[This article was first published in Army Sustainment Professional Bulletin, which was then called Army Logistician, volume 3, number 1 (January–February 1971), pages 16–19, 44. The text, including any biographical note, is reproduced as faithfully as possible to enable searchability. To view any images and charts in the article, refer to the issue itself, available on DVIDS and the bulletin’s archives at asu.army.mil/alog/.]
The TASCOM of today can provide the base for the Army’s logistics doctrine of the 1980’s. Tailored from the TASTA-70 concept, TASCOM functions within the NATO structure. It has a dual support mission-operational logistics and area supply.
IN APRIL 1969 the old U.S. Army Communications Zone (COMMZ), Europe, was reorganized and redesignated the U.S. Theater Army Support Command, Europe (TASCOM), in order to bring the command’s organization more in line with The Administrative Support Theater Army (TASTA)-70 doctrine. Since that time, observers of the European logistics scene have noted that TASCOM has continued to evolve and reorganize but not in complete consonance with the TASTA-70 study. Reasonably, one could ask, Why not implement the TASTA-70 concept precisely as it was formulated? or Why reinvent the wheel? These are perfectly valid questions that should be addressed and documented for two reasons. First, the TASCOM of today must be responsive to the Army’s needs in the precise oversea environment in which it is employed, befitting the on-the-ground circumstances and the timing of the specific needs. Second, in the long range, it should provide logistics policy makers with a realistic and well-rounded foundation on which to base the Army’s oversea logistics doctrine of the 1980’s.
TASCOM — Variation of TASTA-70
The original concept of TASTA-70 was basically one that visualized a full group of U.S. Armies operating in the field under conditions of war. Accordingly, the study addresses the organization of large support forces, known as a Theater Army Support Command, that would be essential to support large tactical forces in a “going” war. In the TASCOM management structure under the TASTA-70 concept, various functional commands which relate to a large force were designated. These included transportation, supply and maintenance, personnel, medical, engineer, and area support, plus other commands of sizes and types required in large-scale operations. All but two were actually formed even though the forces under them have been stripped down to current needs.
TASTA-70 is predicated also on our forces operating in a virtually isolated environment with little consideration given to the probability that we would be part of an allied force operating, at least initially, in a friendly country. These hypotheses are not really applicable to conditions that govern our presence in Europe today because we do not have European-based U.S. forces in the large numbers envisioned in TASTA-70; we are not required, initially, to perform all the functions assigned the TASCOM in TASTA-70 because we are operating in a friendly environment which is far from isolated; we are an integral part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a multinational structure; and we have made advancements in communications, transportation, and support technology that require some of the provisions of TASTA-70 to be viewed in a new light.
Host Country Support
Perhaps I should clarify the statement regarding the fact that TASCOM is not required to perform all the missions assigned to it under TASTA-70 by referring to the German Territorial Southern Command (GTSC) which is, in some respects, the German equivalent of a TASCOM — as a TASCOM would operate in the continental United States (CONUS). Remember that the U.S. forces are located principally in the Federal Republic of Germany. Our tactical forces are located on the real estate of a host nation which of itself has very capable forces and a strong interest in maintaining a barrier to any offensive action. The host country has organized itself to provide some elements of support not only for its own forces but also for any other forces that are located in the Federal Republic of Germany and would fight there. For example, general rear area security and the handling of disasters are the responsibility of the GTSC. The assumption of these functions by GTSC, therefore, takes a considerable burden off the American forces.
Integrated Security Links
TASCOM units now are concerned only with their own internal security within their respective areas which they occupy, maintaining close liaison with the GTSC so that an overall, well-integrated security plan is evolved.
GTSC also provides a very effective link for obtaining commercial and military communications and transportation that is in use within the Federal Republic of Germany — communications and transportation that would be needed in the event of large-scale operations. For example, the German railway network is a very effective transportation system that must be used to capacity in event of war. This railway is under the control of the GTSC for management and distribution and we have means of working effectively with the GTSC to use this capability. This arrangement is very beneficial also in the combined NATO structure — a departure once again from the TASTA-70 considerations.
NATO Structure has Impact
Another example of the effect of the NATO structure on our existence in the Federal Republic of Germany is the fact that every command that contains a group of corps size or larger is multinational. Consequently, the communications and the flow of information, the directives we issue, and the procedures we use must all be standardized within the NATO structure as compared to a system which is peculiar only to the United States.
In the Central Army Group (CENTAG) area, for example, there are two German corps and two American corps. These organizations, although not exactly alike, must be similar in nature if the CENTAG commander is to command and control his units effectively. Because of the similarity among units and because the number of U.S. forces committed in peacetime is smaller than envisioned in TASTA-70, there is no real requirement for numerous independent commands.
Centralized Logistics Control
Initially, it is far more reasonable and efficient, as well as more effective, in the early days of war to have a centrally controlled logistics system with all of the management cadre elements present for expansion as the situation changes and forces build up, than to have a large, diverse support command structure that has difficulty responding in a truly dynamic sense. The early phase of a war is the very time when maximum use must be made of every available support operation and facility until a logistics buildup is accomplished commensurate with the buildup of tactical forces.
Flexibility A Key
These considerations have a great deal of impact on how the logistics structure must be organized to carry out assigned missions. Our thinking and our planning must be flexible. We cannot think solely of a U.S. commitment, nor can we ever dispel the idea that we must be able to operate independently whenever necessary.
The method of organization I envision is one that reduces the requirement for numerous, widely dispersed independent commands, operating in different command channels. These commands generate an increased amount of paperwork, have difficulty in communications, and experience problems of separation in time and distance. A more desirous system which eliminates these problems is one that would permit us to have the vital operating elements of each of these commands in a centrally located position serviced by common, special staffs, such as an inspector general, a staff judge advocate, an adjutant general, and others. These operating elements would then bear the same responsibilities as would an independent command insofar as operational mission is concerned. By centralization and proximity, there would be better coordination, better communications, smoother continuity, and an ability to react much faster on a day-to-day basis both in peacetime as well as in the early days of a contingency situation.
TASCOM Structure Expandable
The system would allow for quicker surfacing and solutions to problems and make the maximum use of available resources in any emergency. Then, as a contingency situation grew in size to the extent that it became too large for centralized control, these operational elements would be separated from the parent headquarters and formed into independent headquarters and commands under the TASCOM structure. They would then operate much the same as is envisioned in the TASTA-70 concept as modified for the NATO environment.
Resupply From CONUS Bases
Related to this concept of organization that I envision in Europe in peacetime is the consideration that we are moving into an era where resupply is almost as rapid from bases or dedicated depots in the United States as it has been in the past from bases in a communications zone or rear area. The technological advances made in the rapid transmission of electrical data, the use of the C-5A aircraft, and the new containerization concepts now permit us to request supplies from CONUS and deliver them directly to the requisitioner more rapidly than we did in World War II from rear areas in Europe. Accordingly, the requirement for storing massive amounts of supplies in Europe is not as valid as it was in the past. Thus, without the middle men, we can afford to strip out a number of echelons engaged in supply. Safety levels can be reduced simply because of the shorter turnaround time. This results in two important savings — the size of the facilities required together with its manpower and the amount of stocks that we put on the ground merely as contingency items.
In balance, however, we can ill afford to reduce supplies to a level lower than that which is considered vitally necessary to allow for contingencies in the flow of supplies from CONUS. We must, of course, include stocks for units scheduled to move in early in any emergency. We must position these stocks so that they are not overly concentrated and subject to destruction, thereby causing a serious reduction in our readiness. These stocks should be distributed so that they can be effectively employed almost immediately and almost without the requirement of transporting them over any great distances in the early phases of an engagement. The safety stocks in the rear become fundamentally contingency stocks in the event any potential enemy does not choose to fight the war in accordance with our plans. Consequently, we must definitely have contingency considerations to meet unforeseen requirements. These stocks are not static in nature. They must be rotated, serviced, and modified as necessary if our reserve is to be ready for any emergency.
A very important consideration in implementing logistics doctrine in Europe is that in peace TASCOM not only has an operational logistics mission — which is a basic concept of TASTA-70 — but it also has a supply mission for area support with literally hundreds of posts, camps, and stations located throughout Western Germany, the Benelux countries, and the United Kingdom. In this geographical area there are approximately 42,000 family housing units in addition to clubs and messes, commissaries, and other activities normally found in a post, camp, or station. A sizable force is required to handle this mission in peacetime. The handling of noncombatants in an emergency also requires the TASCOM presence. Our task in peacetime is to provide support to our military personnel and their families and to afford them the opportunity to enjoy a normal family life as much as possible, even though we are located in a foreign country.
Increased Readiness
With the centralized concept I envision in peacetime, our readiness will not, in my view, decrease here in Europe. Rather, readiness increases without having to maintain separate command organizations in peace for any wartime contingency. Further, we do not have to put massive amounts of stock on the ground subject to great risk and the long turnaround time that has been experienced in past wars. Rather than reduce our readiness posture, a streamlined and dynamic organization would exist — one that stands ready to meet an emergency and one not as susceptible to bombing or destruction as are large supply areas in congested terrain.
For the long term, the key to European logistics readiness dwells with a dynamic organizational concept fully responsive to the support of the troop strengths on the ground and ready in CONUS, the handling of noncombatants, and the ability to build in a timely sense as the troop strength expands. Additional contingency stocks and support must exist in peace for any shortfall in the timely growth of support during a buildup phase. Our readiness is measured in terms of the total package, not just the tactical strength.
Lieutenant General Charles W. Eifler was commanding general of U.S. Theater Army Support Command, Europe. The former deputy commander-in-chief, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army, General Eifler came to Europe from Huntsville, Alabama, where he was commanding general of the U.S. Army Missile Command. He commanded the 1st Logistical Command in Vietnam from January 1966 to May 1967.
| Date Taken: | 06.26.2025 |
| Date Posted: | 06.26.2025 09:17 |
| Story ID: | 501556 |
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