WEBVTT

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All right , good afternoon . The

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subcommittee will come to order . Um ,

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I'm sorry , good morning . Good morning .

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The subcommittee will come to order . I

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ask unanimous consent that the chair be

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authorized to declare a recess at any

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time without objection , so ordered .

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Today we will hear from our witnesses

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on US special operations forces in

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command and their challenges and

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resource priorities for fiscal year

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2026 . Over the past several years ,

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our nation has confronted an evolving

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landscape , an evolving landscape of

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great power competition . Our special

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operators have adapted to meet the

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challenges posed by our adversaries

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while continuing to come to combat the

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continuous and evolving threats posed

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by violent extremist organizations ,

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military proxies , and non-state actors .

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Despite the long wars in Afghanistan

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and Iraq coming to close , the demands

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on special operations have actually

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increased , and they continue to rise .

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Special operations continue to be our

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greatest hedge against strategic

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distraction as they singularly respond

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to crisis around the world and

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neutralize terrorist networks with the

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intent and means to attack to attack

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our homeland . The complexity of these

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no fail missions continues to rise as

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the battlefield becomes increasingly

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contested and denied by the

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proliferation of peer adversary

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capabilities and malign influence . We

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similarly rely on our special

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operations forces to impose costs on

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adversaries critical to reestablishing

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deterrents and providing the nation

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with a position of advantage should

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deterrents fail . We ask a lot of our

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special operations forces and demands

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on them will continue to grow every day .

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It is it is critical that we provide

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you with the resources that you need ,

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and we intend to do that . We look

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forward to hearing how Congress can

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best support SOCOM so that you can

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continue to provide the high return on

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investment the nation requires while

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simultaneously modernizing for the

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challenges of the future . Our

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witnesses today are leaders in the

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special operations community . I wanna

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welcome Deputy Assistant Secretary of

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Defense Colby Jenkins , uh , performing

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the duties of Assistant Secretary of

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Defense for Special Operations in low

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intensity conflict . Thank you , sir .

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And General Brian Fenton , US Army

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commander of US Special Operations

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Command . Thank you , sir . In the

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interest of time , I ask that the

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witnesses keep their opening remarks to

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5 minutes or less so that we have

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sufficient time for questions and

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answers . With that , let me thank our

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witnesses for appearing again , and I

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now recognize Ranking Member Crow for

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any opening remarks that you have .

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Thank you , Chairman . I appreciate

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your leadership in this and the other

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members as well , um , Mr . Jenkins ,

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uh , General Fenton , thank you as well

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for your leadership . um , as the

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chairman mentioned , you know , we're

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in an era of unprecedented threats and

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evolution in the battlefield , uh , you

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all continue to lead the men and women

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that are on the , the tip of the spear ,

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so to speak , in that evolution . Uh ,

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this subcommittee is a partner in that

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effort . There's no gamesmanship .

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There's no gotcha in the subcommittee ,

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which makes it unique in Congress at

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this time . We are here as , as your

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partner . We of course have an

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important oversight role , which we

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will always fulfill and ask hard

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questions and press when necessary ,

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but more than anything else , we just

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want to get the answers to how we can

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better support you , what resources are

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needed . Uh , so that the men and women

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who are doing incredible things on our

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behalf around the world , very

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dangerous things , oftentimes giving

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their lives to protect all of us , have

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the best , the best training , the best

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equipment , uh , the best modernization ,

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that that is our , our simple goal here ,

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uh , and it's a goal that I know that

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we share , uh , deeply and you have a

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commitment to that goal . So with that ,

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uh , I won't uh take any more time . We

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can jump right into it . I yield back .

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Thank you . Thank you . We'll

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now hear from our witnesses and then

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we'll move into question and answer

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session . We have a 9 a.m. hard stop ,

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uh , so that we can in this open

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portion so that we can get to the , uh ,

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closed portion immediately afterwards .

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We will be reconvening in Rayburn

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2337 immediately after this , uh , open

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session for the classified session . Mr .

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Jenkins , we'll go ahead and begin with

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you . Good morning Chairman Jackson ,

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Ranking Member Crow and other

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distinguished members of the

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subcommittee . Thank you for the

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opportunity to testify on the global

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posture of our nation's special

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operations forces , or SOF . I'm

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honored to testify alongside General

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Fenton . We are joined here today by

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two extraordinary Americans who I would

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like to take a moment to recognize

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Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of

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Defense and director of the Special

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Operations Secretariat , Doctor Sandra

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Hobson , seated behind me . And SOEC

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senior enlisted advisor Command Master

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Chief Brad Reinelander also seated

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behind me . These dedicated servant

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leaders bring expertise and insights

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that have been invaluable as we

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advocate within the Department of

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Defense on behalf of our SOF members

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and their families . As a combat

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veteran Green Beret myself , the

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opportunity to work with these

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incredible teammates and represent our

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soft enterprises proud , profoundly

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humbling , and special . Today's global

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security environment has become

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increasingly complex as AI and other

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technological advancements rapidly

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transform the character of warfare .

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Threats from state and non-state actors

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continue to converge . Our global

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competitors actively seek to undermine

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the United States and our allies .

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Terrorist and transnational criminal

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networks continue to pose a serious

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threat to the homeland . In these

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turbulent times , my office , the

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Office of Special Operations Low

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Intensity conflict or SOLIC , and the

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US Special Operations Command remain at

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the forefront of our nation's strategic

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priorities , representing less than 2% ,

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2% of the defense budget . Our special

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operations forces provide unique

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outsized effects , adding exceptional

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value to the nation . Tasked with the

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most challenging and dangerous missions ,

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soft remain the world's most lethal ,

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adaptable , and capable force . Our

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priorities for the soft Enterprise are

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squarely nested within Secretary He's

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priorities for the joint force defend

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the homeland , strengthen deterrence ,

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and increase burden sharing with allies

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and partners . Our elite warriors deter

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our adversaries by creating strategic

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asymmetric advantages and maintaining a

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regular warfare superiority ,

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leveraging our close relationships with

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foreign partners in critical regions ,

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SOF are uniquely positioned to identify

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and counter our adversaries malign and

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coercive activities . Whether in the

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Indo-Pacific , Europe , the Middle East ,

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Africa , Western Hemisphere , or near

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our own southern border , these low

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cost small footprint efforts promote

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stability , empower partners and allies ,

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and lead efforts against China ,

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terrorists , drug traffickers , and

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other threats . Even with the global

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increase in demand , our special

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operations forces face personnel cuts

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and resource constraints . In fact ,

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armed conflict and regional instability

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have driven a 200% increase , 200%

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increase in our crisis response mission

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over the past 3 years , while at the

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same time operational and logistics

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costs for crisis response have

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increased 260% . We must ensure

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SOF's readiness while balancing

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operational demands and optimizing

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available resources . We must also

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promote accountability through rigorous

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analytics and data-driven decision

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making . Congress wisely established

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civilian oversight of special

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operations to ensure that soft remains

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strategically aligned . Ethically

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grounded and accountable , my office

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provides that policy direction ,

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resource advocacy and oversight needed

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to ensure that SOF's initiatives and

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efforts stay focused on war fighter

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needs and national objectives without

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mission creep or undue strain on the

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force . This oversight is not

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bureaucratic . In fact , it is

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essential to effective war fighting .

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Our nation's security depends on a

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strong , agile , modernized , and

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accountable soft enterprise . With your

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support , we will continue ensuring

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that SOF is ready to deter , fight and

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win anytime , anywhere . Thank

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you again for the opportunity to

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testify . I invite you to visit the

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soft community around the globe and to

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meet our service members and their

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families and to see firsthand the

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capabilities that we bring in the

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defense of our nation . Your continued

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support is critical . I look forward to

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answering your questions . Thank you .

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Thank you , sir . General Fenton ,

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you're recognized for 5 minutes .

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Chairman Jackson , ranking member Crow ,

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distinguished members of the

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subcommittee , thank you for the

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opportunity to testify before you today .

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This month marks 38 years since the

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creation of Special Operations Command .

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We're thankful for Congress's

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incredible foresight in creating us and

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steadfast support ever since . Joined

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today by Command Sergeant Major Shane

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Shorter . Shane exemplifies the

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unmatched caliber of our

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non-commissioned officer corps . If you

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look at the hardest problems facing our

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nation , the darkest corners of this

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earth , you'll find our special

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operations non-commissioned officers

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solving them . Our NCOs exemplify the

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precision and lethality of your special

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operations teams and demonstrate our

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competitive and comparative advantage .

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They are the reason we're envied by

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militaries around the globe . It's an

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honor of a lifetime for Shane and me to

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represent the uniformed and civilian

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members of your special operations

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command and the global soft warriors

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from 28 nations along with interagency

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partners stationed at our SOCOM

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headquarters in Tampa . I'm also

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honored today to testify along

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Secretary Jenkins from ASD SOLAC . We

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rely on SOLAC's partnership , support

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and advocacy to ensure your special

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operations warriors and their families

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who serve right alongside them continue

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to thrive and win . We're in an era of

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serious national security challenges .

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The border , communist China , Russia ,

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Iran , North Korea , terrorist

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organizations all pose significant

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threats in isolation . However , we are

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increasingly seeing these threats

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converge across the globe . Meanwhile ,

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the character of work is changing

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faster than we've ever seen . The

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innovation cycle now turns in days and

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weeks , not months and years . Our

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adversaries use $10,000 one-way drones

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that we shoot down with $2 million

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dollar missiles . That cost benefit

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curve is upside down . To summarize ,

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this is the most complex , asymmetric ,

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and hybrid threat security environment

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I've seen in 38 years of service .

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Contending with these challenges

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demands more from your special

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operations forces that requires tough

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choices , forcing tradeoffs as we

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strike to balance an increase in

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operations , readiness , and the need

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for modernization . Your elite SOCOM

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team provides an outsized return on any

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investment . However , with only 3% of

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the DOD forces and less than 2% of

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DOD's budget , we are now playing a

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zero-sum game . Yet I'd submit your

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special operations forces are

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tailor-made for this era . Rapidly

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responding to crisis . Disrupting

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terrorist organizations and

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asymmetrically deterring our

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adversaries . Employed expressly at the

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direction of the president and the

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secretary of defense , SOCOM's crisis

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response mission is the nation's most

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lethal and surgical tool to eliminate

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threats to the homeland , rescue

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American citizens and protect our

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diplomats all at a moment's notice . In

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the past 3.5 years , the frequency of

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these presidentially directed missions

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significantly increased by 200% . Yet

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for this sacred obligation we will

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accept no risk in today's crisis

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response mission . Some may think we're

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done fighting terror . I'd submit

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terror is not done with us . SOCOM's

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mission to degrade terrorist groups

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starts at our border , spans the globe .

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In recent months , your special

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operations teams eliminated over 500

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terrorists who had the intent and

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capability to strike at our homeland .

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Alongside our global special operations

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partners , we've captured over 600 .

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Aligned with the department's

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priorities , deterrence has long been a

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part of SOCOM's DNA . We are America's

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irregular warfare experts . We deter

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war by altering our adversaries

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decisions below the threshold of

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conflict in the gray zone , and we

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stand ready to prevail if deterrence

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fails . As combatant commands seek to

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strengthen deterrence , requests for

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SOCOM capabilities have increased by

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more than 35% in the last two years

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alone . Against that backdrop , we

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continue to continue to grapple with

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years of flat budgets , 14% decrease in

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buying power , significant personnel

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reductions , and the requirement to

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evolve our technology and authorities .

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All this forces trade-offs , tough

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choices that challenge current missions

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and puts modernization at risk . Yet

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your SOCOM remains the world's premier

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special operations force , and I pledge

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to always provide the nation with the

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best special operations capability for

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the fiscal and personnel resources we

13:26.450 --> 13:29.190
receive . We will never compromise on

13:29.190 --> 13:31.520
standards and lethality . We are

13:31.520 --> 13:33.631
grateful for this subcommittee's work

13:33.631 --> 13:35.853
on novel approaches to soft funding and

13:35.853 --> 13:37.853
authorities , and I look forward to

13:37.853 --> 13:39.853
taking your questions . Thank you .

13:40.460 --> 13:42.659
Thank you , General . We'll start with

13:42.659 --> 13:44.437
questions now and I'll start by

13:44.437 --> 13:46.369
recognizing myself . Um , General

13:46.369 --> 13:48.591
Fenton , we had our office call about 3

13:48.591 --> 13:50.480
weeks ago , and you mentioned the

13:50.480 --> 13:52.313
challenges of supporting all the

13:52.313 --> 13:54.258
requests of SOF , um , that you're

13:54.258 --> 13:56.091
getting from the , um , from the

13:56.091 --> 13:58.313
geographic combatant commands . Uh , in

13:58.313 --> 14:00.480
your statement , you mentioned the 35%

14:00.480 --> 14:02.840
increase from 2023 to 2025 . Can you

14:02.840 --> 14:04.784
expand a little bit , uh , for the

14:04.784 --> 14:06.618
benefit of the folks here , uh ,

14:06.618 --> 14:08.840
watching this hearing ? Can you tell us

14:08.840 --> 14:10.896
a little bit , uh , give us a better

14:10.896 --> 14:13.118
sense of what that number is and , uh ,

14:13.118 --> 14:15.118
how many times you've had to , uh ,

14:15.118 --> 14:17.340
deny request , uh , and the reason that

14:17.340 --> 14:21.140
you have to do so . Representative ,

14:21.219 --> 14:23.820
uh , I'll start by saying the COCOM

14:23.820 --> 14:26.340
demand for special operations forces is

14:26.340 --> 14:28.340
up , and I'm sure you've heard that

14:28.340 --> 14:30.562
from the combatant commanders that come

14:30.562 --> 14:32.618
before you . I think for a number of

14:32.618 --> 14:34.673
reasons in deterrence . First , they

14:34.673 --> 14:36.896
know that the highest value proposition

14:36.896 --> 14:38.896
in some sense that soft provides is

14:38.896 --> 14:41.118
prior to conflict . The things we do to

14:41.118 --> 14:42.951
prevent building relationships ,

14:43.090 --> 14:45.423
developing access basing and overflight ,

14:45.423 --> 14:47.646
uh , providing indications and warnings

14:48.219 --> 14:50.275
along with everything we're doing to

14:50.275 --> 14:52.386
prepare . In the event that worst day

14:52.386 --> 14:55.140
comes , uh . Closing kill webs or kill

14:55.140 --> 14:57.900
chains or sensor systems giving uh

14:57.900 --> 15:00.140
cocom commanders options and

15:00.140 --> 15:02.251
opportunities they wouldn't otherwise

15:02.251 --> 15:04.307
have and presenting a whole bunch of

15:04.307 --> 15:06.529
dilemmas and challenges to an adversary

15:06.529 --> 15:08.751
they wouldn't have . I think that's why

15:08.751 --> 15:08.179
we see the demand going up and that

15:08.179 --> 15:10.419
comes in the form of asking for special

15:10.419 --> 15:13.659
forces team , Marine Raider teams , NSW

15:13.659 --> 15:15.826
teams , command and control elements ,

15:15.826 --> 15:18.580
ASOC , and that's that 35% increase .

15:19.119 --> 15:21.341
To your point on where we've had to say

15:21.341 --> 15:23.563
no , uh , I'll give you a number . Last

15:23.563 --> 15:25.563
December in one of the global force

15:25.563 --> 15:27.675
management tanks , I had to say no 41

15:27.675 --> 15:30.250
times to request just like that . I

15:30.250 --> 15:32.417
hurt my heart . It's a high compliment

15:32.417 --> 15:34.306
that this soft team is that value

15:34.306 --> 15:36.472
proposition to the entire department .

15:36.472 --> 15:38.639
We couldn't do it . And we couldn't do

15:38.639 --> 15:40.861
it , my sense , and I'll wind this down

15:40.861 --> 15:43.083
for you two reasons . There's certainly

15:43.083 --> 15:45.306
a capability and capacity piece against

15:45.306 --> 15:47.417
the great humans that do their work ,

15:47.417 --> 15:49.528
and as you know we've been reduced in

15:49.528 --> 15:51.583
the past uh couple of years by up to

15:51.583 --> 15:53.639
5000 , but there's also now a fiscal

15:53.639 --> 15:55.750
constraint that's pulling at us based

15:55.750 --> 15:57.599
on an increasingly , uh , uh ,

15:57.609 --> 15:59.979
decreasing top line , a decreasing top

15:59.979 --> 16:02.210
line . Uh , that now comes into play .

16:02.340 --> 16:04.451
So at times , even if I could put the

16:04.451 --> 16:06.940
person out there , fiscally , uh , the

16:06.940 --> 16:08.996
cost is prohibitive , and I'll pause

16:08.996 --> 16:11.107
here . Thank you , sir . I appreciate

16:11.107 --> 16:13.218
that . We're gonna do our best to fix

16:13.218 --> 16:15.273
that . Uh , Secretary Jenkins , um .

16:15.650 --> 16:17.872
SOCOM's budget has been relatively flat

16:17.872 --> 16:19.817
for the past decade . Uh , in your

16:19.817 --> 16:21.872
combined written statement , it is ,

16:21.872 --> 16:24.094
it's , it is less than 2% of the budget

16:24.094 --> 16:26.094
in one of the few DOD organizations

16:26.094 --> 16:27.872
that has not seen an increase ,

16:28.000 --> 16:30.599
although overall budget has increased

16:30.599 --> 16:32.766
significantly . Uh , how are you using

16:32.766 --> 16:34.988
your service like secretary position to

16:34.988 --> 16:37.210
campaign for a higher budget , uh , for

16:37.210 --> 16:39.432
SOCOM , and how much do you think SOCOM

16:39.432 --> 16:41.760
needs ? Well thank you Chairman . We ,

16:41.770 --> 16:43.826
we love those kind of questions , so

16:43.826 --> 16:45.659
thank you very much . Uh , in my

16:45.659 --> 16:47.770
service like capacity it is very much

16:47.770 --> 16:49.714
my , my responsibility and role to

16:49.714 --> 16:51.937
campaign to keep those sharp elbows out

16:51.937 --> 16:51.909
so that I can advocate on behalf of ,

16:51.969 --> 16:54.136
of our soft enterprise and just , just

16:54.136 --> 16:56.136
last week we had the opportunity to

16:56.136 --> 16:58.025
brief the new deputy secretary of

16:58.025 --> 17:00.136
defense and had a very warm reception

17:00.136 --> 17:02.136
in terms of examining what we would

17:02.136 --> 17:04.136
have to propose for 8% cuts because

17:04.136 --> 17:06.080
every every uh organizations being

17:06.080 --> 17:08.136
asked to propose those . And we , we

17:08.136 --> 17:10.247
found a good reception in terms of we

17:10.247 --> 17:12.358
wanna keep you whole the best that we

17:12.358 --> 17:14.525
can . So it's our , our responsibility

17:14.525 --> 17:16.691
to make sure that we interact with our

17:16.691 --> 17:16.568
service counterparts . That's where we

17:16.568 --> 17:19.400
see , uh . Maybe danger is a strong

17:19.400 --> 17:21.456
word , but that's when they consider

17:21.456 --> 17:23.678
cuts there's so many downstream effects

17:23.678 --> 17:25.622
to us that aren't often taken into

17:25.622 --> 17:27.789
account when when the army considers a

17:27.789 --> 17:30.011
cut or the navy or so forth . So that's

17:30.011 --> 17:32.233
where we really hedge our , our , our ,

17:32.233 --> 17:34.344
uh , and defend our budget so that we

17:34.344 --> 17:36.456
make sure when services are defending

17:36.456 --> 17:38.678
are proposing other cuts we can step in

17:38.678 --> 17:40.789
early or before and make sure that we

17:40.789 --> 17:43.011
guard our equities as well . So it's an

17:43.011 --> 17:44.900
ongoing campaign . Uh , we have a

17:44.900 --> 17:44.859
regular warfare out against our

17:44.859 --> 17:47.400
adversaries , and we also run uh

17:47.400 --> 17:49.511
similar regular warfare within within

17:49.511 --> 17:51.400
the department to protect our our

17:51.400 --> 17:53.456
equities . Do you have any idea what

17:53.456 --> 17:55.511
that number looks like ? I , I don't

17:55.511 --> 17:57.678
know the top number just yet . It , it

17:57.678 --> 17:57.510
hasn't been identified . I'd have to ,

17:57.560 --> 17:59.616
to leave that to the , to the deputy

17:59.616 --> 18:01.782
and the comptroller as well , um , but

18:01.782 --> 18:03.838
I know that those are actively being

18:03.838 --> 18:06.060
considered right now . OK , thank you .

18:06.060 --> 18:05.989
My time is essentially up here , so ,

18:06.000 --> 18:07.944
uh , I'm gonna yield and recognize

18:07.944 --> 18:10.420
ranking member Crow . Thank you ,

18:10.459 --> 18:12.403
Chairman . Just picking up on that

18:12.403 --> 18:15.329
question , uh , stream , if there were ,

18:15.459 --> 18:17.699
if you were forced to make an 8% cuts ,

18:17.780 --> 18:19.891
what would that look like ? Just kind

18:19.891 --> 18:23.339
of paint a picture here . Well , I'm ,

18:23.439 --> 18:25.495
I'm not a doctor , but if I was , it

18:25.495 --> 18:27.550
would be cutting into bone . Uh , we

18:27.550 --> 18:29.772
are already lean and efficient , and we

18:29.772 --> 18:31.995
try to be good stewards of everything ,

18:31.995 --> 18:33.661
uh , every penny that that we

18:33.661 --> 18:35.828
gratefully receive , um , but , but we

18:35.828 --> 18:37.717
have to be conscious of , of , of

18:37.717 --> 18:39.939
making sure it's always a good exercise

18:39.939 --> 18:42.106
to examine our resources and make sure

18:42.106 --> 18:44.328
that we're posturing for the next , the

18:44.328 --> 18:44.199
future war and not fighting the last

18:44.199 --> 18:47.400
war . There's no there's no you're lean

18:47.400 --> 18:49.678
and mean as you're supposed to be . Uh ,

18:49.699 --> 18:51.755
so cutting into that is cutting into

18:51.755 --> 18:53.588
valuable resources and support ,

18:53.588 --> 18:55.699
correct , cutting right into the bone

18:55.699 --> 18:57.866
for sure . And so we , we , we , we're

18:57.866 --> 18:59.866
doing our best to avoid that at all

18:59.866 --> 19:02.143
costs . General Fenton , you know , we ,

19:02.143 --> 19:01.380
we've had a number of conversations

19:01.380 --> 19:03.436
about acquisition and rapid fielding

19:03.436 --> 19:05.569
capabilities , so I wanted to , uh ,

19:05.579 --> 19:07.746
talk about that publicly on the record

19:07.746 --> 19:09.801
a little bit . Uh , talk to me about

19:09.801 --> 19:11.635
the importance of giving you new

19:11.635 --> 19:13.801
authorities that would allow you to go

19:13.801 --> 19:16.410
to commercial , to just rapidly speed

19:16.410 --> 19:18.739
up the acquisition process so we could

19:18.739 --> 19:21.760
field new technologies . Uh ,

19:21.969 --> 19:24.260
representative , I think a thank you

19:24.260 --> 19:26.427
for having those discussions with us .

19:26.427 --> 19:28.760
It certainly planted a lot of ideas and ,

19:28.760 --> 19:30.982
uh , in our team and I , I hope did the

19:30.982 --> 19:33.204
same with yours . I'd start by saying I

19:33.204 --> 19:35.427
think when I talk about modernization ,

19:35.427 --> 19:37.593
some folks may and transformation lots

19:37.593 --> 19:39.816
of times folks think technology only of

19:39.816 --> 19:41.982
course you know it so come with people

19:41.982 --> 19:41.959
is the number one priority we start

19:41.959 --> 19:44.181
there , then we talk about technology ,

19:44.300 --> 19:46.467
but we also had authorities in there ,

19:46.467 --> 19:48.467
and I think on this piece this is a

19:48.467 --> 19:50.633
modernization that is , I think , long

19:50.633 --> 19:52.744
overdue . Uh , the reason I give it ,

19:52.744 --> 19:54.967
uh , in that way I think about it , our

19:54.967 --> 19:57.244
current acquisition procurement system .

19:57.380 --> 19:59.547
And I mean no harm to everybody that's

19:59.547 --> 20:01.713
been a part of that , but I would just

20:01.713 --> 20:03.880
offer it's outdated . It's glacial . I

20:03.880 --> 20:06.102
think it works in years and decades and

20:06.102 --> 20:05.890
probably rightly so for some of the

20:05.890 --> 20:08.089
highest ticket items aircraft carrier

20:08.089 --> 20:10.050
bomber or fighter , but what we're

20:10.050 --> 20:11.994
seeing through the lens of Ukraine

20:11.994 --> 20:14.161
needs to be an acquisition site , uh ,

20:14.161 --> 20:16.800
and procurement system that is , uh ,

20:16.810 --> 20:19.849
hyper speed supersonic because over

20:19.849 --> 20:21.849
there we're watching the changes in

20:21.849 --> 20:24.016
minutes , hours and days , and that is

20:24.016 --> 20:26.293
a very stark contrast , uh , different .

20:26.329 --> 20:29.349
I came in . 1987 I was using Vietnam

20:29.349 --> 20:30.905
era gear because that was a

20:30.905 --> 20:33.150
generational acquisition procurement

20:33.150 --> 20:35.150
process that would be unacceptable

20:35.150 --> 20:37.261
today . So I think starting with that

20:37.261 --> 20:39.510
and then acknowledging it's probably a

20:39.510 --> 20:41.939
reflection of requirements , processes

20:41.939 --> 20:43.995
that need to be modified , updated ,

20:44.069 --> 20:46.430
those authorities changed . I could say

20:46.430 --> 20:48.652
it so bluntly , take more people out of

20:48.652 --> 20:51.550
that system , get less hands on the

20:51.550 --> 20:53.772
requirements process , go from operator

20:53.772 --> 20:55.939
to commander . And then acquisition in

20:55.939 --> 20:58.689
in one way would be to allow cocoms and

20:58.689 --> 21:01.209
others directly downrange performing

21:01.209 --> 21:03.569
the mission to to create those

21:03.569 --> 21:05.736
requirements . That's right . And then

21:05.736 --> 21:07.736
buckets of money , I think that's a

21:07.736 --> 21:09.902
challenge . There's a lot . I , I call

21:09.902 --> 21:12.013
them handcuffs against the striated .

21:12.013 --> 21:14.275
O1M RDTNE and uh procurement pots . I

21:14.275 --> 21:16.331
think there's a way to take a lot of

21:16.331 --> 21:18.497
that off , compress the multiple lines

21:18.497 --> 21:20.719
to just a couple , and really modernize

21:20.719 --> 21:22.886
there . And then I think lastly , as I

21:22.886 --> 21:25.053
think about the requirements process ,

21:25.053 --> 21:27.714
certainly the buckets of time give us

21:27.714 --> 21:29.936
give us an opportunity to think through

21:29.936 --> 21:32.158
multi-year processes . So 2 years might

21:32.158 --> 21:34.325
seem multi-year , I think to all of us

21:34.325 --> 21:36.492
multiyear probably needs to be 5 to 10

21:36.492 --> 21:38.603
years so we can move at the speed and

21:38.603 --> 21:40.714
evolution of what we're seeing out on

21:40.714 --> 21:42.825
the battlefield . last piece , my own

21:42.825 --> 21:44.881
combat experience underscored for me

21:44.881 --> 21:47.158
the importance of protecting civilians ,

21:47.158 --> 21:49.270
doing everything possible to minimize

21:49.270 --> 21:51.436
civilian casualties , because not only

21:51.436 --> 21:53.658
is that efficient , you know , less use

21:53.658 --> 21:55.547
of ammunition , more focus on the

21:55.547 --> 21:57.770
adversary . Um , less distraction , but

21:57.770 --> 21:59.436
it's actually there's a moral

21:59.436 --> 22:01.381
imperative to make sure that we're

22:01.381 --> 22:03.158
leading with our values . We're

22:03.158 --> 22:05.381
fighting with our values . Uh , we , we

22:05.381 --> 22:05.310
created a couple of years ago on a

22:05.310 --> 22:07.359
bipartisan basis the , the Armed

22:07.359 --> 22:09.359
Services Committee that created the

22:09.359 --> 22:11.026
Civilian Protection Center of

22:11.026 --> 22:13.229
Excellence . Uh , could you speak very

22:13.229 --> 22:15.349
briefly in your own experience as to

22:15.349 --> 22:17.430
the importance of making sure that

22:17.430 --> 22:19.597
civilians are protected in the conduct

22:19.597 --> 22:21.819
of our missions and what that means for

22:21.819 --> 22:24.349
you as an operator ? Representative , I ,

22:24.400 --> 22:26.344
I think you , uh , you laid it out

22:26.344 --> 22:28.122
pretty clearly . I think it's a

22:28.122 --> 22:30.178
strategic obligation . You call it a

22:30.178 --> 22:32.122
moral obligation to accomplish the

22:32.122 --> 22:34.011
mission and especially when we're

22:34.011 --> 22:36.233
talking about high-end kinetics of , of

22:36.233 --> 22:38.122
eliminating the threat . Yet also

22:38.122 --> 22:39.678
making sure that we protect

22:39.678 --> 22:41.567
non-combatants , uh , civilians ,

22:41.567 --> 22:43.511
vulnerable population because that

22:43.511 --> 22:45.678
sends a very different message that we

22:45.678 --> 22:47.789
are the United States of America will

22:47.789 --> 22:49.956
do the mission , get the bad guys , so

22:49.956 --> 22:52.233
to speak , but protect those around it ,

22:52.233 --> 22:54.456
and I think that differentiates us from

22:54.456 --> 22:56.344
the adversaries we're watching in

22:56.344 --> 22:56.239
motion right now . I think the other

22:56.239 --> 22:58.183
piece it sends is a message to the

22:58.183 --> 23:00.680
civilian population in that nation that

23:00.680 --> 23:03.560
we're absolutely there to do uh the

23:03.560 --> 23:05.599
missions against bad actors or bad

23:05.599 --> 23:08.069
things . But in many , many ways to be

23:08.069 --> 23:10.236
the United States of America that they

23:10.236 --> 23:12.347
know to be and and sending diplomatic

23:12.347 --> 23:14.347
message that you know we're , we're

23:14.347 --> 23:16.458
here to reassure sure and I think you

23:16.458 --> 23:18.236
can do that in the way that you

23:18.236 --> 23:20.180
certainly SOCOM approaches kinetic

23:20.180 --> 23:22.513
operations . Thank you to you both . Uh ,

23:22.513 --> 23:24.680
I'm out of time . Are you back . Thank

23:24.680 --> 23:26.402
you , Mr . or Mr . Scott , you

23:26.402 --> 23:28.569
recognized for 5 minutes . Thank you ,

23:28.569 --> 23:30.625
uh , Mr . Chairman , and gentlemen ,

23:30.625 --> 23:30.260
thanks for being here . I'm gonna have

23:30.260 --> 23:32.482
to slip to a rules committee meeting as

23:32.482 --> 23:34.482
soon as I ask the questions , but I

23:34.482 --> 23:36.538
want to mention this , and you don't

23:36.538 --> 23:38.593
have to comment on it , but I , uh ,

23:38.593 --> 23:40.816
General Fenton , the 18X program , uh ,

23:40.949 --> 23:43.005
my experience with it is people that

23:43.005 --> 23:45.171
we've tried to help get in the Genesis

23:45.171 --> 23:47.390
program . Has pushed out and I think

23:47.390 --> 23:49.279
the Genesis program would be more

23:49.279 --> 23:51.557
appropriately named the Exodus program .

23:51.557 --> 23:53.668
Most of the people that we would want

23:53.668 --> 23:53.560
in special forces are going to have a

23:53.560 --> 23:55.671
career in athletics . Uh , that means

23:55.671 --> 23:57.838
they're gonna have an injury somewhere

23:57.838 --> 23:59.838
along the way , and yet the Genesis

23:59.838 --> 24:02.560
program seeks through every line of

24:02.560 --> 24:04.560
their medical history . And if they

24:04.560 --> 24:07.089
find any little thing , they . They

24:07.089 --> 24:09.311
forced them out . So some way , somehow

24:09.311 --> 24:11.422
we've got to find the balance between

24:11.422 --> 24:13.589
getting the , uh , the right people in

24:13.589 --> 24:16.329
the 18X program and , um , getting them

24:16.329 --> 24:19.050
around the Genesis program . Um , with

24:19.050 --> 24:21.250
that said , the president , and I

24:21.250 --> 24:23.306
believe rightfully so designated the

24:23.306 --> 24:24.917
cartels as foreign terrorist

24:24.917 --> 24:26.972
organizations . And , uh , they have

24:26.972 --> 24:29.194
directed , he has directed our military

24:29.194 --> 24:31.417
forces to support securing our southern

24:31.417 --> 24:33.417
border . My question gets to , uh ,

24:33.417 --> 24:35.639
your authorities and operations and how

24:35.639 --> 24:37.528
they have shifted to address this

24:37.528 --> 24:37.229
foreign terrorist threat from the

24:37.229 --> 24:41.030
cartels . I can just start from the

24:41.040 --> 24:43.020
the general authority so as as a

24:43.020 --> 24:45.187
designation of FTL that does not grant

24:45.187 --> 24:47.353
us any new authorities , but it , it ,

24:47.353 --> 24:49.409
it definitely unlocks our ability to

24:49.409 --> 24:51.076
work better with our whole of

24:51.076 --> 24:53.020
government approach . You think in

24:53.020 --> 24:55.242
terms of counter threat finance and how

24:55.242 --> 24:57.353
we can better , more efficiently pass

24:57.353 --> 24:59.520
off those target packets if you will ,

24:59.520 --> 25:01.631
the law law enforcement . Um , but at

25:01.631 --> 25:01.329
the end of the day it helps us across

25:01.329 --> 25:03.369
the force reinforce that border

25:03.369 --> 25:05.536
security is national security , and we

25:05.536 --> 25:07.536
will be ready to defend and provide

25:07.536 --> 25:09.425
options to the president if he so

25:09.425 --> 25:11.591
chooses , but that's where we stand in

25:11.591 --> 25:13.813
terms of authorities don't add anything

25:13.813 --> 25:16.036
to that . Yeah , Representative , I'd ,

25:16.036 --> 25:18.202
I'd say I double down on , uh , border

25:18.202 --> 25:17.609
security is national security , and

25:17.609 --> 25:19.887
I've mentioned in my opening statement ,

25:19.887 --> 25:21.776
you know , our part to defend the

25:21.776 --> 25:21.729
homeland if I look at it through the

25:21.729 --> 25:23.840
lens of counterterrorism first really

25:23.840 --> 25:25.729
starts at our border and goes out

25:25.729 --> 25:28.000
across the globe . Um , I would offer a

25:28.000 --> 25:30.222
double down that , you know , we've got

25:30.222 --> 25:32.444
no new authorities or directions , um ,

25:32.444 --> 25:35.359
as the , uh , uh , Secretary Jenkins

25:35.359 --> 25:37.581
mentioned , and then , but priority and

25:37.581 --> 25:39.581
focus certainly has changed , and I

25:39.581 --> 25:41.581
think in that effort you've seen an

25:41.581 --> 25:43.748
uplift of SOCOM teammates to SoC North

25:43.748 --> 25:45.692
Special Operations Command North ,

25:45.692 --> 25:47.692
working with , uh , General Gio and

25:47.692 --> 25:49.803
Northcom in order to put together the

25:49.803 --> 25:51.915
plans , uh , assessments , and , uh ,

25:51.915 --> 25:53.470
various other documents and

25:53.470 --> 25:55.637
opportunities that are required by the

25:55.637 --> 25:57.692
SACAF and by the department . Well ,

25:57.692 --> 25:59.915
the , uh , the 2% of the defense budget

25:59.915 --> 26:02.137
and , and how much you're called on has

26:02.137 --> 26:01.550
been addressed a lot . So I'll skip

26:01.550 --> 26:03.772
over that other than say this , I think

26:03.772 --> 26:05.494
you'll see the members of this

26:05.494 --> 26:07.772
subcommittee working to make sure that ,

26:07.772 --> 26:07.750
uh , that that is addressed . And I do

26:07.750 --> 26:09.917
think that the new secretary will look

26:09.917 --> 26:13.750
favorably , uh , upon that . And , um ,

26:13.859 --> 26:15.692
so you talked a little bit about

26:15.692 --> 26:18.500
intelligence , um . And you've thought

26:18.500 --> 26:21.810
a little bit about drones and how , um ,

26:22.180 --> 26:25.050
drone warfare in Ukraine has changed

26:25.050 --> 26:28.589
really the The face of war .

26:28.920 --> 26:31.390
How , how are you working with , um ,

26:31.949 --> 26:35.109
the outside industry to develop , uh ,

26:35.119 --> 26:37.189
how we're going to protect ourselves

26:37.189 --> 26:40.920
from drones ? I just say just

26:40.920 --> 26:43.087
briefly then talk to the details of uh

26:43.087 --> 26:45.520
just to reassure or validate what you

26:45.520 --> 26:47.687
what you said , sir , uh we , I hosted

26:47.687 --> 26:49.798
uh uh a partner leader in my office a

26:49.798 --> 26:51.909
few weeks ago that's over there and ,

26:51.909 --> 26:53.853
and he reinforced that if , if you

26:53.853 --> 26:55.853
think you're at the cutting edge of

26:55.853 --> 26:55.280
battle and you haven't been to Ukraine ,

26:55.319 --> 26:57.486
then , then you're wrong . And so we ,

26:57.486 --> 26:59.708
we are actively taking the lessons that

26:59.708 --> 27:01.819
we learned there that that require us

27:01.819 --> 27:03.763
to innovate daily if not hourly to

27:03.763 --> 27:05.875
adapt and build solutions on the spot

27:05.875 --> 27:07.763
that can be employed the next day

27:07.763 --> 27:09.819
instead of weeks and months down the

27:09.819 --> 27:11.819
road we are definitely taking those

27:11.819 --> 27:13.763
lessons and applying them . To end

27:13.763 --> 27:15.930
paycom and elsewhere , but in terms of

27:15.930 --> 27:15.680
do you wanna talk to the details of

27:15.680 --> 27:17.791
that ? Thank you , Representative . I

27:17.791 --> 27:19.902
think the heart of your question when

27:19.902 --> 27:21.958
we look at Ukraine , I think we come

27:21.958 --> 27:21.699
away with what I'd call strategic

27:21.699 --> 27:24.280
lesson symmetry versus asymmetry . I

27:24.280 --> 27:26.391
want to think about symmetry , that's

27:26.391 --> 27:28.502
the things that all nations have that

27:28.502 --> 27:30.613
are military fighting nations for the

27:30.613 --> 27:32.947
worst day artillery , aircraft carriers ,

27:33.000 --> 27:35.222
bombers , fighters , and they need it .

27:35.489 --> 27:37.650
Asymmetry I think is where in this

27:37.650 --> 27:40.920
conflict it's showing itself as a 10 x

27:41.290 --> 27:44.650
100X helpful to a cost imposition and I

27:44.650 --> 27:46.706
think when we look at that certainly

27:46.706 --> 27:48.872
through the lens of special operations

27:48.872 --> 27:51.039
command and put it out figuratively in

27:51.039 --> 27:53.094
a ledger symmetry versus asymmetry ,

27:53.094 --> 27:55.261
our sense is the asymmetry side of the

27:55.261 --> 27:57.483
house , uh , is not where we need to be

27:57.483 --> 27:59.706
in many ways is probably missing drones

27:59.706 --> 28:01.539
of any kind , AI autonomy out of

28:01.539 --> 28:03.761
manufacturing . To your point , that is

28:03.761 --> 28:05.983
now the purview in many of those of the

28:05.983 --> 28:08.150
commercial and the private sector . We

28:08.150 --> 28:10.206
are absolutely involved with them in

28:10.206 --> 28:12.428
many , many different ways , personally

28:12.428 --> 28:14.594
going out and meeting them , listening

28:14.594 --> 28:14.339
to the things they're seeing ,

28:14.540 --> 28:16.707
providing some of our observations and

28:16.707 --> 28:18.929
lesson loans from Ukraine so that those

28:18.929 --> 28:20.984
things can be blended . We have tech

28:20.984 --> 28:23.449
pods , uh , 2 or 3 folks that are in

28:23.660 --> 28:25.771
New York , Boston Corridor , Austin ,

28:25.771 --> 28:27.827
Texas , Silicon Valley , and we have

28:28.060 --> 28:30.282
all kinds of ways for folks to come see

28:30.282 --> 28:32.338
us at SOCOM to talk to us about that

28:32.338 --> 28:34.504
because we know that that we've got to

28:34.504 --> 28:36.782
get busy and changing that ledger . Uh ,

28:36.782 --> 28:38.893
we got to start filling that thing in

28:38.893 --> 28:41.060
with asymmetric anything , hundreds of

28:41.060 --> 28:43.060
thousands of air on crude systems ,

28:43.060 --> 28:45.171
maritime surface , subsurface , and I

28:45.171 --> 28:47.171
would just offer as I end this that

28:47.171 --> 28:49.227
also takes money . And I think as we

28:49.227 --> 28:51.449
think modernization , that's one of the

28:51.449 --> 28:50.670
things that you know we're really

28:50.670 --> 28:52.430
talking about here uh we're

28:52.430 --> 28:54.550
transferring risk , uh , into

28:54.550 --> 28:56.661
modernization and deterrence and that

28:56.661 --> 28:58.709
risk in my mind is winning in the

28:58.709 --> 29:00.750
future . I think that that's the

29:00.750 --> 29:02.806
challenge right now and that will be

29:02.806 --> 29:04.917
part of winning those uncrude systems

29:04.917 --> 29:07.083
and AI and certainly autonomy . Well ,

29:07.083 --> 29:09.139
I'm glad the leash is off and I hope

29:09.139 --> 29:11.306
that you get some money to , to , uh ,

29:11.306 --> 29:13.528
get the equipment that you need . Thank

29:13.528 --> 29:15.528
you . Thank you , Mr . Scott . Mr .

29:15.528 --> 29:17.472
Cisneros , you're recognized for 5

29:17.472 --> 29:19.583
minutes . Thank you , Mr . Chairman ,

29:19.583 --> 29:21.639
and uh thank our witnesses for being

29:21.639 --> 29:23.861
here today . As a former USD of PNR , I

29:23.861 --> 29:25.972
feel like I have to defend Genesis in

29:25.972 --> 29:28.083
the sense . Uh , what it does and and

29:28.083 --> 29:30.306
the fact that it does give a picture of

29:30.306 --> 29:30.020
looking at the whole medical thing but

29:30.020 --> 29:33.780
it is the services , not Genesis that

29:33.780 --> 29:35.930
decides what is acceptable medically

29:35.930 --> 29:38.569
and what is not . But with that , um ,

29:39.420 --> 29:41.642
being the former USDP and our readiness

29:41.642 --> 29:43.753
was part of my portfolio and training

29:43.753 --> 29:45.829
fell under under that . So my first

29:45.829 --> 29:47.940
question , General Fenton is gonna be

29:47.940 --> 29:50.089
about training and there was a GAO

29:50.089 --> 29:53.439
report , um . That came out that said

29:53.439 --> 29:55.661
most training accidents are a result of

29:55.661 --> 29:57.680
human error and concerningly SOCOM

29:57.680 --> 29:59.736
lacks the funding to fully implement

29:59.736 --> 30:02.229
the training oversight program . So

30:02.229 --> 30:04.550
does SOCOM have any plan to conduct any

30:04.550 --> 30:07.229
analysis of negative safety trends or

30:07.229 --> 30:09.060
re-evaluate training assessment

30:09.060 --> 30:12.170
programs since it was reported that 80%

30:12.170 --> 30:14.310
of non-combat incidents come from

30:14.310 --> 30:17.609
training ? Representative , I , I'll

30:17.609 --> 30:19.665
start by saying first , any accident

30:19.665 --> 30:22.479
training or uh where she had a death uh

30:22.479 --> 30:24.500
is absolutely not what we're we're

30:24.500 --> 30:27.380
we're all about . We are about um

30:27.380 --> 30:30.550
rigorous , uh , arduous training , uh ,

30:30.560 --> 30:32.839
so that if in the event some of our

30:32.839 --> 30:35.400
teammates go into combat that combat is

30:35.400 --> 30:37.511
easier than the training they've seen

30:37.511 --> 30:39.733
and the training we'll do over and over

30:39.733 --> 30:41.789
again . I would , uh , take , take a

30:41.789 --> 30:43.789
little bit of um . Uh , umbridge or

30:43.789 --> 30:45.900
maybe even dispute with the fact that

30:45.900 --> 30:47.956
we don't do continual assessments of

30:47.956 --> 30:49.900
the safety of our various training

30:49.900 --> 30:51.733
courses we do , we have a lot of

30:51.733 --> 30:53.956
training courses , assessment selection

30:53.956 --> 30:55.900
for our army teammates , Air Force

30:55.900 --> 30:57.900
teammates , Marine teammates , Navy

30:57.900 --> 30:59.900
teammates , and those are looked at

30:59.900 --> 31:01.956
consistently usually by what I would

31:01.956 --> 31:04.233
call an outer cordon of medical safety ,

31:04.449 --> 31:06.410
uh , very , uh , very experienced

31:06.410 --> 31:09.609
civilian personnel to to to continue to

31:09.609 --> 31:12.099
um address that . Uh , that's our

31:12.099 --> 31:14.619
sacred obligation to the , the uh .

31:15.739 --> 31:17.795
Moms and dads to send us their their

31:17.795 --> 31:19.850
sons and daughters for these kind of

31:19.850 --> 31:22.072
standards-based training and we do that

31:22.072 --> 31:24.350
so I think we're always in that motion .

31:24.350 --> 31:26.572
Uh , we , we continually strive to have

31:26.572 --> 31:28.739
the very hardest training we can while

31:28.739 --> 31:31.017
protecting the teammates that are , uh ,

31:31.017 --> 31:33.239
certainly the national treasure sent to

31:33.239 --> 31:35.461
us by this nation . Do you , but do you

31:35.461 --> 31:37.683
have the funding that you need in order

31:37.683 --> 31:39.683
to implement the training oversight

31:39.683 --> 31:41.572
programs and do ensuring that the

31:41.572 --> 31:43.739
safety of the training is is at max

31:43.739 --> 31:45.906
capacity there . Uh , representative ,

31:45.969 --> 31:48.410
first I'll start . No , um , I talk

31:48.410 --> 31:50.466
about it in terms of modernization ,

31:50.466 --> 31:52.299
and I think as I laid out in the

31:52.299 --> 31:54.466
opening statement , and we'll continue

31:54.466 --> 31:56.466
to come back to , uh , training and

31:56.466 --> 31:58.132
training exercises along with

31:58.132 --> 32:00.243
modernizing authorities , modernizing

32:00.243 --> 32:02.577
technology and when I talk about people ,

32:02.577 --> 32:04.521
certainly I start with humans more

32:04.521 --> 32:06.354
important the hardware long held

32:06.354 --> 32:08.577
special , uh , operations command Truth

32:08.577 --> 32:10.688
and education for uncertainty as part

32:10.688 --> 32:12.577
of modernization , and that's our

32:12.577 --> 32:14.959
humans . We absolutely need more money

32:14.959 --> 32:16.848
to make sure we're doing that and

32:16.848 --> 32:19.015
keeping up , especially as we make our

32:19.015 --> 32:21.237
training exercises , not our assessment

32:21.237 --> 32:23.292
selection processes , more complex ,

32:23.292 --> 32:25.760
more complicated so that we emulate

32:25.760 --> 32:27.649
what we're actually seeing on the

32:27.649 --> 32:29.482
environment now . Integrated air

32:29.482 --> 32:31.482
missile defense it's no longer just

32:31.482 --> 32:33.482
about opSec and distance . Now it's

32:33.482 --> 32:35.149
almost pure adversary systems

32:35.149 --> 32:37.093
everywhere , so I think absolutely

32:37.093 --> 32:39.260
representative no well thank you and I

32:39.260 --> 32:41.482
understand I mean the training like you

32:41.482 --> 32:43.427
said the job and the missions that

32:43.427 --> 32:45.538
you're . Uh , your service members go

32:45.538 --> 32:47.704
out and have to do , uh , they need to

32:47.704 --> 32:49.816
train at optimum levels , so , but we

32:49.816 --> 32:51.927
need to make sure , and I , I think I

32:51.927 --> 32:51.790
don't wanna speak for the committee ,

32:51.910 --> 32:54.132
but I will do what I can to ensure that

32:54.132 --> 32:56.354
you have the funding to ensure that you

32:56.354 --> 32:58.577
have the safety standards that you need

32:58.577 --> 32:58.420
to ensure that it's safe . Thank you ,

32:58.430 --> 33:00.550
um , Mr . Jenkins , just , uh , one

33:00.550 --> 33:03.510
question for you here , sir . um , you

33:03.510 --> 33:05.750
know , Congress created like the

33:05.750 --> 33:07.917
special operation forces there to kind

33:07.917 --> 33:10.194
of almost make it like another service ,

33:10.194 --> 33:12.417
but yet it's not really another service

33:12.417 --> 33:14.694
because . You know , you're not like a ,

33:14.694 --> 33:16.639
you're not in the acting role as a

33:16.639 --> 33:18.750
service chief . You're really kind of

33:18.750 --> 33:20.472
uh well I think at a assistant

33:20.472 --> 33:23.650
secretary level there , right ? So . Do

33:23.650 --> 33:25.729
you feel that the fact that they've

33:25.729 --> 33:27.840
kind of taken this and kind of put it

33:27.840 --> 33:30.062
in there and started this off , they're

33:30.062 --> 33:32.118
away from the services that that has

33:32.118 --> 33:34.340
kind of had an effect on the funding as

33:34.340 --> 33:36.396
to maybe why the services may not be

33:36.396 --> 33:38.396
funding this or or it's not getting

33:38.396 --> 33:40.562
funded at the level because you're not

33:40.562 --> 33:42.729
at an equal level and yet the services

33:42.729 --> 33:44.951
don't have control over this anymore so

33:44.951 --> 33:46.951
they're not putting in the assets .

33:46.951 --> 33:49.173
That they used to , uh , perhaps you've

33:49.173 --> 33:51.451
landed on some , some key points there ,

33:51.451 --> 33:51.310
and we , we are grateful to Congress

33:51.310 --> 33:53.366
that that SOLIC exists so that we do

33:53.366 --> 33:55.532
have those service like capabilities .

33:55.532 --> 33:57.839
Um , I do wear two hats where I am a

33:57.839 --> 34:00.540
service like , uh , uh , adviser to the

34:00.540 --> 34:02.707
SECF , but I'm also a policy advisor ,

34:02.707 --> 34:04.929
so it's a unique ASD ship , as you said

34:04.929 --> 34:06.651
and . And so , so yes , we are

34:06.651 --> 34:08.707
constantly keeping our elbow sharp ,

34:08.707 --> 34:10.818
making sure that we're at the correct

34:10.818 --> 34:12.984
tables with our service counterparts ,

34:12.984 --> 34:12.770
and that as they ponder cuts we can

34:12.770 --> 34:15.010
defend our own equities and and make

34:15.010 --> 34:17.232
sure that they understand a cut here in

34:17.232 --> 34:19.454
the army affects Army soft down here or

34:19.454 --> 34:21.677
a cut in the navy affects naval special

34:21.677 --> 34:23.843
warfare as well . So we , we certainly

34:23.843 --> 34:25.621
are grateful for Congress , the

34:25.621 --> 34:27.621
reinforcement that we receive . All

34:27.621 --> 34:29.621
right , are you back another time .

34:29.621 --> 34:31.510
Thank you , sir . Mr . Luttrell ,

34:31.510 --> 34:33.621
you're now recognized for 5 minutes .

34:33.621 --> 34:33.408
Thank you , Mr . Chairman . Thank you

34:33.408 --> 34:35.468
all for coming this morning and for

34:35.468 --> 34:37.301
everybody in here in uniform and

34:37.301 --> 34:39.524
veterans , thank you for your service .

34:39.524 --> 34:41.468
Uh , general , preservation of the

34:41.468 --> 34:43.579
force is one of the things that I , I

34:43.579 --> 34:45.579
really focused in on as a member of

34:45.579 --> 34:48.239
Congress . And it's not , it's kind of

34:48.239 --> 34:51.540
roll the tape back . Um It's not

34:51.540 --> 34:53.651
something necessarily we , we , the ,

34:53.651 --> 34:55.984
the shooters necessarily concentrate on .

34:55.984 --> 34:57.984
I think it's more of the force that

34:57.984 --> 35:01.879
needs to . Apply that . Kind of

35:01.879 --> 35:04.080
those , those spaces to , to the

35:04.080 --> 35:06.909
special operations community and we

35:06.909 --> 35:09.360
have subject matter experts in the , in

35:09.360 --> 35:11.582
the , in the special forces community .

35:11.582 --> 35:13.804
We have dietitians , nutritionists , we

35:13.804 --> 35:15.860
have exercise scientists , we have a

35:15.860 --> 35:18.027
myriad of professionals that outline .

35:18.027 --> 35:20.209
Everything for our operators , but yet

35:20.459 --> 35:22.659
when this information is provided to

35:22.659 --> 35:24.770
those operators , they have to go out

35:24.860 --> 35:26.860
and buy those supplements and those

35:26.860 --> 35:28.860
nutrients and and and everything to

35:28.860 --> 35:30.804
just for that sustainment and that

35:30.804 --> 35:33.520
sustainment process , um . With their

35:33.520 --> 35:35.840
own money and I wholeheartedly now

35:35.840 --> 35:38.007
disagree with that . I think that that

35:38.007 --> 35:40.229
should be something that is provided by

35:40.229 --> 35:42.284
the community . Uh , I'd like to get

35:42.284 --> 35:44.396
your thoughts on that and , and , and

35:44.396 --> 35:46.618
see , and see , um , you know , and get

35:46.618 --> 35:48.618
your stance because it's downstream

35:48.618 --> 35:50.673
that I'm also worried about once the

35:50.673 --> 35:50.239
operators they exit the military and

35:50.239 --> 35:52.350
they , they start the next chapter in

35:52.350 --> 35:54.517
their life , we want to make sure that

35:54.517 --> 35:56.572
they , they have the ability to move

35:56.572 --> 35:58.517
forward and they don't end up bald

35:58.517 --> 36:01.350
broken with beards and . Just say my

36:01.350 --> 36:03.590
name . I had it , uh , sir , I can't

36:03.590 --> 36:05.701
put that on the record . I don't want

36:05.701 --> 36:07.923
to look in that direction . Yeah , OK ,

36:07.923 --> 36:07.870
but you know where I'm kind of going it

36:07.870 --> 36:11.469
sir , sir , sir , uh , thank you . Uh ,

36:11.560 --> 36:13.671
uh , I'll start with , uh , I do want

36:13.671 --> 36:15.909
to thank , uh , this Congress and many

36:15.909 --> 36:18.050
who came before those who come after

36:18.050 --> 36:20.272
for the , uh , POTI program . That that

36:20.429 --> 36:22.780
that's huge , uh , inside of an

36:22.780 --> 36:24.836
organization that says people as our

36:24.836 --> 36:26.891
number one priority because they are

36:26.891 --> 36:29.002
competitive and competitive advantage

36:29.002 --> 36:30.891
and in plain language they're the

36:30.891 --> 36:33.002
weapon system , uh , and I think when

36:33.002 --> 36:35.169
you think about it that way we look at

36:35.169 --> 36:34.870
it through the lens of human

36:34.870 --> 36:37.040
performance by maybe what standards

36:37.040 --> 36:39.510
would be elsewhere for just wellness .

36:39.860 --> 36:41.971
And , and I think when we go to human

36:41.971 --> 36:45.229
performance , you uh your uh uh alumni

36:45.229 --> 36:47.340
representative of what we do , it's a

36:47.340 --> 36:49.451
science-based approach to how we work

36:49.451 --> 36:51.396
out , which is very different than

36:51.396 --> 36:53.285
maybe 20-30 years ago . nutrition

36:53.285 --> 36:55.507
absolutely as you said , we know that's

36:55.507 --> 36:57.673
a key part . Sleep , it's everything ,

36:57.673 --> 36:59.785
and we're blessed that that's part of

36:59.785 --> 37:01.840
our , our ecosystem . I think on the

37:01.840 --> 37:04.118
nutrition side we do have the greatest .

37:04.118 --> 37:06.285
Nutritionists , dieticians , they come

37:06.285 --> 37:08.507
from the sports , the high-end athletic

37:08.507 --> 37:10.507
community , and they're , they're ,

37:10.507 --> 37:10.399
they're taking it like tactical

37:10.399 --> 37:12.566
athletes that we are . I think in that

37:12.566 --> 37:14.566
point they talked to us quite a bit

37:14.566 --> 37:16.621
about upping our game through either

37:16.621 --> 37:18.949
third party certified supplements , uh ,

37:18.969 --> 37:21.191
in a way that they can account for . We

37:21.191 --> 37:23.247
absolutely want to protect our force

37:23.247 --> 37:25.525
put anything in the force that is , uh ,

37:25.525 --> 37:27.525
a long term endangerment . Uh , but

37:27.525 --> 37:29.691
these are assessed and , and checked ,

37:29.691 --> 37:31.580
I think supplements , third party

37:31.580 --> 37:33.691
certified , and sports foods , things

37:33.691 --> 37:35.302
that help continue to up the

37:35.302 --> 37:37.358
performance , uh , unlike what maybe

37:37.358 --> 37:39.525
our adversaries are doing when they're

37:39.525 --> 37:41.636
experimenting on each other and doing

37:41.636 --> 37:43.802
things that we absolutely would not do

37:43.802 --> 37:46.136
to any of our teammates , um , so I , I ,

37:46.136 --> 37:48.358
I , I absolutely think that's something

37:48.358 --> 37:50.580
we need to consider and we'll certainly

37:50.580 --> 37:49.870
look for your support on that . Thank

37:49.870 --> 37:52.092
you . And so Mr . Jenkins , when you're

37:52.189 --> 37:54.467
chatting with the Secretary of Defense ,

37:54.467 --> 37:56.633
um , if , if you would be so kind to .

37:58.379 --> 38:00.657
Bring this point to him that he , this ,

38:00.879 --> 38:02.546
he knows this . I've had this

38:02.546 --> 38:04.768
conversation with him , but I want this

38:04.768 --> 38:06.990
to resonate not only from the committee

38:06.990 --> 38:06.879
but to the leadership and the DOD that

38:06.879 --> 38:09.909
um . This is an area that needs to be

38:09.909 --> 38:12.076
filled . This is a gap . This is a gap

38:12.076 --> 38:15.510
that we shouldn't have any longer , um ,

38:15.590 --> 38:18.129
you bet . And as you know , our our

38:18.129 --> 38:20.407
service members are his first priority .

38:20.469 --> 38:22.580
You see him doing PT with them . He's

38:22.580 --> 38:24.802
at every turn he's , he's engaging , so

38:24.802 --> 38:26.858
definitely that that would be top of

38:26.858 --> 38:29.080
mind . OK , when it comes to preventive

38:29.080 --> 38:31.302
maintenance , and I like to focus in on

38:31.302 --> 38:33.830
traumatic brain injury and and . I want

38:33.830 --> 38:35.719
to make sure that the , the , the

38:35.719 --> 38:38.969
forces are You know , we're , we're

38:38.969 --> 38:40.913
gifted , we're innovative creative

38:40.913 --> 38:42.913
thinkers and we adapt very well . I

38:42.913 --> 38:44.747
wanna make sure that we're we're

38:44.747 --> 38:46.747
concentrating on things that we can

38:46.747 --> 38:48.802
carry with us on the battlefield for

38:48.802 --> 38:51.025
preventive maintenance , but post blast

38:51.025 --> 38:53.025
medical procedures , whether or not

38:53.025 --> 38:55.191
we're talking about blast packs or I ,

38:55.191 --> 38:57.191
I don't want that to kind of take a

38:57.191 --> 38:59.247
take get back on its heels and stall

38:59.247 --> 39:01.358
out any so I know that you and I have

39:01.358 --> 39:03.580
had this conversation quite a bit , but

39:03.580 --> 39:05.747
I , I just , I need you to hear me say

39:05.747 --> 39:07.802
this . And I like you can respond to

39:07.802 --> 39:10.025
that if you like . I want to give you a

39:10.025 --> 39:09.709
commitment right back . I appreciate

39:09.709 --> 39:12.070
you saying I want to double down . Uh ,

39:12.300 --> 39:14.411
I , I would just pull the thread from

39:14.411 --> 39:16.633
the last conversation . I think some of

39:16.633 --> 39:18.856
these third party supplements , and I ,

39:18.856 --> 39:18.830
I probably don't know them by name ,

39:19.159 --> 39:23.040
also have , uh , efficacy . Uh , uh ,

39:23.090 --> 39:25.368
against TBI and other things that , uh ,

39:25.368 --> 39:27.590
our nutritionists have looked at , so I

39:27.590 --> 39:29.812
think there's a , a thread to be pulled

39:29.812 --> 39:31.534
in there . I double down on my

39:31.534 --> 39:33.757
commitment to you . We will not back up

39:33.757 --> 39:35.923
on either the TBI side , which we when

39:35.923 --> 39:38.090
we talk about it as acute brain injury

39:38.090 --> 39:40.257
or even the repeat exposure to blast ,

39:40.257 --> 39:42.312
which is a chronic piece that I hope

39:42.312 --> 39:44.646
many of you got to see me talk about on ,

39:44.646 --> 39:46.590
on , uh , 60 Minutes and reinforce

39:46.590 --> 39:48.590
SOCOM's commitment to that . So you

39:48.590 --> 39:50.701
have my commitment to both of those ,

39:50.701 --> 39:50.139
uh , representative . Thank you , sir .

39:52.429 --> 39:54.151
Thank you Ms . Jacobs . You're

39:54.151 --> 39:56.318
recognized for 5 minutes . Thank you ,

39:56.318 --> 39:56.120
Mr . Chairman . Uh , thank you ,

39:56.159 --> 39:58.381
General Fenton , Mr . Jenkins for being

39:58.381 --> 40:00.715
here . Um , first , I just want to , um ,

40:01.060 --> 40:02.838
thank you for , uh , your great

40:02.838 --> 40:04.504
comments on the importance of

40:04.504 --> 40:06.671
addressing civilian harm . I know that

40:06.671 --> 40:08.560
there's some conversations in the

40:08.560 --> 40:10.727
administration about shutting down the

40:10.727 --> 40:12.504
center of excellence , and so I

40:12.504 --> 40:14.338
appreciate how forcefully you've

40:14.338 --> 40:16.116
advocated for the importance of

40:16.116 --> 40:18.116
addressing this issue . Um , I also

40:18.116 --> 40:20.409
just wanted , um , to , to make sure I ,

40:20.540 --> 40:23.419
uh , we get on the record . Um , I know

40:23.419 --> 40:25.141
you said the foreign terrorist

40:25.141 --> 40:27.363
organization designation of the Mexican

40:27.363 --> 40:29.530
drug cartels does not give you any new

40:29.530 --> 40:32.199
authorizations . Is that accurate ? Yes

40:32.199 --> 40:35.260
ma'am . OK . And uh , are there any

40:35.260 --> 40:37.929
planning or preparations for military

40:37.929 --> 40:41.570
action occurring within Mexico ?

40:42.270 --> 40:44.429
Ma'am , I , I can't speak to active

40:44.429 --> 40:46.540
ongoing discussions , but , but it is

40:46.540 --> 40:48.762
our sacred obligation to make sure that

40:48.762 --> 40:50.818
we are prepared and ready to provide

40:50.818 --> 40:52.818
options for the president should he

40:52.818 --> 40:55.040
decide . OK , and , uh , given that the

40:55.040 --> 40:56.929
FTO designation does not give you

40:56.929 --> 40:58.929
additional authorities , is it your

40:58.929 --> 41:01.179
understanding that before any potential

41:01.179 --> 41:03.290
use of military force in Mexico , you

41:03.290 --> 41:05.512
would need to come back to Congress for

41:05.512 --> 41:07.679
explicit congressional authorization ?

41:07.850 --> 41:10.072
Ma'am , that would , that would fall to

41:10.072 --> 41:12.128
our commander in chief and , and the

41:12.128 --> 41:14.350
engagement between the executive branch

41:14.350 --> 41:16.683
and Congress . So yes , ma'am , I would ,

41:16.683 --> 41:15.899
I would think there would be discussion

41:15.899 --> 41:18.489
there . OK , excellent . Um , General

41:18.489 --> 41:20.433
Fenton , I wanted to ask you about

41:20.433 --> 41:22.550
Africa . Um , the record of soft

41:22.550 --> 41:24.661
operations in Africa has been mixed ,

41:24.661 --> 41:26.439
right ? We've had some tactical

41:26.439 --> 41:28.939
successes . Some , uh , you know ,

41:29.020 --> 41:31.580
evident strategic outcomes , uh , such

41:31.580 --> 41:33.802
as stability , governance , and lasting

41:33.802 --> 41:36.024
reduction and extremist activity remain

41:36.024 --> 41:38.060
elusive , um , and we've seen in

41:38.060 --> 41:41.780
Somalia and the Sahel , um , so given

41:41.780 --> 41:44.002
these outcomes , how is SOCOM adjusting

41:44.002 --> 41:45.947
its approach to ensure that future

41:45.947 --> 41:47.891
engagements yield more sustainable

41:47.891 --> 41:49.502
results and avoid unintended

41:49.502 --> 41:51.447
consequences such as inadvertently

41:51.447 --> 41:53.613
contributing to regional instability ?

41:53.613 --> 41:55.669
Uh , representative , uh , um , I'll

41:55.669 --> 41:57.724
start by saying that when I , when I

41:57.724 --> 41:59.780
look at , uh , partnerships wherever

41:59.780 --> 42:01.891
they may be and certainly through the

42:01.891 --> 42:03.724
lens of SOCOM as premier partner

42:03.724 --> 42:05.613
organization and the way that our

42:05.613 --> 42:07.502
components in our theater special

42:07.502 --> 42:09.336
operations command do it , I , I

42:09.336 --> 42:11.558
probably take a bit of a long term view

42:11.558 --> 42:13.558
maybe all the way back to the 1950s

42:13.558 --> 42:15.558
when Special forces and then RRSA ,

42:16.260 --> 42:18.830
ASOC , NSW teams all started , so I

42:18.830 --> 42:21.052
think the , the record is mostly on the

42:21.052 --> 42:23.163
upside in terms of partnership across

42:23.163 --> 42:25.274
the globe . I'd probably say the same

42:25.274 --> 42:27.219
thing in Africa and I think that's

42:27.219 --> 42:29.330
attributable to when there are , uh ,

42:29.330 --> 42:30.997
challenges . I think we're an

42:30.997 --> 42:33.219
incredibly fast learning organization .

42:33.219 --> 42:35.386
What we do to address them in terms of

42:35.386 --> 42:37.441
maybe it's how we vet differently if

42:37.441 --> 42:39.552
we're talking about a certain type of

42:39.552 --> 42:41.774
forces it could be uh about authorities

42:41.774 --> 42:43.941
we need modernized so that we can move

42:43.941 --> 42:45.774
faster and then meet the partner

42:45.774 --> 42:47.941
nations' demand . I think all of those

42:47.941 --> 42:50.163
really go towards at some point we have

42:50.163 --> 42:52.330
a common interest . We want to go from

42:52.330 --> 42:54.497
some level of burden sharing to burden

42:54.497 --> 42:57.120
owning by uh that nation at some point

42:57.120 --> 42:59.342
them leading in that burden and I think

42:59.342 --> 43:01.342
to do that we're always gonna learn

43:01.342 --> 43:03.398
lessons but I can commit to you that

43:03.398 --> 43:03.159
we're always bringing them back in a

43:03.159 --> 43:05.879
virtuous cycle to our force and then

43:05.879 --> 43:08.046
inserting them in an institutionalized

43:08.046 --> 43:10.212
way and then doing it all over again .

43:10.212 --> 43:12.379
Um , that's really helpful . Um , what

43:12.379 --> 43:14.546
do you think the lessons are then from

43:14.546 --> 43:16.712
some of the sort of strategic failures

43:16.712 --> 43:19.729
we've had in the Sahel ? Um , so I

43:19.729 --> 43:21.673
don't know that SOFA had strategic

43:21.673 --> 43:23.562
failures just to be on the record

43:23.562 --> 43:25.673
myself . uh , I think there , there's

43:25.673 --> 43:27.562
certainly strategic lessons to be

43:27.562 --> 43:29.729
learned . I think the first one , if I

43:29.729 --> 43:31.896
could give , uh , is , uh , we need to

43:31.896 --> 43:33.840
do more information operations . I

43:33.840 --> 43:36.007
think there's a void , and this is not

43:36.007 --> 43:35.729
only in SOCOM , it's probably the

43:35.729 --> 43:37.951
Department of Defense , probably across

43:37.951 --> 43:40.399
the uh in our agency . Um , that

43:40.399 --> 43:42.621
information operation void in many ways

43:42.621 --> 43:44.732
I think allowed adversaries to get in

43:44.732 --> 43:46.800
there and um mistruths , untruths ,

43:47.000 --> 43:49.239
falsities put a different narrative

43:49.239 --> 43:51.461
based on their view of the world , what

43:51.461 --> 43:53.770
they wanted . And mostly uh the great

43:53.770 --> 43:56.169
work we've done for years . So I think

43:56.169 --> 43:58.225
information operations is number one

43:58.225 --> 44:00.002
silence is consent if we're not

44:00.129 --> 44:02.240
informing and we're not uh leveraging

44:02.240 --> 44:04.185
that as a traditional activity , I

44:04.185 --> 44:06.240
think , uh , we're seeing in space .

44:06.240 --> 44:08.296
Probably the second one is , uh , an

44:08.296 --> 44:10.351
opportunity to really understand the

44:10.351 --> 44:12.518
other partners there besides just that

44:12.518 --> 44:14.573
nation , so partners from across the

44:14.573 --> 44:16.629
globe and what are their agendas ? I

44:16.629 --> 44:18.740
think we get better that at each time

44:18.740 --> 44:20.962
they'll be the two that I'd put against

44:20.962 --> 44:23.296
the backdrop of Africa . Thank you , um ,

44:23.296 --> 44:25.407
Mr . Jenkins , anything you wanted to

44:25.407 --> 44:27.280
add about , um , so , uh , soft

44:27.280 --> 44:29.447
operations in Africa ? Uh , we want to

44:29.447 --> 44:31.391
make sure that there are 3 primary

44:31.391 --> 44:33.558
lines of effort that we're focusing on

44:33.558 --> 44:35.836
defend the homeland , uh , deter China ,

44:35.836 --> 44:38.002
and make sure that we shift burdens to

44:38.002 --> 44:40.113
our allies and partners . So anything

44:40.113 --> 44:42.002
that affects those three lines of

44:42.002 --> 44:44.224
effort if we see threats emanating from

44:44.224 --> 44:46.336
West Africa , otherwise we would need

44:46.336 --> 44:46.179
to take every opportunity we can to ,

44:46.189 --> 44:48.350
to mitigate that . Well , thank you .

44:48.840 --> 44:51.062
Thank you , thank you , Mr . Chairman .

44:51.120 --> 44:53.398
Thank you . Against my better judgment ,

44:53.398 --> 44:55.620
Mr . Van Orden , you are recognized for

44:55.620 --> 44:57.842
5 minutes . Thank you , Mr . Chairman .

44:57.842 --> 45:00.009
I noticed that my colleague from Texas

45:00.009 --> 45:02.009
abandoned his post , knowing that I

45:02.009 --> 45:04.176
have the microphone next . Um , I just

45:04.176 --> 45:06.009
wanna emphasize something , Mr .

45:06.009 --> 45:08.176
Jenkins that you mentioned , and you ,

45:08.176 --> 45:10.287
we've had this discussion , we've had

45:10.287 --> 45:12.509
this discussion , Mr . Cinneros brought

45:12.509 --> 45:14.564
it up . Um , the Army Special Forces

45:14.564 --> 45:16.620
Green Berets are named after a hat .

45:16.679 --> 45:19.139
And the seals are named after how we go

45:19.139 --> 45:21.195
to work , right ? Sea air and land ,

45:21.195 --> 45:23.306
those are the methods of infiltration

45:23.306 --> 45:25.528
for us to accomplish a mission and when

45:25.528 --> 45:27.860
general purpose forces cut these

45:27.860 --> 45:30.129
platforms we simply can't go to work .

45:30.979 --> 45:34.189
And um it it would be interesting to

45:34.189 --> 45:36.356
know what is your coordination process

45:36.356 --> 45:38.189
with general purpose forces when

45:38.189 --> 45:40.245
they're speaking about cutting these

45:40.245 --> 45:42.022
platforms ? I mean , is there a

45:42.022 --> 45:43.967
formalized processor ? There are ,

45:43.967 --> 45:46.189
there are different , and thank you for

45:46.189 --> 45:45.949
calling that out because that is very

45:45.949 --> 45:47.949
much right in our bay look where we

45:47.949 --> 45:49.893
need to defend our equities . Um ,

45:49.893 --> 45:52.005
there are different processes DMAGs ,

45:52.005 --> 45:54.419
RAGs , uh , where we are able to sit

45:54.419 --> 45:56.350
with our services with other

45:56.350 --> 45:58.572
representatives from Comptroller in the

45:58.572 --> 46:00.794
deputy's office where , where proposals

46:00.794 --> 46:02.961
can be put forward and we can , we can

46:02.961 --> 46:02.949
battle back . We can defend or or in

46:02.949 --> 46:05.171
the spirit of bipartisanship , bring up

46:05.171 --> 46:07.393
Mr . Cinisterra's point , um , when you

46:07.393 --> 46:09.560
sit at the table , I mean , are you at

46:09.560 --> 46:11.616
the kid table at Thanksgiving or are

46:11.616 --> 46:13.727
you like sitting with everybody ? And

46:13.727 --> 46:15.893
you're pulling your weight , meaning ,

46:15.893 --> 46:18.116
does your , does your , um , assessment

46:18.116 --> 46:20.338
have value in these scenarios and we're

46:20.338 --> 46:22.338
speaking about cutting , you know ,

46:22.338 --> 46:24.116
multi-billion dollar multi-year

46:24.116 --> 46:26.338
platforms . It , it , we certainly have

46:26.338 --> 46:28.338
to it's a constant struggle to make

46:28.338 --> 46:30.560
sure that our elbows stay sharp , but ,

46:30.560 --> 46:30.379
but we are at , for example , just last

46:30.379 --> 46:32.601
week I was sitting two chairs down from

46:32.601 --> 46:34.657
the deputy briefing our budget , our

46:34.657 --> 46:36.823
soft budget , and had the full room to

46:36.823 --> 46:38.990
our to our attention . And , and , and

46:38.990 --> 46:41.212
support , so we , but , but , but , but

46:41.212 --> 46:41.189
to your point , we have , it's a

46:41.189 --> 46:43.189
constant struggle . It's a , it's a

46:43.189 --> 46:45.300
different culture to to think of soft

46:45.300 --> 46:48.270
as , as a service . So that's why we

46:48.270 --> 46:50.381
appreciate Congress's support so that

46:50.381 --> 46:52.548
we are there . Very well , thank you ,

46:52.548 --> 46:54.381
and I'm sorry , I remiss for not

46:54.381 --> 46:56.492
recognizing the mass chief and CS I'm

46:56.492 --> 46:55.820
here . Thanks for coming here , boys .

46:55.870 --> 46:58.070
It's good to see you . Um , less than

46:58.070 --> 47:01.260
2% of the DOD budget is spent on soft

47:01.260 --> 47:03.560
operations , correct ? Uh , everyone

47:03.560 --> 47:05.671
here , I think everyone at least over

47:05.671 --> 47:08.280
here has done , uh , joint combined

47:08.280 --> 47:11.030
exercise for training . Um , sometimes

47:11.439 --> 47:13.606
we would call that training tomorrow's

47:13.606 --> 47:15.550
enemies today and we have a proven

47:15.550 --> 47:17.772
track record of training people that we

47:17.772 --> 47:19.995
should not , everything from the school

47:19.995 --> 47:22.328
of America's in the 70s and uh you know ,

47:22.328 --> 47:24.272
trained the Taliban , armed them ,

47:24.272 --> 47:23.889
equipped them , did all this stuff .

47:23.919 --> 47:25.975
We've created our own enemies and so

47:25.975 --> 47:28.030
I'm wondering what percentage of the

47:28.030 --> 47:31.790
soft budget is used for the JET

47:31.790 --> 47:35.080
programs . Well , I don't know that

47:35.080 --> 47:37.358
specific number off the top of my head ,

47:37.358 --> 47:39.524
but we can get back I would appreciate

47:39.524 --> 47:41.636
that tremendously and then along with

47:41.636 --> 47:43.691
that , so I , I have two tasks for 2

47:43.691 --> 47:45.691
bits of homework because you're not

47:45.691 --> 47:45.070
gonna know the answer to this one

47:45.070 --> 47:48.110
either . Um , so , and , uh , that's

47:48.110 --> 47:50.270
not a , I'm not impugning your , your

47:50.270 --> 47:52.270
knowledge . I'm just saying this is

47:52.270 --> 47:54.326
kind of a detailed question . So I'd

47:54.326 --> 47:54.179
like to know what percentage of the

47:54.179 --> 47:56.429
soft budget is used for J sets . I also

47:56.429 --> 47:58.151
want , would like to know what

47:58.151 --> 48:00.262
percentage of the soft budget is used

48:00.262 --> 48:02.373
for the soft skills that are on Smoke

48:02.373 --> 48:04.373
bombm Hill when we're talking about

48:04.373 --> 48:06.429
nation building stuff . I understand

48:06.429 --> 48:06.060
you're gonna cut some of your psyops ,

48:06.070 --> 48:08.181
guys . I agree with that completely .

48:08.181 --> 48:10.292
So if you could . Get it , you know ,

48:10.489 --> 48:12.489
on a piece of paper and tell us how

48:12.489 --> 48:14.659
much of our budget is soft budget is

48:14.659 --> 48:18.139
being expended for the soft skills for

48:18.139 --> 48:20.195
nation building , which we have done

48:20.195 --> 48:22.729
horribly across the world since Vietnam ,

48:23.020 --> 48:25.409
honestly , and then what percentage

48:25.409 --> 48:27.780
specifically for J sets that would be

48:27.780 --> 48:29.770
awesome . Thank you , sir . Uh ,

48:29.820 --> 48:32.419
General Fenton , um , you understand

48:32.419 --> 48:34.475
your component commanders start with

48:34.475 --> 48:36.752
the operation on OM deficit every year ,

48:36.752 --> 48:39.199
right ? I do , sir . And so our guys

48:39.199 --> 48:41.032
are filling out you for unfunded

48:41.032 --> 48:43.143
requests on on the regular just to be

48:43.143 --> 48:46.340
able to to do their job , correct ? OK ,

48:46.479 --> 48:48.757
so here's what I'd like from you , sir .

48:48.757 --> 48:51.360
Um , what I would like is by component

48:51.360 --> 48:54.669
commander , what is the delta between

48:54.879 --> 48:57.629
what they're given every year . And

48:57.629 --> 49:00.689
then the total of the Eofers on average ,

49:00.699 --> 49:04.179
let's say a 5 year average . So that we

49:04.350 --> 49:06.750
under this chairman's leadership can

49:06.750 --> 49:09.020
hopefully plus up all the ONM budgets

49:09.020 --> 49:11.131
for our special operations forces and

49:11.131 --> 49:14.050
component commands . Will do . Give us

49:14.050 --> 49:16.161
real numbers . You , you , you'll get

49:16.161 --> 49:18.217
real numbers and representative if I

49:18.217 --> 49:20.328
might so taken for action , uh , just

49:20.328 --> 49:22.383
on J sets , just I , I think on , on

49:22.383 --> 49:24.494
one side of the coin , you , you know

49:24.494 --> 49:26.929
those also there's , uh , many of our

49:26.929 --> 49:28.985
teammates and not building nations ,

49:28.985 --> 49:31.040
but those J sets go against building

49:31.040 --> 49:33.096
high-end tier one forces in a lot of

49:33.096 --> 49:35.318
those countries . That have stayed with

49:35.318 --> 49:37.429
the longest serving and listed member

49:37.429 --> 49:37.280
of the United States military to ever

49:37.280 --> 49:39.280
be elected to Congress , and I also

49:39.280 --> 49:41.113
have the most years as a special

49:41.113 --> 49:43.058
operations forces operative of any

49:43.058 --> 49:42.610
member of Congress in the history of

49:42.610 --> 49:44.721
the country . I know exactly what the

49:44.721 --> 49:46.777
hell I'm talking about , sir . Roger

49:46.777 --> 49:48.999
that . I just add that many of those of

49:48.999 --> 49:51.221
them become security exporters , so I ,

49:51.221 --> 49:51.205
I think if we pegged out a . Track

49:51.205 --> 49:53.564
record and I probably owe you that on

49:53.564 --> 49:55.675
where those have not just been nation

49:55.675 --> 49:57.620
building and and somehow turned uh

49:57.620 --> 50:00.044
enemy but have gone on to burden share

50:00.044 --> 50:02.645
to bird no to to lead and I think those

50:02.645 --> 50:04.589
are great stories and I could talk

50:04.589 --> 50:06.756
about them in close that I we we ought

50:06.756 --> 50:06.354
not to forget about . Thank you ,

50:06.445 --> 50:09.294
General . I appreciate it . Thanks , Mr .

50:09.364 --> 50:11.308
Harrigan , you're recognized for 5

50:11.308 --> 50:13.253
minutes . Thank you , Mr . Chair .

50:13.253 --> 50:15.364
Gentlemen , thanks for your testimony

50:15.364 --> 50:17.586
this morning . It's good to see both of

50:17.586 --> 50:19.697
you , uh . General Fenton , I had the

50:19.697 --> 50:21.808
opportunity to spend the weekend down

50:21.808 --> 50:23.975
with General Barraga at UAOC , and one

50:23.975 --> 50:25.920
of the things that we were talking

50:25.920 --> 50:28.031
about is , uh , that's that concerned

50:28.031 --> 50:30.364
me greatly is that the Green Berets are ,

50:30.364 --> 50:33.000
are currently only producing about half

50:33.000 --> 50:35.560
the number that they are treading each

50:35.560 --> 50:37.760
year , uh , through separation or

50:37.760 --> 50:39.871
retirement . What , what are we doing

50:39.871 --> 50:42.169
across the force specifically that's a

50:42.169 --> 50:44.280
conversation about the Green Berets ,

50:44.280 --> 50:46.558
but what are we doing across the force .

50:46.558 --> 50:48.447
To make sure that we are actually

50:48.447 --> 50:50.225
replacing the number of special

50:50.225 --> 50:52.649
operators that we need . A

50:52.649 --> 50:54.649
representative , uh , I'll start by

50:54.649 --> 50:56.969
saying first we maintain the standards ,

50:57.290 --> 50:59.719
right ? And as I look at that , uh ,

50:59.729 --> 51:01.785
it's a challenge to get a production

51:01.785 --> 51:03.896
that in some days if I think if we're

51:03.896 --> 51:06.118
talking about SF enlisted , I think the

51:06.118 --> 51:07.896
requirement General Brock could

51:07.896 --> 51:10.689
probably talk is about 825 . When the

51:10.689 --> 51:13.290
force overall shrinks , um , that

51:13.290 --> 51:15.169
certainly shrinks down our input

51:15.169 --> 51:17.340
pipeline . And we're not gonna adjust

51:17.340 --> 51:19.280
the standards and we've had this

51:19.280 --> 51:21.447
conversation with Secretary of Defense

51:21.447 --> 51:23.391
who is all about lethality and war

51:23.391 --> 51:25.391
fighting , and I talked a bit about

51:25.391 --> 51:27.391
production rates and I think at the

51:27.391 --> 51:29.724
very end he said maintain the standards .

51:29.724 --> 51:31.780
Roger that . Now that isn't don't do

51:31.780 --> 51:33.836
other work to try to get more in the

51:33.836 --> 51:36.002
pipeline so I think with uh some level

51:36.002 --> 51:38.224
of for size reduction in the army we're

51:38.224 --> 51:40.336
talking about the army here that is a

51:40.336 --> 51:42.447
challenge of who wants to come in the

51:42.447 --> 51:44.391
pipeline . I will offer that we've

51:44.391 --> 51:46.447
tried to amp up our 18 X-ray program

51:46.447 --> 51:48.613
which has been , and hopefully General

51:48.613 --> 51:48.520
Brog explained this to you , it's been

51:48.520 --> 51:50.840
a really good program . It's about 3000

51:50.840 --> 51:53.062
folks who otherwise would not come into

51:53.062 --> 51:55.284
the army coming in off the street going

51:55.284 --> 51:57.173
through infantry basic training ,

51:57.173 --> 51:59.229
advanced training , and , uh , going

51:59.229 --> 52:00.784
through , uh , SFAS and the

52:00.784 --> 52:03.000
qualification course and that 3000 ,

52:03.320 --> 52:06.520
about 800 make it so there's about 2200

52:06.520 --> 52:08.687
because we're enforcing the standard .

52:08.687 --> 52:10.798
That go back to the army and serve in

52:10.798 --> 52:13.076
all kind of infantry units and do well .

52:13.076 --> 52:15.187
I do think there's a way we could amp

52:15.187 --> 52:17.242
that up not only for the good of the

52:17.242 --> 52:19.298
Green Berets , which are part of the

52:19.298 --> 52:21.242
joint force , but also to bring in

52:21.242 --> 52:20.580
additional folks into the army who

52:20.580 --> 52:22.636
would otherwise not even think about

52:22.636 --> 52:24.469
the army unless they were coming

52:24.469 --> 52:26.524
towards special operations so we get

52:26.524 --> 52:28.691
the same type of contracts with Ranger

52:28.691 --> 52:28.620
contracts . So I think there's a lot

52:28.620 --> 52:30.676
out there we're trying to do , but I

52:30.676 --> 52:32.564
think it all goes against we will

52:32.564 --> 52:34.787
absolutely maintain the standards we've

52:34.787 --> 52:36.953
had a recent audit . And uh that audit

52:36.953 --> 52:39.176
from the Department of Defense has come

52:39.176 --> 52:38.870
back that we're we're maintaining the

52:38.870 --> 52:40.703
standards so I think we got some

52:40.703 --> 52:42.926
challenges . Yeah , thanks for that and

52:42.926 --> 52:45.259
thank you for maintaining the standards .

52:45.259 --> 52:47.314
It's incredibly important and uh I'd

52:47.314 --> 52:49.370
like to take the rest of my time and

52:49.370 --> 52:51.537
and talk about drones . Mr . Jenkins ,

52:51.537 --> 52:53.537
you talked about uh . We need to be

52:53.537 --> 52:55.875
actively taking lessons and innovate

52:56.364 --> 52:58.885
from current conflicts . General , you

52:58.885 --> 53:01.284
talked about a supersonic acquisition

53:01.284 --> 53:03.324
and procurement process , uh , that

53:03.324 --> 53:05.491
we're moving at a glacial pace that we

53:05.491 --> 53:09.439
have an outdated system , uh . And

53:09.439 --> 53:12.409
you also said that we're still at the

53:12.409 --> 53:14.639
talking stage with industry with

53:14.639 --> 53:16.083
respect to small drones .

53:16.909 --> 53:19.020
Representative , no , uh , we're well

53:19.020 --> 53:21.131
in discussion . I just wanted to make

53:21.131 --> 53:23.409
sure that folks understand maybe I was ,

53:23.409 --> 53:25.409
uh , I misstated we are in constant

53:25.409 --> 53:27.576
discussion with small and medium sized

53:27.750 --> 53:29.861
companies that are in this business ,

53:29.861 --> 53:32.028
and in many ways we have some of their

53:32.028 --> 53:34.028
product already , so we're not just

53:34.028 --> 53:36.194
talking , we're actually doing OK , we

53:36.194 --> 53:36.159
need to do more . I , I appreciate that

53:36.159 --> 53:37.881
because I was , I was a little

53:37.881 --> 53:39.770
concerned by the statement , uh ,

53:39.770 --> 53:41.881
thinking we need to move a little bit

53:41.881 --> 53:43.937
faster and soft . Uh , Roger , so we

53:43.937 --> 53:46.103
are absolutely , but I'm never happy .

53:46.103 --> 53:48.103
I want to go speedier so I won't be

53:48.103 --> 53:50.048
complacent , but we're well in the

53:50.048 --> 53:52.270
thick of this . One of the lessons that

53:52.270 --> 53:54.949
I have picked up from Ukraine is that

53:54.949 --> 53:57.709
their production process of how they're

53:57.709 --> 54:00.219
manufacturing these FPV drones , which ,

54:00.469 --> 54:02.580
as we have discovered are responsible

54:02.580 --> 54:04.636
for 80% of the Russian casualties on

54:04.636 --> 54:06.691
the front lines . These are become a

54:06.691 --> 54:08.136
very , very important and

54:08.136 --> 54:10.080
transformational technology on the

54:10.080 --> 54:11.858
battlefield . Is that they have

54:11.858 --> 54:13.747
somewhat of a hybrid mechanism of

54:13.747 --> 54:15.969
production , uh , some outside industry

54:15.969 --> 54:18.300
some internal . Are you open to the

54:18.300 --> 54:21.060
possibility that in order to actually

54:21.060 --> 54:24.479
create this capability at scale that

54:24.739 --> 54:26.850
part of that effort may actually need

54:26.850 --> 54:29.072
to be done organically within the force

54:29.072 --> 54:30.795
given all the frustrations and

54:30.795 --> 54:33.139
constraints that we have with our

54:33.139 --> 54:34.917
defense industrial base and our

54:34.917 --> 54:38.310
acquisition process at this time ? I

54:38.310 --> 54:40.254
absolutely am , uh , I think we're

54:40.254 --> 54:42.366
we're already doing it throughout all

54:42.366 --> 54:44.477
this off . We've got incredible folks

54:44.477 --> 54:46.754
who come in who not only want to shoot ,

54:46.754 --> 54:48.810
move , communicate , do combatives ,

54:48.810 --> 54:50.754
get after the what I call the soft

54:50.754 --> 54:52.532
basics that are the , the , the

54:52.532 --> 54:54.532
baseline . They're all into putting

54:54.532 --> 54:56.699
this stuff together and getting it out

54:56.699 --> 54:58.921
in a homemade way and doing them in the

54:58.921 --> 55:01.088
hundreds . I think our challenge is at

55:01.088 --> 55:03.239
some point to scale that . There's

55:03.239 --> 55:05.128
probably a a private sector piece

55:05.128 --> 55:07.239
that's gonna come in , but I think in

55:07.239 --> 55:09.295
many ways we're doing that , uh , we

55:09.295 --> 55:11.350
need to be able to scale that and we

55:11.350 --> 55:13.406
want to scale more . If , if I could

55:13.406 --> 55:15.628
just double down that costs money too .

55:15.628 --> 55:17.795
It costs money . So yeah , thank you .

55:17.795 --> 55:20.017
Thank you . Thank you , Mr . Ryan . You

55:20.017 --> 55:22.239
record for 5 minutes . Uh , thank you ,

55:22.239 --> 55:21.580
Mr . Chair . I know we have a hard stop ,

55:21.659 --> 55:23.770
so , uh , if you need to cut me off ,

55:23.770 --> 55:25.929
that's fine . I was late . Um , uh ,

55:25.939 --> 55:28.050
thank you both for being here . Thank

55:28.050 --> 55:30.161
you for all the work you're doing and

55:30.161 --> 55:32.383
have done . I wanna pick up on what you

55:32.383 --> 55:32.209
said , General Fenton earlier about IO

55:32.209 --> 55:34.219
and the both the importance and

55:34.219 --> 55:36.419
opportunity and frankly the really the

55:36.419 --> 55:40.120
high ROI we get on doing IO versus the

55:40.120 --> 55:42.120
cost of a lot of other things we've

55:42.120 --> 55:43.787
talked about today . Um , and

55:43.787 --> 55:45.953
specifically within that realm I wanna

55:45.953 --> 55:48.009
focus on miso and and Indo Pay , you

55:48.009 --> 55:50.287
know , miso within the Indo Paycom AOR .

55:50.287 --> 55:52.453
I , I'm pretty sure you guys are still

55:52.453 --> 55:54.453
sort of the designated as the joint

55:54.453 --> 55:56.620
proponent for miso across , across the

55:56.620 --> 55:58.731
joint force , um , as I've heard from

55:58.731 --> 56:00.842
various folks across , um , the force

56:00.842 --> 56:03.064
while there's a continued investment in

56:03.064 --> 56:05.064
this area , um . We're still seeing

56:05.064 --> 56:07.287
that across the different uh components

56:07.287 --> 56:09.120
in TSOCs . There's a pretty wide

56:09.120 --> 56:11.344
variety of , uh , capability and

56:11.344 --> 56:13.566
specifically tech tools and data that's

56:13.566 --> 56:15.622
available , um , from , from TSOC to

56:15.622 --> 56:17.344
TSOC . Have you guys looked at

56:17.344 --> 56:19.745
standardizing tools across the force

56:19.745 --> 56:22.344
from ESO , um , so that , um , kind of

56:22.344 --> 56:24.995
cocom and TSOC commanders can better

56:24.995 --> 56:26.828
plan and , and sort of know what

56:26.828 --> 56:28.828
they're gonna get . I can just talk

56:28.828 --> 56:30.773
policy real quick . Uh , at within

56:30.773 --> 56:32.995
SOLAC we have the information operation

56:32.995 --> 56:35.030
policy uh office that that sits in

56:35.030 --> 56:37.669
oversight of all the IO miso plans

56:37.669 --> 56:39.836
across all the combatant commands . So

56:39.836 --> 56:41.836
so that's a tremendous tool to make

56:41.836 --> 56:43.836
sure that our messages are synced ,

56:43.836 --> 56:43.550
that we're in coordinating with our

56:43.550 --> 56:45.772
interagency partners as well , which in

56:45.772 --> 56:48.106
the past . was not necessarily the case .

56:48.106 --> 56:50.328
We had IO messages going across to each

56:50.328 --> 56:52.524
other and so synchronization is is

56:52.524 --> 56:54.580
working at the policy level but then

56:54.580 --> 56:56.580
down to the tactical level . Do you

56:56.580 --> 56:58.746
want to expand on that ? I , uh , uh ,

56:58.746 --> 57:00.857
just hit the part of we are trying to

57:00.857 --> 57:02.913
make that a balance as you mentioned

57:02.913 --> 57:04.968
because we want folks to continue to

57:04.968 --> 57:06.968
innovate and then there's a balance

57:06.968 --> 57:09.080
between standardization . And I think

57:09.080 --> 57:08.649
we're always looking at that a

57:08.649 --> 57:10.871
representative in the right way through

57:10.871 --> 57:12.816
soft size so we don't suffocate in

57:12.816 --> 57:14.871
innovation which is for the here and

57:14.871 --> 57:16.927
now modernization for tomorrow but I

57:16.927 --> 57:18.538
would offer that where I see

57:18.538 --> 57:20.593
standardization because I don't have

57:20.593 --> 57:22.705
the modernization money I'm unable to

57:22.705 --> 57:24.760
scale it almost back to the previous

57:24.760 --> 57:26.482
discussion so I think that's a

57:26.482 --> 57:28.705
challenge if we find something we wanna

57:28.705 --> 57:30.760
bring across all the theater special

57:30.760 --> 57:32.760
ops commands . That that that takes

57:32.760 --> 57:34.982
funds and I think in that arena that uh

57:34.982 --> 57:37.205
that that's those are many of the other

57:37.205 --> 57:39.371
things in modernization we're not able

57:39.371 --> 57:38.800
to do . Yeah , and I just wanna

57:38.800 --> 57:40.856
reiterate that I think that's one of

57:40.856 --> 57:42.856
the smartest and and frankly lowest

57:42.856 --> 57:44.967
dollar investments we could make that

57:44.967 --> 57:47.189
would provide huge leverage in terms of

57:47.189 --> 57:49.189
when you have identified those come

57:49.189 --> 57:48.770
back to us so that we can figure out

57:48.770 --> 57:50.659
how to how to help you scale that

57:50.659 --> 57:53.149
across , um , I know . So just , uh ,

57:53.159 --> 57:55.399
big , uh , I only have 2 minutes , but

57:55.399 --> 57:57.732
I wanna pick up also on what I've heard ,

57:57.732 --> 57:59.843
um , as I came in around this idea of

57:59.843 --> 58:02.066
sort of burden sharing and and shifting

58:02.066 --> 58:04.288
the burden . I've heard that used a lot

58:04.288 --> 58:06.510
now in the last few months , um , but I

58:06.510 --> 58:08.510
don't really know what we're , what

58:08.510 --> 58:08.479
we're talking about there . Can , can

58:08.479 --> 58:10.646
you either you or both of you with the

58:10.646 --> 58:12.535
time we have expand on that ? I'm

58:12.535 --> 58:14.479
frankly , I'm concerned about that

58:14.479 --> 58:16.701
given . I , I feel like that could mean

58:16.701 --> 58:18.923
we're backing away from critical , uh ,

58:18.923 --> 58:21.090
partnerships that you all have in your

58:21.090 --> 58:23.312
inner forces have built through blood ,

58:23.312 --> 58:23.080
sweat , and tears over many , many

58:23.080 --> 58:25.080
decades . Maybe I'm wrong . Can you

58:25.080 --> 58:27.191
help me understand that ? Yeah , I'll

58:27.191 --> 58:29.302
just brief , uh , start high and then

58:29.302 --> 58:31.524
we'll go down to the , the weeds , uh ,

58:31.524 --> 58:33.636
just for my own personal experience ,

58:33.636 --> 58:35.691
for example , working in Colombia as

58:35.691 --> 58:37.802
part of Plan Colombia working by with

58:37.802 --> 58:37.760
and through our partners there for an

58:37.760 --> 58:39.816
internal defense that that's core to

58:39.816 --> 58:42.310
our , our , uh , our mission . Uh ,

58:42.320 --> 58:44.431
building that partner nation capacity

58:44.431 --> 58:47.000
allows us as a nation to build partners

58:47.000 --> 58:49.111
that are fully not to interrupt you I

58:49.111 --> 58:51.278
understand that that's what I'm saying

58:51.278 --> 58:53.444
we're not backing away from partners .

58:53.444 --> 58:55.333
We're just making sure that those

58:55.333 --> 58:55.330
partners that have capability and

58:55.330 --> 58:57.552
capacity can now operate on their own a

58:57.552 --> 58:59.774
little bit more efficiently and then we

58:59.774 --> 58:59.540
can go ahead .

59:03.719 --> 59:05.941
Happy to cover a really detailed one in

59:05.941 --> 59:08.108
the closed session represent you there

59:08.108 --> 59:09.886
and then I'll double down on uh

59:09.886 --> 59:11.997
Secretary Jenkins . We're not backing

59:11.997 --> 59:14.108
away . I think it's a key part of who

59:14.108 --> 59:16.052
SOCOM is . It's in our DNA to be a

59:16.052 --> 59:17.997
premier partner for us right now ,

59:17.997 --> 59:20.108
almost 7000 folks across 80 different

59:20.108 --> 59:22.219
countries persistently present . Uh ,

59:22.300 --> 59:24.467
and , uh , I think that's , that's the

59:24.467 --> 59:26.633
way we do business . Thank you . I , I

59:26.633 --> 59:28.856
commend that . I agree and I just wanna

59:28.856 --> 59:28.419
make sure that is the message that we

59:28.419 --> 59:30.459
are sending loud and clear , and I

59:30.459 --> 59:32.459
appreciate you saying that and that

59:32.459 --> 59:34.100
asked that the others in the

59:34.100 --> 59:36.156
administration continue to reiterate

59:36.156 --> 59:38.433
that we're not backing away from those ,

59:38.433 --> 59:40.489
uh , critical partnerships and , and

59:40.489 --> 59:42.711
representative I'd be uh uh derelict in

59:42.711 --> 59:44.767
my duties if I didn't say . And that

59:44.767 --> 59:46.767
cost of that is also going up , you

59:46.767 --> 59:48.989
know , the , the price to have somebody

59:48.989 --> 59:48.360
out there doing that , which I think is

59:48.360 --> 59:50.540
a global sensor provides opportunities

59:50.540 --> 59:52.919
and advantages to co-coms , the , the

59:52.919 --> 59:55.030
price of sustaining the humans when I

59:55.030 --> 59:57.252
come out of the Middle East is going up

59:57.252 --> 59:59.141
exponentially . So those are risk

59:59.141 --> 01:00:01.086
tradeoffs we make won't mean we're

01:00:01.086 --> 01:00:03.197
backing away from partners might mean

01:00:03.197 --> 01:00:04.975
the fiscal constraints plus the

01:00:04.975 --> 01:00:07.030
personnel piece put us in a place we

01:00:07.030 --> 01:00:09.363
can't do it . Thank you and you're back ,

01:00:09.363 --> 01:00:11.697
Mr . Chair . Thank you . Uh , with this ,

01:00:11.697 --> 01:00:13.919
we're just gonna close the open session

01:00:13.919 --> 01:00:12.659
here . We're gonna immediately

01:00:12.659 --> 01:00:15.300
reconvene in 2337 for the classified

01:00:15.300 --> 01:00:17.467
session . I just want to say before we

01:00:17.467 --> 01:00:19.633
leave , thank you , gentlemen for your

01:00:19.633 --> 01:00:21.744
time today . I wanna say thank you to

01:00:21.744 --> 01:00:21.340
everyone in the audience , uh , that is

01:00:21.340 --> 01:00:23.451
in uniform for your service . Uh , we

01:00:23.451 --> 01:00:25.673
all recognize that , uh , the sacrifice

01:00:25.673 --> 01:00:27.729
of you and your families , uh , that

01:00:27.729 --> 01:00:29.840
and , and , and the value that we get

01:00:29.840 --> 01:00:31.729
from that , you're protecting our

01:00:31.729 --> 01:00:33.840
country and , and we want to just say

01:00:33.840 --> 01:00:33.669
thank you . So with that , we're

01:00:33.669 --> 01:00:34.139
adjourned .