Colonel LeGro Receives His Guidance as G-2

Photo By Sgt. 1st Class Jose Acosta | General DePuy awards the Silver Star to Colonel LeGro on13 July 1966.  

UNITED STATES

04.17.2023

Courtesy Story

U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence

by Michael E. Bigelow, INSCOM Command Historian

19 APRIL 1966
On 19 April 1966, General Orders No. 562 appointed Lt. Col. William E. LeGro as the G-2 for the 1st Infantry Division, then in South Vietnam. Earlier, the 43-year-old infantryman received his initial guidance from Maj. Gen. William E. DePuy, his division commander.

During World War II, Californian LeGro had enlisted and served in the 41st Infantry Division in New Guinea and the Philippines. Commissioned as an infantry second lieutenant in 1949, he served in a variety of staff and command positions as he rose to lieutenant colonel by 1966. Unusually, he had several tactical intelligence assignments. In Germany, he was an S-2 of one of the 1st Infantry Division’s rifle battalions. Later in the Korean War, he served on the G-2 staff of the 2d Infantry Division and, later, of the Eighth Army. In the spring of 1966, after a tour as the Army Staff's action officer for policy matters associated with Southeast Asia, LeGro headed to Vietnam, hoping to take command of an infantry battalion.

General DePuy, the new commander of the 1st Infantry Division, had other ideas, however. When LeGro arrived in Vietnam in late March, DePuy had just relieved his G-2. He had lost confidence in the officer because of his inability to give coherent intelligence briefings and his failure to visit the battle areas. At the same time, he knew that LeGro had been an intelligence staff officer before and recognized that LeGro’s previous assignment on the Army Staff had given him an appreciation of the enemy situation in Vietnam. Disappointed he would not be a battalion commander, LeGro still carefully listened to General DePuy’s guidance. He wrote it down on a notecard that he kept in his pocket for his tenure as G-2.

Much of the guidance was typical of what G-2s might receive from their commanders. For example, DePuy told LeGro to give the evening intelligence briefings personally. These briefings would include relevant facts of the enemy order of battle and LeGro’s own interpretation of the enemy capabilities and intentions. DePuy also wanted his G-2 to build up the intelligence section. LeGro took this to mean improving the efficiency of the division’s intelligence system.

Additionally, DePuy expected his G-2 to maintain close contact with the two nearby South Vietnamese divisions as well as higher headquarters. Likewise, he instructed LeGro to compete for intelligence resources, so their division received its share of collection assets and analytical support. To comply with both of these directives, LeGro quickly established and actively maintained contacts at Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV) to ensure the 1st Infantry Division was always at the head of the line for intelligence support.

General DePuy’s last two instructions—managing B-52 targeting and handling deception planning for the division—were, however, clear departures from the usual G-2 functions. Although normally G-3 duties, DePuy believed his G-2 would have better insights on what to target with both high explosives and misinformation. So, for the next year, LeGro had responsibility for selecting spots to bomb and enemy to deceive.

LeGro left his division commander's office feeling ill-prepared to take on these six tasks. Yet, using his own analytical and leadership skills, he was able to provide the demanding DePuy what he wanted from his G-2.

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• Date Taken: 04.17.2023
• Date Posted: 04.17.2023 10:51
• Story ID: 442729
• Location: US