Photo By Erin Thompson | A Company of the 10th Mountain Division heads up Mt. Belvedere in Italy.... read more read more
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by Michael E. Bigelow, INSCOM Command Historian
10TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION SECURES KEY HIGH GROUND
On 25 February 1945, Brig. Gen. George P. Hays’ 10th Mountain Division secured the strategic Mount Belvedere massif in northern Italy. Aggressive leadership and careful planning combined with Lt. Col. Robert C. Works’ multi-source intelligence effort accounted for the division’s success.
Hays’ division had arrived in Italy in early January 1945. As part of Lt. Gen. Lucian Truscott’s Fifth Army, the division assumed a defensive sector south of Mount Belvedere in the Apennines mountains, about thirty-five miles northwest of Florence. As his division moved into position in mid-January, General Hays learned of its first mission: seize the Belvedere hill mass. This strategic high ground dominated one of the major approaches into the Po Valley, the U.S. Fifth Army’s next major objective.
As soon as the division moved into the area, Colonel Works, the divisional G-2, and his staff set up shop. Thirty-year-old Works was a West Pointer from Minnesota and joined the division in 1942. He had served as 87th Infantry’s S-3 during its operation in Kiska, Alaska. In early December 1944, he became Hays’ G-2, and he was one of the first of the division to arrive in Italy. He was ably seconded by Montanan Maj. William S. Lueck, another longtime member of the division. Together, they began to take stock of the enemy and terrain.
To do this, they monitored the almost daily patrols to determine attack routes and locate enemy positions. Aerial reconnaissance gave them a look further than patrols could go. Information from prisoners and partisans provided useful unit identification and locations. In the weeks before the attack, Works and Lueck reported fifteen known artillery positions and seventy-four trenches, machine guns positions, and enemy dug outs discovered by photo intelligence.
Before disseminating the information, Colonel Works had his analysts comment on the raw information, especially the prisoner or partisan reports. Often these comments took the form of “Reported several times before” to prevent double or triple counting. Moreover, the G-2 had his photo interpreters look at the information and provide their judgments. These “PI Comments” confirmed the information or stated the similarity to another report. Sometimes they noted “Cannot be seen on photos” or “No coverage.” In the end, this analysis double-checked the combat information from one source against another and provided a more accurate situational awareness of the enemy.
By 18 February, Works and his G-2 estimated four battalions of the German 232d Infantry Division defended along the two ridges with four battalions in reserve supported by several artillery battalions. The defenses would be protected by “an intricate system of mine fields…ranged along the passable trails, covering thereby all logical routes of approach.” The estimates pointed out “the Germans had shown considerable power in repulsing local action.” In the G-2 daily reports, Works and Lueck emphasized the German capability and intention to counterattack against any American attack. On 20 February, Lueck noted, “[The enemy] will probably counterattack and attempt to regain Mt. Belvedere from the vicinity of Caselletta with one battalion.” Two days later, he estimated the enemy was most likely to “counterattack with platoon to regiment sized attacks at one or more places along our front during the night and early morning of 23 Feb.”
Armed with this situational awareness, General Hays jumped off his offensive on the night of 18 February with a supporting attack against the Riva Ridge, just east of Mount Belvedere. The next night, six battalions attacked up Belvedere. Over the next six days, the division moved northeast along the rugged terrain to push the enemy off the hill mass. In the process, the division fought off the expected German counterattacks until finally securing the Belvedere massif on 25 February. In doing so, the division had driven a wedge into the German defenses and opened the maneuver space for the Fifth Army’s drive into the important Po Valley.
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| Date Taken: | 02.25.2024 |
| Date Posted: | 02.26.2024 11:50 |
| Story ID: | 464699 |
| Location: | US |
| Web Views: | 203 |
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