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# Military Review

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MAY-JUNE 2017



# Greetings!

For the past nine months I have had the distinct privilege of serving as the director of Army University Press and the editor in chief of *Military Review*. While here, I have had the honor of working with an amazing team of professionals whose energy, passion, and pride inspire me daily. Thank you Bill, Jeff, Desirae, Beth, Arin, Linda, and Amanda.

The entire Army University Press team is purpose-driven and always focused on advancing the ideas and insights leaders need to lead and succeed. They engage us in exploring ideas, thinking critically, and engaging creatively. They support our writing and participation in professional discourse. And, they keep us abreast of emerging factors impacting the global security environment and the future of war. The diverse content and exceptional quality of every edition of *Military Review* reflects these ambitions.

This edition of *Military Review* distinguishes itself by featuring several articles discussing concepts and issues that are increasingly salient features of the operational environment—features that doctrine does not ordinarily fully address, or, more often, seldom considers at all: the use of nontraditional weapons, including lawfare, autonomous weapon systems, and gender equality.

The lawfare article establishes the framework and highlights the increasing confluence of public opinion, international law, and politics on operations. The article on autonomous weapons discusses the pros and cons of their employment, challenges to limiting and defining autonomous weapons, and policy recommendations regarding these controversial systems. Additionally, two articles address the issue of gender inequality, promoting gender equality as a factor in shaping regional security and overall political stability, and as a determinant in peacemaking.

In a featured article, Anthony Cordesman provides a biting critique on the deficiencies of stability operations doctrine, especially as it pertains to Syria in the aftermath of any upcoming peace accord. We selected the remaining articles to expand the reader's view of the evolving operational environment and provide ideas to confront the challenges associated with change.

In addition to *Military Review*, I encourage you to tap into all of the publication platforms and educational services Army University Press offers to support individual and institutional development. Our books, handbooks, journals, primers, exclusive online multimedia content, and discussion forums are available anytime at http://www.armyupress.army.mil/. The easiest way to keep up with our expanding content is though our social media, so check us out on Facebook and Twitter.

Beyond just reading and staying informed, start contributing to the body of professional military knowledge. Research, explore, and write about topics that interest you, and submit your articles and manuscripts for publication. We have multiple publishing platforms, including *Military Review*, the *Journal of Military Learning*, and the *NCO Journal*. We also sponsor the Future Warfare Writing Program, the NCO Writing Competition, and the DePuy Writing Competition. Our newest venue is "Extended Battlefield: Future of War," a forum that publishes original articles about the future of war and houses a reference library of articles, papers, and news to keep you up-to-date on the ideas informing the multidomain battle concept.

This has been an exciting time to serve with Army University Press and *Military Review* as we transition toward multimedia publishing, enabled by our new website and heightened social media interaction. This transition is only possible because of the opportunities created by Army University, the industrious and innovative staff of Army University Press, and the continued support of our loyal readers and contributors. Thank you!

I have sincerely enjoyed every moment serving as the director of Army University Press and editor in chief of *Military Review*. I look forward to remaining engaged in the professional discourse you lead, enjoying the increasingly diverse content and leader development resources you offer, and appreciating the valuable service you provide our Army. ■

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## 2017 General William E. DePuy

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**Contest closes 17 July 2017**

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# Themes and Suggested Topics for Future Editions

## Global Challenges

- What nations consider themselves to be at war or in conflict with the United States? How are they conducting war, and what does this mean for the Army?
- What are the ramifications of increased Russian military presence in the Middle East?
- What are the military implications of China's economic penetration into Latin America, Africa, and broader Asia?
- What must the U.S. military do to prepare for possible contingency operations in the South China Sea?
- What are the security implications of the growing Islamic presence in Europe? Elsewhere in the world?
- What must the Army do to prepare to fight in urban terrain or megacities? What are the ethical challenges to operating in this type of environment?
- What operational and logistical challenges arise from domestic and foreign infrastructure limitations and how can we mitigate them?
- How can we better prepare soldiers to operate against atypical combatants (i.e., nonuniformed or child warriors) and under conditions where noncombatants are difficult to distinguish?

## The Changing U.S. Army

- Are U.S. Army rotational units as effective as permanently assigned, forward-deployed units?
- Does the Army need designated security force assistance brigades? How should they be organized?
- Is there a role for the Army in homeland security operations? What must the Army be prepared for?
- How is gender integration changing the Army and how it operates?
- How does Army doctrine need to change to incorporate the cyberspace domain?
- Have associated units helped or hindered readiness?

**Previous pages:** Iraqi security forces soldiers pause for a photo 25 February 2017 during react-to-enemy-contact training at Camp Taji, Iraq. The soldiers attended a Junior Leaders Course led by coalition forces designed to enhance basic combat skills in support of Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve, the global coalition to defeat Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. (Photo by Spc. Christopher Brecht, U.S. Army)

Pvt. 1st Class Rafael Mendez uses a training Javelin 13 February 2016 to simulate hitting a target at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California. (Photo by Spc. Josephine Carlson, U.S. Army)

**Next page:** Paratroopers from 4th Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, leave Malemute Drop Zone 22 November 2016 after conducting an airborne insertion and M119 howitzer live-fire training at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska. (Photo by Alejandro Pena, U.S. Air Force)

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# Military Review

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**Mark A. Milley—General, United States Army Chief of Staff**

Official:

Gerald B. O'Keefe—Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army




**Next page:** Pvt. Logan Lopez, a cavalry scout assigned to 1st Squadron, 33rd Cavalry, 101st Airborne Division, participates in fire phobia training 23 October 2016 during a mission rehearsal exercise for Kosovo Force at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany. (Photo by Spc. Adeline Witherspoon, U.S. Army)


Sgt. Kyle Hale of 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, contains an unruly crowd 10 June 2008 to protect a man who was nearly trampled outside the Al Rasheed Bank in the Jamila market in the Shiite enclave of Sadr City, Baghdad, Iraq. (Photo by Petros Giannakouris, Associated Press)

# Lawfare 101
## A Primer

Maj. Gen. Charles Dunlap Jr., U.S. Air Force, Retired

For many commanders and other military leaders, the role of law in twenty-first century conflicts is a source of frustration. Some think it is "handcuffing" them in a way that is inhibiting combat success.[1] For others, law is another "tool that is used by the enemies of the West."[2] For at least one key ally, Great Britain, law seems to be injecting counterproductive hesitancy into operational environments.[3] All of these interpretations have elements of truth, but at the same time they are not quite accurate in providing

an understanding of what might be called the role of *lawfare* in today's military conflicts.

Law has become central to twenty-first century conflicts. Today's wars are waged in what Joel Trachtman calls a "law-rich environment, with an abundance of legal rules and legal fora."[4] This is the result of many factors outside of the military context, including the impact of internationalized economics. Still, as the Global Policy Forum points out, globalization "is changing the contours of law and creating new global legal institutions and norms."[5]

As with many other aspects of modern life, trends in the economic sphere impact warfighting, and this includes how law interacts with armed conflict. Many senior leaders have come to recognize this reality. Retired Marine Corps Gen. James L. Jones, a former NATO commander and U.S. national security advisor, observed several years ago that the nature of war had changed. "It's become very legalistic and very complex," he said, adding that now "you have to have a lawyer or a dozen."[6]

Technology has also revolutionized the impact of law on war, as its many manifestations add to war's complexity. Sorting out the implications of technology for warfighting requires an advanced appreciation for the norms that do—or should—govern it. Retired Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal recently observed that "technology has only made law more relevant to the battlefield."[7] He believes that "no true understanding of the exercise of U.S. military power can be attained without a solid appreciation of how the law shapes military missions and their outcomes."[8]

The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of the concept of what has come to be known as lawfare. This essay also aims to provide some practical context for nonlawyer leaders to think about lawfare, as well as some considerations for how to prepare to operate against an enemy seeking to capitalize on this phenomenon of contemporary conflicts.[9]

## What is Lawfare?

The term lawfare has existed for some time, but its modern usage first appeared in a paper this author wrote for Harvard's Kennedy School in 2001.[10] Lawfare represents an effort to provide military and other nonlawyer audiences an easily understood "bumper sticker" phrasing for how belligerents, and particularly those unable to challenge America's high-tech military capabilities, are attempting to use law as a form of "asymmetric" warfare.[11]

Over time, the definition has evolved, but today it is best understood as the use of law as a means of accomplishing what might otherwise require the application of traditional military force. It is something of an example of what Chinese strategist Sun Tzu might say is the "supreme excellence" of war, which aims to subdue "the enemy's resistance without fighting."[12] Most often, however, it will only be one part of a larger strategy that could likely involve kinetic (lethal) and other traditional military capabilities.

More importantly, lawfare is ideologically neutral. Indeed, it is helpful to think of it as a weapon that can be used for good or evil, depending upon who is wielding it and for what reasons. As Trachtman says, "Lawfare can substitute for warfare where it provides a means to compel specified behavior with fewer costs than kinetic warfare, or even in cases where kinetic warfare would be ineffective."[13] That is a truth that is equally applicable to America's enemies as it is to the United States itself.

## How Has the United States Used Lawfare?

There are many examples of how law can be used to peacefully substitute for other military methodologies. For example, during the early part of Operation Enduring Freedom, commercial satellite imagery of areas in Afghanistan became available on the open market. Although there may have been a number of ways to stop such extremely valuable data from falling into hostile hands, a legal "weapon"—a contract—was used to buy up the imagery. Doing so prevented

**Maj. Gen. Charles Dunlap Jr., U.S. Air Force, retired,** served thirty-four years on active duty before retiring in 2010 as the Air Force's deputy judge advocate general. His assignments included tours in Europe and Korea, and he deployed for operations in Africa and the Middle East. He is a graduate of St. Joseph's University and Villanova University School of Law and is a distinguished graduate of the National War College. He is the executive director of the Center on Law, Ethics and National Security at Duke University School of Law. He blogs on *LAWFIRE*, https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/.

> They are using the law in order to turn respect for the law in the United States and other democratic countries into a vulnerability.

"the pictures from falling into the hands of terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda."[14]

Law plays a very significant role in counterinsurgency operations. Although the term lawfare is not used, Field Manual 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, is replete with how law is a key element of the comprehensive approach that success in such conflicts requires.[15] In particular, it makes the point that "establishing the rule of law is a key goal and end state in counterinsurgency."[16] As Gen. David H. Petraeus has pointed out, it is unlikely that a counterinsurgency effort will succeed absent a form of lawfare that brings about the rule of law in the target state instead of relying solely on killing or capturing the insurgent force.[17]

There are further legal means that can impact military capabilities rather directly. For example, sanctions crippled the Iraqi air force to the point where fewer than one-third of its aircraft were flyable when the coalition invaded in 2003.[18] The operational impact is obvious: Iraqi jets were grounded just as effectively as if they were shot down. Sanctions are also seen as having slowed Russia's military buildup. Kyle Mizokami reported in 2016 that international sanctions (along with falling oil prices) were adversely affecting the economy, which, in turn, frustrated Russia's efforts to rebuild its military.[19]

There has been an array of approaches for using law to undermine adversaries, approaches that can be put under the aegis of lawfare. For example, Juan Zarate, a former Treasury Department official, describes a range of legal initiatives his agency used to disrupt and deny terrorists, in particular the financial resources they needed.[20] In addition, even private litigation is working to deny access to the banking and social media platforms terrorists increasingly rely upon.[21]

## How Does the Adversary Use Lawfare?

Many hostile nonstate actors use lawfare as a mainstay of their strategy for confronting high-tech militaries. To be clear, they are using the law in order to turn respect for the law in the United States and other democratic countries into a vulnerability. For example, they might seek to exploit real or imagined reports of civilian casualties in the hopes that fear of causing more of the same will result in a constrained use of certain military technologies (e.g., airpower) by rule-of-law countries like the United States.

The after effects of the bombing of the Al Firdos bunker during the 1991 Gulf War presaged much of what we see today. Although believed to be a military command-and-control center, it was actually being used as a shelter for the families of high-level Iraqi officials. When pictures of dead and injured civilians were broadcast worldwide, they "accomplished what the Iraqi air defenses could not: downtown Baghdad was to be attacked sparingly, if at all."[22]

Ironically, nothing violative of the law of war had occurred, but perceptions of the same had the operational effect of a sophisticated air defense system.[23] Many adversaries have "gone to school" on this event as an example of a low-tech means to counter high-tech systems. Obviously, perceptions do matter. Michael Riesman and Chris T. Antoniou insist,

> In modern popular democracies, even a limited armed conflict requires a substantial base of public support. That support can erode or even reverse itself rapidly, no matter how worthy the political objective, if people *believe* that the war is being conducted in an unfair, inhumane, or iniquitous way. [italics added][24]

Accordingly, after witnessing what the Al Firdos bombing raid accomplished, some adversaries seek to exploit such incidents when they occur, but others seek to orchestrate them in order to get the benefit of the restraint that might follow. For example, the Islamic State "uses civilians as human shields to claim that the U.S.-led coalition is targeting innocent people during the strikes."[25]

Syrian Army officers and their families who support President Bashar al-Assad are locked in "human shield" cages by a rebel group called "Army of Islam" 31 October 2015 in the Damascus suburb of Douma, Syria. The group claimed the human shields would protect Douma's civilians from airstrikes led by Russian and Syrian air forces. (Photo by Balkis Press/Sipa USA via Associated Press)

In fact, most U.S. adversaries actually see our political culture's respect for the law as a "center of gravity" to be exploited. William Eckhardt observes,

> Knowing that our society so respects the rule of law that it demands compliance with it, our enemies carefully attack our military plans as illegal and immoral and our execution of those plans as contrary to the law of war. Our vulnerability here is what philosopher of war Carl von Clausewitz would term our "center of gravity."[26]

Incidents of illegality markedly advance an enemy's lawfare strategy. The Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal that occurred during the Iraq War is a classic illustration.[27] It is significant that Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, then commander of Combined Joint Task Force 7 (commander of coalition ground forces in Iraq), used traditional military language in assessing the impact of the explosion of criminality at Abu Ghraib by terming it "clearly a defeat" because its *effect* was indistinguishable from that imposed by traditional military setbacks.[28] Elsewhere, as reported by Joseph Berger in the *New York Times*, Petraeus, then head of U.S. Central Command, had explained during an interview how violations of the law impact what happens on the battlefield:

> "Whenever we have, perhaps, taken expedient measures, they have turned around and bitten us in the backside," [Petraeus] said. Whenever Americans have used methods that violated the Geneva Conventions or the standards of the International Committee of the Red Cross, he said: "We end up paying the price for it ultimately. Abu Ghraib and other situations like that are nonbiodegradable. They don't go away. The enemy continues to beat you with them like a stick."[29]

The situation is even more aggravated in an era of proliferated sports cameras, cell phones, and similar

devices able to record and transmit images worldwide in real or near-real time. A forty-second video of marines urinating on the bodies of dead Taliban that went "viral" was, according Afghan leaders, a "recruitment tool for the Taliban."[30] This is exactly the kind of avoidable illegality that lawfare-oriented adversaries readily exploit.

The point is that today each troop in the field is, indeed, a "strategic corporal." Gen. Charles C. Krulak, former commandant of the Marine Corps, said in 1999 that "the individual marine will be the most conspicuous symbol of American foreign policy and will potentially influence not only the immediate tactical situation, but the operational and strategic levels as well."[31] Today, the exposure of lawfulness or unlawfulness of individuals, superempowered by technology, is able to have an operational or strategic impact.

## Chinese and Russian Lawfare

It is a mistake to think that lawfare is something only utilized by technology-vulnerable nonstate actors. Countries with formidable military capabilities do employ lawfare, but differently. China, for example, has an extremely sophisticated "legal warfare" doctrine, which designates such strategies as one of their "three warfares."[32] According to Dean Cheng, the "People's Liberation Army are approaching lawfare from a different perspective: as an offensive weapon capable of hamstringing opponents and seizing the political initiative."[33]

Quoting Chinese sources, Cheng says, "Legal warfare, at its most basic, involves 'arguing that one's own side is obeying the law, criticizing the other side for violating the law, and making arguments for one's own side in cases where there are also violations of the law.'"[34] Current events suggest that China seems to be executing its lawfare strategy. Indeed, some observers see this strategy as the main thrust of their expansion into the South China Sea.[35]

Additionally, today, Russia is often viewed as a preeminent practitioner of what has been called "hybrid war," of which lawfare is an element. In Army parlance, the term "hybrid threat" captures "the seemingly increased complexity of operations, the multiplicity of actors involved, and the blurring between traditional elements of conflict."[36] It combines "traditional forces governed by law, military tradition, and custom with unregulated forces that act with no restrictions on violence or target selection."[37]

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr. says he tries to stay away from "hybrid" terminology. Rather, he considers it "a competition with an adversary that has a military dimension, but the adversary knows exactly what the threshold is for us to take decisive military action." Consequently, he says "they operate below that level," and are able to "continue to advance their interests and we lose competitive advantage."[38]

Legal experts say that Russia's form of hybrid warfare explicitly seeks to blur legal lines in order to exploit the uncertainty that results.[39] They posit that the "inherent complexity, ambiguity, and the attributable character of hybrid warfare create not only new security but also legal challenges," especially for these "who adhere to international law within good faith and the commonly agreed frameworks established under and governed by the principles of the rule of law."[40] Plainly, this is a form of lawfare and something long a part of Russia's arsenal.[41]

## Responding at the Tactical Level: The Commander's Responsibilities

Quite obviously, many of the challenges and opportunities presented by lawfare in its many manifestations arise mostly at the strategic and operational levels of conflict. This does not, however, mean that other aspects of lawfare are of no importance to those at the tactical level. This is relevant with respect to denying the enemy the opportunity to employ lawfare techniques to exploit or orchestrate acts that create the fact or perception of lawlessness that will undermine or even prevent mission success.

Most commanders and tactical-level leaders understand that they have a wide variety of responsibilities in the legal arena, particularly with respect to discipline. The Army's *2015 Commander's Legal Handbook* counsels that in many instances,

> The purpose of your actions should be to preserve the legal situation until you can consult with your servicing Judge Advocate. However, like most aspects of your command responsibilities, you can fail if you just wait for things to come to you. You need to be proactive in preventing problems before they occur.[42]

In terms of operations, being proactive with respect to the challenge of lawfare includes what I call "legal preparation of the battlespace."

## Legal Preparation of the Battlespace

Commanders are familiar with the concept of intelligence preparation of the battlefield but need to add *legal* preparation of the battlespace to their "to-do" list.[43] This means systematically analyzing the legal dimensions of a particular mission and its context, and determining their potential effect on operations. It then becomes incumbent on commanders—at every level—to take whatever actions they can to enhance positive effects of the law on the operation, and to eliminate or mitigate potential adverse impacts.

Key to this effort would be utilization of the supporting judge advocate generals (JAGs). Like other services, the Army JAG Corps has established an explicit practice area to "provide legal advice to commanders and their staffers on domestic, foreign, and international laws that influence military operations."[44]

Recently, Maj. Dan Maurer, an Army JAG, advised his fellow uniformed lawyers about the need to understand their advisory role vis-à-vis the commander and other decision makers. Although not addressing lawfare specifically, his advice nevertheless has application: "Decision-makers need to be fully confident and fully aware of not only *what* you think, but *why* you think it, and *how* their particular decisions will affect *others* beyond the slim consequences of the immediate battle drill."[45]

Most commanders would likely agree with Maurer, but how can they ensure that their legal advisor is capable of giving them that sort of insight? Part of the answer is easy, in that commanders will likely be supported by a JAG with strong legal skills. Getting an appointment as a JAG officer is extremely competitive these days, and law students and lawyers who aspire for a commission must be among the very best.[46] However, legal acumen is only part of the process.

The finest lawyer cannot be effective if he or she does not fully understand the client's business and needs. In the military setting, this means a deep understanding of the mission, capabilities, and mindset of the supported unit. Much of this falls upon the JAG to develop, but commanders can facilitate the process by reaching out to their supporting legal officer. This means ensuring that the JAG visits the unit frequently and acquires a familiarity with its soldiers,

# INTEGRATING LAWFARE AND WARFARE



INTEGRATING LAWFARE AND WARFARE

JOEL P. TRACHTMAN*

**Abstract:** Current military campaigns are not waged solely on the physical battlefield, but in multiple other arenas. One such arena is lawfare: legal activity that supports, undermines, or substitutes for other types of warfare. In today's law-rich environment, with an abundance of legal rules and legal fora, strategists must evaluate the full scope of possible legal argumentation. Lawfare can substitute for warfare where it provides a means to compel specified behavior with fewer costs than kinetic warfare, or even in cases where kinetic warfare would be ineffective. As a result, lawfare can be strategically integrated into military command structures to bring about desired outcomes.

INTRODUCTION

Both kinetic warfare and legal dispute are forms of contestation.[1] Contestation can be physical or symbolic.[2] Legal arguments or claims are one type of symbolic contestation.[3] Other types of symbolic contestation may be based on historical justification, moral philosophy, or religious doctrine.[4] Symbolic contestation may be used alongside or in place of physical contestation.[5] Although we may plan strategy around geographically defined contested arenas like the South China Sea, the Crimea, or Syria, we may also consider functionally defined arenas such as the cyber or biological arenas.[6] Arenas for contestation may be geographic or functional, physical, or symbol-



* Professor of International Law, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. This essay is based on a speech given at the Naval War College Current Strategy Forum in June 2015.

[1] *See* ORDE F. KITTRIE, LAWFARE: LAW AS A WEAPON OF WAR 1, 3 (2016); Timothy Noah, *Birth of a Washington Word*, SLATE (Nov. 20, 2002, 6:40 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/chatterbox/2002/11/birth_of_a_washington_word.html [https://perma.cc/A4AU-B6JW].

[2] *See* KITTRIE, *supra* note 1, at 6–7.

[3] *See id.*

[4] *See* Gerrie Ter Haar, *Religion: Source of Conflict or Resource for Peace?*, *in* BELIEF OR BARRIER: RELIGION, VIOLENCE, AND VISIONS FOR PEACE 1, 13 (Gerrie Ter Haar & James J. Busuttil eds., 2005).

[5] *See* KITTRIE, *supra* note 1, at 6–7.

[6] *See* Peter Navarro, *China's Non-Kinetic "Three Warfares" Against America*, NAT'L INT. (Jan. 5, 2016), http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinas-non-kinetic-three-warfares-against-america-14808 [https://perma.cc/54RS-XJCC]; *see, e.g.*, *infra* notes 49–70, 83–91 and accompanying text.



Joel P. Trachtman, in his article "Integrating Lawfare and Warfare," writes that lawfare can be integrated into a military command structure strategically if one wants to bring about desired outcomes. He recommends areas in which an integrated legal component may improve strategic and tactical outcomes:

a. Identify disputes in which legal resolution is unlikely in order to predict more accurately the context for kinetic disputes.

b. Join in the planning of new weapons systems and adaptation of existing weapons systems in order to maximize effectiveness given legal restraints.

c. Anticipate challenges to rules of engagement and target policies and identify methods to maximize effectiveness despite potential challenges.

d. Identify circumstances where opponents are creating legal facts on the ground that may give them an advantage in future conflicts, such as the Chinese South China Sea operations.

e. Identify circumstances in which it may be attractive to create legal facts on the ground for advantage.

f. Identify circumstances in which opponents are seeking to create international legal rules or modify or apply existing international legal rules that will restrict use of weapons in which your forces have an advantage.

g. Propose international legal rules or modify or apply existing international legal rules that will restrict use of weapons in which your forces are at a disadvantage.

h. Identify competitors' efforts to block your access to materiel and formulate legal responses.

i. Identify competitors' needs for materiel and seek to block access within applicable law.

Source: Joel P. Trachtman, "Integrating Lawfare and Warfare," *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review* 39, no. 2 (2016): 267 and 281, accessed 20 March 2017, http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol39/iss2/3.

equipment, and methods of operation. This must be accomplished in garrison because it is extremely difficult to do on the fly or once deployed.

Success, Maurer tells us, is "measured by *the relationship itself* between the advisor and principal decision maker."[47] He offers these questions for introspection by both the legal advisor and the decision maker:

> Is [the relationship] characterized by trust? Is it deep? Is it candid? Does it forgive errors and accept nuance and a bit of chaos? Is it built to allow for the *time* to be *all* of these things, or is it nothing more than a twice-monthly status report?[48]

None of this, of course, obviates the responsibility of the supporting legal advisor and others in his or her functional chain of supervision to engage in a wide-ranging professional, and often highly technical, legal analysis, and to prepare a supporting legal plan that spans all levels of war as is necessary to effectively wage lawfare and, conversely, defend against it.[49]

## Educate the Troops about Lawfare

Beyond securing the right legal advisor, it is important to have the troops understand the "why" about lawfare. The most obvious part of this process for tactical-level units is ensuring the troops understand that battlespace discipline is more than a matter of personal character and accountability; it directly relates, as discussed earlier, to operational success.

Consequently, commanders and other leaders need to explain the importance of denying adversaries incidents of real or perceived misconduct that can be exploited. This part of the legal preparation of the battlefield must begin long before the unit arrives in the battlespace. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in *Chappell v. Wallace,*

> The inescapable demands of military discipline and obedience to orders cannot be taught on battlefields; the habit of immediate compliance with military procedures and orders must be virtually reflex, with no time for debate or reflection.[50]

Yet at the same time, twenty-first century commanders need to appreciate that today's troops are not automatons (and we should not want them to be). According to the 2016 Deloitte Millennial Survey, personal values have the greatest influence on millennials' decision making.[51] This means they need to have a keen understanding of how a task fits with their personal values or ethics.[52] Richard Schragger points out that "law allows our troops to engage in forceful, violent acts with relatively little hesitation or moral qualms."[53] Law can, he says, create a "well-defined legal space within which individual soldiers can act without resorting to their own personal moral codes."[54]

Absent a firm grounding in the importance of law and its moral underpinnings, personal moral codes can take a dark turn under the enormous stress of combat. The late historian Stephen Ambrose observed that it is a "universal aspect of war" that when you put young troops "in a foreign country with weapons in their hands, sometimes terrible things happen that you wish had never happened."[55] More recently, William Langewiesche has reported on just how combat can catastrophically distort the judgment of otherwise good soldiers.[56] This and other case studies need to be carefully examined by leaders, JAGs, and troops alike.

Clearly, to deny adversaries an effective lawfare strategy, troops must be trained on the law of war and its incorporation into the rules of engagement. Leaders, however, need to be wary of self-imposed restraints, because they can work to benefit adversaries. For example, the announcement by NATO first and later by the United States of the rules of engagement that require a "near certainty" of zero civilian casualties creates the perception of illegality when such casualties inevitably occur, even though international law does not require zero civilian casualties but merely that they need not be excessive in relation to the concrete and directed military advantage anticipated.[57]

Such publicly announced restraints invite adversaries to do exactly what the law does not want them to do: embed themselves among civilians in order to protect themselves from an air attack more effectively than any air defense might be able to do. Indeed, there is a real risk that overly restrictive rules of engagement may, paradoxically, endanger civilians because the failure to conduct a strike may save some civilians in the near term, but over time, the enemy who escapes an attack may go on to wreak more havoc on innocents, which would not have been the case if the attack had gone forward and the enemy had been neutralized.[58]

All of this suggests that the complexities of modern battlefields, and in particular the implications of

lawfare and counter-lawfare techniques, make solutions very fact-dependent. A sophisticated understanding of the legal "terrain" is essential and will require a real intellectual investment by military leaders and their forces if they are to be prepared to succeed.

The legal machinations of Russians waging hybrid war are not necessarily the same as China's legal warfare in the South China Sea or the Islamic State's ruthless exploitation of human shields to ward off high-tech weaponry. Each approach is a related but differing application of lawfare. Only by a discriminate and detailed analysis of these various lawfare strategies will U.S. forces be able to anticipate and blunt an adversary's use of lawfare.

## Concluding Observations

There is yet much work to do. In his book on lawfare, Orde Kittrie makes the astute observation that "despite the term having been coined by a U.S. government official, the U.S. government has only sporadically engaged with the concept of lawfare."[59] He goes on to lament that the United States has "no lawfare strategy or doctrine, and no office or interagency mechanism that systematically develops or coordinates U.S. offensive lawfare or U.S. defenses against lawfare."[60]

Although enumerating all of the techniques to counter adversary lawfare strategies is beyond the scope of this article, I hope that, together with other experts, a start is underway. Fortunately, some useful work has been done with respect to specific challenges. For example, Stefan Halper's 2013 paper—prepared for the Department of Defense's Office of Net Assessments—provides useful ideas not only for the specific situation it addresses (China's actions in the South China Sea) but also with real application to other lawfare situations.[61] Trachtman has also done some valuable work that will help develop thinking about lawfare.[62]

Furthermore, in a recent article in NATO's *Three Swords Magazine*, U.S. Army Lt. Col. John Moore notes that while the alliance has no formal definition or doctrine, the concept has been discussed in papers and at conferences.[63] Given the rise especially of Russia's employment of hybrid war with its lawfare element, he believes it is urgent that NATO coalesce its already extant thinking about lawfareand express it in a formal doctrine in order to facilitate the alliance's ability to defend itself against lawfare techniques, as well as to use the concept proactively.[64]

In the meantime, commanders and leaders at all levels need to include law and lawfare into their planning process and operational conduct, even in the absence of formal doctrine. The fact is that lawfare is not a passing phenomenon; it is intrinsic to current conflicts and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future. The best leaders will ensure that they and their troops will be prepared to meet this challenge. ■

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# MilitaryReview

# WE RECOMMEND

For those who would like to know more about lawfare, *Military Review* recommends two articles by retired U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. Charles Dunlap Jr.



COMMENTARY

Lawfare Today:
A Perspective

BY MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES J. DUNLAP, JR., USAF

Lawfare is a concept that is ever more frequently discussed in government, academic, and media circles. Regrettably, that discussion is not as informed as it might be. The purpose of this commentary is to clarify what lawfare means by discussing how it originated, how it is being used by opposing sides in modern conflicts, and what some of the challenges are as we look ahead. Although I've tinkered with the definition over the years, I now define "lawfare" as the strategy of using – or misusing – law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective.[1] As such, I view law in this context much the same as a weapon. It is a means that can be used for good or bad purposes.

I started using "lawfare" in speeches and writings[2] beginning in the late 1990s because I wanted a "bumper sticker" term easily understood by a variety of audiences to describe how law was altering warfare. At that point, I had the hubris to think I invented the term; actually, it had been used a couple of times previously in a completely different context starting in the mid-1970s.[3] I needed something to describe what I and others saw as a new relationship between law and war. General James L. Jones, then the commander of NATO, famously observed in a *Parade* magazine article:

> It used to be a simple thing to fight a battle…In a perfect world, a general would get up and say, "Follow me, men," and everybody would say, "Aye, sir" and run off. But that's not the world anymore, …[now] you have to have a lawyer or a dozen. It's become very legalistic and very complex.[4]

The reasons for this phenomenon are several, but I think they are largely

Major General Dunlap is the Deputy Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Air Force. His biography is available at http://www.af.mil/library/biographies/bio.asp?bioID=5393. This commentary is based on a speech presented to the American Bar Association's 17th Annual Review of the Field of National Security Law Conference, November 16, 2007. The views and opinions expressed are those of the author alone, and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense.

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

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Raul A. "Pete" Pedrozo and Daria P. Wollschlaeger (Editors)

XII

Lawfare Today . . . and Tomorrow

Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.*

*A principal strategic tactic of the Taliban . . . is either provoking or exploiting civilian casualties.*

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates[1]

*I. Introduction*

Although he does not use the term "lawfare," Secretary Gates' observation reflects what is in reality one of the most common iterations of lawfare in today's conflicts. Specifically, the Taliban are aiming to achieve a particular military effect, that is, the neutralization of US and allied technical superiority, especially with respect to airpower. To do so they are, as Secretary Gates indicates, creating the perception of violations of one of the fundamental norms of the law of armed conflict (LOAC), that is, the distinction between combatants and civilians.

While "provoking or exploiting civilian casualties" is clearly a type of lawfare, it is by no means its only form. Although the definition has evolved somewhat since its modern interpretation was introduced in 2001,[2] today I define it as "the strategy of using—or misusing—law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve a warfighting objective."[3]

As such, it is ideologically neutral, that is, it is best conceptualized much as a weapon that can be wielded by either side in a belligerency. In fact, many uses of legal "weapons" and methodologies avoid the need to resort to physical violence

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The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.

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To view this article, visit: http://stockton.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1084&context=ils.


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# The Heart of the Matter

## The Security of Women, The Security of States

Valerie M. Hudson, PhD
Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, PhD
Mary Caprioli, PhD
Chad F. Emmett, PhD

Civilian refugees, the majority of whom are women and children, arrive at the village of Putumatalan in Puthukkudiyirippu, northern Sri Lanka, 22 April 2009 after fleeing an area still controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in the "No Fire Zone." Thousands more refugees surged out of Sri Lanka's war zone while soldiers and Tamil Tiger rebels fought the apparent endgame of Asia's longest-running war despite calls to protect those still trapped. (Photo by Stringer, Reuters)

What are the roots of conflict and insecurity for states? Some scholars argue that civilizational differences, defined by ethnicity, language, and religion, are the primary underlying catalysts for conflict and insecurity.[1] Others have spoken of the importance of differentiating between democratic and nondemocratic regime types in explaining conflict in the modern international system.[2] Still others assert that poverty, exacerbated by resource scarcity in a context of unequal access, is at the heart of conflict and insecurity at both micro and macro levels of analysis.[3]

In this article, we argue that there is another more fundamental, and perhaps more powerful, explanatory factor than those conventionally suggested that must be considered when examining issues of state security and conflict: the treatment of females within society. We have come to that conclusion through exhaustive research, both qualitatively as well as quantitatively. Unfortunately, the supporting statistical analyses and descriptions of methodology are too expansive and perhaps a little esoteric to be presented here for this relatively short article,

and so we present here the major key findings of our conclusions. For those who have interest in seeing a concise treatment of the data analyses in significantly more detail with accompanying graphic outlays, these can be found in our book, *Sex and World Peace*.

At first glance, our argument seems hardly intuitive. How could the treatment of women possibly be linked to matters of high politics such as war and national security? For some, the two realms seem not to inhabit the same conceptual space. For others, the linkage between treatment of women and security is obvious. For example, in 2006, Secretary–General of the United Nations Kofi Annan opined, "The world is starting to grasp that there is no policy more effective in promoting development, health, and education than the empowerment of women and girls. And I would venture that no policy is more important in preventing conflict, or in achieving reconciliation after a conflict has ended."[4]

In this article, we wish to examine Annan's assertion focusing on the question, Is there a significant linkage between the security of women and the security of states?

When a coauthor of this article raised that question in a departmental research meeting, the answer was swift and certain: "No." The prevailing opinion was that violence wrought by the great military conflicts of the twentieth century was proof that security scholars would do best by focusing on larger issues such as democracy and democratization, poverty and wealth, ideology and national identity. Along a scale of "blood spilt and lives lost" as the proper location of concern for security studies, colleagues queried, "why would one ever choose to look at women?"[5]

Taken aback by such professed certainty that we were on the wrong course, it took some time for us to articulate an answer. On examining the issue of what "the security of the state" really means, how would one account for the death toll among Indian women as a result of female infanticide and sex-selective abortion from 1980 to the present if not in the category of such a death toll being a genuine "security issue?" The number of females deaths involved is almost forty times the death toll from all of India's wars since and including its bloody struggle for independence. This fact alone would suggest broad adverse security implications for the stability and economic well-being of the state.

Consequently, we reasoned, it would be instructive to consider the scale upon which women die from sex-selective causes inquiring into the implications such had for state security. Using overall sex ratios as a crude marker for a host of causes of death by virtue of being female, we found ourselves contemplating the results shown in the figure (page 21) in comparison with the great slaughters of the twentieth century.[6]

Moreover, because the death tolls for the wars and conflicts listed above include deaths of women as both civilians and combatants, we thought it not to be an exaggeration to suggest that the majority of "blood spilt and lives lost" over the last century has been, in the first place, mainly those of females.

Unfortunately, when thinking of war and peace and national security, many people confine their vision to a picture of a uniformed soldier—male—lying dead on the field of battle, gendering these important issues male. In contrast, perhaps a fresh vision, such as that offered in the figure, should turn the thoughts of those deeply thinking about national and global security to the girl baby drowned in a nearby stream, or to the charred body of a young bride assassinated in a "kitchen fire" of her in-laws' making. To pose the question more conceptually, might there be more to inquire about than simply the effect of war on women—*might the security of women in fact affect the security of states?*

Extensive research has shown that there is a strong rationale for asserting a relationship between the security of women and the security of states.[7] Sexual difference serves as a critical model for the societal treatment of difference between and among individuals and collectivities. A long tradition in social psychology has found three basic differences that individuals notice immediately when they encounter a new person almost from infancy: age, sex, and race.[8] Although there is some preliminary evidence that recognition of racial differences can be "erased" when such differences are crossed with coalitional status, no one has shown a similar disabling of sex recognition.[9] Indeed, the psychologist Alice Eagly asserts, "Gender stereotypes trump race stereotypes in every social science test."[10] In this way, sex,

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**Mary Caprioli, PhD,** is an associate professor of political science and director of international studies program at the University of Minnesota Duluth. She has researched the role of gendered structural inequality on political conflict and violence. Caprioli pioneered a new line of scholarly inquiry between the security of women and the national and international behavior of states and confirmed the link using quantitative methodology. Her research focuses broadly on conflict and security studies, including inter- and intrastate violence, and specifically on assessing the role of gendered structural inequality in predicting violence.

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


**(A)**
**Death Toll V**

Brazil (1.1 million)
Russo-Japanese War (13 million)
Balkans (.14 million)
German East Africa (.18 million)
Libya (.13 million)
Grecco-Turkish War (.25 million)
Spanish Civil War (.47 million)
Abyssinia (.4 million)
Russo-Finish (.15 million)
Greek Civil War (.16 million)
Tito (.2 million)
First Indochina War (.4 million)
Colombia (.2 million)
Indian partition (.5 million)
Romania (.15 million)
Burma/Myanmar (.13 million)
Algeria (.7 million)
Guatemala (.2 million)
Indonesia (.4 million)
Uganda (.6 million)
Angola (.6 million)
East Timor (.2 million)
Lebanon (.15 million)
Iraq (.7 million)
Liberia (.15 million)
Bosnia (.18 million)
Somalia (.4 million)
Israel/Arab (.07 million)
Angola (.08 million)
Sierra Leone (.08 million)

**(B)**
**Death Toll IV**

Tibet (.6 million)
Mexican Revolution (1 million)
Ethiopia (1.4 million)
Nigeria (1 million)
Mozambique (1 million)
Sudan (1.9 million)

**(C)**
**Death Toll III**

Pre-PRC 20th century China (4 million)
Congo, 20th century (3.8 million)
Vietnam (3.5 million)
Korea (2.8 million)
Afghanistan (1.8 million)
Khmer Rouge, Cambodia (1.65 million)
Estimated Armenian genocide (1.5 million)
Russian Civil War (1.4 million)
Rwanda/Burundi (1.35 million)
Bangladesh (1.25 million)
Iran/Iraq War (1 million)

(Adapted from a graphic in *Sex and World Peace*)

**Figure. Comparison of Conflict Deaths in the Twentieth Century and Deaths Resulting from Devaluation of Female Life at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century**

like age, becomes a basic category of identification and a profound marker of difference.[11]

Sex and age categorizations play variant roles in society. Everyone will someday move into another age group; in general, with exceptions, this kind of change does not occur with regard to sex groupings. Sex difference is arguably the primary formative fixed difference experienced in human society,[12] and sexual reproduction is the strongest evolutionary driver of human social arrangements.[13]

Concurring with these insights from psychological and evolutionary research, French philosopher Sylviane Agacinski reflects, "It is always the difference of the sexes that serves as a model for all other differences, and the male/female hierarchy that is taken as a metaphor for all inter-ethnic hierarchies."[14] Consequently, societally based differences in status beliefs about the sexes, reflected in practices, customs, and law, may well have important political consequences, including consequences for nation-state security policy and for conflict and cooperation within and between nation-states.

Utilizing the theoretical framework that we call the "women and peace thesis," linking how women are

treated with how their nation-states behave, we first surveyed the existing empirical literature linking the situation of women to the situation of states, and then conducted an initial empirical investigation of the framework's propositions using diverse existing data bases that had compiled a wide variety of statistical information related to the situation of women and the situation and behavior of states. Our findings, detailed in *Sex and World Peace*, showed strong, significant relationships in the direction predicted.[15]

## Literature Review of Existing Empirical Findings: Women and the State

There is a substantial literature linking the treatment of women to important state-level variables. Scholarly attention to the link between women and the state arguably began in the field of development. As early as 1970, Ester Boserup argued that omission of gender aspects of development led to project failure. Since her pioneering work, we have seen waves of successive research concerning the role of women in economic development and quality of life.[16] The empirical literature in this field has contributed to the establishment of strong cross-national linkages between gender variables and economic variables, including GDP per capita, global competitiveness ranking, and economic growth rates.[17] State-level health variables, especially child survival/mortality and malnutrition, are also significantly correlated to female status and education.[18]

Such previous research helps us understand the significant negative correlation between indices of corruption and indices of women's social and economic rights.[19] This implies that expansion of women's rights thus offer an added economic benefit: decreases in political corruption due to greater equity of female empowerment in society overall appear to support an increase in investment and growth. In other words, increasing gender equity promotes economic growth.[20]

The linkages between the situation and status of women, on the one hand, and economic and health variables on the other have paved the way for research on political variables also. Of special note is that initial research in this area suggests that the priorities and perspectives of a government appear to change as women become more visible and audible within its ranks. Previous research studies show that the more women there are in government, the greater the attention given to social welfare, legal protection, and transparency in government and business.[21] For example, in one survey, 80 percent of respondents said that women's participation restores trust in government.[22]

All in all, then, many in the world are beginning to recognize that the status of women often substantially influences important political aspects of the states in which they live. This recognition, in turn, has already led in many cases to innovative policy initiatives to capitalize on these insights.[23]

Despite the impressive array of empirical findings, when one turns to questions of women and national security defined in a more traditional sense, there are theoretical reasons for believing that the security and behavior of a state are linked to the situation and security of its women. This suggests specific lines of research inquiry: Does the evidence support this proposition? And, if so, what is the form of that linkage?

There are two primary strands of inquiry that have brought this linkage into sharper focus: academic theory and policy exposition. A strong foundation in the rich theoretical literature of feminist security studies emphasizes the relationship between women's status and international relations.[24] In addition to academic endeavors, noteworthy is the formal articulation of the need to include women in peace negotiations as codified in the 2000 UN Security Council Resolution 1325, the 2008 recognition in UN Security Council Resolution 1820 of the need to punish those who commit rape in conflict, a broader intergovernmental organization (IGO)/non-governmental organization (NGO) advocacy program called Women, Peace, and Security, which has resulted in stronger gender mainstreaming in areas such as UN peacekeeping operations, and a new Gender Architecture (GEAR) for the United Nations, which resulted in the creation of UN Women in July 2010.[25]

Using in-depth ethnographic case studies, processtracing, and poststructuralist discourse analysis, researchers have penned many fine empirical works in feminist security studies.[26] Below we survey more quantitative work.

In a recent empirical analysis of Muslim societies, M. Steven Fish finds that predominantly Muslim nations do not disproportionately suffer from political violence, but they do disproportionately suffer from authoritarian rule.[27] He explores why Islam


*Burying Babies in China*, illustration in *Wesleyan Juvenile Offering* (London: Wesleyan Mission House, March 1865), 40. Female infanticide is a major cause of concern in several nations such as China and India. It has been argued that the "low status" in which women are viewed in patriarchal societies creates a bias against females. (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

appears to disfavor democracy, and after controlling for many variables, including economic development, economic growth, ethnic fractionalism, and others, he finds that indicators related to the subordination of women, including literacy rate gap and sex ratio, account for a substantial proportion of the relationship between Islam and authoritarianism. He hypothesizes that the oppression of females—one of the earliest social acts observed by all in the society—provides the template for other types of oppression, including authoritarianism, in Islamic nation-states. Treatment of women, then, may affect societal propensity to adopt a particular governance system, such as authoritarianism or democracy.

Another primary question of interest is how the treatment of women at the domestic level has an impact on state behavior internationally. This question is important to show the linkage between gender and security because it shows those with decision-making power that the treatment of women has far-reaching practical consequences well beyond that of the abstract objective of obtaining social justice. A body of conventional empirical work spearheaded by Mary Caprioli links measures of domestic gender inequality to state-level variables concerning conflict and security, with statistically significant results. The clear implication is that the international system may be more or less secure depending upon the situation of women within its units.

Caprioli uses three measures of gender equality—political equality (percentage of women in parliament and number of years of suffrage), economic equality (percentage of women in the labor force), and social equality (fertility rate)—to show that states with higher levels of social, economic, and political gender equality are less likely to rely on military force to settle international disputes.[28] In other words, Caprioli found that higher levels of gender equality make a state less likely to threaten, display, or use force, or go to war once involved in an interstate dispute. Therefore, Caprioli argues, foreign policy aimed at

Rebecca is training at a vocational center in South Sudan on 3 August 2011 to become the first female mason in her community. The center, supported by Oxfam—an international confederation of charitable organizations focused on human rights and the alleviation of global poverty—is helping women branch out into careers that were not previously open to them such as masons, mechanics, and electricians. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

creating peace should focus on improving the status of women as a means to that end.

Elsewhere, Caprioli and Mark Boyer examined the impact of gender equality on a state's behavior during international crises, which is a situation in which there is a high probability of violence. They wanted to explore whether gender equality has an impact on state behavior when violence is highly likely. Their research revealed that states exhibiting high levels of gender equality measured by the percentage of women in parliament also exhibit lower levels of violence in international crises and disputes.[29] Examining aggregate data over a fifty-year period (1954–1994), they found a statistically significant relationship between level of violence in crisis and the percentage of female leaders in positions of authority.

In general, they discovered that states with higher levels of political gender equality are less likely to have minor clashes, serious clashes, or war in the high-stakes environment of international crisis. The research by Caprioli and Boyer also finds that gender equality has an effect on a state's foreign policy behavior in terms of decreasing violence during international crises.

Such data collection and analysis strongly suggest that gender equality matters when states are involved in interstate disputes and when they are involved in international crises. Caprioli extends this literature and finds a similar relationship associated with state escalation of violence. States with the highest levels of gender equality display statistically significant lower levels of aggression in interstate disputes by being less likely to use force first.[30] So states with higher levels of gender equality are less likely to throw the first punch, and even when attacked they are less likely to escalate the use of violence.

Virtually the same pattern was found with respect to intrastate incidents of conflict.[31] Caprioli

also studied the impact of gender equality on domestic conflict. She found that states with higher levels of gender equality are less likely to experience domestic conflict. M. Steven Fish has commented, "[T]he repressiveness and unquestioned dominance … of the male in relations between men and women replicate themselves in broader society, creating a culture of domination, intolerance, and dependency in social and political life."[32] This suggests that while it is surely not the only important factor, the promotion of better treatment for women would help ensure greater social justice and peace, and would help prevent domestic conflict within a nation.

In an attempt to examine domestic human rights abuses as a whole, Caprioli and Peter Trumbore created a measure capturing gender inequality, ethnic inequality, and political repression. They found that states characterized by norms of gender and ethnic inequality as well as human rights abuses are more likely to become involved in militarized interstate disputes, and in violent interstate disputes, to be the aggressors during international disputes, and to rely on force when involved in an international dispute.[33]

David Sobek and his coauthors confirm Caprioli and Trumbore's findings that domestic norms centered on equality and respect for human rights reduce international conflict.[34] Elsewhere, lessons from gaming scenarios also appear to demonstrate that norms of inequality and violence at the domestic level, including between the sexes, may help "replicate" violence at the international level.[35]

In sum, this body of empirical work demonstrates that the promotion of gender equality goes far beyond the sometimes abstract issue of promoting social justice for its own sake and has important practical consequences for international security.

Furthermore, it strongly suggests that, in fact, international security cannot be attained without gender equality. The status of women, it seems, is a main societal taproot of international security.

Indeed, perhaps Samuel Huntington's reflections on the clash of civilizations between nations would be better viewed as a clash between gender civilizations, with treatment of women being an important marker of civilizational divide.[36]

In support of such a conceptual revision, Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, though not researching nation-state behavior per se, examined psychological attitudes toward women across "civilizations" defined more traditionally in terms of religion or ethnicity. They found that contrary to popular impression, beliefs about democracy and other political values are not very different between, say, Islamic and Christian cultures. Beliefs about gender equality, however, differ markedly, which they take to be evidence that conceptualization of culture, or the nation-state, or civilization must be redefined to include a gender component. Furthermore, they find strong associations between psychological attitudes about women and indicators such as the percentage of women elected to the national legistature.[37]

## Country-Specific Data on Women, or the Lack Thereof

As scholars and politicians have begun to recognize the importance of the relationship of the status of women to political and economic stability as well as to peace, indices on gender equality have likewise assumed greater importance. Despite the many differing cultural conceptions of women and women's lives, certain underlying aspects of their lives can be universally assessed to determine the security and status of a woman in her society, and that status may, justifiably, be compared cross-nationally. According to Martha Nussbaum, observable variables such as highly abnormal sex ratios in favor of males, or restrictions that deny girls the legal right or the access to education, can be applied cross-nationally to determine gender status beliefs as they directly relate to the status of women and national security.[38] We apply the same logic to create cross-national scales capturing various aspects of women's security as a prelude to investigating hypotheses derived from the "women-and-peace thesis."

## Formulating Effective Research Methodology to Test Our Hypothesis

To create scales for comparative analysis, one needs reliable data to analyze. Fortunately, several useful compilations of statistical information concerning women using different indices have already been compiled, which we used to conduct statistical comparison and analysis. Among these are the UN's Woman's Indicators and Statistics Database (WISTAT; approximately seventy-six statistics), GenderStats (twenty-one

statistics), and the World Economic Forum's Gender Gap Project (thirty-three statistics).

Beyond single statistical measures, some laudatory attempts have also been made to create multivariable indices of women's status. Two of these indices, developed in 1995, are the United Nations Development Programme's Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) and Gender Development Index (GDI). The new GII (Gender Inequality Index), replaces both GDI and GEM, but still shares some of its predecessor's problems. In addition to GEM and GDI, the CIRI Human Rights Dataset has also developed three indices of women's rights.[39]

The Gender Gap Index (GGI) of the World Economic Forum (WEF) is the most ambitious project to date in efforts to more fully capture the situation of women. The WEF has developed eight scales. The coding for four of the scales is obscure (paternal versus maternal authority, polygamy, female genital mutilation, and the existence of laws punishing violence against women). The coding for the other four scales, however—economic participation and opportunity (five statistics), educational attainment (four statistics), political empowerment (three statistics), and health and survival (two statistics)—contains the usual half dozen statistics, as cited above, plus variants; for example, educational attainment looks at gaps not only in female-to-male literacy but also in enrollment figures at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels. All of the scales evidence a persistent reliance on easily quantified information, to the exclusion of qualitative information that could provide a more nuanced view of the situation of women. The United Nations Economic Commission of Africa's AGDI (African Gender and Development Index) comes much closer to our ideal of multifactorial, qualitative-plus-quantitative measures used as the foundation for a richer scaling of the cross-national status of women, but it was scaled for only twelve sub-Saharan African nations.[40]

Researchers seeking to study the impact of gender inequality on state security and behavior are thus faced with a serious challenge. There are approximately six to ten variables concerning women that are easily quantified and that form the basis for most analysis of the situation of women in the world today. But in order to advance a research agenda that might definitively link the security of women to the security of states, it became clear to us that scholars must develop more robust capabilities to expand beyond the confines of the most easily obtainable information, and incorporate not only statistics but also more detailed qualitative information.

We recognized that the empirical research agenda we wished to advance, then, required creation of the means by which it could effectively be pursued. To address this need, we created the WomanStats Database, which began compiling data on more than 320 variables concerning the security and situation of women for 175 states, and currently contains more than 220,000 data points.[41] Additional data points are added every day.

Realizing that discrepancies often exist among rhetoric, law, and practice, we sought data on three aspects of each phenomenon in which we were interested—law, practice/custom, and statistical information. This approach now allows researchers to access useful and reliable data regardless of their preferred method of inquiry, whether quantitative or qualitative. Quantitatively oriented researchers can find statistics on the prevalence of particular practices as readily as qualitatively oriented researchers can locate narrative information on the experiences and lives of women. We are thus able to provide a richer data source for researchers who are dissatisfied with relatively superficial indicators, and to empower researchers to create their own indices.

For example, when examining the phenomenon of domestic violence, we collect data not only on the incidence of domestic violence and laws concerning domestic violence but also on custom and practice concerning domestic violence. For example, is domestic violence generally reported? Why or why not? What is the level of societal support for victims of domestic violence, such as the existence of shelters and hotlines? How is fault decided in legal cases concerning domestic violence? What is the range of punishment for this offense? Is violence sometimes sanctioned by the culture, such as in cases of "disobedience" by a wife or daughter? Are there regional, religious, or ethnic differences in the incidence of domestic violence within the society? Are there other barriers to the enforcement of the law, such as low arrest and/or conviction rates? In the WomanStats Database, there are seven variables on domestic violence alone; eleven on rape; fifteen on marriage practice, and so on.[42]

## Results

Methodology that compared and contrasted the analyses of several different data bases provided striking evidence to support our hypothesis. A brief summary of our findings is noted below.[43]

**The Physical Security of Women.** The first cluster of hypotheses inquired as to whether there was a statistically significant relationship between our measures of the physical security of women (PSOW) and three dependent variables: GPI (the Global Peace Index), SOCIC (States of Concern Index), and RN (Relations with Neighbors Index). The observable relationships for this first cluster of hypotheses are highly statistically significant. We found that the physical security of women, whether that is measured including or excluding the enactment of son preference through female infanticide and sex-selective abortion, is strongly associated with the peacefulness of the state, the degree to which the state is of concern to the international community, and the quality of relations between the state and its neighbors.

**Inequity in Family Law and Polygyny.** The second cluster of hypotheses inquired into the relationship among family law, the security of women, and the security of the state operationalized as above (GPI, SOCIC, RN). Family law and the practices dealing with matters such as marriage, divorce, custody, inheritance, and other intimate family issues, might well act as markers describing to what extent a society has been able to mitigate the evolutionary male dominance hierarchy.[44]

Whereas inequitable family law favoring males was for the most part universal until the twentieth century, we see now in the twenty-first century a real spectrum of family law systems. Systems range from almost completely equitable, de jure if not de facto, to being virtually intact from a millennium ago.

Additionally, we placed special focus on studying the effects of polygyny (multiple wives) in this analysis. Though preliminary, results from our research appear to provide strong evidence that polygyny has a very adverse impact on the security of the state.

This conclusion is also widely supported by previous research. Anthropologists have noted the inherent instability and violence of societies where polygyny is prevalent. As Robert Wright puts it, "Extreme polygyny often goes hand in hand with extreme political hierarchy, and reaches its zenith under the most despotic regimes."[45] Laura Betzig, in an intriguing




## WomanStats Database

The WomanStats Database is a nation-by-nation database on women that is used for academic research as well as to inform policy formation (the latter includes its use by both the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee and various agencies of the United Nations). The database provides a platform from which many different types of research questions concerning women can be addressed. The project's principal research contributors shape their research agendas according to their disciplinary backgrounds and research interests.

The core researcher contributors and coders primarily explore the relationship between the situation and security of women, and the dynamics among security, stability, and behavior of the state. They address such questions as:

- Are states with greater levels of violence against women less peaceful, of greater concern to the international community, and on worse terms with neighboring states?
- Is the degree to which a state is discrepant in its enforcement of laws protecting women related to the degree to which the state is noncompliant with international norms, treaties, and obligations?
- Is the degree of inequity in family law related to the stability of the state?
- Are states with prevalent polygyny also states with higher levels of violence against women?
- Is the Islamic world monolithic in its treatment of women, or are there notable differences in the treatment of women, as measured by various indices?
- Is there a relationship between the degree to which a society is structured on patrilineality and its health, wealth, governance, demographic, and conflict status?

The WomanStats Project data bank has been used as a primary source for a wide variety of published empirical research work linking the security of women to the security of states. Such published research has appeared in *International Security*, the *American Political Science Review*, the *Journal of Peace Research*, *Political Psychology*, and *Politics and Gender*.

For access to the database, or for more information, the website can be accessed at: http://www.womanstats.org/.

empirical study of 186 societies, found the correlation between polygyny and despotism to be statistically significant.[46] Anthropologists have also found significant correlation between polygyny and the amount of warfare in which societies engage.[47] Boone even suggests that polygynous societies are more likely to engage in expansionist warfare as a means of distracting low-status males who may be left without mates.[48]

**Discrepancy between State Law and Societal Practice Concerning Women.** Our analysis appeared to support the hypothesis that if a state is indifferent about enforcing laws that protect the women in its society, it is also less likely to be compliant with international norms to which it has committed. We can examine this question by examining the association between the discrepancy between state law and societal practice concerning women variable on the one hand, and the SOCIC scale on the other. A comparison of quantitative data in this area shows that the results are statistically very strong and quite significant. This supports the observation that if a state does not care about its women, it also tends not to care about the international commitments it has made.[49]


Evidence suggests that the greater role women have in governance, the more stable and peaceful a society is likely to be. Moreover, peace operations require greater cooperation and synergy between uniformed and nonuniformed personnel, many of whom can be expected to be women, in the aftermath of instability involving violence. (Photo courtesy of the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes [ACCORD])

## Research Conclusions

Our research findings indicate conventional empirical warrant for hypotheses linking the security of women and the security of states. There is a strong and statistically significant relationship between the physical security of women and three measures capturing the relative peacefulness of states. Furthermore, in comparative testing with other conventional explanatory factors assumed to be related to such measures of state security—factors including level of democracy, level of wealth, and prevalence of Islamic civilization—the physical security of women explains more of the variance in the same three measures of state security in both bivariate and multivariate analysis. In addition, we can show that other practices indicating a low level of security for women, whether that be prevalent polygyny, inequitable family law and practice favoring men, or a high level of discrepancy between state law and societal practice concerning women, are also associated with lower levels of state peacefulness in a strong and significant manner.

This is not to say that gender equality is the only important factor to consider or to address. But what would be possible to say is that inattention to gender inequality is not likely to produce sustainable results in

peace or security. In her TEDWomen speech in 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated, "The United States has made empowering women and girls a cornerstone of our foreign policy because women's equality is not just a moral issue, it's not just a humanitarian issue, it is not just a fairness issue. It is a security issue, it is a prosperity issue, and it is a peace issue … . [I]t's in the vital interests of the United States of America." On the basis of our own and others' research findings, we would agree with this assessment.[50] We hasten to add that much more in the way of empirical analysis must be undertaken before these results can be considered authoritative; nevertheless, even in preliminary form, these are challenging and provocative results.

## What Is Security?

The results described above lead us to ask anew, what constitutes security? And how is security to be obtained?

We assert that the evidence strongly suggests that any account of security that does not include consideration of violence against women as a key metric is an impoverished account of security. We find a strong and significant relationship between the physical security of women and the peacefulness of states. We also assert that when evolutionary forces predisposing to violent patriarchy are not checked through the use of cultural selection and social learning to ameliorate sexual inequality, dysfunctional templates of violence and control diffuse throughout society and are manifested in state security and behavior.

Combining our present results with those of previous research efforts, not only do we fail to falsify that theoretical assertion by using conventional aggregate statistical hypothesis-testing methodologies, but we find greater empirical warrant for that assertion than for several well-established alternative hypotheses.[51]

Based on our findings, we can now envision new research questions for security studies, which are possible to raise only if the linkage between the security of women and the security of states is taken seriously. For example, terrorism is a topic that may profit from a gender analysis: Does polygamy lead to marriage market dislocations, which also heighten the allure of the terrorism among young adult males with no hope of eventually marrying?[52] Does the subjected status of women feed into the development of terrorist groups offering a promise of greater equality to women, such as we see in Sri Lanka and Nepal?

Similarly, security demographics is a nascent subfield that, we argue, must incorporate gender lenses: for example, is enactment of son preference through female infanticide and sex-selective abortion a predisposing factor for state instability and bellicosity?[53]

And what would Huntington's map look like if we re-drew it along the lines of differences in the security of women instead of relatively abstracts notions of supposed blocs having common cultural affinity? Would we see a new type or definition of "civilization" by looking at that map, and would it give us greater leverage on questions of identity, conflict and security than Huntington's original map? For example, are alliance patterns better understood as associated with membership in the same "gender civilization"? Is the recently noted ability of populations to increase their happiness set point over time linked to the improving security of women in those nations?[54] And, what ramifications will that have for state behavior? In the subfield of foreign policy analysis, are there identifiable differences in processes and outcomes of foreign policy decision making in nations with higher levels of gender equality? Does the average psychological profile and foreign policy orientation of national leaders differ between countries with higher versus lower levels of security for women?

## What Are States For?

If security is the aim of the state, our results suggest that to both understand and promote national and international security, the situation and treatment of women cannot be overlooked. States that have improved the status of women are, as a rule, demonstrably healthier, wealthier, less corrupt, more democratic, more secure, and more powerful on the world stage in the early twenty-first century. It is almost as if fortune smiles most broadly on those states where women are most secure. We do not believe this is a coincidence.

We therefore assert that questions regarding the influence of gender equality on state security will not subside in importance, but rather will grow in importance over time as the global population expands and competition for resources increases. We see in the current international system the rise to great power status of states in which the security of women is severely compromised. We cannot

help but think of the rise of India and China, where almost a hundred million women are missing from the population as a result of sex-selective abortion, high suicide rates among young women, and other symptoms of a profound lack of security for women. We take this to mean that the true clash of civilizations in the future may not, in fact, be along the lines envisioned by Huntington but along the fault lines between civilizations that treat women as equal members of the human species and civilizations that cannot or will not do so. Furthermore, we expect to see much more prevalent conflict between and within nations of that second group.

## From Theory to Action

Though the mores regarding the treatment of women are written deeply in the culture of each society, they are amenable to change. Women have recently received the rights to vote and stand for office in countries where they have not had those rights before; UN Security Council Resolutions 1325, 1820, and others have changed peacekeeping and conflict resolution practices on the ground; stricter enforcement of laws against sex-selective abortion is making a dent in abnormal birth sex ratios in some countries. There is no reason to shrug helplessly if we identify the insecurity of women as an important factor in state insecurity and conflict. To the contrary, the recognition that the security of women affects the security of states offers policymakers an inestimably valuable policy agenda in the quest for greater peace and stability in the international system overall.

In the view of Potts and Hayden, "[O]ne way to reduce the risk of violence is to empower women and maximize their role in society. This is perhaps the most profound insight to come from taking an evolutionary perspective on war: empowering women reduces the risk of violent conflict. Far from being what some regard as merely a politically correct notion of feminist philosophy, women's role in reducing the risk of war is borne out by rigorous study and historical experience … [C]ontemporary Western nations have a great opportunity to make the world more secure and reduce terrorism by doing everything they can to empower women who live in countries where they currently enjoy few choices and wield little or no political power … Overseas, the US preaches democracy and free markets, but is slow to challenge the traditional restraints so cruelly heaped on women in many developing countries—restraints that keep women from participating as equals in political and economic life."[55]

## The "So What" for the Military

Turning to practical relevance of the above findings to the U.S. military, we conclude by offering the observation that in a world where the senior military leadership is currently exhorting armed forces personnel to prepare for "complex operations," an appreciation for the ofttimes overlooked or unrecognized dynamic of sexual inequality in operational areas should be an indispensable point of consideration in the future.

First, in almost any future contingency that we can envision in which the United States will be involved, the U.S. military will likely be the prime conduit of national humanitarian values used to instill stability in the rebuild phase of operations. We assert that vigorous steps to promote women's equality among populations as a part of such stability operations should henceforth be permanently recognized as a key component for establishing viable stability in both war torn nations as well as those that are often categorized as developing nations. Consequently, we strongly recommend the need to incorporate into military doctrine and training a formal requirement to promote women's empowerment in appropriate ways among populations as a prime objective when engaged in such operations as well as during peacetime training engagements with foreign militaries of countries that suffer from the effects of extreme inequality between men and women.

Second, our military's understanding of the environment in which they operate is incomplete without gender lenses. Seeing how brideprice and polygyny create conditions under which rebel groups can much more easily recruit is to see more of what is happening—and that has strategic and operational implications. Seeing that mothers often are the first to know when their sons are being radicalized, know where not to let their children play because of danger from hidden ordnance, and also preserve key evidence of the massacre of their loved ones, is to understand that what is happening with women is integrally related to military objectives. Seeing that one's own female soldiers are often perceived as a "third gender" in patrilineal clan cultures, and can defuse honor-based conflict that would otherwise occur in male-male encounters,

has tactical significance. Seeing that one cannot stabilize a community until women feel safe enough to weave that community's life through their daily chores assuring food, water, and fuel for families is to develop deeper insight into stability operations. Being gender-aware means being smarter in a military sense.

However, as implied in the first point above, it is vital that women's empowerment should not just be seen as a means to more successful military operations—which it is—but must also be seen as an end, as one of the very benchmarks of military success. The women of Iraq would assert that in setting back the cause of women through its military intervention, the U.S. set back its own military objectives in that land, paving the way for even more egregious threat and instability. It is time for greater embrace of realism in military thinking—a realism that acknowledges the very real linkage between the security of women and the security of their nations.

Much blood and treasure have been spent on the export of democracy or free-market capitalism in the pursuit of less conflictual international relations, with less success than hoped for. Research strongly suggests the export of norms of greater gender equality will prove a more promising and effective strategy.[56] Such norms of gender equality would include not only demands for high levels of physical security for women, but also strong promotion of equity under the law (especially family law), as well as parity in the councils of national decision making. ■

*Large portions of this article and the figure are reproduced from chapter 4 of the book* Sex and World Peace *by permission of* International Security *from Valerie M. Hudson, Mary Caprioli, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Rose McDermott, and Chad F. Emmett, "The Heart of the Matter: The Security of Women and the Security of States,"* International Security *33, no. 3 (2008/2009): 7–45. The authors would like to note they have updated their findings and continued with their research, currently under the U.S. Army Research Laboratory and the U.S. Army Research Office through the Department of Defense Minerva Research Initiative under grant number W911NF-14-1-0532.*

## Military Review

# WE RECOMMEND




## Sex & World Peace

**Columbia University Press, 2012**

Valerie M. Hudson, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Mary Caprioli, and Chad F. Emmett

This multidisciplinary book examines the issue of unequal gender treatment as a factor having decisive influence on world security and, by extension, the operational environment. It incorporates perspectives from scholars in political science, cultural geography, and psychology. Of particular note, it provides a detailed micro-analysis of the play of gender issues in Islamic nations.

The underlying thesis of the book is that the treatment of women is an often unperceived, but key, component of international affairs and a "red flag" that can be correlated to the relative stability of societies as it relates to conditions conducive to violence. The authors argue that degrees of gender inequality in society can be correlated to the degree of proclivity for violence, human exploitation, and societal instability overall. They argue further that such norms of violence have an impact proportionally on everything from population growth to economics and regime type.

The authors break from Harvard scholar Samuel Huntington (who asserted that future conflicts could be predicted based on cultural and religious divides) and assert from research offered that the battle lines of future conflict are better forecast by comparative analysis of gender inequality that cuts across cultural and religious divides (e.g., the more states are fraught with gender inequality, the more likely such will default to violence as a means of solving both domestic issues and international crises). The authors go on to assert that security studies now and in the future, to be reliable, must account for issues related to gender equality to fully address and make more complete and understandable the dynamics of state and systems of international security at all levels.

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Injured Syrian women arrive at a field hospital 15 August 2012 after an air strike hit their homes in the town of Azaz on the outskirts of Aleppo, Syria. (Photo by Khalil Hamra, Associated Press)

# Coping with Noncombatant Women in the Battlespace


## Incorporating United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 into the Operational Environment

Master Sgt. Vince Lowery, U.S. Army

***Editor's note:*** *This article is the second place winner of the 2016* NCO Journal *writing contest. It is an abridged version of the original, which was previously published online in the* NCO Journal.

When soldiers prepare to deploy to a conflict zone, it is logical for them to learn as much as possible about the area in which they will be operating. The enemy already has the home-field advantage; it is only appropriate to mitigate that advantage by learning as much as one can about the land and the people who live there. Additionally, it is important to learn more about the growing power of nonstate groups, the mounting importance of multinational organizations, and the shifting cast of allies and partner nations that may become involved in operations for their own purposes, and how each adds complexity to, and affects, operational environments.

To our Army's disadvantage, it must remain adaptable to fight across the geographical spectrum, which means it is compelled to train generically when there is no known specific threat or target. Therefore, there will be a shortage of time to train on specific geographical areas and focus on familiarizing the force with specific cultures as unexpected contingencies arise. However, even in the face of so many unknowns, experience has shown that there are constants that can be expected to emerge as factors during most foreseeable operations. These can be anticipated and our forces should prepare to deal with them. Among these are constants that were not fully recognized until comparatively recently.

Among such previously underappreciated constants is the influence noncombatant women living in the operational area have on the success or failure of operations. Experience has shown that knowing what a host-nation's population (young or old, majority or minority, male or female) really wants for their own state or country is key to gaining an understanding of a society. When factors of ethnicity, race, or gender are considered and included during the planning process, the outcome of the mission can be greatly affected.[1]

**Master Sgt. Vince Lowery, U.S. Army,** serves as the I Corps G-9 (civil affairs) operations NCO with an additional duty to serve as the corps gender advisor. Lowery has served in a variety of Ranger, airborne, and civil affairs assignments.

With the above in context, over the last seventeen years of continuous U.S. involvement in both conflict as well as preconflict stabilization missions, a growing body of knowledge gleaned from both practical experience as well as organized research is revealing that the final success of stability operations is largely dependent on the ultimate status of women in the battlespace. It appears that the better women are cared for during stability operations, and the more they are included in the governing institutions of a society in the aftermath of conflict, the more likely the success of stabilization.[2] In contrast, the less the welfare and concerns of women are incorporated into planned stability actions, the less probability of success.

Knowledge regarding the dynamics such factors ultimately play in operational planning can assist in the efforts by U.S. forces to prevent societies from becoming failed states and can enhance the ability of those societies to transition into prosperous nations that can be governed and can protect themselves against new threats.

Therefore, a major consideration during operational planning is mitigating the lack of attention paid to vulnerable populations such as women and children, who typically make up over half of a society's population. Historically, militaries have neglected to include factors related to vulnerable populations during the planning, execution, and assessment of operations. Research by the United Nations (UN) has shown that most militaries tend to think these issues are not to be discussed until after the fighting has ceased.[3] However, critical analysis of past stabilizations appears to highlight that this line of thought is not logical for future conflict prevention or operational mission success.

Therefore, in stark contrast to previous planning methodology, the considerable effect vulnerable populations, of which women make up a large part, can have on the fight should be planned for and monitored during the entire campaign. A way of looking at these types of operational concerns, which has been gaining salience due to their contributions to successful mission execution, is the incorporation into planning of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS).

## A Brief History of UNSCR 1325

In 2000, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325, formally recognizing how conflict affects women and children differently than men.[4]

The United Nations (UN) Security Council votes unanimously to adopt Resolution 1325 on 31 October 2000 at the UN headquarters in New York City, urging an enhanced role for women in preventing conflict, promoting peace, and assisting in postconflict reconstruction within UN operations. Resolution 1325 calls on all actors involved to adopt a gender perspective when negotiating and implementing peace agreements and further calls on all parties to armed conflict to fully respect international law applicable to the human rights of women and girls as civilians and as refugees. (Photo by Milton Grant, UN)

It is a legal framework that addresses not only the inordinate impact of war on women but also the pivotal role women should and do play in conflict management, conflict resolution, and sustainable peace. Some of the key actions it calls for include

- increased representation of women in decision-making processes related to conflict resolution, peace, and security;
- better protection of women under international human-rights law during armed conflict;
- special attention to women's welfare and roles in pursuit of postwar justice and disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration of refugees; and
- encouragement of member states to significantly increase their support of initiatives that integrate women during peace, protect women during conflict, and provide gender-sensitive training.

In 2011, President Barack Obama signed Executive Order 13595, "Instituting a National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security."[5] The national action plan represents "ongoing government-wide efforts to leverage U.S. diplomatic, defense, and development resources to improve the participation of women in peace and conflict prevention processes, protect women and girls from gender-based violence, and help ensure that women have full and equal access to relief and recovery resources."[6]

In August 2013, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for rule of law and detainee policy, in coordination with the Joint Staff's deputy director for partnership strategy in the Directorate of Strategic Plans and Policy, created an implementation guide directing all organizational entities within the Department of Defense

A Palestinian woman argues with an Israeli border policeman 4 September 2015 during a protest against Jewish settlements in the West Bank village of Nabi Saleh near the Palestinian city of Ramallah. (Photo by Mohamad Torokman, Reuters)

to incorporate the concepts into their programs and policies.[7] Though this guide is currently under revision to align with an updated national action plan, it nevertheless is useful in providing the spirit and intent of the guidance that will be forthcoming.

At present, soldiers, particularly those serving at brigade level or below, may think the concept of considering a gender perspective and integrating it into the planning, execution, and assessment of all operations is outside of what they need to know in order to fight the war on the ground; or that it is above their level of concern and meant only for planners at the strategic or political level. However, the increasingly strategic nature of the operational battlespace, which has resulted from globalization of social media, now makes it imperative for all soldiers, and especially NCOs and junior officers who have the most intimate and first-hand contact with people in the operational area, to become far more familiar with and sensitive to how the social dynamics stemming from the treatment of women affect ultimate success of missions. Therefore, since NCOs and junior officers lead patrols that feed information through their reporting to the overall intelligence picture, the culture of operational planning must change together with the elements of key information, which must be adapted to include observations relative to the evolving status of women in the operational area.

Additionally, field grade officers and senior NCOs analyzing the data collected need to become equally familiar with and far more sophisticated in understanding how female concerns and treatment affect stability operations to ensure that the troops going on patrols are gathering the right information from all relevant sources. Without a necessary change in such collection and understanding, too often troops will continue using the same methodologies for developing sources of information as the previous unit, which may not be depicting an accurate intelligence picture of what

is actually happening. While methods for developing trained sources may be a proven technique to serve a specific end, this technique may not tap the intelligence-rich observations and opinions of the average person on the street, including observations from vulnerable populations, with whom soldiers have contact as part of the broader intelligence effort. As a result, the intelligence picture developed only from trained sources has a real chance of being skewed, highly biased, and just dramatically incomplete.

This could be analogized as an investigator trying to gather information from witnesses of a crime. No two witnesses will have the same statement on what occurred because all of their perspectives are different. Their life experiences and their socially constructed upbringing will influence how they interpret what they saw. No matter how many times an investigator goes back to a particular witness for information, it will most likely alter little from the initial statement. It would be foolish to think that civilians encountered in conflict areas would be different than any other witnesses.

Additionally, with a somewhat changed focus on certain aspects of intelligence collections as they relate to direct contact with and collection on vulnerable populations, it needs to be highlighted that NCOs will play an ever-increasing role in the staff process at all organizational levels because decisions and actions at higher echelons cannot be executed successfully unless they are supported by the NCOs collecting information and executing actions at the tactical and operational levels.

## Introducing WPS to the Force

In an effort to introduce planning emphasis related to vulnerable populations into the I Corps planning culture, new intelligence and analytical techniques were included in Exercise Talisman Saber 2015 (TS 15), a biennial combined training activity designed to train Australian and U.S. military forces in planning and conducting combined task force operations. TS 15 was the first combined, joint-level exercise in which U.S. Pacific Command, more specifically I Corps, was required to integrate gender perspectives supporting UNSCR 1325. Australia's designation of WPS integration as the exercise's third training objective was the drive behind the inclusion.

In April 2015 (three months prior to the exercise), I Corps identified a three-person team to support the accomplishment of the WPS training objective. The assistant chief of staff (G-9) identified a male civil affairs senior NCO to serve as I Corps's internal representative and provide continuity for the program. The NCO assisted a female civilian contractor (a gender expert) who acted as the primary gender advisor to the I Corps commander.[8] The third member of the team was a female Army Reserve civil affairs field grade officer with several years of experience in the field of gender studies.

The I Corps commander, during his initial remarks for academics week, mentioned the importance of WPS for mission success and spoke of the need to incorporate UNSCR 1325 guidance on WPS during the exercise. Though the majority of the soldiers that would support the exercise heard those comments, the guidance had little impact as most of them were ignorant as to what it was or how to apply the concepts. This became evident the following week during the ramp-up exercise (RAMPEX). The team's primary observation was that the majority of I Corps's soldiers (with exception of the primary exercise planning staff) were completely unaware of UNSCR 1325, gender mainstreaming, or their roles in the exercise. This was despite having a block of instruction a week prior on the topic by the civilian contractor.[9]

## Key Lessons Learned

To ensure any training is successful, standards must be upheld. One of those is enforcing accountability, especially when training on a new concept in military planning and operations. One of the primary responsibilities of an NCO or an officer is to uphold and enforce accountability. It should have been the primary staff officers (colonels) and their sergeants major at the corps level that ensured their soldiers grasped the basic concepts of gender considerations and the incorporation of UNSCR 1325.

Additionally, new concepts like incorporating a gender perspective must have the support of the entire command team. Without leader emphasis from the commanding general down to the team leader, there is little chance units will take incorporating the concept of gender perspective as an effective planning consideration.

Further observations made during the RAMPEX showed there was a considerable amount of confusion about, and resistance to, incorporating WPS from staff members. The heaviest resistance to inclusion came from those with less understanding of the subject, which correlated with those who were comfortable with the way

they were already conducting their planning and operations. Those few who did grasp the concept of incorporation of a gender perspective were inclined to include it in their operations and were willing to ask for additional information on how they could better incorporate it.

A successful effort during the RAMPEX was the creation of a standard operating procedure for when soldiers would be exposed to human rights violations, specifically, human trafficking and sexually based gender violence. This product, termed "Soldier's Card," was later utilized by one of the major subordinate commands during the exercise. The unit was confronted with a situation in which young children were being smuggled out of the country for slavery under the guise that their uncle was transporting them to their family in a dislocated citizen camp. Because the soldiers took the time to read the standard operating procedure, which gave them a tool for identifying what that situation could look like, the unit was able to recognize what was really going on, detain the human trafficker, and reunite the children with their parents.

**WPS in the exercise.** During the two to three days leading up to the start of the exercise, the WPS team prioritized incorporating gender into current operations as well as mentoring subordinate gender focal points at the division level.[10] Once the exercise started, the time-intensive demands of the battle rhythm left no dedicated time to continue training the force. From an after-action review perspective, the team should have dedicated time to educate personnel during the exercise through informal opportunities, possibly training individuals or sections during short breaks or creating short learning points and cycling them through with other posted morale, welfare, and recreational advertisements and announcements on television screens that were in the break rooms. In addition, training on UNSCR 1325 and gender mainstreaming should have been set up or directed for those who did not attend the classroom training, such as the liaison officers and soldiers from the major subordinate commands, many of whom were not even aware that there was a WPS training objective.

The team's general assessment during the middle of the exercise was that the majority of the I Corps staff were still uneducated on the concept of WPS. This was exacerbated by neglecting to ensure soldiers participating in the exercise conducted a twenty- to sixty-minute familiarization course on Joint Knowledge Online—as the operation order instructed in its coordinating instructions. Ensuring course participation would have given the entire force a basic understanding of what WPS was and why the unit was incorporating UNSCR 1325 into their mission.

**Different divisions, different mindsets.** Under I Corps, the designated combined forces land component command (CFLCC), there were two assigned infantry divisions that displayed markedly different levels of proficiency in the incorporation of UNSCR 1325. The first did very little in regards to WPS inclusion. It was evident through e-mail conversations that they were not going to place any priority on implementation of WPS. The task for inclusion was assigned to a female Australian officer who was given little guidance and no means to effectively communicate with the I Corps team. Not only did they fail to incorporate WPS but they also failed at training personnel in their force to establish continuity for future operations and exercises like TS 17, where the division will act as the CFLCC.

The other division followed through on what was expected by the Department of Defense as per the implementation guide. This division appointed a gender field advisor who read the CFLCC gender annex, utilized it as a guide, and established necessary reports, systems, and guidance for subordinate units, which led to incorporating gender mainstreaming effectively in the division.

The first division is a U.S. Army (active-duty) infantry division. It is my observation that they have been institutionalized with decades of carrying out military planning methodology, ensnared in a monotonous routine of executing the same operations year after year. They continually train for the same exercises, which utilize the same planning materials that their predecessors used. All their objectives are based off the same training guidance that faintly changed from the previous year. Their training cannot be based off a specific mission; it must be spread over the wide gamut of missions as they must be able to respond to threats anywhere in the world. They stick to their routine because it works, and they choose not to change because the fear of new concepts pulls them out of their comfort zone. This is no different from many other infantry units in today's Army.

The other division, an Army National Guard infantry division, did not plan using the same mindset as the active-duty division. My observations are that the National Guard is a conglomerate of professionally trained soldiers who are also civilians. Their training is also directed

A Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fighter helps civilian refugees, including large numbers of women and children, who were evacuated by the SDF from an Islamic State-controlled neighborhood of Manbij 12 August 2016 in Aleppo Governorate, Syria. The SDF said the Islamic State was using civilians as human shields. (Photo by Rodi Said, Reuters)

through training guidance and a mission-essential task list like that of their active-duty counterparts, but their time for training is extremely limited, giving them a different set of priorities. From my observations, the focus of their training was toward their certification to be a deployable unit and succeeding in the training objectives established for TS 15 that would certify them to deploy. Of course, one of those training objectives was the incorporation of WPS.

Even though environments differ for all soldiers, in general, I believe the active-duty military mindset is different from that of someone who spends the majority of his or her professional career working in the civilian sector. It is my observation that soldiers with civilian business-world interaction can be more adaptable and accepting of change. Civilian businesses have to adapt to ever-changing climates and demographics to continue to remain successful, and many civilian employees have learned to think "big picture" with broader perspectives so they can remain competitive in a tight economy, whereas active-duty leaders keep their lower-enlisted soldiers focused narrowly on a few tasks to accomplish the mission. The guard unit personnel were able to understand how incorporating the concept of a gender perspective would enable them to have greater success because it incorporated a broader perspective in the analysis of the conflict. Doing so gave them greater operational understanding of their environment. They did not push back or reject the concept as their sister division did, but rather they accepted it and used it to their advantage for mission success.

Leadership endorsement for WPS incorporation was also emphasized repeatedly by the Guard command team, with their division's chief of staff emphasizing to the soldiers to think about how WPS ties into operations and how the second- and third-order effects would affect the success of the mission. He also tied

together intelligence, manpower, planning, logistics, personnel management, and all other aspects of the fight, showing that all elements have their part to play in mission success. He used an all-inclusive approach and challenged his soldiers to do the same.

A common philosophical aphorism of unknown origin states, "wisdom, if obtained, only comes after much experience and much reflection." Something military leaders must never forget is that their ability to show their subordinates the bigger picture by providing them with purpose, direction, and motivation is imperative to the success of the mission. In my twenty-three years of military experience, I have found that soldiers' attitudes have always been a direct reflection of the type of leadership they receive. If their leadership gives the impression that something is not important, soldiers will follow that lead. As with the differences in the two divisions, you could certainly tell which command supported it and which one did not.

**Post-exercise survey.** On the final day of the exercise, one-hundred and twenty anonymous surveys were distributed through all CFLCC staff sections; one-hundred and two were returned. The results confirmed many of the points made through this article. The main point it confirmed was that most leaders placed little to no emphasis on UNSCR 1325 or incorporating the concept of a gender perspective into the exercise despite it being a training objective and emphasized by the commanding general.

The following comments are some responses to the question, "What is the main thought that comes to mind when you hear WPS?" They reflect how leadership values became represented in the thoughts and attitudes of subordinates. In order of frequency, responders said,

- WPS is a woman's issue;
- WPS is about protecting women's rights;
- WPS does not apply to me or my job; and
- WPS is another staff function that is a duplication of effort.

All of these are false assumptions and could have been easily dispelled had the persons making them attended the academics training or taken the online training course.

Another pertinent response set was the answers to "What did you wish you had learned about WPS that could have been useful (during the exercise)?" Soldiers expressed that they wanted

- to have received information and training along with expectations from leadership;
- to know impacts to targeting;
- to see how WPS applies at the operational and tactical levels; and
- to understand how operational implementation shapes strategic efforts.

These comments indicate that soldiers have a desire to learn about this new concept. Soldiers need their NCOs to learn new concepts, like WPS, that will benefit their long-term efforts in operations. They also need to hear from their officers the importance of these concepts and how these concepts are tied into the larger picture of mission success. Most of all, these soldiers want their leaders to take the time to teach them.

## The "So What"

The growing power of nonstate groups, the mounting importance of multinational organizations, and the shifting cast of allies and partner nations are adding complexity to operational environments. For years, the military has ignored the effects that vulnerable populations such as women and children have as active agents in combat and how they contribute to mitigating conflict. Military history and experience have repeatedly shown that unfamiliarity with the local culture and society can result in a failure to anticipate challenges and an inability to accomplish national objectives. Yet, military leaders continue to focus the majority of their efforts on "kinetic" warfighting capabilities and continue to presume conflicts are exclusively male oriented, perpetuating the notion that peace is solely delivered through the efforts of those same males who are doing the fighting.

With the recent constraints on resources, it is more important than ever to have soldiers with specific training and awareness of UNSCR 1325 who are able to embed the concept of a gender perspective into every staff section to provide different perspectives that can positively affect the outcome of a conflict. If certain considerations are not taken into account, a population's trust can be lost, turning those who we are there to help against us. Losing the trust of the population can mean a greater resistance postconflict and a drawn-out transition phase to peace and stability operations. Our forces cannot

handle another drawn-out campaign that will continue to stretch our resources and our manpower thin.

Studies continue to show that WPS implementation and incorporating the concept of gender perspective save time, money, and lives.[11] Integrating WPS also adds a level of realism to training exercises and enhances the exercise of mission command during training by enabling leaders to deal with a wider range of circumstances that have real-world implications.

NCOs and officers owe it to their soldiers to enable them with the ability to understand the big picture. They must take the time to grow their soldiers into the leaders of the future and not merely use them as implements to fight with today. ■

## Notes

1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1, "Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspective into the NATO Command Structure," 8 August 2012, accessed 28 February 2017, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_04/20150414_20120808_NU_Bi-SCD_40-11.pdf. According to NATO, gender refers to the social attributes associated with being male and female learned through socialization and determines a person's position and value in a given context. This refers to the relationships between women and men, and girls and boys, as well as the relations between women and between men. These attributes, opportunities, and relationships are socially constructed and are learned through socialization processes. Gender does not equate to woman. Sex is the classification of people as male or female. At birth, infants are assigned a sex based on a combination of bodily characteristics, including chromosomes, hormones, internal reproductive organs, and genitalia.

2. Valerie M. Hudson et al., "The Heart of the Matter: The Security of Women and the Security of States," chap. 4 in *Sex and World Peace* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

3. Radhika Coomaraswamy, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations [UN] Security Council Resolution 1325* (UN Women, 2015), accessed 28 February 2017, http://wps.unwomen.org/~/media/files/un%20women/wps/highlights/unw-global-study-1325-2015.pdf.

4. UN Security Council, Resolution 1325 (2000) [on Women, Peace, and Security], 31 October 2000, accessed 2 March 2017, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/720/18/PDF/N0072018.pdf.

5. Instituting a National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security, 76 C.F.R. 80,205 (19 December 2011), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-12-23/pdf/2011-33089.pdf. President Barack Obama called for the creation of a national action plan (NAP) on women, peace, and security (WPS). NAP describes the U.S. government's course of action to accomplish the following five principles:

First, the engagement and protection of women as agents of peace and stability are central to United States efforts to promote security, prevent, respond to, and resolve conflict, and rebuild societies.

Second, by building on the goals for gender integration described in the *U.S. National Security Strategy* and the *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, the U.S. efforts on WPS complement and enhance existing initiatives to advance gender equality and women's empowerment, ensure respect for human rights, and address the needs of vulnerable populations in crisis and conflict environments.

Third, in executing this policy, the United States is guided by the principle of inclusion, seeking out the views and participation of a wide variety of stakeholders—women and girls; men and boys; and members of marginalized groups, including youth, ethnic, racial, or religious minorities; persons with disabilities; displaced persons and indigenous peoples; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals; and people from all socioeconomic strata.

Fourth, in order to maximize the impact of the NAP, the United States seeks to ensure that activities in support of WPS are coordinated among all relevant departments and agencies of the government, integrated into relevant U.S. foreign policy initiatives, and enhanced by engagement with international partners.

Finally, U.S. government agencies are accountable for the implementation of the policies and initiatives endorsed in the NAP.

6. United States Agency of International Development, "United States Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender-Based Violence Globally: 2016 Update," June 2016, accessed 2 March 2017, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/258703.pdf.

7. Anne Witkowsky, "Integrating Gender Perspectives within the Department of Defense," *PRISM* 6, no. 1 (2016): 34.

8. The role of gender advisor (GENAD) is the official program of record for all activities to include plans, training, and exercises concerning WPS, gender equality, and gender mainstreaming. It is the responsibility of the GENAD to provide a conduit for WPS implementation in policies, plans, and activities.

9. Gender and UN Peacekeeping Operations (New York: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, October 2005), 1–4, accessed 14 April 2017, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/gender_brochure.pdf; see also Committee on Women in the NATO Forces (CWINF), CWINF Guidance for NATO Gender Mainstreaming (Brussels: NATO, June 2007), accessed 14 April 2017, http://www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/cwinf_guidance.pdf. Gender mainstreaming is defined as a strategy to achieve gender equality by assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies, and programs in all areas and at all levels, in order to assure that the concerns and experiences of women and men are taken into account in the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of policies and programs in all political, economic, and societal spheres. This will lead to women and men benefiting equally. Gender mainstreaming in this context represents the process to recognize and incorporate the role gender plays in relation to NATO's various operational missions. Gender mainstreaming does not focus solely on women, but the benefits of mainstreaming practices recognize women's disadvantaged position in various communities.

10. Gender focal point (GFP) is a dual-hatted position that supports the commander in implementing directives and procedures with gender perspective. The GFP maintains functional dialogue with the GENAD but reports within the chain of command. The GFP at the tactical level ensures that gender perspective is fully integrated into the daily tasks of the operation. These activities could include, but are not limited to, patrolling, enabling the provision of humanitarian aid, search procedures, assisting national security forces, assessing the different security risks of men and women in monitoring and evaluation activities, and providing gender training for NATO personnel.

11. UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary–General on Women and Peace and Security" (New York: UN, 16 September 2015), accessed 28 February 2017, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Report%20of%20the%20Secretary%20General%20on%20women%20and%20peace%20and%20security.pdf; Natalia Zakharova, *Women and Peace and Security: Guidelines for National Implementation* (New York: UN Women, 2012), accessed 28 February 2017, http://www.unwomen.org/~/media/Headquarters/Media/Publications/en/02BPlanonWomenandPeaceandSecurity.pdf; Hudson et al., "The Heart of the Matter."

An army engineer from the Russian International Mine Action Center disarms a booby trap 3 February 2017 in a residence in Aleppo, Syria. (Photo courtesy of Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation)

# Stability Operations in Syria

## The Need for a Revolution in Civil-Military Affairs

Anthony H. Cordesman

In an ideal world, the U.S. military would only have a military role. But, in practice, no one gets to fight the wars they want, and this is especially true today. The United States is deeply involved in wars that can only be won at the civil-military level, and where coming to grips with the deep internal divisions and tensions of the host country, and the pressures from outside states, are critical. Unless the United States adapts to this reality, it can easily lose the war at the civil level even when it wins at the military level. This is especially true in the case of the "failed states" where the United States is now fighting. The United States

either has to hope for a near-miraculous improvement in the governance and capability of host-country partners, or focus on successful civil-military operations as being as important for success as combat.

So far, the United States has failed to recognize the sheer scale of the civil problems it faces in conducting military operations. It has failed to understand that it needs to carry out a revolution in civil-military affairs if it is to be successful in fighting failed-state wars that involve major counterinsurgency campaigns and reliance on host-country forces. The U.S. military role in Syria is a key case in point, and it illustrates all too clearly that any military effort to avoid dealing with the full consequences of the civil side of war can be a recipe for failure.

## A Lack of Meaningful Directives and Doctrine

Part of the problem is that this is an area for which there is neither meaningful guidance nor doctrine. Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction 3000.05, *Stability Operations*, is so vague as to be meaningless.[1] It defines stability operations as "an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief."[2]

The policy sections of Instruction 3000.05 call for virtually every activity imaginable without setting meaningful priorities or goals:

> a. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations. The Department of Defense shall be prepared to:
>
> (1) Conduct stability operations activities throughout all phases of conflict and across the range of military operations, including in combat and non-combat environments. The magnitude of stability operations missions may range from small-scale, short-duration to large-scale, long-duration.
>
> (2) Support stability operations activities led by other U.S. Government departments or agencies (hereafter referred to collectively as "U.S. Government agencies"), foreign governments and security forces, international governmental organizations, or when otherwise directed.
>
> (3) Lead stability operations activities to establish civil security and civil control, restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance until such time as it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, or international governmental organizations. In such circumstances, the Department will operate within U.S. Government and, as appropriate, international structures for managing civil-military operations, and will seek to enable the deployment and utilization of the appropriate civilian capabilities.
>
> b. The Department shall have the capability and capacity to conduct stability operations activities to fulfill DOD Component responsibilities under national and international law. Capabilities shall be compatible, through interoperable and complementary solutions, to those of other U.S. Government agencies and foreign governments and security forces to ensure that, when directed, the Department can:
>
> (1) Establish civil security and civil control.
>
> (2) Restore or provide essential services.
>
> (3) Repair critical infrastructure.
>
> (4) Provide humanitarian assistance.
>
> c. Integrated civilian and military efforts are essential to the conduct of successful stability operations. The Department shall:
>
> (1) Support the stability operations planning efforts of other U.S. Government agencies.
>
> (2) Collaborate with other U.S. Government agencies and with foreign governments and security forces, international governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector firms as appropriate to plan, prepare for, and conduct stability operations.
>
> (3) Continue to support the development, implementation, and operations of

civil-military teams and related efforts aimed at unity of effort in rebuilding basic infrastructure; developing local governance structures; fostering security, economic stability, and development; and building indigenous capacity for such tasks.

d. The Department shall assist other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, and international governmental organizations in planning and executing reconstruction and stabilization efforts, to include:

(1) Disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating former belligerents into civil society.

(2) Rehabilitating former belligerents and units into legitimate security forces.

(3) Strengthening governance and the rule of law.

(4) Fostering economic stability and development.

e. The DoD Components shall explicitly address and integrate stability operations-related concepts and capabilities across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and applicable exercises, strategies, and plans.[3]

The revised U.S. Army field manual on stability operations—Field Manual 3-07, *Stability*—provides much better general guidance, but it tacitly assumes that the host-country government is competent and willing to carry out all necessary reforms.[4] It ignores the lessons of the Vietnam conflict, the campaigns in Afghanistan from 2001 to date, and the campaigns in Iraq from 2003 to the present. It ignores virtually all of the realities of dealing with real-world host-country governments, and what past and current conflicts have revealed about the problems in simply calling for a whole-of-government approach. As for the overlapping guidance in DOD Directive 2000.13, *Civil Affairs*, it is even more vague, general, and decoupled from the wars the United States is now fighting.[5]

While the United States did attempt something approaching nation building in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014 and in Iraq between 2004 and 2011, few argue that these efforts produced effective civil-military coordination, and both largely failed. If anything, these failures have led the United States to try to both minimize the role of U.S. ground forces in failed-state wars and restrict stability operations to a minimum. The very term "nation building" is now one the United States seeks to avoid. In practice, stability operations are still being generally treated as only a passing phase in warfare. The key goal for military forces is to defeat the enemy, and dealing with civilians now occurs largely at the tactical level and consists largely of humanitarian relief.

> … the grand strategic goal of warfighting is never just to produce a favorable military outcome or to defeat the enemy. It is to win as lasting a victory as possible in political, economic, and security terms.

This is a fundamentally unrealistic approach to modern U.S. military operations. It ignores the real-world nature of the wars in Vietnam, the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Syria—the case study that is the focus of this analysis. It also ignores just how often the U.S. military is forced to engage in stability and civil-military operations. As a Defense Science Board study, *Transition to and from Hostilities*, pointed out in 2004, "Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has conducted new stabilization and reconstruction operations every 18 to 24 months."[6] More importantly, the report revealed that the cost of these operations far outstrips the cost of major combat operations in both human resources and treasure.[7]

Like far too many cases in the past, it also ignores the fact that grand strategy can only succeed if the United States not only terminates a conflict successfully but also creates conditions that provide lasting security and stability. All wars have an end, and the grand strategic goal of warfighting is never just to produce a favorable military outcome or to defeat the enemy. It is to win as lasting a victory as possible in political, economic, and security terms. The kind of thinking that led the Office of

the secretary of defense to take a far more serious look at stability operations in its *Biennial Assessment of Stability Operations Capabilities* in 2012 is even more critical today, and cases like Syria illustrate the point.[8]

## Conventional Wars Never Have a Conventional Ending

America's military history provides a vital prelude to any case study of issues related to stability operations. Throughout American history, this aspect of war has presented major and lasting problems—even when wars were fought on territory in or nearby U.S. territory, even when they used tactics and strategy focused on conventional warfare, and even when the United States won decisive victories at the tactical and strategic levels.

The American colonies had no clear plan for peace when the United States won independence. Virtually every war with Native Americans ended in an unstable peace and unintended tragedy for Native Americans. The United States fought the Mexican-American War in an era of "manifest destiny," but with no clear plan for its outcome, and Mexican Americans suffered for decades as a result. There was no plan for victory at the end of the Civil War, and the result was Reconstruction and nearly a century of racism.

The Spanish-American War was the first major U.S. military adventure distant from U.S. territory, but a victorious United States had no victory plan for Cuba. It subsequently annexed the Philippines almost by accident and then had to fight a counterinsurgency campaign against native Filipinos. And, in its next military conflict, the U.S. failure to create a stable end to World War I played a key role in causing World War II.

The United States ended World War II without any clear plan for its aftermath in either Europe or Japan. The initial U.S. efforts to enforce a rapidly improvised version of the Morgenthau Plan to limit the future role of Germany—and U.S. failure to focus on recovery and refugees—helped create a crisis that was only alleviated by the Marshall Plan and U.S. acceptance of the need to provide aid because of the advent of the Cold War.

The United States did improvise an effective occupation effort in Japan after World War II, but economic recovery and political stability came as much from the flood of U.S. spending triggered by the Korean War as from U.S. plans. Fortunately, the United States did provide aid to South Korea, but again because the war did not really end and aid was clearly critical.

Since that time, U.S. failures to develop a stable civil sector in Vietnam were ultimately as critical as the weaknesses in South Vietnamese forces. The United States first avoided dealing with the civil aftermath of the war with Iraq in 1991, then invaded without any civil and conflict termination plans in 2003. It indulged in nation building in Iraq from 2004 to 2011, and it now fights the Islamic State (IS) in both Iraq and Syria without any meaningful plan for what happen after IS's defeat. The United States carried out similar operations in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. As reports by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank make all too clear, most of the U.S. nation-building effort has been no more successful than in Iraq, and the United States again has no clear plans for the future.[9]

## The Challenge of "Failed State" Wars

These lessons are particularly important now that the United States is committed to a series of wars, like that in Syria, which are anything but conventional. The United

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States is now fighting what are largely counterinsurgency campaigns, although they are sometimes labeled as fights against terrorism. It is fighting major campaigns—mixing airpower with train, advise, and assist units; Special Forces; and other small land-combat elements in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. At the same time, the United States is playing a limited role in other conflicts in Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and parts of sub-Saharan Africa.

In all of these wars, the failures of the host countries to meet their people's needs in governance, development, and security—and their gross corruption and incompetence—are as much a threat as the enemy. They are all wars against an enemy with a hostile ideology—violent Islamic extremism—and the fight for hearts and mind is critical. They are all wars where outside powers like Iran and Turkey play a major role, where U.S. local and regional strategic partners are critical, and where combinations of rival ethnic, sectarian, and tribal groups compete for power, often to the point of near or actual civil war.

In practical terms, however, they are wars where the United States now lets the immediate tactical situation dominate, where there is no clear strategy for military victory, and where there is no grand strategy for full conflict termination or for postconflict stability and security. In these conflicts, the United States has largely turned away from any form of nation building. The limited U.S. military presence on the ground is not backed by major aid efforts or by a forward-deployed civilian presence, and the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are no longer involved in civil-military operations. In one key case—Afghanistan—only a limited counterterrorism force plays a forward-combat role. In Iraq, the ground presence is deliberately limited and focused on tactical support. And in Syria, the United States relies on small detachments of Special Forces to support Syrian Kurdish and "moderate" Arab rebel forces, while other U.S. and allied forces train small elements in countries such as Jordan and Iraq.

As a result, stability operations either do not exist or are narrowly focused on specific regions and small tactical areas of operation, and failed host governments are left to act on their own. There is no clear civil effort to bring lasting stability, and outside states such as Iran, Russia, Turkey, and Pakistan play a more active civil-military role. If anything, the official U.S. posture toward the host governments in Afghanistan and Iraq is largely one of constantly claiming civil progress that is exaggerated or does not exist, or one of ignoring the full range of civil problems—effectively a strategy based on hope and denial.

## Syria: The Worst Test Case?

It is an open question as to whether Syria is the worst test case in either strategic or humanitarian terms. In many ways, Syria is only of marginal strategic interest to the United States as long as it is not the center of some extremist "caliphate" and no longer exports terrorism. Afghanistan may only have limited strategic importance in absolute terms, but it has become a symbol of U.S. capability, and it too presents fewer host-country problems. Yemen has even less strategic importance than Syria unless it becomes a threat to maritime shipping or far more of a threat to Saudi Arabia and Oman. Even so, the situation in Yemen has deteriorated to the point where it rivals Syria as a humanitarian disaster.

Syria, however, cannot be decoupled from the war in Iraq. Iraq's civil-military and host-country problems are not as severe as in the other wars the United States is now fighting, but Iraq is a major oil power that shares a border with Iran, and it has far more strategic importance to the United States. It is also hard to see how the United States can help Iraq achieve lasting stability unless Syria is stable. An unstable Syria also threatens allied and friendly states such as Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, and Syrian instability presents a serious risk that any defeat of IS elsewhere will simply lead to a new violent Islamist extremist movement in eastern Syria that could become a major threat to the interests of the United States and its allies.

More broadly, U.S. policy in Syria is widely seen as a failure and a sign of growing American weakness in the Middle East. U.S. diplomacy has so far failed to counter or balance Russian influence and has become a sideshow to other efforts to negotiate a cease-fire. While the United States plays a military role in the fight against IS in Syria, it conspicuously has failed to create effective, unified, and moderate Arab rebel forces.

The United States has avoided committing large ground forces to Syria and has avoided becoming involved in a serious air war with pro-Bashar al-Assad forces. However, this has come at the cost of far more decisive Russian, Iranian, and Hezbollah military intervention, and Turkish intervention as much against America's Syrian Kurdish allies as against IS. The United States also may not have any clear civil-military program in Syria, but it has become one of the largest single aid donors,

spending some $6 billion on humanitarian aid.[10] It has effectively committed itself to open-ended humanitarian aid without any clear prospect of creating a state where that aid can go to help recovery and reconstruction.

## Syria is Deeply Divided, and Syria's Neighbors Present Further Critical Challenges

Syria is a grim study in just how important the civil dimension of war can be, and in just how difficult the challenge of stability operations (and nation building) can be in tactical, strategic, and grand strategic terms. Many argue that the United States could have intervened decisively early in the Syrian crisis and civil war, done so at acceptable risk, done so at much lower cost, and done so before Syria became a humanitarian disaster and before some three hundred thousand to five hundred thousand Syrian civilians were killed in the fighting. There are no reliable estimates of the seriously injured, but the numbers may well be higher.

USAID estimates provide all too clear a picture of Syrian suffering at a civil level and highlight one aspect of the challenge of conducting stability operations. USAID estimates that there are 13.5 million people in need of humanitarian assistance in Syria in a country with a total remaining population of around 22 million. There are 6.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Syria, and U.S. aid is now critical to some 4 million people each month.[11]

No one has a full count of the number Syrian refugees outside Syria because many have stopped registering. Syrian refugees are, however, putting a far greater burden on neighboring states than on Europe or the token numbers that the United States may or may not admit. There are at least 4.8 million Syrian refugees in neighboring states: 2.7 million Syrian refugees in Turkey, 1 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon, 656,400 Syrian refugees in Jordan, and 225,500 Syrian refugees in Iraq.[12]

The situation inside Syria is already critical and is growing steadily worse. The United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) warned at the end of 2016,

> Over half of the population has been forced from their homes, and many people have been displaced multiple times. Children and youth comprise more than half of the displaced, as well as half of those in need of humanitarian assistance. Parties to the conflict act with impunity, committing violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.
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> Among conflict-affected communities, life-threatening needs continue to grow. Neighboring countries have restricted the admission of people fleeing Syria, leaving hundreds of thousands of people stranded in deplorable conditions on their borders. In some cases, these populations are beyond the reach of humanitarian actors.
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> Civilians living in thirteen besieged locations, 643,780 people in need of humanitarian assistance are denied their basic rights, including freedom of movement and access to adequate food, water, and health care. Frequent denial of entry of humanitarian assistance into these areas and blockage of urgent medical evacuations result in civilian deaths and suffering. 3.9 million people in need live in hard-to-reach areas that humanitarian actors are unable to reach in a sustained manner through available modalities.[13]

In the absence of a political solution to the conflict, intense and widespread hostilities are likely to persist in 2017. After nearly six years of senseless and brutal conflict, the outrage at what is occurring in Syria and what is being perpetrated against the Syrian people must be maintained. Now is the time for advocacy and now is the time for the various parties to come together and bring an end to the conflict in Syria.

## U.S. Stability and Civil-Military Operations for Whom and for What

"Might have beens" are always studies in irrelevance. What these facts on the ground make all too clear is that today's Syria is a steadily worsening and divided mess. The United States now seems to lack options for either security or stability, and the U.S. ability to link some kind of meaningful military operation to effective civil-military operations, conflict termination, and reconstruction and recovery is dubious at best.

Syria's problems go far beyond its humanitarian crises and simply trying to defeat one key enemy. Even if IS is largely defeated, large numbers of IS fighters are certain to escape and disperse, and Syria will still present

extraordinarily difficult security and stability problems. Any broader cease-fire is likely to either collapse under the pressure of warring factions or see new power struggles in a divided Syria between elements of the Assad regime, the main Arab rebel factions that include large numbers of Islamist extremists, and the U.S.-backed Syrian Kurds.

The pro-Assad forces seem likely to win in the more populated areas in western Syria. Aleppo has fallen, and pro-Assad or Syrian Arab Republic forces dominate the populated areas of Western Syria with varying degrees of Russian, Iranian, and Hezbollah support and influence. Regime and allied forces have been responsible for the overwhelming majority of atrocities, civilian casualties, and collateral damage. At best, they can control and repress, but cannot bring lasting stability and unity.

No one can predict what will happen in eastern Syria or near the border with Iraq. While the Syrian Arab Republic forces try to preserve the image of unity in dealing with the outside world, there are serious divisions within them, and significant numbers of the current population are IDPs who have moved to obtain security and not because of any loyalty to the regime.

Eastern Syria is divided into competing and sometimes warring rebel, sectarian, and ethnic factions: the more secular and moderate Arab rebel factions in the Free Syrian Army, the relatively more moderate Arab Islamist factions, and the largely Arab Islamist extremist factions in the Army of Conquest. There are also largely Kurdish forces in the Rojava region of northern Syria, along with the so-called Syrian Defense Forces. These forces predominantly consist of personnel from the *Yekîneyên Parastina Gel* (YPG, or the Kurdish People's Protection Units). Estimates of their size range from forty thousand to seventy thousand fighters. While largely Kurdish, some estimates put the number of Arabs, Turkmens, Armenians, Assyrians, and other minorities as high as 40 percent of the fighters.

For all the talk of a "unified" Free Syrian Army, the Arab rebel movements are now deeply divided, and include large Islamic extremist elements such as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, Ahrar al-Sham, Fatah al-Islam, and Jordanian Salafi-jihadists. Many experts believe such extremist groups dominate the number of Arab fighters.

At the same time, the U.S.-backed Syrian Kurdish fighters pursue their own ethnic goals and territorial ambitions, with ties to the *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê* (PKK, or the Kurdistan Worker's Party) in Turkey, and ties to the Kurds in Iraq. The key element in the Syrian Kurdish rebel force—the YPG—has proven to be the only effective rebel element in fighting IS. The YPG is the key U.S.-backed element in Syria—albeit with a strangely dysfunctional libertarian ideology that attempts to combine socialism with the views of social anarchists.

This has vastly complicated U.S. coordination with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's government in Turkey, which sees the YPG as an ally to the PKK and a threat to Turkey. As Syria continued to deteriorate, Turkey became steadily more involved on a military level because of its own civil war with the Kurds within its own borders. Turkey desires to create a security zone in Syria on its southern border and wants to keep Syria's Kurds in the west divided from the Kurds in the east. Additionally, Erdoğan is using the war to help take a central role in governing Turkey by expanding his role as president to authoritarian levels.

So far, Ankara has been forced to temper its ambitions in the face of stiff resistance from IS fighters near al-Bab and from entrenched Kurdish forces in Manbij—two towns that are critical to the control of Aleppo Province and crucial for any future group operations against Raqqa, IS's de facto capital. No one, however, can predict whether the Kurds will find some way to work with Arab Syrian rebels, the Turks, or other factions; how much U.S. civil and military aid they get and where; and how any stability and other civil aid will be provided. As of February 2017, the United States had made increases in the support it was providing by air, Special Forces, and other select combat elements, but it still had not decided on the military options for providing the Syrian Kurds and associated Arab forces with the weapons and support they needed to move on Raqqa.

All of these forces divide Syria along both military and civil fault lines. Virtually any form of victory against one faction tends to empower to remaining factions and lead to new forms of conflict. As for U.S. strategy, it was in a total state of flux at the time this analysis was written in early February. The Trump administration has made it clear that it does not endorse the military plans to strengthen U.S.-supported rebels forces in Syria formed under the Obama administration, but it has not announced plans of its own. It did issue a presidential memorandum calling for a *Plan to Defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria*.[14] This memorandum, however, makes no mention of any form of stability operations, any aspect

Thousands of desperate residents flood a destroyed main street January 2014 in Damascus, Syria, to meet aid workers from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). The UNRWA was able to complete its first humanitarian food distribution in Yarmouk Camp there after almost six months of siege. (Photo courtesy of UNRWA)

of a civil campaign and effort to coordinate civil-military operations, or the need for resolve. Rather than deal with stability operations, or civil-military affairs, the U.S. strategy called for in the text of the memorandum seems to be one of "we'll fight IS until we leave, and please don't bother us with the end result."

More broadly, the United States has never announced any plan or effort to use humanitarian aid and civil-military programs to try to stabilize the areas under Syrian Kurdish control and the rest of the border area near Iraq, find some modus vivendi between Syrian Kurd and Arab, and find a modus vivendi between Syria's Kurds and Turkey. At least as of February, the Trump administration—like the Obama administration before it—has also failed to provide any indication of what it meant by talking about "safe zones," although the new president has said on television that he "will absolutely do safe zones in Syria" for refugees fleeing violence in their country, devastated by years of civil war.[15]

So far, the United States has never come to grips with the real-world civil-military problems in choosing locations for those safe zones and defining who such zones would protect. The Trump administration has not detailed how the sites could be secured in the air and on the ground; what kind of civilian facilities would be provided; how they would be resupplied; and what their structure and capacity structure could be in terms of the water, power, other infrastructure, education, and medical services needed by hundreds of thousands to millions of civilians.

What is all too clear, however, is that there are virtually no services, surplus housing, infrastructure, and the other essentials of stability operations anywhere in eastern Syria after more than a half decade of war. It is equally clear that almost any choice involves alienating some faction, possible attacks by the Assad regime, and possible attacks by Turkey, divided Kurdish factions,

or hostile Arab rebel factions. There are all too many threats, both in the air and on the ground.

## Leaving Syria's Neighbors and its Border with Iraq without Either a Military or Civil Strategy

This vacuum in civil-military and stability operations goes much further than Syria. Syria's other neighbors are forced to focus on their own security and stability. Israel must shape its own security and guard against a sweep of threats from undergoverned or destabilized spaces, which include IS-linked Salafi-Jihadi threats in Egypt's Sinai, potential instability tied to Hezbollah along the UN Blue Line with Lebanon, and threats on the Golan Heights from both Hezbollah and Iran's Quds Force on the one hand and al-Qaida-affiliated groups on the other.

Lebanon and Jordan face similar challenges from potentially ungoverned and undergoverned spaces along their borders with Syria, and both—with U.S. and Western support—have responded by significantly expanding and reshaping their militaries' border security and deterrence forces. Given their limited topography, smaller populations, and relatively weaker economies, Lebanon and Jordan also bear a disproportionately larger burden tied to the number of Syrian refugees.

The most critical problem from the viewpoint of classic stability operations, however, is that Iraq has an open and vulnerable border with Syria. It has its own Kurdish problems and has a deep division between its Sunni and Shiite populations. Even if the United States can avoid stability operations and a civil-military effort in most of Syria, it cannot defeat IS's physical "caliphate" and ensure that no combination of other violent Islamist extremists that replace it could successfully challenge other neighboring states, or export terrorism, unless it takes such action.

In order to secure Iraq, the United States has to have a civil-military strategy for both eastern Syria and the border area with Iraq and Jordan. This strategy must ensure the defeat of IS in Syria as well as in Iraq, and it must make certain that the liberation of eastern Syria and western Iraq does not create a bloc of Sunni Arabs hostile to Syrian and Iraqi Kurds and the Iraqi central government. Such a strategy has to deal with civil stability and not simply with military security.

As of February 2017, the United States had not developed effective Arab rebel forces to defeat IS in Syria and had not given the Rojava, Syrian Defense Forces, or YPG the same mix of weapons, forward advisors, and combat support necessary to defeat IS in its Syrian capital in Raqqa. Neither the Obama nor the Trump administration has ever made any unclassified statement of its overall strategy or plans for stability operations for dealing with the Iraqi border area and eastern Syria when—*and if*—IS is defeated, and the Obama administration left office without resolving any of the tension between Turkey and Syria's Kurds.

The United States can solve part of this narrow "stability" problem by sustaining the present levels of aid to Iraq and by ensuring that Jordan and Lebanon can secure their borders with Syria. It must, however, work actively with the Iraqi central government to persuade it to provide the aid, support, political equity, and security to Iraqi Sunnis that will give them reason to be loyal to the Iraqi central government.

The United States may well have to broker some form of Syrian Kurdish security zone in Northeastern Syria that will give its Kurds and allied minorities the resources they need to preserve near-autonomy, and it may have to broker an arrangement with Turkey where it can accept that the Syrian Kurds will not actively back the PKK in the ongoing Turkish conflict. It may also have to work with Jordan and the Arab Gulf states to provide aid and resources to Arab Sunnis in the far east of Syria to limit Islamic extremist influence. This, however, is far easier to propose than to implement, and it is a further warning that successful operations in failed-state wars need both an integrated civil-military strategy and a civil effort that looks beyond the military dimension, humanitarian aid, and purely local and ephemeral stability operations.

## The Ultimate Stability Challenge: Recovery and Reconstruction

It is far from clear how long the United States can avoid looking at the far more serious problem of recovery and reconstruction in Syria, both in terms of any broad form of conflict termination and creating any kind of lasting "victory." As bad as the civil, governance, economic, and justice sectors are in Afghanistan and Iraq, Syria is truly a failed state in

terms of governance, economics, and every aspect of recovery and reconstruction.

Estimates of the cost of reconstruction are highly uncertain, but estimates by World Vision and Frontier Economics have risen to over $275 billion today and indicate that the total could be over $1 trillion if the civil war drags on to 2020.[16] To put these kinds of figures in additional perspective, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates that Syria's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) dropped by 70 percent between 2010 and 2016; it was only $24.6 billion in 2014 at the official exchange rate, and was only $55.8 billion in 2015, even in purchasing power parity terms. And, no one can begin to estimate what it will take to deal with what may well be a deeply divided country, to reduce corruption and misgovernment to workable levels, and to establish any stable pattern of income distribution and reconstruction efforts.[17]

The UN's Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) published a far more detailed study in November 2016, titled *Survey of Economic and Social Developments in the Arab Region, 2015-2016*. This study addressed the cost of the political upheavals and fighting in the Middle East and North Africa region that begin in 2011 and provided the following summary description of the longer-term cost of recovery and reconstruction in Syria.

> Now in its sixth year, the Syrian civil war has led to one of the most severe humanitarian crises of the new millennium. The international community has failed to end the conflict or provide adequate aid. Recent estimates put the total death toll at 470,000.[i] The country's population has decreased by one fifth, due to casualties and emigration. The war has been accompanied by atrocities, the rise of the so-called "Islamic State," a regional and global refugee crisis, and external intervention that has only fueled hostilities.
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> The conflict has left a once middle-income economy in ruins. Various studies have been conducted on the impact of the war on the economy. However, official data have been scant since the war began and account only for activities in areas controlled by the Government. Data on other regions are more difficult to gather.

In this study, we make use of the most recent estimates of economic losses and look at potential post-war projections.

**1. Pre-conflict situation and trajectory**

According to the Government's Eleventh Five-year Plan, GDP stood at $60.2 billion in 2010 and was set to grow steadily in the years to 2015 [Source: "Post-Conflict Challenges for the Macroeconomic Policies for Syria," National Agenda for the Future of Syria (NAFS) (Beirut: ESCWA, 2016)]. Under the plan, public investment was to rise from SYP [Syrian Pound] 309 billion to SYP 514 billion between 2011 and 2015, with major investments in public administration, transportation, water and electricity. In practice, those plans have been stripped back and funds have been diverted to military expenditure.

**2. Impact of the conflict**

According to NAFS estimations, the Syrian conflict has caused losses of $259 billion since 2011, including $169 billion from lost GDP as compared with pre-conflict projections, and $89.9 billion from accumulated physical capital loss. The Syrian Centre for Policy Research (SCPR) says that overall GDP loss has been three times the size of the country's GDP in 2010.[ii] The degree of destruction has increased over time, and ramped-up bombing campaigns since late 2015 have begun targeting infrastructure and economically vital sectors such as energy, which had previously been largely immune. This will further diminish the productive capital stock left at the end of the war.

Building and industry have borne the brunt of destruction. Output of manufacturing, a key subsector for job and income creation and an indicator of economic transformation, now stands at one third of its 2010 level.

Despite farming losses, favorable weather, and the shift to smallholder agriculture during the conflict lifted agriculture's share of GDP from 17.4 percent before the crisis to 28.7 percent in 2015. That has been matched by a fall in the GDP share of other sectors, particularly mining (an 11.6 percentage point

Syrian troops and pro-government gunmen walk inside the destroyed Umayyad Mosque 13 December 2016 in Aleppo, Syria. (Photo courtesy of Syrian Arab News Agency)

drop) and internal trade (a 4.5 percentage point drop).[iii] Other subsectors, including tourism and utilities, have also been adversely affected.

Public and private sector consumption and investment continue to slide. Public consumption dropped by nearly one third from 2014 to 2015, and household consumption has fallen as consumer price index (CPI) inflation has risen.[iv] "Semi-public" consumption (that is, consumption in areas beyond the Government's control) represented 13.2 percent of GDP in 2015. For example, the so-called "Islamic State" controls three quarters of oil production.

Unemployment rose from 15 percent in 2011 to 48 percent in 2014. Some three million Syrians, responsible for 12.2 million dependent family members, have lost their jobs during the course of the conflict.[v] More than 80 percent of the Syrian population were living below the poverty line at the end of 2015, as opposed to 28 percent in 2010.[vi] Areas with the highest poverty rates include Al-Raqqa, Idlib, Deir El Zor, Homs and the rural area around Damascus, all of which have witnessed some of the most brutal and prolonged battles of the conflict so far. The deep descent into poverty has been fueled by rising unemployment, the loss of property and assets by large numbers of IDPs and sharp cuts in food and fuel subsidies.

The continuing economic destruction will translate into a new lower level and trajectory for the Syrian economy, with greater dependence on imports and aid. Debt, unemployment, inflation and other negative indicators are all worsening, and any gains in terms of remittances and informal trade are vastly offset by the physical losses and opportunity costs of the war. So, although theory posits that countries in long-term conflict may adjust

> to the economic consequences, the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic is worsening every year according to most economic indicators.
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> The conflict has triggered an unprecedented refugee crisis. The plight of refugees has been documented but global humanitarian assistance and legal allowances for displaced persons remain inadequate. Under an agreement reached in London between European and Arab partners in February 2016, it was decided to open markets for manufactured goods, such as textiles, from Jordan because of the refugee burden that country is bearing.[vii] According to the ILO, 28 percent of Syrian refugees in Jordan had work in early 2014. Unemployment in that country had, however, soared from 14.5 percent in March 2011 to 22 percent in 2014.[18]

The study goes on to describe the high cost of the war to Syria's neighbors and the impact of its refugee issues on their economies. It then summarizes the key conclusions of an economic model for reconstruction that assumes a full and immediate solution to the conflict, national unity, and massive outside investment and aid.

> The NAFS scenario for rebuilding the economy of the Syrian Arab Republic, supposing that hostilities will end in 2016, uses a financial programming model to calculate what will be needed to return the country's GDP to its 2010 level by 2025.
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> … Under the scenario, a minimum public investment of $183.5 billion will be needed to rebuild the country. This equals the sum of cumulative capital loss during the conflict and the investments intended under the 2011 five-year plan, and will boost growth through multiplier effects and stimulate private investment.
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> … Reconstruction could be divided into two phases … a peacebuilding phase (2016–2018), with a focus on basic needs, ending violence and initiating economic recovery, and a State-building phase (2019–2025), expanding investments to productive sectors and activities, with sectoral allocations presumably based on the five-year plan. The process will require major and expanding investment, particularly from the private sector. Success will depend greatly on the sources and reliability of, and conditions attached to, the available financing options.
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> An alternative exercise utilizes a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, based on the assumption that hostilities end in 2016 and implementation of Eleventh National Development Plan, with a focus on rebuilding destroyed capital and restoring public investment.[viii]
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> This yields interesting projections, including a steady increase in GDP similar to the NAFS calculations, but with a spike of 40.6 percent GDP growth in 2016 due to the immediate infusion of capital and assistance, before it levels off to an average of between 11 and 15 percent. Capital stock would grow at its pre-crisis rate to reach 2011 levels by 2017 in an optimistic projection. Public investment would spike in 2016 and continue to grow as well, triggering private sector investment. Exports would increase slowly, reaching a value of 20 percent of GDP by 2020, while imports would boom at 57 percent of GDP in 2016, later stabilizing at 43 percent. In the absence of grants, the public deficit and debt would increase to 50 and 200 percent of GDP respectively. This highlights the importance of tapping into a broad range of alternative financing options. With so many Syrians displaced externally, remittances will play an important role in rebuilding as many of those who find work will remain abroad and continue to work and send money home.
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> Post-conflict macroeconomic policy will have to go beyond stabilization and tackle problems resulting from the loss of physical and human capital, brain drain, deep political and geographical divisions, as well as factoring in peacebuilding. The approach to post-war reconstruction in Lebanon offers some cautionary lessons. The economic policies and political arrangements arrived at, although they helped the country to emerge from conflict, did not prove sustainable in the longer term.[19]

The IMF has issued a series of assessments of the impact of Syrian conflict and the problems it creates for reconstruction. One such assessment was issued in June 2016, and it joins the UN study in warning just how serious the recovery and reconstruction challenge is, although the IMF study seems less optimistic than the UN ESCWA study about the speed with which recovery is possible:

> **The conflict has set the country back decades in terms of economic, social, and human development.** Syria's GDP today is less than half of what it was before the war started. Inflation is high double digits, and there has been a large depreciation of the exchange rate. International reserves have been depleted to finance large fiscal and current account deficits, while public debt has more than doubled. Syria's people are struggling with the devastating effects of the conflict, including widespread unemployment and poverty, homelessness, food and medicine shortages, and destruction of public services and infrastructure. The situation for those who have stayed in Syria is dire: half of the population is displaced, the social fabric is torn, many children are no longer schooled, access to medicine, food and clean water is limited, and many people of all ages are traumatized by the war.
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> **Rebuilding the country will be a complex and monumental task.** Reconstructing damaged physical infrastructure will require substantial international support and prioritization**.** Rebuilding Syria's human capital and social cohesion will be an even greater and lasting challenge. Considerable resources will need to go to rebuilding the lives of internally displaced people, and to encouraging the return and reintegration of refugees along with reducing the divisions and tensions between various sectarian communities. Far-reaching economic reforms will be needed to create stability, growth, and job prospects. The immediate focus would need to be on urgent humanitarian assistance, restoring macroeconomic stability and rebuilding institutional capacity to implement cohesive and meaningful reforms. In the medium term, the reform agenda could include diversifying the economy, creating jobs for the young and displaced, tackling environmental issues, and addressing long-standing issues such as the regional disparities in income and greater political and social inclusion.[20]

The following are key points in the IMF study:

> **Many factors will determine the extent and speed of rebuilding the country.** Most importantly, the timeframe and success of any reconstruction will hinge on when and how the conflict is resolved. This, in turn, will shape the scope and pace of political and economic reforms. And it will determine how much external assistance is forthcoming, including whether Syria will be able to attract private investment. It will be critical to establish quick wins, including in the energy sector and agriculture, as well as in labor intensive industries such as textile or food processing, which could become drivers of growth.
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> **The recovery will likely take a long time.** The literature on post-conflict recovery shows that a longer-lasting conflict will have a more negative impact on the economy and institutions, and prolong the recovery.[ix] For instance, it took Lebanon, which experienced 16 years of conflict, 20 years to catch up to the real GDP level it enjoyed before the war, while it took Kuwait, which endured two years of conflict, seven years to regain its pre-war GDP level. Given the unprecedented scale of devastation, it may be difficult to compare Syria with other post conflict cases. That said, if we hypothetically assume that for Syria the post-conflict rebuilding period will begin in 2018 and the economy grows at its trend rate of about 4 1/2 percent, *it would take the country about 20 years to reach its pre-war real GDP level.*[x] Achieving a higher growth rate would allow the country to achieve a faster recovery.[xi] This assumes that the country can quickly restore its production capacity and human capital levels and remains intact as a sovereign territory. *Any break-up of the country would affect potential*

*growth and might require creating new institutions and governance structures.*

**Rebuilding damaged physical infrastructure will be a monumental task, with reconstruction cost estimates in the range of $100 to $200 billion**. SCPR estimates that the destruction of physical infrastructure between 2011 and 2014 amounted to US$72–75 billion, equivalent to about 120 percent of 2010 GDP. *The Syrian Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources estimated in early 2015 that the conflict has cost the oil industry alone US$27 billion from the destruction of wells, pipelines, and refineries.*[xii] Similarly, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) suggests that it will take years for Syrian's domestic energy system to return to its pre-conflict operating status, even after the conflict subsides.[xiii] With the escalation of the conflict since the second half of 2015, the rebuilding estimates are likely to be much higher. More recently, the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) estimated that Syria would require about $180 to $200 billion—three times the 2010 GDP.[xiv]

**Syria will also have to grapple with deep-rooted socioeconomic challenges.** The extreme rise in mass poverty, destruction of health and education services, and large-scale displacement of Syrians will pose huge challenges. Syria's population has shrunk by 20–30 percent, with 50 percent of the population internally displaced, destroyed homes, and many highly skilled workers and entrepreneurs having left the country. Moreover, the currently *low school enrollment rate of children will negatively impact the country's potential output for years to come.* SCPR estimated in 2014 that the loss of years of schooling by children represents a human capital deficit of $5 billion in education investment. A recent United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) report placed the loss in human capital at $10.5 billion from the loss of education of Syrian children and youth.[xv] Many children have been born into conflict and exposed to violence, and studies show that exposure to violent conflicts has long-term effects on generations to come. Therefore, considerable resources will need to go to rebuilding the lives of internally displaced people, and to encouraging the return and reintegration of refugees. Further, the conflict has exacerbated existing, and created new, divisions and tensions between various sectarian communities across the country that will need to be addressed in a meaningful way to promote social and political cohesion.[21]

The IMF study focuses on the IMF's mission, and fiscal reform and stability as the path to recovery and reconstruction. It notes that there are serious problems in getting the data needed for even an assessment, and its reform suggestions give priority to fiscal issues over political needs and conflict resolution. At the same time, the study makes it make it clear that there is a very real political and human dimension:

**The post-conflict reconstruction efforts should seek to address regional disparities in income and social inclusion**. Poverty and extreme poverty, according to SCPR, have worsened further with the conflict, and are highest in governorates that have been most affected by the conflict and that were historically the poorest in the country. Addressing the underpinnings of these disparities should be central to any policy package intended to bring about peace and prosperity. Innovative approaches will be required to improve the provision of public services, including reconstruction of damaged water pipelines, farm irrigation and drainage, roads, schools and hospitals, employment prospects, and access to finance at the regional levels. Institutional and governance arrangements should be considered to give local authorities greater controls over service delivery, including greater forms of fiscal decentralization.[xvi] However, for fiscal decentralization to work, certain critical governance

conditions will need to be in place, including ensuring local authorities are held accountable and resources are spent in a transparent manner. Therefore, any decentralization efforts have to take into account Syria's new governance model, as well as the state of its institutions.

**Rebuilding public institutions and improving governance will be key.** This includes making fiscal policy and fiscal management effective, fair, and transparent; developing the rule of law and judiciary independence; and re-establishing and strengthening the capacity for monetary operations and banking supervision, and reforming the bank regulatory framework, including the anti-money laundry and combating terrorist financing (AML/CFT) regime.[xvii] These efforts would help address governance issues that plagued the country prior to the start of the conflict and contributed to regional and income disparities, and that likely have further deteriorated. They would also help facilitate the re-integration of the domestic financial system into the global economy, lower transaction costs, and reduce the size of the informal sector. Lessons from other post conflict countries show that framing an overall consistent technical assistance strategy at the outset of the post-conflict phase and securing donor coordination are critical for successful implementation of economic and institutional reforms.[22]

The World Bank has also addressed the challenge of Syrian recovery and reconstruction. Its work also highlights the sheer scale of the recovery and reconstruction effort that will be needed, and an October 2016 update of its work highlights and updates its assessments of several important issues:

The conflict has had severe macroeconomic implications. Real GDP contracted sharply in 2012–15, including some 12 percent in 2015. After increasing by nearly 90 percent in 2013, inflation eased but remained high at nearly 30 percent in 2014–15. The severe decline in oil receipts since the second half of 2012 and disruptions of trade due to the conflict has put pressure on the balance of payments and the exchange rate. Revenues from oil exports decreased from US$4.7 billion in 2011 to an estimated US$0.14 billion in 2015 as most of Syria's oil fields are outside government control. The current account deficit reached 19 percent of GDP in 2014 but declined markedly to 8 percent of GDP in 2015. International reserves declined from US$20 billion at end-2010 to US$1.1 billion at end-2015, while the Syrian pound depreciated from 47 pounds per USD in 2010 to 517 pounds per USD at end-August 2016. The overall fiscal deficit increased sharply, reaching 20 percent of GDP in 2015, with revenues falling to an all-time low of below 7 percent of GDP during 2014–15 due to a collapse of oil and tax revenues. In response, the government cut spending, including on wages and salaries, but this was not enough to offset the fall in revenues and higher military spending.

Macroeconomic and poverty projections are complicated by the uncertainty about the duration and severity of the conflict. Nevertheless, real GDP is estimated to continue to contract in 2016 by around 4 percent on account of a worsening of the conflict in key centers of economic activity such as Aleppo and as oil and gas production and non-oil economic activity continue to suffer from the conflict. Inflation is likely to remain very high at around 25 percent in 2016, because of continued ex-change rate depreciation, trade disruptions, and shortages. Current account and fiscal deficits are also projected to remain large, broadly around the levels of 2015. Medium-term macroeconomic prospects hinge on containing the war and finding a political resolution to the conflict, and rebuilding the damaged infrastructure and social capital.

The key challenges are clearly to end the conflict and restore basic public services along with other measures to address the humanitarian crisis.[23]




Funding figures are as of 13 July 2016. All international figures are according to the United Nation's Financial Tracking Service and based on international commitments during the current calendar year, while U.S. Government (USG) figures are according to the USG and reflect the most recent USG commitments based on the fiscal year, which began on 1 October 2015.

(Graphic courtesy of USAID, 13 July 2016, https://www.usaid.gov/crisis/syria/fy16/fs04)

**Figure. Humanitarian Aid to Syria by Donor in 2016**

As horrifying as the potential human cost of failing to address these issues would be, the practical costs in dollars of any recovery and reconstruction effort to put Syria back on the path to recovery after any successful conflict resolution would present a massive potential drain on global international aid for a country with otherwise limited strategic importance to the United States.

Such an effort would also force outside powers to go far beyond some narrow definition of stability operations and fully address the issue of nation building. Moreover, the previous studies only deal with the current size of the problem. As long as the fighting and large-scale instability persist, Syria will continue to deteriorate, and the suffering of the Syrian people will increase. Here again, it is critical to understand that short-term goals do not solve any key problems. A cease-fire is not a substitute for peace, nor a base for recovery and reconstruction.

Syria may lack a meaningful stable base for recovery and reconstruction even *if* the Assad regime and rebels can agree on halting the fighting; *if* the Assad government, Russia, Iran, Turkey, and key factions including Hezbollah can agree on their respective roles in western Syria; and *if* the different Arab rebel factions and Kurds can agree on areas of control, some form of federation, or some form of independence in eastern Syria. None of these options necessarily creates an effective structure of governance or economy, deals with the refugee and IDP problem, or offers any clear path to recovery and a return to development.

This leaves the United States with very limited grand strategic options to deal with the most important single challenge in stability operations. One U.S. option is to try to dodge the issue of creating some form of stability operations that can create a basis for postconflict recovery and reconstruction entirely by taking the position that Russian, Iranian, and Turkish military interventions in Syria create responsibility by these countries for taking the lead in aid, recovery, and reconstruction. This option reflects real-world U.S. strategic priorities.

This option also reflects the reality that the de facto division of the country and survival of the Assad regime—whose past record of governance, development, and corruption led to the upheavals that began in 2011—make effective reform and reconstruction dubious prospects at best. From a humanitarian viewpoint, however, the crisis in Syria is so great that there is a strong moral and ethical case for intervention regardless of U.S. strategic priorities. However, from a practical, or "realist," viewpoint, that argument only applies if some form of intervention can clearly work, if there is enough governance and stability to ensure that aid is used effectively, and if intervention and aid help all of Syria's people—not just some faction or sectarian and ethnic group.

At the same time, the United States cannot ignore the real-world problems of trying to support lasting conflict resolution and nation building. Throwing good money at bad leaders will not serve either strategic or humanitarian interests, and aiding

some factions or excluding others does not lay the groundwork for stability and lasting peace. The Assad regime is, and always has been, a bad government. The World Bank governance indicators reflect a long history of incompetence by the government of the Syrian Arab Republic (the Assad regime) in all six measures of governance and show its capabilities have crashed to the bottom of the world since 2011.[24]

The World Bank's six measures include *voice and accountability, political stability and the absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.*[25] All six focus on practical governance and not on more idealistic values such as human rights and democracy. About the most that can be said for the Assad regime is that the World Bank has rated Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen as near the bottom of world performance as Syria during the entire period from 1996 to 2015, regardless of changes in regime during this period and U.S. aid and nation-building efforts.[26] A look at CIA, UN, IMF, Arab Human Development, and World Bank economic development and governance reports over the period from 2000 to 2016 for Syria—and for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen—reveals the same broad patterns. "Failed-state wars" is not an exaggeration: host governments really can be as much of a threat as the enemy, insurgencies do have major material as well as ideological causes,

## Table 1. International Aid to Syrian Organizations Affiliated with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs (UN OCHA) Humanitarian Response Plan

| Donor | Funding in U.S. dollars | Percent of grand total | Outstanding pledges in U.S. dollars |
|---|---|---|---|
| Germany | $668,699,404 | 24.7% | 0 |
| United States | $667,796,939 | 24.6% | 0 |
| European Commission | $460,817,260 | 17.0% | 0 |
| Private (individuals and organizations) | $159,943,972 | 5.9% | 0 |
| United Kingdom | $146,816,366 | 5.4% | 0 |
| Japan | $123,948,997 | 4.6% | 0 |
| Norway | $99,471,536 | 3.7% | 0 |
| Canada | $96,540,841 | 3.6% | 0 |
| France | $56,177,713 | 2.1% | 0 |
| Netherlands | $49,544,386 | 1.8% | 0 |
| Belgium | $23,787,424 | 0.9% | 0 |
| Denmark | $16,947,713 | 0.6% | 0 |
| Sweden | $16,567,712 | 0.6% | 0 |
| Various (details not yet provided) | $15,234,762 | 0.6% | 0 |
| Kuwait | $12,960,000 | 0.5% | 0 |
| Australia | $10,697,441 | 0.4% | 0 |
| Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) | $10,370,450 | 0.4% | 0 |
| Qatar | $8,884,204 | 0.3% | 0 |
| Switzerland | $8,802,973 | 0.3% | 0 |
| Carry-over (donors not specified) | $8,310,359 | 0.3% | 0 |
| Italy | $7,791,023 | 0.3% | 0 |
| Spain | $7,761,021 | 0.3% | 0 |
| Finland | $7,712,171 | 0.3% | 0 |
| Saudi Arabia | $7,458,732 | 0.3% | 0 |
| Allocation of unearmarked funds by UN agencies | $6,704,827 | 0.2% | 0 |
| Others | $12,605,153 | 0.5% | $1,000,000 |
| **Grand total in U.S. dollars: $2,712,353,379** | | **100.0%** | **$1,000,000** |

(Table based on information from the Financial Tracking Service, UN OCHA, 28 February 2017, http://fts.unocha.org)

## Table 2. International Aid to Syrian Organizations Not Affiliated with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs (UN OCHA) Humanitarian Response Plan

| Donor | Funding in U.S. dollars | Percent of grand total | Outstanding pledges in U.S. dollars |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | $394,391,920 | 20.2% | $1,000,000 |
| Germany | $150,163,001 | 7.7% | 0 |
| United Kingdom | $145,043,639 | 7.4% | 0 |
| United Arab Emirates | $132,030,024 | 6.8% | 0 |
| Norway | $74,804,112 | 3.8% | 0 |
| Kuwait | $62,102,444 | 3.2% | $11,937,556 |
| Switzerland | $29,293,101 | 1.5% | 0 |
| Denmark | $19,987,473 | 1.0% | 0 |
| Japan | $19,795,445 | 1.0% | 0 |
| Austria | $16,381,737 | 0.8% | 0 |
| Sweden | $13,537,380 | 0.7% | 0 |
| Netherlands | $13,157,895 | 0.7% | 0 |
| European Commission | $10,120,070 | 0.5% | 0 |
| France | $8,907,892 | 0.5% | 0 |
| Saudi Arabia | $7,459,516 | 0.4% | $1,000,000 |
| Australia | $6,540,592 | 0.3% | 0 |
| Luxembourg | $6,177,034 | 0.3% | 0 |
| Italy | $5,957,833 | 0.3% | $16,296,248 |
| Ireland | $5,868,622 | 0.3% | 0 |
| Finland | $4,703,947 | 0.2% | 0 |
| Canada | $4,166,749 | 0.2% | $1,500,000 |
| Poland | $3,783,769 | 0.2% | 0 |
| Hungary | $3,282,276 | 0.2% | 0 |
| Qatar | $2,664,681 | 0.1% | 0 |
| Czech Republic | $1,606,475 | 0.1% | 0 |
| Spain | $1,592,416 | 0.1% | 0 |
| Belgium | $557,414 | 0.0% | 0 |
| Belarus | $522,000 | 0.0% | 0 |
| Estonia | $430,547 | 0.0% | 0 |
| New Zealand | $302,527 | 0.0% | 0 |
| Liechtenstein | $150,263 | 0.0% | 0 |
| Romania | $72,464 | 0.0% | 0 |
| Slovenia | $71,182 | 0.0% | 0 |
| Korea | 0 | 0.0% | 6,200,000 |
| Others | $802,319,300 | 41.2% | 0 |
| **Grand total in U.S. dollars: $1,947,945,740** | | **100.0%** | **$37,933,804** |

(Table based on information from the Financial Tracking Service, UN OCHA, 28 February 2017, http://fts.unocha.org)

and the civil dimensions of war really are critical.

As a result, the United States has two more positive real-world options for this far broader aspect of stability operations. One is to concentrate solely on the more limited kinds of humanitarian aid that pass through international hands and help ordinary Syrians regardless of their location, faction, sect, or ethnic background, and to press other states to provide such aid as well.

As has been noted earlier, USAID reports that the United States had allocated some $6 billion in such aid as of January 2016, and the figure (page 59) shows that there are many other donors.[27] The USAID report is further backed up by the data provided by OCHA as depicted in tables 1 (page 60) and 2.[28] Providing such aid through bodies such as the UN's OCHA, the International Syria Support Group Humanitarian Assistance Task Force, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, and the UN World Food Programme bypasses both the Syrian government and rebel factions and can achieve significant humanitarian goals.

Such humanitarian aid does not meet more lasting needs such as recovery and development, but it is far from clear that there is a credible option for such

action. In contrast, there are many different countries providing direct humanitarian aid to Syria and to Syrian refugees. The figure (page 59) does make it clear that the U.S. share of such aid is likely to be relatively large, and any contributions by Russia and Iran may be slow to come if ever. Such choice does not tie the United States to what may be "mission impossible" for years to come or make the United States seem responsible for a Syria that will not or cannot help itself.

A second, and more positive, option reflects both the real-world limits of outside nation-building efforts that became all too clear in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the real-world limits imposed by U.S. politics and public willingness to repeat the immense cost and waste that occurred in both countries. The U.S. public and Congress might accept a major U.S. contribution to the equivalent of an international Marshall Plan—a plan in which other states paid a very substantial part of the cost, clear conditions were laid down for allocating the money with clearly defined auditing and measures of effectiveness, and the administration and support were accomplished by a competent international body with real integrity like the IMF or the World Bank.[29]

Although the U.S. government has already shown it lacks both the will and the competence to implement such a plan, as was the case with the original Marshall Plan, even putting such an option on the table could have a powerful effect in bringing civil stability and creating some incentive for a real peace. The plan could also be offered to other conflict states with funding awarded on a competitive basis.

One thing is all too clear, however, from both a Syrian case study and the related lessons of Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen. Revolutions in military affairs are not a substitute for revolutions in civil-military affairs. Being the best warfighter in the world is not enough. Neither is treating stability operations and civil-military affairs as a sideshow. Grand strategy means shaping the way in which wars end and their aftermath, not simply defeating the enemy. ■

***Editor's note:*** *An earlier version of this article was previously published as a* Military Review *online exclusive 2 March 2017.*

## Notes

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29. The Marshall Plan was a large-scale economic recovery program to help Western European countries rebuild after World War II. The United States contributed over $12 billion over the four years the program was in effect. Funds were distributed on a per capita basis.

Sgt. 1st Class Hussain Dad (*left*) with the 201st Afghan National Army (ANA) Corps watches a fellow ANA soldier review targeted frequencies on the Wolfhound's signal scanning device 25 January 2014 during Afghanistan's first Wolfhound fielding and training at Forward Operating Base Gamberi, Laghman Province, Afghanistan. The Wolfhound allows 201st ANA Corps soldiers to hear and locate the enemy's radio transmissions. (Photo by Sgt. 1st Class E. L. Craig, U.S. Army)

# The State of Afghanistan's Intelligence Enterprise

Maj. Gen. Robert P. Walters Jr., U.S. Army
Col. Loren G. Traugutt, U.S. Army

It is October 2016. The Taliban has been pressing hard for several weeks to take the provincial capital of Uruzgan. North of Kandahar, it has been attacking Afghan National Police (ANP) checkpoints and police stations, killing police and innocent civilians, and looting supplies and equipment from overrun or abandoned buildings. On an early morning in late October, a group of Taliban insurgents takes respite in an isolated compound of several buildings. Haphazardly occupying a single fighting position over the last few days, the insurgents take advantage of the brief pause.[1]

Unbeknownst to this band of insurgents, an Afghan PC-12 reconnaissance plane has been loitering high above for several hours, keeping a close eye on them and relaying every detail back to a nearby Afghan National Army (ANA) commander on the ground. The PC-12 pilot reaffirms to the commander that the Taliban insurgents remain entrenched in the compound below and that there is a complete absence of civilians.

Suddenly, an Afghan A-29 Super Tucano attack aircraft descends from the cloudless sky, lining up its attack run on the unsuspecting insurgents. The detonation of two MK81 bombs ends the lives of those insurgents hiding out in the northernmost building of the compound. Once the realization of what has just happened settles in, the remaining Taliban insurgents make the fateful mistake of rushing to the only fortified fighting position in the compound. The PC-12 pilot is talking directly to the pilot of the attack aircraft, giving him instant feedback on the A-29's first attack run, and now lining him up for a second and final run. As the last insurgent reaches the final fighting position he will ever occupy, the A-29 pilot releases his remaining MK81 bomb.

Precise airstrikes such as these do not happen by chance; they are complex operations that are the result of a deliberate targeting process that relies on an ever-growing and robust Afghan intelligence structure. It is a process that requires the mentoring and assistance of a dedicated group of U.S. and coalition trainers and advisors. More importantly, there is a committed group of Afghans who are willing and able to adapt to an ever-changing environment, both militarily and politically. Maj. Gen. Abdul Manan Farahi, the ANA general staff chief of intelligence (GSG2), who is responsible for all of the ANA's intelligence structure, often states, "Where you have good partners, you will have success."[2] As the coalition and Afghanistan continue to partner, the Afghans will continue to demonstrate many successes.

## Afghan Intelligence Systems

The description of the A-29 air strike is representative of the numerous success stories attributed to the Afghan intelligence structure and the targeting process that supports it. Several intelligence systems within the Afghan military play a significant role in that success, underscoring the importance of these systems within an intelligence architecture.

**National Information Management System.** The system with the largest contribution to Afghan intelligence success is the National Information Management System (NIMS). Similar to the U.S. Army's Distributed Common Ground System, the NIMS allows military units across Afghanistan to share real-time intelligence and provides decision makers the ability to make informed and time-sensitive decisions.

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The initial version of the NIMS provided only basic information-sharing capabilities; analytical tools and targeting-specific modules were almost nonexistent. As Afghan intelligence officers struggled to develop a complex and transparent targeting process, they realized the initial limitations of the system. Working closely with their coalition advisors, several modifications were brainstormed and developed in July 2016. In less than two months, the requested modifications were incorporated, resulting in an enhanced Afghanistan-wide targeting process. Nearly every facet of the process was streamlined and simplified.

**PC-12 reconnaissance aircraft.** In the "find" phase of the F3EAD targeting process (find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate), a key Afghan intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) asset enters the scene.[3] The PC-12 is a single-engine, turboprop, manned aircraft that provides the Afghans with a dedicated ISR platform capable of both real-time full-motion video (FMV) and communications intelligence. It was fielded to the Afghan Special Mission Wing (Afghanistan's day/night, air assault, and ISR aviation special mission unit) in early 2014.

The PC-12 played a critical role in the A-29 airstrike narrative above. The real-time FMV capability confirmed the existence and precise location of the Taliban compound in the target package for Afghan national-level approval. The PC-12 maintained a persistent eye on its target while concurrently confirming the absence of civilians within collateral-damage range. The PC-12 pilot communicated directly with the pilot of the A-29, ensuring the pilot's situational awareness of the target area.

The PC-12 is a critical asset in both the "exploit" and "analyze" targeting phases, collecting real-time battle-damage assessment that can be fed directly to an A-29 pilot and an Afghan commander on the ground. This information feeds the decision-making cycle of the pilot and commander on whether to conduct follow-on strikes. A final and more thorough strike assessment is also conducted by intelligence analysts at the national level based on the PC-12's video, which is linked into the NIMS.

**ScanEagle.** Afghanistan's first and only unmanned aircraft system (UAS) provides a real-time FMV capability in direct support of corps-level operations; the ScanEagle UAS has the potential to tremendously enhance the Afghan's ability to conduct successful targeting across the battlefield.

Two ScanEagle systems are currently in operation in Afghanistan, with six additional systems scheduled to be fully operational by 2019. The first ScanEagle system in operation is a U.S. government-owned and contractor-operated (GOCO) system used solely for ANA training. The second ScanEagle system, also a GOCO system, became the first to be operated primarily by trained Afghan operators upon the graduation of the first class of Afghan students from ScanEagle training in November 2016. As such, the system is a perfect example of the success of coalition fielding, training, and advising with the ANA.

**Wolfhound.** Another ISR system having positive effects on the battlefield for the Afghans is the Wolfhound, a low-level voice intercept system. The successful employment of the Wolfhound highlights both the quality work of our U.S. and coalition advisors and the adaptability of our Afghan partners to learn and adjust to a new way of operating.

Afghan units initially opted most often to employ the Wolfhounds in a purely defensive posture, keeping each system of three direction-finding (DF) radios in a static position. The Wolfhound system is effective to a small degree in this defensive posture; however, it was apparent to advisors that the Wolfhounds were not being used to the system's full potential. In discussions between a U.S. intelligence advisor and his Afghan counterpart, the deputy G-2 (intelligence officer) of an ANA unit, the deputy G-2 expressed his struggle with his ANA soldiers continually coming under attack while trying to clear a critical route between two remote ANA bases in Uruzgan.[4] He knew his soldiers would receive contact from the mountainous high ground in northern Kandahar, but they could never determine where along the route the enemy attacks would occur until it was too late.

The U.S. advisor realized the ANA soldiers were not deploying the Wolfhound systems to their maximum potential. A simple dialog on how radio DF and triangulation work led to an immediate change in how the ANA deployed their Wolfhound systems during route-clearing operations. The deputy G-2 organized training sessions and rehearsals, preparing the soldiers to not only triangulate enemy positions but to also then quickly call for indirect fire onto those locations. Less than two weeks later, during a continuation of their critical route-clearing

A ScanEagle image taken 31 October 2016 in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. (Image courtesy of authors)


A PC-12 image taken 5 November 2016 in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. (Image courtesy of authors)

mission to Tarin Kot, these soldiers once again made contact with local Taliban insurgents firing from several spots on the surrounding high ground. Executing the battle drill they rehearsed numerous times the previous week, this unit was able to obtain precise locations of the enemy insurgents, call for both D-30 artillery and 82 mm mortar indirect fire, and neutralize each of the enemy positions. Furthermore, the updated technique allowed the ANA corps to later identify and arrest an Afghan police officer who was informing the Taliban on the locations of the ANA patrols. The dedication and persistence of U.S. advisors to advise and assist, and the willingness of their Afghan counterparts to learn and adapt epitomizes the advisor-counterpart relationship.

**Persistent Surveillance System.** Providing a tremendous ISR capability for the Afghans at numerous locations across Afghanistan, the Persistent Surveillance System consists of both aerostat balloons and Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID) towers. Currently, six ANA aerostat balloons and twenty-two RAID towers are in operation across Afghanistan. These systems provide persistent ISR coverage for force protection, intelligence generation, patrol overwatch, countering improvised explosive devices, and countering indirect fire. In October 2015 in Zabul Province, an ANA 205th Corps' RAID tower operator identified over twenty-five Taliban insurgents and six motorcycles preparing for an attack. Through coordination with the supporting ANA artillery unit, the Afghans used indirect fire to effectively disperse the insurgent group and prevent their attack on the local city.

In another incident in January 2016, following an insurgent rocket attack near the Italian embassy inside the Kabul Green Zone, an Afghan-operated aerostat in Kabul was able coordinate with coalition aerostat operators to identify the origin of the rocket launch. This effort enabled Afghan police to quickly converge on the site and recover several unfired rockets that would have otherwise been launched at coalition bases later.

**Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System.** A final key intelligence asset worth mentioning is the ANA GSG2's Preliminary Credibility

Assessment Screening System (PCASS) program. This polygraph program ensures Afghans are properly screened prior to assuming sensitive positions throughout the ANA and Afghanistan government. Initiated in late 2012 due to the unacceptably high rate of "green-on-blue" incidents, the PCASS program is credited with a significant reduction of insider threats. Between December 2012 and June 2016, the Afghans have conducted over thirty thousand PCASS exams, resulting in over four hundred Afghans being removed from positions of proximity to coalition forces.[5] During this timeframe, several insurgent infiltration cells were also disrupted, making it possible for U.S. and coalition advisors to continue the mission of advising Afghans while concurrently ensuring the integrity of the Afghan targeting process.



Afghan National Army students receive National Incident Management System training February 2017 at the National Military Command Center in Kabul, Afghanistan. (Photo by Muhammad Aslam, Afghanistan Development and Registry Services)

### National Information Management System (NIMS)

· Secure, modular, web-based intelligence operations reporting database
· Similar to the U.S. Army's distributed common ground systems-army
· Locally developed
· Afghan-requested modifications (July 2016) included:
  - video feedback component
  - target pack serial number tracking mechanism
  - tool to link intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance requests to specific target packs
  - digital authority approval from national leaders, significantly expediting targeting process

## The Afghan Targeting Process

Even the most capable ISR systems require the right people in the right organizations to maintain, manage, and operate them. In the past two years, the Afghanistan Ministry of Defense has established important intelligence organizations and structures in order to manage and fuse intelligence across the country. The most important organization in Afghanistan's national targeting processes is the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC), the all-source, intelligence fusion center. Organized under the ANA GSG2, the NMIC's focus is primarily on counterinsurgency, providing analytical capability in support of targeting operations for both special operations and conventional forces. The NMIC is critical for the targeting process of strategic strikes involving the A-29 aircraft.

The Afghan targeting process begins with the submission of a target request originating at a tactical unit from one of the several ANA corps. The request passes through the NIMS to the NMIC Targeting Section.

An Afghan National Army aerostat balloon prepares to deploy 28 January 2015 at the Afghan Intelligence Training Center in Sia Sang, Afghanistan. (Photo courtesy of Combat Information Center, New Kabul Compound, Afghanistan)

### Persistent Stare System (PSS)

· Six aerostat blimps
  - day/night, electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) cameras
  - Afghan operated
  - two additional aerostats to be fielded by fiscal year 2019
· Twenty Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment towers
  - Star SAFIRE III EO/IR camera
  - Afghan operated
  - two additional towers to be fielded in fiscal year 2017

The NMIC targeting staff conducts a thorough review of the information in the request to ensure there is a viable target for execution.

The targeting staff then develops a target package that includes, but is not limited to, the locations of civilian population and infrastructure, antiaircraft weapon systems, and friendly forces within the target area; friendly force frequencies, call signs, and mobile numbers; data-mining of recent intelligence reporting within the NIMS; and geospatial imagery content. The Current Intelligence Section provides recent and relevant intelligence updates and the Geospatial Section provides the imagery to create a full and robust all-source product.

Once the target package is developed, it is included for consideration on the agenda of the daily GSG2-led Target Working Group meeting. The NMIC targeting chief chairs the meeting, bringing together representatives of agencies from across the Afghan government, including the office of the ANA general staff chief of operations (GSG3), the National Threat Intelligence Center, the Ministry of Interior, and the National Directorate of Security. This daily meeting is an excellent example of the intelligence sharing and intragovernment teamwork that is occurring in Afghanistan to ensure the success of complex operations like targeting.

Target packages that meet the stringent criteria of the Target Working Group proceed to the ANA Targeting Board, where the collateral damage estimate level is determined. If the collateral damage estimate is at an acceptable level, the GSG3, the chief of general staff, or the minister of defense then approves the target package for A-29 execution.

Finally, the Mission Planning Cell, manned by experienced and dedicated Afghan officers, conducts an additional review of the entire target package and coordinates ISR support. Nearly every A-29 mission includes pre- and poststrike ISR support by a PC-12 or a ScanEagle.

The entire targeting process can be conducted in less than twenty-four hours; this is made possible by the NIMS targeting module and the proven abilities of

An Afghan National Army soldier conducting training on the Wolfhound system 14 February 2017 at Camp Commando, Afghanistan. (Photo by Capt. Lindsay Gaylord, U.S. Army)

### Wolfhound

- Enhanced low-level voice intercept
- Dismounted, backpack system
- Detects, identifies, and direction finds VHF or UHF push-to-talk
- One Wolfhound system consisting of three nodes
- All six Afghan National Army corps fully fielded

A ScanEagle prepares for launch 14 April 2016 in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. (Photo by Lt. Charity Edgar, U.S. Navy)

### ScanEagle Unmanned Aircraft System

- Electro-optical/infrared/full-motion video capability directly supporting Afghan National Army ground commanders
- Fielding started April 2016
- One government-owned contractor-operated system dedicated to training Afghan soldiers
- One Afghan operated system in Helmand Province
- Six more systems to be fielded by fiscal year 2019

A member of the Afghan Air Force guides an A-29 Super Tucano 15 January 2016 at Hamid Karzai International Airport, Kabul, Afghanistan. The aircraft was added to the Afghan Air Force's inventory in the spring of 2016. Designed to operate in high temperatures and in extremely rugged terrain, the A-29 Super Tucano is a highly maneuverable fourth-generation weapons system capable of delivering precision-guided munitions. (Photo by Tech. Sgt. Nathan Lipscomb, U.S. Air Force)

the Afghans who own the targeting process. The NIMS targeting module allows complete transparency of target requests countrywide and eases tracking target requests. The module standardizes targeting-related forms and allows for operations-intelligence integration and synchronization with Afghan organizations external to the Ministry of Defense.

## Tangible Results

The successes of the ANA's intelligence structure mentioned above are significant, especially when compared to its status from a mere two years ago. In 2014, none of the ISR systems mentioned above existed in the ANA. ANA units then were conducting military operations under a more robust presence of coalition forces, and all the supporting ISR assets were owned and operated by the coalition. Today, the story is different, with a much more capable and better-equipped Afghan military on the cusp of being self-sufficient.

Tangible results abound, such as with the NIMS modifications. From September through November 2016, almost two hundred target requests were submitted through the NIMS, resulting in sixty-five A-29 strikes across every ANA corps.[6] And, in early 2016, the first ScanEagle system was fielded to directly support ANA operations in Helmand Province, although it was U.S. owned and operated. Since then, the first class of Afghan students has graduated from the ScanEagle School and now operates that ScanEagle system in support of military operations.

Just as significant as having these systems is having personnel trained to operate and sustain them. The ANA now conducts training for selected soldiers on how to use both the aerostat and the RAID tower at the Intelligence Training Center in Kabul. Afghan soldiers perform their own maintenance on the

Wolfhound systems, and the ANA recently contracted an Afghan company to provide field-service representatives to maintain all these systems used by ANA corps throughout Afghanistan.

The corps commanders across the ANA recognize and appreciate just how far the intelligence apparatus has come. During a recent Afghan Corps Commanders Conference (held at the Ministry of Defense in November 2016), the current state of Afghan intelligence was highly praised, and the consensus was that intelligence was indeed driving operations throughout Afghanistan.[7]

## The Future

Novelist Louis L'Amour said, "Nobody got anywhere in this world by simply being content," and neither the coalition advisors nor their Afghan counterparts are yet content.[8] As far as we have come in the past two years, great things await us in the years to come. The deliberate targeting process described above continues to be refined and honed, ensuring the right enemy targets are hit in a timely manner without civilian casualties. The next step is already being undertaken, as the ANA general staffs work on a formal dynamic targeting process utilizing F3EAD, which will greatly expand the Afghan targeting process by allowing moving targets to be engaged, enhancing its effects against the Taliban.

Finally, within the next two years, the ANA will procure two more aerostats and two more RAID towers. They will also field six more ScanEagle systems, giving each ANA corps its own organic unmanned aerial ISR system. These ScanEagle systems will be operated and maintained by the Afghans and will give each corps the ability do what they currently rely solely on the PC-12 to do.

In the not so distant future, it will be an Afghan-operated ScanEagle providing the "find" and "fix" phases of a dynamic targeting opportunity. It will be an Afghan pilot sitting at the ground control station in Uruzgan, maintaining persistent observation from high above. A team of Afghan soldiers helping to operate the ScanEagle will vector in the highly reliable A-29 strike aircraft. The target this time might be Taliban insurgents fleeing the battlefield in pickup trucks. The A-29 will come swooping down to deal yet another lethal blow to the enemy insurgency, delivering a small but important victory to a dedicated Afghan military force and the coalition advisors who advise them, and providing yet another concrete example of how capable the Afghan intelligence enterprise has become. ■

## Notes

1. Andrew Lowe (GSG2 National Military Intelligence Center targeting mentor and Operations Team lead, Headquarters, Resolute Support), interview by Loren Traugutt, 26 October 2016, Kabul, Afghanistan.

2. Abdul Manan Farahi (Afghan National Army general staff chief of intelligence), interview by Loren Traugutt, 5 November 2016, Ministry of Defense, Kabul, Afghanistan.

3. Joint Publication 3-26, *Counterterrorism* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 24 October 2014), V-4, fig. V-2.

4. Alexander Driscoll (captain, U.S. Army, ANA 215th Corps senior intelligence advisor), interview by Loren Traugutt, 25 October 2016, Kabul, Afghanistan.

5. Micah Reel (GSG2 strategic counterintelligence mentor, Headquarters, Resolute Support), interview by Loren Traugutt, 14 December 2016, Kabul, Afghanistan.

6. Lowe, interview.

7. General remarks from Afghan officers during the Afghan National Army Corps Commanders Conference, November 2016, Ministry of Defense, Kabul, Afghanistan.

8. Louis L'Amour, *Bendigo Shafter* (New York: Bantam Books, March 2004), Kindle edition.

# Pros and Cons of Autonomous Weapons Systems

Amitai Etzioni, PhD

Oren Etzioni, PhD

Autonomous weapons systems and military robots are progressing from science fiction movies to designers' drawing boards, to engineering laboratories, and to the battlefield. These machines have prompted a debate among military planners, roboticists, and ethicists about the development and deployment of weapons that can perform increasingly advanced functions, including targeting and application of force, with little or no human oversight.

Some military experts hold that autonomous weapons systems not only confer significant strategic and tactical advantages in the battleground but also that they are preferable on moral grounds to the use of human combatants. In contrast, critics hold that these weapons should be curbed, if not banned altogether, for a variety of moral and legal reasons. This article first reviews arguments by those who favor autonomous weapons systems and then by those who oppose them. Next, it discusses challenges to limiting and defining autonomous weapons. Finally, it closes with a policy recommendation.

## Arguments in Support of Autonomous Weapons Systems

Support for autonomous weapons systems falls into two general categories. Some members of the defense community advocate autonomous weapons because of military advantages. Other supporters emphasize moral justifications for using them.

**Military advantages.** Those who call for further development and deployment of autonomous weapons systems generally point to several military advantages. First, autonomous weapons systems act as a force multiplier. That is, fewer warfighters are needed for a given mission, and the efficacy of each warfighter is greater. Next, advocates credit autonomous weapons systems with expanding the battlefield, allowing combat to reach into areas that were previously inaccessible. Finally, autonomous weapons systems can reduce casualties by removing human warfighters from dangerous missions.[1]

The Department of Defense's *Unmanned Systems Roadmap: 2007-2032* provides additional reasons for pursuing autonomous weapons systems. These include that robots are better suited than humans for "'dull, dirty, or dangerous' missions."[2] An example of a dull mission is long-duration sorties. An example of a dirty mission is one that exposes humans to potentially harmful radiological material. An example of a dangerous mission is explosive ordnance disposal. Maj. Jeffrey S. Thurnher, U.S. Army, adds, "[lethal autonomous robots] have the unique potential to operate at a tempo faster than humans can possibly achieve and to lethally strike even when communications links have been severed."[3]

In addition, the long-term savings that could be achieved through fielding an army of military robots have been highlighted. In a 2013 article published in *The Fiscal Times*, David Francis cites Department of Defense figures showing that "each soldier in Afghanistan costs the Pentagon roughly $850,000 per year."[4] Some estimate the cost per year to be even higher. Conversely, according to Francis, "the TALON robot—a small rover that can be outfitted with weapons, costs $230,000."[5]

As autonomous weapons systems move from concept to reality, military planners, roboticists, and ethicists debate the advantages, disadvantages, and morality of their use in current and future operating environments. (Image by Peggy Frierson)

According to *Defense News,* Gen. Robert Cone, former commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, suggested at the 2014 Army Aviation Symposium that by relying more on "support robots," the Army eventually could reduce the size of a brigade from four thousand to three thousand soldiers without a concomitant reduction in effectiveness.[6]

Air Force Maj. Jason S. DeSon, writing in the *Air Force Law Review,* notes the potential advantages of autonomous aerial weapons systems.[7] According to DeSon, the physical strain of high-G maneuvers and the intense mental concentration and situational awareness required of fighter pilots make them very prone to fatigue and exhaustion; robot pilots, on the other hand would not be subject to these physiological and mental constraints. Moreover, fully autonomous planes could be programmed to take genuinely random and unpredictable action that could confuse an opponent. More striking still, Air Force Capt. Michael Byrnes predicts that a single unmanned aerial vehicle with machine-controlled maneuvering and accuracy could, "with a few hundred rounds of ammunition and sufficient fuel reserves," take out an entire fleet of aircraft, presumably one with human pilots.[8]

In 2012, a report by the Defense Science Board, in support of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, identified "six key areas in which advances in autonomy would

have significant benefit to [an] unmanned system: perception, planning, learning, human-robot interaction, natural language understanding, and multiagent coordination."[9] *Perception*, or perceptual processing, refers to sensors and sensing. Sensors include hardware, and sensing includes software.[10]

Next, according to the Defense Science Board, *planning* refers to "computing a sequence or partial order of actions that … [achieve] a desired state."[11] The process relies on effective processes and "algorithms needed to make decisions about action (provide autonomy) in situations in which humans are not in the environment (e.g., space, the ocean)."[12] Then, *learning* refers to how machines can collect and process large amounts of data into knowledge. The report asserts that research has shown machines process data into knowledge more effectively than people do.[13] It gives the example of machine learning for autonomous navigation in land vehicles and robots.[14]

*Human-robot interaction* refers to "how people work or play with robots."[15] Robots are quite different from other computers or tools because they are "physically situated agents," and human users interact with them in distinct ways.[16] Research on interaction needs to span a number of domains well beyond engineering, including psychology, cognitive science, and communications, among others.

"*Natural language processing* concerns … systems that can communicate with people using ordinary human languages."[17] Moreover, "natural language is the most normal and intuitive way for humans to instruct autonomous systems; it allows them to provide diverse, high-level goals and strategies rather than detailed teleoperation."[18] Hence, further development of the ability of autonomous weapons systems to respond to commands in a natural language is necessary.

Finally, the Defense Science Board uses the term *multiagent coordination* for circumstances in which a task is distributed among "multiple robots, software agents, or humans."[19] Tasks could be centrally planned or coordinated through interactions of the agents. This sort of coordination goes beyond mere cooperation because "it assumes that the agents have a cognitive understanding of each other's capabilities, can monitor progress towards the goal, and engage in more human-like teamwork."[20]

**Moral justifications.** Several military experts and roboticists have argued that autonomous weapons systems should not only be regarded as morally acceptable but also that they would in fact be ethically preferable to human fighters. For example, roboticist Ronald C. Arkin believes autonomous robots in the future will be able to act more "humanely" on the battlefield for a number of reasons, including that they do not need to be programmed with a self-preservation instinct, potentially eliminating the need for a "shoot-first, ask questions later" attitude.[21] The judgments of autonomous weapons systems will not be clouded by emotions such as fear or hysteria, and the systems will be able to process much more incoming sensory information than humans without discarding or distorting it to fit preconceived notions. Finally, per Arkin, in teams comprised of human and robot soldiers, the robots could be more relied upon to report ethical infractions they observed than would a team of humans who might close ranks.[22]

Lt. Col. Douglas A. Pryer, U.S. Army, asserts there might be ethical advantages to removing humans from high-stress combat zones in favor of robots. He points to neuroscience research that suggests the neural circuits responsible for conscious self-control can shut down when overloaded with stress, leading to sexual assaults and other crimes that soldiers would otherwise be less likely to commit. However, Pryer sets aside the question of whether or not waging war via robots is ethical in the abstract. Instead, he suggests that because it sparks so much moral outrage among the populations from whom the United States most needs support, robot warfare has serious strategic disadvantages, and it fuels the cycle of perpetual warfare.[23]

## Arguments Opposed to Autonomous Weapons Systems

While some support autonomous weapons systems with moral arguments, others base their opposition on moral grounds. Still others assert that moral arguments against autonomous weapons systems are misguided.

**Opposition on moral grounds.** In July 2015, an open letter calling for a ban on autonomous weapons was released at an international joint conference on artificial intelligence. The letter warns, "Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology has reached a point where the deployment of such systems is—practically if not legally—feasible within years, not decades, and the stakes are high: autonomous weapons have been described as the third revolution in warfare, after gunpowder and nuclear arms."[24] The letter also notes that AI has the potential to benefit humanity, but that if a military AI arms race ensues, AI's reputation

could be tarnished, and a public backlash might curtail future benefits of AI. The letter has an impressive list of signatories, including Elon Musk (inventor and founder of Tesla), Steve Wozniak (cofounder of Apple), physicist Stephen Hawking (University of Cambridge), and Noam Chomsky (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), among others. Over three thousand AI and robotics researchers have also signed the letter. The open letter simply calls for "a ban on offensive autonomous weapons beyond meaningful human control."[25]

We note in passing that it is often unclear whether a weapon is offensive or defensive. Thus, many assume that an effective missile defense shield is strictly defensive, but it can be extremely destabilizing if it allows one nation to launch a nuclear strike against another without fear of retaliation.

In April 2013, the United Nations (UN) special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions presented a report to the UN Human Rights Council. The report recommended that member states should declare and implement moratoria on the testing, production, transfer, and deployment of lethal autonomous robotics (LARs) until an internationally agreed upon framework for LARs has been established.[26]

That same year, a group of engineers, AI and robotics experts, and other scientists and researchers from thirty-seven countries issued the "Scientists' Call to Ban Autonomous Lethal Robots." The statement notes the lack of scientific evidence that robots could, in the future, have "the functionality required for accurate target identification, situational awareness, or decisions regarding the proportional use of force."[27] Hence, they may cause a high level of collateral damage. The statement ends by insisting that "decisions about the application of violent force must not be delegated to machines."[28]

Indeed, the delegation of life-or-death decision making to nonhuman agents is a recurring concern of those who oppose autonomous weapons systems. The most obvious manifestation of this concern relates to systems that are capable of choosing their own targets. Thus, highly regarded computer scientist Noel Sharkey has called for a ban on "lethal autonomous targeting" because it violates the Principle of Distinction, considered one of the most important rules of armed conflict—autonomous weapons systems will find it very hard to determine who is a civilian and who is a combatant, which is difficult even for humans.[29] Allowing AI to make decisions about targeting will most likely result in civilian casualties and unacceptable collateral damage.

Another major concern is the problem of accountability when autonomous weapons systems are deployed. Ethicist Robert Sparrow highlights this ethical issue by noting that a fundamental condition of international humanitarian law, or *jus in bello*, requires that some person must be held responsible for civilian deaths. Any weapon or other means of war that makes it impossible to identify responsibility for the casualties it causes does not meet the requirements of jus in bello, and, therefore, should not be employed in war.[30]

This issue arises because AI-equipped machines make decisions on their own, so it is difficult to determine whether a flawed decision is due to flaws in the program or in the autonomous deliberations of the AI-equipped (so-called smart) machines. The nature of this problem was highlighted when a driverless car violated the speed limits by moving too slowly on a highway, and it was unclear to whom the ticket should be issued.[31] In situations where a human being makes the decision to use force against a target, there is a clear chain of accountability, stretching from whoever actually "pulled the trigger" to the commander who gave the order. In the case of autonomous weapons systems, no such clarity exists. It is unclear who or what are to be blamed or held liable.

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What Sharkey, Sparrow and the signatories of the open letter propose could be labeled "upstream regulation," that is, a proposal for setting limits on the development of autonomous weapons systems technology and drawing red lines that future technological developments should not be allowed to cross. This kind of upstream approach tries to foresee the direction of technological development and preempt the dangers such developments would pose. Others prefer "downstream regulation," which takes a wait-and-see approach by developing regulations as new advances occur. Legal scholars Kenneth Anderson and Matthew Waxman, who advocate this approach, argue that regulation will have to emerge along with the technology because they believe that morality will coevolve with technological development.[32]

Thus, arguments about the irreplaceability of human conscience and moral judgment may have to be revisited.[33] In addition, they suggest that as humans become more accustomed to machines performing functions with life-or-death implications or consequences (such as driving cars or performing surgeries), humans will most likely become more comfortable with AI technology's incorporation into weaponry. Thus, Anderson and Waxman propose what might be considered a communitarian solution by suggesting that the United States should work on developing norms and principles (rather than binding legal rules) guiding and constraining research and development—and eventual deployment—of autonomous weapons systems. Those norms could help establish expectations about legally or ethically appropriate conduct. Anderson and Waxman write,

> To be successful, the United States government would have to resist two extreme instincts. It would have to resist its own instincts to hunker down behind secrecy and avoid discussing and defending even guiding principles. It would also have to refuse to cede the moral high ground to critics of autonomous lethal systems, opponents demanding some grand international treaty or multilateral regime to regulate or even prohibit them.[34]

**Counterarguments.** In response, some argue against any attempt to apply to robots the language of morality that applies to human agents. Military ethicist George Lucas Jr. points out, for example, that robots cannot feel anger or a desire to "get even" by seeking retaliation for harm done to their compatriots.[35] Lucas holds that the debate thus far has been obfuscated by the confusion of machine autonomy with moral autonomy. The Roomba vacuum cleaner and Patriot missile "are both 'autonomous' in that they perform their assigned missions, including encountering and responding to obstacles, problems, and unforeseen circumstances with minimal human oversight," but not in the sense that they can change or abort their mission if they have "moral objections."[36] Lucas thus holds that the primary concern of engineers and designers developing autonomous weapons systems should not be *ethics* but rather *safety* and *reliability*, which means taking due care to address the possible risks of malfunctions, mistakes, or misuse that autonomous weapons systems will present. We note, though, that safety is of course a moral value as well.

Lt. Col. Shane R. Reeves and Maj. William J. Johnson, judge advocates in the U.S. Army, note that there are battlefields absent of civilians, such as underwater and space, where autonomous weapons could reduce the possibility of suffering and death by eliminating the need for combatants.[37] We note that this valid observation does not agitate against a ban in other, in effect most, battlefields.

Michael N. Schmitt of the Naval War College makes a distinction between weapons that are illegal per se and the unlawful use of otherwise legal weapons. For example, a rifle is not prohibited under international law, but using it to shoot civilians would constitute an unlawful use. On the other hand, some weapons (e.g., biological weapons) are unlawful per se, even when used only against combatants. Thus, Schmitt grants that some autonomous weapons systems might contravene international law, but "it is categorically not the case that all such systems will do so."[38] Thus, even an autonomous system that is incapable of distinguishing between civilians and combatants should not necessarily be unlawful per se, as autonomous weapons systems could be used in situations where no civilians were present, such as against tank formations in the desert or against warships. Such a system could be *used* unlawfully, though, if it were employed in contexts where civilians were present. We assert that some limitations on such weapons should be called for.

Soldiers from 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, move forward toward simulated opposing forces with a multipurpose unmanned tactical transport 22 July 2016 during the Pacific Manned-Unmanned Initiative at Marine Corps Training Area Bellows, Hawaii. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Christopher Hubenthal, U.S. Air Force)

In their review of the debate, legal scholars Gregory Noone and Diana Noone conclude that everyone is in agreement that any autonomous weapons system would have to comply with the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), and thus be able to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants. They write, "No academic or practitioner is stating anything to the contrary; therefore, this part of any argument from either side must be ignored as a red herring. Simply put, no one would agree to any weapon that ignores LOAC obligations."[39]

## Limits on Autonomous Weapons Systems and Definitions of Autonomy

The international community has agreed to limits on mines and chemical and biological weapons, but an agreement on limiting autonomous weapons systems would meet numerous challenges. One challenge is the lack of consensus on how to define the autonomy of weapons systems, even among members of the Department of Defense. A standard definition that accounts for levels of autonomy could help guide an incremental approach to proposing limits.

**Limits on autonomous weapons systems.** We take it for granted that no nation would agree to forswear the use of autonomous weapons systems unless its adversaries would do the same. At first blush, it may seem that it is not beyond the realm of possibility to obtain an international agreement to ban autonomous weapons systems or at least some kinds of them.

Many bans exist in one category or another of weapons, and they have been quite well honored and enforced. These include the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (known as the Ottawa Treaty, which became international law in 1999); the Chemical Weapons Convention (ratified in 1997); and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,

Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (known as the Biological Weapons Convention, adopted in 1975). The record of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (adopted in 1970) is more complicated, but it is credited with having stopped several nations from developing nuclear arms and causing at least one to give them up.

Some advocates of a ban on autonomous weapons systems seek to ban not merely production and deployment but also research, development, and testing of these machines. This may well be impossible as autonomous weapons systems can be developed and tested in small workshops and do not leave a trail. Nor could one rely on satellites for inspection data for the same reasons. We hence assume that if such a ban were possible, it would mainly focus on deployment and mass production.

Even so, such a ban would face considerable difficulties. While it is possible to determine what is a chemical weapon and what is not (despite some disagreements at the margin, for example, about law enforcement use of irritant chemical weapons), and to clearly define nuclear arms or land mines, autonomous weapons systems come with very different levels of autonomy.[40] A ban on all autonomous weapons would require foregoing many modern weapons already mass produced and deployed.

**Definitions of autonomy.** Different definitions have been attached to the word "autonomy" in different Department of Defense documents, and the resulting concepts suggest rather different views on the future of robotic warfare. One definition, used by the Defense Science Board, views autonomy merely as high-end automation: "a capability (or a set of capabilities) that enables a particular action of a system to be automatic or, within programmed boundaries, 'self-governing.'"[41] According to this definition, already existing capabilities, such as autopilot used in aircraft, could qualify as autonomous.

Another definition, used in the *Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011–2036*, suggests a qualitatively different view of autonomy: "an autonomous system is able to make a decision based on a set of rules and/or limitations. It is able to determine what information is important in making a decision."[42] In this view, autonomous systems are less predictable than merely automated ones, as the AI not only is performing a specified action but also is making decisions and thus potentially taking an action that a human did not order. A human is still responsible for programming the behavior of the autonomous system, and the actions the system takes would have to be consistent with the laws and strategies provided by humans. However, no individual action would be completely predictable or preprogrammed.

It is easy to find still other definitions of autonomy. The International Committee of the Red Cross defines autonomous weapons as those able to "independently select and attack targets, i.e., with autonomy in the 'critical functions' of acquiring, tracking, selecting and attacking targets."[43]

A 2012 Human Rights Watch report by Bonnie Docherty, *Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots*, defines three categories of autonomy. Based on the kind of human involvement, the categories are human-in-the-loop, human-on-the-loop, and human-out-of-the-loop weapons.[44]

"Human-*in*-the-loop weapons [are] robots that can select targets and deliver force only with a human command."[45] Numerous examples of the first type already are in use. For example, Israel's Iron Dome system detects incoming rockets, predicts their trajectory, and then sends




*The U.S. Army Robotic and Autonomous Systems Strategy*, published March 2017 by U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, describes how the Army intends to integrate new technologies into future organizations to help ensure overmatch against increasingly capable enemies. Five capability objectives are to increase situational awareness, lighten soldiers' workloads, sustain the force, facilitate movement and maneuver, and protect the force. To view the strategy, visit https://www.tradoc.army.mil/FrontPageContent/Docs/RAS_Strategy.pdf.

this information to a human soldier who decides whether to launch an interceptor rocket.[46]

"Human-*on-the*-loop weapons [are] robots that can select targets and deliver force under the oversight of a human operator who can override the robots' actions."[47] An example mentioned by Docherty includes the SGR-A1 built by Samsung, a sentry robot used along the Korean Demilitarized Zone. It uses a low-light camera and pattern-recognition software to detect intruders and then issues a verbal warning. If the intruder does not surrender, the robot has a machine gun that can be fired remotely by a soldier the robot has alerted, or by the robot itself if it is in fully automatic mode.[48]

The United States also deploys human-on-the-loop weapons systems. For example, the MK 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System has been used on Navy ships since the 1980s, and it is capable of detecting, evaluating, tracking, engaging, and using force against antiship missiles and high-speed aircraft threats without any human commands.[49] The Center for a New American Security published a white paper that estimated as of 2015 at least thirty countries have deployed or are developing human-supervised systems.[50]

"Human-*out-of*-the-loop weapons [are] robots capable of selecting targets and delivering force without any human input or interaction."[51] This kind of autonomous weapons system is the source of much concern about "killing machines." Military strategist Thomas K. Adams warned that, in the future, humans would be reduced to making only initial policy decisions about war, and they would have mere symbolic authority over automated systems.[52] In the Human Rights Watch report, Docherty warns, "By eliminating human involvement in the decision to use lethal force in armed conflict, fully autonomous weapons would undermine other, nonlegal protections for civilians."[53] For example, a repressive dictator could deploy emotionless robots to kill and instill fear among a population without having to worry about soldiers who might empathize with their victims (who might be neighbors, acquaintances, or even family members) and then turn against the dictator.

For the purposes of this paper, we take autonomy to mean a machine has the ability to make decisions based on information gathered by the machine and to act on the basis of its own deliberations, beyond the instructions and parameters its producers, programmers, and users provided to the machine.

## A Way to Initiate an International Agreement Limiting Autonomous Weapons

We find it hard to imagine nations agreeing to return to a world in which weapons had no measure of autonomy. On the contrary, development in AI leads one to expect that more and more machines and instruments of all kinds will become more autonomous. Bombers and fighter aircraft having no human pilot seem inevitable. Although it is true that any level of autonomy entails, by definition, some loss of human control, this genie has left the bottle and we see no way to put it back again.

**Where to begin.** The most promising way to proceed is to determine whether one can obtain an international agreement to ban *fully autonomous* weapons with missions that *cannot be aborted* and that cannot be recalled once they are launched. If they malfunction and target civilian centers, there is no way to stop them. Like unexploded landmines placed without marks, these weapons will continue to kill even after the sides settle their difference and sue for peace.

One may argue that gaining such an agreement should not be arduous because no rational policy maker will favor such a weapon. Indeed, the Pentagon has directed that "autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force."[54]

**Why to begin.** However, one should note that human-out-of-the-loop arms are very effective in reinforcing a red line. Declaration by representatives of one nation that if another nation engages in a certain kind of hostile behavior, swift and severe retaliation will follow, are open to misinterpretation by the other side, even if backed up with deployment of troops or other military assets.

Leaders, drawing on considerable historical experience, may bet that they be able to cross the red line and be spared because of one reason or another. Hence, arms without a human in the loop make for much more credible red lines. (This is a form of the "precommitment strategy" discussed by Thomas Schelling in *Arms and Influence*, in which one party limits its own

options by obligating itself to retaliate, thus making its deterrence more credible.)[55]

We suggest that nations might be willing to forgo this advantage of fully autonomous arms in order to gain the assurance that once hostilities ceased, they could avoid becoming entangled in new rounds of fighting because some bombers were still running loose and attacking the other side, or because some bombers might malfunction and attack civilian centers. Finally, if a ban on fully autonomous weapons were agreed upon and means of verification were developed, one could aspire to move toward limiting weapons with a high but not full measure of autonomy. ■

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Office of the Secretary of Defense Logistics Program fellows visit the bridge of the USNS *Gilliland* 28 October 2015 during a tour of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) ship. Shown from left to right are Stanley McMillian, Lt. Col. Ed Hogan (*kneeling*), Bryan Jerkatis, Donald Gillespie, Art Clark (MSC Surge Sealift Program Readiness Officer), USNS *Gilliland*'s Master Keith Finnerty, and Renee Hubbard. (Photo courtesy of U.S. Navy)

## The Office of the Secretary of Defense Logistics Fellows Program

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Logistics Fellows Program is open to field-grade officer (O4 to O5) and Department of Defense (DOD) civilian logisticians (GS-13 to GS-14). According to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, which administers the program, the one-year fellowship is a developmental assignment that fosters learning, growth, and experiential opportunities.

Fellows participate in policy formulation and department-wide oversight responsibilities. They tour public- and private-sector logistics organizations to learn how they conduct operations and to observe industry best practices. They gain insight into legislative processes through visits to Congress, and they attend national-level forums and engage in collaborative efforts with industry partners. Fellows can observe and interact with appointed and career senior executives and flag officers, including one-on-one meetings with senior logistics leaders in the military departments, joint staff, OSD, and other agencies. They can gain a deeper understanding of the OSD perspective and how it affects the DOD enterprise. More information about the program and how to apply can be found at http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/lmr/fellows_program.html.


Wes Coleman (*left*), a construction manager for Fluor Corporation, reports on the progress of a new Ebola treatment unit to Maj. Gen. Gary Volesky, the commander of Joint Forces Command–United Assistance, and Sam Sells (*background*), the military liaison for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), during Operation United Assistance 2 December 2014 in Ganta, Liberia. United Assistance is a Department of Defense operation to provide logistics, training, and engineering support to USAID-led efforts to contain the Ebola virus outbreak in Liberia. (Photo by Sgt. 1st Class Brien Vorhees, U.S. Army)

# New Logistics Ideas for a Complex World

Col. James Kennedy, U.S. Army, Retired
Lt. Col. Kris Hughes, U.S. Army

*The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World* describes the anticipated challenges the Army might face in the future.[1] It explains that the Army does not know the time, place, or enemy it will face, and it identifies the operational challenges the Army must anticipate to win. In order to meet those challenges, the U.S. Army's centers of excellence are busy identifying capability gaps; determining doctrine, organization,

training, materiel, leadership education, personnel, facilities, and policy solutions; and updating functional concepts to evolve the current force into the Army described in *Force 2025 and Beyond*.[2] The "AirLand Battle" or "Full-Spectrum Operations" experience of our senior leaders and the forward operating base and counterinsurgency experience of our midgrade leaders served us well during the Cold War and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.[3] However, in our unknown and unknowable future, we will need to change some of our paradigms. It is our intent to highlight five recommendations to drive discussion at the Sustainment Center of Excellence and with senior leaders that may help our sustainment force be more responsive and agile for soldiers and commanders:

- Create a joint logistics staff officer career track.
- Create a specific military occupational specialty (MOS) for operational contract support officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in lieu of additional skill identifiers.
- Provide an annex in a doctrine publication that includes a template statement of work that can be easily modified.
- Create "homestead" units in which the majority of special skill logistical personnel can be retained to maintain their skill sets.
- Provide rapid access to the Army working capital funds for Army contracting officers.

## Joint Logistics Staff Officer

Joint assignments provide Army officers the opportunity to develop the skills and knowledge necessary to be successful when planning and executing joint operations. The skills and knowledge they gain include using the joint planning process, integrating Army-centric capabilities into joint operations, and gaining an understanding of the capabilities and cultures of the other services.[4] However, once their joint assignments are complete, officers that are now experienced and joint qualified return to an Army organization, creating a joint-billet vacancy that a non-joint-qualified officer must fill. While the Army will benefit from having a joint-qualified officer back in its ranks, the joint community will have to wait for a new officer to develop the required skills to be fully proficient in his or her duties. In a future where joint operations will be more prevalent, does this continual loss of experience make sense? What if instead of rotating officers in and out of joint billets, we allow a certain percentage of logistics officers to follow a joint officer career path?

Once officers reach the rank of major, complete their key developmental assignments, and are eligible for joint assignments, they could be given the option to follow a joint career path. While these officers would still compete for branch command assignments to ensure they are competitive for promotion, all their future assignments would be joint. There are many advantages to this option. By allowing a certain number of logistics officers to follow a joint career path, the joint community will retain their joint experience. Upon entering a new joint assignment, these officers will not have the same basic joint-operations knowledge gaps that non-joint-qualified officers often have, so they will more efficiently and quickly contribute to the mission. The officers will bring new perspectives and insights from previous joint assignments, and they will also have an understanding of how the other services work and how to best integrate Army capabilities into joint operations. Gaining an understanding of service cultures is one of the most

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difficult perspectives for a joint officer to develop. It is impossible to teach; this understanding must come from experience, which takes time.

Another advantage of this option is the savings in both temporary duty and permanent change of station (PCS) costs. Maintaining joint-qualified officers in joint assignments means there will be a reduced requirement to send officers to the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia, to attend the ten-week Joint and Combined Warfighting School. The school is necessary for an officer to receive Joint Professional Military Education Phase II certification, which is a requirement to receive the Joint Qualified Officer additional skill identifier (3L). Additionally, by having officers on a joint career path, the duration of their assignments can be extended past the traditional three years, reducing PCS costs and mission degradation caused by personnel transitions.

A major drawback to this option is the potential loss of an officer's Army-specific knowledge due to serving exclusively in joint billets, but there are a number of ways to mitigate this. Officers on a joint career track can participate in Army conferences and events, or serve in an observer coach/trainer assignment with the Mission Command Training Program in their specialty area of expertise. They can maintain their Army-specific proficiency by receiving newsletters from their functional branches or from organizations such as the Center for Army Lessons Learned. And, they can follow Army organizations such as Army Materiel Command or the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command on social media or on the organizations' websites.

Maintaining Army-specific knowledge is not a new challenge for Army personnel. Many officers spend time in broadening assignments where they have little contact with the Army. Foreign area officers are a good example of officers that must maintain their Army proficiency despite being stationed away from Army forces, and the Acquisition Branch has a "regreening" program to help its officers retain currency.

As previously mentioned, the Army benefits from having joint-qualified officers in its ranks, but the amount of joint-qualified officers serving in Army organizations would decrease if officers choose to follow a joint career track. Despite this reduction, the Army would still have some officers rotating between joint and Army assignments, and with more efficient communication between service staffs, the Army would not lose the benefits of having joint-qualified personnel in its ranks.

Finally, there may be some concern about a non-joint career track officer's potential to earn the rank of general officer as joint qualification is a requirement. However, if an officer demonstrates the potential to be a general officer, he or she can still be assigned to an enterprise-level joint billet to receive joint qualification, but not remain in the joint community permanently.

## Operational Contract Support Officer and Noncommissioned Officer

The first two operational contract support (OCS) principles identified in Joint Publication 4-10, *Operational Contract Support*, are, "Contracted support can be a significant force multiplier …," and "Most joint operations will include contracted support."[5] Leaders and soldiers today can attest to the tremendous benefits contracted support brings to the fight to support mission accomplishment, especially in protracted operations or in an expeditionary environment where the number of military "boots on the ground" is limited.

Operation United Assistance, the U.S. government response to combating the Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa in 2015, is an excellent recent example of how the U.S. Army and U.S. Africa Command quickly harnessed the capabilities of commercial companies and Logistics Civil Augmentation Program contractors to execute planning, construction, and sustainment, which played a huge role in the success of the mission. Yet, the Department of Defense inspector general's report from October 2015 clearly stated that the Army provided insufficient supervision and training to contracting officer representatives (CORs) during the mission.[6]

Having an adequate supply of well-trained and experienced CORs is an excellent mitigation for contracting shortfalls, but with force reductions, we need to look at solutions that do not require growing the force. The current system of COR oversight is not working and needs an adjustment. To rectify this, we recommend the creation of a secondary Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 51O, for OCS officers and NCOs, with the Sustainment Center of Excellence as the proponent.[7] This MOS is not meant to be a replacement for the 3C additional skill identifier (ASI), which is awarded to personnel who qualify to plan for contractor integration at the operational and

tactical levels. Instead, this MOS could be awarded after attending a short course at Fort Lee, Virginia, or the Contracting Center of Excellence in Huntsville, Alabama, to certify the selectees in their new secondary MOS. Our rationale for an MOS instead of an ASI is that an MOS fills a primary duty, while the ASI is often considered as an additional duty.

Currently, brigade combat teams have a 3C ASI OCS planner authorized for the assistant S-4 (logistics officer). In addition to planning, this person manages OCS as an additional duty, but often without appropriate training. Adding a new member to the brigade staff—a 51O officer—to focus on OCS execution and management during an operation would reduce the workload on the OCS planner. When not deployed, these officers would continue to work in units in both the operating and generating force in their primary MOS. When needed, however, they could be tasked by the Department of the Army or pulled from other locations in the command to deploy with a unit.

The 51O officer and NCO could be placed on a unit's table of organization (TOE) or augmentation table of distribution and allowances (TDA) at the O-6 headquarters level, but not filled unless deployed, similar to the Professional Officer Filler Information System concept for medical personnel.[8] Once deployed, the primary duty description of this officer or NCO would be to oversee and manage the CORs, to teach and coach the CORs in the performance of their duties, and to perform other additional duties as assigned. A prequalification for the MOS would be that the soldier must have successfully performed duties as a COR for a year. The benefit of the prequalification is that a unit will receive a staff officer with skills and experience in management of contractors, OCS, and CORs.

One incentive for someone to volunteer for this second MOS might be his or her desire to build on their experience in contracting and COR management. Another incentive might be an individual's desire to contribute to the operation. Additionally, OCS is a very marketable skill after departing service, so individuals having this secondary MOS could benefit after their military service. The Army could also offer incentive pay or some other bonus to soldiers who serve in these positions. There would be no need for career progression in the MOS because it is a secondary MOS only.

The Army potentially would need to have up to one hundred personnel with this secondary MOS to meet rotational demands in high-utilization areas, or as few as twenty-five in normal contingency operations. This would not result in growth for the Army since this is a secondary MOS for TOEs and TDAs and not a primary MOS requiring a modified table of organization and equipment (a permanent) space. The position could also be filled by a civilian who is trained and experienced, depending on the mission.

The Army's automated force-structure management programs would require adjustments to ensure this MOS requirement was recognized as secondary and would not result in an increase in total strength. This automated system change would require funding, but the future cost avoidances from better management associated with the new MOS would pay back the upfront cost. Two major benefits to the Army would be increased efficiency in supervision and fewer cases of waste or abuse because better qualified leaders would be managing OCS from within the brigade staff as their primary duty.

## Performance Work Statement in Doctrine

Defining the requirements is the first thing that must be done before starting a contract, but the Army does not always get the requirements right for many understandable reasons. Requirements identification is not an easy task, so many times Army leaders turn to past statements of work or other historical documents for their starting points. However, this leads to another challenge: finding past statements of work. While the Office of the Secretary of Defense and its Contingency Acquisition Support Model have performance work statement (PWS) templates on the contingency contracting website, these may not meet all situations.[9] Additionally, professional military training does not address these tools, so officers on the ground need a reference.

We propose including an annex in current doctrine publications that provides a template statement of work that can be easily modified. For example, in Army Techniques Publication 4-41, *Army Field Feeding and Class I Operations*, an annex could be included with a template PWS for contracting for field feeding services.[10] This type of PWS could be included in other functional doctrine manuals to ensure more thorough and efficient requirements development. While each

PWS needs to be analyzed to meet the needs of the specific mission, providing a template PWS as an annex for functional doctrine may ensure a unit captures certain general requirements. Additionally, requesting units will have an easy-to-reference guide to ensure a more effective contract. This template will reduce the burden on contracting offices, ensure critical requirements are not missed, reduce the amount of time requesting units spend on developing the PWS, and make the contracting process more responsive. And, since the expertise to ensure all requirements are included may not be available to assist with writing the PWS, these templates could ensure critical requirements are not left out. Additionally, a class on drafting PWS could be added to unit professional development programs and taught by the local contracting office.

There are some requirements and standards that should not be overlooked in a PWS, but often are. The PWS template should include

- the acceptable number of hours a contractor is allowed to work and if the hours of work are continuous or can be broken up over a twenty-four-hour period;
- government-furnished equipment; the accountability, readiness reporting, and maintenance of that equipment; and the specific use for the equipment to prevent misuse;
- means of accounting for contract personnel to include reporting times;
- required reports and deliverables to include submission time, formats, and means of transmission;
- inspection requirements to include the purpose for the inspection and how the inspection will be conducted;
- requirements for specific materials and processes; and
- life support made available to contractors such as housing, food service, medical care, and other available services.

By ensuring these requirements and standards are included in each PWS, the contractor will be more efficient, saving time and money, and the contract management will be more effective because the support will be better planned.

Another method to develop effective PWS development skills in Army leaders is to reinstate the PWS Development Course at the Army Logistics University, or increase the COR Course and the current OCS Planner (3C ASI) Course to include PWS development. This would ensure more officers are educated in proper requirements development and in adding the Contingency Acquisition Support Model information into PWSs as appropriate.

## Homestead Units

Given the planning limitation that we do not often know where or when we will be deploying, there are certain functional units that the Army may need in the opening days or weeks of an operation. We propose reassessing the idea of "homestead" units, where the majority of personnel can be retained in a unit to maintain unique skill sets. Reserve component units, in practice, already do this to a large extent, but these units take months to mobilize. One unit that might fit this concept is the 7th Transportation Brigade (Expeditionary), whose mission is to provide port, terminal, and watercraft operations, including logistics over-the-shore operations. This is the only unit of its kind in the active-duty structure. With the current concerns about enemy anti-access/area denial capabilities and the lack of advance knowledge of seaport, airport, and initial staging base locations, it makes sense to have our only expeditionary transportation Army asset as proficient, trained, and experienced as possible.

In a homestead unit, subordinate-unit captains and junior NCOs would be identified and retained as majors and senior NCOs on the brigade staff. Some might even stay in the unit as lieutenant colonels and sergeants major. Officers and NCOs could move in and out of the unit while the majority of senior leaders homestead in the unit. For example, once a captain completed company command, if he or she performed well, the brigade commander could designate the officer for return as a major after a generating force assignment for broadening and career progression.

Advantages created by homestead units include a decrease in PCS costs and the development of a core cadre with increased experience in unit-specific techniques, tactics, procedures, and operations. And, even if a new brigade commander or command sergeant major is not from the homesteading population, the staff that supports the new leadership would be very experienced. Another benefit for the homesteaders would be a more stabilized family environment. Spouses could

Soldiers with the 331st Transportation Company connect the final section of the Trident Pier causeway 15 April 2013 in Pohang, South Korea, during the Combined Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (CJLOTS) military exercise. CJLOTS was a ten-day training event intended to improve logistics interoperability, communication, and cooperation between the United States and South Korea. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

get long-term work, soldiers could benefit from home ownership, and children could remain in the same schools for longer periods. Finally, to make training, support, and readiness more effective, all the homestead units could be collocated on one base.

A downside to homesteading would be the potential for complacency and a lack of new ideas and perspectives, conditions that are generally overcome through varied personnel assignments. However, since these types of units would be highly specialized, the only perspectives in the Army regarding their respective specializations would come from within the units themselves. This would only apply to non-brigade-combat-team active-component units. Some possible units to study include a quartermaster pipeline terminal operating company, an inland cargo transfer company, a movement control battalion, a field services company, and maybe one combat sustainment support battalion.

## Access to the Army Working Capital Funds

*The Army Operating Concept* defines "set the theater" as "actions taken to establish and maintain the conditions necessary to seize the initiative and retain freedom of action."[11] One constraint that continually slows an Army contracting officer's ability to set the theater is the lack of immediate access to funds. The Army's cumbersome financial system does not support rapid acquisition in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief or immediate contingency environments. During Operation United Assistance, Army Contracting Command personnel could not procure needed supplies and services for days after arrival because they had to wait for appropriate funding to be released to U.S. Army Africa and then allocated to them for use through the General Fund Enterprise Business System.[12] However, the Defense Logistics Agency

(DLA) deployed contingency contracting personnel from their Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) who were able to write contracts immediately off the plane. Why? Because DLA has a process to authorize the JCASO contracting officer access to the Defense Working Capital Fund (DWCF) for immediate needs with the intent of reimbursing the DWCF once the authorized mission funds are released. While this was the first time JCASO's expeditionary contracting officers executed using DLA's DCWF, it proved to be a great success.

Under the provisions of Title 10, the secretary of defense may establish working capital funds to finance inventories of supplies, and industrial-type activities that provide common services, such as repair, manufacturing, or remanufacturing.[13] A large portion of the Army Working Capital Fund (AWCF) is managed by activities under Army Materiel Command. However, under the current rules, the Army cannot authorize subordinate elements to allocate AWCF money for emergent activities like Operation United Assistance in the manner executed by DLA. Thus, the Army should review and amend its policy to authorize Army Materiel Command to provide a limited amount of AWCF to the appropriate Army service component command to ensure Army Contracting Command contracting officers can respond swiftly to immediate life-support and setting-the-theater requirements, especially in humanitarian and disaster response operations.

## Conclusion

The recommendations mentioned above provide innovative approaches to achieving success when the Army does not know the time, place, or enemy it will be facing. By maintaining experience in our joint staff officers, enhancing our contract capability with the development of an OCS officer and NCO secondary MOS, creating efficiency by including template PWSs in doctrine, increasing proficiency in functional units through homesteading, and providing immediate access to funds through AWCF, the Army can more easily seize the initiative. Through the consideration of these proposed concepts, the Army can ensure it is responsive and adaptive, and ready to address the challenges of the unknowns and win in a complex world. ■

## Notes

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3. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 20 August 1982); FM 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, June 2001). "AirLand Battle" and "Full-Spectrum Operations" are previous doctrinal concepts of the U.S. Army.

4. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 11 August 2011), xxv.

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7. Kenneth Gambles, Ellsworth K. Johnson III, and Ethan A. Jones, "Military Proponency—Functional Area (FA) 51," *Army AL&T* (October-December 2009): 25–29, accessed 14 March 2017, http://asc.army.mil/docs/pubs/alt/2009/4_OctNovDec/articles/25_Military_Proponency--Functional_Area_(FA)_51_200904.pdf. The Army currently maintains career management field (CMF) 51 in the Army Acquisition Corps. Commissioned officers in this CMF are designated as FA 51 officers, while NCOs have a specific military occupational specialty 51C—acquisition, logistics, and technology (AL&T) contracting NCO.

8. Army Regulation 601-142, *Army Medical Department Professional Filler System* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 9 April 2007).

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11. TP 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept*, 23.

12. "General Fund Enterprise Business Systems (GFEBS)," U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center website, accessed 15 March 2017, http://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/general-fund-enterprise-business-systems-gfebs/.

13. 10 U.S.C. § 2208 (2015).


Boat crewmen with Maritime Safety and Security Team Los Angeles–Long Beach conduct tactical boat maneuvers 31 July 2012 during an exercise in San Pedro, California. The exercise was designed to test the unit's ability to protect a ship docked at a pier as well as underway using four Coast Guard small boats. (Photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Adam Eggers, U.S. Coast Guard)

# An Underutilized Counterinsurgency Asset

## The U.S. Coast Guard

Daniel E. Ward

Low-intensity conflict and insurgency are not only the most prevalent emerging threats globally but they are also those most likely to shape the world construct over the next decade and beyond. As one considers how to deal with such conflicts, it should be highlighted that many of the world's unstable areas most likely to be affected by insurgency are located in coastal nations. Consequently, the extensive experience of the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) in conducting littoral missions, coupled with that service's duality as both a military and a law-enforcement force, should make the USCG a logical choice as a key component of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. However, its capabilities in that capacity have been seriously underappreciated and underutilized.

Maritime Enforcement Specialist 3rd Class Jorge Lopez-Centellas, a U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement detachment member, conducts escort training with Cameroon sailors aboard USNS *Spearhead* 29 February 2016 in the Atlantic Ocean. (Photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Amanda A. Dunford, U.S. Navy)

COIN operations require a full spectrum of forces to address the numerous aspects associated with battling an insurgency and supporting a host-nation (HN) government in its efforts to achieve security and stability. The four military branches residing in the Department of Defense (DOD) have an entrenched role in COIN, both in academic and operational constructs. However, a vital asset is often overlooked: using the USCG during a COIN operation to complement DOD forces.

COIN involves employing elements of "soft power" (persuasion without force or coercion), engaging with HN personnel, and building security forces suited for missions that often include law enforcement and border control. The USCG habitually performs in these areas as it conducts its primary missions. Additionally, the USCG has a history of overseas engagements in which its unique capabilities—those not found within other branches of the military—were leveraged. Examples include port security and management of navigation aids in Iraq, instruction in countersmuggling and fisheries enforcement measures in Latin America and Africa, and liaison with partner nations whose maritime missions are more closely aligned with the USCG than the U.S. Navy. For these reasons, the USCG should be brought more closely into the "COIN fold," thereby increasing its operational tempo with regard to supporting nations against insurgents, as deemed necessary by U.S. government policy.

This is already occurring at some levels, but at a rate that, basically, amounts to window dressing. The USCG is often underutilized, in part because of misperceptions about its deployability and its blue-water capabilities, as well as inherent "inside-the-box" thinking on the part of strategic leadership that does not allow consideration of the smallest armed service as a COIN asset. Simple security principles dictate that we should address threats at a distance, vice allowing them to come into the homeland. Hence, we should push our borders out, and in this case, our coasts. By leveraging the USCG as a COIN asset, we can effectively enable partner nations to exert more

control over their own waters, create linkages between U.S. and HN military services, and gain information on the operational capacity and capabilities of our partners. Elements of COIN strategy have specific applicability to USCG mission sets, and there are particular areas in which the USCG is better suited than the DOD for such tasking. This includes securing maritime borders, meshing of law enforcement and defense functions within a single service, and building relationships with the populace from a constabulary vice defense posture.

Martin N. Murphy noted in *Proceedings* that today, "maritime insurgency presents a far greater challenge to world naval forces than random acts of terrorism at sea."[1] This challenge must be addressed, not simply through direct action, but by building, supporting, and establishing capable maritime security forces—a mission ready-made for the USCG. In large part, this is because the USCG's duality as a military and law enforcement organization gives it unique capabilities and insights not readily available within the DOD components. When assessing tools needed for COIN, one must recognize that

> in a country seriously threatened by insurgency … the simple two-tiered (police and military) model to which the United States is accustomed will not work. Instead, there is a need for sophisticated paramilitary internal-security forces organized, trained, and equipped to function either as police or as combat units, or as a hybrid of the two in tricky circumstances.[2]

Essentially, this defines the USCG.

## Foundations and Doctrine

Within the scope of COIN, stability operations are a critical foundational function. Stability operations include

> various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.[3]

Stability operations are primarily where USCG forces can serve to augment existing constructs. The long-term overarching objective for COIN is that a country and its governing bodies will provide stability and security as well as effective governance to the population. As noted by Heather Gregg, "a counterinsurgency campaign requires the creation of a functioning state, a government that can stand on its own, provide for its citizens, and promote regional and international stability."[4]

So, why is the USCG not already a major player in COIN? Operations such as maritime patrol, law enforcement, fisheries regulations, and port control are integral to many developing nations' security and stability. However, even though the USCG is mentioned or theoretically conceptualized with foreign internal defense (FID), it is often underutilized or not considered at all. At issue is the ability to see how the USCG can be an asset when compared with its larger, more overtly military cousins. When thinking about low-intensity conflict, "U.S. preparation for maritime small wars is stuck between two longtime tendencies," one being a preference "to focus on big conventional wars" and the other a dismissal of the "maritime domain as a matter of little strategic importance" when planning for low-intensity conflict.[5] Hence, if the environment is not given its due regard, one of the best tools for the job is not at the forefront of leadership's thinking.

Many authors, in the analysis of current COIN operations, have noted that "while the military has been an unparalleled expeditionary warfighter, our diplomatic, information, economic, and governance efforts have failed to fulfill stability operations."[6] This does not negatively reflect on the military personnel who put their lives at risk every day on such operations. However, instead of expecting forces trained primarily for close combat to conduct stability operations, maybe forces already geared for a similar mission should be employed.

The USCG is especially experienced in the control of maritime, coastal, and riverine environments, which are key for COIN success. Examples of such COIN environments include the struggle for control over waterways in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War, which "were key pathways for the movement of insurgent supplies and personnel." Similarly, control over

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A Coast Guard Cutter *Stratton* boarding team investigates a self-propelled semisubmersible interdicted 19 July 2015 in international waters off the coast of Central America. The *Stratton*'s crew recovered more than six tons of cocaine from the forty-foot vessel. (Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class LaNola Stone, U.S. Coast Guard)

waterways is integral to counterinsurgency in Iraq, where "movement of arms and IEDs along the country's estuaries and rivers" is a basic insurgent technique.[7]

COIN becomes even more complicated in other areas where "piracy flourishes … with poorly guarded ports and underpaid security personnel."[8] The factor of piracy could be greatly alleviated through applying USCG expertise in the establishment of functional patrol forces.

In an overarching analysis, David Sterman points out that "we will continue to see maritime insurgent networks and maritime counterinsurgent forces play important roles in irregular warfare."[9] If that is the case, we need better application of COIN tools to address this issue, many of which are intrinsic to the USCG, where there is already a foundation upon which to build, both empirically and academically. For example, USCG units that are operationally tasked with deployed law enforcement and security missions "also conduct a significant amount of FID by training foreign forces and operating with them in a 'technical assistance' capacity."[10] And, within governing documents such as Joint Publication (JP) 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*, the DOD already notes that "the ability to handle evolving scenarios as a federal law enforcement agency or an armed force is a unique characteristic of the USCG" as the USCG acts as a "maritime constabulary force."[11] This capability gives the USCG inherent knowledge, skills, and abilities not found or not exercised as a primary function within the other branches of the military.

There are several factors that illustrate the necessity of using USCG assets vice reliance on DOD units. For example, the U.S. Navy's blue-water focus does not align with the majority of the world's maritime forces, but working alongside those HN forces realistically falls more in line with the USCG's littoral footprint; USCG mission sets are more closely associated and share commonality with many foreign maritime forces.

To a large extent, stability operations and FID are forms of constabulary activities aimed at establishing

domestic order, security, and effective governance. Chapter 12 of *Small Wars Manual, U.S. Marine Corps (1940)* describes the need for a "constabulary" force that is "the national-defense force of the country concerned and also performs police duties and civil functions," meaning this organization is three-fold in military, law enforcement, and regulatory functions.[12] While this system may be somewhat foreign to the other branches of the U.S. military, these three areas basically describe the architectural concept behind the composition and structure of the USCG. And, while this model may not be the norm from a purely U.S. military perspective, the USCG structure can serve as a foundational model for many emerging nations, especially with those trying to coordinate and present a united front against an insurgency. So, to train a constabulary force, we should use our own to set the example and do the training.

We see that "despite the clear potential for insurgents and terrorists to use the maritime space, the issue has received scant attention. For example, the Navy's new *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* calls for a forward naval presence, but says little about the maritime small wars such forces might encounter."[13] Yet, we do not have to reinvent the wheel, because the basic doctrinal literature, such as JP 3-22, acknowledges that in consideration of COIN assets, "a common constabulary and multimission nature promotes instant understanding and interoperability and makes USCG a valued partner for many naval and maritime forces."[14]

But, this simple statement is not enough. What can we demonstrate as a "platform for understanding" in order to show that the unique nature of USCG operations make this service aptly suited for stability operations? One argument is that

> USSOCOM [U.S. Special Operations Command] has never had a maritime equivalent to the Army Special Forces [SF] and Civil Affairs teams that build ground force capacity overseas and carry out the increasingly decisive work in the civil–military realm. The maritime forces that can best perform such missions exist today in the U.S. Coast Guard.[15]

This is substantiated, because "while the U.S. Navy is arguably the world's only global maritime superpower," and a handful of other nations have substantial blue-water fleets, the "maritime forces—navies, coast guards, maritime police, etc. [of the rest of the world]—most closely resemble the U.S. Coast Guard."[16] As a result, because of the nature of most foreign maritime forces, they "can best identify with the Coast Guard, rather than the U.S. Navy."[17]

DOD doctrine found in JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency,* denotes potential maritime civil-affairs skill sets to include "maritime law; marine fisheries and resource management; port administration and port operations; maritime interagency coordination; port/waterborne security; customs and logistics; port/intercoastal surveys; and control of maritime immigration," which are core missions of the USCG, not the U.S. Navy.[18] These tasks, coupled with the additional responsibility of training HN forces to perform these tasks, are jobs that would arguably be better performed by those who are responsible for the same missions in their domestic capacity defending the United States.

Though it is true that a small USCG footprint already exists behind the scenes, it should be greatly expanded. Overseas training such as that provided by the USCG's International Training Division is currently performed outside the scope of the COIN realm as stand-alone operations or often as a task subordinated under another construct, such as counternarcotics. The capability exists, but we must bring it into the COIN fold.

## History, Hot Spots, and Obstacles

USCG forces have performed missions in nonpermissive environments, have engaged in combat, and have built a significant legacy of filling unique gaps and niches during DOD operations, so there is little reason not to embrace USCG capabilities when considering ongoing and future COIN matters. For example, training a HN coast guard should be assigned to the USCG as a primary task in COIN operations. This would include training HN forces, guiding the creation of command and control and administrative infrastructure, and mentoring through support of local operations.

In the author's experience as a riverine advisor to HN forces in Peru and Bolivia from 2000 to 2003, the unique ability of USCG personnel to bridge the gap between traditional military roles and law enforcement served as an enormous advantage when establishing and working with similar constabulary-type forces. In addition, the USCG's culture of being a small force that often had to "do more with less" while being seconded to other DOD components created, in an ironic way, a shared sense of

commonality between HN personnel and USCG advisors that was often a solid basis for long-term engagement. Also, the USCG culture of flexibility played a large role in allowing the teams with which the author deployed to focus on HN tactics, procedures, and technology, vice trying to push U.S. concepts upon HN forces that could not sustain the same resources as the United States or that would be limited due to localized restrictions on performing as "photocopies" of U.S. forces.

Essentially, "in much the same way as SF work with indigenous ground forces to shape the foreign security environment, Coast Guard special-purpose forces have long-term relationships with the maritime police and other counterdrug forces of Latin America," which has created a cadre of capabilities that can be exploited in other areas of the world.[19]

## Context

Since the inception of the USCG as the Revenue Cutter Service in 1790, its units have actively participated in many of our nation's conflicts. This is an important note, as some may question using USCG forces as a COIN asset, thinking the USCG is simply a domestic law enforcement organization. However, this is clearly not the case. In Vietnam, "the U.S. Navy requested Coast Guard assistance … because it then lacked a brown water capability," and in July 1965, "the first elements of Task Force 115, Operation Market Time … arrived for combat duty," which included coastal interdiction, gunfire support, and raiding missions.[20] From the First Gulf War until the present, USCG assets such as law enforcement detachments, port security units, and patrol boats and cutters have actively addressed "U.S. Central Command's requirements for unique Coast Guard capabilities in the Northern Arabian Gulf."[21]

So, in addition to its honorable history of participation in the nation's conflicts, there is a modern basis for USCG operations in combat zones, not simply in permissive environments. When this experience is coupled with the maritime strategy in the aforementioned U.S. Navy's *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, which notes specific USCG tasking in the Pacific and Middle East to include "work with regional partners and navies using joint and combined patrols, ship-rider exchanges, and multinational exercises" and building "partner nation capacity for maritime governance," one must wonder why the USCG is not already being more heavily used for long-term stability operations within the overall COIN and FID constructs.[22] Whether it is risk aversion from USCG leadership, a lack of general recognition of USCG capabilities from senior DOD leadership, or both, the result is that the United States is not fully using a valuable resource. This degrades the ability to optimally support and develop HN maritime forces and at the same time places DOD forces into roles for which they are not ideally suited.

As it is established that the USCG can effectively serve as a COIN asset for incidents and conflict in the maritime arena, we must next decide if threats in this realm are actually relevant and warrant further U.S. attention using the USCG in these deployed theaters. In truth, there are numerous examples of areas in which, if the United States became involved, COIN would be the leading principle of engagement, and the USCG would be a necessary part of the team.

For example, in Asia, insurgent capability in the maritime arena was demonstrated by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, who "formed a naval subgroup, the Sea Tigers … to perform the vital task of smuggling supplies" that later "expanded its operations and began targeting the Sri Lankan Navy."[23] Others such as Jemaah Islamiyah and the Abu Sayyaf group have employed maritime assets in Southeast Asia to "escape across international boundaries and smuggle weapons to their target countries."[24] Elsewhere, in Indonesia, the *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (Free Aceh Movement, or GAM) displayed insurgent maritime prowess by using "small boats to bring in supplies by ship and transport[ing] members out of Aceh by sea."[25] And, in Africa, forces of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta "occupied" areas "by rebels with machine-gun equipped speedboats" and at one time "reduced Nigeria's oil production by a quarter."[26]

To illustrate another area where COIN might be applied, in 2008, the Mumbai attackers "came by sea, sailing from Karachi on a Pakistani cargo vessel," and then "hijacked an Indian fishing trawler."[27] This attack, in particular, "highlighted India's inability to effectively monitor its coastline—a condition that is common to many littoral states in both the developing and the developed world."[28] Other hot spots that could potentially warrant coastal intervention


The crew of a U.S. Coast Guard twenty-five-foot transportable port security boat pauses 3 May 2003 during a patrol of the Khawr 'Abd Allah near Umm Qasr, Iraq. Crewmembers from *PSU 311* include Machinist Mate 3rd Class David Slifka on the .50 caliber machinegun, coxswain Port Securityman 2nd Class Keith Caires, and M-60 machinegunner Boatswain Mate 3rd Class Robert Shaw. (Photo by Public Affairs Specialist 1st Class John Gaffney, U.S. Coast Guard)

include Somalia, Yemen, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Ivory Coast.

To counter insurgent use of sea and littoral areas, HN forces need an effective maritime presence—in effect, a functional, coastal patrol force. Even when larger conventional naval forces are dedicated to such conflicts, the results can be ineffective in addressing root issues because these forces are not geared for these operations. Off the Somalia coast, where piracy has become a maritime security matter, the *Global Policy Forum* noted in 2012 that if the United Nations Security Council "were really acting for Somalia's ... wellbeing, it would have acted long ago to halt illegal fishing and dumping by speedily setting up a coast guard that could halt these crimes." However, even though the "secretary-general proposed ... that the naval forces should take on the task of patrolling Somalia's coasts against illegal fishing and dumping ... why should a heavily-armed and hugely expensive naval force do this work, when a lightly armed coast guard would serve the purpose much better?"[29] This analysis hits the proverbial nail on the head. All tools are not created equal. It is necessary to choose the right one for the job.

Murphy's article in *Proceedings* acknowledged that while "naval forces have supported counterinsurgency campaigns around the world for the past fifty years," most, including U.S. naval forces, have not "had to confront an insurgence presence on water or projected from the coast," and this is exacerbated by the fact that "major navies are torn between the demands of possible major conflict against a near-peer competitor and the messy, ambiguous small wars for which their ships and operational methods are ill-suited."[30]

However, even with such logical arguments, many still dismiss the USCG. In 2008, the RAND Corporation published its study *War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency*, which highlighted coastal security

requirements that included "training and provision of patrol craft, radar, communications, and other equipment"; "augmenting local patrol with advanced maritime surveillance"; and "performing 'blue water' maritime patrol and intercept function."[31] All of these are *primary* functions of the USCG, to include blue-water patrols. The same study noted an "increasingly important" need for "'green-water' (near-coastal) and 'brown-water' (riverine) security capabilities" and recognized "securing a coastline, territorial waters, harbors and ports, and rivers is difficult and expensive."[32] However, the same analysis concluded that the U.S. Navy "does not have the numbers of assets to provide coastal security everywhere that there could be insurgent activity … nor can the U.S. Coast Guard fill this need, given its domestic mission."[33] To be blunt, members of the study are either expressing ignorance of the capabilities and real-world missions of the USCG, or their views are influenced by a "cultural" dismissal of the USCG's ability to forward deploy.

## Conclusion

Understanding how to use a tool does not always translate into the proper use or even actual implementation of that tool. Herein rests the obstacle that must be overcome in order to better and more effectively employ the Coast Guard within the COIN construct. Doctrine exists, and similar operations and training with HN partners are already ongoing to a limited extent. Therefore, the need is to augment usage. Additional forces in select areas would allow for better supplementation to COIN missions, but the skill sets and abilities are largely already in place.

In its doctrinal publications, the DOD makes statements such as "the USCG possesses broad authorities across the spectrum of military, law enforcement, regulatory, and intelligence activities in support of FID."[34] However, this is countered by observations from the field such as "the United States does not have a national-level police force providing an expeditionary, sustainable, professional civilian law enforcement capability for use in a deployed environment."[35]

Consequently, current military culture and doctrine do not mesh because perception, even within the USCG, is a limiting factor. The same 2008 RAND study that dismissed USCG capabilities also states that any assessment of COIN options necessitates "the assignment of responsibility for core COIN capabilities to those departments that possess the most relevant competencies."[36] In order to make this a reality for the USCG, not only must we overcome a lack of external acknowledgment but also within the service, leaders must "drop old prejudices and inhibitions, and … allow such forces to operate, train, and develop their capabilities beyond the constraints of conventional imaginations."[37]

So, our analysis comes full circle to the doctrine upon which much of our COIN operations are based. Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, contains a snippet that readily tells commanders that "the Coast Guard may also be of value, since its coastal patrol, fisheries oversight, and port security missions correlate with the responsibilities of navies in developing countries."[38] Thus, we must take the next step and more fully integrate the USCG beyond simple engagements toward robust COIN support, in the form of stability operations focused toward coastal development of HN forces and the overall security and "winning of the populace," which would empirically bring more strength to a COIN commander's table. A key avenue of approach is for the USCG to be more forward leaning and proactive in seeking out missions in which it can offer its unique skill sets to the DOD vice being reactive to requests. Another element is education of joint services in the capabilities of the USCG, *as they can apply to COIN*. Lastly, the USCG and the DOD should actively work to give the USCG a seat at the "COIN table" before engagements occur, so as to better design, plan, and coordinate for the future.

The USCG has a wealth of capabilities that are directly linked to stability operations and missions, such as those within the civil affairs realm, with a particular emphasis on maritime, coastal, and riverine environments. These skill sets do not reside elsewhere in any DOD service or any other government agency. The USCG has experience and history operating as a proven combat force, integrated into DOD operations throughout the globe. And, the USCG has and does perform overseas HN training and infrastructure development with numerous foreign partners. The premise is not to argue that the USCG should be out front in conventional, large-scale maritime combat operations, nor that the USCG could replace or supplant the direct action and offensive capabilities of special operations forces. Since COIN is


The eighty-two-foot U.S. Coast Guard Cutter *Point Comfort* inspects a fishing junk 8 November 1965 at Dương Đông, Vietnam. (Photo by Photographer's Mate Chief Petty Officer Frank Borzage, U.S. Coast Guard)

based upon the "winning of the populace" by establishing functional HN security forces, creating sustainable government services, and providing stability, the USCG, in its uniquely dual civil–military and law enforcement role, is a tool that is currently wasted by not being more actively used in COIN operations. ■

*The views presented are the author's and do not represent the U.S. government, his employer, or an official position.*

## Notes

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Maj. Robert Bonham receives a master's degree of military science 17 June 2014 from Kuwait's Deputy Prime Minister Sheikh Salem Abdulaziz Al-Sabah at the Mubarak Al Abdullah Joint Command and Staff College in Kuwait City, Kuwait. Bonham attended the college as a participant in the U.S. Army's Schools of Other Nations program. (Photo by Sgt. Tracy R. Myers, U.S. Army Central)

# Strategic Scholars

## Educating Army Leaders at Foreign Staff Colleges


Maj. Christopher Gin, U.S. Army

*Education is the most reliable strategic investment that the Army can make in the face of an uncertain future.*

—The Army University White Paper

The U.S. Army's officer professional military education system underscores the organization's investment in its people. Scholarships are available to four-year universities and military academies, civilian graduate schools, and a plethora of other educational opportunities during a typical officer's twenty-year career. Why does the Department of Defense choose to spend millions of dollars to educate officers beyond the training required for managing violence in warfare? The answer, perhaps, lies in the Army's role in American foreign policy and national security—the Army supports

U.S. Army Maj. Michael Kendall (*end left*) and fellow German Staff College students stand in front of the Brandenburg Gate 22 September 2015 in Berlin, Germany. The Military Academy of the German Armed Forces, *Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr*, was established in 1957 and relocated to Hamburg in 1958. (Photo by Maj. Chris Heukers, Royal Netherlands Army)

national strategic goals, and its senior officers must function as strategic leaders. One way of growing strategic leaders who operate effectively in a complex world and give their best military advice to civilian leaders is through a more deliberate investment in Army officers' worldly education.

This paper is a summarized version of the author's School of Advanced Military Studies monograph and investigates an important aspect of the current officer education system: the attendance of U.S. Army officers at foreign military staff colleges.[1] Increasing the number of Army officers sent to foreign staff colleges would add significant value to the Army by increasing the number of strategic leaders who have the knowledge and experience to contextualize complex international systems with clarity and meaning for their organizations.[2]

Since the Spanish-American War of 1898, the Army's forward presence has kept it at the tip of U.S. diplomacy, both as a security guarantor at global fault lines and as the physical manifestation of U.S. might and interests. For example, for nearly seventy years on the Korean peninsula, U.S. forces have stood as a deterrent to North Korean aggression and as a committed ally to the Republic of Korea. As a testament to the importance of strategic alliances, the U.S. Army 2nd Infantry Division, headquartered north of Seoul, is the only combined division in the U.S. Army where U.S. and Republic of Korea staffs are integrated throughout the headquarters. In Europe, as Gen. Mark A. Milley explained during his 2015 confirmation hearing, U.S. forces in coordination with NATO continue to bolster Europe's defense amid fears of a resurgent Russia.[3] As the international commitments of the United States grow and threats arise, it is essential that Army leaders are comfortable operating in the world beyond America's borders. Since nearly all Army officers are graduates of American universities, it can be reasonably

assumed some find themselves living abroad for the first time when on an operational deployment. Once abroad, they are forced to simultaneously experience the stress of a real-world mission and the anxiety of cultural dissonance.

*The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World,* published in October 2014, emphasizes the complex world in which the Army is one of many actors.[4] As the Army's operations are global, it derives significant benefits from deliberately sending officers abroad to be educated in regions where they can then be assigned to serve. Specifically, graduate-level education at foreign staff colleges provides officers with an intimate understanding of partner states' military organizations and capabilities. More important, such an experience sheds light on the "fear, honor, and interests" of others, which are more easily ascertained through significant interaction.[5]

Senior leaders depend on their subordinates to draw clarity from unclear information and help direct organizational action in an efficacious manner.[6] Foreign staff college graduates are a valuable information conduit. In international environments, they can collectively contribute a high degree of what Harvard Business School professor Tarun Khanna calls *contextual intelligence*: "the ability to understand the limits of our knowledge and to adapt that knowledge to an environment different from the one in which it was developed."[7] The value of foreign staff college graduates' experience will be reflected in the way they can articulate meaning in a complex, adaptive world to their subordinates, leaders, and organizations.

## Echoes from the Past

From 1936 to 1938, then Capt. Albert C. Wedemeyer studied the military theory taught at the German Staff College, the *Kriegsakademie*, in Berlin. His experience far from American shores, at the heart of what would become Nazi Germany's army, and among German peers and instructors, presumably left an indelible impression on Wedemeyer. It would underpin his understanding of how Nazi Germany would conduct operations in World War II. What he learned about the German army's preference for a war of movement, as opposed to the trench warfare experience in the First World War, informed senior American leaders. It also added to Wedemeyer's credibility as one of few American officers who possessed contextual intelligence that could be applied directly against Nazi Germany.[8]

Though Wedemeyer's education at the Kriegsakademie preceded the entry of the United States into World War II, the likelihood of future hostilities must have been apparent to the young American officer during his time as a student. In addition to improving his mastery of German, he took every opportunity to gather information for a comprehensive report he would later write on the modern German army.[9] Most important, his report, and the interviews Army leaders sought with him upon his return to the United States, showed that his contextual intelligence about Nazi Germany helped inform American strategy in ways both meaningful and efficacious in pursuit of ultimate victory. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson acknowledged the direct value of Wedemeyer's foreign staff college education on America's war plans to defeat Germany:

> [Wedemeyer] was a student at the German Staff School from 1936 to 1938 and has furnished our Staff with much valuable information about German methods. I have found that among certain gossips in Washington such a connection is enough to make a man suspected but without such first-hand information as to what the Germans are doing we should be badly off indeed.[10]

Chief of the War Plans Division Brig. Gen. George C. Marshall took a particular interest in Wedemeyer's final report from his foreign staff college experience, and he ordered Wedemeyer to serve on his staff and help write the Victory Program for Nazi Germany's defeat.[11] Wedemeyer's experience illustrates the value that foreign staff college education had on a notable strategic leader. It serves as an example of how foreign military schooling can contribute to success during military operations against potential future enemies, or in a concerted effort with allies, within

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## The Victory Plan

### An Intellectual Tour de Force

Army downsizing planners face an intellectual challenge, as did World War II planners charged with rapid upsizing.[1] Overcoming planning challenges depends on strategic thought.

In *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941*, published in 1989, historian Charles E. Kirkpatrick writes of the World War II mobilization plan developed by then Maj. Albert C. Wedemeyer: "Very few staff papers have ever had its prescience, its impact, or its far-reaching consequences," and "in only fourteen pages [*The Victory Plan of 1941*] lays out the strategic objectives of the United States in the event of war, states American strategic military requirements for such a war, and develops and outlines the force structure."[2] Maj. Christopher Gin points out in "Strategic Scholars: Educating Army Leaders at Foreign Staff Colleges," this issue of *Military Review*, that professional military study in Germany enhanced Wedemeyer's strategic perspective.

Gen. Albert Coady Wedemeyer (1897–1989), U.S. Army, served primarily in Asia during World War II. (Photo courtesy of U.S. War Department)

According to Kirkpatrick, with whom Wedemeyer collaborated in the 1980s, "Quantitative issues often preoccupy modern planners who try to figure the number of divisions, types and quantities of weapons, training, and deployment … . In fact, [these] are almost always variables that depend upon the social, political, military, and technological contexts of the day. Rather, therefore, than seeking numerical answers to constantly evolving questions, the modern planner must devise a rational approach to solving a problem that has endless and conflicting variables. …"

"The prevailing political and military conditions decisively affect the possible choices open to the planner. … Any military plan, to be effective, must relate to attainable national objectives. … Mobilization planning cannot be considered distinct from operational and logistical planning, for all three must be components of any comprehensive strategic plan."[3]

The *New York Times* reported that in 1987, a few years before retired Gen. Wedemeyer died, British military historian John Keegan called him "one of the most intellectual and farsighted military minds America has ever produced."[4] Kirkpatrick describes Wedemeyer's plan as an "intellectual tour de force."[5]

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complex environments described in *The Army Operating Concept*.[12]

## The Education of a Strategic Leader

Like many Army senior officers entrusted with the highest responsibilities for the Nation's defense, Wedemeyer was a product of his studies. The foundation for his critical service and contribution to the Allied cause was his attendance at the Kriegsakademie from 1936 to 1938.[13] His experience in Berlin among America's future enemies, and the report he wrote upon his return, provided the basis of his credibility, intellect, and leadership potential that senior officers identified as rare but important traits, which they needed to create a winning strategy.

His time at the Kriegsakademie allowed him the first-hand opportunity to make note of German capabilities and doctrine that would have otherwise been known through conjecture, intelligence estimates, or second-hand information sources. He later told aspiring planners, "The strategic planner notes the capabilities of other nations and makes a comparative appraisal of his own available resources, and thus evolves flexible plans for the attainment of national objectives."[14] Because he was able to build a working subject-matter expertise on the enemy from his experiences at their staff college, he was able to contribute to the strategic planning process better than his peers. Were it not for this unique opportunity,

and the knowledge manifested in Wedemeyer's report, it is unlikely that Marshall would have hand-selected Wedemeyer in 1939 for such a high position on the War Plans Division staff. Wedemeyer's insights went beyond just manning and equipment; they spoke to the soul of the enemy he had come to know.

In today's foreign staff college exchange programs, U.S. Army officers may interact with military students from countries with whom the United States does not have an official exchange program. Regardless of the potential for relationships to shift, a good understanding of partners is always important. Interaction at staff colleges offers an opportunity for soft-power influence, and it may even provide placement and access to information that future Army leaders may otherwise not have access to in such a personal way.[15] The value of the education is manifested in those graduates who draw on their experiences to make significant contributions during their careers.

## Reflective Practitioners

This article draws from the results of the author's online, cross-sectional survey of Army officers who attended foreign staff colleges since 2005.[16] The purpose was to assess whether the staff college exchange program adds value to the Army. A key finding was that 95 percent of survey respondents reported their participation in the Schools of Other Nations program, the umbrella organization that administers overseas professional military education, provided value to the Army. The survey used content analysis to capture the value of their experiences in the context of when they attended the schools, and how those experiences affected their contributions to the Army in the following years.[17]

## Results of the Survey

Out of the 176 foreign staff college graduates identified, ninety-four initially started the survey, with eighty-two completing it in varying amounts of detail to five objective demographics questions and seven open-ended questions.[18] The eighty-two officers who submitted completed surveys are referred to as "respondents" throughout this paper and are the only data the author draws from. Several comments from graduates of different Army commissioning year groups indicate those who applied for foreign staff college did so at a time when U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) attendance was open to all majors, as opposed to a board-selected group, thus creating a waiting list for attendance at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Unaffectionately referred to as the "no major left behind" years, many applicants to foreign staff colleges perceived CGSC to lack the prestige and rigor of a highly selective foreign staff college. When asked about why they chose a foreign staff college instead of CGSC, two common themes were a competitive educational opportunity not offered to everyone and a measured consideration for future career impact, as illustrated in the following comment:

> I elected to go to a foreign staff college for two reasons. The first reason was to be able to do something different during my career. I have not wanted to do the same thing as everyone else in the Army, but want to have unique experiences that most people in the United States are not able to experience. The second reason was the timing of when my branch manager had scheduled me to the U.S. ILE [intermediate-level education]. By attending a foreign school, I was able to attend a qualifying ILE, graduate from SAMS [School of Advanced Military Studies], complete a utilization tour, and complete a key development job prior to the primary selection board for lieutenant colonel.[19]

Another response highlights the same themes:

> Part of the decision included an awareness that potentially I would miss out on a portion of the standard education or even relationship building that my peers were receiving and had the opportunity to make at Leavenworth. However, when General Petraeus briefed my cohorts who were slated to attend foreign staff colleges, he mentioned that we would be well-postured and he discussed the "decathlete" concept of well-rounded leaders, and finished by communicating the idea that no one set path leads to success. Ultimately, I felt that the opportunity to attend a foreign staff college was simply an opportunity that my peers did not recognize or were even afraid to embark on.[20]

Eighty-six percent of respondents reported being moderately or very proficient in the host nation's language of instruction prior to attending their respective foreign staff colleges.[21] Furthermore, 89 percent received fewer than three months of formal language

training prior to attending school.[22] Only two respondents said they were inadequately prepared to participate in class due to language limitations, indicating that the Schools of Other Nations screening criteria for language requirements prior to attending a foreign staff college are generally effective.[23]

## Analyzing Value

Three of the twelve survey questions asked respondents to reflect on positive and negative aspects of their experience, and then comment on whether or not the experience added value to the Army. Unsurprisingly, 27 percent of open-ended negative comments centered on the opportunity cost of not interacting with U.S. Army peers.[24] While many enjoyed representing the Army abroad, some lamented their inability to expand their organizational network at CGSC. A typical response was, "I was not able to develop contacts within my peer group. I also missed out on opportunities to interview with unit chiefs of staff and Human Resource Command during their visits to Fort Leavenworth."[25] However, no comment explicitly stated in hindsight that the military student would give up the foreign staff college experience to attend CGSC, but two did advocate officers being allowed to complete both.[26]

Despite some frustrations, a majority of respondents found their experiences increased their value as staff officers. When asked what value the Army gained from sending them to a foreign staff college, most lauded the soft power they felt they were able to exert on host-country nationals, as well as other international students from less friendly nations such as China, Russia, Iran, and Syria. One respondent wrote, "Relationship building was invaluable. Putting a face to the U.S. Army often changed the host [nation's] foreign students' thoughts and perspectives on who we are as a military and as a people."[27] Fifty-nine percent of respondents regarded their foreign network of professionals as a valuable takeaway and believed they could leverage those relationships in future operations.[28]

A second positive theme from the survey was the contextual intelligence that an officer could later contribute to his or her future roles. Eighty-three percent of those surveyed indicated an increase in strategic thinking or regional expertise based on their experience.[29] One officer stated that the Army gained "an officer with a broader operational and strategic perspective who can rapidly build a multinational team and work in a complex, multinational environment."[30] Another wrote that he became "a more capable officer with more robust analytical skills and knowledge to enable [engagement] at the highest levels of operational and strategy roles."[31] Most comments like this centered on feeling better prepared for the future and more confident in their ability to operate "without U.S. infrastructure … in an international environment."[32]

Of eighty-two respondents, 95 percent agreed that the Schools of Other Nations program added value to the Army.[33] This feedback is useful to evaluate the program holistically in a way that the Army as an institution does not seem to capture at the moment. One poignant comment stated, "This, like many programs, is on cruise control and not being used properly as an element of soft power or influence."[34] Another mentioned, "There was no feedback loop. After training concluded an [after action review] could have been required; lessons learned could have been harvested. Organizational and personal profiles could have been developed or updated."[35] By capturing a segment of reflections from ten years of experience, this research provides analysis that can lead to better optimization and higher-value returns to the Army.

## Preparing for a Complex Future

Throughout his life, Albert Wedemeyer continued to reflect on his career of service, and he keenly identified persistent problems with how Americans approached strategy. Biographer Keith E. Eiler conducted an interview with Wedemeyer in 1982, in which this insightful exchange regarding strategic thinking occurred:

> [Eiler: ] General, as you look back on the history of your time, what thoughts predominate? … What can or should be done?
> [Wedemeyer:] Americans simply must become more forehanded and consistent in the way we manage our public affairs. As populations grow and the struggle for space and resources becomes more intense, a lot of heat is generated. We can't afford simply to sit back, let events take their course, and jump in with a military solution when a crisis gets out of hand. There are so many ways in which the course of events can be influenced without the use or threat of force. Economic, diplomatic, cultural, psychological, and other means are available in limitless variety. If all these "instruments of

> The foreign staff college education experience develops both soft-power leverage and the contextual intelligence that strategic leaders need to be effective in a complex world.

> national policy" are employed in a timely, coordinated, and imaginative way, in accordance with a reasonably steady game plan, there is good reason to hope for progress toward a better world without the scourge of war.
> [Eiler:] I guess you are saying that we should all become strategists—in the broader sense of that term?
> [Wedemeyer:] Precisely![36]

The general's decree strikes to the heart of the critical need for the right education for strategic leaders in the military. Wedemeyer, a man of common career beginnings, became more than the product of his own experience through a personal commitment to education, but that was only half of the equation the Army needed to reap the value he offered. The more important half was the Army's institutional commitment to growing strategic thinkers when it first established the educational exchange program, and then it selected Wedemeyer as the best candidate to attend. There was no prescient way for the Army to know the eventual return for sending Wedemeyer abroad, but by sending him, and then a stream of exchange officers annually to many countries, the Army maintained a strategic foothold—not through technology and firepower but through the contextual intelligence its officers gained while being educated abroad.[37]

The officer surveys conducted for this paper attest to the value of foreign staff college education. The soft-power leverage and contextual intelligence graduates gained, in most cases, readily translated into job placement and effectiveness. The topic of officer education to meet the Army's strategic challenges remains relevant and subject to debate. For example, in "The Centurion Mindset and the Army's Strategic Leader Paradigm," Jason Warren discusses the importance of improving how the Army manages the intellectual development of its leaders.[38] The foreign staff college education program offers an intellectual line of effort that can link the self-reflective centurions of today to the strategic masterminds the Army will need them to be in the future.

## The Way Ahead

The foreign staff college education experience develops both soft-power leverage and the contextual intelligence that strategic leaders need to be effective in a complex world. Currently, the program is suboptimized because it has not expanded into areas where weighted national security interests lie. Of note, in the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) area of responsibility, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines do not offer staff college education to their army officers, though their officers routinely attend CGSC at Fort Leavenworth. These countries represent three out of four U.S. security treaty allies in USPACOM, with Japan being the fourth. In Europe, there is also a noticeable dearth of opportunities in former Soviet Bloc states, though more substantial opportunities exist in Western Europe. There are currently fewer than ten participants in most other combatant commands, with none at schools in countries included in U.S. Africa Command. While any major program changes necessitate coordination, funding, and agreement beyond the scope of this paper, it may be worthwhile to explore how a future program that could garner more value for the Army might look. Based on the key findings of the survey responses, the following recommendations suggest a way ahead.

**Recommendation 1:** The program should better align with foreseeable threats in light of *The Army Operating Concept*, specifically in Asia and Eastern Europe. The onus is on the theater armies to use their existing soft power with partnered nations to host more numerous and frequent Army staff college students. This thrust should be accompanied with cogent narrative about the benefits for reciprocal education for professional officer populations, centered on shared national security interests that include alliances, interoperability of forces, and potential enemies.

**Recommendation 2:** The resident CGSC course should be a prerequisite for attendance at a foreign staff college. This would ensure that Army officers have already been competitively selected for professional education based on their performance and promotion potential. It would also provide a one-year, standardized education in American doctrine prior to being sent abroad. Selected officers at CGSC would still have the opportunity to form a network of peers that many in the survey mentioned they missed out on by attending only a foreign staff college.

**Recommendation 3:** The Army should consider making the program automatically available to the top 10 percent of each graduating CGSC class, roughly one hundred students per year. An order-of-merit list at CGSC is already an annual endeavor and could easily identify the top contenders for the program, but potential to represent the heart and intellect of the U.S. Army abroad may be more readily apparent in person than on the Officer Record Brief electronic resume. A final selection committee comprised of Schools of Other Nations representatives, CGSC instructors, and representatives from the different combatant commands could conduct in-person interviews to assess the best-suited officers for each school and region.

**Recommendation 4:** Organizational leaders must control the internal, strategic narrative. Senior leader support will be necessary to reassure selected officers that their broadened education is truly valued and that their professional timelines would be bolstered, rather than adversely affected, should they be selected to attend a foreign staff college. The Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) at the School of Advanced Military Studies is heralded as a worthwhile year of education for those selected to attend precisely because of the incentivized value it adds to both the individual and the organization. AMSP students are competitively selected, so they are seen as the elite of CGSC. They typically forego immediate key developmental positions for a year of education, followed by a year of utilization. Their fears for promotion potential are assuaged by the value the institution places on the experience, which is echoed in the rhetoric of senior commanders, and reflected in the data of AMSP graduates who are selected for battalion command in greater percentage than their nongraduate peers.[39] In order for the Schools of Other Nations program to reach its potential, it must appreciate that perceptions of the program's value affect both the quality of the applicant pool and the future effectiveness of its graduates.

The Army consistently states that producing adaptive, broadly educated officers is a strategic priority.[40] Foreign staff college education, deliberately arranged around the world in common purpose, increases the probability of strategically adept leaders who can guide the organization in a complex world. It also makes those military leaders better prepared for contextualizing the national security effects of military options to civilian leaders. ■

## Notes

***Epigraph.*** "The Army University White Paper: Educating Leaders to Win in a Complex World" (U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2015).

1. Christopher Gin, *Soldiers, Scholars, Diplomats: Educating Strategic Leaders at Foreign Staff Colleges* (monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies [SAMS] Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2016).

2. Foreign staff colleges are defined and limited in this study to those schools in other nations that train midcareer, field-grade officers for further service, and are not to be combined with national war colleges that typically educate more senior officers.

3. Committee on Armed Services, *Hearing to Consider the Nomination of General Mark A. Milley, USA, to be Chief of Staff of the Army*, 114th Cong. (Washington, DC, 21 July 2015), 31, accessed 4 January 2017, http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/15-64%20-%207-21-15.pdf.

4. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (TP) 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, 2020-2040* (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 2014).

5. Thucydides, *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*, ed. Robert B. Strassler, trans. Richard Crawley (New York: The Free Press, 1996), 43.

6. Gen. David G. Perkins, "Army Operating Concept: Delivering the Future," *Army Magazine*, October 2014, 68, accessed 4 January 2017, http://www1.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2014/Documents/11November14/Perkins_GRBook2014.pdf. According to Perkins, commander of TRADOC, Army priorities include "optimizing soldier and team performance" and "developing adaptive and innovative leaders and institutions to understand and operate in complex environments."

7. Tarun Khanna, "A Case for Contextual Intelligence," *Management International Review* 55, no. 2 (April 2015): 181–90. See also Khanna, "Contextual Intelligence," *Harvard Business Review* 92, no. 5 (September 2014): 58–68.

8. "Captain Wedemeyer Report on the Kriegsakademie," 11 July 1938, Albert C. Wedemeyer Papers, box 6, folder 35, page 12, Hoover Institution Archives.

9. Ibid., page 68.

10. "Henry L. Stimson letter to President Roosevelt," 2 March 1942, Albert C. Wedemeyer Papers, box 71, folder 6, Hoover Institution Archives. Stimson also said of Wedemeyer, "Colonel Wedemeyer is one of the very best officers we have in the General Staff. He is the right hand man of the Chief of the War Plans Division and has the confidence of everybody from Marshall down," underlining the effectiveness of an educated but relatively junior officer.

11. "Memorandum to Colonel Eiler," 9 April 1985, Albert C. Wedemeyer Papers, box 6, folder 35, Hoover Institution Archives; preface page to "Captain Wedemeyer Report on the Kriegsakademie," 11 July 1938, Hoover Institution Archives.

12. TP 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, 2020-2040*.

13. Charles E. Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1992), 13–15, accessed 17 January 2017, http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/093/93-10/CMH_Pub_93-10.pdf; app. A shows "The Army Portion of the Victory Plan."

14. "U.S. Postwar Strategy," speech to the National War College, 17 February 1949, Albert C. Wedemeyer Papers, box 8, folder 5, page 5, Hoover Institution Archives.

15. Joseph S. Nye, "Soft Power and Higher Education," *Educause Review* (January 2005): 34. Nye defines his concept of "soft power" as "The ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments." All of the author's references to soft power in this paper adopt Nye's definition.

16. Christopher Gin, "Foreign Staff College Graduate Survey," online questionnaire, conducted January to February 2016, as reported in Gin, *Soldiers, Scholars Diplomats: Educating Strategic Leaders at Foreign Staff Colleges*. This survey was conducted as part of the author's SAMS monograph research. U.S. Army Human Resources Command provided contact information for officers who attended a foreign staff college between 2005 and 2015. The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College provided quality assurance and quality control for the survey, assisted in its distribution via email, and received the results. Per the statement of consent for participation in the survey, the participants remain anonymous. Per Arlene Fink, *How to Conduct Surveys: A Step-by-Step Guide,* 4th ed. (Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications, 2009), 66–67, in a cross-sectional survey, data are collected at one time.

17. Fink, *How to Conduct Surveys*, 89, defines content analysis as "a method of analyzing qualitative data for the purpose of drawing inferences about the meaning of recorded information such as the open-ended responses and comments made by survey respondents."

18. Gin, "Foreign Staff College Graduate Survey." See R. M. Groves, "Experiments in Producing Nonresponse Bias," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 70, no. 5 (2006): 720–36, as quoted in Floyd J. Fowler, *Survey Research Methods*, 4th ed. (Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications, 2009), 177. For this survey, only a 53 percent response rate of the sample population was made available for contact. Although error due to nonresponse can be large, the amount of error is not highly correlated with the response rate. Therefore, it is hard to say when a response rate is too low to be of use. The author concedes a credibility concession with a seemingly high nonresponse rate, but feels this compromise does not essentially detract from the value of the survey responses.

19. Gin, "Foreign Staff College Graduate Survey."

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Keith Eiler, "The Man Who Planned the Victory," *Hoover Digest* 4 (30 October 2001), accessed 5 January 2017, http://www.hoover.org/research/man-who-planned-victory. Eiler's original interview notes are available in the Inventory of the Keith E. Eiler Papers, 1880-2003, box 1, folder 4, pages 44–45, "Interview by Keith E. Eiler with General A. C. Wedemeyer draft of 29 November 1982," Hoover Institution Archives.

37. Jörg Muth, *Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901-1940, and the Consequences for World War II* (Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press, 2011), 305. Several other American officers also attended the Kriegsakademie in the same period as Wedemeyer, and also produced reports of their experience.

38. Jason W. Warren, "The Centurion Mindset and the Army's Strategic Leader Paradigm," *Parameters* 45, no 3. (2015): 27–38. The "centurion mindset," embodied in Gen. Creighton Abrams, discounts the tradition of great American generals who were broadly experienced and educated.

39. U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, "SAMS Overview," PowerPoint presentation, 3 August 2015, slide 6, accessed 4 February 2016, https://partis.leavenworth.army.mil/student/SitePages/Home.aspx. Data under the heading "US Army Command Selection Analysis & Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) Graduates," show that from 2012 to 2014, AMSP graduates were selected for the primary command select list at a 17 percent, 16 percent, and 10 percent higher frequency than their peers without AMSP, respectively. AMSP Army active alumni also include three generals, eight lieutenant generals, twelve major generals, and fifteen brigadier generals. The concluding message is that attending AMSP does not hurt its graduates' careers.

40. David G. Perkins, *Strategic Business Plan for the Army University* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Center, 2015).

U.S. Army soldiers from the Alpha Battery, 2nd Air Defense Artillery Regiment, launch the first of two Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors from Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands 10 September 2013 during a successful intercept test. The test was conducted by the Missile Defense Agency, Ballistic Missile Defense System Operational Test Agency, Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, and U.S. Pacific Command. The test, designated Flight Test Operational-01, stressed the ability of the THAAD weapon systems to function as part of a layered defense architecture to defeat two near-simultaneous ballistic missile targets. (Photo courtesy of Missile Defense Agency)

# How to Build an Armadillo

## Lessons Learned from the First Forward-Deployed THAAD Battery

Lt. Col. Jonathan C. Stafford, U.S. Army

In the spring of 2013, the U.S. government faced a provocation cycle from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), which, for the first time, involved a direct and viable threat to the U.S. territory of Guam.[1] In response to this threat, the military deployed the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to the island. THAAD is the Army's newest and most advanced missile defense system, and it has proven itself to be an effective deterrent to North Korean aggression. Since its first operational deployment, many important lessons have been learned that military leaders should use to plan for future deployments of the THAAD system.

## Background

The DPRK has executed repeated provocation cycles over the decades that have caused various types of military responses. Historically, these provocations focused on conventional military actions against its rival, the Republic of Korea. However, since his December 2011 assumption of leadership, DPRK ruler Kim Jong-un has used his country's growing arsenal of ballistic missiles as his preferred choice for provocation cycles. During the eighteen-year rule of his father, Kim Jong-il, there were eighteen missile tests. In comparison, during Kim Jong-un's four-year reign there have been twenty-five missile tests.[2]

Though most of the U.S. homeland is out of range of North Korea's current ballistic missile inventory, the U.S. territory of Guam is located approximately two thousand miles from the DPRK. Possibly believing they had identified a potential U.S. vulnerability, DPRK military officials made repeated threats against Guam as part of their spring 2013 provocation cycle. The distance between Guam and the DPRK puts the island's 161,000 U.S. citizens within the range of the DPRK's ballistic missiles.[3] The threats of a North Korean missile attack were taken very seriously on Guam as air-raid and shelter-in-place drills were conducted on the island.[4] Furthermore, Guam's governor, Eddie Calvo, appealed directly to then Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel to deploy missile defenses to defend the island.[5]

In response, the U.S. military initially deployed an Aegis ship equipped with SM-3 missiles to defend Guam.[6] However, due to the persistent North Korean ballistic missile threat to the island, a sustainable long-term alternative was needed. Fortunately for Pentagon planners, the THAAD system had just received a conditional material release for two batteries and a transition of operations to the Army in February 2012.[7]

Subsequently, in March 2013, a decision was made by the National Command Authority to deploy a THAAD battery to Guam to protect the homeland of the United States from an immediate and emergent threat of a missile attack from North Korea.[8] In early April 2013, the secretary of defense directed the Army to deploy the 4th Air Defense Artillery Unit, 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade (A/4) THAAD battery out of Fort Bliss, Texas, to Guam. The A/4 THAAD battery was placed under the command of the 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC), headquartered in Hawaii. The A/4 THAAD battery assumed the defense of Guam mission on an expeditionary basis on 25 April 2013. The deployment had special historic significance since the soldiers were the first active-duty air defenders to deploy to Guam since World War II.[9]

Since this first operational deployment of THAAD, the Army has fielded a total of five batteries, with four already rotated to conduct the defense of Guam mission. The fifth THAAD battery became a permanently stationed unit on Guam in 2016.[10] In the next two years, two additional THAAD batteries will bring the fielded total to seven.[11] These additional batteries have provided military planners the capacity to support deployments to areas in need of the system's unique capabilities. Additionally, it has been announced that South Korea was designated as the next location for a forward-stationed THAAD battery.[12]

Notwithstanding the deployment of these batteries, as other adversaries continue to advance their ballistic missile capabilities, the demand for THAAD will only increase. This demand means military planners need to learn the special requirements to deploy a THAAD battery now, rather than waiting until a decision to deploy is made. A study of the first operational deployment of THAAD to Guam is the best place to begin learning these planning requirements. The most salient lessons learned are noted below.

## Command and Control/Coordination of Support

First, the command and control infrastructure for the unit needs to be developed before any decision is made to deploy a THAAD battery. The first part of developing command and control is building the organizational command structure. For the THAAD battery on Guam, a headquarters element called Task Force Talon was established. The task force was composed of personnel from the 94th AAMDC in Hawaii. The Task Force Talon staff was composed of six noncommissioned officers, five staff officers, a sergeant major, and a lieutenant colonel who commands the unit. Most of the personnel conduct one-year temporary change-of-station tours to Guam from Hawaii. The task force headquarters executes all the functions expected of a battalion staff, such as processing personnel actions, providing intelligence support, planning operations, and coordinating logistics.

U.S. Army Pacific commander Gen. Vincent Brooks speaks with soldiers of the 4th Air Defense Artillery Unit, 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade (A/4) Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 18 August 2013 about personnel and operational issues during his visit to the unit at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. The A/4 THAAD deployed to Guam in April 2013 as a part of the 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command Task Force Talon Mission. (Photo by Angela Kershner, U.S. Army Pacific PAO)

The headquarters staff also serves as the organization that integrates THAAD operations with the Air Force's 36th Wing on Andersen Air Force Base and with Joint Region Marianas, which has executive-level installation management responsibilities on Guam. Integration of the battery with the 36th Wing and Joint Region Marianas has been extremely important because those organizations provide the majority of the logistical support for the task force, such as with lodging, dining facility support, medical services, and bulk fuel. All this support required the signing of various inter-service support agreements that were developed by the Task Force Talon headquarters. The task force headquarters also conducted coordination with outside organizations such as the Missile Defense Agency and the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Life-Cycle Management Command, that provide external support to the THAAD battery.

## Preparation for Visitor Protocol

Another somewhat unusual, but important, function of the Task Force Talon staff that needs to be considered in THAAD battery deployment planning is support arrangements for distinguished visitors to the site. The high-profile mission of Task Force Talon has made it a key location for senior leaders to visit. Past visitors have included the governor of Guam, congressional delegations, news media, senior Department of Defense leaders, and foreign dignitaries.[13] Without support from the Task Force Talon staff, the captain that commands the THAAD battery and the headquarters platoon personnel would have to execute all the protocol missions associated with distinguished visitors, a function for which they lack the experience and personnel to properly conduct. Most importantly, diverting assets for protocol purposes with higher headquarters' support would take away from the battery's main focus, which is executing its real-world defense of Guam mission.

This is why it is imperative that as soon as the intent to deploy a THAAD battery is confirmed, the higher headquarters be identified as well. In the case of Task Force Talon, the 94th AAMDC personnel directorate (G-1) immediately requested a derivative unit identification code to establish a higher headquarters on Guam. It is important to execute this request as soon as possible since the process takes time to complete. For example, Task Force Talon was on the ground on Guam and operating before the task force was officially recognized with a derivative unit identification code because of the rapid deployment of the THAAD battery. The Task Force Talon commander did not officially assume command until the derivative unit identification code was received.

## Communications Architecture

The next part of command and control involves developing an adequate communications architecture to support THAAD battery operations. It is critical for THAAD battery operators to be able to communicate with the greater missile defense network established in the Indo–Asia–Pacific region to coordinate fires properly. Being located on an existing Air Force base allowed terrestrial communications lines for external communications connectivity to be run to the THAAD battery's location. However, for such an important real-world mission the THAAD battery required a redundant communications capability. The deployment of a Secure Mobile Anti-Jam Reliable Tactical Terminal (SMART-T) system and its accompanying squad of soldiers from the 307th Signal Battalion out of Hawaii provided this redundancy for "Site Armadillo." The SMART-T is a Humvee-mounted extremely high-frequency satellite terminal that provides robust, jam-resistant communications in support of the THAAD battery.[14]

Considering the increasing cyber and electronic warfare threats to military communications, the SMART-T is a critical capability that ensures the THAAD battery is always able to communicate with the greater missile defense network in the Indo–Asia–Pacific region. For future deployments of THAAD, military planners will need to determine provisions for redundant and secure communications for the THAAD battery.

## Site Requirements

When THAAD was designated to deploy to Guam, one of the most obvious issues military planners had to determine was where to put the THAAD battery. The proper placement of a THAAD battery is critical to ensuring it is located in a position that provides the highest probability of intercepting enemy tactical ballistic missiles. For Guam, the enemy tactical ballistic missile threat to the island was coming from the northwest, where the DPRK is located. Fortunately, northwest Guam was largely unoccupied since it is home to an abandoned airfield. The airfield, known as Northwest Field, was constructed after the military recaptured Guam from the occupying Imperial Japanese military in July 1944.[15] Now, seventy-two years later, the historic runways of Northwest Field have become the perfect location for deploying a THAAD battery.

The most complex piece of equipment to plan site requirements around is the THAAD battery's AN/TPY-2 radar.[16] The radar is considered the world's most powerful ground-mobile X-band radar. The radar antenna is also what gives the THAAD location on Guam the name Site Armadillo. When the AN/TPY-2 radar antenna is in a stowed configuration, it looks like the hard surface of an armadillo's shell.

This powerful radar requires a very firm surface for transport and emplacement. The low ground clearance and sensitive equipment inside the radar require that a solid road be used during transport. This means that a thorough reconnaissance of the roads identified for transport needs to be completed prior to the deployment. The perfect THAAD site is of no use if the radar cannot be safely transported to the location due to poor road conditions.

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Once at its final destination, the THAAD radar needs to be emplaced on a firm surface in order to acquire objects hundreds of miles above the Earth's surface. For example, the radar would not be able to accurately track these objects if it was sitting on a soft surface and slowly sinking into the mud. The seven-decade-old runway tarmac on Northwest Field proved to be a suitable surface to emplace the THAAD radar.

Besides planning for a firm surface, an additional consideration is that safe keep-out zones for personnel and aircraft need to be maintained around the radar. The powerful radiation from the AN/TPY-2 radar could have negative effects on people's health and could damage aircraft if safe keep-out zones are not enforced. The Army Techniques Publication 3-01.91, *Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Techniques* manual, lists the features of safe keep-out zones. These zones range from one hundred meters for troops up to 5,500 meters for aircraft carrying munitions.[17]

In keeping with this guide, due to the flight operations of nearby Andersen Air Force Base and Guam's Won Pat International Airport, a temporary flight restriction was established around Northwest Field along with other safety measures to ensure no aircraft flew within the radar's safe keep-out zone.[18] Additionally, the THAAD launcher also was given a back blast safety keep-out zone that was a three-hundred-meter semicircle around the rear of the launcher and eight hundred meters in front of it. For the THAAD battery on Guam, HESCO barriers and razor wire were constructed to enforce the safe keep-out zones for personnel and equipment. Maintaining and enforcing such keep-out zones will be a critical planning requirement for any future THAAD deployments.

## Radio Frequency Clearance and Management

Besides being a safety consideration, the powerful X-band radar, along with other emitters from the THAAD battery, requires frequency clearance. Without proper frequency clearance and management, a THAAD battery has the possibility of interfering with the operation of other civilian and government frequencies used in the area. Due to THAAD operating in a remote area of Guam, frequency clearance was able to be properly coordinated with few issues. However, future deployments of THAAD could require it to emplace in or around more urbanized areas. The more urbanized a THAAD operating location is, the more challenging the frequency clearance process will be.

## Proper Grounding of Equipment

The brains of the THAAD radar is the THAAD fire control and communications (TFCC). The unit's soldiers operate the TFCC from shelters, which are located in four specialized light medium tactical vehicles. The TFCC, THAAD radar, and launchers all require appropriate grounding.

Proper grounding of the equipment ended up being an issue initially for THAAD on Guam because of the coral rock directly below the surface. The coral rock was difficult to penetrate with grounding rods and did not provide the recommended grounding for the equipment. The installation of a grounding grid for the TFCC and the THAAD radar and the construction of launcher pads with appropriate grounding within the concrete resolved these issues on Site Armadillo. Future THAAD sites will need to conduct surveys of the site's soil to determine if it meets the recommended grounding requirements for THAAD equipment.

## Power Source

A final site consideration is determining the need for a long-term power source. The THAAD battery was originally designed to conduct short-term deployments in support of the warfighter and then redeploy back to its home station. However, for THAAD on Guam, the mission became an enduring one due to the persistent missile threat from North Korea. One result was that the tactical generators on Site Armadillo had to run twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. This heavy usage meant extra maintenance had to be conducted to keep the generators operational. The maintenance became challenging because the THAAD battery was assigned only one generator mechanic. Also, the maintenance challenges only increased when additional generators were needed to power the site security cameras, communications equipment, and life-support trailers.

To reduce the generator maintenance burden, Task Force Talon was able to acquire a Mobile Electric Power 810A generator to power Site Armadillo from a single power source. This prime power source allowed all the tactical generators on the site to be powered down and

The first elements of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system arrive in the Republic of Korea (ROK) 6 March 2017. U.S. Forces Korea continues its progress in fulfilling the ROK–U.S. Alliance decision to install the THAAD system on the Korean Peninsula as a defensive measure in response to ongoing provocative North Korean missile tests. (Photo courtesy of 7th Air Force PAO)

serviced after two years of near continuous use. It also had the side benefit of improving the quality of life on Site Armadillo due to the decrease in generator noise.

However, relying on tactical generators should not be regarded as a permanent solution. As part of the planning process for future THAAD deployments, a plan for long-term power generation to sustain a THAAD site will need to be developed. Depending on tactical generators for long-term operations is not a sustainable course of action. Prime power generators or, if available, commercial power, are options that should be explored for the long-term power needs of future THAAD sites.

## Environmental Considerations

Due to the remote nature of Site Armadillo and the availability of the abandoned runways, the site considerations were easily resolved for the deployment of THAAD to Guam. However, some things that would prove to be far more challenging were the environmental considerations.

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires that all branches of the government give proper consideration to the environment prior to undertaking any major federal action.[19] Since Guam is a U.S. territory, the Department of Defense had to comply with the NEPA guidelines as part of any THAAD permanent stationing action on Guam.

This required the Department of Defense to conduct an environmental assessment (EA) to document the environmental impacts associated with the operation of a permanently stationed THAAD battery on Guam. The EA is an extremely detailed document that looks at air quality, noise pollution, water resources, biological resources, cultural resources, hazardous materials, socioeconomic impacts, and a host of other factors that are part of any stationing action.[20] If the EA determines that the permanent

stationing of THAAD will not have significant environmental impacts, a finding of no significant impact will be issued. A finding of no significant impact is a document that presents the reasons why the EA concluded that there are no significant environmental impacts for the project.

Along with complying with NEPA requirements, THAAD on Guam had to comply with local environmental regulations. For example, the previously mentioned installation of a grounding grid required a well-drilling permit from the Guam Environmental Protection Agency.[21] The THAAD radar has grounding rods for the radar that are nine feet long (in three three-foot sections) and one-half inch in diameter.[22] Due to the coral rock below the surface, a drill was required to install the grounding rods. In order to drill the grounding rods into the ground, the local vendor had to secure a well-drilling permit from the Guam Environmental Protection Agency that cost the task force thousands of dollars to purchase.

## Community Relations

Another environmental consideration is the impact on-site noise will have on local communities. The THAAD radar is powered by two powerful prime power units that can generate noise in excess of the eighty-five-decibel level, which can cause hearing damage with prolonged exposure.[23] Fortunately, the isolation of Site Armadillo prevented any noise issues with the local community. However, at a forward-based radar site that uses the AN/TPY-2 in Kyoga-Misaki, Japan, noise pollution has been a serious point of contention between the Army and the local community.

The issue was contentious enough that then Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani made a visit to the U.S. base at Kyoga-Misaki in December 2015 as part of a public relations campaign to show the local community that all efforts were being made to reduce noise.[24] The installation of muffling devices and sound barriers eliminated most of the low-frequency noise on Kyoga-Misaki. These measures, together with future announced plans to hook up the site to commercial power to fully eliminate noise pollution, have done much to allay community concerns. For future THAAD sites, military planners need to determine if the noise from the prime power units will have an adverse impact on local communities and develop ways to reduce it, like at Kyoga-Misaki.

Though most of the environmental considerations mentioned resulted from compliance with NEPA due to the location being on U.S. soil and under its jurisdiction, future THAAD deployments will likely be to areas external to the United States, which would fall outside the jurisdiction of the NEPA. However, planners will still be required to identify any potential environmental regulations that will need to be complied with before a THAAD deployment. Likewise, a campaign to educate the public about THAAD will also be needed. For example, due to negative media coverage about the possible environmental impacts of THAAD in South Korea, various political figures have come out against the deployment.[25]

On Guam, Task Force Talon has been able to avoid such criticism by proactively engaging the public and the island's political leadership about the deployment of the THAAD system. The task force leadership conducted a series of town halls in local villages to educate and receive feedback from the public about the permanent stationing of THAAD.[26] The task force also participated in major local events, sponsored schools, and hosted site visits for local dignitaries to strengthen bonds between the task force and the local community. These bonds built trust with the local community and the island's political leadership to support the permanency of THAAD on Guam.[27]

## Security Requirements

After working out if a location can support a THAAD battery, the next thing planners need to consider is how to secure the potential site. Due to the unique nature of THAAD being a strategic asset, for security, it falls under Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Instruction (SI) 538-02 (classified), *Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) System Security Level (SSL) Designation*. Inside SI 538-2 it clearly identifies physical security requirements such as the fencing, lighting, and sensors needed to secure a THAAD site. The original expeditionary deployment of THAAD caused the site to be secured with non-permanent physical security features such as concertina wire and wooden guard towers. The reason more rugged physical security structures could not be built on Site Armadillo initially was because of the pending

environmental assessment. Once the EA is complete, permanent fencing, concrete guard towers, and other physical security enhancements can be constructed.

The expeditionary physical security infrastructure became a major concern when Typhoon Dolphin hit Guam in May 2015 and destroyed some of the temporary security infrastructure.[28] Powerful storms are a regular occurrence on Guam, which makes building permanent infrastructure for a long-term presence on the island a priority. For future THAAD sites, military planners will need to complete an assessment to determine what permanent physical security enhancements are required by the STRATCOM instruction and then develop a course of action to properly secure the site.

The STRATCOM instruction also identifies the amount of personnel needed to secure a THAAD site. Since a THAAD battery does not have enough personnel to conduct its missile defense mission and still comply with the SI 538-2 security requirements, it has to be augmented with a security force (SECFOR).

To comply with the instruction's security requirements, U.S. Army Pacific deploys a SECFOR company on a four-to six-month rotation to Guam to defend Site Armadillo.[29] The SECFOR units supporting this task have ranged from military police to artillerymen, engineers, and infantrymen. Future deployments of THAAD will require a SECFOR, and the size of the element will depend on the security infrastructure in place around the site. More personnel are needed to secure an expeditionary site compared to a permanent site.

Once a SECFOR unit is established, the security personnel will need to be well trained in the escalation of force. In all operations, the starting point for engagement criteria is the standing rules of engagement (SROE) and standing rules for the use of force (SRUF). The definitions for these terms are found in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01B, *Standing Rules of Engagement/ Standing Rules for the Use of Force*, which explains the distinct difference between SROE and SRUF.[30]

The SROE from the CJCSI 3121.01B provide the inherent right of self-defense and the application of force for mission accomplishment. The SROE are designed to provide a common template for development and implementation of rules of engagement for the full range of military operations, from peacekeeping to war, when outside the territory of the United States. Within the U.S. territory, the SROE apply only to air and maritime homeland defense missions. Included in the SROE are SRUF, which apply to land-based homeland defense missions within the territory of the United States. This means the SROE apply only to the air defense personnel regarding use of their THAAD weapon system, and the SRUF apply to the SECFOR personnel.

The distinction between the two caused some initial delays in understanding the SROE for THAAD and the escalation of force authorized for the SECFOR personnel when the unit first deployed to Guam. For future THAAD sites, planners will need to closely work with the legal community and confirm that the correct kill chain for THAAD is written into the deployment order. Additionally, planners will need to develop an internal standard operating procedure that clearly depicts what escalation of force measures are appropriate, how they are used, and when the use of deadly force is authorized for the SECFOR unit.

## Conclusion

As adversaries continue to build and proliferate their ballistic missile capabilities, the demand for THAAD will only increase. In order to meet the demand, military planners must become familiar with some of the complexities involved with deploying a THAAD battery. Deploying a THAAD battery requires some unique planning considerations when compared to other more common air defense systems such as the Patriot system. The first operational deployment of THAAD to Site Armadillo on Guam provided many important operational lessons to better plan for future THAAD deployments. Not all planning considerations for THAAD can be described in this paper due to security classification reasons, but planning for the command and control, site requirements, environmental considerations, and security for a THAAD site is where planners need to start in order build their own "armadillo." ■

***Editor's note:*** *An earlier version of this article was previously published as a* Military Review *online exclusive 10 March 2017.*

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


# Playing to the Edge

## American Intelligence in the Age of Terror

Michael V. Hayden, Penguin, New York, 2016, 452 pages

Maj. Charles J. Scheck, U.S. Army

Support for the intelligence community swings like a pendulum. Michael V. Hayden, in his book *Playing to the Edge: American Intelligence in the Age of Terror,* reflects such swings by openly describing the ups and downs of his career in that community with candor and splendid prose. The memoir is detailed enough to engross a Beltway insider and is engaging enough to invite in the average American. The title, *Playing to the Edge*, references athletes playing so close to the line they get chalk dust on their cleats. This is a metaphor Hayden uses to demonstrate and defend his use of every tool and authority within legitimate bounds, including this book. A retired four-star general, Hayden retells stories with the utmost competence and humility. He gives clarity to the extremely complex issues he faced in his career. Focusing on his impact at the National Security Agency (NSA) and on his leadership at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during a tumultuous time allows for a brief review of his career, including how his intelligence affected the fight against al-Qaida and what landmark decisions were made during his tenure.

Beginning in 1999, Hayden's mission as he took over the NSA was to "shake things up"; he certainly accomplished that goal. The NSA, the primary objective of which is to track electronic data during transmission, lost 30 percent of its operating budget in the 1990s. During that same period, Hayden reports that the global telecommunications revolution was in full swing: the number of mobile cell phones increased from 16 million to 741 million, Internet users increased from 4 million to 361 million, and international telephone traffic grew from 38 billion minutes to over 100 billion minutes. Upon taking the reins, Hayden was confronted with two conflicting challenges: the first was antiquated technology that threatened operational deafness in less than a decade, and the second was the leaden bureaucracy that was driven by the fear of omnipotence within the organization itself. Hayden took on both issues with strength and poise, but his role in history was solidified on the fateful day of 11 September 2001.

The NSA admitted it had no prior knowledge of the attacks, but, under Hayden, the pendulum started to swing. As Hayden states, it is easy to judge intelligence agencies for not doing enough in times of crisis and for overstepping their bounds when we as a nation feel safe. In a telling moment two days after 9/11, while speaking to an anxious workforce, he issued several reminders. The first was that the balance between security and liberty was fragile, but that our country was formed on the notion that liberty demands priority. The second was that in that moment of America's call for justice, "more than three hundred million Americans wish they had your job."

In the weeks, months, and years to follow, Hayden

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


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would push the envelope to get every last bit of intelligence the letter of the law would allow. He spoke clearly on Stellarwind—the push to gather intelligence inside the United States originating from or heading to foreign sources—an effort fully supported and encouraged by President George W. Bush. That intelligence was a powerful tool, and hopefully, history will allow a far more definitive look at how much that single action leveraged our intelligence community once more information is eventually declassified and released.

In a war where the enemy was extremely hard to find yet relatively easy to eliminate, Hayden made another, but less public, contribution at the NSA to bring intelligence to the front lines. He made clear to his teams that they were not a supporting element but rather a dynamic fighting force. Their intelligence became real time, and the NSA built systems based on customer needs and individual rules of engagement. Retelling a conversation with the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, where he was being asked for more intelligence, Hayden said, "Charlie, let me give you another way of thinking about this. You give me a little action, and I'll give you a lot more intelligence." In other words, operational moves force the enemy to move and communicate, allowing for intelligence that is much more complete, and making for a successful working arrangement with organizations such as U.S. Special Operations Command.

While Hayden's goal was to shake up the NSA, in contrast, he asserts, his mission at the CIA was to settle things down. The CIA was in shambles after failing to uncover the 9/11 plot, fumbling over the lack of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq, and folding under the public pressure due to its use of enhanced interrogation techniques. Hayden very humbly admits failure in the lack of information regarding the 9/11 plot and in simply "getting it wrong" in terms of WMD. He did not accept the passing of the blame to the White House on that issue and was very eager to take responsibility first at the NSA and again at the CIA. Interrogation techniques, however, proved to be a challenge, where public opinion and the ever-critical press once again stunted his efforts.

Hayden worked to build consensus on the CIA's new program by laying out ground rules for who was held, where and for how long they were held, and what techniques were used for their interrogations. With the utmost respect for the decisions that were made just after 9/11, Hayden admits that it was easier for him at that time to take tactics off the table because the American people had forgotten the fear they felt in the days following 9/11. He also was quick to defend his interrogators, whom he described as performing their jobs out

of a "sense of duty, not enthusiasm." Eventually, new guidelines were set, leaving six of the thirteen enhanced interrogation techniques in place. Hayden candidly gave his opinion to summarize this decision: "America (not just CIA) was largely out of the detention and interrogation business. We had finally succeeded in making it so legally difficult and so politically dangerous to grab and hold someone that we would simply default to the kill switch to take terrorists off the battlefield."

The unfortunate truth is that most of Hayden's decisions had little to do with keeping America safe and much to do with keeping Americans appeased. Handling the press and the politics associated with these huge issues was a never-ending task. His opinion of the press, which was often unfavorable, is delivered respectfully but honestly. In reference to the battle between the government's responsibility to keep secrets and the public's right to know, Hayden offers up a quote from David Ignatius: "We journalists usually try to argue that we have carefully weighed the pros and cons and believe that the public benefits of disclosure outweigh potential harm. The problem is that we aren't fully qualified to make those judgments."

Hayden's career was littered with such decisions. The months in 2006 leading up to "The Surge" in Iraq were no different. Hayden declared that "we had created tactical successes but without strategic effect," and he admittedly wrestled with which action would cause the least harm, pulling troops out or keeping them in. He spoke at great length about the struggles in the Maliki government and the reasons it ultimately failed despite Bush's dedication to its cause. Ironically, as in most of his recounts, the declaration of success or failure was not as important as defining the circumstances surrounding the decision and the intentions of the decision makers.

Overall, *Playing to the Edge* provides the consumer with an excellent background on the intelligence community and a candid version of some of the toughest decisions made post-9/11. The book does not boast about the accomplishments of the CIA, the NSA, or of Michael Hayden but rather aims to generate public support by authoritatively informing readers. It was unfortunate that this book had to be written, but in general, the intelligence community should be able to protect their agents and fellow residents under a veil of secrecy and not divulge information that is potentially harmful to future endeavors. Hayden states in the book, "Secrecy in a democracy is not a grant of power, but a grant of trust." In my opinion, Hayden goes a great distance to earn that trust—perhaps even too far. ■

# Spc. Hilda I. Clayton

## May 21, 1991 to July 2, 2013

Spc. Hilda I. Clayton, a visual information specialist assigned to the 55th Signal Company (Combat Camera), was killed while photographing a live-fire training exercise 2 July 2013 in Laghman Province, Afghanistan. Clayton and four Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers died when a mortar tube accidentally exploded during an ANA mortar validation exercise being supported by U.S. Army trainers. She was attached to the 4th Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, based at Forward Operating Base Gamberi in eastern Afghanistan.

At the critical juncture of the war, when it was necessary for the ANA to increasingly assume responsibility for military actions, the story was not in the fighting but in the partnership that was necessary between U.S. and Afghan forces to stabilize the Afghan nation. One of the Afghan soldiers killed was a photojournalist that Clayton had partnered with to train in photojournalism. Not only did Clayton help document activities aimed at shaping and strengthening the partnership but she also shared in the risk by participating in the effort.

Combat Camera soldiers are trained to take still and video imagery in any environment. Their primary mission is to accompany combat soldiers wherever deployed to document the history of combat operations. Clayton's death symbolizes how female soldiers are increasingly exposed to hazardous situations in training and in combat on par with their male counterparts.

Clayton's service and sacrifice were recognized during memorial ceremonies at Forward Operating Base Gamberi on 8 July 2013 and at the Defense Information School (DINFOS), Fort Meade, Maryland, on 13 December 2013. At Fort Meade, Clayton's name was added to the DINFOS Hall of Heroes.

Combat Camera further honored Clayton by naming the award for the winner of its annual best combat camera competition after her. ■

A mortar tube accidentally explodes 2 July 2013 during an Afghan National Army (ANA) live-fire training exercise in Laghman Province, Afghanistan. The accident killed U.S. Army Spc. Hilda I. Clayton and four ANA soldiers. *Above*: The photo taken by one of the Afghan soldiers at the moment of the explosion. *Background*: The photo was simultaneously taken by Spc. Clayton.


Spc. Hilda I. Clayton, 22, was the first combat documentation and production specialist to be killed in Afghanistan. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Army)

The Spc. Hilda I. Clayton Best Combat Camera (COMCAM) Competition, designed to challenge joint service combat camera personnel, is named for Clayton, who died in Afghanistan 2 July 2013. The Best COMCAM Competition consist of five days of events to test competitors on their physical and technical skills.