Problems and Solutions in the Civilian Service Corps Program

Courtesy Photo | Craters are marked to ensure that coalition forces are aware of all new construction in their area.  

12.11.2008

Courtesy Story

555th Engineer Brigade

By 1st Lt. Matthew Hitzeroth
555th Engineer Brigade

One of the main challenges facing forces on both sides of a counterinsurgency fight is the ability to effectively transition from one phase of engagement to the next. The means of transition is a key to victory in that a premature shift in tactics could result in the measures not being sustainable, causing setbacks to the operational situation rather than progress. One method of ensuring the successful progression of the COIN fight is creating a comprehensive campaign plan with definite steps which mirror the theoretical COIN model, but are specifically tailored to the actual conflict and have readily quantifiable measures of effectiveness. Currently, the coalition forces in Iraq are attempting to transition operations in Iraq from those focused on security to those focused on achieving economic normalcy. One example of such an economic-focused operation is the Civilian Service Corps program. Although this program is an appropriate fit for this phase of COIN operations, it has not succeeded in the same way the Sons of Iraq movement did one phase earlier in the conflict for several reasons: limitations in coalition contracting practices; lack of contact with the local population; and vulnerability to the operational vagaries of the coalition presence in Iraq. In its place, I recommend a program which incorporates traditional U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Provincial Reconstruction Team and Multi-National Forces - Iraq contracting as well as on the job training.

The purpose of the CSC program is to transition the masses of temporary Iraqi security forces in the SoI program to the traditional civilian job market. It attempts to do this by awarding a contract to train former SoIs in marketable industrial skills such as concrete repair, utilities, and mechanical maintenance. The SoIs are redesignated as Iraqi student workers and begin an apprenticeship in their specific programs through the contractor. The programs last anywhere from six months to a year and the goal for the final transition is to link the trained students with local businesses for immediate employment. While hands-on training is a main focus of the curriculum, the program is more like a technical school than on-the-job training. The program is managed by the U.S. operational environment owner (usually a battalion) who establishes relationships with local leadership and security forces. Because of these relationships and the realistic need for a short commute for the ISW's, the whole program has a very local flavor to it.

The CSC program is unfortunately limited by several major issues. The first is coalition contracting. Contracting officers gauge a contractor from the quality of a bid. The CSC bids are evaluated based on the quality of the training program, bid price, contractor reputation, and, unfortunately, the ability to portray competence through drafting of a bid. While these are all valid measures of assessment, the gaping hole in the evaluation process is a formal technical evaluation board. Contracted construction bids are normally vetted by a board of subject matter experts in the engineer trades specific to the project. The board evaluates all bids and makes a recommendation based on their technical knowledge and experience to the contracting officer. Since CSC projects are geared towards training in the minds of the contracting offices and project purchasing officers, qualified engineers are not formally tasked to evaluate the projects during the bidding process even though so much of the program hinges on construction techniques and qualifications. Since the intent of the CSC programs is training, the only quality assurance that can by contract be conducted is on training—not finished products. Therefore, the contractor cannot be held responsible for the quality of any hands on training projects. For instance, a constructed building does not necessarily need to remain standing, and an electrical panel does not actually have to be able to distribute electricity. Given this reality, the training itself is not held to a set standard either despite that being the main goal. The best way to evaluate any training is by examination. For the CSC program, these projects are the examination, but there's no requirement to even attempt to pass.

Many of the contracts are large, often several million dollars, and contracts of this size are almost always awarded to a select few established contractors from Baghdad and Balad. That is because these contractors are the only ones capable of submitting bids that stand up to the scrutiny of coalition forces contracting officers who require them to have the necessary capital, expertise, and ability to fulfill the contract. Multiple issues arise from hiring a large contractor that does not have a connection to the local population. The three most relevant issues concern security, the local economy and the quality control of the contract.

Security is an essential part of the program because it is a key indicator of whether the region is ready to transition from a phase of security-building to one of normal economic growth. The large contractor has limited knowledge of the local security situation which can lead to employed ISWs being subjected to threats and lack of security support from the local leadership to ensure success. A local contractor would be much more effective at gauging and ensuring security because they would have the full support of provincial leadership having similar tribal and often family connections - factors which can't be overlooked in Iraqi culture. In addition, large contractors headquartered in Balad or Baghdad also have a smaller impact on the local economy because they will only hire labor and some management personnel from the local populace. A local contractor will hire the labor, the management, and spend a higher percentage of the money received in the local markets. However, the most problematic issue to combat with any contractor is their commitment to quality control. The only incentives a large contractor has to complete a quality project are to receive the payments. The quality of the training program is often limited to the minimum cost and effort necessary to continue getting paid, and contractual deadlines are only an incentive for contractors who want to move on to the next contract or are concerned about receiving similar contracts. The local contractor will want to provide quality training because they will know and hire some of the personnel receiving the training; the same cannot be said for large contractors headquartered in the big cities.

Even when the contractor, local officials, and the ISWs have an excellent working relationship, the contract has to be tracked and assured through all phases by representatives of the U.S. government. In the case of CSC's in Iraq, this is the US armed forces. Quality assurance for CSC programs is often delegated to engineer units who are qualified to QA construction. They in turn must rely on the U.S. operational environment owner's control of the SoI/ISW programs to ensure attendance of the training and security. Besides muddying the waters to an insurmountable degree - now at least five entities are involved, if you're keeping track - both the engineer inspectors and the operational environment owner are subject to the shifting and drawing down of forces as the overall operating picture is affected by security gains and domestic political pressure. The result is that units are almost never able to see a contract from bid through award to completion, and there is a high probability that not enough qualified US forces may be available to QA all the proposed CSCs effectively in the near future. This will lead to failed contracts and wasted US funds that could be better spent elsewhere.

Two specific CSCs help illustrate these issues: the Salah ad Din Road Repair CSC and the Southern Kirkuk CSC. The Salah ad Din Road Repair CSC is a program geographically spread from Balad through Samarra up towards Tikrit (an area encompassing three US brigades areas of operation). Its purpose was to train 450 former SoI's in manual concrete repair and basic road construction. It was awarded to Green Dream Ltd out of Baghdad with an office in Balad. The contractor was the only one to submit a professional, reasonable bid and follow up with answers to contracting questions intelligently. Many of the issues brought up already plagued this project from the start, but the main issues became the lack of a local contractors and lack of competition for qualified bids. The Baghdad/Balad based contractor was not able to ensure security for ISW's in Samarra specifically because they had no relationship with the local leaders. There were instances of threats to ISW leaders and many felt that the security situation warranted allowing ISWs to carry weapons during their work, although the contract prohibited this. These problems were partially offset by committed efforts from the U.S. operational environment owner and corps-level engineers to make the program work regardless of shortcomings. In addition, at the same time as the Salah ad Din CSC began, the contractor was submitting bids for five other CSCs in the Kirkuk region. These were contracts that Green Dream was not qualified to be awarded based on the contractor's difficulties in fulfilling the requirements of the one existing contract. However, the ability to "sound" competent led the contracting officer to seriously consider and award some of those contracts to them. That Green Dream was awarded any contracts outside the Balad/Baghdad metro area violates the principles of keeping the reconstruction locally focused in its multiple economic impacts and prevented local contractors from developing their capacity.

The Southern Kirkuk CSC showed more promise than Salah ad Din's program. This project trained ISW's on basic plumbing, electrical, and carpentry skills. First, it was awarded to a contractor owned by a local sheik who had hired a staff of competent, qualified engineers. Hiring locally builds local economic capacity for the contractors as well as the skilled labor being trained. Also, being local, they had worked out their own security before the program even started, allowing them to ensure quality training. At the same time however, the contracting office did not ask for engineer support until after the contract had been awarded. Fortunately the contractor was qualified and reputable, but the contracting officer should have asked for engineer support earlier. During this time the contracting office awarded this CSC and four others on behalf of a brigade who had less time left in country than the length of any of the contracts. The brigade later found out that the area of operations was about to be downsized and partially divided into non-CF control. This almost guaranteed that there would be limited coalition involvement in a coalition-funded contract, and highlighted the inherent risk with operational forces trying to ensure the success of contracts of significant length. There is not enough engineer support in the Kirkuk province to provide the required QA for this CSC and the other four that were up for funding at the same time. This QA presence was essential in keeping the Salah ad Din CSC on track and ought to be a key task for inclusion in all other CSCs.

In place of the current CSC program, I recommend transitioning SoI's and other unemployed Iraqis into a joint US/GOI temp agency. To employ this new, untrained workforce, future contracts should be put out for bidding with clauses that require the contractors to employ a certain number or percentage of Iraqi temps in the contract. The understanding would be that these workers will get a regular salary based on the position they fulfill for the contractor and receive whatever on-the-job training the contractor deems fit. The contractor would find it in his best interest to train the temps to improve his own efficiency, decrease waste, and increase profit. The QA job immediately becomes simplified. In addition to evaluating fewer contracts, QA efforts could focus on the quality of work done by the contractor rather than on training, while individual progress by the temps could be gauged by supervisor evaluations and attendance records. It puts the burden of responsibility on the contractor rather than sharing it between several different parties. Also, CERP and I-CERP projects are often managed by trained project managers from USACE, PRT, and other DOS entities. This allows US forces to be more flexible in supporting with QA efforts while focusing on operational missions critical to consolidating the gains made over the last few years. Also, these projects are already offered for bid in many cases only to select local contractors in an effort to increase these firms' abilities and stimulate the local economy.

Whether the difficulties plaguing the CSC program will cause reverses in the progress coalition forces have enjoyed over the last year remains to be seen. The momentum of the lethal measures taken against insurgents and the maturation of the provincial and national governments may well allow increased opportunities for Iraqis to transition from the security job force to the commercial sector regardless. However, this can still be augmented by a refocused CF plan such as the one presented in this article. Existing contracting avenues should include provisions for using former security forces and other unemployed Iraqis. The temporary workers program could be monitored initially by coalition forces with the goal and plan in place to transition it eventually to the Iraqi ministry of labor. This program would need to be worked into the legal framework which constrains contracting and be further developed to ensure QA goals are reasonable, quantifiable, and obtainable.

• Date Taken: 12.11.2008
• Date Posted: 12.11.2008 10:25
• Story ID: 27527