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by Michael E. Bigelow, INSCOM Command Historian
INTELLIGENCE LEADS TO THE BATTLE OF GERMANTOWN
On Oct. 4, 1777, American forces under General George Washington fought a sharp contest northwest of Philadelphia. Washington had hoped to achieve a Trenton-like victory by attacking a portion of Maj. Gen. William Howe’s British army at Germantown. Intelligence in the first days of October gave him his opportunity.
In the three weeks after his defeat along Brandywine Creek in southwest Pennsylvania, Washington had kept his army northwest of Philadelphia. On Sep. 26, the British had entered the American capital and then took up positions near the village of Germantown, about five miles to the north. In opting not to defend Philadelphia, Washington maintained his freedom of action, seeking to seize the initiative. As he received reinforcements, he watched and waited for an opportunity to strike at the British. He learned of such an opportunity in the first days of October.
“Having received intelligence through Two intercepted Letters [on Oct. 2], that Genl Howe had detached a part of his force for the purpose of reducing…the Forts on Delaware,” Washington wrote the day after the battle, “I communicated the Accounts to my Genl Officers, who were unanimously of Opinion, that a favourable Opportunity offered to make an Attack upon the Troops, which were at & near German Town.”
Who captured these two letters is unknown. Maj. John Clark had not fully established his successful spy network yet. Perhaps some group of local American militia, like the famed Philadelphia Associators, had captured the British courier. More likely, one of Washington’s cavalry detachments captured the courier. Maj. Benjamin Tallmadge commanded a squadron of the 2d Continental Light Dragoons in support of Washington’s army. Likewise, Col. Stephan Moylan and his 4th Continental Light Dragoons were in the area. One of Moylan’s subordinates, Capt. Charles Craig, later would prove to be an effective gatherer of information.
By reading Howe’s correspondence, Washington realized the British commander had weakened his forces around Germantown. To reinforce his efforts to capture the rebel forts along the Delaware River to the south of Philadelphia, General Howe sent one thousand men to Chester to the southwest and two thousand more to Delaware to the southeast. On Oct. 3, Washington received confirming intelligence from Lt. Col. Samuel Smith, who commanded Fort Mifflin along the Delaware. Smith reported that the British forces south of Philadelphia had been reinforced from the north; he noted Maj. Elias Boys “reports their strength to be 1500 men at least 1300 of whom went from Phila[delphia].” With this corroboration, Washington planned an attack against the estimated 8,000 British forces near Germantown.
After conferring with his generals, Washington decided to surprise the British camp with a four-pronged attack to drive the British line back while hitting both flanks to get into the British rear. In an early morning attack, the two center columns of regular Continentals, well supported by artillery, would hit the British center with overwhelming force. On both flanks, American militia would make simultaneous attacks. Washington’s audacious plan required clockwork precision and a good deal of luck.
The attack began at 0500 “with charged bayonets and without firing.” Initially the Americans steadily advanced and pushed the British back. Morning fog, however, disrupted coordination between the columns and a stubborn British defense at the Chew House stalled one column. After three hours of hard fighting, Washington’s forces fell back. Nevertheless, British historian, Sir George Otto Trevelyan, noted that European leaders “were profoundly impressed…that a new army, raised within the year, and undaunted by a series of recent disasters, had assailed a victorious enemy in his own quarters, and had only been repulsed after a sharp and dubious conflict.” That positive impression of American military prowess was made because General Washington had timely, actionable intelligence.
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| Date Taken: | 10.01.2025 |
| Date Posted: | 10.01.2025 10:29 |
| Story ID: | 549819 |
| Location: | US |
| Web Views: | 15 |
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