WEBVTT 00:17.440 --> 00:20.129 Good morning everyone . Come on , you 00:20.129 --> 00:22.407 can do better than that . Good morning , 00:22.407 --> 00:24.850 everyone . There we go , there we go . 00:25.459 --> 00:27.515 So for our press conference , ladies 00:27.515 --> 00:29.780 and gentlemen , it's been moved to room 00:29.780 --> 00:33.180 Derrasol on the 2nd floor . I'm 00:33.180 --> 00:35.291 Lieutenant General Retired Leslie C . 00:35.291 --> 00:37.013 Smith , the vice president for 00:37.013 --> 00:39.439 Leadership and Education here at AUSA . 00:39.979 --> 00:41.923 Let's give General Donahue another 00:41.923 --> 00:43.035 round of applause . 00:49.590 --> 00:51.669 We will now kick off our first panel 00:51.669 --> 00:54.630 titled World War Next , The 00:54.630 --> 00:57.450 Interconnected Global Threat . We have 00:57.450 --> 00:59.770 a fantastic group of experts here to 00:59.770 --> 01:01.548 share their insights about this 01:01.548 --> 01:04.599 critical discussion . To moderate today , 01:04.639 --> 01:07.529 we have Mr . Haino Klink , founder and 01:07.529 --> 01:11.480 principal of Clink Global LLC . Clink 01:11.480 --> 01:14.400 Global LLC provides strategic advisory 01:14.400 --> 01:17.199 services to private sector clients . 01:18.230 --> 01:20.174 Previously as the Deputy Assistant 01:20.174 --> 01:23.349 Secretary of Defense for East Asia . He 01:23.349 --> 01:25.540 devised and implemented US defense 01:25.540 --> 01:27.940 policy in more than 20 countries and 01:27.940 --> 01:31.459 territories . Colonel Klink's lengthy 01:31.459 --> 01:34.209 military career culminated as the Chief 01:34.209 --> 01:37.419 of Army International Affairs , where 01:37.419 --> 01:40.709 he was a senior advisor . On 01:40.709 --> 01:43.569 geopolitical foreign affairs and 01:43.569 --> 01:45.540 international security cooperation 01:45.540 --> 01:48.870 issues , he holds undergraduate and 01:48.870 --> 01:50.759 graduate degrees in international 01:50.759 --> 01:53.580 relations from Boston University as our 01:53.580 --> 01:56.940 panel goes to take their seats , an MBA 01:56.940 --> 01:58.996 in international management from the 01:58.996 --> 02:02.040 University of London , and MS degrees 02:02.040 --> 02:04.040 from the University of Rome and the 02:04.040 --> 02:07.059 University of Milan . Please join me in 02:07.059 --> 02:09.281 a round of applause as they come to the 02:09.281 --> 02:10.281 stage today . 02:33.000 --> 02:35.410 Hana , the floor is yours . 02:37.210 --> 02:40.570 Can everybody hear me OK ? Can you hear 02:40.570 --> 02:42.681 me in the back ? Uh , now I think you 02:42.681 --> 02:44.959 can hear me in the back . Good morning , 02:44.959 --> 02:47.960 everyone . Shen Morgan and A . Or test 02:47.960 --> 02:51.330 in Wiesbaden . I'm particularly happy 02:51.330 --> 02:55.289 to return to my homeland and um 02:55.289 --> 02:57.679 as General Smith had said , I was 02:57.679 --> 03:00.009 actually a China specialist while I was 03:00.009 --> 03:02.231 in the army , which of course you would 03:02.231 --> 03:04.342 expect the US Army to do with the guy 03:04.342 --> 03:06.398 who was born and raised in Germany , 03:06.398 --> 03:08.565 right ? So , uh , so I'm very happy to 03:08.565 --> 03:10.787 be back . um , this morning we're gonna 03:10.787 --> 03:12.953 kick off with a very interesting panel 03:12.953 --> 03:15.009 that I think is gonna get all of our 03:15.009 --> 03:16.953 intellectual juices flowing . Uh , 03:16.953 --> 03:19.176 that's going to really segue nicely off 03:19.176 --> 03:21.231 of some of General Brown and General 03:21.231 --> 03:22.676 Dano's comments about how 03:22.676 --> 03:24.842 interconnected , uh , the world really 03:24.842 --> 03:26.953 is and how we can't really separate , 03:26.953 --> 03:29.065 uh , the European theater from , uh , 03:29.065 --> 03:32.419 the Indo-Pacific and this morning we 03:32.419 --> 03:34.586 have with us representatives from some 03:34.586 --> 03:37.580 of our key allies , uh , both in the 03:37.580 --> 03:40.179 Indo-Pacific as well as in Europe , and 03:40.179 --> 03:42.401 what I'd like to do is offer you just a 03:42.401 --> 03:44.809 very brief introduction . Uh , to all 03:44.809 --> 03:46.753 of them , and then , uh , we'll go 03:46.753 --> 03:49.089 right into , uh , the discussion . So 03:49.089 --> 03:51.369 to my right , we have Air Vice Marshal 03:51.369 --> 03:53.800 Diane Turton from the Royal Australian 03:53.800 --> 03:56.649 Air Force . She's currently assigned as 03:56.649 --> 03:58.816 the Australian military representative 03:58.816 --> 04:01.070 to NATO and the European Union . She's 04:01.070 --> 04:04.190 a career ADF intelligence officers had 04:04.190 --> 04:06.740 multiple postings , uh , in 04:06.750 --> 04:08.917 intelligence as well as operations and 04:08.917 --> 04:11.429 planning capacities and has deployed to 04:11.429 --> 04:15.389 Somalia , Iraq , and Afghanistan to her 04:15.389 --> 04:17.556 right , we have Lieutenant General Pai 04:17.556 --> 04:19.445 Vallimachi , the commander of the 04:19.445 --> 04:22.199 Finnish army . Uh , who has served in a 04:22.199 --> 04:24.678 variety of command staff positions at 04:24.678 --> 04:27.148 the ministerial level , army level , 04:27.199 --> 04:29.032 and has also served as a liaison 04:29.032 --> 04:31.199 officer to the US Joint Forces Command 04:31.199 --> 04:33.158 in Norfolk . He's commanded at all 04:33.158 --> 04:35.549 levels within the Finnish army , and he 04:35.549 --> 04:37.716 has operational deployments , multiple 04:37.716 --> 04:39.771 deployments to the Balkans , uh , as 04:39.771 --> 04:42.039 well as to Afghanistan . And to his 04:42.039 --> 04:44.199 right is Doctor John Nagl , the 04:44.199 --> 04:46.558 professor of war , war fighting studies 04:46.558 --> 04:48.878 at the US Army War College in Carlisle , 04:48.959 --> 04:51.170 Pennsylvania . He's a retired Army 04:51.170 --> 04:53.809 officer , having served in both Iraq 04:53.809 --> 04:56.769 wars . He's the author of a book that 04:56.769 --> 04:58.825 many of us served in the army in the 04:58.825 --> 05:00.880 early 2000s grew up with learning to 05:00.880 --> 05:03.809 eat soup with a knife . He's a renowned 05:03.809 --> 05:06.489 counterinsurgency expert , and he has 05:06.489 --> 05:08.730 multiple affiliations with think tanks 05:08.730 --> 05:12.209 in the United States . So to kind of 05:12.209 --> 05:14.850 get the discussion going , I kind of 05:14.850 --> 05:17.730 like to harken back to the comments of 05:17.730 --> 05:20.450 NATO Secretary General Steenbeck last 05:20.450 --> 05:23.089 year , uh , just prior to the NATO 05:23.089 --> 05:25.649 summit in Washington where he made a 05:25.649 --> 05:27.809 couple of points that I think we all 05:27.809 --> 05:30.649 realize are obvious now , but candidly 05:30.649 --> 05:33.690 they had to be stated , and he said for 05:33.690 --> 05:35.690 instance that security is no longer 05:35.690 --> 05:38.100 just regional , it's global . And we 05:38.149 --> 05:40.750 can't divide the world anymore into 05:40.750 --> 05:43.350 individual theaters . Everything is 05:43.350 --> 05:47.100 intertwined . And I think we realized 05:47.100 --> 05:49.267 that prior to him actually saying that 05:49.267 --> 05:51.260 explicitly , but we failed to 05:51.260 --> 05:54.040 acknowledge it publicly , so he did , I 05:54.040 --> 05:56.769 think the alliance a great service by 05:56.769 --> 06:00.329 being very explicit in stating that . 06:01.079 --> 06:03.869 And since then , of course , we have 06:03.869 --> 06:07.529 seen that . The the 06:07.750 --> 06:10.070 the the types of coordination whether 06:10.070 --> 06:12.299 it's formal or informal that are 06:12.299 --> 06:14.790 occurring not just between Russia and 06:14.790 --> 06:17.529 China but also between Iran and Russia , 06:17.589 --> 06:20.220 Iran and China , the DPRK and Russia 06:20.670 --> 06:23.500 have just underscored the fact that uh 06:23.500 --> 06:27.170 we cannot . Look at threats only in the 06:27.170 --> 06:28.948 Euro-Atlantic separate from the 06:28.948 --> 06:30.892 Indo-Pacific . It is all very much 06:30.892 --> 06:34.239 connected . And of course Secretary 06:34.239 --> 06:37.079 General Rutte has said also that 06:37.079 --> 06:39.600 through its support for Russia and 06:39.600 --> 06:41.933 Russia's defense industry in particular , 06:41.933 --> 06:44.100 China has become a decisive enabler of 06:44.100 --> 06:46.880 Russia's war in Ukraine , and some of 06:46.880 --> 06:49.440 the numbers are quite stark . 70% of 06:49.440 --> 06:51.679 the machine tools that the Russians 06:51.679 --> 06:54.390 used for weapons manufacturing come 06:54.390 --> 06:56.501 from the People's Republic of China . 06:56.501 --> 07:00.070 90% of electronics that are used in 07:00.070 --> 07:02.029 Russia's war machine come from the 07:02.029 --> 07:05.260 People's Republic of China . Moreover , 07:05.510 --> 07:07.566 it just , it was just last week that 07:07.566 --> 07:09.566 Secretary Rutin is meeting with the 07:09.566 --> 07:12.170 Chancellor Metz said that Xi Jinping , 07:12.670 --> 07:14.892 before he would attack Taiwan , he will 07:14.892 --> 07:18.019 make a call to Moscow to ask Putin to 07:18.019 --> 07:20.510 keep us busy in this part of Europe . I 07:20.510 --> 07:23.070 think that that is probably not an 07:23.070 --> 07:25.181 understatement , particularly because 07:25.181 --> 07:28.290 if you think about when Putin traveled 07:28.290 --> 07:30.709 to Beijing for the Winter Olympics in 07:30.709 --> 07:33.690 2022 , it was just prior . To the 07:33.690 --> 07:36.750 Russian invasion of Ukraine and I think 07:36.750 --> 07:38.639 you know at the at the eve of the 07:38.639 --> 07:40.639 invasion where the Russians and the 07:40.639 --> 07:43.519 Chinese started this so-called no limit 07:43.519 --> 07:45.690 strategic partnership , uh , I think 07:45.690 --> 07:48.649 it's reasonable to , uh , conclude that 07:48.649 --> 07:51.640 there was some sort of if not collusion , 07:51.929 --> 07:54.151 uh , at least information sharing going 07:54.151 --> 07:57.299 on . And then of course we heard also 07:57.299 --> 07:59.929 very recently uh earlier this month 08:00.220 --> 08:02.660 when the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang 08:02.660 --> 08:05.899 Yi met with his EU counterpart Kaya 08:05.899 --> 08:09.140 Kaas that Beijing and he and this is he 08:09.140 --> 08:12.100 has not officially uh said that he said 08:12.100 --> 08:14.044 this , but it's been attributed to 08:14.044 --> 08:16.156 European Union officials that were in 08:16.156 --> 08:18.322 the meeting that Beijing cannot accept 08:18.322 --> 08:20.322 Russia losing the war in Ukraine as 08:20.322 --> 08:22.322 this could allow the US to turn its 08:22.322 --> 08:25.209 full attention to China . So again I 08:25.209 --> 08:27.600 think we've seen over and over again 08:27.970 --> 08:30.809 that the connection between Beijing and 08:30.809 --> 08:33.799 Moscow this access if you will , uh , 08:33.890 --> 08:36.479 is in fact a clear and present threat 08:36.479 --> 08:39.770 to all of us , not just , uh , in , in 08:39.770 --> 08:41.937 Europe and the North Atlantic , but in 08:41.937 --> 08:44.109 the Indo-Pacific as well . And then 08:44.109 --> 08:46.165 let's talk about the fact that we've 08:46.165 --> 08:49.439 even see now in Europe forces from 08:49.439 --> 08:51.439 Asian countries actually engaged in 08:51.439 --> 08:54.859 kinetic operations , the Russian DPRK 08:55.109 --> 08:57.348 connection , the fact that in June of 08:57.348 --> 08:59.908 last year , Putin and Kim Jong Un 08:59.908 --> 09:01.797 signed a treaty . That included a 09:01.797 --> 09:04.530 mutual assistance clause . The fact 09:04.530 --> 09:07.260 that we know , uh , now and have known 09:07.260 --> 09:09.593 for a while , obviously we've seen , uh , 09:09.593 --> 09:11.859 DPRK forces actually fighting our 09:11.859 --> 09:14.590 Ukrainian partners , uh , in the region . 09:14.820 --> 09:16.931 The fact that it's been reported that 09:16.931 --> 09:20.179 50% of all artillery shells that the 09:20.179 --> 09:22.460 Russians are using are coming from 09:22.460 --> 09:24.627 North Korea , not to mention ballistic 09:24.627 --> 09:26.849 missiles and other components . And the 09:26.849 --> 09:28.904 flip side of this , and this is what 09:28.904 --> 09:31.016 some of our Indo Pacific partners are 09:31.016 --> 09:33.340 particularly concerned about , what is 09:33.340 --> 09:36.260 North Korea getting in return ? Because 09:36.260 --> 09:38.371 obviously they're not just doing this 09:38.371 --> 09:40.538 out of altruism . And the concern here 09:40.538 --> 09:44.210 is that the Russians are are uh sharing 09:44.239 --> 09:46.350 technology , particularly in terms of 09:46.350 --> 09:49.020 ICPM technology and submarine 09:49.020 --> 09:51.380 technology that can then used to 09:51.380 --> 09:54.119 threaten the US homeland perhaps and 09:54.119 --> 09:56.510 obviously our key treaty partners South 09:56.510 --> 09:59.349 Korea and Japan in the region . And 09:59.349 --> 10:01.293 just last week again , the Russian 10:01.293 --> 10:03.349 Foreign Minister Lavrov was visiting 10:04.229 --> 10:06.789 North Korea and again underscored the 10:06.789 --> 10:09.849 relationship between the two countries . 10:11.299 --> 10:14.010 And then when we look at the Iranian 10:14.010 --> 10:17.070 connection , we all know that Iran of 10:17.070 --> 10:20.840 course has supplied Russia with drones 10:20.840 --> 10:23.369 that rain upon Ukrainian cities night 10:23.369 --> 10:26.090 after night . We know that they've 10:26.090 --> 10:28.312 involved in training Russian forces and 10:28.312 --> 10:30.210 how to operate those drones and 10:30.210 --> 10:32.210 apparently have also provided other 10:32.210 --> 10:34.909 munitions . The Russians in turn have 10:34.909 --> 10:37.830 provided systems such as the S-300 , 10:38.119 --> 10:40.799 which I would venture to guess probably 10:40.799 --> 10:42.743 doesn't exist anymore after recent 10:42.743 --> 10:44.966 strikes against Iran . And if they do , 10:45.440 --> 10:48.169 probably not too many left . And then 10:48.169 --> 10:50.859 of course the Chinese Iranian link as 10:50.859 --> 10:54.789 well as China is the number one 10:54.789 --> 10:57.900 consumer of Iranian oil . 90% of 10:57.900 --> 11:00.969 Iranian crude gets sold to the Chinese 11:01.219 --> 11:05.179 and of course those funds serve as a 11:05.179 --> 11:08.539 key resource in providing the uh the 11:08.539 --> 11:10.419 funds necessary whether it's for 11:10.419 --> 11:13.789 defense modernization or even uh what 11:13.789 --> 11:16.067 remains of the Iranian nuclear program . 11:16.500 --> 11:19.080 So again I think the the linkages are 11:19.080 --> 11:22.039 very , very clear uh that we 11:22.039 --> 11:25.830 cannot separate what our adversaries 11:25.830 --> 11:27.830 are doing in this part of the world 11:27.830 --> 11:29.997 with what they're doing in the Pacific 11:29.997 --> 11:31.997 because they are in fact working in 11:31.997 --> 11:34.108 concert with one another . And that's 11:34.108 --> 11:36.390 why it , it's , uh , I think an obvious 11:36.390 --> 11:39.200 understatement to uh to say that we , 11:39.510 --> 11:42.539 whether it's the NATO partners , the IP 11:42.539 --> 11:44.989 4 partners , and others need to work 11:44.989 --> 11:47.309 more and more in conjunction with one 11:47.309 --> 11:50.179 another to try to do all we can to 11:50.179 --> 11:52.549 enhance deterrence , not just in the 11:52.549 --> 11:54.771 Baltics , but I would say in the Taiwan 11:54.771 --> 11:56.993 Strait as well and other places such as 11:56.993 --> 11:59.130 the South China Sea . So with that as 11:59.130 --> 12:01.241 an introduction , what I'd like to do 12:01.241 --> 12:03.770 now is turn it over to , uh , the panel 12:03.770 --> 12:06.080 members for some introductory remarks . 12:06.369 --> 12:08.530 And then what we'll do is later on 12:08.530 --> 12:10.752 we'll have an opportunity to respond to 12:10.752 --> 12:12.974 your questions too . Air Vice Marshal . 12:12.974 --> 12:15.197 Thank you , I know , um , and thank you 12:15.197 --> 12:17.141 for the invitation today , um , to 12:17.141 --> 12:19.197 speak with an Indo-Pacific voice and 12:19.197 --> 12:21.539 perspective . Australia has always 12:21.539 --> 12:23.595 believed Europe and the Indo-Pacific 12:23.595 --> 12:25.372 theaters are deeply connected . 12:25.479 --> 12:27.701 Australia was NATO's first partner back 12:27.701 --> 12:30.340 in 1953 . Additionally , the 12:30.340 --> 12:32.580 Indo-Pacific is home to 60% of the 12:32.580 --> 12:35.140 world's population and 50% of the 12:35.140 --> 12:37.979 world's GDP . The Indian Ocean hosts 12:37.979 --> 12:40.201 more than 1/3 of the world's bark cargo 12:40.201 --> 12:43.169 traffic and 2/3 of global oil shipments . 12:43.419 --> 12:46.179 And on average , 2000 ships transport 12:46.179 --> 12:48.299 goods across the Indian Ocean and the 12:48.299 --> 12:50.700 South China Sea to Europe every day and 12:50.700 --> 12:53.659 back . We are no longer simply bounded 12:53.659 --> 12:56.799 by geography . As Haino mentioned , a 12:56.799 --> 12:59.021 stark example of this is the deployment 12:59.021 --> 13:00.966 of North Korean forces to fight in 13:00.966 --> 13:03.280 Ukraine , where North Korean forces are 13:03.280 --> 13:05.510 gaining valuable combat experience , 13:05.799 --> 13:08.030 utilizing the Ukraine battlefield as an 13:08.030 --> 13:10.308 operational test bed for their weapons , 13:10.308 --> 13:12.299 and gaining access to Russian 13:12.299 --> 13:14.750 technology and capability . And this 13:14.750 --> 13:16.669 capability will manifest in the 13:16.669 --> 13:20.020 Indo-Pacific . Today the Indo-Pacific 13:20.020 --> 13:22.309 looms large as an area of intensifying 13:22.309 --> 13:25.710 geopolitical competition . We note that 13:25.710 --> 13:27.877 China has been undertaking the largest 13:27.877 --> 13:29.988 military buildup since World War II , 13:30.229 --> 13:32.679 and its expansionist activities is 13:32.679 --> 13:34.901 encroaching the land borders with India 13:34.901 --> 13:37.123 and Bhutan and the South and East China 13:37.123 --> 13:39.780 Ses where Japan , Brunei , Malaysia , 13:39.950 --> 13:42.549 the Philippines , and Vietnam all have 13:42.549 --> 13:46.250 rival claims . And a note on the 13:46.250 --> 13:48.909 China dream . China's national 13:48.909 --> 13:50.687 strategies to achieve the great 13:50.687 --> 13:53.030 rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by 13:53.030 --> 13:57.010 2049 . So today we see Beijing using 13:57.010 --> 13:59.500 a multi-dimensional approach to achieve 13:59.500 --> 14:02.219 its strategic objective , drawing on 14:02.219 --> 14:04.619 all aspects of national power and 14:04.619 --> 14:06.960 leveraging whole of nation resources . 14:08.049 --> 14:10.369 This involves multiple actions along 14:10.369 --> 14:12.809 the spectrum of competition from 14:12.809 --> 14:14.760 influence campaigns , information 14:14.760 --> 14:16.849 operations , and other forms of 14:16.849 --> 14:19.289 political warfare at the low end , to 14:19.289 --> 14:22.000 gray zone tactics , economic leverage 14:22.000 --> 14:24.222 and coercive statecraft in the middle , 14:24.609 --> 14:26.770 to conventional military threats and 14:26.770 --> 14:28.770 the role of strategic forces at the 14:28.770 --> 14:32.150 high end . We also see Russia and North 14:32.150 --> 14:33.872 Korea adopting this approach , 14:34.280 --> 14:36.559 intensifying all domain competition 14:36.559 --> 14:39.000 against Western allies along a spectrum 14:39.000 --> 14:41.400 of conflict that begins in the gray 14:41.400 --> 14:44.359 zone and continuously and continues 14:44.359 --> 14:46.599 seamlessly to the strategic nuclear 14:46.599 --> 14:49.650 domain , including space and cyberspace . 14:51.000 --> 14:53.056 Furthermore , all three view nuclear 14:53.056 --> 14:55.309 weapons as important shadow casters 14:55.599 --> 14:57.909 over almost all of their activities , 14:58.280 --> 15:00.549 rather than as a focus for deterrence 15:00.549 --> 15:02.719 and conflict termination exclusively . 15:03.760 --> 15:05.982 So this translates to what we're seeing 15:05.982 --> 15:08.119 today . Beijing's theory of victory 15:08.119 --> 15:10.286 involving the use of non-nuclear tools 15:10.286 --> 15:13.289 of escalation to erode Western resolve , 15:13.840 --> 15:16.062 and to provide it with the conventional 15:16.062 --> 15:18.062 operational advantage in conflict , 15:18.320 --> 15:20.042 grounded on an assessment that 15:20.042 --> 15:22.599 Washington and its allies are unlikely 15:22.599 --> 15:24.960 to use nuclear weapons outside of 15:24.960 --> 15:28.280 all-out war . So understanding China's 15:28.280 --> 15:30.770 strategy offers insights on the current 15:30.770 --> 15:32.881 and future course of China's military 15:32.881 --> 15:35.500 reform and modernization in terms of 15:35.500 --> 15:37.969 its strength , technology advances , 15:38.539 --> 15:41.299 organization and operational concepts , 15:41.619 --> 15:43.700 all of which seek to offer China's 15:43.700 --> 15:46.890 leaders expanded military options in 15:46.890 --> 15:49.880 support of their national goals . It is 15:49.880 --> 15:52.760 an integrated approach where warfare is 15:52.760 --> 15:55.599 firmly nested within statecraft , where 15:55.599 --> 15:58.559 the law of power is increasingly 15:58.559 --> 16:00.503 challenging the power of the law . 16:01.309 --> 16:04.469 Thank you very much uh for giving us 16:04.469 --> 16:06.691 lots of food for thought , and I'm sure 16:06.691 --> 16:08.580 lots of ammunitions for follow-up 16:08.580 --> 16:11.210 questions . John Van Thank you , Heiner . 16:11.409 --> 16:14.049 Um , good morning y'all and uh thank 16:14.049 --> 16:18.039 you for asking me to the panel . I know 16:18.039 --> 16:21.479 I have to say that it took me days to 16:21.479 --> 16:25.280 figure out why on earth , AUSA , and 16:25.280 --> 16:28.359 you are asking a grumpy old Finn who 16:28.359 --> 16:31.679 doesn't smile on on this 16:31.679 --> 16:34.229 panel coming from a remote country , 16:34.400 --> 16:36.880 only Lars from Norway is further away . 16:38.099 --> 16:41.840 Uh , until I really understood , we are 16:41.840 --> 16:44.989 at an inflection point . The threat is 16:44.989 --> 16:48.859 global . It is interconnected . And 16:48.869 --> 16:50.989 furthermore , I realized we're not 16:50.989 --> 16:53.200 alone anymore after we joined the 16:53.200 --> 16:56.679 alliance . So if we have to go to war , 16:56.719 --> 16:58.830 it is with allies and partners at the 16:58.830 --> 17:01.080 minimum , it will be , it will have 17:01.080 --> 17:04.219 global effects even if the engagements 17:04.219 --> 17:06.160 are not , but they will be 17:06.160 --> 17:08.359 interconnected . So we'll need each 17:08.359 --> 17:12.109 other and unity to to overcome whatever 17:12.109 --> 17:15.310 is put against us . Uh , a few remarks 17:15.310 --> 17:18.270 on , on the threat . Russia and its 17:18.270 --> 17:20.430 partners are constantly modifying and 17:20.430 --> 17:23.550 making uh their means and ways better 17:23.829 --> 17:27.209 with the speed . That we did not 17:27.209 --> 17:29.487 anticipate and it's because of the war . 17:30.489 --> 17:32.156 They're learning , adopting , 17:32.156 --> 17:34.045 improvising , and modifying their 17:34.045 --> 17:35.933 systems and changes , and this is 17:35.933 --> 17:38.100 something that we need to share across 17:38.100 --> 17:40.500 continents , across time zones so that 17:40.500 --> 17:42.859 we understand how the fight is 17:42.859 --> 17:44.692 developing , whether it's in the 17:44.692 --> 17:48.530 Pacific or it is in Europe . Or in the 17:48.530 --> 17:51.170 Middle East , wherever the war is 17:51.170 --> 17:53.560 fought , that's the place where to look 17:53.560 --> 17:56.250 at what , what is the change and and 17:56.250 --> 18:00.219 how to change . And this needs to be 18:00.219 --> 18:03.920 shared , um . But in a couple of 18:03.920 --> 18:07.160 years' time , probably the wars of 22 , 18:07.199 --> 18:10.400 23 to 25 will be looked at the past 18:10.400 --> 18:14.319 wars , those wars that the generals 18:14.680 --> 18:16.959 are accused of fighting and preparing 18:16.959 --> 18:19.719 for . So we need to really look at what 18:19.719 --> 18:22.839 is the next step and not to be content 18:22.839 --> 18:25.439 of building up something that exists 18:25.439 --> 18:29.030 now . So we need to pace up ourselves 18:29.030 --> 18:32.619 and look forward . Thank God we get new 18:32.619 --> 18:34.786 people and younger generations and not 18:34.786 --> 18:36.897 the old guys thinking about it only . 18:38.060 --> 18:41.939 Um So what kind of war are 18:41.939 --> 18:44.319 we preparing for ? What kind of 18:44.319 --> 18:46.640 deterrence and possible war we want and 18:46.640 --> 18:49.459 we don't want . There's a great article 18:49.459 --> 18:51.969 written by Major General Van Wagenen , 18:52.439 --> 18:54.920 Colonel Ben Colonel David and Benjamin 18:54.920 --> 18:58.410 Jensen just in July about multiple 18:58.839 --> 19:01.239 US and NATO war games and simulations 19:01.239 --> 19:03.461 demonstrate the alliances and inability 19:03.461 --> 19:06.199 to address multiple anti-access area 19:06.199 --> 19:08.959 denial complexes and repel Russia's 19:08.959 --> 19:11.510 mass and momentum before they threaten 19:11.510 --> 19:14.250 tactical nuclear escalation . This 19:14.250 --> 19:17.130 dilemma requires requires a new way of 19:17.130 --> 19:21.099 fighting . Uh , and spot on , thank 19:21.099 --> 19:23.266 you , thank you , Matt for a very good 19:23.266 --> 19:25.660 article that gives us a solid base to 19:25.660 --> 19:28.459 look forward , and then you tie all 19:28.459 --> 19:32.420 this to the What what General Donahue 19:32.420 --> 19:35.560 uh just uh presented at at the keynotes . 19:36.510 --> 19:38.670 From a small frontline nation's point 19:38.670 --> 19:41.520 of view , I can say what kind of world 19:41.520 --> 19:44.729 we don't want . We don't want a long 19:44.729 --> 19:47.609 protracted war of attrition like what 19:47.609 --> 19:50.300 is happening in Ukraine . We did that 19:50.300 --> 19:53.849 in the Winter War in 1939 1940 . Don't 19:53.849 --> 19:56.609 recommend it . Uh , we should come up 19:56.609 --> 19:59.609 with means and ways that are 20:00.790 --> 20:02.989 Enables us to deter and fight in 20:02.989 --> 20:05.260 different ways with allies and partners 20:05.260 --> 20:07.371 and like like General Donoghue said , 20:07.660 --> 20:11.270 optionally . Manned , not necessarily 20:11.270 --> 20:13.900 manned . So this takes us to the next 20:13.900 --> 20:16.260 step of looking at what , how can we do 20:16.260 --> 20:20.229 things differently . So before I 20:20.229 --> 20:22.396 say a few words about ways and means , 20:22.396 --> 20:24.562 uh , what is conventional deterrence ? 20:24.562 --> 20:26.699 What is the calculus Russia , China , 20:26.829 --> 20:29.709 Iran , and others use ? I argue one of 20:29.709 --> 20:32.469 the key factor is the will , national 20:32.469 --> 20:35.270 will to defend the alliances and the 20:35.270 --> 20:38.109 partners' will to defend . And , and 20:38.109 --> 20:40.550 how do you measure that ? the will is 20:40.550 --> 20:44.310 actually manifested in the 3.5% 20:44.310 --> 20:47.280 GDP plus 1.5% GDP . 20:48.239 --> 20:51.949 That is the will to invest in security , 20:52.219 --> 20:55.520 invest in uh in a war economy and 20:55.520 --> 20:58.890 defense industrial base . And and I 20:58.890 --> 21:02.640 think , and I argue that uh . Russia 21:02.640 --> 21:04.751 and China will be very , very closely 21:04.751 --> 21:06.584 monitoring how we are doing this 21:06.584 --> 21:10.079 transformation or promise to actually 21:10.079 --> 21:13.839 deliver money and investments and then 21:13.839 --> 21:16.439 deliver capabilities and capabilities 21:16.439 --> 21:20.359 that will have the old 21:20.359 --> 21:24.069 mass and new mass which we both both 21:24.069 --> 21:27.800 will need . So we will need actually um . 21:29.329 --> 21:32.949 Some of the old equipment . Um The 21:33.890 --> 21:36.819 eastern flank deterrence line defense 21:36.819 --> 21:40.459 deterrence line . Will require some of 21:40.459 --> 21:42.515 the old hardware we have main battle 21:42.515 --> 21:44.570 tanks , infantry fighting vehicles , 21:44.570 --> 21:46.737 but some of them needs to be updated , 21:46.737 --> 21:48.903 not to be bigger , not to be heavier , 21:48.903 --> 21:51.219 but to be more capable of fighting in 21:51.219 --> 21:54.290 the in the new new battlefield . 21:57.430 --> 22:00.260 And we need to understand the need for 22:00.260 --> 22:02.316 security of supply , create magazine 22:02.316 --> 22:04.427 death not only in ammunition but also 22:04.427 --> 22:07.780 fuel , spare parts , and maintenance 22:07.780 --> 22:09.947 capability and repairs because we have 22:09.947 --> 22:12.099 to stay in the fight . It doesn't 22:12.099 --> 22:14.266 matter if it's short or long , we need 22:14.266 --> 22:16.530 to stay in the fight . And this 22:16.530 --> 22:19.959 connects us , uh , Europe to 22:19.959 --> 22:23.010 Indo-Pacific quite easily when we think 22:23.010 --> 22:26.180 about a supply line of K-9 , 22:26.569 --> 22:28.625 artillery , self-propelled propelled 22:28.625 --> 22:31.479 gun from uh South Korea . We are using 22:31.479 --> 22:33.920 it and I know many frontline nations in 22:33.920 --> 22:36.390 Europe are using the same platform . 22:39.550 --> 22:41.880 As well as the ammo . 22:48.550 --> 22:51.229 in very precise terms with uh within 22:51.229 --> 22:54.010 the Pacific . And this creates us a 22:54.010 --> 22:55.566 security of supply . Fine . 22:58.280 --> 23:00.560 New hard business model because you 23:00.560 --> 23:02.616 can't stay in the fight with the old 23:02.616 --> 23:05.640 way , so I'm doing , I prepared you a 23:05.640 --> 23:08.180 drone . You can fly with this and 23:08.180 --> 23:10.291 purchase this for the next 10 years . 23:10.709 --> 23:13.349 No , it's every 60 days to 90 days to 23:13.349 --> 23:15.390 120 days you need to update the 23:15.390 --> 23:18.550 software , update the system and the 23:18.550 --> 23:22.390 way you operate it . So this modus , 23:22.459 --> 23:24.869 new modus operandi change requires 23:24.869 --> 23:27.091 changes in the defense industry process 23:27.091 --> 23:29.589 model , defense forces procurement 23:29.589 --> 23:31.910 models , and the way we do business . 23:32.800 --> 23:35.290 And we need to combine old and new 23:35.589 --> 23:39.479 means of mass . And my last point 23:39.479 --> 23:43.310 is data . Data is essential in 23:43.310 --> 23:46.400 and live data in its many forms . Um . 23:48.109 --> 23:50.380 Having been to Ukraine and see what 23:50.380 --> 23:53.150 they can do today and then I go back to 23:53.150 --> 23:56.989 my own . Service and I'm saying we're 23:56.989 --> 24:00.979 far behind . Ukrainians are much 24:00.979 --> 24:03.180 more advanced on how they adapt , how 24:03.180 --> 24:05.790 they develop and fight the new ways , 24:06.180 --> 24:09.089 and we need to really learn from that . 24:09.209 --> 24:11.670 It's not don't wait to observe the 24:11.670 --> 24:14.790 lessons , go and look at the lessons 24:14.790 --> 24:18.060 and really dig in what does this mean 24:18.060 --> 24:21.400 to us . And um the uh . 24:22.609 --> 24:24.839 And I think that the ability to share 24:24.839 --> 24:27.790 data . And uh having 24:27.790 --> 24:30.109 interoperability , something that is 24:30.109 --> 24:33.229 given , not asked for , and that is 24:33.229 --> 24:35.451 something that industry needs to really 24:35.451 --> 24:37.451 get a grip on . Don't sell us stuff 24:37.451 --> 24:39.739 that has uh Finland specific equipment . 24:41.359 --> 24:44.699 Provide stuff and capabilities that are 24:44.699 --> 24:48.160 interconnected from the get-go that is 24:48.160 --> 24:51.150 so essential . And you have to 24:51.150 --> 24:53.317 cooperate among each other even though 24:53.317 --> 24:56.209 you are competitors . Uh Thank you , 24:56.380 --> 24:58.660 thank you , many , many great points 24:58.660 --> 25:00.989 there . One thing I think that really , 25:01.099 --> 25:04.579 uh , for me at least deserves this 25:04.579 --> 25:06.690 particular foot stomp is the national 25:06.690 --> 25:08.801 will portion and remembering when the 25:08.801 --> 25:11.530 commitments to 2% were made in Wales 25:11.780 --> 25:14.020 and how many years it actually took to 25:14.020 --> 25:17.380 get to 2% , we can't repeat that we 25:17.380 --> 25:19.930 need to be committed . And I would say 25:20.130 --> 25:23.530 if any country's population serves as 25:23.530 --> 25:25.849 an example with respect to will to 25:25.849 --> 25:28.459 fight , it's Finland and I remember 25:28.459 --> 25:30.348 oftentimes talking with Taiwanese 25:30.348 --> 25:33.569 interlocutors and telling them don't 25:33.569 --> 25:36.130 look to the United States as a as a as 25:36.130 --> 25:38.489 a good example for you look at 25:38.489 --> 25:41.050 countries like Finland , um , with that . 25:41.829 --> 25:44.189 Doctor Nagl , please , thank you , I 25:44.189 --> 25:46.356 know , and I think they're bringing my 25:46.356 --> 25:49.109 slides up . Uh , I'd like to start off 25:49.109 --> 25:51.220 today by , uh , pointing out that I'm 25:51.220 --> 25:53.589 presenting in American View , not the 25:53.589 --> 25:55.949 American View , and certainly not the 25:55.949 --> 25:58.430 view of the United States Army or the 25:58.430 --> 26:02.099 United States Army War College . And uh 26:02.099 --> 26:04.210 I've been thinking about this subject 26:04.210 --> 26:06.266 for a little more than a year . I've 26:06.266 --> 26:07.988 published on it in general . I 26:07.988 --> 26:09.821 apologize , but the title of the 26:09.821 --> 26:12.050 article I published uh is is not going 26:12.050 --> 26:14.489 to make you happy uh that the article 26:14.489 --> 26:18.449 is titled On protracted war because I'm 26:18.449 --> 26:21.280 very afraid that the war that we may 26:21.280 --> 26:24.609 already be fighting , not World War 26:24.609 --> 26:27.719 next , but World War now . 26:28.349 --> 26:30.589 Right , is likely to be a protracted 26:30.589 --> 26:33.270 war . And my bottom line is that we are 26:33.270 --> 26:35.381 not ready for that . I published that 26:35.381 --> 26:37.437 piece in the Modern War Institute in 26:37.437 --> 26:40.780 October with my friend George Topic . I 26:40.780 --> 26:43.579 started thinking about this topic in 26:43.579 --> 26:46.339 April of last year , in April of 2024 26:46.339 --> 26:48.561 when I read in the post , George Will . 26:49.660 --> 26:51.716 Uh , who wrote , we can see now that 26:51.716 --> 26:53.938 the great unraveling that was World War 26:53.938 --> 26:55.882 II began perhaps with Japan's 1931 26:55.882 --> 26:58.819 invasion of Manchuria . Without the 26:58.819 --> 27:01.041 benefit of retrospection , we cannot be 27:01.041 --> 27:03.790 certain that World War 3 has not begun . 27:04.939 --> 27:07.050 And I found that interesting . George 27:07.050 --> 27:09.217 Will is well sourced . he's smart he's 27:09.217 --> 27:11.439 been around for a long time , but , but 27:11.439 --> 27:14.089 I didn't think much of it until a week 27:14.089 --> 27:17.640 later when again in the post , uh , I , 27:17.689 --> 27:20.329 I read a , a short interview with House 27:20.329 --> 27:22.551 Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Mike 27:22.551 --> 27:25.319 McCaul from Texas . And Chairman McCaul 27:25.319 --> 27:28.760 is one of the top 20 or so people on 27:28.760 --> 27:30.982 foreign policy and national security in 27:30.982 --> 27:33.093 the United States is the chair of the 27:33.093 --> 27:35.204 House Foreign Affairs Committee , and 27:35.204 --> 27:37.260 in response to a question what keeps 27:37.260 --> 27:39.038 you up at night on the record , 27:39.038 --> 27:41.149 Chairman McCaul said what keeps me up 27:41.149 --> 27:43.920 at night is World War 3 , an unholy 27:43.920 --> 27:46.198 alliance between Russia , China , Iran , 27:46.198 --> 27:48.510 and North Korea threatening both Europe 27:48.510 --> 27:51.410 and the Pacific . And I was reading 27:51.410 --> 27:53.577 that quote that led me to start taking 27:53.577 --> 27:55.900 the subject very , very seriously . 27:56.010 --> 27:58.290 George Will was one thing , and Mike 27:58.290 --> 28:01.040 McCall was another slide please . 28:03.650 --> 28:06.099 And then it turned out that a number of 28:06.099 --> 28:08.930 people uh whose opinion I respect very , 28:08.979 --> 28:11.040 very highly were thinking similar 28:11.040 --> 28:13.979 things . Phil Zelio is probably not 28:13.979 --> 28:16.035 well known to most in the audience . 28:16.035 --> 28:19.410 He's an academic , uh , probably , uh , 28:19.420 --> 28:21.979 the , the most influential thing he's 28:21.979 --> 28:24.380 done , he was the executive director of 28:24.380 --> 28:26.739 the 9/11 Commission that examined that 28:26.739 --> 28:28.839 horrific event . In American history 28:28.839 --> 28:31.040 and is the lead author of the 9/11 28:31.040 --> 28:33.096 Commission report , perhaps the best 28:33.096 --> 28:35.310 government document ever produced . 28:35.680 --> 28:37.736 Fill in a piece in uh Texas National 28:37.736 --> 28:39.680 Security Review titled Confronting 28:39.680 --> 28:41.902 Another Access , History , Humility and 28:41.902 --> 28:45.339 Wishful Thinking . Wrote to me a 28:45.339 --> 28:47.172 serious possibility of worldwide 28:47.172 --> 28:50.180 warfare may be only in the 20 to 30% 28:50.180 --> 28:54.099 range , but that is not reassuring and 28:54.099 --> 28:56.266 for those who don't know Phil , I have 28:56.266 --> 28:58.432 to tell you that he is one of the most 28:58.432 --> 29:01.300 serious steady people I've ever met . 29:01.339 --> 29:03.910 If he thinks there's a 1 in 3 chance of 29:03.910 --> 29:06.699 worldwide warfare , odds are pretty 29:06.699 --> 29:09.400 high that he's right . My friends 29:09.400 --> 29:11.289 Andrea Kendall Taylor and Richard 29:11.289 --> 29:13.122 Fontaine at the Center for a New 29:13.122 --> 29:15.178 American Security published at about 29:15.178 --> 29:17.969 the same time . Noting the shared aim 29:17.969 --> 29:20.080 of weakening the United States in its 29:20.080 --> 29:22.300 leadership role among China , Iran , 29:22.420 --> 29:24.630 North Korea , and Russia and suggested 29:24.939 --> 29:27.020 that that shared objective , the 29:27.020 --> 29:30.020 general talked about ends . Russia , 29:30.180 --> 29:32.380 China , North Korea and Iran have the 29:32.380 --> 29:36.040 same end , the same objective . And my 29:36.040 --> 29:38.096 friends Andrew and Richard suggested 29:38.199 --> 29:40.430 that that would bond them tightly 29:40.839 --> 29:43.640 together in their desire to achieve 29:43.640 --> 29:45.939 that objective , and they similarly 29:45.939 --> 29:47.772 suggested that their efforts had 29:47.772 --> 29:51.150 already begun . I know this is a cheery 29:51.150 --> 29:53.317 talk . It's about to get worse with my 29:53.317 --> 29:56.800 3rd and last slide , please . And if I 29:56.800 --> 29:59.880 could get you to read one thing , it 29:59.880 --> 30:02.102 would be the Commission on the National 30:02.102 --> 30:05.030 Defense Strategy published in July 2024 . 30:05.469 --> 30:08.199 Uh , that commission was organized and 30:08.199 --> 30:10.143 run by two of the best thinkers on 30:10.143 --> 30:12.421 national security in the United States , 30:12.719 --> 30:14.949 former member of Congress Jane Harman 30:15.319 --> 30:17.400 and former Undersecretary of Defense 30:17.400 --> 30:20.099 for Policy Eric Adelman . And 30:20.099 --> 30:22.979 Representative Harman and uh Secretary 30:22.979 --> 30:25.420 Edelman wrote , the threats the United 30:25.420 --> 30:27.531 States faces are the most serious and 30:27.531 --> 30:29.531 the most challenging the nation has 30:29.531 --> 30:31.753 encountered . Not just since the end of 30:31.753 --> 30:34.729 the Cold War , but since 1945 . 30:35.589 --> 30:37.920 And they said , include the potential 30:37.920 --> 30:40.780 for near term major war . They 30:40.780 --> 30:44.380 concluded the nation , my nation , the 30:44.380 --> 30:47.609 United States is not ready today . 30:48.410 --> 30:50.632 And that commission on national defense 30:50.632 --> 30:52.920 strategy is available online . You can 30:52.920 --> 30:55.479 download it now . The seven page 30:55.479 --> 30:58.400 executive summary is the best thing I 30:58.400 --> 31:01.560 know of . In the American realm . 31:02.780 --> 31:04.939 For the threats we face and what we 31:04.939 --> 31:07.739 need to do to solve them and 31:07.739 --> 31:10.810 interestingly back in July of last year , 31:11.290 --> 31:13.234 Jane and Eric recommended that the 31:13.234 --> 31:15.699 United States begin spending an 31:15.699 --> 31:19.420 additional $500 billion a year . 31:20.619 --> 31:23.859 About 1.5% of GDP 31:24.160 --> 31:27.040 every year , which would take the 31:27.040 --> 31:30.469 United States also up to the 5% level 31:30.920 --> 31:34.729 that NATO has just agreed to . So 31:34.729 --> 31:37.489 there's an extraordinary confluence of 31:37.489 --> 31:40.010 thinking in the most serious national 31:40.010 --> 31:42.569 security thinkers , I believe in the 31:42.569 --> 31:45.489 United States and here in Europe and 31:45.489 --> 31:47.930 our friends in Asia and around the 31:47.930 --> 31:50.260 globe . And the the last quote I'm 31:50.260 --> 31:52.093 gonna read to you is from former 31:52.093 --> 31:54.204 Secretary of Defense Bob Gates , uh , 31:54.204 --> 31:56.660 extraordinary man , the only American 31:56.660 --> 31:59.099 Secretary of Defense to serve in two 31:59.099 --> 32:01.300 different administrations , and 32:01.300 --> 32:03.959 astonishingly Gates served in in both a 32:03.959 --> 32:05.859 Republican and a Democratic 32:05.859 --> 32:08.192 administration . Gates said in the post , 32:08.290 --> 32:10.457 after a 30 year holiday from history , 32:10.457 --> 32:12.623 we face an aggressive China and Russia 32:12.623 --> 32:15.219 abetted by North Korea and Iran and the 32:15.219 --> 32:18.250 very real prospect of war between 32:18.250 --> 32:21.170 nuclear armed great powers . 32:22.599 --> 32:25.569 I've continued to collect quotes from 32:25.569 --> 32:29.140 people thinking about the prospect of 32:29.140 --> 32:31.349 World War 3 , the possibility that we 32:31.349 --> 32:34.819 are already in World War 3 . Time for 32:34.819 --> 32:37.859 uh time forbids me from running through 32:37.859 --> 32:41.810 all of them . But I will note that Ross 32:41.810 --> 32:44.819 Duhoe in the New York Times just Sunday 32:44.819 --> 32:47.949 3 days ago , published a piece titled 32:47.949 --> 32:51.579 Who Is Winning the World War . His 32:51.579 --> 32:55.000 answer was not the United States . 32:56.839 --> 33:00.380 Fortunately Representative Harman and 33:00.380 --> 33:03.060 Secretary Edelman have told the United 33:03.060 --> 33:06.500 States what we need to do . To prepare 33:06.500 --> 33:09.859 for this war , to deter this war , and 33:09.859 --> 33:12.540 if necessary to win it with our friends 33:12.540 --> 33:14.651 and allies around the globe , many of 33:14.651 --> 33:17.579 whom are gathered here today to help us 33:17.579 --> 33:19.819 think about and more importantly to 33:19.819 --> 33:22.660 help us take action on how we can 33:22.660 --> 33:25.819 prevent this catastrophe from happening 33:25.819 --> 33:28.310 again . I'd like to thank and 33:28.310 --> 33:31.750 congratulate AUSA for choosing such an 33:31.750 --> 33:34.660 unbelievably timely and depressing 33:35.069 --> 33:37.979 topic on which to start this conference . 33:39.310 --> 33:41.349 Well , thank you for that sobering 33:41.349 --> 33:43.410 assessment and starting us us off on 33:43.410 --> 33:45.910 such a positive note on this early 33:45.910 --> 33:48.589 morning . Um , I'm fun at parties . 33:50.069 --> 33:52.236 Hopefully by the time everybody leaves 33:52.236 --> 33:54.402 tomorrow we'll all be in a better mood 33:54.402 --> 33:56.347 because we've come up with ways to 33:56.347 --> 33:58.920 mitigate some of these threats . So 33:58.920 --> 34:01.142 what I'd like to do now is just kind of 34:01.142 --> 34:03.031 start off with asking a couple of 34:03.031 --> 34:05.198 questions before I turn to some of the 34:05.198 --> 34:07.198 audience provided questions and I'd 34:07.198 --> 34:09.198 like to start off with uh your vice 34:09.198 --> 34:11.253 Marshal Turton you know we've talked 34:11.253 --> 34:13.364 obviously a lot about the Ukraine war 34:13.364 --> 34:15.420 and rightly so we have our Ukrainian 34:15.420 --> 34:17.642 partners here with us in the room , you 34:17.642 --> 34:19.870 know , we see uh the destruction that 34:19.870 --> 34:23.120 is being , uh , uh , levied upon them 34:23.120 --> 34:25.287 by the Russian aggressors and , and as 34:25.287 --> 34:28.270 an Australian serving in Brussels . And 34:28.270 --> 34:30.326 that you know , being I'm sure every 34:30.326 --> 34:32.492 day exposed to the intelligence coming 34:32.492 --> 34:35.510 out of Ukraine , um , could you share 34:35.510 --> 34:37.969 with us some of your insights about 34:37.969 --> 34:41.030 what are some of the implications for 34:41.030 --> 34:43.219 deterring conflict in the Indo-Pacific 34:43.669 --> 34:45.909 and if deterrence fails , God forbid , 34:46.110 --> 34:49.719 how to prevail in a conflict . Based on 34:49.719 --> 34:51.497 some of the lessons that we are 34:51.497 --> 34:53.552 learning on a daily basis in Ukraine 34:53.552 --> 34:55.441 and not just necessarily tactical 34:55.441 --> 34:57.441 operational but also perhaps at the 34:57.441 --> 35:01.070 strategic level . Right . Thanks Hino . 35:01.149 --> 35:03.459 um , I guess it'd be fair to say that , 35:03.669 --> 35:05.836 uh , what has happened in Ukraine with 35:05.836 --> 35:08.058 the conflict has created a more complex 35:08.058 --> 35:10.169 and uncertain security environment in 35:10.169 --> 35:12.280 the Indo-Pacific . Uh , it's forced a 35:12.280 --> 35:14.391 lot of countries there to have a look 35:14.391 --> 35:16.502 at their strategic priorities , their 35:16.502 --> 35:18.830 alliances , and the economic 35:18.830 --> 35:21.760 relationships as well . Um , it's worth 35:21.760 --> 35:23.816 noting that one of the things that's 35:23.816 --> 35:25.704 been highlighted from the Ukraine 35:25.704 --> 35:27.816 conflict is that conflict anywhere in 35:27.816 --> 35:30.320 the world has significant far-reaching 35:30.320 --> 35:33.360 consequences . Um , but what we're 35:33.360 --> 35:35.669 seeing as well in the Indo-Pacific is , 35:36.080 --> 35:38.360 uh , a shift in the Chinese approach as 35:38.360 --> 35:41.560 well . So when we look at what China is 35:41.560 --> 35:44.040 doing in the Ukraine space , they've 35:44.040 --> 35:45.873 played , they're playing quite a 35:45.873 --> 35:47.762 sophisticated hedging role on the 35:47.762 --> 35:49.818 global , on a global scale . Uh , on 35:49.818 --> 35:51.984 one hand , they put themselves forward 35:51.984 --> 35:53.984 as a peace broker , but then on the 35:53.984 --> 35:56.040 other hand , they continue to supply 35:56.040 --> 35:58.151 technology and equipment to Russia to 35:58.151 --> 36:00.096 wage the war . Uh , you would have 36:00.096 --> 36:02.449 heard , uh , that China proposed a 12 36:02.449 --> 36:05.649 point peace plan , but then abstained 36:05.649 --> 36:09.090 on voting , uh , on UN resolution ES 36:09.090 --> 36:12.010 1160 , which expressly demanded that 36:12.010 --> 36:15.850 Russia withdraw from Ukraine . So what 36:15.850 --> 36:17.850 we're actually seeing is China is 36:17.850 --> 36:20.070 looking , uh , is utilizing what's 36:20.070 --> 36:22.290 happening in Ukraine to maneuver on 36:22.290 --> 36:25.570 multiple fronts , um , but most 36:25.570 --> 36:27.570 interestingly , I think um they are 36:27.570 --> 36:30.239 looking at it as an opportunity to keep 36:30.239 --> 36:32.350 the focus away of what's happening in 36:32.350 --> 36:34.295 the inner Pacific . For instance , 36:34.295 --> 36:36.461 their increased presence in the Taiwan 36:36.461 --> 36:38.572 Strait and uh and the violations that 36:38.572 --> 36:41.739 are occurring in Hong Kong as well . Uh , 36:41.820 --> 36:43.876 there's also a deepening of Russia's 36:43.876 --> 36:45.931 political and economic dependence on 36:45.931 --> 36:49.080 China . Um , which is , um , increasing 36:49.080 --> 36:51.191 China's access to Russian resources , 36:51.239 --> 36:53.750 and what we see quite concerningly here , 36:54.159 --> 36:56.310 this includes access to the Arctic , 36:56.439 --> 36:58.495 where we're seeing a growing Chinese 36:58.495 --> 37:01.080 permanent presence as well . So for now 37:01.080 --> 37:03.979 we see when we look at what China is 37:03.979 --> 37:07.179 doing in the Ukraine space , um it 37:07.179 --> 37:10.179 would take a change to their calculus 37:10.179 --> 37:12.219 on how it actually affects their 37:12.219 --> 37:14.689 national strategy and their national 37:14.689 --> 37:17.060 objectives in order for them to sort of 37:17.060 --> 37:19.139 change the focus from where they are 37:19.139 --> 37:21.580 now currently supporting Russia to one 37:21.580 --> 37:24.610 where um they look at actually um how 37:24.610 --> 37:26.554 that is impacting the global rules 37:26.554 --> 37:28.666 based order . Thank you very much for 37:28.666 --> 37:32.350 that . Um General Pay , yeah , so , 37:32.489 --> 37:34.489 uh , General Don , you talked about 37:34.489 --> 37:37.669 A2AD in terms of the Kaliningrad 37:37.669 --> 37:40.830 oblast , and A2AD is a term that , you 37:40.830 --> 37:42.886 know , is thrown around all the time 37:42.886 --> 37:46.780 whether it's in the context uh of uh 37:46.780 --> 37:48.949 Europe but also in the Indo-Pacific , 37:49.280 --> 37:51.709 uh , particularly the East China Sea . 37:53.330 --> 37:55.290 Can you share with us some of your 37:55.290 --> 37:57.889 perspectives on perhaps what might be 37:57.889 --> 38:00.770 some differences in how we look at the 38:00.770 --> 38:02.689 A28D challenges , whether it's in 38:02.689 --> 38:05.429 Europe , you know , compared to , for 38:05.429 --> 38:08.110 instance , the Indo-Pacific . Actually , 38:08.239 --> 38:11.780 a very good question , um . From 38:13.219 --> 38:15.620 Coming from a country which has a long 38:15.620 --> 38:19.409 land border . At the far 38:19.409 --> 38:22.919 north end , there's an A2AD bubble , 38:23.129 --> 38:25.240 and the southern part there's another 38:25.240 --> 38:28.129 one . And in between , there's a huge 38:28.129 --> 38:31.120 land mass . And when you think about 38:31.969 --> 38:35.290 concentrating our , our mental thinking 38:35.290 --> 38:38.909 about it is about the A2AD that's 38:38.909 --> 38:42.229 false . That's number one , that's the 38:42.229 --> 38:46.100 game opening moment . If 38:46.100 --> 38:48.156 we look at the look at the how do we 38:48.156 --> 38:50.156 need to fight , we need to take the 38:50.156 --> 38:53.600 A28Ds first , but then what's 38:53.600 --> 38:56.580 next ? And that's when when we really 38:56.580 --> 38:58.913 need to think about the way of fighting , 38:58.913 --> 39:01.419 not looking at just the bubbles , and 39:01.419 --> 39:04.580 that's why I think the the idea of the 39:04.580 --> 39:08.500 eastern flank deterrence line and the 39:08.500 --> 39:12.340 RPs family or NATO family of plans , 39:12.540 --> 39:14.373 it's not just about taking those 39:14.373 --> 39:17.340 bubbles away . It's much more and it 39:17.340 --> 39:19.507 has to be much more , and when we look 39:19.507 --> 39:22.560 at the war in Ukraine . It's not just 39:22.560 --> 39:24.840 on the front lines . What is the close , 39:24.959 --> 39:26.681 what is the deep ? What is the 39:26.681 --> 39:29.239 strategic deep ? What does that mean 39:29.239 --> 39:31.406 and what kind of capabilities you need 39:31.406 --> 39:33.517 to have there and , and in order , in 39:33.517 --> 39:35.628 order to win , in order , in order to 39:35.628 --> 39:38.070 stop . The war . 39:39.320 --> 39:41.600 So , so , uh , and I think it's the 39:41.600 --> 39:44.959 same in the Indo-Pacific , where many 39:44.959 --> 39:47.520 people think that it's uh there's not 39:47.520 --> 39:49.742 very much land mass because you look at 39:49.742 --> 39:51.909 the map , which by the way , the world 39:51.909 --> 39:54.270 is flat when you look at the map . That 39:54.270 --> 39:56.103 it's an army guy's point of view 39:56.103 --> 39:58.159 because you look at the map and it's 39:58.159 --> 40:00.469 always flat . So , so the point , you 40:00.469 --> 40:02.590 look at the map and you see a lot of 40:02.590 --> 40:05.899 water . But the land mass is quite 40:05.899 --> 40:08.340 immense , so it's , it's huge amount of 40:08.340 --> 40:11.020 terrain , and there again it's about 40:12.189 --> 40:14.830 most people don't walk on water , which 40:14.830 --> 40:18.189 means you have to take ground and in in 40:18.189 --> 40:21.469 order to take ground back . You need to 40:21.469 --> 40:25.149 take the A2AD bubbles away in order 40:25.149 --> 40:28.469 to secure yourself and take back the 40:28.469 --> 40:30.691 ground that you have lost , if you have 40:30.691 --> 40:33.949 lost some . So the logics are there and 40:33.989 --> 40:36.211 and I think the most important thing is 40:36.211 --> 40:39.469 to change information . And see how 40:40.360 --> 40:43.469 The A2AD bubbles operate in in each , 40:43.620 --> 40:46.659 each areas in order to find new ways of 40:46.659 --> 40:50.229 how to take them down over . Thank you . 40:50.250 --> 40:52.540 That's good . I , I'd like to , uh , 40:52.600 --> 40:54.656 and I'm sure General Brown remembers 40:54.656 --> 40:57.010 serving in Hawaii always this talk of a 40:57.010 --> 41:00.010 maritime theater and occasionally we'd 41:00.010 --> 41:02.810 have to , uh , remind , uh , our navy 41:02.810 --> 41:06.209 brethren of World War 2 history and the 41:06.209 --> 41:08.376 island hopping campaign and the like , 41:08.376 --> 41:10.489 um , so I think that's a good point 41:10.489 --> 41:14.370 made by you , sir John , um , we 41:14.370 --> 41:17.889 see much made in , in the press as well 41:17.889 --> 41:20.590 as uh . In scholarly works now about 41:20.590 --> 41:23.439 the crinks basically the axis of a 41:23.439 --> 41:26.520 feeble China , Russia , uh , Iran , 41:26.600 --> 41:28.959 North Korea , can you tell us a little 41:28.959 --> 41:31.015 bit about , you know , how concerned 41:31.015 --> 41:34.639 are you about these countries uh 41:34.639 --> 41:36.879 actually coordinating , colluding , 41:37.040 --> 41:39.959 cooperating because on the one hand we 41:39.959 --> 41:42.070 see it every day , yes , on the other 41:42.070 --> 41:44.469 hand , in the recent , uh , 41:44.479 --> 41:46.590 intervention of the United States and 41:46.590 --> 41:48.701 Iran . The Russians , of course , did 41:48.701 --> 41:50.949 not seem particularly active in their 41:50.949 --> 41:52.889 support . Yeah , it's a terrific 41:52.889 --> 41:55.850 question . I know , um , I , I , I , I 41:55.850 --> 41:57.961 want to start off by saying something 41:57.961 --> 42:00.080 slightly positive in that , uh , um , 42:00.090 --> 42:03.820 on that front given that a Finn just 42:03.820 --> 42:06.770 accused me of being dour and unsmiling 42:06.770 --> 42:08.826 and taking a naked view in the world 42:08.826 --> 42:11.159 that's maybe my greatest accomplishment , 42:11.159 --> 42:13.949 uh , of my life . So we , we , my , my 42:13.949 --> 42:16.171 wife calls me Doctor Doom . She's gonna 42:16.171 --> 42:18.449 be um amused that the Finns agree . So , 42:18.459 --> 42:22.399 so , um , this is . Uh , it's 42:22.399 --> 42:24.566 been called , I can't remember by whom 42:24.566 --> 42:26.677 now , an axis of convenience . Uh , I 42:26.677 --> 42:28.843 quoted , uh , Andre Kendall Taylor and 42:28.843 --> 42:31.066 Richard Fontaine noting that that there 42:31.066 --> 42:34.669 are are shared interests certainly , um , 42:34.719 --> 42:37.610 and , and , uh , perhaps some shared 42:38.199 --> 42:40.649 values in these authoritarian regimes , 42:40.919 --> 42:43.120 but one of the great strengths of the 42:43.120 --> 42:45.176 Western alliance and we're seeing it 42:45.176 --> 42:48.739 here today . Is that authoritarian 42:48.739 --> 42:51.719 regimes tend to lose protracted 42:51.969 --> 42:55.120 wars they don't trust each other the 42:55.129 --> 42:57.185 theme apparently of the conference , 42:57.185 --> 43:00.229 the trust that unites us and the shared 43:00.229 --> 43:02.396 the deep shared values , the belief in 43:02.396 --> 43:05.850 democracy and freedom provide so much 43:05.850 --> 43:07.794 worth fighting for and we're we're 43:07.794 --> 43:09.683 seeing that obviously most , most 43:09.683 --> 43:11.739 notably in our Ukrainian friends and 43:11.739 --> 43:14.209 brothers and sisters so it was 43:14.209 --> 43:18.110 incredibly important to me . That when 43:18.110 --> 43:20.520 Iran was attacked by the United States 43:20.520 --> 43:22.800 by those , those brave and bold B-2 43:22.800 --> 43:25.639 pilots , uh , uh , supported by by an 43:25.639 --> 43:29.159 extraordinary galaxy of uh skill 43:29.159 --> 43:31.360 sets , uh , across all of our armed 43:31.360 --> 43:33.527 forces and with the help of allies and 43:33.527 --> 43:36.520 partners as well that both Russia and 43:36.520 --> 43:39.719 China issued essentially pro forma 43:39.719 --> 43:42.090 complaints . They did not take any 43:42.090 --> 43:44.419 action . They did not step up Russia , 43:44.610 --> 43:47.959 did not step up its attacks on Ukraine , 43:48.209 --> 43:50.370 uh , in light of , uh , what we had 43:50.370 --> 43:54.209 done to Iran , uh , China , um . 43:55.100 --> 43:58.120 continues to aggress and impose upon 43:58.120 --> 43:59.842 Taiwan , the Philippines , its 43:59.842 --> 44:02.009 neighbors in the South China Sea , but 44:02.009 --> 44:04.219 we , we did not see the very tight 44:04.219 --> 44:07.350 bonds that we might have expected there , 44:07.600 --> 44:10.199 and that provides me some degree of 44:10.199 --> 44:13.520 hope . I think that fundamentally China 44:13.520 --> 44:17.040 in particular , which , as we note 44:17.439 --> 44:21.040 has been enormously helpful to 44:21.040 --> 44:23.979 Russia . Uh , but , but ultimately 44:23.979 --> 44:26.100 China depends and , and , and depends 44:26.100 --> 44:29.540 upon both Russian and Iranian oil , but 44:29.540 --> 44:31.939 China also depends for its political 44:31.939 --> 44:34.179 survival for the survival of the 44:34.179 --> 44:36.659 Chinese Communist Party . There has to 44:36.659 --> 44:38.603 be continued economic growth . The 44:38.603 --> 44:40.939 bargain the PRC has made with its 44:40.939 --> 44:43.979 people is you give up your hopes for 44:43.979 --> 44:46.260 political freedom and we will respond 44:46.260 --> 44:48.593 with double digit economic growth rates . 44:48.610 --> 44:51.280 And as long as that deal holds , I 44:51.280 --> 44:53.336 think the Chinese Communist Party is 44:53.336 --> 44:56.840 secure . If it breaks , then , uh , I , 44:56.959 --> 44:59.080 I think the CCP is in trouble . The 44:59.080 --> 45:01.024 Center for Strategic International 45:01.024 --> 45:03.358 Studies ran a number of China war games , 45:03.358 --> 45:05.479 uh , uh , uh , unclassified and , and 45:05.479 --> 45:08.959 found that in , in every case the 45:08.959 --> 45:11.292 losses were immense on both the Chinese , 45:11.292 --> 45:13.459 the American , our allies and partners 45:13.459 --> 45:15.989 sides , but the CCP fell . 45:16.939 --> 45:19.639 So China doesn't want to fight this war . 45:19.679 --> 45:21.919 The economic consequences of this war 45:21.919 --> 45:25.310 are devastating for China . It does , I 45:25.310 --> 45:28.760 think , believe that by supporting 45:28.760 --> 45:31.080 Russia , supporting Iran , it can 45:31.080 --> 45:33.247 continue to derive economic benefits , 45:33.247 --> 45:35.919 in particular cheap oil and as , as a 45:35.919 --> 45:37.919 previous panelists noted , keep the 45:37.919 --> 45:41.479 United States distracted and , and so I , 45:41.560 --> 45:44.199 I think there is room for smart 45:44.199 --> 45:47.439 diplomacy . By the United States , 45:47.850 --> 45:50.050 by all of the countries represented in 45:50.050 --> 45:52.106 this room and and other rooms I know 45:52.106 --> 45:53.939 are watching it around the globe 45:53.939 --> 45:56.290 working in concert can find ways to 45:56.290 --> 45:59.810 drive wedges between and among those 45:59.810 --> 46:01.969 countries we have to do that by 46:01.969 --> 46:04.025 presenting a united front and that's 46:04.025 --> 46:06.330 why I think events like this are so 46:06.330 --> 46:10.030 unbelievably important . Very good 46:10.030 --> 46:13.370 points made and I would just offer that 46:13.370 --> 46:15.969 you know we all have been amazed at the 46:15.969 --> 46:18.649 amount of money the Chinese have poured 46:18.649 --> 46:22.370 into uh defense investment uh for 46:22.370 --> 46:26.229 decades now . Um , I would only mention 46:26.229 --> 46:29.489 that uh China actually spends more on 46:29.489 --> 46:32.959 domestic security than they do 46:32.959 --> 46:36.659 on the investments in the PLA . Because 46:36.659 --> 46:38.381 the one thing that the Chinese 46:38.381 --> 46:41.020 communist fears more than the United 46:41.020 --> 46:44.179 States or the United States working in 46:44.179 --> 46:46.620 concert with its partners and allies is 46:46.620 --> 46:50.060 its own people . And that's why they 46:50.060 --> 46:53.340 spend so , so much on the Ministry of 46:53.340 --> 46:55.229 State Security Ministry of Public 46:55.229 --> 46:57.451 Security , people's armed police , uh , 46:57.459 --> 47:00.100 and other agencies and organizations 47:00.100 --> 47:01.989 responsible for domestic security 47:01.989 --> 47:04.780 within the PRC . OK , um , I'm gonna 47:04.780 --> 47:06.947 ask this question . I'm gonna ask each 47:06.947 --> 47:09.379 panelist , um , to respond . Why don't 47:09.379 --> 47:12.419 you start us off , John , um , at the 47:12.419 --> 47:14.580 Hague summit in June , NATO allies 47:14.580 --> 47:17.580 adopted a 5% of GDP defense spending 47:17.580 --> 47:20.790 target . Beyond that top line spending , 47:21.000 --> 47:23.000 how should burden sharing evolve in 47:23.000 --> 47:25.110 practical terms , such as in 47:25.110 --> 47:27.179 operational contributions , forward 47:27.179 --> 47:30.000 presence or logistics capacity , John . 47:30.760 --> 47:33.570 I , I think it's very important to note 47:33.570 --> 47:37.439 that while . Quantity 47:37.439 --> 47:40.760 has a quality all its own and 47:40.760 --> 47:43.719 investments matter . It's important for 47:43.719 --> 47:45.879 the American people to remember the 47:45.879 --> 47:48.879 extraordinary contributions made by our 47:48.879 --> 47:51.909 allies and partners in support of 47:52.239 --> 47:54.879 shared freedom . Uh , the , the , the 47:54.879 --> 47:57.800 shared support of the , uh , uh , rules 47:57.800 --> 47:59.578 based international order , the 47:59.578 --> 48:01.578 economic system that has created so 48:01.578 --> 48:03.744 much peace and prosperity in the world 48:03.744 --> 48:06.159 over the past 75 years , and , and that 48:06.159 --> 48:09.070 not all of the contributions made , uh , 48:09.080 --> 48:11.760 by , by countries like Germany which 48:11.760 --> 48:15.600 continues to station a huge number of 48:15.600 --> 48:17.433 American forces inside this very 48:17.433 --> 48:19.879 densely populated country and that 48:19.879 --> 48:23.760 without the . Access , basing , 48:23.770 --> 48:25.992 and overflight rights that are provided 48:25.992 --> 48:29.850 by countries like Japan , Taiwan uh not 48:29.850 --> 48:32.270 Taiwan , uh , not Taiwan , not yet . 48:32.729 --> 48:34.896 Careful China . Uh , the Philippines , 48:34.896 --> 48:38.409 um . Uh , all of our NATO , uh , 48:38.540 --> 48:40.540 partners and allies , South Korea , 48:40.620 --> 48:42.676 that America would not be able to do 48:42.676 --> 48:44.731 what it does in support of peace and 48:44.731 --> 48:46.731 security around the globe . I think 48:46.731 --> 48:49.064 it's hard to put a dollar value on that , 48:49.064 --> 48:51.064 but it's essential for Americans to 48:51.419 --> 48:55.360 remember it . I , I also think it's um 48:55.770 --> 48:58.080 very , very important to think about 48:58.080 --> 49:01.370 and to think differently about what the 49:01.370 --> 49:05.250 allies can do together in terms of 49:05.250 --> 49:07.889 shared procurement of systems . And we 49:07.899 --> 49:10.066 we've talked a bunch about China today 49:10.066 --> 49:12.550 and correctly so Russia continues to be 49:12.550 --> 49:14.909 a a a a major 49:14.909 --> 49:17.979 petrochemical producer , petroleum 49:17.979 --> 49:20.090 producer with nuclear weapons , but , 49:20.090 --> 49:22.257 but it is not a significant industrial 49:22.257 --> 49:24.423 base . It is struggling to continue to 49:24.423 --> 49:26.701 provide combat vehicles , for instance , 49:26.701 --> 49:28.812 uh , for , for its ongoing unjust war 49:28.812 --> 49:31.879 against Ukraine , but . Important , 49:32.169 --> 49:34.225 unbelievably important to note and , 49:34.225 --> 49:36.502 and we've we've talked about the , the , 49:36.502 --> 49:39.370 um , while , while land matters in the 49:39.370 --> 49:41.592 Pacific , so does the ocean . There's a 49:41.592 --> 49:44.409 lot of it . China produces 60% , 49:44.419 --> 49:48.010 60% of all of the ships built in the 49:48.010 --> 49:50.649 United States by tonnage . The United 49:50.649 --> 49:53.699 States 0.3 . Not 49:53.699 --> 49:57.419 3% , 0.3% of the tonnage produced in 49:57.419 --> 49:59.752 the world , but our allies and partners , 49:59.752 --> 50:01.975 it comes up to to something approaching 50:01.975 --> 50:04.197 parity . South Korea in particular , an 50:04.197 --> 50:06.308 extraordinary shipbuilding industry , 50:06.308 --> 50:08.086 Japan , a terrific shipbuilding 50:08.086 --> 50:10.308 industry , and , and so we have to find 50:10.308 --> 50:11.975 ways to take advantage of the 50:11.975 --> 50:14.070 capability that that each . Of the 50:14.070 --> 50:17.469 allies have and and together make us 50:17.469 --> 50:19.709 stronger than the sum of our parts use 50:19.709 --> 50:22.229 our access basing overflight and in 50:22.229 --> 50:24.396 particular our defense industrial base 50:24.396 --> 50:26.562 and I , I , I just have to recommend , 50:26.562 --> 50:28.562 I'm a professor I recommend books . 50:28.562 --> 50:30.618 Phillips Peyton O'Brien is a British 50:30.618 --> 50:32.507 scholar who wrote a terrific book 50:32.507 --> 50:34.899 called How the War Was Won . It focuses , 50:35.020 --> 50:37.320 I know we're at AUSA . I know we're at 50:37.320 --> 50:40.350 Land Euro . It focuses on shipbuilding 50:40.350 --> 50:43.510 and plane building . And and how 50:43.510 --> 50:45.566 important that was during the Second 50:45.566 --> 50:47.510 World War on both fronts , it's an 50:47.510 --> 50:50.629 incredibly important look at how the 50:50.629 --> 50:53.310 defense industrial base is what 50:53.310 --> 50:55.229 preserved freedom and democracy 50:55.229 --> 50:57.510 liberated Europe and Asia during the 50:57.510 --> 51:00.399 Second World War . Thanks very much , 51:00.550 --> 51:04.350 General . I have no idea . I am I 51:04.350 --> 51:06.350 answering your question , but , but 51:06.350 --> 51:09.679 here , here you get it . Uh . The 51:09.679 --> 51:13.229 question for me is really about what 51:13.229 --> 51:16.800 deters Russia ? What is the 51:16.800 --> 51:19.709 calculus behind it ? And so , so the 51:19.709 --> 51:23.439 Hague puts one set of part of that 51:23.439 --> 51:26.570 conventional deterrence . And , and 51:26.570 --> 51:29.830 we're doing a lot already today . So we 51:29.830 --> 51:31.886 have stepped up , we've done , we're 51:31.886 --> 51:34.209 doing the planning . We know which 51:34.209 --> 51:36.659 forces we have , how we need to get 51:36.659 --> 51:39.669 security of supply up , Amos and stocks 51:39.669 --> 51:43.399 up . uh Finland made a . a 51:43.399 --> 51:46.870 significant contribution , uh , already 51:47.040 --> 51:50.479 on the um April 2022 . 51:51.560 --> 51:55.399 To put €2.5 billion on spare parts , 51:55.699 --> 51:58.399 ammo , stocks up , uh , get our spare 51:58.399 --> 52:01.389 parts , maintenance personnel exercises , 52:01.439 --> 52:03.959 calling in reservists within the next 4 52:03.959 --> 52:05.848 years , and now we have done that 52:05.848 --> 52:08.719 nearly all so we've done already a lot 52:08.719 --> 52:12.110 which brings it creates a credible 52:12.479 --> 52:14.959 deterrence or at least from our 52:14.959 --> 52:17.239 perspective and I , I know that my , my 52:17.239 --> 52:19.929 colleagues here . Uh , they're doing 52:19.929 --> 52:22.679 exactly the same as at the speed of 52:22.810 --> 52:25.530 what the current bureaucracy allows . 52:26.709 --> 52:29.389 And I , I see the 3 time frames . One 52:29.389 --> 52:32.260 is now , fight tonight . And the next 52:32.260 --> 52:35.260 one is , what can we do before 2030 , 52:35.520 --> 52:37.742 and then there's things that are beyond 52:37.742 --> 52:40.290 that . And now the focus is , OK , how 52:40.290 --> 52:42.649 do we do what we have now and then we 52:42.649 --> 52:45.530 need to have speed , but we have to 52:45.530 --> 52:47.729 divide our thoughts with what is 52:47.729 --> 52:50.530 achievable now in the short term and 52:50.530 --> 52:52.800 what needs to be pushed further back . 52:53.520 --> 52:56.459 And leave some intellectual maneuver 52:56.459 --> 52:59.350 window of opportunities open for the 52:59.350 --> 53:02.179 longer term . And that's why like we 53:02.179 --> 53:05.010 like back home , we , we decided that 53:05.010 --> 53:07.610 we'll push the question of how do we 53:07.610 --> 53:10.209 modernize the main metal main battle 53:10.209 --> 53:13.679 tanks , the leopard 8824s and 6 . 53:14.520 --> 53:17.050 We're pushing that forward in order to 53:17.050 --> 53:19.409 have an understanding what do we need 53:19.409 --> 53:22.889 really then so so we're doing and , and 53:22.889 --> 53:25.056 we're establishing the uh forward land 53:25.056 --> 53:28.129 forces to Finland with Sweden as as the 53:28.129 --> 53:31.530 framework nation so um it's . 53:32.040 --> 53:35.120 Like going back to the old 30 year war 53:35.120 --> 53:37.719 times where where Sweden and Finland 53:37.719 --> 53:39.941 were doing the same stuff with the same 53:39.941 --> 53:42.199 regiments , so there's many things that 53:42.199 --> 53:44.750 are hooking us together and we're doing 53:44.750 --> 53:48.209 it already . We just don't realize that . 53:50.510 --> 53:52.677 Mentioning the 30 Years' War and while 53:52.677 --> 53:56.459 in Germany , that's very brave . I know . 54:00.149 --> 54:02.489 So I absolutely agree , you know , the , 54:02.500 --> 54:04.830 um , we do need to work , uh , in terms 54:04.830 --> 54:06.949 of logistics resupply , sharing of 54:06.949 --> 54:08.838 information I think is absolutely 54:08.838 --> 54:11.199 critical . Um , I hold a very strong 54:11.199 --> 54:13.840 belief that whoever controls the data 54:13.840 --> 54:16.062 environment of the future will have the 54:16.062 --> 54:17.784 battlefield edge . And I think 54:17.784 --> 54:19.618 therefore we need to look at the 54:19.618 --> 54:21.507 partnerships , um , and how do we 54:21.507 --> 54:23.350 actually move and move data and 54:23.350 --> 54:25.350 information and an understanding of 54:25.350 --> 54:28.149 that data as well . Um , because that 54:28.149 --> 54:29.927 is what's going to generate the 54:29.927 --> 54:32.038 strength in our partnership in how we 54:32.038 --> 54:34.500 are able to fight together , um , but I 54:34.500 --> 54:36.580 also think the other thing that we 54:37.060 --> 54:39.729 haven't quite got right yet is , A 54:39.729 --> 54:42.080 framework or an understanding on how we 54:42.080 --> 54:44.250 can actually assess our adversaries' 54:44.250 --> 54:46.129 capabilities . So we're seeing 54:46.129 --> 54:48.240 adversaries today that are not simply 54:48.240 --> 54:50.570 fighting on the military battlefield or 54:50.570 --> 54:52.810 in a conventional sense , but they're 54:52.810 --> 54:54.699 fighting us on multiple different 54:54.699 --> 54:57.409 layers . So we um there's there's the 54:57.409 --> 54:59.353 economic layer , there's cognitive 54:59.353 --> 55:01.476 warfare , they're challenging . Uh , 55:01.535 --> 55:03.865 the law , what I call legal warfare as 55:03.865 --> 55:05.809 well . So we're seeing that in the 55:05.809 --> 55:07.809 Indo-Pacific as well . So how do we 55:07.809 --> 55:10.595 actually combat an adversary or 55:10.595 --> 55:12.651 adversaries that are coming together 55:12.875 --> 55:15.355 and are able and are able to , I guess 55:15.355 --> 55:17.436 in sometimes understand ourselves 55:17.436 --> 55:20.065 better than we do , so they're able to 55:20.065 --> 55:22.236 then dismantle some of the frameworks 55:22.236 --> 55:25.451 that underpin . Our democracies , um , 55:25.501 --> 55:27.501 so I think there's a , there's work 55:27.501 --> 55:29.612 that we can do there in building that 55:29.612 --> 55:31.668 framework . How do we actually train 55:31.862 --> 55:34.342 our people , our analysts , uh , how do 55:34.342 --> 55:36.398 we partner with academia , how do we 55:36.398 --> 55:38.509 partner with industry to provide that 55:38.509 --> 55:40.302 consolidated means of actually 55:40.302 --> 55:42.422 countering what we're seeing in the 55:42.422 --> 55:46.320 adversary space . If I may just 55:46.320 --> 55:48.542 ask a follow up partially based on that 55:48.542 --> 55:50.709 response , but also partially based on 55:50.709 --> 55:52.931 some of your original comments when you 55:52.931 --> 55:55.098 were talking about Beijing's theory of 55:55.098 --> 55:58.189 victory are do you think the Chinese 55:58.540 --> 56:01.919 are or what lessons might the Chinese 56:02.449 --> 56:05.489 be drawing from the war in Ukraine and 56:05.489 --> 56:07.889 how the West has reacted to that in 56:07.889 --> 56:10.139 terms of shaping its own theory of 56:10.139 --> 56:14.010 victory . Uh , for achieving 56:14.010 --> 56:16.232 the political ends that it seeks in the 56:16.232 --> 56:19.360 Indo-Pacific . Yeah , so , um , as I 56:19.360 --> 56:21.527 mentioned before , China is taking a , 56:21.527 --> 56:23.749 a multi-pronged approach . They've been 56:23.749 --> 56:26.229 doing this since , you know , the 1970s , 56:26.580 --> 56:28.909 um , where they now , uh , they've kind 56:28.909 --> 56:31.076 of invested in the , in the World Bank 56:31.076 --> 56:33.020 and the World Trade Organization . 56:33.020 --> 56:35.560 They've built um economic structures 56:35.560 --> 56:38.179 that , uh , well , I guess , shadow 56:38.179 --> 56:40.750 those or uh alternatives to , to what 56:40.750 --> 56:43.919 we , we have currently . Um , and they 56:43.919 --> 56:45.919 are looking at how the world has 56:45.919 --> 56:48.629 responded to Russia and the Ukraine war . 56:48.840 --> 56:50.951 They're looking at how sanctions have 56:50.951 --> 56:53.118 been put in place . They're looking at 56:53.118 --> 56:55.360 how we've come together to actually 56:55.360 --> 56:57.360 make donations . They're looking at 56:57.360 --> 56:59.138 some of the limitations that we 56:59.138 --> 57:01.304 sometimes self-imposed on ourselves as 57:01.304 --> 57:03.193 democratic nations . They're also 57:03.193 --> 57:05.000 looking at how our public are 57:05.000 --> 57:07.111 responding to decisions governments , 57:07.111 --> 57:09.000 uh , our governments have made in 57:09.000 --> 57:11.222 support of Ukraine . Uh , and what they 57:11.222 --> 57:13.222 are um are seeing from that is what 57:13.222 --> 57:15.449 they're translating into how do they 57:15.449 --> 57:19.149 then respond to , um , to , I guess in 57:19.149 --> 57:21.360 the Indo-Pacific , we're seeing them , 57:21.429 --> 57:23.770 uh , looking to undermine , you know , 57:23.850 --> 57:25.794 in the Philippines , for example , 57:25.794 --> 57:28.128 through an information warfare campaign , 57:28.128 --> 57:30.239 you know , they're challenging UNCLOS 57:30.239 --> 57:32.294 and the law of the sea , and they're 57:32.294 --> 57:34.517 looking to see how the world's actually 57:34.517 --> 57:36.739 responding to that . Um , are sanctions 57:36.739 --> 57:38.961 effective ? Is that working in Russia ? 57:38.961 --> 57:41.128 Are we coming together sufficiently to 57:41.128 --> 57:43.406 put things in place in a timely manner ? 57:43.406 --> 57:45.517 What is actually constraining some of 57:45.517 --> 57:47.628 our decisions because of , you know , 57:47.628 --> 57:49.461 national objectives and national 57:49.461 --> 57:51.572 sovereign , and how are our political 57:51.572 --> 57:51.560 systems , you know , what we're seeing 57:51.560 --> 57:53.616 in some of the elections in Europe , 57:53.616 --> 57:55.560 for example , you know , um , what 57:55.560 --> 57:57.727 plays out in the political frame plays 57:57.727 --> 57:59.893 out in the security table at NATO 9 or 57:59.893 --> 58:02.750 12 months later . So I think um we're 58:02.750 --> 58:05.360 starting to um they are understanding 58:05.810 --> 58:09.000 uh even more clearly how we respond , 58:09.449 --> 58:11.505 whereas 5 or 10 years ago they might 58:11.505 --> 58:13.929 have just kind of been testing what 58:13.929 --> 58:16.290 those might be . It's a good point and 58:16.290 --> 58:18.090 if we think back as well , you 58:18.090 --> 58:20.459 mentioned WTO for instance , you know , 58:20.729 --> 58:23.370 the biggest advocate for Chinese 58:23.370 --> 58:25.530 accession to the WTO was the US 58:25.530 --> 58:27.889 government . And when we think about 58:27.889 --> 58:30.000 all these international organizations 58:30.000 --> 58:32.290 that the American leadership and 58:32.290 --> 58:34.346 Western leadership stepped back from 58:34.346 --> 58:37.129 over the years , that that vacuum was 58:37.129 --> 58:40.120 filled by the Chinese , uh , and now 58:40.489 --> 58:42.600 some , you know , again you mentioned 58:42.600 --> 58:44.767 UNCLOS which of course the US is not a 58:44.767 --> 58:46.969 signatory of , um , there are many 58:46.969 --> 58:49.639 challenges now in new domains , uh , 58:49.649 --> 58:51.649 that we did not think that we would 58:51.649 --> 58:54.270 have to compete against the Chinese so , 58:54.739 --> 58:57.699 OK , um . General Posy , I've got a 58:57.699 --> 59:00.570 question for you , please . Uh , we've 59:00.570 --> 59:02.570 talked about , and this is from the 59:02.570 --> 59:04.848 audience , we've talked about how , uh , 59:04.848 --> 59:06.903 Russia may seek to tie up the United 59:06.903 --> 59:09.370 States , uh , and perhaps even NATO as 59:09.370 --> 59:12.280 a whole in case of a Taiwan contingency . 59:13.550 --> 59:15.606 Uh , the question is what innovative 59:15.606 --> 59:19.580 ways would this manifest in , in that 59:19.580 --> 59:21.850 we may not have thought of perhaps such 59:21.850 --> 59:23.979 as a Georgia scenario , a Balkan 59:23.979 --> 59:27.219 scenario , or the or the Arctic and the 59:27.219 --> 59:30.100 follow up would be , you know , how 59:30.100 --> 59:33.659 could we ensure that this would be much 59:33.659 --> 59:37.419 harder for Russia to do um if they 59:37.659 --> 59:40.340 do something along the lines of , you 59:40.340 --> 59:42.510 know , little green men . In Ukraine , 59:42.520 --> 59:44.820 as we saw in the early days . 59:46.540 --> 59:49.510 Now my boss , uh , the chief of defense 59:49.510 --> 59:52.659 and , uh , General Yakko I said very 59:52.659 --> 59:55.250 well , uh , he was asked how fast can 59:55.250 --> 59:57.419 Russia reconstitute and how , what is 59:57.419 --> 59:59.586 the time frame and all that and what , 59:59.586 --> 01:00:01.808 what is the new ways that they would do 01:00:01.808 --> 01:00:05.699 and he said stop . We have to 01:00:05.699 --> 01:00:09.129 be ready , so take responsibility 01:00:09.129 --> 01:00:12.520 yourself . And prepare for whatever 01:00:12.520 --> 01:00:16.189 eventual Cases like a land grab 01:00:16.439 --> 01:00:20.239 or a small land grab to destabilize the 01:00:20.239 --> 01:00:24.070 unity of of of NATO , the alliance or 01:00:24.560 --> 01:00:28.409 uh . a larger invasion or hybrid , uh , 01:00:28.449 --> 01:00:31.489 a combined hybrid , uh , actions like 01:00:31.489 --> 01:00:34.949 we've seen in the Baltic Sea . So be 01:00:34.949 --> 01:00:36.780 prepared . It's about creating 01:00:36.780 --> 01:00:39.149 readiness now be yourself , you need to 01:00:39.149 --> 01:00:43.149 be ready . And that's why the eastern 01:00:43.149 --> 01:00:47.129 flank deterrence line as an As 01:00:47.129 --> 01:00:50.010 a view What it looks like . 01:00:51.370 --> 01:00:53.959 Do your own share to make that the 01:00:53.959 --> 01:00:57.639 alliance stronger . And do your own for 01:00:57.639 --> 01:00:59.861 the alliance and the alliance will take 01:00:59.861 --> 01:01:02.199 care we're doing a lot of things up 01:01:02.199 --> 01:01:05.479 north we're establishing the joint 01:01:05.479 --> 01:01:08.719 operating area Northwest and with the 01:01:08.719 --> 01:01:12.510 UK field army commander we're doing a 01:01:12.510 --> 01:01:15.129 lot with the arc we're doing a lot with 01:01:15.129 --> 01:01:17.879 Norway , Sweden , Denmark . 01:01:18.580 --> 01:01:22.449 And Italy , France looking at how can 01:01:22.449 --> 01:01:25.330 you contribute and be better prepared 01:01:25.330 --> 01:01:28.010 up north , so we're doing a lot of that . 01:01:28.129 --> 01:01:30.770 So it's about not looking at only 01:01:30.770 --> 01:01:32.969 Russia but what can we do in order to 01:01:32.969 --> 01:01:35.370 be better and be ready and create 01:01:35.370 --> 01:01:37.481 readiness and that's why the security 01:01:37.481 --> 01:01:39.439 of supplies developed together , 01:01:40.050 --> 01:01:43.090 trained together , and that's that's 01:01:43.090 --> 01:01:45.810 how we build deterrent over . Thank you . 01:01:46.419 --> 01:01:48.641 John , do you have any thoughts about , 01:01:48.641 --> 01:01:50.641 you know , the Russians trying to . 01:01:51.669 --> 01:01:54.929 Complicate um the strategic environment 01:01:54.929 --> 01:01:57.040 in case there's something going on in 01:01:57.040 --> 01:01:59.820 the Indo-Pacific . Um , I know , I 01:01:59.820 --> 01:02:01.876 think you and I are the only two old 01:02:01.876 --> 01:02:04.600 enough to have served in uniform during 01:02:04.600 --> 01:02:07.399 the Cold War . And you and I thus 01:02:07.399 --> 01:02:09.800 remember the famed Fold the gap and the 01:02:09.800 --> 01:02:11.967 great concern that Russia was going to 01:02:11.967 --> 01:02:14.133 attack through there . Uh , one of the 01:02:14.133 --> 01:02:16.244 things I'm concerned about now is the 01:02:16.244 --> 01:02:19.280 Sowlaki gap and the , the pressure that 01:02:19.280 --> 01:02:21.439 could be put on the Baltics . I think 01:02:21.439 --> 01:02:24.790 that in in the cases of both Russia and 01:02:25.000 --> 01:02:27.439 China , I think the , the , uh . Air 01:02:27.449 --> 01:02:29.671 Vice Marshal has been very good on this 01:02:29.671 --> 01:02:31.949 point , the idea of an information war , 01:02:31.949 --> 01:02:34.350 communications war , an economic war , 01:02:34.629 --> 01:02:36.899 and , and , and , uh , I , I think of , 01:02:37.550 --> 01:02:39.606 uh , Sunza , the , the great Chinese 01:02:39.606 --> 01:02:41.661 philosopher of war who said that the 01:02:41.661 --> 01:02:43.909 acme of skill is to win without 01:02:43.909 --> 01:02:46.419 fighting . And and I think that both 01:02:46.419 --> 01:02:48.580 Russia and China would like to win 01:02:48.580 --> 01:02:50.580 without fighting , and I think that 01:02:50.580 --> 01:02:53.159 that's particularly true for China 01:02:53.729 --> 01:02:55.729 given the difficulties they've seen 01:02:55.729 --> 01:02:58.090 Russia have in subduing a a much 01:02:58.090 --> 01:03:00.729 smaller neighbor with which they share 01:03:00.729 --> 01:03:03.429 a long ground border . And if Russia , 01:03:03.479 --> 01:03:05.719 which is a much more combat experienced 01:03:05.719 --> 01:03:09.360 military than China does , can't take a 01:03:09.360 --> 01:03:11.693 smaller neighbor across a ground border . 01:03:12.300 --> 01:03:14.133 And I think China should be well 01:03:14.133 --> 01:03:16.169 advised to know to perhaps the most 01:03:16.169 --> 01:03:18.336 difficult of all military operations , 01:03:18.489 --> 01:03:20.489 an amphibious assault against a 01:03:20.489 --> 01:03:22.969 defended territory . They , they've got 01:03:22.969 --> 01:03:26.800 an awful lot to be concerned about , 01:03:27.370 --> 01:03:29.592 but , but most of all I will say what I 01:03:29.592 --> 01:03:31.759 say to my friends in the United States 01:03:31.759 --> 01:03:33.870 who are concerned about China , about 01:03:33.870 --> 01:03:35.981 the rise of China's power , the , the 01:03:35.981 --> 01:03:38.037 military spending that you've talked 01:03:38.037 --> 01:03:40.259 about so well , I know , and I say that 01:03:40.259 --> 01:03:42.260 if you want to deter China . Defeat 01:03:42.260 --> 01:03:46.179 Russia and defend Ukraine . Good 01:03:46.179 --> 01:03:48.540 point . Good point . General Pasi , 01:03:48.580 --> 01:03:51.129 back to you , a question from the 01:03:51.129 --> 01:03:54.409 audience . In an era where the speed of 01:03:54.409 --> 01:03:56.909 conflict from cyber to hypersonics and 01:03:56.909 --> 01:03:59.879 drones can outpace decision making . 01:04:00.800 --> 01:04:03.300 What specific steps must our nations 01:04:03.300 --> 01:04:05.939 take today to ensure real-time 01:04:05.939 --> 01:04:08.060 collective readiness across domains , 01:04:08.219 --> 01:04:10.060 alliances , and time zones ? 01:04:12.800 --> 01:04:14.967 I told you there would be 1 or 2 trick 01:04:14.967 --> 01:04:18.830 questions . Oh my goodness . So , 01:04:19.199 --> 01:04:22.929 OK , uh . I'm probably 01:04:22.929 --> 01:04:25.409 repeating myself , but I think the 01:04:25.409 --> 01:04:27.810 keynote speaker today , General Donahue 01:04:27.810 --> 01:04:31.459 was , was really explaining it 01:04:31.459 --> 01:04:34.699 in , in a , in a way . It's not only 01:04:34.699 --> 01:04:37.169 about data , it is about how we 01:04:37.169 --> 01:04:39.320 interconnect and we make sure that we 01:04:39.320 --> 01:04:43.139 have enough stuff . To stop and it has 01:04:43.139 --> 01:04:46.939 to be multi-domain . And , and then 01:04:46.939 --> 01:04:49.106 comes the question of how do you , how 01:04:49.106 --> 01:04:51.469 do you do multi domain , uh . 01:04:52.689 --> 01:04:55.889 The very often we say it's joint , now 01:04:55.889 --> 01:04:58.719 it's multi-domain , but the question is , 01:04:59.090 --> 01:05:01.810 how , how do you best employ and use 01:05:01.810 --> 01:05:05.760 your capabilities to hit . Uh , 01:05:06.010 --> 01:05:08.177 the targets that you really want . And 01:05:08.177 --> 01:05:10.610 if you really understand the , the , 01:05:10.649 --> 01:05:12.729 the target system analysis is good 01:05:12.729 --> 01:05:14.951 enough , then you know which targets to 01:05:14.951 --> 01:05:17.209 hit and then you just need to 01:05:17.209 --> 01:05:20.270 distribute that data . In order to hit 01:05:20.270 --> 01:05:22.492 the right targets at the right time and 01:05:22.492 --> 01:05:24.437 to have the platforms at the right 01:05:24.437 --> 01:05:27.550 place and it's a it's a hostile cyber 01:05:27.550 --> 01:05:31.280 environment which challenges that so 01:05:31.280 --> 01:05:33.336 that's why we need the old mass , we 01:05:33.336 --> 01:05:35.391 need the new mass and and there's an 01:05:36.189 --> 01:05:39.639 investment curve that . Of the old 01:05:39.639 --> 01:05:41.528 legacy systems , that's where the 01:05:41.528 --> 01:05:44.909 majority of our money goes . And , and 01:05:44.909 --> 01:05:47.131 I have to say that that has to change . 01:05:47.580 --> 01:05:50.239 It has to change . Because we need to 01:05:50.239 --> 01:05:53.750 do new ways . And not go head on head 01:05:54.000 --> 01:05:56.111 that would lead only to the attrition 01:05:56.111 --> 01:05:58.600 war . But the , but the good thing is a 01:05:58.600 --> 01:06:01.159 good note was from a Ukrainian general 01:06:01.159 --> 01:06:04.320 who General Pa , the then army for army 01:06:04.320 --> 01:06:07.530 commander . He was in Finland , um . On 01:06:07.530 --> 01:06:10.169 my , my uh request to come and visit 01:06:10.169 --> 01:06:13.290 and talk to us and he he looked at the 01:06:13.290 --> 01:06:15.512 military problems we have and he said , 01:06:15.512 --> 01:06:17.401 Passy , don't worry , you're OK . 01:06:17.401 --> 01:06:19.512 You're gonna hit them , they're gonna 01:06:19.512 --> 01:06:21.568 be scared . They're more scared than 01:06:21.568 --> 01:06:23.568 you are , just hit them . They will 01:06:23.568 --> 01:06:27.260 obey steel . So it's , it's a 01:06:27.260 --> 01:06:29.427 mentality that you have to just change 01:06:29.427 --> 01:06:31.649 and say , yeah , we're gonna hit them . 01:06:31.649 --> 01:06:33.927 If they come , if we , if we go to war , 01:06:34.060 --> 01:06:36.949 you need to do that . I hope we will 01:06:36.949 --> 01:06:40.360 deter them from doing that . I , I 01:06:40.360 --> 01:06:43.600 think you , uh , you just underscored 01:06:43.600 --> 01:06:46.879 something foundational , um , and based 01:06:46.879 --> 01:06:48.712 on what General Don you had said 01:06:48.712 --> 01:06:51.280 earlier as well with respect to , you 01:06:51.280 --> 01:06:54.479 know , some of his , um , guidance to 01:06:54.479 --> 01:06:57.080 industry about building things where 01:06:57.080 --> 01:06:59.129 interoperability is baked in 01:06:59.399 --> 01:07:03.100 cybersecurity is baked in . Um , open 01:07:03.100 --> 01:07:06.379 architecture is , uh , the , the new 01:07:06.379 --> 01:07:08.546 normal . These are , I think , some of 01:07:08.546 --> 01:07:10.770 the things that , uh , government , 01:07:10.780 --> 01:07:12.669 militaries , and industry have to 01:07:12.669 --> 01:07:15.500 partner on , um , because again it is 01:07:15.500 --> 01:07:17.860 in this theater an alliance of 32 01:07:17.860 --> 01:07:20.419 nations , um , in the Indo-Pacific of 01:07:20.419 --> 01:07:22.586 course the United States has bilateral 01:07:22.586 --> 01:07:24.780 alliances , but we see more and more a 01:07:24.780 --> 01:07:27.169 collective sense of security . Um , so 01:07:27.169 --> 01:07:30.050 that , again , again , is fundamental 01:07:30.050 --> 01:07:32.090 that we have to look at these 01:07:32.090 --> 01:07:34.312 challenges in a much different way with 01:07:34.312 --> 01:07:36.146 all the stakeholders , including 01:07:36.146 --> 01:07:38.729 industry . Thank you . Um , John , let 01:07:38.729 --> 01:07:42.590 me go back to you , um . So 01:07:42.919 --> 01:07:44.909 you know we've seen obviously the 01:07:44.909 --> 01:07:47.360 Middle East embroiled in conflict since 01:07:47.360 --> 01:07:49.610 the heinous attacks of October 7th 01:07:50.239 --> 01:07:53.330 against Israel and then more recently 01:07:53.330 --> 01:07:57.070 of course uh Israeli and US strikes 01:07:57.280 --> 01:08:01.280 against Iran . um , can you again 01:08:01.280 --> 01:08:03.391 talking about this axis of upheaval , 01:08:04.040 --> 01:08:06.373 what message do you think has been sent ? 01:08:06.919 --> 01:08:09.570 What message has been received not just 01:08:09.570 --> 01:08:13.290 by Iran , but by Russia and China and 01:08:13.290 --> 01:08:17.269 North Korea as well . Uh , I published 01:08:17.269 --> 01:08:19.325 a piece a couple of years ago . It's 01:08:19.325 --> 01:08:21.380 what professors do , um , with a , a 01:08:21.380 --> 01:08:23.325 marine friend of mine , uh , Keith 01:08:23.325 --> 01:08:25.436 Berky Pyle , and the piece was titled 01:08:25.436 --> 01:08:27.325 China Can Wait . The Army's Focus 01:08:27.325 --> 01:08:29.499 Should be Europe . And I think sorry 01:08:29.499 --> 01:08:31.721 General Brown , you're looking right at 01:08:31.721 --> 01:08:33.943 you've got this doleful look staring at 01:08:33.943 --> 01:08:33.699 me , the former US Army Pacific 01:08:33.699 --> 01:08:36.298 Commander , uh , but , but , but right , 01:08:36.418 --> 01:08:38.579 the land bureau suggests this is in 01:08:38.579 --> 01:08:41.898 fact the um the most important land 01:08:41.898 --> 01:08:44.648 theater in the world . It has been , uh , 01:08:44.659 --> 01:08:46.659 for centuries it will , I believe , 01:08:46.659 --> 01:08:49.608 continue to be . And , and , and , and 01:08:49.608 --> 01:08:52.849 so I think that that this conference by 01:08:52.849 --> 01:08:55.599 itself is sending a message to Russia 01:08:55.849 --> 01:08:58.869 and to China . I do think that the 01:08:59.208 --> 01:09:03.208 um security challenges of of um 01:09:03.208 --> 01:09:06.859 that that . We together collectively 01:09:06.859 --> 01:09:09.879 face in in the Middle East and and in 01:09:09.879 --> 01:09:13.410 Eastern Europe are the acute threat 01:09:13.700 --> 01:09:15.700 that not just , not just the United 01:09:15.700 --> 01:09:17.867 States , but the world faces right now 01:09:17.867 --> 01:09:20.033 with the United States describes China 01:09:20.033 --> 01:09:22.660 as our pacing challenge . And I , I 01:09:22.660 --> 01:09:24.882 think both of those words are important 01:09:25.140 --> 01:09:27.196 pacing because that's who we have to 01:09:27.196 --> 01:09:29.362 keep up with . I've talked about their 01:09:29.362 --> 01:09:29.259 ship building , the extraordinary 01:09:29.259 --> 01:09:31.660 defense build up that I talked to very 01:09:31.660 --> 01:09:33.930 well , but it's a challenge right now , 01:09:33.979 --> 01:09:36.201 I think , and not a threat . It doesn't 01:09:36.201 --> 01:09:38.423 have to turn into a threat if we do the 01:09:38.423 --> 01:09:41.149 right things against our acute threats 01:09:41.459 --> 01:09:45.029 which right now are Iran and 01:09:45.029 --> 01:09:48.019 Russia . And I do think that Iran has 01:09:48.019 --> 01:09:51.688 had an unbelievably bad year 01:09:52.179 --> 01:09:54.499 um with the the loss of its proxy 01:09:54.499 --> 01:09:56.666 forces really across the Middle East , 01:09:56.666 --> 01:09:59.488 the , the , um , complete destruction 01:09:59.488 --> 01:10:02.979 of its air defense systems , it's A2 AD 01:10:02.979 --> 01:10:05.418 bubble is gone , is completely gone , 01:10:05.809 --> 01:10:07.976 and , and of course the , the enormous 01:10:07.976 --> 01:10:10.409 setback to its nuclear weapons program . 01:10:11.100 --> 01:10:14.250 And now with with just in the past 72 01:10:14.250 --> 01:10:17.970 hours or so uh an extraordinary show of 01:10:17.970 --> 01:10:20.450 support for Ukraine from the United 01:10:20.450 --> 01:10:23.009 States and from our NATO partners who 01:10:23.009 --> 01:10:26.209 are going to be procuring uh the , the 01:10:26.209 --> 01:10:27.931 weapon systems that Ukraine so 01:10:27.931 --> 01:10:30.098 desperately needs and and that we will 01:10:30.098 --> 01:10:32.209 be going there . I think we've sent a 01:10:32.209 --> 01:10:34.265 terrific message , uh , very obvious 01:10:34.265 --> 01:10:36.431 message to Iran . Uh , we , we are now 01:10:36.431 --> 01:10:38.320 sending both both Europe with the 01:10:38.320 --> 01:10:39.987 commitment to 5% , NATO , the 01:10:39.987 --> 01:10:42.509 commitment to 5% , but also now the 01:10:42.509 --> 01:10:44.790 American commitment to to continue to 01:10:44.790 --> 01:10:47.899 support Ukraine with an additional $10 01:10:47.899 --> 01:10:49.955 billion and the threat of additional 01:10:49.955 --> 01:10:51.677 sanctions against Russia , and 01:10:51.677 --> 01:10:53.750 sanctions do work . They're hard and 01:10:53.750 --> 01:10:55.750 they're slow , and they take a long 01:10:55.750 --> 01:10:57.861 time , but they are absolutely having 01:10:57.861 --> 01:10:59.694 an impact on Russia's ability to 01:10:59.694 --> 01:11:01.806 continue its war . They would have an 01:11:01.806 --> 01:11:04.879 even bigger impact on China . I think 01:11:04.879 --> 01:11:07.200 very strongly that the right message is 01:11:07.200 --> 01:11:10.629 being sent to China to North Korea 01:11:10.629 --> 01:11:13.640 that we are ready to fight tonight if 01:11:13.640 --> 01:11:16.319 we have to be , there's more we can do 01:11:16.319 --> 01:11:18.375 and we're doing a bunch of that work 01:11:18.375 --> 01:11:20.486 right here these next 2 days . That's 01:11:20.486 --> 01:11:22.486 great . I , I think we've certainly 01:11:22.486 --> 01:11:24.799 have seen a powerful confluence of 01:11:24.799 --> 01:11:27.439 events just in the last 34 weeks that 01:11:27.439 --> 01:11:30.759 hopefully has uh set the stage 01:11:30.759 --> 01:11:34.160 for . An enhancement of deterrences all 01:11:34.160 --> 01:11:36.216 around the world whether it's in the 01:11:36.216 --> 01:11:38.438 Euro-Atlantic in the Indo-Pacific or in 01:11:38.438 --> 01:11:40.709 the Middle East . So , uh , I'm afraid 01:11:40.709 --> 01:11:42.598 I can't get to any more questions 01:11:42.598 --> 01:11:44.820 because we are starting to run short of 01:11:44.820 --> 01:11:46.820 time but what I'd like to do now is 01:11:46.820 --> 01:11:48.653 just give each panelist a couple 01:11:48.653 --> 01:11:50.653 minutes to , uh , uh , give us some 01:11:50.653 --> 01:11:52.899 concluding thoughts and perhaps , uh , 01:11:52.919 --> 01:11:56.069 an optimistic outlook for the future 01:11:56.439 --> 01:11:58.520 based on , uh , what we're gonna be 01:11:58.520 --> 01:12:00.742 focusing on here in the next two days , 01:12:00.742 --> 01:12:04.060 John . Thanks , I know this 01:12:04.830 --> 01:12:06.830 is an extraordinary period in human 01:12:06.830 --> 01:12:09.229 history . Um , I , I run a couple of 01:12:09.229 --> 01:12:11.451 projects at the War College . Uh one of 01:12:11.451 --> 01:12:13.285 them is a Ukraine war integrated 01:12:13.285 --> 01:12:15.396 research project that tries to derive 01:12:15.396 --> 01:12:17.589 lessons learned from Ukraine for the 01:12:17.589 --> 01:12:19.811 United States military , for our allies 01:12:19.811 --> 01:12:22.069 and partners around the globe . Another 01:12:22.069 --> 01:12:25.629 is Project 1938 , which asks the 01:12:25.629 --> 01:12:27.740 question that's been previously asked 01:12:27.740 --> 01:12:29.796 by historian Tim Snyder what if it's 01:12:29.796 --> 01:12:33.399 1938 ? What if we are right now on the 01:12:33.399 --> 01:12:37.240 verge of a full shooting world war 01:12:37.240 --> 01:12:39.560 in both the Atlantic and the Pacific , 01:12:40.040 --> 01:12:42.096 and I think we are fortunate to have 01:12:42.096 --> 01:12:44.207 the lessons of history to draw upon . 01:12:44.207 --> 01:12:46.096 I've , I've mentioned a number of 01:12:46.096 --> 01:12:48.429 authors today who I encourage people to , 01:12:48.429 --> 01:12:51.680 to learn from . And we are fortunate to 01:12:51.680 --> 01:12:54.759 have the leadership we have in in our 01:12:54.759 --> 01:12:57.160 allies and partners and in the United 01:12:57.160 --> 01:12:59.879 States who are taking those lessons of 01:12:59.879 --> 01:13:02.399 history seriously who understand the 01:13:02.399 --> 01:13:04.399 extraordinary cost of war currently 01:13:04.399 --> 01:13:06.399 being borne most directly by our 01:13:06.399 --> 01:13:08.160 Ukrainian friends and who are 01:13:08.160 --> 01:13:11.229 determined to stop that aggression here 01:13:11.479 --> 01:13:14.490 and now . And , and that , that I think 01:13:14.490 --> 01:13:17.970 makes future wars much less likely if 01:13:17.970 --> 01:13:20.470 we continue to stand together in 01:13:20.470 --> 01:13:22.200 defense of freedom and against 01:13:22.200 --> 01:13:24.850 aggression and tyranny . Thank you , 01:13:25.040 --> 01:13:28.279 General . Thank you . uh , I'll address 01:13:28.279 --> 01:13:31.479 the industry with this . So up in the 01:13:31.479 --> 01:13:34.640 Nordics we have uh applied a strategy 01:13:34.640 --> 01:13:38.149 laid out by a previous Swedish 01:13:38.560 --> 01:13:41.620 Army army chief , General Carlinga 01:13:41.620 --> 01:13:45.479 Breson about cross develop cross by 01:13:45.479 --> 01:13:48.830 cross use equipment . In order to 01:13:48.830 --> 01:13:50.990 create supply and that gives us a 01:13:50.990 --> 01:13:54.069 possibility to have similar equipment 01:13:54.069 --> 01:13:56.509 interchangeability and uh we can stay 01:13:56.509 --> 01:13:59.029 in the fight better . For the industry , 01:13:59.140 --> 01:14:01.362 we're gonna be smarter , we're gonna be 01:14:01.362 --> 01:14:03.418 more demanding , and we're expecting 01:14:03.418 --> 01:14:05.970 you to deliver faster than ever before . 01:14:06.830 --> 01:14:09.290 And we will have to change our ways of 01:14:09.290 --> 01:14:12.040 doing procurement , and that's gonna be 01:14:12.209 --> 01:14:14.560 each nation has to work on that , but 01:14:14.560 --> 01:14:17.450 we please do cooperate and don't 01:14:17.450 --> 01:14:21.169 compete . There's enough stuff to 01:14:21.169 --> 01:14:24.279 deliver and and enough money to make . 01:14:25.160 --> 01:14:27.271 Which , which is of course one of the 01:14:27.271 --> 01:14:29.438 key things , but more importantly , we 01:14:29.438 --> 01:14:31.919 owe it to our people . We owe it to our 01:14:31.919 --> 01:14:34.240 taxpayers to be very responsible how we 01:14:34.240 --> 01:14:37.000 use the money , uh , and , and the 01:14:37.000 --> 01:14:39.549 commitments of the 5% is huge . 01:14:41.149 --> 01:14:43.669 So let's focus on creating a deterrence 01:14:43.669 --> 01:14:46.500 that will deter Russia and China of 01:14:46.750 --> 01:14:50.270 going to war with us . Thank Air Vice 01:14:50.270 --> 01:14:53.049 Marshal Turton I guess I'd , I'd like 01:14:53.049 --> 01:14:55.216 to sort of end on a , a bit more of an 01:14:55.216 --> 01:14:57.327 optimistic note . I think what , once 01:14:57.327 --> 01:14:59.438 we've gone through a , a pretty tough 01:14:59.438 --> 01:15:01.438 couple of years , I think what it's 01:15:01.438 --> 01:15:03.327 done is it's brought together and 01:15:03.327 --> 01:15:05.605 strengthened a lot of the partnerships . 01:15:05.605 --> 01:15:07.771 I think the fact that we're having the 01:15:07.771 --> 01:15:09.827 conversations we're having today , I 01:15:09.827 --> 01:15:09.419 think we're being a lot more honest 01:15:09.419 --> 01:15:11.586 about what we're seeing , uh , in what 01:15:11.586 --> 01:15:13.752 our adversaries are doing . Um , and , 01:15:13.752 --> 01:15:15.808 and how we're countering them . What 01:15:15.808 --> 01:15:17.975 we're seeing in Europe , for example , 01:15:17.975 --> 01:15:20.197 the coming together of NATO and EU just 01:15:20.197 --> 01:15:22.530 in the last 18 months , you know , it's , 01:15:22.530 --> 01:15:24.808 it's quite phenomenal . You know , the , 01:15:24.808 --> 01:15:26.641 the strength of , uh , those two 01:15:26.641 --> 01:15:28.975 organizations coming together , I think , 01:15:28.975 --> 01:15:31.086 um , you know , uh , uh , have global 01:15:31.086 --> 01:15:33.141 implications . It's making our ads . 01:15:33.222 --> 01:15:35.981 sit up and think about , you know , do 01:15:35.981 --> 01:15:38.421 they want to be part of the , uh , of 01:15:38.421 --> 01:15:40.421 this global rules based order or do 01:15:40.421 --> 01:15:42.532 they want to create their own ? And I 01:15:42.532 --> 01:15:44.754 guess the dilemma or what we need to be 01:15:44.754 --> 01:15:47.341 able to do is convince them that the 01:15:47.341 --> 01:15:49.341 alternative is not better than what 01:15:49.341 --> 01:15:51.452 we've had and that's what's delivered 01:15:51.452 --> 01:15:53.674 us that peace dividend for the last few 01:15:53.674 --> 01:15:55.897 decades . Well , thank you for that and 01:15:55.897 --> 01:15:57.779 um . I think , uh , ladies and 01:15:57.779 --> 01:15:59.501 gentlemen , uh , I feel pretty 01:15:59.501 --> 01:16:01.740 confident in saying that , uh , this 01:16:01.740 --> 01:16:03.962 morning's conversation certainly raised 01:16:03.962 --> 01:16:05.939 a lot of tough topics , a lot of 01:16:05.939 --> 01:16:08.549 challenges that we have to face , but , 01:16:08.620 --> 01:16:10.979 uh , the one thing that I am a true 01:16:10.979 --> 01:16:14.290 believer in is , uh , the power of , uh , 01:16:14.299 --> 01:16:17.100 the alliances that we have between the 01:16:17.100 --> 01:16:19.156 United States and its North Atlantic 01:16:19.156 --> 01:16:22.060 partners as well as that with our 01:16:22.060 --> 01:16:25.270 partners and allies in the Pacific . Um , 01:16:25.430 --> 01:16:28.430 this axis of , of people between the 01:16:28.430 --> 01:16:30.374 Russians , the Chinese , the North 01:16:30.374 --> 01:16:32.597 Koreans , and Iranians , um , not to be 01:16:32.597 --> 01:16:34.652 overly simplistic , but I think it's 01:16:34.652 --> 01:16:36.819 more a marriage of convenience than , 01:16:36.870 --> 01:16:39.910 uh , necessarily , uh , representative 01:16:39.910 --> 01:16:43.430 of a confluence of , uh , values 01:16:43.430 --> 01:16:46.350 and interests , uh , like what we've 01:16:46.350 --> 01:16:48.683 shared and what we've shared , you know , 01:16:48.683 --> 01:16:51.229 since , uh , the end of the Second 01:16:51.229 --> 01:16:53.410 World War , since the end of the Cold 01:16:53.410 --> 01:16:55.899 War . Uh , and now into the 21st 01:16:55.899 --> 01:16:58.669 century , so I believe that the 01:16:58.669 --> 01:17:02.049 advantages lie in finding 01:17:02.379 --> 01:17:04.620 economies of scale and scope in terms 01:17:04.620 --> 01:17:06.700 of industrial cooperation , whether 01:17:06.700 --> 01:17:08.740 it's co-development of systems , 01:17:08.899 --> 01:17:12.500 co-production , bulk buying , um , and 01:17:12.500 --> 01:17:15.939 looking at things through a new and 01:17:15.939 --> 01:17:19.220 more innovative lens , um , so despite 01:17:19.220 --> 01:17:21.442 the fact that we have many challenges , 01:17:21.500 --> 01:17:24.439 uh . Being able to face those together 01:17:24.779 --> 01:17:28.120 I think uh will mean that we will be 01:17:28.120 --> 01:17:31.729 able to deter our common adversaries 01:17:31.729 --> 01:17:34.560 and again if that deterrence does in 01:17:34.560 --> 01:17:36.671 fact fail that would we would be able 01:17:36.671 --> 01:17:38.893 to prevail so if you would just join me 01:17:38.893 --> 01:17:40.949 in thanking uh our panelists today , 01:17:41.020 --> 01:17:42.742 thank you for your attention . 01:17:50.259 --> 01:17:52.481 Well , thank you , Hana , and thanks to 01:17:52.481 --> 01:17:54.648 this great group of panelists for this 01:17:54.648 --> 01:17:56.870 discussion . I'm Brigadier General Jack 01:17:56.870 --> 01:17:58.981 Haley , US Army retired , and I'm the 01:17:58.981 --> 01:17:58.419 vice president of meetings and 01:17:58.419 --> 01:18:00.660 membership for AUSA , and I get the 01:18:00.660 --> 01:18:02.882 privilege of taking you all the break . 01:18:02.882 --> 01:18:04.771 So we'll take a 45 minute break . 01:18:04.771 --> 01:18:06.660 Refreshments are available in the 01:18:06.660 --> 01:18:08.827 exhibit hall in central foyer . Please 01:18:08.827 --> 01:18:10.882 return here at 1100 to hear our next 01:18:10.882 --> 01:18:11.770 panel . Thank you .