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by Erin E. Thompson, USAICoE Staff Historian
MI-9 IDENTIFIES TRAINING DEFICIENCIES DURING WORLD WAR I
On Jul. 29, 1918, the Military Intelligence Division (MID) established the MI-9 Field Intelligence Section. Despite its title, the section was not responsible for overseeing intelligence operations, but rather for solving the problem of disorganized combat intelligence training for personnel deploying to France.
A large deficiency in intelligence training quickly became apparent as American intelligence officers began arriving in France in 1917. Prior to their arrival in Europe, these officers attended a two-week course at the Army War College, followed by attendance at either the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) General Staff College in France or the British Army Intelligence School in England. This training was determined to be inadequate, and a new U.S. Army Intelligence School was soon established in Langres, France, to provide the necessary training.
Although the Langres school was a significant improvement to training received by general staff officers, intelligence personnel arriving with their divisions continued to display insufficient training, particularly in positive intelligence areas, such as scouting and field observation. Intelligence training at division training centers in the U.S. remained focused primarily on negative intelligence, such as espionage and counterintelligence.
On Jul. 29, 1918, the MID established the MI-9 Section within the Positive Branch to identify and correct these training shortfalls. The MID selected AEF intelligence officer Col. Frederick L. Dengler as section chief. He quickly identified several factors leading to the inadequate training of intelligence personnel in France, including a misunderstanding and devaluing of intelligence by regimental, battalion, and company commanders that led to the wrong men being recommended for intelligence training; failure to differentiate between positive and negative intelligence during training; and a lack of sufficient intelligence training materials. These factors produced major variations in the quality of training at different centers and in the subsequent performance of personnel in combat units.
Colonel Dengler visited eleven divisional training centers in the U.S. to audit their intelligence training. In August 1918, based on Dengler’s observations, Brig. Gen. Marlborough Churchill, chief of the MID, submitted several recommendations to the War Department chief of staff. These suggestions included providing standard equipment to each division training center, producing training films and regular intelligence bulletins for pre-deployment training, and limiting positive intelligence training within the U.S. to personnel at divisions or below.
These recommendations quickly met with protest from Brig. Gen. Lytle Brown, director of the War Plans Division’s (WPD) Training Branch, who argued his branch held authority over all Army training, including intelligence. The chief of staff approved Churchill’s proposal “in principle,” but agreed the WPD Training Branch was responsible for executing the changes. MI-9 was subsequently relegated to an advisory role to the WPD, and Colonel Dengler was attached to the Training Branch for the specific purpose of improving positive intelligence training within the Army.
This agreement between MI-9 and the WPD brought about several improvements to standardize combat intelligence training across the Army. During the section’s brief few months of operation, it obtained an agreement with the AEF to assign officers and soldiers with combat experience, including qualified intelligence personnel, to serve as instructors at division training centers. Likewise, the MID produced its first training manual, "Provisional Combat Intelligence Manual," in October 1918.
MI-9 was disbanded following the armistice, and postwar downsizing efforts left many of these training issues unresolved. Nevertheless, the section emphasized the necessity for continuous development in the Army’s positive intelligence training. Colonel Dengler received the Army Distinguished Service Medal for his work with the AEF G-2 and his role in improving intelligence training during the last months of the war.
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| Date Taken: | 07.25.2025 |
| Date Posted: | 07.25.2025 14:50 |
| Story ID: | 543868 |
| Location: | US |
| Web Views: | 17 |
| Downloads: | 0 |
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