[This article was first published in Army Sustainment Professional Bulletin, which was then called Army Logistician, volume 3, number 3 (May–June 1971), pages 18–21, 44. The text, including any biographical note, is reproduced as faithfully as possible to enable searchability. To view any images and charts in the article, refer to the issue itself, available on DVIDS.]
THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID) is an agency of the U.S. Department of State whose operations extend worldwide. Its role and its advisory activities vary in each country, depending upon the needs and capabilities of the country and the programs that the host country and USAID personnel develop jointly. The role of the USAID is similar to the role of a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) with one important difference. Whereas the MAAG provides advice and assistance to the host government’s military forces, USAID personnel perform similar services for the host government’s civilian institutions for economic development in fields such as industry, agriculture, and natural resource development. USAID also assists the host government in building its public service institutions such as health, education, administration, and related functions.
-Editor
THE SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM in 1965 plunged the United States Agency for International Development/Vietnam (USAID/VN) into a unique and unprecedented role. While USAID/VN was attempting to assist the Government of Vietnam in the orderly development of that country, the Republic became engaged in a disruptive, prolonged, full-scale war. The introduction of U.S. and free world military forces at that time, the subsequent rapid buildup, and the increased tempo of military operations added to the complexities of the situation.
The Government of the Republic of Vietnam (GVN) had taken on military, economic development, pacification, and welfare activities beyond the country’s logistics support capabilities. The United States provided commodity support of these activities on a large scale and assisted in financing commercial imports. All of these actions further strained existing logistics facilities, personnel, and systems.
The result was that USAID/VN not only faced increased demands in its traditional advisory role but it also became involved in operational logistics.
Unprecedented Involvement
USAID/VN operational involvement in most aspects of the GVN’s logistics functions was to support and to contribute to the U.S. war objectives, to assist the GVN in providing help to the people suffering as a consequence of the war, and to establish a logistics base in the civilian sector for the long-term development of the country in the postwar era. To accomplish these tasks, USAID/VN became deeply involved in the tasks of port operations and management, warehousing and distribution, maintenance, and procurement. Such involvement was without precedent on the part of USAID, and it had to be done in the midst of an expanding war.
When USAID/VN became involved in operational logistics, much of the GVN’s civilian logistics infrastructure was fragmented among its various ministries and lacked standard procedures and mutual support. The logistics activities were incapable of handling the increased volume of supplies arriving in-country that required rapid discharge, distribution, and proper storage. In addition, there was virtually no provision for maintenance of large numbers of vehicles and other equipment provided by the United Stales in support of the Vietnam Government’s greatly expanded counterinsurgency and pacification programs.
USAID Role Expanded
To accomplish the ever-increasing operational tasks, USAID/VN recruited large numbers of personnel to perform the logistics tasks that had overwhelmed the GVN. Concurrently, the advisory effort was enlarged and intensified. Through joint USAID-GVN planning, systems and procedures were developed to facilitate an orderly return of logistics operations to the GVN. The objectives USAID sought to achieve by its operational involvement have been achieved in varying degrees by an extraordinary, combined GVN-U.S. effort.
Before the buildup, some logistics activities were being carried out by the GVN’s Central Purchasing and Supply Agency (CPSA). A relatively small, understaffed agency whose founding had been urged by USAID/VN, the CPSA was gradually being trained in modem logistics procedures and techniques when the rapid buildup began. The CPSA and various other GVN ministries and agencies were charged by law with performing certain logistics tasks. Although the magnitude of the logistics tasks overwhelmed their personnel and budgets, nevertheless they did exist and were functioning to a degree. Logistics progress was hampered for it was necessary that all of the USAID/VN efforts be coordinated with and approved by these various GVN agencies.
USAID/VN’s main logistics effort was directed toward four functional areas — port management and operations, warehousing and distribution, maintenance, and procurement. As an agency whose role is primarily advisory, USAID/VN had no precedent and few written procedures for such operational involvement. To cope with the operational logistics tasks thrust upon it, USAID/VN began intensive recruiting and logistics personnel strength rose from 35 in May 1965 to a peak of 208 by January 1968. Almost all of those recruited were retired military personnel, and although all services were represented, the majority had been trained in U.S. Army schools and had extensive experience in various areas of logistics. This similarity of training, background, and experience was invaluable, and it was the knowledge and initiative of these men that greatly contributed to solving many of the day-to-day problems encountered in Vietnam, and to developing both the short- and long-range plans for disinvolvement in the operational logistics role.
Port Operations Critical
The most critical operational problem that both the GVN and USAID/VN faced initially was the congestion of the Saigon port. The delay in discharging cargo adversely affected military operations, the GVN-USAID pacification programs, and the commercial importers. With the concurrence of the GVN, an agreement was signed between USAID and the Department of Defense (DOD) whereby the U.S. Army assumed responsibility for discharge, customs clearance, and delivery to first-destination consignee of incoming cargo consigned to USAID and GVN ministries. The Army also assumed the advisory role to the director of the Saigon port, while USAID/VN retained the advisory role in the Republic of Vietnam’s up-country ports.
The volume of cargoes entering Saigon port made warehousing a critical problem. Warehouses in existence were antiquated for the most part and inadequate for the volume and type of commodities entering the country. Modern warehouses were required and GVN personnel had to be trained to operate them. Joint GVN-USAID/VN planning resulted in the construction of a modern, central warehouse complex within the Saigon area to serve as a port backup storage facility. It contained over 670,000 square feet of covered storage and 1,900 feet of barge landing space to facilitate clearing cargo from the Saigon port. Modern warehouses were also constructed at the up-country ports of Da Nang, Qui Nhon, and Nha Tiang.
Air Delivery Used
Distribution of commodities throughout Vietnam was frequently hampered by enemy activity that disrupted the lines of communication. Close liaison was maintained with the U.S. military and the airlift capability of the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV) and Air America was used to deliver needed cargoes when ground routes were unsafe. Military Sealift Command shipping and MACV airlift were also used for movement of outsized cargo from Saigon to up-country ports or to provinces accessible only by air.
The increased tempo of the U.S.-GVN pacification programs required a great increase in vehicles and equipment throughout the country, and maintenance of these items was the responsibility of the ministry to whom consigned. In most cases, the ministry possessed neither the facilities nor the skilled personnel to properly maintain this equipment. Demands on the GVN budget also limited the amount of money allocated to each ministry for these services. Joint GVN-USAID/VN planning resulted in a two-pronged approach to this problem.
A national maintenance system was instituted that consisted of a province maintenance shop program and a repair parts depot. In each province, a maintenance shop was constructed and equipment was supplied to perform maintenance and minor repairs on all GVN vehicles in the province. A repair parts depot was established in Saigon as the source of all repair parts for the shops and for the ministries that possessed the capability of performing repair work on their own vehicles. Maintenance advisers were assigned to the four military regions in the country to assist and advise the GVN, and a national registration program was initiated to provide the repair parts depot with a listing of all GVN-owned vehicles and equipment throughout the country. Procedures were also established to register with the depot all USAID/VN-financed vehicles and equipment subsequently entering the country.
ln the area of procurement, USAID/VN was confronted with the same problem common to other logistics functions. The slow, cumbersome procedures and the small staff of the GVN could not meet the urgency of the situation. It was necessary to establish a procurement branch within the logistics division to expeditiously procure and perform the attendant tasks common to a large-scale procurement activity. The procurement load reached a peak or $163 million in fiscal year 1967.
Politico-Military Considerations
Logisticians can grasp the peculiarity of USAID/VN’s position at the time. USAID is primarily an advisory agency, whose tasks are usually performed within a fairly stable, established structure of a host government in a peacetime or post-hostilities atmosphere. However, in Vietnam USAID logistics effort became primarily operational within a government structure that was changing to meet the requirements of a war and whose ministries’ accelerating programs depended in great part on USAID/VN logistics efforts for the success of their programs. In retrospect, perhaps the easiest course would have been to assume far more operational control of the GVN logistics effort than was actually assumed. However, this course would have been self-defeating for USAID's long-range and traditional objectives. Several basic decisions were made early in its operational involvement, and time has proved them correct.
Logistics Policies Set
First, USAID/VN would perform only those logistics tasks that the GVN did not possess the capability to perform at that time. Second, the advisory effort would be enlarged and intensified. Third, operational tasks would be returned to the GVN as rapidly as conditions and the GVN capability permitted. Fourth, maximum use would be made of existing systems, procedures, and personnel of other U.S. agencies.
The many and varied tasks performed by USAID/VN in carrying out these basic decisions are too numerous to explain in detail here. However, a few examples will serve as an indicator of USAID/VN activities in the years that followed.
The introduction of U.S. Army personnel into Saigon port operations assured the eventual clearing of its congested state. Meanwhile, USAID/VN intensified its training efforts to assure a satisfactory level of performance when the Army returned all port activities to the GVN. Port personnel were trained in modern cargo handling techniques, the use of mechanized handling equipment, the widespread use of pallets, traffic control within the port, segregation and efficient storage of cargo, and the maintenance of accurate documentation on receipt, location, and release of cargoes. In addition, USAID/VN provided for surfacing roads, constructing hardstands, and rehabilitating warehouses and port facilities. Through the joint efforts of the GVN, the U.S. Army, and the USAID/VN, Saigon port congestion was ended in 1967 and port functions were gradually returned to the full control of the GVN.
The USAID/VN-financed construction of the large warehouse complex at Thu Duc, in the vicinity of Saigon, as well as USAID/VN’s warehouse construction program throughout the country, was essential not only to provide the GVN with a modern, efficient warehousing system but also to provide the necessary facilities for the nationwide distribution of USAID/VN-financed commodities required for the counterinsurgency and reconstruction programs. Concurrently, an integrated supply system common to all ministries whose commodities were being distributed throughout the rural areas was developed, standard forms were designed in the Vietnamese language, and hundreds of Vietnamese supply personnel were trained in the application of a system called “The Basic Supply Regulation.” The development, writing, and publication of this regulation and the training of Vietnamese in its use was accelerated. Today this regulation is in effect in every province, as well as at the national and regional levels. The system is entirely Vietnamese-operated throughout the country.
Procedures Streamlined
An accepted practice among U.S. Government agencies is to dispose of an item that is beyond economical repair or to transfer a usable item for which a requirement no longer exists to another agency that could use it. The GVN procedures for these actions were so cumbersome as to be almost unworkable, to the effect that such transactions were virtually unknown. With the assistance of USAID/VN, the GVN developed a streamlined procedure and a simplified format that has proved so successful that the GVN now routinely transfers excess major items between ministries and auctions those items beyond economical repair.
One of the most beneficial outgrowths of USAID/VN’s operational logistics involvement was the revelation to the GVN and USAID of those precise areas where the GVN logistics infrastructure needed strengthening. ln coordination with GVN personnel, USAID/VN developed plans to establish within the GVN a logistics structure capable of assuming many of the logistics tasks that USAID/VN had performed. In October 1968, USAID/VN’s planning and advisory effort culminated in the establishment of the Central Logistics Agency (CLA), formerly known as CPSA, which became the major counterpart of the USAID/VN logistics program and the major government instrumentality in carrying out the GVN’s numerous logistics activities. For the first time, the GVN has a centrally managed organization that is constantly increasing its capacity to perform logistics functions and services for all nonmilitary GVN agencies that are required for the country’s economic development.
The logistics systems of the Department of Defense and Department of the Army are well known to the logistics personnel of USAID/VN. Some of the USAID/VN logistics personnel were former military personnel who had held key positions in these systems and had helped to design and modify them. An early basic decision, you recall, was not to duplicate existing systems of other U.S. agencies. To do so would have been extravagant and time consuming. Instead, wherever possible, USAID attempted to tie in to existing systems by negotiating agreements with departments in Washington and by arranging interagency support agreements in Vietnam. The benefits of being able to use an existing system with established procedures are readily apparent, and one of the first acts was to have all USAID-financed commodities transported to Vietnam through the Defense Transportation System. Other agreements gave USAID/VN access to the Defense Electronic Supply Center, the Defense General Supply Center, and other elements of the Defense Supply Agency. In the Far East, USAID/VN’s first source of repair parts was the U.S. Army Depot, Japan, and for medical items, the U.S. Army Medical Depot, Okinawa. Federal Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures and Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures are used, and the MACV communications system is employed for transceiving requisitions and receiving supply status reports. Since 1 July 1970, repair parts have been requisitioned through the Defense Supply Agency or the U.S. Army International Logistics Center, which passes them to various supply sources within the United States.
The system developed by the U.S. Army for acquiring excess property has proved most beneficial to USAID. Not only have large amounts of money been saved by the acquisition of this property for USAID/VN projects, but the immediate availability of items has often saved the months of leadtime required in new procurement. USAID/VN requisitions directly from the U.S. Army through the Pacific Command Utilization and Redistribution Agency (PURA) system, and the requested items are shipped via the Defense Transportation System. USAID/VN has received and put to use much property made excess by the withdrawal of military forces from Vietnam.
Training Vital
ln this era of rapid communications, complex machines, and sophisticated systems, attention is seldom given to those who train the individuals to operate the systems. USAID/VN’s Participant Training Program, whereby Vietnamese personnel are selected for training in the continental United States, has been highly successful. The Army’s Logistics Management Center at Fort Lee, Virginia, has provided training to GVN personnel that is not possible in Vietnam. The Duke of Wellington is reputed to have remarked that the battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton. If this be so, it would be no great exaggeration to say that many of Vietnam’s logistics problems were solved in the classrooms of the Army Logistics Management Center.
Trainees who have returned to Vietnam, armed with new knowledge and a new spirit of confidence in their own abilities, now occupy important positions in the GVN directorates and services. The development of Vietnam’s logistics base and its future economic progress depends upon how well these people — and others like them — meet the challenges that lie ahead.
Jesse M. Johnson was director of the Office of Logistics, Bureau for Vietnam, USAID, Washington. D.C. A retired Army colonel, he spent the greater part of his military career in logistics staff and operations assignments in Southeast Asia, Europe, and the continental United States. He served as assistant director for logistics with USAID in Vietnam.
| Date Taken: | 09.22.2025 |
| Date Posted: | 09.22.2025 16:01 |
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