[This article was first published in Army Sustainment Professional Bulletin, which was then called Army Logistician, volume 3, number 2 (March–April 1971), pages 28–32. The text, including any biographical note, is reproduced as faithfully as possible to enable searchability. To view any images and charts in the article, refer to the issue itself, available on DVIDS and the bulletin’s archives at asu.army.mil/alog/.]
When operations cannot keep pace with the technology of the times, it is management’s responsibility to solve the dilemma.
INERTIA brought about by satisfaction with the status quo has always been the bane of managers. When this malady strikes the management group of any organization, deterioration is the inevitable consequence.
If you were a top manager in a corporation with net assets of over $360 million, annual operating expenses of over $10 million, annual commodity transactions of over $50 million — and if your 2,500-man work force was largely composed of people planning to retire in the next ten years, your equipment was old and obsolete, and costs were climbing — what would you do?
This, briefly, was the situation facing the management of the Kaiserslautern Army Depot, one of the major United States Army supply depots in Europe. Realization that operations were not keeping pace with the times occurred to the top management of the depot just over three years ago.
An Objective Evaluation
Strategically located in central West Germany, the depot has excellent access to all major transportation arteries. Its mission is to receive, store, maintain in storage, and issue supplies to United States forces stationed throughout Europe. These factors and the outlook for things to come made it compelling that the management objectively evaluate the ability of the depot to successfully complete future missions.
This evaluation revealed obsolete equipment, a lack of adequate storage space, a shortage of qualified man-power, and spiraling labor costs. The management decision reached at Kaiserslautern was — modernize!
With this decision, management initiated a comprehensive modernization program to expand and mechanize storage operations and facilities. The program sequence called for a conceptual stage, an engineering design and analysis stage, a justification stage, an authorization and funding stage, and a program implementation stage. Today, at Kaiserslautern Army Depot, modernization of operations is in various stages of implementation.
Conceptualizing
It was necessary to create an attitude of healthy dissatisfaction with the status quo in order to initiate the conceptual stage of the Kaiserslautern Army Depot modernization program. A “think tank” was organized to investigate the merits and limitations of existing operations, with an eye to how maximum improvement could be obtained with minimum dollar expenditures. The “think tank” was comprised of top management experts in receiving, issuing, storing, and shipping. The depot commander and his executive assistant were also members. The “think tank” was a heterogeneous mixture of officers, enlisted men, Department of the Army civilians, and local nationals. Two in the group were women who could survey with a critical eye!
From the “think tank,” a concept for modernizing emerged. The first hurdle in improving operations had been cleared just by getting managers to become aware of deficiencies and to think positively about improvements.
Design and Analysis
The second step in the management process was to assign the modernization concept to a task force for the design and analysis tasks. Directed by a chief, the task force consisted of project engineers, draftsmen, modelmakers, and secretarial help. An essential part of the task force was a touch of youth — people who questioned the antiquated operations that had been accepted as immutable. The best qualified representatives of all depot operations augmented the basic task force.
As the design progressed, specialists from the U.S. Army Materiel Command who were functionally oriented in modern depot supply operations were brought from the continental United States to assist in refining early designs.
During this stage, it was important to create an atmosphere in which everyone considered himself a contributor. The feeling or idea that the plan was a particular individual’s or group’s creation was avoided in order to prevent passive sabotage from impeding progress. During the design and analysis stage, the plan was segmented and priorities were assigned to specific parts of the program. Priorities were based on cost versus savings and on improvements required for successful mission accomplishment. Because of the possibility that only high priority segments of the plan would gain approval, alternate and backup plans were developed to insure a smooth running operation at any stage in the program.
After completing the design, the total plan was analyzed for flexibility, cost, and capacity. System capabilities were determined and possible bottlenecks were eliminated. During this stage, three-dimensional scale models were constructed so that alternative equipment layouts could be arranged and rearranged with a minimum of effort. Since the models were prominently displayed, a steady stream of comments and suggestions were evoked from members of the staff and from visitors. Blueprints could never have stimulated equal interest. The final engineering drawings were made using the models as convenient references, thus mitigating the requirement for highly skilled draftsmen.
Justification
Justification became the next major management step if the modernization effort was to gain authorization and funding. This stage was perhaps the most beneficial in producing an efficient, economical, and workable plan because it required thorough investigation and documentation of every conceivable aspect of both existing and proposed facilities.
Both tangible and intangible factors were considered. Costs and savings data to which dollar values could be assigned yielded tangible factors. Costs and savings considerations were —
• Capital costs (equipment purchased with depot funds).
• Procurement of equipment and missiles, Army (PEMA) costs (centrally purchased equipment for which the depot does not provide funds).
• Repair, and utilities costs (funds for minor alterations to fixed property and facilities).
• Military construction, Army (MCA) costs.
• Miscellaneous costs.
• Personnel savings.
• Equipment savings.
• Space savings.
The investment was amortized for each priority as well as for the total modernization program. The formula used was that accepted in the commercial industrial engineering world of today.
What are some of the intangible benefits that are accrued through modernization? Kaiserslautern Army Depot, along with other U.S. installations in Europe, faces a critical civilian labor problem. A high percentage of the local national work force is between the ages of 50 and 60; hence, in the next few years, an abnormally large number of these employees will retire. Because of the relatively low pay scale and substandard working conditions, outstanding young people are not attracted to fill the vacancies created by the retirement of older employees. As a result of the modernization, increased motivation among the remaining work force is expected, and highly competent personnel are expected to be attracted to work in the modern environment.
The recently revalued deutsche mark now costs the United States 8 percent more than it did before the revaluation. Wage increases can also be expected soon if currently employed personnel are to be retained. Reduced personnel requirements brought about by the increased mechanization will help to offset these expenses.
Authorization and funding were sought after the engineering plans and justification were completed. Obtaining authorization and funding is basically a process of salesmanship. The plan must be sound with a valid justification and amortization factor; but, too, the plan must be presented in an interesting manner.
3-D Model
The scale models constructed to show all facets of the proposed modernization program proved to be invaluable in presenting the plan. It is not possible to bluff using a three-dimensional model as a briefing aid. It might be possible to bluff using blueprints that are not easily read and understood by untrained personnel. Visiting officials responsible for approving and funding the program were able to see precisely what the investment would produce. Because of their size, the models could not be taken to higher headquarters, so color photographs and slides were shown instead. They told the story nearly as well as the models.
Once the justification and funding were approved, the actual construction and installation presented numerous other problems. Two considerations are paramount in managing the implementation stage.
First, interference with operations caused by modernization activities must be kept to a minimum. Regular receiving, storing, and issuing missions must continue on a “business as usual” basis. Detailed advance planning is required for such things as the relocation of transportation activities, rerouting of vehicle traffic, and establishment of new parking lots.
Second, rewarehousing of supplies in depot storage must be synchronized with the contractor’s construction activities. Operation CHECKERS was the name given to the rapid movement of nearly 11,000 tons of bulk supplies to make way for the new construction.
Operation CHECKERS is simple when it is compared with Operation CHESS which is to follow. Operation CHESS will cover thousands of individual moves required to achieve optimal placement of supplies in the new facilities as they become available for use. Operation CHESS will require the highest level of planning ability that the depot can muster. Factors such as the cost of the item to be stored, whether or not it is a fast or slow mover, its status on the theater authorized stockage list, its unit size and weight, the quantity on hand and the quantity anticipated for long-term storage, and the physical inventory requirements are some of the many considerations in planning the occupancy of the new facilities at the Kaiserslautern Army Depot.
Security Problems
There is another important consideration during the implementation stage of such a modernization program — the ever-present possibility of active or passive sabotage. A potential security problem is inherent when it is apparent that there will be a reduction in the work force. Active sabotage can involve the intentional misuse of machines in an effort to impede or stop operations. Passive sabotage is the failure to use new machinery fully and properly, making it appear that the excess personnel are, in fact, still needed. The danger of sabotage can be minimized with proper personnel training and education throughout the modernization program.
Additional Benefits
Managing a modernization program is not an easy or simple matter, but it is a rewarding experience. The Kaiserslautern modernization will increase critically needed storage space from three-quarters of a million to over 1.4 million square feet of covered warehouse space. Mechanizing all operations where the state-of-the-art permits will ease the tight labor situation, and replacing worn out and obsolete equipment with new and modern items will improve operations. The result is a safer and more comfortable place to work. The centralization of functions also eliminates duplication and enhances supervision.
The entire modernization program will cost only about 2 percent of the value of supplies stored at Kaiserslautern and will be amortized in a period of less than three years.
Comprehensive action is the key to managing the modernization of this key supply depot. When the program is complete, Kaiserslautern Army Depot will provide even more rapid and responsive supply support to United States and NATO forces in Europe at rock bottom cost.
Brigadier General John R. Pierce, Jr., the former commander of Kaiserslautern Army Depot, was Deputy Commanding General for Area Support, TASCOM, Europe. General Pierce served as management adviser to the Minister of Defense, Republic of Korea, and commanded the Da Nang Subarea and 80th General Support Group, Vietnam.
| Date Taken: | 06.26.2025 |
| Date Posted: | 06.26.2025 12:02 |
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