Army's 'can-do culture' sometimes hinders policy discussions

Photo By David Vergun | Members of U.S. Congress examine an Army M1A2 Abram Main Battle Tank during a visit with Team Estonia, May 29, 2015, at the Central Training Area near Tapa, Estonia. Army leaders are often reluctant to challenge policy makers, including members of Congress, according to the U.S. Army War College report: "Elihu Root Study: The Total Army," released May 3, 2016.  

DC, DC, UNITED STATES

05.18.2016

Story by David Vergun       

Defense Media Activity - Army   

WASHINGTON (Army News Service, May 20, 2016) -- The Army's "can-do," problem solving culture is often regarded as one of its greatest assets. But there are times when it can also be viewed as a hindrance, such as when it comes to policy discussions that influence Army missions, said Ryan S. McCannell.

McCannell, a student at the U.S. Army War College, and a member of the U.S. Agency for International Development, was one of 17 students at the USAWC who authored a report with this and other conclusions.

Army Col. Kevin A. McAninch said that report: "Elihu Root Study: The Total Army," released May 3, examined the Army's core mission -- fighting and winning America's wars -- against a backdrop of Army culture, operational and strategic requirements, force structure, joint requirements, policy decisions, and a shrinking budget.

Those elements often create an underlying but powerful tension within the Army, he said.

McCannell said the Army's can-do attitude prevents a robust discussion with policymakers that decide the Army's resourcing and missions. These decision-makers include members of Congress, the administration and the Department of Defense.

Army "culture is the prism through which Army leaders make decisions about how they manage all their priorities with limited resources," McCannell said. This "prevents a robust discussion of all of the different options available as well as the tradeoffs."

In their report, the authors explained how Army culture prevents senior leadership from admitting, for instance, that something might not be possible to accomplish.

"The high-performance or 'mission-first' orientation of Army culture complicates leaders' efforts to describe trade-offs effectively, feeding perceptions that the Army is unwilling or unable to be transparent about its calculations of ends, ways, means, and risks," the report reads. "The Army's statutory, regulatory, and strategic requirements in the face of unknowable future threats far exceed the force's available resources and capabilities."

The report says Army culture "makes it hard for leaders to admit that they anticipate a future mission for which the Army will not be prepared," and says that Army leaders would consider admitting such a scenario as a "dereliction of duty."

Instead, the report concludes, Army leadership wants to be prepared for every possibility and requests the funding to allow that -- even though it may not get what it asks for.

"This is married with an implied, grudging acceptance that the Army will figure it out using the available resources," the report continues, "which ultimately results in mortgaging future readiness by postponing needed modernization programs and wasting billions of dollars on canceled acquisition programs. This response, while laudable in some respects, is not useful for policy makers faced with making difficult resource decisions, especially given that few other U.S. government agencies have as much difficulty articulating how a reduction in resources will curtail their mandates or substantially increase associated risks."

Army Col. Katherine J. Graef added that this culture is also an "obstacle to reforming the Army" and that it's "an invisible but powerful force that influences all of us no matter what organization you're in."

The study concluded, she said, that there should be more discussion about how culture influences decision-making and "senior leaders need to be aware of it and acknowledge it."

She added that Soldiers at all levels of responsibility should be encouraged to "question unspoken assumptions" and challenge them to "move the Army forward in a positive way."

TIMES HAVE CHANGED

Graef said that while the Army has always been issued marching orders from policymakers, much has changed within the last 15 years that calls for more robust discussions between Soldiers and their civilian leaders.

"Look at the speed [at which] our adversaries are able to meet our strategies and capabilities and adjust to them," she said. "That's what's different than in the past. They can adjust faster."

Assumptions about the structure of the Army should be open to discussion, she said. Is the Army structured in such a way that it can defeat adversaries as well as meeting demands from policymakers?

McAninch said the students asked themselves what the Army command structure would look like if it were redesigned and if it would look like it does today.

"We're not sure that it would," he said.

After researching and debating what that new structure might look like, the report advocates "allocating the current responsibilities of Army service component commands to corps headquarters, under the operational control of geographic combatant commanders. Corps headquarters, with their embedded mission command capabilities and operational focus, will effectively support GCCs and are better suited for employment as joint task forces."

"In essence, that would reinvigorate the corps to be the warfighting element in support of joint requirements," he said, adding that the Guard and Reserve would be included in that new structure, but their responsibilities would remain as they are at the present time.

Another example of restructuring the Army, McAninch said, would be "right-leveling the organization, pushing greater responsibility to lower levels." The proliferation of officers, especially in the middle grades, has created a top-heavy, costly structure out of balance with core operational capability.

ABOUT THE STUDY

Army Col. Phil Ryan said the study started in August and included research and meeting with senior military and policy leaders.

Since the report was released, the students have been having discussions about the report with the Center for New American Strategy, the Congressional Research Service, the Heritage Foundation, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the American Enterprise Institute, the National Guard Bureau, and the Army G-8, he said.

Even if all of the report's recommendations are not followed, Ryan said he hopes it will generate robust discussion. He said he believes it already has, particularly among junior officers who were rather surprised that senior Army leaders would be so open to questioning traditionally held assumptions.

Ryan said the 17 students included a good mix, which added to different points of view. The others not already mentioned are: Pakistan Brig. Gen. Syed Najeeb Ahmed; Brent G. Bahl, State Department; Army Col. Edwin J. Callahan; India Brig. Gen. Jagdish B. Chaudhari; Army Col. Michael N. Clancy; Columbia Col. Juan C. Correa Consuegra; Army National Guard Lt. Col. Zachariahs Delwiche; Dr. Andrew Hill, USAWC; Air Force Lt. Col. Benjamin R. Jonsson; Coast Guard Capt. Scott E. Langum; Army Lt. Col. Paul L. Larson; Army Reserve Lt. Col. Earl G. Matthews; Army Lt. Col. Christopher W. Muller; and, New Zealand Col. Brett J. Rankin.

• Date Taken: 05.18.2016
• Date Posted: 05.23.2016 15:22
• Story ID: 198779
• Location: DC, DC, US