"How did it go?"

Courtesy Photo | An Iraqi mounted patrol from the 1st Brigade, 4th Iraqi Army Division, maneuvers...... read more read more

Courtesy Photo | An Iraqi mounted patrol from the 1st Brigade, 4th Iraqi Army Division, maneuvers toward a group of villages during an operation Nov. 16, 2006, near the Northeastern portion of Lake Tharthar in Salah ad Din, Iraq. U.S. Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class Robert Brogan (released)  see less | View Image Page

TIKRIT, IRAQ

11.29.2006

Courtesy Story

3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division

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by Capt. Steve Barrier
3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division

TIKRIT, Iraq - I recently had the unique opportunity to participate with soldiers of the 1st Brigade, 4th Iraqi Army Division, in planning and executing an air assault mission involving almost 400 members of the Iraqi army, four CH-47 Chinooks, two OH-58D Kiowa Warriors, and a contingent of 25 U.S. Soldiers. After being a "fly on the wall" throughout this process with them, I felt compelled to share my experience with all who were interested.

At the top of the list of questions I was asked was, "How did it go?" After sitting down and collecting my thoughts on all of the sights and sounds I experienced throughout the four-day operation, I found the answer to that question was more difficult than the innocence the question suggests.

To put all of this in perspective, I need to set the stage. I am the deputy aviation officer for the 3rd Brigade Combat Team of the 82nd Airborne Division currently deployed to Tikrit, Iraq, in the Multi-National Division - North area of operation under the 25th Infantry Division.

Our area of responsibility includes the Salah ad Din Province. This region is located north of Baghdad and encompasses the cities of Balad in the south, Bayji in the north, and the Jabal Hamrjn Mountains to the east. The city of Tikrit is located in the middle of this region. The Iraqi soldiers from 1st Brigade, 4th Iraqi Army Division have responsibility for security throughout the province. However, U.S. troops continue to assist them as a quick reaction force and with assets they don't yet have, such as aviation. We also have a small team of U.S. troops that advise the Iraqi army staffs at battalion, brigade, and division levels. These teams are called Military Transition Teams, or MiTT. A typical MiTT consists of 11 Soldiers varying in rank from Staff Sergeant to Colonel. Most are combat veterans, and each has their own specialties - operations, logistics, medical, and communications - in which they offer advice and council to their respective Iraqi counterparts. The intent is to expedite the transfer of responsibility from the coalition forces to the Iraqi army.

This particular mission has its roots in mid-October or so ago when Brig. Gen. Abdul Jabbar, commander of the 1st Brigade, 4th Iraqi Army Division, and Col. Bryan Owens, commander of the 82nd Airborne Division's 3rd Brigade Combat Team met to discuss security in the province.

The two leaders decided to conduct a large-scale, all-Iraqi operation in a remote area of the province to defeat anti-Iraqi forces. Key to the success of this operation was the ability to rapidly put a sizable Iraqi force on the ground. This was the beginning of the plan to conduct an all Iraqi air assault.

I was tasked to assist the Iraqi soldiers in planning the air assault. The plan called for a simultaneous arrival at the objective by the first lift of CH-47 Chinooks and the lead elements of the ground-assault force. OH-58D Kiowa Warriors would provide security for the ground forces. Once on the ground, the air assault force would isolate the objective while the mounted forces would search the objective. This was a simple, yet effective plan. More importantly, the plan is very similar to what U.S. forces would use to achieve the same affects.

However, plans rarely survive initial contact. That was the case in this mission. Morning weather was our first enemy. As final preparations were being made in the early morning darkness, fog began to form. Brig. Gen. Jabbar made the decision to continue with the ground portion of the plan, thus, launching his ground-assault force.

The air-assault force would arrive as soon as the fog cleared. The new plan would have the mounted force isolate the objective while the air assault force would conduct the search. This kind of adjustment attests Brig. Gen. Jabbar and his staff's ability to rapidly react to a fluid situation where little information is certain. Quick reaction and good, clear-headed, last-minute decision making are excellent qualities leaders need to have.

The new plan was executed and the ground force found and isolated the objective. By this time, the sun was just beginning to come up and the fog was starting to burn off. The air assault was only a little more than an hour overdue. With the objective secured by the ground force, the CH-47 Chinooks came into view on the horizon. They landed at their pre-planned landing zones, off-loaded their troops and departed. Within two hours, the objective had been secured and searched with all planned tasks executed to standard.

However, since nothing of significance was found at the objective, Brig. Gen. Jabbar consulted with his staff again and decided to make an addition to the plan. He would call for the CH-47s to return to take the dismounted troops off the objective since there was not room in the vehicles to take them with us. The mounted force would continue to search a large area of the desert in search of the anti-Iraqi forces he knew to be operating in the area.

The Chinooks arrived to pick up the air-assault troopers and returned safely to base. When the aircraft departed, the ground force mounted their vehicles, and west in search of AIF.

Brig. Gen. Jabbar halted the convoy on a hilltop where he could see for miles. Immediately, the Iraqi soldiers dispersed into a multi-layered, hasty defense of their leader while he analyzed the terrain.

On the horizon were several villages, and with a brief wave of his hand, the soldiers mounted their vehicles and dashed across the desert as fast as anything I have ever witnessed navigate the complex desert terrain.

With relentless energy, the Iraqis surrounded the village, then entered and began a search of all the structures. They questioned all of the males.

In the meantime, Brig. Gen. Jabbar would find the village elder and explain what was going on and why he was there. Less than 15 minutes passed, and the soldiers were mounted again and heading for the next village. The Iraqi army conducted this battle drill approximately 10 more times throughout the morning.

The mission was complete after we consolidated back at the original objective. Brig. Gen. Jabbar arranged lunch to be served as an after action review was conducted to capture any lessons learned from the day's excursion.

Lunch was not the typical meal-ready-to-eat, or MRE, that U.S. troops would have expected. Instead, we had rice, cucumbers, tomatoes, and lamb. All cooked right there on the spot.

In the span of four days, I saw the brigade staff of 1st Brigade, 4th Iraqi Army Division, take a concept, develop the plan, issue an operations order to subordinate units, coordinate with U.S. forces for assets, execute the plan, and even conduct an after-action review to capture lessons learned for future operations.

By any army's standard, this mission, conducted entirely by the Iraqi Army, was a success. So, in response to the original short question, "How did it go?" The short answer is, "It went well."