Photo By Erin Thompson | South Vietnamese troops crossing the Laotian border on Route 9 during Operation LAM...... read more read more
Subscribe
On Feb. 8, 1971, the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) launched Operation Lam Son 719, an incursion into southeastern Laos to disrupt the flow of enemy supplies along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and put President Richard Nixon’s Vietnamization policy to the test.
Following the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in mid-1970, the president’s staff and allied military leadership set their sights on the Vietnam-Laos border, where the North Vietnamese army (PAVN) was moving the center of its logistical activity. Attacking the supply bases near Tchepone in southeastern Laos could cut off a major artery of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and prevent the PAVN from launching a counteroffensive into South Vietnam.
At the behest of Nixon and his staff, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) commander General Creighton W. Abrams began planning a multi-phased offensive into Laos. American support of the invasion was limited to artillery from within South Vietnam and air operations, as American ground forces and advisors were restricted from operating outside Vietnam by the newly enacted Cooper-Church Amendment. It would be the first time ARVN units entered battle without U.S. advisors, a major test of Vietnamization, which sought to shift responsibility for the war effort to the South Vietnamese.
North Vietnamese spies were rampant within the ARVN, leading to strict limitations on command and staff involved in the planning. Some participating units received little advanced notice and were not provided with the latest intelligence regarding troop strength and movement, an estimated 22,000 enemy troops and increased antiaircraft capabilities around Tchepone. In mid-January, Brig. Gen. William C. Potts, MACV J-2, reported an even larger enemy presence around the ARVN I Corps area in South Vietnam that could easily be sent as reinforcements within days of an invasion. The intelligence worried Abrams, but the potential gains of the operation were deemed too important. Additionally, many within MACV predicted the invasion would be only “lightly opposed” based on experience in Cambodia the previous summer.
During Phase I of the offensive, Operation Dewey Canyon II, American troops restored the air base at Khe Sanh and established fire bases. Meanwhile, engineers cleared Route 9 up to the Laotian border, and allied air units flew in troops and supplies. Bad weather hindered some essential construction projects and canceled airstrikes intended to destroy PAVN antiaircraft weaponry. Phase II, Operation Lam Son 719, began on Feb. 8, 1971. Under the command of Lt. Gen. Hoang Xuan Lam, approximately 17,000 ARVN troops advanced into Laos. The invasion was slowed by difficult terrain and continued weather problems, but enemy resistance was initially light. The ARVN was expected to secure Tchepone within a few days before moving on to Phases III and IV, the destruction of nearby enemy logistics support areas.
However, on Feb. 11, ARVN forces suddenly stopped. General Lam, a political general heavily influenced by South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu, was commanded to move cautiously and avoid heavy casualties which might threaten Thieu’s reelection campaign. The halt allowed the PAVN to gather reinforcements and surround the stalled ARVN force, just as some intelligence officers had warned. What commenced was described by historian George C. Herring as “a slugfest” along Route 9. Poor weather, communication breakdowns, and failure to destroy the enemy’s antiaircraft capabilities led to significant losses of allied personnel and equipment.
The ARVN finally arrived in Tchepone on Mar. 7, but General Lam refused to remain in Laos without U.S. ground support—impossible due to limitations imposed by Congress. The ARVN began withdrawing on Mar. 11 and did not fully escape Laos until Mar. 23. The U.S. XXIV Corps counted 7,683 ARVN and 1,402 American casualties; the PAVN reported some 10,000 casualties, but allied sources suggested it was closer to 19,000.
The operation exposed security vulnerabilities on the Ho Chi Minh Trail and, by forcing North Vietnam to expend enormous resources and manpower, delayed any major enemy offensives until 1972. Nevertheless, the perceived poor performance of the ARVN led to increased antiwar sentiment and intensified the growing rift between the U.S. and South Vietnamese governments. As a test of Vietnamization, General Bruce Palmer Jr. described Lam Son 719 as “at best a shaky draw and in reality a psychological defeat for the ARVN.”
Article by Erin E. Thompson, USAICoE Staff Historian. New issues of This Week in MI History are published each week. To report story errors, ask questions, request previous articles, or be added to our distribution list, please contact: TR-ICoE-Command-Historian@army.mil.
| Date Taken: | 02.06.2026 |
| Date Posted: | 02.06.2026 12:08 |
| Story ID: | 557622 |
| Location: | US |
| Web Views: | 16 |
| Downloads: | 0 |
This work, Americans Support Invasion of Laos (8 FEB 1971), by Erin Thompson, identified by DVIDS, must comply with the restrictions shown on https://www.dvidshub.net/about/copyright.
No keywords found.
