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The role of the U.S. Army as an expeditionary force has been, in large, a natural step in its evolution. From a fledging Army struggling with growing pains to the lethal force it is today, the U.S. Army has undergone massive leaps and bounds in innovation.
Three conflicts from 1846 to 1898 encapsulate the rapid innovations in the Army’s ability to project power. The Mexican-American War (1846-48) tested the Army’s ability to project power into foreign territory while ensuring that it was supplied, trained, and manned. The American Civil War (1861-65) tested the Union Army in projecting its force deep into enemy territory while engaging in conflicts on two fronts. The Spanish-American War (1898) was the next greatest test for the American Army, adding the dimension of oceans and fighting in battles half-way around the world. When we think of the Army’s ability to project its power today, however, it is the Spanish-American War that stands out.[1]
In the years between 1865-98, the Army was tasked with two key objectives, one of which was rather novel. First, it was tasked with ensuring continued security for settlers out West against hostile Natives.[2] This, coupled with the assistance in reconstruction of a devastated and defeated South proved to challenge the logistics capabilities of the Army. Second, it was challenged to create a storage of stocks to be ready if war broke out. This preparation was much more concerted and focused than any time previous in the Army’s history.
On February 15, 1898, an explosion in Havana Harbor aboard the USS Maine served as the catalyst that pushed the U.S. Army back into a state of war. Over 250 crew members were lost on the ship that had been deployed to protect American interests during the Cuban War of Independence. The ensuing Spanish-American War followed by the subsequent Philippine-American War thrust the Army into faraway lands. However, there was a significant problem that the Army was forced to overcome.
Unlike in most conflict, the American declaration of War came long before the preparations were complete. Much of the Army in 1898 was dispersed across the United States, accomplishing the task of reconstruction and preservation coupled with the entanglement of the various Indian Wars.[3] Of the approximately 25,000 personnel, many were poorly trained, and most were scattered all the way across the country. Most of the 100,000 National Guardsmen were also ill-prepared and had even less training than their regular counterparts. There were also no mechanisms in place for a rapid mobilization or drafting to raise the numbers of the Regular Army, certainly not a mobilization that was required for projecting an Army overseas. Outside of Congress passing an authorization to increase the Army from 26,000 to 65,000 strong, the Nation relied on rapid recruitment of personnel to fill the ranks to a peak of around 59,000 before the war ended.[4]
But there was still another issue that compounded beyond just the numbers and training of the Army: how do you get the Army to where it needs to go?
The Army’s experience with conducting joint operations was limited, and the focus on modernization at the time had been invested in the Navy due to an increase in interest in foreign trade.[5] However, the Navy was better equipped to, at the very least, transport the Army to the battlefields in Cuba. The staging area for men and materiel was selected to be broken out between New Orleans, Mobile, and Tampa. Tampa was selected due to its location relative to the theater of operations.
Things were not entirely smooth in Tampa, however. The bay only had a single pier, and it was not prepared for the quantity of materiel, and bottlenecks to supply chains were common. Infrastructure could sustain smaller numbers, but when the Army began to stockpile materiel in the port, this infrastructure was not prepared. This also meant that some of the most needed supplies were wrapped up in the bottleneck. The issues highlighted the need to transform the Army’s logistics supply chain. Supplies were not necessarily organized either. In fact, none of the ports selected to push men or materiel through were prepared for such a buildup.[6]
Supplies were varied, ranging from personal accoutrements such as canteens and haversacks, to larger pieces such as carriages and cannon. In addition to men, horses were in demand and were held near the Tampa yard to await transport to Cuba for operations. Caretakers and security were a must for these resources as well. All culminating in a massive shortage in manpower, a bottleneck for resources, and a single point of entry and exit for the entirety of the American armed forces. Hundreds of miles north in Chickamauga Park, Georgia, the Regular Army had gathered in and around the area staging for their movement south to Tampa.[7]
Not only were supplies bottlenecked and short for the force deploying, but it was also short for the Soldiers at home. New recruits found themselves arriving in camps for training to be met with lack of socks, underwear, and shoes. Food was poorly prepared, and infirmaries were not stocked to handle injuries or illness. Sanitary conditions were also poor. All these shortages and deficiencies led to a quality of training that was far below what was necessary. Further, it impacted how quickly these new forces could be made ready for war.[8]
The Army was dependent on the Navy to support their operations in the Caribbean Sea. The Army ordered Maj. Gen. William R. Shafter to provide support in turn to the Navy at the end of May 1898. Shafter was charged with embarking to Santiago on the southeastern coast of Cuba. Despite the order being received and manpower and materiel built up in Tampa, Shafter required an additional two weeks before his V Corps was ready to embark. There were no plans, no general staff, and no special staff to direct the organization or mobilization of the force. The bottlenecks were reportedly so severe that materiel was backed up to South Carolina.[9]
The deployments to Cuba were stressful enough on the Army, but those problems were compounded even more for deployments to Puerto Rico and even further in the Philippines.
Distance proved to be a significant obstacle for communication in the Philippines. This made coordination of supplies and planning extremely difficult. Timing of ensuring those supplies arrived when and where the Army needed them also proved to be extremely difficult. It also meant splitting the stockpiles of supplies within the Continental U.S. (CONUS).[10] Perhaps the most significant obstacle and burden on the logistics chain, however, was the rampant spread of illness and disease coupled with unsuitable equipment. While disease was ever present in the Caribbean Theater, the Pacific Theater made diagnoses, shipment of medical supplies, and medication even more critical and life-threatening.[11]
Despite the U.S. claiming victory, the Treaty of Paris in the Autumn of 1898 did little to give the Army reprieve. Tensions continued in the Philippines reigniting the embers of war in the Pacific. The Philippine-American War raged for another four years. As with the Caribbean Theater, the Army was heavily reliant on the Navy to coordinate operations in the Pacific Theater. When the war concluded, sustaining the presence of the Army in the region was necessary to ensure the occupying force was supplied. Further, it also now had to leverage humanitarian aid. Resistance continued in the Philippines until the close of operations in 1902, with occupation forces remaining there until after World War II. Yet there was another problem that faced the Army: guerrilla warfare.[12]
Within the jungles of the Philippines, guerrilla warfare was rampant, further exacerbating the ongoing supply shortages, poor equipment maintenance, subpar sanitary, and poor health conditions. As many as 70,000 Regular Army personnel engaged with Philippine guerilla fighters. Many of these Soldiers were not fully trained nor equipped, and the American doctrine of combat had not widely adopted widespread insurgency or counter-insurgency operations. Such engagements provided additional emphasis on the need for larger caliber sidearms to remain in service. Thus, in 1911, after the Army revised its 1892 requirement for a new sidearm to replace single-action revolvers, the Browning Colt M1911 45 caliber pistol was adopted.[13]
The war also spurred the further development of rifle technology, with the Krag-Jorgensen rifle that replaced the Trapdoor Springfield rifle from the late Civil War. However, it was lessons learned from the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars that led to the development of the M1903 Springfield. The M1903 better matched the capabilities of the 1893 Mauser that most Spanish forces used during the war. It also allowed for better standardization and was easier to sustain, reducing the overall problems of materiel support by the Army.[14]
At Rock Island Arsenal, rapid production and shipment of materiel directly sustained and supported Soldiers in both theaters of operation. Between 1871 and 1886, Maj. Daniel Webster Flagler commanded the arsenal at Rock Island.[15] During his time at Rock Island, Flagler assessed the capabilities of the new arsenal and placed it on the path to become a war materiel production powerhouse. During the Spanish-American War, Flagler (now Brig. Gen.) was the Chief of Ordnance. He relied heavily on the production output from Rock Island Arsenal, which shipped materiel directly to ports on both coasts.[16]
The culmination of the lessons learned during the Spanish-American and Philippine-American War led to the establishment of a formal General Staff in the Army. Elihu Root, Secretary of War, published his paper and advocated it to the Senate Committee on Military Affairs in March 1902. Root argued that both the General Staff and a reorganization of the supply departments was necessary for proper structure of the Army to prevent the logistic issues that unfolded during the previous four years.[17] The idea was to allow specialized services and staff to focus on their area of expertise while answering directly to a single commander. They would also be enabled to create plans for their individual sections. These commanders would then answer to a higher authority up to the single Commanding General of the Army. This is the structure that would follow the Army into World War I and last until the early 1950s.[18]
In addition, the Medical Department was expanded, reacting to the struggles with illness during the war. The Ordnance and Quartermaster Departments were also renovated and expanded.
The first time the Army was challenged to use these new structures and its new technology was during the Punitive Expedition. In 1916, while Europe was entranced with war, the Army was tasked with responding to a series of cross-border raids conducted by Pancho Villa. Mexican President Venustiano Carranza’s forces were unable to totally silence Villa, resulting in American intervention in the war-torn nation. Mexico had been in the throes of revolution, and the might of its federal forces were limited. Maj. Gen. Frederick Funston was tasked with massing the buildup of forces and materiel on the border to prepare for this intervention.[19]
Funston had ordered Brig. Gen. John Pershing to lead the expeditionary force into Mexico to capture or kill Villa. Early in the campaign, Funston had ordered the buildup of the National Guard to augment any manpower shortages. Pershing, however, noticed the same logistic problems in Columbus, New Mexico that had plagued the Army in Tampa years before. He quickly took actions to remedy the situation by appointing officers in charge of various aspects of the supply chain and logistic elements.[20] Rail and roads were constructed in such a way to create a chain of supply hubs to improve the flow of necessary resources. Large amounts of manpower were augmented with civilian labor. Although, this created an issue of managing that new civilian workforce.[21] These civilians required their own oversight and generally also needed their own food, shelter, and equipment.
The lower intensity and tempo of operations in the Punitive Expedition meant that materiel resources were usually not in question for the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). Drinking water and climate proved to be the biggest challenge, and disease was relatively mild with less than three percent infection rates. While the Army was unable to capture Villa, they were able to attrit and disarm his band of followers. This meant that the number of cross-border raids dwindled and eventually ceased.[22]
By late 1916 and into early 1917, the United States had shifted its posture in building up materiel. The war in Europe was edging its way more and more into the minds of military planners. Nevertheless, the AEF remained well-supplied throughout their engagement. Just after Germany repealed its ban on unrestricted submarine warfare, the AEF was called home. World War I was on the horizon for the Army, and so too was its next biggest challenge in its evolution to be a global force for democracy.
1. Shrader, Charles R. “A Century of Power Projection, 1898-1998.” Landpower Essay Series. Association of the U.S. Army: Institute of Land Warfare, Arlington, Virginia. July 1998. pp1-3.
2. Kloimwieder, Gottfried; Owen, Noel P. “Analysis of U.S. Military Mobilizations, Demobilizations, and Peacetime Force Maintenance from 1890 to 1991.” September 1992. p84.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. pp8-9, 30-31.
5. Ibid. p83.
6. Shrader, Charles R. United States Army Logistics, 1775-1992: An Anthology. Volume 2. Center of Military History, Washington, D.C. 1997. pp327-329.
7. Cosmas, Graham A. An Army for Empire: The U.S. Army in the Spanish-American War. Texas A&M University Press, College Station, Texas. 1998.
8. Kennan, George. Campaigning in Cuba. The Century Company, New York. pp48-52 found in Shrader, 1997. pp347-350.
9. Shrader, 1997. p328.
10. Annual Report of the Major-General Commanding the Army to the Secretary of War. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1898. pp60-62 found in Ibid. pp369-371.
11. Cirillo, Vincent J. “Fever and Reform: The Typhoid Epidemic in the Spanish-American War.” Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences. Oxford University Press. 2000. pp363-397.
12. Linn, Brian McAllister. The Philippine War, 1899-1902. University of Kansas Press. 2000. p275.
13. Sharpe, Matthew. M1911 .45 Caliber Pistol. The Army Historical Foundation, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
14. Finley, James P. “Weapons: 1910-39.” Huachuca Illustrated: A Magazine of the Fort Huachuca Museum. Volume 1. Huachuca Museum Society, Fort Huachuca, Arizona. 1993.
15. Flagler writes about his tenure at Rock Island Arsenal in his history. Flagler, D. W. The Rock Island Arsenal from its Establishment in 1863 to December, 1876; and of the Island of Rock Island, the Site of the Arsenal, from 1804 to 1863. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1877.
16. War’s Greatest Workshop: Rock Island Arsenal (Historical, Topographical and Illustrative). Arsenal Publishing Company, Rock Island, Illinois. 1922. pp61-66.
17. Root, Elihu. “The Effective Organization of the Army: Statement before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs.” Washington, D.C. March 12, 1902 found in Shrader, 1997. pp373-377.
18. Shrader, 1997. pp379-385.
19. Ibid. pp389-390.
20. Ibid. pp391-392.
21. Ibid. p393.
22. Ibid. pp393-396.
| Date Taken: | 04.28.2025 |
| Date Posted: | 04.28.2025 11:18 |
| Story ID: | 496327 |
| Location: | US |
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