WEBVTT 00:07.510 --> 00:09.550 Good morning everyone . Welcome to 00:09.550 --> 00:11.717 episode 14 of Nickel for Your Thoughts 00:11.717 --> 00:13.939 podcast . My name is Masterson Rivera , 00:14.069 --> 00:17.309 Class 76 , deeds not words . This 00:17.309 --> 00:19.476 morning we have a special guest , Mr . 00:19.476 --> 00:21.709 Michael A . Barkin , senior diplomatic 00:21.709 --> 00:23.950 advisor , Army University . Good 00:23.950 --> 00:25.950 morning , sir . How are you doing ? 00:25.950 --> 00:27.950 Good morning , Sergeant . I'm doing 00:27.950 --> 00:27.950 great . Good , good . So we have a 00:27.950 --> 00:29.950 couple questions for you today , as 00:29.950 --> 00:32.117 you're aware . Uh , the first question 00:32.117 --> 00:34.172 we have for you today . The roles of 00:34.172 --> 00:35.950 the Department of State and the 00:35.950 --> 00:38.117 Department of War are distinct , often 00:38.117 --> 00:40.283 with different cultures , priorities , 00:40.283 --> 00:42.228 and operational tempos as a senior 00:42.228 --> 00:44.250 diplomatic advisor . How do you 00:44.250 --> 00:46.306 navigate these differences to ensure 00:46.306 --> 00:47.917 that military activities are 00:47.917 --> 00:50.479 effectively integrated with and 00:50.479 --> 00:52.701 supportive of broader US foreign policy 00:52.701 --> 00:56.290 objectives ? So I , I think that 00:56.290 --> 00:58.290 there's a couple of answers to that 00:58.290 --> 01:00.650 question . I think one is the 01:00.650 --> 01:02.761 Department of Defense , Department of 01:02.761 --> 01:05.529 War has instituted two programs . One 01:05.529 --> 01:07.599 is the political advisor program and 01:07.599 --> 01:11.430 the other is the uh advisors and 01:11.529 --> 01:13.650 faculty members that are lent by the 01:13.650 --> 01:15.594 Department of State to the various 01:15.594 --> 01:18.529 Department of War schools where we 01:18.529 --> 01:21.459 provide teaching experience but also um 01:21.559 --> 01:24.980 uh diplomatic expertise . As the senior 01:24.980 --> 01:27.750 diplomatic advisor to Army University , 01:28.580 --> 01:31.800 my role is to work with those within 01:31.800 --> 01:35.569 the enterprise who are ensuring that 01:35.569 --> 01:37.680 the students come out of the programs 01:37.680 --> 01:39.791 with a good understanding of the D of 01:39.791 --> 01:41.958 the dime . So I think diplomacy is one 01:41.958 --> 01:43.680 of the things that is the less 01:43.680 --> 01:45.902 understood . I know when I started as a 01:45.902 --> 01:47.902 political advisor at Stratcom , the 01:47.902 --> 01:49.958 question uh was always posed to me , 01:49.958 --> 01:51.958 well , we'll just do a demarchesh . 01:51.958 --> 01:53.902 Let's do a demarche . That's the , 01:53.902 --> 01:56.069 that's the the COA that we will take . 01:56.069 --> 01:58.180 And I would say , well , what are you 01:58.180 --> 01:57.589 going to say in the demarche ? And 01:57.589 --> 01:59.811 they'd say , oh , I don't know . Do you 01:59.811 --> 02:01.811 have to say something ? And I would 02:01.811 --> 02:01.639 have to explain that a demarche is 02:01.639 --> 02:03.760 simply a message that one government 02:03.760 --> 02:05.982 sends to another , and that the content 02:06.239 --> 02:09.460 is crucial . Um , so it's an 02:09.460 --> 02:11.627 educational aspect from the Department 02:11.627 --> 02:13.849 of Defense , but I think there's also a 02:13.849 --> 02:16.016 huge amount that we can learn from the 02:16.016 --> 02:18.071 Department of War as well . Uh , and 02:18.071 --> 02:19.738 luckily overseas we have that 02:19.738 --> 02:21.571 opportunity because we work very 02:21.571 --> 02:24.169 closely with male groups , um , and 02:24.179 --> 02:26.860 defense attaches and others , uh , who 02:26.860 --> 02:29.027 are , who we work with on a day to day 02:29.027 --> 02:30.916 basis in our embassies overseas . 02:31.089 --> 02:33.410 Unfortunately , there's no program in 02:33.410 --> 02:35.919 Washington , so the , for the , for the , 02:35.970 --> 02:38.026 the bureaucrats of the Department of 02:38.026 --> 02:39.859 State and the bureaucrats of the 02:39.859 --> 02:42.192 Department of War to interact very much . 02:42.192 --> 02:41.970 That doesn't happen and that's a shame . 02:42.210 --> 02:44.610 But overseas , uh , we do tend to meld 02:44.610 --> 02:47.130 into one team , with one mission 02:47.130 --> 02:49.440 overseas . And then I think that our 02:49.820 --> 02:53.139 detailing military into the State 02:53.139 --> 02:55.361 Department is something that happens as 02:55.361 --> 02:57.472 well , and then State Department into 02:57.472 --> 02:59.306 the military . These are ways of 02:59.306 --> 03:01.361 sharing the culture , both sides . I 03:01.361 --> 03:03.361 think each side has things to learn 03:03.361 --> 03:05.472 from the other culture , and it's one 03:05.472 --> 03:05.339 of the things that , that I think makes 03:05.339 --> 03:07.561 both organizations stronger . Thank you 03:07.561 --> 03:09.617 for your answer , sir . Moving on to 03:09.617 --> 03:11.895 the next question . Military diplomacy . 03:12.419 --> 03:14.330 Also known as defense diplomacy , 03:14.860 --> 03:16.779 includes a range of non-combat 03:16.779 --> 03:18.668 activities like joint exercises , 03:18.779 --> 03:20.860 personal exchanges , and high-level 03:20.860 --> 03:24.240 military dialogue . In your view , what 03:24.240 --> 03:26.220 is the main purpose of these 03:26.220 --> 03:28.320 engagements ? Is it primarily for 03:28.320 --> 03:31.020 building trust and preventing conflict , 03:31.520 --> 03:34.399 or is it a tool for gaining a strategic 03:34.399 --> 03:36.960 advantage in an era of great power 03:36.960 --> 03:39.016 competition ? Uh , Sergeant Rivera , 03:39.070 --> 03:41.800 I'd say all of the above , is the , the 03:41.800 --> 03:44.740 goal is of any sort of diplomatic 03:44.880 --> 03:47.213 personal action is to make a connection . 03:47.889 --> 03:50.940 Um , there are things that , uh , the 03:50.940 --> 03:52.996 Department of War can learn from the 03:52.996 --> 03:55.162 Department of Defense and vice versa . 03:55.162 --> 03:54.630 There are things the Department of 03:54.630 --> 03:56.797 Defense can learn from the Ministry of 03:56.797 --> 03:59.074 Defense in Great Britain , for example , 03:59.074 --> 04:01.241 uh , or in Japan , or in South Korea , 04:01.241 --> 04:03.408 or in other allied countries . Um , so 04:03.408 --> 04:05.574 I think person to person international 04:05.574 --> 04:07.463 military exchanges are incredibly 04:07.463 --> 04:09.630 important to be able to share the kind 04:09.630 --> 04:11.519 of information . That is not only 04:11.519 --> 04:13.797 useful on a practical day by day basis , 04:13.797 --> 04:15.852 but which plays into the longer-term 04:15.852 --> 04:17.963 strategic goal of being good allies . 04:17.963 --> 04:20.059 Um , for example , uh , when I was a 04:20.059 --> 04:21.948 political advisor at StratCom , a 04:21.948 --> 04:24.281 four-star admiral in charge of StratCom , 04:24.549 --> 04:26.549 I traveled around the world to meet 04:26.549 --> 04:28.605 with other , uh , leaders around the 04:28.605 --> 04:31.070 world and made connections with other 04:31.070 --> 04:33.309 senior military leaders . Uh , this is 04:33.309 --> 04:35.410 the absolutely crucial kind of 04:35.540 --> 04:38.630 connection that happens in peacetime . 04:39.209 --> 04:41.431 But which comes into play in wartime or 04:41.431 --> 04:44.049 in times of great power conflict , when 04:44.049 --> 04:46.450 you need to call somebody . Simply 04:46.450 --> 04:48.672 knowing the person who has your role on 04:48.672 --> 04:50.728 the other side of the Atlantic in an 04:50.728 --> 04:52.839 allied country and being able to pick 04:52.839 --> 04:54.950 up the phone and call them makes your 04:54.950 --> 04:56.950 job more effective , makes you more 04:56.950 --> 04:58.950 effective , makes your mission more 04:58.950 --> 05:01.117 effective , uh , and is a good thing . 05:01.117 --> 05:03.283 Diplomacy is not just person to person 05:03.283 --> 05:05.061 diplomacy in the military . The 05:05.061 --> 05:07.117 military does a fantastic job around 05:07.117 --> 05:09.283 the world of on the ground diplomacy , 05:09.283 --> 05:12.369 of marrying up humanitarian aid with 05:12.369 --> 05:14.730 tactical , uh , training , for example . 05:15.190 --> 05:17.301 So when I was in Latin America , uh , 05:17.301 --> 05:19.950 the USS Mercy , a hospital ship , did 05:19.950 --> 05:22.510 frequent , frequent trips around the 05:22.510 --> 05:24.677 region , and it would dock into places 05:24.677 --> 05:27.510 and treat local citizens . This was 05:27.510 --> 05:30.190 amazing diplomacy because the citizens 05:30.190 --> 05:32.301 were getting to see the United States 05:32.301 --> 05:33.912 at its very best , providing 05:33.912 --> 05:36.023 humanitarian assistance . At the same 05:36.023 --> 05:38.134 time , a hospital ship that had never 05:38.134 --> 05:40.301 practices is not gonna be effective in 05:40.301 --> 05:42.468 time of war . You want a hospital ship 05:42.468 --> 05:44.301 to be able to handle hundreds of 05:44.301 --> 05:46.579 casualties , mass casualties at a time , 05:46.579 --> 05:48.912 because if there were ever , God forbid , 05:48.912 --> 05:50.801 a time when US forces needed that 05:50.801 --> 05:52.968 hospital ship , you want them to be as 05:52.968 --> 05:55.134 effective as possible . We train to be 05:55.134 --> 05:57.301 ready for war , uh , and that training 05:57.301 --> 05:59.523 happens in all places . I saw this in , 05:59.523 --> 06:01.859 um , Honduras after natural disasters . 06:02.720 --> 06:06.140 When , uh , the US Army flew in , um , 06:06.149 --> 06:09.440 bridges , flew in tents and medical 06:09.440 --> 06:12.920 supplies . And a great , a great symbol 06:12.920 --> 06:15.087 of friendship with an allied country , 06:15.359 --> 06:18.399 and at the same time , army capability 06:18.399 --> 06:20.779 was improved . Building bridges is a 06:20.779 --> 06:24.130 pretty key wartime skill . And to be 06:24.130 --> 06:26.241 able to do it on the fly in a country 06:26.241 --> 06:28.297 that you're not familiar with , um , 06:28.297 --> 06:30.352 both helps that country that has a , 06:30.352 --> 06:32.519 had a bridge washed out in a hurricane 06:32.519 --> 06:34.574 and , and keeps our capability to do 06:34.574 --> 06:36.686 the things that we need to be able to 06:36.686 --> 06:38.852 do , um , uh , strong . So , I'm a big 06:38.852 --> 06:40.574 believer both in the top level 06:40.574 --> 06:42.686 diplomacy by the Defense Department , 06:42.686 --> 06:44.797 War Department , uh , and lower-level 06:44.797 --> 06:46.686 diplomacy because I think it pays 06:46.686 --> 06:48.630 incredible dividends , uh , in the 06:48.630 --> 06:50.630 short term and in the longer term . 06:51.160 --> 06:53.279 Thank you . So what I hear is rapport 06:53.279 --> 06:57.200 is key for diplomacy . Yes , the 06:57.200 --> 06:59.200 whole point of diplomacy is to make 06:59.200 --> 07:02.989 connections . Um , You know , many 07:02.989 --> 07:05.156 people sometimes as diplomats , we sit 07:05.156 --> 07:07.267 down with , with human rights abusers 07:07.267 --> 07:09.211 and with torturers and with , with 07:09.211 --> 07:11.267 other horrible people . I've done it 07:11.267 --> 07:13.156 myself . And you don't like these 07:13.156 --> 07:15.211 people , but making connections with 07:15.211 --> 07:17.267 these people , it's not friendship . 07:17.267 --> 07:19.489 Let's , don't get me wrong , but it's a 07:19.489 --> 07:21.600 connection that's useful for carrying 07:21.600 --> 07:23.378 out the US mission uh with that 07:23.378 --> 07:25.540 particular place . Uh , and so , Um , 07:25.600 --> 07:27.959 building rapport with allies is great 07:27.959 --> 07:30.126 because you work together and it helps 07:30.126 --> 07:32.126 you work together better . Building 07:32.126 --> 07:34.348 rapport , um . Even with the military , 07:34.348 --> 07:36.348 with , with people who are not your 07:36.348 --> 07:38.570 allies , helps you understand the enemy 07:38.570 --> 07:40.848 better , um , helps you better able to , 07:40.848 --> 07:43.070 to combat them if that's what you're at 07:43.070 --> 07:42.399 the end of the day , you need to do . 07:43.799 --> 07:46.200 Moving on to our next question . So 07:46.200 --> 07:48.367 could you describe the unique function 07:48.559 --> 07:50.781 your position plays in shaping military 07:50.781 --> 07:54.059 diplomacy ? So the mere fact that that 07:54.059 --> 07:56.459 now Army University has , has created a 07:56.459 --> 07:58.292 position for a senior diplomatic 07:58.292 --> 08:00.700 advisor shows the importance that the 08:00.700 --> 08:04.260 entire enterprise uh puts into making 08:04.260 --> 08:06.940 sure that their graduates are prepared 08:06.940 --> 08:08.880 to interact at the highest levels 08:09.059 --> 08:11.115 throughout the dime in senior policy 08:11.115 --> 08:15.070 positions , um . And so , you 08:15.070 --> 08:18.670 know , my uh instructions are to do 08:18.670 --> 08:20.837 everything I can to make sure that the 08:20.837 --> 08:23.779 educational component of the uh Army 08:23.779 --> 08:25.557 university , which now includes 08:25.557 --> 08:28.739 multiple components , um . Helps the , 08:28.750 --> 08:30.750 the , the students and graduates of 08:30.750 --> 08:32.972 these programs best understand the role 08:32.972 --> 08:35.139 diplomacy plays , the things diplomacy 08:35.139 --> 08:37.417 can do , the things diplomacy can't do . 08:37.549 --> 08:39.327 Uh , that will make them better 08:39.327 --> 08:41.258 warfighters in the future . The 08:41.258 --> 08:43.425 outcomes of military diplomacy such as 08:43.425 --> 08:44.980 building trust or enhancing 08:44.980 --> 08:46.989 interoperability with allied armed 08:46.989 --> 08:49.268 forces can be more difficult to measure 08:49.268 --> 08:51.508 than the results of kinetic military 08:51.508 --> 08:53.730 operations . What metrics or indicators 08:53.730 --> 08:55.468 do you use to evaluate the 08:55.468 --> 08:57.468 effectiveness of military diplomacy 08:57.468 --> 08:59.588 initiatives and could you provide an 08:59.588 --> 09:01.669 example of a particular successful 09:01.669 --> 09:05.260 engagement and what made it so ? So I 09:05.260 --> 09:07.149 think that's a very good question 09:07.149 --> 09:09.260 because the metrics are a bit mushy . 09:09.260 --> 09:11.204 But I think I would go back to the 09:11.204 --> 09:13.316 humanitarian examples I gave before , 09:13.316 --> 09:15.482 and I think that the metrics you would 09:15.482 --> 09:15.380 use , you would look at people's 09:15.380 --> 09:17.547 viewpoints towards the United States , 09:17.547 --> 09:19.713 um , after humanitarian assistance has 09:19.713 --> 09:21.880 been delivered . And I think you would 09:21.880 --> 09:23.824 find , uh , invariably that people 09:23.824 --> 09:25.769 think well of the United States in 09:25.769 --> 09:27.824 those situations , that humanitarian 09:27.824 --> 09:29.936 assistance , diplomacy is carried out 09:29.936 --> 09:32.047 by the military , uh , is a win-win . 09:32.047 --> 09:34.269 It's a win for , for impressions of the 09:34.269 --> 09:36.491 United States . It's a win for military 09:36.491 --> 09:38.713 training , um , and ultimately , it's a 09:38.713 --> 09:40.991 win for making us stronger . Thank you , 09:40.991 --> 09:42.936 sir . And last question , Military 09:42.936 --> 09:45.059 diplomacy has inherent risks where 09:45.059 --> 09:47.281 actions meant to build confidence could 09:47.281 --> 09:50.599 be misinterpreted as provocation . In 09:50.599 --> 09:53.039 your advisory role , how do you help 09:53.039 --> 09:55.599 balance the need to demonstrate 09:55.599 --> 09:57.799 military capability , for instance , 09:58.159 --> 09:59.900 through freedom of navigation 09:59.900 --> 10:02.280 operations with the diplomatic goal of 10:02.280 --> 10:04.002 avoiding escalating tensions , 10:04.280 --> 10:06.679 especially in contested areas like the 10:06.679 --> 10:09.890 South China Sea . So , the commander of 10:09.890 --> 10:11.779 StratCom when I was there , who's 10:11.779 --> 10:14.112 responsible for all our nuclear sources , 10:14.112 --> 10:16.334 used to say , if you want to remove the 10:16.334 --> 10:19.070 risk of nuclear war . I could tell you 10:19.070 --> 10:21.237 how to do it in one word , surrender . 10:21.237 --> 10:23.014 So I think that we are not in a 10:23.014 --> 10:25.181 position where we want to surrender to 10:25.181 --> 10:27.070 the world . And there are certain 10:27.070 --> 10:29.292 values that we stand up for worldwide , 10:29.292 --> 10:29.150 and one of them is freedom of 10:29.150 --> 10:30.983 navigation , in particular , the 10:30.983 --> 10:33.206 example you give . So , I don't think , 10:33.280 --> 10:35.336 I think there's a misperception that 10:35.336 --> 10:37.447 those of us in the Department of , of 10:37.447 --> 10:39.502 State are constantly saying , stop , 10:39.502 --> 10:41.724 stop , stop , don't , don't make people 10:41.724 --> 10:43.836 angry . Uh , that's not , uh , that's 10:43.836 --> 10:46.058 not the majority opinion . I think what 10:46.058 --> 10:48.320 we're trying to do is to keep America 10:48.320 --> 10:50.520 strong and , and we , and there are 10:50.520 --> 10:52.853 ways to demonstrates America's strength . 10:53.080 --> 10:55.280 At the end of the day , no one's gonna 10:55.280 --> 10:57.391 do anything because the Department of 10:57.391 --> 11:00.229 State told them to do it . There is an 11:00.229 --> 11:02.659 incredibly crucial role for the 11:02.659 --> 11:04.659 Department of War to play , for the 11:04.659 --> 11:06.492 American armed forces to play in 11:06.492 --> 11:08.659 general . And so , things like freedom 11:08.659 --> 11:10.715 of navigation Acts are demonstrating 11:10.715 --> 11:13.059 America's strength . So , I agree that 11:13.059 --> 11:15.170 they are escalatory , but I don't , I 11:15.170 --> 11:17.337 don't have a problem with that . There 11:17.337 --> 11:19.226 are times you need to escalate to 11:19.226 --> 11:21.340 demonstrate will and resolve . And if 11:21.340 --> 11:23.618 you don't demonstrate will and resolve , 11:23.618 --> 11:25.784 you're showing weakness . And when you 11:25.784 --> 11:27.562 show weakness , an adversary is 11:27.562 --> 11:29.679 emboldened to take action . Uh , so , 11:29.859 --> 11:31.748 freedom of phone ops , freedom of 11:31.748 --> 11:33.915 navigation phone ops operations happen 11:33.915 --> 11:36.380 all over the world . Um , I think you 11:36.380 --> 11:38.602 need to be thoughtful about how they're 11:38.602 --> 11:40.491 employed . I think you need to be 11:40.491 --> 11:42.491 thoughtful about the ships that are 11:42.491 --> 11:44.158 used . I think you need to be 11:44.158 --> 11:46.213 thoughtful with timing . I will tell 11:46.213 --> 11:48.047 you that I have been involved in 11:48.047 --> 11:50.102 embassies around the world , and the 11:50.102 --> 11:52.330 Department of War always coordinates 11:52.330 --> 11:54.330 with the embassies involved about a 11:54.330 --> 11:56.386 freedom of navigation operation that 11:56.386 --> 11:58.552 will take place within the AOR of that 11:58.552 --> 12:00.719 embassy because we want to make sure , 12:00.719 --> 12:02.941 obviously , we don't want escalation to 12:02.941 --> 12:05.052 tip into something more serious . But 12:05.052 --> 12:06.997 I'm fully supportive and the State 12:06.997 --> 12:08.719 Department as a whole is fully 12:08.719 --> 12:10.774 supportive of us showing that we are 12:10.774 --> 12:12.997 willing to stand up for the values that 12:12.997 --> 12:15.274 are important to us . Thank you . Well , 12:15.274 --> 12:17.386 Mr . Birkin , I want to thank you for 12:17.386 --> 12:19.441 your time . And the valuable insight 12:19.441 --> 12:21.552 you provided today to our listeners . 12:21.552 --> 12:23.441 Thank you for joining us today on 12:23.441 --> 12:25.719 episode 14 of Nickel for Your Thoughts . 12:25.719 --> 12:25.969 Thank you for listening .