by Erin E. Thompson, USAICoE Staff Historian
EARLY WARNING SAVES BATON ROUGE
On Aug. 5, 1862, Confederate Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge launched an attack on Union-held Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Despite his efforts to surprise Union forces, critical intelligence provided Brig. Gen. Thomas R. Williams with much needed time to organize infantry and naval support for the defense of the city.
The Union seized control of Baton Rouge following the capture of New Orleans in the spring of 1862. This victory gave the Union control of the southern Mississippi River and allowed its fleet to sail north, where R. Adm. David G. Farragut hoped to capture the Confederate stronghold at Vicksburg, Mississippi. On May 29, General Williams established an occupation force in Baton Rouge before joining Farragut at Vicksburg and becoming responsible for digging a canal to bypass Vicksburg and potentially divert the river current away from the city.
Confederate Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn was headquartered at Vicksburg during Farragut’s bombardment of the city throughout the summer of 1862. Hoping to divert Union attention, Van Dorn began planning an attack on Baton Rouge to regain the critical navigation and communications route on the Mississippi and Red Rivers and push the Union out of Louisiana. He collected intelligence throughout June and July about Union troop strength from Brig. Gen. Daniel Ruggles, commander of a small force at Camp Moore. Van Dorn was forced to delay any action against the city due to the ongoing siege of Vicksburg.
By mid-July, Williams’ men were struck by dysentery and malaria from the monthlong canal digging. When it became clear the project would not succeed, Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler ordered Williams to return to Baton Rouge. Meanwhile, Farragut’s forces had little success against the well-fortified Vicksburg or the ironclad ram Arkansas. Without Williams’ land force to support the naval blockade and siege of the city, Farragut departed for New Orleans.
The retreat of Union forces from Vicksburg allowed Van Dorn to prepare an assault on Baton Rouge. On July 27, he ordered General Breckinridge to depart with 4,000 men from Vicksburg. They arrived at Camp Moore on July 28, where Ruggles informed Breckinridge that the Union strength at Baton Rouge now numbered 5,000 troops, with several gunboats in the harbor. Illness had reduced Breckinridge’s force to about 3,400. Despite being outnumbered, he informed Van Dorn he could take Baton Rouge if supported by the Arkansas. Van Dorn replied that the ship would arrive on August 5.
General Williams’ forces arrived in Baton Rouge on July 26. Many of his men were still sick, depleting Williams’ force to about 2,500. The harbor was guarded by the ironclads Essex and Sumter and two gunboats. On August 2, Williams received intelligence from Union spy John Mahan that Breckinridge’s forces had left Camp Moore enroute to Baton Rouge. Williams quickly informed General Butler in New Orleans, who was skeptical of the information and initially refused to send reinforcements. In the afternoon of August 4, Williams’ scouts confirmed Breckinridge’s approach, giving Williams time to organize his men for the defense of the city.
At dawn on Aug. 5, 1862, Breckinridge’s army, now only 2,600 men and having lost the element of surprise, attacked the city. In the ensuing battle, General Williams was killed, and Col. Thomas W. Cahill of the 9th Connecticut Infantry took command. Cahill eventually ordered his forces to retreat further into the city, allowing the gunboats to fire on the Confederate lines. Breckinridge’s only hope was the Arkansas, which had still not arrived. In fact, the ship, which had been under repair when it was ordered to Baton Rouge, had suffered engine failure and ran aground about four miles north of the city. It was set on fire the next day to prevent capture by the Union. Breckinridge, heavily outgunned by the Union Navy and without naval support, was forced to retreat to Port Hudson, about twenty miles north of Baton Rouge. The Union victory was short-lived; the city was soon abandoned over fears of a Confederate attack on New Orleans.
New issues of This Week in MI History are published each week. To report story errors, ask questions, request previous articles, or be added to our distribution list, please contact: TR-ICoE-Command-Historian@army.mil.
Date Taken: | 08.01.2025 |
Date Posted: | 08.01.2025 15:28 |
Story ID: | 544563 |
Location: | US |
Web Views: | 24 |
Downloads: | 0 |
This work, Early Warning Saves Baton Rouge (5 AUG 1862), by Erin Thompson, identified by DVIDS, must comply with the restrictions shown on https://www.dvidshub.net/about/copyright.