WEBVTT 00:07.809 --> 00:10.010 Good morning listeners . Welcome to 00:10.010 --> 00:11.899 episode 17 of the Nickel for Your 00:11.899 --> 00:13.930 Thoughts podcast here at the NCO 00:13.930 --> 00:15.986 Leadership Center of Excellence . My 00:15.986 --> 00:17.986 name is Massar Moises Oseguera from 00:17.986 --> 00:20.639 Class 76 of the Sergeant Major Academy . 00:20.979 --> 00:23.620 Deeds , not words . Today we have the 00:23.620 --> 00:25.898 privilege of speaking with the US Army , 00:26.049 --> 00:27.882 Europe and Africa Command Team . 00:27.882 --> 00:30.105 General Christopher Donahue and Command 00:30.105 --> 00:32.216 Sergeant Major Christopher Mullenna . 00:32.216 --> 00:34.327 Gentlemen , good morning . Welcome to 00:34.327 --> 00:36.660 the NCO Leadership Center of Excellence . 00:36.660 --> 00:38.660 How are you doing today ? Awesome . 00:38.660 --> 00:40.882 Thanks for having us here . This is For 00:40.882 --> 00:42.993 me personally , great to be back with 00:42.993 --> 00:45.216 the team . Yeah , for me , I mean , the 00:45.216 --> 00:47.216 NCO Corps is our greatest strategic 00:47.216 --> 00:49.271 advantage and , you know , I'm , I'm 00:49.271 --> 00:51.493 biased , but the US Army's NCO Corps is 00:51.493 --> 00:53.438 the best in the world . I couldn't 00:53.438 --> 00:55.549 agree with you more , sir . Would you 00:55.549 --> 00:57.660 like to take some time to explain the 00:57.660 --> 00:59.771 US Army , Europe , and Africa Command 00:59.771 --> 01:01.160 and what their roles and 01:01.160 --> 01:03.382 responsibilities are to our listeners ? 01:03.382 --> 01:05.271 Yeah , I mean , uh , so US Army , 01:05.271 --> 01:07.489 Europe , Africa , uh obviously we are 01:07.489 --> 01:09.211 the theater , the army theater 01:09.211 --> 01:12.269 component . Uh , for UCO and then also 01:12.269 --> 01:15.110 for AFRICO , and we're responsible for 01:15.110 --> 01:18.029 a number of operational plans , setting 01:18.029 --> 01:20.440 the theater , um , and also the 01:20.440 --> 01:23.150 strategic posture of forces there and 01:23.150 --> 01:25.206 recommending that back to both , you 01:25.206 --> 01:27.372 know , for , for me , General George , 01:27.372 --> 01:29.150 and then to both of those COCOM 01:29.150 --> 01:31.169 commanders , General Grikovich and 01:31.190 --> 01:33.357 General Anderson and AFRICO , and then 01:33.357 --> 01:35.412 on the NATO side I'm also the LANCOM 01:35.412 --> 01:37.860 commander . So , the , the theater 01:37.860 --> 01:40.027 component commander for that and again 01:40.027 --> 01:41.916 with that a number of operational 01:41.940 --> 01:43.773 things and then we , we also are 01:43.773 --> 01:47.300 responsible for Ukraine as well . Thank 01:47.300 --> 01:49.411 you , sir . Uh , you mentioned , uh , 01:49.411 --> 01:51.633 strategic landscape and that's gonna be 01:51.633 --> 01:53.633 where we start off with , with this 01:53.633 --> 01:56.129 podcast . General Donahue , sir , the 01:56.129 --> 01:58.240 operational environment in Europe has 01:58.240 --> 02:00.296 fundamentally shifted since February 02:00.296 --> 02:02.351 2022 . Beyond the immediate need for 02:02.351 --> 02:05.150 deterrence . What is a more subtle long 02:05.150 --> 02:07.317 term change you are driving within the 02:07.317 --> 02:09.206 command to ensure we are not just 02:09.206 --> 02:10.983 postured for today's threat but 02:10.983 --> 02:12.650 actively shaping the security 02:12.650 --> 02:14.928 environment for the next decade ? Yeah , 02:14.928 --> 02:17.039 I mean , so one , right now we have a 02:17.039 --> 02:18.817 great , you know , leadership , 02:18.817 --> 02:21.094 civilian leadership , uh , in the army , 02:21.094 --> 02:21.070 you know , with Secretary Driscoll , 02:21.160 --> 02:23.869 but you're seeing , uh , a number of 02:23.869 --> 02:26.202 areas to include our ambassador to NATO , 02:26.229 --> 02:28.750 Ambassador Matt Whittaker , where we 02:28.750 --> 02:30.972 are empowered to make changes and we're 02:30.972 --> 02:33.083 making those changes , so . We're not 02:33.083 --> 02:35.194 changing , you know , you never fight 02:35.194 --> 02:37.417 the last war , OK , so what's happening 02:37.417 --> 02:39.472 in Ukraine , that's not gonna be the 02:39.472 --> 02:41.583 next war , but we're taking all those 02:41.583 --> 02:43.583 lessons and we're putting them into 02:43.583 --> 02:46.080 very specific operating concepts , uh , 02:46.149 --> 02:48.260 in the case of the big one that we're 02:48.260 --> 02:50.316 working on out there with the US and 02:50.316 --> 02:52.038 NATO lens is the eastern flank 02:52.038 --> 02:54.038 deterrence line , right , to ensure 02:54.038 --> 02:56.205 that we can deter any adversary in the 02:56.205 --> 02:58.316 globe , and then we're doing a number 02:58.316 --> 03:01.460 of . Uh , testing both whether that's 03:01.460 --> 03:04.550 exercises , uh , technical , everything 03:04.550 --> 03:06.750 else to make sure that we are actually 03:06.750 --> 03:09.460 able to do what we have developed and , 03:09.470 --> 03:11.526 uh , the , the army in particular is 03:11.526 --> 03:13.748 doing some really neat things . We have 03:13.748 --> 03:15.803 a thing called GTED and what the , I 03:15.803 --> 03:17.914 won't bore you with the acronym , but 03:17.914 --> 03:20.081 really what that is is everything that 03:20.081 --> 03:22.303 you need to . Identify what you have to 03:22.303 --> 03:25.279 develop . And then go out and test it 03:25.279 --> 03:27.279 and then put it into the system and 03:27.279 --> 03:29.479 actually buy a small amount so that we 03:29.479 --> 03:31.559 can , you know , go out and start to 03:31.559 --> 03:33.670 use that in this case for the eastern 03:33.670 --> 03:35.726 flank but also make sure that we can 03:35.726 --> 03:37.781 use it on the southern border of the 03:37.781 --> 03:39.839 United States or out in the Indo 03:39.839 --> 03:42.000 Pacific so all those things we're 03:42.000 --> 03:44.339 testing , um , and , and we're going 03:44.339 --> 03:46.561 over and making sure that we're sharing 03:46.561 --> 03:48.617 all of that stuff so it's a , it's a 03:48.617 --> 03:50.979 remarkable opportunity and then also , 03:51.039 --> 03:54.449 uh , you know , clearly with our . Job , 03:54.610 --> 03:57.619 uh , for Ukraine is that we're also , 03:58.169 --> 04:00.280 you know , ultimately leveraging that 04:00.280 --> 04:02.447 and making sure that we're stealing as 04:02.447 --> 04:04.558 much as possible , uh , all the right 04:04.558 --> 04:06.669 lessons out of that and incorporating 04:06.669 --> 04:08.836 that into it . Yes , sir , thank you . 04:08.836 --> 04:11.002 Uh , it sounds to me that , uh , a lot 04:11.002 --> 04:12.836 of the lessons learned are being 04:12.836 --> 04:14.669 incorporated into innovation and 04:14.669 --> 04:16.669 modernizing our force to fight that 04:16.669 --> 04:18.780 future fight , uh , Star Major . Uh , 04:18.780 --> 04:20.725 the conflict in Ukraine has been a 04:20.725 --> 04:22.891 brutal teacher on the survivability of 04:22.891 --> 04:24.947 soldiers and equipment on the modern 04:24.947 --> 04:26.947 battlefield . How are those lessons 04:26.947 --> 04:26.600 changing the way you approach the 04:26.600 --> 04:28.656 training and development of our NCOs 04:28.656 --> 04:30.600 and junior soldiers ? What are you 04:30.600 --> 04:32.822 emphasizing now that perhaps we weren't 04:32.822 --> 04:34.933 two years ago ? Yeah , thanks for the 04:34.933 --> 04:37.619 question . I think . One which has not 04:37.619 --> 04:39.841 changed is we gotta be brilliant at the 04:39.841 --> 04:41.980 basics and right now we're in this 04:41.980 --> 04:44.036 transition period where we , there's 04:44.036 --> 04:46.480 all these emerging technologies and 04:47.019 --> 04:49.500 they're changing rapidly . So sometimes 04:49.500 --> 04:51.333 as soon as you get that piece of 04:51.333 --> 04:53.556 equipment , um , it could be obsolete , 04:53.619 --> 04:56.730 you know , a few days later , um . But 04:57.309 --> 05:00.109 founded , brilliant at the basics and 05:00.390 --> 05:02.612 what we're seeing , and we , I think we 05:02.612 --> 05:04.989 kind of already knew this is , uh , you 05:04.989 --> 05:07.089 know , our field craft and our , our 05:07.089 --> 05:08.910 and and SIA Corps focused on 05:08.910 --> 05:10.632 survivability , you know , the 05:10.632 --> 05:12.540 Ukrainians will tell us like that 05:12.540 --> 05:14.709 vehicle , if you're not executing a 05:14.709 --> 05:16.765 task in that vehicle , you should be 05:16.765 --> 05:18.542 nowhere near that vehicle . You 05:18.542 --> 05:20.653 shouldn't sleep in it . You shouldn't 05:20.653 --> 05:22.487 hang out around it . Um , and so 05:22.487 --> 05:24.779 there's a , there's a . Disciplines , 05:25.029 --> 05:27.519 um , some undeveloped disciplines , uh , 05:27.799 --> 05:30.021 that we have right now that we're , you 05:30.021 --> 05:31.799 know , we're from a field craft 05:31.799 --> 05:34.021 perspective that , that aren't inherent 05:34.021 --> 05:36.243 in how we fought in , in the past . And 05:36.243 --> 05:38.355 so when you look at the , the , the , 05:38.355 --> 05:40.521 the fight there , I mean , it's , it's 05:40.521 --> 05:42.521 World War One , tactics with modern 05:42.559 --> 05:44.750 technology , and it's gonna require 05:44.750 --> 05:46.972 incredible discipline of our soldiers , 05:47.200 --> 05:49.459 um . In that fight their job is to 05:49.459 --> 05:51.899 survive and the Ukrainians have really 05:51.899 --> 05:54.066 figured this out and they've learned , 05:54.066 --> 05:56.179 you know , the hard way in in so many 05:56.179 --> 05:58.850 different ways and we're in a position 05:58.850 --> 06:01.500 where we can take that those lessons 06:01.500 --> 06:03.980 learned and introduce them into our 06:03.980 --> 06:06.980 formations and show them like real time 06:06.980 --> 06:09.540 like hey , if we aren't changing or we 06:09.540 --> 06:11.762 aren't developing this discipline , our 06:11.762 --> 06:14.109 survivability rate is very , very low 06:14.230 --> 06:16.397 and you know we can see that firsthand 06:16.397 --> 06:18.730 with the Ukrainians . Yes , sir , Major , 06:18.730 --> 06:21.008 thank you . Um , this question is , uh , 06:21.008 --> 06:23.119 for both of you . Sir , sir , Major , 06:23.119 --> 06:25.119 your command operates in a constant 06:25.119 --> 06:27.230 state of competition . Could you both 06:27.230 --> 06:29.397 share a concrete example of what a win 06:29.397 --> 06:31.230 looks like for your soldiers and 06:31.230 --> 06:33.341 leaders on a day to day basis , short 06:33.341 --> 06:35.508 of armed conflict ? How do you measure 06:35.508 --> 06:35.220 success when the goal is to deter ? 06:36.690 --> 06:38.746 Yeah , I , I think the the first one 06:38.746 --> 06:40.857 that jumps out is , you know , we had 06:40.857 --> 06:43.739 an incursion in Poland and uh . You 06:43.739 --> 06:47.010 know , Romania of uh shahed 06:47.010 --> 06:50.760 drones . And everything that we've been 06:50.760 --> 06:52.649 talking about how we're trying to 06:52.649 --> 06:54.704 develop the eastern flank deterrence 06:54.704 --> 06:56.871 line and all this , all the GTAD , all 06:56.871 --> 06:56.640 this other stuff that I'm talking about , 06:56.679 --> 06:58.790 whenever that happened , we needed an 06:58.790 --> 07:01.720 answer , uh , as both from a US 07:01.720 --> 07:03.776 perspective and from a , uh , a NATO 07:03.776 --> 07:05.920 alliance perspective of how do you 07:05.920 --> 07:08.480 address this to make sure that you were 07:08.480 --> 07:11.239 able to deter but also give confidence 07:11.239 --> 07:13.072 that we could do that across the 07:13.072 --> 07:15.160 eastern flank and , uh , because of 07:15.160 --> 07:17.160 everything that we've been doing we 07:17.160 --> 07:19.216 already had all the right . Uh , you 07:19.216 --> 07:21.382 know , sensors and everything in place 07:21.382 --> 07:23.438 so that we could adapt and integrate 07:23.438 --> 07:25.549 everything and then . The US was able 07:25.549 --> 07:27.660 to provide a capability to Poland and 07:27.660 --> 07:31.589 Romania called MIOS , that's one of the 07:31.589 --> 07:33.811 main capabilities shooting down shahids 07:33.811 --> 07:35.922 in Ukraine . So all these things that 07:35.922 --> 07:38.033 we've learned , we brought out , made 07:38.033 --> 07:40.200 better , integrated further , and that 07:40.200 --> 07:43.079 that core of that was US Army NCOs that 07:43.079 --> 07:45.600 did that , you know , that has , has 07:45.600 --> 07:48.239 provided our allies and more 07:48.239 --> 07:51.279 importantly , uh , deterred Russia from 07:51.279 --> 07:53.335 doing anything else that they may be 07:53.335 --> 07:56.450 thinking of . So , it sounds to me that 07:56.630 --> 07:58.797 uh the main focus of that is , is kind 07:58.797 --> 08:01.109 of uh fostering and cultivating the 08:01.109 --> 08:03.331 alliances that we've , we've built with 08:03.331 --> 08:05.387 those partner nations as well , uh , 08:05.387 --> 08:07.442 which leads us to our next uh set of 08:07.442 --> 08:09.553 topics , uh , which is the alliance , 08:09.553 --> 08:11.553 people and readiness . Um , General 08:11.553 --> 08:13.665 Donahue , sir , with the accession of 08:13.665 --> 08:15.720 Finland and Sweden , the dynamics of 08:15.720 --> 08:17.442 the NATO alliance have changed 08:17.442 --> 08:19.498 significantly . What is the greatest 08:19.498 --> 08:21.665 opportunity this presents for UAEF and 08:21.665 --> 08:23.831 what is the most significant challenge 08:23.831 --> 08:25.831 we must overcome to ensure seamless 08:25.831 --> 08:27.942 interoperability across this expanded 08:27.942 --> 08:30.276 frontier ? Yeah , so the first thing is , 08:30.276 --> 08:32.498 is , uh , you know , Finland and Sweden 08:32.498 --> 08:34.442 and the CSM and I have gotten very 08:34.442 --> 08:36.659 close with , you know , all the 08:36.669 --> 08:38.502 military leaders with both those 08:38.502 --> 08:40.447 countries . They , they brought an 08:40.447 --> 08:42.669 incredible capability to the alliance . 08:42.669 --> 08:44.725 I mean , really , really good ground 08:44.725 --> 08:48.219 forces in particular . Um , and it also , 08:48.440 --> 08:50.773 you know , obviously this is an unclass , 08:50.773 --> 08:52.718 uh , podcast here , but it creates 08:52.718 --> 08:54.440 other operational and tactical 08:54.440 --> 08:57.059 opportunities for you just based off of . 08:57.750 --> 09:00.229 The geography and everything else , so 09:00.229 --> 09:02.349 that's obviously good news to ensure 09:02.349 --> 09:06.159 that we deter . So that that's kind of 09:06.159 --> 09:08.103 the first thing , and then all the 09:08.103 --> 09:10.849 interoperability . And any capability 09:10.849 --> 09:13.130 that we're developing out there is 09:13.130 --> 09:15.130 something that has to be able to go 09:15.130 --> 09:17.352 anywhere in the world , right ? So it's 09:17.352 --> 09:19.019 not , yes , we are developing 09:19.019 --> 09:21.019 capability to eliminate a strategic 09:21.019 --> 09:23.000 dilemma in Europe and to put the 09:23.000 --> 09:25.222 alliance , put the other members of the 09:25.222 --> 09:27.890 alliance in the lead , um , all those 09:27.890 --> 09:30.001 things are playing out , but all that 09:30.001 --> 09:32.090 is stuff that our army and our joint 09:32.090 --> 09:34.146 force can use throughout the globe , 09:34.146 --> 09:36.034 and we're sharing all of that and 09:36.034 --> 09:38.368 exercising it as well . Thank you , sir . 09:38.919 --> 09:41.260 It's our Major . Considering the unique 09:41.260 --> 09:43.500 demands of the European theater , what 09:43.500 --> 09:45.722 is one critical talent or skill set the 09:45.722 --> 09:48.320 army currently undervalues in its NCOs , 09:48.619 --> 09:50.841 and how are you working within commands 09:50.841 --> 09:52.952 to cultivate that talent before these 09:52.952 --> 09:55.119 NCOs arrive in your formation ? Yeah , 09:55.119 --> 09:57.119 I , I don't know that we undervalue 09:57.119 --> 09:59.286 anything , but I think that as we're , 09:59.286 --> 10:01.508 you know , we're transforming , um , as 10:01.508 --> 10:03.619 an institution , lots of great change 10:03.619 --> 10:06.020 happening across the force , and one of 10:06.020 --> 10:08.500 the things that I think about is . We 10:08.500 --> 10:12.419 have access to a lot of data and that 10:12.419 --> 10:15.130 data's got to be part of a process that 10:15.130 --> 10:17.500 is very disciplined and thoughtful , 10:17.780 --> 10:20.619 and it's got to create outputs that our 10:20.619 --> 10:23.690 commanders can use and that's relevant , 10:23.700 --> 10:25.922 and there's so much of it , it's , it's 10:25.922 --> 10:28.280 difficult for our team to completely , 10:28.580 --> 10:30.691 you know , understand , and we've got 10:30.691 --> 10:32.636 to be able to get that data to our 10:32.636 --> 10:34.469 commanders so that they can make 10:34.469 --> 10:36.524 relevant and timely decisions . Um , 10:36.524 --> 10:38.747 where the , I think where the NCO Corps 10:38.747 --> 10:40.969 fits in that , you know , the NCO Corps 10:40.969 --> 10:40.809 is highly trusted by our commanders . 10:41.130 --> 10:43.489 They allow us to do things under their 10:43.489 --> 10:45.656 authority that most armies would never 10:45.656 --> 10:47.659 allow their NCOs to do , uh , 10:47.809 --> 10:49.865 exceptional initiative , exceptional 10:49.865 --> 10:51.976 problem solvers . And then where does 10:51.976 --> 10:54.570 that level of talent at the , 10:54.729 --> 10:56.785 particularly at the tactical level , 10:56.785 --> 10:58.890 like fit in so that a commander can 10:58.890 --> 11:02.849 focus on . Making sure the next 2 or 3 11:02.849 --> 11:05.049 problems that haven't even presented 11:05.049 --> 11:06.993 themselves , you know , be able to 11:06.993 --> 11:09.105 focus on and think on those and where 11:09.105 --> 11:11.327 does the NCO Corps fit in there so that 11:11.327 --> 11:13.327 the commander doesn't have to worry 11:13.327 --> 11:13.250 about some of those problems . I think 11:13.250 --> 11:15.520 that there's potential for the NCO 11:15.520 --> 11:17.742 Corps to be able to solve and get after 11:17.742 --> 11:19.964 those things for our , our officers and 11:19.964 --> 11:22.131 commanders . You know , just the other 11:22.131 --> 11:24.242 day our CTO came and said , Hey , Sar 11:24.242 --> 11:26.353 Major , you know this guy , uh , huge 11:26.353 --> 11:28.559 brain . I want to train . All of the 11:28.559 --> 11:31.719 NCOs on the Maven Smart system , on , 11:31.799 --> 11:33.910 on the entire URAF staff . I'm like , 11:33.910 --> 11:36.132 wow , that's a pretty heavy lift . OK , 11:36.132 --> 11:38.077 I'm in . Let's do it , right ? And 11:38.077 --> 11:40.799 because he is watching the NCOs on the 11:40.799 --> 11:42.855 staff and the role they're playing , 11:42.855 --> 11:45.021 and this really started with our chief 11:45.021 --> 11:47.021 of staff that had the first time in 11:47.021 --> 11:48.799 URAF history , uh , just before 11:48.799 --> 11:50.799 Christmas , he said , hey , all the 11:50.799 --> 11:52.855 NCOs on the staff are gonna brief at 11:52.855 --> 11:54.966 the commander's update brief . It was 11:54.966 --> 11:57.077 completely NCO led , right ? And he , 11:57.077 --> 11:59.243 and the reason that he's doing that is 11:59.243 --> 12:01.419 because he knows that there's untapped 12:02.239 --> 12:04.599 potential and bandwidth in our NCO 12:04.599 --> 12:06.488 corps . I mean , our officers are 12:06.488 --> 12:08.488 grinding really , really hard , and 12:08.488 --> 12:10.821 there's , but the , the bandwidth there , 12:10.821 --> 12:13.159 I mean , it's almost maxed out because 12:13.169 --> 12:15.447 we're asking them to do so many things . 12:15.447 --> 12:17.960 And he realized , hey , I can get NCOs 12:17.960 --> 12:21.460 doing a lot of these tasks and um . 12:21.900 --> 12:24.122 The most important way to do that is to 12:24.122 --> 12:26.344 make sure they understand what , what's 12:26.344 --> 12:28.400 going on first and the relevant name 12:28.400 --> 12:30.678 and their , and their purpose is clear . 12:30.678 --> 12:32.789 Um , so he had them brief and , and I 12:32.789 --> 12:34.844 think that , you know , that start , 12:34.844 --> 12:36.844 you know , that and then our CO CTO 12:36.844 --> 12:38.956 talking about like how do we get NCOs 12:38.956 --> 12:40.900 managing this system , um , that's 12:40.900 --> 12:43.479 pretty complicated . Um , but he sees 12:43.700 --> 12:45.700 that they're smart enough , they're 12:45.700 --> 12:47.867 talented enough , they understand it , 12:47.867 --> 12:50.200 especially the , the , the younger NCOs , 12:50.200 --> 12:52.367 the stuff that's like inherently based 12:52.367 --> 12:52.260 on , you know , when , when they were 12:52.260 --> 12:54.149 born and what , what they've been 12:54.149 --> 12:56.204 introduced to in their young lives , 12:56.204 --> 12:58.204 like they , they get all this stuff 12:58.204 --> 12:57.979 already , like they're ready to like 12:57.979 --> 13:00.257 start programming things and doing all , 13:00.257 --> 13:02.312 all sorts of cool stuff . So there's 13:02.312 --> 13:05.190 some . Tap potential within an NCO 13:05.190 --> 13:07.570 corps that we're , we're recognizing 13:07.750 --> 13:10.030 and uh we're , we're gonna fool us . 13:10.520 --> 13:12.687 You know , CSM's being humble , so I'm 13:12.687 --> 13:14.853 gonna give you another example of what 13:14.853 --> 13:16.853 he's doing with our NCO corps . You 13:16.853 --> 13:18.909 know , our priorities are people and 13:18.909 --> 13:21.187 war fighting , right , interchangeable . 13:21.187 --> 13:21.130 You can't have one without the other . 13:21.869 --> 13:24.091 Well , any time people come to Europe , 13:24.091 --> 13:25.980 we owe it to them that they leave 13:25.980 --> 13:28.202 better trained than when they arrived , 13:28.202 --> 13:30.313 and there's only one way to do that . 13:30.313 --> 13:32.480 You have to evaluate it . It has to be 13:32.480 --> 13:34.702 data , right ? It has to be proven . So 13:34.702 --> 13:36.925 when they come in they'll take a test , 13:36.925 --> 13:39.147 uh , of various things , and then we'll 13:39.147 --> 13:41.369 be able to track using data how they're 13:41.369 --> 13:41.270 getting better , right ? And then there 13:41.270 --> 13:44.309 has to be that , so that's very , you 13:44.309 --> 13:46.531 know , quantitative . There has to be a 13:46.531 --> 13:48.420 qualitative , so we , we do other 13:48.420 --> 13:50.476 things to make sure that we're doing 13:50.476 --> 13:52.531 both . He's the guy that is building 13:52.531 --> 13:54.753 and driving that program at our level . 13:54.753 --> 13:57.031 He's the man that's responsible for it . 13:57.031 --> 13:59.580 Um , and , and it's pretty amazing , uh , 13:59.590 --> 14:02.030 what he's doing with that . Um , I 14:02.030 --> 14:04.086 can't think of any other army in the 14:04.086 --> 14:06.086 world where something at that scale 14:06.086 --> 14:08.197 could be done by one , you know , one 14:08.197 --> 14:10.141 NCO like this , in this case , the 14:10.141 --> 14:12.252 commandar Major , Pretty amazing . It 14:12.252 --> 14:14.363 is , sir . Uh , I think it gets after 14:14.363 --> 14:16.530 what you , you mentioned earlier , our 14:16.530 --> 14:18.752 major , uh , how the rate of , uh , all 14:18.752 --> 14:20.919 this technology , you know , advancing 14:20.919 --> 14:22.974 every single day and not having that 14:22.974 --> 14:25.197 training infrastructure to , you know , 14:25.197 --> 14:27.419 keep up with it , um , but this kind of 14:27.419 --> 14:26.770 gets after it in a , in a small 14:26.770 --> 14:28.714 singular way , but it's a good way 14:28.714 --> 14:31.340 forward . To kind of keep up with that 14:31.340 --> 14:33.562 technology as well . So that , that's , 14:33.562 --> 14:35.451 that's amazing . Brilliant at the 14:35.451 --> 14:37.562 basics . He's testing that . You have 14:37.562 --> 14:39.673 to bring data in . You have to do all 14:39.673 --> 14:39.239 these things that all comes together in 14:39.239 --> 14:41.461 this program that he's doing . And I'll 14:41.461 --> 14:43.295 tell you what , you know , where 14:43.295 --> 14:45.517 transformation and contact fits in this 14:45.517 --> 14:45.280 is the part , part of the idea . It's 14:45.280 --> 14:49.070 many things . Let's , this started with 14:49.070 --> 14:51.070 the Chief of Staff General George . 14:51.070 --> 14:53.390 Let's get these , these emerging 14:53.390 --> 14:55.446 technologies . Let's just buy them , 14:55.630 --> 14:57.852 get them in the hands of our soldiers . 14:57.852 --> 15:00.019 They'll figure it out for us , for the 15:00.019 --> 15:02.969 army . Its young NCOs and soldiers just 15:02.969 --> 15:06.429 being handed equipment , never used it 15:06.429 --> 15:08.429 before , and the , and the Chief of 15:08.429 --> 15:10.540 staff of the Army is like , figure it 15:10.540 --> 15:12.596 out for the army . We're counting on 15:12.596 --> 15:14.762 you . That's , that's the kind of like 15:14.762 --> 15:16.929 initiative that we have going on right 15:16.929 --> 15:16.539 now . It's pretty impressive . Yeah , 15:16.580 --> 15:18.469 that's pretty amazing, ar Major . 15:18.469 --> 15:20.840 Moving on to leadership and the future . 15:21.190 --> 15:23.412 As a command team , you've shifted from 15:23.412 --> 15:25.599 leading units to shaping systems that 15:25.599 --> 15:27.655 impact thousands . How do you ensure 15:27.655 --> 15:29.599 that you don't lose touch with the 15:29.599 --> 15:31.655 realities on the ground from a young 15:31.655 --> 15:33.599 private in Poland or a sergeant in 15:33.599 --> 15:35.766 Djibouti ? What is your most effective 15:35.766 --> 15:37.710 mechanism for receiving unfiltered 15:37.710 --> 15:39.821 feedback ? So the first thing is , is 15:39.821 --> 15:41.821 you have to be present . Now , um , 15:41.821 --> 15:43.710 anywhere we go , anytime we visit 15:43.710 --> 15:45.950 anything , we will go out to the lowest 15:45.950 --> 15:48.006 levels and talk to people . That's , 15:48.006 --> 15:49.894 that's not new , right ? Any good 15:49.894 --> 15:51.950 commander or command star major does 15:51.950 --> 15:54.117 that . Now I also know that whenever I 15:54.117 --> 15:56.339 show up , it , it's , it's not the same 15:56.339 --> 15:58.339 as when Captain Donahue showed up , 15:58.339 --> 16:00.561 right ? That's just reality . So I have 16:00.561 --> 16:02.450 to be able to go out there and be 16:02.450 --> 16:04.450 present and , and cut all the other 16:04.450 --> 16:06.830 chafe away from it , um . The other 16:06.830 --> 16:08.997 thing that we do every day is we do PT 16:08.997 --> 16:11.108 with people and you just partner with 16:11.108 --> 16:13.219 people and talk and and listen and be 16:13.219 --> 16:15.441 present , right , every , you know , so 16:15.441 --> 16:17.441 we just went through all of 3 Corps 16:17.441 --> 16:19.497 which is now assigned here we did PT 16:19.497 --> 16:21.950 with uh folks every day so that that's 16:21.950 --> 16:23.950 that one time a day , no matter how 16:23.950 --> 16:26.117 busy you are that you get to do that . 16:26.450 --> 16:28.672 Uh , and then the other one is , and we 16:28.672 --> 16:30.839 just talked about it , is that's where 16:30.839 --> 16:32.839 you have this incredible capability 16:32.839 --> 16:34.894 called your command sergeant Major . 16:34.894 --> 16:37.117 They go out and they are your source of 16:37.117 --> 16:39.280 ground truth . So he's , he's the guy 16:39.280 --> 16:41.613 that I rely on for ground truth , right ? 16:41.613 --> 16:43.780 And he has this amazing NCO corps that 16:43.780 --> 16:45.780 can do it . And , and there's other 16:45.780 --> 16:47.947 things we do that kind of , you know , 16:47.947 --> 16:50.280 for the sake of brevity , those are the , 16:50.280 --> 16:52.336 the big things from , from my side , 16:52.336 --> 16:54.391 but I'm very cognizant of the fact . 16:54.391 --> 16:56.890 That I need an incredible NCO like this 16:56.890 --> 16:58.929 guy right here , uh , to be able to 16:58.929 --> 17:01.262 help me out with that , not helping out , 17:01.262 --> 17:03.262 he , he is my primary source of all 17:03.262 --> 17:05.429 that . This is one of the strengths of 17:05.429 --> 17:07.429 our NCO corps . It's really , I , I 17:07.429 --> 17:09.485 find really cool and , you know , in 17:09.485 --> 17:11.540 this position just , you know , give 17:11.540 --> 17:13.762 you an example , um , what he's talking 17:13.762 --> 17:15.873 about is we could be in any country , 17:15.873 --> 17:18.560 fly there and be engaging , you know , 17:18.760 --> 17:20.871 sitting with an ambassador , having a 17:20.871 --> 17:23.204 conversation , and he , he's like , hey , 17:23.204 --> 17:25.427 I want you at that meeting . So there I 17:25.427 --> 17:27.427 am , so Mader having a conversation 17:27.427 --> 17:29.427 with my boss and an ambassador with 17:29.427 --> 17:31.649 with US ambassador whether that country 17:31.649 --> 17:33.760 is , and then an hour later , I could 17:33.760 --> 17:35.927 be out . Uh , in the same country or a 17:35.927 --> 17:38.430 different country , um , talking to a 17:38.430 --> 17:40.597 new soldier that just showed up at the 17:40.597 --> 17:43.060 organization . Um , so the , the sphere 17:43.060 --> 17:45.180 of influence there , you know , one 17:45.180 --> 17:47.347 moment you're talking to an ambassador 17:47.347 --> 17:49.236 appointed by the president of the 17:49.236 --> 17:51.347 United States and then you're talking 17:51.347 --> 17:51.099 to a soldier that , you know , just 17:51.099 --> 17:52.932 graduated high school , probably 17:52.932 --> 17:55.155 doesn't have a driver's license , knows 17:55.155 --> 17:56.988 how to drive a tank , and you're 17:56.988 --> 17:56.260 talking to him about him , you know , 17:56.380 --> 17:58.569 his , his journey . Yes , sounds like 17:58.569 --> 18:00.625 that the trust is really critical to 18:00.625 --> 18:02.402 building that cohesion and that 18:02.402 --> 18:04.458 communication that goes from down to 18:04.458 --> 18:06.680 that private that you mentioned up to , 18:06.680 --> 18:08.402 up to you and , and , um , the 18:08.402 --> 18:10.402 commander's level . Um , Star Major 18:10.402 --> 18:12.458 Mullenna , uh , what do you wish you 18:12.458 --> 18:14.736 had known as an entry-level star major , 18:14.736 --> 18:16.791 uh , before stepping into your first 18:16.791 --> 18:19.013 role as a star major ? Yeah , I , I was 18:19.013 --> 18:21.291 just , I mean , so many things , right , 18:21.291 --> 18:23.458 so many things , and I had , and I had 18:23.458 --> 18:26.239 great , uh , advice along the way , um , 18:26.530 --> 18:28.752 but sometimes you just , you just don't 18:28.752 --> 18:31.760 know what you don't know . Uh I think 18:31.760 --> 18:33.816 in what I told the class out there , 18:33.910 --> 18:36.021 you know , as you're in the academy . 18:36.880 --> 18:38.713 that that first that year in the 18:38.713 --> 18:40.713 academy is really important because 18:40.713 --> 18:42.658 you're , you're transitioning from 18:42.658 --> 18:44.824 being a directional level leader where 18:44.824 --> 18:46.824 you were serving in an organization 18:46.824 --> 18:48.769 probably as a first sergeant , you 18:48.769 --> 18:51.102 probably knew all your soldiers by name , 18:51.102 --> 18:53.324 you had incredible influence , probably 18:53.324 --> 18:55.213 the most senior um soldier in the 18:55.213 --> 18:57.547 company , including your commander , uh , 18:57.547 --> 18:59.547 you're an expert trainer . You were 18:59.547 --> 19:01.658 expert solving problem solver for the 19:01.658 --> 19:03.769 organizations . You drove the , you , 19:03.769 --> 19:05.880 you ran the company from day to day . 19:05.880 --> 19:07.991 You own the timeline , then you , you 19:07.991 --> 19:10.213 leave and now you're sort of working at 19:10.213 --> 19:12.102 the operational level . You got a 19:12.102 --> 19:14.213 commander who is , uh , probably more 19:14.213 --> 19:16.380 experienced than , than you are . Um , 19:16.380 --> 19:18.602 it's just how the paradigm shifts there 19:18.602 --> 19:20.769 at the battalion commander CSM level . 19:20.769 --> 19:23.102 And so now , uh , you're working with a , 19:23.102 --> 19:25.269 you know , a commander that's probably 19:25.269 --> 19:27.436 got more experience than you . And has 19:27.436 --> 19:29.602 worked on a battalion staff and you've 19:29.602 --> 19:31.880 got to quickly figure that out , right ? 19:31.880 --> 19:34.047 And then while you're at the academy , 19:34.047 --> 19:36.269 you're thinking like , who do I want to 19:36.269 --> 19:38.436 be as a CSM ? I'm certainly not . No , 19:38.436 --> 19:40.436 nobody in that classroom is worried 19:40.436 --> 19:42.547 about grass or PT belts , even though 19:42.547 --> 19:44.491 it's a , a , a joke that everybody 19:44.491 --> 19:46.436 likes to make . But their focus is 19:46.436 --> 19:48.491 training , war fighting , and taking 19:48.491 --> 19:50.436 care of their soldiers like that , 19:50.436 --> 19:52.547 that's what , and then they're trying 19:52.547 --> 19:52.319 to figure out how am I gonna , how am I 19:52.319 --> 19:54.479 gonna be that person . I wish I would 19:54.479 --> 19:56.590 have known instead of being the . The 19:56.590 --> 19:58.812 CSM that I wanted to be , I wish I have 19:58.812 --> 20:01.146 realized when I go to that organization , 20:01.146 --> 20:03.257 I need to be the CSM the organization 20:03.257 --> 20:05.479 needs me to be . Uh , thank you , Sir , 20:05.479 --> 20:07.880 Major General Donahue . Commander Major 20:07.880 --> 20:10.060 Mullennax , thank you for your time . 20:10.599 --> 20:12.599 Do you have any closing thoughts or 20:12.599 --> 20:14.821 remarks you would like to share ? Hey , 20:14.821 --> 20:17.043 I just wanna say thanks for having us . 20:17.043 --> 20:19.266 Um , it's , it was really awesome to be 20:19.266 --> 20:21.266 back here with the , you know , the 20:21.266 --> 20:23.432 future of our army . I think . When we 20:23.432 --> 20:26.300 think about leader development . I 20:26.300 --> 20:28.300 measure that whenever I think I was 20:28.300 --> 20:30.522 looking out across all those students , 20:30.522 --> 20:32.522 I'm thinking , OK , we're in pretty 20:32.522 --> 20:34.633 good hands because I can look at them 20:34.633 --> 20:36.800 and tell like . You know , what is 20:36.800 --> 20:38.633 success ? It means that whenever 20:38.633 --> 20:40.689 they're , they're doing the job that 20:40.689 --> 20:42.856 I'm doing , they're gonna do it better 20:42.856 --> 20:44.911 than I did . He nailed it like every 20:44.911 --> 20:47.022 great CSM does . We , we are in great 20:47.022 --> 20:49.078 hands . Thanks for the opportunity . 20:49.078 --> 20:51.300 Thank you , sir . Listeners , thank you 20:51.300 --> 20:53.467 for joining us for the 17th episode of 20:53.467 --> 20:55.689 A Nickel for Your Thoughts . Be sure to 20:55.689 --> 20:56.239 tune in for episode 18 .