The Center for Army Lessons Learned leads the Army Lessons Learned Program and delivers timely and relevant information to resolve gaps, enhance readiness, and inform modernization.
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This new paper sheds light on how the Chinese Communist Party views its security environment and how this perception shapes the PLA’s approach to... read more
This new paper sheds light on how the Chinese Communist Party views its security environment and how this perception shapes the PLA’s approach to warfighting, particularly its emphasis on “active defense” and “systems confrontation.” The insights presented here are not merely academic; they are essential for informing our training methodologies and force development initiatives.
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In modern large-scale combat operations, the overwhelming volume of data from intelligence sensors hinders effective decision-making by division and corps... read more
In modern large-scale combat operations, the overwhelming volume of data from intelligence sensors hinders effective decision-making by division and corps G2s. Priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), while crucial for focusing intelligence efforts, are often poorly managed due to unclear roles and responsibilities within the G2 and difficulties adapting to rapidly changing enemy situations. This article argues that a standardized PIR management process, incorporating a holistic view of PIR components (PIRs, indicators, and Specific Information Requirements - SIRs) and clearly defined G2 roles, is essential for effective intelligence analysis and decision-making. This involves expanding PIR management beyond the Analysis and Control Element (ACE) to include other key intelligence personnel, particularly leveraging the expertise of the fusion cell and single-source analysts, and ensuring close collaboration with intelligence planners and current operations personnel throughout the planning process.
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In the fast-paced environment of large-scale combat operations (LSCO), managing HR is a critical yet often overlooked aspect of mission success. During the... read more
In the fast-paced environment of large-scale combat operations (LSCO), managing HR is a critical yet often overlooked aspect of mission success. During the JPMRC exercise, the absence of a dedicated Mortuary Affairs Company and realistic HR simulation limited the effectiveness of training. To address this gap, incorporating simulated HR could significantly enhance the realism of future exercises.
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This article discusses the learning experience of the 2BCT, 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Fires’ Cell transition to SBU-E. It provides rudimentary... read more
This article discusses the learning experience of the 2BCT, 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Fires’ Cell transition to SBU-E. It provides rudimentary procedures to help other units more quickly integrate it into their own systems and processes and best practices developed by the unit during their operations validating the new Secure But Unclassified-Encrypted (SBU-E) Kill Chain starting from BN FSE (MUOS Unclassed-Digital) through our BDE AFATDS boxes (SBU-E) to DIV Fires (SIPR) as well as to the FAR’s FDCs (SBU-E) and down to the guns.
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The Center for Army Lessons Learned, in conjunction with serving and former PLs and PSGs, has compiled lessons learned and best practices for PLs and PSGs... read more
The Center for Army Lessons Learned, in conjunction with serving and former PLs and PSGs, has compiled lessons learned and best practices for PLs and PSGs and those who aspire to these positions to improve themselves and their units. The purpose of this handbook is to provide these lessons learned and best practices to PLs and PSGs to help enable their success in their first 100 days in position and beyond.
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While the U.S. Army has divested itself from counterinsurgency doctrine, favoring instead large-scale combat operations in multi-domains, the... read more
While the U.S. Army has divested itself from counterinsurgency doctrine, favoring instead large-scale combat operations in multi-domains, the characteristics of advising in armed conflict has not changed. As combat advising teams pair with partner forces during the offense, other advisor teams may remain behind to train and equip local security forces as a way towards consolidating gains in a division rear area. This document explores combat advising and consolidating gains through a clear, hold, build framework, and provides examples from Ukraine.
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