive of good results to adopt and put into effect the general rule that we will not permit the assigning of ships to this run merely for carrying exports to the United States, unless they also carry a reasonable amount of goods that are now on the

restricted list for Japan (besides ----- high grade hemp and iron ore). Of course, the prospects of securing ore are very meager whatever we do. Then, again, if the efforts of the Filipinos mentioned in (2) should happily bring results, and ----- permits be given for shipments to America together with shipments for Japan ----- a link system could be applied in giving permits for loading for both countries. As the Filipinos are now negotiating with the Americans regarding this matter, it is my idea that we content ourselves for the present with working silently in all quarters to bring influence to bear and wait for results.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 346

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 31, 1941
TO: Tokyo #616.

At 6:00 P.M. on the 30th the State Department notified me to the effect that:

1. In case the cargoes are being sent back, the Japanese boats may have until 2:00 P.M. Saturday, the 2nd, to enter port and will be given a reasonable time to depart.

2. In case the manifest shows American ports as the destination of the cargoes, this should be changed (for example, to Kobe) before reaching port (this is a temporary measure for getting around the customs office regulation that goods manifested for American ports must be unloaded before vessel is given clearance). Also detailed procedure should be worked out with the customs authorities.

Trans. 8-12-41

No. 347

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 2, 1941
TO: Honolulu #65.

Instructions were issued on the 1st by the N.Y.K. for the Tatsuta Maru to stop at Honolulu.

Trans. 8-8-41

No. 348

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 2, 1941
TO: San Francisco #99.

According to a Domei dispatch, a part of the cargo of the Tatsuta Maru was seized for the owners. Please telegraph in detail as soon as possible the true facts of the matter.

Trans. 8-9-41

No. 349

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 2, 1941
TO: Seattle # 24.

According to a message received by the N.Y.K. there is danger of the cargo of the Heian Maru being attached by the owners. After conference it was decided to have the entire cargo unloaded at Vancouver. Please telegraph in detail as soon as possible the latest facts of the matter.

Trans. 8-8-41

No. 350

FROM: Seattle (Sato) August 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 82.

The Heian Maru left on the 4th direct for Japan. Nothing was taken on except fuel and food for the use of the ship.

Relayed to Washington, all consuls in U.S. (and Honolulu), Ottawa, and Vancouver.

Trans. 8-5-41

No. 351

FROM: Hollywood (Nakauchi) August 4, 1941
TO: Washington, D.C. # 58.

Since I have already received a wire from the Captain of the special duty ship "Shiriyo" saying they would arrive in port on the 9th, please let me know if the above-mentioned ship has yet entered United States territorial waters. Please wire reply.

Trans. 8-12-41

No. 352

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 12, 1941
TO: San Francisco # 62.

Secret outside the Department.

Will you have Consul INAGAKI go to ----- and find out from TOTARO IWASAKI (YOZEN) in strict secrecy and, if necessary, from some American concerned, the ----- and the present condition of the Silver Shirts Movement. Then wire me information concerning the necessary travelling expense, date of sailing and other expenses in connection with preparations for IWASAKI to come to Japan inasmuch as we would like to use him under our direction in connection with the Silver Shirts Movement if you find that his personality and training (judged not on the basis of his reputation) are suitable for this purpose. What I would like to do, in carrying out our political policy toward the United States, is not to depend on mere pecuniary connections, but also to direct the aforementioned movement in order to establish justice in the United States. Will you, therefore, send me detailed information

regarding the world views which form the basis of the movement, the personality and intellectual capacity of those carrying on the movement and, also, such other information that might be of interest to me?

Trans. 7-7-41

No. 353

FROM: San Francisco (Muto) June 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 109.

(3-part message complete.)

Secret outside the Department.

1. This Silver Shirt movement was founded in 1934 as a juridical person under Delaware law. It is anti-communistic and anti-Jewish, and has representatives in every state, all led by Chief PELLEY, and at one time had 30 or 40 thousand regular members.

Lecture societies were organized and they distributed their weekly mouthpiece and books and pamphlets written by PELLEY and THORKELSON, who, until last year, was a republican congressman from Montana. Their line of propaganda is as follows:

The administrative and juridical branches of the ROOSEVELT administration are shot through with international Judaism and communism and is coming under the influence of the British royalty, which is under the thumb of these elements. America must be defended from them. America's foreign policy must be to save the human race from the enslaving grasp of the international Jews. As for the Orient, the United States must not interfere. As for Europe, the United States must not interfere. She must look after herself.

The Silver Shirts organization is being investigated by the DIES committee as a 5th column activity (volume 6 of this committee's report) and cannot act openly. Last year, either under legal pressure or of its own accord, it dissolved and began an underground movement. However, its weekly mouthpiece and other publications are being shipped from Indianapolis and distributed all over the country. It seems that this is being accomplished through huge special contributions. (According to the DIES investigation, those contributors alone who have been so far discovered, for a year and a half, beginning in 1937, had contributed $66,000.)

2. Well, I had INAGAKI confer with IWASAKI, who said that on April 20th he had first received an offer from PELLEY, at whose suggestion he sent a letter the last of April to Lt. Col. SUGITA, of the Headquarters of the General Staff (who will tell you all about it) asking if the Japanese government would not help out with the Plans; and that again he had asked JIRO KOGA of the Society of Brethren Overseas to contact the German Ambassador in Tokyo in case Japan could not grant this help.

Since then I understand that PELLEY has asked time and again if we had a reply, but I fear this plan could hardly succeed in America under the present conditions. I think it would be dangerous for us to have anything to do with this. IWASAKI lost faith in the guy because of his past failures but the fellow is a very earnest and studious man. He concentrates on the Jewish problem, and is possessed with Pelleyism. Already he has, it seems, furnished the Chief of Staff with pertinent information, and, remembering the KOJIMA affair in Los Angeles, I think we should make use of him after fully instructing him. I want to give him

$500 with which to settle his accounts and enough money to travel second class in Japan for about three months; so please wire back at once.

I am shipping the Silver Shirts printed matter.

Trans. 6-29-42

No. 354

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 11, 1941
TO: Washington # 287.

With reference to propaganda among Negroes as a scheme against the United States, your immediate reply in regard to the following points is requested:

1. Training of Negroes as (fifth columnists ?).
2. The way to utilize them in order to begin the movement ?).
3. The method of contacting the agitators and leaders among the Negroes, as well as both right and left wings. Also, the amount of expenses involved.

The Minister requests that the above message be forwarded to New York, New Orleans, San Francisco and Los Angeles.

Trans. 5-27-42

No. 355

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 468.

(Part 1 of 3.)

(Message # 257 from New York to the Foreign Minister.)

Re your # 287[a] to Washington.

1. Approximately 25% of the total population of the United States is Negro. In the north, centering around New York and Chicago, there is a movement to equalize the status of these people. They are being educated along general sociological lines, and gradually their political position is being equalized. In last year's presidential election, one Congressman, two state Senators, 50 members of state Legislatures, and two Justices were elected from among the Negro population. But still the political strength of the Negro organization can be used much to our advantage, so long as the bread and butter of the Negro depend so utterly upon the white man. Taking advantage of their economic unrest, we might use them to slacken the progress of the United States' plans for national defense and economy as well as for sabotage. However, I must point out the following facts: With the exception of a few pioneers, the Negroes are not organized into a strong racial group, conscious of the fact that it consists of an oppressed people. There are certain progressive organizations working toward the equalization of the Negro, such as the Negro Congress, the Negro Alliance (both Leftist), and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. It is to be noted, however, that the largest Negro organizations are financed by the Jews. I do not see much that we might do aside from cooperating with these organizations in elevating the status of the Negro, from which we could expect very great results. Another thing is that the movement to equalize the Negro was originally fostered ideologically and financially by the Communist Party, and among Negro

leaders there is a rather large Leftist element. Doubtless, however, many of them are quite compromising for convenience's sake, and instead of trying to start a social revolution are following the single principle of elevating the Negro. Therefore, they could not be called strictly Leftist.

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[a]See II, 354.

Trans. 7-8-41

No. 356

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 468.

(Part 2 of 3.)

(Message # 257 from New York to the Foreign Minister.)

To be kept secret within the Department.

2. Since the close of last year, I have been using a Negro literary critic named -----[a] and have had him open a news service for Negro newspapers. The Negro press is so poor that it has no news service of its own, and as I have told you in various messages, -----[a] has been getting relatively good results, and because of the advantage we have in using men like this in our political and subversive activities, the effect of propaganda upon the Negroes is naturally limited.

3. HIKIDA is in most intimate contact with Negro groups and Negro leaders. I am going to have him continue to work along that line and have him foster the organization of Negroes of great ability, thus advancing our own purposes. Concerning the advantage of using Negroes in procuring intelligences, since I have not yet used Negro spies directly, I am unable to judge. However, as an experiment I am now instructing Mr. -----[a],an official of the New York branch of the National Youth Administration, and a graduate of -----[a], to be a spy.

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[a]DoD comment: Names withheld.

Trans. 7-8-41

No. 357

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 468.

(Part 3 of 3.)

(Message # 257 from New York to the Foreign Minister.)

To be kept secret within the Department.

4. In organizing our schemes among the Negroes, in view of the fact that the organizations practically all have their headquarters in Washington, naturally that city should be our hub. However, in actually carrying out our plots, we would be met with a number of difficulties, so at first we had better center around Mr. HIKIDA's work in New York, while at the same time

working assiduously in Washington. After we see what results we get in this manner, we can undertake our job in Chicago. In view of the fact that the United States lacks skilled labor to carry out its defense production plans, naval arsenals and other military establishments are gradually admitting Negroes to technical lines. At present there is a fairly small number of Negroes in the naval arsenals at Norfolk and Portsmouth, Virginia. In the arsenals at Philadelphia and Brooklyn there are also a few unskilled Negro laborers, so I would say that in the future there will be considerable profit in our getting Negroes to gather military intelligences for us. I am sending this in a suitable manner to Chicago, Los Angeles, and New Orleans.

Trans. 7-8-41

No. 358

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 475.

(Intelligence Report of Secondary Order.)

Before attacking the Soviet, Germany secretly carried on some peace talks with Great Britain. From Churchill down they steadfastly refused to harken to the Germans; but now, in case the Soviet is quickly shattered according to Germany's plans, and it appears imminent that Great Britain will be invaded and the foundations of the British Empire shaken, and in case Germany's peace terms are not too severe, peace parlays may ensue. The United States is serving as a check or a brake and there are men in the State Department who favor peace in order to prevent the annihilation of the British Empire. There are also such men in the Cabinet, for example, Secretary of Commerce, JESSE JONES. LINDBERG told a friend of mine that peace talk will bud in July and blossom in the autumn.

Trans. 7-10-41

No. 359

FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) July 10, 1941
TO: Washington # 1481.

(Circular)

Message to Berlin # 630. Secret.

There have been a good many reports from the United States and other places that Italy and Germany are nonplussed. Although I, myself, (the Foreign Minister), have complete faith in the explanation made by Ribbentrop, please send anything you can about it. It is said that the peace rumor is a machination (activity) of England and the United States. Please find out from Ribbentrop at a convenient opportunity exactly what the German opinion is of the true intent of this activity. Please telegraph the gist. This has been sent to England, America, and the Soviet.

Trans. 7-24-41

No. 360

FROM: Chicago (Olmori) August 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #25.

As you are well aware, it is best to observe the conversion of automobile factories into manufacturing centers of military goods in order to secure an idea as to the extent of United States Government's stepping up all defense plans. The details concerning current contract amounts and items of production that have been assigned to the automobile industry in this area are as follows:

The General Motors Corporation has defense contracts amounting to $275,000,000. These call for the production of trucks, antiaircraft guns, airplane parts and airplane engines.

Ford has contracts amounting to $778,000,000 calling for the production of bombers, airplane engines, armored cars, and trucks.

Chrysler has defense contracts amounting to $375,000,000 for the production of tanks, trucks, anti-aircraft guns and parts for bombers.

Packard has defense contracts amounting to $245,000,000 which call for the production of aircraft engines and airplane -----.

Relayed to Washington and New York.

Trans. 8-8-41

No. 361

FROM: New York (Morishima) August 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #379.

With regard to HOPKINS' mission in the Soviet, though officials in Washington generally give the explanation that he has gone there to confer on aid in the form of supplies to the Soviet, DENNY, diplomatic editorial writer for the Script Howard newspaper, wrote under date of the 31st in a Washington dispatch that since Germany and the Soviet were so deeply involved in war, the Soviet was demanding not only complete material assistance, but also that joint British and American military activities be commenced not only in Germany's rear, but in Norway as well. On the other hand in England and the United States it would seem that there is a desire that, in the event of thorough going activity in the war against Germany and against Japan, that the Soviet offer a guarantee to attack Japan.

Whether or not HOPKINS and STALIN are able to decide upon an agreement cannot be predicted, but it would seem clear that such was HOPKINS' mission there. LAWRENCE DENNIS on the same day in his "Work Letter" said that he had heard that HOPKINS' mission in the Soviet was ----- ----- -----. The "Daily Worker", in a front page editorial, reported that HOPKINS' mission was to bring about joint British, American and Russian international cooperation. This is for your information.

Relayed to Washington.

Trans. 7-8-41

No. 362

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 4, 1941
TO: Moscow, Berlin # 225.

(Circular) (Message to Tokyo # 648)

1. I have made a thorough study of the notes exchanged between America and Soviet Russia which extend the validity of the American Soviet trade agreement of August 6, 1937 up to August 6, 1942.

2. The above-mentioned notes were exchanged between America and the Soviet at the same time as were those, the gist of which you received in my wire # 649[a].

The above was announced by the State Department at 8 o'clock on the 4th. (4th., 8:30 A.M.)

Relayed to -----.

[a]Regarding American-Japanese relations with regard to exports and the French-Indo China question.

Trans. 8-11-41

No. 363

FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 325.

I have decided hereafter in the case of intelligences which I consider reliable to start them with the word "jōkō" (first priority) and in the case of those which are mere heresay, but sufficiently important to be brought to your attention, with "jootsu" (secondary importance).

Please note.

Trans. 5-22-41

No. 364

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 4, 1941
TO: Berne, Washington & Mexico # 1180.

(Circular)

Hereafter when you have intelligence messages to send us, please consider where you got them from, their substance and degree of reliability. Those which you consider almost certain mark "Jōkō", primary importance, and those of which the reliability is questionable mark "Jōōtsu", secondary importance.

Trans. 6-14-41

No. 365

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 473.

Re your Circular # 1367[a].

I think it would be well to:

1. Burn up all the account books in the respective offices except those for the last three or four years.
2. In order to insure against any disruption of financial management of the respective offices, collect all funds to be paid up to the end of the fiscal year and wire the same.
3. After checking up on the fixtures now in possession, without reference to the ledger, prepare a list of the fixtures actually necessary.
4. If a suitable purchaser could be found, sell the official land situated on "N" Street in our city.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-9-41

No. 366

FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) Unnumbered.

(Washington to Tokyo # 313)

(Re your extra.)

I redispatch my message as follows:

No. 313.

Re your Circular message # 584[a].

I am having the person in charge put matters in order. However, the records of this office have been kept in a rather disorderly fashion, and furthermore, the number of items which are handled by this office as a daily routine is fairly high.

For these reasons, it is practically impossible for one man to even attempt to tackle the older documents. We would like to select some one to assist in the work of putting this office in order immediately. (This person would be one who was selected by the San Francisco Consulate-General.)

Please give the matter of employing this man at one hundred dollars a month and allowing him $180 travelling expenses, your consideration. In view of the critical times, will you reply immediately.

[a]"Because of present critical international situation separate at once all secret documents into a special class. Burn all other documents immediately, in strict secrecy, excepting a few that may be currently needed."

Trans. 5-20-41

No. 367

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 456.

(Secret, to be kept inside department.)

I would like your permission to burn certain codes which I have in this office, the use of which is to be stopped and which will in the future be of no use, certain ones rarely used, and certain others of which I have too many. Would you please send me instructions?

Trans. 7-5-41

No. 368

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 516.

(Strictly Secret.)

In accordance with your instruction, I have been compiling my records, and the materials which should be returned to the home office I have packed into 22 wooden boxes. These have been loaded on board the Kawasaki Steamship Company steamer NORFOLK MARU which left Baltimore on the 12th. I am mailing you the details and -----.

Furthermore, because this steamer will stop at ports of call in South America, it is understood that it will not reach Yokohama until the end of ----- month[a]. Should it be thought that in the light of the international situation that is too late a date, please arrange to have this ship not stop at its ports of call in South America but sail directly to Japan.

[a]The two letters giving the number of the month are very badly garbled and could not represent any number; however, it is felt that August is definitely the month meant.

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 369

FROM: Tokyo July 7, 1941
TO: Washington # 335.

As a means of sending our communications from here, if worse comes to worse, we have plans for making use of the intelligence dispatches that are being sent out each night; but as a means of making contact from your end, we have been thinking of the possibility of having a wireless set with an operator of exceptional ability in your office, and at the time of the day that is most favorable for dispatches, sending them in relay via South America and Yaruto[a] in the South Seas. However, I would like to know your opinion as to the feasibility of the plan as regards the following three points.

(1) Could a transmitter of about 100 or 200 watts, or its parts, be assembled in your city under the guise of "amateur" use?

(2) Could this be set up and trial communications carried out as an "amateur" with the relay stations? Then after having it set up secretly in your office, would there be any chance of trying it out, if need be, in a very short trial transmission?

(3) It is expected that if the situation takes a turn for the worst, that extreme limitations, if not prohibitions, will be placed upon the use of the radio in general. In such an event is there any likelihood that the above-mentioned equipment could be used to good advantage?

[a]Yaruto, principal island of Jaluit (Bonham) Atoll. (6° 00′ N., 169° 35′ E.)

Trans. 7-8-41

No. 370

FROM: Washington — July 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 558.

Re your # 335[a].

I have conferred with our navy experts in regard to the technical points involved, and as a result our opinions, on the points you asked about, are as follows:

(1) This would be possible.

(2) and (3) While it would likely be possible to send communications as "amateurs", with the highly developed detector equipment in use here, it would be impossible to keep secret the existence and use of such a radio set in the Embassy compound. This would be especially true whenever the situation should become worse, and with interference to be encountered in wave lengths, there would be little hope of our being able to make any efficient use of such means, and looked at from the situation as a whole we think it would be inadvisable to try it.

[a]Tokyo questions Washington on the possibility of setting up a wireless set at the Ambassador's office as a precaution against developments leading to limitations to or possible prohibition of, the use of radio. July 7, 1941; II, 361.

Trans. 7-26-41

No. 371

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — May 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 337.

Re your circular # 1013[a].

Secret outside the Department.

In our present telegraphic room we have no space for the equipment, so we shall have to revise and expand it in order to accommodate the equipment. The best place to land this would be in Baltimore. I can send a member of my staff there and I am sure we can get it to Washington without any trouble. As soon as I arrive at an estimate of the expenses for this rebuilding and expansion, I will let you know.

[a]Tokyo says it would like to ship a special size safe to maintain custody of code machines and code books, and asks for immediate information as to place of installation, whether or not it will be difficult to bring in, and where it should be unloaded.

Trans. 5-29-41

No. 372

FROM: Washington — May 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 339.

From New York as follows:

Re your Circular to America # 1013[a].

As you wrote in your letter, the present office is too small and unless we rent other quarters there will be no room to install a safe. Also, we wish to get a place rather removed from the present office. Even if, for example, we enforce our night watch as at present, (as you are well aware, the matter of the night watch is illegal and very inconvenient), it is extremely difficult to maintain adequate protection for our secret codes. Furthermore, Hirasawa has informed us that unless we have a separate house it will not be possible to install a code machine. He has also communicated this to the head office. Our lease on the present office expires in September of this year. We wish to move to a place that will be suitable for the telegraphic office also, and there install all the equipment we need. This will also be the best place to install the safe to which you refer.

We have made tentative arrangements for moving to a suitable location in October of this year with rent about the same as here and only await your approval. However, the landlord must have definite word by June 1st, so please wire approval immediately.

In regard to the expenses connected with the move, maintaining a separate office and an apartment will necessitate more employees. This, together with the heating and various other commodities involved, will mean that our operating expenses will be several times what they are at present. Conditions being what they are, I again ask permission to make this move.

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[a]Matsuoka wires Washington he is sending a safe for maintaining custody of code machines and books. Wants to know where it will be installed and where it shall be unloaded.

Trans. 6-5-41

No. 373

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) — June 2, 1941
TO: Rome, Washington, Berlin, Moscow, Berne and Rio — Circular # 1166.

(Urgent)

(3 parts—complete) (Washington Circular # 126)

In various countries the science of cryptography and cryptanalysis is being practiced more and more. To tell the truth, no absolute confidence can be placed in the secrecy of a code. We, ourselves, in this office are worrying about drawing up a set of new codes, so we would like for you to give us some suggestions from time to time as to suitable procedures. Please pay the strictest attention always during the transfer and tenure of codes and heed the following points on the maintenance of the security of codes, independent of reliance on safes alone.

1. Needless to say, courier mail is a more secure method of transmitting information than by reliance upon codes, so when there is some secret matter which might arouse a given nation, please send the message by courier mail or some other method equally as safe.

2. I am having an official in charge of this work keep the various offices informed. Each time you get a list, keep one copy of it only and burn the preceding list immediately.

3. Hereafter, as a matter of principle, code messages in ----- are not to be sent anywhere except to this office. As a matter of fact, all other code messages, except those to this office, save in cases of necessity, are to be stopped.

Please see to it that there is no misunderstanding to the effect that after abolishing this sort of dispatches it is not our intention to increase the difficulties of those in charge of telegraphic work through the necessity of safeguarding dispatches, or the sudden complication of our codes, but that I am merely trying to make our dispatches in general more safe and facile.

Trans. 6-10-41

No. 375

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 2, 1941
TO: Rome, Vichy, Moscow, Berne, Berlin, Bangkok, Washington, Singapore, and Batavia Circular # 1167.

As stated in circular # 1166[a] from the Foreign Minister, the strictest care is necessary for the protection of the secrecy of codes. Well, our telegraphic staffs are already busy without the aforementioned innovations, and this is but another added burden, so please have them cut down dispatches to the absolute minimum.

[a]See II, 373.

Trans. 6-10-41

No. 376

FROM: Washington July 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo

Message # 268 from New York to Tokyo.

The duties of telegraphic clerk for this office are being handled by Watanabe alone and up to now he has been able to accomplish the work by being very faithful in the discharge of his duties. But in view of the present increase in the number of telegrams which must be handled through this office for the various departments, as for instance the instruction regarding shipping and the more important telegrams concerning commercial firms, banks, and intelligence agents, and the necessity of maintaining secrecy, it will be necessary immediately to have some one sent here temporarily at least from the nearest office. At the same time we wish to request that you give immediate consideration to the matter of increasing the clerical staff here and wire us immediately as to what action you have taken.

We are well aware of the shortage of help that exists all along the line. All of the staff here are doing their best to help out in the telegraphic department. However, the complexity of the telegraphic art of the present day does not lend itself very well to part time work. (Our three clerks here all hold additional posts. One is engaged in correspondence, another in accounting, and the other in commerce.) Due to the pressure of business it is very difficult to handle the telegraphic code. Please give this matter consideration.

Trans. 7-9-41

No. 377

FROM: Washington July 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 554.

(Part 1 of 3)

340 from New York to the Foreign Minister.

(Strictly Secret.)

Re message # 339* from the United States to the Foreign Minister.

Though we are now searching for a separate building, we have not been able to find one, and in the meantime, time is awasting, and there is the matter of instructions received from you on successive occasions with regard to the emergency situation. Under the present situation, in order that we might prepare ourselves for more critical developments, we feel it advisable to make the best use of the facilities at hand. Therefore, for the time being at least, we have given up the proposal of attempting to find a satisfactory building of our own. We would like at this time to effect an expansion of our business office and to acquire the necessary equipment for such an expansion, in addition to which we feel that the equipping of our telegraphic and document rooms as well as a night duty room is of the utmost importance. In order that we may immediately realize these things for the time being we feel we must at least rent additional office space immediately and along the following lines:

1. The business offices of the Consul-Generalcy at the present time are more than overcrowded. We have been forced to use the two old ordinary reception rooms to serve also as document and night rooms. When we are anxious to use the reception room for the entertainment of a caller, we find it most inconvenient to carry on anything like a secret conversation. In order that we may use the reception room as it was originally intended, it is going to be absolutely necessary that we rent another room.

*Not available.

Trans. 8-9-41

No. 378

FROM: Washington July 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 554.

(Part 2 of 3.)

2. After hours, in order to maintain a watch for the purpose of the preservation of our secrets, we have had a member of the staff on night duty since August of last year. Because there is no suitable room in the office which can be assigned to such a purpose, we have been forced to use a studio couch in the reception room as a bed for this member of the staff. In spite of the fact that this duty works a considerable hardship upon the staff member from the point of view of health, should the situation here become more critical, there would be no recourse for us but to assign two men to this duty, but with the present facilities this is impossible. Now there are building regulations having to do with night duty in the office, but we have come to an understanding with the owners by saying we are working twenty-four hours per day. However, having reached that understanding, it is most inconvenient for the man on duty to have

to go to the bathroom in his night clothes. Consequently, it is absolutely necessary, if we are going to do a satisfactory job in the operation of this night duty, we will have to rent a room which at least has a minimum of conveniences.

3. The room which we are now using for telegraphic operations is exceedingly small. There is no room for two to be on duty at the same time. Therefore, we would like to have you consider expanding this office so that we may take care of special safes and increase in the personnel (please refer to my # 368[a]) which we hope to have in the future.

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[a]In which NOMURA advises Tokyo that the *New York Times* stated that Japan has been considering a neutrality pact with the United States and that he, NOMURA, had advised the U.S. Government to do the proper thing about the article.

Trans. 8-9-41

No. 379

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 554.

(Part 3 of 3)

Last summer it was necessary to change the reception room into a document room. This room we are now using for the custody of important documents, the classification of documents, the operation of Japanese type mimeograph machines, and for the collection and disposition of documents. Not only is it impossible to use this room as a reception room, but for purposes of document collection and disposition it is much too cramped. Should you give your permission to the increasing of our staff of Japanese typists by one person, it is a fact that there would be no room for the machine he or she would use. Therefore, at this time, it is of utmost necessity that we increase our floor space to take care of one room to be used for document collection and disposition. With regard to the above, a total increase of appropriation would be required in the amount of $3,700.00, and the equipment fund would require an increase of $1,093.00. (Blue prints and estimates on the cost of equipment we are sending you by air mail.)

Though this increased appropriation seems very high, it can't be helped. On the one hand, in order that we might continue renting the present official residence as it stands, we have finally secured a reduction of $1,000.00 in our annual rental as a result of our determined negotiations with the owners. After you have considered that a deduction of this amount from the increased appropriation requested a balance of $2,700.00 remains to be appropriated, please be so kind as to sanction this increased allotment immediately. Furthermore, in these times it would seem that should the vacant room immediately adjoining this office be rented by an American, it might be most embarrassing from the point of view of the maintenance of our secrets. Therefore, please consider this fact as well as the others mentioned.

Trans. 8-9-41

No. 380

FROM: New York (Morishima) July 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #371.

Lately our telegraphic duties have been gradually increasing. Telegrams from the Finance Office and other governmental messages as well as request messages from merchants and banks have been piling up. Dispatches which require immediate attention have grown rapidly in number. Therefore, I placed another member of my staff with Mr. WATANABE, who is in charge of such business, and had Secretary KIHARA come to our assistance from ----- and Secretary KAJIHARA come up from Washington. They are pressed in Washington also, and for technical reasons KAJIHARA cannot be spared long, and I shall have to send him back to Washington this week. Our telegraphic section must have help, however, so I have asked Washington to send us an aide from the Embassy. Please order them to choose a man with experience in urgent telegrams and send him up here immediately.

Trans. 10-10-41

No. 381

FROM: Washington July 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo #601.

There is a request from the Military and Naval Attaches that due to the situation prevailing at the present time they be permitted to move their office to the Embassy, for a time at least.

I recognize this as a reasonable request and will make the necessary arrangements for room. Please grant the request.

Trans. 8-1-41

No. 382

FROM: Washington July 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo #596.

From Chicago as follows:

Re your Circular #1366[a].

After consultation with the Embassy it has been decided to entrust the Imperial Portrait to the Embassy.

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[a]To forestall the possibility of their offices in foreign countries being closed without warning, by the countries involved, Matsuoka issues instructions that precautions shall be taken for the safety of the Emperor's portrait and, at the opportune time, the destruction of codes and official documents.

Trans. 8-1-41

No. 383

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #615.

Reference your #3 0.

The imperial portraits at New York and Chicago are en route to Washington. Student clerk HASHIZUME will leave by train on the 30th for San Francisco where he will place the portraits on the Asama Maru. Minister WAKASUGI will take over the pictures on board and will return them to the home office.

Trans. 8-2-41

No. 384

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 2, 1941
TO: Mexico #93.

We have appropriated 100,000 yen for your intelligence and enlightenment expenses during the current fiscal year, and I am hereby sending you the first installment of 25,000 yen. This money is to be used as follows:

1. If worse comes to worst, we consider Mexico City, along with Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, and Santiago as most important bases for intelligence concerning the United States. From a geographical standpoint it is most natural that we should endeavor to set up in Mexico City an establishment where we can carry on routine business in the matter of collecting intelligence concerning the United States. This point I stressed particularly in the outline in the first paragraph of my secret ____ #62* with reference to propaganda activities.

2. Though the funds are in the main to be used in intelligence concerning the United States, what is left should be used in gathering intelligence in Mexico. Bear in mind that in putting this policy into effect our principal aim is to collect every possible bit of intelligence concerning the United States and, with this in view, I want you to contact and work out a cooperative policy with our officials in Los Angeles, Houston, New Orleans and New York. Furthermore, in this connection, Mexicali might well be used.

3. Please also plan to use RAFAEL MUNAS for purposes of interception.

4. Concerning propaganda and enlightment, in case the United States joins the war, we will endeavor to use our nationals there to our best possible advantage and we will do our very best to use Rightist and Leftist Labor organizations and promote their anti-American revolutionary influence. Please use your best efforts to achieve this.

Secret outside the Department.

*Not available.

Trans. 7-1-41

No. 385

FROM: Mexico City (Sato) June 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 206.

I wish to send JOSE LLERGO.

This man is thirty years old, youthful and energetic, and is already an influential reporter. His elder brother is the editor of the weekly periodical HOY. Although it seems to me that by and large Mexican newspapers are following the tendency of yielding to pressure from the United States, nevertheless HOY has steadily maintained unbiased editorials. I believe that through this man we can greatly influence the press of this country and that it would be much to our advantage to use him in the future.

I would like to send him by the next plane, so will you please remit his traveling expenses?

Trans. 7-3-41

No. 386

FROM: Mexico July 19, 1941
TO: Tckyo # 280.

Re my # 206[a].

1. On the 18th, PAPESU came to call on me to bid me farewell. On this occasion, he brought a man by the name of ISAKU DEIYASU (Isaac Diaz ?) (he is also a reporter on the OI (?), and is said to be PAPESU's best friend). Since touring Europe, Diaz also has become very desirous of traveling to Japan. So, seizing upon PAPESU's visit to Japan, he has decided to go there too, at his own expense.

Some time ago, I had members of my staff make investigations into the characters of these men. This was the first time, however, that I met and talked with Diaz, and was happy to find that both men were exceedingly pleasant.

They are both underlings of Maximino Camacho and are well qualified for future utilization by us. I was firmly convinced that it would be to our interest to have both men travel to Japan. I, therefore, told Diaz that because there was no time to advise my home government of his coming, I could not say definitely whether he could be given any financial assistance or not. However, I would do my best for him, I said; and told him to go to Japan on the assumption that he would have to pay his own way, (in part, at least).

Because of these circumstances, I would appreciate your giving consideration to allowing Diaz the same sort of treatment as has been extended to PAPESU.

[a]June 14, II, 385. Consul General Sato at Mexico City states his desire to send Jose Llergo, outstanding Mexican news reporter and brother of the Editor of Hoy, weekly periodical. Believes that the Mexican press can be greatly influenced through him.

Trans. 7-23-41

No. 387

FROM: Mexico (Miura) June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 222.

From Minister YAMAGATA (en route to Peru).

1. *The Question of Obtaining Military Materials.*

Both the President and the Minister of Economics kept on running away from me; consequently, I was unable to have them allow me to confer with them. Both the German and Italian Ministers advised me against undertaking negotiations in any way conspicuous. Even if I opened the negotiations by bringing up first of all the question of rayon and proposed either a barter system or compensatory trade, there is very little likelihood of my succeeding by approaching the question through the front door. There is no way but to approach it from the back door. At any rate, it is a question whether I would succeed in this matter, inasmuch as additional pressure is being exerted at present by the United States. Mexican business men in this field expect that sooner or later an embargo or export license system would be put into effect affecting the export to Japan of mercury and other materials. Under these circumstances, I think it is very important for us to make purchases now in as large quantities and in as secret a manner as possible.

2. As regards political trends in this part of the world, I will wire you information after my arrival in Panama since trends in the Caribbean and Central American countries must also be taken into consideration.

Trans. 7-1-41

No. 388

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Mexico City June 20, 1941
105.

Re your # 208*.

1. In reference to the purchase of exports referred to previously, a high price was offered for 15,000 boxes (bales, crates ?). Following up the idea of your suggestion, 7,500 boxes were finally agreed upon. The price was lowered from $83.00 for 120 denier to $81.00 for 150 denier.

2. In order that outsiders may be kept from getting in on this export purchase, it will be necessary for the Ministry of Commerce and Industry to give out a warning within the near future.

3. Please continue endeavoring to obtain a barter of artificial silk for mercury. In addition, try to obtain assurance of general essential materials by offering the Mexicans any sort of stipulations desired, such as offering to make a deposit of guarantee. Also, it is desired to make barter arrangements for necessary industrial materials. Please answer by wire, giving your opinion about this.

*Not available.

Trans. 6-23-41

No. 389

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 12, 1941
TO: Mexico City #96.

To Minister YAMAGATA.

In view of the fact that there are at present certain delicate trends in Columbia, on your way to Peru will you please stop for one week at Bogota.

Trans. 7-1-41

No. 390

FROM: Bogota (Yanai) June 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #60.

According to your message #96[a] to our Minister in Mexico, Minister YAMAGATA[b] is soon to visit me. Both from a geographical and a business point of view, our petroleum interests in Mexico are being curtailed. Consequently, I feel that it is necessary to have official NAGUMO[c], who is stationed in Quito, come here and sit with me while we discuss this matter with Minister YAMAGATA. Therefore, will you please arrange to have NAGUMO come here after visiting Lima? I have discussed this with NAGUMO.

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[a]See II, 389.

[b]Kiyoshi Yamagata has held important positions in Venezuela, Foreign Office, in Tokyo, and in legations at London, Washington, and Brussels, accompained by Secretary Takagi.

[c]Consul in Quito, Ecuador.

Trans. 6-25-41

No. 391

FROM: Mexico (Miura) June 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo #224.

(In 2 parts—complete.)

Relative to getting this office organized on a war time basis, I explained all the circumstances within the office to Minister Yamagata and discussed plans with him thoroughly. As a result we have concluded that the following measure would be most desirable and therefore, we would like to request your cooperation in bringing them about at the earliest possible time:

(1) We (have been expecting ?) the arrival of Secretary Fujii and he seems to have arrived in *Spain* (?) but we have already received a dispatch from him saying "I have been trying to secure steamer accommodation, but under present conditions there is little prospect. The Foreign Office understands this and therefore, you will please be advised accordingly." Now, with the outbreak of the German-Soviet hostilities it will be still more difficult for him to come, and therefore, we would request that some other person be appointed and sent forward at once.

(2) As mentioned in my #134[a], we have here greatly desired (closer contacts with ?) those connected with trade relations, financial matters and the intelligence work, and if there are

difficulties in the way of getting these hooked up together at this time, why not appoint someone now who as the above mentioned first secretary could have general charge over the business in the office, and in addition also have the responsibility of either the trade or the intelligence work. If this could be done, then we could have Secretary Sato look after the other duties. Or in case no suitable person can be found of the First Secretary class, if we could have some young person with experience in either of these lines of work sent out immediately, we could put Sato in general charge of the office work and one of the other lines.

(3) Please appoint as capable a person as possible as Fukushima's relief at once.

(4) Kataoka and Samijima are both competent men, but they have been here many years, and from the standpoint of bringing about a new atmosphere in this office we would like to have them transferred elsewhere and new men appointed in their places. In case it is impossible to have them transferred elsewhere, we would be pleased to have Kataoka appointed to Salvador and Samijima to Mexicali, and have Takashima and Miyazawa from those places, respectively, appointed to duty in this office.

(5) Then, although Kato of Mexicali does have a situation in his family, in view of the needs during this serious emergency, I wish his return home could be deferred a while longer and that he be instructed immediately to take up duties in this office, or else have orders issued for Kato of Argentina, who is said to be returning home soon, report for service here for the time being. In this latter instance, we would have no objections to Kato's being ordered to duty elsewhere.

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*Not available.

Trans. 7-1-41

No. 392

FROM: Mexico City — July 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 240.

Re my # 224*.

In view of the times and conditions, we do not believe that it would be to our interest to move Kato of Mexicali. Please, therefore, do not issue orders for him to return to Japan, but instead have him stay where he is for the present, and have Miyazawa come here and assume his post alone.

Will you please also consider ways and means of making use of Kato in the event that (the ?) Mexicali (office ?) is strengthened?

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*See II, 391, Amb. Miura at Mexico City wires Tokyo of his plans, after conference with Minister Yamagata, for organizing the Mexico City office on a war time basis. Suggests several changes of personnel at the office and requests that someone be sent there to substitute for Secy. Fujii who is in Spain and unable to leave because of lack of steamer accomodations.

Trans. 7-7-41

No. 393

FROM: Mexico City (Miura) July 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 236.

Re paragraph # 2 of your # 111[a].

1. KATO, of Mexicali, spoke to the following effect to Emissary YAMAGATA and to the members of this office when he visited this office recently for the purpose of business (I was at that time visiting the other country to which I have been accredited).

He said: "In Mexicali and vicinity American influence is predominant (All officials from the Governor down are puppets of the United States). Although there are many Japanese inhabitants there, since not one of them belongs to the intelligentsia, if intelligence work is to be carried on, it is absolutely necessary that both funds and the personnel be reorganized at the branch."

2. I believe he is right. Although it is difficult to conduct intelligence work, which is liable to be noticeable, in a border city having a population, according to recent figures, of 15,000, I believe the work there would prove useful, provided that the intelligence net in Los Angeles and vicinity is well organized, especially if a situation occurs in which we find it necessary to withdraw our officials now in the United States. Now, if this is so, I believe we should at once establish connection with Los Angeles and make necessary preparations.

[a]See II, 398—Tokyo asks Mexico to reply as soon as possible regarding the plan to contact and work out a cooperative policy with officials in Los Angeles, Houston, New Orleans, and New York in an effort to collect every possible bit of intelligence concerning the United States.

Trans. 7-7-41

No. 394

FROM: Mexico City (Miura) June 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 232.

Re my # 229[a].

1. With regard to the AP dispatch referred to in the above mentioned message, the Foreign Office issued a statement on the 27th, the gist of which was as follows:

The aims of an agreement of this nature between the governments of these two countries are, as outlined in the statement published on 8 June (refer to my message # 204[b]) to mutually supply each other with materials needed under the present world conditions. The text of the agreement can, undoubtedly, be made public shortly.

2. We have been continuing to work on the matter contained in paragraph 2 of my message # 208[c]. Since we have been able to establish connections with Maximino Camacho recently, (we shall be able to make a detailed report shortly), we postponed making the demands contained in your message # 134[d] for the time being. However, in view of the manner in which the above statement was made, we now believe that it would be well to discuss the matter openly with the Foreign Minister. We are at present making arrangements to do so.

[a]Not available.

[b]"A negotiation is underway between officials of America and Mexico which proposes to institute an agreement between the two countries to supply each other with needed commodities," etc.

[c]Not available.

[d]Not available. Probably a garbled number.

Trans. 7-7-41

No. 395

FROM: Mexico City (Miura) June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 220.

We have studied the situation here with reference to the matter of Japanese ships fishing in Mexican waters and are agreed that for the time being there is nothing for us to worry about and that we should merely watch coolly the course of events. A Naval message of the 20th will give you the details.

Trans. 6-30-41

No. 396

FROM: Mexico City (Miura) July 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 238.

(Part 1 of 3.)

1. On the 2nd, I went to see Foreign Minister PADILLA and stated: "From statements made by the Foreign Office on the 9th, and 27th, of last month, it would appear that the United States and Mexico are considering concluding an agreement concerning the supply of materials necessary for the manufacture of arms. On the 20th and today A.P. reports from Washington that this treaty aims to prevent the shipment of materials anywhere outside the American countries. Would you please tell me the truth about this?" Foreign Minister PADILLA replied: "It is true that we are considering an agreement of this sort, but this is a question concerning only the American powers and has nothing to do with any other countries."

2. Therefore, I stated: "I know that it is quite natural for the several American states to look out for themselves in the matter of necessary materials, but what I would like to know is this; in case you Mexicans have more materials than you need and are able to sell some abroad, will you be prevented from selling them to us Japanese?" The Foreign Minister answered: "As a matter of fact, only today we received from the United States the proposal mentioned in the A.P. wire (See my 239*). The gist of it is that American goods are not to be shipped out of the American states. We are carefully considering the matter at present and have not yet made our minds up."

*Not available.

Trans. 7-8-41

No. 397

FROM: Mexico City (Miura) July 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 238.

(Part 2 of 3.)

At this point I interposed: "Well, you know how friendly our two countries have been for a long time and the fact that not once has anything unpleasant occurred is something rarely seen in the markets of the world. Even today Japan is selling Mexico some of the materials which she most urgently requires and she is, as you know, one of Mexico's best customers. So,

if through an agreement like the one you mentioned Japanese-Mexican relations are marred, I will be blamed and will find it difficult to understand why you treated me so." The Foreign Minister answered: "Well, to tell the truth, our relations with Japan are causing us the most regret. That is precisely why the Mexican government is hesitating, but, considering the fact that Mexico will have to obtain machinery and other goods which she needs, she finds it necessary to sell her own goods to the United States, and that is the whole point of this agreement; consequently, to say that you Japanese could sell us the machinery and so forth instead of the United States is quite beside the point."

4. To this I responded: "Japan is now progressing in the production of heavy industries goods and is in a position to sell surpluses in the line. Let me enumerate for you the list offered by the Chief of the Commercial Section which Minister YAMAGATA brought along." But the Foreign Minister replied: "All these points are being studied by experts in the competent departments." Mr. PADILLA made a gesture as if to end our conversation.

Trans. 7-8-41

No. 398

FROM: Mexico City (Miura) July 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 238.

(Part 3 of 3.)

5. However, I continued, "There are finally two things which I would like to say to you. First, the goods which we Japanese purchase are not to be transshipped to Germany; and second, I have every reason to believe that the European war will end sooner than expected." The Foreign Minister expressed confidence in my first statement, but concerning the second he asked: "Well, then, if you are so sure it is going to end so quickly, about when do you think that will be?" I said, "Being located here in Mexico, I am not in a position to know the course of world events, but I can assure you that this is the feeling of the Japanese Government." The Foreign Minister was silent for a minute or two; then said, "There is a lot to what you have come and told me today. When I come to consider the treaty I will give full consideration to it."

That last point seems to have been bothering the Mexicans considerably and what I said about it appears to have moved him greatly.

Sent also to Washington. Will Washington please get in touch with New York on this?

Trans. 7-8-41

No. 399

FROM: Tokyo June 28, 1941
TO: Mexico City # 111.

Re my # 93*.

1. Please establish communications between the United States and Mexico at once and also report regularly on the progress of our schemes.

2. Please reply as soon as possible on the plan described in the 2nd paragraph of the above message.

*See II, 384.

Trans. 7-1-41

No. 400

FROM: Mexico (Miura) July 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 245.

(Part 1 of 4.)

1. It is clear that one of the most urgent requirements of the present time is the establishment of an (international ?) route for the communication of intelligences between the United States and Mexico. In my opinion, this route which is to be established should be used by our embassy, the consular offices, and other semi-official offices in the United States, as well as in espionage net connections with Mexico City.

2. In the case of war, the method under consideration involves the direct linking of all our espionage agents in the United States directly with this city. The various observations and opinions gathered from our espionage net in the United States should, in my opinion, be carried out here. However, judging from the current examples of German and Italian officials, it is clear that the American Government will not permit too much movement of officials from the United States to Central and South America. Therefore, this very day, please order the reduction of these intelligence agents from official status to civilian status at as early a date as possible. Then they can make representations to the Mexican Government as individuals.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 401

FROM: Mexico (Miura) July 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 245.

(Part 2 of 4.)

Persons in the border areas should secure passport visas before it becomes too late and begin to perform their duties.

3. In my considered opinion, the persons carrying on the activities of the aforementioned route should make possible the transference and contact between our espionage net in the United States and our officials here in Mexico which can be done most effectively in Mexico. In cooperation, therefore, with army and naval authorities, offices should be established in Laredo, El Paso, Nogales, and Mexicali. Conferences have been going on with army and naval officers in regard to this matter. If this is to be done, much planning will be required with parties in the United States who will be getting in contact with me. With this in mind, on the occasion of a recent trip to the United States, I stopped off in New Orleans and Houston, and from what I learned there in those places, such a thing hadn't been given the slightest consideration.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 402

FROM: Mexico (Miura) July 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 245.

(Part 3 of 4.)

When I was in Washington, the official in charge of this matter, after establishing Washington and New York areas in the espionage net, made the statement that he would like to wait for a little while before making a tour for contact purposes. Since that time until today, the question stands as it did then. Furthermore, in regard to Los Angeles, when Minister YAMAGATA's party recently passed through there, he was told that they had no acquaintanceship with such things as intelligence nets, and for that reason they had made no special plans. Since then, all of these offices, on the instructions of the home office ----- ----- gradually are bringing their plans to a head for ----- -----. At the present time, as far as civilian agents are concerned it will be impossible to make (it ?) more concrete.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 403

FROM: Mexico (Miura) July 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 245.

(Part 4 of 4.)

In reading your message on the intelligence route matter, I have received the impression that ----- ----- there is no clear distinction made between the question of this route and the establishment of an intelligence net in this country dealing with the United States (with regard to the details of this latter matter, I will wire my humble opinions separately). However, it is clear that the question of the intelligence route does not imply the establishment of the espionage net in the United States by civilian agents. This is definitely a function of the diplomatic offices in the United States and is absolutely impossible for us here in Mexico City to bring into being. Army and naval officers here feel that the questions are quite apart and separate. In order that we not work at cross purposes, however, I am inquiring for additional information.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 404

FROM: Mexico (Miura) July 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 286.

Re Part 1 of your # 349[a] to Washington.

In my # 236[b], I told you more about the advantages and disadvantages of using Mexicali. To confer with me on the matters mentioned in my # 278[c], I had TERAZAKI, ITO, and KATO come back there, and we again looked into the situation. We decided that our previous conclusions were based on peacetime and that in case there is an emergency, Mexicali would probably not be a good place as the basic point for routing because of the following considerations:

(1) Mexicali is far away from headquarters, and not only are airplanes the only convenient means of transportation, but also communications are very bad. If something started, we would not even be able to use American planes.

(2) Four days would be necessary for contact by railway.

(3) In Mexicali there is not one single daily newspaper, and we could only rely upon American-Mexican journals so all the news that came to our ears would be late. Another thing, Lower California is now, to all intents and purposes, under the jurisdiction of Southern California, and in case something began to pop, it would be inevitable that the United States would bring tremendous pressure to bear. To tell the truth, the activities of Japanese citizens in the border cities are even now being subjected to the closest scrutiny, so in time of crisis, Mexicali would be no place for any activities of ours.

I have transmitted this to Washington.

---

[a]See II, 411.

[b]In which KATO of Mexicali says that if intelligence work is to be carried on in Mexicali, it will be necessary that both funds and personnel be reorganized. He also tells of the difficulty of intelligence work in a border town. See II, 393.

[c]Regarding the protecting of Japanese nationals residing in Mexico in case of war.

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 405

FROM: Washington — July 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #534.

Re your #387[a].

Secretary Terasaki has already left for Mexico. How shall we handle this item? Please wire.

---

[a]Terasaki was to have taken some codes to Mexico that Ambassador Shigemitsu brought from London.

Trans. 7-28-41

No. 406

FROM: Mexico — July 26, 1941
TO: Panama — #8.

Secretary TERASAKI left here the 26th arriving at your place the 27th.

Trans. 8-16-41

No. 407

FROM: Mexico (Miura) — July 26, 1941
TO: Washington — #41.

Secretary TERASAKI left today for South America.
Relayed to Tokyo, Caracas, and -----.

Trans. 8-2-41

No. 408

FROM: Mexico (Miura) July 27, 1941
TO: Rio de Janeiro #3.

Secretary TERASAKI left here yesterday for your place by air and expects to arrive August 2nd. He will stop off three days in Panama and three days in the Port of Spain.

Trans. 8-1-41

No. 409

FROM: Mexico (Miura) July 28, 1941
TO: Rio de Janeiro #4.

Diet Member SHINOHARA left here on the 28th and will be accompained from Panama by Secretary TERASAKI.

Trans. 8-13-41

No. 410

FROM: Mexico City (Miura) July 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #285.

Strictly Secret. To be handled in government code.

Re your Excellency's #349[a] to the Ambassador in America.

From Terazaki and Ito (after consultation with Minister MIURA).

1. It is believed best not to regard Mexico, as heretofore, as the main base of intelligence in comparison to Brazil, Argentina and Chile for the following reasons:

a. As it is difficult to get information about internal conditions in the United States except by newspapers and magazines, there is no other way possible other than the assignment of a specialist, for this work takes a great deal of time.

b. The general feeling of the public in Mexico is good; but aside from Japanese-Mexican relations, it is judged that at the present time Mexico may be properly viewed as a dependency of the United States.

c. Referring to the last part of your caption message, should the United States join the war, Mexico would follow suit, if not formally, at least practically.

d. Should Mexico go to war it would be impossible, because of communications, to expand (or it may be translated 'to transfer') the intelligence organization.

2. It is not expedient to have Mexico as an important or the chief base. It is believed suitable to make the country you mention in your caption message the main base.

Of course, in case of war, in using all available points, Mexico may be properly utilized.

In accordance with the idea of your suggestions along this line, a continued study is being made of practicable plans for intelligence 'routes' and connections.

This has been transmitted to the United States.

[a]See II, 411; in which Tokyo orders Consul ITO and Secretary TERAZAKI to Mexico and outlines the plans for establishment of an intelligence net.

Trans. 7-28-41

No. 411

FROM: Tokyo July 10, 1941
TO: Washington # 349.

Secret outside the Department.

(To be handled in Government Code.)

Re # 18[a] from New Orleans and # 244 (?)[b] from Mexico to this Foreign Minister.

We wish Consul ITO to go to Mexico City. Lately the offices housing the German and Italian Consulates were closed and their intelligence net broken. Intelligence activities in the Americas and suitable liaison are now essential, so we wish Secretary TERAZAKI also to go to Mexico to confer with our Minister there, in order to realize our plans in a concrete fashion based on the policy described in previous messages. We want Secretary TERAZAKI, and him only, to stop off at Quito, Los Angeles, San Francisco, etc. In this connection the points which we would like to bring to your attention are as follows:

1. We will have three routes to Mexico from the United States, consisting of Laredo, Ciudad Juarez and Mexicali. Mexicali in particular is a convenient point for us on the west coast. In case we need more personnel, we can get them from our Ministry in Mexico.

2. We will establish a Chile route from Mexico to Manzanillo and a Brazil route by way of Vera Cruz.

3. Various officials in the United States and Mexico will work out all the details of their own espionage nets, correlate them, and develop a concrete plan for making contacts and exchanges on the border.

4. In order to succeed in the objective, ways and means for keeping in contact through telegraphy, telephones, memoranda, and word of mouth will be decided upon and put into effect.

5. These routes are to be established against the day of evil and, while all is calm, nothing must be done which would jeopardize their security; therefore, at present investigate only the feasibility of circulating over them.

6. The expenses are to be paid by the several offices.

Because of its geographical position, Mexico is the main point for intelligence work in Brazil, Argentina and Chile, as well as in the United States. Therefore, before we think of relying too much upon Brazil, Argentina and Chile, let us concentrate on Mexico. However, the other three bases are different. In case the United States joins the war, they would inevitably come under her control, but so long as Mexico does not officially join the war, we can continue our intelligence schemes there. Paralleling these plans of ours, if you can also work out a plan for establishing a liaison net with Brazil, Argentina and Chile, it would be excellent groundwork for the establishment presently of an intelligence net. Please transmit this to Mexico City and take with you to New Orleans.

[a] Not available.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 412

FROM: Mexico (Miura) July 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 254.

Strictly secret—To be handled in Government Code.

Re your # 115[a].

After conferring with the "L" Agency, I send you the results, together with my humble opinions. After you have conferred with the naval officials fully on this matter, please send me instructions.

1. The "L" Company also seems frequently to have felt the need of this sort of thing. For a long time they have been highly in favor of this kind of proposal and hope earnestly that we can put it into practice. Be sure, so far as receiving is concerned, we are even now able to use the "L" Agency.

2. The transmitter should be placed in the office at the very beginning. While we are experimenting and while we are actually transmitting, we will take every technical precaution possible to conceal it. We will have to be particularly careful to avoid the method of exchanging messages. We must rather rely upon broadcasts. If this apparatus should be discovered by Mexico sometime in the future, we are determined to hold our ground on the basis of inviolability. If, after experimenting with the machine as amateurs, we took it into the building, that would be dangerous. Such a plan would not do.

2. (Sic) I have three suggestions concerning the procurement of the transmitter. However, if possible, I would like for you to use the first.

(1) If there is a sufficient margin of time, you might obtain such a machine in one unit from the Navy and ship it to me as a private piece of furniture.

(2) After purchasing the manner of machine you have mentioned, in the United States, we might bring it into Mexico. (Concerning the quality, price, etc., we would have to get in touch with our agents in the place of purchase.)

(3) We might purchase the parts here or in the United States and assemble a composite instrument. However, we would encounter many technical difficulties in the last proposal and would have to enlist the assistance of our special naval officials in New York.

3. In the matter of the transmitter and personnel necessary to operate it, the "L" Agency is prepared to cooperate with us, and I do not think we would have any trouble along those lines.

4. If we use the first proposal mentioned in paragraph 2, we could communicate directly with Japan, so when you come to consider this, please consider direct communication and relay liaison in separate categories. (I do not mean to say, however, that there is any objection to your considering simultaneously liaison between relay stations.)

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-10-41

No. 413

FROM: Mexico (Miura) July 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #247.

Strictly Secret.

To be handled in Government Code.

(Part 1 of 2)[a].

Re your #93[b] and my #244[c].

1. Need I tell you that I will try my very best to knit closely and strengthen our American intelligence net (please consider the question of the route in an entirely different category) and to foster the anti-American and anti-war atmosphere in Mexico? But, still I feel I may say fairly conclusively that, in the light of existing conditions in this country, we cannot expect to achieve very much along these lines.

2. I mean to say that the political and foreign policy of Mexico is directed by President CAMACHO and his cabinet, which is with him body and soul. It is not too much to say that they will brook absolutely no interference or even suggestions. Not only that, but every one of these gentlemen is strongly pro-American and it would be absolutely impossible, I think, to procure any information which would stand our glorious Empire in good stead. Since CAMACHO seized control here, particularly in recent times, there has been a fierce and relentless campaign to control or stamp out labor, Communist, Nationalist and anti-American groups. I am sorry to say that I cannot see any chance at all of our succeeding here with any of our schemes.

3. Well, the first and foremost aim or our schemes is to ruin the position of leadership which the United States has with regard to the other nations of the hemisphere, to break up its so-called "Good Neighbor Policy" and thereby destroy any possibility of future coordination among these nations. Granted that this is our main objective, if we are to succeed, I should think it would be a better policy to turn our eyes elsewhere, rather than to pin our hopes upon a fruitless nation like this. I do not think it would be amiss to try some relatively simpler plan.

---

[a] Part 2 of 2, See II, 414.

[b] In which MATSUOKA says 100,000 yen have been appropriated for intelligence and enlightenment expenses during the current fiscal year and gives instructions as to its use. See II, 384.

[c] Not available.

Trans. 7-9-41

No. 414

FROM: Mexico (Miura) July 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #247.

(Part 2 of 2)[a].

Secret outside the Department.

Military Attache NISI, attached to this office, has a great deal of confidence in the possibility of planning a rebellion in Guatemala. Although he had submitted his suggestion about

three months ago to the military authorities in Tokyo, he was advised to wait and watch developments while maintaining liaison with those interested, because at that time our relations with the United States were delicate. On the other hand, is it not also a good plan to get Marshall URUTAADO of Nicaragua, concerning whom I made reference in my secret message #62[b], to lead a rebellion, since he is not only a very influential man but a greatly respected person?

5. Such a plot might not necessarily be a success in every respect; however, even if it fails, if it's carried out to a certain extent, it would have to be quieted by the United States using its armed forces. In such a case, it would cast a shadow on the so-called "Good Neighbor Policy" of the United States and cause a cleavage among the countries on the American continent. It would also endanger considerably the fundamental policy on which the United States attaches the greatest importance, a policy which envisages placing within her influence the regions extending to Panama. If it succeeds to an extent, it would at least upset at once the political balance among the countries as far as Panama. It would seem to me that there is considerable likelihood of its turning that region into an arena of political confusion.

6. Therefore, I wish to request that you give this matter your careful consideration in the light of our national policy. Furthermore, even if we provide the funds necessary for this plot, it is plain that the plans would not be carried out immediately on the following day, and so it seems to me that we should provide funds sufficient to commence preparations for the rebellion in accordance with the contingencies that may arise.

7. In case the above plot is carried out, I am of the intention of placing the entire leadership in the hands of a military official who has had the greatest amount of training and experience as a specialist in plotting. May I have a reply as soon as possible?

---

[a]See II, 413.
[b]Not available.

Trans. 7-8-41

No. 415

FROM: Mexico (Miura) July 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #250.

Secret.

Re your #92[a].

1. It has become extremely difficult to obtain definite information or get hold of best opinions here in this country. Your attention is called to my #247[b] and other telegrams. (At present, I am leaving on a two months' inspection tour of Central and South America. At the end of that period I am returning to my post here. According to reports made by the Military Attache, there is no nation on the American continent that feels the hand of, and has been influenced by, the United States as much as Mexico.) This is evident but the government here is in reality an absolutist one. The relations concerning the recognition of the CAMACHO administration have been a delicate problem. The government authorities have been daring in directly announcing their feelings in order to lead along the masses who are not necessarily in accord (with the delicate problem of recognition, etc). This (action of the authorities) is seen to be an exception when compared to most other countries and may be termed a

distinctive phenomenon of this country. Conditions have become very difficult and this may well explain why PADILLA, the Foreign Minister, has been able to make explanations, which are apparently not in keeping with the position he holds.

2. The conditions of the countries where there are missions are respectively different. Furthermore, there are changes from time to time which are brought to your attention. As in ancient China, there are those who say one thing and others who say another, and this sort of information was satisfactory. But you cannot "justify" the use of only this method in all countries throughout all times. The missions abroad are submitting to the home country accurate judgments and it is not asked whether or not these are (just) newspaper articles. Appropriately, I have been using the above-mentioned means as well as noticing the public announcements made by the President and PADILLA, the Foreign Minister, in their character of public officials. These have been systematically reported, together with "comments". As other materials, developments of conditions in this country have been reported.

Reply has been made in accordance with your telegram. (I have become fatigued and exhausted from this sending of telegrams for successive days and nights.)

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[a]Not available.

[b]See II, 414 and 413, in which MIURA discusses the Japanese plans to strengthen the American intelligence net and to foster anti-American and anti-war atmosphere in Mexico.

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 416

FROM: San Francisco (Muto) July 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 116.

To Chief Archivist SHIGEMATSU from Courier TAKI.

I have the Imperial portraits with me on the Kamakura Maru. Arriving Yokahama on the 20th with ten courier pouches. Please arrange to have my clearance expedited.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 417

FROM: Mexico City (Miura) July 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 249.

Secret.

Re your Circular # 1366[a] to the Ambassador in the United States.

1. I am keeping in mind the essence of your instructions. If the United States (in view of the) preparations made, enters the war, it is impossible to tell when Mexico would follow the United States into war. If Mexico should not do this, it is not hard to imagine that Mexico would fall into a position similar to that of actual participation. In any case, it would be impossible to carry on trans-Pacific commerce. It is, therefore, doubtful that the Emperor's Portrait could be returned and so plans are being considered for returning it, for the time being, to the (Foreign Affairs) main office by safe and secret means.

2. After the Emperor's picture is placed in a double wooden box and securely wrapped, it is to be taken to Acapulco by a member of the office and will be registered with the Mexican Foreign Office as baggage belonging to the Naval Attache, SATO. It will be entrusted with the captain of the "Ginyo Maru" leaving Acapulco on July 20. You are to arrange that someone from the main office make an official trip to Yokahama for it. If there are no objections to this plan, please telegraph an immediate reply.

[e]In which instructions are given for handling the Emperor's portrait in case of war.

Trans. 7-15-41

No. 418

FROM: Mexico City (Miura) July 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 249.

Regarding your Circular # 1366[e]:

With reference to the purport of your instructions, complete arrangements are under way for handling the situation in the event that the United States should enter the war. Mexico would inevitably follow the United States, and we would have to withdraw upon her actual entrance into the war.

Our position under such circumstances would be insecure, and it would become axiomatic that communications on the Pacific would become impossible, and it is feared that it would be impossible to return the Imperial Portrait. Consequently, we are considering the most secure means of sending it to the Foreign Office.

Twenty cases carefully packed and addressed to the Foreign Office have been taken to Acapulco under seal, as personal luggage by Naval Attache Sato, and are held there in care of employee Ide, to be entrusted to the captain of the Ginyo Maru leaving on 22 July. Please make arrangements to send someone from the Foreign Ministry to receive them when the ship arrives at Yokohama. If there is no objection to this procedure please reply promptly.

This is a retransmission of my message of the 5th.

[e]To forestall the possibility of their offices in foreign countries being closed without warning by the countries involved, Matsuoka issues instructions that precautions shall be taken for the safety of the Emperor's portrait, and, at the opportune time, the destruction of codes and official documents.

Trans. 9-19-41

No. 419

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 10, 1941
TO: Mexico City # 118.

Re your # 249[e].

There are no objections to the procedure you suggested. Take care that information about this matter does not get outside the Department. Also, be careful in dealing with the captain.

[e]See II, 417—Re Mexico's plan for shipment of Emperor's portrait back to Japan.

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 420

FROM: Mexico City (Miura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 262.

Re your message # 118[a].

I would like to have the Imperial portraits at the Salvador Consulate handled in the same manner as those of this office. Therefore, please issue instructions to have them sent to catch the Ginyo Maru leaving Acapulco[b] on the 22nd. In case they miss this boat, have them use the next mail steamer, the "Rakyuo Maru". In this case, I would like to send a member of my staff to Salavador.

---

[a] See II, 419.
[b] A seaport on the SW coast of Mexico.

Trans. 7-23-41

No. 421

FROM: Mexico July 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 251.

1. I understand that the great majority of the Japanese residents in the United States intend to remain in that country in the event matters come to the worst between Japan and the United States. In the light of the manner in which both the United States and Mexico have been treating Germans and Italians recently, there is, of course, no possibility of Mexico's allowing Japanese residents from other countries to enter within her border. For this reason, insofar as we are concerned, the question of accommodating the Japanese now resident in the United States is not an immediate one. Circumstances affecting this question have changed from those which influenced my former views on the matter.

2. Furthermore, the Japanese residents in this country, who are to a large extent permanent settlers, entertain the same views as those residing in the United States. We may expect that there will be a lapse of a certain amount of time before Mexico definitely takes an attitude completely in harmony with that of the United States. However, since by that time it will already be extremely difficult to sail on Japanese ships or to take airplanes for South American countries, Japanese residents in the country (including the members of this office) would very likely be obliged to remain here.

3. Therefore, on the basis of the situation described above, we are making preparations at this office to call, on about the 15th of this month, in an inconspicuous manner, fourteen or fifteen representatives from various parts of the country so that we may learn of the situation existing in those parts as well as discuss such questions as mutual help among Japanese residents in the respective districts, maintenance of liaison between Mexico City and these districts, promotion of friendly feeling toward us among people in Mexico and protection of enterprises as well as property of the Japanese residents. We are, also, considering dispatching members of this staff to the various localities as a result of this conference and in response to political developments.

Trans. 7-11-41

No. 422

FROM: Mexico City — July 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #278.

Re your message #144[a] to Brazil.

In accordance with the contents of my message #251[b], I summoned the more influential people in Mexico City and representatives from the various areas in Mexico, to my office. I relayed to them your instructions with regard to our giving guidance to our nationals residing in Mexico. Following this up, I warned them of the things they as Japanese should be prepared to face, and asked them to consider ways and means of making the best of them.

The various points listed below were decided upon as being the best way of meeting the present situation. All those present assured me that our nationals would understand them, and would do everything in their power to adhere to our decisions.

1. In view of the times, it is of the utmost importance that there be an efficient system of liaison with this office so that we may act in unity. We decided that we could best accomplish this by, first of all, strengthening the Federation of Japanese Associations. At the same time, we divided the country into nine areas, taking into consideration its geography, transportation facilities, and the distribution of the population of our nationals. In each area a liaison officer will be installed who will offer guidance to our nationals residing in his area as well as to report, at suitable intervals, the general conditions of his area. He will, also, relay in the most effective manner instructions issued by this office to the Japanese population in his area.

2. As a means of protecting our nationals in the event of unfavorable developments in the future, we shall endeavor to at all times promote better feeling toward the Japanese people among the Mexicans. Towards this end, we should urge the members of the Japanese Associations and more particularly influential Japanese persons, to make an even greater effort than heretofore. When and if worse comes to worst, each area will put into effect the most appropriate means of protecting the people therein. Funds to be used in such an emergency will be collected within the areas themselves.

3. Means of protecting Japanese businesses in the event of unfavorable developments as well as steps which shall be taken if there are indications that Japanese assets in Mexico will be frozen, were decided upon along the lines contained in my message #174[c].

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[a]Not available.

[b]See II, 421. Mexico City wires Tokyo that a great majority of Japanese residents will probably remain in the U.S. in the event of a break with the U.S. That Mexico would probably not permit Japanese from U.S. to enter that country. A conference of Japanese representatives from various parts of Mexico will meet shortly in Mexico City to formulate plans for mutual help among Japanese districts.

[c]Not available.

Trans. 7-22-41

No. 423

FROM: Mexico City (Miura) — July 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #257.

Strictly secret.

The port of Manzanillo is the greatest unloading point for imports and exports from there to Japan. Furthermore, as you know, this port depends for its life upon Japanese ships. For a

long time I have felt the need of establishing a consulate there. The United States, whose interest in this port is relatively negligible, has a consulate, and lately Great Britain, who has never had any interest at all in Manzanillo, has also established a consulate there. According to reliable information, the American Consul is bringing to bear considerable pressure on the Mexican officials in unison with the British Consul, and they are closely spying upon our merchants to see what goods they ship to Japan. This is easy for them because we lack a diplomatic office of our own, and that is why we feel all the more keenly the need of one. Thus, summing up all I have been able to learn, if we Japanese could establish two or three consulates and branch offices throughout Mexico, we would get extremely gratifying results. Because of its central position and particularly because of our imports and exports to and from this point, we consider Manzanillo the best choice. Moreover, last year our consulate at Mazatlan was closed, and now our nationals there suffer many inconveniences as a result. Therefore, I would suggest that you also consider establishing an assistant consulate there.

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 424

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Mexico

July 10, 1941
119.

Re your # 237[a].

Inquiry is being made of the Artificial Silk Export Association. Because of the shortage of ships, there was no export plan for July. As yet no definite plan has been evolved for August. Already there is a plan for the export of about 12,000 boxes (because of the shipping shortage, there is slight prospect for 6,000). In order to form a decision, your reports are being studied at this time. Because of the Government's order in connection with the defense plan, it is necessary to obtain permits for the export of silk thread. A step has again been taken in this connection. Please give your opinion of the limits of the exports to Mexico. The Department of Trade and Industry has given its approval. (Inform the Export Association branch about this.)

In the Mexican exports to Japan, the list of goods prohibited from exportation (must be considered ?) ----- (garbled) ----- ----- because of the strict control of munitions, follow out the plan given in your # 298[b], Part 2, by trying to guarantee the supply of quick-silver and materials for military use.

---

[a]Available, not translated. Contains discussion of steps necessary for exportation; the necessity of Japan for certain materials; and Mexico's giving preference to the United States in her export shipments.

[b]Not available.

Trans. 7-12-41

No. 425

FROM: Mexico City July 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 260.

In 2 parts—complete.

Re my # 242[a].

1. I have requested an interview with the Minister of Economics several times since then, but as usual he continued to dodge it. On the 9th, however, on the occasion of the Foreign Minister's party, I cornered him and as a result I was able to secure the interview on the 12th.

2. First of all, referring to my conversations with the Foreign Minister, I said that I understood that the technical aspects of this matter were being studied by the Economic Ministry. In view of the fact that this matter affects Japan very vitally, I said, I would like very much to be advised of the opinions of the Minister of Economics.

The Minister evaded the issue by replying that the only role his Ministry played in this matter was to express its opinion, from a purely technical standpoint, to the Foreign Ministry. The Foreign Ministry, he continued, has complete jurisdiction over whether to accept or reject the Economic Ministry's findings, as well as to determine the form and scope of the U.S.-Mexican agreement.

3. I pointed out, therefore, that the Economic Ministry would be held responsible for the maintenance and promotion of economic relations between Japan and Mexico, and asked him if trade between Japan and Mexico could be continued to the present extent in spite of the signing of the U.S.-Mexican agreement being considered at the present time.

The Minister replied that he desired continuance of the present status of the relations between our two countries on all materials which do not come under the terms of the agreement which is now being drawn up to meet emergency conditions.

I pointed out that we were afraid that should the major part of our present trade come under the terms of the above-mentioned agreement, we would be unable to continue our present close relations.

The Minister replied that the Foreign Ministry had been advised by his Ministry of the materials which were essential to Mexico. He added that Japanese rayon was included in that list.

(Part 2.)

4. At this point, I pointed out to the Minister that Mexican mercury and other items were essential to Japan in the same manner that Japanese rayon was needed by Mexico. How would it be to consider ways and means of mutually supplying the other with such essential materials, I asked as a feeder.

The Minister replied that he is in a position which makes it impossible to discuss such a matter until the above-mentioned pact had been agreed upon. He added that in his own personal opinion, a domestic law would be put into effect restricting the exporting of certain materials to nations other than those of the American continents.

5. I, therefore, changed the subject and told the Minister that Japan is now in a position, under a smooth working control system, to definitely supply a great deal of products of heavy industries and chemical industries. I asked him to bear that in mind, and followed this up by reading off the list of articles which could be supplied by us.

The Minister thanked me for the important information and added that as soon as the scope of the agreement had been determined, special consideration would be given this matter.

A copy of this message was cabled to Washington. Washington will please send a copy to New York.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 426

FROM: Mexico City (Miura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 261.

Intelligence of a primary order.

I have heard that the United States is soon going to establish here in Mexico City a branch of the Treasury Department.

I think that this must be to persecute and break up deals between Axis commercial concerns and American dealers and when a pact is established between the United States and Mexico securing for the United States the desired products, to carefully see that the treaty is carried out. Therefore, I am carefully watching this development. I have wired this to Washington. Will Washington please get in touch with New York?

Trans. 7-17-41

No. 427

FROM: Mexico July 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 269.

Re my # 265[a].

Immediately, on the 15th, I summoned the businessmen involved as well as the military and naval attaches and made a special point of listening to their opinions on the matter. As a result, the following decisions were reached and it is our intention to dispose of the matter along these lines:

1. First of all, have them approve the exporting of goods already contracted for.

2. Have them consider ways of excepting those goods which are essential to Japan and Mexico.

3. If by some chance, the U.S.-Mexican talks have progressed to such a point as to make Mexico feel that they need not rely upon exports from us, we shall refuse to supply Mexico with the goods, such as rayon (contracts for which have already been signed). Moreover, we shall refuse to allow the shipment of copra, rubber, etc., on Japanese ships on which they have practically depended, heretofore. We shall continue to deny them the use of our vessels until such a time that they beg us on bended knee (on the pretext that they could not depend on being supplied by the United States, or some such excuse) to allow them the use of these bottoms.

4. The Takaoka Maru is scheduled to sail from Manzanillo on about the 17th; the Sagami Maru on about the 21st; and the Ginyo Maru on the 23rd. We shall be able to get a pretty good idea of this country's intentions by watching the steps it takes with regard to exports of goods already contracted for which are scheduled to be shipped on the above-named vessels. (The

shipments consist of about 2,000 tons of lead, about 1200 tons of mercury, and 250 tons of -----, etc.)

On the other hand, the Kunikawa Maru and the Kagi Maru which are carrying loads of rayon (totaling about 3800 cases) arrived on the 15th in Manzanillo. Unloading of this cargo has already begun so there is nothing that can be done about them. However, the Heiyo Maru, also loaded with rayon, is scheduled to arrive on about the 25th. We could, if deemed necessary, prevent this cargo from being unloaded.

A copy of this message was sent to Washington with a request that Washington relay it to New York.

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[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-22-41

No. 428

FROM: Tokyo July 18, 1941
TO: Mexico # 131.

Re your # 272[a].

We have been informed that the customs officials at Manzanillo will not give clearance to the Akagi Maru until the 800 tons of lead for Mitsui, which have been loaded, have been unloaded. As our ships are in use, we cannot permit their demurrage. Please make representations and wire result.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-19-41

No. 429

FROM: Mexico (Miura) July 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 276.

Re your # 131[a].

1. On the 16th, while the Akagi Maru was being loaded with goods to be shipped to Japan at Manzanillo[b], both the British and the United States Consuls at that port strongly urged, on the grounds of the Presidential order issued on the 15th, the Chief of the Customs to forbid the loading. However, the Captain of the ship refused to comply with the demand, saying that he had not received any order to that effect from the management. Consequently, the ship was able to sail as I have already reported to you in my # 274[c] and there was no such incident as that which you inquired about.

2. Investigation on our part revealed that the news had been sent to New York from the agency at that port and then, as you have indicated, it was transmitted to Japan misrepresenting the facts. However, for future reference, will you please investigate where the news originated and wire me your reply?

3. The Captain of the Akagi Maru wisely supervised the loading as long as the ship could take on the cargo and until the last minute before a formal order was issued to the Customs Office and was thus able to sail out of the port. On the other hand, the Captain of the Kunikawa Maru of the Kawasaki Company refused to take on cargo despite the fact that the consignors did their best to explain to him the Presidential order and the utter necessity, because of the present political situation, of loading the ships, and stood his ground for reason of the fact that he had not received any order from his company. He finally sailed at midnight on the 16th. This Captain's lack of appreciation of the present crisis and his lack of common sense is now being made a target of criticism.

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[a]See II, 428, in which Tokyo directs Mexico to make representations for the clearance of the Akagi Maru, which has been detained at Manzanillo because of a cargo of 800 tons of lead.

[b]Seaport town in Mexico.

[c]Not available.

Trans. 7-22-41

No. 430

FROM: Tokyo July 21, 1941
TO: Mexico City # 133.

Re your # 276[a], paragraph 2.

This report was wired from the American Metal Company of Manzanillo which is a subsidiary of the Mitsui Shipping Company, to the New York branch of Mitsui as the above company's secret report and was wired from there to us.

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[a]On the 16th, the Akagi Maru had difficulty in finally getting clearance from Manzanillo because of a cargo of 800 tons of lead she was taking, over objections of U.S. and British Consuls. Please investigate where the news originated. Our investigation shows it was sent to New York and then in a misleading version to Tokyo. July 18, 1941, II, 429.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 431

FROM: Mexico City (Miura) July 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 273.

(Part 1 of 2, Part 2 missing.)

Regarding my message # 269[a].

I immediately asked for an interview with the Foreign Minister, but was rebuffed on the grounds of excessive business. Therefore, I called on the Foreign Vice Minister on the 16th, and inquired of him as to what effect and implication the U.S.-Mexican agreement of yesterday has upon Japanese-Mexican relations.

The Vice Minister replied that the true character of the said agreement was explained in the Presidential proclamation. It is of a very general nature and, as a means of continental defense, it merely prohibits the exporting of certain specified articles beyond the confines of

the American continents. It is in no way intended to bear unfavorable effects on the friendly relations between the two countries.

2. I, therefore, said that I assumed that this law would not be put into effect until the details mentioned in Article 2 of the Presidential proclamation were worked out. Was I correct in this assumption, I asked.

The Vice Minister replied that the terms contained in the proclamation could be carried out without awaiting the working out of the details. Moreover, he said, the nature of the export embargo rule would not be affected by the details referred to.

I then said that it was the customary thing in these cases to exempt all articles for which contracts had previously been signed. Could we expect this in this instance, I asked. The Vice Minister replied that he would have to make inquiries of competent authorities for the official decision, before he could make a definite reply. In his own personal opinion, he thought that the embargo law would be interpreted in its strictest sense. He believes that even those articles previously contracted for would immediately come under the terms of the proclamation.

I pointed out that if that were the case the businessmen concerned would suffer enormous losses. It seemed to me that Mexico could make a concession to that degree at least, I said, in behalf of maintaining Japanese-Mexican friendly relations which Mexico did not wish to impair, as he, himself, had said earlier. Furthermore, I said, according to information I had, exporting of goods which had already been sold by U.S. merchants in Mexico to Japanese merchants, has been approved by Mexican official circles. If that were the case, I continued, it seemed that the same ruling should be applicable on all similar instances.

In spite of these strong arguments on my part, the Vice Minister was adamant. He insisted that the Presidential proclamation was applicable to goods previously and subsequently contracted for and regardless of the nationality of the merchant handling it. If Japanese merchants suffer losses as a consequence, there was nothing he could do except to express his regrets, he said.

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[a]July 15, 1941; II, 427. At a meeting of Japanese businessmen and attachés at Mexico City, decisions were made regarding steps to be taken in the event U.S.-Mexican talks reach the stage where Mexico feels she need not depend on exports from Japan.

Trans. 7-24-41

No. 432

FROM: Mexico City — July 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 279.

Regarding my message # 273[a].

1. On the 19th, the Foreign Vice Minister requested this Minister to call on him, so I complied. Upon arriving there, he told me that as promised, he had the Mexican reply pertaining to our discussion of the 16th.

According to the earlier interpretation of the Foreign Ministry of Mexico, the export embargo proclaimed by the President was to be applied on all of the goods listed, whether or not contracts for their exportation had been signed prior to the proclamation. The Chief of the Trade Section's opinion was sought on this interpretation, the Vice Minister told me, and he confirmed the correctness of the Foreign Office's interpretation.

2. Upon being advised of this, I said that there were some points I wished to be enlightened on, although they concerned a different matter. I have been advised, I said, that a certain amount of time is allowed before a ruling is put into effect, so that the areas affected can be notified of the new law. I inquired whether that law was applicable in this instance.

He replied that laws were put into effect upon the passage of sufficient time after the proclamation so as to make certain that it has reached the destination. This time depends on the distance from the capital to the extremities of the affected area. To the number of days obtained through this calculation, three more days are added, and at the expiration of that time limit, the proclamation becomes law.

The actual day this proclamation becomes law is not clear -----.

(Rest of message unreadable.)

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[a]July 17, 1941; II, 431.

Trans. 7-24-41

No. 433

FROM: Mexico City July 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 283.

(In 2 parts—complete.)

Re my message # 279[a].

In view of the fact that Mexico has clarified her attitude, I shall not cable you a report on our behind the scenes activities as I should, for the time being. We are advised from all of our intelligence sources that the United States cannot supply Mexico with rayon.

Our strongest weapon with which to settle various problems with Mexico is, therefore, our threat to cease supplying her with rayon.

On the morning of the 19th, I summoned all of our nationals engaged in this business to my offices, and made this point clear to them. Various opinions on this matter were exchanged, as a result of which the following general decisions were agreed upon. Please advise me of your opinions of them immediately.

1. Regarding the matter referred to in paragraph 4 of my message # 269[b]. We gave considerable thought to ways and means to avoid unloading the approximately 2800 cases of rayon on board the Heiyo Maru, as follows:

a. Unloading it at Los Angeles and storing it in the customs warehouses had drawbacks. We cannot foresee any bottoms available to ship it back to Japan. On the other hand, the United States may, under some circumstances, interfere with its being reexported.

b. If the ship arrives in Manzanillo and unloads all her cargo destined to that port with the exception of the rayon, there is a good chance that the government of Mexico will delay the issuance of sailing orders.

c. Even assuming that the vessel does depart from Manzanillo and Acapulco with her rayon cargo, it is feared that the space taken by the 780 tons or thereabouts of the rayon would seriously hamper the transporting of cargo she is expected to pick up in South American ports.

Of the above, possibility "b" is looked upon with the most gravity. There is little doubt that this country will make every effort to obtain the cargo, and will prevent the ship's sailing until every possibility has been tried. Such an eventuality would be contrary to the desires you expressed in your message # 131[c].

On the other hand, as long as no agreement has been reached between the United States and Mexico with regard to rayon, the rayon stock of this country will be exhausted in only a few months even if we do let them have the twenty-odd hundred cases on board the Heiyo Maru. This is, of course, on the assumption that there will be no further rayon shipments to Mexico from Japan. Moreover, we are convinced that the men connected with the rayon business in this country who are completely at the mercy of a few capitalists who control the raw materials, will become agitated as soon as our attitude becomes known to them.

For this reason, we believe that it would be best for us to have the rayon on the Heiyo Maru unloaded without any fuss and at the same time, notify the Mexicans that no further shipments can be made. We would appreciate your granting us permission to use this threat as our weapon in conducting further negotiations.

2. Please, therefore, prevent the loading of any rayon on the Sanuki Maru which is scheduled to sail early in August.

3. Please have the rayon merchants in Japan cable the rayon merchants in this country that official orders have been issued to the effect that there shall be no further shipments after the shipment on the Heiyo Maru. (The merchants in this country may file suits on the grounds of breach of contract. In such an event, our merchants may refer to the above cable and point out that the breach was due entirely to unavoidable circumstances.)

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[a] July 19, 1941; II, 432.

[b] July 15, 1941; II, 427. At a meeting of Japanese businessmen and attachés at Mexico City, decisions were made regarding steps to be taken in the event U.S.-Mexican talks reach the stage where Mexico feels she need not depend on exports from Japan.

[c] July 18, 1941; II, 428. Customs officials at Manzanillo have refused to give clearance to the Akagi Maru until 800 tons of lead for Mitsui have been unloaded. Tokyo directs Mexico City to make representations.

Trans. 7-24-41

No. 434

FROM: Mexico City — July 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 282.

(In 2 parts—complete.)

Re your message # 132[a].

1. Our strategy of working on Maximino Camacho through DOUEENIYASU was brought to an end, for the time being anyhow, by the Presidential proclamation of the 15th.

We, therefore, mapped out a slightly different strategy, and had the above-mentioned DO make inquiries of the United States Embassy here and also of the FLA. As a result, we were able to definitely ascertain that the United States could not supply the rayon. This fact was further substantiated by DO's partner in New York, CHERUMU.

Armed with this information, I had him call, during the evening of the 16th, upon the Economic Minister who I had contacted in advance through Maximino Camacho. For being assured of receiving rayon from Japan, the Economic Minister accepted our basic proposal of trading rayon (20,000 cases) for mercury (8,000 bottles).

2. In view of the above circumstances, DO says that he would like to have the contract made retroactive to June. If the following terms are agreeable to us, it is his opinion that the contract can be signed during next week:

(1) Maximino's commission upon the successful conclusion of the original agreement was to have been 100,000 pesos for trading 50,000 cases of rayon for 20,000 bottles of mercury. Since this proposed agreement involves 20,000 cases and 8,000 bottles, the commission is to be 50,000 pesos.

(2) Since the mercury must be purchased immediately here, Japan must make payment for it.

(3) If by some chance traffic on the Pacific is stopped before the mercury shipment is made, Japan is to assume the loss incurred through reselling it at the present buying price quoted by the FLA ($170).

Although the rayon will come through the branch offices, it will have to then go through the hands of DO. Since DO will do the buying of the mercury, he will make a certain handling charge per bottle of mercury purchased.

3. Our manipulations through DO had progressed to the point outlined above. It is our intention, however, to use rayon as our weapon to obtain not only mercury but all the other materials for which we had contracted. For this reason we did not submit a report immediately.

As I reported in my message #279[b], the attitude of the Mexicans was made clear during the morning of the 19th. Hence, I have been having DO make investigation among the men in circles concerned, as to the advisability of continuing our behind the scene manipulation.

In view of these circumstances, I would appreciate your advising me whether you have any objections to continuing the manipulations if it seems as if there is a chance of success.

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[a]A shipment of 7,000 boxes of silk scheduled for export to Mexico has been held up. Tokyo directs Mexico City to use this as a lever in his negotiations. July 18, 1941; II, 436.

[b]July 19, 1941; II, 432.

Trans. 7-23-41

No. 435

FROM: Tokyo — July 22, 1941
TO: Mexico — #134.

Re your #282[a]

1. Please proceed immediately with our plans to procure equitable exchanges of quicksilver for rayon.

2. After conferring with the Department of Commerce and Industry, we have decided to stop the already contracted-for 7,000 boxes of rayon to be shipped from Japan early in August. Explain this to the Mexican Government by saying that this measure originates in the principle of our trade policy to recognize only such deals as will assure us the obtention of the goods we need in return and that that is merely a legal execution of the trade control regulations. Unless and until we can get some results through our schemes, will you please negotiate for the exchange of already contracted-for goods, with the exception of quicksilver, for rayon. This department has just made a survey of already contracted-for goods, which is as follows:

Quicksilver—4,683 tons (Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Shōwa Trading Company)
Lead Ore—1,200 tons (Mitsui)
Fluorspar—605 tons (in transit)
Molybdenum—23 tons (Mitsui)

Tungsten—23 tons (Mitsui)
Isinglass—18 tons (in transit)

In addition to the above, the Naval representatives have purchased the following; however, please get in touch with the Naval Attaches concerning this:

Quicksilver—1,500 tons
Lead Ore—1,350 tons
Molybdenum—75 tons

3. We are very much interested in knowing just to what extent the United States is going to be able to furnish supplies to Mexico because this is going to have a great effect upon our activities. Therefore, please get every intelligence you possibly can on this subject.

[a]July 19, 1941; II 434.

Trans. 7-23-41

No. 436

FROM: Tokyo — July 18, 1941
TO: Mexico — # 132.

Re your # 269[a].

Please do the best you can in this matter. Furthermore, the Artificial Silk Association has planned to send 7,000 boxes the 4th or 5th of August. This shipment of contracted orders is being held up (a conference was held with the Department of Commerce and Industry). Use this (prohibition of shipment) as a lever in your negotiations. Please wire the result (your caption message of the 5th has not yet arrived.)

[a]July 15, 1941; II 427.

Trans. 7-21-41

No. 437

FROM: Tokyo — July 23, 1941
TO: Mexico City — # 136.

Regarding my message # 134[a].

In view of their attitude, expressed by their putting into effect an embargo on exports of materials essential to Japan, and for the purpose of making effective the reorganization of our export program as outlined in my circular message # 1394[b], the Ministries concerned have decided to prohibit the exporting of not only rayon, but of all other general merchandise, to Mexico. Arrangements to put this measure in effect have already been made. It will be in effect until they voluntarily change their attitude.

Please be advised of the above and make use of it in the best manner possible.

[a]See II, 435.
[b]Not available.

Trans. 7-24-41

No. 438

FROM: Mexico
TO: Tokyo

July 26, 1941
293.

Re your # 135[a].

I cannot contain myself because of your instructions by telegram in which I come to realize that the government is spurring itself on to its destination by having made a definite decision through the arrangements for a general embargo, if necessary, in order to make Mexico reconsider. On the other hand, it is easy to realize that the various Central and South American countries would adopt a repulsive attitude should such a position be taken by us. Also to be considered is the fact that several materials needed by us have been left out of the President's "list" (such as petroleum, petroleum products, pine tar, cotton and "cotton linters"). Although all plans possible have been tried, this trump card of complete prohibition of exports must be thoroughly thought out. Should it be carried out now in a comprehensive form or should this policy be generally explained? The merchants mentioned in the last part of my telegram could be informed of this policy and I would not formally communicate any information to the government here. No move should be taken until the above has been well studied.

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[a]In which Tokyo advises Mexico City that the Ministries concerned have decided to prohibit the exporting of not only rayon, but of all other general merchandise, to Mexico.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 439

FROM: Mexico
TO: Tokyo

July 26, 1941
294.

(Part 1 of 2.)

Re your # 132[a].

The following is an account of conditions up to now relating to the survey by the United States and Mexico concerning the present capacity of the United States to supply Mexico with necessities, especially artificial silk, as well as the endeavor to find a way out of this problem through the Mexican companies handling artificial silk and mineral products.

1. The Artificial Silk Question.

Reports obtained from officials and business firms concerned entirely agree that the United States is unable to supply the customary needs of trade and that stocks in this country are not large. Naturally the course to be followed by the Mexican Government is that of requesting the supply of needed amounts from the United States. If the United States is unable to furnish suitable supplies, there will be no way other than the softening of the President's orders to allow an exchange of needed materials. Recently the Minister of National Economy summoned KATO and listened to the Japanese side of the artificial silk problem. This seemed to be nothing more than preparation for negotiations with the United States. Later this same minister let out to the director of the controlling company, who was present at the meeting, that negotiations with the Foreign Office (Department of State ?) were contemplated. The publication in two or three days by the newspapers that negotiations had been initiated

with the United States was confirmation of this surmise. Furthermore, the United States would not stand for the amelioration of the embargo order against Japan which would permit 50,000 cases a year. It is feared that the United States will not be able to supply the necessary amount even at the sacrifice of the difference (about $1,000,000) between our artificial silk and cotton cloth. As it is understood, we can still hold out longer.

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[a]Re shipment of artificial silk. July 18, 1941; II 436.

Trans. 7-31-41

No. 440

FROM: Mexico — July 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 294.

(Part 2 of 2.)

2. Quicksilver and Other Mineral Products.

In connection with quicksilver, which occupies an important place among the contracted materials, MITSUBISHI confidentially informs us that although the Credito Minero, with whom they have a contract, is making all efforts to get shipping permits from the Ministry of National Economy, there are no hopes whatsoever. Also, MITSUBISHI's letter of credit was returned (revoked ?) on July 23. As MITSUI has no such cancellation clause in their contract, they will have to assume full liability.

But again, not only is there some hope, but as mentioned in telegram # 12[a] from New York to me, the companies with American connections (partly American ownership ?) are bringing commercial and effective pressure to bear upon the government which, if successful, will have a beneficial influence upon most of the contracted materials. MITSUI can be advised to "push" in this same way. It is seen that as far as the American merchants are concerned, it is impossible to make any movement for the tempering of the President's order which was the result of pressure on the part of the United States. As explained, there can be no optimism for the future, judging from the attitude of the Mexican government.

Sent to the United States; to be transmitted immediately to New York.

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[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-31-41

No. 441

FROM: Tokyo — July 31, 1941
TO: Mexico City — # 142.

Re your # 294[a].

If the United States attempts to furnish Mexico with rayon at a cheap price, regardless of loss or profit, we are prepared to counter this by furnishing them rayon at about 60 dollars, or one half the price of American rayon, if they will assure us of exports, in corresponding amounts, of the commodities that are essential to Japan. (We have conferred with the departments

concerned.) You will therefore communicate this fact to the Mexicans in some suitable manner, and while thus checking the actual supply of rayon from America, endeavor to secure a modification of the Presidential order. If unfortunately this should prove impossible, you will make use of this proposal, as material for fostering anti-American ideas, as one means of increasing America's sacrifices, as per paragraph 1 of your message referred to above.

[a]See II, 439-440.

Trans. 8-1-41

No. 442

FROM: Mexico (Miura) July 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #299.

In connection with what I told you in my #294[a], we have 1,200 tons of lead left over in Manzanillo for which we wish to get a permit. The American smelting, however, said that out of consideration for its relations with the United States it would be impossible to move it. Therefore, the Mitsui officials negotiated directly with the Minister of Economics. The Minister said that the American Government had requested that Japan not be allowed to export this because it is material necessary for defense and that he would, therefore, have to refuse. I have sent this to Washington. Will Washington please get in touch with New York.

[a]See II, 439-440.

Trans. 7-31-41

No. 443

FROM: Mexico July 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #300.

1. #575[a] from Washington and #73[b] from me to the Minister suggest means whereby you may make remittances to us now that our assets in America are frozen. I suppose that you are considering these, along with other possible means. My monthly output, including secret expenses and expenses in connection with Japanese residents amounts to $7,000 (telegraphic expenses $4,000, salaries $1,000, other miscellaneous expenses such as loans, etc., $1,400.) But at present all I have is $12,000. Now, if we deduct the salaries for July amounting to $1,600 and telegraphic expenses for June and July amounting to $11,000, it leaves me with a deficit of $600. So, you must figure out some way of furnishing me with sufficient funds immediately. (I am sending by next wire my own opinions on the best method.)

2. By the way, on the 29th I got eleven checks for salaries, and the two large banks here both refused to cash them because of the freezing order. I told them that since the United States was losing $500 more or less for ordinary living expenses, it naturally would seem that Mexico could do the same thing. Inquiry concerning this is being made of New York through the Bank of Mexico.

3. By the way, the Army and Navy, as reported in a government code message of last January 24, furnished their people directly with enough money for a whole year. For your information.

Note: This is a retranslation of a message sent 8-1-41 which was incomplete.

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[a]Not available.

[b]This is probably a garble for # 273 which tells of an interview with the Foreign Vice Minister regarding the effect and implication of the United States-Mexican embargo agreement upon Japanese-Mexican relations. July 17, 1941; II, 431.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 444

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 12, 1941
TO: Mexico City # 121.

(Secret within the office.)

In view of the situation in Mexico there is a feeling in government circles that the $350,000 which is said to be the capital of the Pacific Petroleum Company in Mexico should be immediately withdrawn. Since this money is necessary for the continuance of business of this company we are also thinking of placing it in the name of our Legation so that it cannot be touched. Will you please let me have your comments on these points by return wire?

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 445

FROM: Mexico (Miura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 263.

(Secret outside the Department.)

Re your # 121[a].

Regarding this question, there are the following two opinions:

a. In view of the fact that prospecting has been carried on thus far and also that the Raguuna[b] Company, being a Mexican firm, naturally has rights which we should expect in discussing whether the 10,000,000 yen investment should be revived or not, the opinion that the remaining $300,000 be paid back to Japan is hardly justifiable. If this money is paid back, all the investment so far made would have been made in vain.

b. Everyone knows that the RA Company is a subsidiary of the Taiheiyō Company. Furthermore, it is impossible to predict what will happen to the company in case of an emergency, for the company has as yet no supporters among the influential members of the present regime. And, too, inasmuch as only a short time has elapsed since it began prospecting, it is hard to say whether with the $300,000 balance it would be able to hit an oil vein. If there is no prospect of future investment., it would be well to give up the venture altogether for the time being.

The opinion coming under aforementioned "A" is naturally to be expected of those who are in Mexico. As to which of these two views should be accepted, is a question which should be

decided in Tokyo after various matters have been taken into consideration. If the basic policy is to carry on the venture, regardless of sacrifice, on the ground that the venture is one into which the nation had entered as a long range plan, the viewpoint "A" should be adopted. On the other hand, if oil is hit, the money should be kept in the hands of the Taiheiyō and there will be no alternative but to adopt the point of view "B", though today, when it is impossible to send ships into the Atlantic, the oil is likely to be useless, and regardless of whether or not there is some other valuable or safe enterprise in which to make an investment.

[a]In which Tokyo suggests placing the $350,000, which is said to be the capital of the Pacific Petroleum Company in Mexico, in the name of the Japanese Legation so that it cannot be touched and asks for Mexico's comments. July 12, 1941; II, 444.

[b]Kana spelling. (Laguna Oil Company.)

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 446

FROM: Tokyo July 17, 1941
TO: Mexico City # 128.

Re your # 263[a].

The following points were decided upon after conferring with the various departments involved. Please make the necessary arrangements.

1. The $300,000 capital is to be given to them immediately. To prevent this fund from being frozen or seized, have them keep it in the office of the Japanese legation. Disbursement shall be made from it at will. (If the Legation is to be closed at some future date, this fund will be turned over to the Laguna Company. Under such circumstances, Turu will be instructed to prevent the enterprise from being discontinued.)

2. In the event that additional funds are required, the matter will have to be given further consideration, after which a decision will be reached. (If it becomes necessary for the company's staff to evacuate, Turu will remain there to carry out some special measures.)

[a]July 14, 1941; II, 445.

Trans. 7-19-41

No. 447

FROM: Tokyo July 26, 1941
TO: Mexico # 146.

Request telegram. From the Pacific Petroleum Company to OKUMURA.

As the United States issued an order on the 25th freezing Japanese funds, please immediately hand over to the Legation the funds on deposit, 3,600,000 pesos. Also, as the use of code telegrams has been prohibited since the 22nd, in the future we will send all telegrams through the Foreign Office.

Trans. 7-26-41

No. 448

FROM: Mexico (Miura) August 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #308.

(Courtesy Report.)

The following is to the Main Office of the Taiheiyō (Pacific) Petroleum Company—from OKUMURA to KUBOTA:

#31—See your #44. If worse comes to worse we will:

(1) Set affairs in order as per your #37 and #39.

(2) As for our employees, we will send NAKAMURA, ANDO, and NAKAGAWA home at once and keep AMAYA, KURITA, and their families, together with KANEKO and KAWAHARA here until the end.

(3) We wired the Navy a request for the well-digging in #29.

(4) Who sent the unreceived message mentioned in ordinary telegram #18?

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 449

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) June 4, 1941
TO: Washington #7.

Message to Tokyo #191.

(Part 2 of 2)[a].

6. Should the Suez Near East situation develop unfavorably for Britain, America's Pacific policies will necessarily have to prevent Japan from attacking England in the Far East as well as her back door.

7. America's attitude toward Japan is becoming stronger and stronger and more "warlike." She is increasing the number of her bombers in the Pacific. Though she is taking some measure in China, it is thought that they will not become -----. While she is planning to ship essential military products to CHIANG's China, soon as economic embargo direct at Japan ----- ----- ----- will be established.

8. Germany, it is presumed, will bring pressure upon Spain and Portugal after the Harvest of (month) have been reaped. On the basis that this is the assumption held by those in the Government, it is rumored that the United States will prevent German penetration into the Atlantic islands of these two countries, as well as Dakar.

9. Though there are some bases for the rumor, it is imagined that there will be an armistice declared either this summer or fall, but the Government does not anticipate an "early peace" and has been planning for a long war.

10. Plans for economic warfare are being drawn up. A complete export embargo will be instituted (aimed principally at Japan). At the same time, the Government, in order to preserve and to defend others from going over to the Axis camp, as well as to prevent the economic bankruptcy of South America and other friendly nations, will enter into a program of increased buying and importing.

Relayed to Washington.

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[a]Part 1 of 2—See II, 450.

Trans. 6-17-41

No. 450

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) June 4, 1941
TO: Washington #7.

Message to Tokyo #191.

(Part 1 of 2)[a]

1. The patrol has been proposed instead of the convoy system but it will soon clash with German submarines or planes, and an inevitable situation will occur.

2. The Government, in connection with its revisions of the Neutrality Law, is now in the process of sounding out opinion in both houses. Though much time will be lost in debate, Congress will undoubtedly pass the measure.

3. After American ships have been sunk, the Government believes opinion will become much stronger and will insist upon defense of shipping.

4. Though they talk of avoiding war, such expressions as the freedom of the seas are but a "side entrance" to maintaining control of the seas.

5. The maintenance of "non-belligerency" is but a stopgap while preparations are being made until an incident breaks out or until public opinion has come around to the point where participation is possible.

[a]See II, 449.

Trans. 6-16-41

No. 451

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) June 10, 1941
TO: Santiago #134.

(Circular)

Message from Tokyo as #100

(Part 1 of 2)[a]

Recently, due to machination on the part of the United States, there are some Central and South American countries which either have instituted or are about to institute export license systems and other measures for the purpose of limiting exports to Japan.

In dealing with this tendency: (1) ----- ----- that although the reason for placing limitation on exports to Japan seems to be based on the assumption that such exports are being re-exported from Japan to the belligerents, the fact is that because of scarcity of ships, Japan is importing but 60% of what she herself needs of the Central and South American products and for this reason she is by no means in a position to reexport these products to any third country.

[a]Part 2 of 2 not available.

Trans. 6-26-41

No. 452

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 14, 1941
TO: Lima # 107.

Your assistant naval attaché KAMEDA (extra duty) will be relieved in the near future and Lt. Commander SADAYOSHI NAKAYAMA, now on duty in the United States appointed in his place.

Trans. 7-31-41

No. 453

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 14, 1941
TO: Rio de Janeiro # 140.

Your naval attaché (extra duty) SHIGEHIRO will be relieved in the near future of his assignment as extra duty naval attaché and appointed to your office as principal duty naval attaché. Lt. Commander SADAYOSHI NAKAYAMA, now on duty in the United States, will be appointed as assistant naval attaché. Lt. Commander KAMEDA will be relieved as extra duty assistant naval attaché.

Trans. 7-31-41

No. 454

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) July 14, 1941
TO: Santiago # 14.

(Message from Tokyo # 122.)

Rear Admiral KATSUMI YUKISHITA has been appointed Naval Attaché to your Embassy and also to Chile. Commander SHIGEHIRO has been relieved. Please transmit this to Chile.

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 455

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 16, 1941
TO: Rio de Janeiro # 146.

Student Secretary (?) KUSANO is leaving Yokohama, August 9th, on the HIKAWA MARU for his new post via the United States.

Trans. 7-30-41

No. 456

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 16, 1941
TO: Rio de Janeiro # 147.

Semi-official employee KASAHARA, accompanied by his family, is leaving Yokohama on the Loan on the 24th, for his new post.

Trans. (Not dated)

No. 457

FROM: Santiago (Kawasaki) July 18, 1941
TO: Lima # 21.

Message from Tokyo # 75.

Lieut. Col. HARUO TESHIMA is appointed Military Attaché to Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia as of the 16th. Lieut. KOKO is relieved.

Translator's note: Lieut. Col. TESHIMA does not speak Spanish but speaks English fluently. He has spent several years as Military Attaché in India.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 458

FROM: Sao Paolo (Hara) August 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 81.

I arrived on the 2nd and have completed taking over of the duties from NARUSE. Am reporting by letter to the Embassy in Brazil.

Trans. 8-12-41

No. 459

FROM: Rio (Ishii) August 4, 1941
TO: Santiago # 5.

Rear Admiral SAKAMAKI and Commander NAITŌ left Sao Paulo on the 6th and Buenos Aires on the ? by (Conelor?) plane for your place. They will not make connections with the Rokuyō Maru. Please make arrangements so that they will catch the Shuyō Maru without fail. (Request Message.)

Trans. 8-16-41

No. 460

FROM: Rio (Ishii) August 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #317.

From Rear Admiral SAKAMAKI to Vice-Minister of the Navy.

The schedule of movements of Commander NAITO and myself are as follows:
By air arriving Buenos Aires on the 6th and Santiago on the 11th. Taking the Heiyo Maru at Valparaiso.
This has been transmitted to Argentina, Chile and Peru. (Request message.)

Trans. 8-15-41

No. 461

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) July 22, 1941
TO: Los Angeles #1.

Please mail me ten copies of the pamphlet entitled *Americanism* issued by the Central Japanese Society of your city. Also several copies of any such pamphlets which may be issued in the San Francisco area. Also please telegraph me briefly the impressions and comments on these pamphlets by the first generation Japanese.

Trans. 3-11-41

No. 462

FROM: Rio (Ishii) June 26, 1941
TO: Santiago #153.

(Circular)

(Message to Tokyo # 224.)

(Part 4 of 4)[a].

4. The United States seems to be in a quandary as to how best handle the existing government and it is being said that in ----- circles she is using the ----- Integralistas Party (the American Ambassador GAFFERY has the reputation of being a person well versed in the control of instigators of revolution). It seems that, with a view of frightening VARGAS, America recently had her hand in the matter of bringing former President WASHINGTON RUIZ out of many years of retirement following his explusion by VARGAS. There are many who profess such theories. Furthermore, the United States, taking advantage of the corruption of Brazilian ----- circles, is using large sums of money. Without a doubt, their "infiltration" is quite deep rooted. Many say that the President's authority is wasting away.

Among the ABC powers of South America, Brazil is the most vulnerable to the pressures applied to her by the United States. This being the case, it is regrettable that the Axis is not taking counter-policies to combat it.

[a]Parts 1, 2, and 3 not available.

Trans. 9-20-41

No. 463

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) July 30, 1941
TO: Sao Paulo. # 66.

Re your message # 60[a].

We have no objections to the establishment of youth training centers. However, in actually putting these into operation, should we intend to set up Japanese teachers to instruct Japanese residents in Brazil in a manner similar to the instruction given Japanese here, in the light of current Brazilian policy it seems to me that it is necessary to take progressive steps in order to forestall suspicion on the part of the Brazilian authorities. Not only that, but I believe that it is advisable to give a great deal of study to the possibilities of the dismemberment of our cultural dissemination associations and our general counter-policy to such measures. This sort of an enterprise might put a curse upon our total policies toward Brazil should we put its budget and actual operation directly in the hands of our diplomatic offices in Brazil. On the other hand, we would insist on having direct supervision in the hands of the diplomatic officials only to the point of setting up the organization. Our policy now is to postpone, for a short time, the question of disbursing subsidy funds because we would like to have the functioning of the organization dependent on the instructor's personal merits.

Furthermore, after you have referred to the similar opinions expressed in secret message # 156, please wire the Ministry of Overseas Affairs what you intend to do.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 10-15-41

No. 464

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) July 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 299.

Re your circular # 1366[a].

1. We have been burning all secret papers, including telegrams, official letters, etc., dated up to the end of 1934, and have taken precautions so that the other papers may be burned at any time. We have also instructed the offices under our jurisdiction to do likewise.

2. Since the possibility is increasing of all steamship services between Japan and this country being given up, and in view of the present international situation, we would like to send the Imperial portraits in care of the captain of the Nan-A Maru which is scheduled to stop at Rio de Janeiro on August 5. I would like to have the portraits in the other offices under our jurisdiction sent back in care of one of the ships which are sailing southward with a view of proceeding by way of the Straits of Magellan.

[a]In which Tokyo says that in view of the present international situation the Imperial portrait should be carefully protected, and that there is no objection to returning it to Japan. Also, if the occasion demands, code books and secret documents should be burned, but this should not be done too soon as it would inconvenience communication.

Trans. 8-15-41

No. 465

FROM: Santiago (Kawasaki) June 2, 1941
TO: Buenos Aires, Washington, and Rio de Janeiro # 31.

Circular.

(Message to Tokyo as # 111.)

(1st) I understand that the other day a member of the Chilean Military Commission confidentially informed the German Ambassador that in reply to a request by the United States for the use of the Straits of Magellan, the Chilean Government replied that in view of this country's peace policy, this would not be possible.

Trans. 6-21-41

No. 466

FROM: Santiago (Kawasaki) June 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 116.

Part 1 of 3.

1. On the 2nd, I questioned ERASURISU*, a member of Congress, and he gave the following as his view of the matter:

Because the United States had begun to prevent, by refusal to issue permits, export from that country of materials which she considers necessary and vital, Chile also has had to resort to the same method. The Conservative Party would have to approve of this action if it is to keep in step with the general trend of affairs. However, since he already realizes the importance of trade and ----- with Japan, when the question comes up at the plenary session on the 10th, he would speak against any proposal that would place obstacles in the way of trade with Japan.

*Kana spelling.

Trans. 6-21-41

No. 467

FROM: Santiago (Kawasaki) June 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 116.

Part 2 of 3.

2. I met and discussed the matter with Chairman DEYURAN* and learned that what he was consulted on by the Foreign Minister had to do principally with the question of reexportation. He stated that he thought there would hardly be a possibility of a total embargo being placed on export to Japan of such items as minerals, but that inasmuch as it is not easy to ----- ----- they would probably prohibit reexportation of (war materials?), institute the license system and reserve themselves materials needed by (the) industries (in this country?) He promised, however, that he would make an effort toward having a clause inserted to the effect that no export limitation would be placed on such items so long as there is a surplus of them.

*Kana spelling.

Trans. 6-21-41

No. 468

FROM: Santiago (Kawasaki) June 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 116.

Part 3 of 3.

3. Although the bill has not yet been announced to the -----, I had an opportunity confidentially to peruse it in advance and found that under the date of the 31st, it dealt principally with two points; reexportation and the export license system and that (the supporters) were strongly urging its early passage.

I understand that during the debate held on the 4th, they even had voted against referring the bill to a committee.

4. Senator BARESU[a] (a Mitsubishi advisor), I understood, spoke quite pessimistically about the prospect.

5. I expect to confer with the Foreign Minister within the next two or three days. I am wiring you this much for your information.

---

[a]Kana spelling.

Trans. 6-21-41

No. 469

FROM: Santiago (Kawasaki) June 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 118.

(In 2 parts—complete)

Convey the following to RYOSHA:

"Cobaltera" has secured the following definite proposals and requests immediate instructions as to whether or not to accept them.

(1) For a period of 5 years they are given the handling of the entire annual output of ore for Japan.

(2) Ore of 1% content and up will be loaded in bulk, and refined ore of 5% and up will be put in bags and delivered F.O.B. at Huasco or Coquimbo.

(3) Price to be fixed every six months by mutual agreement taking into account the Canadian prices, the general market, actual costs of mining, etc.

(4) In the event such agreement is not reached, it will be permissible to sell to a third party on a 15 day notice; however, the Japanese reserve the right to accept within this period after reconsideration.

(5) Settlement for the first year's production of ore of a minimum of 1% grade, will be made at Huasco at one dollar per unit (one pound of pure cobalt), but in the case of ore of 5% and up settlement will be made later.

(6) In case any ore should remain unshipped after six months from the time of its arrival at Huasco interest at the rate of 6% per annum is to be paid on the original cost price; the company is to do its best to ship at least 30 tons per month of ores of 1% grade and up.

(7) Previous to shipping, samples of the ore are to be taken out, at the expense of the purchaser.

(8) 80% of the price will be paid on the basis of estimates made from ship loading papers. The weighing and collecting of samples is to be done in the presence of a representative of the seller, and in the case of those in Japan, this is final, and the balance will be paid when the weight and analysis has been ascertained.

(9) The analysis of the Japan mint shall be final, and in the case of any great discrepancy, the Ledoux analysis is to be the arbiter.

(10) Immediately upon the conclusion of the contract, a loan of one million pesos will be made to the company from the Japanese, on the condition that it be used directly in the development of mines. This is to be paid back in 5 years with interest at 6%. Payments to be made by deducting 10% from the purchase price. In case of sale to a third party, 15% is to be deducted from purchase price to pay on the loan.

(11) The mine-lots are to be written into the contract as security for the loan. However, as the first mortgage on these is held by the Bureaus of Industries, this will be a second mortgage.

(12) If it is impossible to pay up the principal and interest in the five years, the sole agency contract will be extended until the full payment can be made.

(13) If four months elapse after ore reaches Huasco without shipment having been made, 80% of the price is to be paid.

Inasmuch as there has been a great deal of delay in waiting for them to make up their minds in regard to stock investment privileges, rates, the dispatch of engineers, etc., we would like to see this contract concluded at once. (Request message.)

Trans. 6-20-41

No. 470

FROM: Santiago (Kawasaki) July 1, 1941
TO: Rio, Lima, Panama, Washington, Buenos Aires # 43.

(Circular)

Message to Tokyo # 158.

Since the beginning of the German-Soviet conflict, the attitude of the Communist Party here has radically changed. In the Houses of Parliament, too, speeches proposing aid to the Soviet are being made. Throwing the peace and order of the past into disruption, they, together with the pro-American wing of the Socialist Party, are creating dissention. Joining the front of democracy, the Communist Party has forgotten its age-old war against British and American capitalism and is taking a strong editorial stand which is principally anti-German. Though they have planned street demonstrations, the Government's control of such demonstrations is strict and on each occasion they have been dispersed.

Among the moving pictures shown, anti-German ones have been banned. The ----- ----- -----, realizing the increasing influence of the Communist Party, is attacking it as presenting an unpatriotic threat to the Government. The influential newspaper "Mercurio" like the "----- ya", however, is printing in large headlines the prediction of the ultimate defeat of the Soviet. This matter is evoking a great deal of attention.

Trans. 7-11-41

No. 471

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) June 10, 1941
TO: Washington #70.

(Circular).

(Message to Tokyo #198.)

Re my 183[a].

On the 12th, the Chief of the Trade Bureau, I understand, told NAKAMURA[b] that the presidential decree issued the other day would have no unfavorable effect on Japan, inasmuch as Japan has a trade agreement with Argentina and that Japan need not be concerned because he was of the intention of bringing about a more satisfactory trade relation with Japan.

It seems to me that the United States has had something to do with this question.

Relayed to the United States and Brazil.

---

[a]Not available.

[b]Commercial Secretary, Japanese Legation, Buenos Aires.

Trans. 7-11-41

No. 472

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) August 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #317.

Re your message #1525[a].

In view of the situation there has been a great increase in the number of request messages between firms here and their home offices and this is giving our telegraph personnel a great deal of trouble. I would like to have these request messages designated in the "Z" table. Please wire as soon as possible if this fits in with the procedure mentioned in your caption message.

---

[a]In which Tokyo sends out a circular giving instructions for controlling the use of wireless telegraphy and telephony for the purpose of increasing the efficiency of counter-espionage work.

Trans. 10-17-41

No. 473

FROM: Bogota (Yanai) June 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #76.

(Part 1 of 2)[b]

In another message, I will wire you more of the details of the general situation in Ecuador; however, I thought I had better send you immediately the important impressions I obtained.

1. From the highest to the lowest, the people of Ecuador entertain the profoundest hatred for the Peruvians and there are many, many of them who expect Peru to attack them at any

moment. Of all the countries in South America, Peru is the only (anti-Axis power ?). The (British ?) who live in Peru earnestly trust that Peru is going to help them. Taking advantage of this situation, the United States has established propaganda headquarters in Guayaquil[a] and is spreading every day such fantastic stories as were never heard of in heaven or earth and the newspapers are publishing such stories serially day by day.

[a]Seaport and commercial city in Ecuador.
[b]See II, 475.

Trans. 6-30-41

No. 474

FROM: Bogota (Yanai) June 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #77.

Germans here in Colombia tell me that Nazi activities are not doing so well. Powerful government officials like the President, a former lawyer for British oil concerns, are turning in favor of England and the United States. Ecuador is looking to Washington for assistance against Peru.

Trans. 7-12-41

No. 475

FROM: Bogota (Yanai) June 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #76.

(Part 2 of 2)

I told you more about this in my #17[a] from Quito. When I talked with the Foreign Minister, as I told you in that message, he told me that the question of the Peruvian border was gradually growing more and more "grave". In a quaking voice he said to me: "Peru is preparing for War."

2. Contrasted with her relations with Peru, Colombia's relations with Ecuador are most amicable. As a matter of fact, save on Government buildings, both flags float jointly everywhere. You might say that the two countries are flying one banner. Now, I was to jointly serve in Peru but I prefer Ecuador. I inquired of the Ecuadorean Government from Bogota if it would be all right for me to represent my country there, as well as in Bogota, and they expressed great satisfaction. The Foreign Minister and all the officials expressed great approval.

[a]In which NAGUMA says he has explained to the Peruvian Foreign Minister that newspaper reports saying there were 8,000 Japanese troops connected with the border dispute, were unfounded. See II 473 for part one.

Trans. 6-30-41

No. 476

FROM: (Lima ?) July 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 167.

This government has demanded an apology from Ecuador for the attack on the Guayaquil consulate as a preliminary to accepting the conditions proposed by the United States, Brazil, and Argentina. Ecuador has done this, and, therefore, this country will (1) withdraw its army to the line agreed upon by both countries in 1936; (2) this will be carried out under the direction of a joint military commission; (3) flying of military planes will be prohibited in the evacuated zone; (4) she will sign the various peace documents; (5) this government has announced that on the 16th it replied to the mediating powers that she agreed with the solution of the affair.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 477

FROM: Lima (Sakamoto) June 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 152.

The Peruvian Government issued a presidential decree dated June 27th, to the effect that for reasons of the maintenance of neutrality, the entrance into Peruvian waters and harbors by submarines of belligerent powers was prohibited. Details following by mail.

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 478

FROM: Caracas (Ohgimi) July 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 67.

Foreign Office Secret.

The wife of the oldest son of the former president of this country received the information given below from the wife of the present president. The former passed the information on to her best friend, who is the wife (Venezuelan) of Yazawa, President of the Foreigner's Association.

The President told his wife that all of the Central and South American Governments received a suggestion from the U.S. about three weeks ago, to apply the pressure on Japanese residing in their respective countries. Methods whereby these Japanese would be forced to leave the countries were pointed out to them.

We are at present making every effort to ascertain if there is any basis of fact in this.

Trans. 9-25-41

No. 479

FROM: Tokyo May 30, 1941
TO: Berlin # 462.

In the near future we would like to make radical revisions in the method of using cryptographic systems as, in view of the present situation, it is practically impossible for us in this office

to communicate with the Embassy in England, let alone make courier contact. Therefore, please have KIMARA immediately draw up new methods to be used between this office and London. (Fundamental and radical changes are thought to be desirable. Furthermore, if it is possible, there should be two or three different methods.) As it is understood that Secretary MATSUI[a], who was in Vichy when I went to Europe, is shortly going to England, please have KIMARA go to Vichy so that he will arrive before MATSUI leaves. (Another plan would be to have -----[b] come to Berlin.)

Please arrange to send us the revised system for use in your office, as well as the new system for use between this office and London by the next courier or have FUKUDA bring it when he returns home.

Relay to Vichy.

---

[a]Third Secretary of Japanese Embassy in London.

[b]Name garbled.

Trans. 6-3-41

No. 480

FROM: London — June 14, 1941
TO: Washington — No number.

Message from Tokyo # 201.

(Very Urgent.)

We need to change the rules for the use of systems, but inasmuch as no convenient courier connections could be made with your office, will you have NOMOTO[a] develop an entirely new set of rules for the use of your office, and when you return to Japan, have these rules taken as far as Lisbon. From Lisbon, they should be transmitted ----- to our Ambassador in Berlin by Ambassador KATO and courier, and have our Ambassador in Berlin transmit them by means of courier to our respective ambassadors in the European countries, as well as to the Spanish Minister in Switzerland. Will you, yourself, transmit them to our Ambassador in Washington? The rules should be of three or four different sets. As to the date for commencing the use, as well as the extent that would be put into use, I will wire you by using one of the arrangements proposed by your office after we have received them.

Relay to -----, Switzerland; relay message from ----- to all ambassadors in Europe.

---

[a]Probably KAWAMOTO. The name is garbled.

Trans. 7-9-41

No. 481

FROM: Tokyo (Jap. For. Min.) — July 26, 1941
TO: London — # 232.

We have received in good condition ----- # 1, namely, regulations for systems, worked out by Telegraphist NOMOTO. These rules will be used only for messages exchanged between your

office and this department. I will wire you the date on which we will begin using them. In consideration of the fact that the messages may be transmitted, we have sent copies of these regulations to Manchukuo, Peking, Tientsin, Nanking, Shanghai, Canton, Hongkong, Mexico and Manila. Please transmit the same to the United States and Switzerland and have them transmit it from Switzerland to Germany, Italy and France.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 482

FROM: Tokyo June 11, 1941
TO: Berlin # 502.

(Received from Cape Town as # 13)

I am transmitting No. 13 from Cape Town to me as follows:

Re my No. 12[a]. We had a telegram from the Ambassador in Berlin via the Minister in Portugal regarding British shipping, but inasmuch as 17 days elapsed from the time it was sent till we received it we wonder if Britain is not exercising a strict censorship over telegrams from that source. Because we cannot be sure that there is no danger in maintaining the secrecy of our codes in transmitting such information, from now on we will transmit to the Ambassador in Germany through Tokyo instead of through Portugal.

"Please relay this to the Ambassador in Tokyo together with my # 14.[b]"

---

[a]Report on British ship movements.
[b]Re British shipping in South Africa.

Trans. 6-14-41

No. 483

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) May 13, 1941
TO: London (Ambassador) # 170.

Re my # 160[a].

Concerning this item of the request to close, please propose that the British government recommend immediately to the Egyptian government its revocation. (Under date of May 5th the Egyptian government in an official communication consented to removal to Cairo and carrying on business there but any further concessions were impossible, they said.)

Furthermore, the Egyptian government, under date of March 5th forbade the use of any language but English and French in ordinary communications and forbade the use of code messages entirely to the Alexandria consulate. Please take up both of these points with the British government.

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[a]Not available.

Trans. 5-16-41

No. 484

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) May 26, 1941
TO: Lima #116.

(Circular)

Message from Tokyo as Circular #1124 (Part 2 of 3)*.

1. Australia is faithful to the mother country and is growing more hostile to Japan.

2. In India the Punjab troops will not kneel to England, and many favor Italy. The Sikhs and Mohammedans are at outs and peace and order are broken. Of the Indian troops sent to Malaya, the Sikhs and the Bengali cannot be placed in the same areas, and eye each other angrily.

*Other parts not available.

Trans. 7-12-41

No. 485

FROM: Tokyo May 20, 1941
TO: China Net #1101.

(Circular)

From London as #362 on the 16th.

In connections with my #360* and #361*, on the 16th, I conferred with Undersecretary BUTLER and he said: "Among the Englishmen arrested in North China it seems that Mr. DAVIS has been in jail for four years now. This man is a minister and the Church and other organizations are as angry as hell. They have protested to the Government and we are on the spot. We are keeping this as much as possible out of the newspapers in order to avoid further confusion. We are anxious beyond words about this. Now, I don't care on what grounds you do it, but I want you to see that DAVIS and the others are released. You might free them on the grounds of extraterritoriality."

I replied: "Well, I will refer your request to Tokyo."

*Not available.

Trans. 5-22-41

No. 486

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) May 23, 1941
TO: Los Angeles (Riyoji) #043.

Investigate and wire back regarding the truth of a Domei cable stating that 11 seamen from the whaler, Tonan Maru, had been placed on the "blacklist" by the British consulate in Los Angeles.

Trans. 5-28-41

No. 487

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) June 2, 1941
TO: Buenos Aires # 125.

Strictly Secret.

Lately England has been very loathe to grant visas readily for our people to travel in British territory. Consequently, from now on when Englishmen (Canadians, Australians, Hindus, etc.,) wish to travel in our country, we will hold up consideration of their applications for passports for a corresponding length of time. In the case of diplomatic, business, and ordinary passports, in each instance have a request message sent in to this office. (However, telegraphs requesting diplomatic passports will be franked.)

Trans. 6-4-41

No. 488

FROM: Shanghai June 4, 1941
TO: Net # 455.

(Circular.) Message to Tokyo # 908.

Re my # 847[a].

On May 22nd, and on June 3rd, I requested representatives of the Army, Navy and the Far Eastern Reconstruction Bureau to meet in a conference and discuss the question of rights claimed by Germans for owning and operating factories in Shanghai and its vicinity. As a result, it was decided to put into effect the following decisions:

1. As regards the claim of ownership made by the German firm JIIMUSEN[b] of the RYUK[b] factory of the SUIDEI[b] Company of Shanghai, we found it to be based on insufficient reasons and, inasmuch as it is possible to regard it as mere nominal transference of registration, we shall refuse to recognize the claim and reject it after giving our reasons for so doing.

2. Furthermore, as regards a demand made to MINDOZOSHISHO[c] by the SIN CHANG Company, a British firm, for the payment of 1,500 pounds for machinery sold to it, we shall immediately make the payment since the attitude of this firm is quite gentlemanly and the amount is ascertainable.

3. Also, in the matter of the claim to possession made by the German firm of BEN-MAIYAA[b] relative to the aforementioned paper factory, we shall have them rescind the claim inasmuch as it is based on no grounds whatsoever and those of the machinery purchased and which are at present in Kako[d] (Message incomplete).

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Kana spelling.
[c] Kana spelling—probably the name of a paper manufacturing company.
[d] In Chekiang Province.

Trans. 6-11-41

No. 489

FROM: Tokyo — June 10, 1941
TO: Hankow and Nanking — # 1226.

(Circular)

Message to Shanghai # 503.

On the 6th, the Commercial Attache from the British Embassy called on the Chief of the Far Eastern Bureau. He handed him a memorandum in which it was stated that on account of prohibition imposed upon British firms in Gisho[a] against remittance of money, these firms were unable to pay the workers on lighters and that the British Embassy in Shanghai had requested the Japanese authorities for permission to pay $8,000 a month to the Taizo Company and $6,500 to the Taiwa Company but that no reply had been received. The Commercial Attache appealed for our assistance in this matter.

Meting out this kind of treatment does not benefit us in view of the general political situation. Since it is liable to lead to a misunderstanding of our real intention, will you endeavor to correct the situation and wire me the result?

Relayed to Nanking.

[a]Gisho (Ichang) in Hunan Province.

Trans. 6-12-41

No. 490

FROM: Bangkok — June 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 333.

Summing up the report from Vice Consul KATUNO, we learn that the "gesture" of the British along the border has become of late quite systematic and threatening and shows signs of being made on a large scale. Such incidents as the invasion on May 10th, and 22nd, of southern Thailand by planes, and the arresting and imprisonment of two British officers who had crossed the border -----.

(Message incomplete.)

Trans. 6-17-41

No. 491

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) — May 22, 1941
TO: London — No number.

Your Honor will never return to your post, so please make arrangements with that in mind. Great Britain made an inquiry and in reply I informed CRAIGIE[a] that while in Europe, I had no opportunity to confer with Your Honor and consequently now am ordering you to return to get first hand reports from you. Will you please give the same explanation to the British Government.

[a]British Ambassador to Tokyo.

Trans. 5-26-41

No. 492

FROM: London (Japanese Ambassador) June 3, 1941
TO: New York (Japanese Consul General) # 008.

I, [a] accompanied by Clerk Ushiba, am leaving Lisbon by Clipper on the 25th of this month headed for New York. We wish to leave San Francisco sometime about the middle of July so, if possible, please make reservations and wire back.

[a] Ambassador Shigemitsu, recalled from London.

Trans. 6-19-41

No. 493

FROM: London (Japanese Ambassador) June 13, 1941
TO: Washington (Japanese Ambassador) # 058.

I am returning to Japan and have made my schedule so that I shall arrive in New York the 26th. I should like to see you either in New York or Washington. Have made reservations on the Yawata Maru leaving San Francisco July 13th.

Trans. 6-19-41

No. 494

FROM: Dublin June 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 12.

Following are the views on international affairs of the Foreign Office Official as told to me.

a. Although the people in this country talk as if they are going to fight until victory is won, the prospect of a decisive victory on the battlefields is dim insofar as they are concerned. So long as the Government is firmly determined, the people will, in accordance with their characteristics, follow the Government, but once either the Government or some great statesman should submit a peace proposal the people will gladly support it, for such is their psychology. For making such a proposal, there is no one but Lloyd George.

b. Churchill's influence has, of late, been declining. However, Bevin has no intention of becoming the Prime Minister in his stead.

c. Putting together information coming from Washington, it seems that the United States is certain of Japan's never joining the war. This is evident from the fact that she expressed no anxiety at the time the negotiations between the Dutch East Indies and Japan were broken off.

Trans. 6-24-41

No. 495

FROM: Berlin (Osima) July 18, 1941
TO: Washington No number.

(Message to Tokyo # 923).

Re your # 630*.

1. I had a conversation with Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP on the 14th. Time and again did I broach the subject of British-German peace talks, and just as many times did the Foreign Minister say that never once has Germany either directly or indirectly started any conversations concerning peace with Great Britain such as you mention. He says that these rumors astir in the United States, which you mention concerning mediation between England and Germany are absolutely news to him. He says that he cannot imagine for what other reason they could have been invented except to try to divorce Japan from the Tripartite Alliance, because just as soon as Germany finishes up with Russia according to schedule, she is going to fling her whole air force on the British force and stage a landing. In his own words he said, "Now I want you Japanese to rely upon us Germans and not pay any attention to these rumors abroad throughout the world."

2. My own guesses in this matter are as follows:

a. All talk of peace between England and Germany is so far merely guesses. We have heard them here in Berlin but always figured that such was the natural course of events now that the Germans are fighting the Russians. I, myself, thinking that there might be something to some of them, have been paying close attention to everything I heard, but in no case have I so far found anything which would support this heresay.

b. I think that the fact that such rumors are going the rounds in the United States merely proves that London and Washington are cooperating on lying propaganda. I mean to say that Great Britain wishes to ruin or at least weaken Germany's war-lust and to win over third countries to Great Britain's side. London is naturally anxious to emasculate the three-way pact and to sever Berlin and Vichy and is using the United States for her own aims in restraining Japan.

c. Not only do the statements of the German high officials indicate that there is no basis for peace talks now or in the future between the Teutons and the Anglo-Saxons, but the whole European situation shows it. I have wired you this repeatedly. Granted that there may be a small group in Germany interested in bringing the German and English leaders to the peace table, under the present circumstances I can see absolutely no possibility of their success.

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*Not available.

Trans. 7-31-41

No. 496

FROM: Tokyo June 11, 1941
TO: Berlin # 501.

(Received from Cape Town as # 12.)

Telegram No. 12 from the Cape Town Consul to me.

1. On the 5th, 31st, 27th, and 29th, British ships of the 10,000 ton class entered port and left on the 29th and 31st respectively, and they had on board about 3,000 English soldiers, I suppose.

2. On the 5th, 31st, and 30th, two British ships of the Eddington class entered port and left on the 11th, 7th and 3rd, and they were transporting 3,000 English troops.

3. The names of the above ships could not be identified but the destination was Egypt and vicinity.

Further, the above transports were not protected by convoy when entering or leaving port. They were ----- to Durban or TOZ, British territory in East Africa -----.

Trans. 6-14-41

No. 497

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 24, 1941
TO: Berlin # 551.

Strictly secret.

19 from the Consul in Capetown to this Minister is as follows:

According to intelligence in this office.

1. One British ship, one French ship, names unknown, together with the Netherlands ship "New Amsterdam" (each of them about 30,000 tons. The French and Netherlands ships have been commandeered by the British since the beginning of the war), convoyed by a British cruiser (of the 3000 ton class), carrying 10,000 South African troops, left the port of Durban on the 10th, bound north.

2. (Seven ?) British ships, names undiscernible (20,000 ton class), carrying British home-land troops (the number of troops could not be ascertained), entered the port of Durban on the 13th and left port on the 16th bound north.

3. A Belgian ship whose name was unknown (of the 8,000 ton class), carrying approximately 2,000 native Belgian Congo troops, entered the port of Durban on the 11th and left for an unknown destination.

The destination of the vessels mentioned above could not be definitely established, but it seemed to be the Egyptian area.

4. On the 8th, one small French patrol ship entered the port of Durban.

I am passing this on to you as it came to me.

Trans. 6-28-41

No. 498

FROM: Tokyo June 11, 1941
TO: Berlin # 503.

Received from Cape Town as # 14.

Cape Town to Berlin # 1.

Re your (Berlin to Cape Town) # 1[a].

The movements of British shipping are strictly secret and access to the dock area forbidden. At present, there has been a great increase of shipping via South Africa since Italy declared

war. Ships are being expropriated and on crowded days about thirty vessels are anchored temporarily in the outer harbor, and there are never less than ten vessels waiting to enter the inner harbor, sometimes waiting five days. Before the war, there was usually no delay, after stopping for an hour in the outer harbor.

This is generally true also at Durban. In clear weather, when it appears dangerous outside, shipping from Northeastern India is ordered to put in at the Portuguese port of Laurenco Marques.

Defense work seems to be in progress.

Though it is difficult to do so, I hope to obtain information on the nationality, numbers and routes of such ships, especially their number.

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*Not available.

Trans. 6-14-41

No. 499

FROM: London — June 15, 1941
TO: Washington — # 059.

(In 2 parts—Part 1 missing.)

Action Tokyo as # 438.

On the occasion of my talks with Foreign Minister Eden on the 4th and the 9th, I repeated my attack on Britain's China and economic policies. Whereupon, he repeated his previous assertion that he could not help it if these policies offended the Tripartite Pact.

I then told him that while Britain views her relations only in connection with the European war, Japan must view her relation with Great Britain in connection with the China war. Therefore, if we are to clear up our mutual dissatisfaction we must do so at their source.

Judging from various indications, it appears that Britain is gradually coming around to giving greater consideration to the question of her relations with Japan, save the question of American aid to Britain.

Although peace appears far off, Britain is preparing for it even now, therefore, I feel that it is important for our country to give due consideration to this problem also.

Trans. 6-18-41

No. 500

FROM: Shanghai (Moriuchi) — August 2, 1941
TO: Singapore — # 673.

(Circular) Message to Tokyo # 1428.

Much attention is being attracted by a San Francisco U.P. dispatch dated the 1st to the effect that the British Naval Attache to the United States has stated that in case the United States enters the war she will, of course, have use of Singapore, and also by the following Reuters dispatch from Chungking dated the 1st, both published in the English language newspapers:

"English and Chinese authorities are avoiding statements concerning their collaboration. It is believed that there is no special treaty or agreement between the two countries; nevertheless, there can be no room for doubt that there exists close understanding and cooperation between them. Especially is it clear to the world that the military authorities of the two countries are maintaining close contact. Ambassador KERR says that the relations between England and China are closer than is generally supposed by the world, etc."

Relayed to Nanking, Hongkong, Singapore and Rangoon.

Trans. 9-8-41

No. 501

FROM: Tokyo — June 9, 1941
TO: Moscow — # 581.

Action London as # 196.

It has been reported that the British Ambassador to Moscow, Sir Stafford Cripps, is returning to England via Sweden. In view of the strained relations existing between Germany and Russia now, it is necessary to watch British-Russian relations; so please keep the above Ambassador's movements under surveillance after his return to London.

Trans. 6-21-41

No. 502

FROM: Tokyo — July 23, 1941
TO: London — # 229.

For your personal information:

According to a reliable source of information, China is making every effort to force the British-Soviet agreement to cover the Far Eastern situation, with the intention of provoking British-Japanese collision. Ambassador HU (Ko) is said to be agitating to this end.

Trans. 7-30-41

No. 503

FROM: Tokyo — June 30, 1941
TO: Canton — # 1362.

(Circular.)

Message from Hongkong # 315, June 28.

Report.

TEI SŌ HA[a], who arrived at ----- on the 25th, in order to assume the position as director of the seven great newspapers of the Seiji[b] chain, as well as manager of the KO library (refer to page 405 of Who's Who and to my letter # 323[c],) spoke confidentially to an agent of this office, HYŌ JIN SI[d], (a member of the educational committee and one who was on especially good terms with TEI in the days of the CHYŪ WŌ NIPPO[e]) as follows:

1. On the 21st, the day before the war began between Germany and Soviet Russia, the British Ambassador in Rome, acting in accordance with instructions from London, conferred with the Soviet Ambassador and said, "BRITAIN would like to see the threat on the eastern border of Soviet Russia eliminated and assure the British colonies in the Pacific safety by, jointly with Russia, urging Chungking to compromise with Japan on condition that the latter withdraw from the Axis." To this the Soviet Ambassador replied on the 23rd, stating that he was speaking on instructions which he had sought from Moscow. He said, "While on the other hand there is no possibility of Japan withdrawing from the Axis, the Chungking Government cannot believe that Japan would submit. Consequently, until Japan's attitude becomes definite, Soviet Russia does not wish to take any positive step regarding questions in the Far East. It is not that Soviet Russia considers it advisable to regard the Japanese-Soviet treaty as important, but that the Japanese-Chinese war is an important factor at present in keeping Japan from aiding the other Axis Powers."

The two diplomats conferred for four days without coming to an agreement (PA[f] also admitted that the British Ambassador conferred with the Soviet Ambassador).

2. On the 23rd, the Chinese Communist Party wired Chungking a message expressing its friendly attitude toward Soviet Russia, demanding the closing of German and Italian Embassies as well as Consulates, the expulsion of Germans and Italians from China, and promising full cooperation with Chungking in the war. On the other hand, the pro-German faction leader SHU KA KA[g] urged the government to confer with both German and Italian authorities before announcing its stand.

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[a]Kana spelling.
[b]Probably "Star" chain.
[c]Not available.
[d]Kana spelling for Feng Jen-Chih.
[e]Kana spelling, a newspaper.
[f]Panyushukin, Russian Ambassador to Chungking.
[g]Kana spelling for Chu Chia-Hua.

Trans. 7-5-41

No. 504

FROM: Tokyo — July 5, 1941
TO: Washington — # 353.

Action London as # 217.

On the 4th, Ambassador Craigie called on this Minister and requested information as to Japan's attitude with regard to the Russo-German war. I replied along the lines, somewhat abbreviated, of my explanation on the 2nd to Soviet Ambassador Smetanin, (see my message to Moscow # 689[a]).

Subsequently, I pointed out that the Tripartite Pact in no way affected the individual relations between the Soviet Union and Germany, Italy or Japan. In the same manner, the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact, does not in any way affect the Tripartite Pact.

I further explained that the terms of the Tripartite Agreement, according to my interpretations, in no way obligated Japan to go to war with the Soviet Union. The German government, moreover, has not to date requested that we enter into the war.

I pointed out, however, that the Tripartite Pact was the foundation on which we have built out national policy and Japan intends to act in accordance with its aims and spirit.

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[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 505

FROM: Tokyo — June 10, 1941
TO: Shanghai — # 502.

Recently the Army has desired to take over four ships of the Foochow[a] customs which are now anchored, according to reports, at Keelung[b], but they have been listening to me. The head of the Kowloon (Chiulung)[c] customs union stated that this action would be against the (integrity) of the customs. We have instructed them that we will act in regard to the customs as we please. The English in respect to the commandeering of these ships take the same sort of position and there will not be any objections made in answer to this. There will be no particular questions involved and it is seen that approval or disapproval of the commandeering of the boats will soon be reached. No matter what form of a reply is made, it will not hinder the present (Japanese ?) Mezu[d] negotiations, or this might be used to instrumentally hasten these negotiations. Please reply concerning this matter.

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[a]Capital of Fukien Province, S.E. China.
[b]Seaport in N.E. Formosa.
[c]English leased territory opposite Hongkong.
[d]Kana spelling.

Trans. 6-14-41

No. 506

FROM: Tokyo — July 4, 1941
TO: London — # 215.

Re Part 2 of your # 464[a].

I will handle the matter as you suggest. At present when we are short of ships, we have decided that it would be better to load the second and third allotments of nickel on the YAMAKIKU MARU arriving the last of July, and the MOMOYAMA MARU arriving approximately August 20, which will take on 5,000 and 7,000 tons, respectively. Thus, we have decided to defer the loading of the iron ore.

While I do not think that they will object to our taking on the third allotment so close to the second, perhaps you had better ask them for their approval and wire me back what they say. Furthermore, so that there may be no trouble at all in carrying this out, will you please ask EDEN to advise the Governor General to let us proceed unmolested? Later on, I am going to wire you how to negotiate from now on concerning what you mentioned in (1) of your caption message, and increasing our quota.

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[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-9-41

No. 507

FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) July 26, 1941
TO: Vancouver # 1610.

(Circular.)

Because of the growing fear that England and the United States will detain our ships, will you please secretly instruct the captains of all ships at anchor under your jurisdiction to leave port immediately. Regarding ships putting into harbor, we are instructing them to stand by.

Trans. 8-8-41

No. 508

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) July 26, 1941
TO: Batavia # 1510.

(Circular.)

Secret outside the office.

Because of increasing danger of the United States and England jointly detaining Japanese vessels, please secretly instruct the captains of all Japanese vessels in areas under your jurisdiction to leave port; give them special orders not to enter port for the time being but to anchor at some suitable point in the ocean. ----- (one sentence unintelligible) -----.

Trans. 9-5-41

No. 509

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 31, 1941
TO: London # 1681.

(Circular.) (Message to ----- and Manila as Cir. # 1671 on July 30th.)

(Strictly Secret)

Re my Cir # 1610[a].

The principal reasons for having called back the Japanese ships were to insure the safety of the ships themselves and to avoid the danger of the cargo, as well as the payment for the cargo, being frozen. Now that anxiety of possible detention of our ships has lessened, they should be allowed to enter port one after the other. The consignors, in fear of the payment being frozen, say that they want the cargo unloaded. However, we have been hoping that unloading of the cargo could be avoided because the act might attract attention and excite further antagonism; but, at the same time the cargo should not be retained so long as to call forth formal rejection. Since the country to which you have been accredited does not necessarily have any intention of cutting off trade with Japan entirely, I shall wire you instructions with regard to the general question of frozen assets later, after our counter-measures have been considered. For the time being, I would like to have you negotiate so that they will give some sort of a guarantee for the payment of the cargo (for example, getting them to issue a general permission for applying the payment for the cargo to that for exports to Japan), and then have the cargo unloaded on the basis of such a guarantee. Will you, therefore, take this matter up with them at once and -----

----- -----. Furthermore, if anything has been left behind by the ships which had suddenly left port in obedience to the caption telegraphic instructions, will you confer with the persons concerned with these ships and use your discretion in calling these ships back into port.

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*See II, 507.

Trans. 8-8-41

No. 510

FROM: Canton — July 24, 1941
TO: Nanking — #134.

(Circular.)

To Shanghai as Circular #133.

To Tokyo as #275.

In compliance with the urgent request of the Supreme Military and Naval Commander in South China to our Hongkong office on the 24th, I sent a note to the British Consul General to the following effect:

Recently British military planes have frequently flown over areas in which our forces have been operating and aviators have openly reconnoitered our troop movements.

We shall have to regard airplanes which fly over occupied territory and the positions of Imperial Japanese warships and transports as enemy planes. In order to avoid the possibility of untoward events, therefore, we should like to have the practice stopped.

If, in spite of this warning, the flights go on, it will be necessary for us to take military steps to prevent them and the responsibility for all losses will rest squarely upon the shoulders of the British.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 511

FROM: Canton — July 26, 1941
TO: Net — #278.

In response to a request originating with the Chief of Special Duties Section in the Navy to protest against the following action on the part of the British, I submitted a protest to the British Consul-General on the 26th: On the 16th of July about noon, a British warship (Cyclope type) carrying large and small airplanes approached a Japanese submarine which was at that time sailing at a point 112 miles from the ORAN lighthouse (----- southeast of ORAN), and after shooting three shells close to the bow of the ship, sailed off in the direction of Hongkong. Furthermore, shortly before this shelling, a British land plane came to about 50 meters of this submarine. Then on the morning of the 22nd, a British plane flew very close to a Japanese warship which was anchored at a place on the HAINAN Island, and after reconnoitering at low altitude, took a position for dive bombing over a Japanese Naval transport which then happened to be sailing nearby. These incidents are acts not only of disrespect to warships but also of interference with our maneuvers. We have for some time been calling the attention

of the British authorities to just such acts of disrespect, but the British have not changed their attitude and repeatedly interfere with our maneuvers. This naturally makes us suspicious of how much sincerity there is on the part of the British authorities. Should the British again resort to such acts, we might take suitable steps for self-defense, and in that case, the British must be held responsible for their consequences.

Relayed to ----- and Hongkong.

Trans. 8-1-41

No. 512

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

June 14, 1941
1256.

(Circular)

On the 13th, Ambassador CRAIGIE[a] called on the Vice-Minister and stated: "I would point out that in *Mein Kampf* Hitler says that regardless of the length of the war, the terribleness of the sacrifice, and regardless of how unprepared they be, compared with other countries, the British people will fight till they win. I think that Great Britain is sure to win, but if it so be that Germany whips us, there is the danger that she will subjugate the whole world. Germany has ambitions regarding the Netherlands Indies in particular, and the United States and Russia are absolutely certain to be involved in the struggle. Japan alone of all countries is in an excellent position to maintain neutrality. Now, if you Japanese go ahead and use force in connection with the Netherlands Indies problem, Great Britain will be terribly aggrieved. I would like to know what the Japanese government is going to do about the latest reply from the Netherlands officials." The Vice-Minister replied, "Well, we have decided to bring Representative YOSHIZAWA[b] home." CRAIGIE then asked, "After he leaves Batavia, do you intend to continue these negotiations in Tokyo with the Netherlands Minister?" The Vice-Minister answered, "Well, no, we have no such intention, but I suppose that depends on the course of events, after all. As a matter of fact, the Foreign Office boasts of its intention to establish peace and order in eastern Asia. Now, if in the face of that, it goes ahead and publicly announces that the Netherlands officials have rejected a weak-kneed proposal, you can well imagine what we would be up against. We tried to get them to accept it, but in spite of how easy we made it for them they turned us down. Now, if we publicly announce that our businessmen have accepted this sort of treatment, the pressure of public opinion would be severe. However, rather than to cause trouble, I am glad to say that we have decided that it will not be deemed necessary to publish all the facts. As revealed in the Japanese newspapers, popular resentment in this case does not appear to be very strong. However, if our various political groups get hold of the matter and play it up, it would be difficult to prophesy what trouble might result. I have often told the Netherlands Minister about this. It was not that I was trying to bargain with him, I was merely pointing out facts; I was talking to him personally as a friend. However, I would appreciate it if you would not transmit this information to his home government." CRAIGIE replied, "Yes, I know that there are some inflammatory elements here who would like to see the Netherlands Indies seized by force and that in the cabinet there are some autocrats with dangerous influence. We British can see no reason why you Japanese should not get some rubber and tin, provided you do not transship it to Germany. Did you ever give the Netherlands officials any assurance that you would not resell these articles to the Germans?" The Vice-Minister replied, "Yes, we repeatedly told them that Germany would get none of it."

In this interview the Vice-Minister got the impression that England must have reached the extremity of her endurance and that she is greatly worried.

This message addressed to Washington and Berlin. Relay message from Washington to London.

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[a]British Ambassador to Tokyo.
[b]Envoy Extraordinary in Batavia.

Trans. 6-17-41

No. 513

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) July 26, 1941
TO: Ottawa # 1619

Circular.

Message to London (?) # 233.

On the 25th I asked the British Ambassador to call and informed him of the mutual agreement, reached between Japan and France for the joint defense of French Indo-China. I told him that this agreement came about as a result of alarming reports leading to fear that the existence and safety of French Indo-China (*sic*). It was arrived at in a friendly atmosphere for the purpose of guaranteeing the safety of French Indo-China, the maintenance of peace, and to oppose any enveloping movement against Japan. I explained that it was purely a defensive arrangement against the attack of any third party and that the Imperial Japanese Government will strictly observe its obligation to respect the territorial integrity of French Indo-China.

The British Ambassador replied that there was no foundation for the alarming reports which I spoke of and that it was an exceedingly regrettable matter that Japan should use them for an excuse to advance, in spite of the fact that the British Government had warned her that such action might lead to serious consequences. He continued in the vein expressed by EDEN in his address in Parliament on the same day, that Japan's steps in French Indo-China could not but be considered by the British Government as a potential threat to British territory and rights and interests in Asia.

He then withdrew, but in another visit today, when I informed him of the contents of my Circular # 1615[a], prefacing his remarks by the statement that this was merely his own opinion, he said that he thought surely some compromise could be reached by which the dispatch of troops could be postponed until such time as the truth or falsity of the aforementioned "alarming report" could be determined. To this I responded that I regretted I was in no position to accept his suggestion; however, England need have no fear as to the peaceful nature and purpose of Japan's present conduct.

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[a]Not available.

Trans. 8-6-41

No. 514

FROM: Ottawa (Yoshizawa) July 26, 1941
TO: Vancouver, London and Washington #21.

Circular.

Message to Tokyo #111.

After my interview recounted to you in my #110[a], the Premier gave me the official text which I sent in my separate wire #112[b]. He said: "I have received a report from the English Ambassador in Tokyo and though we regret it very much, the Canadian Government will have to take similar steps. Please communicate this immediately to your Government. Though Canada has never done this before, under the present circumstances such direct retaliations have to be made and in our opinion this makes impossible the conclusion of a Canadian-Japanese commercial treaty. It is hoped that further sweeping measures will not have to be taken." With regard to this communication, should there be anything that you might like to add to my acknowledgment, please let me know at once.

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[a]See II, 516 which tells of an interview with the Canadian Premier at the time of the termination of the Canadian-Japanese commercial treaty.

[b]See II, 515 which gives the text of the official note sent the Japanese Government terminating the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation.

Trans. 8-12-41

No. 515

FROM: Ottawa (Yoshizawa) July 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo #112.

The Government of Canada has had under consideration the operation, under present conditions, of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation which was signed in London on April 3, 1911. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 26, the notice of adhesion in respect to Canada was given on May 1, 1913. The Government of Canada has reached the conclusion that this treaty can no longer be regarded as fulfilling the objects which the Government of Canada had in mind at the time of adhesion. I have the honor, therefore, to give notice, in accordance with the provisions of Article 27 of the treaty, of the intention of His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, in respect of Canada, to terminate the same. The treaty will cease to have effect upon the expiration of a period of twelve months from this date, etc., etc.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 516

FROM: Ottawa (Yoshizawa) July 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #110.

To Vancouver as circular #20.

Re my message #106[a].

(Three parts—complete).

On the 26th, I asked for an interview and went to call on the Premier. I said, "I wired last night's statement direct to Tokyo, so in any event, I will receive some instructions from my country concerning the views of the Japanese Empire and the counter measures it proposes to take. However, for the time being, I cannot help feeling a deep depression because you know how hard I have worked to maintain relations between Japan and Canada. I just wanted to tell you frankly how hurt I am and to question you on two or three points. I also wish to comment on these points myself." Prefacing my talk thus, I continued. "First of all did Canada do this, acting as one link in a comprehensive imperial anti-Japanese move?"

The Premier replied, "Canada saw that what has been happening in the Southern Pacific was a threat to her independence. It was in order to forestall danger there that this step was taken."

I then asked, "What earthly connection is there between French Indo-China and the safety of Canada?"

The Premier retorted, "Let me revise my previous statement a little. Supposing for the moment that there will be no immediate direct effect on Canada. British territories in that area certainly do feel in imminent peril. Does not this have a direct relevancy to the security of the British Empire taken as a whole? How can we feel safe when such things happen? Canada merely felt in the common interest it was up to her to take some steps to cope with the situation. You know the members of the British Commonwealth must act with some unity of purpose."

I answered, "Well, as for me, I can see little rapport between this measure on the part of the British Empire as a whole and the situation with which it is supposed to cope. Whether or not the British Empire has been in any sort of contact with the United States of America I do not know, but I do know that the United States stretched forth her hand and seized Greenland and Iceland, proclaiming that this was necessary in the interests of hemisphere defense. Well, now our ideal is an East-Asian sphere of co-prosperity and by the same logic as was used by the United States, say in Iceland, we occupied French Indo-China. We had even more reason to do so. I cannot but feel that the measures you have taken are very inopportune and designed to preclude our peaceful penetration into areas necessary to our existence."

The Premier replied, "The case of Iceland is entirely different from this. If the United States had not secured it, there was a very real danger of the Nazis getting a foothold there and striking at the Western Hemisphere. Now, on the question of whether England and the United States would have attacked French Indo-China if Japan had not gotten there beforehand there is a great difference of opinion.

I replied, "Well, as to whether or not England was threatening French Indo-China, I, myself am not in a position to say either 'yea' or 'nay'. But we Japanese do feel quite sure that the thing that has been thwarting our efforts to settle the China question has been Anglo-American aid to CHIANG KAI-SHEK. At last it is up to us to put an end to that. Do you think it too much to call this assistance that I have been speaking of a sort of threat? I heard, too, that the de GAULLIST's were up to mischief in French Indo-China. So, have it how you will. We figure that we have reason aplenty to penetrate that country. We talked it over with Vichy,

didn't we? Vichy saw our point and did not argue. Furthermore, we did it all peaceably and then what happens? Along comes England and the United States, working out a joint blockade preparatory to applying unendurable economic pressure against us Japanese. So you see how sorry and discouraged I feel. I cannot see how you all hope to secure the peace of the Pacific by an encirclement policy like this."

The Premier replied, "In any event, despite seemingly logical arguments, it is not right to resort to force."

I did not wish to go into the matter too deeply and get into a quarrel with him, so in conclusion I asked what the phrase, "in accordance with the desires of CHIANG KAI-SHEK," in the statement meant and where it came from. The Premier replied that if he remembered rightly CHIANG had recently made some requests through the London Government.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-6-41

No. 517

FROM: Rome (Horikiri) May 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo No number.

From Ambassador OSHIMA.[a]

After talking to Premier MUSSOLINI on the 12th, Foreign Minister CIANO requested an interview with me on the 13th. The gist of our conversations on the occasion of Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP's visit to Rome is as follows:

CIANO began by saying that the questions of most importance to Germany and Italy at the present time were, first, the HESS incident and, second, America's attitude.

"With regard to the HESS incident, Your Excellency too has heard all the details from Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP and there is nothing which I can add to that except to say that I believe that Britain and the United States will make great use of this in their propaganda; but within a few days it will have been forgotten.

"Regardless of what you might have to say about America's attitude, insofar as it affects the carrying out of the attack against England, it is of vital importance. Nevertheless, it is our hope that Japan, taking a strong position with regard to America's ultimate attitude regardless of whether she looks at it from the point of view of the character of the Tripartite Alliance or from the consideration of her own future rights and interest, will not permit the possibility of America's freedom of action in the Atlantic becoming an actuality."

I then replied: "I do not know whether there are currently any conversations in progress between Japan and the United States; but inasmuch as the Tripartite Alliance is the foundation of Japanese diplomacy and we have received the support of the entire country, I am confident that Japan will enter into absolutely nothing which is contrary to the interests of Germany and Italy."

Continuing my conversations by changing the subject, I inquired of German-Soviet relations. To which, CIANO replied: "Of course, I have had absolutely no information from Germany but, speaking for myself and myself alone, my impression, and it does not exceed that, is that the relations between the two countries recently have taken an ever worsening trend. Don't you think that in the light of Germany this day ----- that the outbreak of war between

Germany and the Soviet is virtually inevitable?" When he said that, I got the impression from CIANO's manner that Communism was the great danger.

Relayed to Germany.

[a] Japanese Ambassador to Germany.

Trans. 5–16–41

No. 518

FROM: Rome
TO: Tokyo

May 14, 1941
272.

Strictly secret.

From Ambassador OSHIMA.[a]

On the afternoon of the 13th Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP visited Rome. This morning, in order to pay my respects, I called upon him. He prefaced his remarks by saying that he had come to Rome in view of the necessity of discussing with Premier MUSSOLINI and Foreign Minister CIANO various questions relating to the Tripartite Agreement, the Iraqi question and the HESS incident. In this message, I am wiring the details of his comments with regard to the HESS incident in his own words.

"For the past few years HESS has been greatly troubled by a gall bladder ailment. In order to forget the agony of that ailment he became as astrological faddist, frequently conjuring castles in the air out of his fancies. Though he occupied a position of prominence in the party as acting FUEHRER, it is a fact that he knew little or nothing about political questions. As a confident of the Fuehrer for many years in whom much personal confidence was felt, he personally worked hard in not a little contribution in the present conflict and, with the view of working upon the Fascist element of Great Britain in order to bring about the conclusion of the offensive against England with as little sacrifice and loss of life as possible, he has believed that they should bring about the downfall of Prime Minister CHURCHILL. In order to carry this out, he tried to get HITLER to look with favor upon his plan. This was to use a British subject, the Duke of Hamilton, with whom he had become acquainted, in matters dealing with an aerial survey of Mount Everest, but this man is absolutely anti-German and is now an aviator for the British Army.

"Recently HESS has shown absolutely no aptitude for foreign policy.

"This person, HAMILTON, originally was pro-German but later became anti-German. At the present time, I do not know but what he may be actually participating in the war. On the other hand, should CHURCHILL welcome him, the Fascist faction of Great Britain, which has long admired the name of RUDOLPH HESS, will, he had thought quickly rally around him. Aware as we are that his mind is not normal, we do not consider the acts of this unhappy official treasonable even to the slightest extent. Though in his sections he has strayed from the normal path, it is clear that he entertained but the best intentions.

"In spite of the fact that this has added fuel to British and American anti-German propaganda, the above facts will be made known within a few days."

Relayed to France and Russia, England, United States, Germany and -----.

Relay to England and France.

[a] Japanese Ambassador to Germany.

Trans. 5–15–41

No. 519

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

May 14, 1941
540.

(Part 1 of 2).

To be handled in Government Code.

A certain authoritative German told me confidentially with regard to the HESS incident as follows:

"1. The recent incident has amazed the German people no end and there is no question about it. It is clear that it has truly had a great effect upon them. Regardless of how I might explain it, it would be difficult to make one understand through a logical process. The way it is being publicized, too, places the German citizens in an awkward position. Should we say that HESS was ill, then why has he been allowed to maintain the position of Acting Fuehrer? And, if so, how was it possible for him of his own accord to take an airplane, fly it to its destination in Great Britain, and make a landing within a short distance of the spot where he wanted to land? And, though one were to try to explain it, there is nothing that one can say except that it is an incident peculiar to a nation which is built upon a foundation of dictatorship, as this man was and is a warm personal friend of Chancellor HITLER, who is the sole authority in all Germany.

"2. It goes without saying that HESS was mentally ill just as it was reported and also that he, during his early years, received a British schooling. It is believable, therefore, that he was strongly pro-British in his leanings. Since the time, back in 1923, when he helped edit Mein Kampf, his ideas have not changed one whit and this only goes to show his overzealousness. For, since that time, one cannot overlook the enormous changes in the world situation as far as Germany's position is concerned. Since 1923 an era has passed. For the above reasons he, aside from having Chancellor HITLER's personal confidence, has for these many years differed slightly in his thinking and one cannot doubt but what he is anxious to leave Germany ----- ----- -----. Looking at it in the light of present-day developments, one cannot but say that it was wrong to permit him to hold such an office as Acting Fuehrer but, as for Chancellor HITLER, his faithfulness to this man is well brought out in his attitude toward him. Furthermore, because HITLER will not change in his attitude toward HESS, at the present time we cannot but regard him as a disillusioned individual."

Trans. 5-20-41

No. 520

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

May 14,1941
540.

(Part 2 of 2).

To be handled in Government code.

"3. In HESS's letter which he left he said that, should this present war be allowed to continue, it would mean not only the downfall of Great Britain but the destruction of the whole European civilization. Sacrificing himself, therefore, he said that he would strive for the reconciliation of Germany and England. This, he said, would be possible through conversations with a certain individual in that country. (He went there with the intention of conducting con-

versations with Lord HAMILTON who resided in the neighborhood of Glasgow. This person, being a pro-German Britisher, was a man of considerable fame and an old friend of HESS's.) Having achieved his purpose, he said that he would return, etc., etc. It is certain that this man, mentally ill, with this naive motive, undertook to do the impossible. Though he had absolutely no intention of selling out his own country, for all that there is no doubt but that he did not have control of all his faculties. Though this does not mean that he was crazy, one cannot help but say that he was certainly not a normal man.

"4. In order that he, HESS, might bring to a conclusion this inevitable war against England, he had not conversed overmuch with Chancellor HITLER. Furthermore, it is actually true that he had a great personal dislike for Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP who is very close to Chancellor HITLER. In summing this all up, not only was he extremely ignorant of current German diplomatic policy but in a sense he ----- -----. Therefore, in the light of the current incident, there is not a single chance that one could possibly expect any kind of change in German foreign policy.

"5. This incident, in view of HESS's position, had a profound effect upon all of the people. Especially the blow dealt to the Party was enormous and the influence of the Party in actual politics has again further diminished. However, Chancellor HITLER and GOERING, together with the brains of the military group, are of one mind. There is no doubt that in the progress of the war today this incident is but a minor episode. Should England and America dream that because of this incident there is a division within the ranks in Germany, they can only be disappointed."

Trans.5-20-41

No. 521

FROM: Rome — May 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo — No number.

To be handled in Government code.

Re my #272[a].

I have already wired to you the views of the Italian Government regarding the escape of HESS to England. According to a radio broadcast from England, HESS had landed near the estate of HAMILTON and had spoken to the latter, after which HAMILTON met DUFF COOPER, and DUFF COOPER in turn consulted CHURCHILL. However, that these people had thus acted is hard for me to accept as entirely true. HITLER in his speech said that the war would be over this year. Despite this fact, the war seems to be shaping itself into a long drawn out affair. The German Government has recently completed all preparations for attacking Soviet Russia. They are talking more than ever about the impending war with that country. Furthermore, she has been aroused by recent secret negotiations between the United States and Japan and seems to have been impressed by the possibility of Japan's maintaining a neutral attitude in the event the United States joins the war. On the other hand Germany now holds a dominating position on the European continent and for this reason events in the Near East are turning in her favor; as for instance in regards ----- -----. Also, in Egypt the possibility of British, German and Italian forces taking on further aggression, especially with regard to Suez, is evident. It may be that the fate of Great Britain will be decided in that part of the world. Furthermore, cooperation between Germany and France has of late rapidly become a reality. The ----- question is also becoming more favorable to Germany. All this seems to point to the possibil-

ity of leading Great Britain to consider compromising with Germany, depending of course on the terms offered. In the light of these developments, the HESS incident may be regarded as a grand scheme compromising Germany's peace offense on England.

The above is still within the scope of mere imagination. However, I have set this down for your reference.

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*See II, in which Ambassador OSHIMA tells of his conversation with VON RIBBENTROP re HESS's escape to England.

Trans. 6-3-41

No. 522

FROM: Berlin (Oshima) May 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #558.

(Part 1 of 2).

1. The high German officials themselves are making many speculations concerning the HESS affair. To me it appears that HESS did not take flight after breaking with the Germans or the Nazi Party. It may be that he did differ with their views, but it is clear that he did not act out of fear for his personal safety. There is nothing in this case suggestive of the ROEHM incident of 1934.

2. All along HESS has maintained an attitude of the strictest servility towards HITLER, and in return HITLER has accorded him the utmost trust. This leads to rumors that possibly a secret understanding exists between him and the Fuehrer and that his act may be the first step in a compromise between London and Berlin. In view of the fact that German-Soviet relations are delicate and that the chances for American participation in the war appear to be gradually increasing, this view has come to be the one generally entertained by the newsmen of third countries. It seems that in spite of his position, HESS was not well up on Germany's high Governmental policies of the present moment. It is clear that he had had no opportunity to talk with HITLER lately. A responsible official of the German Government said this to me: "What HESS did he did in good faith, but such an act constitutes insubordination; it contravenes the principle that a leader can act only within the bounds of the authority invested in him. So, I can reveal to you that it has been decided that if he comes back he will be shot." Thus it can be seen that HESS had no understanding with HITLER concerning his trip.

3. From the notes HESS left behind it can be seen how eager he was for peace negotiations between London and Berlin. Even after the war broke out he was in touch with Lord HAMILTON. Honestly and in perfectly good faith, he believed that peace talks were possible. Why, he actually thought that in two days his negotiations would be a big success and that he would return home by airplane using benzine furnished by the English! (That is actually what he says in his notes). So you see that he had lost all his common sense if he ever had any. German announcements picture HESS as a man completely divorced from realistic policies. They are particularly indulgent in their tone. I do not think, however, that this has any connection with high German policy. I think merely that the German officials respect the man's good intentions and good faith and that they do not wish unnecessarily to stir up more trouble.

Trans. 5-20-41

No. 523

FROM: Berlin (Oshima) May 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 558.
Revised Translation

(Part 2 of 2).

4. HESS, in his confidence in the possibility of Anglo-German peace talks, was at total variance with the opinions of other high German officials. He apparently believed that HITLER would like to make peace with England and compromise, but that the Fuehrer's advisers, deciding to give Britain a decisive blow, would not let the Fuehrer do what he wished to do. One high German official said to me:"What HESS has done does not really make any difference to us, It was purely and simply a personal act of his own. It had no background. There will, of course, be temporary shock and perhaps a severe one but no definite effect will be noted. It would be the greatest sort of an error to regard this as an indication of dissention in high German Government circles. Now, of course, we Germans cannot escape the effect of damaging propaganda circulated by England and the United States on this occasion, but our course in this war is unswerving and this event is only a ripple. But what about the case in which England might decide to talk compromise terms with Germany? Well, then, I would not say that there is no possibility of us using HESS, but he went over the heads of his superiors and I am not sure that it would be to our best interests to use him."

Trans. 5–20–41

No. 524

FROM: Tokyo June 4, 1941
TO: Hsinking, Nanking, Shanghai, Tiensin and Peking # 1183.

Circular.

Message from Rome as # 334 on May 30th.

BORERI, the editor of the "Corriere della Sera", as a spy report, gave as a remark of CIANO's that RIBBENTROP visited Italy for the purpose of explaining the HESS incident. In regard to this flight of HESS,Italian official circles are of the opinion that HESS must have been sent to England as a result of instructions from GOERING. Upon being informed, HITLER flew into a rage. As regards RIBBENTROP, it was similar to the essence of my # 272[a]. Afterwards RIBBENTROP (assured) that Italy would be allowed to dominate (?) Croatia, Dalmatia and the Greek Islands and, at the same time, the Greek individuality is to be respected. An agreement with Greece similar to the Bermuda agreement is being contemplated. As yet there have been no conversations between Germany and Italy regarding the French question. RIBBENTROP even made no reference to this question whatsoever. It is entirely a rumor that any request was made to the effect that Italy was to abandon her territorial demands regarding France and it is seen that northern Italy is thoroughly dissatisfied. It is perceived that CIANO has spoken especially to BO[b] in the same tenor. Moreover, it is the opinion among the German residents that

Italy in exchange for her territorial demands against France will be agreeable to and satisfied with making demands in the eastern Mediterranean.

Relay to -----.

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[a] See II, 518 in which RIBBENTROP informs HORIKIRI, the Japanese Ambassador to Rome, that HESS is an ill and abnormal man and flew to Britain on his own initiative to work upon the Fascist element there to bring about a reconciliation.

[b] Perhaps SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE, Indian revolutionary now in Rome

Trans. 6-10-41

No. 525

FROM: Vienna (Yamaji) June 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #49.

Part 1 of 2[b].

Re part three of your Circular #1125 (Europe 4)[a]

The question of an Anglo-Nazi peace would now seem to warrant our constant attention. I understand that yesterday the Russian ambassador to London wired his government a message containing the following point. (1) Great Britain is outwardly boasting very much. However, according to reliable reports HESS told LORD HAMILTON that HITLER, as ever, considers Russia and the Comintern as the real enemies of the whole world; (2) If the Soviet yields to the German demands concerning the Near East and cooperates with the Reich, the fate of the British Empire will be most gravely threatened. Therefore, the British Government and the King are seriously considering making peace with Germany.

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[a] Not available.

[b] Not available (Part 2 of 2).

Trans. 6-16-41

No. 526

FROM: Berlin May 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #557.

(Part 1 of 2).

To be handled in Government Code.

With regard to the chances of British-German reconciliation, too, they have always been mindful of them, but with the added stimulus of the current HESS incident, not a few rumors are circulating. With regard to this incident I have already expressed the opinions maintained here in my separate message but along the following lines I am giving some of my observations:

1. Since the beginning of this war Germany has on numerous occasions, as you know, made overtures with regard to conciliation. Should the aims of *Mein Kampf* be instituted as they stand, there is no doubt but what from a theoretical point of view reconciliation between Germany and England could be attained at almost any time. However, the war having progressed already to

the point at which it now stands, the whole of England's influence on the European continent has been eliminated. This is but one phase of the New World Order and the fight will continue in order that the new order can be established not only in Europe but also in Africa. At the present time Germany considers:

a. That she is no longer interested merely in removing England's political influence from the European continent;

b. That she must incorporate within the Axis Africa (including the Mediterranean area) and the Near East.

c. That, having developed to that point, she will consolidate; then prepare for the great struggle of the future between Germany and the United States.

It is thought too, that she is even considering taking over the British fleet.

2. However, should this materialize, Germany's war aims, in comparison with her current demands, will change radically with the developments of the war. The political and economic situation within Germany is considered sound. Under the present circumstances I do not believe that it is necessary for Germany to, of her own volition, take a backward step and bring about conciliation. The greatest question is whether Japan, the United States and the Soviet, too, will be drawn directly into the war.

Trans. 5-21-41

No. 527

FROM: Berlin (Oshima) May 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #557.

(Part 2 of 2).

3a. It is Germany's strong determination that the first premise in the overthrow of England is to perpetuate the predominant position of the Tripartite Alliance. Regardless of to what extent the United States steps up her aid to England, the reason that she would not be overly perturbed, even if the United States were to participate in the war, is that she feels Japan will exercise a restraining influence on the United States in the Pacific. Certainly, utilizing her entire strength, Japan will preclude movement into the Atlantic. Therefore, though in spite of the existence of the Tripartite Agreement and through conversations between Japan and the United States, the United States in actuality can without any fear from the rear concentrate her fleet into the Atlantic, and should such a situation develop such as effective convoying and an expansion of merchant marine warfare, then Germany to that extent could lighten her terms and sue for peace.

3b. Germany's self confidence with regard to the Soviet is much more than imagination. In spite of the fact that at the present time there exists a danger of war between Germany and the Soviet, should that war materialize and should there be such a development as would result from some kind of hitch in Germany's war plans and that so develop into a long-time exhaustive one, it will have, as a matter of course, great effect upon Germany's attack against Britain. In such an event, or depending upon America's attitude or again upon Japan's future course, she will be in a position to offer conciliation to England.

4. In summing this all up, in the light of the situation as it stands today, as long as England will not submit to reconciliation which would be tantamount to unconditional surrender, I do not see Germany has anything to gain by entering into any conversations. At the same time, I am convinced that Japan's attitude will wield a tremendous effect and that as a result much careful consideration must be given to it.

Trans. 5-21-41

No. 528

FROM: Hsinking — June 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 379.

(Part 1 of 2; Part 2 not available).

It is quite possible that the reaction of the anti-communism groups and others in the United States to the recent German attack on the U.S.S.R. will have the salutary effect of dampening the war sentiment in the United States. (Since it has been reported that Hess informed the heads of the British government that Hitler's real objective is to crush Russia and stamp out communism, also that Hitler considers German-American war as mutually suicidal and accordingly made peace overtures to England, it can be assumed that the present German attack on the U.S.S.R. is directly connected with Hess's mission).

Even if Germany fails in seeking British collaboration, as a result of her campaign against Russia, she will be able to secure sufficient materials to put her in a better position to wage a long drawn out war with England. In order to realize this, Germany took the offensive before Russia could complete her military preparations and at the same time is seeking British and American conciliation. It is on the basis of these advantages that Germany has carried her war against Russia.

Trans. 6-30-41

No. 529

FROM: Tokyo — May 17, 1941
TO: Berlin — Unnumbered.

Re: The Chief of Mission code message from Rome dated the 15th.[a]

This matter is being handled in the United States also as a strictly secret matter. Only the President, the Secretary of State and one other Cabinet official have any knowledge concerning it. Not a single word of it has been sent even to the U.S. Ambassador in Japan.

Under these circumstances, I feel duty bound to act in the same manner. In the past, such matters have frequently been handled in this manner. My not taking you into complete confidence in this instance, does not in any way carry an implication that I do not trust you. I sincerely hope that there will be no misunderstandings on this point. I shall advise you of the entire matter when things have developed to a certain stage.

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[a]Not available.

See II, 34, in which Tokyo advises Washington that the Japanese Ambassadors in Germany and Italy have been advised (to a certain extent) of the "Understanding" negotiations.

Trans. 5-19-41

No. 530

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

May 19, 1941
567.

(Chief of Office Routing).

I had heard various rumors of Japanese-U.S. negotiations in connection with rumors of your going to the United States. I learned for the first time on 5 May, from Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, that the above was not mere idle rumor. However, guessing at your intentions, I told myself that this matter should be allowed to progress without my taking part in it.

At the same time, I could not but feel considerable anxiety when I took into consideration the future of our country, and the effect that the proposal may have on the Tripartite Pact. Moreover, I feel that it is my duty as your representative, to report to you the attitude of the official circles in Germany as well as my humble opinions. I am, therefore, dispatching them to you in supplementary cables numbered 568[a] and 569.[b]

Another matter I would like to mention here concerns your reasons for not reporting this Understanding proposal to the Ambassadors in Germany and in Italy. I would like to take this opportunity to express my opinion in this connection.

Please be assured of one thing: In critical times such as these, my first consideration is for the welfare of my country. I do not for even one second think about such things as personal trust or one's personal duties to another individual.

Such matters as the formulation of foreign policy and the ways and means of carrying them out are entirely up to the Foreign Minister. The only point that I wonder at is your apparent disinterest in obtaining reports on the attitudes of the official circles of Italy and Germany with regard to such a matter as a U.S.-Japanese agreement which, after all, would have considerable effect on the Tripartite Pact. I am sending the two supplementary messages so that you may be better acquainted with the reactions here. I feel that as long as I am the Ambassador to Germany, it is my duty to do this.

[a] See II, 531.
[b] See II, 532.

Trans. 5–21–41

No. 531

FROM: Berlin (Osima)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

May 19, 1941
568.

(In 6 parts—complete).

Part 1. Chief of Office Routing.

On May 3rd, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop asked me to see him. At our interview he said, "Today I received a telegram from Ambassador Ott regarding Japanese-American negotiations. As I understand that neither you nor the Japanese Ambassador at Rome is supposed to know about these negotiations, I suppose I should not mention it to you but because of the seriousness of this subject and our mutual friendship, I am unable to withhold the information from you any longer. I trust that you will fully understand the circumstances." So saying, he showed me a telegram from Ott, giving the main points of the four articles of the agreement proposed by the United States on April 16th. He then said, "Information regarding such a pro-

posal coming out of a clear sky makes it very difficult for me to understand the motive of the Japanese government."

Thereupon I avoided this subject by explaining that when Foreign Minister Matsuoka visited Germany he made it very clear that the Tripartite Pact will be the basis of Japan's foreign policy. Therefore there was no point in promising that we will not do anything that will be inconsistent with the Pact.

Again on the 9th Ribbentrop had me call on him. He showed me telegrams from Ambassador Ott giving Japan's provisional reply to the American proposal and also the conversation between Matsuoka and Ott held on May 6th. Ribbentrop then said, "It is now clear from other similar telegrams from Ambassador Ott, but it appears from Japan's provisional reply that Japan has already gone into these negotiations quite deeply. Speaking frankly, among information obtained from various sources, some indicate that these negotiations were originally proposed by Japan. Also the conversation between Foreign Minister Matsuoka and Ambassador Ott seems to show that the Foreign Minister was driven to agree to this course by a certain group in Japan. Another thing, the Foreign Minister is reported to have said during this conversation that in the event of German-Soviet war Japan will also fight, but it now appears that Mr. Matsuoka has changed his mind regarding what he told me as his private view, on the occasion of his visit here, that Japan is about to attack Singapore.

Part 2. "I doubt the sincerity of Roosevelt and it might be that Japan may be taken in by his group, or she might use this agreement to circumvent her obligation (under the Tripartite Pact) to fight when the moment arrives. It is true that many technical loop holes can be found to justify Japan's position but actually a thing like this will weaken the structure of the Tripartite Pact. Furthermore, it might cause Japan to loose the opportunity of gaining supremacy in East Asia. After giving this matter a considerable thought I have arrived at two proposals which may be considered as those of Germany. They are:

"(a) Proposal to turn down the United States proposal.

"(b) Proposal to agree to a Japanese-American agreement on the condition that the United States abandon her plan for convoy and patrol services and maintain an absolute neutrality.

"I personally am in favor of the first proposal and I would like to promote its acceptance, but what is your opinion regarding these proposals?

I, therefore, told him that common sense indicates to me that our government would be more favorably disposed toward the second proposal, because if such an agreement were reached, Britain will have to fight Germany singlehanded and for that reason will hasten the termination of the war. Also, although this might sound a bit too optimistic, Roosevelt and his group, realizing that aid to Britain is ineffective, may jump at this opportunity to retreat from their present policy of giving aid to Britain. Then again, it might prove useful in determining at least, Roosevelt's sincerity regarding aid to Britain, and at the same time may help to convince some of our countrymen the impossibility of Japanese-American cooperation.

Part 3. Ribbentrop then replied that so long as these negotiations continue, there is the danger of the United States trying to draw Japan away from Germany, (opinion already expressed in my message #545, to Turkey #11, and that it might also be used within the United States to silence the peace advocates by indicating that an understanding such as this will give the United States a free hand in the Atlantic. For these reasons, he said he could not agree with me.

Then he explained that as these proposals have not yet been submitted to Hitler for his approval, he will telegraph my opinion with the proposals to Hitler tonight. (Hitler is now living outside Berlin.)

When I asked him whether this matter has been taken up with the Italian government, he replied that the Italian Ambassador has already reported it to his home government but no direct conversations between the two governments have yet taken place, but as soon as Hitler's approval is obtained the German government will draw up instructions to Ambassador Ott and at that time the matter will be taken up direct, by both governments.

Part 4. As I had made arrangements to see Mussolini early this month, I left for Rome on the 10th. The German Ambassador, Bismarck, called on me on the 12th and stating that he was under instructions from Ribbentrop, he showed me the German government's instructions to Ott and explained that Italy also was in accord. Upon reading the text I found that Hitler's approval was given to the proposal which was not supported by Ribbentrop.

On the 13th Ribbentrop suddenly arrived in Rome by air to confer with Mussolini and Ciano. On the morning of the 14th he asked me to call on him. He showed me Ott's telegram describing the talk with you and he expressed a great dissatisfaction with your statement that due to the international situation the negotiations had to be started without awaiting the Italian and German views. Stating that if you had waited only a few hours longer you would have received them, he asked why it was that you were unable to wait.

I therefore explained to him that while I do not know the facts of the situation and therefore can not make any positive statement, I thought that it might have been due to the necessity of assuring absolute secrecy and also because these matters had first to be submitted for Imperial approval. I assured him that no disrespect was intended either for Italy or Germany.

Part 5. Nevertheless, Ribbentrop would not be appeased, and he said, "During Foreign Minister Matsuoka's visit to Germany, I had talked with him on several occasions but never once did he mention the Japanese-American negotiations, which certainly have a great bearing on the Tripartite Pact. It is very strange that no sooner than he arrives home, we are confronted with reports on these negotiations. To speak bluntly, I personally think that these negotiations will greatly weaken the Pact, and just as I have mentioned before, from the very beginning, I have distrusted Roosevelt, and I had intended to suggest to Japan to abandon the negotiations with the United States, but it so turns out now that the instructions adopted support the proposal which was not of my choice".

I therefore told him that no misunderstanding should arise over this question between the German and Japanese governments and suggested that he let Ott know of his misgivings on this question and also look into the whole thing very carefully.

The same evening I called on Foreign Minister Ciano, but as Ribbentrop had already conferred with Mussolini and Ciano on this matter, what he had to say was no different from that of Ribbentrop's views.

Part 6. I called on Vice Minister Weizsacker, at his request, as soon as I returned to Berlin on May 17th. He said he was under telegraphic instruction from Ribbentrop, who is now at FUSSHURU, and he showed me a telegram from Ott, dated the 14th, which dealt with Japan's reply to the United States proposal and another telegram, to Ott, giving the German government's instructions regarding the above.

He then said that as he had been instructed only to show you these telegrams he does not intend to express his views but in view of the present war situation the German government is greatly concerned with the outcome of this question and that Germany also views with great interest Foreign Minister Matsuoka's statement to Ambassador Ott, to the effect that Japan will aid Germany in case of German-Soviet war.

He then asked me whether the Foreign Minister was able to acquaint himself fully with the German-Soviet relations, before returning to Japan. I replied that while I do not know what the

Foreign Minister said about Japan's position in the event of German-Soviet war, as all important questions today must await Imperial decision, whatever he said must have been simply his personal opinion. As for his understanding of the German-Soviet relations, I am sure that there is little to worry about on this score, as he has had many opportunitites to talk over this subject with Foreign Minister Ribbentrop during his visit to Germany.

Trans. 5-22-41

No. 532

FROM: Berlin (Osima) May 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 569.

(In 3 parts—complete)

Chief of Office Routing.

1. I reported in my separate cable[a] the fact that Germany is showing considerable dissatisfaction with regard to the proposed U.S.-Japanese agreement, and that they show much concern over the future of the Tripartite Pact.

From a practical viewpoint, the United States is involved in the war today. Should we remain silent with regard to the words and acts of the United States and enter into a Japanese-U.S. agreement, it would amount to the same thing in the eyes of many, as our giving approval to the violent anti-Axis expressions and actions of the United States. From the viewpoint of international law, such an act would mean the prevention of U.S. entrance into the European war, but at the same time, it would indicate that Japan was evading her duty to enter the war. It would be impossible to dispel this doubt from the minds of the German people.

At the time of your visit to Germany recently, the people outdid themselves in their expression of welcome to you. They publicized the fact that your visit was proof of strengthened ties among the Axis countries.

Since this other matter came up immediately after this, there is considerable feeling here that they have been double-crossed.

2. I am perfectly aware of the fact that there is a need for us to get a political and economic breathing spell by bringing about an immediate settlement of the China Affair. At the same time, the fortunes of the European war are constantly favoring Germany and Italy in an ever increasing degree. We can even forsee some very important developments within the next few months.

Under such circumstances, would it be wise for us, for some immediate gains, to invite the animosity of Germany and Italy who will have the power over Europe? I have considerable doubts, myself. In other words, I suspect that this proposal made by the United States was motivated only by that country's desire to separate us from the Axis powers, and is purely a temporary stop-gap effort on their part.

I am afraid that if we pursue such a "middle of the road" diplomacy, we will be left standing alone on the international stage, at the critical period immediately following the war.

3. I shall not go into the fact at this moment that we will constantly be bearing a telltale scar in the future if settlement of the China Affair is brought through the lip-service of the United States.

However, if we were to abandon at this most opportune time all of our dreams with regard to the southward expansion and at the same time abandon our position as a threat to Singapore,

I fear that we would be looked upon contemptuously not only by Britain and the United States, but by Germany and Italy as well.

It is all very well from the U.S. standpoint to have a situation in which she need not be concerned of the future on the Pacific. She could then concentrate on her assistance to Britain, avoiding, all the time, openly declaring that she was in the war. Such a development could affect the war situation in Europe considerably, and it would be difficult for any to guarantee that nothing unfortunate would happen to Japan.

Should we promise to the United States that we would abandon our claims for leadership in Greater East Asia, which naturally includes the territories in the southwest, it is clear that we could not insist upon the right of leadership to Germany and Italy. Hence, we would have to admit that we had abandoned our project of establishing a new order in Greater East Asia.

4. By the signing of the Tripartite Pact last fall, our nationals were given a clear goal to strive for. Should we, at this time, enter into an agreement with the United States, our people would become confused and be at a loss as to know what the ultimate goal is. In our international relations, such a step would invite suspicion and contempt of our friends. I fear that in reality this would mean that Japan would have to stand alone in the international scene.

However, in the event that the government of Japan feels that it is absolutely necessary to enter into an agreement, it is highly desirous that the following two points be put into effect:

(a) Clearly establish the fact that Japan is entering into the U.S.-Japanese agreement so that Japan can make use of the position held by the United States to further bolster the spirit of the Tripartite Pact and at the same time make things easier for Germany and Italy in their war against England. I further believe that it is absolutely necessary that we demand of the United States that she change her policy with regard to the European war, to one of strict neutrality, and at the same time clearly establish the conditions of the Tripartite Pact under which it is our duty to enter the war.

Should the United States refuse to accept these conditions, the agreement would not be entered into.

(b) It would be to our biggest disadvantage if we allow the Germans and Italians to get the impression that the advocates of the status quo in our country (those who advocate the maintenance of the status quo in the Orient) have gained so much power that entering into this agreement was unavoidable. This would give the Germans and Italians the idea that we entered into agreement so as to evade entering into the war.

Hence, I believe that it is necessary for us to exchange opinions with Germany and Italy, and have them clearly understand the points brought out in (a).

---

[a] See II, 531.

Trans. 5-22-41

No. 533

FROM: Berlin — May 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #575.

The Japanese-American negotiations now under consideration indicate an important change in our national policy and affects the work of our military attaches in Germany considerably.

Therefore, it is necessary to inform our attache regarding this. I have submitted to their exclusive perusal my messages #567[a], #568[b], and #569[c]. Please show these messages to the Ministers of Navy and Army, Chief of Staff, and Chief of Military Affairs Bureau.

[a]See II, 530.
[b]See II, 531.
[c]See II, 532.

Trans. 5-22-41

No. 534

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) May 24, 1941
TO: Berlin #438.

Strictly Secret

Re your #567[a].

I have carefully read and considered what you have brought to my attention. The fact that Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP has gone ahead and talked these circumstances over with you confidentially proves that he has superlative trust in you which is a matter of deep gratification to me. I am wiring you the reasons why we have so far released no intelligences on this subject. We have no ulterior motives. Of course I can understand why Your Honor is upset over these negotiations, but I want you to know once and for all the Tri-Partite Alliance is the cornerstone of our Imperial Policy and that we are going to adhere strictly thereto; and, furthermore, that our government is going to do absolutely nothing to contravene the spirit of this Pact. Please put your mind at rest and believe in your Foreign Minister. When you have sufficiently comprehended what I say in my #439[b], go and tell Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and the other German Officials that under no circumstances are they to have any anxiety or misunderstanding concerning any possible acts of ours, and that they must have complete confidence in us.

[a]Amb. Osima expresses anxiety over the effect of Japanese-American negotiations on Tripartite Pact and says he is reporting attitude of German official circles, along with his own opinions, in supplementary telegrams. See II, 531.
[b]See II, 535.

Trans. 5-26-41

No. 535

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) May 24, 1941
TO: Berlin #439.

(Part 1 of 4). Re your #568[a] and #569[b].

1. So Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP, having received information concerning the proposal for an understanding between Japan and the United States, is surprised and entertains resentment because I did not hold some definite conversations with him on this subject while I was on my trip to Europe. Well, as a matter of fact, while I was in Berlin I exchanged com-

prehensive opinions with the Foreign Minister on the Japanese-American question. It goes without saying that the whole crux of the Tri-Partite Pact is to prevent the United States from entering the war and that, therefore, it is to the mutual interests of the three powers concerned to take whatever diplomatic measures are necessary to achieve that aim. As I told you in my #396[c], on my return to Moscow I informed the American Ambassador that with respect to (1) not entering the war; and (2) advising CHIANG KAI SHEK to make peace; (3) at the same time we could not by any means permit this understanding to have any effect upon the Three-Power Pact. I went so far as to specifically state that if the United States fights, so will Japan. I had him wire this to President ROOSEVELT as a personal message from me, but upon my return to Japan, I found that prior thereto the United States had already put forth a proposal for a comprehensive pact to adjust relations between the two countries. I knew absolutely nothing about this until I returned to Tokyo and the United States had absolutely no basis upon which to carry on definite negotiations.

(Part 2 of 4).

In view of this fact, I cannot see where the Germans have any reasons to be alarmed. It is the policy of the Imperial Government in the future to stick resolutely to the above-mentioned three points, and as for Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP worrying about us damaging the Tri-Partite Pact by taking any sort of measures, so far as we are concerned, there is absolutely nothing to it. Furthermore, in view of the measures I have taken since I returned home, and from the statements made by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary HULL, the United States knows perfectly well what our attitude is and will be.

2. I do not know what is in the back of ROOSEVELT'S mind, nor for that matter does anyone else. In general I agree with the guesses of Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP, but after all if we mutually make the Tri-Partite Pact the immovable base of our National Policy, it follows that we would by no means fall in with any schemes of the United States to divorce Tokyo and Berlin.

Hereafter, schemes on the part of London and Washington to divorce us will become more and more active and it is therefore all the more necessary for the officials of Tokyo, Berlin and Rome to be on the alert and stand even closer together. Why, if Germany and Italy begin to doubt us in the least over this matter, by this mere fact our enemies would have already driven a wedge between us by their nefarious schemes.

I hope without remission that Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP will now, if ever put their faith in me. By this time they both ought to know that I am reliable.

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[a]and[b]Ambassador Osima reports attitude of German official circles toward the Japanese-American negotiations. See II, 531 and 532.

[c]Matsuoka tells Ambassador Osima that he has asked American Ambassador in Moscow to advise Roosevelt that if America fights so will Japan, and that he would like to have Chiang Kai Shek advised to make peace. Matsuoka continues that a proposal for adjusting Japanese-American relations is being worked out, but that until further notice nothing is to be revealed to the Germans.

As a matter of fact, Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP has already expressed his complete faith in me.

(Part 3 of 4).

3. Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP is very unhappy over the fact that we began these negotiations before receiving any views from Germany, but I reserved my reply to the United States for a whole week. (As a matter of fact, the reply was withheld for more than four weeks

from the time the United States put forth its original proposal.) This ought to convince him of my trustworthiness. At that time conditions in the United States seemed to be quite serious and we were anxious at least to postpone a reply for several more days. (On the 8th we received a confidential report that the American Congress had approved the convoy policy and that on the 14th the President was due to approve it.) However, we were most anxious by all means to prevent the United States from sanctioning convoys and to eliminate the danger of her participation in the war. Therefore, at last and sooner than we expected, on the 12th we suddenly put forth our counter-proposal. Now for anyone to say that I was pressed by a certain group and had to fall in line reveals a gross misunderstanding of my character and intentions and it hurts my feelings very much. My reasons for not informing the Germans before is as I have said and I was only anxious to do the right thing and not get involved in something uncertain.

(Part 4 of 4).

From beginning to end I have always been interested in maintaining the integrity of the Tri-Partite Pact and, therefore, although I did tell a few people what was going on, I refrained from giving the Military or any other group any information. (This had nothing to do with the influence of the group who wishes to maintain the so-called status quo mentioned in your #569[a]. It is rather the Army and Navy who are zealous.) Yes, I waited a whole week before I sent in a reply and the fact that our counter-proposal was made at the psychological moment is proven by the fact that the President postponed his address scheduled on the 14th. In any event, hereafter I will continue as I have always done in endeavoring to keep in touch with the Germans and Italians, but on the other hand we are a free country, aren't we? When it comes to the exercise of our policy, we do not have on every occasion to run to Germany and Italy and ask their advice, do we? It is not as if we were scheming to renounce the Tri-Partite Pact in the slightest. There is not a single one in the whole Government who would think of such a thing. Let your mind be at peace on that score. I suppose that by now Germany (and Italy) are convinced that we are on the right side. In any case, they have no reason to fear. Furthermore, I have on several occasions subsequently endeavored to satisfy OTT[b] that everything is satisfactory and I suppose he has so advised his Government; however, I want to trouble you, also, to once more explain everything carefully to Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP.

[a]See II, 532.
[b]German Ambassador in Tokyo.

Trans. (Not dated)

No. 536

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) May 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo #631.

About two weeks ago, the American Ambassador mentioned that conversations have started between the Foreign Minister and Ambassador Grew. Therefore, I called on him today to inquire how the conversations were progressing. He said that although he has not received any information from his government, he feels that discussions on far-reaching problems, including the question of the United State's aid to China, are taking place.

He suggested that I renew my inquiry in due time as he expects to get in touch with his government regarding this matter shortly.

I agreed to this, but as he reiterated the impossibility of Japanese-American war, I explained to him that our country is definitely opposed to fighting America and that from what little knowledge I have of military science, an out and out battle engagement between the two forces would be impossible but if a war between America and Germany is provoked by the American fleet, Japan is obligated by the terms of the treaty to fight against America. This, I said, has been declared time and again by our Premier.

Thereupon, he replied that there is very little likelihood of the American fleet taking the initiative in provoking war with Germany. On the contrary, Germany would be the one to take the initiative.

I then told him that in the event of this kind it would be very difficult to decide which party is the aggressor and Japan is very anxious that American fleet forces refrain from taking action which might provoke a German-American war.

Our opinions concurred on the present German-Soviet relations, namely that the much talked about German attack on U.S.S.R. will not materialize, unless the present war extends into next year and the German supply of materials becomes exhausted. I also told him that according to newspapers, the American-Soviet relations appear to be gradually becoming worse and -----. If there is no objection, please let me know the gist of conversations between you and Ambassador Grew.

Trans. 6-5-41

No. 537

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) May 27, 1941
TO: Berlin (Koshi) #446.

You mention in your message #568[a] that during my conversations with Ambassador Ott, I told him that Japan would enter the war in the event that a Soviet-German war broke out.

The truth of the matter is that during the above mentioned conversation I said that it would be practically impossible to foretell what the attitude the government of Japan would take at the time of such an eventuality would be. I did, however, say that as my personal opinion I could not visualize Japan not striking at the Soviet Union from the (Manchukuo?) area if war was declared between Germany and the Soviet Union. I added that this would be the case even if no Tripartite Pact existed. This was the extent of my statement to the Ambassador.

I need not here add that this statement in no way differed from the meat of my conversations with Dictator Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop when I met with them recently.

When the opportunity arises, will you please clarify this matter to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop? I have had the Vice Minister explain this point to Ambassador Ott.

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[a]See II, 531.

Trans. 5-29-41

No. 538

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) May 28, 1941
TO: Berlin # 458.

Strictly secret.

I would like to have you immediately communicate the following as this Minister's personal message to Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP:

"In view of the current international situation which so deeply involves my country, and of the internal situation within Japan, this Minister sincerely hopes that the German Government, insofar as is possible, will avoid a military clash with the Soviet."

The above you can tell him outspokenly as a friend, but further in this connection, should you have any additional ideas, please express them to him with candor.

Trans. 5-29-41

No. 539

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 4, 1941
TO: Berlin # 481.

Re your # 581[a].

I suppose you can just about understand what I meant in my # 458[b]. As a matter or principle, it is a foregone conclusion that for the government of any country to regulate within its own circles the discussion of matters of grave importance to the state is within the realm of impossibility. Furthermore, if this leaks out to the public, there is the danger that it might uselessly cause hectic speculation. What you say is, in general, correct, but on the basis of what I have just said, my intention is to slowly watch this trend of events and, until I can no longer hold my peace, to refrain from bringing up the matter you mention for government discussion. I want you, also, to keep this in mind and keep me posted constantly with intelligence revealing the course of Russo-German relations.

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[a] Not available.

[b] MATSUOKA advises OSIMA to tell RIBBENTROP not to have any trouble with Russia because conditions in Japan would not, at present, favor that country doing anything about it. See II, 538.

Trans. 6-11-41

No. 540

FROM: Tokyo June 20, 1941
TO: Moscow # 625.

Re your # 666[a].

Referring to your report of 7 June, recommending that Japan take steps to settle the Russo-German differences peacefully.

As I have advised you, twice and thrice have I advised Germany to endeavor to win the cooperation of the Soviet, but I fear that things have already gone too far and that there is scant hope of such a possibility. However, if you see any chance of this, will you please let me know and I will send you some instructions.

---

[a]See II, 540A in which Ambassador TATEKAWA says he feels it is incumbent on Japan to effect a delay in the German-Russian crisis and asks for instructions.

Trans. 6–24–41

No. 540A

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) 7 June 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #666.

In summing up the various information at hand, Germany is preparing to make certain important demands on Russia, which will be backed up by threat of resorting to force.

In view of Japan's relation to Germany through the Tripartite Pact and also her relation to Russia through the Neutrality Pact, I feel that it is incumbent on Japan to effect a delay in the crisis by intervention, and to urge Russia to either join the Axis or collaborate closely with the anti-British, anti-United States groups.

However, in the event that Germany submits her demands to Russia, Japan should warn Russia in a friendly manner to accept the demands, in order to avoid war.

That this course is consistent can be seen from the talks you have had with Stalin.

Please send me instructions as soon as you have prepared the details for the warning note mentioned above.

Trans. 6–10–41

No. 541

FROM: Tokyo May 27, 1941
TO: Moscow #533.

In connection with revising the relations between the United States and Japan, unofficial conversations were being conducted between Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull for some time. On the 16th of last month (before this Minister's arrival home) the U.S. government presented a broad secret "understanding" agreement, which was aimed at revising the relationship between the two countries.

We studies their proposed plans from the viewpoints of;

(1) The absolute impermissability of its affecting the Tripartite Pact in any way, since the latter is the basis of our national policy.

(2) The prevention of the United States from convoying ships to England and also of the United States from entering the war, since that would bring about a chaotic world which would probably develop into the complete destruction of human civilization.

(3) Having the United States cease her aid to the Chiang regime.

As a result of studying the matter carefully from these various angles, we had Ambassador Nomura submit out counter proposal, the gist of which follows:

1. Clarification of the fact that the Tripartite Pact is an instrument for defense. Its aims are to prevent the spreading of the war and to guarantee the safety and the well being of our own country. We should now cooperate in the matter of avoidance of taking belligerent steps, but instead, remain strictly neutral. We agree not to aid one of the belligerents while hindering the other, which constitutes, in actuality, an act of war.

2. Japan asks the United States to recognize the three basic principles promulgated by Konoye, the Nanking Treaty, and the cooperation between Japan, Manchukuo, and China. At the same time, we ask that the United States urge the Chiang regime to cease hostilities, and refuse Chiang aid in the event that it is refused.

3. Counter ways and means of mutually guaranteeing the supplying of materials needed by the other. Moreover, the United States shall cooperate with Japan in the latter's peaceful exploitation of the southwest Pacific area.

4. Cooperation between the two countries to prevent countries which are neutral at the present (from entering the war), and guarantee their independence.

We have not, as yet, received the official reaction to our proposals.

There are only a very few persons in both countries who have knowledge of these proceedings. It is being kept a strict secret to all other persons. Please bear this in mind and keep this information to yourself. Under no circumstances, permit this information to leak out.

Relay to England, France, Italy.

Trans. 5–31–41

No. 542

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) May 12, 1941
TO: Berlin # 399.

Re my # 395[a].

Regarding the present shortage of bottoms, according to the communications officials:

a. There has been an increased amount of maritime shipping because of the "New Order in East Asia" policy.

b. *Because of the use of vessels for military purposes and other special needs, any increase in bottoms is extremely difficult.*

c. The situation is very dark because of changes in Europe, making it difficult to purchase or lease ships. We are able to take care of not more than 60 per cent of our maritime shipments. Because of the lack of transportation for the necessary materials purchased by Japan from South America and other overseas points, it is extremely detrimental to make any increase (from April to June it would amount to 20,000 tons). *If we should take over German shipments, it would be an extremely great sacrifice to pay. This is for your information only.*

[a] Not available.

Trans. 5–15–41

No. 543

FROM: Tokyo — May 17, 1941
TO: Berlin — # 415.

On the 16th I presented to Ambassador Ott the figures given by the Director of the Bureau of Commercial Affairs regarding the supply of rubber for Germany from French Indo-China, Netherlands East Indies, and Thailand, and spoke to him as follows, but he said that he had asked his government for instructions and would have to await the result before answering.

Japan's yearly imports of rubber are as follows: raw rubber, about 50,000 tons; scrap rubber, about 30,000 tons; and other than this about 10,000 tons of raw rubber for Manchuria. However, at present, importation from Malaya is cut off. The importation of the 30,000 tons of scrap rubber from America is now prohibited. And of the amount agreed upon from Netherlands East Indies, about half has been purchased during the first half of the year, or about 9,000 tons. (However, of this amount about 6,000 tons has gone to Germany and Italy.) Hence, we can expect nothing from these before July, and according to the above source of information, i.e., the Commerce Bureau, we can not be certain about imports after July. Again in Thailand at present the German merchants are cornering the market without regard to price so til now, we have made absolutely no purchases in F.I.C., and have done our best to expedite the supply to Germany. As is clear from the above, Japan has sacrificed her own interests for Germany as a result of which the rubber situation has become acute in Japan and some factories have had to close down. Therefore we request that of the 6,250 tons of rubber from French Indo-China, (scheduled to arrive in Japan soon), Japan be allowed to appropriate for her own use 3,500 tons. The amount to be replaced as soon as conditions permit.

Trans. 5-19-41

No. 544

FROM: Tokyo — May 22, 1941
TO: Berlin — # 435.

Secret outside the Department

Re my # 415[a].

On the 22d the Chief of the Commerce Bureau called on TISSHU[b] in order to urge him anew to agree to our appropriation of 3,500 tons. According to a wire from Saigon, it is understood that they are prepared to send 5,375 tons bound for Germany as the June allotment, in addition to which it is understood that it is going to be possible for them to supply Japan by the middle of July. Therefore, it is understood that he proposed a postscript to the effect that we will, as a matter of course, make restoration to them of this 3,500 tons when it is convenient for us to do so.

In view of the fact that the War, Naval and Foreign Offices are in accord in this matter, we would like to have you, too, negotiate with the German Government in order that they may, in so far as possible, accept this plan. Please wire me the results.

---

[a] MATSUOKA tells Berlin of presenting to German Ambassador OTT the figures regarding supply of rubber for Germany from French Indo-China, Netherlands East Indies and Thailand and also statement of Japan's yearly imports of rubber. See II, 543.

[b] Kana spelling

This is a request message in which Tokyo tells Berlin: "In order to facilitate the whole problem of Germany's rubber needs, we are negotiating with WOHLTHAT. Please press the matter of the 3,500 tons we desire to appropriate and wire the result."

Trans. 6-4-41

No. 545

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Rome

June 3, 1941

Re your #291[a] and #320[a].

Our subsequent negotiations with Germany regarding tin have not made much progress. We are trying to acquire an increase in the allotment for ourselves. However, as a result of separate negotiations with Italy we have arranged for this time only to purchase 150 tons of tin ore which we will refine and then sell to Italy.

This is for your information only.

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[a] Not Available.

Trans. 6-19-41

No. 546

FROM: Berlin (Japanese Ambassador)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

June 9, 1941
#658.

The German newspapers are manifesting great interest in the Dutch-Japanese trade negotiations as well as in various problems concerning collaboration and rights in Greater East Asia. It will be necessary to explain these matters to Germany eventually, so I would appreciate an early telegram regarding the Dutch reply and the trend of the negotiation.

Regarding the matter in your #475[a] of June 3rd, it is handled as indicated in my #472[b]. Is your #442[b] to be Chief of Office Routing? Please reply.

---

[a] Dated 3 June: Inquiry by Tokyo regarding reasons for improving Germans air communications to Chungking.

[b] Not available.

Berlin gives a complete explanation of this in his #695 of June 16th.

Trans. 6-21-41

No. 547

FROM: Berlin (Osima) June 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #693.

Re your #511[a].

Will you please reply by wire at once regarding the following points:

1. Do we have the confidence of being able to purchase the quantity included in the schedule for June 1 and thereafter, and are you of the intention of Germany selling us the same?

2. Has Germany's schedule for the period beginning July 1 been made known to our government?

3. Comparative figures on past purchases by Japan and Germany of rubber produced in Thailand.

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[a]Not available.

Trans. 6-18-41

No. 548

FROM: Berlin (Osima) June 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #733.

(Urgent).

(Re your #511[a], our #512[b].

On the 20th MATSUSHIMA[c], in accordance with your instructions, made representations to the Chief of the Commerce Bureau, WIEHL. WIEHL said (1) that although he would accommodate the Japanese by lending them 2500 tons in accordance with our desires, the Japanese were to accept the previous second proposal, and today or tomorrow this proposal will be telegraphed to the Ambassador in Tokyo; (a) there will be no hindrances to the Japanese purchase of rubber from French Indo-China and Thailand. The inability of Germany to make purchases would be suitably adjusted. Today or tomorrow a new plan will be presented to us regarding the policy of Thailand rubber. It is intended to telegraph this proposal directly to Tokyo. (3) The amount of rubber left over after shipments have been made to the United States and France proper will be divided between Japan and Germany. As yet, no information has been received, but I understand that he answered that proper study of this must be made.

MATSUSHIMA asked regarding the contents of this new proposal, but as yet no definite decision has been reached. I believe that this will bring about a noticeable change in the German and Japanese imports from French Indo-China and Thailand.

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[a]Not available.
[b]Plain text message.
[c]Jap Minister at Berlin.

Trans. 7-11-41

No. 549

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) May 26, 1941
TO: Mexico #90.

(Courtesy Message—To be kept secret within the Department)

The German Ambassador in Tokyo has asked us a favor. When the German Minister in Mexico hands over to you 200,000 American dollars belonging to Germany, which has been kept in Mexico, will you please be very careful to handle this in such a way that it is not discovered by anyone. Address it to this office as personal property of yours and send it on a Japanese ship.

Trans. 7-7-41

No. 550

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 9, 1941
TO: Berlin (Koshi) #490.

The Army has suggested that in order to increase the usefulness of Major General Takuma Shimoyama, who is leaving for Germany shortly, they would like to give him the title of Military Attaché for Aviation, attached to your office, and limited to service there. As we do not have a separate air force in Japan, to appoint a military air attaché in addition to the present military attaché might seem a bit irregular, but if the country concerned consents to it, it ought to be all right, and unless ----- please have the military attaché briefly inform them of the plan. According to the Army authorities, Lieut-General Banzai was accredited in the capacity of military attaché with additional duty of air attaché; but we were unaware of this.

If this is true, it would be sufficient merely to inform the Germans that Lieut-General Banzai has been relieved of his additional duties, and that Major General Shimoyama is assuming those duties. If this will not do, we will have to give study to the matter of the division of duties of the present assistant attache, and the aviation officer.

Please give us your opinion by return dispatch.

The Naval authorities also ----- (garbled out).

Trans. 6-24-41

No. 551

FROM: Berlin (Jap Ambassador) June 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #741.

Regarding your #490[a] and #525[b]:

The local military attaché is at present submitting his opinions to the General Staff Headquarters. As soon as a reply is received, we will give it further considerations, and send you a reply dispatch.

---

[a] Re-title for Maj. Gen. Shimoyama as Military Air Attaché. See II, 550.

[b] Not available.

Trans. 6-24-41

No. 552

FROM: Rome June 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #341.

Re my last year's #323[a].

Well, semi-official KANAKURA has taken office and, from the point of view of the work involved in our cultural plans, I think it quite feasible to place here in Rome a correspondent of the International Cultural Advancement Society, particularly considering the importance of the work and the part we play in it here. In order to unify our cultural plans, I think that one of the terms should be that this work should be directed by myself and I would like for you to appoint Mr. SOICHI NOGAMI as the correspondent. Will you please pass the word on to the Society mentioned and help them realize our plans?

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 6-5-41

No. 553

FROM: Rome (Horikiri) June 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #393.

Re your circular #1148[a].

The printed materials which we have received have been highly suitable and have been distributed. In order that we may awaken a great deal of interest in Japan, other newspapers, magazines and articles could be given to the writers here as basic materials and would achieve a very beneficial result. Recently there has been a great increase in the fad of studying things concerning Japan. As I believe that more and more effort will be devoted to increasing the printing of matter along this line, please continue to send copies, especially of the Pictorial Orient, Contemporary Japan, Oriental Affairs, East Asia Economic Intelligence Series and Nippon Japan Yearbook. These are especially commented upon, and please inquire in order that increasing amounts of these may be sent every twenty days or so.

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[a]Not available.

Trans. 6-25-41

No. 554

FROM: Rome (Horikiri) June 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo No number.

To the Personnel Chief:

TOYAMA[a] has a bad reputation among the Japanese here. There is no place here for anyone trying to further trade at present. I know nothing of his ability nor whether he would submit

to the discipline of the Foreign Office. I have talked this over with some of my people and we don't think he would be suitable as a Commercial Attache here.

[a] Head of a trade promotion office in Rome.

Trans. 7-12-41

No. 555

FROM: Berlin May 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #541.

Strictly Secret.

The same gentleman whom I quoted in my #540[a] told me confidentially the following with regard to the general European question:

"1. CHANCELLOR HITLER had conversations with DARLAN in Berchtesgaden which were conducted in a most amiable atmosphere. HITLER was well impressed by DARLAN. I do not know but what in the future policies with regard to France will center around DARLAN rather than LAVAL. The Franco-German talks covered the use of French colonies as German military bases and the use of the French Navy for convoying French shipping. Syria is a great problem but in the event of American participation in the war Dakar will assume a much greater importance. (According to a special report, it is rumored that already German troops have landed even in Algeria.) WEYGAND, too, is aware of this. This, of course, is an unofficial report but on the surface at least there is nothing to contradict it.

"2. The Soviet unchangingly has been faithfully carrying out her supply of goods. Furthermore, in certain quarters she has withdrawn her troops from the border but whether this is in anticipation of war or with the intention of avoiding war, is not clear. The preparations of the German authorities are progressing on schedule but in truth the decision as to whether war will arise rests entirely with no man other than CHANCELLOR HITLER. However, it is a fact that it is being said that the German Army is confident that within a few weeks it would be able to carry European Russia before it.

"3. The transportation of arms and munitions to Iraq is scheduled to begin soon with the tacit consent of Turkey. It is thought that the air arm, too, will within a very few days arrive on the spot. In the event that Turkey's attitude becomes none too pleasing, I do not know but what Syria might be offered to her.

"4. Germany has decided that Italy shall have domination over the eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, the ----- is as I have told you previously and in the future Egypt too will come under the Italian sphere of influence. At the same time that Germany on the one hand grants Italy a sphere of influence over the eastern Mediterranean, on the other hand she is restraining demands upon the French which already are making for joint German-French collaboration."

[a] The person to whom this message refers is spoken of in message #540 as "a certain authoritative German." See II, 519.

Trans. 5-17-41

No. 556

FROM: Tokyo — June 3, 1941
TO: Nanking, Shanghai, Tientsin, Peking and Hsinking — No. 1175.

(Circular). Message from Berlin # 619 on May 30th.

(Part 1 of 4)[a].

Airplanes and mechanized forces are utilized to the maximum in the present large war. Air power especially is of great importance. It is the natural thing that large scale wars in Europe take place during the latter part of spring. Germany has been making intense preparations since the war against France. As the advent of good weather has been delayed more than a month in comparison to usual years, it might be said that as yet the proper atmospheric conditions have not occurred. You were able to confirm all of this during your visit to Germany and you also know that Chancellor HITLER is resolved to bring about an end to this war as soon as possible. There is no room for doubt that the beginning of a great war (battle) is to take place. This could take any of the following forms:

a. A direct attack and occupation of England proper;
b. A complete sweeping away of English power from the eastern Mediterranean;
c. A war embracing Iraq;
d. A North African battle taking in Egypt and the Suez;
e. The taking of Gibraltar;
f. A war in the territory surrounding Dakar;
g. And, finally, a war against the Soviet.

The manner of carrying this out and the time of its execution are entirely a secret plan of Chancellor HITLER's. As yet it is still too early to know exactly the course of events but the previously mentioned points are clearly indicated.

1. The Germans' chief object is the destruction and over-throw of England, but as yet it is too early to understand the trend of developments. Although submarines and air bombardment are worldwide in scope and are important, it is believed that if this struggle is continued to the bitter end, terrestrial war movements will be the decisive factor.

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[a] Part 2 and 3 of 4, which say that in an epoch-making effort, HITLER is destroying the power of Britain. Now she has to adjust her relations with the Soviet. Perhaps she could defeat the Soviet and England at the same time but she might have to make up with England. See II, 557, 558, 560.

Trans. 6-9-41

No. 557

FROM: Tokyo — June 3, 1941
TO: Nanking, Shanghai, Tienstin, Peking and Hsinking — # 1175.

(Circular). Message from Berlin # 619 on May 30th.

(Part 2 of 4)[a].

2. From the German viewpoint, it is necessary to pulverize the power of the British Empire. This has already been started. At a glance, it seems necessary that the Germans concentrate all their war resources to obtain their objective of destroying this power. Although it is seen

that this is a problem of proper placement, the German war effort of defending their country to the maximum extent as they state they are doing is an epoch-making achievement. HITLER, in the use of this immense war power, is not limited to one locality, but it is judged that a shifting form of warfare is at his disposal.

3. Reference is made to my series of telegrams regarding German-Soviet relations (especially #413[b]). The adjustment of difficulties between the two countries is seen to be an inevitable development. It need not be said that this forms an indispensable element in the new order in Europe. In respect to Germany's war with England, it would be possible for her at the same time to prepare and carry out an annihilating movement against the Russian Army within a short period. Taking into consideration the oft repeated loyalty of the Germans and all other factors and HITLER's attitude, would a favorable result be brought in time (if the indicated development continues?)? The only other alternative would be rapprochement with England. Not a few calculations point out that no matter what turn German war effort takes, the important point (climax?) will begin within this year.

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[a]Part 1 of 4. See II, 556.
[b]Not available.

Trans. 6-6-41

No. 558

FROM: Tokyo June 3, 1941
TO: Nanking, Shanghai, Tientsin, Peking and Hsinking #1175.

(Circular). Message from Berlin #619 on May 30th.

(Part 3 of 4).

4. At the present time, the German Naval, Air and Army forces amount to 10,000,000 men (another source indicates 12,000,000). First-class fighting planes number from 10,000 to 15,000; second-class fighting planes (planes which could be converted into superior first-class planes) number 20,000; and third-class fighting planes (training ships and civil aircraft) number 30,000. The monthly production is 2,000 planes. It is clearly evident that all this constitutes a variable reserve of power for the Germans. It appears that the number of submarines exceeds 200. For the short period just ended from the Polish war until the end of the Balkan campaign there has been almost no manufacture of arms and munitions because a surplus had been accumulated. All attention has been focused upon the construction of airplanes and submarines. It is seen that since the beginning of the war, as a result of all the battles, a small number, exceeding 40,000 men, has been killed. As a reflection of the great war result achieved, I believe that the German Army forms an irresistable force and is capable of carrying out a type of fearless and audacious warfare never before conceived.

Trans. 6-6-41

No. 559

FROM: Berlin June 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo #696.

Re my #637[a].

Subject: A summary of the war reports from June 1st to the 15th. (However, for the military operations in Crete see the first part of my message.)

1. Although both sides continue the aerial warfare, there is no intensity of it.
2. Tonnage of English shipping losses are as follows:
   By aerial attack: 17,400 tons
   By submarine attack: 128,800 tons.
3. In the eastern Mediterranean, having obtained the surrender of Crete, the Luftwaffe has taken up the bombing of Alexandria, Haifa (Joppa) and Cyprus.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 8-8-41

No. 560

FROM: Tokyo June 3, 1941
TO: Nanking, Shanghai, Tientsin, Peking and Hsinking #1175.

(Circular). Message from Berlin #619 on May 30th.

(Part 4 of 4).

5. The German people in general desire that peace be established. Although this is natural, their confidence in Chancellor HITLER's plan of achieving victory is growing more and more. They are firm in not slackening up in their (war effort?). It has come about that in their effort to protect their country, the over 10 million men in the regular army and the leaders and members of the Party have become fused into one solid unit.

6. It is seen that at present the Germans are utilizing in this way their excess power. The time and manner of utilizing this and its potentiality is based upon the inclinations of Berlin. The explanation is that Germany is in a much more favorable position now than she was during the last great war when her only allies were Austria and Hungary, at which time she was fighting on all fronts against England, Imperialistic Russia, Italy, the Balkan States, Japan and the United States. If in the event that the United States should enter the war, it is seen that the Atlantic would form an obstacle, if Germany should take England, she would begin the establishment of a New Order in Europe and would signify that this battle of military power would not last long.

The Economic and Military Attaches have assisted in the preparation of this report.

Trans. 6-9-41

No. 561

FROM: Berlin June 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #639.

Very urgent.

(Part 1 of ?) Part 1 only available.

There follows the gist of a conversation I have had with Chancellor HITLER:

1. First of all, the Chancellor expressed confidence in a complete victory in this war and then went on to state with conviction that the Reichswehr has gradually made many improvements in organization, preparations, artillery and ordnance through experience and instruction since the beginning of the war, and since the war in western Yugoslavia ended two months ago, preparations have been completely finished. He was particular to say that he had the greatest confidence in the power of leadership of all his leaders from the highest to the lowest as well as in the bravery of his troops, and then declared that the losses of the German Army so far have been surprisingly small, death casualties not exceeding in general 10% of ordinary mortality figures within the Reich itself. He said, "For the dead and for their bereaved families, I have the deepest sympathy, but at last the time had come when Germany had no alternative but to move, and this extent of sacrifice was inevitable. After all, our sacrifices now are relatively small, but I am absolutely certain that had we waited 5 or 10 years, the sacrifice would have been infinitely greater."

2. HITLER said, "The seizure of Crete was accomplished entirely by aerial tactics, which is a new strategy. In this struggle we sunk 8 battleships and took 12,000 prisoners. Now we have come to the point where we can and will bomb Alexandria. Well, I can tell you one thing for sure. I am absolutely determined to bring England to absolute annihilation. Look at the way England acts! She is devilishly cunning at heart. She is first, last, and always a schemer thinking only of her own good. In 1935, during the Ethiopian war, the British Government invited me to join them in clamping down on Italy, but I knew perfectly well that as soon as Italy was overthrown we Germans would be next, so I immediately joined up with the Italians. Now the thing for us Japanese, Germans and Italians to do is to continue more and more to strengthen the ties which bind us because in my heart I know that it will be to our mutual advantage. Yesterday MUSSOLINI told me exactly the same thing."

Note: OSIMA tells of conversations with HITLER and RIBBENTROP at Salsburg on June 3rd and 4th, saying details will be sent in separate wire.

Trans. 6-6-41

No. 562

FROM: Berlin (Osima) June 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #643.

When I talked with Foreign Minister Ribbentrop on the 4th, he stated that there were not a few editorials and articles appearing in Japanese newspapers reflecting moves to divorce Japan and Germany. He showed me the article contained in my #520[a] and other editorials and articles and asked me to see that more attention was paid to this sort of thing. I replied that we differ from Germany in this respect, and do not exercise control over the press, and

that although I did not think the Imperial Government would do anything about it, I would transmit his statement thereto.

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[a]See II, 562A in which Germany complains about unfriendly articles appearing in Japanese newspapers.

Trans. 6-7-41

No. 562A

FROM: Berlin (Osima) May 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #630.

1. DNA and other agencies, without giving details, send in articles and editorials appearing in our newspapers and the German authorities are becoming rather alarmed. Every time they receive something which displeases them because they consider it disadvantageous or delicate, referring to German-Soviet relations (for example, the article published by the Neoshi on May 5th and the article about Iraq in the Lakrumin of the 3rd), they come to me and complain. Well, all I can do is explain to them the difference between our way of doing things and the German way of doing things as far as the press is concerned.

2. Through a most rigorous control of the press, Germany supresses all reports unfavorable to Japan. Not only that but she follows a policy of treating everything concerning Russia with silent contempt and the tendency is to make as little reference thereto as possible. When STALIN assumed the Premiership of the Soviet, you would be surprised at what tiny reports appeared in the German papers concerning this.

3. Please take note of the above facts and see that the press is given better guidance hereafter.

Trans. 5-21-41

No. 563

FROM: Rome June 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #356.

(Part 2 of 2.)[a]

Strictly Secret.

3. I: "Well, it seems to me that it is necessary to divest Syria and Iraq of British influence and for Germany and Italy to get the oil and raw materials in those areas in their own hands. It is being said that Bagdad has been occupied by the British Army. Do Germany and Italy intend to let things drift along in that area for the time being?"

CIANO: "No reports concerning the war in those quarters have come to my hands, so right now I can make you no answer."

4. I: "You know I have been hearing lately that relations between Berlin and Moscow are not so good. What do you know about it?"

CIANO: "Well, I know for a fact that they are not quite so friendly as they once were, but the actual strength of the Soviet is by far less than that of Germany. STALIN knows that well enough, and consequently he will in all probability compromise and there is not likely to be any fighting."

5. I: "What do you think of ROOSEVELT's recent speech?"

CIANO: "MUSSOLINI has been studying it very closely. We cannot tell how this speech will be put into practice from now on. All we can do is wait and see."

6. I: "What was said at the BRENNER conference?"

CIANO: "Well, it concerned political and military generalities. Really there is not much I can tell you about it. You know, Croatia is about to enter the Tripartite Pact, and I understand the Protocol will be signed in Venice on the 14th."

Relayed to Berlin and Moscow.

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[c]See II, 568 for Part 1.

Trans. 6–7–41

No. 564

FROM: Rome — June 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo — No number.

Today, the 4th, ANDO[a] had an interview with PRUNAS[b] and asked with what object BŌSU[c] was here in Rome. PRUNAS replied, "BŌSU wishes to stir up a revolution in India with the assistance of Germany, Italy and Japan, and he wishes to make Europe the headquarters for this revolution. He wishes to talk to various officials of ours. That is why he is here. As yet, however, he has not conferred with Premier MUSSOLINI or Foreign Minister CIANO. In the meantime, he is interviewing our high officials and before long the attitude of the Italian Government should become clear. This fellow, BŌSU, is quite a character. However, we are not quite sure whether he could be used as the central figure in a revolution in India." ANDO then replied, "Well, I would like to meet the man and talk personally with him. What do you say?" PRUNAS replied, "Why, certainly! Go ahead!", thereupon giving ANDO his assumed name and his address. When ANDO confers with BŌSU, if there are any points concerning any Hindu revolutionaries in Japan which he should have in mind and discuss, please wire me back immediately.

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[a]Counselor at Jap Embassy, Rome.
[b]Director General of Transoceania Bureau of Italian Foreign Office.
[c]Kana spelling, BOSE(?).

Trans. 6–7–41

No. 565

FROM: Tokyo — June 9, 1941
TO: Rome — # 150.

Regarding the last part of your message of June 6th.[a]

(1) The FUOAUADO BUROKU[b], which is led by BOSU[c], has, recently, completely broken away from the Congress Party. Its stronghold is in "BO's"*** native province of Bengal and is said to have a membership of 1,000,000.

Since the Congress Party under Gandhi is taking the illogical and unrealistic stand of opposing the active participation in the war by East Indians, the F.B.[b] can be considered the only truly anti-British group.

(2) Although there is a Japanese branch of the Congress Party organized by resident Indians, it is doubtful whether it has any direct dealing with the main party in India. Others, here, are the type that go no further than to talk against England and there is no one that will be influential in India.

(3) "BO"[c] got in touch with our Ambassador in Berlin during his stay in Germany, and in accordance with his wish we have agreed to handle the liaison between him and his party in India. Therefore, when you meet "BO"[c], please bear the above in mind and do nothing more than listen to what he has to say.

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[a]Subhas Bose is in Rome arranging with Axis leaders to set up headquarters for carrying out his plans for revolution in India. The Jap Counsellor is to interview him shortly. See II, 564.

[b]Forward Bloc (?).

[c]Subhas Bose, Indian independence advocate. Deported from India. Has been living in Berlin.

Trans. 6-9-41

No. 566

FROM: Lisbon June 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #91.

(Revised Translation)

When I interviewed the German Acting Minister, I inquired as to Germany's attitude toward Portugal in the event of Spain's participation in the Tripartite Alliance. He made the statement that though the entire decision rested with HITLER, he did not believe that Germany would insist upon her participation.

Relayed to Germany and Italy. Have forwarded by mail in code form to Spain.

Trans. 6-16-41

No. 567

FROM: Berlin (Japanese Ambassador) May 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #585.

(Part 1 of 3.)

The following is information given on the 21st to a member of this office by a reliable German; however, inasmuch as it contains not a few points having to do with future plans of Germany, please handle the information with precaution.

1. The German landing of troops on the island of Crete has not yet been made public since it is the custom of the German Government not to publish anything until a certain degree of success has been achieved. Nevertheless, the strategy is being carried out as planned. Although the British forces are at present putting up a stiff resistance, German victory is expected to be announced in two or three days.

2. Although outwardly Turkey gives a different impression, she is in fact getting closer and closer to the Axis. Shipments of arms and ammunition to Iraq have already been carried out through Turkish territory and troops are being sent by air by way of Syria. The air forces dispatched to Syria are of considerable strength. These forces are being used not only for the purpose of giving assistance to Iraq but with the control of the entire Near East in view. It is

also with a view of making them instrumental in prosecution in the future of a political policy toward India.

3. Since the conclusion of the agreement between Germany and France, both the German and Italian expeditionary forces to Africa are to land at Tunis. Because of this understanding, dispatching of troops has become considerably easier and an attack on the Suez is expected to be carried out from this point through Egypt.

4. Cooperation between Germany and France is being furthered by negotiations being carried on in Paris between ABETZ[a] and DARLAN, on the basis of the conference previously held between HITLER and DARLAN. Discussions have already been completed in regard to freeing of war prisoners, alleviation of French responsibilities in the occupied territories, and the lessening of distinction between the occupied and unoccupied territories. It is expected that in the future questions will be dealt with in such a manner as they would be more favorable to the French. On the agenda have been placed such questions as the return of the Vichy Government to Paris (date indefinite) and supplying food to France (in case France is completely blockaded by Britain and the United States.)

[a]German Ambassador to Vichy.

Trans. 6-12-41

No. 568

FROM: Rome
TO: Moscow

June 6, 1941
356.

(Part 1 of 2.)[a]

Strictly secret.

On the 6th, I called on CIANO and congratulated him on the conquest of Crete, after which our conversation ran as follows:

1. I: "If you launch a real offensive on a major scale, I certainly do not believe it would be very difficult to defeat the British Isles. At least, theoretically speaking, the combined navies of Germany and Italy ought to make possible a successful land invasion. Judging from events so far, it looks at least this should be possible. What do you think about it?"

CIANO: "To be sure, theoretically it is as you say perhaps, but when it comes to facts, it is not quite as simple as you seem to think. Judging from the fleet protecting the British Isles, her Island defenses and her air arm, such as invasion would not be so easy."

2. I: "The fall of Crete must certainly have made a deep impression on the various people in the Near East. I do not think that any time ought to be lost in continuing the fight on to Alexandria and Suez. Do you not think that this is an excellent opportunity?"

CIANO: "It is as you say, and we are now gradually preparing to do that; still, when it begins to get hot, I fear that we are going to find it tough going in the torrid zones of the south."

[a]See II, 563 for Part 2.

Trans. 6-7-41

No. 569

FROM: Vichy (Harada) May 10, 1941
TO: Washington No number.

Message to Tokyo # 230.

For your reference the following is given of the conversations held with the German officials on the 9th:

1. DARLAN went to Paris twice on the 9th. This is in connection with the negotiations which are going on at this time regarding the economical collaboration. The French-German political relations have become much smoother.

2. The Germans have been sufficiently satisfied with the progress of the negotiations regarding closer economic collaboration. The question of the manufacture of military trucks has been satisfactorily compromised.

3. It is believed that the Germans do not have any definite demands in regard to the improvement of traffic between occupied and unoccupied territories or regarding the amount of the reduction in the payment by France to Germany. It is not known but what the strict neutrality of French North Africa has been requested in respect to the development of war conditions concerning Gibraltar.

4. The Germans would receive no benefit from the worsening of Iran's position, who is -----, the French Navy. It is thought that in respect to the two points of German negotiations with DARLAN and at the same time the ----- in connection with LAVAL, are progressing.

5. With the closer economic collaboration between Germany and France, the position of the United States has been worsened. In spite of his belonging to the naval fleet, LEAHY's smooth relations with DARLAN have been limited. It is seen here at this time that this Ambassador has been unable to carry out his mission.

Relayed to Berlin, Rome, London, Washington, and Moscow.

Trans. 5-17-41

No. 570

FROM: Vichy (Kato) May 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 256.

Re: My # 255[a].

According to a member of the German Foreign Office Staff in Vichy on the 14th, the meeting of Vice Premier Darlan and Chancellor HITLER will be the basis for the German-French collaboration not only in a political sense but also will include military cooperation; for example, the transport of troop supplies acorss Syria and the offering of sea and air bases in the French colonies in North Africa, as well as the preservation of the French Empire and its colonies, together with the use of the French Navy, are the main points on this collaboration. According to this same official, he believes that the Vichy Government will agree to this at this time.

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[a]Agreement that Germany will guarantee the territorial integrity of France with the exception of Alsace Loraine in exchange for French cooperation in establishing a new order in Europe.

Trans. 5-21-41

No. 571

FROM: Vichy (Kato) May 20, 1941
TO: Washington No number.

Message to Tokyo as # 264.

Re my # 250[a].

Since then French Government sources have avoided committing themselves concerning definite terms for further collaboration with Germany. However, my caption message is quite well backed up by the course of events. BASSE confidentially told me that Germany is supporting Italy's penetration into the Balkans but is denying Rome's demands on Nice, Corsica, and Savoy. On her side, France has quickly obtained the release of 100,000 prisoners (published on the 19th). Furthermore, it would appear that through negotiations Germany is about to reduce the maintenance cost for her army of occupation still further to 240,000,000 francs per day.

The details of the present negotiations have not yet been published but the communique of the 23rd and PETAIN'S radio address of the 15th were designed to sway public favor further toward Germany and in the end the populace will inevitably follow their leaders. DARLAN returned to Paris on the 19th and it appears that his negotiations with the Germans will in all probability go along nicely.

In connection with these negotiations, the United States has taken certain unfavorable steps. ROOSEVELT has made a speech and the American officials have held up French ships. Therefore, casting aside his wonted politeness toward the United States, PETAIN pointed out to Ambassador LEAHY that the assistance afforded France by the United States is not enough. Furthermore, the newspapers are more and more reflecting dissentiment. (*sic*)

Relayed to Berlin, Rome, London, Washington, Moscow and Ankara.

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[a]See II, 569 in which Vichy reports to Tokyo negotiations being carried on between DARLAN and German authorities regarding economic collaboration.

Trans. 5–23–41

No. 572

FROM: Rome June 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 363.

According to information received on the 7th, there is a possibility of the Vichy government concluding a peace treaty with Germany and Italy. This question is said to have been discussed at the recent meeting of Hitler and Mussolini. In conjunction with the above treaty, the questions of Croatia and Nice are expected to be settled.

France is said to be agreeable to joining the Tripartite Pact in order to take part in the establishment of a new order in Europe, and this point also was said to have been discussed by Hitler and Mussolini.

The fact that France is leaning more and more towards the Axis might be a point to bear in mind in connection with Japanese-French Indo China economic agreement.

Trans. 6–9–41

No. 573

FROM: London (Japanese Ambassador) June 10, 1941
TO: Washington #67.

Message to Tokyo #417, June 6, 1941.

Part 2 of 2[a].

3. I said, "Well, the British Government is treating France as though she were an enemy. Only yesteryear she was an ally. Is this not strange and sad? I read in the newspapers reports that German influence is filtering into not only Syria, but also Morocco and Dakar, and the French fleet is still afloat. Will not this have a serious effect upon Great Britain's prosecution of the war?" The Foreign Minister replied, "The attitude that Vichy is taking is proving a source of consternation to both London and Washington, but still we are endeavoring to the last to keep France out of the category of our enemies. It cannot yet be said correctly that the attitude of Vichy is deliberately and flagrantly hostile, only we are watching the movements of its fleet and what takes place in its colonies, trying always to prevent the worse coming to the worst, but still if and when the time comes, we are ready to shoot. When France fell last year, I made a number of trips there with Prime Minister CHURCHILL. LAVAL, DARLAN and, of course, MARSHALL PETAIN have wished most ardently that we British would take the same attitide as Vichy and bring a speedy conclusion to this war. But, we British are determined independently to prosecute it to the end. This angers them to the extreme. Then, too, the question of traditional Anglo-French feelings is a painful one. To tell the truth, the biggest half of the French populace are not with Vichy in spirit.

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[a]Part 1 not available.

Trans. 6-12-41

No. 574

FROM: Vichy (Kato) June 10, 1941
TO: Washington No number.

Message to Tokyo #296.

On the 10th, I called on the Minister of War, General HUNTZIGER. General HUNTZIGER told me the following: "The British troops invading Syria consist of at least three divisions which are made up of British, Australian, and Indian troops. They have approximately 300 tanks and their air force is exceptionally strong. In view of the fact that the French demobilized some time ago, our forces, including native troops, are inferior to the British armed forces on a ratio of two to one. Having practically no tanks, defensive warfare for us will be very difficult and we maintain great fears in the situation. However, our air force in comparison with the British air arm is on a par, if not superior to theirs. Up to today the British have lost 5 planes while we have lost 2. At the present time, the advanced forces of the French Army are maintaining contact with the British attacking units. Though doubtless they will make successive retreats, we believe that we can hold up the British advance in this defensive area. However, the outcome of the war cannot be foretold, especially in view of the fact that one portion of French troops must be maintained close to the Turkish border, in addition to which, though it is most regrettable, we must maintain a considerable force in the rear to preserve peace and order.

"Furthermore, there are approximately 1,000 Frenchmen in the DeGaullist detachments and approximately 2,000 negroid Abyssinian recruits with the British Army. Though there may possibly be other motivating factors in the British mind behind the current incident, it would seem that the DeGaullist faction figured the invasion would be very easy. However, the Arabian native population, being given to discord and lacking in restraint, will be very difficult to control should the war spread because looting and internal strife will develop among them. The British forces will burn their hands on this situation."

Relayed to London, Washington, -----, Rome and Moscow.

Trans. 6-14-41

No. 575

FROM: Ankara
TO: Tokyo

July 12, 1941
137.

The situation in Syria.

1. In spite of the fact that the French Government is doing its very utmost in order to render all assistance to Syria, negotiations with Turkey for the transport of arms has come to naught. Not only is transportation by sea subject to attack by British armed forces, but according to a local French attache, their shortage of ammunition is creating a tremendous problem. This makes the waging of this war practically impossible. Though it be said that from considerations of honor and their relations with the DE GAULLISTS they have already rejected the British proposals, the French realize that the fate of Syria is sealed. Regardless of whatever path they follow, Syria will come under the sway of British occupying forces.

2. Turkey, since the British Army invaded Syria, has strengthened her border troops. At the present time, it seems that she has more than five divisions there. This indicates nothing more or less than that she is prepared for all eventualities. The Turkish authorities, of course, have no intention of abandoning their position to avoid war at all costs.

Trans. 7-17-41

No. 576

FROM: Ankara (Kurihara)
TO: Moscow

June 4, 1941
100.

(Part 1 of 2.)

June 4th: The local Iraqi ministerial authorities told me:

"1. Prior to the outbreak of the recent incident, Iraqi troops were stationed in Bagdad, Jibunie[a], and in the Kirkuk-Mosul[b] area. Bagdad, having fallen into the hands of the pro-British wing, and the Jibunie division's strength dependent upon its geographical location, is limited to nothing more than guerrilla warfare; consequently, henceforth Iraqi ----- ----- ----- depends entirely upon the Kirkuk-Mosul troops under the leadership of General MASUKUTUDO[a]. But two days ago when this General was questioned in regard to his views by the German military representative in Mosul, no answer was forthcoming and it seems that his attitude was not clarified."

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[a]Kana spelling.
[b]Town in Iraq.

Trans. 6-13-41

No. 577

FROM: Ankara (Kurihara) June 4, 1941
TO: Moscow # 100.

(Part 2 of 2.)

"2. The shortage of gasoline has a major importance in the current incident. The French have purchased gasoline from Turkey which was to have been shipped from Constantinople through Turkey on the 1st to Allepo[a] but, because of the shortage of railroad cars, it has been delayed for ----- days in Constantinople. This is indeed regrettable.

"3. At the present time, 900,000 tons of British and American goods bound for Turkey have accumulated in Basra.[b]

"4. The Premier, the Minister of War and the Minister of the Interior in the new Iraqi cabinet are thoroughly pro-British but, on the other hand, the fact that MURIASAIDO[c], considered to be opportunistic (?), was not put into the Cabinet, has divided the pro-British faction into two camps. The assumption of political power henceforth would seem to be in line with Britain's policy."

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[a]Town in northern Syria.
[b]On the Gulf of Persia, a seaport of Iraq.
[c]Kana spelling.

Trans. 6-13-41

No. 578

FROM: Ankara June 14, 1941
TO: Rome No number.

Message from Geneva to Tokyo # 133.

According to paragraph 22 of the Constitution of this country, in case the King has not yet reached his manhood, the former King appoints a regent, but until the regency is recognized by the Parliament, the appointee is not accorded treatment due to a regent, nor allowed to exercise his authority in national affairs. In case the previous King fails to appoint a regent, the Parliament makes the appointment. For this reason, as I have said in my # 128[a], on legal grounds we are not in a position to recognize ABUDORUIRA,[a] who is said to be the regent favored by Great Britain. Under the circumstances, the Cabinet which has been organized under "A"'s influence is an illegitimate body. The German Government, on this account, is maintaining a strong attitude against recognizing the present government. However, in view of the fact that "A" and his Cabinet probably would be in existence no longer than two or three months more, and of the fact that considerable inconvenience would be felt in planning the future of the Axis Powers if we should too strongly adhere to the legal requirements given above, I am of the intention of overlooking the legal aspects of the question and of not avoiding making necessary contacts with the present government. I would like to have your approval of this.

I have already consulted with the Italian Minister on this matter, and so will you please explain it to the German authorities if you think it is necessary to do so.

The matter has been taken up with the Military Attache OTA, also.
Please ----- ----- to the Military authorities.
Relayed to Turkey. Relay message from Turkey to ----- and Persia.

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[a]Not available.
[b]Kana spelling, Emer Abdul Ilah—maternal uncle of King named regent.

Trans. 6-24-41

No. 579

FROM: Ankara (Kurihara) June 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo No number.

Message from Geneva # 27, June 2, 1941.

Unless some direct and summary measures are taken by Germany and Italy in following up this recent incident, it is feared that the whole Arabian movement will be severely hampered in its development. At this time, when it is thought that the Iraqi oil field pipe line and the railroad line connecting this city with Basra has been destroyed, British interests chiefly lie in the Habaniyah base which serves as a point in air and land transport from Trans-Jorden. Inasmuch as there are large oil reserves maintained in underground reservoirs and other subterranean facilities, please do your very utmost to have the German and Italian authorities bomb this base immediately.

I have already discussed this matter with Military Attaché Ōta. Please transmit this information to the military authorities.

Relay to Tokyo, Germany and Italy and Iraq.

Trans. 6-6-41

No. 580

FROM: Bagdad (Miyazaki) June 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 30.

As a result of England having recently set up a puppet government here, if at some future time the German-Italian forces march into this country, there is the danger that England will organize the troops of this country for defense, and call the Germans and Italians invaders; and in carrying on an intense propaganda campaign inciting the native tribes. To put it briefly, speedy German-Italain support is indispensable.

With respect to this, please do all you can to arouse the attention of the Germans and Italians. I have conferred with Consul Ōta in this matter. Please relay this to the army.

Relayed to Turkey.

Please relay message from Turkey, to Persia, Germany and Italy.

Trans. 6-25-41

No. 581

FROM: Bagdad (Miyazaki) June 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 137.

My # 136[a] gave the results of the rupture of relations between this country and Italy. The Foreign Office in this country has made the following request to me: "Though the Iraqi Govern-

ment has ordered the recall of Minister PACHA, now residing in Rome, please arrange it so that your Embassy in Rome will pay the above-mentioned Minister an estimated £200, as well as such other money as he may require in view of the impossibility of sending him money for his return." In view of the extraordinary urgency, I would like to have you go to the trouble of making these arrangements at as early a date as possible. As soon as a decision has been reached, please instruct the Embassy in Rome and advise me.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 6-16-41

No. 582

FROM: Tokyo June 21, 1941
TO: Berlin #513.

Action Ankara as #52:

On the 20th, the Turkish Ambassador resident in Tokyo called on me, saying that he had been instructed by his government to report to the Japanese Government the formation of the pact with Germany and its contents. He said that the contents of the pact were just as had been officially announced already in the newspapers. After telling him that I desired him to convey my appreciation of this information, I went on to say that I thought Turkey was very fortunate to have concluded a pact with Germany; that, as a matter of fact, Turkey occupied a very difficult position in her relations between England, Germany, and the Soviet. As a fellow Asiatic, I had felt secret misgivings for her future, but that now I was greatly relieved by the formation of this pact.

I told him that I had studied Hitler for many years, and that I had come to realize that, while Hitler on the one hand, in matters of national policy, etc., seemed to be very cruel and heartless, on the other hand, he was a man who had a very warm heart and high ideals, and that as a result of my recent visit to Berlin this impression had been strengthened. I have utmost confidence in Hitler, and it is my desire that your government, also, will put your whole-hearted trust in Germany and Hitler. On the dawn of the New Era, you need have no fear that Germany will tread you under-foot, but you may have confidence that Germany will, of course, do the right thing.

I offer the above as the impressions and opinions of this Minister at this time, for the information of your governments, and I do not believe that this will be entirely valueless.

The Turkish Minister said he would wire the details immediately, and withdrew.

Trans. 6-25-41

No. 583

FROM: Berlin July 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #843.

(Tokyo Circular #1483, 7-5-41).

On the 3rd Ambassador STAHMER, who had gone to Italy for a change of air, returned and I went to see him for a little talk. I said: "In German consulates and other diplomatic establishments throughout China there are many stubborn pro-Chinese officials who have recognized the WANG regime now and this situation does not coincide with what is to be expected. I want

you now to discharge all these superannuated officials and replace them with new blood which is more imbued with the spirit of National Socialism." STAHMER replied: "I go the limit in agreeing with the feeling you express. I shall submit this matter to Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and endeavor to remedy this situation as soon as possible." Will you please wire me back immediately the names of the German officials in the consulates and other diplomatic establishments in China which are not in harmony with the policy of the Japanese Imperial Government.

Trans. 7-17-41

No. 584

FROM: Tokyo — July 22, 1941
TO: Berlin — #674.

Refer to your message #843[a].

The substance of your message was immediately transmitted to all offices in China and to the Embassy in Manchukuo. Full names and personal records (were requested to be present?), but it appears that there are no suitable persons. In view of this, the opinions expressed in Message #1283[b] from Shanghai to this office are very appropriate. Please endeavor to carry it out that way.

[a] See II, 583 in which Berlin is advised that in the German consulates and other diplomatic establishments throughout China there are many stubborn pro-Chinese officials, and it was requested that they be replaced with others who are properly imbued with the spirit of "National Socialisms." STAHMER said that he agreed with this and requested the names of the above-mentioned officials.

[b] Not available.

Trans. 7-30-41

No. 585

FROM: Tokyo — July 12, 1941
TO: Net — #1495.

Received from Berlin as #876, 9 July.

1. As I reported earlier, the German Economic Minister issued secret orders to merchants in the Far East to transact Germany's business with only German merchants. This was done towards the end of giving German merchants the control of German trade in the Far East. This, of course, would have exceedingly far reaching effects.

Therefore, please point to this fact in the trade negotiations being conducted at the present time between Germany and Japan-Manchukuo and urge that these secret orders be retracted.

Moreover, at the German-Chinese trade negotiations which are scheduled to be held shortly ---------- (two lines missed)---------- try to arrange to have this included as one of the terms, and by these means have it abolished. I firmly believe that it is of utmost importance to place, at the present time, Japanese and German merchants on an equal basis—each to have equal opportunities—in so far as trade between Japan-Manchukuo-China and Germany is concerned.

2. As long as Germany continues to insist upon doing all Germany's business in the Far East through German merchants, I believe that we should insist that all of Japan's business with Germany be conducted through Japanese merchants.

3. Since all of our merchants here are anxious to have the German ruling abolished as soon as possible, please give this matter your immediate attention. Please advise me of your decision for my personal information.

Trans. 7-15-41

No. 586

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

July 31, 1941
707.

(Shanghai to Tokyo # 1283)

Re your Circular # 1482[a].

If one should try to classify or group the German diplomatic officials (mostly consular officials) in China, there would be two kinds. (1) Those who place emphasis upon political concert between Japan, Germany and Manchuria from the viewpoint of its larger aspects, and are trying to handle the various matters that arise in China with due regard to this viewpoint. (2) Those who are inclined to place the emphasis upon the protection of their own immediate financial and commercial interests, and therefore in the handling of matters do not necessarily take an attitude that is in harmony with our plans. The former group is limited to a small number of Nazi trained men, whereas the majority who have served in China for many years belong to the second group. However, it would not be right to think of all the latter as being anti-Japanese. Likewise in the former group there seems to be a tendency, as they stay on in China and experience friction with us over restrictions on the shipping in or out of commodities, and restrictions in matters of residence and transit, for them to reach the place where they do not consistently entertain good feelings toward us.

The problem from now on, since the German officials have secured the right of direct approach to the Nanking Government, by virtue of the recognition of that government, will lie in the "delicate" relations that will arise between these officials and us, and the Nanking Government officials. Looking at it from the standpoint of these officials, those of which we will need to be most cautious, are those of the first group rather than those of the second group.

All the German diplomatic officials here, with the exception of Acting Consul General TINSAA (the one of whom the Ecuador government took exception because of his being such an extreme Nazi, who recently was transferred here, and, when Fischer was transferred to Nanking, became Acting Consul General) would be placed in the above mentioned second group, and rather than for us here to try to handle the German officials personally I think it would be proper to have Berlin send instructions, now that Germany has recognized the Nanking Government, for all the German diplomatic officials and for the German businessmen who are back of them to be careful of any anti-Japanese and pro-Chungking conduct. (As for example, the disguising (?) and registry-transfer of enemy ships, the violation of rules concerning the shipping in and out of commodities, and ----- of which there has been a good deal of late by the German merchants.)

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-20-41

No. 587

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

July 18, 1941
1549.

Circular.

Message to Nanking # 300.

(Part 1 of 2).

1. We may expect that it would be necessary, after the establishment of a new order in the Far East as well as in Europe, to arrange a new economic treaty between Germany and China, based on the recognition of the leading position of Japan and Germany in that new order. However, inasmuch as a large scale war is still being fought in China, even if at this time a comprehensive and ----- agreement is concluded, we cannot expect it to be satisfactorily applied. It seems to me that it would be best if, as individual questions come up, their friendly settlements could be effected in a realistic manner under a close agreement and contact maintained between Japan, Germany and China. If it is the desire of the German Government to come to an agreement with China because of the existence of a "pro memoria" and because of the various circumstances, it might be well to arrange a provisional agreement between Germany and China which will include two or three clauses (for example, relative to internal taxes, etc.,) in addition to those clauses contained in the present German-Chinese treaty and agreement; namely, those having to do with manufacturing and commercial enterprises and exporting and importing. Then, for Japan and Germany to arrive at a compromise by concluding an agreement including such principles as German cooperation during the war with our plans; respect for the special relations obtaining between Japan, Manchukuo and China; and the granting of advantages over those granted to any third power in the sphere in which the respective signatories enjoy leadership. In any case, my opinion is that the time is not ripe for concluding a very comprehensive agreement.

Trans. 7-22-41

No. 588

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Peking, and Shanghai

July 18, 1941
1549.

Circular.

Message to Nanking # 300.

(Part 2 of 2).

2. The Imperial Government has definitely promised to abolish extra territorial rights as soon as the relations between Japan and China improve to a sufficient degree. Advancing as she is along with Germany toward the establishment of a new order, it goes without saying that in guiding the new People's Government, Japan must so influence the Government, during the intermediary period leading up to the abolition of the extra territorial rights, that it will accord as favorable a treatment as possible to the Germans with a view of improving the latter's position. Therefore, I would like to have definite measures instituted after consulting the German authorities on individual cases. (I have in the past received various complaints from FISCHER[a] relative to the treatment being accorded by the Concession Court in Shanghai to the Germans.

It is not clear to me what concrete instances he refers to, nor do I know how close a contact is being maintained between FISCHER and his own country).

Relayed to ----- and Berlin.

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[a] German Consul General in Shanghai.

Trans. 7-21-41

No. 589

FROM: Peking
TO: Nanking and Shanghai

July 22, 1941
324.

Circular.

(Message to Tokyo # 465).

I gather that in your opinion it would be feasible to permit the Germans to conclude with China some very simple agreement stipulating the principle of most-favored nation treatment in case Berlin must and will have it so. As you know, the North China-Mongolian border occupies a special position as an area of joint Japanese-Chinese policy. Nothing at all however evanescent, must be done which would have a grave effect upon this area's status. I know that you are sufficiently shrewd to handle the matter adroitly, but please be guided by this conception.

Sent to NANDAI and to SHANGHAI.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 590

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Berlin

July 17, 1941
657.

Re your # 898[a]:

With regard to the Japan-U.S. negotiations, we have not been pressing the United States for an understanding. As a matter of fact, no concrete steps had been taken by us since the latter part of June when we received the final proposal issued by the United States, until very recently. Finally, however, the liaison conference was able to come to a preliminary agreement, and our revised proposal will be submitted, probably within the next day or two.

During this period, both the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo have been urging me to give them a hint as to the contents of the United States proposal. As was the case previously, it was obvious that Japan would not accept the extremely slip-shod proposals made by the United States. We were afraid that if we released the U.S. proposal in confidence to Germany and Italy, it may have given rise to misunderstandings. Therefore, we advised the German and Italian Ambassadors that, as had been done before, we wished to discuss the matter ourselves first, and as soon as we had made a decision, we would inform them without delay. We will advise you and the Ambassador in Italy, in the same manner.

The negotiations referred to here have considerable bearing on our domestic as well as foreign policies and, therefore, we cannot discontinue them abruptly. On the other hand, there

are still considerable differences of opinion between the United States and Japan. Since we insist that any agreement with the United States must be based on the Tripartite Pact, there is very little chance of successfully concluding an agreement.

The above is for only your information.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-19-41

No. 591

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

July 24, 1941
687.

During the conversation between Vice-Minister OHASHI and Ambassador OTT on the 22nd, the Ambassador referred to the Japanese-American negotiations and said, "Germany, I am afraid, will not be favorably impressed by these negotiations. In view of the fact that of late the Russo-German war is becoming increasingly favorable to Germany, it would be well for the sake of our common interest for Japan to decide now where she stands." In reply the Vice-Minister said, "As regards the first question, it will probably fade into the background within the next few days when Japan will have occupied southern French Indo-China. And as to the second question, do you not understand what Japan is at present so intensely preparing for?" He added, "I would like for you to consider the fact that for Germany to be so insistent on Japan's national policy, might possibly have an adverse effect on the Axis policy." I understand that the Ambassador appeared to see what was meant.

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 592

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Berlin

July 16, 1941
656.

Re your # 888[a].

All your life, Your Honor has been a man of deep thought, able to discern the inner meanings of things, so I believe that the unheard of predicament that our country now faces and the horrible situation existing here can almost be guessed by you. When I took office here as Foreign Minister, the situation looked hopeless. I, myself, thought at one time that there was nothing upon this earth that could save us from the abyss, but I am a man who never says "can't." From the time I was a mere boy that has been my philosophy, and I still stick to it today. I know that Your Honor is very far away, and I fear that you cannot in your own mind picture the tribulations we are enduring these days, but come what may, let us two continue our patience, follow the light of our Empire which leads us, and never lose faith by listening to dissuading arguments.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-19-41

No. 593

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

July 19, 1941
669.

(Abstract).

The Cabinet shake up was necessary to expedite matters in connection with National affairs and has no further significance. Japan's foreign policy will not be changed and she will remain faithful to the principles of the Tripartite Pact.

Relayed to Rome, Nanking.

Trans. 7-21-41

No. 594

FROM: Rome (Horikiri)
TO: Tokyo

July 18, 1941
469.

Strictly Secret.

Re your # 646[a] to Germany.

I had ANDO[b], for the sake of secrecy, make representations to CIANO through PRUNAS[c]. PRUNAS expressed his regret and hoped for success in this matter, along with the American and British counter propaganda. He said that America's position was being watched closely and that there would be no great reaction. ANDO said this matter was nothing more than public opinion and nothing need be done in respect to American and British counter movements, and answered it was needless to say that this would restrict things in favor of Germany and Italy. Again at that time, reference was made to our political change. As yet no information has been received from INDELLI[d]. Although there have been various reports in the press regarding just how conditions are, there is sympathy for MATSUOKA, as he had brought about the uniting of the three countries, but there is not a little tendency to think the withdrawal of the Foreign Minister means a change in the tri-party policy. When asked about his opinion, ANDO explained that this present political change meant the strengthening of popular unity and that it does not signify the change in the fundamental political policy of Japan. This development is rather the strengthening of the tri-party union. As instructed in the caption message, he explained that from the viewpoint of the Japanese government the retirement of MATSUOKA could clearly be seen not to be a change of tri-party policy. Again PRUNAS asked if MATSUOKA should resign, would not the making of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Treaty be a reason for such action. He (ANDO) answered that the Japanese-Soviet agreement was a natural outgrowth of the tri-party pact. Although this was the case, because of the outbreak of the German-Soviet conflict so soon after its conslusion, the impression is that the Japanese public is a bit confused, but the fact is that their patroitism is extremely determined. The presence of this confusion in their minds, need not be taken into consideration in

viewing the unity of the people. He answered that he thought the signing of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Treaty has nothing to do with the retirement of MATSUOKA.

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[a] See II, 594A, in which Tokyo says that the negotiations which have been commenced with France mark the first step in Japan's southward advance, and asks the cooperation of Germany and Italy, in helping to persuade France to accede to their request.

[b] Japanese counselor at Embassy in Rome.

[c] Italian, Director of Transoceania Bureau.

[d] Italian Ambassador in Tokyo.

Trans. 7-23-41

No. 594A

FROM: Tokyo 15 July 1941
TO: Berlin #646.

As the Ambassador in France has already notified you we have at last commenced negotiations with France with a firm determination. This marks the first step in our southward advance; at the same time it signifies a very grave life and death step in our relations with England and America. We have thrown in our lot with Germany and Italy in harmony with the Tripartite Pact and intend to cooperate with them. Under the form of negotiations a request has come from the French government to the government to which you are accredited to get them to mediate a refusel or an amelioration of our demands. In case they dodge the issue please ask them to help us from the flank and persuade France to accede to our requests.

Please relay this as instructions to Italy.

Please relay this to France.

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 595

FROM: Rome (Horikiri) July 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #483.

The authorities of this country are maintaining a circumspect attitude toward our recent Cabinet change and are avoiding comment. However, the fact that Premier KONOYE received the Imperial Commission for the second time and also the statement of Your Excellency to the newspapers to the effect that Japan's foreign policy remained the same made a generally favorable impression. The newspapers here are commenting upon Japan's unshakeable determination. The authorities are paying a great deal of attention to Japan's immediate actions.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 596

FROM: Tokyo — July 25, 1941
TO: Rome — # 204.

Please convey the following to Foreign Minister Ciano from ex-Foreign Minister Matsuoka.

I take this occasion as I am leaving office to express my thanks to you who still hold office for your kindness to me. I fully believe that there will be no change in this country's foreign policy. Please convey my greetings to Premier Mussolini.

Trans. 7-30-41

No. 597

FROM: Tokyo — July 24, 1941
TO: Berlin — # 688.

Will you please transmit the following message from former Minister MATSUOKA to Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP:

"Now that I have resigned, I wish to thank Your Excellency for the encouragement you gave me while I was still in office. I assure you that you will see no change in the Imperial Government's foreign policy because of my resignation. Will you please so inform Chancellor HITLER and give him my best regards."

Trans. 7-26-41

No. 598

FROM: Tokyo — July 28, 1941
TO: Berlin — # 700.

Strictly Secret.

(Request Message).

From the Chief of the Exchange Bureau to Finance Official YUMOTO.

On the 27th the following decision was reached in a Cabinet meeting concerning retaliatory measures against the United States for bringing into play an order freezing Japanese money. The measures which will be taken on the basis thereof will be to freeze the financial assets of Americans and to limit their dealings. The ordinance upon which the Treasury Department will rely, based on the law governing the control of foreign exchange, is outlined in my separate # 701[a]. This ordinance was promulgated today, the 28th, to meet the action of the United States in freezing Japanese assets. Be it noted:

In case the United States actuates an order freezing Japanese assets, Japan likewise in answer thereto will take measures of revenge, based upon the law for the control of foreign exchange and will curtail all the dealings of citizens of the United States. However, if in applying the order the United States chooses to deal leniently with us, we will answer in kind. We will have Manchukuo and China take the same measures as are taken in Japan.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-30-41

No. 599

FROM: Berlin — July 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #913.

Re your message #661[a]. The following is a retransmission.

#906. At Koenigsburg, on the night of the 14th.

This morning I flew to the general headquarters and was received first by Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and then by Dictator Hitler. We conversed for a period of over five hours, during which time we exchanged opinions in a straightforward manner.

As you are aware, Hitler is a very idealistic person. When he urged Japanese cooperation with Germany, he showed no indications of asking for it for the purpose of benefiting Germany alone. Instead, he pointed out that in the long run, the United States and the Soviet Union are the foes of Germany and Japan jointly. With this consideration, he urged that Japan clearly express its attitude with the Tripartite Pact as its basis. I could clearly see that the Fuehrer was not at all satisfied with Japan's attitude, particularly with regard to the continuation of the Japanese-U.S. negotiations.

I am convinced that he made his suggestions in the interests of Japan, because, as I mentioned before, he is a highly idealistic person. If we proceed in the present manner, I feel certain that it would be the equivalent of removing the back bone from the Tripartite Pact. Under such circumstances, regardless of how strongly we try to make use of the Tripartite Pact at the conclusion of the present European war, it would be all in vain.

I do not believe that I am cowering under German intimidations. It is one thing if we do not intend to look upon the Tripartite Pact with any importance. However, if we intend to make the Tripartite Pact the foundation of all of our foreign policy I feel that there is considerable room for reflection. I am convinced that I neither lie nor exaggerate and I am willing to assume full responsibility for my conviction. Please believe me and trust me.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7–18–41

No. 600

FROM: Berlin — July 31, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #969.

Re your Circular #1642.[a]

1. I fear that your opinion regarding Germany's plans and objectives in the Russo-German war does not touch on the real motives and that there is danger of misunderstanding in regard to these. Please make special reference to my telegrans #413[a], 418[a], 456[a], 619[a], 638[a], 639[a], 669[a], 716[a], etc.

2. As I understand it, in your opinion, Germany recognizes that effecting a landing in England would be difficult and so is preparing for a long war. But according to my opinion, while it is true that Germany is making preparations for a long war, still I believe that Germany as heretofore is planning to bring matters to a conclusion in a short war. Please inform me as to the basis for your opinion.

3. That the Soviet should plan a guerrilla war was only natural, however I think that it will be very difficult for Russia to exhaust the German army, which has an excess of mechanized divisions and aerial strength, by such tactics.

4. Not to expect the immediate collapse of the Stalin regime is to reach a hasty conclusion. Even during the existence of the Stalin regime the amount of actual administrative power exercised by it is a problem deserving close study. (This is closely related to investigations being carried on by the Japanese government in the Orient.) I wish to be informed of your expectations regarding the probable course of the Stalin regime after the destruction of the Soviet army in Europe(?).

5. That America will go to war one day is axiomatic. The problem is not whether or not America will go to war on the basis of international law, but just to what extent America has the power and facilities to extend aid to Britain. I would like to know concretely just what your prognostications in regard to this are.

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[a] 1642: dated 29 July; 413: Not available; 418, 456, 457, 619, 638, 639, 669, 716, not translated.

Trans. 8-6-41

No. 601

FROM: Berlin — May 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #541.

Strictly Secret.

The same gentleman whom I quoted in my #540[a] told me confidentially the following with regard to the general European question:

"1. CHANCELLOR HITLER had conversations with DARLAN in Berchtesgaden which were conducted in a most amiable atmosphere. HITLER was well impressed by DARLAN. I do not know but what in the future policies with regard to France will center around DARLAN rather than LAVAL. The France-German talks covered the use of French colonies as German military bases and the use of the French Navy for convoying French shipping. Syria is a great problem but in the event of American participation in the war Dakar will assume a much greater importance. (According to a special report, it is rumored that already German troops have landed even in Algeria.) WEYGAND, too, is aware of this. This, of course, is an unofficial report but on the surface at least there is nothing to contradict it.

"2. The Soviet unchangingly has been faithfully carrying out her supply of goods. Furthermore, in certain quarters she has withdrawn her troops from the border but whether this is in anticipation of war or with the intention of avoiding war, is not clear. The preparations of the German authorities are progressing on schedule but in truth the decision as to whether war will arise rests entirely with no man other than CHANCELLOR HITLER. However, it is a fact that it is being said that the German Army is confident that within a few weeks it would be able to carry European Russia before it.

"3. The transportation of arms and munitions to Iraq is scheduled to begin soon with the tacit consent of Turkey. It is thought that the air arm, too, will within a very few days arrive on the spot. In the event that Turkey's attitude becomes none too pleasing, I do not know but what Syria might be offered to her.

"4. Germany has decided that Italy shall have domination over the eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, the ----- ----- is as I have told you previously and in the future Egypt too will come

under the Italian sphere of influence. At the same time that Germany on the one hand grants Italy a sphere of influence over the eastern Mediterranean, on the other hand she is restraining demands upon the French which already are making for joint German-French collaboration."

[a]The person to whom this message refers is spoken of in message #540 as "a certain authoritative German." See II, 519.

Trans. 5-14-41

No. 602

FROM: Tokyo May 20, 1941
TO: Berne #4

With reference to your regular communication #48[a], please report if there is any activity concerning the exchange of materials through Soviet Russia in respect to German commerce.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 5-23-41

No. 603

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) May 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #76 Commerce.

Regarding your (commerce circular #1049).

Hiruga stated confidentially to Miyakawa as follows:

"When the Economic Agreement (with Germany) was entered into on September 28, 1939, U.S.S.R. invited Germany to transport goods through U.S.S.R. as much as she please and made absolutely no other commitments. At that time, there was no talk about what should be done about war materials, which indeed was very unfortunate. We have in previous times prohibited the importation and transportation of war materials, but regarding the present restrictions we have received inquiries from Berlin. However, excepting the item list 4, we have done nothing more than to draw up more detailed list. The item list 4 is a new list, and because of its importance I have asked MIKOYAN about it. According to him, all the machine tools and other machinery on the prohibition list are of special type which can be used for making arms, bombs and planes. Therefore, we informed Berlin to that effect and are awaiting instructions."

When Miyakawa asked whether an exception can't be made in this particular case, Hiruga replied that he had nothing to say on that point.

Trans. 5-19-41

No. 604

FROM: Tokyo May 19, 1941
TO: Berlin # 419.

Re your # 535[a].

Obtain German opinion of the following points:

(1) Since U.S.S.R. will not accept transit goods consigned to destinations other than those countries which have a transit agreement with Russia, have goods so consigned shipped as if to Germany which will then forward.

(2) Pay freight in free German marks for goods shipped through occupied territory.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 6–20–41

No. 605

FROM Tokyo May 22, 1941
TO: Berne # 47.

On March 17th, there was published a Soviet-Swiss commercial pact and it would appear that there was appended thereto a clause concerning the transit of Swiss goods through the Soviet. On March 12th, the Soviet issued an order to forestall the transit through Russia of the goods mentioned in my # 48[a] and # 49[a]. It looks as though this was designed to keep us from getting military machines and pertinent manufacturing tools. We are now conferring about this and would like to know whether or not it is true that the Soviet is contriving to keep us from procuring arms and machinery from Switzerland by land routes. Please conduct a private investigation and wire me back as soon as possible.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 5–24–41

No. 606

FROM: Berlin June 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 654.

To Chief of Commerce Bureau from Matusima.

With German and Soviet relations becoming increasingly bad, it will soon be impossible to import goods from Germany via Siberia.

Trans. 6–9–41

No. 607

FROM: Berlin June 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #712.

I have been for some time informing the German Government of our desire that trade be opened between the unoccupied territories and Japan. To this, that government has replied by inquiring what we think of its suggestion that we add to the terms of the recently concluded Japan-Soviet Trade Pact others which would make possible transit of goods through Soviet territories to and from Third-Power countries (including the unoccupied territories) in addition to Germany.

Will you please inform me whether such terms have been included?

Trans. 6-20-41

No. 608

FROM: Hsinking June 17, 1941
TO: Moscow #64.

Action Tokyo as #339.

Regarding my #236, Paragraph (2):[a]

No formal arrangement with the Soviet is necessary to reopen courier service between Manchukuo and Europe except the requirement of visas. Hereafter, we wish to send couriers, on the average of once in two months. Komura and Ōki will be sent according to the following schedule:

23 June, leave Manchuli; 29 June, Moscow; 1 July, arrive Berlin; 7 July, arrive Rome.

On return trip they will stay one or two days in Moscow.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 6-19-41

No. 609

FROM: Moscow May 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo #586.

(Abstract)

Japanese Ambassador requested Molotov to explain the rumor that war threatens between the U.S.S.R. and Germany, as should such a war take place, Japan will be placed in an embarrassing situation as she is a party to the Tripartite Pact and at the same time is a party to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. The only course for her, in such an eventuality, would be to act as a mediator. Molotov assured the Japanese Ambassador that the rumor is without foundation and it was designed to discredit the Tripartite Pact.

Trans. 6-20-41

No. 610

FROM: Tokyo May 17, 1941
TO: Washington # 1058.

(Circular.) Message from Moscow # 596 on May 16th.

(Part 1 of 2.)

That within the near future Germany will wage war upon the Soviet is not more than a groundless rumor. Because the German officialdom, particularly the military group, is indulging in strong and sensationalistic propaganda, the situation has taken an exceedingly critical turn. Though it would seem on the one hand that the Soviet was making great defensive preparations along the western border, in view of their unprecedented calm, I cannot view these indications as pointing toward the German contention, but whichever is true, as there are some perplexing developments, I called upon MOLOTOV the other day and below I am expressing my opinion with regard to them:

1. Germany has some 140 to 150 divisions and the Soviet roughly 116 divisions concentrated on the western border. However, should it become necessary, Germany could still further reinforce these troops with picked mobile troops which, compared with the Russian forces, are much superior. Over and above that, Soviet forces traditionally have feared the German army and, though they feel that they could carry on a defensive war, with considerable strength, they do not consider that they have much chance of winning.

2. Therefore, though the Soviet will sacrifice much, she is following a policy I imagine which has for its aim the avoidance of a frontal clash with Germany. At the same time, in order to overcome this disparity in military strength, she is concentrating her total strength in order to build up large quantities and improve her military equipment and is therefore, hurriedly attempting to secure essential military resources. Then, too, in spite of the fact that recent Balkan developments were not to the favor of Soviet policy and her railroad facilities are overtaxed, she is doing her utmost to supply Germany with large quantities of natural resources.

Trans. 5-19-41

No. 611

FROM: Tokyo May 17, 1941
TO: Washington # 1058.

(Circular.) Message from Moscow # 596 on May 16th.

(Part 2 of 2.)

3. The German Army is well able to overthrow the Soviet Army. However, it is hard to believe that she could conclude operations against Russia within a period of two months as is being reported frequently these days. Doubtless within two months she could break through the first line and possibly might be able to occupy the Ukraine within that time, but I do not believe that she can within this period completely annihilate the whole army. Not only would this be difficult from a point of view of military geography, but the Soviet Army would avoid fighting a decisive battle and would rather follow an evasive strategy. Should this be done, however, there is no escaping the fact that Germany will deal a terrific blow, and in any case situations within occupied areas being so confused would make it very difficult for Germany to secure the products of that land. Therefore, I cannot see the advantage for Germany to do

this, inasmuch as at the present time through peaceful negotiations she is securing the natural resources she wants.

4. Germany, already having concluded her Balkan campaign, is continuing her military efforts in the Near East and, therefore, it is necessary that she prevent the Soviet from interfering. Then again, in the event that war developed on an ever-expanding basis and she were forced to hold out against England and the United States, there would be no other way but that she depend more than ever upon the essential military and food resources of the Soviet, as well as those tropical military resources from the Far East. Her success or failure in this event would be a question of life and death; therefore, the essential course of the future will be for her to demand more not only of Russian petroleum and grains but also iron ore and other heavy industry raw materials. In such an event, should the Soviet not comply, as a final resort she might wage war, but for the time being she is following a policy which has for its aim a show of power and for that reason she has large concentrations of German troops on the Soviet border. That is why, too, I believe that she, regardless of the attitude the Soviet takes, is loudly proclaiming in propaganda that she will fight the Soviet at the drop of a hat.

5. In summing this all up, as long as the Soviet does not radically change her attitude toward Germany, I do not think that there will be a frontal clash between the armed forces of the two countries. On the one hand, though STALIN will follow a course of cooperation, and because he is being more or less forced to do so, I do not see any chance in the near future of a major war developing between Germany and the Soviet.

6. In the event of a world conflagration, a German-Soviet clash will occur when the Soviet lines up with England and America. Because such a situation would be most disadvantageous to our country, we must do our best to take measures to prevent it.

Relayed to Berlin, Rome, London, Vichy and Ankara. Relay to Washington, Manchukuo and Nanking.

Trans. 5-19-41

No. 612

FROM: Rome (Horikiri) May 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 314.

I have received an intelligence from a Vatican source that the Pope not long ago instructed the Apostolic Delegates in the various nations to gather information of the attitude of the Soviet. Summing up the reports which came in, it appears that just as when Germany succeeded in the Balkans, Moscow renounced the special rights of the diplomatic envoys of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Denmark, she is now still being carried along on the wave of German successes and her relations with London and Washington are getting worse and worse. Tokyo's neutrality treaty with Moscow angered the United States and Germany's superior position in the Balkans was a threat to STALIN. Therefore, Moscow had, as she saw it, no alternative but to tie up with Japan and Germany, as well as establish relations with the pro-Nazis government of Iraq. In connection with the latter point, it appears that the question of the Soviet's right to exist in Central Asia and Asia is now being discussed by Japan and Moscow.

Trans. 5-28-41

No. 613

FROM: Berlin (Osima) June 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #717.

Re your #1260[a].

I don't know how the German authorities view the matter, but I am giving below my own opinion.

1. In hopes of not giving Germany any excuse for attacking her, Soviet Russia is at present refraining even from general mobilization. Therefore, I believe that she would not attempt to influence Great Britain and the United States before she enters the war.

2. The coming German-Soviet War, I believe, will end in a short time and, therefore, there would be no time for Great Britain and the United States to give her any concrete aid, nor would there be any time for concluding a political agreement.

3. Great Britain would, no doubt, endeavor to get more aid from the United States and to influence Japan to withdraw from the three-power alliance by taking this opportunity of pointing out in her propaganda how untrustworthy Germany is for having violated the German-Soviet non-aggression pact. She, however, would give Soviet Russia no more than lip service.

4. As to the United States, she will at first wait to see what would happen, and if in the meantime it becomes evident that Soviet Russia is being defeated, she will not give Russia any aid. The question then would be the increase of aid to Britain along the intensification of anti-German public opinion. However, with the defeat of Soviet Russia, this would probably pass as a mere temporary phenomenom, and this would lead her to forego her plans of joining the war.

---

[a] In which Tokyo asks for information regarding the threatened German-Soviet rupture and the possibility of events following the course of German-Soviet war, Soviet-British alliance, American-Soviet rapprochement and finally the entrance of the United States in the war.

Trans. 6-19-41

No. 614

FROM: Rome May 30, 1941
TO: Moscow No number.

To Tokyo as #332.

According to information which we have at hand, NWGURO[a], eminent in Catholic press circles, told our source confidentially: "German-Soviet relations have reached a pass of extreme tension. Though the Soviet is maintaining a tranquil attitude, Germany is not at all satisfied and will shortly wage war against the Soviet. Germany in her war against the Soviet will win great successive battles. The focal questions of the current European war will become an offensive against the Soviet. I expect a compromising atmosphere will be taken by Germany toward England and America."

Furthermore, an exceptionally well-informed newspaperman in Germany is understood to have said that hostilities with the Soviet will start about June 15th.

Most especially here there are many who believe that Germany will hold off her war against England and immediately enter into hostilities against the Soviet. They further expect that the Soviet will take, thereupon, a conciliatory attitude.

---

[a] Kana spelling, badly garbled.

Trans. 6-2-41

No. 615

FROM: Rome — June 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #346.

A special correspondent of the Gionnale d'Italia, resident in Belgrade, Tomayori by name ----- returned from a trip to Sofia and reported to Ando[a] as follows:

1. On the surface it appears that Russian influence has been completely swept out in the settlement of the Yugoslavian question. However, actually the sympathies of the Serbs and the Croats for the Slavs is as strong as ever and while they have had to submit outwardly to German and Italian domination, their inward antipathy is as fierce as ever. Under the German army's direction the major industries such as mining are being steadily revived, but the economic situation is in chaos, prices are soaring, and poverty is the order of the day.

2. In the Balkans, there are persistent rumors of an impending Russo-German war. On a north bound German armored car, I saw scribbled the words "NACHO Moscow" (On to Moscow?).

In the Soviet diplomatic circles in Sofia, the outbreak of a war between Germany and Russia would be welcomed, and it would be regarded as very fortunate indeed if such a conflict would lead to the overthrow of the political strength of the Communist Party ----- (message unfinished).

---

[a] Of the Japanese diplomatic staff.

Trans. 6-4-41

No. 616

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) — May 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) — #589.

(Abstract).

U.S.S.R. demanding more than they expect to get out of the negotiations for trade and fishery agreements, fearing that the North Sakhalin question may come to naught when the above agreements are concluded. Japanese Ambassador suggest to home government that assurance be given that North Sakhalin question will be handled separately not later than next August.

Trans. 5-31-41

No. 617

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Moscow

May 28, 1941
537.

Strictly Secret.

Re your # 625[a].

1. Will you please impart this as a personal message from this Foreign Minister to MOLOTOV or, if needs be, to STALIN?

a. As stated some time ago in Moscow, although the question of rights and interests in northern Sakhalin[b] has been long pending, at latest I intend definitely to settle it this year and I wish them to put their trust in me.

b. I must make my position of leadership in my country easier because in conducting the commercial negotiations and the fishing negotiations satisfactorily we will run into some delicate internal conditions concerning rights and interest. I would like as soon as possible to negotiate along both lines.

2. We have decided to maintain as usual our defenses in the North Seas but I have issued special instructions for our subjects there to be very careful not to trespass within the territorial waters of the Soviet nor commit any other act such as those the Soviet has been protesting.

---

[a] Not available.

[b] Island owned jointly by Russia and Japan in S.W. Okhotsk Sea.

Trans. 6-4-41

No. 618

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Moscow

June 13, 1941
599.

Re my # 560[b].

Please advise by return dispatch as to the intentions of the Soviet. Also ----- that regardless of whether or not the Soviet approves, the Kaiyo Maru will leave Tokyo on the 15th of June for the RIYAHOKUSRKII Islands. (If the weather is favorable and conditions permit, we will have her proceed as far as the SEEBIRUNAYA[a] Islands.)

---

[a] May be Serbrennaya, on Sakhalin Island. See Sailing Directions for Siberia and Chosen; H. O. No. 122, 1932, p. 271.

[b] Not available.

Trans. 6-19-41

No. 619

FROM: Moscow
TO: Tokyo

June 1, 1941
#641.

(In 2 parts—complete.)

Secret.

Pursuant to the instruction in your message 537[a], I saw Molotov on the 31st. He said that he had instructed Smetanin on the 28th to see if the trade agreement and fishing rights treaty could not be completed without further delay. But it has been almost four months since the neutrality pact was concluded, and the negotiations should be speeded up. As instructed in the Foreign Minister's telegram, I asked if there was any reason for not concluding the fisheries and trade agreements within six months.

There are several reasons for opening the fisheries conference soon. Although the conclusion of the neutrality pact was generally welcomed in Japan, the prompt settlement of the trade and fisheries issues would effectively answer those in Japan who opposed the neutrality treaty. Consequently, I believe it necessary to demonstrate sincerity in those negotiations.

The fisheries question should be settled at once, for the reasons stated above, and especially for reasons concerning you personally. A recent published statement here blames you for the delay in negotiations and states that there must be some internal conditions in Japan which are proving troublesome.

The statement continued that usually the first moves in fisheries negotiations are made by the Soviet government, and that you had stated to Smetanin that you wished to end the delay.

It stated that TUARAPUKIN and Miyakawa had talked for two and a half hours, and that the same evening Molotov drew up and delivered on May 15th the Soviet government's statement regarding the fisheries question, and that the Japanese reply was transmitted to Foreign Minister Molotov on May 31st.

More than six months have passed since Foreign Minister Matsuoka's promises regarding the Sakhalin fisheries question, and it is hoped that compromise can be reached as promptly as possible, so that the question of our other rights can be taken up.

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[a]In a personal message to Molotov (or Stalin) Matsuoka expresses his desire to definitely settle the question of rights and interests in Northern Sakhalin. See II, 617.

Trans. 6-11-41

No. 620

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

June 1, 1941
#642.

Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka's personal message:

(1) This Minister reaffirms his desire, previously expressed by him at Moscow, that the question of negotiations for our rights in North Sakhalin be settled within six months from the date of agreement.

(2) As satisfactory conclusion of negotiations for the settlement of the trade treaty and the fisheries agreement bears intimate relation to the settlement of the negotiations relative to our rights (in North Sakhalin) which will in turn substantiate this Minister's position in

handling delicate domestic problems, he desires that these negotiations be brought to satisfactory conclusion at once, in accordance with the following:

(a) In connection with the trade negotiations, we consider the Soviet proposal calling for post payment of freight differentials for goods carried on land and sea, as totally unsatisfactory. Therefore, the Soviet proposal should be discarded in favor of the Japanese proposal which calls for "whenever possible, spot payments shall be made", and the negotiations should be brought to a speedy end in order to hasten the conclusion of the treaty.

(b) Regarding the fisheries agreement, our proposal of May 14th should be taken as the basis of negotiations, which should be brought to a satisfactory termination during June in order that the agreement may be reached and signed in the month of August.

Note: See II, 617.

Trans. 6-6-41

No. 621

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) June 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #643.

According to Molotov's most recent statement concerning the Russo-Japanese trade negotiations, there is only one problem to be dealt with which stands in the way of a final settlement, which might be reached next week; I, myself, have in addition to this problem two or three other points to take up; however, I believe we can reach a solution without any great difficulty.

The greatest hurdle is the Russian demand that we make up the differential between land and sea shipping expenses by delivery of commodities: I have given this Soviet request most careful consideration, and have examined the problem from every angle, but I could not give a definite promise, due to hesitance on my part to believe that our government would make up the whole differential by payment in merchandise as the Soviets wish. I explained in detail that we want to comply with the Russian demand, if we are able to procure the articles the Russians want, and on learning this, Molotov announced that if that was the case, he believed it would be possible to find a formula for mutual agreement on this matter.

I have forwarded the revised proposal to Mikoyan already, and I now believe that next week I can conclude the entire business with the two officials mentioned above.

Trans. 6-23-41

No. 622

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) June 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo No number.

Negotiations #96 (Part 6 of 6)[a].

( ) The exchange of notes shall be "Confidential" and shall consist of a mutual exchange of identical documents.

( ) We accept the Soviet proposals given in my *letter* dated 16 May 1941, consisting of the several items after "following understanding".

( ) In regard to subsection (1), modify my Negotiations *message (?)* #110[b] as follows:

Delete "above-mentioned"; and then following "Agreement", insert "concerning exchange of goods all payments of this date". The Soviet negotiators have strongly advocated the elimination of "or seem to cease", and we have consented to this elimination, although we gave several examples showing the necessity for retaining it.

( ) Regarding subsection (2) on the subject of bank accounts, the Soviet want the following amendments incorporated:

Before "Agreement," in the middle of the paragraph, add "above-mentioned"; following "concerning" delete everything down to "this date"; delete "foreign" from the phrase "free foreign currencies" appearing in two places; and change "through a Japanese bank", to read "through the Yokohama Specie Bank" and at the end change to read "accounts with the said bank".

We strongly urged the substitution of "including" for "regarding", but they refused to agree even after we explained fully our reasons and viewpoint. It will, therefore, remain as it is.

5. *List of Trade Goods*

The list of articles is to be covered by a new supplement to a Trade Treaty. This list will be formally signed as a part of the treaty, as I indicated in my separate telegram to Negotiations message #97[c]. The articles are the same as given in my earlier letter #125, except that B at the end of "List 1" should read "other goods".

Correct the figures to correspond with 4 of my Negotiations message #91[d].

6. The Tables of Trade Goods in the treaty supplement, prepared by the Office of Trade Representatives, will be formally signed in the same manner as the treaty itself.

Furthermore, I shall use my full title as Ambassador in signing.

Note: Quoted parts are English text.

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[a] Parts 1 to 5 not available.
[b] Not available.
[c] Not available.
[d] Not available.

Trans. 6–11–41

No. 623

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) June 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) No number.

Negotiations #100.

Re my negotiations #94[a] and #96[b].

Please make the following additions and corrections:

1. *Trade Agreement*

( ) (6) Capitalize the "A" in "the said annex".

( ) (8) Do not use "hyphens" between the word "most-favoured-nation". (Similarly, eliminate the hyphens where this expression appears in other paragraphs.)

( ) At the end, change capital "U" to small "u" in the word "Undersigned"; change "s" to "z" in the word "authorised". (Also make similar changes where these words occur elsewhere).

2. *Organs to be associated with the Office of Trade Representative.*

( ) Capitalize "s" in the expression "Legal Status" in the heading.

( ) (3) Remove the comma after the first parenthetical item beginning with Trade Representative, and eliminate the remainder (of this sentence). (?)[c]

In the middle of the second section of this same subparagraph ( ) (3), eliminate the comma following "the location of the office".

3. *Jurisdiction over assets and property of the Trade Representative and of temporary organs.*

( ) In the first section correct the expression "and Annex to this Agreement", to read "and the Annex to the said Agreement".

( ) "accept, Monsieur -----," should read "I beg you, Monsieur -----, to accept". (Use this latter expression in the other correspondence on this subject.)

4. *Currency Exchange Arrangements.*

( ) (3) Eliminate the commas just before and after "stipulated in the present Article".

( ) (5) Before the "etc" at the end, eliminate the comma.

5. *Commercial Transportation.*

( ) (1) (III) Before "the carrying" ----- (garbled).

( ) (2) In the middle of this paragraph eliminate the comma between "the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" and "and such".

In this same subparagraph capitalize the "g" in "group". (Make similar changes in ensuing paragraphs and tables of trade goods.)

( ) (5) (II) Drop "the" from the phrase "the Group (A) or (B)".

(III) Eliminate the word "Group" before "(B)".

( ) (7) (I) After "remain in force", add the word "for".

Note: Quoted items above are in English language.

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[a] Not available.

[b] Only part 6 of 6 available; See II, 622.

[c] Translation of this sentence doubtful; badly garbled.

Trans. 6-11-41

No. 624

FROM: Hsinking
TO: Tokyo

June 9, 1941
302.

Re your # 313[a].

Agreement reached not to announce anything outside of regarding the duties of the committee established as a result of the Togo-Molotov agreement except the material contained in the joint communique.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-1-41

No. 625

FROM: Hsinking (Umeza) May 20, 1941
TO: Moscow #36.

Message to Tokyo #262.

There is going to be a conference opening at Chita on the 27th of May and until some understanding is reached therein the Army is of the opinion that the whole matter should be kept absolutely secret. However, since the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact was concluded already a month has passed and no definite results from this agreement are apparent, I feel that there is a tendency throughout the world to make light of our arrangement with the Soviet, so perhaps it would be a good gesture so far as the United States is concerned for us to briefly publish the mere fact that such a conference is to be opened. In any case, if it is your intention to keep this matter totally secret let me know by return wire because I will have to let Moscow know about our desires in this connection.

Relayed to Russia.

Trans. 6-4-41

No. 626

FROM: Hsinking May 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #268.

The preparations for carrying out the settlement of the Manchurian-Soviet border delineation have been started. Reference is made to my #267[a]. The protocol of the Manchurian-Soviet war zone agreement made by the Foreign Office during April of last year should be sent to the Ambassador in Russia. Please wire if this has been done.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 5-27-41

No. 627

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 15, 1941
TO: Vichy #230.

(Part 1 of 2) (Message from Hsinking #328).

(Message to Washington & Peking Cir. #103).

The ----- ----- for the settlement of the border dispute between Manchukuo and Mongolia, which had been going on in Chita finally resulted in an agreement. It has been decided to (make public ?) a statement concerning it on the ----- as given in the separate telegram. That this agreement was so swiftly concluded was due partly to the fact that the relations between the two countries had turned for the better because of the conclusion of the Japan-Soviet neutrality treaty and partly to the fact that the representatives on both sides had endeavored to compromise in a peaceful spirit. This is for your information. For your reference, I am, furthermore, sending you the following with regard to this question.

The work of border demarcation which has been carried on since the Nomohan armistice (----- ----- -----) by ----- and Outer Mongolia until ----- was disrupted when a certain technical difficulty was met with (with both Ambassador TŌGŌ and MOLOTOV agreeing, the border line was drawn upon the map, but their views conflicted when it came to applying the line to the actual situation), and the matter has been allowed to stand unsettled.

Trans. 8-25-41

No. 628

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 15, 1941
TO: Vichy #230.

(Part 2 of 2).

Message from Hinking #328. Message to Washington and Peking as Circular #103.

More recently, following the conclusion of the Japan-Soviet neutrality treaty between Ambassador TATEKAWA and MOLOTOV, a conversation was held between these men, resulting in a decision to resume the negotiations between Manchukuo and Mongolia. On May ----- representatives of Manchukuo and Mongolia met in Chita and discussed the details, technical and -----, relative to the area in question. On June 10th, both parties came to an agreement, and on the ----- formally signed the agreement. On the coming -----, the representatives will meet again in the area concerned and resume their work of actual demarcation. When the preliminary work of demarcation shall have been completed (it is expected that it will be completed by the end of this summer at the latest), the representatives will gather again at ----- and will endeavor to arrange a final agreement defining the border.

Will you please transmit this telegram together with the separate message?

Trans. 8-25-41

No. 629

FROM: Moscow June 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #735.

Translator Takahashi's observations on his way to his post were as follows:

A. Trip west.

1. In the following ten stations DARASUN, Kumasskaya, Chita, PETOROFUSUKII-ZARCDO, Ulan Ude, MUISOWAYA, TANHOI, Nizhnii, Udinsk, YURUGA, UERESIT-IYAAGINO, a total of ten military trains was observed loaded with 50 or 60 military trucks, and water supply trucks and canteens, etc.

2. In the vicinity of PERUMU there was one train loaded with field pieces and ten anti-aircraft guns.

3. In the vicinity of KIIROFU there was one train loaded with a few armoured trucks and amphibian tanks.

B. Trip east.

1. In the vicinity of Nizhnii Udinsk there was one train loaded with about 12,200 ton -----.

2. In the vicinity of SUJEETIYA there were two trains loaded with about 10 howitzers and military trucks, etc.

Trans. 7-7-41.

No. 630

FROM: Hsinking
TO: Moscow

June 10, 1941
54.

(To Tokyo as # 320.)

Re my # 309.

I understand that while Vice Consul AGATA was traveling from Chita to Manchuli he saw 27 armored trains carrying in all 800 trucks. This is too large a number of trucks to be transported even in time of maneuvers. In view of the present international situation this is a phenomenon which deserves our close attention.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 6-13-41

No. 631

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Moscow

June 16, 1941
No Number.

Commerce # 151.

Secret outside the Department.

Will you get an agreement from the Soviet Government to the effect that they also would not publish the following three diplomatic notes:

1. Letters pertaining to temporary attachment of property and to property.
2. Letters concerning mutual establishment of trade representatives.
3. Letters pertaining to the first paragraph of the agreement.

(The contents of these three letters will be known only to the Foreign Office of our government and will not be submitted to the Privy Council. This information is for you only.)

Trans. 6-19-41

No. 632

FROM: Moscow
TO: Tokyo

June 17, 1941
No Number.

110 (Commerce)

1. We have mentioned the matter of revising your Commercial # 148[a] and # 149[a], paragraph 2, (paragraph 1 has already been revised), to the other party. They are of the same opinion and we desire to have the revision which they have agreed, signed.

2. Re your Commercial #151[b]. It has been agreed not to make official announcement regarding any of the "confidential" documents (connected with these negotiations).

[a]Not available.
[b]See II, 631.

Trans. 6-2-41

No. 633

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Moscow

June 9, 1941
#578.

Re your #668[a].

While recognizing that this is a special occasion, we are rather reluctant regarding the matter of a Soviet aeroplane entering Japan. Therefore, we will have a civilian plane fly to Vladivostok to meet it on the morning of the 9th. The Russian Ambassador concurred in this. So during the day (the 9th) we will have a plane of the Manchurian Company fly to Vladivostok and bring the two Soviet doctors and their attendant. They will travel without visas.

Please relay this with your message to Manchuria and Vladivostok.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 6-20-41

No. 634

FROM: Rome
TO: Tokyo

May 27, 1941
#317.

On the 27th, ANDŌ dined with the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, KURAJENKOFU. On that occasion, ANDŌ asked whether there was any truth to the rumor that Germany has concluded an agreement with the U.S.S.R. for joint exploitation of the Ukraine. The First Secretary categorically denied the existence of such an agreement and said that, in his opinion, Germany and the U.S.S.R. will cooperate with each other to the end.

Trans. 5-28-41

No. 635

FROM: Rome (Giappone)
TO: Moscow (Koshi)

June 5, 1941
No Number.

Action Tokyo as #355.

(Abstract)

According to reliable sources in Italian diplomatic circles, Italy desires to conclude a trade agreement with Russia whereby Italian electric appliances will be exchanged "bartered" for Russian raw materials.

As soon as the Italians have a definite proposal they plan to send a mission to Moscow headed by VUNORUPI.

Trans. 6-21-41

No. 636

FROM: Sofia (Izumi) June 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #89.

(Part 1 of 3)

Reports.

1. ----- the following are the demands made by Germany on Soviet Russia about the -----: (1) To return to Rumania a section of Bukovina which includes Tie-----nouibu[a] and which is situated in the interior of Bessarabia inhabited now by Rumanians: (2) To reconsider the German-Russian borderline in Galicia (to return to the German sphere of influence two-thirds of this region, including Dorohouiti[b] and Ru—fu[c]): (3) To allow German experts to enter the Ukraine so that Germany may be sure of securing raw materials: (4) To grant Germany the right to pass through B—mu[d], Caucasus and, if necessary, Rikaihi[e], so that Germany may send her troops by way of the Black Sea into Arabia and Iraq.

2. That Germany has not referred to entire Bessarabia in her demands may be interpreted to be more or less a compromise on her part. The second demand may be interpreted thus: *a.* The abolition of the natural boundary; *b.* Transference to the Ukraine after the war by Rumania of the (Sovereignty?) of that region in which 3,000,000 Ukrainians inhabit.

The third demand means the infiltration of fifth columnists into the Ukraine.

The fourth demand signified forcing Russia to forego her ambitions in Central Asia.

---

[a] [b] [c] Kana spellings ([b] Probably Dorohoi in northern Rumania)
[d] Kana spelling. Probably Batimi, the southern-most Soviet port on the Black Sea.
[e] Kana spelling.

Trans. 6-14-41

No. 637

FROM: Sofia (Izumi) June 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #89.

(Part 2 of 3.)

3. If Russia accepts this, the prestige of the Red Army will be shattered: STALIN'S position may totter; and the present regime may break up. But even if it does not, the possibility is quite great that the anti-STALIN wing of the Red Army may stage a coup d'etat. On the other hand, it appears that it is either acquiesce or fight, so you can see how Russia is menaced both from within and from without by an urgent crisis.

4. (1) If Germany fights, I believe that she can defeat Russia in two or three weeks, but I do not believe that after all Germany has any territorial designs. All she wants is to overthrow the present government and substitute a pro-German regime.

(2) German diplomatic quarters are now apparently considering that the prospects are not bad for peace. However, the army is bringing pressure to bear upon RIBBENTROP and his associates demanding a showdown between Germany and Russia, and demanding to know whether or not Russian Bolshevism, so hostile to everything German, can co-exist with the Reich.

Trans. 6-19-41

No. 638

FROM: Sofia (Izumi) June 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #89.

(Part 3 of 3.)

(3) Some say that all HITLER is doing is trying, even at the risk of war, to bring Russia finally into the Tripartite Alliance. Well, we shall know what is what within two weeks as a result of the negotiations between the two countries.

5. (1) On May 31st, the German Army demanded the mobilization of the (Bulgarian) forces.

(2) The Russian Minister in Belgrade recently warned Russian families in Central Europe to go back home (the ----- Minister in Sofia sent his family home the last of April.)

(3) Among the five places on the German-Soviet border, there are only two which are attracting much attention; namely, Pusiemisuru[a] and Marukinka[a].

I think that you already know about these demands of Germany on the Soviet. However, I thought I had better let you know how it looks from here.

---

[a]Kana spelling.

Trans. 6-19-41

No. 639

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) June 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #666.

In summing up the various information at hand, Germany is preparing to make certain important demands on Russia, which will be backed up by threat of resorting to force.

In view of Japan's relation to Germany through the Tripartite Pact and also her relation to Russia through the Neutrality Pact, I feel that it is incumbent on Japan to effect a delay in the crisis by intervention, and to urge Russia to either join the Axis or collaborate closely with the anti-British, anti-United States groups.

However, in the event that Germany submits her demands to Russia, Japan should warn Russia in a friendly manner to accept the demands, in order to avoid war.

That this course is consistent can be seen from the talks you have had with Stalin.

Please send me instructions as soon as you have prepared the details for the warning note mentioned above.

Trans. 6-10-41

No. 640

FROM: Rome June 14, 1941
TO: Ankara No Number.

Message to Tokyo as #373.

(Part 2 of 2.)

As long as Germany's military superiority over the Soviet is undisputed, we should maintain, for a while at least, a neutral attitude. Waiting unitl the Soviet moves her Far Eastern

troops into the west, in order that the peace of East Asia might be guaranteed, we then should present the Soviet with demands for the removal of her Far Eastern territorial troops as well as other pertinent requests. In the event she does not comply, we should then by force of arms proceed to occupy strategic coastal points in northern Karafuto[b]. It would be wise for us to prevent this area from becoming a base of operations for Britain and America in their aiding the Soviet. In the prosecution of this, Far Eastern Soviet should be granted its independence under the sovereignty of the empire and in the capacity of an independent nation it should function, as a matter of course, as but one wing of the great East Asian co-prosperity sphere of influence.

5. Germany's attack against the Soviet inevitably will throw the Soviet into active cooperation with England and America. Britain and the United States' aid to the Soviet is but a matter of course. Should we at too early a date, take the offensive against the Soviet, then at the same time that the United States joins in the war against the Axis, we would find ourselves drawn into a war with the United States. In this connection, if the empire, from the point of view of economy as well as militarily speaking, has made sufficient preparations, there is no reason why we should avoid, in the final analysis, waging a war on two fronts. However, if our preparation has been insufficient, we must take measures so that we will not be snared into such a trap. Therefore, as a matter of expediency, we should do our utmost to lead the Soviet and Germany into cooperation in the Tripartite alliance, and it is my firm belief that our best plan would be to endeavor to bring about victory in the China incident and to put out plans for the south seas on a more practical and stronger basis.

Relayed to Berlin, Moscow, and Ankara.

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[a]Part 1 of 2 not available.

[b]Japanese name of Sakhalin Island, an island in Okhotsk Sea.

Trans. 6-17-41

No. 641

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) June 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #667.

The German Ambassador called on me on the 7th and said there were rumors afloat to the effect that Molotov was to visit Tokyo. He inquired as to whether there was any truth in these rumors. I told him that I remembered that on the occasion of Matsuoka's visit here, Matsuoka had said to Molotov: "If you come to Tokyo, we will give you a great welcome."

However, Matsuoka said this merely as a matter of form, but that recently a Tokyo newspaper had printed this as though there might be some truth in it, and that the above-mentioned rumor had perhaps grown out of that incident.

I took the occasion to tell him that Russo-German relations looked rather "alarming", and asked him about the state of affairs. His reply is in general as follows:

1. He has heard nothing directly from his government.

2. Opinion among the many Germans coming from Germany seemed about evenly divided between an outbreak of hostilities this year and the opinion that such a thing could not happen.

3. Should not the Soviet authorities know more about such things than we do, and yet there do not appear to be any indications of an attack.

4. He thought that in the main, the Soviet had acceded to Germany's requests, and that their accomplishment was proceeding smoothly; hence, there was no reason for Germany's attacking Russia.

Trans. 6–25–41

No. 642

FROM: Ankara June 18, 1941
TO: Moscow # 113.

On the 17th a member of the German Embassy here spoke confidentially to KINOSITA[a] to the effect that Germany was at present pressing extensive demands upon Soviet Russia and that if Soviet Russia complies with most of the demands, all will be well, but if she does not, there will be war. This question is expected to be settled within the next ten days. I am sending this for your reference.

[a]Consul at Ankara.

Trans. 6–20–41

No. 643

FROM: Berlin June 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 635.

In response to a request from Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP, I went to Salzburg on the 3rd and had an interview with him from 4 to 5:30 p.m. in FUSIRU, and from 7 to 8 p.m., we both had a conversation with HITLER[a]. Again on the 4th from 11 a.m. on, I had an interview with RIBBENTROP for more than an hour.[b] Details in a separate telegram.

[a]Available.
[b]Available. See II, 646.

Trans. 6–5–41

No. 644

FROM: Berlin (Osima) June 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 635.

At the request of Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP I flew to Salzburg on the 3rd and had an interview with him from 4:00 p.m. until 5:30 at Fugiru. From 7:00 until 8:00 in the evening he and I had a meeting with HITLER. I again had an interview which lasted more than an hour, with RIBBENTROP on the 4th from 11:00 a.m. Details are sent by telegram separately.

[a]Kana spelling.

Trans. 6–7–41

No. 645

FROM: Berlin (Osima) June 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #636.

Re my #635[a].

1. Both men tell me that in every probability war with Russia cannot be avoided.
2. I am wiring you the details in my next message. This is a matter of the gravest secrecy, so please keep the contents of the telegram absolutely to yourself.

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[a]OSIMA wires MATSUOKA that he interviewed HITLER and RIBBENTROP on the 3rd and is wiring the details separately. See II, 643.

See II, 561 and II, 646 in which OSIMA wires MATSUOKA the details of his interview with HITLER and RIBBENTROP.

Trans. 6-11-41

No. 646

FROM: Berlin June 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #638.

(Part 1 of ?) Part 1 only available.

The following are the salient points brought up by Foreign Minister Ribbentrop:

1. Soviet-German relations have become exceedingly bad of late, considerably increasing the possibility of war between them. However, it cannot be said that war is a certainty. As was stated earlier, if war does break out, Germany is confident that the campaign will be completed wihtin a period of two to three months. Ribbentrop asked that I place complete confidence in his words, pointing out the fact that since the beginning of the Polish campaign, everything he said would happen did, in actuality, come to pass.

I asked him when the war would begin, if it were to take place. He replied that the time for the outbreak was as yet undecided. However, he added that if we had to make any preparations for that occasion, he urges us to complete them as soon as possible.

2. Although there are many rumors to the effect that negotiations are being conducted between the Soviet Union and Germany, Ribbentrop says that such rumors are absolutely groundless. Germany is conducting no negotiations. Moreover, Germany has completed all of her preparations and troop concentrations along her eastern border. The Soviet Union has also massed troops along her side of the border, he said.

3. While we were on this subject, I said that on the surface it would seem (not?) wise to take on the Soviet Union as an enemy, too, in view of the fact that the main German objective is to attack England. I asked if there were some circumstances which made this war unavoidable.

Ribbentrop replied that the attitude of the Soviet Union of late was becoming increasingly unfriendly toward Germany. Very recently, he added, there was even an armed border clash between the two forces at the mouth of the Danube. It is evident that the Soviet Union is waiting for Germany to fail.

As far as Germany is concerned, the Foreign Minister continued, she has ample confidence in the war against England. However, she cannot overlook an outside possibility of an unlooked for reversal. Should the Soviet Union be fought now, Germany will have complete and

undisputable control of the entire European continent. Under those circumstances, it will be absolutely impossible for Great Britain and the United States, regardless of what they may attempt, to lay a hand on Germany. In other words, even from the viewpoint of her war against England, it is imperative that the Soviet Union be beaten down now.

4. I inquired what would have become of the Stalin regime if Germany did smash the Soviet army. Ribbentrop replied that frankly, he could not say. However, one could be assured of the fact that under those circumstances the Soviet Union could not long wield any weight politically. It is Germany's intention to bring about splits in the Soviet Union itself. He further said that he does not doubt for a moment that such a condition in the Soviet Union would considerably enhance Japan's position in the Far East.

Trans. 6–6–41

No. 647

FROM: Berlin (Osima) June 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #646.

To Vice Minister OHASHI:

For the time being, I think it would be a good idea for you, in some inconspicuous manner, to postpone the departure of Japanese citizens for Europe via Siberia. You will understand why.

Trans. 6–11–41

No. 648

FROM: Berlin (Osima) June 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #674.

RIBBENTROP'S man has brought me a reliable report to the effect that three or four days ago the German Ambassador in Tokyo was ordered to stop Germans from returning to Germany by way of Siberia because of a grave situation.

Trans. 6–14–41

No. 649

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 14, 1941
TO: Berlin #517.

We have several reports that Berlin has demanded of Moscow certain agricultural and mineral rights at least in the Ukraine. Now I want you to go to VON RIBBENTROP and report the following in my own words:

"If any diplomatic negotiations have already begun between Germany and the Soviet, we have as yet not heard what the nature of these negotiations is. If Germany is already carrying on any such negotiations or intends to do so, could you not let me know what it is all about?"

I even understand that Germany and the Soviet are already negotiating, and that the Soviet is making some counter-demands of Germany. If you can find out anything about this, please wire me back immediately.

Trans. 6–16–41

No. 650

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 14, 1941
TO: Rome #156.

We have several reports to the effect that it appears that the German Government has probably already presented the Kremlin with some demands on the Ukraine, etc. We also hear that the Soviet has also presented Germany with some demands and that negotiations have been opened. Please try to find out anything you can about this and wire me back immediately.

Trans. 6–16–41

No. 651

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 20, 1941
TO: Berlin #539.

Today Domei reports from Berlin that Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP has just had an important conversation with the Russian Ambassador, and we are inclined to believe that this is so. Will you please try to find out what was said and wire me back immediately?

Trans. 6–23–41

No. 652

FROM: Berlin (Osima) June 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #735.

Re your #539[a].

Today, the 20th, I called on Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP, and he made the following statement:

"I have held absolutely no conversations with Russian Ambassador DEGANOV(b) recently, Two or three days ago he called on Vice-Minister WEIZSAECKER relative to matters of ordinary business. ----- It was erroneously thought he had called on me. Just as I told you some days ago with regard to German-Soviet relations, up to now we have conducted positively no negotiations with the Russian authorities and, in addition, to the best of my opinion, we have absolutely no intention of carrying on any such negotiations with them in the future."

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[a]Russian Ambassador to Berlin.

Trans. 6–23–41

No. 653

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Moscow

June 13, 1941
No Number.

Received from London as # 435.

(Abstract—badly garbled.)

1. Ambassador Cripps returned on the 11th. In a conversation with the Vice Minister on the 12th, he stated that the Ambassador believes a Soviet-German war possible but that the army and Stalin are opposed and that Stalin will not consent. The principal German desires are oil, food and control of communications in the Black Sea region.

In a speech on the 1st, Prime Minister Churchill stated that a Soviet-German war is inevitable.

2. As in the case of Turkey, an Asiatic-European rapprochement, at least on Anglo-Russian oil, is possible since Britain is fighting countries constituting a menace to Russia. Russia would make her participation in a peace conference conditional upon acceptance of her demands.

3. The general view here is that German-Soviet hostilities are inevitable to prevent increasing encirclement of Russia in the Iran and Afghanistan regions and a German domination of Turkey.

4. Ambassador Cripps' mission did not materially improve Anglo-Soviet relations. The development of German-Soviet relations is being followed with great concern.

Trans. 6-19-41

No. 654

FROM: Moscow
TO: Tokyo

June 16, 1941
708.

(Part 1 of 2)[a].

Re your 605[b].

When on the 13th, I spoke to HIRUGAA on this question, he said that insofar as the Embassy here is concerned, it knew nothing of it. In compliance with your instruction, again on the 16th, I had MIYAKAWA question him for over an hour, but it seems that the matter in question has not yet taken place.

MIYAKAWA asked, "Judging from the manner in which denials were published by the Tass[c] on the 13th regarding the question of Russo-German relations (for the text please refer to Domei reports), did not the Soviet Government expect the German Government to reciprocate by issuing denials?"

To this HIRUGAA ----- that two or three days following the publication on May 25th of the article in the Pravda (denial of the story about leasing the Ukraine; mentioned in my # 626) -----.

---

[a]Part 2 of 2, in which "HI" tells MIYAKAWA that no instructions had been given by the Government for members of the Diplomatic Corps to return home. See II, 655.

[b]Not available.

[c]Official Russian News agency.

Trans. 6-27-41

No. 655

FROM: Moscow June 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #708.

(Part 2 of 2)[a].

Through MIYAKAWA[b], he said to "HI"[c] that it appeared strange that the members of the diplomatic corps, steps ----- ----- ----- (garbled) were returning to Germany. "HI" said that this was principally due to family reasons and that there were a few who had returned because of various rumors circulating among the members of the Embassy? (Consulate?) and that no instructions had been given by the government as to whether they should return or not. MIYAKAWA said that the impressions received from Berlin, here[d] and from "HI" were conflicting. Japan, as an ally, was immobilizing the British East Asia fleet and was working to prevent the United States from entering the war and that this was not a particularly satisfactory condition. "HI" then stated that as far as this place[d] was concerned, no instructions or information had been received. The concentration in the border region was merely a measure in case something should happen in respect to a neighboring country whose cunning intentions were only expressed by force, and would it really be efficient to go only half way in carrying out such a restraint?

There is nothing unusual in the conditions of the German Embassy here.

---

[a]See II,

[b]First Secretary, Japanese Embassy, Moscow.

[c]*Translator's Note:* In message #709, the person referred to as "HITLER", appeared in the text as "HI", which is the usual abbreviated designation for "HITLER". However, the contents of #708 indicate that HITLER is not the person referred to in that message. See II, 656.

[d]Moscow.

Trans. 6-21-41

No. 656

FROM: Moscow June 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #709.

Strictly secret.

Re my #708[a].

When MIYAKAWA[b] probed the Italian intelligence Officer on the 16th, that office is understood to have said: "In view of the deep-rooted rumor that a German-Soviet conflict would shortly begin, the Italian Embassy roughly one week ago wired its Home Government for instructions. No reply wire has as yet been forthcoming. Yesterday, the 15th, the Italian Ambassador questioned the German Ambassador concerning the evacuation of families of members of the German Embassy staff." It is understood that the German Ambassador gave the same explanation as I reported "HITLER" to have given in my ----- wire. He continued his confidential remarks by saying: "In order to take the responsibility for the female members of the staff, the Italian Ambassador, in accordance with their wishes, is arranging for their evacuation by tonight's train."

Furthermore, from the manner in which the above-mentioned intelligence officer spoke, it may be true that they have no information with regard to the question of closing the local

German Embassy as there is no indication that they have started burning codes or taking any other similar steps.

---

[a]See II, 655.
[b]First Secretary, Japanese Embassy in Moscow.
[c]See Part 2.

Trans. 6-21-41

No. 657

FROM: Moscow June 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 707.

Strictly secret.

Re your # 583[a].

Concerning the matter mentioned in # 196[b] from the Minister to London, summing up the views of various quarters here, no matter how much the Soviet is egged on by England and the United States, she knows full well that she has to maintain a cooperative attitude with Germany and cannot yield to such encouragement. I told you in my # 695[a] about the rumors of a war between Germany and Russia denied by Tass[c]. I think that British Ambassador, CRIPPS had something to do with this and, as proof, it appears that he will never return to Moscow.

Relayed to London.

---

[a]Not available.
[b]Not available.
[c]Official Russian News Agency.

Trans. 6-21-41

No. 658

FROM: Tokyo June 17, 1941
TO: Washington Circular # 1260.

Both Britain and the U.S.S.R. are reporting denials of the threatening German-Soviet rupture and are minimizing the situation. They are also reporting the impossibility of British-Soviet rapprochement.

However, the strained relations between Germany and the U.S.S.R. is a fact and for this reason the above must be considered as mere propaganda.

It is quite possible that these events will follow the course of German-Soviet war; Soviet-British alliance, American-Soviet rapprochement and finally the entrance of the United States in the war.

Therefore, please obtain and send as much information as possible relative to these items.

This message addressed to England, the United States, Germany, U.S.S.R. Relay from Germany to Italy as this Minister's instructions.

Trans. 6-17-41

No. 659

FROM: Berlin (Osima) June 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #691.

Concerning the attitude that we shall take in case war breaks out between Germany and Russia, although I think that you are already giving the matter your complete consideration, since I believe it to be of extremely vital importance that we be up to date, once more I am reporting these ideas in detail.

Previously, Chancellor HITLER told me of the actual situation at the beginning of the Norway offensive and of the Western offensive drives, as you know from my #208[a]. Since he always, at the outset, launches out in a surprise attack, even in the apparently imminent German-Russian war, HITLER has already finished making his preparations and but awaits the most propitious moment in the general setup of conditions and weather for the lightening-like execution of his plans. On absolutely reliable information, the Rumanian army also on the 13th was completely mobilized. HITLER returned to Berlin today, and it is confirmed fact that BARUCHITSCH and HALDER (?) and other military leaders have gone to the front line. Also, judging that the hour of conflict is approaching rapidly, will you, as speedily as possible, decide how Japan is to cope with this situation.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 6–16–41

No. 660

FROM: Berlin (Osima) June 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #716.

1. In my #701[a], I reported to you in the imminent probability of the opening of hostilities between Germany and the Soviet Union. Well, for some time now the Germans have been talking in a hostile manner. For several days the weather had been bad, but since yesterday the skies have cleared completely. Furthermore, the Soviet has become quite aware of the intentions of the Reich, so I don't know but what we may see the outbreak of war at any moment.

2. Concerning the probable outcome of such a struggle, as I have repeatedly told you, the Germans have complete assurance. General HALDER(?), who has always advocated such a move, says that so far as the Army is concerned, war with Russia amounts to nothing more than a police action and that the whole thing should be over within four weeks. Judging from the way the German Army has been going, it does seem that the Russian Army will be annihilated in a short time.

3. Germany has gradually strengthened her preparations in the Netherlands, Belgian and French coastal areas, and she is gradually evacuating her nationals from these regions so it may well be that the Reich will make a decisive attack upon the British Isles while in the midst of the Russian fray. Summing all this up, I would say that at least within the next several months, the European situation will take a sudden turn, and the war, so far as arms are concerned will end summarily. Now in the face of this, our most pressing problem is to meet the situation with the proper steps for our own welfare.

4. First of all, it is urgent that we adopt and adamantly stick to a policy assuring the establishment and maintenance of our area and rights of co-prosperity in Greater East Asia. We must speedily adopt a definite policy in our relations with the South Seas, China, the United States, and Soviet Russia. As I say, we must meet the European situation with a counter-policy of our own from which we ourselves will derive the greatest benefits and carry it out with resolution. At such a critical moment as this, naturally, you must see to it that our emissaries abroad are thoroughly advised concerning our Empire's policy, intentions, and plans so please instruct them fully through the proper channels.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 6-19-41

No. 661

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) June 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #721.

Since it has become impossible to handle American money remittances of the Berlin Branch of the Yokahama Specie Bank, due to America's freezing of German and Italian capital, henceforth, I think that there is nothing left to do but to send American dollar remittances from Tokyo directly to the Independent Bank here in Moscow. After you have given this matter your careful consideration, please advise me as to necessary particulars as soon as you are able.

Trans. 6-25-41

No. 662

FROM: Berlin (Osima) June 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #738.

Regard my #737[a].

During a talk today with Ribbentrop, he mentioned that U.S.S.R. was concentrating its Far Eastern forces in European Russia, and although he didn't mention it, he intimated that the recent Japanese-Soviet relations might have something to do with this.

Thereupon, I explained that European Russia being the heart of U.S.S.R. and Far Eastern Russia being nothing more than its arms and limbs, it would be perfectly natural, from the military standpoint, for U.S.S.R. to concentrate its forces in the vital European Russia, and that this move has nothing to do with the Japanese-Soviet relations.

Please keep me informed regarding the troop movements, etc., of the Soviet Far Eastern forces.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 6-25-41

No. 663

FROM: Moscow — June 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #723.

1. At noon on the 23rd, I talked with the German Ambassador, and he said, "On the night of the 21st, I received from my government a note to the Soviet government which said, in effect, that since the activities of the Soviet Army on the border could no longer be tolerated, hostilities were to begin."

2. He continued, "At five o'clock in the morning, I went and handed it to Mr. MOLOTOV, who said, "We have already been attacked at four A.M." All I said was, "We are very sorry."

3. I asked, "Well, what I would like to know is if there have been any negotiations with the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin," and he replied, "None whatever."

4. I said, "You have been here in Moscow for several years and have done your best to make and keep German-Soviet relations good, and I cannot tell you how sorry I am that this day has ever come." To my expression of sorrow, the German Ambassador replied, "Well, you need not grieve. I knew on April 17 for the first time that Germany was going to attack Soviet Russia. No, the Soviet was not deliberately obstructing Germany's military action. There was absolutely no reason for Germany to resort to war. I told them so, but it was no use. God only knows what far-off objective HITLER has in his mind. It must be that the military leaders guided him strongly in this venture."

5. The German Ambassador continued, "Here there are about 200 German officials; throughout the length and breadth of this land there are many more amounting to a huge figure. I asked MOLOTOV if they might first go to Iran. Those under the jurisdiction of our consul in Vladivostok will be sent to Japan.

6. "Last night a final telegram from Berlin reached me saying that I should leave our interests in the hands of the Bulgarian Minister here and endeavor to have the Rumanian Minister leave the city."

Trans. 6-25-41

No. 664

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) — June 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #731.

I understand that this morning the German Ambassador delivered an important note to the Soviet Government and has begun preparations to evacuate the Embassy. I will immediately confer with SCHULENBERG[a] and wire you back the details.

[a] German Ambassador in Moscow.

Trans. 6-25-41

No. 665

FROM: Vladivostok (Ota) June 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 223.

Strictly secret.

At 5:30 P.M. on the 22nd, the German Consul General telephoned me asking me to come to see him. At first, I sent Vice Consul NEI, and later went myself. He began by saying that he really should have come to see me but that the situation did not permit it and extended his apologies.

He said that he had not as yet received any official dispatch from his home government (and perhaps would never receive it), but that according to the Berlin radio at 2 P.M. a conflict had begun to rage along the entire border between Germany and Russia. At 1 P.M. the German Foreign Minister and the Minister of Propaganda had announced this fact to foreign correspondents. However, this war, coming so soon after the non-aggression pact with Russia, was brought on by the fact that the Comintern had been engaging in activities within Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary and other countries coming within the German sphere of influence, and also because Russia had refused to accede to Germany's demands that she withdraw her armies from the border between the two countries.

This war (he continued) was started by Germany, therefore, for the present, it was his opinion that Japan should maintain a position of neutrality. Furthermore, since he and his staff would soon have to take leave for Japan or Manchukuo, he requested our kind consideration.

I told him that I would be very glad to take care of any secret documents for him, and he expressed his appreciation for this but said that there was none left because he had received instructions two or three days before to prepare for disposal of all important documents, and having received a telegram at 7 o'clock the night before, he had spent the whole night burning them all up. At the present moment, he said, he had nothing whatever left but a little money and expected at any time to receive the order to be on his way.

Trans. 6–26–41

No. 666

FROM: Berlin (Osima) June 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 752.

The following is the war situation as described to me by a person near to RIBBENTROP when he called on me on the evening of the 22nd.

Today's fighting brought out the fact that the Russian troops along the border had not been completely assembled.

During today's fighting it is certain that as many as five hundred enemy airplanes have been either shot down or destroyed on the ground.

Twenty-five Romanian divisions, in addition to German forces, have been placed under the command of ANTENESUKO[a], and fifteen Finnish divisions, with addition of German troops, have been put under the command of MANNERUSUHAIMU[a] (Mannerheim). Both the Romanian and Finnish troops, especially the latter, have been effectively used. All this goes to show that the first day of fighting had proceeded successfully in every way, and has contributed to greater confidence in the ultimate outcome of the conflict.

[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 6–24–41

No. 667

FROM: Koenigsberg (Sugihara) June 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 24.

About noon of the 22nd (or 21st ?), Russian planes raided Tilsit[a], but I understand they did little damage.

[a] City in East Prussia.

Trans. 6–28–41

No. 668

FROM: Vladivostok (Ota) June 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudajin) # 227.

Regarding my # 225[a].

On the 23rd, I met the acting U.S. Consul-General, and in the course of our conversation, the Consul-General referring to the German-Soviet war, stated that with the great differences of superiority and inferiority in all points between the German and Soviet armies, it is a foregone conclusion that the German forces will take the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and the (electrical ?) industrial areas, but that it remains to be seen whether or not they intend to smash the Soviet at this time. As for America's attitude, it will likely be announced soon, but in his own opinion, he was convinced that President Roosevelt will declare America's participation in the war, and material assistance for Russia. However, he expressed his hopes that Japan, which is in a unique position, would move with caution.

A member of our staff, for the sake of making contact with them, proceeded to the German Consulate-General at 1 p.m., but the insignia at the entrance already had been removed, and a civilian guard at the gate was keeping anyone from entering.

Relay to England, the United States, and Manchukuo.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 6–28–41

No. 669

FROM: Tokyo June 25, 1941
TO: Berlin # 556.

(In 3 parts—complete).

(Secret)

In the evening of the 22nd, Ambassador Ott called on me, bringing with him the German note which was transmitted to the Russian government by the Foreign Minister earlier in the day and acting under instructions of the home government, he communicated to me verbally its contents and explained that Hitler has given orders to use every might and means (MIT ALLEN MACHT MITTLE NENDGEGETRETEN (*sic*)) to march against the U.S.S.R.

I thanked the Ambassador for this information and told him that although I have been informed by Ambassador SI that Germany had declared war on Russia, it is not clear to me from the present report whether Germany has actually declared war. Whereupon, the German Ambassador replied that there appears to be no expression to that effect in the note.

I concurred in the particulars of his remarks, and added that the sessions of the liaison conference would be extended.

At the time of this interview, I stated that at the liaison conference on the 20th, the French Indo-China problem had been the principal topic discussed. With regard to the German-Soviet war, it was decided on the 24th that this government would make no move until after a full consultation with the German government. (Berlin to Tokyo #738[a]). The General Staff and Intelligence Service will be consulted promptly regarding the Soviet Army's movements.

Regarding Poland, I said that this government will not quibble over details; that its conduct will be entirely in accordance with the spirit and aims of the Three Power Pact. We are quite satisfied with that treaty and have no other desire except to act in accordance with it.

Please repeat to Italy.

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[a]The Jap Amb. at Berlin reports his conversation with Ribbentrop regarding the Soviet's concentrating their Far Eastern Forces in European Russia. Ribbentrop implies it to be a result of Jap-Soviet relations. See II, 662.

Trans. 6–30–41

No. 670

FROM: Vladivostok June 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo #272.

Re your #166[a]. Concerning my #223[b].

I called on Hi, I, Hu, and found that all three of them were well as usual.

From the 23rd on, as I explained in the first part of my telegram #277[c], the German Consul General has had no connection with the outside world and he does not go out at all. On the same day, I called on the diplomatic representative "A" on some other business and at that time I said that if the Kasai Maru was still at anchor the German Consul General desired to embark on it and that the ----- there were cognizant of this and should lend their assistance. "A" said that regarding the mutual treatment of the German-Soviet diplomats and consuls general he thought that the governments concerned would have to discuss this matter.

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[a]Not available.

[b]See II, 665—The German Consul General at Vladivostok tells the Jap Consul General of his instructions from Berlin pertaining to the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and Russia, and in his opinion, Japan should maintain a position of neutrality.

[c]See II, 668—The U.S. Consul General at Vladivostok has expressed his firm conviction that Pres. Roosevelt will declare participation in the war and provide material assistance for Russia; also, his hope that Japan will move with caution.

Trans. 7–2–41

No. 671

FROM: Koenigsberg (Sugihara) June 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 23.

I have been informed by a member of the Nazi Party here that, paralleling her military attack upon Russia, Germany considers it necessary to bring about the establishment of a pro-German regime as quickly as possible. The invasion has already begun. Aside from the regime in Russia proper, it is planned to set up other separate governments in the Ukraine, White Russia and the Baltic shore nations. Lithuania and Latvia, however, will coalesce and Esthonia will be annexed to Finland. High Nazi officials have been discussing the details of this for several days, but as yet they are not in complete accord.

Trans. 6–25–41

No. 672

FROM: Hsinking June 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 379.

(Part 1 of 2[a].)

From Secretary Yoshitomi.

I presume that you have already obtained sufficient information from various sources regarding Germany's reasons for making war on Russia, however, for the sake of reference I will add my opinion based on my experiences while serving in Russia and on various opinions prevalent here, as follows:

1. Germany's real objective is the crushing of Russia. If she should be turned from this objective by the British blockade to disposing of the British problem first and then after that to dispose of Russia the result would not be according to expectations but would probably entail a long war. If Germany should spend her strength in attacking Britain, America would certainly enter the war and in time, Russia having completed her military preparations, would enter the war against Germany and thus there is a grave danger that Germany might lose the opportunity of crushing Russia, which is her real objective. I think this is the reason why Germany attacked Russia suddenly without waiting for Russia to effect her military preparations. (In September of last year the German attache, Lt. General KESURING, resident in Germany (?) told me that it was generally understood in German army circles that it would take Russia two more years to prepare for war.)

2. Furthermore:

a. There were 162 divisions of the German army on the Russian border who were not only inactive but could not be used elsewhere. By making war with Russia, Germany did not need to employ fresh divisions.

b. By attacking Russia, Germany would gain possession of the Ukraine's iron, coal, and grain, and the Caucasian petroleum, etc., and by pulverizing the Russian army, Germany would remove all anxiety about the future.

c. Also by such an attack Germany might not find it impossible to arrive at an understanding with England and America.

3. That Germany desired not the absolute crushing of Britain but rather an understanding or compromise with her under certain definite regulations, was expressed to me many a time by leading members of the German Embassy in Moscow.

Again from another angle, there are many in England who, like the Duke of Windsor, cherish a feeling of affection for Germany. (It is reported that it was for the purpose of cutting off his relationship with Germany that Churchill exiled the Duke to America.) Germany for the present is turning her destructive strength toward Russia and by so doing will not only secure her eastern front but will also lend strength to the arguments of those in England who oppose England's blockade policy and thus pave the way for an understanding with England.

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[a]See II, 758, which is probably part 2 of this message.

Trans. 7–3–41

No. 673

FROM: Tokyo June 27, 1941
TO: Berlin #566.

An Asahi dispatch was received on the 26th regarding the war situation as follows:

"The Soviet will retire to the Ural region and there carry on a long war but the Germans will seek to terminate the war by the destruction of the Red army and then turn to the solution of the British question. However, the German authorities are regarding as a life and death matter the effecting of a landing on Britain itself. In other quarters, there are rumors that the future objective of the war will be changed and a peace proposal submitted to Britain early in July."

Please ascertain as to whether this dispatch passed the German censors. Also in view of the American radio broadcasts and an unverified report that Von Papen has submitted an anti-Comintern proposal to the British Ambassador in Ankara, please ascertain what Germany's attitude toward Britain is.

Trans. 6–30–41

No. 674

FROM: Berlin June 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo #806.

Re your #566[a].

I have already discussed the matter of Germany's future policy toward England in my telegram #785[b], so I presume you are cognizant of that. However, on the 22nd, Chancellor Hitler in an official notice stated that: "The policy of Anglo-Russian cooperation has become very clear. It has become imperative that Germany send a large force to the eastern front to decide the fortunes of war there. In order to accomplish this the air force in particular will be confronted with difficulties." Since that time the German papers are continually emphasizing the point that the Russian campaign is but a prelude to the British campaign and that the two campaigns are indivisible. I will follow the above with another telegram.

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[a]See II, 673. According to an Asahi dispatch, there are rumors that Germany will submit a peace proposal to England early in July. In view of U.S. radio broadcasts and a rumored anti-Comintern proposal to the British Amb. at Ankara by Von Papen, please ascertain Germany's attitude toward Britain.

[b]Not available.

Trans. 7–3–41

No. 675

FROM: Tokyo June 23, 1941
TO: China Net # 1333.

(Circular.)

Received from London as # 456.

Re my # 440[a].

General report.

(1) According to information obtained by our informant from Vice Minister of War, GURIGU, on the 23rd, as a result of Churchill's speech of the 22nd, in which he promised British aid to Russia, the British government has decided to return Ambassador Cripps to Moscow and also to carry out plans for aid to Russia by sending the Commander-in-Chief of the Middle Eastern forces, General Wavell, to Moscow to confer on the question of joint actions on the part of the British and Soviet forces, and also by sending military missions consisting of military experts.

(2) As the clarification of the United States' stand toward Russia has not yet been made, the British government, seeking to keep in step with the United States, is said to be hesitant about concluding an alliance with Soviet Russia immediately.

(3) Despite the 22nd being Sunday, the Soviet Ambassador had a conference with Foreign Minister Eden, extending to many hours. During this conference Eden is said to have urged Russia to wage a protracted war. (Britain fears that unless the war is protracted, the Russians will have to fight Germany alone and since Germany has already its Fifth Columnist organized not only in the three Baltic border states, but also in Ukraine and Caucasus, it would be a simple matter for German troops to occupy these areas.)

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[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-2-41

No. 676

FROM: Berlin June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 760.

At the time of our conversation mentioned in my # 759[a], this man spoke as follows regarding the political situation since the opening of the German-Soviet war, basing his views on various information received by the German Government.

1. The attitude of Great Britain toward the German-Soviet war is that she has so far been observing what success Germany has been making so that she may ascertain the extent of the German victories and decide what policy she should adopt toward Germany. However, remembering the failures that she has experienced by interfering at the outset of the past several wars, she is at first giving merely moral encouragement, believing as she does that it would be dangerous to formulate too soon any concrete steps with a view to approaching Soviet Russia.

2. In the United States the Soviet Ambassador UUMANSUKII[b] contacted Assistant Secretary of State SUMMER[c] on several occasions, but so far has not been able to accomplish anything

of political value. Such is the information received. The United States also will probably wait and see how the German-Soviet war will progress and, if German victory becomes a certainty, she, it is thought, will forego her plans of giving Soviet Russia any positive aid.

3. General FRANCO has requested of Germany that Spanish volunteers be allowed to join the anti-Communist crusaders. The German army is opposed to this idea because it has no military value, but the political leaders are quite in favor of it because it would be invaluable in the influence it would have on the South American countries and because of its propaganda value. The German Government has not decided as yet whether to accept or reject this offer.

4. In Sweden both the King and Army believe that Sweden should participate in the war against Soviet Russia; however, the Government as a whole is opposed to this step, being strongly colored as it is with republican idealism. Public opinion in that country is at present divided and the country is facing an internal crisis; however, the anti-Soviet faction is gradually overpowering the anti-Nazi faction.

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[a]See II, 748 and II, 749.
[b]Kana spelling of OUMANSKY.
[c]Probably SUMNER WELLES.

Trans. 6-25-41

No. 677

FROM: Berlin (Osima) June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo #761.

At the time of the conference, mentioned in my #759[a], he spoke as follows, saying that the information is of utmost secrecy:

"1. In order to steal a march on the Soviet Army before the latter could increase her forces, Germany suddenly opened war, despite the fact that her forces in Finland had not completed preparations for attack. Therefore, the Finnish Army and the German troops in Finland, which are to cooperate with the Finns, have not yet taken the offensive and Finland is at present camouflaging her real intention by pretending to defend her neutrality.

"2. Yesterday, the 23rd, HITLER went to the General Headquarters in East Prussia and is personally leading the campaign. Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP is planning to go to the General Headquarters the coming week-end."

Please take special precaution so as to keep this message secret.

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[a]Not available.

Trans. 6-25-41

No. 678

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 4, 1941
TO: Hsinking # 369.

Message from Moscow as # 834.

Re your # 681[a].

1. Day before yesterday, the 30th, when I conferred with the American Ambassador, I asked him if he had met the members of the British Military Mission, but he replied that he hadn't. There are only a Major and an Army Captain now at the American Embassy. They are not qualified to attend the conference and; besides, since the United States has no reason for being so intensely interested as is England in giving Russia aid, I hardly believe the conference is a military conference of the three powers.

2. The American Ambassador is strongly anti-Soviet and seems to be hoping for Russia's downfall. He has often said to me that even if the United States give assistance to Soviet Russia, it would not be given in time inasmuch as it would take four months in the case of the United States and three months in the case of Great Britain for aid to reach Russia. Also, in regard to the outcome of the war, the Ambassador seems to have a very pessimistic outlook. He seems to think that the German troops would be advancing in large numbers into the vicinity of Moscow within the next ten or fifteen days. He has been urging me to jointly address a question to MOLOTOV; namely, the question: "How is the Soviet Government going to manage to provide trains for the removal of foreign diplomats in the event that Government must move to another place?" But I am urging him to wait awhile before asking such a question since at this time, when the war has not yet developed to the stage he describes, such a question would be an insult to the Soviet Government. He has moved the entire personnel of the Embassy only during the day time.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-9-41

No. 679

FROM: Rome August 5, 1941
TO: Washington No number.

(Message to Tokyo # 512) (Part 1 of 3) (Strictly Secret).

Re your Excellency's # 708[a] to Berlin.

1. Your caption message makes the attitude of the Imperial Government, as well as your own opinions, quite clear on the exercise of our national policy as laid down on July 2. I, too, needless to say, have great hopes of seeing this policy materialize. Let me point out, however, that since our forces occupied French Indo-China, Great Britain and the United States have tied in still more closely with Chungking, and their relations with CHIANG are more intimate than ever. The United States, while avoiding physical violence with us, is, nevertheless, meddling in our affairs and strengthening her policy of economic oppression, beyond any doubt. It is true that in the United States there is opposition to assisting the Soviet government or abetting her military forces, and those who wish to tie up with Russia are keeping in

the background, but with the passing of time, this hostility may become weaker, and the United States may use supply bases in the Far East to help Russia and to cause her to complete the encirclement of Japan.

*See II, 204 which outlines the Imperial Government's policies and views with regard to helping Germany against Russia.

Trans. 8–7–41

No. 680

FROM: Rome — August 3, 1941
TO: Washington — No number.

(Message to Tokyo # 512) (Part 2 of 3) (Strictly Secret).

Once Russo-American solidarity is achieved, we may encounter the inevitable necessity of fighting their combined forces. This is not at all unimaginable; so just as soon as possible, before this takes place I think we should make ready and settle the northern question. I cannot tell you how much I hope that we will act in unison with Germany and Italy in putting an end to the Soviet regime.

2. The United States in particular is scheming to cut us off from all petroleum supplies. Although this will anger our populace beyond bounds, I still think that we should use our occupation of French Indo-China for the moment merely as a threat against England and the United States and not yield at present to their provocations. We should prepare quickly and take one solid blow northwards.

Trans. Not dated

No. 681

FROM: Rome — August 5, 1941
TO: Washington — No number.

(Message to Tokyo # 512) (Part 3 of 3) (Strictly Secret)

Thus, if we strike Russia severely, although I do not believe that England and the United States would stop assisting her, I do not think that they would even challenge us. First, we could pulverize the Soviet's Far Eastern forces, get a foothold in the petroleum regions of northern Sakhalin, and get a naval base at Kamchatka; then we could proceed to occupy important areas on the continent. We could seize the important thoroughfares to Europe, then would we, indeed, be achieving the unity called for by the Tripartite Agreement. Then, indeed, would we make it easy for Germany and Italy to crush Great Britain. We will get our chance to deal with England and the United States, never worry about that, but we can deal with them better when we are stronger. There is plenty of time for us to get the South Seas. If we succeed with the plan I have described above, with no trouble at all we could finish off all Anglo-American opposition to our settlement of the China question. This, I think, would be the best way to carry out the letter and spirit of the Tripartite Pact, which is the keynote of the policy of the Japanese Empire.

I have wired this to Berlin and Washington.

Trans. 8–7–41

No. 682

FROM: Helsinki (Sakaya) June 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 102.

Re my # 95[a].

Defenses in this country have been improved constantly ever since the Russo-Finnish war of last year and especially has the eastern border been firmly guarded. Although there has been no ----- as yet, emergency mobilization has been ordered—and it is said that as many as 10,000 men have been called to arms on the 15th alone. Also, women's relief detachments and supply detachments have been formed. (The maids in official residences have been drafted.) Anti-aircraft guns have been placed at strategic positions in the city. The members of young men's associations and others have joined the ----- German troops who have come into this country and seem to be determined to fight for restoration, with interest payment, of the lost territories. There has been a sudden decline in the number of laborers and there is a marked scarcity of taxicabs.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 6-24-41

No. 683

FROM: Hsinking June 24, 1941
TO: Peking, Nanking, and Shanghai # 110.

(Circular).

Message to Tokyo as # 390.

Strictly secret.

I have recently been actively investigating repercussions of the Russo-German war in the areas to the east and present hereunder a summary of my findings to date:

1. Concerning movements of the Russian Far Eastern Army.

a. According to late reports the Red Army of the East seems to have received orders from Moscow on the 22nd to take up positions within the areas adjacent to the border, viewing Japan as the imagined enemy, but to strictly refrain from actions which might in any way arouse the suspicions of Japan and Manchukuo.

b. It appears that troops in the Eastern Manchukuoan front are gradually being transferred westward.

c. At about 3:00 P.M. on the 22nd, Soviet troops in the Eastern Manchukuoan front suddenly, in plain view of our observers, began to engage in all kinds of sports such as basketball and "catch ball." This was evidently a pretense because on the other hand they were constructing "Tochka" (a type of Russian trench) and bringing up supplies of ammunition in preparation for a possible attack.

2. Soviet activities in Manchukuo—As yet nothing appears on the surface, but even as they are endeavoring to keep from provoking the Japanese, they are sending many spies and plotters into the interior of Manchukuo to work together with their subversive organization already established.

3. Popular reactions within Manchukuo—In general, everyone is calm but there are those of our nations who emphatically maintain that now is the time for Japan, in one stroke, to advance to a position on a line with Chita and overthrow the Soviet system, thus taking advantage of this opportunity to eliminate this "root of all evil" in the Far East. There are also some White Russians who manifest the same desire. There are some Japanese, on the other hand, who are very apprehensive over the idea that Manchukuo may shortly become embroiled in the conflict. Notice Manchukuoans have thus far remained silent.

4. Movements of the Communist 8th Route Army—I have not yet been able to make definite observations, but there are those who believe that depending upon the way the war goes in European Russia, this army may be moved to Outer Mongolia on the pretext that China must defend both Russia and Outer Mongolia.

Relayed to Peking, Nanking, Shanghai, and Harbin.

Trans. 6–27–41

No. 684

FROM: Hsinking — June 25, 1941
TO: Shanghai, Nanking, Peking — # 117.

(Circular).

Action Tokyo as # 367.

Activities of the Soviet Army on the Russo-Manchurian border up to the evening of the 25th:

a. Complete light control on the whole front.
b. Increasing the supply of airplanes, cannon, automobiles, and high-angle guns.
c. Emergency mobilization of the army.
d. Opening of the embrasures in the pill boxes.
e. Constant reconnaissance toward our side and building of fortifications on about the same scale as at the time of the Nomohan incident.

Trans. 6–28–41

No. 685

FROM: Hsinking — June 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 378.

To Vice Foreign Minister Ohasi from Yositomi.

(1) The Kwantung Army is maintaining an attitude of reserve regarding the present German-Soviet war and it is avoiding moves which might cause the U.S.S.R. to suspect the attitude of our government. It is also adhering to the policy of friendliness in affecting both countries apropos the final settlement of the China affair. (However, at this time, with the outcome of the German campaign still an uncertainty, the Kwantung Army is opposed to diverting its forces to the China area.) (See my # 254[a].) On the other hand there are many young officers in the Kwantung Army (especially those at the scene) who think the time is ripe to take the offensive in settling the Russian question once and for all.

(2) According to information obtained by the local gendarmerie, the attitude of the Imperial headquarters toward the U.S.S.R. has taken a sudden jingoistic turn since last night.

(3) The Manchukuo government is said to be sending to Tokyo in a day or two a representative from the Bureau of General Affairs to confer on materials to be supplied by Manchukuo in case of Japanese-Russian war.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 6-30-41

No. 686

FROM: Hsingking — June 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 390.

Strictly secret.

Re my # 367[a].

The following is a description of the movements of the Soviet Far Eastern forces since my last report.

1. They have increased the scouts and vigilance by the guards has become much more strict.

2. Although they placed bombers in the first line immediately after the war between Germany and Soviet Russia began, they have been moving them to the rear since the 26th, and have been concentrating pursuit planes in the first line. This is indicative of the fact that defense preparations along the Soviet-Manchukuoan border have changed from temporary preparations to permanent preparations.

3. It appears that they have entered the second stage of preparations in the Far East (by "the second stage of preparations" is meant that they have taken the position for going into action whenever necessary).

4. All activity against Manchukuo has become lively.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 687

FROM: Hsinking — July 13, 1941
TO: Moscow — # 447.

(Abstract)

Re Moscow to Tokyo # 904[a].

Since the beginning of the German-Soviet war, Russian observation planes have been crossing the Soviet-Manchukuo border daily. We wish to avoid incidents, therefore, with the approval of the military, we have had the Manchukuo government make representations to the Soviet Consul General in Harbin. The recent Soviet complaints may be their answer to the above representations.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-15-41

No. 688

FROM: Hsinking July 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 461.

To SAKAMOTO, Chief of the Europe-Asia Section, from HANAWA.

On the 12th, KYURUBON[a], the German Consul General in Vladivostock, arrived here (he expects to take the post in Hsinking hereafter) and spoke confidentially as follows to a member of this office.

1. "I was back in Germany in February and March of this year. At that time, the leaders in the German Government were of the opinion that, because of insufficient preparations, Germany must postpone the invasion of England until next summer. If Russia, at Germany's back, threatens Germany with a powerful air force, Germany will not be able to concentrate her entire air power next summer when the invasion of England is to take place. Therefore, she must destroy the Russian air force this summer. On my way back to resume my post, I stopped in Moscow and conferred with Ambassador SCHULENBERG. When I conveyed to him this opinion of the German leaders, he said, 'To attack Russia at the present time is not a wise policy, inasmuch as Russia is supplying Germany with more materials than she had promised to supply.'"

2. "The Russo-German war will end, of course, in a German victory, but it would be dangerous to expect that the STALIN regime will fall very soon, since the government would very likely be transferred to Siberia. Germany, no doubt, will follow the policy of organizing independent countries for the various races, but will meet with considerable difficulty in controlling these independent countries. This is a matter of great concern."

3. "It appears that the Kwangtung Army has become quite active in Northern Manchuria. It would probably take a tremendous number of troops to occupy the region east of the Baikal[b]. Perhaps the greatest difficulty would be experienced in governing the region after the invasion, in as much as the territory is vast and means of communication quite inadequate."

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[a] Kana spelling.
[b] Lake on the Siberian railroad.

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 689

FROM: Hsinking July 1, 1941
TO: Net # 133.

(Circular).

Action of Tokyo as # ?.

(Abstract)

Refers to Hsinking's # 360[a].

Review of conditions in Manchuria.

(1) Manchurians, especially the working classes, are primarily concerned with crop conditions, and are calm with regard to the Russian situation.

(2) They are attentive to Soviet activities and fear an attack on Japan.

(3) One group considers the present a good opportunity to settle the Outer Mongolian situation.

(4) Soviet nationals in Manchuria are apprehensive, especially young men subject to military service.

(5) Jews in Manchuria are mostly anti-German, and they fear that Japan's entry into the war would result in the loss of their property.

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[c]See II, 683. Intelligence report from Hsinking on Soviet military activity on the Russo-Manchukuoan border; Soviet activities in Manchukuo; popular reaction in Manchukuo and movement of the Communist Route Army.

Trans. 7-3-41

No. 690

FROM: Hsinking July 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #416 (?).

In view of the political situation, there is a danger of Manchukuo being used as a stage for espionage activities by third-power nations. After discussing the matter with the Manchukuoan authorities, we have decided confidentially to carry out roughly the following measures in order to supervise with greater stringency entrance, passage, and residence in Manchukuo by members of any third-power nation. Of these three, especially the question of passage through Manchukuo by members of third-power nations is one which has to do a great deal with our concern and, therefore, there is need of the Manchukuo Government keeping in step with us in supervision. Will you, therefore, wire me your opinion in the matter? Furthermore, we would like to have the representatives of the KWANGTUNG authorities participate in the passport conference. I shall wire you the names of the representatives as soon as they have been decided. (We shall directly get in touch with the KWANGTUNG Government.)

1. Entrance by members of the third-power nations.—Except in case circumstances do not permit it, instructions should be sought for the handling of each case, and permission should be issued individually.

2. Passage by members of the third-power countries.—(1) Those traveling eastward from Europe (as given in my #277[c]). (2) Travelers passing through on way to Moscow. In both of these cases instructions should be sought. However, for reasons of the Russo-German war and also of the relations between Britain, the United States, and Soviet Russia, as a matter of general principle, no visas should be granted to Americans and Britishers.

3. Travel and residence in Manchukuo.—Stricter supervision should be exercised generally in these matters.

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[c]Not available.

Trans. 7-12-41

No. 691

FROM: Hsinking — July 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 415.

Secret.

From Commercial Attache HANADA.

With the development of the present situation, there is no telling when and what sort of condition will arise within the Soviet Far Eastern borders. In order to be prepared for such an emergency, I believe we should have the officials of the Foreign Office who are connected with Russian affairs quickly sent to Manchukuo, which will be the base of our operations, and arrange to have them take whatever steps that may be called for and thus take all measures necessary for precaution. In other words, officials withdrawing from Soviet Russia, those who have found it impossible to take up their duties in Europe, as well as some from among those belonging to our diplomatic staffs in Europe who are versed in Russian affairs, should be assigned to the Special Affairs organizations in HARBIN, HILAR, BOTANKO[a], TAONAN, and KOKKA[b]. I would like to have these officials carry on the duties in these organizations as members of the Foreign Office and have them maintain liaison with intelligence organizations and other bodies.

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[a] Kana spelling for Mutankiang (?).
[b] Kana spelling.
HARBIN, HILAR, BOTANKO, TAONAN, and KOKKA are all Manchukuoan centers.

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 692

FROM: Hsinking — July 11, 1941
TO: Tientsin — Circular # 155.

Action Tokyo as # 436.

As scheduled, the conference of the Consuls assigned to posts in Manchukuo was held on the 10th and 11th. From the home office Secretary Narita and three others were present besides all of the Consuls in Manchukuo. Also present were Secretary Sibusawa and Watanabe from the Nanking office, Consul Okuma and Clerk Sekinui from the Consulate General in Kalgan. Among those representing Manchukuo was Commercial Attache Ogawa of the Foreign Bureau.

On the first day greetings were expressed by Counselor Hanawa and Secretary Narita. Following these, Secretary Yositomi described world conditions as affected by the German-Soviet war; Interpreter Katoda spoke on the ability of the Soviet Union to resist Germany (see "A" of separate cable); Staff member ----- described acts of violence perpetrated against Manchukuo by the Comintern (see "B" of separate cable).

As special reports, the following papers were read: The actual formation of the Red forces, by (Major Kotani ?); the strategy of violence by the Soviet forces should a total war between the Soviet Union and Japan become an actuality, by Lieutenant -----; the trend of the general attitudes of the people of Manchukuo and Korea by Vice Chief Ide of the Chief Inspector's office; recent outlook in Korea, administration officer of the Governor of Korea's office; economic value of Mongolia, by Yamamoto of the research section of the South Manchuria Railroad, etc.

On the second day, spokesmen for the various offices in Manchukuo and China submitted reports. After these, opinions were exchanged on matters pertaining to (a) counter-espionage, and (b) gathering and disseminating of intelligence.

The outline of the special reports follow:

1. Staff Officer Kotani:

There were questions on the general outlook of security in the Far East and as to the military strategy of the German-Soviet war. (These deleted here.) With regard to the quality of the Soviet forces the officer said that both the officer and men were of fairly high calibre. This is particularly true of those connected with the air force and tank forces, who, for the most part, are graduates of the KOMUSOMORU. They have considerable tactical knowledge and ability and are quite patriotic.

(Part 2—badly garbled.)

Hane (person's name) (formerly chief of the ----- section of the police department; as such he was in charge of the "dangerous thoughts" control of the Kwantung Army): After taking into consideration the developments during the various acts of violence by the Soviet forces against Manchukuo, including the Nomonhan incident, the Soviet Union will undoubtedly make much effort along the lines and through the channels enumerated below in the event of a total war between the Soviet Union and Japan. (The speaker went into considerable detail on all points brought out below.)

(1) Incite disunity of thought.
(2) Promote riots and strikes in factories.
(3) Incite disorganization in the Manchukuoan army.
(4) Promotion of disunity through anti-Japanese and Communistic elements.
(5) Instigate activities among the banditry.
(6) Gun fire.
(7) Destruction.
(8) Spreading of disease germs.
(9) Throw credit into a chaotic condition.
(10) Economic disorganization.
(11) Distribution of printed material.

3. Vice Chief Ide brought out the following points:

Japanese leadership among the Manchukuoans is becoming weaker of recent months; the non-materialization of various plans; conflicting economic policies through various pressures; the not-too-bright future for the colonists; dissatisfaction among the Manchukuoans and Koreans.

4. Administration officer Mizuno said that for a time subsequent to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese incident, conditions in Korea were very favorable. However, since then, and to the accompaniment of the Incident turn-into a long affair and one of the criticalness of Japanese-U.S. relations. One faction among the Koreans—particularly among those students in schools above the secondary class—is engaging in a movement of independence and radicalism.

5. Investigator Yamamoto of the South Manchurian Railroad described the importance to the matters with Union of the industrial European Russia.

Copies of this message, together with the separate cable, have been cabled to Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai, and Nanking, and a copy was sent to Harbin, Peking will please relay it to Kalgan.

Trans. 7-17-41

No. 693

FROM: Shanghai
TO: Tokyo

June 25, 1941
1081.

(Abstract)

Russians in Shanghai, both Reds and Whites, are uniting in enthusiasm for defense of homeland.

Trans. 7-1-41

No. 694

FROM: Nanking
TO: Hsinking

June 26, 1941
Gogai.

(Abstract)

Retransmission of # 45 to Tokyo[a] and Circular # 152[a] to your office.

Nanking government requested information regarding instructions to be given to newspapers concerning Nanking government's policy towards the German-Russian war. I suggested that the emphasis should be placed on the fact that time for peace in China is at hand, as Chungking government can no longer depend on aid from Russia.

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[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-3-41

No. 695

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Nanking, Hankow, Shanghai, Tientsin, Peking and Canton

July 1, 1941
Circular # 1375.
Message from Hongkong # 313, June 28.

(Part 2 of 2)

2. Another agent called on such members of the opposition group as CHIEN YU JIN[a], GAN KEI KEI[b], CHO—ROKU[c], and KYO SU CHI[d], and got their views, according to which: They realize the fact that ----- ----- ----- ----- is great. For this reason, although it is impossible for Japan to show definitely where she stands, depending on her power of endurance, it is expected that she will, in time, make her attitude more clear. They consider that common action on the part of Japan and Germany against Russia is not beyond the realm of possibility. Chungking may be able to eliminate the danger of ----- by abandoning her hostile attitude toward the Chinese Communist Party. However, should the present war become increasingly favorable to Germany, it is bound to facilitate a comprehensive settlement by Japan of the China incident and this, they believe, would eliminate future anxieties. Although it is said, that CHIEN YU JIN[a] had urged Chungking to join Britain, the United States, and Soviet Russia and proclaim opposition to both Japan and Germany. Inasmuch as Communist STALIN is a pragmatic person, there is a possibility of his seeing, before it is too late, the

inevitability of Russia's defeat and of his compromising with Germany. Since Germany has no intention of annihilating Russia, it is a question whether these two countries will fight to the end. In view of such possibilities, it is unwise for both Japan and China to be swayed by emotion to the intent of taking a biased position one way or the other.

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[a]Kana spelling for CHEN YU-JEN (EUGENE CHEN), a member of the Executive Yuan and formerly Foreign Minister in the Chinese Government.

[b]Kana spelling for YEN HUI CHING (W. W. YEN), Chinese Ambassador to U.S.S.R.

[c]Kana spelling for CHAO CHI-LU (?), head of the Government of Kiangsu Province.

[d]Kana spelling for HSU CHUNG-CHIH, inspector and member of the Nationalist Party.

Trans. 7-10-41

No. 696

FROM: Tokyo — July 1, 1941
TO: Nanking, Hankow, Shanghai, Tientsin, Peking, Hsinking, and Canton — Cir. # 1376.

(Message from Hongkong # 314, June 28.)
Re my # 313[a].

The following activities were noted in Chungking:

1. Although Chungking officials are somewhat worried for fear that Japan might concentrate her energy in prosecuting her policy toward Chungking now that she has been freed completely from the Russian menance, it is clear that the Chinese foreign policy will be carried out with greater facility than heretofore. They consider it best to formulate a policy by first ascertaining Japan's attitude and also by observing the development of the war situation. There are some who advocate Chungking's taking sides with Britain and the United States and severing relations with Germany and Italy; but the great majority are of the opinion that they should wait and see. Such being the case, the central authorities have issued an order to the respective organs of public opinion advising them to refrain from publishing opinions too much in favor of either Germany or Russia (the foregoing is CF).

2. Various foreign representatives in Chungking, and, above all, the Soviet Ambassador PA[b] are extremely active. On the 24th, PA[b] proposed a Chino-Soviet alliance to the Foreign Office. To this the Foreign Office replied that the proposal would have to be referred to the various section chiefs upon their taking their respective posts, and to the National Defense Conference. It is the opinion of the Foreign Minister that in principle there is no objection to concluding the alliance, but inasmuch as the British and American attitude toward Soviet Russia lies in their desire to cooperate with Russia in the European war, it is important that China wait and observe what future developments might be. Referring to this question, GAN KEI KEI[c] on the 25th sent a telegram to the Foreign Office to the effect that Soviet Russia's diplomacy being -----, it is an object of odium to the various European nations, and so Soviet Russia is likely to disintegrate; and that inasmuch as further aid from Soviet Russia is a matter of question, these factors should be taken into consideration in adjusting Chungking's relations with that country. Furthermore, it is said that the British Ambassador had made some sort of proposal to the Soviet Ambassador with a view to attracting Japan (please refer to my # 315[d]).

3. On the 18th, CHIANG KAI SHEK appointed ----- to governorship for SHENSHI Province, relieved SHO TEI BUN[e] of his political duties and put him in charge of twelve divisions prin-

cipally for the purpose of defending that region, and entrusted him with the entire responsibility of watching the developments in ENAN[f]. However, since the commencement of the Russo-German war, CHIANG has softened the ----- demands made of the 18th Army and has been taking the attitude that it would be sufficient if the Army does not rebel against the Chungking authorities. Furthermore, he has requested MO TAKU TO[g] to come to ----- for the purpose of directly negotiating the question of joint action. Also, it is said that he has promised to consider the demand made by SHU ON RAI[h] for the payment of stipends covering the months of May and June, a demand which SHU based on the fact that his army had strictly observed the order of the Chungking Government by participating in the ----- war (The foregoing is KC.)

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[a] Not available.
[b] PANYUSHUKIN, Russian Ambassador to Chungking.
[c] Kana spelling for YEN HUI CHING (W.W. YEN), Chinese Ambassador to Russia.
[d] See II, 696A.
[e] Kana spelling for CHINAG TING-WEN, Commander of the 9th Division.
[f] Kana spelling for YENAN, a town in north central China, Kansu Province.
[g] Kana spelling for MAO TSE-TUNG, Chief of Communist Party.
[h] Kana spelling for CHOU EN-LAI, a Communist leader.

Trans. 7-5-41

No. 696A

FROM: Tokyo June 30, 1941
TO: Canton # 1362.

Circular

Message from Hongkong # 315, June 28. Report.

TRI SO HA[a] who arrived at ----- on the 25th in order to assume the position as director of the seven great newspapers of the Seiji[b] chain, as well as the manager of the LO library (refer to page 405 of Who's Who and to my letter # 323[c],) spoke confidentially to an agent of this office NYO JIN SI[d] (a member of the educational committee and one who was an especially good terms with TRI in the days of the Gkyu Wo Nippo[e]) as follows:

1. On the 21st, the day before the war began between Germany and the Soviet Russia, the British Ambassador in Rome, acting in accordance with instructions from London, conferred with the Soviet Ambassador and said, "Britain would like to see the threat on the eastern border of Soviet Russia eliminated and assure the British colonies on the Pacific safety by, jointly with Russia, urging Chungking to compromise with Japan on condition that the latter withdraw from the Axis". To this the Soviet Ambassador replied on the 23rd, stating that he was speaking on instructions which he had sought from Moscow. He said, "While on the other hand there is no possibility of Japan withdrawing from the Axis, the Chungking Government cannot believe that Japan would submit. Consequently, until Japan's attitude becomes definite, Soviet Russia does not wish to take any positive step regarding questions in the Far East. It is not that Soviet Russia considers it advisable to regard the Japanese-Soviet treaty as important, but that the Japanese-Chinese war is an important factor at present in keeping Japan from aiding the other Axis Powers".

The two diplomats conferred for four days without coming to an agreement (PA[f] also admitted that the British Ambassador conferred with the Soviet Ambassador.)

2. On the 23rd the Chinese Communist Party wired Chungking a message expressing its friendly attitude toward Soviet Russia, demanding the closing of German and Italian Embassies as well as Consulates, the expulsion of Germans and Italians from China, and promising full cooperation with Chungking in the war. On the other hand, the pro-German Faction leader SHU KA KA[g] urged the government to confer with both German and Italian authorities before announcing its stand.

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[a] Kana spelling.
[b] Probably "Star" chain.
[c] Not available.
[d] Kana spelling for Feng Jen-Chih.
[e] Kana spelling, a newspaper.
[f] Panyushukin, Russian Ambassador to Chungking.
[g] Kana spelling for Chu Chin-Nun.

Trans. 7–5–41

No. 697

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Shanghai

August 4, 1941
782.

According to intelligences received by the Mitsui branch office in Soerabaja, it is understood that they are planning to transship East Indian rubber at Shanghai, exporting it from there to Vladivostok. Furthermore, according to a military wire from Shanghai, the Soviet is buying petroleum from agents of British and American firms in your city, and it is thought that they may try to transport it to Vladivostok. Please investigate and report the truth of the matter.

Trans. 8–6–41

No. 698

FROM: Beyoglu
TO: Kaboul

June 26, 1941
Message to Tokyo
117.

1. Yesterday, the 25th, a treaty of non-aggression was signed by Germany and Turkey. It is thought that Turkey would watch developments for a time and eventually become a member of the Axis both in name and fact.

2. On the 23rd, Turkey declared her neutrality toward the German-Soviet war and is now endeavoring to keep herself from being embroiled in it. Expecting that this war would eventually eliminate the long-standing threat against their safety, the Turkish people in general welcome the outbreak.

3. It is generally believed that after fighting Russia, Germany would advance southward from CAUCASUS[a] through IRAQ and SYRIA and attack EGYPT. On the 25th, what is purported to be a military expert's view, was published in the London *A–I*, according to which it is quite possible that German mechanized forces will proceed from IRAN through BALUCHISTAN[b] and press on toward the Indian border, and already there are many fifth columnists working actively in IRAN. This article has attracted a great deal of interest.

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[a] A division of Russia between the Black and Caspian Seas.
[b] An area in southwestern Asia, west of India.

Trans. Not dated

No. 699

FROM: Ankara July 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 152.

1. Piecing together conversations with the Italian and German Ambassadors and other officials it seems that there is no doubt that Germany is only waiting till she has delivered a knock-out blow to Russia to require Turkey to join the Axis and permit transit of troops and occupation. Ambassador Papen is urging submission and appears rather optimistic.

Furthermore, it is an established fact that Germany is only waiting till the German army invades the Caucasus to land troops and supplies at Trabzan on the Black Sea and cross Turkish territory and effect a liaison there. Regardless of the course that the above negotiations take Turkey will have to make clear her attitude and course of action very soon.

2. On the other hand England and Russia are spreading propaganda to the effect that Germany is going to attack Turkey, but Turkey is expecting the collapse of Russia and would welcome it so she is not much moved by the propaganda, I think.

Trans. 7-31-41

No. 700

FROM: Ankara July 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 138.

Since the beginning of the German-Russian conflict, for awhile Turkish newspapers maintained a very cautious attitude. Since then, however, they have begun to make manifest their gradually increasing anti-Russian feeling and their opinions with regard to the superiority of the German troops. It is becoming clear that with regard to Russia, their long-harbored resentment against her is gradually gaining support. Recently, LITVINOFF in a speech referred cynically to the Turks who felt themselves secure in Nazi guarantees and thus continued to maintain neutrality. The Turkish radio on the 11th manifested its resentment in a deliberate attempt to refute such an attitude, but there are not a few newspapers who violently attack this tendency. On the 12th, the influential JUMA-FURIETO[a] and its other papers were ordered to discontinue publication for some days.

The tendency is, as the German-Russian war develops, for the anti-Russian feeling to gain considerable strength, particularly in regard to the CAUCASUS question mentioned in my # 126[b]. Furthermore, while this trend is going on, it is clear that the general pro-German tendency is gaining strength.

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[a] Kana spelling.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 7-17-41

No. 701

FROM: Tokyo July 30, 1941
TO: Hsinking # 437.

Strictly Secret.

Message # 146 from Ankara.

(Part 1 of 2)

The present situation in the Near East and the outlook for the future are as follows:

a. For the moment an all-solemn silentness reigns over the Near East because of the neutrality of Turkey and Syrian armistice, but after occupying the Caucasus it is probable that Germany will traverse Iran or go through Turkey to attack Iraq. As a matter of fact, everyone expects war to break out in the Near East in the autumn and to last far into the winter.

Iraq is the key to the defense of Egypt and India and its importance has therefore increased tremendously. Not long ago Britain put General WAVELL in charge of the defense of India, including Iraq, and is doing everything possible to increase the Iraq Army, of which a German Attache told me that there is about one division in the neighborhood of Basra. The German and Italian Attaches have just told me that during the last part of June from 10,000 to 40,000 British soldiers left the British Isles, headed for Basra. This I think to be a fact.

b. On July 19th the German Naval Attache said to me, "Turkey is stepping lively to keep out of trouble. She is playing for time and avoiding giving over to either London or Berlin, but if Iraq becomes the object of attack, Ankara will no longer be able to mark time as she is doing today. The reason is obvious. Both Great Britain and Germany will naturally present ultimatums demanding that troops be allowed to traverse the country."

Trans. 8-1-41

No. 702

FROM: Tokyo July 30, 1941
TO: Hsinking # 437.

(Part 2 of 2)

"As a result Ankara can do one of two things—refuse both or decide upon which to yield to. And in either event the inevitable outcome is likely to be war."

Doesn't this show how indomitable are the intentions of the Germans? I cannot see any recourse for Turkey but to submit to them. Look at how the Germans act. This shows that no one can dilly-dally with them. In my belief, once again far beyond the expectations of the laity, Germany will draw her sword and with the rapidity of lightning strike Turkey to the heart. So far, however, I have nothing to go on but supposition. Nevertheless, it is certain that up to now Turkey's attitude towards Germany has been far from pleasing to the Berlin officials and, in order to carry out her policies in this part of the world, she is going to have to quell the Turks. I believe that the time of political activity is about over and that the shooting is near at hand.

Relayed to Vichy, -----, -----, -----, and Bagdad.

Trans. 8-1-41

No. 703

FROM: Berlin June 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 792.

With Hungary declaring war today (27th) and Italy preparing to send its troops to the eastern battle fronts, the greater part of the European countries are about to participate, directly, in the war. Although it appears that the German military heads did not necessarily welcome this situation (see my # 760[a]), as it is clear from the declaration Hitler made to the German people on the day Germany moved against Soviet Russia, and also from the German Foreign Office's note to the Soviet government, one of the objectives of this war is to save world culture from Bolshevism which to Hitler is not simply an idle excuse but a most sincere aspiration, and for which reason, it was intended that the forces of other European countries join the German crusade against Bolshevism. Not only must Japan not relax in her efforts to promote Japanese and Manchurian commerce and to establish supremacy in East Asia, but she is also morally obligated to support this war by virtue of that spirit which prompted her to take the initiative in concluding an anti-Comintern pact with other powers.

[a]See II, 676.

Trans. 6–30–41

No. 704

FROM: Rome (Horikiri) June 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 404.

With regard to the war with the Soviet, the Italian Propaganda Ministry gave the following instructions to Italian newspaper editors on both the *(date)*[a] and the *(date)*[b].

a. Order of the *(date)*[a]

1. Point out the inevitability of the war.

2. Point out that the war against the Soviet is based upon ideological differences and "real politik."

3. Point out that the demands of the Soviet, particularly the demands against the Balkans, were definite threats against the safety of Italy.

4. Point out the various points making for solidarity between Germany and Italy.

5. Answer the refutation appearing in the Tass of the *(date)*[b]

6. Use the actual statements of HITLER and RIBBENTROP.

7. Avoid quoting anti-Bolshevik phrases from MUSSOLINI's speeches.

b. Orders of the *(date)*.[b]

1. Do not refer to the attitude of various countries, either allied with Italy or on friendly relations with her, toward the war with the Soviet until public announcement has been made by those countries of their attitude.

2. Do not refer to the fundamental attitude of the various Baltic States with regard to ----- -----.

[a]Dates marked "a" are the same.
[b]Dates marked "b" are the same.

Trans. 7–9–41

No. 705

FROM: Rome (Horikiri) June 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #394.

1. I had MASE interview PURUNASU[a] regarding the Russo-German war. I understand that PU[a] said that no information has come from the German Government to the Italian Government regarding this question, nor has the German Government asked for Italian aid. He also said that the Italian Government had informed the Soviet Ambassador in Rome that the Government has been in touch with the Soviet Union since 5:30 A.M. on the 22nd.

2. On the other hand, according to an intelligence report, I understand that Germany has recently transferred the work of guarding the occupied territories in the Balkans to the Italians.

I am sending you this information for the present.

Relayed to Berlin.

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[a] Kana spelling for PRUNAS, Director General of Transoceania Bureau of Italian Foreign Office.

Trans. 6-24-41

No. 706

FROM: Berlin (Osima) July 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo #958 (Separate message).

(1) Anxious know public reaction in India and your personal reaction to Russo-German war.

(2) Expect American pressure bring about liberal policy in India and further attempt for compromise with Congress be made by British Government despite failure of present attempt. Please adopt all possible measures for preventing such compromise. If we continue our national struggle, then independence will come before long.

(3) Even if America enters this war, Germany will not be beaten this time. Germany has whole of Europe within her grip now, her internal economic situation is good. India's hope for independence lies in victory of Tripartite powers.

(4) I intend recruiting some friendly powers for financial assistance. Please arrange country-wide propaganda against compromise with British Government.

(5) Germany hopes for victory over Russia in a few weeks. Thereafter, I expect Germany to make pronouncement about India's independence. After this, I intend appealing to our countrymen to cooperate with the Axis powers and fight England. Will this appeal meet with public approval or disapproval? Big upheaval in India should be started after Axis declaration regarding India's independence. Cabinets for centre and provinces should be prepared from now and they will have to take over administration at proper time.

(6) Ask BAKSHI to send some reliable unmarked men from Bengal to work with our comrades in frontier province and tribal territory.

(7) Japan's active policy in the Far East including Indo-China should be welcomed by India as it is helpful to our national objective.

Note: Ticker 1145, 2 Aug. states Gayda wrote as follows in Giornale D'Italia, today: "The Indian Problem is one of those which must be solved satisfactorily at the conclusion of the

present war. This has never been the British aim because it is contrary to British policy that India should have independence. An Axis victory would achieve this."

Note: Text in English.

Trans. 8-2-41

No. 707

FROM: Hsinking June 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 354.

Very Secret.

From Yoshitomi[a] to Head of East Asia Section:

1. While the Soviet will be forced to retreat for a while in the war with Germany, they have extensive territory and are rich in resources, both of man-power and materials. Furthermore, the fact that in three months winter will be setting in, must be taken into careful consideration in trying to forecast the future of a war between Germany and the Soviet.

The thorough-going propagandistic education that has been carried on for 24 years, ever since the Revolution, having now resulted in the rather deep permeation of the Communistic ideas into the minds of all classes, it is very dangerous to assume that a revolution will break out in the Soviet immediately upon the outbreak of the war, and that the Stalin regime will collapse. At the same time, I think that it will be well for the Imperial Government to assume a very prudent attitude in respect to this German-Soviet war, and, observing the transitions in the situation for a while, gradually determine the position which we should take.

2. That is, I think it highly important that we guard against anything like taking advantage of the German-Soviet war to force a settlement of pending questions between Japan and the Soviet, and Manchukuo and the Soviet, or taking the offensive against the Soviet; but, at the same time, utilize the fact that the Soviet has been forced to ----- to concentrate our full powers on the settlement of the China problem and thus at the earliest possible time strengthen the political and military position of the Empire as regards Britain, the United States, and the Soviet.

3. Therefore, we should studiously avoid anything that would cause the Soviet to feel the least suspicion with regard to our intentions, or that would excite a sense of precaution against Japan. (According to military intelligences received, it seems that the Soviet have already begun various military precautions, including the building of pill boxes, on their eastern borders.) With regard to such matters as pending questions between Manchukuo and the Soviet, etc., I think it proper to continue negotiations in a friendly manner on the basis of our settled policies.

The above is not very well worded, but it is sent for your information. In regard to paragraphs 2 and 3 above, the Kwantung Army are entirely in accord with my opinions.

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[a] First Secretary of Japanese Embassy, Hsinking, transferred from Embassy in Moscow in September, 1940.

Trans. 6-26-41

No. 708

FROM: Tokyo (Jap Foreign Minster) June 25, 1941
TO: Moscow (Koshi) # 648.

Action Circular # 1319.

(3 parts—complete)

Yesterday, the 23rd, at 4 p.m. Ambassador Smetanin[a] called on me (Matsuoka) and the following conversation ensued:

The Ambassador presented me with Molotov's declaration, and said: "I presume that you know in general what it is all about." I replied, "From Ambassador Tatekawa's[b] reports, I have a general idea; however, I will read the report". He inquired as to whether it was Japan's intention to honor the Neutrality Pact. I replied: "As I have stated in my conversations on 22 April, following my return to Japan from my European tour, the Neutrality Pact has no relation to—nor influence on—the Japanese-German-Italian Tripartite Pact. I believe that Stalin and Molotov are aware of this point. As to the attitude the Japanese Government will take toward the present turn of events, the government itself is not clear, and opinions are not crystallized. I think this point will come up perhaps in the joint session tomorrow (the 25th). It's necessary to get in touch with the German and Italian Governments on this point."

The Ambassador said: "Am I to understand that your government's attitude is undetermined?" I replied: "Certainly; however, it is very clear that this will have no influence on Japan's stand as determined by the Tripartite Pact."

The Ambassador then inquired: "How do you interpret article 2 of the Neutrality Pact?" I replied: "The Tripartite Pact is the keynote of our foreign policy, and Japan is certainly not going to make any decision that conflicts with that. Recently, when I talked with Stalin, I told him that Japan was not going to collaborate with Britain and America, but was going to walk along with the Axis. At that time, I did not anticipate any such thing as a Russo-German war. Had there been any indications of such an occurrence, I would not have hesitated to undertake the role of mediation. How has it come about that I was not given this opportunity, now that war has broken out?"

The Ambassador said, "Russia carried out the Russo-German agreement whole-heartedly, and the Germans had no cause for complaint. In spite of this, they attacked suddenly, without a declaration of war. It was like a peal of thunder out of a clear sky."

To this I replied, "If you read Hitler's pronouncement, you will see that he has something to say, also. Which contention is just as difficult to determine at this early date.

"To speak frankly, just why did Ambassador Cripps[c] return suddenly to England. Is it not possible to conjecture that there was some connection between his return and Churchill's statement?"

"The Ambassador said, "Foreign Ambassadors return to their home countries after an extended term of service for a period of rest. It was for this purpose and not for some shameful talk that Cripps returned. The Germans made no complaints before they attacked, but as a device for the attack, they listed a lot of reasons which were all merely inventions, and if these are considered impartially, it can be seen that no real reason for the attack exists."

"I replied, "The Tripartite Pact is the axis of our national policy, and according to this Japan has thrown her fate in with Germany and Italy. On the other hand, I have always worked for the improvement of relations between Russia and Japan, and at present an outbreak of hostilities between these two countries would be most unfortunate indeed. As a matter of fact, I had the report of the German Ambassador last evening, and the Italian Ambassador has just called on me and questioned me."

The Ambassador said, "The British Ambassador also worked directly for the improvement of Russo-Japanese relations. Of this fact I am personally well aware, and I am thankful for it, as are also the Russian people. I hope that your government will take an objective view of the situation, and consider it in all fairness. In any event, I will call on you again in a few days, and inquire your frank opinion."

I thanked him for his consideration, and the interview closed.

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[a] Russian Ambassador to Japan.
[b] Japanese Ambassador to U.S.S.R.
[c] British Ambassador to U.S.S.R.

Trans. 6–27–41

No. 709

FROM: Vichy (Japanese Ambassador) June 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 322.

On 24 June, BOMOGOROFF, the Soviet Ambassador resident here, called on me and said that if there were no objections, he would like to inquire my opinion regarding the stand Japan would take in view of the outbreak of Russo-German hostilities. I replied that to date I had had no instructions from my government, but according to my opinion, Japan would consider conditions very carefully, as a signatory of the Tripartite Pact, and also of the Neutrality Pact. The Ambassador went on to say that the Soviet for her part had observed strictly not only the sacred treaty between herself and Germany, but also the trade pact, up to this day. And now that Germany had suddenly attacked her, conditions were as serious as they were in 1905 and again in 1918. He said he hoped that Japan and Russia could maintain the friendly relations indicated by the Neutrality Pact.

In answer to my question, he said that he had called on the local American Ambassador, Admiral Leahy, but that the said ambassador had not made a clear statement of the American Government's attitude, and furthermore, he did not make a declaration of sympathy.

Trans. 6–26–41

No. 710

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) June 25, 1941
TO: Rome (Koshi) # 161.

On the afternoon of the 24th, the Italian Ambassador called on me and notified me that Italy was at war with the Soviet, and then asked me how I regarded Japan's neutrality pact with Russia. I replied that the neutrality pact had no connection with—or influence on—the Tri-Partite Pact, and that while during the course of my conversations with Stalin and Molotov I made no direct reference to the Tri-Partite Pact, still the fact that it is the pivot of Japanese foreign relations and all Japanese international policy is influenced by it must have been clear to them at the time of the negotiations regarding the neutrality pact, and I am sure that Stalin and Molotov can have had no grounds for a misunderstanding on this point.

Furthermore, in the published conversation following my return to Japan, this point was stated very clearly. As to the attitude that the Japanese Government will adopt at the present

time, I can say that no policy has as yet been determined, but as soon as a policy is decided upon, I will announce it to the German and Italian Governments, and, if necessary, I will talk with you regarding it.

Please transmit this to Germany. I have sent it to Russia.

Trans. 6-26-41

No. 711

FROM: Vladivostok (Ota) June 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #237.

In the event a situation such as you have described in the last part of your #167[a] arises, I intend to take the following emergency measures in order to preserve secrecy, and so I would like to have your permission in this matter.

1. Both codes and machines will be burned or destroyed at the last moment when their continued use is considered dangerous.

2. At this time, the following telegrams will be burned as quickly as possible:

Telegrams from and to this point consisting of bound volumes covering the period 1934 to 1936, inclusive (those for the year 1937 were destroyed on September 17, 1939, with your permission), and the period 1938 and 1939, inclusive.

Also telegrams to and from (Berlin ?) in bound volumes from the period 1934 to 1939, inclusive.

3. Telegrams and letters for 1940 and thereafter will be burned simultaneously with 1. Papers such as reports on secret investigations, simultaneously with 2.

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[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-2-41

No. 712

FROM: Moscow June 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo #777.

(Parts 2 and 3 of 3 part message—Part 1 not available.)

I explained that, late in April, some such statement was believed to have been made by the German government to Ambassador Oshima but it certainly was not made in the form of an official statement. While I myself refused to believe the report, the rumors kept on mounting day by day. Finally, I sought your opinion regarding it and much to my satisfaction I was reassured by Your Excellency's reply that it was nothing more than just rumor.

If the Japanese government did know of the German decision, I am certain that it was not until a few days before the hostilities began, for the courier to Germany was sent from Tokyo on June 20th, and two of our officials were on their way to Germany and to the Balkans, and one of our secretaries and a clerk were sent to Iran on the 21st. Therefore, it is quite conceivable that my government had no advanced information regarding the German plan.

It is quite possible that some time in the past Foreign Minister Matsuoka did warn Germany not to do anything of this sort, but I, myself, have received no communication on this subject from my government.

Thereupon, Molotov said that since there is nothing in the Tripartite Pact regarding Soviet Russia he felt that Japan was not obligated to oppose Russia.

He then continued, "Since we are neighbors, we should not consider only the immediate interests but should also think in terms of future interests, and it is my sincere hope that both sides will refrain from taking steps which will affect our mutual good relations, which recently have taken a turn for the better."

I told him that as an Ambassador and also as a participant in the formulation of the Neutrality Pact, I definitely expect that the Japanese government will respect the Neutrality Pact and I also expressed my agreement with his remark that no steps should be taken to upset the good relations now enjoyed by both countries, and indicated that we expect Soviet Russia to refrain, hereafter, from issuing propaganda designed to agitate the laboring class, and also suggested that greater facility be extended to issuing entry visas. (Your #660[a]). Molotov then replied that he will see to it that early reply will be given regarding these points.

I then asked him whether the report circulated just before the war about Russian-British alliance was just another rumor. He replied that there is absolutely no truth to this report and assured me that no negotiations to this effect had been carried out. However, he said since the hostilities began arrangements have been made to have negotiations sent for the purpose of negotiating such an alliance.

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[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-3-41

No. 713

FROM: Moscow — June 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #778.

Due to the most recent move recklessly taken by Germany, no doubt you are confronted with a nation divided in opinion. I appreciate the difficult task which faces you. Though I can see this difficult situation, I must admit that I seem to be unable to conjure up any brilliant plan and for this reason I have kept silent on the matter.

I can see that we should make some gesture to show that we are not cold to the terms of the Tripartite Pact. At the same time, with our troops so scattered as they are at present, we probably could not offer Germany our complete military cooperation.

In the final analysis, it is my opinion that we should maintain the status quo until such a time that our forces in Manchukuo become an actual threat in the East Siberia area. In the meantime, in my opinion, there seems to be no other course than to exert our every effort to bring the China Affair to a close.

I realize that the above suggestion is exceedingly short of being a comprehensive course of action, but at times, having no definite plan is a plan in itself.

The U.S.S.R. and the Soviet armed forces have already exposed their weakness. Apparently, the Soviet forces are falling right in with the German force's strategy. It seems to me that there is a necessity for the German forces to ----- after the next three or four days, but there are no guarantees against a radical change being brought about in the situation.

Please advise me of all the points of which I should be aware as well as of the attitude of the government. (If the government has not determined its definite attitude, please inform me of the general trend.)

The entire staff here is in good health and high spirits, and is preparing itself for any eventuality.

Translator's note: Above are the views of Lt. Gen. Tatekawa, I.J.A. (ret.), present Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.

Trans. 7–10–41

No. 714

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

June 27, 1941
563.

(Abstract)

Regarding your # 767[a].

On the occasion of my conversation with Ambassador Ott, I explained that at the time of my visit to Germany, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop said nothing about seeking Japan's aid in the event of German-Soviet war, therefore, I assumed that for one reason or another Germany was not particularly anxious to have Japan take part in this war. Since the impression I got from Ambassador Osima's message was that Ribbentrop is somewhat puzzled because Japan is not making necessary preparations despite her intention to take part in the war, I felt it necessary to explain the above circumstances to Ambassador Ott.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 7–3–41

No. 715

FROM: Rome
TO: Tokyo

June 30, 1941
415.

Part 1 of 2[a].

Now that Germany and her Allies are about to conquer European Russia, I suppose that you have already considered the policy we should take toward Russia. However, I am submitting to you the following as a supplement to my # 377[b].

1. The order issued by the United States Government for giving aid to Russia gave the CHIANG regime a great light. Furthermore, the improvement of relations between Japan and Soviet Russia has contributed immensely toward enabling Russia to move a part of her troops eastward. Because of these developments, the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Agreement may be said to have lost its historical significance. Though there is no need of Japan adhering strictly to this agreement, it is clear for the present cabinet to immediately adopt an anti-Soviet policy—even if the government in doing so attempts to maintain the appearance of justice and integrity by placing the blame on Bolshevism—would give the impression that Japan is an opportunist country and so would have a bad effect not only on the future of the country but also on the integrity of the country; for, the government, in total disregard of the country's traditional policy and ideology, has been spreading propaganda to the effect that friendly relations between Japan and Soviet Russia is a possibility. I believe, therefore, that it is necessary

that the government take a ----- attitude before undertaking any military action against Russia.

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[a]See II, 716.
[b]Not available.

Trans. 7-7-41

No. 716

FROM: Rome — June 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 415.

(Urgent.)

(Part 2 of 2)[a].

2. The Alliance Powers, primarily Germany and Italy, have as their objective in fighting Russia the overthrow of Bolshevism and the saving of the civilization of Europe. Needless to say, the destruction of Bolshevism coincides with our national good and if we, too, fight Russia, that would be our primary aim, but we also have something else to bear in mind. We should eradicate this one great root of evil which is such a threat to the peace of East Asia. We ought, furthermore, as I see it, to take measures to prevent third powers from using Asiatic Russia as a base whence third countries can assist Russia. This would strengthen the unshakable basis which we are trying so hard to establish for continued stability in greater East Asia. I think that if we would now do our part to prepare the ground for the new era and make it clear that we stand with the Axis, it would strengthen the morale of our people at home and make it easier for third powers to understand the adamant position we are taking. I also think that it would contribute to a happier readjustment of our relations with Germany if we made plans concerning the future of Soviet territory in greater East Asia and laid our schemes for what is to come subsequent to the war with Russia.

This message has been sent to Berlin (?) and Moscow (?).

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[a]See II, 715.

Trans. 7-2-41

No. 717

FROM: Berlin (Osima) — June 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 798.

(Part 1 of 2.)

The fact is, various informations sent to me, as well as European newspaper articles which have appeared from day to day recently, deal with frequent meetings of the Japanese Cabinet and other organizations, and these have caused the reader to be concerned over the indecisive attitude of the Japanese Government and to arouse extreme anxiety in the hearts of the Japanese living abroad as to what the future holds for Japan. Already even the smallest group of European nations have made their respective attitudes clear, and so for the Japanese

government not to have been able to make its attitude known, despite the fact that Japan is an important member of the Three-Power Alliance and also the fact that she led the way in concluding an anti-Communist agreement in 1936, is indeed a matter of great regret inasmuch as it affects the honor as well as the integrity of the country. I well understand that this is partly due to the difficult situation existing within Japan and I realize your solicitude, but this is not the time for arguments. What is needed is a bold decision. I beg of you to decide our attitude as soon as possible.

Please transmit this message to both the Army and the Navy.

Trans. 7–11–41

No. 718

FROM: Ankara — July 1, 1941
TO: Berlin, Moscow — Unnumbered.

Action Tokyo as # 123.

(1) It is clear that a complete collapse of the U.S.S.R. is inevitable and it is my opinion that this will take place in less than five weeks. It goes without saying that the most urgent task at this time is to do away, once and for all, with the Soviet menace and to build a firm foundation for the establishment of the Greater East Asia.

While I realize that, due to our peculiar domestic situation, our government had to exercise caution and reserve in all matters since the beginning of the China Affair. However, I am impelled by the urgency of the times to submit herewith my humble views for your consideration.

(2) The obligation to respect the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact might be given as an argument against declaring war on Russia. However, such an argument is without logic. As indicated by the spirit of the Tripartite Pact, the Neutrality Pact presupposed freindly relations between Germany and the U.S.S.R. Now that the situation has changed the same obligation no longer exists. As a matter of fact, it is generally expected here that sooner or later Japan will join in the war, and this is being played up variously in the newspapers as the natural outcome.

(3) Of course, the contention that we must act with caution because the U.S. may enter the war or they might enforce embargoes or trade pressure is not something that has just now had its beginning; and if in such an opportunity we are still going to allow ourselves to be restrained by the U.S., the destiny of the Empire is sealed, and the effect on the morale of our people will be most serious. As I view it, if we take advantage of this splendid providential opportunity, we should surely be able to make our operations against the Soviet decisive in a very short time, and even from the standpoint of the U.S. it should be apparent that the collapse of the Soviet Union would be only a matter of a short time, inasmuch as they are in a desperate situation already, regardless of whether we enter the war or not. Therefore, I think it highly doubtful that our participation in the war would bring on hostilities between Japan and the U.S., or even lead to any extremely oppressive trade measures, in view of the fact that it would be a battle for the extermination of the "Bolsehviki." American participation in the war is more likely to be determined by the outlook in regard to their aid-to-England program and the prospect of the outcome of the war between England and Germany, rather than by the situation in East Asia. Therefore, to continue to hesitate as we have in the past on the score of avoiding a crisis between Japan and the U.S. is sure to bring it on and lead to our falling prey to the American schemes.

(4) There is no need now of my calling attention to the great importance of our plans for settling the China incident and pushing southward, but a clearing out of the Soviet forces would prove one determining factor in connection with settling the incident; while it is a reproach to us that in such a matter as the southward advance, we are still merely loud in talk but with no accompanying action.

(5) If we merely spend the days in arguing over such points as the above, and by long chance find that we must continue to the last to hold ourselves back, then we must needs (*sic*) be reconciled to the ultimate extension of Germany's influence even to the Far East.

(6) To sum it all up, it seems to be the most proper and natural thing that we should at this time effect an out-and-out settlement of our problems with the Soviet and thus bring about a realization of the ideals of the Tripartite Alliance. The world at large is expecting this. This must also be said to be the deep-seated conviction of our united people at home. I expect you will be taking some action, but if by any chance our movements should prove too late, with consequences that might be comparable to the contemptible course pursued by the Soviet Union in the disposition of Poland, any strategic advantage gained would be far outweighed by the spiritual losses that would be sustained.

Therefore, I think it is highly important that decisive action be taken at once, so that this opportunity be not lost.

Trans. 7–15–41

No. 719

FROM: Tokyo — June 28, 1941
TO: Berlin — # 575.

For sometime now you have been requesting me to send you instructions concerning the policy of the Imperial Government, now that Germany and Russia have gone to war. I pray you, be more patient. No country in the world, so long as it is not autocratic, could come to any immediate and easy solution to a problem like this. As you know, at first to prate at random about such a subject as that would be dangerous because important secrets might leak out. Until some decision is finally reached on this policy, it has been and still is my intention purposely to hold my peace. However, in three or four days, I shall have some instructions to wire you which are to be transmitted to the Italian and German Ambassadors. For your information, I forecast this for you. This message has been sent also to our Ambassador in Rome.

Trans. 7–2–41

No. 720

FROM: Berlin (Osima) — June 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 802.

Re your # 575[a].

I hear that a conference will be held within a few days. After that the Government will spur on the people into a solid group. (It is clear ?) that faith in the destiny of the country will widen.

[a] In which MATSUOKA tells Berlin that in three or four days he will wire instructions to be transmitted to the Italian and German Ambassadors concerning the policy of the Imperial Government. See II, 719.

Trans. 7–12–41

No. 721

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 2, 1941
TO: Berlin #582.

From the Vice Minister.

Re your #815[a].

The message which I just received looks interesting, but it was not in time for the morning session of the Diet. In that session we decided upon our national policy, concerning which I will send you instructions again. The German and Italian Ambassadors will both be greeted by me at 2:00 p.m. Please tell Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP that I am very sorry that his message arrived too late but that nothing can be done about it now.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-21-41

No. 722

FROM: Berlin July 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #825.

To be handled in Government Code.

(Part 1 of 3)[a].

Yesterday, the 1st, I flew to the German headquarters in East Prussia and conferred with Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP. This afternoon I flew back to Berlin. Our conversation was as follows:

1. RIBBENTROP said: "As I told you yesterday morning over the telephone, I felt that now when such world-shaking events are taking place, I wanted to communicate my most intimate feelings to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA. I wanted to do this quickly so this morning I instructed AMBASSADOR OTT to go and tell him frankly how I felt. I could not tell you all I wanted to say on the telephone and that is why I asked you to come to our headquarters here. I wanted to talk to you personally."

2. Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP continued: "Moscow, London and Washington are spreading propaganda to the effect that our attack on Russia was deliberate and provocative. As a matter of fact, although it is probably true that upon contacting the German forces it was not the Soviet that immediately began the attack, still they were concentrating a tremendous force on their western border, planning first of all to strike at Finland and Rumania. We had found that out and feared that while we were in the midst of an attack on the British Isles they would embark on a military venture against us.

(Message incomplete.)

[a] Part 2 not available.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 7-7-41

No. 723

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 2, 1941
TO: Berlin # 588.

Message to Moscow # 690.

Part 1 of 2.

Oral Statement (Translation).

I take pleasure in informing Your Excellency that Japan necessarily feels deep concern with the German-Soviet war that has unfortunately broken out. To be frank, Japan finds herself in the most awkward position faced with the war between Germany and Italy, her allies, on the one hand, and the U.S.S.R. on the other, with whom she has but recently begun to improve relations in sincere desire to promote and maintain good neighborliness. Japan is, therefore, most anxious to see the termination of the hostilities at the earliest possible date, earnestly wishing that they may at least be confined to regions not immediately adjacent to the Far East where she possesses vital interest.

Note: Text in English.

Trans. 7-5-41

No. 724

FROM: Tokyo July 2, 1941
TO: Berlin # 588.

Message to Moscow # 690.

Part 2 of 2.

The Japanese Government takes this opportunity to state that they do not at present feel compelled to modify their policy towards the U.S.S.R. except to the extent of their natural desire not to give rise to misunderstandings to their allies. It is their sincere hope that they will be able to pursue a course of policy carefully calculated at once to serve their own interests and to preserve the spirit of mutual trust among the allies, while maintaining good relations with the U.S.S.R. I need hardly add that their Excellencies, Messieurs STALIN and MOLOTOFF, may rest assured that I will do my best but that future developments will largely decide if the Japanese Government can consistently abide by this policy.

Tokyo, July 2nd, 1941.

Note: Text in English.

Trans. 7-5-41

No. 725

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 2, 1941
TO: Berlin #585.

Part 1 of 2.

ORAL STATEMENT.

(Translation).

Please convey the following to His Excellency HERR VON RIBBENTROP:

I have duly noted Your Excellency's request made through Ambassador General OTT in Tokyo and Ambassador General OSHIMA in Berlin. I have taken particular care in studying the views set forth by Your Excellency in approaching the Japanese Government with the request.

In replying, I take pleasure in stating that Japan is preparing for all possible eventualities as regards the U.S.S.R. in order to join forces with Germany in actively combating the communist menace. Japan is keenly watching developments of conditions in Eastern Siberia in particular, determined as she is to destroy the communist system established there. It is, I believe, hardly necessary to add that the augmentation of military preparations, among other things, with an eye to realizing this object, together with the aim of restraining the Soviet Russia at the Far Eastern and (i----st----lewit----- a-y,[a] is steadfastly kept in the mind of the Japanese government.

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[a]The portion of message in parentheses was garbled. The dashes indicate the exact number of English letters missed.

Trans. 7-3-41

No. 726

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 2, 1941
TO: Berlin #585.

Part 2 of 2.

At the same time, I beg to state that the Japanese Government have (*sic*) decided to secure points d'appui in French Indo-China which will enable Japan further to strengthen her pressure upon Great Britain and the U.S.A. In this connection, I would like to draw Your Excellency's attention to the fact that Japan has been keeping constant vigil in the Pacific including the southwestern ocean with a view to restraining these two powers and she will continue the efforts and even intensify them, if necessary. I trust that Your Excellency is in full agreement with me that this really constitutes a vital contribution towards our common cause, indeed no less vital than Japan's intervention at this juncture in the German-Soviet war. Japan cannot and will not relax her efforts in the south, which after all possesses a very important bearing upon the whole course of the war out of which I am most confident that Germany and Italy will soon emerge victoriously. I assure Your Excellency once again that the Japanese Government will not fail to act in accordance with the aims and spirit of the Tripartite Pact.

Tokyo, July 2, 1941.

Note: Text in English.

Trans. 7-3-41

No. 727

FROM: Tokyo July 2, 1941
TO: Berlin # 1390.

(Circular).

(Part 1 of 2).

(National Secret).

At the conference held in the presence of the Emperor on July 2nd, "The Principal Points in the Imperial Policy for Coping with the Changing Situation" were decided. This policy consists of the following two parts. The first part "The Policy" and the second part "The Principal Points" (I am wiring merely the gist of the matter). Inasmuch as this has to do with national defense secrets, keep the information only to yourself. Please also transmit the content to both the Naval and Military Attaches, together with this precaution.

The Policy.

1. Imperial Japan shall adhere to the policy of contributing to world peace by establishing the Great East Asia Sphere of Coprosperity, regardless of how the world situation may change.

2. The Imperial Government shall continue its endeavor to dispose of the China incident, and shall take measures with a view to advancing southward in order to establish firmly a basis for her self-existence and self-protection.

Trans. 8-8-41

No. 728

FROM: Tokyo July 3, 1941
TO: Washington # 1433.

(Circular).

Action Moscow as # 696 (?).

Re my # 688[a].

Ambassador Smetanin called at my request at three o'clock on the afternoon of the 1st. I told him that the Japanese government's basic policy regarding the international situation had been decided upon at this morning's Cabinet conference.

I said that in reply to his recent inquiry the Imperial government found the situation complicated, and the atmosphere tense. It was thought best to present a written statement to him (my message # 689[a]) in Japanese and in English translation.

The gist of this statement is, that with reference to the German-Soviet hostilities, the Japanese government feels that Japanese-Soviet good relations must be preserved at all costs, and that this government wished to lend its good offices to both Germany and Russia. Because of the complexity of the situation it is hoped that the Soviet government will exercise due caution.

I added to the Ambassador that I bespoke his cooperations, and that his failure to do so would disturb the situation, and I wished to avoid this at all costs. A similar statement from him would be very encouraging.

I added, however, that if war materials are supplied through the Vladivostok region, Germany and Italy must make demands upon the Japanese government to stop this.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 7–7–41

No. 729

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

July 10, 1941
1483 (??).
[# 1433]

(Circular).

(Part 2, Part 1 missing.)

Action Moscow as # 686, (?), [696] 3 July.

I told him that as the national policy of the Empire is based upon the Tripartite Pact, we, naturally, cannot take any course that will interfere with the smooth operation of the Pact. On the other hand, there is a great danger that the action of the United States may stimulate the public opinion to the point of forcing the already delicate situation of Japan to an open rapture with the U.S.S.R. While the effect of the British action is not quite as strong as that of the United States, if such a thing as the British-Soviet Alliance occurs, it may be necessary to alter our policy somewhat. For this reason, I asked that Stalin and Molotov be prevailed upon not to permit this to happen.

I further told him that, in view of the times, there are many false rumors afloat in Japan and suggested that discretion be used in this regard.

Whereupon, Ambassador Smetanin replied: "I fully understand the various points you have just mentioned, and I will give careful study to your written note. I am grateful to you for your efforts towards better Japanese-Soviet relations, and I am particularly happy to note that since your assumption to your post the relations between the two countries have improved tremendously, and many of the outstanding difficulties have been settled. It is my belief that we can contribute much to the welfare of the world by favorable adjustment of Japanese-Soviet relations and I hope that greater efforts will be directed to this end."

Trans. 7–15–41

No. 730

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

July 3, 1941
830.

Translator's note: Following message badly garbled; gist guessed at.

(Abstract)

I have recently become ill and find that I am unable to fulfill my duties. For this reason, will you please order me home at once.

Trans. 7–12–41

No. 731

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 4, 1941
TO: Berlin #607.

From the Vice-Minister.

The Foreign Minister was at variance with the general trend of the Foreign Office, and you see what happened as a result. Please keep this in mind.

Trans. 7-22-41

No. 732

FROM: Tokyo July 5, 1941
TO: Berlin #613.

Regarding your #830[a].

Please give reconsideration regarding the matter of your desire to return home.

While I sympathize with your physical condition the effect of your deserting your post at a time like this will be extremely unfavorable and considered quite inopportune.

It goes without saying that none of us is free to do as he pleases in this world and our duty to our country demands that we put aside our personal desires and unite in a single effort for the good of our country.

I feel confident that the situations facing our country are fairly well understood through the "oral statement" submitted by me to Ambassador Ott (Germany), Inmari (?) (Italy) and Smetanin (Russia). I am also quite certain that Foreign Minister Ribbentrop will have no difficulty in understanding our position.

The declaration of our countries concrete policy involves more than a declaration of an opinion, it involves various problems affecting military preparations, etc., and certainly a brilliant person such as Hitler can appreciate this without difficulty. It also should be clear that the resumption of our relations with the Soviet is not due to any fondness on our part for the U.S.S.R. In considering the various problems involved, we are forced by circumstances beyond our control to maintain the present attitude, and I would appreciate your giving greater consideration to this point.

Regarding your resignation, this requires the approval of the Emperor, and I am reluctant, in view of the times, to approach His Majesty regarding it. I, therefore, beseech you to remain at your post and cooperate with me in seeing our country through these troubled times.

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[a]See II, 730. The Jap Amb. at Berlin wires Tokyo he is ill and unable to fulfill his duties. Requests that he be ordered home at once.

Trans. 7-22-41

No. 733

FROM: Tokyo July 12, 1941
TO: Berlin #637.

(Part 1 of 3)[a].

On the evening of the 8th, your personal message was transmitted to me through Ambassador OTT. That evening I asked the Ambassador to transmit to you my humble opinion concerning the views you expressed to me with so much confidence in me, and also my thanks for your having done so. The Ambassador thought the Oral Statement that was given him that afternoon regarding the important decision Japan had made on that day and the few remarks I had made in reference to the decision constituted my reply to your message. Consequently, nothing more was done about it. Furthermore, since then there has not been any request made by the Ambassador for a reply. Besides, I did not think that you were anticipating a separate reply from me. I have thought over your message since then, and since last night when I had to go to bed with a fever, I again thought over your message, and although I felt that I had already replied to it, I also began to feel that as a close friend of yours I must convey my humble opinions to you again, and so, prompted by the feeling that we are intimate friends, I am writing this message to you briefly and solely for you.

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[a] See II, 734, 735.

Trans. 7-19-41

No. 734

FROM: Tokyo July 12, 1941
TO: Berlin #637.

(Part 2 of 3)[a].

(1) I trust that you have been able to understand through the oral statement which I handed to Ambassador OTT, as well as through the few remarks I had added, the trend of our country which you were desirous of knowing.

(2) As you know, Japan is not Germany; that is to say, she is not a country in which a dictator decides the national policy. Furthermore, there are, unfortunately, many people who, because of past foreign intercourse and of international tradition, are still incorrigible worshippers of Great Britain and the United States. Since there is among the subjects a considerable divergence of opinions, unlike Germany, these various opinions are being put into practice with good intentions. In other words, a condition exists in this country such as we find in all non-belligerent countries at present and which had prevailed in Germany before the appearance of HITLER. Therefore, I cannot help but ask you to consider sympathetically the fact that we must at all times exercise patience and resort to soft pedaling methods and untiringly work toward our original objective, at times making an effort to be even more cautious.

(3) I wish to thank you very much for the information and forecast relative to the war between Germany and Soviet Russia which you gave me in your message. I am at all times paying close attention to developments taking place in this war. These developments are important in view not only of our common objective, but also of the tremendous effect it will have upon the future of this country. I feel extremely happy over the brilliant victories which Ger-

many has been winning up to today. However, I have some (disagreement?) with regard to your opinions concerning the future.

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*Part 1 of 3 see II, 733.

Trans. 7-21-41

No. 735

FROM: Tokyo July 12, 1941
TO: Berlin # 637.

(Part 3 of 3).

(4) I was quite elated to find in the message which you sent me that in most points regarding the future you concur with me. As to the question of disposing of Soviet Russia, I agree with you entirely, as you will judge from the answers I made when I conferred with you concerning that country.

(5) However, as you have noted during our conversations, we differ somewhat in our views regarding the possibility of the United States entering the war. I am praying day and night that things will turn out as you are hoping they will. If only we could take a common measure in order to keep the United States out of this war until the Russian question is settled, it would be fine, for, we agree in what should be done thereafter. It goes without saying that Japan is constantly endeavoring to realize her objective in this direction. However, regarding this question—it may be because I know little about the United States—I, as a Foreign Minister of an allied country as well as an intimate friend of yours, cannot help but be greatly concerned. I would greatly appreciate your informing HITLER of this fact which I have repeatedly pointed out. What I am endeavoring to do is to prepare spiritually and materially for coping also with a situation that might be disadvantageous to us.

(6) In regard to the concluding words in your message, I need not point out by means of examples that I am entirely in accord with your views. (July 12, 1941).

Trans. 7-21-41

No. 736

FROM: Ankara July 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 150.

On the 26th VON PAPEN, referring to the suppressive measures taken by the United States against Japan, said: "America beyond any doubt never has desired, nor does she now desire, war with Japan. The American Isolationists are tending to become stronger. Therefore, if you Japanese are content with consolidating your gains in French Indo-China and turn rather upon the Soviet, I do not think that the United States will fight. On the other hand, Germany, too, is taking a very cautious attitude until she has defeated Russia. She is doing her best to forestall a conflict between the American and German naval and air forces in the Atlantic and, at the same time, to defeat Russia and prepare for an attack upon the British Isles. This, however, seems to me an impossible task."

Relayed to Berlin. Relay to Hsinking.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 737

FROM: Tokyo July 15, 1941
TO: Washington # 1505.

(Circular)

Action Moscow as # 737.

On the 12th, Soviet Ambassador Smetanin called on this Minister and stated that he has been advised by the Ambassadors of Britain and the United States that I had said that the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact is an impotent instrument from the legal standpoint, and that Japan was not obliged to adhere to its terms. The Soviet Ambassador wished to be told as to the truth of these alleged statements.

I, therefore, replied that:

1. The Pact was, of course, effective. However, in view of the circumstances at the time of its signing, it was not applicable to the present war. Japan intends to strictly adhere to the aims and spirit of the Tripartite Pact, which, in fact, is the foundation of Japan's entire foreign policy. The neutrality agreement is effective only in so far as the Soviet's relations with all countries excepting those countries which are our allies (*sic*).

2. To date, neither Germany nor Italy has invoked the Tripartite Pact to demand our entrance into the war. Moreover, this Minister does not anticipate that either will make such a demand in the future.

3. I am firmly convinced that in so far as this particular war is concerned, Japan need not be subjected to the terms of either the Tripartite Pact or the Neutrality Pact and that she is in a position to decide upon a policy entirely independent of both.

Speaking in a strictly legal sense, the terms of the Tripartite Pact could be interpreted to mean that Japan is obligated to enter this war. However, Germany, which has the law on her side, has not demanded that we enter this war. I advised that the Soviet Union act with care and urged the Ambassador to make an effort to facilitate the carrying out of Japan's policy which I outlined to the Ambassador on 2 July.

According to press reports, I said, the turning over of Kamchatka to the United States by the Soviet Union is being considered. Other newspapers report that Great Britain is dispatching military officers and other personnel to Siberia.

I pointed out to the Ambassador that such reports excite Japanese public opinion to a great degree. Even if these reports are denied, the feeling of doubt would no doubt sharply rise.

Please be advised that paragraphs 1 to 3 were subsequently put in writing and handed to the Ambassador. When the opportunity arises, will you, too reiterate to the Soviet authorities the various points outlined above.

Relayed to NZB and Washington.

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 738

FROM: Tokyo July 15, 1941
TO: Washington # 1506.

(Circular)

Subsequent to the outbreak of the war between Germany and the Soviet Union, I explained and clarified Japan's stand with regard to Japanese-Soviet relations, to the Soviet Ambassador

on 24 June and again on 2 July. On these occasions, the Ambassador gave every indication that he was satisfied. The fact that he again called on me for further information (see my message to Moscow #747[a]) indicates that the British and United States Ambassadors in Tokyo are stirring him up.

The above is for your information.

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[a] See II,

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 739

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) June 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #742.

Reporting conditions here since the beginning of hostilities:

1. Since immediately following Molotov's radio broadcast, long lines of people have been seen waiting to purchase food supplies and kerosene.

2. In the city at every open space, crowds are seen listening to instructions broadcast regarding air-defense (also in meetings in all factories), but not much enthusiasm is shown.

3. When night falls, there is seen some movement of ----- directed toward the anti-aircraft gun positions.

4. Very strict control is exercised over ----- of all dwellings and dormitories.

5. As for telegrams from Findland, #117[a] from the Minister there to the Foreign Minister, and #128[a] were received this morning and afternoon, respectively.

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[a] Not available

Trans. 6-27-41

No. 740

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) June 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #743.

1. The German Embassy here was ordered to vacate the local legation of former Poland and the legation residence of the former Austria, in which the Germans had been housing some of its staff members. It seems they will be able to take care of all the staff members in dwellings belonging to the Embassy, but all contact and telephone connections with the outside are cut off.

2. The Italian Embassy has had no communication from the home government, and, therefore, it is not known when they will be leaving for Italy.

3. ----- Lieut. General Yamashita ----- ----- safely from ----- (too garbled for completion).

Trans. 6-27-41

No. 741

FROM: Moscow June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Tatekawa) #747.

1. An air-defense maneuver was held here for about 30 minutes from 3:00 A.M. on the 24th, during which period airplanes flew over the city and shells were shot from anti-aircraft guns. Although this time the maneuver came immediately following the opening of the Russo-German War and no advance notice was given of it, on the whole, considerable efficiency was shown in mobilizing both the protection units and security units, and the citizens appeared to maintain an attitude of calm.

2. I have noted a marked decrease in the number of taxi cabs in the city, and one now sees hardly a cab in use. Lines of people waiting to purchase food and other daily necessities have grown fewer. There is abundance of food, but the market price is tending upward.

Trans. 6-27-41

No. 742

FROM: Tokyo June 30, 1941
TO: Hsinking No number.

Extra

Re your message of the 28th.

1. We are confident that they will perform their duties with all zeal and assist the Red Army and Navy which will win the final victory.

2. Every enemy in the past, notably Napoleon, that has invaded Russia has met disaster. That in itself is a good omen that the ultimate victory will be to Russia.

3. Reports on the war are scarce, but on the western border the Red Army's counter-offensive appears to have been successful. It appears that on the 22nd and 23rd, 50,000 prisoners were taken and 300 tanks blown up. Scarcely any reference is made to their own losses. However, it is reported that up to the 24th, 381 German planes were downed and that the Red Army lost 374.

I have sent this message to Hsinking.

Trans. 7-3-41

No. 743

FROM: Tokyo July 16, 1941
TO: Hsinking #404.

Received from Moscow as #928, 15 July.

Second report on the developments of the Russo-German war.

1. The German army in the north is continuing its fierce attack to the south of Leningrad in order to facilitate the advance of the main German forces in the center. Apparently, it is the German strategy to use this northern force to compel the northwestern forces of the Soviet Union to abandon Leningrad. However, since about a week ago, or after the capture of Ostrov, this German army has not shown much activity.

This seems to indicate that the German force in that area is not large, or that it is purposely avoiding the entrance into the area between Leningrad and Moscow. The scenes of the crucial battles are now shifting to Polotsk and Vitebsk, to the north of the highway connecting Minsk and Moscow.

Between the Soviet military bases in this area and Moscow there are no natural or artificial barriers to speak of. If the Germans succeed in capturing these Soviet military strongholds, then they will be able to pour into Moscow from several directions. These battles may be said to be the key to the whole war and, therefore, the Soviet Union is making all out efforts to hold this area.

Basically speaking, the outstanding feature of the Soviet defense strip is its extreme depth, which, according to common knowledge, reaches 40 kilometers if division bases, army air corps bases and other bases are included in it. It is possible, therefore, that the German forces which by fierce attacks succeeded in breaking through the first and second lines of defense, are being held by the subsequent Soviet defense bases. Unless the Germans succeed in breaking through these last defense bases within this week or so, it is believed that considerable time will be required by them to reassemble their attacking forces.

In the South-Central front, the fall of Kiev is expected within the next few days. However, the German forces will be confronted with the big problem of crossing the Dnieper River which is a big obstacle to hurdle. They will not doubt require considerable time to make preparations for the crossing unless the Soviet forces make some unexpected and inexcusable errors.

2. Apparently the Soviet forces are gradually overcoming their original confusion. They have managed to rush troops from the Ural and west Siberia to the front lines to bolster the forces regularly stationed in European Russia. Through such means, they were able to form a defense organization of sorts in the nick of time.

However, about one third of the cream of the Soviet air and mechanized forces was lost in the very first battles. Already, there are indications that they are fighting with their backs against the wall. It is, therefore, firmly believed that the complete defeat of the Soviet forces is only a matter of time.

3. The government of the Soviet Union has clamped down a strict censorship on news to the general public, of Soviet military defeats. The news which is released is not accurate; rather, it is a reflection of wishful thinking. It is regularly reported that "the German advances are being turned back over the entire line." The general public in Moscow are still ignorant of the fact that Minsk fell into German hands shortly after the outbreak of hostilities. At the same time, since Germany has not bombed Moscow as yet, the people are considerably less excited now than they were at the outset of the hostilities.

You can well imagine the surprise and the subsequent confusion of these uninformed people when, all of a sudden, they hear German gunfire and are showered with German bombs.

(From here to end garbled, guess work contained).

The general public has been advised that if the war continues, it will have to be put on a ration system. However, there are indications that there is an extreme shortage of food and daily necessities already and it is to be doubted whether this shortage could now be overcome even if an extreme ration card system were put into effect tomorrow. Since the outbreak of this war such articles as fish have disappeared from the market counters.

Please relay this message to Manchukuo.

Trans. 7-21-41

No. 744

FROM: Vladivostok (Ota) June 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 228.

The situation in Vladivostok is, on the whole, as calm as before. The coast defense areas and each of the government trusts are under rigid military control.

Trans. 7-1-41

No. 745

FROM: Vladivostok June 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 230.

There has been no great change in conditions here up to the 25th. Emergency measures are in force, the regulation of commodities and supplies to the defense force -----. The fleet and the air corps began practice on the 24th. The attitude toward Japan (?) has undergone no change. Some civilians talk to the officials.

Details of the military conditions are as follows:

1. Conditions on the 22nd.

(1) About 7:30 P.M. emergency orders were issued to the army and navy sentries who had gone out for the evening and they could be seen everywhere in the city running to their posts of duty.

(2) At about 9 P.M., one truck loaded to capacity with armoured infantry and following this three navy trucks loaded with 4-turret high angle machine guns could be seen moving out to guard (duty).

(3) The fleet was inactive and nothing out of the ordinary could be observed. The corps that had charge of air defense seemed to be at their posts.

2. Conditions on the 23rd.

(1) Military trucks were going back and forth constantly in connection with air defense.

(2) The fleet was still inactive, but part of it engaged in target practice.

(3) The radio broadcast throughout the day concerning coastal defense. ----------.

3. Conditions on the 24th.

(1) No change on the land front from the previous day. The number of soldiers in the city seemed to be about as before.

(2) The warships that had been in the harbor for the past several days sailed out early in the morning apparently for practice maneuvers.

(3) The air corps began making flights this morning. The guards who are on duty in the city in ordinary times began practicing in earnest.

4. Conditions on the 25th.

(1) No change during the forenoon.

(2) The fleet had already gone out for practice maneuvers, but the warships left in the harbor at 8 A.M., were as follows:

1 light cruiser
1 mine layer
1 submarine tender
4 destroyers
10-20 submarines
5 special service ships

Most of these were being repaired.

Trans. 7-2-41

No. 746

FROM: Vladivostok — July 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 259.

Report on recent naval activities in this area.

Since the beginning of the German-Soviet war the naval authorities here have tightened up on watch and are engaged in naval preparations by enforcing various exercises to meet any eventuality. However, naval exercises are limited to only one section of the force for there are many ships which are undergoing repairs. Evidently the preparations are intended for defense against Japan.

(1) Activities of the fleet.

A part of the ERU type and SICHA type submarines assigned to this area appear to be operating somewhere else, for there are comparatively few submarines in port at present. However, the remainder of submarines, the torpedo boat division, mine layer division, mine sweeper division, high speed torpedo craft division, etc. are still here and are either undergoing repairs or are engaged in exercises. The first phase of exercises ended with the basic maneuvers in early June and the 2nd phase is already underway. Lately the departure of craft from the bay has become infrequent but since the war, those craft which do go out seldom return, even though it be Saturday or Sunday. Not only this, but planes of types SB, E15, E16 and OFU-BOOHU are quite active and it appears that they are engaged in exercises with the fleet. However, the exercises appear to be greatly handicapped by so many ships being placed under repairs.

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 747

FROM: Tokyo — July 8, 1941
TO: Hsinking — # 380.

(Part 1 of 2)[a]

(Abstract)

Received from Vladivostok—Vladivostok to Tokyo # 264, 5 July.

Re your Circular # 1388[a].

Report on general local conditions since declaration of war.

(1) Shipment of arms and foodstuff reduced considerably.
(2) Official papers express need for taking precautionary attitude towards Japan.
(3) Foodstuffs scarce due to control.

[a] Not available

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 748

FROM: Berlin June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 759.

(Part 1 of 2).

Strictly Secret.

This morning, the 24th, one close to RIBBENTROP called on me, and since I had previously asked RIBBENTROP that daily reports of the war be given me, this man spoke to me as follows on the last two days of fighting.

1. The number of airplanes destroyed in the air, as well as on the ground, up to the night of the 23rd (the second day of fighting) exceeds two thousand. Thus, the Soviet air forces in the first line at the outbreak of the war were completely annihilated and the German air force has gained, already, the mastery of the air on the battle front and it is now extending this area to points in the rear of the enemy. As the result of this success, from today on Berlin will be excluded from the danger zone defined by the German National Defense Association.

2. Raids conducted by the Soviet air force within German territories consisted of the following points up to the end of the second day of the war. They raided Meemeru[a], Tirujitto[a], Insuteruburugu[a] and Orutensuburug[a] only once, and Keenihisuberugu[a] three times, but they have not flown to any points outside of East Prussia. As to the number of machines used, although fifteen flew over Orutensuburugu to other points, only two or three machines were used for raiding. The casualties totaled twenty dead and there was no damage done to military objectives.

3. Since the Soviet air force was completely absorbed in the morning of the first day of the war, more than half of its planes were destroyed on the ground and no great air battle took place. The impression received during the two days of fighting attests that although the Soviet air forces have excellent planes, the Russians proved to be more unskilled than expected in the matter of handling machinery and piloting the planes. This has given Germany the assurance that she would be as successful in this war as she had been in Poland.

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[a]Kana spelling.

Trans. 6-25-41

No. 749

FROM: Berlin June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 759.

(Part 2 of 2).

Strictly secret.

4. The German Army has completely absorbed the enemy on land as well, and not one bridge along the border has been destroyed by the enemy. It has captured the barracks along the borderline practically intact. Judging from two days of fighting, the Russians have unmistakably shown their shortcoming; namely, the lack of positive individual judgment. Their morale is also poor, and we have noticed that their detachments are sorely lacking in both education and training.

5. The German Army, by the morning of the 23rd, had captured Renberugu[a], and by the evening of the second day of the war the German detachments have penetrated far into Russia, some detachments advancing between forty and fifty kilometers and others between two hundred and two hundred and fifty kilometers. Among the mechanized detachments, some have already surrounded the enemy's supply line in the rear.

Especially along the Baltic coast, the German forces have been able to penetrate north of Kobuno[a] and completely annihilate two Soviet detachments.

6. The Rumanian troops, also, fought successfully, and Germany is very much satisfied with this fact.

7. So far, the Soviet Navy in the Baltic Sea has been quite inactive, and although the sea passage from Germany to Helsinki is, of course, thwart with danger, Germany is still able to do what has to be done.

8. In many respects German successes during the first two days of the war have exceeded their expectation. However, information on this subject will not be made public for a time in order to conceal Germany's plans for the future. I believe ----- ----- ----- about the end of this week.

(Message incomplete.)

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[a]Kana spelling.

Trans. 6-25-41

No. 750

FROM: Berlin July 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 833.

On 2 July, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop's office forwarded us the following information concerning the progress of the war. (The contents of this report have not been made public.)

1. There have been no outstanding battles on the Rumanian front. However, a number of places from which the Prut River will be crossed, were captured.

2. The Hungarian forces are fast replacing the Soviet forces which have fallen back, along their entire front, and are still advancing.

3. On the southern front, the Soviet crack armored forces have been completely surrounded in the vicinity and to the north of Lemburg. Their annihilation is imminent.

In the central and northern fronts, the main German forces are advancing along the BURENNA (Berezina ? Brenner ?) River and the DUNA (Dnieper ?) River. The Soviet troops caught within the second pincer movement between Bialystok and Minsk have been approximately halved.

4. After a bitter battle on the Finnish front, the German forces smashed the Soviet forces in the Petsamo area. The Germans are continuing their advance. On 30 June, another 25,000 prisoners were taken together with 600 tanks.

5. There were no Soviet planes over German territory on 2 July. In spite of unfavorable weather conditions, the German air forces continued to show much activity.

Trans. 7-8-41

No. 751

FROM: Berlin July 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #840.

On the 3rd, WIEHL[a] told MATSUSHIMA[b] that judging from the facts that since the beginning of the German-Soviet conflict, the German Army, in invading Russian territory, has not blown up the bridges and that the Russians left behind livestock and agricultural products just as they were, and that Stalin's pictures in public buildings had been utterly destroyed, it would seem that the Russians held great antipathy for the STALIN regime. In the light of these facts, they seem to expect the early overthrow of STALIN control. Since considerable troops have been stationed at important points along the Siberian Railroad, it is apparent that they are attempting to gurantee transportation facilities. Within a few months it is thought that transportation facilities will be, on the whole, much improved over pre-war days. Therefore, ----- ----- -----.

[a]Chief of the Trade Bureau.
[b]Japanese Minister in Berlin.

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 752

FROM: Berlin (Osima) July 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #866.

From the main headquarters of the German Army in East Prussia, Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP has just wired me the following:

"For strategic reasons I have refrained from publishing the military situation so far. This, however, is no longer necessary, and the press and radio may release the news, but if it is agreeable with you, I would like to stop the special reports I have been giving. Nevertheless, every time there is something important which may not be published, I will let you know."

In reply, I expressed accord with this.

The report he gave me of the latest military situation is as follows:

1. In the fighting north of PURIPETTO[a] the Soviet forces have been practically decisively defeated. In this area they can no longer muster any considerable resistance.

2. South of PURIPETTO at LEMBURG and in the area north thereof, the Soviet forces were routed. However, they are rallying to some extent and endeavoring to collect their forces for a counter-attack. However, a serious offensive on their part is preposterous.

3. The troops in Finland are purposely postponing their advance until the strategic moment.

4. The Ukraine can be taken without a strong drive and will be subjugated by Germany principally through subversive measures.

5. 6,000 tanks have so far been destroyed. How many new tanks they had before the war broke out is uncertain. However, it is possible that they had a few. The majority of their tanks now in use were fresh from the factory, and since they had not even been tested or tried out, losses are known to have been tremendous.

6. In the theatre of war, the German air arm has almost completely gained supremacy of the heavens.

[a]Kana spelling.

Trans. 7-11-41

No. 753

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

July 14, 1941
899.

In response to RIBBENTROP's invitation, I am going to the Eastern Front on the 14th (Lt. Colonel SAIGO will accompany me). After observing the battle front, I expect to return to Berlin on the 18th. I shall probably meet HITLER while at the front.

Your "message" sent in your telegram # 637[a] will be handed to RIBBENTROP on the same occasion.

[a] Not available.

Trans. Not dated

No. 754

FROM: Berlin (Osima)
TO: Tokyo

July 19, 1941
915.

Having visited General Headquarters and completed my inspection of the battlefields, I returned to Berlin this morning.

Trans. 7-30-41

No. 755

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsinking

July 12, 1941
396.

Message from Berlin # 890.

Re my # 855[a].

According to confidential information received by a member of this office from the Propaganda Office, there is a report that in addition to sending illegal counter broadcasts over Russia, Germany is sending short-wave anti-Soviet broadcasts throughout the country. It seems that this information is now being checked.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-15-41

No. 756

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda)
TO: Berlin

July 30, 1941
No number.

(Strictly Secret)

As in the past wireless communications between Japan and Germany have recently become very difficult owing to interference and this is especially true with reference to transmission from Germany. Since it looks as though this is due to Russian strategy, I would like you to

suggest to the German communications office that certain definite counter measures be studied and let me know the result of this request by wire.

1. When interference has occurred: Tokyo-Berlin telegraphic communications since July 4th. Tokyo-Berlin telephone communications since July 15th. Washington-Berlin telegraphic communications since July 8th. In all of the above cases interference was detected in the receiving of telegrams and in making telephone calls.

2. Method of interference: In both the telegraph and telephone circuits transmission from Berlin was made completely unintelligible through interference of a series of unvarying letters or dots of 3 K.C. frequency. Somewhat stronger waves were used than those emanating from Berlin. Telegraphic communication was completely destroyed. Telephone communication was possible although extremely difficult. However, at night it became a little difficult. However, at night it became a little easier to talk on the telephone.

3. Wave lengths of stations sending out interference:

DGO — 13235 K.C. DFZ — 20020 K.C.

DOY — 14880 K.C.

No interference has been experienced recently in photo transmission between Tokyo and Berlin.

4. Since we are able to receive wave lengths up to four, please arrange for suitable corresponding lengths to be used at your end.

Trans. 8–2–41

No. 757

FROM: Berlin August 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo #975.

On the 31st, a certain very reliable German made the following comments with regard to the German-Soviet war.

1. Soviet losses due to death, wounds, and captures, have reached at least 2,500,000 to date. Because the Soviet forces are putting up a stubborn resistance, the number of their dead is enormous.

2. Up until the 27th, there were about sixty Russian military groups, both large and small, which had been surrounded by the German forces. (This was due in part to the fact that the Germans advance beyond the encircled groups without waiting for their annihilation.) There are about twenty Soviet divisions trapped in the German circle in the area northeast of Smolensk.

3. Timoshenko's central forces have suffered severe losses. Voroshelov's northern forces have also suffered serious damages with the exception of the forces under his command in the extreme north. Although the forces under Budenny in the south are faring fairly well so far, they too are gradually becoming the victims of German encircling tactics. Severe blows have been dealt to most of the Soviet crack troops. It is an undeniable fact that the quality of the Soviet fighters is becoming lower.

4. In the north, a striking force reached Leningrad last evening. However, a public announcement will not be made until the city has definitely fallen. In the central section, the Germans have advanced to a point east of Vyazma, while in the south Kiev has been encircled. The bulk of the German forces in this area are advancing southward beyond Kiev, without awaiting its fall.

5. About 10,000 Soviet planes have been destroyed to date, and the quality of the remainder are definitely inferior. However, counting the Soviet air force in the Far East, approximately one third of its original force still remains.

Just last week, a strong Soviet force including tanks, attempted a counter attack in the area to the south of Smolensk. For a time there was only one German division available to hold this attack. For a time it had been hard going, but since then the Germans, having turned the table, have succeeded in encircling the Soviet forces.

The Soviet forces were apparently composed of enormous air, tank, and man powers. It must be said that Germany has had good fortune in having been able to smash the opposition to the extent it already has. Had Germany delayed acting when she did, it is an absolute certainty that the Soviet Union would have completed a gigantic arms program.

6. To the German strategists who place importance in annihilating the enemy in field operations, it is very fortunate that the Russian forces stuck to their posts to the last without retreating. German operations are proceeding exactly as planned and the commands are in exceedingly high spirits.

7. Because Germany does not announce war developments, not only the Soviet Union but Britain and the United States seem to be flooded with various reports. Attempts are apparently being made to utilize these unfounded reports for political gains in such areas as Turkey.

Foreign Minister Ribbentrop is advocating more public announcements of the progress of the war so that political use may be made of them. Hitler, however, places the most importance on the military aspect and insists on keeping the reports secret.

8. It is true that a few Russian stragglers managed to hide in the forests behind the advancing German front lines. These make an appearance sometimes. However, the general public, particularly the farmers, welcome the arrival of the German forces. No actual guerrilla warfare is being conducted.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 758

FROM: Hsinking June 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 379.

379 (Part 1 of 2; Part 2 not available)

It is quite possible that the reaction of the anti-communism groups and others in the United States to the recent German attack on the U.S.S.R. will have the salutary effect of dampening the war sentiment in the United States. (Since it has been reported that Hess informed the heads of the British government that Hitler's real objective is to crush Russia and stamp out communism, also that Hitler considers German-American war as mutually suicidal and accordingly made peace overtures to England, it can be assumed that the present German attack on the U.S.S.R. is directly connected with Hess's mission.)

Even if Germany fails in seeking British collaboration as a result of her campaign against Russia, she will be able to secure sufficient materials to put her in a better position to wage a long drawn out war with England. In order to realize this, Germany took the offensive before Russia could complete her military preparations and at the same time is seeking British and American conciliation. It is on the basis of these advantages that Germany has carried her war against Russia.

Trans. 6-30-41

No. 759

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsinking

August 1, 1941
460.

Originated Ankara. *Ankara to Tokyo # 154*

On July 31st Foreign Minister SARAJOGURU[a] told me that Russia has called up nearly all of its reserves, invasion (?) has continued so far into the country that even retreat is impossible, most of the army must have been destroyed and the collapse of Russia is a matter of another month or month and a half. It seems that a few days ago he told the German Ambassador in an extremely optimistic manner that the above was the observation of the Turkish military department.

The Foreign Minister said further with reference to the occupation of French Indo-China that Japan's having accomplished this by peaceful means was a great success and that in the future it was very clear that war between Japan and England and America would not be desirable, and that he did not think that conditions would get worse than they were today: further that Japan's next objective would be rather in the direction of the north, etc.

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[a]Kana spelling.

Trans. 8–7–41

No. 760

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsinking

August 2, 1941
450.

Part 1 of 2

I am hereby sending message # 111 from Stockholm to this Foreign Minister.

Under the guidance of the German Ministry of Propaganda a certain pro-German news reporter recently made a complete survey of the front lines in the vicinity of Baranovitshi. (I think he is a reporter for the Stockholm Tidnigen.) Upon his return he gave an account of his observations to a close friend of his who in turn told it all to me. The story runs as follows:

A. The Soviet's main method of warfare consists of air raids, but the German land and air forces are both superior to those of the Russians and no matter how many conscripts strengthen the Soviet forces, Germany's ultimate military success is beyond doubt. The casualties suffered by the Soviet forces as well as their losses in planes have been enormous, but it could not be said that their air power has broken down and that the Germans have gained superiority in the heavens. It seems that the most conspicuous resistance is being offered around Leningrad. German officers say that the reserve power of the Red army is very great and that they probably still have great power of resistance and that, therefore, it is too early for optimism. Now in this connection it is to be noted that the Red army lately has put into action some new types of American tanks and planes. It also seems that in the region of the Volga and in Siberia the latest American material and skill has been used.

On their route of invasion how many and many a time has the German army met with unexpected obstacles! How often has it been rendered impossible for them to reestablish liaison between their units! For this reason much precious time has been lost.

Since entering old Russia, Germany's greatest ordeals have been the result of guerilla tactics used by the Soviet soldiers and the civilian inhabitants. There is a thickly wooded area in

the Pripet swamps. There are still many, many remaining troops taking refuge in it. A German force endeavored to rout them; but knowing nothing of the area, failed completely. These people have become wild men—savages. When they are in the verge of starvation, or order to seek food they emerge upon the neighboring villages. They know that the only safety for the hopeless is to hope for no safety and with a courage born of desperation they set upon the sentries and tear them to pieces. Such of these as have been taken prisoners are mostly without overcoats. They are all hatless and barefooted, and few of them indeed have any underwear; but they know not the meaning of answering a command. The word obedience is not in their vocabulary and the Germans would be better off without them because whenever they try to handle them, they get their hands burned.

Trans. 8–5–41

No. 761

FROM: Tokyo August 2, 1941
TO: Hsinking # 450.

Part 2 of 2

Part 3 of 4 (This message was evidently originally a four-part one.)

When these men retreat they usually burn villages to the ground and leave nothing standing, and suffering in this region is terrible. The danger of epidemics lurks in the drinking water. The differences between the temperatures during the night and during the day are extreme and hard to endure. Along the northern front the shortage of houses and sleeping time wears people out. The majority of the prisoners are weak, suffering from malnutrition and indigestible foods, not at all as vigorous as were the Soviet soldiers during the last war. As a matter of fact it is difficult to understand how with such weak bodies they can offer the resistance they do. A prisoner told me that aside from bread he had been living on only the meagerest and vilest tasting diet, because there is hardly any meat at all, let alone potatoes.

B. Among the territories occupied by the German army the residents of former Poland are the most docile, but the residents in Soviet territory are nowhere strongly opposed to the war and evidences can be seen nowhere of a trend to break away from the STALIN regime and establish independent area. A very strange thing, however, is to be noted. The Ukraine itself was not on the road to independence. I venture to say that this gave the Germans quite a surprise and a setback. The officers in the front line are saying that Germany will win the war, but on the question of maintaining peace and order after the victory they maintain an uneasy silence. It can be seen that they are none too happy over the outlook on this score. The War against Russia is surely a strange one. It might be and indeed often is compared to the China incident.

Even though Moscow is taken and the critical stage in military operations ended, and even though the war ends this Autumn with a victory for the Germans, that will not be the last word. Guerrilla warfare will continue and as far as the Russians are concerned, it will after all be a surrender without a defeat. If we were to look for an example, none better could be found than Napoleon's experience in Spain. Sooner or later this German-Soviet war will be over, but no man, even officers, could dare venture a guess as to what will happen after that.

Trans. 8–5–41

No. 762

FROM: Berlin — June 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #747.

As a result of the German-Soviet conflict although actual fighting will cease shortly, it will be some time before transportation facilities will have returned to normal), for the time being travel through Siberia will be impossible. Therefore, please send us immediately your opinions with regard to the following emergency measures:

1. Courier pairs SOMEMIYA—MATAYAME (recently left here by plane but were forced to return to Berlin from Warsaw); IIGAOKADA; and SHINAGAWA—KAGA, currently in Europe, should be sent home by way of the United States.

2. After we have discussed with these persons, soon to return to Japan, former Manchurian Railroad official NAKANISHI; M.P. HASE; Miss WAKAKO YAMADA; Secretary from the Department of Jurisprudence KAYOHARA, what they would like to do, we shall take corresponding measures.

3. Henceforth, courier connections between the home office and Europe should be by the way of the United States.

With regard to those mentioned in 1 and 2 above, we are making inquiries at the present time in Lisbon for their passage on mail steamers, but it is understood that American shipping lines recently have not permitted Japanese to board their steamers. In view of the present situation, please negotiate with them so that they will permit their steamers to take on these passengers. With regard to the naval mission which is in Berlin at the present time and soon to return to Japan, after we have discussed the matter with the naval authorities here, I will let you know by wire what we plan to do.

Trans. 6-24-41

No. 763

FROM: Berlin — July 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #903.

Re my #775[a].

We are trying to make arrangements for the 70 persons here who are scheduled to return to Japan to go by way of North or South America in Portuguese or Spanish ships. However, vessels are few and passengers are many and it is impossible to get booking for more than a very few persons each month. I have previously made request to Tokyo for arrangements to be made for Japanese ships on the North or South American run or the African run to call at Lisbon and I realize that as you stated in your Circular #1498[a] to Rome that such a procedure would be difficult to accomplish. Recently, the Minister resident in Iran has requested that a Japanese ship on the Bombay run be sent to the Persian gulf in order to evacuate the Japanese residents in that country. If this could be done, it would at the same time solve the problem of those desiring to return who are in this country. Please do your utmost to see that this is accomplished.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 764

FROM: Berlin — June 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 793.

Re # 759 from Moscow to the Minister[a].

On the occasion of the conversation regarding my telegram # 789[b], for the sake of reference I stated the situation of the German Embassy as above and WA[c] expressed his thanks for this and said that although he had suggested to the Soviet government the reciprocal exchange of German and Soviet Embassy persons in Turkey he had had no reply yet. He intimated that the Soviet Ambassador there was receiving courteous protection. However, in order to clarify the situation, I promised to report and I have relayed this to Russia.

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[a]The Bulgarian Legation at Moscow has made inquiries regarding looking after German interests there, but so far have been unable to make contact with the German Embassy.

[b]Not available.

[c]Weisacre?

Trans. 6-30-41

No. 765

FROM: Tokyo — June 28, 1941
TO: Moscow — # 668.

Secret outside the department.

Re your # 767[a].

I believe it is of utmost importance to get the diplomats of the several countries which are engaged in war against Russia, who are still in Moscow, out of the country safely, not only from the humanitarian point of view, but also from the point of view of saving their own lives. Therefore, will you, at once, as if at your own suggestion, after talking things over with the American Ambassador in Moscow, unofficially suggest to the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, with regard to the diplomats of those said countries, in accordance with the ordinary courtesies, and according to international practices, the plan of holding a meeting and exchanging at a given place, the diplomats of those several countries who are now in Moscow, for the Soviet diplomats who are residing in the belligerent countries.

Now, I want you to try, at the same time, to arrange with them to permit Commercial Attache YANNERII of the Italian Embassy in Tokyo, to leave the country, having been one of the party along with Vice-Admiral YAMASHITA who were forcibly detained in OTOPORU.

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[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-3-41

No. 766

FROM: Tokyo — July 2, 1941
TO: Berlin — # 1393.

This Foreign Minister's # 695 to Moscow.

On the 1st, we received a request from the Soviet Embassy to assist 160 members of the families of their staff in Tokyo who plan to go home on ships sailing the 6th and 16th. For your information.

Trans. 7–8–41

No. 767

FROM: Moscow — July 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 842.

1. In view of the present situation it is inevitable that the Soviet government evacuate Moscow in the near future. I have had instructions to take a part of the staff and accompany the government, in case such a situation arises, and leave the rest of the staff here. However, conditions at that time may be such that it will be impossible for any to leave and we may all have to remain here. At any rate, I desire your permission to act according to my discretion in the emergency because conditions in this country differ from conditions in other European countries.

2. Regardless of which course is taken it will be pointless to leave a large staff here and would result in unnecessary complications. I think it would be well at this time to designate clearly the ones who are to be included in the third evacuation. There are a number in the office who have arrived recently from Japan and I think it would be better to transfer them to other European countries rather than have them return to Japan at this time. However, in order that those who are to return may begin to make preparations please decide on them and wire immediately. The figures in parenthesis give the time that the following arrived at their posts:

3. Sumino, Chancellor, (Feb. 1931)
Nagato, Secretary, (May, 1941)
Furumi, Clerk, (April, 1940)
Watanabe, Clerk, (Aug. 1940)
Komuro, Clerk, (May, 1941)
Mitani, Clerk, (Feb. 1941)
Hanai, Employee, (June, 1941)
Saito, Watchman, (May, 1941)

Total eight. Those who will remain if the occasion arises will, in addition to myself, be six members from this office, five minor officials, and three workers, (including my cook).

Trans. 7–10–41

No. 768

FROM: Tokyo — June 26, 1941
TO: Rome — # 163.

(Message to Moscow # 659).

Since Italy's participation in this war, the Imperial Government has taken over the protection of Italian interests in India, the overseas dominions of Australia and Canada, Netherlands Indies, as well as Iraq. Now, once again through Italian Ambassador, by virtue of the specific request of the Italian government, they have decided to have you take over the protection of Italian interests in the country to which you are accredited. Therefore, since this is the case, make a formal request of the Soviet and after you have received their approval, please proceed to take over the protection of Italian rights and interests.

Now, the following is for your information alone:

1. The scope entailed in the protection of Italian interests is limited by international law to the supervision of Italian diplomatic establishments in the Soviet and the protection of Italian nationals within the borders of that country.

2. By nature, the protection of interests of belligerent powers in this case, even though the Soviet grants its approval, differs in character from the method of consular sanction. Therefore, by virtue of this we haven't the authority nor are we duty bound to protect the interests of that country in place of the Italian Government, but it will be sufficient merely to render assistance in the handling of Italian interests in the Soviet on a practical basis.

3. Furthermore, with regard to the evacuation of Italian Embassy officials (refer to my # 654[a]), please render immediate assistance.

I have transmitted this to Italy.

Italy will transmit this to Germany.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 6–28–41

No. 769

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) — July 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 776.

Re your # 659[a].

I met Molotov on the 26th, and handed him the official document regarding this matter and also communicated to him the gist of your telegram # 654[b]. Molotov said that he would have to give his reply later but in general the problem would have to be settled mutually. In that case, I said that it would be necessary for me to get in touch immediately with the Italian Ambassador. Molotov replied that he would guarantee such contact as soon as he had a reply regarding the protection of interests. I inquired as to whether the Italian Ambassador were still in Moscow and Molotov said that he wondered whether the Italian Ambassador hadn't moved to some other city along with the German Embassy staff.

[a] Tokyo directs Moscow to arrange for taking over the protection of Italian interests in Russia; outlining the scope of Japan's responsibility in this connection as covered by international law.

[b] Not available. See II, 768.

Trans. 7–9–41

No. 770

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa)
TO: Tokyo

June 25, 1941
760.

Immediately on receipt of your # 654[a], I called by telephone to request the Italian Ambassador to visit me, but as I could not get connections I sent Miyakawa. He found five or six uniformed police at the entrance, who, by orders of the Soviet Government, were prohibiting any ingress or egress, and he was unable to enter and there was nothing to do but leave. The last contact we had with the Italian Embassy was when their intelligence officer, Relli, called on Miyakawa in the morning of the 23rd to receive information contained in your # 631[b].

[a] Not available.

[b] Jap. Commercial Attaché, at Moscow is requested to inform the Italian Ambassador and Secretary that their wives arrived at Tokyo and are well.

Trans. 7-1-41

No. 771

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Rome

July 10, 1941
187.

Received from Moscow as # 866, 7th.

Re my Telegram # 821[a], part 2.

We received a list of the Italian property from the Foreign department on the 6th, but the list was very incomplete and contained mainly the paintings and the automobile. The property that the Italian Consulate has was borrowed from BYUROBIN. We made a thorough investigation of the place and the Soviet authorities have no objection to our taking over the Italian interests here. The Italian Embassy is closed and the front door sealed with a guard standing duty at the entrance.

According to the Swedish Minister here, the Swedish Legation with the consent of the Soviets had taken over the protection of the Slovakian legation recently and since that time some one had broken into the garage and cellar and taken away things stored there. This had been explained to the Soviet government but so far no action had been taken. As regarding the Italian Embassy it will be impossible to guarantee that such an incident might not occur. Particularly is this so regarding the Italian Embassy for the Italians have there priceless paintings from the Museum. Also in Leningrad and other places they have real estate and buildings, and it will be difficult to maintain strict protection over these. As regards the extent of the control, we are to exercise over the said property, your telegram was not very clear. We desire instructions regarding the consulate. Please get in touch with the Italian Ambassador in Tokyo regarding this.

Please relay this to Italy.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-11-41

No. 772

FROM: Berlin (Osima) July 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #891.

Re my #883[a].

On the 12th, I had a member of my staff call on the officer in charge of the Foreign Office to inquire of him the number and names of the members of the Chinese Embassy who left Berlin on the 10th. Though we have been requested by the Nanking Government to ask for authorization to commandeer the Chinese Embassy Building, its movable property and deposits which are owned and in the name of the Chinese Government, the Foreign Office official in charge made the statement that the German authorities would like to comply in giving such authority and right to commandeer this property. He continued by saying:

1. The Chinese Berlin Embassy staff (with the exception of one minor official who is sick in bed at the present time); their families; two members of the Hamburg Consul-Generalcy (the Vice-Consul and his secretary); five members from the Consul-General's office in Vienna (the Consul-General, his wife, the Vice-Consul, his wife, and their private secretary; as well as the staff member of the Embassy in Belgium who came here to Berlin to live; making a total of 44 persons, left Berlin on the 10th for Berne, Switzerland. A member of the German Foreign Office accompanied this party and saw to it that all members entered Switzerland.

Furthermore, it is understood that the party of six which preceded this last group has already headed for Turkey. The German Government has adopted the policy of not permitting those who have been deprived of their official status to continue living within the realm of the German line.

2. The German Government on yesterday, the 11th, through their police organization, took over the Italian Embassy building and the equipment and properties appurtaining to it (*sic*). Though considerable surveillance is being brought to bear upon this property, the German Government is ready and willing to accede insofar as possible to our wishes with regard to the various points of the representations filed with them. Furthermore, the German Government is prepared in this connection to advise the Japanese Government each time any measures are taken.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. Not dated

No. 773

FROM: Berlin (Osima) July 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #845.

Re my #844[a].

When WEAMAN[b] conversed with KASE[c], he told KASE that Poland still had an Embassy in Japan. Because he thought that Japan had various reasons for retaining the Dutch Ministry, he would not make a question of that, but Germany would like to see the Polish Embassy withdrawn from Japan. I understand he spoke thus to KASE in a casual way. I believe that this is

a reasonable demand and so it should be complied with as soon as possible now that a war is going on between Germany and Soviet Russia.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Chief of Political Bureau.
[c] Counselor at Japanese Embassy in Berlin.

Trans. 7-24-41

No. 774

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 10, 1941
TO: Berlin #626.

Re your #845[a].

Although the Japanese Government has been making arragements for the withdrawal of the Polish Embassy, because I have come to the conclusion that it would be better to postpone the matter in view of various circumstances, we are not at present forcing this question. I informed Ambassador OTT of this on the 8th.

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[a] See II, 773.

Trans. 7-24-41

No. 775

FROM: Tokyo July 15, 1941
TO: Berlin #649.

Re your #867[a].

There are no objections to your proceeding as you suggested with the turning over to Germany gratis the lands and buildings belonging to the Polish and Czech diplomatic establishments. However, in regard to liquidating the liabilities on them it will be very difficult to make a request for an appropriation for anything but special fund (?). However, please state that in regard to the establishments in the German occupied areas of Belgium and France we are not prepared to make such a philanthropic contribution no matter what the future course of events may be.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 776

FROM: Berlin (Osima) June 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #780.

A large quantity of our purchases in this country is at present en route through Russia. Please negotiate and arrange suitably with Soviet officials so that these will go through without obstruction.

Trans. 6-30-41

No. 777

FROM: Berlin June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo #758.

In order to adopt a comprehensive policy concerning commerce between Japan and Germany now that war has broken out between the Reich and the Soviet Union, on the 23rd, I convoked representatives of influential business concerns here. We discussed the matter and as a result arrived at the following opinions:

I. As a matter of principle, new business deals will be postponed.

II. Business deals already under contract will not be cancelled by us. We will, however, in the meantime watch the situation closely.

III. Payments involved in deals already contracted (installments on orders of machinery, returns on import deals cancelled by the Reich, etc.) will, for the time being, be kept in the Yokohama Specie Bank. At the same time, the individual concerns will figure out how much is to be paid out and revise their figures as may be necessary. When this is done, we will have another conference.

I will wire you later the results of the conference mentioned in III. Concerning the adjustment of Japanese-German relations mentioned above, and concerning the maintenance of trade between the two countries, if you have anything in mind which you think we ought to consider, please wire me back immediately.

Trans. 6-26-41

No. 778

FROM: Tokyo July 1, 1941
TO: Berlin #577.

Re your #775[a].

In the matter of the 27,000 tons of accumulated freight for Japan mentioned in your message referred to above, and the goods on order of which it is expected we will take delivery during the next six months, please confer with the military and naval attachés, and on investigation divide the goods up into the four following classes, with number of tons of each and advise us as to the results at once.

(1) Goods being received by officials that will need to be secured in a hurry.
(2) Goods being received by civilians that will need to be secured in a hurry.
(3) Officially secured goods that do not come under No. 1.

(4) Civilian goods that do not come under No. 2.

Furthermore, as the firms in Japan that are concerned in this are anxious about it, please tell their branch offices in your city ----- for their information.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-3-41

No. 779

FROM: Tokyo July 9, 1941
TO: Berlin # 1466.

(Circular)

Action Moscow as # 718.

Re your # 815[a].

1. Inasmuch as Germany has insured the freight going west, it is being sent F.O.B. as a matter of form. It appears that the Soviet contend that they have proof that it is being sent as German property. As a matter of fact, it will be possible with regard to some of the freight to give proof to the Soviet that title of ownership has not yet passed to the Germans. (Actually such a proposal has not yet been made.) Again the Soviet has required that a certificate accompany all freight west and it is possible that such a certificate may not be available for some freight. It might be well to leave this loop hole in the negotiations open so that in order for the merchants to obtain it in the future they may have to make a request as to the best method of procedure hence it might be well for you to withdraw your statement to the Soviet.

In harmony with the other party's request 16,000 (yen ?) has been entrusted to the Soviet trade representatives in Tokyo, it has been ascertained.

3. The "disposition of the rest" referred to in my # 702[a], part 1, was to the effect that if the owners desired representation should be made to the Soviet to purchase the freight or ----------.

4. When I have a reply from Germany regarding my # 666[a], part 3, last paragraph, I will transmit it.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-15-41

No. 780

FROM: Tokyo July 15, 1941
TO: Berlin # 648.

Secret. Re your # 303[a].

We would have you defer the conclusion of the formal contract in regard to the supplying of HANNOOTOO[b] until after it becomes more evident that freight can be shipped, but inasmuch as we wish by all means to secure the same as much as possible before June of 1943, we would like to have the preliminary negotiations with the Berlin parties gotten under way now, so as

to have everything in readiness, that, if need be, the formal contracts could be closed up on short notice. Accordingly, you will please take note of the following points, and then begin preliminary conversations with them, advising us as to results. For the time being we would like to have this matter kept separate from the trade agreement that is being negotiated at the present.

(1) The amount of the order 37 HANNOOTOO (?) (2880 kilo tons), special boiler (?), 790 kilo tons. However, these items might be reduced if necessary because of their manufacturing capacity.

(2) The time limit for our securing the above to be no later than June, 1943, and it is desired to have delivery made at as early a time as possible within the above period.

(3) We will furnish 30 kilo tons of ferro-molybdenum needed in the manufacture of these articles. (This is the estimate of our technicians.) However, if the supply of HANNOOTOO to be furnished is reduced, the supply of ferro-molybdenum will also be reduced accordingly. Furthermore, the delivery of this will not be made in advance, but will be shipped from Japan simultaneously with shipments leaving Germany for Japan.

(4) While ferro-tungsten is not a material needed for the manufacture in question, we are prepared to furnish this as a compensation up to a maximum limit of 100 tons. (We would keep it at as small an amount as possible.) Time of delivery and conditions for reducing amount supplied would be the same as in the case of ferry-molybdenum.

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[a] Not available.

[b] May be some heavy machinery, retort, or something in connection with metal production or refining, or could it be guns for battleship under construction?

Trans. 7–22–41

No. 781

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 18, 1941
TO: Berlin #663.

Re your #881[a].

This question is still being considered by the ministries concerned. However, I am reporting developments up to the present.

1. We have decided to make actual payments for good already shipped as well as for those contracted for in the manner described in the messages addressed to the Financial Officer and to the Yokohama Specie Bank in your city, so please refer to them for this information.

2. For the payment of contracted goods not yet shipped, it would be necessary to apply anew for import permits for these goods. The Ministry of Finance wishes to make payments, as a matter of general principle, after the goods have reached their destinations. However, among the goods ordered by the military, there are many for which advance payment has been completed. In view of this fact and of the fact that if the principle set forth by the Finance Ministry is adhered to too strictly, there is danger, as you have pointed out in the first part of your message, of contracts being cancelled by Germany, there is a tendency to favor changing the terms of payment to f.o.b. factory for those items which we consider as absolutely necessary and thus make sure that these goods may be gotten. This Ministries concerned are holding a joint conference at present in order to learn the total amount of goods already ordered and to study other details.

3. As to new orders, setting aside those which for the present do not require advance payment, there is no way but to set a limit to the orders. It would be necessary to decide on a policy in regard to this matter with our future trade with Germany in mind (for instance, because of an increasing demand on our part, our supply of whale oil may be radically reduced. In fact, supplies to Germany from us will probably be reduced generally). Therefore, this question is being discussed together with that mentioned in paragraph 2.

With regard to the request which you had made concerning new orders in your caption telegram, we are now negotiating with the Ministries concerned so as to effect a unification insofar as it is possible to do so.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-21-41

No. 782

FROM: Tokyo July 21, 1941
TO: Berlin #673.

Regarding your #914[a].

I have explained to the German government that—

(1) We expect to spend, in the period of five years, the sum of Y250,000,000 on machinery, patents and drawings and also for the exchange of technicians through the instrumentality of the technical treaty. Our expenditure regarding the above for the next year or two to be met by the Y100,000,000 credit to be extended to us by Germany and future payments to be made either in foreign currency or in trade, whichever these Germany wishes to choose. Accordingly, the question of making payment is a matter of a year or two hence.

(2) Not only because of waning export efforts to Germany, as already reported in my #663[a], but also due to further reduction in exports, necessitated by the removal of German silver to new quarters, whose space is somewhat limited, and also to the nature of export goods, it would be somewhat difficult to encourage buying.

(3) As regards the trade negotiations, the question of detailed list of articles, and quantity, will have to be deferred until the settlement of the German-Soviet situation. However, we are now considering the question of establishing some sort of basic agreement as a necessary prelude to economic mutual assistance.

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[a] See II, 781.

Trans. 7-26-41

No. 783

FROM: Rome (Horikiri) July 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo #451.

Action Berne as #011.

Re my #7[a].

On the 11th, I visited an official of the Foreign Office and inquired about Italy's decision regarding this item. The above official said that for military reasons Italy could not permit the

transit through Italy of machinery destined for America and, therefore, it was unavoidable that Italy return a negative answer to the Japanese proposal. However, inasmuch as Italy was deeply interested in the expansion of Japanese manufacturing capacity, if Japan could think up some other method of attaining her ends Italy would be more than glad to give it further study.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-22-41

No. 784

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Moscow

July 19, 1941
#755.

Having been appointed to the post of Foreign Minister, I intend to do my humble best to meet and clear up the difficult situation confronting us. I would appreciate your staying on at your post and cooperating with me.

Trans. 7-21-41

No. 785

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa)
TO: Tokyo

July 20, 1941
#964.

I thank you very much for your kind telegram. As you may surmise, there was one reason why I had agreed to take upon myself this great responsibility, notwithstanding the fact that I was far from equal to it, and that was because I was heartily in agreement with the Foreign Minister's ideas, which I knew would not permit my refusal, and because I was deeply moved by his strong determination. My past policy was that of drawing Soviet Russia into the Three-Power Alliance or at least of keeping that country from moving closer to Britain and the United States. However, the general situation has now radically changed. For our Government to formulate an entirely new policy toward Soviet Russia is only to be expected. This change I expect will meet with some difficulty when it comes to application. We may expect that it would be wise to change our attitude in regard, for example, to the question of rights and interest in northern Karafuto[a] from the attitude we have heretofore taken. Under the circumstances, it would not be so easy for you to make me a leader in breaking a promise, for the making of which I had been partly responsible, and so I cannot willingly accept the offer. I believe, therefore, that it is both profitable and natural that you should appoint a new Ambassador who well understands the newly instituted policy. I am extremely sorry to have to reject your offer, especially because I realize the gravity of the present crisis, but I trust that you will understand what I have so far set down and will immediately order me back to Japan.

---

[a] Japanese name of Sakhalin Island, north of Japan in Sea of Okhotsk.

Trans. 7-23-41

No. 786

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) July 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #974.

Re my #829[a].

Since conditions have become more threatening, we are taking the following steps at 6:00 p.m. on the 23rd (Moscow time), and so please be so informed. All codes with the exception of those listed below will be burned:[b]

Please transmit this message suitably as you have done my previous messages.

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[a] Not available.
[b] DoD Comment: Details deleted.

Trans. 7-28-41

No. 787

FROM: Tokyo July 19, 1941
TO: Shanghai #728.

According to MMM report, the British Commercial Attaché has been instructed to facilitate departure of cargo vessels going to the U.S.S.R. and also to the United States. Please let me know situation relative to exports from Shanghai to Vladivostok.

In view of our stand toward the U.S.S.R. we should not resort to measures which may be too provoking. However, please see whether you can find a way to assume some sort of control over transportation of goods to the U.S.S.R. and let me know.

Trans. 7-21-41

No. 788

FROM: Vienna (Yamaji) August 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo #063.

(Strictly Secret.)

A considerable number of persons in influential circles in this area are now strongly advocating the capturing of the Trans-Siberia Railroad to better communication facilities between Japan and Germany, and for other reasons. (It would not be particularly difficult to do this, these persons insist, particularly if the project is carried out through the joint action of Germany and Japan.)

This is a proposition which is worthy of our special attention.

Trans. 8-19-41

No. 789

FROM: Tokyo June 10, 1941
TO: Canton # 96.

On the 7th, French Ambassador HENRY called on this Minister and stated that since the occupation of the island of Weichow[a], French missionaries of an evangelistic organization had been persecuted by the Japanese. Since last year, the whereabouts of SONNUFUROO and KASUTIOO, white men, have been unknown, and rumors are circulating that they have met foul play at the hands of the Japanese. Furthermore, one exiled Chinese minister and six nuns are understood to be under strict Japanese surveillance, in addition to which all religious activities have been banned. In view of these statements, they request that this Chinese minister and the nuns be permitted to leave the island and they have requested that they be placed under French jurisdiction at Fort Bayard[b]. Therefore, after you have contacted the local military authorities and made careful examination of the facts of the matter, wire me your findings.

(I am sending you by air mail the translation of the memorandum handed over to us by the Ambassador.)

---

[a] Weichow is an island off the cost of Kwantung Province in South China.
[b] Fort Bayard is a town on the South China coast across from the island of Hainan.

Trans. 6-13-41

No. 790

FROM: Tokyo June 20, 1941
TO: Nanking # 216.

(Msg. to Shanghai # 560)

Re my # 424[a].

On the 7th, the French Ambassador called on me and said that to hand over these documents would have a bad effect on the French rights and interests which exist principally in the unoccupied areas of China, and he requested that we reconsider the matter. Accordingly, on the 18th, the Chief of the East Asia Bureau told the French Commercial Attache that there is a danger that the attitude which the French authorities have and persist in keeping will again bring about an unfavorable attitude toward France. In order to expedite the settlement of this matter, he requestted that instructions be sent out to the actual place.

Relayed to Nanking.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 6-25-41

No. 791

FROM: Tokyo June 7, 1941
TO: Washington # 1216.

(Circular)

Action Vichy as # 219.

(*Abstract*) Re my # 206[a].

The Japanese army in Indo China has decided to insist upon the right to seize and requisition property destined for China. The question of French responsibility and sovereignty is involved, but by Franco-Japanese cooperation it is believed baseless fears can be alleviated, probably by consignment of seized merchandise to Japanese interests in Indo China. An agreement upon this subject is being drafted.

---

[a]Ratification by Japanese of the F.I.C.-Thai peace treaty will be about 25 June—by Thai, about 26 June. Request French ratification during June. (See Vol. I)

Trans. 6-9-41

No. 792

FROM: Vichy (Kato) June 11, 1941
TO: Washington (KOSHI) No number.

Action Tokyo as # 297 (In four parts, complete).

My observations regarding Franco-German collaboration after having recently conferred with the important cabinet members, with Ambassador Abetz resident in Paris, and with Laval, are as follows:

1. During the five months interval from the Laval incident in December of last year to the time of the Berchtesgaden conferences of May of this year, there were not political relations between the two countries and events were simply allowed to take their course by both sides. However, since the turn of events in the Balkans, the Vichy government, stimulated by the poverty of the necessities of life, and watching the direction the wind was blowing in the British and German camps, decided that there was nothing left for them to do in order to secure national independence and prosperity but to cooperate with Germany.

Therefore, recently, at last in line with Laval's thinking, Franco-German collaboration was decided upon. Declarations came in rapid succession from Petain and Darlan on the heels of the Berchtesgaden interviews and the policy of the Vichy government is to strongly propagandize Franco-German collaboration while steadily putting it into practice.

2. No clear pattern of the content of the Franco-German collaboration has as yet been manifest. However, the leading spirits on both sides are in complete agreement regarding the principles and motives of the relations between the two countries as set forth in the Berchtesgaden interviews and by this a new era has opened up before our eyes in Franco-German collaboration. That France is to undertake the protection of the home and country and the possessions herself is generally understood. Indirectly this will lead to the approval of the preservation of the integrity of the French empire as a whole. Getting down now to more specific problems, or rather to secondary considerations, it is provided that, as far as possible, there will be a reduc-

tion in the price of the seized war materials, and that the restrictions on the circulation of persons and goods between occupied and unoccupied France will be relaxed and prisoners returned.

3. A large part of France will continue to be occupied by German soldiers. There will be a large number of Anglo-American sympathizers who will act in unison with, or attempt to act in unison with, the maneuvers of De Gaulle. In view of the present situation in France there will of course be difficulties in effecting a collaboration with Germany. Germany for its part, in order to secure coastal air ports and bases in the rear to support military operations against Britain, will find it necessary to hold the present occupied area for some time to come. Again, it is inevitable that there should continue to exist in France many anti-collaborationists who desire to see France remain an enemy of Germany and, therefore, it is necessary that Germany, while recognizing the desires and aspirations of France for a united territory, reserve certain guarantees of France's good faith. Therefore, it is necessary for a time at least that the occupied area remain as at present, and thus it is apparent that the course of the military operations against England and the faithfulness with which France discharges her share of the obligations under the coalition are a clue to the continued existence of unoccupied France as such.

4. The matter of the conclusion of a separate peace during this interval by either France or Germany is a problem that has come up but no final peace could be concluded that did not include the return of the occupied area and hence such a contingency is hardly conceivable and certainly could not occur immediately. Regarding the basis of peace, the return of Alsace-Lorraine, PADDKAREE, and part of France, a member of the Vichy Cabinet said to me: "There is no help for Alsace, but there is certainly no question but what Lorraine is a part of France and it is certainly unreasonable. As to PADDKAREE this is very hard to understand." CHUNIZII was established solely by the French and inasmuch as they have no right to request it from the Italians, they have a tremendous antipathy for the Italians. This fact was voiced by all the Cabinet members. I could not see that there was any agreement at present in the talks regarding the problem of Africa and Syria.

5. In view of the conditions resulting from America's inevitable participation in the war, Germany is aware of the possibility of French territory being used by enemy countries and is considering the problem of protecting French possessions. A large amount of the arms and munitions that were prohibited under the old agreement are being sent out to the armies in the possessions. However, to what extent Germany will lend a hand in case these provinces are actually attacked remains to be seen. Immediately after the outbreak of the Iraq incident, Iraq requested German aid and while Germany sent a few divisions of the air force by way of Syria she found it impossible to dispatch the air force that Iraq desired because the synthetic rubber and synthetic fuel that the German army uses will not stand the intense heat of countries like Iraq. Also, because she did not wish to extend the battle line so far she did not dispatch soldiers there either. At present, even if Syria could be occupied by Britain there is a question as to whether Germany will dispatch soldiers or not and only the course of events will determine this. It is difficult now to see that France and Germany have an understanding regarding this area.

6. France's aim in this Franco-German collaboration is to secure for herself a leading role in the new order to be established in Europe after the war. As far as the continent of Europe is concerned France sees that German victory is inevitable. Collaborationists of the old guard like Laval and Hitler, hold an idea that is absolutely contrary to the conventional one regarding conquered people. While Germany retains the absolute leadership after the war, she will abolish the meaningless national boundary lines and while respecting the autonomy and independence of the various peoples of Europe she will expect them all to work together for the common welfare and interest of all. Thus, in the future, the relations between conqueror and conquered take on an entirely new meaning and France instead of endeavoring to establish her

autonomy and independence will endeavor to play a leading role in the New Europe. Germany recognizes on her part that the establishment of this new order in Europe would be very difficult without France's cooperation. Sincere belief in this does not permit of hesitation ----- advocating Franco-German collaboration. The collaborationists in France ----- (Last two lines garbled out.)

Trans. 6-19-41

No. 793

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 12, 1941
TO: Vichy # 222.

You inquire about my # 216[a]. Well in it I told you about the feeling that I have had for many years that I would like to see France and Germany make a permanent peace. I merely thought that this would help you along in your future negotiations with the French, and did not mean to say that we have any definite plans for mediation between France and Germany right now under the present circumstances. I am sure that you were not mistaken about this, but I thought I had better let you know.

---

[a]See II, 793 A, B, and C, in which MATSUOKA declares that only an understanding between Germany and France will there be peace in Europe.

Trans. 6-14-41

No. 793A

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 4, 1941
TO: Vichy # 216.

(Part 1 of 3)

I, the Foreign Minister, have always entertained the belief that since Japan emerged from isolation as a great power it is our mission to be a stabilizing force for world peace, in the realization of which we are able to contribute very greatly. Looking at the real facts of the world situation today from the point of view of fundamentals, I do not believe that we can stand idly by and see the stability and peace of Europe, which, after all, was the fountainhead of the civilization of our times, vanish. Now, the stability and peace of Europe depends primarily upon a reconciliation between Germany and France, followed by continued harmony between those two nations. The British Empire itself ought to realize that this would be best for her own good. From her heart she begs and prays for peace and security, but when she faces the problem of peace throughout Europe she is too deeply involved on that continent to extricate herself and view the matter realistically. Her interests are so vast and varied in Europe that she has always followed the policy of, as they say in English, "divide and rule." History proves that! No country in the geographical position of England, bound up as she is by interests in Europe, could ever hope to contribute to the stabilization of this continent, but our empire, which has relatively small material interests in Europe and who can view the world on a broader plane, stands in a good position to bring about harmony between Germany and France. For thirty or forty years I have entertained this view and it has been my constant hope that our empire might contribute to the peace of the world.

Trans. 6-7-41

No. 793B

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 4, 1941
TO: Vichy #216.

(Part 2 of 3)

Last autumn we entered into an alliance relationship with Germany and Italy. Using our convenient position produced thereby, I have hoped to take a step, even though it be but one step, in the direction of realizing the ideal of my lifetime. Nay and more, the fact that some years ago we concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany (immediately upon my return to Tokyo from Geneva without a moment's delay I advanced this proposal, confident in the hope that it would lead to an alliance) and, proceeding further, converted it into a Tri-Partite Pact, was motivated and conceived by this single idea of my own. When I recently visited Europe, in Germany I reiterated my deeprooted convictions and I learned definitely from Chancellor HITLER that he intends to give France the position of a great power in the new order which is to be established in Europe. How glad I was to hear him say that! I also frankly told Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP what I have been cherishing over these long, long years and went on to explain to him that Japan, who is a friend and ally of Germany, is in a favorable position to mediate between Germany (and Italy) and France, in which case I hoped that Germany would do her utmost to assist France.

Well, in Japan I met and came to know Mr. ROBAN[a] and fortunately before I left for Europe and also after my return, I confidentially told him of the confidence and hope of my whole lifetime. (Ambassador HENRY knew all about it) and Mr. ROBAN said to me: "I, too, all my life have always said that France must reach a permanent understanding with Germany.

---

[a]Plenipotentiary from Vichy to French Indo-China.

Trans. 6-7-41

No. 793C

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 4, 1941
TO: Vichy #216.

Part 3 of 3.

He continued, "Unless this happens, I am of the opinion that there will never be peace in Europe. I absolutely agree with what you say." I then said, "Well then, Mr. ROBAN, on your way back to France I want you to be sure to stop off in Japan and to talk with Ambassador STARMER, and if it is alright with him, to go to Germany and talk with Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and then even perhaps with Chancellor HITLER." Mr. Roban replied, "I will talk with Ambassador STARMER, but before I converse with HITLER and RIBBENTROP, I will have to go first to Vichy and commune with MARSHAL PETAIN. Otherwise I fear that the plan might be difficult to carry out." On this we both agreed. (The last time Mr. ROBAN was in Japan he did not get a chance to talk with Ambassador STARMER, who was very busy.)

Will Your Honor please study this message well and when you have it in mind, go and tell the German officials with appropriate emphasis what I have so fervently hoped for over these many, many years. Please use your efforts to get them to agree to our mediation. Needless to say, the matter is rather delicate; so I am sure you will be quite circumspect.

When I was in Germany, I explained to Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and to Ambassador STARMER the fine character of Mr. ROBAN and I said to them, "Gentlemen, here is a man of the future upon whom we must keep our eyes." Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP listened with great interest and nodded in assent.

Please wire this to Berlin.

Trans. 6-7-41

No. 794

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 16, 1941
TO: Vichy # 233.

(Message to Berlin # 519.)

(Part 1 of 2.)

Re your # 685[a].

In view of the trend of events, the Imperial Government finds it necessary first of all to secure airplane bases in southern French Indo-China and to expedite an understanding whereby our warships can freely enter and leave that country. Will you, therefore, immediately go and ask Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP to have the Vichy Government secretly agree to this so that we may without any delay definitely obtain ports and airplane bases. Please ask him to have Vichy wire the French Indo-Chinese officials to support our claims so that we may obtain these rights and begin to expand and strengthen them. Use my next number, 520[a], as the basis of your explanation. If this plan of ours does not succeed, if and when the times comes, the Imperial Government is determined on its own to take whatever measures may be necessary.

It goes without saying that our Empire has no intention of invading French Indo-China. This point is clarified by the recent exchange of notes between Japan and French Indo-Chinese authorities, as well as by the assurances in the peace treaty recently signed between Japan and French Indo-China.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 6-17-41

No. 795

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 16, 1941
TO: Vichy # 233.

Message to Berlin # 519.

(Part 2 of 2.)

The Imperial Government has in no wise changed its policy of continuing its guarantees to respect the territorial integrity of French Indo-China. To tell the truth, as things now look it would appear that it is Great Britain who might subjugate that country and make it a base for an attack on Japan. It is our desire to offset the danger of Great Britain seizing this important area. French Indo-China must be defended from such a fate. To be sure, I feel that the French

know that it is to their advantage as well as to ours to make secure the strategic position of our great Empire in the Far East and that our interest, as well as theirs, centers in French Indo-China. Another thing: Lately the DeGaullists have been strengthening their position in southern French Indo-China and there is a tendency for the people no longer to listen to the Governor General. Please explain that also to RIBBENTROP and ask him to guide and advise the Vichy Government to speedily acquiesce to our demands without any misgivings as to our good intentions.

This situation will permit of no equivocation, so please negotiate with this clearly in mind.

This message is sent also to Vichy.

Trans. 6-17-41

No. 796

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

June 17, 1941
234.

Action Berlin as # 520.

Airports agreed upon between Japan (?) and French Indo-China in the order of their importance:

1. Saigon Bienhoa
2. Phnompenh
3. Kompontrach
4. Nhatrang
5. Soctrang
6. Toura—(Tourain)
7. Simreap

Harbors in order of importance:

1. Saigon
2. Camranh

This had been relayed to France.

Trans. 6-19-41

No. 797

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

June 18, 1941
237.

Message to Berlin # 533.

Re your # 700[a] and # 707[a].

Will you please communicate my # 519[b] verbatim by word of mouth to Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP. In that message, you know, I spoke of suitable measures, etc. Now, if the Foreign Minister questions you, tell him that I want him to put complete trust in me. Tell him that the Imperial Government would not take such a step as this without strong resolution, and that it goes without saying that our Government has no bad faith in mind.

During this conversation, if the Foreign Minister takes the view that, in view of the nature of the relations existing between Germany and France, even though he tried to get Vichy to

accept our proposal it would be impossible to do so, please be sure to tell him not to even attempt it because this is a serious matter and if it leaked out that we were trying to get Germany to bring pressure to bear upon Vichy for such a purpose a serious secret would be disclosed and our future schemes blasted. If RIBBENTROP, in other words, thinks Germany could not succeed, we will have to think of some way to approach the matter on our own. Please keep this in mind during your conversation.

---

[a] Not available.

[b] Matsuoka wires Osima in Berlin to ask Ribbentrop to bring pressure to bear on Vichy to obtain airplane bases and free ports in Southern French Indo-China in order to offset and oppose British machinations See II, 795.

Trans. 6–19–41

No. 798

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 22, 1941
TO: Vichy # 246.

Message to Berlin # 549.

Re your # 736[a].

Please go to Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP immediately and clarify the following points:

1. As I said in my previous message, if Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and Ambassador ABETZ[b] do not think that there is much chance in succeeding, since the Japanese Government is prepared to broach the subject with Vichy and the French Indo-China officials and to begin negotiations with them, tell RIBBENTROP to drop the matter.

2. It is absolutely essential that we get military bases[c] and air bases[d] and proceed to work at their expansion, and it naturally follows that in order to defend the same we must station in the areas concerned a sufficient number of soldiers.

3. If we cannot by the regular diplomatic methods cause France to agree, we are definitely determined to achieve our object by military means.

Relayed to Vichy.

---

[a] Not available.

[b] German Ambassador to Vichy.

[c] Saigon and Camranth Bay as Naval Bases.

[d] Seven air bases in South French Indo-China.

Trans. 6–23–41

No. 799

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 30, 1941
TO: Vichy # 252.

Re my # 571 to Berlin[a].

In spite of what our Ambassador in Berlin says, we consider that it is now absolutely essential to make France accede to our demands, so please follow the instruction in my caption message.

Please transmit to Berlin.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7–3–41

No. 800

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

June 28, 1941
1358.

(Circular)

(Secret outside the Department)

Re # 230[a] addressed to this minister from Saigon.

On the 25th, the Economic Affairs representative spoke to me confidentially as follows:

"1. I think it would not be difficult, by means of negotiations between Tokyo, Berlin, and Vichy, in view of the outbreak of war between Germany and Soviet Russia, to have Japan take charge of rubber from French Indo-China; namely, 1,875 tons (at present waiting for a ship to carry it) destined for TOKUSHU[b], and the 7,000 tons destined for the same port and to be shipped in July; in all, 7,875[c] tons.

"2. I believe it would be possible also to ----- ----- ----- regarding the 5,000 tons (the second shipment) destined for Japan if Japan negotiates with the Vichy government."

In the light of the situation described above, I think it is very important that we take a bold step at this time regarding rubber. I am giving you my humble suggestion hoping that it would be of interest to you.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Unknown.
[c] Probably a mistake for 8,875 tons.

Trans. 7-1-41

No. 801

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

July 4, 1941
609.

Re your # 828[a].

We have come to the conclusion that it would be of no use for Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP to try to prevail upon the Vichy Government to accede to our demands and that he would have hardly any chance of succeeding. Therefore, will you, in accordance with my previous message, advise the Germans to refrain from speaking of the matter at all? On the other hand, will you please immediately inform Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP that as soon as we get a suitable opportunity we are going to negotiate with Vichy and, if they say us nay, we will fight. In this case, after hostilities are begun, we may see fit to request at least verbal assistance from Germany.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-7-41

No. 802

FROM: Berlin July 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo #860.

Chief of Office routing.

Re your #609[a].

On the 7th, I called Ambassador Stahmer and asked him to wire Foreign Minister Ribbentrop at the office of the High Command and at the same time I asked him to communicate it immediately to Ambassador Abetz.

---

[a]See II, 801. "We have come to the conclusion that it would be of no use for Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to try to prevail upon the Vichy government to accede to our demands and that he would have hardly any chance of succeeding. Therefore, will you, in accordance with my previous message, advise the Germans to refrain from speaking on the matter at all. On the other hand, will you please immediately inform Foreign Minister Ribbentrop that as soon as we get a suitable opportunity we are going to negotiate with Vichy and, if they say us nay, we will fight. In this case after hostilities are begun, we may see fit to request at least verbal assistance from Germany."

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 803

FROM: Berlin June 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #800.

Re your #571[a].

I reported additional data on France's recognition of the Wang regime in my #791[a] but since you made no reference whatever to this, I believe our messages must have crossed. If we want to insure for ourselves in the future freedom of action in French Indo-China, in my opinion, it is decidely not the best policy at this time to press the point of recognition of the Wang regime. I beg you most earnestly to drop the matter.

Transmitted to France.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-1-41

No. 804

FROM: Tokyo July 4, 1941
TO: ----- #1425.

(Circular)

(Message to Vichy #256)

Re your #336[a].

The People's Government is most eager to get France's recognition, and so please again press the matter strongly on the government.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-8-41

No. 805

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 8, 1941
TO: Vichy # 263.

Re your # 347[a].

We have decided, everything considered, that the basic negotiations will be carried on in Vichy. In view of the extreme gravity of these negotiations, you will please undertake them with great assurance and firmness. I, the Foreign Minister, trust implicitly in your ability and know you will spare no efforts.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-11-41

No. 806

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 10, 1941
TO: Hanoi # 167.

In exchange for compliance with our request that regular air service between Japan and Thailand be increased, the French authorities have been asking that we sell them airplanes. Having decided to comply with the request for the reason that we wish to increase our influence in French Indo-China in the matter of aviation, I understand that the Army has sent the following telegram to Official SUMIDA. Therefore, please be so informed.

1. A reply be addressed to the French authorities that we would sell, in exchange for increased air service, airplanes (two airplanes of the AT type belonging to the Japanese Aviation Company), and, furthermore, that we would like to have the EERU FURANSU[a] made a company jointly managed by Japan and France.

2. The airplanes are to be supplied them with the political developments in view. This is to take place from August onward. (However, keep this date strictly secret from the French authorities).

---

[a] AIR FRANCAIS.

Trans. 7-15-41

No. 807

FROM: Tokyo July 11, 1941
TO: Vichy # 270.

(In 2 parts—complete.)

To Hanoi as # 172.

Exchange of ratification of the economic treaty between Japan and French Indo-China has now taken place at last. We feel very keenly the need of having promoters sent at once to look after our rights and interests which are stipulated in Article 5 of the protocol, and as a prelim-

inary to adoption it was decided that for the purpose of speeding up economic investigations with such promoters in mind, an investigative committee be organized and sent to French Indo-China under government direction. Please bear the following points in mind and secure the consent of the French and also their facilitation of the plan:

(1) At the time that we negotiated for the dispatch of experts to make a survey of petroleum resources in French Indo-China, we told them of this plan, but written representation was made by both the Governor General and the Ambassador in Tokyo to the effect that such a survey would need to be referred to the economic conference called for in Article 7 of the protocol, and that it could be carried out only to such an extent as approved by the conference, and therefore, the dispatch of any investigating committee cannot be allowed until after this procedure has been followed. As this was just before the ratification of the treaty we refrained from taking any issued with the French in their position, but allowed the matter to pass that way, however, we cannot recognize this position. Inasmuch as the French in the present treaty have recognized in principle our participation in the development of French Indo-China resources, it becomes absolutely necessary that we make a survey of the resources and go ahead with definite plans for their development. To defer the very first step in the conference would be inconsistent with the spirit of the protocol. As we see it the French, in taking this position, are merely endeavoring to delay our beginning of actual operations, under the pretense of an economic conference, and at the same time they would limit the scope of our investigations, and thus they would reduce to mere words without significance the basic principle involved in the launching of enterprises by Japanese, which they have already recognized. Not only in this matter but in everything, the attitude the French have taken gives one the impression that they are doing their utmost to minimize the real essence of the treaty, and to prevent our economic advance, and that they have no intention of making direct economic cooperation with us amount to anything, which attitude we regret very much.

This is a matter to which we attach great importance, and we want it emphasized from the first, and therefore, we expect the French to accede to our request in this matter just as we have planned it.

(2) It is expected that the group to be sent on this mission will include technicians and promoters, who will engage in technical surveys under the direction of the government. To leave the work to the individual "initiative" of the various firms would only lead to competition and speculation which would be detrimental to real development of resources, and also lead to untoward results in financial conditions in French Indo-China, and therefore, it is planned that a sound development program shall be pushed along under governmental control.

(3) As a matter of fact the ----- and other Japanese firms have already begun operations in iron, manganese, apatite, etc., or are endeavoring to launch into it, and, therefore, it is essential that the government at once have surveys made and begin to direct the Japanese enterprises in lines of mutual endeavor. We wish to send the party of investigators very soon and are laying definite plans for it.

(4) As to the make-up of the party. There will be a chairman (we intend to give him the status of an envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary), and several ----- from headquarters to be resident in French Indo-China to make contracts with French Indo-China authorities. Besides these, other experts will be sent from time to time on the basis of replenishments who will make investigations in regard to the mining industries, (iron, coal, manganese, and the non-ferrous metals), agricultural industries, (rice, yellow hemp, rubber), forestry industries, and marine products, etc.

This has been relayed to Hanoi. Hanoi will send it on to Saigon by the next mail.

Trans. 7–29–41

No. 808

FROM: Vichy — July 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 355.

Re your # 267[a].

On the 10th, I had Harada suggest to ARUNAARU that as the Germans had agreed in principle to our "schedule"[b] we would like to have him arrange at once for these supplies. "A" replied that he had no advice as yet from the Germans, and to a question from Harada he is said to have replied that as this was the first he had heard of any understanding between Germany and France regarding the remainder of that which was to be loaded for France proper, he would like inquiry made of ----- at once.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] For shipping rubber and other strategic materials(?).

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 809

FROM: Tokyo — May 7, 1941
TO: Vichy — # 184.

Re your # 194[a].

Please prod the French authorities without delay and reply outcome.

---

[a] As Ambassador Henry seems to be very busy, the Japs ask the French to allow the negotiations on F.I-C. rubber, etc., to be carried on in Vichy.

Trans. 5-12-41

No. 810

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) — July 14, 1941
TO: Vichy — # 282.

(Secret.)

Re my # 184[a].

According to a wire from Ambassador OSIMA[b], the German authorities have already agreed to the matter, and so will you urge the matter on the French authorities as soon as possible and wire me the results.

---

[a] See II, 607 concerning negotiations on French Indo-China rubber.
[b] Japanese Ambassador in Berlin.

Trans. 7-17-41

No. 811

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 12, 1941
TO: Vichy #272.

Important messages are being sent out today, the 12th. Keep the office force in readiness.

Trans. Not dated

No. 812

FROM: Tokyo July 12, 1941
TO: Vichy #273.

Secret. To be handled in Government Code.

(Part 1 of 2)[a].

1. Because of the new international conditions which are extremely difficult, the Imperial Government had decided that the acquisition of military bases and the occupation by Imperial troops in French Indo-China is necessary for the establishment of a "Far Eastern Sphere of Co-prosperity." Representations have been made to the French Government recently along these lines. The United States and Great Britain protest this action. Putting aside this action on their part, the foregoing will be realized. With the decided strong determination of the Imperial Government, should the French Government and the French Indo-China authorities be opposed, exceeding firmness will be employed.

2. I think it may be said that the relations between Japan and French Indo-China were gradually improving, but as yet a condition of full satisfaction has not been reached. Furthermore, America and England have been constricting us by encirclement. Now if a foothold is gained (by them) in southern French Indo-China, the outcome would be that French Indo-China would not completely follow along with us. There is a feeling that, although the French have successively compromised, this present demand is being forced upon them, the Imperial Government really does not want to do this. In addition it may be said that because France has been approaching the Axis, relations have become delicate. The position has been taken that it is truely inevitable that Japan for her own existence and self-defense follow out a policy of southern expansion.

3. Negotiations are again being made with France. Starting from the point of self-defense, the occupation by Imperial troops and considering the question from a broad view-point, an answer of assent or refusal is to be secured from them. Following out the persuasion (inserting 'on the 20th Japanese time' in the representation suggested in #274[b]), you are to secure an answer from them. We are very desirous that the French accept the demands of the Imperial Government in regard to the (*several* ?) questions in order that the occupation may be a peaceful one. If the period of negotiation is long, it would give France the opportunity to delay and in the meantime the United States and Great Britain would make a great uproar. In order to avoid this, the negotiations must be carried out in the shortest possible period. This would at least, during the aforementioned period, force them to make a definite answer of "yes" or "no". Shoud they accept, make the diplomatic exchange referred to in #276[c]. ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- preparations are being made.

Once this has been started, for strategical reasons definitely refuse to allow changes. For your information only; should France accept, the occupation would be a peaceful one; if not, a military one.

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[a] Part 2, See II, 813.

[b] See II, 814–815. Matsuoka describes the situation in French Indo-China and urges the French Government to accept the Japanese terms and take all necessary steps with the object of defending French Indo-China jointly.

[c] See II, 817. Matsuoka's message to the French Government submitting the proposals regarding French Indo-China.

Trans. 7–16–41

No. 813

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 12, 1941
TO: Vichy #273.

(Part 2 of 2)[a].

4. We are very determined in the present demands. It is difficult to say that there will not be a great change in the position of French Indo-China if the French refuse our demands and the Empire for its own standpoint must station the Emperor's troops there. It is desirous that they clearly realize this. If the French accept, provision will be made for the guarantee in all seriousness and respect for the sovereignty and integrity of French Indo-China. It need not be said that this present agreement viewed within itself contains the deepest feeling for the carrying out of obligations. Be sure to use this to the fullest in prevailing upon them. And, furthermore, of course it is the intention that should France accept, French Indo-China would be considered as an allied country, being in as far as possible, supplied with materials and munitions.

5. In addition, since the establishment of the agreement of last year between HENRI and MATSUOKA and until the recent French-Japanese Protocol and Economic Agreement, the French, through their sincerity, were bringing about at one time a rapprochement with Japan. Now again, military requests are being made. No doubt France finds this strange but it is due to the stringent conditions of late. It is highly desirous that they are convinced that there are no designs of infringing upon French sovereignty.

6. As there is a strong feeling that HENRI in Tokyo is a DeGaullist, the Imperial Government is negotiating as soon as possible. The English Ambassador has actually been informed (?) (garbled at this point). The present negotiations are to take place there (France). In view of the importance of the matter, you are to negotiate directly with Premier PETAIN and of course in those things of the country to which you are accredited you will deal with DARLAN. There is danger that reports of this upon reaching the British would further unnecessarily complicate things, so do not let this leak out. Take strict care with the French. Please telegraph Germany.

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[a] See II, 812 for part 1.

Trans. 7–14–41

No. 814

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 12, 1941
TO: Vichy #274.

Separate wire.

Strictly secret.

(Part 1 of 2.)

1. In view of the pressing situation, due partly to radical changes in recent international relations and partly to military and political activity by the third powers in the South Seas which form a part of the great Far Eastern sphere of co-prosperity, the Imperial Government has found it necessary to resort to every effective means for the purpose of Japan's existence and self-defense. A situation has developed in French Indo-China, and more particularly in its southern section, in which a faction not desiring to cooperate with Japan, as well as Frenchmen in the DeGaulle faction, are plotting in various ways together with the British and Americans. This is a situation which causes no end of concern to Japan. It may well be said that if as a result of this French Indo-China falls in line with Great Britain and the United States with a view of surrounding Japan and if French Indo-China secedes from France and creates a situation that we see today in Syria, it will not only be a great loss to France but a serious matter ----- ----- -----. To prevent the rise of this situation and to safeguard French Indo-China from invasion by third powers and, also, at the same time to perfect the cooperations between Japan and French Indo-China, is an obligation not only on the part of Japan, who is concerned with stability in the Far East, but, also, of France. What is more, conditions have reached the stage already in which we can no longer remain inactive. (Should they deny that the situation is not so serious, will you reply to them that even if the situation has not yet reached that stage at present, it is clear that developments will reach that point sooner or later in accordance with the plans of Britain.)

However, inasmuch as it is not enough to depend on the political agreement recently completed, if we are to realize the aforementioned objective, Japan wishes at this time to take the initiative of cooperating militarily with France with a view to defending French Indo-China.

2. Reviewing the situation at hand, it is clear in the light of recent events that France is not in a position to effectively defend alone her colonies scattered over various parts of the world. Notwithstanding this fact, the developments in French Indo-China have taken on a serious aspect, as described above, and so Japan, regarding as she does French Indo-China as an important part of the Far Eastern sphere of co-prosperity, cannot stand by with her hands folded. It is believed, therefore, that if France intends to really guarantee the safety of Indo-China, she would have to cooperate and join hands completely with Japan, not only in an economic way, but also militarily. For France to comprehend the world trends in the true light and to accept our proposals without reservation by placing absolute confidence in Japan—this is her only way to save French Indo-China from confusion.

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 815

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 12, 1941
TO: Vichy # 274.

Part 2 of 2.

3. The Japanese Government urges the French Government that it accept the following terms on the 20th Japanese time and take all necessary steps with the object of defending French Indo-China jointly. Namely:

(a) Dispatching to southern French Indo-China the required number of troops, several ships and the required number of air detachments.

(b) To permit the use and our establishment of facilities at the following places:

Air Bases 8 places: SIEMU-REABU:
BUNONPEN:
TURAN:
N-YATORAN:
BIENHOA:
SAIGON:
SOKUTORAN: and
KONBON-TORATUSIYU.

Naval Bases 2 places: SAIGON: and
KAMURANH.

(c) Recognize the right of the expeditionary force to conduct maneuvers, to reside and to freely move about and to provide special facilities for these purposes. (This includes a cancellation of all matters in the NISIHARA-MARUTAN Agreement placing a limitation upon the right of residence and freedom of movement of the expeditionary force.)

(d) To take all suitable measures in order to prevent a collision between the French Indo-China forces and the Japanese forces at the points of landing or thereabout which will be specified in a special telegram.

(e) Recognition of the principal conditions relative to the movement of the expeditionary force. (The landing forces are the same as those mentioned in (b).) (However, inasmuch as this point concerns an important military secret it should not be submitted until the other side has given a comprehensive approval of our demands, together with instructions concerning distribution of troops. This point should be made known only after we have wire you.)

(f) As regards details of the expeditionary force, they should be decided at a conference to be held at the military headquarters in French Indo-China (the SUMIDA Organization) with the French Indo-China authorities after the French authorities have approved of our proposal. However, in case these details have not been agreed upon by the time the landing forces have arrived at the points of landing, they should be decided after the landing has been accomplished.

(g) To issue currency for the use of the expeditionary force (the details are given in separate message # 275[a]).

Please transmit to Berlin.

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[a] See II, 816.

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 816

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 12, 1941
TO: Vichy # 275.

Special Message. Secret.

To be handled in Government Code.

Regarding the amount of troops sent to French Indo-China.

1. The French Indo-China authorities are to guarantee to supply the amount in piastres through the organization set-up. The specific method will be brought out in a separate agreement.

2. The amount to be paid for the balance of the year is 23,000,000 piastres (monthly amount, 4,500,000 piastres). This is to be paid in "free yen" (Literal translation), American dollars, or in gold, whichever the French Indo-China authorities desire. Furthermore, the amount of 1,000,000 piastres a month 'loaned' to the army stationed in the Northern section is not included in the above figures.

Trans. 7-15-41

No. 817

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 12, 1941
TO: Vichy # 276.

Separate Telegram.

Strictly Secret.

I am taking the liberty of approaching you with this letter. I have the honor of submitting to the government of your country the following proposal regarding Indo-China in accordance with instructions from my home country.

1. Japan and France should cooperate militarily for joint defense of French Indo-China.

2. For the purpose of this military cooperation, the government of France should grant the following to Japan in French Indo-China: Herein should be listed (a), (b), (c), and (g) given in my telegram # 274[a] (the content of my # 275[b] should be added to (g)).

3. Regarding the landing of the aforementioned expeditionary force, the French Government should recognize the principal point regarding the activity of these forces and, furthermore, should take all suitable steps, including withdrawal of the French Indo-China garrison and air forces in the neighborhood of the points at which the Japanese forces will be landed so that collision between the Japanese forces and the French Indo-China forces may be avoided.

4. The details concerning the movement of the expeditionary forces should be decided by the military authorities of the two countries in French Indo-China.

It is my wish that the government of your country will agree with the foregoing. I would like to add, furthermore, that it is the desire of the Japanese government that in case the government of your country agrees to this, the agreement be recognized by means of a formal written notice as soon as possible. I would like for you to transmit, etc. (In case the French authorities, after nogotiations, refuse to accept our proposal, omit the aforementioned *1.* As to the written agreement, it would be necessary to put *1.* given above (joint defense) in the form of a protocol

(a draft will be sent you separately), and the portion coming under *4.* into a diplomatic document having the validity of a treaty. This is for your reference.

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[a] See II, 814, 815.
[b] See II, 816.

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 818

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 12, 1941
TO: Vichy # 278.

To be handled in Government Code.

Strictly Secret.

Please hand this message to Mr. ROBAN[a] as the personal message of this Minister.
(Furthermore, please caution ROBAN to be very careful not to let this leak out to absolutely any other person.)

This Minister has filed representations recently with the French Government demanding military bases in French Indo-China, as well as other essential concessions, but for the Imperial Government to do this has become absolutely unavoidable in the defense of the rights of self-existence, self-defense, and the defense of our position in the great Far East. In all solemnity the Imperial Government respect the sovereignty of France and the integrity of her territorial rights in French Indo-China and wishes to make clear beforehand her rigid adherence to the duty of ----- ----- ----- with which the Imperial Government finds itself faced, arising from international agreements already established. Not only does it go without saying that we have no intention of avoiding our duties, but should the Imperial Government be able to work in closest concert with the French Government in French Indo-China, it is her most ardent wish to carry out to the fullest extent the responsibilities arising in measures of cooperate defense. On the one hand, the current situation in the South Seas area, of which you are well aware, is as you have repeatedly told the Government of your homeland. These extremely straitened circumstances have already forced the Imperial Government to outline in these representations matters which it cannot possibly excuse. This Minister is able to discern the circumstances between the French Government and the real intentions of the Imperial Government and, in addition to this, considering the effect of a world upheaval, it throws not the slightest doubt on the intentions of the Imperial Japanese Government. We will not stop by merely hoping for the acceptance of these representations with frankness and without reservation.

With regard to this matter, separately Prime Minister KONOE has already sent a personal message to Marshal PETAIN. You are well aware of the world situation, and particularly of the situation in the Far East. I would have Your Excellency, therefore, offer to your Home Government expressions of friendship, and it is my most ardent wish that you will extend your very best efforts that they may accept the representations of the Imperial Japanese Government. I, the Foreign Minister, know full well the great efforts to which Your Excellency has gone in order to maintain Franco-Japanese friendship but I would have you know that I have

been unavoidably forced to ask you to go to great trouble again and again, even more than one could bear, because this is a most serious problem.

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[a] Plenipotentiary from Vichy to French Indo-China.

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 819

FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) July 15, 1941
TO: Washington #369.

(Part 1 of 3)[a]. Message to Vichy #279, on the 12th. Strictly Secret.

The following are noticeable instances of activities on the part of the DeGaulle faction; or principal anti-Japanese activities on the part of the French authorities; and of the militarily, economically, and politically threatening situation in the South Seas. And, so in your negotiations, will you use these instances suitably and in accordance with necessity?

(1) Members of a group now holding important positions in the French Indo-China Government prove to be clearly members of the DeGaulle faction. They are in close connection with Britain and the United States and are acting on lines which betray as well as oppose Japan. These are:

Capt. JUAN, Chief of the Attachees in the Governor General's Office

Col. MANIAN, Chief of Staff of the Army—Kanbojia

DERUSAARU[b], formerly Chief Secretary in the Governor General's Office, at present Chief Director of -----

MANTOBUANI[b], Chief of the Political Section of the Governor General's Office

SHAARUTON[b], Chief of the Education Section in the Governor General's Office

GANEI[b], President of the Bank of Indo-China

DORASHUVUROTIERU[b], President of the French-Chinese "Depresshu" at Saigon.

According to what was revealed to us recently through very reliable information, Capt. JUAN, mentioned above, concluded on January 18th, of this year, at Singapore a secret British-French commercial and navigation treaty. This treaty not only violates unmistakably the sovereignty of France but also contains anti-Japanese clauses in contravention of the Matsuoka-Henri agreement concluded on August 30th of last year.

For instance this treaty promises the British that the French steamers which may be converted into armored cruisers—namely, Maresharu-Joffuru[b]; Darutanian[b]: Araniisu[b]—and also other French steamers capable of a speed of fourteen knots or more which may enter French Indo-China ports in the future, shall not be allowed, without previous consent of the British Naval Headquarters, to visit Japanese ports which lie outside of the protected areas in China and shall not be allowed to sail north of -----.

It also permits British civilian aviators to use the facilities and airports in French Indo-China. Furthermore, at a conference held on January 20th, with the commander of the British fleet, this captain promised that in the event relations with Japan reach the worst stage, French Indo-China should send her ships either to Hongkong or Singapore and place them under British control.

Of late, meetings held between the members of the DeGaulle faction with the Singapore authorities have become increasingly frequent.

(2) The French Indo-China police officials have insulted the members of the Japanese Army who have been entering French Indo-China since last year for occupation; they have oppressed resident Japanese; they have put pressure on natives who have attempted to approach Japanese civilians and officers and soldiers; and while shutting their eyes to anti-Japanese activities carried on by the representative of the Chungking Government, they have by resorting to violence, invaded the office and expelled the representatives of the Nanking Government, which is cooperating with the Japanese Government. In these various ways, they have been persisting in anti-Japanese activity. Again, more recently, they have had referred for consideration by the Japanese-French Economic Conference, the question of sending an economic investigation commission to French Indo-China despite the fact that the conference had nothing to do with the question and thus they have secretly taken an attitude of non-cooperation towards Germany.

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[a] Part 2—See II, 820; Part 3—See II, 821.
[b] Kana spelling.

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 820

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

July 12, 1941
279.

(Part 2 of 3)[a].

3. Political and Military:

(1) England, the United States, and the Netherlands Indies, during the first ten days of (February ? August ?), entered into an agreement for the joint defense of the Pacific and developed lines for joint action against Japan in the fields of politics, economy, and military endeavor. On the basis of this, in Washington, Singapore, and Manila, officials of those countries frequently met for conversations. (Prior to this time, England, Australia, and Canada, as you know, entered into conversations pointing toward joint action.)

(2) England, the United States, and the Netherlands Indies have brought about the participation of CHIANG KAI SHEK in their mutual front. One plan called for the institution of SHANG CHEN[b] as chairman of a group of military representatives which met in ----- and in Singapore. It was decided through conversations among the leaders in Washington, Manila, and Singapore that England and the United States would send specialists to Chungking. Subsequently, on the 12th of (March ? September ?) in Rangoon, a school for the training of leaders in guerilla warfare was entered into jointly by England and China. On the 19th of March, England and China signed their military agreement. (This covered aid to the Chinese by Britain and joint defense of Burma.) During the latter ten days of March, an agreement was entered into for the construction of the Burma railroad. In addition, at the same time that the United States dispatched Major CONNELLY, an aviator, to China, the United States entered into an agreement with China for the joint use of Chinese air fields and the transfer of military fliers.

Furthermore, most recently, on the basis of the British-American-Chinese military agreement, preparations are afoot in Singapore (?) for the establishment of an allied general staff, and it has been decided that Chungking will dispatch seven members to it. However, in addi-

tion to SHANG CHEN, they are planning to send (one?) (three?) persons. Furthermore, they have reached a mutual agreement whereby within one week after a clash in force with Japan, 60,000 CHIANG troops will be dispatched to Malay.

Furthermore, according to the most reliable intelligences, it is expected that the British-Chinese military alliance will be concluded between the 10th and 20th of this month. According to this, this alliance will become effective at the same time that Japan moves to the south. In such an event, it is expected that Chungking will have special troops sent into Burma.

(3) England's schemes with regard to Thailand are as follows: On the one hand, the concentration of military strength in the areas adjacent to Thailand's borders; taking a place of leadership so that she, through the anti-Pibul wing, the Chinese organizations abroad, and the Communist Party, may bring about either the assassination of PIBUL[c] or the overthrow of his regime; the exercise of limitations on the export of -----; or bring about military, economic, and political pressure, but particularly economic pressure, by means of freezing Thaiese funds in London. On the other hand, by exerting first stringent and then lenient measures with regard to our supply of petroleum (first of all ? a minimum of ? 60,000 tons), she is endeavoring to draw Thailand within her own camp and to drive a wedge between Japan and Thailand.

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[a] Part 1, see II, 819. For Part 3 of 3, see II, 821.

[b] Head of the 32nd Route Army; he has for many years been the military inspector for the Nationalist Party.

[c] Prime Minister of Thailand.

Trans. 7-19-41

No. 821

FROM: Tokyo July 12, 1941
TO: Vichy # 279.

Part 3 of 3[a].

4. Economic:

(a) The United States, as you are well aware, has already started to put into operation an embargo against Japan on petroleum and other essential goods. May 30th, they went so as to make the export quota system apply in the Philippine Islands as well.

(b) In the British possessions, scrap iron, nickel, hemp bags, jute, manganese, rubber, tin, bauxite, etc., are being embargoed. In addition, with regard to wool, wheat and iron, they are exercising greater stringency in the issuance of permits on their export quota system.

(c) Through British and American machinations, negotiations between Japan and the Netherlands Indies were broken off, as you are well aware.

(d) Thailand and French Indo-China, through pressure brought to bear upon them by England and the United States and without regard for their duties as contracted, are making it very difficult for us in the manner in which they are supplying us with rice, rubber, tin, etc.

(e) In connection with the military establishments of Britain, the United States, China and the Netherlands Indies, they are daily making stronger and stronger preparations, as proof of which we need not quote any figures.

5. The situation being as I have outlined, in the encirclement of Japan, as long as we do not take strong measures at this time in the southern part of French Indo-China, Thailand and French Indo-China will be drawn into their camp and there is a fear that a situation similar

to that in Syria would probably develop. It is but natural that the Imperial Government should show grave concern at this time. Since the situation is becoming dangerous for France too, for the above reasons it has become necessary for the Imperial Government to take the initiative at this time and more strongly.

Please transmit this to Germany.

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[a] Part 1 not available. See II, 819.

Trans. 7–14–41

No. 822

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Singapore

July 17, 1941
1535.

(Circular).

The Imperial government recently opened negotiations aimed at the establishment of Japanese military bases and the stationing of troops in French Indo-China, with the government of France. The reasons that Japan feels the necessity for taking these steps which are to be taken in the name of joint defense between Japan and French Indo-China, are given in my separate Circular # 1536[a].

It is Japan's desire to put these measures in effect peacefully, if it is in any way possible. If, however, the French Government refuses to agree to our requests of if Britain and/or the United States should interfere, Japan intends to carry out the project by force.

I report the above for only your information. We wish to avoid any friction with Britain and the United States, particularly with Britain.

There are no objections, therefore, to your explaining, on the pretext that they are your own personal opinions, the situation along the following lines; Japan has no intention of using bases in the southern part of French Indo-China as jumping off places for further military penetration; by taking these steps at the present time the territorial integrity of French Indo-China will be guaranteed; moreover, it will prevent possible clashes with the Netherlands East Indies and the Malaya area.

Please make every effort to prevent the officials in the area to which you accredited from becoming unnecessarily agitated in the belief that a crisis is at hand. At the same time, please prevent the Japanese residents there from feeling too uneasy over the situation.

This message address to Singapore and Batavia.

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[a] See II, 823.

Trans. 7–18–41

No. 823

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Singapore

July 17, 1941
1536.

(Circular).

Strictly confidential. Separate cable.

The Imperial government has now decided upon a definite policy. It was adopted to meet the rapid changes which are being brought about in the world situation which is making the southern part of French Indo-China vitally necessary to Japan's continued existence and defense.

The recent attitude of the various British colonies, the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines, have made it essential for Japan to be guaranteed access to needed materials in French Indo-China and Thailand. It is a matter of life and death to Japan to be assured an access to those materials.

The British and the United States are assuming an anti-Japanese attitude in an ever increasing degree. Their military ties with the Chungking government are constantly being intensified and at the same time, they are now applying pressure on Thailand. Moreover, they are urging the De Gaulle faction and the Chinese in the southern part of French Indo-China to sow the seeds of dissatisfaction and discontent. All of these tend to endanger Japan's position in that area and, under some circumstances, may make a second Syria out of French Indo-China.

Added to the joint action on the part of Britain, the United States, and the Netherlands, in the south Pacific area recently there have been reports of a Sino-British alliance, and vigorous penetration into China by the U.S. air force. Through such means, the British-U.S.-Netherlands-Chinese bloc is showing an ever increasingly antagonistic attitude towards Japan. There is a possibility, moreover, that this bloc will tie up with the Soviet Union at some future date and launch an aggression against Japan.

Even from the viewpoint of meeting such an eventuality, it is of the utmost importance to take this step at the present time. Japan cannot, for reasons of self-defense, delay this move any longer.

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 824

FROM: Vichy
TO: Tokyo

July 12, 1941
356.

Re your # 269[a].

On July 1, I had a talk with DARLAN. DARLAN never once mentioned the question of the occupation of French Indo-China. Naturally, neither did I. I got a strong impression from everything DARLAN said that he never dreamed of anything like this.

Two or three days ago when the military and naval attaches here talked with the French military officials, the French officials asked questions which seemed to indicate that there was a leak, but both attaches expressed complete ignorance of the whole situation.

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[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-17-41

No. 825

FROM: Hankow — July 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 223.

At 2:40 the morning of the 12th, seven or eight civilians attached to our Naval forces, clashed with French Concession guards. Having been fired upon by the French guards, one of our Naval personnel was killed and another wounded. Immediately, all of the gates of the Concession were closed and ----- ----- -----. The Naval authorities here have prohibited the communication or publication of all details with regard to this incident. That is all for the time being. I have transmitted this to Shanghai.

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 826

FROM: Tokyo — July 14, 1941
TO: Nanking and Shanghai — # 1500.

(Circular)

Message to Hankow # 144.

Re your # 223[a].

The Naval authorities in your city requested instructions to proceed with demands as follows concerning the French concession; partial police control over the French concession; the patrolling of the French concession by our police troops; in case of necessity, the transit of armed militia; the approval of all this by the Control Board and an apology from its chairman; the punishment of the perpetrators and executors of the crime; indemnities for the injured; and guarantees for the future. The Central Naval officials, after conferring with us Foreign Office officials, wired back their approval, stating however that, in order to succeed in this, the French concession must be closed. The entrance and exit of persons and materials, as well as water, must be limited. The instructions continued that the taking over of the French concession is to be postponed until further orders are issued presently.

Relayed to Nanking and Shanghai.

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[a]See II, 825.

Trans. 7-21-41

No. 827

FROM: Hankow — July 15, 1941
TO: Net — # 061.

(Circular).

In 3 parts—complete.

Action Tokyo as # 225. (Retransmission).

The points that have been cleared up as a result of subsequent investigations are as follows: A certain Shimizu who was a chauffeur attached to the naval base here was called by the draft

and about 12 a.m. on the 11th he took four of his friends who were also navy chauffeurs and drove to a certain Chinese restaurant in the French Concession in a navy automobile. They had lunch together as a sort of farewell for him and after eating went out on the street again. While they were talking to some Chinese geisha girls one of the Concession policemen (a Chinese) came up and an altercation started. The first policeman started to fire and several other policemen came up with bayonets and all fired at the automobile. Shimizu, who was in the auto was severely wounded. When they attempted to flee (?) he was stabbed by bayonets. He was taken to the navy hospital by his companions where he passed away on the morning of the 12th.

In addition to this one of his companions received a slight injury from the glass in the car window. One of the Settlement policemen received a bayonet wound but as none of the Japanese was armed it is very clear that the police must have stabbed each other.

On the 12th, in the presence of myself and the French authorities a coroner's inquest was held as a result of which it was determined that Shimizu had four bullet holes and several bayonet wounds in his body. Also eleven bullet holes were found in the auto.

In connection with the above incident, the French authorities arrested five of Shimizu's colleagues and two other Japanese. On the afternoon of the 12th, I negotiated with the authorities concerned for the release of the Japanese who were being detained but was informed that until it was established that Shimizu's death was caused by his resisting the Settlement police their release would be very difficult. (As a matter of fact, the Settlement police do not have any reasonable grounds for detaining the men.) However, as a result of further negotiation on the afternoon of the 12th, the French authorities said that it had been ascertained that the death was caused by resistance to the police and that the others were innocent of such resistance and hence they might be released. While it is true that the above incident may be viewed as a result of a misunderstanding between the injured parties while under the influence of liquor and the French Settlement police, still the fact remains that unarmed men were shot at and stabbed with bayonets by the police and this clearly proves that there was murderous intent and the fact that the police shot at a naval automobile was proof of an act of hostility toward the navy of that nation. The naval authorities are taking a very grave attitude toward the problem and they do not consider it in the light of a local affair but feel that it will have grave international complications. This opinion was communicated to me on the 13th.

I am sending my opinion of the affair in a separate communication but I am dispatching this much for the present.

Trans. 7-17-41

No. 828

FROM: Shanghai — July 18, 1941
TO: Nanking, Peking, and Tientsin — # 598.

(Circular.)

Message to Tokyo # 1294.

Re # 219[a] from Hankow to this Minister.

We cannot be indifferent to the question of the policy which should be applied to the French concession in Hankow. Ambassador KOSUMU is at present here and I expect I shall have to take up negotiations with him sooner or later. (According to a report published by the French, the Ambassador is supervising the activity of the Consular staff.)

I am sure you are well aware that, depending on that attitude the French take, this question will have a serious effect on the policy we may adopt toward the French concession in this city (Shanghai), as well as toward the international settlements. I am setting down here my own views on the matter:

(1) It is not clear what is exactly meant by "taking general control of police power." So long as it is not actual confiscation, I suppose this means the exercise of police power either by our Army or by our civilian officers. If that is what is meant, it would in effect be no different from our taking control of the administrative power in the concession. (Without the exercise of police power, administration of a concession means nothing at all.) Furthermore, it is a question whether, in other districts where the local background (national background) differs, police power could be exercised along with administrative power.

Of course, it may be possible to place concession police power under the control of our Army or to exercise the usual police power in a concession along with that of the Army; however, in that case it would not be a comprehensive control of the police power. We need to clarify this point.

(2) Inasmuch as resistance by force by the French is not a question, it is possible for us to realize, once we have decided to do so, the supervision of police power in the manner suggested above or its complete confiscation, or even the confiscation of a part of all of the administrative powers over the concession. However, before making up our minds in this connection, it would be necessary for us to consider carefully what attitude we are going to take toward the French concessions in Tientsin and in Canton, as well as in this city. To be sure, we could keep our hand off of the other concessions on the pretext that situations such as have arisen in this concession do not prevail in the other concessions; but a conflict of this kind is likely to arise (or could be made to arise) at any moment. This goes without saying. Therefore, we should at this time determine our general policy.

(3) Regarding the policy recently adopted by our Government concerning the concession question, I have been notified by Administrative Official SIMAZU. The application of this policy ---------- (10 lines missing) -----. The disastrous effect it would have is a serious question indeed. It is a question of tremendous importance when viewed from the standpoint of settling the China Incident. This is because they think that, while Japan is cautious in her attitude toward the United States and Britain, she is abusing a weaker country, and because it would have an effect of deepening the suspicions they cast upon our ideal for the establishment of a new order, as well as upon our ability to bring the China Incident to settlement. (The Association of Concession Supervisors is at present of the same opinion.)

(4) In other words, while the recent incident in Hankow's French concession is not more than a local question, the policy for the disposal of this question is, for the reason given in paragraph (3) and in view of the present political situation, one which affect our general policy relative to all concessions. It is, in my opinion, a test case. I would like to have the Government take every precaution and study this question and issue clear and detailed instructions.

Relayed to -----. The Foreign Office is wiring to Nanking.

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[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-22-41

No. 829

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Nanking, Canton, Shanghai and Peking

July 18, 1941
1546.

(Circular).

Message to Hankow # 147.

Re your # 226[a].

We consider it necessary to take steps to bring the concession under our actual control, though not to the extent of really taking it over. Therefore, will you negotiate with the French officials in your city along the lines of my # 144[b]. Be sure to make them accept the demands in part 3 and 4 of your caption message. (The Army and Navy both agree with this.)

---

[a]Not available.
[b]See II, 826.

Trans. 7-21-41

No. 830

FROM: Hankow
TO: Net

July 21, 1941
066.

(Circular)

Action Tokyo as # 231.

On the morning of the 21st I called upon the French Consul regarding the above incident and explained to him the serious and delicate nature of the problem, particularly as regards the Annam patrolman and how we could no longer have confidence in the Concession police. In order to effect a fundamental situation of the problem a revision Concession policy system will be necessary, I declared, and presented the following as Japan's final proposal for the settlement of the case. The French Consul said that he recognized the gravity of the situation and the unwarranted act of the police, however, he was not in a position to take action himself but he would give careful consideration to the matter and report to the Ambassador and return an answer as soon as possible. With this, the first interview closed.

In order to prevent any recurrence of the disorder for the present, from the 21st all military and naval men and also all Japanese in general have been forbidden to enter the French Concession area.

Text of the Japanese demands:

1. Demotion and dismissal of the Annam policeman.
2. The employment by the French Concession authorities as police (including patrolmen) such Japanese or Chinese as are designated by us.
3. Abolition of all weapons carried by French Concession patrolmen, except bayonets.
4. Permission for Japanese army patrols to make the rounds of the French Concession.
5. Permission for Japanese armored units to cross the French Concession in case the need should occur.
6. An apology from the authorities concerned in this incident.
7. Indemnity for the injured of Y63,875.

8. Compensation for the damaged car, Y8,175.
9. Punishment for the offenders and those concerned in the incident.

Trans. 7-24-41

No. 831

FROM: Tokyo — July 22, 1941
TO: Tientsin, Peking, Nanking, Shanghai — # 1575.

(Circular)

(Message to Hankow # 149.)

Re your # 229[a].

The question of the French concession in Hankow is related to other French as well as joint concessions. Under the present circumstances, I think we had better not take over the French concession in your city. As I told you in my # 147[b], that is the opinion of the central authorities. Furthermore, the exercise of full police rights is a question which concerns the very nature of the concessions. Therefore, let us avoid suggesting this also. As for the other matters, arrange them according to my # 147[b]. Naval headquarters have already wired your naval officials the same instructions.

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[a] Not available.

[b] See II, 829, in which it is stated that it is considered necessary to take steps to bring the concession under actual control, though not to the extent of really taking it over.

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 832

FROM: Tokyo — July 25, 1941
TO: Net — # 1596.

(Circular)

Action Tientsin as # 158 (?).

(Abstract)

The French Counselor (?) resident in Tokyo calls on Vice Minister Yamamoto on the 24th and requests him to use his influence toward reaching a peaceful settlement of the Hankow French Concession problem.

Trans. 8-5-41

No. 833

FROM: Hankow — July 31, 1941
TO: Nanking — #75.

(Circular)

To Peking as Circular #74.

Action Tokyo as #234.

(Separate telegram.)

1. Dismissal and immediate repatriation of all Annam policemen.
2. Return to their respective sections of the three police concerned in Shimizu's death.
3. An apology by the superintendent of police.
4. Payment of Y40,000 indemnity.
5. Employment of Chinese policemen designated by Japan in place of the 65 Annam policemen dismissed.
6. Arms of the personnel of the French police force to be limited to bayonets.
7. To employ as qualified police superintendents two Chinese designated by us.
8. Employment of one reliable Japanese or Chinese who understands French with rank of liaison officer in order to facilitate contact between the Japanese and French authorities.

The above to be appointed as secretary and translator for the French Consul and public affairs department, but it is to be understood that he is not to be used by the French police.

9. Recognition of the right of Japanese armed military and naval patrols and gendarmes to patrol the Concession.
10. Recognition of the right of Japanese troops to cross the Concession at will.

Trans. 8-12-41

No. 834

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) — July 14, 1941
TO: Vichy — #281.

Re your #362[a].

Resent as follows: "The Army is now planning to advance on or about the 20th, and gradually preparations are being completed."

[a] Not available.

Trans. Not dated

No. 835

FROM: Canton — July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 255.

To be kept secret within the Department.

Re my # 253[a].

Subsequent information from the military officials to the Attaches is as follows:

1. The recent general mobilization order expressed the irrevocable resolution of Japan to put an end to Anglo-American assistance in thwarting her natural expansion and her indomitable intention to carry this out, if possible, with the backing of the Axis, but, if necessary, alone. Formalities, such as dining the expeditionary forces and saying farewell to them, have been dispensed with. That is because we did not wish to arouse greatly the feelings of the Japanese populace and because we wished to face this new war with a calm and cool attitude.

2. The immediate object of our occupation of French Indo-China will be to achieve our purposes there. Secondly, its purpose is, when the international situation is suitable, to launch therefrom a rapid attack. This venture we will carry out in spite of any difficulties which may arise. We will endeavor to the last to occupy French Indo-China peacefully but, if resistance is offered, we will crush it by force, occupy the country and set up martial law. After the occupation of French Indo-China, next on our schedule is the sending of an ultimatum to the Netherlands Indies. In the seizing of Singapore the Navy will play the principal part. As for the Army, in seizing Singapore it will need only one division and in seizing the Netherlands Indies, only two. In the main, through the activities of our air arm (in your city,the Spratly Islands, Parao, Thaiese Singora, Portuguese Timor and French Indo-China) and our submarine fleet (in the South Seas Mandate Islands, Hainan Island, and French Indo-China) we will once and for all crush Anglo-American military power and their ability to assist in any schemes against us.

3. The troops soon to occupy French Indo-China will be reorganized as the 25th Army Corps (one Army Corps consists of four divisions) and also the 30th Army Corps, consisting of the South China forces, which will be assigned to special duty with airplanes, tanks, and howitzers. General IIDA (the IIDA Army mentioned in preceding telegrams has been changed to the Nishimura detachment) will be placed in command and general military headquarters will be set up in Saigon. All preparations have been made. The ship fees have been paid and the expedition will soon proceed from here.

Note: Paragraph 2, 4th sentence is information or opinion only of Japanese Military in Canton, and should not be regarded as immediate progress.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 7–19–41

No. 836

FROM: Tokyo — July 15, 1941
TO: Berlin — # 646.

As the Ambassador in France has already notified you, we have at last commenced negotiations with France with a firm determination. This marks the first step in our southward advance; at the same time, it signifies a very grave life and death step in our relations with

England and America. We have thrown in our lot with Germany and Italy in harmony with the Tripartite Pact and intend to cooperate with them. Under the form of negotiations a request has come from the French government to the government to which you are accredited to get them to mediate a refusal or an amelioration of our demands. In case they dodge the issue, please ask them to help us from the flank and persuade France to accede to our requests.

Please relay this as instructions to Italy.

Please relay this to France.

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 837

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hanoi

July 16, 1941
1518.

(Circular)

Strictly Secret.

The Imperial Government, cognizant of the recent critical turn of the international situation, in order to carry out the establishment of the Far Eastern sphere of co-prosperity, has in conference decided that the Imperial forces are to invade the southern portion of French Indo-China with the view of securing military bases. On the 14th, formal representations to that effect were presented to the Vichy Government. Though the United States and England will attempt to thwart this, it is the Imperial Government's firm intention to remove those barriers and to bring about the realization of our aims. Therefore, even though the French Government and the French Indo-Chinese authorities oppose it, we are going to carry it through.

With regard to these representations, we are now negotiating so that their reply of assent or dissent will be handed to us on the 20th, Japan time. As far as the Imperial Government is concerned, it makes no difference whether this invasion is carried out peacefully or in force. Our nationals living there we plan to remove to Takao[a] for the time being; therefore, after you have acquainted yourself with this, please make preparations along the following lines:

I. Saigon (on the basis of the former Consular area of jurisdiction).

Item: Recommendations for evacuation. (Though these are not orders, all people are to be evacuated.) This recommendation is to be issued on the 21st. All are to be on board ship by the 23rd. The ship should sail at early dawn of the 24th. However, until this order has been wired, be most careful not to let it leak out.

Item: For the accommodation of all evacuees, the Osaka Shosen steamer, Kanju Maru, scheduled to leave Saigon July 18th, is to be held over at your port. With regard to this matter, all details have been cleared up with the Ministry of Communications.

With regard to the reason for the delay of the sailing of this ship, please give out the reason that it is due to loading and unloading delays. Please take every precaution not to allow the French authorities to learn of our plans.

Item: Have a member of your staff respectfully carry out the Imperial portraits and after the arrival of the boat in Takao, request that they be placed in custody of the Provincial Office. This staff member of yours is to remain in Takao until further orders.

Item: Only the absolutely essential telegraphic codes are to be kept. The rest are to be burned. Wire me a detailed list of those you burn.

Item: Telegraphic material, as well as secret material, are to be absolutely handled in exactly the same manner.

Item: I will further advise you by wire as to the movements of yourself and the members of your offices.

II. Hanoi (on the basis of the former Consular area of jurisdiction). Though as a matter of policy, we are not going to insist upon the evacuation of all nationals, persons in Junka[b] and other distant places are to move into Hanoi.

III. I have already secretly dispatched this to Saigon.

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[a] Port in Formosa.

[b] Kana spelling.

Trans. 7–17–41

No. 838

FROM: Canton — July 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 264.

(Secret outside the Department.)

Re my # 255[a].

The troops to occupy French Indo-China will leave here the 17th and arrive at SAIGON two weeks later after stopping over on HAINAN ISLAND.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 7–18–41

No. 839

FROM: Tokyo — July 16, 1941
TO: Berlin — # 655.

On the 15th, Vice Minister ŌHASHI invited the German and Italian Ambassadors separately and told them as follows:

"In the name of joint defense of the area concerned, the Japanese Government has decided to demand of the Vichy Government the right to acquire two naval bases and several air bases in southern French Indo-China, and also that of occupying that region by the Imperial Army. Furthermore, Japan plans to complete all negotiations relative to these demands without giving Vichy much time—that is by the 20th—so as to prevent any move on the part of the opposition countries. Japan intends to carry out this plan even if French Indo-China refuses to comply with the demands, or the United States and Britain interfere with its execution. However, this does not mean that Japan is of the mind to occupy French Indo-China or to violate her sovereignty, or to break the treaties made with her. This plan is the first step in Japan's southward advance which Germany has been looking forward to for a long time. In view of the close relation obtaining between Germany and Italy, and in consideration of Japan's desire to obtain her object in as peaceful a manner as possible, Japan requests that they recommend France's acceptance of Japan's demands."

Both Ambassadors replied that they would communicate this request to their respective governments at once.

Please transmit from Berlin and Rome to France.

Trans. 7-20-41

No. 840

FROM: Tokyo July 19, 1941
TO: Vichy #294.

(Strictly secret.)

Although there were some political alterations recently, it should be unnecessary to state that they in no way shall affect our foreign policy. It should be clear that the Cabinet shake-up does not make the slightest change in our attitude with regard to French Indo-China. I mention this fact because there may be some unnecessary confusion if the French government is under the erroneous belief that we intend to soften or change our attitude with the entrance of a new Foreign Minister into the Cabinet.

Please take steps, therefore, to prevent the French from getting the wrong impression.

Trans. 7-22-41

No. 841

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) July 19, 1941
TO: Vichy #295.

Regarding my #273[a]:

Since the military preparations have been completed, the time for embarking on the enterprise has been set for the 24th, regardless of whether the French accept or reject, and orders to proceed will be issued on the 23rd, Japanese time[b]. You will therefore act upon the following:

1. If the French reply to your #366[c] is favorable, you will then immediately hand them the note mentioned in my #276[d] and secure their consent to my #293[e] paragraphs 1 to 5, and advise me by return dispatch as to the results.

2. If the reply to the above is a refusal, or a conditional reply, which will be taken as a refusal (If French conditions are in such phrases as to not alter the sense of our demands, they need not be considered a refusal, but in such a case you may accept them with reservations that the approval of your home government will be necessary) you will then immediately make special effort to cause the French government to reconsider along the following lines and advise us as to results by return dispatch:

"Matters having reached the present stage, we must be free to take such course as we deem necessary, and the military will begin advance into Southern French Indo-China on the basis of our planned action. We desire that orders be issued to the French Indo-China authorities at once that they take all effective and appropriate measures, when our advance is made, as will avoid the necessity of any clash of armed forces. If the French government does not act in harmony with this request of ours and an unfortunate clash of arms should result we of course cannot guarantee that serious changes may not be brought about in the status of French Indo-China, much as we would regret this. If the

French government does give full consent to our demands (in my #293[c]) before the time for issuing the above mentioned marching orders to the military, there is a possibility that the situation can still be cleared up in a peaceful manner by negotiations, and we therefore wish to strongly urge upon the French government that they reflect seriously and reconsider."

3. In your dispatch reply, giving the final attitude of the French on the basis of the above paragraphs 1 and 2, whatever their attitude is, be sure that your reply reaches us on or before the 23rd, Japan time (taking into consideration differences in time and time required for sending, receiving and decoding the message).

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[a]See II, 812 and 813. "Outline of line of reasoning to be used in presenting demands on France for F.I–C. bases. Japan does not want to appear to be forcing the French, but they are determined to accomplish their purpose, peacefully if France accepts, militarily if she refuses."

[b]0000 23 July, Zone–9 (Tokyo time) is 1000 22nd, Washington time, and 1500 22nd, GMT.

[c]Not available 20–7–41.

[d]See II, 817. Text of note to be handed the French on presenting the demands for F.I–C. bases.

[e]Not available 20–7–41, see II, 843.

Trans. 7–20–41

No. 842

FROM: Tokyo — July 20, 1941
TO: Hanoi — #187.

(Part 2 of 2)[a].

3. On the 17th, the Ambassador for the second time called on DA[b] and gave him a strict warning to the effect that if, unfortunately, French cooperation is not forthcoming and a reply rejecting our proposal is made, we will take military action in accordance with our plans and preparations (the recent change of Cabinet has no influence whatsoever on this particular policy). At the same time, the Ambassador requested an early reply from the French Government. To this, DA[b] agreed and promised that after careful consideration he would reply by Saturday.

4. Furthermore, yesterday I wired Ambassador Kato the following instructions:

In case the French reply of the 19th is (1) an acceptance of our demands, he should make them accept all our demands after exchanging diplomatic notes with them. If the reply is (2) a rejection or a condition reply (in which case he should regard it as a rejection, he should not accept it and then tell them that Japan has no alternative other than commencing free action and that, in accordance with plans already established, the army will occupy southern French Indo-China. He should, in that case, ask them to issue an order to the French Indo-China authorities to take effective and suitable measures in order to avoid clash of forces. He should warn the French Government that in case the French Government does not comply with our request and these measures are not taken and, as a result, an unfortunate incident of a military clash occurs, we cannot promise that there will not be an important change in the status of French Indo-China. We should inform them that inasmuch as it goes without saying that the Japanese Government does not wish to see any incident occur, the whole question could be settled in a peaceful manner if the French Government recognizes our demands as a whole on the 23rd at the latest. He should strongly urge the French Government to consider and reconsider this question. (3) He should tell them to make all

arrangements so that their reply will reach Japan not later than the 23rd, whether that reply is one or the other of the two kinds mentioned above.

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[a]Part 1 not available.

[b]Probably Darlan, Vice Premier of France.

Trans. 7-24-41

No. 843

FROM: Tokyo July 20, 1941
TO: Vichy # 296.

(Message to Berlin # 670).

(Strictly Secret. To be handled in Government Code.)

Ambassador KATO informs us by telegram that the French Government says that out of consideration for the Berlin-Vichy armistice treaty, it will be necessary to confer closely with the Germans on this matter. On this excuse, they are postponing an answer. Therefore, today Vice-Minister OHASHI called on Ambassador OTT, saying that the Japanese Government has already completed all preparations, and regardless of whether Vichy accepts or refuses, is determined to take certain action. If military action is inevitable, there is no guaranteeing that the status of French Indo-China will not be affected. This is sure to have a bad effect not only upon Tokyo-Vichy relations, but also upon Berlin-Vichy relations. Consequently, will you please advise the French to accept the Japanese proposal. Ambassador Ott replied, "Well, you know we are now at war with Russia, so by what logic do you imagine that we are in a position to take a strong attitude toward Vichy? No, sir, I cannot tell you what attitude the German Government is going to take in this matter. All I can do is say that I will transmit immediately to Berlin what you have told me."

Will you, too, on the basis of these statements of mine, ask the German Government to advise the French and wire me back what they say.

Trans. Not dated

No. 844

FROM: Vichy July 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 388.

Re my # 386[a].

On the 20th, I conferred with Foreign Minister DARLAN and Council President BUNOA MESIAN (?) (LENOIR MESSIEN). Though, as a result, I have not officially received any reply as yet, the details of why I think they are going to comply with our demands are given in the telegram describing our conversation.

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[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-21-41

No. 845

FROM: Vichy
TO: Tokyo

July 20, 1941
389.

Re my # 386[a].

After conferring with DARLAN on the afternoon of the 19th, I received your # 295[b], and so the morning of the 20th I again met DARLAN and told him that instructions received after the conversation of the previous day showed that Japanese troops will be sent very shortly, and for this reason it is clear that Japan cannot allow him as much time as I said she would allow. I then asked him to issue the necessary orders to the officials in French Indo-China to the effect that armed clashes should be avoided in order to prevent any possibility of unfortunate incidents, for if any unfortunate incidents occur, we cannot be certain that it will not have a far-reaching effect on the status of French Indo-China. As I have previously referred to this matter several times, Japan does not want any such thing to happen. We would like to have the French Government's acceptance of our proposals by 6:00 p.m. on Tuesday, the 22nd. Thus, I urged him to reconsider the question. To this DARLAN replied by asking whether he was right in understanding that what I said consisted of (1) an objection to the French reply given yesterday, (2) a request that an order be transmitted to the authorities in French Indo-China not to offer resistance, and (3) a repeated demand that France accept the proposals. I replied that he was right, and DARLAN seemed to understand it all very well. He answered that a reply will probably be given tomorrow after conferring with Marshal PETAIN.

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[a]Not available.

[b]See II, 841 in which Tokyo advises that the occupation would take place on the 24th regardless of whether France accepts or rejects the proposals.

Trans. 8-5-41

No. 846

FROM: Vichy
TO: Tokyo

July 20, 1941
392.

After my conversation with Foreign Minister DARLAN described in my # 389[a] of the 20th, I talked to BUNOIR MESSIAN. I asked him if he had heard what I told DARLAN the previous night, and he replied that he had just conferred with Colonial Minister PURATON on this matter at DARLAN's residence, as a result of which a final decision had been reached:

(a) France recognizes Japan's demands.

(b) Japan shall first of all make a public statement concerning the maintenance of territorial integrity of French Indo-China.

(c) The French forces will cooperate with the Japanese only in resisting the infringement of third powers and will cooperate in no aggressive schemes whatever.

BUNOIR continued: "You will get an official reply on this matter today or tomorrow from Foreign Minister DARLAN. In the meantime, let me say in connection with the statement mentioned in (b), if France should order its officials to cooperate in this manner without explaining why, we could not expect them to do it and still maintain their honor as soldiers. You Japanese ought to be particularly capable of understanding that, I think, because you have a military code of morals of your own. Furthermore, this statement is

absolutely necessary to satisfy the public mind in France. We expect you to make some sort of public announcement, say like the one contained in Premier KONOYE's message to Marshal PETAIN. Let me say also that this cannot be done too soon. Now with respect to (c), as I said, France is cooperating with you Japanese militarily purely and simply for defense, and we will not engage in any military collusion whose objective is aggression. I want you to well understand this."

This is all for the moment.

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[a]See II, 845.

Trans. 8-2-41

No. 847

FROM: Vichy July 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #393.

As to (2) in my #392[a], the French authorities might demand a confirmation in the form of a protocol or a diplomatic note or in some other form. In regard also to (2), they might want to insert in the protocol or in the French reply a clause to the effect that the French Indo-China Army shall not participate in any plans of an offensive nature. They might also ask that the period of validity of the agreement be definitely fixed. In case they make these requests, will you give preliminary consideration as to whether they should be complied with or not, and if they are to be complied with, in what form it should be done. I would appreciate your informing me by return wire.

Relayed to -----.

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[a]II, 846.

Trans. 8-2-41

No. 848

FROM: Vichy July 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #394.

In the light of what you have said in the last part of your #287[a], I presume that it is your desire to have the final text of the protocol in the two languages. Today when speed is the prime requisite and under the present situation in which courier service or any other form of reliable service is out of the question, it cannot be said that there will be no misunderstanding on how the Kana spelling should be used. Furthermore, if both languages are used in the final text, the French authorities would probably take a great many days in examining the translation. Therefore, I think there is no other way but to use only the French language for the final text. I would appreciate your giving me your opinion by return message.

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[a]Not available.

Trans. 8-2-41

No. 849

FROM: Hanoi
TO: Vichy

July 21, 1941
2.

Special Message. Part 1 of 2 of *10* (??).

(Abstract—very badly garbled.)

The following is a digest of the first paragraph. (In French.)

The exceptional facilities which the French Government is disposed to accord to the Japanese cannot under any circumstances have the character of a military occupation.

The Japanese must remain strictly confined to the needs of the military operations. They are subject to French military authorities and entirely under the latter's control. The Japanese shall, however, be accorded freedom of passage between the point of disembarking and the zone of operations.

(Part 2)

Japanese military activity shall be limited to the territories located north of the Red River. In the zone of operations the French administrative and military authorities shall remain in their posts and in possession of all their powers. The Japanese shall act through the mediation of the French authorities in dealing with the native populations.

The armed Japanese forces landing at the same time cannot under any circumstances, exceed two thirds of the effectives actually mobilized in Tonking, that is, not in excess of 25,000 men.

The Japanese army promises (1) to bear all the costs of transporting, stationing and installing of its personnel and material.

Trans. 7–25–41

No. 850

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hanoi

July 21, 1941
196.

Re my # 191[a].

After seeing Foreign Minister Darlan on the 20th, Ambassador Kato talked with the Minister of Colonies, and others. As a result of these conferences the French Government agreed:

(1) To recognize Japan's demands.

(2) To announce officially Japan's participation in the defense of Indo-China territory.

(3) That Japan alone, and no third power, shall cooperate with the French Indo-Chinese army.

Regardless of whatever Foreign Minister Darlan's formal reply may be, from the viewpoint of the honor of the French Army, and of French chivalry, it is absolutely necessary that the import of Prime Minister Konoye's message to Marshal Petain be considered, and that this move is inevitable in view of conditions in France.

Consequently, we anticipate Foreign Minister Darlan's concurrence in our views on the foregoing three points and a public proclamation to that effect.

The details of actual landing points, numbers of troops and places to station them, will be decided upon as soon as the French make the official recognition of our demands.

Keep in touch with Admiral Sumida.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 7–29–41

No. 851

FROM: Tokyo July 21, 1941
TO: Vichy # 298.

Re your # 393[a].

(1) We are prepared to give assurances regarding the respecting of the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of French Indo-China. As to the form in which it should appear, in their reply of acceptance, this was demanded by the French, but when the formal documents are drafted, we would like to have the title of the protocol dealing with joint defense changed to read "regarding the territorial integrity and joint defense of French Indo-China". Then, changing Article I and II to II and III respectively, add as Article I a statement that "The Japanese government declares that it will respect the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and the sovereignty of France over the Indo-China Federation."

(2) In regard to making it clear that the French Indo-China army cannot cooperate in any plans for aggression against a third power, we have no objection to the French stating this in their reply of acceptance, but if the French demand that this be clearly stated in the formal document, you will point out that the intent of this is made clear in the preamble and in Article I of our original draft of the protocol, and try to suppress such a demand. If the French insist upon it, we would rather have a secret exchange of notes in regard to Article I of the protocol, or a statement by the French only, to the effect that "the military cooperation between Japan and France, anticipated by Article I of the protocol on the joint defense of French Indo-China is purely of a defensive nature and does not include any plans for aggression against a third power". Or as a last resort, we would suggest that the above import be added as a qualifying explanation to Article I of the protocol.

(3) As to the period of duration of this agreement, you will please reply that while our proposed protocol does not specify any time limit, this does not mean that we intend to formulate everlasting promises, but it means that the way is left open for changing the protocol at any time by further mutual agreement between the two countries. In case they insist upon a time limit, you might approach them with a suggested wording to the effect that "when the international situation that has made necessary the joint defense of French Indo-China shall have passed, the governments of the two countries shall confer for the abrogation of this protocol", but as a last stand we have in mind agreeing upon a five year time limit.

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[a] II, 847.

Trans. 7–24–41

No. 852

FROM: Vichy
TO: Tokyo

July 21, 1941
396.

(Parts 2 and 3 of 3, Part 1 missing.)

Part 2. It is in this regard that the French government, faithful to the policy which it has always affirmed, and in cooperation with the Japanese government, will guarantee the defense of Indo-Chinese against all attack, and particularly to exclusion all offensive operations and alleged defensive measures having this protection as their objective. After agreement of the French and Japanese commands ----- (remainder of part 2 garbled out.)

Part 3. On the other hand it must be thoroughly understood that the presence of Japanese forces in the territory or waters of the Union can only be temporary, and that the Imperial government will proceed to the complete withdrawal of its forces as soon as the removal of the dangers which led to their admission.

The French government insists upon the extreme urgency of this indispensable declaration in the circumstances for the maintenance of order in Indo-China and the effective carrying out of the measures made necessary by the arrival of the Japanese armed forces.

Trans. 7-23-41

No. 853

FROM: Vichy
TO: Tokyo

July 21, 1941
395.

(Part 1 of 2, Part 2 not available)

Re my # 389[a].

At his request, I called on Darlan during the morning of the 21st. He advised me that the government of France had decided to cooperate with Japan in defending French Indo-China in accordance with Japanese demands. Thereupon, he read to me the French text which is being forwarded to you as my separate message # 396[b].

He then went on to explain the reasons for the use of the phrase to the effect that France has no alternative than to be inclined (s'incliner) to accept the Japanese demands.

There may be those, he pointed out, both within the country and without, who would protest against the paradox of French resistance to the British in Syria on the one hand and the welcoming of Japanese troops in French Indo-China on the other.

Actually, however, France is anxious to have Japanese cooperation in defending French Indo-China. Please be advised, the Foreign Minister continued, that France is in no way opposed to the Japanese demands.

The French attach considerable importance to our immediately publishing a statement along the lines of Premier Konoye's message to Marshal Petain, regarding the respecting of the sovereignity of French Indo-China, Darlan said. The statement to be published was put in the form of a supplement to the French reply to our demands, he said, and proceeded to read it to me. The text of the statement is contained in my separate message # 397[c].

He added that there was one more point on which France wanted to be assured. This was just that the Japanese forces do not order the removal of the French Indo-Chinese forces now stationed in French Indo-China from their posts; that demands are not made on the various fa-

cilities now being used by the French forces; and that fighting and merchant vessels are not ordered from their present berths.

[a] Not available.
[b] See II, 852.
[c] See II, 854.

Trans. 7-23-41

No. 854

FROM: Vichy — July 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 397.

The French government attaches extreme importance to the published declaration relative to respect for the integrity of Indo-China and for French sovereignty.

Since foreign troops have arrived in territories which they considered it necessary to guard, in spite of this declaration, it was necessary to know exactly the number of such troops stationed in Indo-China.

Trans. 7-23-41

No. 855

FROM: Tokyo — July 24, 1941
TO: Hanoi — # 101.

Message from Vichy # 409 on the 22nd.

(Part 1 of 2)

The reason why the French so readily accepted the Japanese proposals was that they saw how resolute was our determination and how swift was our action. In short, they had no alternative but to yield. Now lately France has been going through a bitter experience in Syria. Japan has guaranteed the territorial integrity of French Indo-China. We decided to undertake the military occupation of French Indo-China under the guise of a joint agreement with France. This however, does not mean at all that they heartily approve of our action. At this time when relations between Japan and France are so delicate and when the French feelings are, to say the least, hurt, our army must show the greatest leniency and understanding. If we take the attitude that, in view of whatever military operations we shall have to carry out in the future France must be forced to follow us to the end, the sentiments of the French people and officials may become so incensed that a permanent estrangement may result. Our Empire must take a long view of its destiny and not bring about any such situation as this.

During the recent conversations, DARLAN strongly stated that if Vichy recognizes the occupation of French Indo-China by the Japanese forces, Japan must positively not interfere in the administration of this territory.

Again DARLAN asked what statement we were ready to make upon occupying French Indo-China, saying that if we demanded the withdrawal of French troops or confiscated private

property, the wrath of Frenchmen in southern French Indo-China would be terrible, which in his opinion was something to give us pause.

Trans. 7-28-41

No. 856

FROM: Tokyo July 22, 1941
TO: Vichy # 299.

(Very urgent.)

Secret

Re your # 392[a].

If you find that DA's[b] formal reply does not differ from the statement made to you by BU, will you proceed immediately along the following lines and wire me the result at once:

1. I would like to have you tell them that we will comply with their wishes and at the same time Japan will quickly publish the statement in (2) and also that we will recognize (3), namely, the fact that the French Indo-China Army will not participate in any plans of an offensive nature by putting this point, in accordance with the French desire, into a proper form. (Please refer to my # 298[c].)

2. We will exchange the document mentioned in your # 391[d], and at the same time recognize what is in my # 293[d]. (If they question the necessary number of troops specified in my # 293[d], you need not let them know of the fact that the number of troops is 40,000.)

Relay to -----.

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[a]II, 846
[b]DARLAN
[c]II, 851.
[d]Not available.

Trans. 7-24-41

No. 857

FROM: Tokyo July 22, 1941
TO: Vichy # 300.

Strictly Secret.

Re your # 394[a].

Inasmuch as the custom of using the Japanese language for the final text of a treaty is a well-established fundamental rule and especially since the protocol in question is one of great importance, we cannot agree to having only the French language used. Of course, it would be all right for the sake of expediting the procedure to proceed with the negotiations on the basis of the French draft and then, after the draft has been put into final shape, to wire us the same. We will use it to make a Japanese version of the text and wire the latter to you. As you may see from the recently concluded peace treaty between France and Thailand and from the French Indo-China economic treaty, the French Government did not express any concern

over these treaties being in the Japanese language. In fact, they left the entire matter to our discretion and so I hardly think they would have any objections to the suggestion given above. However, in accordance with what is customary in France, only the French language may be used in case of diplomatic notes.

I am sending you this information for your reference.

[a]II, 848.

Trans. 7-24-41

No. 858

FROM: Tokyo July 22, 1941
TO: Hanoi # 197.

(Strictly secret)

Re my # 198[a].

At noon on the 21st, DARLAN handed Ambassador KATO an official reply. It is essentially like what BUNOA NESIAN[b] told the Ambassador yesterday. There are only two discrepancies. The note says that France is forced to submit to Japan, and as soon as this occupation is no longer necessary, she expects the troops to be evacuated as soon as possible; and DARLAN verbally stated that he trusted that the French Indo-China army and navy would not be dislocated from its present positions and duties.

[a]Not available.
[b]Kana spelling for BUNOIR-NESSIEN.

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 859

FROM: Vichy (Japanese Ambassador) July 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 426.

Regarding your # 305[a].

Upon making inquiries of the French Authorities, I understand that the Spokesman in connection with the French Indo-China question and in reply to queries as to the truth of the report concerning the establishment of a compromise between Japan and France said, "The time is not yet ripe for making any kind of a statement."

It was thought that in all probability newspaper editors, in writing their editorials, had waxed fanciful.

Then again, I had Harada call on Vice-Minister Roshier. The latter is understood to have said that insofar as France was concerned it was necessary to prepare public opinion to counter the vigorous propagar.da of England and the United States of the past few days. He continued by saying, "Since France is powerless in the Far East, it is but natural that she should want to maintain the safety of French Indo-China through the strength of Japanese leadership in

East Asia." Saying this he expressed himself as desiring to emphasize the necessity of willing cooperation with Japan from this day forward through the newspapers.

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*Not available.

Trans. 8-6-41

No. 860

FROM: Tokyo July 23, 1941
TO: Washington #1587.

Foreign Office Secret.

In connection with our occupation of French Indo-China, you shall conduct a vigorous propaganda campaign which you deem to be the most effective in your area, in cooperation with our military and naval representative there. This propaganda campaign shall be conducted on the general outline set forth below. We have discussed this with the army and navy authorities here.

1. The program outline herewith shall be launched simultaneously with the announcement pertaining to Japanese occupation.

2. The main object of this propaganda campaign is to induce the French Indo-Chinese to whole-heartedly cooperate with us to facilitate lightning action whenever it becomes necessary and at the same time to promote the understanding of, and the placing of reliance in Japan by the people of other areas in the south seas, particularly those of Thailand. We wish to carry out this program without unduly shocking the administrative and economic set-up of French Indo-China.

3. The bulk of our propaganda efforts will be made in French Indo-China and in Thailand. However, in view of the fact that the already existing anti-Japanese propaganda by the British, the United States, and the Netherlands will undoubtedly continue with added vigor, we shall carry on our campaign throughout the world. Bearing in mind the fact that we will undoubtedly be unable to carry on this campaign in such areas as Burma, Malaya, India, Netherlands East Indies, Australia, etc., we must make preparations to invigorate our outlets from French Indo-China and Thailand to those areas. We shall place particular emphasis on propaganda work toward the Netherlands East Indies and Australia, since we wish to have access to the former's oil supply in the future, and to encourage the movement for independence in the latter.

4. The propaganda campaign will be based on the Imperial government's statement which will be issued in connection with actual occupation operations. Its outstanding points will be the promotion of unity in Greater East Asia, including such factors as instilling the spirit of defense of Greater East Aisa; emancipation of the oppressed people; distruction of the British and United States policy of the "almighty dollar"; and the promotion of anti-Communism. Except under special circumstances, we shall guard against any talk of giving the natives (of French Indo-China) their independence.

5. With the occupation of French Indo-China, Japan's aim of establishing a foundation for a New Order in Greater East Asia will have been realized. Hereafter, therefore, we shall be able to put all of our efforts into bringing the China Incident to a conclusion. Through such propaganda, we intend to encourage the Wang regime on the one hand while applying pressure on the Chungking government on the other. At the same time, we intend to pro-

mote the feeling of adherence to Japan among the Chinese residents and the natives of the South Seas area.

6. To counter the antagonistic propaganda emanating from such unfriendly sources as Chungking, Britain, the United States, and the Netherlands, through which they are attempting to deemphasize the importance of Japan on the international scene and to drive a wedge between Japan and Germany, we shall concentrate our efforts to point out the fact that positionally those countries surround Japan and show definite signs of aggression.

We must not, however, give the impression that we intend to make further military penetrations to the south or that we are intending further military penetrations to the south or that we are intending further military ties with Thailand.

7. With regard to propaganda work in the United States, we shall endeavor to point out that we are proceeding towards a New World Order on the basis of -----. We shall also point out that the foreign policy of the United States as it is expressed occasionally by some of her leaders, cannot lead to world peace. We shall also conduct a racial campaign in Central and South America in an attempt to separate them from North America.

8. In the Soviet Union, we shall intimate that United States interests are to the south.

If you find any propaganda material which may be used by Tokyo, please advise us of it by cable.

This cable addressed to: 1. China and Manchukuo; Peking, Shanghai, Nanking, Hankow, Canton, Hongkong, -----. 2. South Seas: Thailand, Hanoi, Manila. 3. Americas: U.S. (The U.S. will please relay it to Germany and Mexico?).

Upon the announcement of the occupation, U.S. will please paraphrase this message and relay it to Canada, as well as to all offices in North, Central, and South America. Please contact New York concerning this matter immediately.

Trans. 7-24-41

No. 861

FROM: Vichy — July 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 420.

(Special message.)

In his note of July 22, 1941, relative to the project for Franco-Japanese military cooperation in Indo-China, the Vice President (states):

"Your Excellency has been shown the spirit in which the French government enters into this agreement;—understanding that it is participating for purely defensive actions having as their objective the safe-guarding of Indo-Chinese territory. It is added that the presence of Japanese forces in the territory and waters of the Union is temporary, and will cease when the foreseen danger has been removed."

I hasten to inform Your Excellency of the concurrence of my Government in these views.

Trans. 8-6-41

No. 862

FROM: Tokyo July 25, 1941
TO: Vichy #317.

Your #412[a] and #420[b].

Regarding the time limit for the withdrawal of our troops, we do not wish to make any promises whatever. Besides, that was settled in the protocol and now is not important. In case there are those who do not agree with the foregoing, you should never use the term "temporary" in referring to the text of your #420, but always state:

"The presence of Japanese forces in the territory and waters of the Union will terminate when the danger has been removed."

----- (message fades out in last line).

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[a] Last half of French text of Vichy's terms for Jap occupation of F.I.-C. II, 863.
[b] Available, See II, 861.

Trans. 7-28-41

No. 863

FROM: Vichy July 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo #412.

Part 1 of 2, Part 2 not available). See *Note.*

----- have agreed upon the following arrangements:

(1) The two governments pledge military cooperation for the common defense of French Indo-China.

(2) The measures taken for this cooperation will be the objective of special arrangements.

(The foregoing (1) and (2) are condensations of those sections of the protocol.)

In testimony whereof the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective governments, have signed the present protocol, which becomes effective on this date, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate in the French and Japanese languages at Vichy the -----[a] of July 1941, corresponding to the -----[a] day of the seventh month of the 16th year of Showa.

Note: First sentence of this message, in Japanese states "that which follows is actually Part of 2 of 2".

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[a] Date omitted.

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 864

FROM: Vichy
TO: Tokyo

July 23, 1941
419.

(French)

Referring to the protocol signed under today's date between our two governments, I have the honor to confirm to Your Excellency the concurrence of the French government in the propositions contained in the letter which you were kind enough to send me under today's date, and which is found reproduced hereafter.

(Japanese) (In the lower margin)

(French)

Accept, Mr. Ambassador, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Trans. 8-6-41

No. 865

FROM: Vichy
TO: Tokyo

July 24, 1941
422.

Re my # 414[a].

During the conference on the 30th, the French officials referred to the agreement concluded on August 30 last year and asked that since, as a result of occupation by the Japanese Army, damages might be incurred, the purport in the last part of the said agreement be written into the protocol or into a diplomatic note. I replied that, the recently concluded agreement being for the purpose of joint defense, France naturally must share part of the responsibility and that it would, therefore, not be proper to write the matter in a formal diplomatic document. I suggested that it would be well to leave the decision of this matter up to the leaders of the army of occupation.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-28-42

No. 866

FROM: Vichy
TO: Tokyo

July 24, 1941
427.

On the 24th I had a member of the staff again inquire of the French authorities what had resulted from the discussion regarding the draft of the protocol. The French authorities confidentially informed him that they were ready to accept all of our second draft contained in my # 421[a] with the exception of the following points. As to the content of the draft, the officials on both sides had conferred thoroughly and so I presume that is no objection to complying with the French desire to this extent. If there is no objection, the draft could be considered as the final one. We would like, therefore, to have you approve of the exceptions insofar as it is possible to do so and we would appreciate your replying by wire at once.

1. To insert: "en consequence" between "reconnaissant" and "que" in the preamble.

2. In their third clause of the principal text the French draft contained in part 2 of my #412[b] should be retained. However they do not insist on inserting the matter contained in the instructions. In ----- ----- ----- of our ----- of my #419[c].

---

[a] Not available.
[b] See II, 863—French draft of protocol.
[c] II, 864.

Trans. 8-5-41

No. 867

FROM: Tokyo July 25, 1941
TO: Vichy #319.

Re your #427[a].

No objections to 1 and 2. Various circumstances require that we complete the arrangements immediately. It is necessary that we proceed with the formalities of presenting to the throne a completed copy of the protocol and the exchanged official text of the proposals. Furthermore in regard to the withdrawal of troops in our letter of acceptance, as I instructed you previously be telegraphed, we desire to have the phrase "this shall be only temporary" eliminated. Please see that none of the following proposals are affected by this.

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[a] See II, 866.

Trans. 7-30-41

No. 868

FROM: Tokyo July 25, 1941
TO: Vichy #316.

In the French text the name of France will be placed first and that of Japan second. In the Japanese text, our country's name comes first.

Trans. 7-28-41

No. 869

FROM: Tokyo July 25, 1941
TO: Vichy #318.

Re your #411[a] and #417[b].

In harmony with former precedents we wish to standardize the terminology in the recent Japanese-Franco protocol.

Please notice these points:

1. Write the word Protocol with a capital P.

2. Use the spelling Indo China.

3. In regard to names of countries as adjectives, capitalize the word "Gouvernement" only when it follows a country's name. Otherwise use small letters.

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[a] Not available.

[b] Not available.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 870

FROM: Tokyo — July 26, 1941
TO: Vichy — # 320.

(Strictly Secret)

1. The Japanese text protocol is as in Special Telegram # 321[a] (Japanese text not required in the official text to be exchanged).

2. The Privy Council will meet in full session Monday, the 28th, after the protocol has been examined in Committees.

3. When the protocol and the exchange of official texts is approved you will be notified by telegraph immediately. As soon as you are in receipt of this telegram, please have the protocol signed and the texts exchanged. (If possible on the 28th.)

4. After signing, send a telegram immediately giving hour and date and manner of signing as well as the date of the document.

5. We will publish the whole text of the protocol upon receipt of your telegram.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-31-41

No. 871

FROM: Tokyo — July 24, 1941
TO: Berlin — # 689.

Considering the French reply of the 21st as a sign of their having accepted our demands as a whole, we commenced negotiations regarding the details, and on the 23rd concluded a treaty in French Indo-China. The government has decided to issue at noon on the 26th its statement on the joint defense of French Indo-China. Will you inform at once the government of the country to which you are accredited the fact that we have succeeded in coming to an agreement and convey to it our thanks for having cooperated with us in this matter. At the same time, will you confidentially inform that government the content of the Japanese Government's statement as given in my # 1597[a].

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[a] See II, 872.

Trans. 7-28-41

No. 872

FROM: Tokyo July 24, 1941
TO: Nanking and Hsinking # 1593.

(Circular)

Strictly Secret.

(To be handled in Government Code)

In order for the Imperial Government to meet the crucial international situation at the present time and to establish in East Asia an area of co-prosperity, the Imperial Government deemed it urgent to secure military bases in southern French Indo-China in the name of joint defense of this French possession. The Cabinet decided to place Imperial forces there and since the 14th the Japanese and French Governments have been carrying on negotiations in Vichy. On the 21st a satisfactory understanding was attained and on the 23d a specific pact was signed in southern French Indo-China. All that now remains is to draw up a protocol for the already agreed upon joint defense and the making formal of the notes which have been exchanged on this subject, along with the stationing of Imperial troops in the pertinent regions. Therefore, the Government has decided to make public on the 26th at noon the statement contained in separate Circular # 1594[a]. This Foreign Minister's instructions are that sometime on the 25th you confidentially so inform WANG CHIN WEI and Premier CHO (CHANG ?). In case questions are asked, you may answer as follows:

1. *Motive for this action:*
Lately the international situation has been changing kaleidoscopically. Particularly in the South Seas, there was a political and economic, as well as military, encirclement of Japan by third countries. That is why we took this step. The very terror of this situation forces us inevitably to take some effective measure in order to maintain the very existence of the Japanese Empire, as well as its honor and position of leadership in East Asia. These third countries were conspiring with the group in French Indo-China which was displeased with French co-operation with the Japanese Empire and also with the DeGaullists. It became evident that they were about to succeed in divorcing French Indo-China from its motherland of France. This rendered it irrevocably essential that our Empire obtain in French Indo-China a political, economic and military foothold.

2. *Sketch of Negotiations:*
In order to leave no time for Anglo-American connivances, we decided that all this must be achieved with great speed. On the 14th we started negotiations in Vichy and had a reply requested by the 19th. We made it clear that we wanted either "yes" or "no." They said, however, that they would have to confer with the signatories of the armistice treaty before they could make us an answer or accept the Japanese proposals, but we told them that we had already thrashed this out sufficiently with the Germans and Italians and that their approval would be a certainty. We further told them that we would like to receive word of their acceptance by the 23d because if this were not forthcoming by that time we would have to take whatever measures of our own we deemed wise. We impressed this upon them and, as a result, on the 21st at noon they yielded completely.

---

[a]Same text as II, 872A which gives the Statement of the Imperial Government concerning French Indo-China negotiations.

Trans. 7-26-41

No. 872A

FROM: Tokyo July 24, 1941
TO: Washington # 402.

Secret Outside the Department.

Statement of the Imperial Government:

Beginning with the conversations which began between Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and Ambassador HENRI last August, several agreements have been reached between Japan and France whereby recently Franco-Japanese relations have quickly become more intimate. Now, once again concerning the joint defense of French Indo-China, the Governments of the two nations have agreed on a friendly policy.

The Imperial Government is determined to maintain the various understandings existing between Tokyo and Vichy. The responsibility of the Imperial Government, based upon its solemn promise to support the territorial integrity and sovereignty of France, will be maintained and hereafter we will endeavor to increase a relationship of amity between our two countries and thus strive to achieve joint prosperity for both.

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 873

FROM: London July 25, 1941
TO: Washington # 069.

Action Tokyo as # 524.

Re your (Circular) # 1595[a].

Local newspapers are making much over Japan's having secured military bases in southern French Indo-China as if it were the first step in further southward encroachments, asserting that next will come attacks upon Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. It seems that the public in general entertain misgivings on this point. Thoughtful persons are expecting that there will be some statement forthcoming from the Japanese Government on the matter. I think that it would be very fitting, when such a statement is made public, if it could also be made plain that this present Japan-French Indo-China agreement has its origin in an earnest desire to preserve the peace of East Asia, and that such a thing as making this the basis for aggression is not even dreamed of.

[a]Dated 25 July. Re steps to be taken in investigating smuggling. Get in touch with local Naval and Military authorities, etc. (Action Canton.)

Trans. 7-31-41

No. 874

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) July 26, 1941
TO: Vichy #325.

(Secret outside the Department)

After the materialization of the plans of the Army and the Navy for the occupation resulting from the agreement made recently for the joint defense of French Indo-China and upon the execution of the terms of the various agreements which have previously been concluded between Japan and France, the relation between Japan and French Indo-China will take on added value and intimacy, and negotiations which will take place in that country will increase in number as well as in importance. However, with the diplomatic organizations that are now existing, it may be impossible to cope with the situation internally and externally. Furthermore, regarded also from the standpoint of unifying diplomatic activities, we need to consider anew the disbanding of the headquarters in Hanoi. I believe it is of utmost importance also to set up a powerful diplomatic organization in French Indo-China. What the government wishes to do is to send a special ambassador to French Indo-China; to have members from the Army, the Navy, and the Foreign Office work with him; to have them perform their duties under this ambassador so that diplomatic work may be unified under one head; to place the consuls in Hanoi and Saigon under the supervision of the ambassador; and in case a necessity arises of sending officials, high and low, who are not members of the armed forces, to have them become members of the Foreign Office; and lastly to have the negotiations between the Army of occupation and the Indo-China authorities carried on through the medium of the ambassador. Will you, therefore, explain (and at once win the approval of the French Government of the fact) that it will be very necessary and also quite convenient to France, in coping with the new situation arising from the agreement for carrying out joint defense, to have such an ambassador sent and also that this plan has no object other than to bring all diplomatic activities under one head.

Trans. 7-31-41

No. 875

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) July 30, 1941
TO: Vichy #333.

Please convey the following to Marshal PETAIN as soon as possible as a personal message from Prime Minister KONOYE: I wish to thank you from the bottom of my heart for your sagacious judgment in agreeing to sign and seal the joint defense pact of Japan and France. Not only do I congratulate you upon your courageous decision, but I should like to take this opportunity to express my firm belief that this act will serve more and more to cement the friendly relations of our two countries.

I pray for your country's success and Your Excellency's good health.

Trans. 8-11-41

No. 876

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) July 30, 1941
TO: Vichy # 334.

Please convey the following to vice Premier DARLAN as soon as possible, as a personal message from me. Regarding the signing of the cooperative defense protocol of French Indo-China by Japan and France, I wish to express my sincere appreciation for your Excellency's endeavors in making possible the signing of this pact. Furthermore I firmly believe this will guarantee peaceful conditions in the far east and contribute to the realization of co-defense and co-existence between Japan and French Indo-China and also between Japan and France. I recall once more the appearance of your Excellency at the London disarmament Conference some years ago. I pray for your Excellency's good health.

Trans. 8-11-41

No. 877

FROM: Rome (Japanese Ambassador) May 20, 1941
TO: Washington No number.

Message to Tokyo # 296.

Re my # 212[a].

According to the same spy reports; according to a report which arrived at the Vatican from the Apostolic delegates in both Peking and Chungking respectively, CHIANG KAI SHEK is abandoning his scheme of being about to make peace with Japan, as he is getting China aid from both England and America; and spurred on by the hope that the United States will fight Japan in the Far East, he is determined to continue the fight to the bitter end. In response, the Vatican, through its Apostolic delegate in Chungking replied that since it can cooperate only in policies of peace between Japan and China, it has no alternative but to refuse the proposal that CHIANG KAI SHEK send a diplomatic envoy to the Vatican, as reported in my # 168[b]. Furthermore, the Vatican has so informed both England and the United States.

[a] Not available.

[b] Rome reports that, according to intelligence, CHIANG KAI SHEK is planning to send his personal envoy to the Vatican with complete approval of the United States. Rome asks that this information be checked for reliability.

Trans. 5-22-41

No. 878

FROM: Peiping May 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 359.

Strictly Secret

CHINTEIEN, President of the Peace and Order Bureau, confidentially told a spy of my office that the Chungking authorities, rather than doubting the Japanese-Chinese peace terms as such, doubt whether or not they can trust Japan's behavior, and until they get sufficient guarantee from the United States, they will not lend their ears to talk of peace.

Trans. 5-31-41

No. 879

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) May 26, 1941
TO: Lima # 116.

(Circular)

Message from Tokyo as Circular # 1124 (Part 1 of 3).

Now that we are trying to establish a new order in East Asia, the United States and England are aiding China all the more. Furthermore, there is an encircling collusion of England, the United States, and the Netherlands. This is tantamount to a treaty of alliance. Nevertheless, with England's successive defeats, particularly in the Mediterranean, the British people are said to be wavering and that the officials have difficulty in keeping up their courage. Our southward threat also adds to their fears.

Trans. 7-12-41

No. 880

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) May 26, 1941
TO: Lima # 116.

Message from Tokyo as Circular # 1124 (Part 3 of 3).

3. Our military occupation of FUKIEN has made exchange of money with the Chinese of the South Seas impossible, and enabled us to seize various commodities destined to aid CHIANG. Thus, China is sadly lacking in supplies. It is even said that the Chinese cannot purchase food for any amount of money. Thus, difficulty being piled on difficulty, the fighting spirit of the Celestials is declining.

Furthermore, (Russian ?) and American stations are broadcasting that we are making peace with CHIANG through the good offices of the United States. This must be an attempt to sever us from the Axis, for we are busy organizing the new WANG government.

Trans. 7-12-41

No. 881

FROM: London (Japanese Ambassador) June 2, 1941
TO: Washington # 86.

(Message to Tokyo as # 408)

On the 28th day, I had a spy of mine, who is a bosom friend of Ambassador BIDDLE, converse with him and under my instructions, as always, to make certain leading statements on the Far Eastern question in order to draw BIDDLE out. Reacting thereto, BIDDLE spoke as follows:

"As usual I agree with you. I have been in touch with the President and there are evidences of some improvement. Ambassador WINANT will soon arrive in Washington. His mission in addition to maintaining liaison with Great Britain is also to discuss the Chinese problem. (WINANT's principle mission for the moment concerns the HESS incident.)"

On the 30th, I talked with Lord HANKEY and he told me that he had talked over his plans with Lord HALIFAX before the latter resigned, and the two were in perfect agreement. (Plans

for HANKEY, himself, to make an unofficial trip in order to persuade the United States to bring an end to the Chinese trouble.) He said: "The United States, you know, is in somewhat of a better position to judge things more coolly than is Great Britain, who is immersed in the throes of war. Therefore, I think this would be a very fine time to concentrate on persuading Washington."

Putting this statement and that statement of his together, I believe you will be able to make some sense out of it. Therefore, I am sending it to you for your information.

Trans. 6–5–41

No. 882

FROM: New York (Morishima) May 26, 1941
TO: Washington #30.

Message to Tokyo #208.

Senator REYNOLDS told -----[a] confidentially that in the present session of the Foreign Relations Committee, WHEELER counsels that the United States cease aiding CHIANG and make up with Japan. GEORGE also favors this. He, WHEELER, and NYE have asked the President to consider this, but he has avoided comment.

Note: Translation delayed due to cryptanalytic difficulties.

[a] DoD Comment: Name withheld.

Trans. 7–12–41

No. 883

FROM: Tokyo May 27, 1941
TO: Net #1136.

(Circular)

Received from Hongkong as #265. *(Abstract)*

Re my #249[a].

According to a report from agent CF regarding James Roosevelt's representations:

There are good prospects of immediately getting permission for transportation by sea, land and air. According to agent KC, 500 trucks have been sent by the Burma Road and the military committee is taking steps to improve air transportation along the Burma route, having 30 transport planes make one round trip a day, scheduled to carry 4500 tons a month.

Major General Cragette of the Philippines flew to Chungking on the 17th to discuss Chinese-American collaboration in air defense, etc., it was rumored.

---

[a] Chinese radio and newspaper reports giving the detailed figures on American aid to China.

Trans. 5–31–41

No. 884

FROM: Tokyo July 2, 1941
TO: Nanking, Shanghai, Peking # 1407.

Message from Hongkong # 318.

Re my # 299[a], last part.

According to separate reports, the number of trucks is 500 (not including privately owned). These are of two makes, Ford and Dodge, (all of 2½ ton capacity). Most of these are to be used to convey military supplies arriving from the United States. This is a report of primary importance.

Relay to Nanking, -----, -----.

---

[a] See II, 884A in which Hongkong relays an intelligence report saying the Chungking officials asked the United States to furnish trucks in which to transport rice, and, as a result, obtain 500 machines.

Trans. 7-11-41

No. 884A

FROM: Tokyo June 19, 1941
TO: Nanking, Shanghai, Peking and Canton # 1274.

(Circular) Message from Hongkong as # 299.

(Intelligence of Primary Importance)

On the 18th PA reported as follows:

Recently, through Quo Tai Chi[a], CHIANG KAI SHEK had ROOSEVELT and HULL informed that he would like to see the Chinese Incident ended simultaneously with that of Europe. ROOSEVELT, however, is said to have replied that the European war will not end in a short time and, after all, there is no necessity of taking such a view as this. (Refer to Your Excellancy's # 175 to Washington.)

For some time, particularly in Chungking, and in general everywhere, there has been a great shortage of rice and the price trend has been upward; therefore, the Chungking officials are trying to settle the question by planning and scheming to import rice from Annam[b] and Thai over the Burma Road. Therefore, they asked the United States to furnish them with trucks in which to transport the rice and, as a result, obtained 500 machines. Now it would appear that these trucks will be delivered within eight months to Rangoon.

Relay to Nanking, Shanghai, Peking and Canton.

---

[a] Chinese Ambassador to Great Britain.

[b] Rich agricultural area of French Indo-China.

Trans. 6-21-41

No. 885

FROM: Tokyo — May 29, 1941
TO: Nanking, Shanghai, Peking and Canton — # 1139.

(Circular)

Message from Hongkong # 267 on the 28th.

Strictly secret.

On the 28th, PA[a] handed a member of my staff a strictly secret note which read as follows: "A part of the $50,000,000 export loan by the United States to China is to be used in purchasing 800 airplanes from the United States. These planes, it appears, are of two types, including the Boeing B–17. The United States will under this arrangement send pilots and mechanics to manage the planes. To effect this deal will require one month."

In this connection XYZ[a] reports that a Boeing can leave a given base in China, fly to Tokyo, raid the city for two hours, and then fly back to China.

Relay to Nanking, Shanghai, Peking and Canton.

---

[a] Probably Japanese intelligence agents.

Trans. 6–3–41

No. 886

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — July 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 492.

(Intelligence of Secondary Order.)

The monthly quantity shipped over the Burma Road is from 8,000 to 10,000 tons—at best, 12,000 tons. If, taking paving material to China, DANIEL G. ARNSTEIN, etc., cover 800 miles of the road with a single crust, the amount will reach 20,000 tons. The material which China was obtaining from Russia prior to the outbreak of the Russo-German war has been stopped. China is very pessimistic about the whole thing and the activities of the Pacifists in Chungking are growing very lively. OWEN and LATTIMORE are going to China to squelch peace talks and, if they do not succeed, WILLKIE will be sent.

Trans. 7–14–41

No. 887

FROM: Shanghai — July 17, 1941
TO: Net — # 587.

(Circular)

Action Tokyo as # 1278

(Abstract)

According to HQ report. The High officials of the Chungking government are elated over Latimore's arrival as signifying a greater British-American-Soviet aid to China. They are

already making preparations for a joint conference. Also, as Latimore is known to be a firm believer in a united China, his first effort will probably be directed toward bringing unity between the Chiang and the Communist factions.

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 888

FROM: Tokyo July 16, 1941
TO: China Net # 1540.

(Circular)

Message from Hongkong # 343.

Strictly Secret.

(Part 1 of 3).

There follows a report on the latest Anglo-American Soviet-Chinese relations:

1. On the 15th, PA confidentially said to a member of my staff: "QUO TAI CHI[a] held a conversation with the British, American and Soviet Ministers and it is being widely rumored that a military alliance is imminent. Now, I, who have no connection at all with Chungking, have a friend who says that this is all untrue and I, myself, do not think that any such thing is yet at hand. Let us look at the present status of the four countries.

a. "After the outbreak of war with Germany, and, for that matter, even before, the Soviet furnished Chungking with no supplies for three or four months. Furthermore, all that England and the United States have done to help China was to put into effect a loan whereby 5,000,000 pounds were to be shipped to China as a stabilizing fund. (As one proof of this, China most urgently needs airplanes, and, until she recently obtained some from the United States, she only had some 200 old planes of British, American, Soviet, German and Italian makes.)

b. "Chungking is planning a policy concerning airplanes proportionate with England and the United States but this, too, is not likely to work out.

c. "Some time ago when CURRIE visited Chungking, he asked that China lend Great Britain some veteran troops but this, too, did not work out.

d. "The United States asked Chungking to lend her an airport near the coast in case Japan advances southward. Chungking gladly agreed but as yet the exact spot has not even been determined. True enough, American aid to China has increased somewhat lately, but aside from political and economic assistance, the United States cannot give China very much military help. All she can hope to do is give China a few camphor injections. The United States is too much interested in her own military preparations and will not see fit to use her resources in somebody else's fight. However, if the United States gets into war with Japan, then she will afford Chungking every assistance that may seem necessary.

---

[a] Chinese Ambassador to Great Britain.

Trans. 7-22-41

No. 889

FROM: Tokyo July 16, 1941
TO: China Net # 1540.

(Circular)

Message from Hongkong # 343.

(Part 2 of 3)[a].

"The United States will send men to improve the Burma Road in order to increase shipping; to deliver airplanes, trucks and other military supplies to Chungking and pilots and other technicians to engage in aeronautical instruction but these will not engage in actual fighting."

Intelligence Report of Secondary Order:

HYŌ SHI CHŪ learned from CHIN KŌ HO that recently, when QUO TAI CHI conferred with the American, British, and Soviet Ambassadors, the American Ambassador, denying that he was on his own opinion, declared that it is the policy of the United States to continue its policy of assisting Soviet Russia just as prior to the outbreak of the war between Germany and Russia. He went on to say that, of course, the United States intends to give every direct assistance possible to the democracies, but will not fight herself unless it is absolutely necessary. He went on to hint that his government would not favor a treaty of alliance under the present circumstances, but that if Japan enters the German-Soviet war, the United States, as a neutral, will give Moscow every assistance possible. The Soviet Ambassador said that although Russia was now mobilizing a tremendous force, she still has foodstuffs aplenty, as well as arms, and that he would assure at least the same amount of assistance to Chungking as usual. The Soviet Ambassador went on to say that if Japan joins this war, he desires Chungking to make an attack along the whole battle line in order to cause Japan trouble in the rear. The British and Chinese Ambassadors agreed that in case anything happens to the British Isles there should be some common meeting ground for Great Britain and China and that, consequently, a Ministry should be established in Calcutta and a Consulate General in Hongkong. It seems that they also discuss the founding of a Consulate at JO CHŌ KI. Aside from these matters, however, no definite policy was established.

---

[a] Part 3 of 3—not available.

Trans. 7-23-41

No. 890

FROM: Shanghai July 30, 1941
TO: Net # 654.

(Circular)

(Message to Tokyo # 1396)

Re my # 1273[a].

According to "HQ" HYU has been completely deprived of his military power in Yunnan, and the stage has about been reached when he has to take all of his orders from CHIANG KAI-SHEK and -----. A conference has been going on in Chungking between the British, Americans, and Chinese concerning the strengthening of Chungking's power and also to lay plans

for the governing and defense of Yunnan. These conversations appear to center around the following subjects:

The reinforcement of the Chungking army of occupation in Yunnan by a (British?) mechanized force and an American air force.

The organization of an allied governing commission composed of representatives of the three countries.

The economic development of the province, the United States furnishing the necessary supplies (the United States insists that the tin mines be reorganized, and already two American experts are on hand to plan this).

The responsibility for the reopening of the Temmen highway to traffic lies with other American experts, as also the traffic facilities of Keinan.

---

[a] See II, 890A.

Trans. 8-5-41

No. 890A

FROM: Shanghai — July 16, 1941
TO: Net — No number.

(Circular 583)

(Message to Tokyo # 1273)

Re my # 1249[a]. HQ report.

On the 14th, SHŪ SHŌ GAKU[b] took RYŪ's[b] written reply to CHIANG KAI-SHEK. According to information coming from the Chinese Communist Party, this reply is an indication of RYU's submission to CHIANG. In it RYU demanded that the Yunnan Army of 220,000 (the present actual number is 160,000) be supported and part of it used to guard the region between Kunming and Tali-fu and also other places and thus have them maintain peace and order. However, CHIANG is adhering to his original plan of placing only three regiments—that is, 20,000 men—of the Yunnan Army under RYŪ's command. HAKŪ SU KI[a] is suggesting to CHIANG that 4,100 of ----- of the Yunnan forces be kept in Yunnan and Hunan, and 4,000 more be removed to Hongyō[b], and thus divide the army. In view of this situation, a compromise is expected to be reached in the near future between CHIANG and RYŪ.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Kana spelling.
[c] Kana spelling for PAI CHUNG-HSI, member of the Central Executive Yuan and Commander of the 9th Route Army.

Trans. 8-5-41

No. 891

FROM: Shanghai — August 4, 1941
TO: Nanking — # 236.

(Message to Tokyo # 1446.)

Intelligence report from WA on the 2nd.

According to an account by a competent person who just arrived in Shanghai from Chungking, the Financial Reconstruction Program lies entirely in the hands of the British and Americans; and the socalled 'production co-operators' work hand in hand with the British and Madame CHIANG KAI-SHEK, but the Industrial (Commercial) Bureau has nothing whatever to do with them. The chief personnel is made up of Britishers who have come from New Zealand and Australia, along with British and American scholars studying abroad, or graduates of the Shanghai Anglo-American Church school. These persons conduct trade on the side, and the goods, other than that which comes under the heading of utilities by the Shanghai authorities, being stolen goods, bring in a neat profit. There is no one who will expose this because everyone is afraid of the power and popularity of Madame CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

Airplane machinery technicians also are English and American students studying abroad; and Belgian, as well as students from other countries studying abroad have already given up their studies ----- -----. Furthermore, all diplomatic power is controlled by Madame CHIANG KAI-SHEK, KUNG HSIANG-SHI[a] and TUNG HSIU-CHIA[b]?; and diplomatic matters, I understand, are decided upon in conferences held by these three together with British and American diplomats. A detailed account is coming by mail.

Relayed to Nanking.

---

[a] Member of the Central Executive Yuan.
[b] Reconstruction Bureau Chief of Kiangsu Province.

Trans. 8-8-41

No. 892

FROM: San Francisco (Muto) — August 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 160.

1. The ----- of the Silver --ver Pacific Line left San Francisco the 15th for ----- ----- ----- ----- carrying some 14 or 15 aviators and bomber technicians bound for Chungking, as well as, a cargo consisting of military material and large caliber guns. The Klipfo-to-, scheduled to leave this port about the middle of September, is taking on a large quantity of military equipment and in addition 20 aviators and bomber technicians bound for Chungking are scheduled to board her before she leaves.

2. According to intelligences emanating from the local ----- ----- the Burma road being ----- ----- British, American and Chinese jointly are planning on the construction of a transportation route between Calcutta and Chungking. This transportation route (part of it will be a military road) will pass through Darjeeling, Lhasa in Tibet, Seitei[a] in the province of Seiko and the city of Seito having its terminus in Chungking. East of Kotei the road is planned to be a military automobile road.

3. Material to be used in the construction of such an involved engineering undertaking is at the present time being assembled and prepared. TO CHIN EN[a] for this purpose is going to ----- on the Matsonia scheduled to leave the 2nd. Boarding a clipper at that place ----- ----- ----- ----- he is scheduled to leave for home on the clipper flying from San Francisco on the 6th.

---

[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 8-30-41

No. 893

FROM: Tokyo — May 24, 1941
TO: Canton — #1122.

(Circular)

Received from Hongkong as #259.

(Abstract)

"CF" reports two intercepted telegrams from CHEN PI-CHUN to RISAISIN[a] and from TOGO[b] to YU HAN-MOU, re: general war situation in China and proposed negotiations for Chinese communist-Kuomintang rapprochement.

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[a] Japanese version of Chinese name. LI CHI-SEN.
[b] Japanese version of Chinese name.

Trans. 5-28-41

No. 894

FROM: Hsinking — June 4, 1941
TO: Nanking, Shanghai, Peking — #93.

(Circular)

Message to Tokyo #289. Strictly Secret.

The intelligence conference which was held in this office in March of this year was extremely beneficial, viewed in the light of the gathering and exchanging information, and in judging the state of affairs of the Far East. Based on the opinions which were unanimous at that first conference, sometime around the middle of this month there will be held the second of these conferences in Shanghai.

Although I think that you have undoubtedly already considered the matters to be touched on in the next conference, I am setting them down here as they come into my mind.

(A) The state of Manchukuoan-Chinese affairs after the completion of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact, (the solution of outstanding questions between Japan and the Soviet, and between Manchukuo and the Soviet; the Soviet's change of attitude toward Manchukuo and China; movements of the Chinese Communist Party, and the Manchukuoan Communist Party).

(B) The completion of the commercial agreement between Japan and French Indo-China. The settlement of the dispute between Japan and French Indo-China, and -----; and also the stiffening attitude of the United States concomitant with discussion on the state of affairs in the South Seas, now under way with ----- as the focal point. If other than the various South Seas officials, such as the Consuls-General of Manila and Hanoi, the Governor-General of Taiwan, and the Chief of the Foreign Affairs Section, etc., can be made to take part in the conference, I think that considerable results will be effected. (It will be enough to have the representative official of North China and a Foreign Office official of Manchukuo participate in the conference.)

Relayed to Shanghai, Nanking and Peking.

Trans. 6-10-41

No. 895

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) May 27, 1941
TO: Singapore (Riyoji) # 133.

Foreign Service.

Before sending the HINOKI[a] code to you by courier, it is most important, because of its secret nature, to ascertain whether or not there is any possibility of its being inspected. Reply by cable.

[a] An abbreviation code.

Trans. 6-2-41

No. 896

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) May 28, 1941
TO: Singapore # 134.

Re your # 249[a]

To send matters of this type, the contents of which they are well aware, in code should be avoided if we are to maintain the secrecy of our telegraphic systems. Therefore, I would like to have you use abbreviating code.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 5-31-41

No. 897

FROM: Tientsin
TO: Tokyo

June 6, 1941
No number.

Extra.

To the Telegraphist NISHI from the Telegraphic Section:

We have a telegram which needs to be transmitted to the Chief of the Kwantung Province. Please instruct us by return wire as to what code we should use in transmission to that Province, as well as to other countries and to Korea.

Trans. 6-11-41

No. 898

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsinking

June 6, 1941
618.

Re your # 287[a] oral report.

Please let me have your answer by reply wire on the circumstances of the opening of mail, and the types of mail which have been opened.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 6-11-41

No. 899

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Canton

July 5, 1941
116.

Hongkong to Tokyo # 325.

Re your # 366[a].

1. The secret documents and telegraphic material have been placed in care of the Consulate at *Hankow* (?) and as you suggested those left are so few that there will be no difficulty in carrying them away. Further arrangements have been made to burn them in very short order should the necessity arise.

2. As a result of a conference with the head of the Japan Society here, I have decided to send the Imperial Portrait which has been bequeathed to the National School here, to the Consul in Canton until conditions become more settled. However, in order not to cause apprehension among the Japanese resident here this will be carried away secretly and as soon as circumstances warrant, it will be returned again.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 8-14-41

No. 900

FROM: Canton
TO: Tokyo

July 14, 1941
261.

(Message to Hongkong as # 88.)

Re # 325[a] addressed to me by you.

On the 14th, I received in perfect condition the two Imperial portraits brought to me by Consul KIMURA (those for the General Consulate and for the Citizens' School).

---

[a]II, 899.

Trans. 7-17-41

No. 901

FROM: Canton
TO: Tokyo

July 14, 1941
263.

Secret outside the Department.

Re my # 261[a].

On the 15th, the Chief of Staff of the Canton Naval Base called on me and inquired as to whether there had been any instructions from the Foreign Office with regard to the respectful transportation of the Imperial portraits in view of the critical times. I replied as follows: "Far from it. Judging by the example established by the closing of German and Italian consular offices in Australia and other places, this is merely a step in preparation for all eventualities." Continuing my remarks, I said that the current German-Soviet war has given us the best opportunity possible in a thousand years and it shall not slip through our fingers. Turning to the map, I said: "The question isn't whether we shall move to the north or to the south. They can't meddle with us in the north. It is only common sense to strengthen ourselves to the south."

---

[a]See II, 900.

Trans. 7-17-41

No. 902

FROM: Shanghai
TO: Nanking

June 5, 1941
154.

Action Tokyo as # 915.

Re your # 153[a] and 154[a].

Regarding our activities in connection with foreign oil for which the Y5,000,000 was appropriated:

As a result of negotiations between the China branch of the Board of Planning, the field service of the War Department and the Standard Oil Co., last November, for the delivery of high octane gasoline to us, on condition that it be removed to the interior, it was agreed to

have delivered 50,000 drums of 86 octane gasoline, but due to objections on the part of Tokyo this agreement was never fulfilled. However, since then, the Board of Planning and its China branch have been conferring on this and other technical matters and recently have succeeded in reaching a general agreement on the method of handling this situation.

Therefore, we have decided to renew our negotiations with the foreign oil firms along the lines set forth in separate message # 916[a].

Regarding the above, the China service of the War Department, which is most concerned with this negotiation, has, in view of the experience of the past negotiations and of the general adverse trend in world situations, ---------- (remainder of message missing).

[a]Not available.

Trans. 6-7-41

No. 903

FROM: Tientsin — July 16, 1941
TO: Tsingtao — # 130.

Message to Tokyo # 218.

Re your # 188[a] addressed to this Minister.

Shipment of powdered milk since April has been only 5,400 pounds. (They were all of the Meiji[b] and not one of the Morinaga[b].) There is none in stock in this city and we are very much concerned because there are more than 2,000 babies in North China who are without milk. Will you, therefore, negotiate with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and with other bodies for immediate shipment. Will you, also, take this matter up with the offices concerned so that priority might be given in assigning a ship to transport the same?

[a]Not available.
[b]Names of confectionery companies manufacturing also milk products.

Trans. 7-22-41

No. 904

FROM: Tokyo — July 16, 1941
TO: Tientsin — # 1520.

(Circular)

Message to Hsinking # 403.

On February 28, 1938, by viture of an agreement with the Manchukuoan Monoply officials, we consigned to Manchukuo opium and narcotics seized in North China. Lately, we have been unable to import opium from foreign countries and lack the ingredients for certain medicines. The manufacturers are complaining. We now need the opium and narcotics which were seized for home use. Will you, therefore, please arrange for us to obtain it? Please explain this situation to the Manchukuoan officials and try to get them to agree. Wire back the results immediately.

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 905

FROM: Tsinan
TO: Tokyo

August 2, 1941
141.

(Message to Peking # 61)

Regarding instructions in your circular message # 364[a].

The local Shantung Automobile Association operates some two hundred vehicles. (Vehicles of all guilds are included in this figure.) (They use approximately fifty thousand gallons of gasoline per month.)

This organization conducts transportation of goods within the city, in the occupied areas near about, as well as among rural communities. In view of the recent freezing order it has become impossible for them to secure gasoline. As a result transportation and ----- ----- is at a stand still. In view of the imminence of the period for cotton deliveries, we would like to have you arrange to (tap?) the current stocks of the local agencies of the Asia, Standard and Texas Oil Companies. (This amounts to eighty thousand tons.)

Please wire us your permission to proceed at as early a date as possible.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 8-6-41

No. 906

FROM: Peking
TO: Tsinan

August 5, 1941
No number.

Re your # 61[a].

It will be all right to permit purchases on the following conditions, but you will direct so that there be nothing of the nature of unreasonable raising of prices, due to the rush of purchasing.

(1) As to the amounts and ----- to be allotted to members of the Association, instructions will be received from the supervising agencies on the grounds.

(2) As to the keeping of gasoline purchased, instructions will be received from the supervising agencies on the ground.

(3) Purchases will be made from the stores now held at Tsinan by the three foreign oil companies (?). (It would be desirable to have the gasoline taken care of by us, but as we are already having an effective supervision over the moving of that which is in Tsingtao, it is felt here that there will hardly be any necessity of having this purchased over again from Tsigntao.)

---

[a]Transportation of goods within the city has become impossible due to inability to obtain gasoline as a result of the freezing order. Suggest stocks of the local Asia, Standard, and Texas companies agencies be (tapped?). See II, 905.

Trans. 8-12-41

No. 907

FROM: Tokyo — June 10, 1941
TO: Peking — # 1224.

(Circular)

(To Shanghai as # 500.)

The British Embassy in Tokyo has informed us that our military authorities in Shanghai are about to confiscate nearly $890,000 in Chinese legal money, which was found in the Morat warehouse located in the French Concession on the Bund; and that England will not tolerate this. The French Embassy likewise is complaining, and has officially asked us to rescind the demand. Please wire me the facts on this matter.

Relayed to Nanking, Peking, Tientsin and Hankow.

Trans. 6-12-41

No. 908

FROM: Tokyo — June 23, 1941
TO: Hankow — # 133.

Action Shanghai as # 569.

Regarding your # 199[a]:

During the Economic negotiations held here between the representatives of China, Manchukuo, Japan and Germany, Germany offered a proposal touching on the question of transporting goods to Germany. (South Seas and South American products.) At that time, some reference was made to goods belonging to Chinese and German firms in Hankow, which were not permitted to be shipped to Shanghai.

Our answer regarding these goods was to the effect that, due to special circumstances, the question of transporting these goods cannot be handled like ordinary transportation problems, and that it involves consultation with the military authorities.

However, we did not give any promise or make any agreement of a kind described in your message referred to above.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 6-26-41

No. 909

FROM: Shanghai — July 8, 1941
TO: Nanking, Peking, and Hongkong — # 554.

(Circular)

Message to Tokyo # 1203.

According to a report received by IWAI[a] on the 7th, the Chungking representative in Shanghai, MISU KO KI[b], received telegraphic orders on the 6th to the following effect:

Japan will shortly declare war and will confiscate all of the assets of Chinese living in the foreign concession (particularly those related to banks) and will also put a stop to the traffic of third-country ships along the coast of China. Therefore, all Chinese firms and merchants in Shanghai should in all haste transfer their commercial interests to foreign names.

It appears that they immediately began to put this scheme into effect.

---

[a]A high Japanese official.
[b]Kana spelling for MI CHI FANG (?).

Trans. (Not dated)

No. 910

FROM: Tokyo July 17, 1941
TO: Net #1568.

Received from Hongkong as #351.

Chiang Kai-shek's army is short of supplies, and Chungking could not hold out longer than ten months if foreign sources of supplies were cut off.

Trans. 7–26–41

No. 911

FROM: Peking July 28, 1941
TO: Tsinan, Tsingtao #347.

(Circular)

(Message to Tokyo #438)

An order has been issued by the North China Army to the Japanese forces at other points to the effect that they should watch closely factories, valuable property, warehouses, etc., belonging to the British and the Americans. However, I understand that they have been warned against using force or doing anything that might be construed in the same light. Will you, therefore, get in touch with the military authorities in your part of the country and take steps so that, except in case of absolute necessity, nothing should be done that is likely to provoke the British and the Americans and bring about a worse state of affairs. Even when this close watching is to begin, it should be done in a casual way and not as if it is actually being done. Will you arrange with the military authorities to have this precaution taken ----- ----- ----- so that this plan would not be communicated to the British and the Americans.

Trans. 8–9–41

No. 912

FROM: Shanghai June 27, 1941
TO: Net # 522.

(Circular)

To Tokyo as # 1097.

The former governor of Chekian province Chiang Pro-ching's comments on the Russo-German war as expressed to "AM" are as follows:

The German military effort is 70% preparation and 30% propaganda while on the Russian side these figures are just the reverse, so there can be little doubt as to the final issue of the war. Germany will not penetrate deep into eastern Europe. When she has obtained her objective she will bring the war to a conclusion.

The Chungking authorities last week prohibited the showing of Charlie Chaplin's picture "The Dictator" in Chungking and are endeavoring to maintain effective relations with Germany. This action was taken upon the advice of the pro-German propagandists and SHU-KAKA, etc. As a matter of fact, Chian Po-cheng is himself a worshiper of Germany. Germany does not desire, as America and England do, to use China's man power and material resources for her own benefit. If Germany is victorious, the Sino-Japanese incident will be brought to a speedy settlement and therefore it appears that he is pinning his hopes on Germany. However, since last year T.V. Soong and Madame Chiang Kai-shek have been advocating strongly the necessity of opposing Japan through Anglo-Russian and U.S.-Russian collaboration and have been working to that end. Since March of this year Soviet aid to China has been cut off, and there is no hope of it being resumed in the future. However, there are hopes of getting supplies from Australia for the next two or three years.

The Chinese Communists have always opposed British and American imperialism but now since it is manifestly impossible for Russia to oppose Germany without British and American aid they find themselves in the same position as Chungking, dependent on Britain and America, and so they have had to do an about face. For instance, it is true that we may not see a revival of the former collaboration between the Kuomintang and the Communists but there will at least be a strengthening of their position resulting from a neutralizing in the friction between the two parties.

The official organ of the Communists is taking a conservative attitude and has made no statement as yet (but according to a dispatch from ENAN province on the 23rd the KAIHO NIPPO charged the Germans with breach of faith and declared that the Germans were digging their own graves and that ultimate victory was certain, Russian aid to China was an example and now Chinese Communists should help the Russians in the defense of their fatherland). There are some Communists here who say that the Russo-German war was occasioned by the establishment of an agreement between Britain and Germany but this is hardly credible.

Trans. 7-3-41

No. 913

FROM: Shanghai — June 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1059.

Received a report regarding the attitude of the Chungking government since the conclusion of the Jap-Soviet neutrality pact, from JK, who happens to be in this city at this moment. I am sending by air mail certain parts of this report, which may be of interest to you, particularly as it related to the question of Kuomingtana-Communist relations and to Chiang's attitude toward peace with Japan.

Trans. 7-1-41

No. 914

FROM: Shanghai — June 16, 1941
TO: Hsinking, Nanking and Hankow — # 491.

(Circular)

Message to Tokyo # 1006.

1. It seems that since taking his post in Chungking Ambassador GAUUS has been reinvestigating the relations between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party by listening to the opinions of the leaders of that Government. According to HA, he has on two different occasions recently invited SHU ON RAI[a] in order to get his viewpoint of the matter. Furthermore, according to AK, the Ambassador conferred with the Russian Ambassador PA[b]. The latter explained that, since the conclusion of the Japanese-Soviet agreement and of the agreement by the United States to grant a loan to China for the purpose of stabilizing Chinese currency, there has been a sudden intensification of suppression of the Chinese Communists, and the anti-Communist faction within the Nationalist Party has brought about the worst relation between the two parties in the last four years by refusing to supply the 18th Army with military funds and by rejecting a perfectly sincere peace offer made by the Chinese Communist Party. Of course, Soviet Russia's decision of not supplying any more war materials and funds to China has had the tendency of encouraging internal dissension in China. However, Soviet Russia is quite willing to immediately resume her assistance to China if the Chinese Nationalist Party would change its attitude toward the Chinese Communist Party. (Intelligence: B)

2. AK has further informed us that the central committee of the Communist Party published through the Shin Ka Sha[c] an appeal to belligerent compatriots in which the committee severely criticized the ruthless suppression exercised by the intransigent faction of the anti-Communist Party against the military policy, as well as the printed organs of the Party. These anti-Communists, the appeal says, furthermore, have cancelled the number designating the 18th Army and are now planning to place SHU TOKU[d], HO TOKU KAI[e] and other leaders of the Chinese Communist Party under arrest, thus placing us under threat. Although the Communist Party has been endeavoring to avoid this sort of civil strife, if self-defense becomes a necessity, it will fight. The Committee thus encouraged the people to rise up in order to

overthrow the pro-Japanese faction and to defend the democratic political rights of the people. (Intelligence: A)

Relayed to Peking, Tientsin, Nanking, Hankow, Manchojuo and Hongkong.

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[a] CHOU EN-LAI (Communist Leader).
[b] Probably Ambassador PANYUSHUKIN in Chungking.
[c] New China Agency.
[d] CHU TE (Communist military chief).
[e] PENG TE-HUAI (Military leader under CHU TE).

Trans. 6-18-41

No. 915

FROM: Tokyo July 1, 1941
TO: Nanking, Hankow, Shanghai, Tientsin, Peking and Canton # 1375.

(Circular)

Message from Hongkong # 313, June 28.

(Part 1 of 2)

The following are views concerning the Russo-German war.

1. While the views of the Chungking authorities are extremely optimistic, the Chinese Communist Party believe that Chungking's position is a very difficult one (XYZ).

(1)[a] Lining up of Britain, the United States, and Soviet Russia, which Chungking has been hoping to see for sometime, has now become an inevitable phenomenon and with it opinions regarding possible peace between Britain and Germany are no longer heard. Although the activity of the anti-Soviet elements in the United States is intense, she is strengthening her military preparation against Germany, increasingly restraining France from getting closer to Germany, and becoming more interested in joint military activity in the Far East. At the same time, she may be expected to become more insistent on Japan's withdrawing from the Axis. Although Soviet aid to China has inevitably ----- -----, China has not felt the lack of it if judged on the basis of the situation that has been prevailing during the past several months of stalemate, for this lack has been satisfactorily compensated for by aid given her by the United States. This turn of affairs has also had a beneficial effect in that it facilitated the effort of getting the Chinese Communist Party to comply with the orders issued by the Chungking Government. In her relations toward Germany and Italy, China may be expected to continue her policy of not approaching them too closely or remaining too aloof.

(2)[b] Although there is no doubt that by taking advantage of the weakening of the belligerent powers Soviet Russia would win the war in the end, the war may last for a long time. There is very little prospect of Soviet Russia's relation with the United States and Britain improving in the future, nor can Chungking depend on the continued assistance from the United States. Heretofore, Soviet Russia would like to see Chungking keep up her anti-Japanese resistance. For Chungking not to make her attitude toward Germany and Italy definite at this state, is unwise. Chungking's international position will grow more and more precarious with the decrease of aid given by Russia and with the increased effort on the part of the United States to appease Japan, nor would friction between Chungking and the Communist Party cease, for there will be increasing activity by the pro-German and pro-Japanese factions within the country and a greater possibility of China's compromising. Social unrest also would increase

as a result of the suffering among the people due to civil war and to rise in commodity prices. On the other hand, Japan will devote her entire effort in order to bring the China incident to a settlement. Therefore, China cannot help but realize that Japan will bring stronger political and military pressure upon her. Furthermore, as opportunities arise, Japan, in accordance with the spirit of the Tripartite Alliance, will make demand on Soviet Russia for political and economic concessions in the Far East, and she would endeavor to secure in this the tacit consent of the United States and Great Britain.

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[a] (1) appears to be the views held by the Chungking authorities.
[b] (2) appears to be the views held by the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party.

Trans. 7-10-41

No. 916

FROM: Tokyo — June 19, 1941
TO: Canton — # 102.

Regarding your # 218.

Unlike the case of French Indo-China, we will derive little or no benefit from sending occupation troops to Macao on the pretext in question. I have discussed this point with the army authorities here, and they are in agreement with me, and have promised to send instructions to the military at the scene to abandon the plan.

Trans. 6-24-41

No. 917

FROM: Canton — June 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 248.

Regarding your # 102[a].

In accordance with instructions issued by the Army Headquarters, our South China forces have abandoned the occupation of Macao. It has decided, instead, to take steps described in my message # 218 and to order the Chinese to pay $150,000 (Hongkong dollar) in fine.

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[a] See II, 916—Army authorities are in agreement with me, that no benefit will be derived from sending occupation troops to Macao on the pretext in question.

Trans. 6-26-41

No. 918

FROM: Tokyo June 28, 1941
TO: Net # 1348.

(Circular)

(Message to Canton # 111).

In view of the fact that considerable smuggling of goods intended to assist CHIANG KAI-SHEK seems to be taking place at Macao, will you discuss the matter with both the Army and Navy authorities in your city and have the official who is taking the place of Consul SUKUI in Macao file a strong protest with the local government there requesting strict surveillance of this activity. Will you also refer to my # 238[a] of last year relative to this question?

This matter has already been taken up with the Army and Navy authorities.

Please transmit this message as instructions from this Minister.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-24-41

No. 919

FROM: Shanghai June 24, 1941
TO: Singapore # 515.

(Circular)

Message to Tokyo # 1074.

Re my # 948[a]. JK Intelligence.

1. KO JIN RIN, General Manager of the Rei Shi Sha, tells me that about 150,000 yuan's worth of provisions, etc., for the use of American aviation volunteers has been received in Hongkong. Currently, this is being transported to the interior.

2. An advance party of six members arrived in this port about the middle of this month. This group constitutes a portion of the American technical advisors being sent to China to give military assistance. Chungking is dispatching a reception committee to welcome them.

3. British Ambassador KERR has invited Chinese cultural leaders to a tea party in Hongkong. The British-American-Chinese military alliance is a fact, and should war break out in the Pacific, this will immediately become apparent.

I have transmitted this message in the same manner as my caption message.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 6-26-41

No. 920

FROM: Tokyo — June 27, 1941
TO: Nanking and Shanghai — #1337.

(Circular)

A special Asahi telephone message from Nanking on the 24th reported that 120 recently recruited pilots, including second generation Chinese, had been sent to Chungking and had arrived; and that this was purportedly done as assistance for Chiang, but in reality it is for the purpose of establishing air bases in interior China in preparation for war with Japan. We have already called attention to this in our #176 to Manila[a], but you will please make every effort to find out facts and conditions relative to such reports and any information bearing on air forces in the interior, and send it along in frequent dispatches, even though the information be fragmentary.

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[a]It is reported that Major Konroo of the U.S. aviation forces is en route Chungking via Manila and Hongkong. Please wire as to the actual circumstances.

Trans. 7-1-41

No. 921

FROM: Shanghai — July 2, 1941
TO: Singapore — #531.

(Circular)

(Message to Tokyo #1126.)

H. Q. Report.

1. In accordance with a stipulation contained in the British—United States—China three-power military pact, BOHAMU[a], Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces, is now making preparations in Singapore for the organization of the general staff, consisting of officers of the three countries. The plan is for Chungking to send a staff of seven members and station them permanently. For the time being, they have decided to send two members. It has been decided that one of the two should be SHO SIN[b] and the other member is to be selected from officers operating in KWANGSI[c]. Furthermore, according to the three-power military pact, British and Chinese forces, as well as the American and British air and naval forces, are to be jointly responsible for the defense of YUNAN[c], KWEICHOW[c], KWANGSI[c], BURMA, MALAY, and the THAIESE border. In case the Japanese Army should advance southward from the bases in French Indo-China, the Chinese central force in KWANGSI and YUNAN is to be placed under the British command for attacking the Japanese forces from the rear. At the same time, CHUNGKING is to send an additional force of 60,000 picked troops to MALAY and the THAIESE border.

2. SHU SI JYU, Chief of the branch ----- of the Chungking Aviation Commission, recently arrived in MANILA; also MO HO SHO, a member of the same organization is to arrive in Singapore in the near future. Their mission is to confer with British and American aviation authorities on a plan for constructing at five different places in KWEICHOW, YUNAN, and KWANGSI, air bases to be used jointly by the three powers. Accompanied by a specialist in the construction of air bases who represents the British and American air forces, the

aforementioned two Chinese officials will first return to ----- on the 11th, and on about the 20th will proceed to KWEIYANG[d] and commence the work of constructing the bases.

On the 22nd, the U.P. reported that 100 American airplanes had reached China. The Shanghai *Times* reported that 50 airplanes of the Curtiss A-410 type had recently arrived at RANGOON and will shortly be shipped to CHUNGKING. It also said that 50 other airplanes are expected to reach RANGOON in the near future and that there exists a secret understanding between the United States and China, according to which the United States will aid in the expansion of the Chinese air forces, and China would allow the United States in case of an emergency to use air bases in China.

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[a]Kana spelling.
[b]Kana spelling for SHANG CHEN, military inspector for Chungking Government.
[c]Chinese provinces.
[d]Capital of Kweichow Province.

Trans. 7-7-41

No. 922

FROM: Shanghai — June 16, 1941
TO: Tientsin — # 489.

(Circular)

Message to Tokyo # 1003.

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The highest defense tribunal of the Chungking Government met and passed a proposal made by KO SHŌ KI[a], GO TETU JO[b], and others for adopting parallel diplomatic policies toward Germany, Soviet Russia and Britain, and the government is having the Foreign Policy Association strongly propagandize the inevitability of the policy. It is thought that this will deal a severe blow to the idea of "ABC"[c] (alliance ?), which is being advocated by KAKU TAI KI[d].

---

[a]KUNG HSIANG-HSI (Member of the Central Executive Yuan)
[b]WU TIEH-CHENG (Member of the Central Executive Yuan and former (?) Mayor of Shanghai)
[c]Probably America—Britain—China
[d]KUO TAI-CHI (Formerly Ambassador to Britain)

Trans. 6-41

No. 923

FROM: Tokyo — July 5, 1941
TO: Nanking, Shanghai, Canton, Peking — # 1437.

(Circular)

Message from Hongkong # 322.

According to information which HYŌ SI CHŌ got from DAI KŌ HŌ, bombers supplied by the United States (the number of machines is not known but I think they are the 10 Boeing B17 types and 18 heavy bombers referred to in my message # 282[a]) packed in 300 separate

cases and 220 trucks (the Fords mentioned in my # 318[b]) will reach Rangoon sometime between July 15 and 20 on board a steamship belonging to the Ford Company. The bombers are to be sent into the interior as they are. The trucks will be assembled in Rangoon and will leave that city toward the end of July or about the middle of August after being loaded with freight. The Chungking authorities are quite anxious that this war material is shipped safely and have sent MO HO SHO to Singapore to discuss plans with British and American officials. I understand that there are points in this information which coincide with what was confidentially told by PA to a member of this staff. I am sending this for your information.

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[a]Not available.

[b]See II, 884 which states the United States had been asked to furnish 500 trucks.

Trans. 7-15-41

No. 924

FROM: Shanghai — July 9, 1941
TO: Nanking and Hongkong — # 558.

(Circular)

Action Tokyo as # 1218.

Dispatch from "JK" (8th).

(1) With pretext of giving aid to China, the United States is building many air bases in various southwestern provinces (in China) and has furnished 200 planes for the purpose of guarding the Burma Road traffic and also to establish air service linking Rangoon, Singapore, and the Philippines in competition with the Japanese line.

The similar special Asahi dispatch to which you refer in your Circular # 1337[a] has already been reported in my message # 895[b].

(2) Regarding the activities of the British-Chinese joint special service organs at Hongkong, Rangoon, and Singapore, it has been decided to confer with IBUNSU and TARYŪ of the Hongkong police department regarding suitable plan to be taken.

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[a]See II, 920. It is reported that 120 Chinese pilots have been sent to Chungking ostensibly as assistance for Chiang, but in reality, for the purpose of establishing air bases in interior China in preparation for war on Japan. Please check up and wire details.

[b]Not available.

Trans. 7-15-41

No. 925

FROM: Peking — June 24, 1941
TO: Nanking and Shanghai — # 259.

(Circular)

Message to Tokyo # 411.

On the 23rd, First Chief Secretary SMYTHE of the American Embassy here in Peking, together with Commercial Attache BUTRICK, who is SMYTHE's successor, came to call on me, the one to say farewell, and the other to present his salutations. At that time, BUTRICK

told me that recently he and AMBASSADOR GAUSS had gone to Chungking, and after remaining there for a short time, he alone returned to Peking. He went on to say that Ambassador GAUSS will come back to Peking some time in November, but whether he would stay for some time or not, he did not know. BUTRICK said that he wasn't sure but that he, too, might be going to Chungking from time to time.

Now, SMYTHE will leave Peking around the 29th, returning to his own country by way of Shanghai, so he said.

I have sent this message to Nanking, Shanghai, and Tientsin.

Trans. 6–27–41

No. 926

FROM: Hankow — June 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 186.

According to information obtained by our informer regarding the instructions issued by the American Ambassador at Chungking, on the 1st of this month, to all the American consuls in the Japanese occupied territory in China, on the occasion of President Roosevelt's son's visit to Chungking, he proposed to Chiang Kai-shek a plan to establish an International league of propaganda organs.

The plan for the above organ calls for economic and technical contributions on the part of the United States, Great Britain, France, China and all the free governments of Europe. Chungking government has agreed to this plan.

Agencies are to be established at Vancouver, Bombay, Honolulu, Burma, and Kunming, and experts, certified by the League are to be sent out to carry on this work. The purpose of the propaganda organ is to direct effective propaganda, championing the principle of freedom, in order to counter the Axis propaganda efforts in South America, South and Western Asia and Africa.

Consuls are instructed to collect useful propaganda material and information in the territory under Japanese political control and transmit them direct to the Embassy, also they are to keep in close contact with the British consuls in this work.

Trans. 6–20–41

No. 927

FROM: Tokyo — July 24, 1941
TO: Washington — # 399.

1313 from Shanghai to the Minister.

Intelligence of Primary Order.

It seems to me that lately CHIANG KAI SHEK had a number of graduates of foreign schools, well-versed in international affairs, go to the United States, together with CHIN something-or-other and LIN something-or-other, members of the Blue Shirt organization. Their principal task is to engage in propaganda and intelligence work. Before they were sent, the Government of the United States formulated a joint policy with Chungking and organized a collaborative Chinese-American propaganda association with headquarters in Washington and branches in Chungking and Geneva. The American membership consists

of the staff of the Intelligence Section and preeminent reporters of the various telegraph and press associations, Admiral YARNELL also is a member. The Chinese membership consists of the whole staff of the Chinese Embassy in Washington, the special correspondents of the Central Chinese News Agency, UN KI[a] and LIN YU TANG. They are to work out ways and means of dealing with all phases of the Far Eastern situation and to exchange intelligences between the United States and China.

[a]Kana spelling of Chinese name.

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 928

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Shanghai

June 2, 1941
475.

Re your # 852[a].

For your own offices intelligence and enlightenment expenses for this fiscal year, we have appropriated 620,000 yen, for your special agents we have appropriated 540,000 yen (of which 600,000 yen are for JK's special activities and which we are sending direct to Shanghai) (*sic*) making a total of 1,160,000 yen. You know that nowadays we have to economize all we can and it was only after considering how important intelligence work in your city is that we arrived at such a high figure, so, in any case, we want you to spend this money as wisely as possible. Please get the details from Secretary YOSHIOKA.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 6-4-41

No. 929

FROM: Shanghai
TO: Nanking

June 23, 1941
512.

(Circular)

Action Tokyo as # 1068.

Rojibi (_____), a member of the Blue Shirt (Ranyisha) special activities group, was caught by the government in Hongkong in the act of communicating to Chief Engineer Okubo in Macao, intercepted messages from Chungking, was questioned, but escaped; however, during the inquiry the officials ascertained that he was receiving large subsidies for this activity from Japanese sources.

The Chungking headquarters dispatched the director of their military jurisidiction department, Yūchorin (_____), to see the British Ambassador, and from him learned the details on this Japanese activity.

Please send a suitable dispatch on this matter from Hongkong to Macao.

Trans. 6-26-41

No. 930

FROM: Shanghai June 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 998.

(Part 1 of 2)[a].

When Mr. IWAI[b] visited Japan not long ago, he discussed by word of mouth with an official in charge in our department the education and methods of employ of certain Chinese now cooperating with us in our newly organized political investigations group, whom we are planning to send to the South Seas. We had planned to have the Nanking Government subsidize the work, but since Mr. IWAI returned, the atmosphere ----- ----- has become quite confused, so we have decided to establish an independent institution called the JIKYO GAKUSHA (Self-strength School), and to proceed with our plans to begin instruction. (The Embassy was of the opinion that we should carry on absolutely secret instruction, but after all, we have to have students, so we have decided to hang out a shingle.)

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[a]Part 2 of 2 not available.
[b]Stationed at Hongkong.

Trans. 6-23-41

No. 931

FROM: Shanghai June 16, 1941
TO: Batavia and Singapore # 487.

Part 1 of 2[a].

Recently having secured the cooperation of certain of my Chinese associates in my political investigation group, we have decided to establish here a school called the TZU CH'IANG (Japanese: JI KYO (Self-strength) Institution, and to begin instruction. In so doing, it is our intention to organize and educate men under the supervision of officers connected with out department, men who can help us deal with the South Seas question which has lately become urgent, and who will cooperate with us in our activities among the Chinese in the South Seas. (They will be our spies in peace time, and when war breaks out we will convert them into our fifth columnists.) With a view to bringing about the success of our machinations, from among the thirty students for the first semester, we will use twenty to educate other young Chinese. I have requested our officials in ----- and ----- and Macao to select students.

---

[a]Part 2 of 2 available, under study.

Trans. 6-23-41

No. 932

FROM: Shanghai — June 16, 1941
TO: Canton, Hongkong, Swatao, Amoy — # 486.

To Tokyo # 1000.

Part 2 of 2.

For the requirements for matriculation, consult my separate Circular # 488[a] and the appended description of the TZU CHI'IANG School. I want you also to consult Mr. YUAN SHU who, I understand, is soon going to your place. We have had relations with him for ten years. Under our leadership he was a key man in the establishment of the new regime. At present he is a lieutenant in the Kuo Min Tang, Vice-Chief of the Society of New China. If he does not visit your place, however, I would like for you please to consider having me send you some ambitious youth who is interested in the project. Of course, this whole project will be under our leadership, and we will foot all the bills. However, on the surface it must appear to be a school, purely Chinese in nature, devoted to instruction in business, commerce, etc.

[a]See II, 933.

Trans. 6-23-41

No. 933

FROM: Shanghai — June 16, 1941
TO: Batavia and Singapore — # 488.

(Secret, Separate Circular)

Details concerning the matriculation of students at the JIKYO GAKUSHA:

1. Young Chinese aged from 18 to 25 who, either at home or abroad, have graduated from higher and secondary schools or who have the equivalent education and who are men with the right ideology. (We have entrance examinations, but those whom the consuls in the places in question choose we will exempt in that group.)
2. The students will be only men.
3. The course will be for one year, but those of excellent record may finish sooner. The specific work of each student will be determined by the officials of the school in cooperation with ourselves.
4. Matriculation fees, laboratory fees, and books will all be borne by the school, and we will give each student 30 yuan for pocket money each month.
5. There will be two dates for the examinations, August 10th and 20th.
6. The last date for written applications will be August 14. Furthermore, with the written application there must be four card photographs of the bust, diplomas from the primary and secondary schools, and a list of marks and credits. Furthermore, each application must be accompanied by a fee of 5 yuan.
7. We will furnish third class railway fare to Shanghai.

(Strictly secret).

Trans. 6-23-41

No. 934

FROM: Shanghai — July 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1269.

Re your # 688[a] to the Officer in Charge of Far Eastern Affairs.

1. Now that our policy toward concessions has brought on an increasingly delicate situation, I would like to ask the Foreign Office to reconsider in the light of the new situation the possibility of supplying suitable personnel for the Secret Service.

2. If it is impossible to do so, there is no way but to decide on a personnel upon consideration after comparing the person(s) mentioned in your telegram with the candidate from the Army (Colonel SAITO). In the light of the fact that what is described in my telegram # 1178[a] had taken place between the Army and this office, it would be wise to leave the decision entirely up to the central authorities. The Army has been notified to this effect. (Is the opinion expressed in your telegram one based on a conversation you had with the Army authorities after comparing our candidates with those of the Army? I would like to know this.)

3. Insofar as I am concerned, I know nothing of WATARI's qualifications (it has since come to our knowledge that he is the younger brother of Colonel WATARI in this city, who is a high staff officer of the NOBORI Detachment). We are not sure of his being comparable to Colonel SAITO (who is a student of foreign languages and a man of a diplomatic type, having a vague idea of things), and yet it would hardly seem that he is the highest type that may be sent from the civilian branch of the government. This is for your information.

4. I understand that in addition to SAITO and NOMA, there are other candidates for the service who are already in ----- studying.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-23-41

No. 935

FROM: Canton — July 21, 1941
TO: Shanghai — # 54 or # 56.

Re your # 29.

As a result of confidential contacts with Chinese connected with this office, eight Chinese have been selected as being of superior merit from among over 200 applicants. They will be sent on the Suzan Maru leaving here about the 28th of this month. We are endeavoring to find two more by that time. The boat fare will be advanced by this office.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 936

FROM: Shanghai — July 7, 1941
TO: Net — # 551.

Action Tokyo as # 1195.

According to "HQ" the Chinese Communists in Enan received instructions from the Third International on June 19th. Again on July 2nd, they received telegraphic instructions

to cooperate with Sinkiang province and Outer Mongolia in forming a revolutionary shock committee. (The Committee to be composed of three members from the Chinese Communists, two members from Sinkiang province and two members from Outer Mongolia), under the chairmanship of MOTAKUTO (Mao Tse-tung) with headquarters at Enan but with plans to move to URANBATORU in the near future.

The gist of the instructions follows:

1. The Central Revolutionary Military Committee of the Chinese Communists is to be dissolved when the necessity arises and a joint Nationalist-Communist military collaboration is to be negotiated.

2. The Chinese Communist Red army is to be fitted out within a month with new equipment. In this Chungking is to cooperate and the Soviet Ambassador in "UG" (URANBATORU ?) will take the responsibility to promote good relations with Chiang Kai-shek.

3. Before effecting the agreement for collaboration between the Nationalists and the Communists, the Communists have prepared for the withdrawal of a large part of the Communist army in Central China and thus the way is paved for an amelioration of the outstanding difficulty in the collaboration between the Nationalists and the Committee.

Trans. 7–11–41

No. 937

FROM: Shanghai — July 14, 1941
TO: Peking, Tientsin, Hsinking — # 574.

(Message to Tokyo # 1252.)

The following is a report submitted by "HQ":

The third International is at present organizing a Far Eastern Council for Revolutionary Offence with MŌ TAKU TŌ[a] as its chairman and with representatives of outer Mongolia, of Sinkyō[b] and of the Northeastern Volunteer Corps, (10 from the Communist party; 5 from outer Mongolia and Sinkyo and 9 from the Northeastern Volunteer Corps) as participating members. This Council consists of four sections; namely, Political, Organizational, Economic and Military. It is in touch with every ----- in China and is planning to assist the Chungking Regime as well as to cooperate with it.

The Organizational section is absorbing men and women in inner Mongolia, Neika[c], Sinkyo, Seikai[d], and Tibet and is engaged in instructing them and organizing them into armies.

The Economic Section is responsible for raising funds for this purpose.

The most important section is the Military Section, headed by RYŪ HAKU SEI[e]. The plan of the Third International is to have these armies, placed under the command of Red Army officers, organized into twelve shock columns (Consisting of 60,000 men, of which (1) one column is a chemical detachment which is expected to have 6,000 members. The Plan further has in view the establishment of 26 training camps in Uranbatoru[f]. Enan[h], etc., with Soviet specialists in chemical warfare in charge of them. It is said that by October, 2,000 persons and by May of next year, 4,000 persons will complete their training.), to have them get behind the lines of the Japanese forces, in four provinces in both Northern China and Northeastern China for the purpose of engaging in chemical partisan war. They will also burn up materials belonging to the Japanese Army and destroy military facilities as well; (2) 3 columns, consisting of about 15,000 members, will not take direct part in the warfare,

but will cooperate with the operations of the outer Mongolian Red Army, the Communist Army, the Northeastern Volunteers and with the Shock Troops of the aforementioned Council in communication, transportation, and relief activities; and (3) 8 columns, consisting of 40,000 members of Shock Troops will take part in partisan warfare and, in cooperation with the outer Mongolian Red Army, they will create disturbances in the rear of the Japanese forces.

Furthermore with regard to the organization of this Council, Soviet Ambassador PA[i] has promised the Chungking Government that the troops will not take an active part in the territories under the jurisdiction of that Government and he has, by this promise, succeeded in winning tacit consent of CHIANG KAI-SHEK. The Council is also asking BA KŌ XU[j], the Governor of Neika, to act jointly with it. It is maintaining connections with the Grand Alliances for National Salvation in Hongkong and also with CHIN KA KO as well.

Relayed to Nanking, Hsinking, -----, Hongkong.

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[a]MAO TSE-TUNG, Commander Communist Army. [b]Sinchang Province.
[c]Ningsia.
[d]Chinghai.
[e]Probably LIU PO-CHENG, Chief of Staff of Communist armies.
[f]Ulan Bator (Urga), Mongolian Republic.
[g]Unidentified.
[h]Shensi Province.
[i]Abbreviation for PAHI JUSHUKIN.
[j]Ma HUNG-KUI, Commander 15th Route Army.

Trans. 8-14-41

No. 938

FROM: Shanghai — August 2, 1941
TO: Net — #674.

(Message to Tokyo #1429.)

HQ report.

1. Most of the detachments under RYU HAKŪ SYŌ[a] belonging to the 119th Division of the Chinese Communist Army have been transferred to Suihoku. This was done in compliance with an order issued by the Soviet Red Army and with Chungking's tacit consent. It is thought that the Chinese Communist Army will, in the future, be ----- ----- ----- ----- the Red Army. After returning about the middle of August from the conference to be held in Chita, RYŪ will probably endeavor to extend his influence with this in view. It is also expected that arms and ammunition for the new and enlarged army will be supplied from Outer Mongolia.

2. Part of the JO KŌ ZEN[b] detachment and several hundred members of the Communist Youth shock troops are attending to the transportation of arms and ammunition from Soviet Russia along the Sen Hoku-Sinkyō route. It is expected that by the end of August forces of the Chinese Communist Army which will be engaged in this sort of transportation will number 4,500 men.

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[a]LIU PO-CHAO.
[b]HSU HSIANG-CHIEN, Commander of the 2nd Communist Army.

Trans. 8-6-1

No. 939

FROM: Peking — August 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo and Tientsin — # 397.

(Message to Tokyo # 507)

As regards our policy concerning the Kailan coal mines, the local army and liaison office regard it as very important. Especially this is so because there are proofs to show that the Communist Party is active and making plans among the workers. Since it would be a serious thing, indeed, should by some means the operation of the mine be halted, they are making every effort to direct those who are in charge of (especially with regard to the treatment of the workers) and guarding the mine. Several days ago the Chief of the Fourth Section of the staff of the local army was sent to the mines to establish liaison with the detachment there and with those in control.

Trans. 8-27-41

No. 940

FROM: Tokyo — July 8, 1941
TO: Nanking, Hankow, Canton, Tientsin, Peking, Hsinking. — # 1453.

Received from Hongkong as # 323, 5 July.

(Abstract)

Newspapers report that President Roosevelt is sending Latimore to the Chungking government as an adviser.

According to "XYZ", high officials of the Chungking government are displeased with his appointment as he lacks experience in political matters, etc.

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 941

FROM: Tokyo — July 19, 1941
TO: Net — # 1565.

(Received from Hongkong as # 356).

The local Chinese newspapers report that Latimore will go to Chungking on the 19th. Since his arrival in Hongkong on the 15th, he has been continuously entertained, first by the Governor General, then the Pacific International Society, ----- representatives of Chiang Kai-shek, the Central China Propaganda agency, the Third International, and various other supporting groups. On each and every occasion he has spoken words of flattery for Chungking. However, according to XYX, Chungking fears that Latimore will be used by the Communists and the Third Internationale. (According to KC, Chiang Kai-shek has wired to TOKENKŌ regarding Latimore's immediately -----). Immediately after Latimore's arrival TEISŌHAŌ published an article in GAISEITOBANPO regarding the Chungking government's strengthening the international popular front and Latimore's not interfering with the Chungking Government's policy.

He went on to say further that Latimore's knowledge or understanding of China's affairs was very meager and warned that caution would have to be exercised in the future.

However, Latimore paid little attention to the above. He attended a round table conference sponsored by SOKEIOEI and SOTO and appeared to give audience to what they advocated. (The contents of which was the same as the editorial referred to in my # 346[a].)

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[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-31-41

No. 942

FROM: Shanghai — August 2, 1941
TO: Hankow, Nanking, Peking and Tientsin — # 670.

Message to Tokyo as # 1424.

According to HQ, LATIMORE, upon arrival at Chungking exchanged opionions with GAUSS and Fox and then emphasized that for the strengthening of China in accordance with the previous agreement, it would be necessary to partially reorganize the Chinese Government ----- message incomplete -----.

Trans. 8-5-41

No. 943

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) — June 4, 1941
TO: Singapore — # 144.

Secret outside the Department.

Re your # 252[a].

In the Home Office with regard to the securing of visas which are currently pending, it is going to be necessary to give priority to Home Office Staff members. Inasmuch as IWATATE's[b] visa application is of considerable long standing, we are wondering whether we should have HAROLD FUJII, SAGARA's additional successor, remain in this office for the time being or, in view of IWATATE's status as an extra official having aroused much question, we are wondering whether it wouldn't be better to make application for visa as a press correspondent attached to your office. Domei is understood to be considering the advisability of cancelling this man's application and dispatching another successor. Please wire me immediately your view on this matter.

---

[a]Not available.

[b]Recently assigned as "extra secretary" to Singapore.

Trans. 6-10-41

No. 944

FROM: Peking — June 14, 1941
TO: Shanghai — #50.

Re your #61[a].

We have been giving information on the general situation to newspapermen here on condition that they would not publish it and would keep it to themselves. We have done so in hopes of promoting among them a clearer conception of the situation. The Domei wire in question was sent after altering it to suit their own conveneience and without our permission information which was supplied by us. We immediately called together the reporters concerned and warned them against such mistreatment. We will especially be careful hereafter in dealing with newspapermen.

Relayed to Tokyo.

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[a]See II,

Trans. 7-23-41

No. 945

FROM: Shanghai — June 23, 1941
TO: Singapore, Hankow, Tientsin, Peking — #510.

Action Tokyo as #1061

A very disrespectful article was published in the June 21 issue of the "China Weekly Review" on page 83.

Trans. 7-1-41

No. 946

FROM: Tokyo — July 16, 1941
TO: Canton — #289.

The group of reporters to attend the meeting in Canton composed of 23 people (some to join en route) has changed its original schedule and will sail from Ujina on the Government ship "Naminoue." On the 27th, it will sail from Takao[a] on the "Amerika Maru", arriving at Canton on the 29th (or 30th). The Japanese announcement has been drawn up as follows: "To increase cooperation among agencies guiding public opinion in order that we may establish a sphere of co-prosperity in East Asia, our declaration and proposals are now being prepared."

The matter of the Government ships is the strictest of secrets.

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[a]City in S.W. Formosa.

Trans. 7-19-41

No. 947

FROM: Canton — July 22, 1941
TO: Hsinking — # 133.

Message to Tokyo # 273

Preparations for the newspaper conference to be held here have been made by the Preparations Committee which is made up of representatives from both Japanese and Chinese newspapers and which is headed by the Chief of the Canton Province. Since the arrival several days ago of KAKU SHU HO, the Vice Chief of the Publicity Department, thanks to his liaison activity, various plans have been rapidly formulated and a program for the conference has been on the whole completed. (I am sending the program by air). Chief of the Publicity Section, RIN[a], will act as Chairman of this conference. On the first day, the head of the People's Government will attend the conference at an appointed time and deliver an address. I understand that they intend to ask the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister to send telegrams of congratulations from the Japanese Government. However, it has not yet been decided whether to request also the Chief of the Information Section and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to wire congratulatory messages. (It is expected that telegrams will be received from the State Minister of Manchukuo and from the Foreign Minister of the Chinese Government.)

I understand that arrival is expected of the 23 Japanese representatives ----- ----- by the (Rukusef?) Maru, and of the 7 Manchukuoan representatives and the 20 Central China representatives by the Taichu Maru, which is leaving Shanghaijon the 21st. It is said the representatives of North China will in the near future arrive by ship, but due to the fact that there are only three participants from North China, those concerned with the conference feel it strange.

---

[a]LIN PAI-SHENG.

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 948

FROM: Tokyo — August 2, 1941
TO: Shanghai and Canton — # 1720.

(Secret outside the Department)

With a view to starting a first-class Chinese language newspaper under the operation of some Chinese living in Saigon, will you please look for a suitable person and wire me his wishes and opinions together with information regarding his background. It will also be necessary to find a staff which would work with the newspaper publisher.

Trans. 8-6-41

No. 949

FROM: Peking July 14, 1941
TO: Net #302.

(Part 1 of 2).

(Message to Tokyo #455).

Secret outside the Department.

Re my #290[a].

According to HAYASI, who has been working in TAIGHEN[b] until July 11, on this question ever since he had left this city together with the Bureau Chief TANAKA on June 30 because ----- is ill with typhoid, YEN[c], SO FUKU SIN[c], and RYU KITI HO[c] came to TAIGEN and negotiated with Bureau Chief TANAKA, and as a result agreed on the following:

A. The SANSEI Army will itself bring about law and order in SANSEI[d] (please refer to my 259[e]). (1) The Sansei Army will be increased to 300,000 and Japan will, through Nanking, furnish it with funds, arms, and ammunition. (2) After this matter has been agreed upon, it will arrange an armistice with the Japanese authorities.

B. Upon the conclusion of an armistice agreement, an announcement will be made, in the name of YEN SHAKU SAN, on opposition to communism and for cooperation in the establishment of a new order in the Far East. Simultaneously it will announce its disconnection with Chungking and urge comrades to join them. The representatives agreed to submit to Japan on the aforementioned conditions. On account of inadequate means of transportation, it has been agreed that the agreement will be signed in TAIGEN three weeks later. Bureau Chief TANAKA expects to go to Shanghai tomorrow, the 15th, to report this matter to the central authorities. It has been decided that CHO KUO JU[c] and O SEI KOKU[c] representing the Sansei Authorities; and WATANABE, Chief of Staff of the Army in northern China, or YUWAMATSU, Commander of the 1st Army, will be the signers.

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[a]Not Available.
[b]Kana spelling for YANGEU, city in SHANSI Province.
[c]Unidentified.
[d]Kana spelling for SHANSI Province.
[e]Regarding visit of First Chief Secretary of the American Embassy and the Commercial Attaché.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 950

FROM: Peking July 14, 1941
TO: Net #302.

(Circular)

(Part 2 of 2).

(Message to Tokyo #455).

2. Furthermore, YEN has requested: A. That a credit be arranged to back up 30,000,000 yuan worth of currency published in Sansei Province.

B. The return of the business establishment (managed by the Army) belonging to YEN SHAKU SAN[a].

C. The return to Sansei Province of the 13 establishments of YEN HOKU[b].

To this Bureau Chief TANAKA replied that although A and B may be discussed, it would be impossible to realize C because of the relations maintained with the MŌ KYŌ[c] Government. YEN agreed to this.

3. YEN SHAKU SAN is now having the Sansei Army's arsenal which is now located in SIAN moved to Sansei and is having ----- families removed from SISEN[d]. He is also taking steps to organize a larger army by sending representatives to SENSEI[e] and SANTO[f] for the purpose. Furthermore, agents of U GAKU CHU[g] and of other generals have been secretly sent to TAIGEN. They have requested that they be allowed to do likewise in the event that YEN's negotiations with the Japanese are a success; at least there are various rumors to this effect. In consideration of the effect it might have on Chungking, it has been decided after a conference between TANAKA and RYŪ that the negotiations be reported to have ended in a failure. This message has been transmitted to ONANGŌ and SHANGHAI. Please transmit it to Hongkong.

---

[a] Kana spelling for YEN HSI-SHAN, Member of Central Executive Yuan; head of the Shansi forces.
[b] Unidentified.
[c] "Wsino-Mongolia Administrative Province".
[d] Kana spelling for SERCHWAN.
[e] Kana spelling for SHENSI.
[f] In Shantung Province.
[g] Kana spelling for YU HSUEH-CHUNG, Governor of Hopeh Province; member of Nationalist Government Military Committee.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 951

FROM: Tokyo — July 22, 1941
TO: Nanking — # 305.

(Separate Telegram).

The recent change in the Japanese Government was made with the object of more vigorously carrying out our national policy and coping with the world situation by rapidly reorganizing and strengthening our internal organization. As you already know from announcements made by the Imperial Government, this is the reason for our having altered our cabinet. It goes without saying that our foreign policy has not been changed in the least nor our traditional policy toward your country, nor has the intimate relation between your country and ours, which was strengthened by your recent visit to Japan, been affected in the least. I trust that, bearing this in mind, you will courageously strive toward the realization of stability in the Far East. I wish to add that I am resolved to cooperate with added effort on the basis of the sacred pledge we made to the end of bringing about increasing progress and power to your country.

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 952

FROM: Shanghai — July 8, 1941
TO: Peking, Tientsin, Nanking and Canton — #556.

(Circular)

Message to Tokyo #1205.

The following is information gotten from HQ:

CHIANG KAI-SHEK has appointed CHIN SEI[a] as Commander in Chief of Ten, Kin, Etsu and Sho. At the same time he has abolished the rear guards at Konmei[b] and Keirin[c], as well as the organizations in ----- Kei and Suiseiko. Thus, he has decided to organize rear guards for the southwest at Kiyo[d] and has appointed KARU SU KI[e] at the head of them. All this has been done for the purpose of effecting unity under joint command of CHIN and KAHU of the armies in the five districts of Ten, Kei, Kin, Etsu, and Sho, and to coordinate the activities of the miscellaneous forces, thus preparing for a future attack on Thailand and French Indo-China, as well as joint action by Chinese and British armies. At the present time, KA YI is placed in charge of organizing rear guards at Kiyo. It is said that seven British officers lead by Major FUDO[f] are in that city and cooperating with KAYI.

Relay to ----- and Hongkong.

---

[a] Chen Chen—Com. 14th Div.
[b] Kungming, in Yunan Province.
[c] Kueilin, in Kwangsi Province.
[d] Kweiyang, in Kweichow Province.
[e] Pai Chung-hsi, Member of Central Executive Yuan and Committee in charge of the S.W. Armies.
[f] Probably the name "HOOD".
[g] Probably Hsia Wei, Commander of the Kwangsi Army.

Trans. 7-11-41

No. 953

FROM: Shanghai — July 14, 1941
TO: Peking — #575.

(Circular)

Message to Tokyo #1255.

According to HQ, one division of the Kansii Army under KA YI[a], 8,000 special duty troops; and the Ko Ki Sho[b] Division of approximately 2,000 troops from the Keirin[c] barracks have received secret orders to quietly move into Burma between July 7th and 20th. Furthermore, in order to form a second line, Chungking is planning to move into that country by the end of September the army which has been in southern Konan[d] and which is under direct control of that Government. Relative to these moves, Great Britain is now negotiating with Chungking for transference to the Chinese Army the responsibility of defending the areas concerned. Since this question involves both political and economic matters, and therefore, is a difficult one to come to an agreement on, CHIANG KAI-SHEK is having ----- KE TSU make a study with the Military Attaché of the British Embassy in hopes of coming to an agreement. Chungking has also issued instructions to RI SAI SIN[e] and KO KYOKU SHO[f], who have been making a

secret inspection tour of the areas concerned, to submit proposals for a satisfactory settlement of the question.

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[a] Hsia Wei-Commander of the Kwangsi Army.
[b] Huang Chi-Hsiang, formerly Commander of the Kwantung Army.
[c] Kweilin Province.
[d] Hunan Province.
[e] Li Chi-Shen, Military Inspector, Member of Central Executive Yuan.
[f] Huang Hsu-Chu, Governor of Kwangsi Province, Com. of the 15th Army.

Trans. 7-23-41

No. 954

FROM: Shanghai July 26, 1941
TO: Net #627.

(Circular)

(Message to Tokyo #1358)

1. Relative to the issuance of the order by the United States for freezing of Japanese funds, at the behest of the army all officials concerned met in a conference on the 26th. The measures adopted by the liaison committee of the Far Eastern Reconstruction Bureau on July 21 were made the subject of the discussion. As a result, it was decided that further study should be made of Measure #1; namely, a plan to enlarge upon and strengthen the method of adjusting export from China to the third countries, a plan which this office proposed after the shipment of materials for aiding CHIANG had come to a stop and which was still being studied. Although Measure #2, namely the confiscation of the property belonging to Americans and also a limitation of special commercial dealings, may not be very effective, the Financial Section of the Army has been drawing up definite plans having to do with the application in China of the measures to be published by Financial Officials and which had originated in the Ministry of Finance, and the section has also been thinking of ways to strengthen the control over removal of materials. It was decided to bring the results of these studies to this office on the 29th and to draw up measures applicable to the area concerned by further discussion of these plans and then to submit them to the central authorities.

2. We are afraid that retaliations on our part will call forth further retaliations and, therefore, strongly advocate that all measures to be taken in the area concerned should be taken only upon instructions from the central authorities and that it would be necessary to apply them in the best possible way.

The Army and Navy authorities as well as the Far Eastern Reconstruction Bureau and Financial Officials have all been apprised of these steps several days ago, but we have not been informed of them at all. This may have been due to some mistake. However, we would like to receive information as soon as possible in the future in regard to such matters. Furthermore, will you from time to time wire me instructions which I should keep in mind in reference to this question?

Trans. 7-28-41

No. 955

FROM: Shanghai — August 4, 1941
TO: Tientsin and Nanking — # 685.

(Circular)

(Message to Tokyo # 1447)

The following is the gist of observations made by local Japanese banking circles relative to the recent freezing of funds.

1. From the very first FOX has advocated the effective use of Chinese stabilizing funds and that for the purpose of reconstructing Chungking's financial position it is necessary to quickly revise the freezing of both Japanese and Chinese assets. When on a chance visit to Shanghai a few days ago, HENCHMAN, the manager of the Shanghai-Hongkong Bank, gave him every support in the above contention. Recently FOX has been urging the United States to make the move immediately and it is believed that he (FOX) was chiefly responsible for the freezing order issued by the United States.

2. Japan's retaliatory measures being unexpectedly severe the United States showed signs of backing down to a certain extent, particularly with respect to the embargo on petroleum products etc. But this is a customary trick on the part of the United States and we must be careful not to unwittingly put too much dependence upon their actions. As a matter of fact in Shanghai no effective financial plan has been adopted in retaliation against the British-American move and counter moves beyond the prohibition of exports through customs have not been formulated. However, England and the United States obtain very few necessities in Shanghai so that such restrictions amount to very little. About the only effect is that local American and British business firms are dealt a fatal blow.

3. The freezing order has not had much effect on the exchange value of Chinese currency, but commodity prices have begun to rise (see my weekly economic report.) A considerable difference has been manifested right along between the declining ratio of domestic purchasing power and foreign exchange rates and hereafter this tendency will gradually be aggravated. As commerce in bleached cotton, 80 per cent of which is held by third countries, is out off a sudden rise in prices is inevitable and many are even expressing the fear that disturbances will break out.

4. Attention is directed to the fact that as a result of the above uneasiness about Chinese currency, Chinese firms are transferring their deposits to the reserve bank in increasing amounts. Just prior to the freezing, on July 25, the total deposits in this bank were something in excess of 57,000,000 yuan but by August 1, they had reached the sum of 81,000,000 yuan.

Trans. 8-7-41

No. 956

FROM: Shanghai — July 28, 1941
TO: Peking, Tientsin, Nanking and Hankow — # 641.

(Circular)

Message to Tokyo as # 1373.

According to secret information secured from the Vice-Manager of the Chinese Bank, American banks here in Shanghai decided after conference on the 26th, that although they had

agreed to make payments in either American or Chinese currency, due to the operation of the order freezing Chinese credits in the United States, they would be unable for a time to guarantee payment in American money in New York. I have informed Japanese banks here of the above.

Relayed to -----.

Trans. 7-31-41

No. 957

FROM: Peking — August 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 123.

Re your Circular # 1550[a].

We do not understand what conditions are as no details of the freezing of Chinese funds have been received. Definite plans to include North China are being made here. Please send us any information received.

Note: This message is badly garbled, thus the translation may be doubtful.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 8-5-41

No. 958

FROM: Tokyo — June 30, 1941
TO: Canton — # 1373.

(Circular)

Message from Hongkong as # 312 on June 28th.

(Report of Primary Order).

According to CF, FOX of the Commission for Collections resents orders issued to him by Chungking and declares that, unless that Government institutes some changes, he will be unable to cope with the situation and is very much dissatisfied. An influential man in the local (Four Harbor Joint Facilities Station?) tells me that he has heard the same thing. He said: "FOX repeats to the Chinese officials that so long as China does not institute some fundamental changes in her financial and economic set-up, loans and other temporary palliatives will do no good. What he demands first of all is financial and economic reform. When CURRY visited Chungking there was much bowing and smiling, eating and drinking, press interviews and a general waste of time. FOX, however, is determined this time to dispense with the big dinners and get down to work. He is sending men out into the field to observe the actual progress of the war and, with this in view, he himself has gone to Shanghai."

Now, when it comes to assisting China, I am sure that the information FOX sends in will be the exact data that Washington is looking for and the (Four Harbor Joint Facilities Stations?) are busy carrying out FOX's every demand.

Relay to -----, Peking, Canton, and Hsinking.

Trans. 7-12-41

No. 959

FROM: Peking — August 5, 1941
TO: Tsingtao — # 88 (?).

Re your # 132[a].

(1) 500 tons per month is not much more than previously, and therefore after conferring with the local committee and reducing the amount some you may issue permit for it.

(2) It is our policy to have the British and American "Trust(s)" voluntarily submit a written promise along the following lines meeting our demands, and then to allow them to continue to do business. Negotiations have already been begun between the local officials and the representatives of the "trust(s)", and it seems at present that the "trust(s)" will recognize our (demands) in their entirety.

(a) In the operation of the British and American "trust(s)" from now on, the approval of an adviser approved by the authorities will be secured at all times.

(b) In order to preserve intact the ownership of (factories) ----- and materials, these will not be transferred at will.

(c) Unconditional compliance will be expected in the matter of the stationing of guards sent by the authorities.

(d) The instructions of the authorities will be followed in the matter of raising of funds and the distribution of profits.

(Documents connected with this will be sent by mail.)

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[a]Not available

Trans. 8-12-41

No. 960

FROM: Tokyo — July 22, 1941
TO: Hsinking, Tientsin, Peking, Tsingtao, Nanking, and Shanghai — # 1576.

(Circular)

(To be sent in Government. Secret within the office.)

From the middle of this month changes on a large scale have been ordered with regard to transportation. With the reference to ----- ships, you are to take the following steps immediately:

1. Incoming ships:

(a) All foreign ships will be held up at the entrance to the harbor. Unless orders to the contrary are received, Japanese ships may enter.

(b) When absolutely necessary, foreign ships arriving at Kobe, Osaka, and Hakodate may be authorized to anchor in the outer harbor.

(c) For the present, no foreign ships will be permitted to stop at any harbors other than the above on the Inland Sea, in northern Kyūshū, and along the northern coast of Yamaguchi Prefecture.

2. Regarding embarkation of foreigners: Foreigners will be denied steam ship tickets on the ground that there are no accommodations. In the event that tickets have already been issued, these must be cancelled.

Furthermore, for the present, foreigners will not be sold tickets on railways between main points on the pretext that there is a shortage of seating space, lodging, and other facilities.

Trans. 8-6-41

No. 961

FROM: Tokyo — August 2, 1941
TO: Hsinking — No number.

Re your # 469[a] and # 475[a].

As you know, with the change in the political situation, the methods employed for granting visas to military men visiting our country have become both complicated and delicate. For some time this Ministry has realized the necessity of unifying these methods, and at present we are having some visas handled after instructions for their disposal have been requested in accordance with our directions. The method suggested in your telegram; namely, of your office issuing instructions regarding the handling of visas to offices located in Manchukuo and China, and which have been referring cases to this Ministry, and especially of having inquiries of whether or not a visa should be granted addressed to your office, would result in ignoring the power of this Ministry over the matter. I, therefore, ask you to be especially careful to avoid this and, hereafter when you issue any visas, to be sure to request instructions from this office before issuance.

Under the present abnormal circumstances, the policy with regard to handling of visas should be that given in my Circular Telegram # 1724[b]. Regardless of the reasons given in your telegram, visas should be issued according to this policy. Will you, therefore, wire messages to this effect from your office to the addresses mentioned in your caption message and wire me immediately that you have done so.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] II, 962.

Trans. 8-6-41

No. 962

FROM: Tokyo — August 2, 1941
TO: Tientsin, Peking, Tsingtao, Harbin, Hsinking, Nanking and Shanghai — # 1724.

(Circular # 1724)

(Secret outside the Department)

Because of the abnormal situation prevailing at present, restrictions are being placed upon travel of foreigners in Japan, Manchukuo and China. There is a rumor now current in this connection to the effect that all visas to foreigners are being (*withheld?*) but the fact is that, in so far as we are concerned and setting aside instances of embarkation on steamers, there is no injunction placed on travel by foreigners. While it is necessary to take into consideration the abnormal situation referred to, I would like to have you take care that in the case of visas

regarding the handling of which instructions should be sought, you seek instructions as heretofore, in case of others, you do not go to the extreme in restricting their issuance.

I am sending this for your information.

Trans. 8-16-41

No. 963

FROM: Hsinking August 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 510.

1. Recently, the army decided on the administrative policy that will be applied on the conquered areas of Siberia. The plan will shortly be submitted to the Emperor for his approval, it is said. The outline of their plan is as follows:

a. General Hata will be in charge of the administration, with Chief of Staff Colonel Junkyū Ikeda his immediate subordinate. Others in the committee include Lieutenant Colonels Saito and Igosi (Egoshi?).

b. The following executive sections will be set up under the above named administrative body:

General Affairs, Peace Preservation, Transportation, Communications, Economics, Public Affairs.

The Chiefs of these sections shall be ----- (garbled).

c. Independent of the above, bureaus of Investigation, Transportation, Communications, and Propaganda, shall be established. They shall receive the support of the Executive Sections and carry on investigations and other various duties.

d. The Investigation Bureau shall investigate the ----- of the South Manchurian Railway.

e. Administrative bodies (corresponding to our Prefectural governments) shall be established in the various districts, under the supervision of the above mentioned Executive organ.

2. There is practically no room for the Foreign Ministry in the plans as they stand at present. This may mean that we would lose a voice in the settlement of the ----- affair. We believe that it is of the utmost importance to obtain some major post in the new set-up and thus assure us a voice in it.

a. The Foreign Ministry should at least get the assignment for the office of the Assistant to the Chief of the General Affairs Section of the above mentioned Executive Organ, and the office of the Chief of Public Affairs Section.

b. The post of the Chief or the Assistant Chief of the Investigation Section should go to the Foreign Ministry.

We are of the opinion that the above are the minimum requests we should make to assure ourselves a voice in the new set-up. Will you please, therefore, give this matter your immediate attention and take steps before the proposal is submitted to the Emperor for his approval. Please advise me of the results.

We intend to contact the ----- concerning this matter here, too, so please advise me of all points that I should be aware of.

General Hata has already indicated to Secretary (Yositomi?) that he would not object to having a Foreign Ministry representative assume the post of section chief or assistant section chief under the above mentioned Executive Organ.

Trans. 8-5-41

No. 964

FROM: Nanking May 24, 1941
TO: Peking #127.

(Circular)

(Message to Tokyo as #337.)

On the 23rd, the German Consul General called on commercial official NAKAMURA and said he had heard various rumors to the effect that Japan was negotiating with the United States, through STEWARD, to make peace with Chungking. He asked what the truth was, and went on to say that on Ambassador HONDA'S[a] return to Japan, the newspapers were full of rumors to the effect that Japan was trying to get the United States to mediate the incident. NAKAMURA replied that there is no truth in statements to the effect that we are seeking the assistance of the United States; that the Ambassador had had no negotiations with STEWARD and, as a matter of fact, none of us Japanese have any interest whatever in that fellow; that these rumors are mere heresay which gather momentum as they run from ear to ear; that our policy is as ever unchanged and that we do not have any intention of becoming particularly friendly with the United States at the expense of the Axis. The German Consul General then went on to display considerable dissatisfaction over the question of German merchants in China and said that he knew perfectly well that Japan was of the opinion that she could push Germany around as she pleased in China; that he would like to know whether or not Foreign Minister MATSUOKA said anything about this matter in Berlin; that we should be aware of the fact that Chungking's relations with the United States and England and her dependence thereon are now stronger than ever, whereas the Nanking Government leans toward the Japanese-Berlin-Italian Axis; that, therefore, he considered any attempts to make up with Chungking under the present circumstances futile. He continued that what Germany expects of Japan is that she treat German merchants on a parity with her own merchants in China because, as a matter of fact, when the Chungking officials were in full sway, because of extraterritorial rights, Germany was actually in a better commercial position than she is today. Furthermore, communications at present are cramping Germany's activities. He said that he would like to know Japan's attitude on these matters. He said also that he would like to know why we have not established diplomatic relations with Poland and the other nations which Germany had annexed because the Berlin officials are very much interested in these two points.

Well, I feel quite sure that the Consul General 's visit was upon instructions from Berlin.

Relayed to Shanghai and Peking.

---

[a] Ambassador to Nanking.

Trans. 5-28-41

No. 965

FROM: Tokyo — June 3, 1941
TO: Berlin — # 475.

According to a special dispatch the German government on June 1st established communications with Chungking via Moscow. Please ascertain the facts in the case and the German government's motive in doing this and wire the result.

Trans. 6-5-41

No. 966

FROM: Berlin (Osima) — June 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 695.

Re your # 475[a].

I inquired of the matter at the German Foreign Office and received the following information:

1. Heretofore separate airplane connections existed between Berlin and Moscow and between Moscow and Chungking, but because of the irregularity of the connection between Moscow and Arumaata[b], the service could not be utilized. However, recently daily service was established between these points and an agreement was made between the postal authorities of Germany and Soviet Russia regarding the handling and cost of mail matter between Berlin and Chungking. The through service has been in effect since June 1.

2. The services between Berlin and Moscow and between Moscow and Arumaata are daily. Between Arumaata and Hami[c] there are two flights a week, and between Hami and Chungking there is only one flight a week. I understand when connections are made as they should be, it is possible to fly from Berlin to Chungking in six days.

3. As you may see from the above, the connection between Berlin and Chungking has no great political significance and so is nothing to be very much concerned over.

4. I have transmitted this message together with your caption message.

---

[a] See II, 965 in which Tokyo informs Berlin that on June 1 the German Government established communications with Chungking via Moscow.

[b] Arumaata = Alma—Ata; capital of Kazak Republic, Soviet Russia.

[c] Hami = town and oasis, East Sinkiang, China. About 43° north, 93° east,

Trans. 6-18-41

No. 967

FROM: Tokyo — June 2, 1941
TO: Nanking — # 178.

Separate message.

(Department Secret)

1. Mr. WANG CHING WEI[a] plans to visit Japan about the middle of June so we are proceeding with our preparations.

2. As a matter of principle, Mr. WANG CHING WEI is to be accorded the treatment of a sovereign on his visit to Japan but only during the brief time of his reception in the Imperial Court.

3. The East Asia Development Company is conferring, on its own part, on ways and means of receiving Mr. WANG CHING WEI.

Points to be remembered:

a. On the Japanese Reception Committee for Mr. WANG CHING WEI will be five ministers; namely, the Premier and the Ministers of War, Navy, Foreign Affairs and Finance.

b. The general welcome will be unrestrained and we will give our people instructions to conduct themselves in such a way as to make Mr. WANG CHING WEI feel that he is receiving the treatment due a complete sovereign.

---

[a] Chief of the Nanking Government.

Trans. 6-5-41

No. 968

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Nanking

June 12, 1941
203.

It is requested that SHIMIZU make an immediate reply concerning the following:

1. Please give details so that there will be no mistake in the order of names of the persons accompanying (WANG CHING WEI). (It is rumored that there is doubt as to the position to be given to the assistant, SHŪ JI CHŌ, and CHIN KUN KEI.)

2. Are the five persons having an audience with the Emperor to be SHŪ, JO RIN, SHŪ, and CHIN (KUN KEI)?

3. (The persons properly qualified to form a part of ?) the party will be SHŪ JI CRŌ, RA KŌ RIN, CHIN KOKU KI, CHIN JŌ TŌ, Ō KIN GEN and (Sub?) Lieutenant YOSHIOKA.

4. Should the persons meeting the respective ministers be SHŪ JI CHŌ as well as SHU FUTSU KAI meeting the Prime Minister, SHŪ FUTSU KAI, JO RYŌ, YIN PAKU SEI[a], meeting the Naval Minister SHŪ FUTSU KAI meeting the Army-Navy (? !) Minister, and SHŪ FUTSU KAI and CHIN KUN KEI meeting the Minister of Finance.

5. Also, would there be any objections to a summary of the daily program to be followed being printed in the newspapers, this to form a part of the propaganda circulating in Japan proper?

6. A "statement" is to be made on the 18th. There will be an interview of the important men with special newspaper reporters on the 22nd, and furthermore, a day before leaving Tokyo it is desired that a "statement" be issued.

7. No newspaper reporter is to have an interview with Departmental Head RIN from the time of his landing in Kobe until the afternoon of the 18th. (There is no objection to photographs being taken.)

8. The return trip will depend upon weather conditions, but it is considered safe enough for it is considered safe enough for it to be made by the Kobe Maru and from Shanghai to Nanking by the regular airplane service. (It has been raining in Tokyo since the 11th.)

9. The Japanese delegation which will be with the party until Kobe will consist of the representative of the Premier, the head of the Far Eastern Section, head of the Protocol (?) Section;

Administrative Official SHIMAZU (SHIMATSU?), and Secretary MIYAZAKI, Ambassador CHO, Assistant SON RI, Central Protection ----- Official, and the Naval Representative.

10. My representative will be at the Koshien Hotel[b] on the 15th.
11. There will also be reporters (both Japanese and Chinese). Please reply.

---

[a] Also spelled RIN HAKU SEI.
[b] Well known hotel near Kobe.

Trans. 6-18-41

No. 969

FROM: Tokyo — June 9, 1941
TO: Nanking — # 194.

(*Abstract*)

Text of official report regarding Wang's visit to Japan to be carried in the evening papers of the 14th.

Trans. 6-14-41

No. 970

FROM: Nanking — June 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 394.

Wang Ching-wei left[a] by aeroplane at 3 p.m. on the 13th.

---

[a] For Tokyo, via Shanghai.

Trans. 6-16-41

No. 971

FROM: Shanghai — June 14, 1941
TO: Nanking — # 173.

Message to Tokyo as # 983.

WANG started from here according to plan at 11:00 a.m., on the 14th and is now on his way to Japan.

Trans. 6-18-41

No. 972

FROM: Nanking June 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 398.

On the 14th, in a radio broadcast from Japan, it was stated that this visit to Japan of Chief WANG is his second. Furthermore, the Shanghai Mainichi, in both an article and an editorial, refers to a previous visit. Have you lifted the ban on publication of such a fact? I shall have to keep the papers here straight on this matter, so please wire me back.

Relayed to Shanghai.

Trans. 6–19–41

No. 973

FROM: Nanking June 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 365.

(*Abstract*)

Re my # 355[a].

Wang's apprehension regarding safety of his life, in connection with his trip to Japan, allayed by our assurance of safe conduct.

---

[a] Report capture of Chau Fuo-Hai by Chiang Kai-shek's agents, see II, 974.

Trans. 7–1–41

No. 974

FROM: Nanking June 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 355.

CHOU FUO-HAI's mother[a] and other members of his family have been captured by Chiang Kai-shek's agents.

---

[a] Former member of the Central Executive Yuan under Chiang Kai-shek; now with the Nanking (Wang Ching-wei) government.

Trans. 7–1–41

No. 975

FROM: Shanghai — June 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 969.

Re your # 1193[a] from the Minister.

In addition to Police Inspector NIMUJA, I have decided to send five aides and four police officers from the Shanghai office as far as the suburbs as an escort for WANCHIN WEI and his party. Your approval is respectfully requested.

---

[a] See II, 975A, in which Tokyo wires Shanghai that WANG CHING WEI will return to Shanghai following his visit to Japan.

Trans. 6-18-41

No. 975A

FROM: Tokyo — June 6, 1941
TO: Shanghai — No number.

Circular # 1193.

Secret outside the Department.

WANG CHING WEI will leave Shanghai on the 14th for Japan. After being in Tokyo for a period of some ten days, he plans to return to Shanghai. In view of the present political situation, undesirable Koreans and Taiwanese ----- ----- (incomplete).

Trans. 6-11-41

No. 976

FROM: Tokyo — June 10, 1941
TO: Nanking — # 201.

We will have to have railway passes issued to WANG CHING WEI's entourage, so please wire me back by return wire the names of WANG's secretary, his valet and the four Chinese newspaper correspondents.

Trans. 6-12-41

No. 977

FROM: Tokyo — June 27, 1941
TO: Nanking — # 228.

Action Shanghai as # 606.

Please convey the following as my instruction to Wang Ching-wei:

"At the time of our conversations, I told Wang Ching-wei that if possible we would like to announce the matter of the loan to the Central Government along with the matter of recognition on July 1. However, as the outbreak of the Russ-Soviet (German) war may occasion a delay in the

matter of recognition, we will announce the matter of the loan separately at 4 p.m. on the 28th, as I announced in my separate telegram #605[a] (to appear in the morning edition on the 29th)."

I have relayed this with my separate telegram to the Ambassador in Nanking.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 6-30-41

No. 978

FROM: Shanghai June 28, 1941
TO: Net #523.

(Circular)

Message to Tokyo as #1101.

Re my #1096[a].

WANG and his party have left Shanghai and the ban on articles and reports will be lifted at 6:00 p.m. on the 28th (Japan time). Please transmit from Peking to officials concerned in North China.

This message sent to Nanking, Peking, Hankow and Canton.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-1-41

No. 979

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 10, 1941
TO: Berlin #498.

Strictly secret.

When I visited Germany on my recent European tour, Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP gave me definite assurances that, with regard to the question of recognizing the New People's Government, he would do so at any time, in accordance with this Minister's wishes. Now that German-Soviet relations are strained has there been any change in German governmental opinion in this connection? Find out for our information. After you have questioned Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP, wire me immediately.

Trans. 6-12-41

No. 980

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 14, 1941
TO: Berlin #514.

Re your #679[a].

In order that we may properly receive NIKAKULS[b] on his visit to Japan, please make representations to RIBBENTROP as if coming directly from me, in accordance to previous telegrams. You are urgently requested to reply concerning the results of these representations.

[a]See II, 981 in which RIBBENTROP states he has no objection to recognizing Wang regime if Japanese government wishes it.

[b]Kana spelling.

No. 981

FROM: Berlin (Osima) June 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #679.

Strictly secret.

Re your #498[a].

As I have reported to you previously in my 159[b], RIBBENTROP told me, also, that he had no objections to recognizing the WANG regime, if it is the wish of the Japanese Government to have him do so, (reserving, of course, HITLER's approval of the matter). He had given you the same assurance last month, so now that German-Soviet relations are strained. I believe Germany would not change her mind in this matter.

Although I have sent you my opinion on this question in my telegram #209[b], I have not yet received your instructions in reply. I would like to ascertain RIBBENTROP's attitude again after you have informed me of your decision in regard to this question, since to ask from time to time the German attitude without our deciding our policy in whether we should ask Germany and Italy to recognize the WANG Government is a matter of our prestige.

[a]See II, 979 in which Matsuoka asks Osima to ascertain whether or not there has been any change in Ribbentrop's intention to recognize the New People's Government at any time that Matsuoka so wishes.

[b]Not available.

Trans. 6-14-41

No. 982

FROM: Berlin (Oshima) June 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #699.

Regarding your #514[a]:

On my inquiry as to whether Germany will comply with our desires and recognize the Wang regime, Ribbentrop said that, as he had already replied to me in February, on this matter, as far as he is concerned, he of course intends to accord such recognition whenever Japan wishes

it done. (See my message #159[b]). He then asked if the suggestion of your Ambassador is now to be taken as a formal proposal of the Japanese Government, stating that if such be the case, he will immediately secure the approval of Chancellor Hitler, as he has not spoken to the Chancellor on this subject as yet.

I told him that I would give him a definite reply after once more ascertaining what the instructions of the Imperial Government would be.

As I ventured to opine in my message #209[b], to continue indefinitely to leave this matter in uncertainty will reflect on the dignity of the Imperial Government, and therefore, I think it proper that we either formally request the recognition of the Wang regime by the German Government, or else at this time convey to the German Government the reasons why we do not seek such recognition.

Please come to a decision as to our attitude at once, and instruct me.

---

[a]Matsuoka requests Berlin to make representations to Ribbentrop re recognition of the Wang regime in order that proper reception can be given NIKAKULS (Kana spelling) on his visit to Japan. See II, 980.

[b]Not available.

Trans. 6–24–41

No. 983

FROM: Berlin — June 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #790.

Re my message #789[a].

The German recognition of the Nanking government will be in the form of a commercial treaty, giving German commercial firms full rights in China.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 6–30–41

No. 984

FROM: Tokyo — July 9, 1941
TO: Shanghai — #1467.

(Circular)

(*Abstract*)

Re Berlin to Tokyo #841[a].

Germany requests Japan to obtain the Nanking government's assurance that Germans will be accorded the same privileges as those accorded the Japanese, before submitting the proposals for a German-Nanking Trade Agreement to the Nanking government.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 7–14–41

No. 985

FROM: Tokyo — June 28, 1941
TO: Net — # 1356.

(Circular)

(Message to Nanking # 231)

Re my # 229[a].

Since we consider that it would not be well for the news of German and Italian recognition of the People's Government to leak out to the newspapers prematurely from our side, we have issued an order prohibiting publication of the question of recognition to be accorded by any third power country to the People's Government. Will you also get in touch with the authorities of the People's Government and take precautions. This ban will be lifted as soon as recognition has been given to the People's Government.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-2-41

No. 986

FROM: Berlin (Osima) — July 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 863.

Re my # 820[a].

On the 7th, WEEMAN, Chief of the State Department, gave the following confidential information to KASE[b]:

1. "The departure of the members of the Chinese Embassy and consulates will probably be delayed until after the 10th, but their withdrawal is certain. The matter of winding up the affairs of the Chinese Embassy will be turned over to the Protocol Bureau who are to get in touch with members of your office.
2. "After we advised the Chinese of our severance of relations with Chungking, CHEN KAI[c] sent us a note severely criticizing our recognition of the Nanking Government. Since it was entirely out of order for us to be in receipt of such a rude communication, we simply returned it.
3. "Within the Chungking sphere of influence there are now residing about 150 Germans whose safety is causing us grave concern. If you Japanese have any ideas as to how to handle the matter, we would be very glad to have you advise us."

I will appreciate it very much if you will take up the above three points by return wire.

[a] Not available.
[b] Counselor at Japanese Embassy in Berlin.
[c] Chinese Ambassador in Germany.

Trans. 7-10-41

No. 987

FROM: Rome (Horikiri) June 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #407.

Re your Circular #1318[a].

I called on CIANO the 26th, and after I had made representations in accordance with your instructions, he said: "As you know, Italy all along has been prepared to recognize the Nanking Government. The fact is that not long ago I even wired WANG CHIN WEI. In addition to this fact, the present Italian Ambassador to China, though he has lived there three years, has not so far presented his credentials to the Chungking Government. In the light of this, it is apparent the Italian Government is giving de facto recognition to the Nanking Government. Though the carrying out of formal recognition offers no difficulties from a political point of view to the Italian Government, we have no recourse but to keep in step with Germany. I will, therefore, get in direct telephone communication with Germany and have another talk with Premier MUSSOLINI, after which I will give you a definite reply. I have transmitted this message to Germany.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 6-28-41

No. 988

FROM: Rome (Horikiri) June 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #414.

Re my #410[a].

On the 30th, PRUNAS[b] told ANDO[c] the following:

1. The Italian Government has completed all arrangements to wire its Ambassador in Shanghai and have him proceed to Nanking tomorrow, the 1st.
2. Instructions have already been wired to Italian diplomatic representatives in the various countries urging them to recommend the other signatories to the Three-Power Pact to give recognition.
3. Several days ago the Spanish Government inquired of the Italian Government what attitude it was to take, and so the Italian Government recommended that the Spanish Government grant recognition. It is, therefore, expected that Spain will also recognize Nanking.

This message has been transmitted to Berlin.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Director General of Transoceania Bureau, Italian Foreign Office.
[c] Secretary in the Japanese Embassy in Rome.

Trans. 7-12-41

No. 989

FROM: Rome — July 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #421.

Re my #417[a].

Croatia announced through the Italian government that it was recognizing the Nanking regime as of today, July 1st.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-2-41

No. 990

FROM: Hsinking — July 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #414.

Re your #362[a].

No objection to Manchukuo and Croatia mutually recognizing each other. Suggest making the arrangements through the Minister in Manchukuo.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-10-41

No. 991

FROM: Rome — July 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #420.

On the 1st, PURUUNASU[a] informed Andō[b] that the Chungking government has notified the Italian government that it will sever diplomatic relations in the event Italy recognizes the Nanking government. Both Italian Ambassador in Chungking and Chinese Ambassador in Rome are expected to return to their respective countries. Germany is also expected to do likewise.

[a]Prunas.
[b]Secretary in the Japanese Embassy, Rome.

Trans. 7-2-41

No. 992

FROM: Tokyo — July 4, 1941
TO: Nanking — # 255.

Message to Berlin # 612.

Strictly Secret. To be handled in government code.

Re your # 478[a], M.M.M.[b] Intelligence Report.

The gist of the wire which the Chief of the Foreign Section of the Chungking Government sent to the Chinese Embassies in Germany and Italy on July 3rd is as follows:

"Since both Germany and Italy have recognized the clandestine government, we have decided to break off relations with both countries. Consequently, leading all the members of your staffs, evacuate immediately. Dispose of the various instruction wires as you have already been instructed to do.

Also, please have the Consul-General in Austria do likewise."

Relay to Rome. Relayed to Nanking.

---

[a] Not available.

[b] It is thought that this deals with military intelligence.

Trans. 7-11-41

No. 993

FROM: Rome — July 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 430.

On the 4th, PRUNAS[a] confidentially told ANDŌ[b] the following: "The Italian government has definitely broken off relations with the Chungking Government, effective this date, and has told the local Chinese Embassy as much. We are of a mind to evacuate Acting Ambassador ALLESANDRINI first of all and then the remainder of the Embassy officials from Chungking."

---

[a] Director General of Transoceania Bureau, Italian Foreign Office.

[b] Secretary in the Japanese Embassy in Rome.

Trans. 7-11-41

No. 994

FROM: Nanking — July 2, 1941
TO: Net — No number.

Message to Tokyo # 447.

Re your # 235[a].

On the 2nd, Commercial Attaché NAKAMURA, together with the Army and Navy Attachés, called on WANG and congratulated him upon his Government's being recognized by Germany, Italy and other countries. WANG, in a very happy mood, stated that it was due to Japan's

assistance that the People's Government has become what it is today and requested that we convey to the Imperial Government his hearty gratitude.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-11-41

No. 995

FROM: Tokyo July 5, 1941
TO: Nanking #253.

(In 2 parts—complete.)

Received from Vichy as #336, 1 July.

Re your #252[a].

On 1 July, I called on Darlan and said that it was evident from what former Foreign Minister Banden said to the then Ambassador Sawada, last September, that France was interested in the matter of recognizing the Nanking government. I added that since the establishment of this government, it has become more and more influential with the passage of time. It has made such strides that today it stands on a very sound foundation. On 1 July, both Germany and Italy recognized this government, and there are indications that several others of the European countries will shortly follow suit.

It is the hope and desire of Japan, I continued, that France, too, take this opportunity to give her recognition of the Nanking government.

To this Darlan replied:

1. France, (being bound by the terms of the German-French peace treaty ----- is not in the same position as others of the European countries. She does not necessarily have to act in precisely the same manner as other members of the Axis powers.

2. Should the peace treaty be revised and another treaty of a better type take its place, and if, in conjunction with this, France were to be given a chance to cooperate in the new situation in Europe, France could make basic changes in her foreign policy. Under such circumstances, France could view her relations under an entirely different light and would make radical changes. However, matters have not progressed to such a point as yet.

3. France possesses French Indo-China, which has a common border with Chiang Kai-shek's domain. As far as I (Darlan) know, Wang's influence does not extend to the southwestern part as yet. Should France, under these circumstances go ahead and recognize the Wang regime, there may be disastrous results. The Chiang faction would, probably, start disputes -----. This would be very much against the interests of France and she is doing everything in her power to prevent occurrence.

4. For these reasons, in spite of the fact that France is exceedingly anxious to voluntarily recognize the Wang regime as an expression of friendship towards Japan, she cannot afford to give rise to unfortunate developments as a result of it. However, if the Soviet Union's aid to Chiang vanishes because of the German-Soviet war resulting in materially weakening Chiang Kai-shek; or if German-French cooperation moves forward another step, and thus wipes away all uncertainties for the future for the people of France, or until such a time that France can keep in solid step with Germany and Japan, it is France's intention to maintain the status quo.

I, therefore, replied that I was perfectly aware of the fact that France was in a different position from any of the other European countries in so far as her position in the Far East was concerned. Moreover, I said, our requesting France to recognize the Wang regime at this time should not be taken to mean that we expected France to do everything that the Axis powers did. However, it is a fact that practically all of France's interests in China are controlled by the Wang government and for this reason it would seem to be to the interest of France to establish healthy relations with that government, I said. I requested that he keep the above fact in mind when giving this matter his further consideration.

In any event, I said in conclusion, we would no doubt find other opportunities in the future to further discuss this matter.

There are indications that even the President is placing considerable importance in this matter. However, it is apparent that France feels considerable concern over the possibility of Chiang Kai-shek extending the conflict to French Indo-China. I, myself, being of the opinion that it would not be particularly to our interest to involve French Indo-China too deeply at the present time, deemed it wise to drop this matter for the time being. I do not think it advisable to press France too much on this recognition matter at the present time.

Translator's note: Last three paragraphs badly garbled; considerable guessing contained in translation.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-9-41

No. 996

FROM: Tokyo July 4, 1941
TO: ----- # 1426.

(Circular)

(Message to Vichy # 256).

Re your # 336[a].

The people's government is most eager to get France's recognition and so please again press the matter strongly on the government.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-8-41

No. 997

FROM: Vichy July 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 344.

Re your # 256[a].

I am of the opinion that it would be well to point out in issuing our demands for military bases the fact that French Indo-China is without defenses at the present time and could very

easily be subjected to manipulations by a third country. As I reported in my message #336[b], Darlan, himself, stated on the occasion of my talks with him concerning Vichy's recognition of Wang's government, that the above anxiety exists with regard to French Indo-China.

Should we conduct negotiations with the Vichy government regarding recognition of the Wang government, prior to making our demands for bases, we may be faced with the possibility of having to say that there were no dangers to French Indo-China from third countries. It is needless to say that that would be very unfavorable to us. (For the moment, I am not taking into consideration that the Vichy government will encourage us in our demands for bases.) It is quite possible, moreover, that as a result of our demands for bases, Franco-Japanese diplomatic relations be broken off. It would be better; under such circumstances it would be to our disadvantage if the Wang government has recognized the Vichy government.

It was with these considerations in mind that I reported as I did at the end of my message #336[b].

From your message #256[a], it is not clear whether you understood the above circumstances or not. I bring out these points again because I thought that possibly you read only that part of my message which concerned the matter of recognizing the Wang government. Will you please transmit your instructions.

---

[a]See II, 996: "The People's Government is most anxious to get France's recognition, and so please again press the matter strongly on the Government."

[b]See II, 995: Jap Amb. at Vichy discusses with Admiral Darlan the question of French recognition of the Nanking government. Because of France's peculiar position under Axis control, and for fear of repercussions from Chungking, Darlan states that for the time being France will continue to maintain the status quo.

Trans. 7–18–41

No. 998

FROM: Berlin — June 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #791.

Re my #783.

According to your Circular #1318 you desire to have the recognition of all Axis countries. In regard to France, it seems that France is seeking Germany's favor at this time. However, in order to insure freedom of action for ourselves in the future, I think it would be best at this time not to ask for France's recognition.

Trans. 6–30–41

No. 999

FROM: Tokyo — July 14, 1941
TO: Nanking — #295.

Message from Vichy as #368.

Re your #256[a].

On the 14th, I went to see Vice-Premier DARLAN and told him that the Japanese Government is now particularly desirous of having Vichy recognize the new Government in Nanking.

In connection with the anxiety which France seems to have concerning French Indo-China, I begged him to reconsider the contents of your message and he promised: "As that is a big question for France, too, I will study it."

Relayed to Berlin.

---

[a] See II, 996, which says that the People's Government is most eager to get France's recognition.

Trans. 7–19–41

No. 1000

FROM: Tokyo July 31, 1941
TO: Vichy #336.

Re your #168 (?).

In view of the establishment of joint defense measures by Japan and French Indo-China it is desired that France go a step farther and recognize the Nanking government. Please wire the present trend of affairs. Furthermore it is reported that Chungking is sending GIDOMEI[a] as ambassador to France and that he left for his post July 13th, going via the United States. Inasmuch as this has an important bearing on the recognition problem please ascertain France's attitude on this and wire. Please relay to Germany.

---

[a] WEI Tao-ming. He is graduate of University of Paris, was member of Chinese Reconstruction Committee and has various newspaper connections.

Trans. 8–14–41

No. 1001

FROM: Tokyo July 8, 1941
TO: Berlin #615.

Re your #837 (?)[a].

Please suggest to the German government that Denmark and Finland recognize the Nanking government. Also when you mention this please suggest that we desire to have them recognize Manchuria at the same time. (Regarding the recognition of Manchuria, it would be well if you would get in touch with the Manchurian Minister there. I think the proper procedure would be to have the Ministers of these two countries resident in Berlin or else have the Ministers of these two countries resident in Japan get in touch with the Manchurian Minister resident in Japan.)

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7–9–41

No. 1002

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

July 12, 1941
#694.

Re your #615[a].

I called on WEISZAECKER[b] on the 11th, and gave him the message contained in your telegram. With regard to the question of Manchukuoan recognition, he said that it would be necessary to secure RIBBENTROP's sanction but that the purport of your message had been noted. The principal points of this telegram and caption telegram have been transmitted to Finland and Sweden.

---

[a]See II, 1001 in which Tokyo requests Berlin to suggest to the German Government that Denmark and Finland recognize the Nanking and Manchurian Governments.

[b]Chief of Political Section, German Foreign Office.

Trans. 7-15-41

No. 1003

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Shanghai

July 21, 1941
#1571.

(Circular)

Message from Berlin as #917 on the 18th.

Re my #894[a].

On the 17th, the Foreign Office again informed me that they would handle the matter in question in accordance with the desire of the Japanese Government and that they would have their Ministers in Finland and Denmark transmit the request to the governments of the respective countries. (Incidentally, I might say that the matter is agreeable to Bureau Chiefs in Switzerland and Denmark.) The Foreign Office also asked if it would not be well if Japan also contacted the Ministers of these countries and through them submitted the request to Finland and Denmark. I replied that we would do so. Furthermore, in regard to the form in which recognition is to be given, the WANG regime, following a customary practice, has agreed to inform in writing its representatives in Berlin and Manchukuo. Please informed that I intend to arrange for contacts with Helsinki and Stockholm (*sic*).

---

[a]See II, 1002, in which WEISZAECKER (Chief of the Political Section of the German Foreign Office) tells OSIMA that it would be necessary to secure RIBBENTROP's sanction to the question of Manchukuoan recognition.

Trans. 7-23-41

No. 1004

FROM: Tokyo July 23, 1941
TO: Hsinking # 1584.

(Circular)

(Abstract)

Finland will recognize the Manchukuo government and possibly the Nanking government.

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 1005

FROM: Helsinki (Sakaya) July 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 200.

On the 19th, the newspapers contained favorable comments concerning the President of Finland taking the necessary steps for the formal recognition of Manchukuo.

Trans. 7-28-41

No. 1006

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) July 26, 1941
TO: Berlin # 697.

The Premier of Manchukuo has requested me to convey to the Ambassador and (SAKA ?) his thanks for their efforts in securing the recognition of Manchukuo by Finland.

Trans. 8-2-41

No. 1007

FROM: Tokyo July 4, 1941
TO: Bangkok # 371.

Re # 812[a] addressed to me from our Ambassador in Germany.

Because of THAILAND's position in regard to the war in Europe, we cannot very well force the matter of recognition upon her; but in consideration of the fact that the request is an earnest one, will you take a suitable opportunity to transmit it to Premier PIBUL and get his views on the matter?

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-7-41

No. 1008

FROM: Tokyo — July 29, 1941
TO: Bangkok — # 443.

(Abstract)

Thailand will recognize Manchuko on 1 August 1941. (Several questions on procedure.)

Trans. 7-30-41

No. 1009

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) — June 28, 1941
TO: Berlin — # 1357.

(Circular)

(Message to Nanking # 230).

Strictly Secret.

Re my # 229[a].

As you know, Chungking has been announcing that in case Germany recognizes the new People's Government, China would recall CHIN KAI[b] from that country. I think that in the event of German recognition of Nanking, we would have to assist in taking over the Chungking diplomats stationed in the countries which have given recognition (as for CHIN KAI, we have a plan of approaching him through the Manchukuoan Minister in Berlin) and also in the treatment to be given by the countries concerned to those officials who refuse to bow to the Nanking Regime. Will you please find out (as far as possible in exact detail) the opinion of the People's Government authorities regarding this matter?

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Chinese Ambassador in Berlin.

Trans. 7-9-41

No. 1010

FROM: Nanking — June 30, 1941
TO: China Net — # 160.

(Circular)

(Part 1 of 2).

Message to Tokyo # 428.

Re your # 230[a].

On the 29th, I called on WANG and found that the Chinese Ambassador to Berlin, CHIN KAI: Charge d'Affaires, SHŪ I; and JO ZUI RIN were all in the employ of WANG when he was Foreign Minister, and some persons with whom he has had close contact. However, he said he had had no intercourse with them since his escape, and since today he is not in a position to

know what these men are thinking, there is no way but to depend on Germany, Italy, and Japan to win them over.

Of course, there is no objection to having them remain in their present positions if they should change over to the peace faction. As for CHIN KAI, I understand that he has been in connection with Moscow, Berlin, and Manchukuo because of the contacts made in the days when he was connected with the bank of China. One way would be to request the Minister[b] for his assistance, but if CHIN KAI refuses to accept the offer, we would have to appoint someone who is now in Europe to take the post, since there is no way of sending a man from China today when we need to have an ambassador appointed as soon as possible.

Fortunately, in this connection, we have RI HEI KŌ who is now representing China at the International Labor Office in Geneva and who was Departmental Chief in the days when CHIN KŌ HAKU was Minister of Commerce. He has been from time to time informing us that he wishes to return to Nanking.

---

[a] See II, 1009.
[b] Probably the Manchukuoan Minister.

Trans. 7-8-41

No. 1011

FROM: Nanking June 30, 1941
TO: Peking # 160.

(Circular).

Message to Tokyo # 428.

(Part 2 of 2)[a].

Judging on the basis of his past record, it would be all right for him to become an Ambassador. Since I am quite sure that he would accept, it might be well to have the Japanese Consul in Geneva approach him with a view of getting him to take up his duties in Berlin. If CHIN KAI[b] also accepts, then we would have him become Ambassador to Rome (as for secretaries, we could select them from students now studying in Germany). Furthermore, in case CHIN KAI joins the peace camp, since the members of his family are living in Shanghai, there is no reason to be concerned over their safety. WANG said also that since this man is well known to him and is pro-German, if both Japan and Germany decide to win him over, he no doubt would listen to reason.

You will see from the aforementioned opinions of WANG's that what he says is within the scope of those matters constituting the exact replies to the questions which you have asked in your telegram. In any case, it would seem that we need to mediate in all matters.

I understand that WANG had discussed this question with HIDAKA[c] toward the end of last year and so will you please get in touch with HIDAKA who is now in Tokyo.

---

[a] For Part 1 of 2 see II, 1010.
[b] Chinese Ambassador in Berlin.
[c] Japanese Minister to Nanking.

Trans. 7-9-41

No. 1012

FROM: Nanking — July 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 465.

(*Abstract*)

Re my # 464[a].

Suitable diplomats to represent Nanking government are very scarce. If no successors can be found to take the place of Chungking diplomats, we must tolerate them for the time being.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 1013

FROM: Berlin — July 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 243.

On the 3rd, Ambassador STAHMER, who had gone to Italy for a change of air, returned and I went to see him for a little talk. I said: "In German consulates and other diplomatic establishments throughout China there are many stubborn pro-Chinese officials who have been there all too many years. You have recognized the WANG regime now and this situation does not coincide with what is to be expected. I want you to discharge all these superannuated officials and replace them with new blood which is more imbued with the spirit of Nazional Socialismus." STAHMER replied "I go the limit in agreeing with the feeling you express. I shall submit this matter to Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and endeavor to remedy this situation as soon as possible." Will you please wire me back immediately the names of the German officials in the consulates and other diplomatic establishments in China which are not in harmony with the policy of the Japanese Imperial Government.

Trans. 7-17-41

No. 1014

FROM: Berlin — June 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo (?) — # 814.

1. After Germany gives recognition to the People's Government, WANG ascertained from CHIN KAI[a] whether he would sever his connections with CHIANG KAI SHEK and serve the People's Government. If he pledges loyalty to the new government, we expect to employ him. However, in that case, as I have already pointed out in my # 805[b], it is important that he should not be allowed to serve in Germany.

Furthermore, we should examine the character of every member of his office and eliminate any who are in the least anti-Japanese and appoint those to diplomatic offices who possess the correct ideology. We would like to employ only those who will pledge loyalty to the new government.

2. I would like to have WANG arrange to entrust to me all the matters connected with taking over the Chinese Embassy in Berlin, its management, etc.; it is my intention not to take any

conspicuous part in this matter but to have the German Government attend to it, at least outwardly. This message has been transmitted to Rumania and Italy. Will you please transmit it to Nanking?

---

[a] Chinese Ambassador in Berlin.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 7–8–41

No. 1015

FROM: Rome — July 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 419.

Re Berlin-Nanking (?) # 814[a].

If CHIN KAI (Chen Chieh) is to be made use of, this is the only place he can be assigned to at this time. But in view of his past connections with the Chungking government, even though he is inclined to be pro-Japanese, he should be sent to Nanking first to show his willingness to serve the Nanking government and also to familiarize himself with the spirit and plans of the new order in East Asia.

Please relay to Nanking. Relayed to Berlin.

---

[a] Not available, probably refers to # 814 from Berlin to *Tokyo*. II, 1014.

Trans. 7–3–41

No. 1016

FROM: Berlin — July 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 854.

Action Nanking as # 1.

(*Abstract*)

Re Nanking-Tokyo # 428[a].

Osima does not consider Ambassador Chen Chieh as a suitable person to represent Wang's government, although he may be useful in his government. Suggests that someone in China, whose loyalty to Wang is unimpeachable, be appointed.

Note: Chen Chieh was Chungking's Ambassador until the Axis recognized Nanking on 1 July.

---

[a] Regarding plans for replacing the present Chinese Ambassador at Berlin. RI HEI HO, now Representing China at the International Labor Office in Geneva is suggested. See II, 1011.

Trans. 7–25–41

No. 1017

FROM: Berlin — July 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #883.

Message to *Berne* ? as #32.

Chinese Ambassador CHIN KAI and his staff and their families, in all about 50 persons, left Potsdam Station via Basle for Berne at 9:30 P.M. on the 10th. Since it will be necessary for them to remain in Switzerland for a while arranging for their return to China, please keep an eye on them and wire me from time to time with regard to their movements.

Relayed to Tokyo and Rome. Relay from Tokyo to Nanking.

Trans. 7-15-41

No. 1018

FROM: Tokyo — July 11, 1941
TO: Nanking — #279.

(*Abstract*)

Rome to Berlin as #24 on 9 July.

Re your #50[a].

Alexandorine advises that he believes it would be inadvisable to attempt to have the (present Chinese Ambassador ?) in Italy represent the Wang regime as he is a strong Chiang admirer and consequently a vigorous Japan-hater.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 1019

FROM: Tokyo — July 14, 1941
TO: Nanking — #286.

(*Abstract*)

Received from Berlin as #895, 13 July.

In compliance with President Wang's request, we have been trying to contact Ambassador Chen Chieh (Chin Kai) to accept the Wang regime, but he is reported to be in Lisbon now. However, as there are not boats available he will probably return to Berlin, at which time we will renew our effort to see him.

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 1020

FROM: Tokyo July 24, 1941
TO: Nanking # 314.

(Message from Madrid to Berlin # 18, July 19)

Re my # 17[a].

On the 19th a number of Chinese arrived here and put up at a certain hotel. I sent FUJII[b] to inquire if CHEN HSUEN[c] was among them and to ask him if he would be good enough to grant me an interview. Well, none less than CHEN himself came down into the hall and said to FUJII: "Yes, he is a bosom friend of mine, but in view of present Japanese-Chinese relations, I feel that for us to talk together would do neither of us anything but harm, particularly in view of the fact that we are such close friends. There is so much military action now that this might cause misunderstandings. No, it would be impractical for me to talk with him at any other place either." Well, I think the only chance we would get to talk with him might be when his troop breaks up at Hongkong. I have sent this to the Minister.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] A telegraphic Secretary in Spain.
[c] Former Chungking Ambassador to Berlin.—Chinese spelling of Chin Kai.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 1021

FROM: Shanghai July 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1303.

Strictly Secret. Urgent.

Since WANG went to Japan, the Nanking Government, with a strong feeling of emotional expectancy, hopes that its own position will be fortified and that our policy of making it firmer and securer will materialize without the loss of a day. The Nanking Government is, therefore, time and again pleading for the return of Ambassador HONDA. For one thing, our treatment of WANG has made quite an impression on Chungking. Now if, as the press reports, Ambassador HONDA resigns, something will not only be lost in Nanking, but also in CHIANG's capital. The unsalutary effect would be exceedingly grave.

This, too, is a point not to lose sight of: We suspect that in Chungking there are some—what the Chinese call suave but ineffectual (Enman Mukekka) officials who look with envy on WANG who is riding high and handsome now. We might win them over soon, but if Ambassador HONDA does not return, their interest will probably cool. Our field officials here, who have been so eager, would fall into despair. I feel sure that all our schemes concerning China would collapse. Yes indeed. The Ambassador must hold his post, and as the first step on our policy of consolidating our gains, he must at once turn his steps to the road back to Nanking.

(In touch with Nanking on this.)

Relayed to Nanking.

Trans. 7-23-41

No. 1022

FROM: Shanghai July 19, 1941
TO: Net #604.

(Circular)

Action Tokyo as #1299.

Action Nanking #215.

(*Abstract*).

Re my #979[a].

The Japanese government, instead of the Nanking government, should be approached first by the Germans who contemplate building factories in the vicinity of Shanghai.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7–25–41

No. 1023

FROM: Peking July 19, 1941
TO: Shanghai and Nanking #315.

(Circular).

Action Tokyo as #460.

(Abstract)

North China Political Council is to handle negotiations[a] under the guidance of Japanese advisers with those countries which have recognized the Wang government.

---

[a] Germany is currently negotiating a broad trade agreement with Japan, China (Nanking), and Manchukuo.

Trans. 7–25–41

No. 1024

FROM: Peking July 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #466.

Re my #460[a].

On the 21st, I called on both the German and Italian commercial attachés in this city and told them that in many ways it would be best to contact us in regard to the matters which they intend to discuss with the HOPEN Administrative Commission. I expect the negotiations between the two commercial attachés and the Administrative Commission will be largely a matter of form, and really important matters, I believe, will not be taken up with the Commission but with Nanking. However, I asked them to be sure to refer matters to the Japanese

Embassy in case these matters have been taken up with the Commission and are of an important nature. I have transmitted this message to NANSAI and SHANGHAI.

---

[a]See II, 1023 in which Peking advises North China Political Council is to handle negotiations under guidance of Japanese advisors with those countries which have recognized the Wang government.

Trans. 7-28-41

No. 1025

FROM: Nanking July 22, 1941
TO: China Net # 191.

(Circular).

Message to Tokyo # 500.

Re your # 460[a] addressed to the Minister from Peking.

1. Since then HIDAKA[b] conferred with WANG and advised him to arrange matters with Germany and Italy after the question of Nanking's relations with these countries has been thoroughly discussed. The German Charge d'Affaires, FISCHER, also remarked to HIDAKA that he would like to be in touch with the Japanese authorities while negotiating with the People's Government.

2. It is also our desire that our Government keep in close touch with both the German and Italian Governments in considering the relations between Germany and Italy on the one hand and Nanking on the other. I would like to have all matters pertaining to this question transmitted to this office. (For example, we would like to have wired to us the telegram giving the conversation held with WAIKAA[c] and BIIRU[d] in Berlin.)

---

[a]II, 1023.
[b]Japanese Minister to Nanking.
[c]Probably WEIZSAICKER, Chief of Political Section, German Foreign Office.
[d]Kana spelling.

Trans. 7-24-41

No. 1026

FROM: Tokyo July 18, 1941
TO: Shanghai, Peking and Canton # 1547.

(Circular).

(Message to Nanking # 299.)

It was decided at a meeting of the directors of the Far Eastern Reconstruction Bureau on the 12th, that the balance of the customs revenue in Canton which has existed since the establishment of the new central government should be transferred to the People's Government from the Shanghai branch of the ----- Bank after the deduction of (1) the deficit created prior to the establishment of the new regime (approximately 54,000 yuan), and (2) the share of expenses

arising from exemptions, miscellaneous expenses, foreign loans, and indemnities. This decision is expected to be approved at the general meeting of the Far Eastern Bureau to be held in the near future. Furthermore, an agreement was arrived at at this director's meeting that in case the revenue due to the People's Government is so insufficient as to cause a deficit in the funds necessary for the execution of such policies, as the anti-Communist policy, which are equally important to Japan, consideration should be given to adopting necessary steps such as liquidation of the funds accumulated as a share of the (Canton ?) Foreign Loan Collateral Fund in Shanghai. Details will be sent you by mail.

Relayed to Canton.

Trans. 7-22-41

No. 1027

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Shanghai

July 22, 1941
722.

The Far Eastern Reconstruction Bureau has addressed a request to the office concerned that they would like to have representatives of the KACHU[a] Liaison Office take part in the conference to be held in your city by the Concession Policy Commission. If you have no special objections, will you arrange to comply with their request? It is expected that the army authorities will notify their agents so that these representatives can participate.

---

[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 1028

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Nanking

July 23, 1941
30- (?).

From Ambassador Honda:

Commercial Attaché Nakamura has ----- about the plans for a reorganization of the Nationalist Government. He also is of the same opinion and, therefore, we would like to see this brought about. However, in view of the view held that this would be done by the rallying of all parties and all factions, as well as those of no party or faction, it seems that it would be necessary to have the full understanding of the SŌ forces (that is of the army through the SŌ forces) for any reform now and we would need to emphasize that one object of such reorganization would be to bring about a closer and more positive concert of action with Japan. It will be well for him to confer with ----- and if it is necessary to have such reformation take place before Wang's ----- and there are prospects of its being done, please talk it over with ----- along the above mentioned lines.

Trans. 7-30-41

No. 1029

FROM: Nanking July 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 515.

Re your # 308[a].

From HIKADA to Ambassador HONDA.

When I called on WANG to discuss the matter in my # 514[a], I suitably communicated to him the purport of your caption telegram. WANG expressed his hearty approval of the matter and said, "I intend to deal with the matter as you have suggested. The reorganization of the government will probably take place about August 10 when I shall have returned from Canton. I will at that time get in touch with you." I understand that he is contacting the Imperial Army in regard to this matter through SHO -----.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-28-41

No. 1030

FROM: Nanking July 16, 1941
TO: Hsinking # 20.

Message to Tokyo # 483.

Re your # 460[a].

During the last of July we will go through the formalities of installing WANG as Chief of the newly recognized Government. It has already been decided that he will tour Kwantung during the first ten days of August and, since plans have definitely been laid, we wish to have him make this trip sometime during the month, although it is impossible right now to set the exact date of his departure.

Relayed to Hsinking.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 1031

FROM: Tokyo — July 11, 1941
TO: Hsinking — # 393.

Action Nanking as # 280.

Re your # 460[a].

No objections to Wang Ching-wei's proposed Manchurian trip. Time to be during this month. It is desired that the round trip be made by aeroplane. This has been discussed with the military and naval authorities.

[a] i.e., Nanking's. Wang Ching-wei desires to make a trip to Manchuria during the latter part of July.

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 1032

FROM: Hsinking — July 18, 1941
TO: Nanking — # 5.

(Message to Tokyo # 467.)

(Strictly Secret.)

Re your # 483[a] addressed to you from Nanking.

Since it is your intention to close SAKŌTEI in August, and since it is impossible to set a date in this matter, I would like to have you make arrangements so that this matter may be postponed indefinitely.

I have consulted with the Manchukuoan government and have transmitted this message to Nanking.

[a] See II, 1030 in which it is stated that WANG will be formally installed as Chief of the newly recognized government and will tour Kwantung during the first ten days of August.

Trans. 7-23-41

No. 1033

FROM: Canton — August 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 290.

(Message to Nanking # 143.)

(Message to Shanghai and Peking as Circular # 148.)

WANG arrived safely by air at 3:00 o'clock and was met at the airport by the military commander and by the highest ranking Japanese and Chinese military and governmental officials along with the German and Italian Consuls General. Along the route from the airport large numbers of Chinese and Japanese lined the streets to welcome him and at every door a flag was hoisted in his honor.

Tomorrow, the 3rd, he will be welcomed in the Foreign Concession (representatives from this office and the military will be present). On the 4th he will attend a session of the Far Eastern Newspaper Conference and that evening will entertain Japanese military and private bigwigs. On the 5th the Japanese will in turn entertain him and at 8:00 p.m. on the 6th he will broadcast. He is expected to leave on the 9th.

Relayed to ----- Peking.

Trans. 8-5-41

No. 1034

FROM: Canton — July 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo — No number.

Strictly secret.

I have been requested by the committee charged with the preparations for the meeting of the Far Eastern newspaper correspondents to request that congratulatory messages be sent by PREMIER KONOYE and the Foreign Minister in view of the fact that WANG is to be present and for other reasons.

It is requested that the wire from the PREMIER reach me not later than August 2. I have consulted MR. UDA, an official of the publicity bureau, regarding this matter.

Trans. 8-6-41

No. 1035

FROM: Tokyo — June 14, 1941
TO: Batavia — No number.

Negotiations # 144 (Separate Telegram)

5. However, needless to say, the Imperial Government will insist on its just proposals. Furthermore, the disruption of the negotiations will have no effect on the usual relations prevailing between Japan and the Dutch East Indies.

4. With the intensification of economic warfare, circumstances surrounding the Dutch East Indies made it impossible to successfully carry on the negotiations. The reply submitted on the 16th by the Dutch East Indies authorities was not only very unsatisfactory but also accompanied by an insistent proposal on their part that they could alter at their own will the amount of those materials which we regard as important and indispensable. In view of the fact that in the past, on various occasions the Dutch Government, as well as the Dutch East Indies Government, had made definite promises or statements regarding this question, we concluded that it is no use arriving at an international agreement on the basis of the recent reply sent to us. This explains the reason for our discontinuing the negotiations and withdrawing our representatives.

-. Relative to this question, the Dutch East Indies Government loudly claims that its policy has for its object the progress of the inhabitants of the islands and their prosperity, but it is clear that our proposals have nothing in them that would interfere with such objectives. It need not be said that rather by firmly establishing economic cooperation with Japan and by thus contributing to peace and order in the Far East, could the Dutch East Indies Government make any progress toward these ends.

2. The Imperial Government, realizing the unity of purpose with the Dutch East Indies Government, has been negotiating with that government on economic questions since September of last year and has made every effort to bring about a successful conclusion. These negotiations covered not only the question of securing necessary materials and of carrying on trade, but also such questions as establishing the right of Japanese subjects to enter the islands; to engage in business; to invest in and establish enterprises; to engage in ocean transportation, in aviation; and -----. In regard to these possibilities, especially in regard to aviation and exploitation of oil fields, Japan as a third-power nation has been cooperating generously with the Dutch East Indies. Consequently, the demands of the Imperial Government were all very reasonable and, therefore, of such nature that they could be easily satisfied if these two governments had been willing to encourage economic cooperation.

-. In November, year before last, our Government proposed to the Dutch Government that negotiations be begun between Japan and the Dutch East Indies, and the Dutch government agreed to this in principle. Later, the Imperial Government got in touch with the Dutch Government on repeated occasions with a view to commencing actual negotiations. However, with the spread of the European war to Holland in May last year, the Dutch East Indies suffered its effects, and negotiations between Japan and the Dutch East Indies also were badly affected as the result of the mobilization of the economic resources of the Dutch East Indies for the prosecution of the war. For the Japanese government, which is pushing toward the objective of establishing a new order in the Far East and toward the establishment of solid economic relations by means of bringing about close cooperation between the Far Eastern peoples, the spread of the European war to the South Sea region was a trend to which it could not be indifferent. It is, of course, evident that in her effort to make herself a well-armed nation, Japan has to depend increasingly upon the natural resources of the Dutch East Indies. She felt the necessity of securing for herself the indispensable resources and by establishing a cooperative relation between her and the Dutch East Indies, to bring about stability in the Far East. Therefore, the Japanese government demanded of the Dutch Government that negotiations be opened at once with the view to firmly establishing such a condition. At the same time, she demanded that the Dutch authorities guarantee Japan a supply of those important materials which Japan hopes to get from the islands. In reply to these demands, the Dutch Government promised that, regardless of how international relations may change as a result of her involvement in the European war, the economic relations between the Dutch East Indies and Japan would be continued as usual in a satisfactory manner. She furthermore revealed her honest intention of putting into practice enthusiastically the program of cooperation, stating that to do so would coincide with the destiny of the Dutch East Indies and would contribute to the establishment of peace and stability in the Far East.

Note: It is customary in the preparation of a long message like this, the contents of which may be disseminated outside diplomatic circles or which are known to other governments, for the Japanese to transpose the paragraphs of the text. It is believed that such was done for this message and that the paragraph numbers are simply reversed.

Trans. 6-20-41

No. 1036

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) May 21, 1941
TO: Batavia (Daihyo) # 120.

According to reliable information the Dutch have decided to reject our final proposal entirely and to demand the return of our representatives.

Trans. 5–27–41

No. 1037

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) May 21, 1941
TO: Batavia (Daihyo) # 122.

(Complete translation, previously abstracted)

Regarding my # 120[a].

According to latest intelligence, FUANMŌKU (Van Mook), had decided to impose a general embargo on rubber exports to Japan and has notified the Netherlands East Indies home government to this effect.

It is claimed that Britain had suggested to the Netherlands government that the Netherlands Indies keep in step with the British Malaya in imposing a general embargo on rubber and tin exports to Japan, and it now appears that the Netherlands Indies has decided to act upon that suggestion.

Hofstraaten is said to have explained the details of our final demands to the British, but out of deference to yourself and our other (trade) representatives he is withholding the publication of the embargo procedure until our representatives withdraw from the Netherlands Indies.

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[a] "According to reliable information, the Dutch have decided to reject our final proposal entirely and to demand the return of our representatives."

Trans. 5–28–41

No. 1038

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) May 21, 1941
TO: Batavia (Daihyo) # 122.

(*Abstract*)

Netherlands East Indies decides to stop all exports of rubber and tin to Japan.
Japanese trade representatives expect to withdraw from Netherlands Indies.

Trans. 5–27–41

No. 1039

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) May 22, 1941
TO: Batavia (Daihyo) (?) No number.

Negotiations # 123.

Strictly Secret.

On the 22nd, the Vice Minister summoned PA[a] and told him that in spite of the fact that Japan has been taking a conciliatory attitude, the Dutch East Indies authorities have been of late stiffening their attitude and that we could not help but suppose that the Dutch East Indies authorities are being influenced by the United States and Great Britain, especially in attempting to tie up the question of the exportation of rubber and tin with the exportation of these materials from French Indo-China and the Malayan states, and in raising one objection after another even in regard to the thirteen items concerning which an understanding had been arrived at some time ago. Under the circumstances, Japan would have to recall her representative, YOSHIZAWA. He added the statement that Japan "May be compelled to take further measures which we have to take." PA replied that the position which the Dutch East Indies authorities are taking with regard to rubber and tin is to be explained by the fact that these materials are being shipped to Germany through Japan. Although, the Vice Minister refrained from stating that none of the materials are being shipped to Germany, he explained that most of them were being used in arms production which has recently been expanded. He replied further that if the Dutch authorities are going to hastily conclude despite this fact that amounts exceeding that of pre-war days are being shipped to Germany, and thus continue to assume an intolerable attitude, we must say that we have reached a stage in which we must reconsider fundamentally the attitude we have been taking.

In reply to this PA, stating that he believed it would be possible to settle the matter if Japan would reveal the figures as to demand and supply of these thirteen items, begged that Japan do so. After stating that he would transmit the request to the Minister, the Vice Minister said that although on several occasions Japan had sowed the Dutch authorities in Batavia the figures, she had not succeeded in convincing them; however, I believe that it may be well to show them the figures. I understand that the Vice Minister told PA that he had been ordered to discuss just this much and no more today. This statement caused PA to be somewhat put out and to request that further consideration be given to the question.

[a] PABST—Netherlands Minister to Tokyo.

Trans. 6-3-41

No. 1040

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) May 1, 1941
TO: Batavia (Riyoji) # 231.

(*Abstract*)

Re your # 349[a].

All accounts of foreign firms in Japan must be clearly indicated in order to facilitate counteraction by the Japanese government in case Japanese credits abroad are frozen. This is a general requirement and is not solely directed against the Netherlands Indies.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 5-12-41

No. 1041

FROM: Riyoji, Batavia — June 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 464.

Secret within the Department.

Re your # 231[a].

1. In the meantime, I have conferred with Chief HOOGSTRATEN of the Commercial Section and took that opportunity to try and get him to accept what you suggested. HOOGSTRATEN said that to have Netherlands Companies in Japan make entries in the Japanese Language was truly a formidable request which could not readily be acceded to. He said, "Here in the Islands the several foreign companies simply make statements of their accounts in the English or Malay language. If, on the other hand, we require them to make daily financial statements in Netherlandish, I can tell you one thing, you Japanese would certainly be up against it. No, I cannot see your point."

I said, "Well, you might say that to have them draw up daily statements in the Japanese language would be exceedingly troublesome, but they have to make notations in Japanese anyway, so I cannot see where it would be so difficult for them to make their main statements out in Japanese. Still, let us leave this argument for a later date. Let us have the Netherlands Companies confer with the Japanese Officials and have them all thrash the question out. What do you think of that?"

HOOGSTRATEN replied, "In that case, let us set a time limit, and with the assistance of the Foreign Office in Tokyo have the Netherlands Commercial Official, the banks, and representatives of the companies get together with the Japanese Officials and discuss the matter. When the results are sent, and after you and I talk it over again, the Netherlands government will decide on its attitude. Will you arrange to have this conference take place immediately?"

2. I have talked with a number of representatives of our companies here and they argue as follows:

Since the Japanese banks and commercial concerns have to make their entries in English, the inconvenience is practically negligible; but if they were constrained to do so in Netherlandish, the large companies and banks, and all our concerns and business houses—even our essential Department of Finance, would incur great losses beyond any doubt. Furthermore, from the point of view of numbers, we would suffer more than they because there are only some fourteen Netherlands Companies in Japan. Consequently, in spite of what you say in your caption message, please explain this to the officials and arrange to hold the conference suggested by HOOGSTRATEN. Try to work out some scheme that will overcome the inconveniences which the Netherlands Companies complain of, and please do nothing which would cause the Netherlands Officials to make our companies in the Islands make statements of accounts in Netherlandish. That, I think, would be the best policy. Please wire me back.

Your caption message and this message have been wired in abstract form to Soerabaja.

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[a]Matsuoka directs that all accounts of foreign firms in Japan must be clearly indicated in order to facilitate counteracting by Japanese Government in case Japanese credits abroad are frozen.

Trans. 6-5-41

No. 1042

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Batavia (Daihyo)

May 31, 1941
No number.

132 (negotiations)

(Strictly secret)

We recently learned that the British and Netherlands commercial attaches in this country were making surveys of our rubber needs. On the 30th, the chief of the Trade Bureau asked that the Netherlands commercial attache call on him.

He was confidentially advised of the figures, prepared with the cooperation of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, showing our consumption of raw rubber, shipments to Manchukuo and China, and of the probable amount of our imports. A copy of these figures is being cabled to you as supplementary cable # 133[a].

For the purpose of partially making up the deficiency of the supply, we wish to purchase 10,000 from Malaya and 10,200 from the Netherlands East Indies. There is apparently no other way then to get along without the 26,874 shortage, by economizing on our needs. It is our desire, therefore, that we import a total of 30,000 from the N.E.I. However, this does not mean that we intend to revise the request of 20,000 made by our delegate Yosizawa, the Netherlands commercial attache was told.

The commercial attache replied that the matter would be taken up with the Minister, and Batavia would be advised by cable subsequently.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 6-4-41

No. 1043

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Batavia (Daihyo)

May 28, 1941
No number.

Negotiations # 128.

According to reliable reports up to the 23rd, the Netherlanders had decided to give a reply of refusal. The Governor-General advised the Assembly (?). According to a very special report of today, the Netherlanders after that are reconsidering not breaking off (negotiations).

Trans. 5-31-41

No. 1044

FROM: Batavia (Daihyo) May 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo No number.

213 (negotiations)

Re your (negotiations) # 126[a].

When I presented the second proposal of my negotiations message # 201[b], I presented it as a separate item.

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[a] Not translated; Dated 27 May.

[b] N.E.I. officials will study a second proposal offer by the Japs in their negotiations and after careful consideration of their needs, give an answer. Their answer will include the separate request for rubber and tin.

Trans. 6-3-41

No. 1045

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) June 12, 1941
TO: Washington # 1241.

(Circular)

Separate Wire. Strictly Secret.

1. We request that you consider in as friendly a manner as possible the applications for permits made by Japanese employees for entry into the country insofar as the law permits, and that at least you grant up to 1,600 permits per year.

2. In order that Japanese engaged in Japanese industries, as well as Netherlands Industries, may penetrate into inconvenient and out-of-the-way places (with the exception of Java-Madora) we request that you permit a certain fixed number of Japanese doctors to practice.

3. We request that permits be granted for the expansion or the establishment of independent as well as joint enterprises, insofar as it is not necessary to make reservations and as long as it is not contrary to national defense or disadvantageous to the inhabitants.

4. We further ask that petroleum rights be granted in some areas.

5. We demand that a promise be given for the establishment of direct air communication between Japan and the Netherlands Indies at some appropriate opportunity in the future, and that improvements be made in the air communications between the Netherlands Indies, Bangkok and Saigon.

6. We request that a promise be given to the effect that at some appropriate time in the future permission will be granted for the construction, under Japanese supervision, of an up-to-date cable line between Japan and the Netherlands Indies. Furthermore, we request cooperation with regard to the improvement of the now existing wireless communication system between Japan and the Netherlands Indies.

7. Should the necessity arise for the use of Japanese products by Japanese industries, providing there are no special objections, we request that permits be granted for the opening of coastal ports. Furthermore, should it be necessary for Japanese currently operating in coastal navigation to increase the number of their ships or their tonnage, so long as there are not particular objections, we request that permits be granted.

8. We would like to have you consider, should it be necessary as a result of the expansion of Japanese enterprises or the increase of Japanese-Netherlands Indies trade, permitting navigation into heretofore unopened ports in order to facilitate the unloading of special goods, providing there are no particular objections presented in maritime law.

9. With regard to the imports quota of Japanese goods, particularly such items as are necessary to the peoples of the Netherlands East Indies, consisting principally of textiles and miscellaneous goods, we request that a quota be established equivalent to approximately 80% of the Netherlands East Indies products imported into this country.

10. With regard to the export of Netherlands East Indies products to Japan, we request that definite permission be given for the minimum demands of various essential goods necessary to us in the following amounts:

Rubber—20,000 tons per year
Tin—3,000 tons per year
Bauxite—400,000 tons
Copra—25,000 tons
Palm oil—12,000 tons

etc., etc. Furthermore, in return for this we have presented quantities for the items which we are especially anxious to buy.

Trans. 6-13-41

No. 1046

FROM: Batavia (Daihyo) June 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 216.

Foreign Office secret.

The Domei story of the 31st was reported, in general, along the lines contained in my message # 217[a].

As you are well aware, we are in the final stages of the negotiations. The Netherlands Indies' counter-proposal is now being carefully studied by the council, and therefore, this is the most critical moment of the entire proceedings.

It is exceedingly unfortunate that at such a time as this, there should be so many Japanese press comments attacking the Netherlands East Indies with their naturally unfavorable reaction upon the Government and people of the Netherlands East Indies.

Should further attacks be made upon these people, by our press, we fear that we will not be able to obtain the concessions we are looking for from them.

Translator's note: Following sentence badly garbled, can only guess at gist.

Will you please, therefore, consider ways and means of preventing the newspapers from carrying such stories.

Hofstraaten told Isizawa that both the government and the people of the Netherlands East Indies found the statement issued by Chief of Section Ishii and other recent Japanese newspaper stories concerning the Netherlands East Indies exceedingly distasteful. He further stated that Minister Pabst had been ordered to make representations in Tokyo concerning them.

Translator's note: Last sentence, above, badly garbled.

[a] Not translated. Niti Niti and Yomiuri (Batavia editors (?) attacks upon N.E.I.).

Trans. 6-3-41

No. 1047

FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) June 2, 1941
TO: Riyoji, Batavia #291.

Secret.

I have assessed 35,000 yen for your expenditure funds for this fiscal year (money for the policy toward Chinese residents will be handled separately), and I am wiring you the first installment of 17,500 yen, together with 676 yen, an advance for MIURA; the sum total being 18,176 yen.

Now, as for the subsidy for the Japanese language newspaper East Indies Nippo (Sinarusuratan), the pros and cons mentioned in my wire to Manila #132[a] should be considered, and as for funds for the management of the native papers, consider the plans each time and wait for a concrete proposal.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 6–5–41

No. 1048

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) June 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #530.

Re your Circular Message #1248[a].

The regular European language periodicals which you send us, insofar as possible, we have distributed through the branch offices of the South Sea Association. Of these, articles and pictures of cultural value are rather widely bought and read on this island. Though occasionally pictorial weekly magazines of two types are reprinted, it is not clear where else publication is being made of them. They are rather prone to give a wide berth to printed material such as we distribute, and there are many who even go so far as to contribute letters to newspapers saying, in effect, "It would be wise to reject printed propaganda material which smacks of Nazi-ism." Not only are we here in this office finding it extremely difficult to use such material, but in recent times there are even indications that because of an extremely strict censor system which is in operation here, this material is being seized while en route to us. We have discarded the principle of large scale distributions such as we maintained in the past and tend now to change our policy to one of concentration in a given local area. Please, therefore, discard all material which smells of propaganda, and after you have carefully selected material of cultural value, please send it to us.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 6–27–41

No. 1049

FROM: Tokyo July 17, 1941
TO: Batavia (Riyoji) # 394.

Re your # 605[a].

In regard to the subsidy for East India Daily and the Chinese SURATAN we are negotiating for Taiwan[b] to supply this. A decision has not been reached yet, but we wish to arrange a definite sum now. We are remitting Y22,858 the equivalent of 10,000 guilders.

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[a] Not available.

[b] Many organs, both official and semi-official, for carrying out Japan's "South Seas advance" are located in Taiwan.

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 1050

FROM: Batavia (Daihyo) June 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 233.

(In 4 parts—complete.)

Preamble

From memoranda presented by the Japanese Delegation, May 14th, and 22nd, the Netherlands Delegation has noticed with satisfaction that Japanese proposals have been modified in several instances after thorough discussion of the various points at issue in course of negotiations. They value these modifications as result of endeavors of Japanese Delegation to adapt Japanese proposals as originally formulated to emergencies of present abnormal circumstances and meet to a certain extent objections raised by the Netherlands Delegation on account of incompatibility of a number of these proposals with the principles of economic policy in the Netherlands Indies. Nevertheless, the Netherlands Delegation cannot but express regret that the views of the Japanese government are still materially at variance with these principles. In fact, the Japanese memorandum of 14th May states that the Japanese government still firmly holds views expressed in preamble of memorandum of 16th January. As these views were based on a supposed inadequacy in development of natural resources of the Netherlands Indies and an assumed interdependence between this country and the Japanese Empire, it is clear that their practical application would tend to create special positions for Japanese interests in the Netherlands Indies. It seems, therefore, appropriate to point once more to the fundamental economic policy of the Netherlands government in regard to this archipelago as set forth in Netherlands memorandum of February 3rd, a policy which involves the furtherance of welfare, progress, and emancipation of its population, nondiscrimination towards friendly foreign powers, and avoidance of field activity. This country has reached a stage of economic growth in which, with assistance of mother country, it may be deemed capable in main of adequately developing its own economic life and resources. This process is in harmony with aspirations of population and care should be taken not to hamper its course by too liberal admittance of foreign interests. The density of population in Java and other parts of archipelago as well as density of population in the mother country emphasize still more the need to open up economic resources and reserve labour market of this country as much as possible for benefit of subjects of kingdom. On other hand, this policy implies that foreign enterprises once establish-

ed in the Netherlands Indies are subject to same rules and entitled same facilities as national enterprises of similar nature provided that interest of Netherlands subjects in country of origin of those enterprises are treated in same spirit. Apart from these considerations of general and economic policy the relations between Netherlands Indies and other countries must for duration of war be affected by subjection of trade and other economic activities to certain unavoidable restrictions in order to prevent direct or indirect advantage, to safeguard defense of Netherlands Indies and to promote war effort of kingdom and its allies. These restrictions are by their nature of temporary character. Notwithstanding the differences in general conception which appears to separate the two governments, the Netherlands Delegation (is convinced) not only of reasonableness of position taken by Netherlands government in regard to specific questions raised in recent Japanese memoranda but also of practical possibilities open to Japanese interests on various points. To this end, the views of the Netherlands government in respect to each of these questions are set forth here below.

I. *The entry of Japanese nationals.*

A purpose of the foreign labor ordinance is to reserve employment in the Netherlands Indies as far as possible of inhabitants of country. Consequently, labor permits can only be granted to foreigners if their labor is deemed necessary and no Netherlands subjects are available for the specific position. Furthermore, it is understood that employer concerned shall as far as possible provide adequate practical training for Netherlands subjects to fill future vacancies. The need of foreign employment is always estimated in liberal way, which policy will be continued. The Netherlands governments aim at an expeditious handling of applications for labor permits as far as feasible in connection with the necessity to obtain advice from different authorities concerned and, in some cases, of local investigation. Because of vital interest involved, the Netherlands government does not see thier way to give assurances that in a number of cases labor permits would be granted to foreigners without taking into account basic principles of the ordinance. Therefore, unconditional guarantee of admission of Japanese nationals up to full quota as asked in Japanese memorandum, which moreover would constitute an inadmissible discrimination against other foreign countries, cannot be given. In this connection, the question as to whether the granting of certain labor permits should or should not be included in aforementioned quota does not seem to need further discussion. The Netherlands government is willing to give favorable consideration to a change in existing regulations in order to permit strictly limited number of Japanese doctors to enter Netherlands Indies for medical practice solely amongst Japanese residents in those places where the number of Japanese residents would justify such course. An extension of their medical practice to all employees or servants working for Japanese interests is not appropriate as majority of those employees and servants consists of people of non-Japanese origin.

II. *Enterprise and business.*

Establishment of enterprises of foreigners in their own account or in joint account with Netherlands nationals is permitted provided such enterprises in opinion of authorities concerned will constitute fitting contribution to economic development of country within scope of general economic policy referred to in preamble.

A. Foregoing also prevails for participation by foreigners in mining enterprises in Netherlands Indies. The answer to requests made by the Japanese Delegation with reference to participation by Japanese interests in exploration and exploitation of mineral oil products in Netherlands Indies will be found in first annex of this memorandum.

B. As extension of fisheries and fishing industries should be reserved mainly for native population the Netherlands government does not find itself in a position to grant permits or facilities

for fishing to foreigners. Whether under special circumstances there might be possibility of granting such facilities to certain foreign applications will have to be considered separately in such case, judging every request on its own merits. For obvious reasons of national defence, the Netherlands government will for time being, not be able to grant such facilities.

C. What has been said heretofore about participation of foreigners in enterprises in the Netherlands Indies also stands for "commercial and other businesses" as well for "warehouse business and others" meant in the Japanese memorandum. It is necessary to reserve these branches of activity to large extent for Netherlands subjects on account of the fact that especially in smaller communities and other enterprises like shops, small warehouses, and small factories opportunities can be found for commercial and industrial education of rural masses which is one of the main problems of economic policy for Netherlands government.

III. *Traffic and traffic communications.*

A. The Netherlands government will be pleased to cooperate with the Japanese government for the improvement of connection between Japanese and Netherlands airlines to Bangkok, Saigon, and possibly other places. They are, however of the opinion that future development of air transport within the archipelago and with foreign countries depends on uncertain factors that under present circumstances they could not commit themselves on this subject.

B. Taking into account present development of wireless connections, there is, as far as the Netherlands government can see, no motive for duplication of telegraphic communication between Japan and the Netherlands Indies by expensive submarine cables. In case improvement of radio communications between Malabar and Japan prove necessary the Netherlands government will be pleased to give cooperation required. There is no indication that in addition to this radio communication provisions need be made for utilization of submarine cable between Yaz and Menado which, moreover, is in such bad state of repair that for its use extensive and costly renovations and improvements would be required.

C. Coastal navigation in the Netherlands Indies has in principle been prohibited for ships under foreign flag in order to promote and protect national shipping. Exceptions to this rule made in certain cases—including certain ships under the Japanese flag—should be regarded as maximum concession granted to shipping interests which already existed when present shipping laws came into force. The Netherlands government are ready however to continue granting such facilities to concessionaires in coastal shipping under foreign flag as needed for maintenance of their enterprises within present limits of type, number and tonnage of ships.

D. The foregoing also applies to permission for ships under foreign flag to all closed ports.

IV. *Trade and commerce.*

As prosperity of the Netherlands Indies depends to a large extent on trade with many countries, it is of vital importance that the Netherlands government retain as far as possible their freedom of action with regard to adjustment of imports to exigencies of export situation. Besides, it is necessary for duration of war to exercise strict control on imports in order to avoid waste of foreign currency and on exports in order to prevent that exports from Netherlands Indies should contribute in any way to provide enemy with materials of strategic value. The Japanese government will undoubtedly understand that the present struggle for national existence admits of no other course. Again, from these considerations, quickly changing international situation renders it inadvisable to enter into formal and binding agreements concerning importation or exportation of definite quantities of commodities for any extended period of time. On the other hand, it is in accordance with the policy of the Netherlands government to refrain from abrupt changes as lasting circumstances and vital interests of the country permit. The Japanese government may rest assured that this policy will be adhered to in respect of mutually important trade between the Netherlands Indies and Japan.

(A) In regard to Japanese interest in Netherlands-Indian import trade, an agreement was reached after fullest consideration and embodied in the so-called Hofstraaten-Ishizawa and Van Mook-Kotani agreements. The Netherlands government sees no necessity to modify these agreements which are still in force. Under present unsettled circumstances, it seems impossible to enter into any commitment concerning quantities of certain commodities which will be imported from any particular country even during next twelve months. The Netherlands government is however prepared—if such is wished for by the Japanese government in interest of regulation of production in Japan—to state quantities of goods for which, during next six months, permits will be issued for importation from countries at choice, on which permits, importation from Japan will be possible as long as prices and terms of delivery can meet competition from other countries. These quantities will have to be determined according to actual needs of Netherlands Indies.

(B) The Netherlands government remains of the opinion that position of Japanese importers in the Netherlands Indies has been satisfactorily settled on basis of above mentioned two agreements and that they could not, without causing undue harm to other interest concerned, enlarge this share; necessities of war render it impossible for the Netherlands government to enter into any obligation to grant permits unconditionally for exportation of various commodities for as long period as next twelve months. Any statement of policy in this respect even for much shorter space of time must be subject to proviso that it cannot be binding whenever in judgment of the Netherlands government, full execution would be of direct or indirect advantage to enemy, or harmful to interest of kingdom and its allies.

However, the Netherlands government appreciates difficulty for Japanese government to adjust their internal economic policies on basis of complete uncertainty with regard to imports from Netherlands Indies, the Netherlands government have no objection to state under express proviso mentioned heretofore, their intentions with regard to restrictions of export for year 1941 as determined by their view on present situation. Such statement is drafted in second appendix of memorandum. It need not be expressly mentioned in this connection that although the Netherlands government must indicate their right to be sole judges of exigencies of war with regards to exports, ordinary channels of intercourse remain open for consideration of facts and complaints in regard to import duties, export taxes, surtaxes, and official prices. Same treatment will be given to goods imported from and exported to Japan as to commodities imported from and exported to all other countries in accordance with principle of non-discrimination.

V. *Termination of agreement.*

If present exchange of views would lead to drawing up of an agreement, the terminating clause could then be considered simultaneously with wording of document.

VI. *Netherlands proposal.*

The Netherlands Delegation propose that following be adopted by the Japanese government—as their contribution to furthering of economic relations.

Note 1. This is the message the Japanese Special Envoy in Batavia reported took his staff ten hours to encipher on 7 June. The Netherlands East Indies sent identical text *in plain English* the preceding day to the Netherlands Legation, Tokyo. See II, 1068, 1069.

Trans. 6-12-41

No. 1051

FROM: Batavia (Daihyo) June 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 223.

(In 4 parts—complete)

1. As shortage of sugar is known to exist in Japanese Empire and adjacent region, Japanese government undertake to provide for import during remaining months of 1941, of Java sugar at rate of 150,000 tons year.

2. Amount of ebony to be imported into Japan from Netherlands Indies shall, for same period, be brought to level of 2,000 tons year, which quantity yet only represents about 50 % of normal imports.

3. Japan government will provide for importation, during remaining months of 1941, of coffee from Netherlands Indies at rate of *31*,000 (?) tons year.

4. Japanese government will grant to Netherlands nationals and companies necessary liberty for undisturbed exercise of their trade, in similar ways as such liberty is granted to Japanese nationals and companies in Netherlands Indies.

Netherlands government, considering Mangkalihat Extension, have no object to granting to B.O.M. concessions region, which form subject of application of that company of February 17, 1941.

Applications of same date for exploration in Banggaiblock and northeast New Guinea will be held over for consideration at such time when activities of B.O.M. shall be sufficiently developed to justify further extension of its concessions. ----- granting concessions in PRESE areas to possible later applicants Netherlands government will carefully examine applications filed by B.O.M.

ANNEX II

Concerning exportation to Japan from Netherlands Indies of various commodities and quantities, specified in Table III, annexed to memorandum of Japan delegation of May 14th, following can be stated. (To avoid possible misunderstanding it is expressly observed, that following statement in no wise ex(?)cludes application ----- and quota to commodities not mentioned in Table III.)

Under present circumstances and unless full execution of measures to be mentioned below would, in their, judgment be of direct or indirect advantage to enemy or harmful to interest of kingdom and its allies, it is intention of Netherlands government for year 1941.

A. To maintain or institute quota for exportation of following commodities, mentioned in Table III, to Japanese Empire during year 1941 in such way, that total quantities in metric tons to be exported during that year ----- each article:

10 Rubber—13,000
17/18. Tin and tin ore (in tin content)—3,000
20. Nickel ore—150,000
22. Castor seed—6,000
24. Cinchona bark—600

B. To institute monthly quota for exportation of following commodities, mentioned in Table III, to Japanese Empire for remaining months of 1941 to amounts specified in metric tons opposite each article:

4. DAMARANDCOPAL—125
(Kapok fiber (including kapok fibre in the seed)—100.
6. Kapok seed and cotton seed—500.

8. Copra (including the equivalent in cocoanut oil)—1,650.
10. Rattan—100.
11. Palm oil—1,000.
14. Tanning materials—125.
19. Bauxite—20,000.
21. Manganese ore—500.
25. Quinine (net weight)—5.
28. Jute (refined)—125.

C. To refrain from instituting quota for exportation to British government of commodities, mentioned in Table III, are not included in lists sub A and B, with following reservations.

Export quota at present for scrap iron is to be regarded as measure to prevent wholesale thefts of iron as consequence of high price obtained in case of unlimited export. Otherwise, there is no objection to export to Japan available scrap iron, as far as it is not needed for home consumption or for allies of Netherlands.

Under last mentioned proviso there is also no objection to exportation to Japan of available ----- ----- exportation of mineral oil and oiling products to Japan ----- matter of negotiation ----- Japanese government importers and oil-producing companies. Present situation of oil-reserves does not, in opinion of Netherlands government allow increase of production. Same applies to export of pitch cokes.

In case in Table III, Japanese government plan to import ----- from Netherlands Indies, no definite opinion can as yet be given.

Same applies to sisal fibre, where quantity applied for is nearly twenty-five times normal amount.

Available date regarding exploitation of molybdenum ore, chrome-iron ore, wolfram ore and mica ("high quality") seem to contradict probability of exports of any importance.

Trans. 6-14-41

No. 1052

FROM: Batavia (Japanese Consul) June 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 230.

To the Chief of the Fuel Bureau, from Itō.

Concessions granted in the Netherlands Indies government's reply are about the best we can hope to get. Therefore, suggest its acceptance.

Trans. 6-9-41

No. 1053

FROM: Batavia (Daihyo) June 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 230.

(Part 2 of 2)[a].

(*Abstract*)

Oil negotiations have practically broken down, and the Netherlands East Indies authorities have not granted request for prospecting rights in Dutch New Guinea. The Dutch also do not agree to Japanese demands regarding rubber and bauxite.

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[a]For Part 1 See 1052, II.

Trans. 6-21-41

No. 1054

FROM: Batavia (Daihyo) June 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo No number.

Negotiation # 299.

Strictly Secret.

Re my # 222[a] and # 227[a].

On the evening of the 10th, beginning at 5 P.M., I conferred until 2 o'clock in the morning with VAN MOOK[b], and Assistant ISIZAWA[c] sat with me. I sought explanations on the various doubtful points in their reply and discovered that the real intentions of the Netherlands' officials are considerably more elastic than the written answer itself. Details follow.

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[a]Not available.
[b]Director of Economic Affairs, N.E.I.
[c]Japanese Consul in Batavia.

Trans. 6-12-41

No. 1055

FROM: Tokyo June 12, 1941
TO: Washington No number.

Cir. # 1240.

Re my # 88[a] addressed to Washington.

Since then we carried on reported negotiations, but it became clear that it is impossible to get the Dutch East Indies government to accept our original proposal as it stands. Therefore, last month by compromising against our wishes on most of the points, we submitted a final proposal incorporating the demands of the Dutch East Indies authorities (the main points are

as given in the separate telegram, Circular #1241[b]). But on the sixth of this month they rejected, in fact, practically all of the propositions contained, even this proposal.

In other words, as regard to such question as: Entrance to the country; operating business; transportation; and professional practice by physician, they proposed (1) that physicians be allowed to conduct their profession only for Japanese patients in certain specified areas; (2) that rights be granted for the exploitation of some of the oil fields demanded by Japan, but as regards the other oil fields, they would consider the matter after ascertaining the achievements in the fields for which rights have been granted. On points other than these, they have budged hardly an inch.

Relative to the question of trade, (1) they proposed that they would consider granting import quotas covering a period of six months on the basis of demands in the Dutch East Indies and provided that the export terms for Japanese products are reasonable (however, this does not mean that they have agreed to our demands as these stand, but that they would notify us of the amount which they have decided on merely in consideration of their own interests in order to give us some idea of our export prospect); (2) relative to their exports, they have reduced the amounts which we included in our final proposal for our importation of the various products from the Dutch East Indies. Especially this is true in the case of rubber in that despite the fact that they had definitely promised in June last year to supply us with 20,000 tons a year, they have reduced the amount to 15,000 tons; also in the case of bauxite, they have cut the amount to 20,000 tons a month in total disregard of the agreement effected between the dealers in the two countries for supplying Japan as much as 400,000 tons a year. They said that they might further reduce the amount or even refuse exportation at any time when they regard that their supply is being used against the interests of Holland and her allies or for the benefit of their enemies. They also claim that the reduction had been effected in order to prevent reexportation to Germany. They added, furthermore, a very vague and unreasonable reservation to the effect that the sole opposition in this matter is the Dutch Government, and thus they avoided giving us any definite pledge. As to the quota period, it extends from one to six months, depending on the article and they claim that in this matter also they reserve the right to reduce the amount at any time and to any extent that seems advisable to them alone. (Especially as regards rubber and tin, they pointed out that actually 10,000 tons of rubber had recently been shipped from French Indo-China in a Japanese ship and had been forwarded to Germany by way of Japan, and they take the attitude that in the future they would keep in step with the British blockade of Germany and adjust the amount according to shipments from French Indo-China and Thailand to Japan and that they might possibly deduct from the aforementioned 10,000 tons or even cancel the full amount. Their attitude relative to tin was the same. Granted that the aforementioned 15,000 tons of rubber and 3,000 tons of tin are exported to Japan this year, inasmuch as 9,900 tons of rubber and 2,300 tons of tin have already been imported by Japan, this means that we could import no more than the balance, namely, 5,100 tons of rubber, and 700 tons of tin.)

The following is the direction for transmitting this and the separate telegram: Soviet Russia—Please transmit together with the separate telegram from Soviet Russia to Germany and Italy; and also, together with the separate telegram, from Washington to London, and transmit the message in a suitable form from Washington to New York as well.

---

[a] Not available.

[b] See II, 1045.

Trans. 6-13-41

No. 1056

FROM: Batavia (Japanese Consul) June 7, 1941
TO: # 479.

Re your Circular # 1060[a].

There is no difficulty regarding transportation. However recently the Consul in Soerabaja returned a safe to Japan and the officials made a compulsory examination, even opening the door and looking inside, and so there is very little prospect of getting anything through without inspection. From this standpoint of the security of secret documents, just what degree of examination are we to be prepared to expect.

Please wire instructions.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 6-20-41

No. 1057

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) June 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 531.

I have, up to the present, from time to time submitted for your consideration my humble views on the diplomatic courier system. In the light of recent actual examples, I would again invite the reconsideration of our department on the following points.

1. Officially chosen couriers ought to be members of our department. To have any others act in this capacity naturally contravenes the very nature of this system. Things being as they are throughout the world at present, the censoring of telegrams and letters is a common practice and quite inescapable. Now when documents are regarded as of such great secrecy as to require their being sent by this system to which we are gradually attaching more and more importance, it certainly behooves us to send them by members of our own department who have a full understanding of their responsibility. At the same time direct verbal contact can be kept up between our department and its agents abroad through these men, quite aside from the business involved in the documents they carry. Now if we let men who are not members of our department engage in this work, not only would we be deprived of such conveniences, but also, we would have to rely upon people who lack education, who may be uncouth, and who have too slight a knowledge of languages. It is very dangerous to send people like this who are obviously not members of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Needless to say, some of them are intelligent enough to have a great distaste for carrying secret documents. To rely on ship captains as couriers is a terrible mistake. Who knows how they will store the documents? They have no contact with the high officials concerned, and in many cases enemies are on their ships. This is a very bad practice. Already the insular officials are beginning to entertain suspicions concerning Japanese couriers, and if things go on this way, they may deprive us of the privilege of courier mail. I am quite sure of this.

2. Now if it is impossible to send forth a member of the Foreign Department, I would like to have you please arrange to have our offices in the field, at least once a month, send a member of their staff to the Home Office so that direct verbal communication can be carried on. I would also point out that offices which have direct contact with Japan through such excellent means as air routes would save both time and money by using this system rather than relying on telegrams.

Trans. 6-25-41

No. 1058

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Batavia

July 28, 1941
344.

Re matter given in the last part of your # 531[a].

Please hand over both messages to the military attaché in your city.

Please be informed that hereafter my telegram which has for its caption word one consisting of either A or M as its second and fifth letters, and of other letters, in a message for the military attaché and should be handled as such.

---

[a] See II, 1057 in which Batavia suggests that official couriers be members of the Foreign Department and that communications with the Home Office be carried on verbally as much as possible.

Trans. 7-11-41

No. 1059

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Batavia

July 10, 1941
371.

Secret outside the department.

Re my # 277[a] and your # 443[b].

We are dispatching Mr. ZOKU NOMOTO as a courier to carry with him secret documents and the cipher machines for your office and Singapore. (He is carrying one machine in each of two suitcases in his possession.) Therefore, please arrange to meet him and to expedite his getting through customs.

Furthermore, this official is leaving Kobe on the 16th of this month on board the NICHIRAN MARU and should arrive in Batavia August (2nd ? 3rd). As there is need for his leaving directly for Singapore, please make arrangements for reservations on a mail boat plying between Batavia and Singapore which will sail about August 10. After you have made reservations for him, please wire the date of departure and arrival in Batavia and Singapore, respectively, to the Singapore office as well as to this office.

---

[a] Not available.

[b] # 443 is the reply to Foreign Office queries relative to the possibility of passage of official baggage through customs without examination, to which Batavia replies that it is possible, provided seals are attached.

Trans. 7-15-41

No. 1060

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 4, 1941
TO: Soerabaja #98.

Re your message #5[a].

Please immediately burn codes which you have in your possession. (Please refer to my circular of last year #2549[a].) Wire a detailed listing of all documents destroyed. (Strictly secret.) Your caption message is mail letter #5.

---

[a] See II, 1060A in which Tokyo sends out a circular giving instructions covering the destruction of obsolete codes and outlines the necessity of exercising great care in order to preserve the secrecy of diplomatic codes.

Trans. 10–23–41

No. 1060A

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) 26 November, 1940
TO: Santiago (Koshi) No number.

#260 (Circular)

Received from Tokyo as Circular #2547.

Of the following codes or insturctions therefor, if you are holding any in your safes, please destroy them by burning immediately:[a]

Upon their destruction, submit a certificate to that effect to this office. Be sure to submit a list of all the systems being held as of the end of the year.

The various foreign countries are redoubling their efforts to intercept each other's coded messages of late. At the same time, these countries are making use of their spy systems and other means to get to the codes.

For these reasons, there is a great need for taking every precautionary measure to protect our codes and other secrets. In each of your offices, the chief of the office himself must assume this responsibility and see to it that there are no slip ups.

No doubt these words of advice are superfluous, but in view of the times I wish to let them set as reminders.

Please give this message the same routing and distribution as you do the urgent intelligence reports.

---

[a] DoD comment: details deleted.

No. 1061

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 4, 1941
TO: Batavia #450.

Regarding your #716[a].

Because of shortage of hands in both domestic and foreign services, I think there is no way but for you to wire the ----- in the usual manner. We expect to send you, in the near future, something which will take the place of the code.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 8–8–41

No. 1062

FROM: Tokyo June 7, 1941
TO: Batavia (Riyoji) #297.

Re my #114[a].

The Dutch business interests, as indicated in my message #281[a], part 2, finally agreed upon F.O.B. shipments, commissions, invoices, and cotton for munitions.

Also, the prompt participation in the agreement of the guilds may be expected as direct negotiations have been started with the leaders of the Japan-South Seas General Merchandise Export Guild. Agreement with the Dutch interests was reached on commission fees effective from the 5th of this month. In order to insure the guild's participation, it was stipulated that their branches in Japan should hereafter not be affected by assessments levied by the Finance Ministry, but that Dutch firms (five having adhered to the agreement) will, under orders of the Commercial Attaché be subject to them.

This will inevitably result in much dissatisfaction on the part of the branch offices in Japan of Dutch firms.

Other export guilds will probably decide to join in the agreement under the conditions mentioned above.

Please inform the Special Envoy upon receipt of this message.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 6–10–41

No. 1063

FROM: Batavia (Japanese Consul) June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo #540.

Re your #321[a].

When I explained the details to HOOGSTRATEN, he said: "It isn't that the Netherlands companies are taking malicious measures, but should the Japanese Government as a completely national policy institute definite tax levies, then on the whole they would have no objections. In spite of the fact that in the past, the Japanese Government has frequently said that

it would in a friendly manner lend its good offices in the settlement of the question of Netherlands Indies companies entering the guilds, the guild authorities have actually thwarted their admission into the guilds. Their constant policy has always been exceedingly unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, I have received reports that the guilds have recently changed their attitude to one more impartial and friendly. However, this I believe to be the result of the assistance rendered by the Japanese Government and for this assistance I am grateful." I replied: "I expect that in the near future I shall receive an authentic report that a satisfactory settlement has been reached."

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 6–26–41

No. 1064

FROM: Batavia (Riyoji) June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 487.

(*Abstract*)

Re your # 293[a].

The local branches of Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Nomura, Iwai, and Kasho have been making free competitive "offers" for June loadings of rubber. Since this is very unfortunate, please take SUTEPPU (steps) to correct this situation at home offices at once.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 6–21–41

No. 1065

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 12, 1941
TO: Batavia (Riyoji) # 308.

(Request message.)

There are now in the Dutch East Indies, three members of Sumitomo[a]: SHIOBARA, IOKA and YASUDA, who have gone with the purpose of establishing a joint stock company (in respect to ?) the rubber plantations "Boruhowo"[b] and "Suranzi."[b] They have permits to stay there for one month and application has been made to extend their stay for another month. The aforementioned permit (is good to) the last part of July, but, as they will not be able to complete their object of going to the Indies by that time, it will be necessary for them to stay another month (that is, until August 14th). Please endeavor to secure this. Reply concerning the results of your efforts.

---

[a] Large Japanese Banking and Investment Corporation.
[b] Kana spelling.

Trans. 6–21–41

No. 1066

FROM: Batavia (Daihyo) June 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo No number.

Negotiations # 236.

To be kept within the Department.

Strictly Secret.

The Dutch authorities notified me that, according to a news dispatch, the Japanese Government is expecting to publish the contents of the instruction telegram in Tokyo along with other governmental communications, at the same time that the instruction telegram arrives in Batavia; and since it was understood that the publication of the contents of the negotiations is to be done after a parley of all the representatives of both sides, they think the publication would be a mistake. And so in order to caution me, they called my attention to this. As the instruction telegram has, as yet, not arrived, I am not enlightened as to the Government's honorable disposition; and so, if perchance we are to come to a rupture without tipping off the various Dutch authorities in advance, not only would the publication of the contents of the negotiations on our own run counter to the understanding, but also it would be detrimental to our future. If you include the contents of the negotiations in your publication, I would like to have you wait at least until I have consulted with the Dutch authorities, and sent you a wire.

The hour when this message left the hands of the telegraphic clerk was 11:40 a.m. Please let me know at once by return wire the hour of its arrival in Tokyo.

Trans. 6-17-41

No. 1067

FROM: Tokyo June 14, 1941
TO: Batavia (Daihyo) # 148.

Re your Negotiations # 236[a].

The text of our publication is as you mentioned in your wire. You virtually did not involve yourself in the details of the negotiations, being contented merely by stating indirectly the reason why we felt it necessary to rupture these negotiations and a bare statement of the fact of the withdrawal of the representatives. That would have been satisfactory had a compromise in the negotiations been reached, but inasmuch as negotiations were severed we cannot see how the way we publish is any of their business. (The details of the publication or the fact that we present them to the Netherlands Indies from the point of view of propaganda, we believe to be an unwise policy.) Notwithstanding that, last November when a compromise was reached in negotiations relating to the purchase of petroleum, in spite of the fact that our representatives were opposed to it, the Netherlands East Indies officials had the petroleum industries issue a joint communique advising everyone of the quantities involved. We have had examples of Netherlands Indies' lack of faith in advising the United States of this matter. Therefore, as far as the Netherlands Indies are concerned, when you advise them of the breaking off of negotiations, tell them as much and refuse all their requests. Now, if by any chance you have any opinions of which you wish to remind me, please do so by return wire.

Furthermore, it is clearly a fact, according to authoritative intelligences, that the Netherlands Indies authorities during the course of negotiations, whenever they found themselves in

a corner, would on each occasion communicate with the United States and Great Britain, informing them of the details and results. Not only that, but they wired the Netherlands Ministry in Tokyo in plain text the contents of our proposals on May 14th, as well as their reply of June 6th, and undoubtedly the Netherlands Government in London would, as a matter of course, wire their envoys abroad similarly. That attitude and such measures ----- ----- ----- I would like to have you point out to them at the same time you tell them the foregoing.

[a] See II, 1066.

Trans. 6-18-41

No. 1068

FROM: Batavia (Japanese Consul) June 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 482.

(Secret outside Department.)

To Chief of Communication Department:

I had my (negotiations) message # 223[a] transposed into the KANADA *system (?)*, but on account of the complicated procedure involved, it required over ten hours to finish the task, even with the entire staff working on it.

In view of the above, would there be any objection to using the MATU[b] system hereafter (using meaningless words at the beginning and the end of the message) when transposing similar foreign-text messages?

[a] See II, 1050, 1051.
[b] Red Machine.

Trans. 6-10-41

No. 1069

FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) June 9, 1941
TO: Batavia (Riyoji) # 302.

Regarding your # 482:[a]

From the Director of the Communications Division[b].

We appreciate the difficulties confronting you in transmitting messages occasioned by the shortage of help in your office. Therefore, from now on, this kind of message[c] may be sent to this country or third countries in abbreviated code, or even on occasion, in plain language.

[a] Batavia complains that it took his entire staff ten hours to encode the text of the NEI note. (It took eight hours to decode.) Requests permission to use the machine for future items of this kind.
[b] Of the Foreign Ministry.
[c] The text of the above note, consisting of 9 single-spaced pages.

Trans. 6-26-41

No. 1070

FROM: Batavia (Daihyo) June 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo No number.

Negotiations # 237.

Strictly secret.

Re your negotiations # 147[a].

In several senses, Sir, your latest instructions are of the gravest importance and, as there are two or three points which are not at all to my taste, I would like to endeavor to modify your views. Would you please, Sir, be good enough to wire me back immediately some instructions along the following lines:

1. When we come to request the reconsideration of the Governor-General, if we use the phrase, "If and when we publish our final proposal, the Cabinet will be in a terrible position in the face of the violence of public opinion," the Netherlanders will say, "Well, who was dealing with the Cabinet anyway? We are dealing with the Japanese Government." No that would have no meaning whatever to the Netherlands officials. Not only that, but it might give them the impression that we have no control over our people and are up against a stone wall. Cannot you see that this would lessen the dignity of Imperial Japan? I do not wish to use any phrase like that.

2. Concerning the maintenance of normal trade and economic relations between Japan and Netherlands India, reference is made to commercial and trade relations in the last sentence of the first part and in the last paragraph of the second part of the Netherlands reply. Now, Sir, let me tell you one thing frankly: We have 7,000 Japanese here in the Netherlands Indies whom we do not wish to see confounded, and I intend to endeavor to my utmost to have the continuance of such normal relations included in a joint communique. I want you to know that.

3. To say that we are going to have Consul General ISIZAWA continue the negotiations would be to express an obstinate and hard-headed attitude after the rupture of negotiations. Furthermore, it would impart the impression that we are saps. Where would all our imperial prestige be then? I think it better to refrain from making any statement like that and wait until things quiet down after the rupture. Then when the various questions arise under happier and more natural circumstances we may be able to resume the talks. I do not wish to make this statement.

4. You say the "uchikiri" of negotiations in one place and the "ketsuretsu" of negotiations in another. Now, Sir, I would appreciate it if you would tell me wherein lies the difference in meaning of those two words. They both mean "rupture" in English. If you can distinguish between the two in the English language, I would appreciate it. To me the statement, "to announce the 'uchikiri' of negotiations" means precisely "to announce the 'ketsuretsu' of negotiations." Furthermore, from the text for publication given in your Negotiations # 146[a] anybody on the face of the earth would understand that negotiations are ruptured. Please clarify the Government's attitude on this point for me if you please, Sir, and be sure to wire me the English words.

5. I do not need to remind you any further that the question of petroleum is but one question in the total negotiations, so we absolutely cannot segregate it and continue to negotiate concerning it. As a matter of principle and as a matter of sentiment, no matter how much I might try such a thing as that, it is obvious that the Netherlands officials would laugh at me. Will you please, Sir, keep these things well in mind?

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 6-17-41

No. 1071

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 16, 1941
TO: Batavia (Daihyo) # 150.

Re your negotiations # 237[a].

1. The matter contained in paragraph 1 of the said telegram was intended to convince them how earnestly we had been endeavoring to arrive at a compromise by doing what is very difficult for us to do, as well as taking the risk involved; and so will you suitably explain this to them, bearing in mind that we are not appealing to them for fear of the fact that, in case the Dutch East Indies authorities reject our final proposal, our Cabinet would be placed in an embarrassing position.

2. As regards paragraph 2 of the same telegram, will you please make the arrangement you have suggested.

3. As to paragraphs 3 and 4, these are intended to show that while it is true that we decided to discontinue the negotiations and to recall our representatives so that we need not accept their reply as the basis for an agreement, it is also true that the Japanese government wishes to avoid giving the world the impression that the discontinuation of the negotiations would result in immediate disruption of normal relations with the Dutch East Indies and create a situation in which we would be obliged to take up arms against the Islands. These paragraphs also explain how, by discontinuing the negotiations and recalling our representatives, our Government endeavored to prevent the rise of circumstances which might infuriate our people.

Furthermore, the words, "To have Consul General ISIZAWA continue the talks, etc.", show our intention of having him tell them in a casual way that he is to discuss with them from time to time matters which were on the agenda whenever such discussion becomes necessary ----- and to do so on the assumption that normal economic relations with the Dutch East Indies can be maintained.

(Remainder of message garbled.)

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[a] See II, 1070 in which Envoy YOSHIZAWA suggests modification of certain points in Tokyo's latest instructions, which are of gravest importance, and asks for an immediate reply.

Trans. 6-24-41

No. 1072

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 18, 1941
TO: Washington # 1264.

(Circular)

Re my Circular # 1240[a].

The contents of the Dutch reply are extremely unsatisfactory; so much so, in fact, as to be unacceptable to us. However, even though we rupture the negotiations, we do not especially want to provoke the Dutch authorities, particularly as it is of relative non-importance to us now. Since the obtainment of the Dutch East Indies goods is not free at this time, and the export of Japanese goods to the Indies amounts to practically nothing, likewise the import of supplies also, I think that we can obtain the type of goods that the Dutch consider unimportant and the amounts that they are willing to give us through ordinary business deals, even though there is

no pact. Therefore, we have decided to rupture the negotiations at this time; but because we wanted to make a political gesture as a warning to them, we had Representative YOSHIZAWA urge the Governor General once more to reflect seriously, but the Governor General answered it was too late to do any more serious reflecting, and so we have decided to break up the negotiations. Representative YOSHIZAWA, his staff, and complete entourage will be withdrawn.

The addresses of this wire are as according to my caption message.

According to my caption wire, transmit it or send in code.

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[a] See II, 1055 in which the Dutch East Indies Government again rejected the Japanese proposals.

Trans. 6-21-41

No. 1073

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 18, 1941
TO: Batavia (Daihyo) # 153.

Strictly secret.

From the Chief of the Fuel Bureau to ITO[a].

1. In view of the peculiarities of the petroleum question, I would like to have you continue your stay as a representative of the petroleum industry even after the Imperial Japanese delegates return home.

2. The international situation being extremely delicate, for the present at least we would like to have you make such necessary contacts with the view of bringing about perfect solutions with regard to the filling of already contracted for purchases of oil and matters dealing with the development of oil fields agreed upon in various conversations, as well as to keep you informed of what we might expect along many various questions. For the time being, at least, we will delay making any direct demands. We would like to have you wait upon a favorable opportunity.

---

[a] Mitsui agent in Batavia; also semi-official of Foreign Office.

Trans. 6-21-41

No. 1074

FROM: Tokyo June 21, 1941
TO: Batavia (Riyoji) # 26.

(*Abstract*)

The Consul General is instructed to protest immediately to the Dutch East Indian authorities against the unreasonable concentration in British hands of control of oil production and transportation, and to urge the adoption of a more reasonable position.

Trans. 7-1-41

No. 1075

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 21, 1941
TO: Batavia (Daihyo) #156.

Regarding your #245[a] and #246[b].

From Chief of the Fuel Bureau to Itō and Hatanaka:

1. The main reason for retaining the fuel representation is the maintenance of contact with the Netherlands Indies authorities for the purpose of keeping opened the channel for future negotiations on the question of oil rights, should the course of events change.
2. The solution of various problems connected with the question of the development of airline service and that of oil, already contracted for, which may require instructions, should be given a secondary importance.
3. We appreciate Mr. Ito's past efforts and we are now looking for a suitable successor. Therefore, please return as soon as his successor reaches there to take over his duties.
4. Please ascertain the matter in question of natural resources, in accordance with my message to Mr. Ito.

---

[a] See II, 1076—Hatanaka feels that since the breakdown of the general negotiations, the local branch office of Mitsui can handle the problem of acquisition of raw materials, and it will be OK for ITO to go home.

[b] See II, 1077—ITO feels that the Dutch are just on the point of accepting their separate proposal, and he wants to see it through before returning.

Trans. 6–25–41

No. 1076

FROM: Batavia (Daihyo) June 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #245.

(Abstract)

From Hatanaka to the Chief of the Fuel Section.

Hatanaka feels that in view of the breakdown of the general negotiations the separate problem of the acquisition of raw materials can be handled by the local branch of Mitsui and that it will be O.K. for Ito to return to Tokyo and let Hatanaka carry on alone.

Trans. 6–21–41

No. 1077

FROM: Batavia (Daihyo) June 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo #246.

(*Abstract*)

From Itō to the Chief of the Fuel Section.

Regarding Hatanaka's telegram[a] that Ito return home and let Hatanaka carry on negotiations alone.

Itō feels that the Dutch are just on the point of accepting their separate proposal and he wants to see it through before returning.

---

[a] See II, 1076.

Trans. 6-21-41

No. 1078

FROM: Batavia (Daihyo) June 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo No number.

Negotiations #251.

To the Chief of the Fuel Bureau from ITO.

Just as I told you in my separate wire #242[a], everything relating to the petroleum question has been taken care of. As far as the Netherlands East Indies Government is concerned, too, there is no point to my staying here any longer. Consequently, I am returning home on the Nisshō Maru. Please acknowledge.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 6-27-41

No. 1079

FROM: Batavia (Daihyo) June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo No number.

Negotiations #253.

To the Chief of the Fuel Bureau from ITO.

Please refer to your special message #156[a] dated the 21st.

Having reached a settlement on the resources question under discussion, the Plenipotentiary made representations to the Governor General, outlining the reasons for insisting upon this humble servant's remaining behind. These reasons, however, were dissolved. Furthermore, with regard to the petroleum question, the attitude of the Netherlands East Indies Government is as I have told you in my successive reports, and as was pointed out to me by VON MOOK[b] in his communication of reply. They cannot accede to any of our objections. Recently, when I

conversed with Mr. VON MOOK, he told me that by virtue of the negotiations having been ruptured, those who represented the Netherlands Indies during the course of the negotiations have already been divested of their authorities as such. "Therefore, questions of this kind", he said, "come under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines. Henceforth, as a matter of course, all negotiations will have to be disposed of through discussion with the competent bureau chiefs and the industrialists. The Bureau of Mines hasn't the authority to handle such important questions as you have been bringing up having to do with political matters. Regardless of whatever point of view you might take with regard to your future acquisition of rights and interests, negotiations on such questions is impossible." The Netherlands East Indies Government, too, will have no dealings with us. Therefore, there is not a single reason for this humble servant or any other person to remain here.

With regard to what you said in your wire, I talked the matter over with the Plenipotentiary, too, and we were completely in accord. On today's date he has dispatched a separate message to the Foreign Minister. Please be advised that I am leaving, in accordance with my wire of yesterday. I regret that I have not been able in my reports to date to make you sufficiently cognizant of the situation here. Immediately after I return home, I shall give a full explanation.

---

[a] See II, 1075.
[b] Director of Economic Affairs.

Trans. 6-26-41

No. 1080

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 12, 1941
TO: Batavia #375.

(Strictly Secret.)

Re your #54 (7 ? 2 ?).

From the Secretary of the Fuel Bureau to SAITO.[a]

No matter how much I ask the government to which you are accredited to let you remain there, I do not believe that they would allow you to remain any length of time. Therefore, please return on a steamer at the end of this month. Concerning the permanent establishment of some sort of fuel office agency, I am now in close touch with the Foreign Office. For your information.

---

[a] Fuel Negotiator in Batavia.

Trans. 7-17-41

No. 1081

FROM: Batavia July 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #705.

On the 30th I called on the Chief of the Trade Bureau, "SU", and asked for a confirmation of our oil agreement. He assured me that the government of the Netherlands East Indies has no

intention of abrogating that agreement. He added that he could see no reason why the company would refuse to sell, either.

I, therefore, advised him that I was in receipt of a report that the company is acting indecisively with regard to loading the oil for which payment has already been made. How about that? I asked.

He replied that probably the company was discussing the disposition of the provision that called for payment in dollars. "MO" (Van Mook) and representatives of the company are to confer on that point tomorrow, the 31st, he added.

I then said that I hoped "MO" (Van Mook) would do everything in his power to make possible the fulfillment of our agreement.

"SU" said that that was a most reasonable hope on my part but that "MO" (Van Mook) would first have to hear what the company officials have to say before making any decision.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 1082

FROM: Tokyo — June 25, 1941
TO: Batavia — # 161.

(*Abstract*)

Re your # 245[a] and # 246[b]. From the Chief of the Fuel Section to Ito and Hatanaka.

Consent to Ito and Hatanaka's return thanking them for their difficult negotiations. Iwata to carry out former policy to be assisted by Saito in place of Hatanaka. Your message of the 22nd could not be deciphered.

---

[a] See II, 1076—Hatanaka feels that since the breakdown of the general negotiations, the local branch of Mitsui can handle the problem of acquisition of raw materials, and it will be OK for Ito to go home.

[b] See II, 1077—Ito feels that the Dutch are just on the point of accepting their separate proposal, and he wants to see it through before returning.

Trans. 7-2-41

No. 1083

FROM: Batavia (Daihyo) — June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo — No number.

Negotiations # 255.

Re your negotiations wire # 156[a].

In summing up the purport of the message received from the Chief of the Fuel Bureau, I most respectfully suppose that in support of the fact that the petroleum resources question, by virtue of VON MOOK's[b] reply to ITO[c], has come to naught, he would like to see, as soon as the international situation has taken a favorable turn, the realization of his long cherished hopes based upon the original wishes of the Imperial Government for an ever broadening acquisition of natural resources over and above our original plans. It is clear that for the present, at least, a favorable turn in the international situation (if by "A favorable changing in the

international situation" he should mean an invasion of Great Britain) cannot be anticipated. Notwithstanding, all this, he instructed ITO and HATANAKA[d] to remain here. It is utterly senseless. As for myself, I see no point in arguing it. Not only that, but VON MOOK first of all, and then all Netherlands Indies authorities, by virtue of VON MOOK's reply, consider the resources question at an end. Though these two men be instructed to remain here, it is but a matter of course that they will have absolutely no dealings with them (with regard, too, to their successors, the same thing will be true). Therefore, though the Chief of the Fuel Bureau has issued instructions in his wire, I am in accord with the desire of these two men who wish to return to Japan on the Nissho Maru. Please bear this in mind.

---

[a] See II, 1075.
[b] Director of Economic Affairs, N.E.I.
[c] Representative in Batavia, accompanying Hatanaka.
[d] Chief representative in Batavia.

Trans. 6-26-41

No. 1084

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) June 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 524.

Re your # 298[a], 199[b] to me, and your # 138[c] to the Special Envoy:

An agreement on tin, manganese and POKI (?) has been reached in the negotiations, but Dutch opposition became more evident and they denied the existence of such an agreement. We should endeavor to negotiate again if the Dutch uncompromising attitude changes.

---

[a] Mitsubishi has a year's contract to load 3000 tons of tin. During the first six months they have loaded 2300 tons and now N.E.I. says they cannot export the remaining 700 tons. Contact the authorities and wire result.
[b] Difficulties in obtaining promised exports of manganese from the D.E.I. (Request message from Mitsui main office).
[c] Not available.

Trans. 7-3-41

No. 1085

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) June 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 525.

Regarding your # 138[a].

From Sekikawa to NICHIRANSHOZI (Jap-Netherlands Commercial ?):

1. In regard to the matter of reduction of shipping amounts, BIRITON has advised us that instructions have been issued by the Finance Ministry that from 1 June on, the limit will be placed at 20,000 tons per month.

As a matter of fact, this has really been in effect since March, because of the ----- of all loading of -----.

2. To this I immediately lodged a strong protest, indicating that we absolutely could not recognize it. However, the above measures are an attempt to apply a war-time embargo act, and it is bound to put a curb upon those concerned in the contracts, with regard to contracts already made and all other deals.

3. This matter is tied up with the policy of utmost national defense, and this, together with the question of supplying commodities to third powers, is being manipulated by the top managers in New York, and it is exceedingly difficult to ferret out the actual facts here.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 6-27-41

No. 1086

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) June 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #529.

Regarding your #325[a].

Since negotiations with Netherlands Indies are in such a delicate stage, orders to purchase sugar, ----- and other things to the head office of Mitsui and Mitsubishi ----- (It might be well to send all telegrams secretly to me for the time being).

This has been sent to Soerabaja, also.

---

[a] Directs purchase of 10,000 tons of sugar, cancels previous order for 12,000 tons, etc.

Trans. 6-26-41

No. 1087

FROM: Rome (Horikiri) June 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #392.

(Intelligence Report, secondary importance.)

According to an intelligence from a Vatican source, it seems that the Apostolic delegate to Batavia sent the following resume to the Vatican:

At first the attitude of the United States toward the Japanese-Netherlands Indies commercial negotiations was not clear. The Netherlands Indies people were helpless and in no position to refuse Japan's demands upon them. Then the United States brought pressure to bear upon the Netherlands Indies, scheming to obtain an excellent bargaining position whereby they could force Japan into a position of neutrality through appeasement if and when the United States should go to war with the Axis. At this stage, it appeared probable that the Japanese-Netherlands Indies negotiations would work out to a solution. But, this scheme of the United States went awry; the United States changed its policy and brought pressure to bear against the Netherlands Indies just as against China; and, along with Great Britain, brought these countries into a cooperative encirclement, ready to defy Japan. Now, the United States is maintaining a defensive line, including the Philippine Islands, China, the Netherlands Indies, and also Thai, all of which have relinquished any hope of Japan remaining neutral. Thus,

holding Japan against the wall, the United States is dangling before her as a lure the material aid necessary for her revitalization, so striving to achieve her objectives. The Netherlands Indies, however, are skeptical of this scheme of the United States and surmise that Japan will, as certain as death, invade their territory.

Trans. 6-24-41

No. 1088

FROM: Tokyo July 17, 1941
TO: Batavia #39- (?).

There are reports to the effect that America, with the assistance of Great Britain, will soon effect a treaty, with the N.E.I. for military cooperation. There are also reports that America is building an air base at DOBU[a]

[a] Probably DOBU in Papua, New Guinea.

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 1089

FROM: Batavia July 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #689.

Re my #687.

1. Although the attitude of the Dutch East Indies Government is not clear, the people at large think that if the United States should change to an aggressive policy and carry out a general embargo, Japan would not hesitate to extend her southward march to include Singapore and the Dutch East Indies most fear now, namely the spread of war into the Pacific, would become a reality. Naturally, they are in a constant state of uneasiness.

2. On the 26th, I had the members of this office tour the city of Batavia. They found that on the whole the city presented an aspect no different from the usual one. The Governor-General moved to his mountain villa in Baitenzorugu on the 26th. The War and Navy Departments as well as other governmental agencies worked only during the forenoon. The soldiers in the barracks in the city were enjoying their weekend leave by going out with their families, and there was no sign of any special vigilance. Of course, the Vigilantes were conspicuous in the city, since it is from today, the 26th, for three days that the blackout which is to cover an area centering on Batavia and Baitenzorugu and which had been planned since several months ago, was to go into effect. I understand, furthermore, that the time for this blackout has not been announced to those concerned and that it is to be carried out on the supposition that there will be an unexpected air raid.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 1090

FROM: Batavia (Japanese Consul) June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo #539.

(Part 1 of 2)

Strictly Secret

1. When I conferred with HOOGSTRATEN[a] on the 23rd, I said: "We are now in receipt of official telegram regarding the Russo-German conflict. Now that connections between Germany and Soviet Russia have been severed, it may well be said that the anxiety over reexportation to Germany, a matter which the Dutch East Indies authorities have repeatedly brought up during the negotiations, has been eliminated. Naturally, for this reason, supplies will be shipped to Japan hereafter in the amount which Japan desires. What do you think of this?" HOOGSTRATEN replied: "We cannot at once agree to freely export materials to Japan since we must wait and see what the general situation following the outbreak of the Russo-German war is going to be and since we do not know how the attitude on the part of Japan is going to change."

2. Then, I sounded out his opinion regarding the possible development of the Russo-German conflict. HOOGSTRATEN's reply was: "Personally, I think it is a very good thing that this conflict broke out. Because of this conflict, Germany will not be able to concentrate her efforts against England and besides, since the Russian Army is bigger and stronger than it was years ago, Germany will not be able to bring it to its knees so easily. In the meantime, United States aid to Great Britain will be spurred on and British fighting power will continuously increase. If Germany, under these circumstances, should dissipate her strength and become exhausted, Soviet Russia will probably hit back and regain her strength. There is no doubt that the downfall of HITLER will be hastened." I stated: "The German Army is superior to the Russian Army. This goes without saying and since, for reason of its morale as well as its historic tradition, it has absolute confidence in winning the war, the possibility of the Germans achieving victory is great. Granted that Soviet Russia wins the war, Europe will come under the control of STALIN instead of HITLER. This does not make much difference to Holland one way or the other, does it?" HOOGSTRATEN replied: "I believe this Russo-German conflict will be a drawn out affair and both sides will become exhausted. Suppose that Soviet Russia won the war; she has ----- with Germany and has no great ambition in so far as Western Europe is concerned and so if HITLER falls, I believe we could easily restore Holland in cooperation with Great Britain."

(Part 2 of 2)

3. HOOGSTRATEN continued by asking me: "We consider Japan's attitude to be of utmost importance. Now, what is Japan's attitude?" I replied: "Of course, I cannot say anything definite until our Government decides on the matter, but in view of the fact that a neutrality treaty has been concluded between Japan and Soviet Russia and, also, in view of the fact that it is stipulated in the fifth clause of the Tri-Partite Treaty that the relations between the respective treaty powers and Soviet Russia shall be in no wise affected by the Alliance, I believe that the change which has taken place in the Russo-German relations will have no immediate effect on Japan."

4. Now, the impression I received from this conversation is that, while the Dutch authorities maybe freed from the anxiety of Dutch East Indies materials being reexported to Germany, she might, depending on developments, begin to ship materials to Soviet Russia on a large scale in hopes of Russia winning over Germany and she might in that case make this necessity

a pretext for not increasing her exports to Japan. Furthermore, should Japan show any gesture in the way of aiding Germany in a concrete manner, I am afraid the Dutch authorities would take a much less compromising and much more anti-Japanese attitude; therefore, I think it would be well to always bear in mind in forming our policy as regards the Russo-German affair what influence such a policy might have on the Dutch East Indies and, after a policy has been formulated, to control and adjust a thorough manner publication of information by the intelligence section as well as newspaper editorials.

Furthermore, in order that I may turn the attitude of the Dutch East Indies as favorably as possible toward us, I would like to be given for my exclusive use information not only concerning every decision our Government makes in so far as such decisions should necessarily be made known to me, but also concerning the developments which follow such decisions.

---

[c] Chief of Commerce Bureau, N.E.I.

Trans. 6-26-41

No. 1091

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) July 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo #632.

1. There are many here who have misgivings as to whether or not Japan should use the present Russo-German war as an occasion to attack Russia. I thought it might be well to know what the attitude of the Netherlands East Indies toward Japan would be in case of such an eventuality and so I sounded out some of those with whom I am in contact. Summarizing my findings the situation seems to be about as follows:

A. Neither the establishment of the Anglo-Russian alliance nor the outbreak of a Russo-Japanese war would have any immediate effect on Japanese-N.E.I. relations.

B. For example, even though Italy has formed an alliance with Germany and is attacking the British army this has no direct bearing on the N.E.I. and therefore, the N.E.I. has not attacked Italy and Italians resident in the N.E.I. are still permitted to carry on business.

C. If by any chance a war should break out between Japan and Russia as long as Japan did not commit any hostile acts toward the N.E.I. there should be no fundamental change in the N.E.I. attitude toward Japan. However, in that event Japan would be attacking the Soviet, which in turn is fighting an enemy of the N.E.I., Germany, and so it would be inevitable that the N.E.I. would have to further regulate the supply of commodities to Japan.

D. In case Japan attacks the N.E.I. directly -----.

2. Our countries ----- toward England and America ----- (garbled out).

Trans. 8-1-41

No. 1092

FROM: Batavia — June 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo — No number.

Negotiations # 257.

Re your negotiations # 15[a].

I have received your very kind message, and my compatriots, one and all are, in truth thankful beyond words. It is truly beyond us to express how, try as we did with our poor strength, we were unable to bring about a successful conclusion to the negotiations. As a result of the publication of the joint communique, I feel sure that here in the Islands there is evidence of a change for the better in the atmosphere toward Japan, and it is a matter for which our country should be happy that our Japanese nationals who reside here are too perturbed. We beseech you to accept our most heartfelt congratulations, and we thank you most humbly.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-1-41

No. 1093

FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa) — June 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 556.

From HASEGAWA (?).

Wish to return to Japan the latter part of July upon close of Japanese-Dutch Society. Request instructions.

Trans. 7-23-41

No. 1094

FROM: Batavia (Jap Consul) — July 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 637.

(*Abstract*)

The Mitubishi home office has instructed the local branch office to evacuate the families of its members. Is this based on the independent decision of the Mitubishi Co., or does it have anything to do with the pending policy of our government which makes such a move necessary?

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 1095

FROM: Batavia (Japanese Consul) July 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo #632 (?).

(Request cable.)

To Chief of General Affairs of the Mitubisi Company from Tanaka:

With regard to the matter of evacuating the members of the staff's families, I have been following the examples set by other business firms, and persuading them to return home.

However, as I reported previously, general conditions continue to be calm, and if anything, are taking a turn for the better. For this reason, there are no families which desire to return home at the present time.

In my humble opinion, I do not believe that there is any need for anxiety as to the safety of those Japanese residing here, as long as Japan does not decide to adopt strong measures.

It is my belief that to convey such matter as was contained in your cable, in plain language text, is to unnecessarily excite the government of the Netherlands East Indies. This has an exceedingly bad effect upon the general situation which was gradually developing into a normal one, and at the same time, it violently interferes with the progress of our production plans.

Was that plain language message sent with the approval of our government and as a gesture of threat against the Netherlands East Indies, in retaliation for the recent export limitations imposed on us by that government? If it was merely a gesture, it had very little effect on this country. On the other hand, if Japan is actually planning some strong action, I would imagine that a message in plain language would give Japanese intentions away to the Netherlands East Indies.

Please advise me of the actual fact as well as whether or not this gesture of threat is being used as an excuse to get the families out of here. I shall await your reply.

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 1096

FROM: Batavia June 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo #553.

Secret.

(1) On the 27th, after the departure of Minister Yoshizawa and party, Hofstraaten expressed the following desires to me in regard to Colonels Maeda and Oga, and Lt. Col. Ishii. As he has repeatedly told me confidentially, the Army has not been pleased over these army officers being here, and in view of the fact that in his conversation with him on the 27th, Yoshizawa told the Governor General that the remaining members of the party would leave on the next ship (and this is a fact), he would like to have the above mentioned three individuals take passage on the Asama Maru that is scheduled to leave 3 July.

(2) I told him that the N.E.I. government had been advised about a week ago that the said three will be leaving on the Kitano Maru 15 July, and that at that time no objection to this has been expressed, and I asked for the reasons for the sudden (change?). Hofstraaten then explained that the coming of military members in the party should have been refused at the very outset of negotiations, but that for the sake of not giving affront to the Japanese government, special consent had been given. However, judging from their conduct since then it has become very evident that they have been more engrossed in the inspection of all parts of the N.E.I. than

in the business pertaining to the negotiations. As a result, serious criticism has been coming to the government from the military authorities in all sections of the country, and this has led to the demand by the government for the departure of these army officers.

Trans. 7-1-41

No. 1097

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Batavia (Riyoji)

July 3, 1941
355.

Re your # 560[a].

The N.E.I. government answered that according to instructions they had received it would be impossible to grant permission but the reasons were not stated clearly. Is this a refusal to permit EGUCHI[b] to return or is it the policy of the N.E.I. government in the future not to recognize Japanese military and naval language student officers? Please take this point up with the proper authorities and wire the result.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Lieutenant Commander, I.J.N. (?)

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 1098

FROM: Batavia (Consul)
TO: Tokyo

July 9, 1941
596.

(*Abstract*)

Re your # 368[a].

Netherlands Indies objects to having (Vice Consul) Takenaka return to N.E.I. because of his previous connection with the radical elements among the natives. Please consider appointing someone else in his place.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 1099

FROM: Batavia
TO: Tokyo

July 18, 1941
645.

According to spy report, in addition to the recently completed air field at BUITENZORG[a], two military air fields are being constructed at TAKGERAN[b] and RANGKASBITOENG[b]. The supplementary landing field at ANJERKIDOEL[c] is being rebuilt. Furthermore, at SERANG[d]

an air field of a much greater scale than the above is, I understand, being built. The details will be sent by mail.

---

[a] South of Batavia.
[b] Unidentified.
[c] West of Serang.
[d] Western tip of Java.

Trans. 7-19-41

No. 1100

FROM: Batavia July 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #648.

According to spy information, there are two United States Naval offices stationed in a certain section of Soerabaja and Java (one arrive about two months ago and the other more recently). There are also British and Australian army officers (the British officer arrived from Singapore) who are stationed respectively in Bandon and Batavia. I understand that these officers are giving military training. I suppose that at various points in the island there are many officers in addition to the above who are serving as either instructors or liaison officers.

Trans. 7-23-41

No. 1101

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) July 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo #667.

According to intelligences (Chinese report) the British commander-in-chief of the Far East forces, Brooke-Popham, and U.S. Naval aviation officer, Normer, are in this area at present. It is further reported that one officer each from the Australian Army and Navy came to Soerabaja several days ago and will remain here as instructors in military affairs.

Trans. 7-26-41

No. 1102

FROM: Soerabaja (Kohri) July 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #296.

(Request telegram).

Please transmit the following to the Provisions Company.

We would like to be entrusted by you with the purchase of Java ----- rice on the following terms: Quantity, up to 2,000 tons; ship to be supplied by you; price and time of shipment, any time you wish in July or August, 9.10 yen; and August or September 9.20 yen; local consumption is active; market for futures is inactive; July and September, inclusive, 9.35 yen; October to December, inclusive 9.95 yen. Because of a general rise in the price in purchasing price, there is little prospect of a decline. If arrangements are made quickly, it might be possible to

arrange the business according to the aforementioned terms. However, if time is lost, rice in stock will be, without doubt, consumed locally. Will you, therefore make arrangements at once.

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 1103

FROM: Batavia July 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #641.

(Separate Message.)

Re Part 3 of my #614[a].

The following are examples of how the Dutch East Indian Government has subjected us to cancellations or postponements on export license agreements which had been consummated.

(1) *Palm Oil:* Because in January of this year the quantity to be exported to Japan was limited to 1,000 tons annually, all of the 1,150 tons which were contracted for by "TOZAN-NŌJI" were unavoidably cancelled. Of the 1,140 tons which remained to be shipped to MITSUI during January to May, we were finally able after various parleys to obtain permission to ship 190 tons up to the end of February. After that everything was stopped, but recently, as stated in my message #603[b], we were able to get 500 tons more.

(2) *Kapok:* In June of this year, the exportable quantity was restricted to 500 tons per month; that is, 3500 tons for the period June to December, inclusive. As a result of this ruling, about 1,100 tons to various companies had to be cancelled.

(3) *Tannin:* From Mangroves, etc. In spite of the fact that export licenses for about 2,000 tons had been agreed upon for June, half of this quantity was not allowed to be shipped.

(4) *Scrap Iron:* In March the Dutch East Indies Government suddenly limited the exportable quantity to Japan to 4,000 tons per month, and in spite of the fact that business transactions had already been entered into, all quantities exceeding the above had to be cancelled.

(5) *Rubber:* In February rubber shipments were restricted to 1,650 tons per month, and all in excess of that amount have been held up.

(6) *Kopra:* Because of sudden restrictions placed upon this by the Dutch East Indian government, Japanese firms in the Celebes have been forced to hold on the spot about 13,000 tons which have been forced to hold on the spot about 13,000 tons which have been contracted for.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 7-22-41

No. 1104

FROM: Tokyo July 17, 1941
TO: Batavia #390 (?).

(Secret.)

Regarding the conditions attached to the Netherlands government's final reply which reduces the rubber export to Japan to 15,000 tons, ANEHA told DO. ROSU that the above reduc-

tion is contrary to the agreement entered into last year at Tokyo between the Foreign Minister and Ambassador Pabst, and that as the above agreement was based on the preliminary talks between DO. ROSU and myself, this matter more or less concerns us both and for this reason, reconsideration is in order to restore the amount to the original 20,000 tons. Whereupon "DO" agreed to take up this matter with "PA" at once. Subsequently, "DO" informed ANEHA that he had received a reply from "PA" stating that our claim was justified and that he will try to make necessary adjustment.

(2) On the same occasion, in answer to "DO's" question, ANEHA explained that as a result of direct German-Vichy negotiations, the 10,000 tons of rubber, out of 25,000 tons purchased, which had been shipped to Kobe, has been designated designated as the property of the German government, and although it should already be on its way to Germany, its present whereabouts is not known. Also, that the remaining 15,000 tons which is supposed to go to Japan is held up in French Indo-China on the ground that there is no rubber on hand which can be spared, and that the negotiations for the 35,000 tons to be bought from Thailand ("DO" is said to have information regarding these negotiations) have not yet resulted in any definite agreement.

Trans. 7-19-41

No. 1105

FROM: Tokyo — July 18, 1941
TO: Batavia — # 404.

(Secret.)

Re your # 614[a], part 3.

The contracted articles are to be exported as soon as possible. Although ships were reserved until the 5th of this month, permits were issued for sailings before the 20th from Japan proper. The NICHIRAN MARU and the CHIRUBUTO are the ships assigned to the Netherlands East Indies.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-23-41

No. 1106

FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa) — July 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 686.

In regard to permitting the use of only English and Japanese in telephone conversations to the Dutch East Indies, the Dutch East Indies Government says that if we prohibit the use of Dutch in such international telephone calls, they may also prohibit the use of Japanese. As there are many Japanese resident in the Dutch East Indies, such a restriction would be very inconvenient. I think, therefore, that when the new system is inaugurated on August 1st, it would be advisable also to recognize the use of Dutch.

Trans. 8-13-41

No. 1107

FROM: Tokyo — July 31, 1941
TO: Batavia — # 473.

(Strictly confidential.)

Regarding your message # 686[a].

As a matter of practice we have been permitting the use of the Dutch language. Moreover, we have been making arrangements to announce a revision in the order within a few days.

In spite of these facts we were advised on the 29th, that the Netherlands East Indies is prohibiting the use of the Japanese language.

The Ministry of Communications now advises us that if your negotiations for the retraction of this order proves to be unsuccessful, it is ready to completely suspend telephonic communications between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies.

We shall not announce any revision to the order until you have completed your negotiations. Please, therefore, advise us of the results of the negotiations as soon as they are available.

---

[a]See II, 1106.

Trans. 8-7-41

No. 1108

FROM: Batavia — July 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 687.

Secret outside the Department.

1. Every time the Netherlands Indies officials have mentioned the matter I have taken the opportunity to endeavor to sound out their views concerning the attitude which the Island Government is taking on the French Indo-China question. On the 25th when I conferred with the Secretary of Economics, VAN MOOK, he made no reference to this subject, but on the 26th when I conferred with Chief UTUHEREN of the Immigration Office, the latter said: "The occupation by Japan of southern French Indo-China has further damaged Japanese relations with England and the United States, and if war breaks out between Japan and England, the Netherlands will have to fight side by side with England. I am very anxious because of this turn of events." As a personal surmise, I stated: "Well, you know how the United States and the Chinese were hindering Japan from procuring French Indo-Chinese goods. It was doubtless in order to stop this that Japan carried on negotiations with Vichy." U. asked: "If that is so, why were you so anxious to get military bases?" I replied: "You know how England and the United States have been increasing their assistance to China and you know what happened in Syria. If we had let French Indo-China alone, England would have brought her economically and militarily under British influence and would not have been long about it. That must be why Japan took this action." U. shook his head, saying: "No, you must be wrong. I cannot think that of England and the United States. I am very much grieved." I hastened to reassure him by saying: "Well, in any case, we are not likely immediately to see the outbreak of war between Japan and England. I don't think this will have any direct effect upon the Netherlands Indies. All we Japanese want is to see an increasing amity between our two countries." U. merely looked chagrined and confused.

2. On the 24th Chief RITTOMAN[a] of the Intelligence Section told a group of Japanese news reporters that in his personal opinion Great Britain would not start a war with Japan over this issue.

3. According to Japanese banking circles, Netherlands concerns have so far remained utterly taciturn.

4. Chief HOOGSTRATEN is now away on vacation but while we were negotiating I once heard him strongly declare: "Occupation of north French Indo-China by Japanese forces would not constitute a direct threat to Netherlands India, but if Japanese troops were to proceed to the southern part, they would indeed be a threat to these islands and we could not overlook it."

5. I have kept my eyes fixed upon the Governor's mansion and on the evening of the 25th the yard was a parking ground for many, many automobiles belonging to high officials.

6. I wanted to congratulate the new member of the Council of the Indies, VAN DER PURASU[a], so on the morning of the 26th I called him up to ask when I might visit him, and he replied: "You do not know how very busy I am. I would appreciate it if we could postpone this interview until the 29th."

7. In short, it seems that the Netherlands Indies Government is deeply and maturely considering its future policy now that we have occupied French Indo-China. This is all for the moment.

Relayed to Australia, -----, -----, Bangkok and Manila.

---

[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 1109

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) July 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #612.

When I saw HOOGSTRATEN, Commerce Bureau Chief, as mentioned in separate message #613[a], he stressed that the Netherland Indies Government consider this a very important question. He hopefully requested in a pressing manner, that Japan soon hand over the mining machinery to the Netherlanders. I answered that I knew nothing about this, but I would inquire into the conditions and confer with him again. Please make a survey of the supply and then reply, giving the form in which I am to answer.

Relayed to -----.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-24-41

No. 1110

FROM: Shanghai July 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1318.

Re my #1219[a].

1. The unloading of the cargo in question was postponed for some time after my previous report but was finally completed in three days beginning on the 14th. Investigation by specialists revealed that, as reported by the Netherlands authorities, the cargo consists of textile machinery. It was found also that this machinery was ordered through the Arnold Company by the Junhō Textile Works in Sainan, but, because it was not shipped in time, the contract was cancelled; that this company had kept the machinery in the warehouse belonging to the Bank of China, and that subsequently the Netherlands Government had purchased it. Thus, all suspicion as to its being the property of the Chungking regime was cleared.

2. A formal protest has been filed by the Consulates of both Britain and the Netherlands. In addition to this, the Java-China Trading Company has addressed a request directly to the gendarmerie for immediate settlement of this question. Consequently, the gendarmerie made the following proposal to the company:

(1) Since an attempt was made to export the machinery in question, in spite of the fact that no permit had been issued for the purpose and the fact that the Army authorities had given warning on four different occasions, if judged on the basis of military regulations, it should logically be confiscated. However, the authorities are considering its release as a special favor and would like, in return, to have the Netherlands firms cooperate with the Japanese hereafter in the purchase of materials by the Japanese government. If the Netherlanders agree to offering such cooperation, the Japanese authorities will offer special facilities at the time the remaining part of the cargo in question will be exported.

(2) Also, the Netherlands authorities should promise that the machinery in question will not be transferred to the Chungking authorities after its release.

The Netherlands authorities accepted these terms. Now we are discussing the details of the question. It is our intention to release this machinery immediately upon our having completed our consideration. I would like to have this matter transmitted at your discretion.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 9–12–41

No. 1111

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) July 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo #668.

Re your #386[b].

(1) I gave reply to the official in charge at the Finance Ministry, as per your reference message, and on the 21st on the occasion of my visiting MO[a] on other business, MO laid great emphasis on the fact that they desire a speedy settlement of this matter. I then explained to him, on the basis of Shanghai's #1229[b] to Tokyo, how the vessel Canton had made difficult the position of the military by acting contrary to the orders of the water police, and also how the reasonableness of our contention in view of the fact that the CHUGOKU Bank is a bank belonging entirely to the Chungking side. However, as MO insisted that the machine in question

was the possession of the Netherlands East Indies, and would not see our point, I told him that this is really a matter that should be handled through Minister Pabst in Tokyo.

(2) If this, with other incidents involving the Dutch that have arisen in China is found to be entirely the fault of the Dutch, there might be no necessity of showing leniency, but if such is not the case, I think it would be highly desirable to try to reach a settlement quickly that would be reasonable to both sides. If the Dutch are not convinced as to the reasonableness of our method of handling this matter, we must remember that there are countless matters pertaining to the supply of important N.E.I. products to Japan, and in connection with the businesses and enterprises of 7,000 Japanese residents, regarding which we are dependent upon the good will of the N.E.I. Government. If we should provoke the Dutch into taking retaliatory measures against these interests, it would be a most unwise course, involving extensive losses.

Please give careful thought to all these points and undertake to reach a speedy settlement of the matter in question.

---

[a] Van Mook.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 1112

FROM: Batavia July 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo #683.

To Shanghai as #9 (?). Re my #612[a].

On the 25th Director "MO" (Van Mook) said that he had had a telegram from the Dutch Authorities in Shanghai to the effect that the spinning[b] machinery had been released and he said that he wished to express his thanks to the authorities there and to the Japanese government for their fair treatment.

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[a] Jap Minister Isizawa wires Tokyo that Commerce Chief Hoogstraaten has requested, in a pressing manner, that the mining machinery be handed over to the N.E.I. Government. Requests instructions. See II, 1109.
[b] A one letter garble would make this "mining" machinery referred to in reference.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 1113

FROM: Batavia July 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #697.

Re my #696[a].

1. Let us compare the steps taken by Batavia with those taken by Washington and London:
(1) Batavia has not abrogated their commercial pacts.
(2) She has not detained our ships.
(3) The Government has neither by statement nor implication directly censured us.
(4) They show an inclination to interpret this general export quota system in such a way as to let us procure the goods we have already contracted for and appear ready to show leniency in continuing to supply us with goods.

So we can see that they are a little more lax than are England and the United States. And yet, essentially beyond any doubt they are one link in the Anglo-American-Netherlands chain of economic encirclement. The only thing is that they hesitate to deliberately insult us. They do not consider it wise to invite a military attack by Japan upon their islands. All they are doing is hiding behind this export quota system to keep out of danger.

2. On the 28th in a conversation I had with VAN MOOK he said: "If the Japanese do not conduct themselves in a manner suitable to us in the future, we will surely exercise a complete economic blockade. We will surely join up with England and there is a possibility that we may go so far as to conclude with the United States and England a military alliance."

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 7–30–41

No. 1114

FROM: Batavia July 31, 1941
TO: Tokyo #713.

During the evening of the 30th, Hofstraaten returned from his vacation and requested that I call on him. I called at his official residence and discussed matters with him for a period of over two hours.

I am of the opinion that the subjects discussed were of the utmost importance. It is a matter of extreme urgency, I believe, for us to draw up a fundamental policy with regard to our relations with the Netherlands East Indies and this talk I had with Hofstraaten should have considerable bearing upon it.

As I reported during the Japanese-Netherlands trade negotiations when I had occasion to discuss matters with Hofstraaten, I found that directness and clarity were two of his outstanding characteristics. I am convinced that his statements were uncolored expressions of the policies of the government of the Netherlands East Indies. In any event, I am sure that one will not be far wrong if he proceeds under that assumption.

Bearing this in mind, will you please give your careful attention to the gist of our conversations of yesterday as they are set forth below:

Hofstraaten: The occupation of the southern part of French Indo-China by the Japanese military, constitutes a direct threat to the Netherlands East Indies. Therefore, the Netherlands East Indies must assume that Japanese antagonism is increasing in intensity.

Isizawa: The recent occupation of French Indo-China was effectuated because of conditions throughout the world, and with the full approval of the government of France. Its purpose was purely that of facilitating defense through cooperation, and nothing more. It is not intended to have any bearing or significance on the Netherlands East Indies.

Hofstraaten: Although you say that there are no ulterior motives involving the Netherlands East Indies, the fact remains that as long as Japan has army, navy and air bases in the southern part of French Indo-China, the Netherlands must necessarily completely review her relations with Japan.

Isizawa: The Netherlands East Indies has been loudly boasting that all of her self-defense arrangements have been completed. Moreover, according to the press the ABCD[a] joint front has been definitely established. Isn't it a fact that it has been clearly stated that because of

these facts there would be nothing to worry about even if Japanese forces did descend upon them? It doesn't seem as if there should be any cause for distress or anxiety.

Hofstraaten: (Makes no reply; maintains silence.)

Isizawa: You say that the relations with Japan must be reviewed. What is implied by that?

Hofstraaten: During our trade negotiations, most importance was placed on the prevention of reexportation of goods to Germany. Now, however, we are compelled to further curtail the delivery of all military supplies such as petroleum which would have a tendency to strengthen the military powers of Japan. This may mean that the trade between the Netherlands East Indies and Japan will be reduced to one fifth of the past figures.

Isizawa: Such a step, of course, would be outrageous and unjust in the extreme. However, if the Netherlands East Indies definitely adopts such a policy, nothing can be done about it. In such an event, Japan will, I suppose, have to find some other appropriate means of obtaining those essential materials to make up for the deficiencies.

----- please relay accordingly.

Trans. 8-7-41

No. 1115

FROM: Batavia
TO: Tokyo

July 31, 1941
#715.

Re my #713[a].

(1) According to the impressions I received in my conversation with HO (Hofstraaten) there is no longer any room for doubt that as long as we are in French Indo-China the Dutch will consider Japan as an out-and-out enemy nation, and will strengthen their cooperation with Britain and the United States in devising every possible means of hindering Japan's southward advance. It therefore becomes absolutely necessary for the Imperial Government to be done with indecision and to effect counter measures. One day's delay will make our position just that much more disadvantageous. However, to give the Dutch cause for irritation, at once, after entering French Indo-China and before our preparations there are completed would be an unwise policy, and therefore I wish the "press campaign" in Japan which resembles a dog barking at the moon could be entirely eliminated.

(2) I have been avoiding coming out into the open in any steps pertaining to the present freezing orders, by having Imagawa of the Specie Bank carry on the negotiations with the administrative bureau and the Java Bank. Both of these have taken the attitude that if some definite plan can be worked out which will be satisfactory to both Japan and the Netherlands, they would be glad to have the Japanese government use its influence for a settlement along those lines, in the case of Dutch gold. Although the freezing order has been enforced thus far, even the Dutch are being greatly inconvenienced by it; as a matter of fact, on the 31st the president of the Java Bank complained to Imagawa about the difficulty Dutch firms in Japan are in, and suggested a loan of 500,000 yen. ----- (Imagawa has sent a cable regarding this). I therefore think that if we maintain a calm attitude, there will be some way of meeting the situation brought about by the freezing order.

(3) However, the present situation in Japanese-Dutch East Indies relations is as I stated in my reference message, and it is evident that trade between the two countries will become more and more restricted, while it will become impossible for a considerable proportion of the Japanese residents to carry on business. Not only that but the Imperial Government, because of

the need of commodities, will naturally be driven into a situation where it will be compelled to take decisive measures against the Netherlands East Indies.

(4) Because of the above mentioned situation, I would like to give guidance to our resident subjects at once, along the following lines:

(a) Gather the heads of the Japanese Associations of the various areas, and advise them that while in the past we have tried our best to pacify the Japanese residents in regard to evacuating, and while at present it does not seem likely that there will be an outbreak of war at once, still the possibilities are that it will become more and more difficult for Japanese residents to engage in their pursuits, and therefore it would be well for each individual to give careful consideration to the matter, and for those who have not the self confidence that they can weather the gale even when the difficulties become more difficult, it would be wiser for them to dispose of their places of business and leave now; while it might be wise for those who have a solid basis for their enterprises and a certain amount of stick-to-it-ive-ness to remain and continue with their businesses for the present and watch developments.

(b) If it becomes evident, regardless of our efforts from now on, that there can be no improvement in Jap-N.E.I. relations, but they continue to worsen, in order to avoid such a disgraceful exhibition as an excited effort to evacuate when it has become too late, I would advise them to take the initiative in withdrawing early. (Thus far I have been of the opinion that it was necessary to have our Japanese residents stay till the very last, but judging from recent trends in the government of the islands, I think that the moment a breaking-off of diplomatic relations is decided upon, a wholesale arrest of resident Japanese will take place, and it would be very disadvantageous for us to have our human resources in subjects who are acquainted with the situation here and speak the Malayan languages held by the enemy. It would be better to have such return to Japan early, keeping a list of their names and addresses, so that in case it should become necessary to employ force with the Netherlands East Indies these individuals could be utilized by the military.

(5) The resident Japanese even now are greatly disturbed over Japanese-Netherlands relations, and if the Japanese ships should stop making calls here, they would immediately become excited, and I would find it impossible to take care of them. Therefore, I would like to have the ships continue to make these calls at least for the present.

(6) I am continually being asked for responsible opinion as to what course they should pursue, by Japanese residents in the various areas. Thus far I have been encouraging them to remain, but the trend among them now seems to be in the direction of speedy evacuation. I think therefore that it would be wise to give them advice along the lines of a definite policy and to begin from now on evacuating them as occasions permit.

(7) Please give these points your careful consideration and advise me on the general aspects of them at least, within about one week.

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[a] See II, 1114.

Trans. 8–7–41

No. 1116

FROM: Batavia July 31, 1941
TO: Tokyo #714.

(In 2 parts—complete.)

1. On the occasion of my conversations with Hofstraaten on the 30th, I advised him that the government of Japan was in the process of reaching a decision with regard to articles already contracted for by N.E.I. merchants from Japan. In the midst of these discussions, the Netherlands East Indies saw fit to freeze Japan funds. Under the circumstances, this was an astounding move on their part, I said.

Hofstraaten said that there was no question for the exporting should be granted to goods which not only had been contracted for but had also been paid for since that constituted the transfer of title to the Netherlands East Indies side. He added that Japan had not acted justly when she refused to issue a definite statement in spite of the fact that the Netherlands East Indies had asked for just such a thing time and time again.

Basically speaking, he continued, if Japan had accepted F.O.B. transactions as had been the custom in the past, this problem probably would not have arisen. In February of this year, Japan insisted that payment be for deliveries at warehouses and in cash. The Netherlands East Indies agreed to these terms. In spite of this, the Japanese on July 7th suddenly prohibited the exporting of goods for which payments had even been made. This being the case, Japan should feel a two-fold responsibility.

At present, he continued the stock of goods held by Netherlands East Indies merchants in Japan (paid for but as yet unshipped) amount to 12 million guilders (about 25 million yen). If this becomes a total loss, it is feared that it may be the final straw as far as those merchants are concerned.

On the other hand, although the Dutch merchants strenuously objected at the time, the government of the Netherlands East Indies ordered the merchants to submit to the warehouse delivery plan, in behalf of promoting trade relations between the two countries.

Japan's funds were frozen, he continued, so that they would be collateral in the unlikely event that these merchants were forced to suffer a loss.

2. I, therefore, said that it was not the intention of Japan to prevent the shipment of goods for which payments had already been made. However, since this was the first instance of export embargo to any country in the whole wide world by Japan, some time was required to definitely settle upon the ways and means of carrying it out.

Furthermore, I said, the 12 million guilders referred to by him, was money privately owned by Dutch merchants. The money that the government of the Netherlands East Indies froze was that set up as exchange funds by the government of Japan. Therefore, there was absolutely no justification in taking such a retaliatory measure. Moreover, when the Netherlands East Indies government went one step further and proclaimed that all exports would be placed on a permit basis, one must assume that an economic war has been declared.

To this Hofstraaten replied that the matter was simply that involving the 12 million guilders. Therefore, if Japan permitted the Dutch merchants to ship their goods from Japan, the government of the Netherlands East Indies would release ten and several odd millions of guilders of Japanese funds it was frozen in the Netherlands East Indies. Moreover, the Japanese would be permitted to buy sugar and like goods from the Netherlands East Indies and also to ship it out.

As a result of the Japanese occupation of the southern part of French Indo-China, the Netherlands East Indies felt a direct threat. From this standpoint, it was deemed to be essential

that emergency measures be adopted. That was why the general license system was put into effect. A comparatively strict limitation on the exporting of petroleum and other war materials will undoubtedly be observed in the future.

3. I said that the Chief of Bureau ----- had assured me that the Netherlands East Indies had no intention of abrogating the petroleum agreement. The two men, I said, would seem to be in disagreement on this point. Hofstraaten replied that the petroleum agreement was a purely civil contract and therefore the government doesn't have to do any abrogating or anything else about it. Even if the agreement continued to be in existence, he said, it would, of course, have to be subjected to the licensing system. Moreover, the government has no intention of granting permission to export the undelivered portion of the contract. As to what extent of this amount would be licensed for exporting, no decision has as yet been reached.

Please relay in accordance with -----.

Trans. 8-8-41

No. 1117

FROM: Batavia — August 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo — No number.

There is no doubt remaining now that the Netherlands East Indies will from now on tighten up restrictions on exports of commodities to Japan, and therefore, we too as one means of countering this will find it necessary to scheme to prevent the export to the Netherlands Indies of rice, salt-fish, etc. from Thai and French Indo-China. This will be quite a blow to the Netherlands Indies, especially in the case of salt-fish, which has amounted to one million guilders worth a year, sent to N.E.I. by Thai and French Indo-China together. This is an absolutely essential article of food to the islanders, and the stoppage of its supply will likely give rise to a serious social problem.

In putting these measures into effect, it will of course be necessary to bear in mind the fact that most of the export trade from these two countries to the Netherlands East Indies goes by way of Singapore, especially the salt-fish.

Please give study to the above at once and advise as to results.

Trans. 8-6-41

No. 1118

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) — August 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 733.

(Secret within the Division)

Re your # 442[a].

HOOGSTRATTEN and I are already in the midst of negotiations. He would not readily make concessions at first, but after further conference granted permission, this once only, for the shipment of rubber, tin, and ilmonite.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-5-41

No. 1119

FROM: Batavia
TO: Tokyo

August 4, 1941
#748.

Regarding my #715[a].

A. I know that you have the matter under careful study, but to tell the truth the unrest among our Nationals here in the Netherlands Indies has me worried. I do not seem to be able to do anything about it. Already 90 people have applied for passage on the Nichiran Maru soon to leave here. The Cheribon and the Makasser each have a full capacity of 75, but they have already received 400 applications and the applications are still mounting. Representatives of our people asked the South Seas Shipping Company to be sure to let them have the Johooru Maru and the Nissho Maru to get away on, and the Company informed me confidentially that if the taking on of cargoes can be dispensed with, each vessel can accommodate 1,000 persons.

B. Thing being at this pass, in accordance with what was said in the caption message, I wish to inform all the chairmen of the Japanese societies in the Islands about the facts. Please wire me back just as soon as you possibly can. In any case, on the 9th, I am having the chairmen of these societies convene here, and if I have not heard from you by then, I must use my judgment in making fitting statements to them.

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[a] See II, 1115 which described steps to be taken with regard to the Japanese Dutch East Indies freezing orders.

Trans. 8–9–41

No. 1120

FROM: Batavia
TO: Tokyo

August 1, 1941
#712.

Re my message #706[a].

Immediately upon hearing rumors of freezing of Japanese funds by the government of the Netherlands East Indies, those merchants who are sensitive to the ups and downs of the commercial circles, as are the Chinese and Arab traders, were quick to realize that the Japanese merchants would encounter difficulties in future importings and that Japanese merchants were interested in cash transactions. These persons became active immediately. For the purpose of getting possession of the stocks that Japanese merchants had on hand, starting with cotton thread and textiles down to every other article, these merchants crowded around our merchants' establishments. They brought with them mountains of guilder notes to consummate these deals.

Due to this run, Japanese merchants who had a stock of goods which came in under the import quota were swamped with buyers. Apparently some single sales amounted to as much as twenty to thirty thousand guilders.

Because of these undisguised acts on the part of the Chinese and others, the government of the Netherlands East Indies became acutely aware of the dangers of skyrocketing prices and at the same time, have an ever present stock of goods. Therefore, on the 30th, an order was issued prohibiting the transfer of woven and knitted goods, fabricated metals, and other articles.

Through that means and also by further restricting by law the fluctuation of costs, the government hopes to curb the undercover transactions of the Chinese and other merchants. At the same time it is evident that uneasiness over the fact that there shall be no more imports from Japan is daily on the increase. It is also apparent that the government of the Netherlands East Indies is finding itself in considerable trouble because of this situation.

In view of this situation, I urge that the Japanese make a determined stand and watch an opportunity to improve matters in the future.

It also should be noted that the order prohibiting the transfer of goods may eventually have the same effect as freezing the funds.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 8–8–41

No. 1121

FROM: Batavia August 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo #732.

To the Chief of the Trade Bureau.

1. Since the trade negotiations, I have had occasion to discuss various subjects with spokesmen for the Netherlands East Indies. The subjects included the matters pertaining to the export association; food for the Dutch residents in Japan; shipping out of Japan the goods contracted and paid for by Dutch merchants in Japan, etc.

In every one of these instances I have been requested by the N.E.I. merchants to use my good offices to bring about a settlement. From these facts, I have been under the impression that they have been putting considerable reliance on the influence contained in my recommendations. However, there has been something indecisive about the attitude of Japan and the people affected had no inkling as to when their particular case would be settled, if ever.

I am of the opinion that that was responsible for the issuance of the "freezing" order and also for the establishment of the central organ about which I made mention in my message #734[a]. It is my further belief that other previously contemplated steps will be put in effect in turn from now on.

2. In view of this fact, I believe that we should abandon the policy of putting our sole reliance in the power of arguments. Instead we should prepare ourselves so that we can retaliate with acts, any acts directed against us. Paralleling this, we should continue our negotiations.

I, therefore, request that you dispatch your instructions to me, with all possible speed in the future. If the subject involves several ministries and an immediate decision cannot be made, will you please advise me of at least the general trend and atmosphere of the discussions. I shall endeavor, under such circumstances, to inform you of the situation on the scene in the hope that the information may be used to speed up the reaching of a decision.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 8–9–41

No. 1122

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) August 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 842.

(Secret)

Re # 189[a] sent from the Yokohama Specie Bank branch in this city to its main office.

1. The impression I received from Secretary VAN MOOK and the Chief of the Bureau ----- relative to the attitude of the Netherlands East Indies Government was, on the whole, the same as that described in IMAGAWA'S report. I, therefore, believe that we should at this time procure materials and products from the Netherlands East Indies within the shortest period possible by use of our funds and adopt the policy outlined in the latter part of the caption telegram for the purpose of wiping out the balance of the frozen funds, (we should ----- the enterprizes conducted by the Japanese residents in the islands ----- ----- ----- -----). The attitude of the authorities here toward Japan has been growing worse every minute ever since our occupation of French Indo-China and with the progress of our plans concerning Thailand. For this reason, if I waste time by waiting for instructions on everything we do, a general embargo might be imposed, and as a result we should be prevented from procuring the materials which are at present procurable. This would bring on the danger of keeping our funds in the frozen state indefinitely. I would, therefore, like to have you entrust to me and to IMAGAWA all negotiations relative to this matter, on condition that these negotiations be based upon the demands we are now making and that we do our utmost in the work. I would appreciate your giving your answer by return wire.

2. Although the Chief of the Exchange Bureau seems to be rather optimistic about future export of materials (the last part of 3 in the caption message), Bureau Chief Ho seems to be opposed to ----- not only of rubber, tin, and ilmenite, but also of palm oil and -----.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-8-41

No. 1123

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) August 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 749.

The order for freezing recently issued by the Netherlands Government is intended to freeze funds but not assets. However, since the order issued by us applies to both the funds and assets of the Netherlanders it gives them an excuse for retaliating against us. There is a great danger of their freezing Japanese assets also on the basis of reciprocity. This would prove quite unprofitable to us; therefore, I believe the first thing we should do for the present—setting aside the question of our future attitude—is to release the guilder funds now being blocked and to apply them for payment of exports to Japan.

I would like to have you so arrange matters at once with a view to either officially informing the Netherlands that our freezing order does not apply to assets, or to discuss this question with the Netherlands Minister PABST.

Trans. 8-8-41

No. 1124

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) August 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #747.

1. Today, the 4th, a Chief of Bureau of the Netherlands East Indies Government filed a request for the transfer of five hundred thousand yen to the Factors[a] in Japan. Please be advised that YIMAKIWA has already wired the Yokohama Specie Bank of this matter in wire #19 (2 or 6) addressed to the Bank.

Now the freezing regulations were promulgated by both countries as being a comprehensive measure and having no bearing on individual cases. In view of the fact that these guilds are doing business in Japan, it would seem to me that they are blundering in not keeping a reserve in Japanese yen. However, should we not permit the transfer of this sum of money they doubtless would take similar action against our banks in these Islands. Such a situation would be most unfortunate in my opinion. For myself, I plan to carefully point out to the Netherlands East Indies Government the error of such a course but what we should consider at this time is the early conversion of our frozen funds into goods. Then we can export those goods.

After this has been done it seems to me quite apparent that we will have to take necessary measures with regard to the Netherlands Indies. Therefore, I advise patience for a little while and compliance to their wishes with regard to the transfer of the five hundred thousand yen in question. This, I think, will be a good plan in precluding the taking of measures by the Netherlands Indies Government against the Japanese banks on these Islands.

2. Should YIMAKIWA'S method progress favorably, no problem will arise but should confusion result, since it will be necessary for us to conserve our shipping space, I would like to have the entry of the Johol Maru into the harbors of these Islands and the sailing of the Nisshō Maru and later boats postponed.

Since I shall wire you again as soon as I have ascertained the attitude of the Netherlands East Indies authorities, I would like to have you reach some decision subsequent to the receipt of that message.

---

[a] Manager of guild branches.

Trans. 8–8–41

No. 1125

FROM: Bangkok (Asada) May 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo #300.

(*Abstract*)

Chinese residents in Thailand still maintain anti-Japanese attitude. They are encouraged to take pro-American and pro-British attitudes. Premature to send representative from the Nanking government to win them over. Better to send men acting as business agents on tour of inspection.

Trans. 7–1–41

No. 1126

FROM: Bangkok (Asada) May 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 289.

Re your # 266[a].

At the time I told BORIBAN how much we wanted, he replied that now the mining lots in the neighborhood of Nakon Sawan[b] are in the hands of Swedish engineers who are engaged in making test borings; and though no calculations of the underground quantities can be made, everything is now being handled by experts, and they will send us samples of the ore and a full report. That is all for the time being. Moreover, BORIBAN intimated that there is the prospect of Japan soon operating the Kurabi mine which was controlled by Mitsubishi last year.

[a] Not available.
[b] City north of Bangkok.

Trans. 5–22–41

No. 1127

FROM: Bangkok (Asada) June 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 320.

Re paragraph 2 of your # 302[a].

With Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Kōhatu as a nucleus, have Mitsui and Mitsubishi take advantage of their connections and purchase inactive rice refineries belonging to Chinese operators and, by adding to them several of the dealers doing business with Kōhatu, form a guild. Then secure a comprehensive export permit and assign work to the respective members of this guild. This is our plan. Aside from the reasons given in my previous message for the addition to Chinese dealers, we have in mind giving them an opportunity to do business directly with those Chinese within the occupied territories and to use this connection in our work of reconciling the Chinese. In regard to this, the two Attaches have made special requests. As to the concrete steps to be taken in forming the guild, it would be necessary to secure the understanding of the Thai Rice Company. We will consider this matter after Secretary SHIBANO returns from French Indo-China.

As for the situation in this country in connection with the principle of having one company in each place, please get the details from Secretary AMADA and Forestry Expert SATO who will shortly return to Japan.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 6–9–41

No. 1128

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 9, 1941
TO: Bangkok (Koshi) #316.

(*Abstract*)

We propose the establishment of a jointly managed Thai-Japanese company to mine tin. Annual potential capacity 6,000 tons, capital about Y 6,000,000 necessary. Tin now shipped to Penangis to be absorbed by this firm, and entire output to be sent to Japan. Measures to be adopted to insure regular uninterrupted shipments to Japan. Ascertain the Thai government's position on this matter and reply promptly.

Trans. 6-12-41

No. 1129

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 9, 1941
TO: Bangkok (Koshi) #317.

Regarding your #317[a].

Those concerned are about agreed to the proposal to use the 100,000 CHARU (Ticals?) to purchase a two-months prospecting contract, and have all the tin ore mined during that time sent here. However, Mitsui says that they cannot take definite action until they have a telegram from the engineers there regarding this. When a decision is reached, payment is to be made out of the above mentioned 100,000 CHARU.

[a] See II, 1130.

Trans. 6-21-41

No. 1130

FROM: Bangkok June 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #317.

Very urgent.

Strictly secret.

With regard to tin mines in Takuapa[a] and Pakutaku, the local Mitsui organization is currently negotiating for their purchase. According to a technical report made by the Mitsui organization, these mines are considered to be quite excellent in quality. Not only would it be beneficial to the extent that it would give us guarantees for the three staple items tungsten, tin, and rubber, for which we are now carrying on negotiations. Since it is felt that the establishment of new enterprises of this type would be particularly beneficial to us, I would like to have you go to the trouble of negotiating with the Mitsui Home Office so that they will decide to purchase an option for these mines, and also to arrange with the Treasury Department for the necessary exchange permits.

No. 1131

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 6, 1941
TO: Bangkok #314.

(Part 2 of 2)[a].

(1) As for petroleum, we shall supply the amount to be consumed by Thailand after ascertaining the amount of consumption in that country and on condition that Thailand furnish us the necessary tankers.

(2) Japan shall demand in the future the entire amount of Thaiese rubber and tin. Thailand shall do her utmost in arranging to assure the supply, the amount of which has been notified by Japan, and Japan shall assist Thailand in so far as such assistance is necessary in order to realize this program.

(3) Japan shall agree to British-Thailand petroleum negotiations on the following conditions:

a. These negotiations shall be carried on as purely small-scale trade.

b. Regardless of whether the petroleum negotiations succeed or not, Thailand shall furnish Japan with as much as possible of the 35,000[b] tons of tin ore a year. (The actual amount of tin ore to be supplied Japan will be decided later.)

It is our intention at first to secure 40% of the entire production; namely, about 6,000 tons, and to eventually secure the entire production. Will you, therefore, take every opportunity to negotiate with the Thaiese authorities for this purpose and at the same time so instruct the importers that they would purchase as great an amount as possible? As to the amount of petroleum, we should supply for the month of June, it will be decided with the British-Thaiese negotiations in view.

---

[a] Part 1 of 2 not available.
[b] Apparently error for 15,000.

Trans. 6-19-41

No. 1132

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 6, 1941
TO: Bangkok #315.

Re your #208[a] (?).

I would like to send to your city by the next airplane, Secretary JURO SUZUKI of the Government Planning Board and also YOSIO YOSIDA, official of the Fuel Bureau by having them respectively act as Foreign Office Secretary and General Affairs official. I want to have them stay there for about one month and have them investigate the present consumption of petroleum, as well as have them assist in instructing from behind the scene as much as possible the way of consuming petroleum. Will you please get in touch with the Thaiese Government and request them to offer conveniences so that these officials may accomplish their mission? In view of the matter which you have set forth in your #208[a], I would like to have your wire me at once what sort of treatment the Thaiese Government would give an expert sent by us to that country.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 6-11-41

Furthermore, it is understood that it is necessary for them to come to a decision as soon as possible.

Advisor ----- in this office has already given his approval in this matter.

---

[a] On west coast of Malay peninsula, in Province of Surat, Thailand.

Trans. 6–9–41

No. 1133

FROM: Bangkok — June 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 315.

Re my 308[a].

DIREKKU[b] has confidentially told me that Great Britain has decided to furnish Thai with 6,000 tons of petroleum. (Furthermore, according to another report she will furnish Thai with two shipments of 6,000 tons each.)

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Kana spelling.

Trans. 6–7–41

No. 1134

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) — June 14, 1941
TO: Bangkok — # 330.

According to a report from a very reliable source, the petroleum which is to be supplied to Thailand from England, will, since business is suspended, be taken in by the Asia Petroleum Company for the time being, and later on will be loaded for the second time. Hereafter, British and American companies will work through intimate liaison and cooperation. The Zuuanda-ato petroleum is backed by the United States Government.

Furthermore, it would seem that the recently concluded secret pact (contents unknown to us) between the Chief of the Propaganda Bureau and the Dutch East Indies officials is not to be affected by this action.

Trans. 6–18–41

No. 1135

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) — June 16, 1941
TO: Bangkok — # 333.

Secret outside the department.

As stated in my # 273[a], it was decided that all matters having to do with our supplying petroleum to Thailand should be under the jurisdiction solely of the Foreign Office. I understand that despite the fact that we had clearly informed WANITTO[b] of this decision when he

was visiting Tokyo, the Thaiese government has submitted a request to our Navy for a supply of 12,000 tons of crude oil. This is an act disregarding our wishes and, therefore, will you please inform the Thaiese government that the Japanese government would not consider such requests when not submitted to the Foreign Office.

We have discussed this matter with the Navy.

---

[a]Not available.
[b]Chief of the Trade Bureau.

Trans. 6–18–41

No. 1136

FROM: Tokyo June 13, 1941
TO: Bangkok # 325.

When you have a convenient opportunity, please tell Pibul that we desire to have NAI. WANITTO come to Japan in connection with the ratifying of the arbitration agreement between Thailand and French Indo–China.

Trans. 6–16–41

No. 1137

FROM: Vichy June 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 285.

Re your 206[a].

I have just received a note from the French Foreign Office which states that as soon as ROBIN[b] returns to his post, proceedings will be begun immediately for ratification and that these proceedings should be concluded by the middle of this month.

---

[a]Exchange of ratification of French Indo-China-Thailand peace treaty. (See Vol. 1).
[b]French Plenipotentiary to French Indo-China.

Trans. 6–7–41

No. 1138

FROM: Bangkok (Futami) June 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 335.

Regarding your Circular # 1227[a].

Thailand is very anxious to have the ratification take place as soon as possible; by the 27th at the very latest.

---

[a]Mediation treaty between Thailand and French Indo-China to be presented to Privy Council in Tokyo on the 18th. Please press for early French-Thai ratification therefore.

Trans. 6–21–41

No. 1139

FROM: Tokyo — June 21, 1941
TO: Vichy — # 241.

Action Bangkok as # 347.

(Abstract)

Regarding my Circular # 1227[a]:

The Thailand-French Indo-China treaty has been signed by all parties concerned. The exchange will take place on 1 July.

---

[a]Tokyo wires that the Thai-French Indo-China mediation treaty will be presented to the Privy Council in Tokyo on 18th June, and urges ratification by both countries as soon as possible after that date.

Trans. 6-24-41

No. 1140

FROM: Bangkok (Futami) — July 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 401.

Today the Italian Minister called and stated that recently he had had an interview with Pibul at which time Pibul made the following observation regarding Japan's southern expansion: "Should not Japan at this time advance to the north? Has not the pressure on the south been alleviated?"

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 1141

FROM: Bangkok — June 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 350.

(Part 1 of 2).

Reporting for your information on the local situation, as fragments were picked up at the time of my call on Pibul when he returned to his post, and during my visit with WANITTO.

(1) It is expected that preparations for the ratification of the border agreement will be ready in a few days as far as Thailand is concerned, but Pibul seems somewhat uneasy about ratification by the French. It would also seem that influential British, Americans and Germans have been telling Pibul that there is danger that some situation will arise that will cause the French to withold ratification

When I met him the other day, Pibul told me there were some things he would like to ascertain about our attitude toward French Indo-China. I told him that in the matter there will be no change in the future in the policy of the Japanese government. I think what Pibul fears the most is that our southward policy might weaken and that we might back down in our pressure on French Indo-China, and especially in the dignified, independent attitude we have taken toward Britain; and that the British and Americans will ----- this, and the pro-British-American factions accordingly will become more aggressive in their activities, making

Pibul's own position within the country more difficult. I rather think that to some extent the break-down of negotiations with N.E.I., and indications of the existence of a type of anti-Japanese agitation in southern French Indo-China might provide material for bettering to some extent the ----- conditions of the Thai government.

(2) In Matsumiya's[a] proposal regarding political and economic cooperation between Japan and Thai, as well as the Mizuno-WANITTO understanding, it is urged that the economic problems be submitted for consideration by the various firms engaged in the businesses concerned, while the political still seem to be in the grasp of WANITTO.

---

[a]Japanese Minister to Thailand in April, 1941, Hajime Matsumiya.

Trans. 7-2-41

No. 1142

FROM: Bangkok
TO: Tokyo

June 23, 1941
350.

(Part 2 of 2).

In regard to the rubber item in the Mizuno-WANITTO understanding, when I met Pibul the other day, he told me that the British had suggested that the amount of rubber to be furnished Japan should be reduced to 25,000 tons a year, that he personally had no intention of considering this, but he asked whether the Japanese government could be satisfied with 35,000 tons yearly. To this I replied that the more we could get the better, but that if the terms of the agreement reached in Tokyo are carried out, of course, our government would be satisfied. In regard to tin, WANITTO called yesterday, the 21st, and said that the British seemed to have no objection to our having up to 2,000 tons of tin ore, and asked how that would be. I told him that he need not even ask as he well knows that that would not be even one half of the amount we need.

(3) In regard to the machinations of the British and American factions in this place, as WANITTO has been back only a short time and has been very busy, it seems that he has been unable to find out all of the facts yet, but what he has been able to learn, has been reported to me from time to time.

In regard to WANITTO's going to Tokyo ----- this year ----- and he, himself, has not been able to decide whether it is necessary or whether this is -----, but he will study it further and wishes to decide which to do later.

(4) When WANITTO called yesterday reference was made to the question of the establishment of a tin refining plant, but I could see no indications of Thailand's having any reliable or definite proposals. Only in regard to the matter of a Japanese-Thai joint management, in the nature of the tin industry in this country, and considering the fact that the ore is secured from tin mines affiliated with British capital, he said there was opposition to the idea of a joint management organization.

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 1143

FROM: Bangkok June 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 346.

Re the last part of my # 344[a].

1. I understand that the Thaiese Government is now organizing five groups—Two groups for land surveying; one group for meteorological observation; and two groups for surveying the Mekong and Mei Rivers.

2. I think that the Japanese Government should increase the number of Japanese joining the groups and decide on our policy. If it seems necessary to consult previously with Thailand and French Indo-China, we should do so with a view to deciding on the procedure to be taken. Will you please inform me in as detailed a manner as possible the number of Japanese members as well as our concrete plan, as I must have this information in order to negotiate the matter with the Thaiese Government.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 7-2-41

No. 1144

FROM: Bangkok July 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 380.

To the Chief of the Commerce Bureau.

The Thaiese Government has granted permission to carry out the plan which WANITTO[a] discussed during his visit in Tokyo; namely, that of establishing a printing office here under joint management of the ASANO BUSSAN KAISHA[b] and the TOPPAN INSATSU KAISHA[c]. Both the Foreign Office and WANITTO have requested that we assist in having technicians sent here for the purpose.

---

[a]Chief of the Thailand Trade Bureau.
[b]A large Japanese manufacturing and trading concern.
[c]Alarge Japanese printing company.

Trans. 7-11-41

No. 1145

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 18, 1941
TO: Bangkok # 340.

Secret.

With reference to the suggestion brought to us SARASASU last year that Japan invest in the Bangkok Chronicle, the stockholders have now come forward with the suggestion that this Thaiese language newspaper be placed under our control under the following plan:

1. The original investment of 8,000 bahts be supplemented by an additional 3,000 by the stockholders and a further 4,400 bahts by SARASASU, the latter amount to be secretly put up by us. The paper would continue under the nominal management of SARASASU and the company.

2. Necessary supplies and equipment for the publication of pictorial and children's magazines to be ordered from Japan.

As soon as the above agreement is entered into, Japan is to deposit to the account of SARASASU in the Bangkok branch of the Yokahama Specie Bank. He will then turn the money over to the company, sending a temporary receipt to Japan, this to be exchanged, as soon as can be arranged, for a certificate of transfer.

Trans. 7-12-41

No. 1146

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 2, 1941
TO: Bangkok #366.

Secret within the department.

Re my #340[a].

We have appropriated 4,400 Baht[b] from the secret intelligence funds and are sending it to you for the purchase of the Bangkok Chronicle. Please handle this matter as stated in the last part of caption message and wire the result.

---

[a]Available, See II, 1145.
[b]Siamese coin, normally $ .4424.

Trans. 7-10-41

No. 1147

FROM: Bangkok July 3, 1941
TO: Shanghai #028.

(Circular).

Action Tokyo as #381.

1. The editor of the Bangkok Chronicle, PIAPURIJIYA, is reported to be planning to make a trip to Japan in the near future. The said editor has been pro-British in the past and it is reported that his purpose in going to Japan is to collect information in China and Japan and that for this purpose he is being subsidized by the local British Minister to the extent of 5,000 bahts.

2. While, of course, it is impossible to swallow this report whole I think that this man's past tendencies should be invested and that special precautions should be taken to keep him under surveillance. This is for your information.

This has been relayed to Shanghai, Nanking, and Canton.

Trans. 7-10-41

No. 1148

FROM: Bangkok July 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 383.

(Strictly Secret.)

Re your # 340[a].

I have not yet received your letter about the matter, so my procedure is not clear; however, the Bangkok *Chronicle* has a very small circulation, and I do not believe it has much influence among the THAIESE. Even if we buy this newspaper, it will still be more or less of a question whether it will be effective as an organ of propaganda, and also it will be necessary to study carefully means and methods for controlling the news which it carries and the supervision of its editorial policy. If you decide on the above, please wire me the details of how the money transaction is to be handled and point out the measures which should be taken.

---

[a] Available, See II, 1145.

Trans. 7–9–41

No. 1149

FROM: Tokyo June 17, 1941
TO: Bangkok # 339.

(Secret outside Department.)

Please let me know, at once, the monthly purchases for this year of Thailand rubber by German firms.

Trans. 6–18–41

No. 1150

FROM: Tokyo June 17, 1941
TO: Bangkok # 336.

(*Abstract*)

From Rubber Importing League to NIPPON JINDŌGYŌKAI.

British company is reported to have instructed its agents to buy up Thailand rubber for export to Malaya at a price higher than the existing market price at Singapore. In return for which they will ship foodstuff and machinery to Bangkok. Please check up on the validity of this report, and also take steps to assure supply of rubber to Japan and prevent its going to Malaya.

Trans. 6–21–41

No. 1151

FROM: Tokyo July 11, 1941
TO: Bangkok #390.

According to reports from sources in which we have a great confidence, negotiations are going on between the U.S. and Thailand for an agreement to exchange manufactured rubber goods for raw rubber.

Trans. 7-11-41

No. 1152

FROM: Bangkok (Futami) June 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #374.

According to the proposal dated November 21, 1940, and based on the principles set forth in the Japan-Thaiese compensatory and settlement agreement, export to Thailand of Japanese products amounts to 130,000,000 yen. How is the possible limit of Japanese exports to Thailand estimated in the face of the changing situation, both domestic and foreign? I would appreciate your wiring me details as well as the estimate of such exports. Futhermore, if our object is to secure for ourselves, for example, 400,000 tons of rice (at 224 yen per unit, f.o.b.); 6,000 tons of tin ore (at 48,000 yen per unit); 55,000 tons of rubber (at 2,450 yen per unit); and 6,000 tons of tungsten ore (at 76,000 yen per unit); the total, according to the current price level, would be the enormous sum of 208,000,000 yen. Then, there is salt to be imported. I believe it is necessary to consider carefully how we are going to pay for all this.

Trans. 7-3-41

No. 1153

FROM: Bangkok July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #403.

(Secret within the Department.)

Separate telegram.

Resume of the British-Thailand agreement.

Petroleum Products

(1) (Great Britain guarantees to supply):

Kerosene oil	-----(?)	Kilotons
Motor oil	2500	Kilotons
Diesel oil	5000	Kilotons
"Gas" oil	1000	Kilotons
Private aviation oil		Normal consumption amount
Military aviation oil		Normal consumption amount
Crude oil	5000	Kilotons
Refined oil	Usual required amount	

(2) All above at C.I.F. prices.

(3) Great Britain guarantees to supply the above (something about black oil—undecipherable).

(4) Great Britain to guarantee transportation, Thai to furnish the "S.S. SAMUI" for that purpose.

(5) Hitherto existing regulations regarding oil between the two countries will be disregarded and new control measures mutually adopted.

(6) Thailand includes in her stipulations for delivering rubber to Britain that Britain furnish her with gunnysacks.

(7) There will be no restrictions to commerce in fertilizers.

(8) The minimum quantity to be shipped to Britain, 18,000 tons. Up to 30,000 tons in addition may be supplied but in no event will a total of 48,000 tons be exceeded.

(9) The price will be at the Malay rate of ----- per 100 kilos up to 135 "baato".

(10) Within two months after the expiration of this agreement, neither these restrictions nor any other (special agreements excepted) will remain in force.

(11) Thailand will send reports in the market price of rubber to Great Britain from time to time.

(12) It is understood that the above (rubber) is to be furnished in exchange for petroleum products.

(13) The Thai government agrees not to use any of the above purchases for re-export.

(14) They are considering ----- 2000 (tons?) tin ore from Malay (badly garbled) at the Singapore price.

(15) This agreement effective for one year.

Trans. 7-23-41

No. 1154

FROM: Bangkok (Futami) July 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 398.

(Secret outside the department.)

Re conditions in this country following the announcement of the conversations held in Tokyo.

(1) At the time the said conversations were brought about, there was quite a stir among the people with all kinds of celebrations and demonstrations, but this excitement among both government officials and the people has suddenly cooled off recently, and ever since the government some time back made its statement about restoring to normal its relations with Great Britain which had become (Translator's note: This sentence badly garbled) ----- if they should now revive their traditional principle of equality and good will for all nations, the French Indo-China problem would be utilized ----- advance would suffer a setback, relations between Japan and Thai in general would enter a period of reaction, and conditions looking toward the future would be anything but reassuring.

(2) In this connection, we might notice the attitude of the Thai Government as revealed in recent contacts. When WANITTO returned from Tokyo the very first question he was asked by Pibul is said to have been—when is Japan going into Singapore? Before this, during negotiations regarding rubber and tin BOLDPZN (?) had made the remark that "If Japan is going into Singapore soon, the rubber and tin will all be furnished to Japan." When we asked what he meant by that he explained that "If Japan puts up an unyielding front to Great Britain, all problems between Japan and Thai will settle themselves."

However, since then the matter of rubber and tin which at one time seemed to have reached a settlement at 38,400 tons, and then later at about 35,000 tons, of late has now dropped to 30,000 tons ----- (garbled out).

Trans. 7-31-41

No. 1155

FROM: Bangkok (Futami) July 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 410.

Report B

Previously Britain had requested the Thailand government to withdraw the currency that it now had in America and promised its assistance with regard to Thailand getting supplies from America, however, no definite conclusion has been reached as yet. At this time, Thailand is making the following negotiations through its Minister in Central America and also through the director of the Central America branch of the Thailand overseas company.

1. They have ordered one freighter of the 5000 ton class and several freighters (number not clear) of the 2000 ton class and smaller. Payment of $500,000 to be made from funds Thailand has on hand in America.
2. Payment for oil purchased from Britain to be made from the same source.
3. Delivery of the bombers ordered (which are now being held in the Philippines) or return of the purchase price.

The above has been proposed to America which in turn has made the following requests but apparently they have not yet been accepted.

1. The non-exclusion of Christianity.
2. That Thailand form no secret foreign trade agreement with a third country.
3. The exchange of intelligence.

Particularly in regard to problems in the Orient. That Thailand take pains to collect information and turn this over to the American Minister. (As for example, Thailand reports regarding the recent conference in Tokyo.)

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 1156

FROM: Tokyo July 16, 1941
TO: Bangkok # 400.

Based upon the second article of the Tokyo-Bangkok Amity Treaty, it is about time we established a commission. You said that your # 198[a] of last year that the Thaiese expressed approval. Ambassador MATSUMIYA and WANITTO[b] worked out a proposal for making more intimate relations between Japan and Thai, even going so far as suggesting the personnel of the Thaiese Commission. But then things took a bad turn because Thai refused to reveal to us the contents of her negotiations with England, the United States, and the Netherlands concerning petroleum and rubber, particularly with respect to joint ownership of the areas concerned. It even looks like they might now resume these talks with Great Britain. If they do what you said in your # 389[a], there are sure to be bad results; therefore, let us immediately have a Japanese-Thaiese commission organized. Negotiate personally with Premier PIBUL and see if you cannot

work out a prospectus for joint Japanese-Thaiese rights and interests. Not only would this bring about a closer rapprochement between our two countries, but will result in mutual benefits. You know by exercising the power of such a commission as this we can get all our negotiations through quickly. You will be our chief representative, assisted by the Military and Naval Attache, together with two first-class secretaries (UCHIYAMA has finished his job and he, too, can serve as a representative). Thus, we will have five negotiators. (In case of necessity, Advisor ONO and other can sit with the Council of Specialists.) We want, if possible, to get Premier PIBUL to be the main Thaiese negotiator but, if he cannot, be sure to get some man who is known to favor this sort of deal with Japan. Please ask PIBUL strongly to realize this proposal immediately and wire me back the results.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Chief of Thaiese Trade Bureau.

Trans. 7-21-41

No. 1157

FROM: Bangkok (Asada) May 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 275.

Recently near the border of Malay close to Singora, there have been signs of considerable unrest. Therefore, in order that prompt communications may be received, please reply by telegraph concerning the possibilities of establishing radio communication in the Consulate General in Singora.

Trans. 5-22-41

No. 1158

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) May 20, 1941
TO: Bangkok # 275.

Re your # 275[a].

It is possible to establish a two-way radio communication with Canton as a relay point, but it is necessary to have machines, aerial and equipment. At this time it is very difficult to carry this out secretly and it is the policy of this Consulate not to make the installation.

---

[a] See II, 1157.

Trans. 5-22-41

No. 1159

FROM: Tokyo July 21, 1941
TO: Bangkok #415.

Re your #396[a].

To Technician Hashimoto from the Director of the Industrial Bureau, as follows:

Select a site 3 or 4 kilometers farther west than the aerials for the 100 kilowatt broadcasters for the BIIMAN building site and then negotiate with the Thailand communications bureau and reply immediately about the result.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 1160

FROM: Tokyo July 24, 1941
TO: Bangkok #427.

Strictly Secret.

Re my #403[a].

Negotiations were begun with Vichy on the 14th. Unanimity was reached on the 21st and on the 22nd exchange of documents took place. Immediate negotiations were begun in Hanoi, and on the 23rd a comprehensive agreement was signed. Thus the matter was settled. At noon on on the 26th we will publish a statement concerning an agreement for the joint defense of French Indo-China described in my separate #428[a]. We think, however, that prior to publishing this statement the Thaiese Government ought to be apprised of the facts and circumstances. Will you please read over well my caption message and then at 6:00 p.m., Thaiese time, go and tell PIBUL[b] confidentially the contents of our statement. Please wire me back what he says. We feel that the publication of this event will have quite an effect upon the people of Thai. We feel that this must be minimized as much as possible, so please urge PIBUL to reassure his people, which we feel him quite capable of doing. Tell him this:

1. It goes without saying that this joint defense understanding is not aimed at Thai and that the traditional friendship between Bangkok and Tokyo will not be affected one whit.

2. Japan is not changed in the slighest in her eagerness to continue to cooperate in the economic development of Thai.

3. The reason why we are giving PIBUL this advance information is because Japanese-Thaiese relations are so intimate.

[a] Not available.
[b] Prime Minister of Thailand.

Trans. 7-28-41

No. 1161

FROM: Bangkok
TO: Tokyo

July 26, 1941
449.

(Secret outside the office).

Re your message # 427[a].

I immediately called on PIBUL and explained the matter to him in accordance with your instructions, at the same time adding that I was telling him privately in accordance with instructions from the Imperial Government because of the especially friendly relations between Japan and Siam. PIBUL expressed his deep appreciation. He showed no surprise as a result of the conversations but said that it was all right.

---

[a]See II, 1160 in which Tokyo gives Bangkok advance information regarding the occupation of French Indo-China.

Trans. 8–8–41

No. 1162

FROM: Bangkok
TO: Tokyo

July 26, 1941
450.

(Part 1 of 2)[a].

As stated in my # 422[b] relating to the British-Thaiese negotiations, the British are to supply Thailand with 21,520 kilotons of petroleum products during the year in return for rubber, tin, and other products. This means that our demands upon Thailand regarding oil, tin, etc., cannot be carried out.

The real object of these negotiations is to obtain Thailand's needs for oil from Britain. If, then, we insist on the accomplishment of our original demands, it will be impossible for the negotiations to go through, with the probable result that Thailand will have to call on us for all of her requirements.

In accordance with the decision of our cabinet and the purport of memoranda issued by Chief of the Commerce Office MIZUHO and of WANITTO, the situation will be handled as follows.

---

[a]For Part 2 of 2, see II,1163 regarding British-Thaiese negotiations for oil, rubber, and tin ore.
[b]Not available.

Trans. 7–31–41

No. 1163

FROM: Bangkok (Futami)
TO: Tokyo

July 26, 1941
450.

(Very Urgent).

(Part 2 of 2)[a].

1. Negotiations between England and Thailand should be started as soon as possible. See to it that Great Britain agrees to supply petroleum products, hemp sacks and oil drums, etc.

2. We will have to be satisfied with the 30,000 kilotons of rubber which Thailand is reserving for us and plan to make up the shortage by increasing the amount from French Indo-China.

3. It is of first importance that Thailand guarantee us a minimum of 6,000 kilotons of tin ore.

4. Since the British-Thaiese negotiations apply for one year only, I want you to reserve the right to demand Thailand's entire output of rubber and tin in the future. For the present, do not do anything to discourage the British-Thaiese negotiations, and rather than make a contract for a stipulated amount of these products for ourselves, simply negotiate to secure whatever quantity is necessary to fill our present requirments. However, it is quite possible that because of the political attitude of the two countries toward our occupation of French Indo-China the agreement between England and Thailand may not materialize. If this happens there will be no necessity for our making the above above concession in our demands upon Thailand.

Whatever we do will depend upon actual events. For the present, please manage as above. If you have any opinion on the matter, please let me have it.

---

[a]See II, 1162, for Part 1.

Trans. 7-30-41

No. 1164

FROM: Tokyo (Corrected Translation.) July 28, 1941
TO: Bangkok #440.

Secret outside the Department.

Re your #450[a].

You may handle the matter as you suggest but, listen, we absolutely must have at least 35,000 tons of rubber and at least 6,000 tons of tin. I mean we must get 3,000 tons of rubber each month and 500 tons of tin. Please make them accept this demand.

---

[a]See II, 1163.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 1165

FROM: Tokyo July 15, 1941
TO: Bangkok #396.

Re your #395[a].

In regard to the Mizuno-WANITTO understanding, we have had formal negotiations with Britain regarding oil, and America has promised 35,000 tons of rubber and as large an amount of tin ore as it is possible to supply, hence in order to insure a supply of rubber and tin from Thailand, in spite of the fact that we have no obligation to do so, it may be well to supply Thailand with the 12,000 tons of oil which she needs at this time in view of the fact that we urgently need supplies from her and also in view of the state of relations existing between Japan and Thailand now as stated in your telegram #398[b]. However, in return for supplying

this 12,000 tons of oil needed by Thailand, we will want definite assurances of a change of attitude on her part and also an assurance of a supply of at least 35,000 tons of rubber a year and 6,000 tons of tin ore a year. From now on we will want to begin importing 3,000 tons of rubber a month and 500 tons of tin ore a month. With this understanding that Thailand guarantees the above supply of commodities we will supply the oil.

It will take about two weeks to complete loading the oil.

---

[a]Not available
[b]See II, 1154.

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 1166

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda). July 22, 1941
TO: Bangkok # 416.

(Secret outside the Department).

Re part 1 of your # 421[a].

You may negotiate on the basis of the line you indicated. However, according to information from -----, if the coupon system is made more lenient and if the production is increased, a total of 80,000 tons a year is possible. Therefore, we should demand 42,000 tons for the year and hold to demanding 35,000 tons as the minimum. 70,000 tons would be all right for tin ore. However, WANITTO[b] claims that 15,000 tons is the figure for tin concentrate produced in Thailand and does not represent the quantity of ore. Our investigation shows that 13,000 tons is the quantity of ore and that the production of tin is about 25,000 to 26,000 a year. Since there is a noticeable discrepancy in the figures, will you please check up on them and in our final proposal demand 40 % of the total amount.

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[a]Not available.
[b]Chief of the Trade Bureau of Thailand.

Trans. 7-26-41

No. 1167

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) July 26, 1941
TO: Bangkok # 434.

According to a press report, not long ago Thai concluded an economic pact with France. Please investigate this immediately and wire me back whether or not it is true, also the gist thereof.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 1168

FROM: Bangkok (Futami) July 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo #460.

Re your #434[a].

The agreement between Thailand and French Indo-China is an agreement (ratified at Saigon July 19) regarding the circulation of money and the transfer of negotiable documents as provided for in Article 9 of the peace treaty signed in Tokyo between Thailand and French Indo-China. It provides for the time and method of payment of the 600,000 piastres and also for passage through the new territories. (A copy of the French text will be sent by air mail).

[a]"According to a press report, not long ago Thai concluded an economic pact with France. Please investigate this immediately and wire me back whether or not it is true, also the gist thereof." See II,1167.

Trans. 8-2-41

No. 1169

FROM: Bangkok (Futami) July 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #448.

1. On the 25th, yesterday, the following notice was given by the Thaiese National Bank to Fukuda, manager of the Yokohama Specie Bank here. As regards the plan of selling 260,000 pounds in t-t to be sent to London in order to raise a fund in baatu with which to purchase Thaiese rice, if the British bank (The National Provincial Bank) should refuse to purchase the same, and consequently its payment to the Thaiese National Bank becomes an impossibility, the latter bank would like to have a written promise to the effect that the Yokohama Specie Bank will be responsible for the payment.

2. Yesterday afternoon when Adivisor ŌNO conferred with PURAJITTO[a], he asked the latter about this matter. The reply was that PURAJITTO did not know anything about it but would look into it at once.

3. As it looks now, this request was not prompted by an order issued by the British authorities; it is an aspect of Thaiese diplomacy in coping with our occupation of French Indo-China. It would also be very serious should Great Britain, following the example of the United States, decide to issue an order for freezing funds.

4. If you have anything that I should know with reference to the Freezing of Japan's funds, please wire it to me. Will you also transmit this message immediately to the Finance Ministry.

[a]Advisor of the National Bank of Thailand.

Trans. 8-5-41

No. 1170

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) July 28, 1941
TO: Bangkok # 439.

(To be kept secret outside the office.)

Refer to your message # 448[a].

1. In regard to the 200,000 pounds, we are waiting for a report from the Yokohama Specie Bank, after which we will telegraph you.

2. As a result of the recent fund freezing by England and the United States, it is feared that we will be unable to buy Siamese products by means of either pounds or dollars. However, as Japan absolutely needs Siamese rubber, tin, etc., please negotiate with Siam to have her accept as a provisional measure payment in free yen until the conclusion of the pending agreement on methods of payment. Telegraph me the results of your negotiations as soon as possible.

---

[a]See II, 1169.

Trans. 8–5–41

No. 1171

FROM: Bangkok July 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 459.

Re paragraph 2 of your # 43–(?).

In spite of the fact that our assets have been frozen in England and the United States is there any grounds for negotiating the use of "free yen" in Thailand? If the use of "free yen" is prohibited how can we go about arranging for "barter"? Wire immediately.

Trans. 8–1–41

No. 1172

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) July 30, 1941
TO: Bangkok # 444.

Reference your # 459[a].

Because of the rapidly changing situation it is desired that you settle for Siamese goods in gold yen. The value of the yen in gold has been estimated as Yen 4.80 per ounce. This figure was arrived at by taking into consideration the following points: the present market value of the batu[b], the fact that gold is worth $35.00 per ounce in the United States, and that the value of the yen in the United States currency is $23\frac{7}{16}$ cents. I shall wire basic proposals for payment in a later message.

Please carry out the measures in paragraph "N" of my #442[c] which referred to the payment of school fees of students sent by the Bureau of the South Seas, and in paragraph "B" of my #411[c] which made inquiry of the date of your return to Japan.

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[a]See II, 1171, in which Bangkok requests Tokyo to wire immediately how they can go about arranging for "barter" if the use of "free yen" is prohibited.

[b]Siamese monetary unit.

[c]Not available.

Trans. 8–5–41

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