WEBVTT

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Committee will come to order uh today

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we begin our fiscal year 2026 posture

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hearings with US Northern and Southern

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Commands . Uh , I want to thank our

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witnesses for their service and for

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joining us today and for the time it

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took to prepare for this hearing . It's ,

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uh , very helpful . I appreciate y'all .

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We know that border security is

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national security . Over the past 4

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years we've learned that the hard way .

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President Biden's open border policies

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triggered historic levels of illegal

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immigration . They also emboldened

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cartels that flooded our streets with

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fentanyl and other drugs made mostly

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with Chinese pre precursor uh chemicals .

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The human cost has been staggering . In

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the 12 months ending October 2024 ,

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over 52,000 Americans died from

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fentanyl overdoses . Republicans have

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been unequivocal . The real fix had to

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come from the top , and President Trump

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delivered through decisive executive

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action , including authorizing the

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deployment of 7500 additional active

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duty troops to the border , illegal

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crossings have plummeted . In February ,

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apprehensions were down 94% compared to

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the year before , and dangerous

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criminals and gang members are being

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removed from our communities . But the

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job isn't done . I look forward to

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working with the president and my

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colleagues on reconciliation package

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that provides the DOD the resources it

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needs to support civilian authorities

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in sealing the borders . Meanwhile ,

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America's adversaries are developing

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and fielding more advanced air and

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missile capabilities . It is clear the

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homeland is no longer a sanctuary .

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Chinese and Russian aircraft have

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ramped up activity around Alaska ,

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including their first ever joint bomber

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patrol . North Korea keeps testing its

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long range missiles , and there are

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signs Russia may be helping them . And

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China and Russia's strategic missile

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capabilities , including hypersonic

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weapons , continue to evolve rapidly .

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Amid these threats , it is alarming .

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There is an effort afoot to auction off

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parts of the spectrum of DOD and uh

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DOD needs to track incoming missiles .

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This spectrum supports most of our

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military radar systems , including our

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early warning and homeland missile

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defense . Losing it would put President

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Trump's Golden Dome initiative at

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serious risk and undermine our security .

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Turning to SOTHCOM . China's growing

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presence in our backyard is a direct

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threat to the United States . Through

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its Belt and Road initiative , China is

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expanding its control over ports ,

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space facilities , and 5G

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telecommunications in that region .

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It's also snapping up copper , lithium ,

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and other critical minerals essential

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to its military modernization . These

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are not business deals , they're beach

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heads in in a conflict , these assets

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would be weaponized against us . That's

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why I support efforts to roll back

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Chinese influence in our hemisphere ,

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especially in the Panama Canal . Thanks

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to this administration , US investors

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are potentially set to take control of

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the Chinese run ports . On either side

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of this vital waterway , Panama has

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also quit the Belt and Road Initiative .

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Russia remains active in the region too ,

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providing training and arms to

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Venezuela , Nicaragua , and Cuba , as

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well as spreading anti-US propaganda ,

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and the Kremlin is flexing its military

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muscle . Last summer , Russian warships

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conducted missile drills in the

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Atlantic before making a port call in

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Havana . It is critical the United

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States wins the strategic competition

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with China and Russia in the Western

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Hemisphere . I look forward to hearing

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from our witnesses and gathering their

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best military judgment on how we meet

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these growing challenges head on , and

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with that I yield to my friend the

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ranking member for any opening comments

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he may have . Uh , thank you , Mr .

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Chairman . I thank the witnesses for ,

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for being here for our inaugural

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posture hearing for the , uh , for the

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new Congress . Um , we have a lot of

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work to do in terms of looking at the

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budget , looking at our national

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security threats , and I think the

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chairman did a pretty good job of

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laying out . What the concerns are in

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the North and Southcom region obviously

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homeland defense is at the top of the

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list , uh , and then organized crime

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that is involved in human trafficking

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and drug trafficking and then the

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malign influence of China , Russia ,

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and to some degree Iran in the region .

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On the border security piece , yes , um ,

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there is greater security on the border

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that is a good thing . I wanna hear

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from NorthCO about what DOD's role is

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going to be in that going forward . We

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have moved considerable assets down to

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that border , uh , and as the chairman

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noted . Um , illegal crossings are way

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down . Is that level of commitment

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necessary and what is it doing to

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readiness elsewhere , uh , during the

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first Trump administration we used some

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of our military bases to house migrants

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that undermined the readiness of those

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those bases , the training that they

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were supposed to do . So how are we

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balancing that mission with this one ,

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particularly in light of the reduced

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number of border crossings ? Is this

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the best place to be spending our money ,

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um , and then the real concern in all

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of this . His partners and allies , as

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I said , I think the chairman laid out

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a really good set of priorities for

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what we need to do to protect the

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homeland and meet our needs in North

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and Southcom , but I'm really curious

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to see how people feel about partners

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and allies . The chairman mentioned

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Panama , for instance , as you know ,

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moving out of the Belt and Road

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Initiative , and that's great , but if

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Panama thinks that the US is going to

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use military force to retake the Panama

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Canal . I suspect Panama might

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recalculate who they need in terms of

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friends and partners . The tariffs that

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we are lobbying at Canada and Mexico ,

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as all of you know , Canada plays a

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huge role in precisely that air defense

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that the chairman outlined . um , they

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are an integral partner without without

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them we could not have the situational

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awareness over our airspace that we

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have if we continue to treat them as a

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hostile nation . If we continue to talk

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about annexing them , basically

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violating their sovereignty , what is

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Canada going to do ? Uh , are they

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going to maintain that partnership ? In

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addition to that , the Department of

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Defense , a lot of the equipment that

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we need to build , um , is done in

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partnership with Canada . We get a lot

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of parts for a lot of critical

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munitions and equipment that we make ,

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um , we're actually gonna drive the

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prices of that up now . Nobody , um ,

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apparently except for President Trump

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knows exactly what he's going to

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announce tomorrow . But the tariffs

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that he has already announced and

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crucially the tariffs that he has

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already threatened are basically

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turning our partners against us .

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They're going to recalculate and figure

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out who their true friends and allies

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are so I'd really like to hear from our

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witnesses how are we gonna navigate

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that ? OK , can America really go it

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alone in the world ? Can we really tell

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the rest of the world basically to go

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to hell ? We only care about ourselves ,

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we don't care about you at all . What

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are the consequences going to be for

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our national security if we take that

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incredibly selfish approach and if we

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basically tell the rest of the world

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that we've decided that we are no

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longer the leader of the free world .

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We are no longer here to help protect

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ideas we are in it for ourselves ,

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period , full stop , and that is all we

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are going to do . I think the

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consequences of that of that are going

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to be devastating to the national

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security of this country . So I look

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forward to this conversation to figure

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out how we can better navigate all of

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those challenges , um , and I thank the

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chairman , uh , for the time . Uh ,

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you're back . Thank the ranking member .

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It's now time to introduce our

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witnesses . Uh , we have Mr . Rafael

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Leonardo who is performing the duties

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of Assistant Secretary of Defense for

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Homeland Defense and hemispheric

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Affairs . Uh , Mr . Leonardo is

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accomplished is accompanied by the

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Honorable Robert Celesis . Uh , he is

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currently deputy director of Washington

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headquarters Services but also has , uh ,

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been advising the secretary on border

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security issues . General Greg Glo is

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the commander of United States Northern

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Command and uh Northern Airspace

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Defense Command , and the Admiral Alvin

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Halsey is the commander of the United

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States Southern Command . Welcome , and ,

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uh , Mr . Leardo , we'll welcome , we ,

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uh , recognize you first for 5 minutes .

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Great thank you Mr . Chairman , uh

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Chairman Rogers ranking member Smith

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and distinguished members of the

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committee , thank you very much for the

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opportunity to testify before you today

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on the national security challenges

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faced by the United States and US

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military activity in North America and

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South America . I'm honored to be here

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in the company of Admiral Halsey and

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General Gio , with whom I've worked

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with very closely over the past two

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months to implement the president's

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agenda in the NorthHCOM and SouthHCOM

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areas of responsibility . I'm also

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grateful to have with me today senior

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adviser to the Deputy Secretary of

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Defense Mr . Robert Salas . Um , he

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also recently performed the duties of

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Secretary of Defense and Deputy

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Secretary of Defense and was at the

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leading edge of advancing early

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administration priorities , especially

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our efforts to secure the US southern

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border . Additionally , he brings

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decades of experience and homeland

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defense within the department , and he

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looks forward to joining me in

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answering your questions today on

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behalf of the office of the Secretary

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of Defense . Today I'd like to

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emphasize 4 key points . First ,

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President Trump and Secretary Hegseth

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share your assessment , Mr . Chairman ,

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that the homeland is no longer a

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sanctuary , and so our top priority is

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to defend the homeland . Second , we

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are surging DOD support and developing

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new capabilities to meet these

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challenges . Third , we continue to

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support our federal , state , and local

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partners , including through disaster

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response and our activities on the

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southern border . And 4th , closely

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tied to the defense of the homeland is

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ensuring our interests are advanced

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throughout the Western Hemisphere and

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to your point , ranking member Smith ,

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that we do this alongside our allies

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and partners in the region . Both

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President Trump and Secretary Hegseth

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have been clear that protecting our

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homeland is priority number one . The

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United States faces a range of

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challenges that threaten our strategic

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stability , including vulnerability

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posed by our unsecured borders ,

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China's unprecedented military buildup ,

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and a range of other threats ,

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including adversaries who seek to

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undermine our military advantage

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through asymmetric means . Adversaries

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should know that the DOD is redoubling

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its efforts on mission resilience , the

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ability to withstand , fight through ,

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and recover quickly from disruption to

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achieve national strategic and

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operational objectives . In the interim

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national defense security guidance ,

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Secretary Hags approved last month ,

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defending the US homeland was

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identified as the top priority of the

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department as we seek to seal our

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borders , repel forms of invasion ,

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including illegal immigration and

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narcotics trafficking , and advance US

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interests in the Western hemisphere .

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The threat from drug cartels , criminal

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gangs , and illegal immigration are a

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national security threat .

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Transnational criminal organizations ,

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including recently designated foreign

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terrorist organizations , cartels ,

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traffic humans and drugs , including

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fentanyl , resulting in tens of

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thousands of American deaths annually .

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On January 20th , the president

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declared a national emergency

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proclaiming that America's sovereignty

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is under attack . Our southern borders

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overrun . Uh , and we must defend our

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nation and its citizens . Since that

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time , the Department of Defense has

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been working to address these

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challenges and implement executive

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orders to seal our border , and we are

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proud to report a 97% decrease in

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illegal border crossings as a result of

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these efforts . To defend the American

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people , we're developing new

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capabilities . President Trump has

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ordered the creation of a next

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generation missile shield called the

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Golden Dome for America . At the same

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time we work to continue to detect and

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track and mitigate challenges posed by

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small unmanned aerial systems to help

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meet this threat , the department will

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continue to conduct counter small UAS

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operations , improve incident response

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mechanisms , and deliver new

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technological solutions to rapidly

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evolving threat , and we know that the

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Congress is also very interested in

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this subject , and we look forward to

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partnering with you to address this

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challenge . We're also working to

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bolster capability in the Arctic where

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China , despite being 900 miles from

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the Arctic Circle , has made increasing

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attempts to bolster its influence in

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the region . While limited in its

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ability to project military power in

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the Arctic , China seeks to bolster its

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bolster its operational expertise and

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is invested in scientific research with

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likely civil military applications . In

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conclusion , from the Arctic to the

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Antarctic in all domains , homeland

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defense and the Western Hemisphere are

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intertwined . The department stands

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ready that to ensure that our homeland

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is fully defended . DOD is committed to

13:05.929 --> 13:08.520
achieving peace through strength . Our

13:08.520 --> 13:10.409
actions both at home and abroad ,

13:10.409 --> 13:12.520
demonstrate our resolve to defend the

13:12.520 --> 13:14.298
American homeland , protect our

13:14.298 --> 13:17.130
interests , and deter aggression . We

13:17.130 --> 13:19.186
appreciate the committee's continued

13:19.186 --> 13:21.297
support for these critical missions .

13:21.297 --> 13:23.574
Chairman Rogers , Ranking Member Smith ,

13:23.574 --> 13:25.408
and distinguished members of the

13:25.408 --> 13:27.574
committee , thank you for your support

13:27.574 --> 13:29.741
and leadership and for the opportunity

13:29.741 --> 13:31.852
to testify before you today . I would

13:31.852 --> 13:33.908
also like to express my appreciation

13:33.908 --> 13:33.840
for your continued commitment and

13:33.840 --> 13:35.840
support to the men and women of the

13:35.840 --> 13:37.840
Department of Defense . Thank you .

13:37.840 --> 13:40.173
Thank you , Mr . Leonardo . Mr . Salaas ,

13:40.173 --> 13:41.284
you're recognized .

13:44.340 --> 13:46.340
Chairman , I'm gonna , uh , pass to

13:46.340 --> 13:49.469
General Gio and Admiral Halsey . In the

13:49.469 --> 13:52.940
interest of the tongue . Thank you ,

13:52.950 --> 13:55.228
Chairman Rogers , Ranking Member Smith ,

13:55.228 --> 13:57.061
and distinguished members of the

13:57.061 --> 13:59.117
committee . It's my honor to command

13:59.117 --> 14:01.117
the men and women of North American

14:01.117 --> 14:03.172
Aerospace Defense Command and United

14:03.172 --> 14:05.117
States Northern Command . I'm also

14:05.117 --> 14:07.172
pleased to appear alongside my SOCOM

14:07.172 --> 14:09.394
shipmate Admiral Bull Halsey as well as

14:09.394 --> 14:11.561
Mr . Bob Salaas and Mr . Raff Leonardo

14:11.561 --> 14:13.770
from OSD . I'd like to highlight three

14:13.770 --> 14:15.937
trends of particular concern for NORAD

14:15.937 --> 14:18.048
and Northcom with direct implications

14:18.048 --> 14:20.299
on homeland defense . First is the

14:20.299 --> 14:22.330
growing cooperation between China ,

14:22.419 --> 14:24.780
Russia , North Korea , and Iran to

14:24.780 --> 14:26.820
challenge the United States . While

14:26.820 --> 14:29.042
their cooperation does not approach the

14:29.042 --> 14:30.709
level of complete integration

14:30.709 --> 14:32.820
demonstrated by the United States and

14:32.820 --> 14:34.764
Canada , the transfer of weapons ,

14:34.764 --> 14:36.987
military technology , and basing access

14:36.987 --> 14:39.539
is cause for significant concern . The

14:39.539 --> 14:41.706
associated risks to North America have

14:41.706 --> 14:43.650
also grown . The number of Russian

14:43.650 --> 14:45.539
bomber incursions into the US and

14:45.539 --> 14:47.539
Canadian air defense identification

14:47.539 --> 14:49.650
zones has returned to levels not seen

14:49.650 --> 14:51.928
before the Russian invasion of Ukraine ,

14:51.940 --> 14:53.884
while the Russian navy surface and

14:53.884 --> 14:55.884
subsurface vessels conducted out of

14:55.884 --> 14:57.996
area deployments off both US coasts ,

14:58.059 --> 15:00.170
including in the vicinity of Alaska .

15:01.039 --> 15:03.150
Second , evolving technologies demand

15:03.150 --> 15:05.710
that NORAD and Northcom rapidly adjust

15:05.710 --> 15:08.869
our defensive posture . Small unrew

15:08.869 --> 15:11.789
aircraft systems or UAS pose a growing

15:11.789 --> 15:13.659
threat to safety and security .

15:14.390 --> 15:16.669
Likewise , as competitors continue to

15:16.669 --> 15:18.447
target US networks and critical

15:18.447 --> 15:20.669
infrastructure and cyberspace , a whole

15:20.669 --> 15:22.725
of government effort is increasingly

15:22.725 --> 15:24.891
necessary to mitigate potential harm .

15:26.020 --> 15:28.340
Finally , non-state actors continued to

15:28.340 --> 15:30.500
target our homeland . Transnational

15:30.500 --> 15:32.580
criminal cartels based in Mexico

15:32.580 --> 15:34.691
threaten US territorial integrity and

15:34.691 --> 15:36.524
the safety of our citizens , and

15:36.524 --> 15:38.636
radical Islamic terrorist groups have

15:38.636 --> 15:40.413
rejuvenated attack planning and

15:40.413 --> 15:42.469
anti-American propaganda intended to

15:42.469 --> 15:44.413
inspire lone wolf attacks like the

15:44.413 --> 15:46.469
deadly New Year's Day attacks in New

15:46.469 --> 15:49.210
Orleans . With that strategic backdrop ,

15:49.340 --> 15:51.507
Homeland Defense remains our command's

15:51.507 --> 15:53.507
essential task , and in mindset and

15:53.507 --> 15:55.451
action , nobody waits on NORAD and

15:55.451 --> 15:57.979
NORCO . That mantra proved true over

15:57.979 --> 16:00.201
the last year as the command's planning

16:00.201 --> 16:02.201
and preparation generated swift and

16:02.201 --> 16:04.090
effective responses to competitor

16:04.090 --> 16:06.260
actions , major disasters , and

16:06.260 --> 16:09.190
emerging requirements . Over the past

16:09.190 --> 16:12.130
12 months , NORAD and NORCO intercepted

16:12.130 --> 16:13.963
joint Russian and Chinese bomber

16:13.963 --> 16:16.409
patrols off the Alaska coast , tracked

16:16.409 --> 16:18.742
Russian surface vessels off both coasts ,

16:18.890 --> 16:20.946
detected and assessed numerous North

16:20.946 --> 16:22.946
Korean ballistic missile launches ,

16:23.210 --> 16:25.169
tracked multiple Chinese dual use

16:25.169 --> 16:27.225
military and research vessels in the

16:27.225 --> 16:29.369
Bering Sea and Arctic Ocean , and

16:29.369 --> 16:31.480
supported Americans in need following

16:31.480 --> 16:33.369
Hurricane Helene and wildfires in

16:33.369 --> 16:35.480
California while posturing to support

16:35.480 --> 16:37.909
Hurricane Milton response . We also

16:37.909 --> 16:39.909
deployed close to 10,000 troops and

16:39.909 --> 16:42.076
delivered unique military capabilities

16:42.076 --> 16:44.909
such as airborne ISR and destroyers in

16:44.909 --> 16:46.909
response to the emergency on the US

16:46.909 --> 16:49.076
southern border and improved defensive

16:49.076 --> 16:50.909
capabilities against all threats

16:50.909 --> 16:53.140
ranging from ICBMs to small drones .

16:54.840 --> 16:56.919
Looking forward , NoRD and Northcom

16:56.919 --> 16:59.229
modernization is crucial to outpacing

16:59.229 --> 17:01.359
our competitors . Establishing a

17:01.359 --> 17:03.359
layered domain awareness network to

17:03.359 --> 17:05.415
detect and track threats approaching

17:05.415 --> 17:08.510
North America from seabed to space is

17:08.510 --> 17:10.343
critical to immediate and future

17:10.343 --> 17:12.510
missions requirements because we can't

17:12.510 --> 17:15.310
defeat what we can't see . To that end ,

17:15.550 --> 17:17.328
I appreciate the department and

17:17.328 --> 17:19.494
congressional support for fielding all

17:19.494 --> 17:21.550
domain capabilities such as airborne

17:21.550 --> 17:23.772
moving target indicator satellites over

17:23.772 --> 17:26.619
the horizon radars , the E-7 wedge tail ,

17:26.829 --> 17:28.885
and integrated undersea surveillance

17:28.885 --> 17:30.885
system . These capabilities support

17:30.885 --> 17:32.718
long-standing NORAD and Northcom

17:32.718 --> 17:34.662
requirements and will serve as the

17:34.662 --> 17:36.440
foundation for the Golden Globe

17:36.910 --> 17:39.219
construct , excuse me , Golden Dome

17:39.219 --> 17:41.330
construct . Defending our borders and

17:41.330 --> 17:43.599
establishing a national missile shield

17:43.599 --> 17:45.766
protecting critical infrastructure and

17:45.766 --> 17:47.655
force projection capability , and

17:47.655 --> 17:49.821
safeguarding our citizens will require

17:49.821 --> 17:51.877
the best our nations have to offer ,

17:51.877 --> 17:53.988
and I'm grateful to the committee for

17:53.988 --> 17:55.877
your ongoing support of NORAD and

17:55.877 --> 17:57.821
NORCO's vital missions . Thank you

17:57.821 --> 17:59.821
again for the opportunity to appear

17:59.821 --> 17:59.479
today , and I look forward to your

17:59.479 --> 18:02.000
questions . We have the watch . Thank

18:02.000 --> 18:04.111
you , General Admiral Halsey , you're

18:04.111 --> 18:05.111
recognized .

18:11.959 --> 18:14.237
Chairman Rogers , ranking member Smith ,

18:14.237 --> 18:16.515
distinguished members of the committee ,

18:16.515 --> 18:18.681
I'm humbled to appear before you today

18:18.681 --> 18:20.737
as the thirty-third commander of the

18:20.737 --> 18:20.719
United States Southern Command . We are

18:20.719 --> 18:22.775
a war fighting organization and I've

18:22.775 --> 18:24.775
moved forward to lead this commands

18:24.775 --> 18:26.441
service members , civilians ,

18:26.441 --> 18:28.608
contractors , and their families as we

18:28.608 --> 18:30.830
embrace our vision of a secure , free ,

18:30.830 --> 18:33.880
and prosperous Western hemisphere . I'm

18:33.880 --> 18:35.936
honored to testify alongside General

18:35.936 --> 18:38.047
Geo , Mr . Salaas , and Mr . Leonardo

18:38.047 --> 18:39.991
as the relationship between United

18:39.991 --> 18:41.880
States Northcom and United States

18:41.880 --> 18:43.936
Southern Command , and our alignment

18:43.936 --> 18:46.102
with OSD is critical to the safety and

18:46.102 --> 18:48.213
security of our homeland . The United

18:48.213 --> 18:47.569
States and our partners in Latin

18:47.569 --> 18:49.709
America and the Caribbean are linked

18:49.709 --> 18:51.598
together not simply by history or

18:51.598 --> 18:53.598
geography but cultural traditions ,

18:53.910 --> 18:56.132
security and economic cooperation and a

18:56.132 --> 18:58.466
steadfast devotion to democratic values .

18:59.469 --> 19:01.691
The enduring commitment to these values

19:01.691 --> 19:03.636
is a cornerstone of our collective

19:03.636 --> 19:05.636
partnerships . Today this vision is

19:05.636 --> 19:07.939
imperiled by a host of threats . These

19:07.939 --> 19:10.050
threats include strategic competition

19:10.050 --> 19:12.161
from China and Russia , the impact of

19:12.161 --> 19:14.328
transnational criminal organizations ,

19:14.328 --> 19:16.495
and a complex transboundary challenges

19:16.495 --> 19:18.328
to include irregular migration ,

19:18.328 --> 19:20.661
natural disasters , eroding democracies ,

19:20.661 --> 19:22.772
food and water and security . China ,

19:22.890 --> 19:25.140
our patient threat continues to its

19:25.140 --> 19:27.196
methodical incursion into our shared

19:27.196 --> 19:29.140
neighborhood exerting diplomatic ,

19:29.140 --> 19:31.140
informational , military , economic

19:31.140 --> 19:33.251
influence to export its authoritarian

19:33.349 --> 19:35.930
model to the region . Most focused to

19:35.930 --> 19:38.152
the east and west when they think about

19:38.152 --> 19:40.374
great power competition . A look to our

19:40.374 --> 19:42.430
South reveals that China has already

19:42.430 --> 19:44.652
established a presence . It's predatory

19:44.652 --> 19:46.541
and opaque investment practices ,

19:46.541 --> 19:48.597
resource extraction , potential dual

19:48.597 --> 19:50.430
use projects from ports to space

19:50.430 --> 19:52.541
threaten the security and sovereignty

19:52.541 --> 19:54.708
of our partners while jeopardizing the

19:54.708 --> 19:54.609
United States' national security .

19:55.449 --> 19:57.505
Simultaneously , Russia supports its

19:57.505 --> 19:59.329
traditional partners in Cuba ,

19:59.410 --> 20:01.890
Nicaragua , and Venezuela using malign

20:01.890 --> 20:03.890
propaganda , military engagements ,

20:03.969 --> 20:05.969
arms sales , and force projection .

20:05.969 --> 20:08.080
Moscow is attempting to undermine the

20:08.080 --> 20:10.136
United States' leadership , interest

20:10.136 --> 20:12.469
and influence in the region . Meanwhile ,

20:12.469 --> 20:14.525
transnational criminal organizations

20:14.525 --> 20:16.747
continue to fuel instability throughout

20:16.747 --> 20:18.413
the region . They exploit the

20:18.413 --> 20:20.413
permissive environment to engage in

20:20.413 --> 20:22.636
brutal violence , illicit trafficking .

20:22.636 --> 20:22.339
And other criminal activities that

20:22.339 --> 20:24.339
undermine the rule of law , disrupt

20:24.339 --> 20:26.561
legitimate government functions and are

20:26.561 --> 20:28.783
having devastating effects that spilled

20:28.783 --> 20:30.783
over into our homeland , destroying

20:30.783 --> 20:32.839
lives . Border security is a concern

20:32.839 --> 20:34.895
for us all . SOCOM recently stood up

20:34.895 --> 20:36.839
Joint Task Force Southern Guard at

20:36.839 --> 20:39.061
Naval Station Guantanamo Bay in support

20:39.061 --> 20:41.228
of the Department of Homeland Security

20:41.228 --> 20:43.228
to safely and humanely hold illegal

20:43.228 --> 20:45.450
aliens until they returned to a country

20:45.450 --> 20:48.060
of origin . Our time is now deliberate

20:48.060 --> 20:50.227
and meaningful action to address these

20:50.227 --> 20:52.689
threats is required for this region ,

20:52.939 --> 20:54.828
our neighborhood will continue to

20:54.828 --> 20:56.900
change . Partnerships are our most

20:56.900 --> 20:59.420
effective approach to countering shared

20:59.420 --> 21:01.531
economic and security concerns . They

21:01.531 --> 21:03.864
enable our enduring trust in the region .

21:03.864 --> 21:05.920
However , we cannot assume that that

21:05.920 --> 21:07.809
will always be the case . To be a

21:07.809 --> 21:10.087
trusted partner , you must be credible ,

21:10.087 --> 21:12.253
present , and engaged during my tenure

21:12.253 --> 21:14.142
at SOCOM , I've witnessed how our

21:14.142 --> 21:16.253
enduring presence builds trust . As a

21:16.253 --> 21:18.309
result , our partners prefer to work

21:18.309 --> 21:20.531
with us over China , Russia , and other

21:20.531 --> 21:22.753
nations to overcome their most pressing

21:22.753 --> 21:24.864
challenges . SOCOMs continue to stand

21:24.864 --> 21:27.142
shoulder to shoulder with our partners .

21:27.142 --> 21:29.198
We have and will continue to respond

21:29.198 --> 21:30.976
rapidly to crises in any form .

21:30.976 --> 21:32.976
Together with our partners , we are

21:32.976 --> 21:35.142
building their capability and capacity

21:35.142 --> 21:37.142
to mitigate , respond , and recover

21:37.142 --> 21:39.253
from our collective threats . Sustain

21:39.253 --> 21:39.180
investment and security cooperation ,

21:39.319 --> 21:41.660
combine in joint exercises , disaster

21:41.660 --> 21:43.827
assistance among other initiatives and

21:43.827 --> 21:45.882
enable us to deliver and innovate at

21:45.882 --> 21:47.882
the point of need as the department

21:47.882 --> 21:49.993
sharpens this war fighting edge . I'm

21:49.993 --> 21:52.104
grateful for the continued support of

21:52.104 --> 21:54.104
Congress . This support is vital to

21:54.104 --> 21:56.327
defending our democratic principles and

21:56.327 --> 21:58.438
interests that underpin the stability

21:58.438 --> 21:58.060
and prosperity of our region and

21:58.060 --> 22:00.282
ultimately the security of our nation .

22:00.282 --> 22:02.282
Thank you again , Chairman Rogers ,

22:02.282 --> 22:04.449
Ranker Meer Smith , and members of the

22:04.449 --> 22:06.671
committee for this opportunity . I look

22:06.671 --> 22:08.893
forward to your questions . Thank you ,

22:08.893 --> 22:08.599
Admiral , uh , all of our witnesses ,

22:08.680 --> 22:10.847
and I recognize myself for the first ,

22:10.847 --> 22:12.902
uh , set of questions . Uh , General

22:12.902 --> 22:15.760
Glo , um , have the cartels , how have

22:15.760 --> 22:18.160
the cartels in Mexico responded to our

22:18.160 --> 22:20.989
shutting down our borders ? Chairman ,

22:21.030 --> 22:23.449
there's 22 , primary ways that we've

22:23.449 --> 22:26.420
seen them , uh , respond . First is ,

22:26.589 --> 22:29.540
uh . They're they're trying to find new

22:29.540 --> 22:31.596
ways to get their products , whether

22:31.596 --> 22:34.180
that's , uh , drugs or people across

22:34.180 --> 22:36.347
the border because of the seal efforts

22:36.347 --> 22:38.739
that have gone on over the last two

22:38.739 --> 22:41.579
months and that's also , uh , forced

22:41.579 --> 22:43.954
them to have more cartel . Cartel

22:43.954 --> 22:46.875
violence as the uh limited ability to

22:46.875 --> 22:50.114
get across the uh the border has forced

22:50.114 --> 22:54.114
cartels to uh incur on to other uh uh

22:54.114 --> 22:56.505
cartels territory to try to get across

22:56.505 --> 22:58.727
and so we're seeing an increase in that

22:58.727 --> 23:00.949
violence as well . Admiral Halsey , how

23:00.949 --> 23:02.838
would you say that the cartels in

23:02.838 --> 23:04.561
Central and South America have

23:04.561 --> 23:06.894
responded to our closure of our borders ?

23:06.894 --> 23:09.061
What behaviors have changed , if any ?

23:09.061 --> 23:11.227
I think the first thing I'm noticing ,

23:11.227 --> 23:12.894
uh , Chairman , is the , uh ,

23:12.894 --> 23:15.116
throughput or lack of , uh , throughput

23:15.116 --> 23:17.283
through daan region right now . We can

23:17.283 --> 23:17.280
take a look at the , uh , cartels and

23:17.280 --> 23:19.520
the , uh , uh , smuggling human

23:19.520 --> 23:21.687
trafficking . We know that it's down .

23:21.687 --> 23:23.798
We know , uh , that Panama has , uh ,

23:23.798 --> 23:25.798
worked very closely with us on that

23:25.798 --> 23:28.131
with regard to the cocaine piece itself ,

23:28.131 --> 23:30.353
uh , we continue to see a record , uh ,

23:30.353 --> 23:32.520
pace of cocaine . The price of cocaine

23:32.520 --> 23:34.742
has dropped , so the cartels are trying

23:34.742 --> 23:34.484
to find ways to get after that . We

23:34.484 --> 23:36.540
have been very deliberate with Jatta

23:36.540 --> 23:38.373
South , which is the , uh , gold

23:38.373 --> 23:40.484
standard for inter interdiction , and

23:40.484 --> 23:42.428
they have , uh , been able to stop

23:42.428 --> 23:44.373
record pace at this point over 190

23:44.373 --> 23:46.595
metric tons . We're on a record pace to

23:46.595 --> 23:48.817
uh to exceed what we did last year . So

23:48.817 --> 23:48.675
I think we're responding to it , but ,

23:48.685 --> 23:50.685
uh , more resources will definitely

23:50.685 --> 23:52.805
help . Great . And I would ask this

23:52.805 --> 23:54.861
question of both , uh , General Gill

23:54.861 --> 23:56.749
and Admiral Halsey in a yes or no

23:56.749 --> 23:59.324
answer . Is the current DOD acquisition

23:59.324 --> 24:02.224
system getting you what you need when

24:02.224 --> 24:05.069
you need it , General Gill ? No ,

24:05.109 --> 24:09.099
Chairman , Admiral Halsey . Uh , no ,

24:09.219 --> 24:11.920
Chairman . And , uh , General Gio , uh ,

24:12.000 --> 24:14.119
you heard me make reference to the

24:14.119 --> 24:16.359
auction , the potential auction of DOD

24:16.359 --> 24:19.750
Spectrum , um , I'm concerned this

24:19.750 --> 24:21.949
would jeopardize , uh , President

24:21.949 --> 24:24.790
Trump's , uh , Golden Dome initiative's

24:24.790 --> 24:27.012
ability to track incoming missiles . Do

24:27.012 --> 24:28.790
you have that concern as well ?

24:29.939 --> 24:32.161
Chairman , I have that strong concern .

24:32.161 --> 24:34.383
Uh , almost all the systems that we use

24:34.383 --> 24:36.939
for homeland defense , uh , rely on

24:36.939 --> 24:39.106
that part of the spectrum that's being

24:39.106 --> 24:41.383
considered to be either sold or shared .

24:41.383 --> 24:44.319
Great , thank you . Uh , Mr . Leonardo ,

24:44.489 --> 24:46.711
how long will it take to provide steady

24:46.711 --> 24:48.933
state southern border security and what

24:48.933 --> 24:51.156
is your estimate of how long , uh , and

24:51.156 --> 24:52.989
how much , uh , it would cost to

24:52.989 --> 24:55.322
execute that ? Yes , uh , Mr . Chairman ,

24:55.322 --> 24:57.267
thank you for that question . Um ,

24:57.267 --> 24:59.433
we've been at this mission for about 2

24:59.433 --> 25:01.045
months , um , so we're still

25:01.045 --> 25:03.156
continually assessing , um , how long

25:03.156 --> 25:02.880
it might take from a steady state

25:02.880 --> 25:04.936
perspective , but that is definitely

25:04.936 --> 25:07.102
the goal is to , um , get it to steady

25:07.102 --> 25:09.158
state in return , um , as you know ,

25:09.158 --> 25:11.324
the Department of Homeland Security is

25:11.324 --> 25:10.839
the lead federal agency and we're in

25:10.839 --> 25:12.744
support , uh . So we'll continue

25:12.744 --> 25:14.911
working with them to assess what their

25:14.911 --> 25:17.077
ongoing need is . I will say as far as

25:17.077 --> 25:19.188
costs go , uh , we did speak with our

25:19.188 --> 25:21.077
OSD Comptroller counterparts this

25:21.077 --> 25:23.665
morning , and so far the cost is $376

25:23.665 --> 25:26.415
million so we expect that that , uh ,

25:26.425 --> 25:28.758
continued state of , uh , spending , um ,

25:28.758 --> 25:30.981
to take place . You know , I , I took a

25:30.981 --> 25:32.944
code down to , to Gitmo , Gitmo

25:32.944 --> 25:35.560
recently and , uh . Uh , uh , right

25:35.560 --> 25:37.560
after that , the limited number of

25:37.560 --> 25:39.560
people that were there were removed

25:40.160 --> 25:42.049
apparently back to their original

25:42.049 --> 25:44.104
country , and I understand that it's

25:44.104 --> 25:45.771
very low volumes now . Do you

25:45.771 --> 25:48.849
anticipate there being a steady flow of

25:48.849 --> 25:51.319
removals from the continental United

25:51.319 --> 25:53.486
States to get more or is that gonna be

25:53.486 --> 25:56.270
continue to be sporadic ? So all of the

25:56.270 --> 25:58.437
folks who are sent to Guantanamo Bay ,

25:58.437 --> 26:00.603
um , are selected by the Department of

26:00.603 --> 26:02.548
Homeland Security and are on final

26:02.548 --> 26:05.069
orders , um , supposedly to , to head

26:05.069 --> 26:07.236
to their , uh , ultimate destination ,

26:07.236 --> 26:09.347
um , so we're continuing to work with

26:09.347 --> 26:11.513
the Department of Homeland Security to

26:11.513 --> 26:11.310
determine who , uh , should be sent

26:11.310 --> 26:13.421
there and we're again we're , uh , in

26:13.421 --> 26:15.643
support of their determinations , sir .

26:15.643 --> 26:17.643
So you don't really know if there's

26:17.643 --> 26:19.643
gonna be a steady stream or if it's

26:19.643 --> 26:21.754
gonna continue to be sporadic . We're

26:21.754 --> 26:23.866
just continuing to attest that , uh ,

26:23.866 --> 26:23.660
Chairman . I don't know if you have

26:23.660 --> 26:25.938
anything to add , Mr . Sala is on that .

26:26.020 --> 26:29.119
Um , Chairman , if I could , um ,

26:29.489 --> 26:31.569
obviously ICE has an incredibly

26:31.569 --> 26:34.119
important job here in the United States ,

26:34.410 --> 26:36.400
as you know , ICE is a very small

26:36.400 --> 26:38.900
organization with big responsibilities .

26:39.400 --> 26:41.890
Currently they have housing for about

26:42.250 --> 26:45.839
45,000 high threat ,

26:46.130 --> 26:49.800
uh , illegal aliens . That capacity

26:49.800 --> 26:51.911
gets exceeded quite a bit and so they

26:51.911 --> 26:54.078
need additional housing . That's where

26:54.078 --> 26:56.133
the department has stepped in . Obvi

26:56.133 --> 26:58.189
obviously to use Gitmo , so I did do

26:58.189 --> 27:00.356
think we'll be continuing to use Gitmo

27:00.356 --> 27:02.469
for some time until ICE has more

27:02.469 --> 27:05.530
capacity to house high threat illegal

27:05.530 --> 27:07.550
aliens . Thank you , Mr . Ellis . I

27:07.550 --> 27:09.550
yield to the ranking member for any

27:09.550 --> 27:11.550
questions he may have . Thank you ,

27:11.550 --> 27:13.717
actually . I , I was curious about the

27:13.717 --> 27:15.883
acquisition reform question for both ,

27:15.883 --> 27:17.994
uh , General Glo and Admiral Holsey .

27:17.994 --> 27:20.106
You said no , it's not adequate . How

27:20.106 --> 27:22.328
would you change the acquisition system

27:22.328 --> 27:22.069
to make it more adequate for your needs ,

27:22.189 --> 27:26.089
both of you . Congressman , I think

27:26.089 --> 27:27.969
it's , uh , receptive to our

27:27.969 --> 27:30.290
requirements . Uh , my concern is the

27:30.290 --> 27:32.234
time it takes from the requirement

27:32.234 --> 27:34.479
process to go in until the , uh ,

27:34.489 --> 27:37.319
capability is , is fielded . Uh , I

27:37.319 --> 27:39.541
don't have , uh , the expertise to tell

27:39.541 --> 27:41.486
you what needs to change , uh , in

27:41.486 --> 27:43.599
there other than we need the , uh ,

27:43.609 --> 27:45.776
required equipment . I'm sorry , but I

27:45.776 --> 27:47.942
find that that statement a little hard

27:47.942 --> 27:50.165
to believe . You're , you're you're a 4

27:50.165 --> 27:52.165
star . You've been doing this for a

27:52.165 --> 27:54.053
long time . You've got at least a

27:54.053 --> 27:53.589
little bit of extra . Expertise as to

27:53.589 --> 27:56.030
how how the acquisition process is is

27:56.030 --> 27:58.141
harming you . I , I , I would think ,

27:58.141 --> 28:00.308
um , and we're very interested in this

28:00.308 --> 28:02.530
committee and how to change it . I mean

28:02.530 --> 28:04.752
you're , you're an end user here , um ,

28:04.752 --> 28:04.630
so you've got to be looking at this a

28:04.630 --> 28:06.741
little bit . Can you give us a little

28:06.741 --> 28:08.741
something more about what you think

28:08.741 --> 28:08.709
should be changed about the process

28:08.709 --> 28:12.369
there ? Well , well , Congressman , I ,

28:12.560 --> 28:14.171
I would say that I think the

28:14.171 --> 28:17.719
requirement process is , is solid . But

28:17.719 --> 28:20.040
the time that it takes for it to go

28:20.040 --> 28:22.119
through and I got that . I know it

28:22.119 --> 28:24.230
takes a lot of time , in fact , and I

28:24.230 --> 28:26.452
would , I just really important I think

28:26.452 --> 28:28.563
for everyone here . I think those two

28:28.563 --> 28:30.841
statements are in direct contradiction .

28:30.841 --> 28:33.063
The requirements process it isn't solid

28:33.063 --> 28:35.119
if it's requiring us to take so much

28:35.119 --> 28:37.175
time to get us what we need , um , I

28:37.175 --> 28:39.286
mean that's kind of where the problem

28:39.286 --> 28:41.397
lies , and I , I would , I would hope

28:41.397 --> 28:43.619
we would want to change that process so

28:43.619 --> 28:43.619
that it didn't take so much time . The ,

28:43.630 --> 28:45.589
the time to establish what the

28:45.589 --> 28:47.700
requirement is , I think is , is , is

28:47.700 --> 28:50.770
solid , sir . What takes long after

28:50.770 --> 28:53.400
that is to go through the development

28:53.400 --> 28:55.800
and procurement and delivery process .

28:56.819 --> 28:59.910
It is the concern that I have , sorry ,

28:59.949 --> 29:03.310
Admiral Halsey . Yes , Congressman , uh ,

29:03.390 --> 29:05.668
two points I would make . One , in the ,

29:05.668 --> 29:07.834
uh , as I look in this region , I must

29:07.834 --> 29:09.946
be credible , present , and engaged .

29:09.946 --> 29:12.001
The thing I look right now is , uh ,

29:12.001 --> 29:14.112
counter US , uh , technology . I need

29:14.112 --> 29:13.510
more of that . I need it quicker , and

29:13.510 --> 29:15.566
we found a process to get after that

29:15.566 --> 29:17.788
from acquisition standpoint . There are

29:17.788 --> 29:19.843
a lot of , uh , innovative solutions

29:19.843 --> 29:19.550
out there . I'll continue to work

29:19.550 --> 29:21.390
towards that , uh , from a ship

29:21.390 --> 29:23.612
maintenance standpoint or ship delivery

29:23.612 --> 29:25.834
standpoint . I need ships . Uh , I need

29:25.834 --> 29:27.668
to be again incredible president

29:27.668 --> 29:29.501
engaged after the TCOs . Have to

29:29.501 --> 29:29.425
counter drug threat , that's just two

29:29.425 --> 29:31.592
points I'll make . I'm sure I can find

29:31.592 --> 29:33.481
some more , uh , uh , points with

29:33.481 --> 29:35.703
aircraft , uh , as well . For what it's

29:35.703 --> 29:37.814
worth , um , I think the requirements

29:37.814 --> 29:39.981
process is killing us . Uh , it is too

29:39.981 --> 29:42.314
cumbersome , too long , too much detail .

29:42.314 --> 29:44.481
We need to more quickly buy commercial

29:44.481 --> 29:46.592
off the shelf solutions , not rely so

29:46.592 --> 29:48.758
much on programs record requirements ,

29:48.758 --> 29:50.703
and again , as the end users , the

29:50.703 --> 29:52.925
degree to which in the building you can

29:52.925 --> 29:55.036
help make that argument . Uh , that's

29:55.036 --> 29:57.036
gonna help us get you the stuff you

29:57.036 --> 29:59.147
need faster . Um , General Gio , um ,

29:59.147 --> 30:01.314
talk to us about how Canada and the US

30:01.314 --> 30:02.981
partner on our air defenses .

30:04.089 --> 30:06.145
Congressman , uh , Canada and the US

30:06.145 --> 30:08.311
are , uh , part of the only binational

30:08.311 --> 30:11.180
command in the world and NORAD and have

30:11.180 --> 30:14.579
been for almost 70 years . So the air

30:14.579 --> 30:17.010
defense , aerospace control , and

30:17.010 --> 30:20.849
maritime warning mission are shared

30:20.849 --> 30:23.199
between Canada and the United States in ,

30:23.250 --> 30:25.920
uh , through NORAD , and so , uh ,

30:25.930 --> 30:28.079
we're integrated at all levels , uh ,

30:28.609 --> 30:31.619
in that mission . And if Canada were to

30:31.619 --> 30:33.508
drop out of that , how would that

30:33.508 --> 30:35.579
change our mission in terms of being

30:35.579 --> 30:38.239
able to protect our airspace ? Well ,

30:38.319 --> 30:40.640
sir , the , the primary way it would be

30:40.640 --> 30:43.709
is the , uh , northern approaches , uh ,

30:43.719 --> 30:46.989
would be severely , uh , underresourced ,

30:47.020 --> 30:49.469
and , uh , we would lose a significant

30:49.469 --> 30:51.691
amount of domain awareness and response

30:51.691 --> 30:53.802
in the northern approaches , which is

30:53.802 --> 30:55.858
the fastest and the easiest approach

30:55.858 --> 30:57.691
for adversaries to take to North

30:57.691 --> 30:59.858
America . And , and Mr . Leonardo , on

30:59.858 --> 31:01.913
the , on the border costs , you said

31:01.913 --> 31:03.969
it's 375 million to date as like the

31:03.969 --> 31:05.691
last two months . How many DOD

31:05.691 --> 31:07.802
personnel are committed to the border

31:07.802 --> 31:09.747
at this point ? Um , I believe the

31:09.747 --> 31:12.109
figure is approximately 6600 active

31:12.109 --> 31:14.276
duty , uh , soldiers , but I , I would

31:14.276 --> 31:16.387
yield to , uh , General Guo , who may

31:16.387 --> 31:18.442
have , uh , the more , um , accurate

31:18.442 --> 31:21.319
details . So it's approximately 6700 on

31:21.319 --> 31:24.920
the , uh , Title 10 forces . Are on the

31:24.920 --> 31:27.479
border and then up to 10,000 have been

31:27.479 --> 31:30.160
ordered and uh the remainder are in the

31:30.160 --> 31:32.280
process of moving down to the border

31:32.280 --> 31:34.719
right and do you have a how how do they

31:34.719 --> 31:36.800
have a specific time period at this

31:36.800 --> 31:38.689
point ? How long we're gonna have

31:38.689 --> 31:40.856
10,000 people at the border ? Do you ,

31:40.880 --> 31:43.500
do you have that ? Uh , sir , I'm , I'm

31:43.500 --> 31:45.939
glad to answer that as you , as you

31:45.939 --> 31:47.828
know , ranking member Smith , the

31:47.828 --> 31:50.050
department has supported the border for

31:50.050 --> 31:52.106
several days . I , I understand that

31:52.106 --> 31:54.106
right , so as far as how long we're

31:54.106 --> 31:56.500
gonna be there now , I , I suspect for

31:56.500 --> 31:59.209
an extended period , uh , based on the

31:59.209 --> 32:01.376
results that we've achieved in just 60

32:01.376 --> 32:03.900
days to shut down the border the way we

32:03.900 --> 32:06.579
have and to support our partners at DHS

32:06.579 --> 32:09.530
and CBP and ICE , it's an incredible ,

32:09.939 --> 32:12.420
incredible . Uh , effort by the

32:12.420 --> 32:14.587
Department of Defense working with DHS

32:14.587 --> 32:16.920
and CBP and ICE and uh . But when these ,

32:16.920 --> 32:18.920
these 10,000 were sent down there ,

32:18.920 --> 32:20.976
they weren't sent down there for a 3

32:20.976 --> 32:20.500
month deployment or a 6 month

32:20.500 --> 32:22.500
deployment , they're just sent down

32:22.500 --> 32:24.667
there and then we'll just see how long

32:24.667 --> 32:26.722
it , how long they stay . There's no

32:26.722 --> 32:28.667
particular time frame . Well , the

32:28.667 --> 32:30.722
executive order tells us to seal the

32:30.722 --> 32:32.833
border and that's what the department

32:32.833 --> 32:34.833
will do . Um , but I want , I wanna

32:34.833 --> 32:37.290
clarify the , the number too that also

32:37.290 --> 32:39.457
includes , uh , the numbers at Gitmo ,

32:39.569 --> 32:41.530
uh , the number of military forces

32:41.530 --> 32:43.641
supporting SOCOM too , sir . I'm over

32:43.641 --> 32:45.863
time , so I have to go back , yell back

32:45.863 --> 32:47.974
the show . Thank you . Gentlemen from

32:47.974 --> 32:49.752
South Carolina , Mr . Wilson is

32:49.752 --> 32:51.919
recognized . Thank you , Mr . Chairman

32:51.919 --> 32:51.739
and thank each of you for coming here

32:51.739 --> 32:53.890
today . I'm very concerned about the

32:54.439 --> 32:57.040
actions of the axis of evil they have

32:57.040 --> 32:59.170
taken to challenge the United States

32:59.170 --> 33:01.281
and Europe and Asia , but also in our

33:01.281 --> 33:03.503
backyard here in the Western Hemisphere

33:03.503 --> 33:05.449
threatening the security and

33:05.449 --> 33:08.319
independence of our allies throughout

33:08.319 --> 33:12.040
the hemisphere . With that in mind . We

33:12.040 --> 33:14.839
know that sadly that we're in a war we

33:14.839 --> 33:17.040
did not choose of dictators with rule

33:17.040 --> 33:19.151
of gun invading democracies with rule

33:19.151 --> 33:22.339
of law . It began February 24 , 2022

33:22.479 --> 33:24.701
when war criminal Putin invaded Ukraine

33:24.701 --> 33:27.160
and then on October 7 , 2023 , the

33:27.160 --> 33:30.079
puppets of Iran invaded Israel . With

33:30.079 --> 33:32.135
that in mind , the Chinese Communist

33:32.135 --> 33:34.357
Party continues to challenge the United

33:34.357 --> 33:36.523
States economically and diplomatically

33:36.523 --> 33:38.746
within the Western Hemisphere . And war

33:38.746 --> 33:40.630
Colonel Putin continues to push

33:40.630 --> 33:42.297
aggressive disinformation and

33:42.297 --> 33:44.920
propaganda while continuing mass murder

33:44.920 --> 33:47.359
in Ukraine . In war , Colonel Putin is

33:47.359 --> 33:49.839
clearly an obsessed , uh , trying to

33:49.839 --> 33:51.839
resurrect the failed Soviet Union .

33:52.000 --> 33:54.278
Oppressing the people of Russia itself ,

33:54.278 --> 33:56.599
uh , Transnistria , uh , of Moldova ,

33:56.680 --> 33:59.079
Belarus , while invading Ukraine and

33:59.079 --> 34:01.301
the Republic of Georgia and threatening

34:01.301 --> 34:03.800
Estonia and the partitioning again of

34:03.800 --> 34:05.800
Poland . With all of that in mind ,

34:05.800 --> 34:09.439
Admiral Josy right now , uh , 22 of 31

34:09.439 --> 34:11.750
countries of the Southern Command , uh ,

34:11.840 --> 34:15.840
still have a part of the Chinese

34:15.840 --> 34:17.507
Communist Party Belt and Road

34:17.507 --> 34:19.989
Initiative . It's uh really reassuring

34:19.989 --> 34:22.108
and so positive that Panama has

34:22.108 --> 34:24.275
announced they're leaving the Belt and

34:24.275 --> 34:27.099
Road Initiative , and we so appreciate

34:27.099 --> 34:29.829
our allies and the people of Panama are

34:29.829 --> 34:32.868
just great people that understand the

34:32.868 --> 34:35.035
threat . With that in mind , Admiral ,

34:35.035 --> 34:37.146
what are the elements and what is the

34:37.146 --> 34:39.368
conduct of the Belt and Road Initiative

34:39.368 --> 34:41.535
and what further resources do you need

34:41.535 --> 34:45.100
to ensure that we can . Continue the

34:45.100 --> 34:47.540
trend of pushing the Chinese Communist

34:47.540 --> 34:49.209
Party out of the hemisphere .

34:51.790 --> 34:53.957
Congressman , the Belt Road Initiative

34:53.957 --> 34:56.012
continues to portray economic , uh ,

34:56.239 --> 34:58.183
opportunity . Uh , we see it a bit

34:58.183 --> 35:00.295
differently . We think our partners ,

35:00.295 --> 35:02.350
uh , by the time they realize what's

35:02.350 --> 35:04.517
going on , they , they've been duped ,

35:04.517 --> 35:04.030
right ? They find themselves with , um ,

35:04.159 --> 35:06.550
high interest rate loans , uh , more ,

35:06.719 --> 35:09.419
uh , data insecurity . Uh , resource

35:09.419 --> 35:11.641
extraction , it goes on and on and on .

35:11.641 --> 35:13.697
I think we have to deliver by making

35:13.697 --> 35:15.808
sure we have an alternative , right ?

35:15.808 --> 35:17.586
So whether that's one thing our

35:17.586 --> 35:19.586
partners continue to ask for is our

35:19.586 --> 35:19.179
presence , right ? They want the

35:19.179 --> 35:21.346
security cooperation , but also we can

35:21.346 --> 35:23.457
look at raising the profile of , uh ,

35:23.459 --> 35:25.403
our , our , uh , businesses in the

35:25.403 --> 35:27.570
region . We need to find a way to have

35:27.570 --> 35:29.737
economic investment . I look at , uh ,

35:29.737 --> 35:32.015
the Office of Stgic Capital , uh , DFC ,

35:32.015 --> 35:34.237
uh , Exim Bank finding ways that we can

35:34.237 --> 35:36.181
deliver for our partners quicker .

35:36.939 --> 35:38.995
Thank you very much indeed that's so

35:38.995 --> 35:40.939
important . I do want to reiterate

35:40.939 --> 35:43.106
again how important Panama is and what

35:43.106 --> 35:45.106
a great model that can be for other

35:45.106 --> 35:47.217
countries of the hemisphere , uh , to

35:47.217 --> 35:49.328
have their economic independence , to

35:49.328 --> 35:51.439
work , uh , uh , freely , uh , in the

35:51.439 --> 35:54.060
world . Jong Guo , over the past few

35:54.060 --> 35:56.171
years we've seen Russia , China , and

35:56.171 --> 35:58.379
Iran continuously extend their reach

35:58.379 --> 36:00.379
into the Western Hemisphere . We've

36:00.379 --> 36:02.379
seen the Iranian navy send warships

36:02.379 --> 36:04.435
into the southern hemisphere along .

36:04.435 --> 36:06.490
With the Chinese Communist Party and

36:06.490 --> 36:08.340
war criminal Putin continuing to

36:08.340 --> 36:10.510
increase military cooperation in the

36:10.510 --> 36:12.860
Western Hemisphere with Russian ships

36:12.860 --> 36:15.219
docking in Havana , maintaining the

36:15.219 --> 36:18.219
communist Cuban dictatorship , and we

36:18.219 --> 36:21.060
again can see that his resurrection of

36:21.060 --> 36:23.300
the failed Soviet Union includes uh

36:23.300 --> 36:25.939
sustaining the very few murderous

36:25.939 --> 36:27.995
allies they have in the world , uh ,

36:27.995 --> 36:30.161
sadly beginning here in our hemisphere

36:30.161 --> 36:33.050
with Cuba . It's is the increasing

36:33.050 --> 36:34.939
reach and cooperation between our

36:34.939 --> 36:37.050
adversaries a growing concern for the

36:37.050 --> 36:39.510
Northern Command and our

36:39.510 --> 36:42.649
aerosense base Defense Command .

36:44.929 --> 36:47.096
Congressman , it is one of our primary

36:47.096 --> 36:49.959
concerns , and that is the increased

36:49.959 --> 36:52.600
cooperation between China , Russia ,

36:53.209 --> 36:56.179
Iran , and North Korea , not only in

36:56.179 --> 36:58.629
exchanging weapons and technology , but

36:58.629 --> 37:01.929
also in access to , to , uh , from

37:01.929 --> 37:04.659
which to operate . Uh , as I mentioned ,

37:04.699 --> 37:08.139
the number of incursions into our air

37:08.139 --> 37:10.250
defense identification zones over the

37:10.250 --> 37:13.379
past year has reached a level that

37:13.379 --> 37:15.712
exceeds what it was before the invasion .

37:15.979 --> 37:17.923
And if you take the year since the

37:17.923 --> 37:20.570
invasion combined , uh , those number

37:20.570 --> 37:22.292
of incursions , that number of

37:22.292 --> 37:24.292
incursions is less than what we had

37:24.292 --> 37:26.459
last year , and I expect that trend to

37:26.459 --> 37:28.514
continue , and it's a big concern to

37:28.514 --> 37:28.459
NORAD and NORCO , and I'm really

37:28.459 --> 37:30.403
grateful that President Trump is .

37:30.540 --> 37:32.570
Addressing the issue of the Iran

37:32.570 --> 37:34.514
capability of developing a nuclear

37:34.514 --> 37:36.929
weapon , uh , indeed , uh , with their

37:36.929 --> 37:39.290
ICBM capability , what we're talking

37:39.290 --> 37:42.330
about is essential threat to our our

37:42.330 --> 37:44.386
ally Israel , but also to the United

37:44.386 --> 37:48.010
States . And so , uh , the regime in

37:48.010 --> 37:50.530
Tehran should not be allowed to have a

37:50.530 --> 37:53.469
nuclear capability . I yield back . I

37:53.469 --> 37:55.247
thank the gentleman chair and I

37:55.247 --> 37:57.469
recognized gentleman from Connecticut ,

37:57.469 --> 37:57.439
Mr . Courtney . Thank you , uh , Mr .

37:57.510 --> 37:59.566
Rogers , and , uh , thank you to all

37:59.566 --> 38:02.139
the witnesses , um , um , this morning .

38:02.429 --> 38:04.709
General Gio , um , at Northcom posture

38:04.709 --> 38:06.931
hearings in recent years , you and your

38:06.931 --> 38:08.709
predecessors have described the

38:08.709 --> 38:10.487
increasing frequency of Russian

38:10.487 --> 38:12.598
submarine patrols that have transited

38:12.598 --> 38:14.598
the Atlantic in the vicinity of the

38:14.598 --> 38:16.765
homeland . You alluded to the undersea

38:16.765 --> 38:18.876
a number of times in your testimony .

38:18.876 --> 38:21.153
It's in your written testimony as well .

38:21.153 --> 38:23.376
Uh , can you tell us as best you can in

38:23.376 --> 38:25.487
an unclassified setting if that trend

38:25.487 --> 38:27.709
is continuing ? Congressman , the , the

38:27.709 --> 38:30.800
trend of , uh , approaching our coast

38:30.800 --> 38:32.949
from both Russia and Chinese , uh ,

38:32.959 --> 38:35.709
submarines is increasing , and we need

38:35.709 --> 38:38.120
a , uh , expanded undersea detection

38:38.120 --> 38:40.231
capability to ensure that we're aware

38:40.231 --> 38:42.287
of these and can properly posture to

38:42.287 --> 38:44.453
defend against submarine launch cruise

38:44.453 --> 38:46.509
missiles or ballistic missiles . And

38:46.509 --> 38:48.676
when you say that undersea detection ,

38:48.676 --> 38:50.731
where you're talking about sensors ,

38:50.731 --> 38:52.731
right ? And uh , and I mean there's

38:52.731 --> 38:54.842
obviously other levels of yes sir I'm

38:54.842 --> 38:56.898
talking about sensors , right , um .

38:56.898 --> 38:59.120
Anti-submarine warfare , uh , to follow

38:59.120 --> 39:01.176
up Mr . Smith's question , um , is a

39:01.176 --> 39:03.342
team sport with our allies . It starts

39:03.342 --> 39:05.889
in Europe , um , in terms of Russian

39:05.889 --> 39:08.649
patrols where , uh , again , um , you

39:08.649 --> 39:10.979
know , UK , France , uh , um ,

39:11.010 --> 39:13.121
participate with the US , and then as

39:13.121 --> 39:15.288
it proceeds further west , uh , Canada

39:15.288 --> 39:17.510
is also part of that team sport , isn't

39:17.510 --> 39:20.209
that correct ? Congressman , that's

39:20.209 --> 39:22.679
correct . Um , and if you use the , uh ,

39:22.689 --> 39:25.169
last out of sea deployment in in July

39:25.169 --> 39:27.489
as an example , uh , the nations that

39:27.489 --> 39:29.211
you mentioned , uh , had first

39:29.211 --> 39:31.322
detection . We picked up on those and

39:31.322 --> 39:33.760
using both Canadian ships and , uh ,

39:33.770 --> 39:36.969
maritime patrol aircraft tracked those ,

39:37.050 --> 39:39.040
uh , the submarine and the surface

39:39.040 --> 39:41.330
vessels all the way until we handed it

39:41.330 --> 39:43.386
to Admiral Halsey's command and they

39:43.386 --> 39:46.040
went into Havana . Thank you and um .

39:46.969 --> 39:50.129
And again we're talking uh about a , a

39:50.129 --> 39:52.351
fleet that despite the war in Ukraine ,

39:52.351 --> 39:54.570
Putin continues to uh invest in fact

39:54.570 --> 39:57.090
yesterday uh he was at a shipyard uh

39:57.090 --> 39:59.368
announcing again another generation of ,

39:59.368 --> 40:01.959
of , uh , submarine , uh capability for

40:01.959 --> 40:05.080
the hydrosonic hydro uh yeah hydrosonic ,

40:05.159 --> 40:07.959
uh , missile , um , payload which , uh ,

40:07.969 --> 40:09.858
again I don't know if you've been

40:09.858 --> 40:11.913
following that but I mean again this

40:11.913 --> 40:14.080
this threat is not sort of stalled out

40:14.080 --> 40:16.413
because of Ukraine . That's right , sir .

40:16.413 --> 40:18.469
So the , uh , maritime threat and um

40:18.469 --> 40:20.358
most parts of the air threat have

40:20.358 --> 40:22.413
actually grown over the last several

40:22.413 --> 40:24.580
years , uh , despite the activities in

40:24.580 --> 40:28.070
Ukraine . So , um , again , the , the

40:28.070 --> 40:30.070
focus in terms of just what are the

40:30.070 --> 40:32.270
most effective ways to counter that ,

40:32.280 --> 40:35.550
uh , clearly requires , um , a

40:35.550 --> 40:37.870
multinational effort and I mean the

40:37.870 --> 40:39.870
good news is is that we've had good

40:39.870 --> 40:42.459
participation in in recent years and uh

40:42.459 --> 40:44.626
I I just wanna , uh , associate myself

40:44.626 --> 40:46.681
with my with uh Mr . Smith's remarks

40:46.681 --> 40:48.889
that this trade war . That has started

40:48.889 --> 40:52.689
is just a a complete um needless um

40:52.689 --> 40:55.139
impediment in terms of you know having

40:55.139 --> 40:58.209
maximum levels of participation . I

40:58.209 --> 41:00.929
mean seeing yesterday the pictures of

41:00.929 --> 41:02.979
South Korea , Japan , and China

41:03.250 --> 41:05.889
announcing jointly an anti-US tariff

41:05.889 --> 41:08.330
initiative with the three leadership of

41:08.330 --> 41:10.441
the three governments shaking hands ,

41:10.441 --> 41:12.879
uh , honestly was sickening , um , and ,

41:13.290 --> 41:15.530
uh , and again we , we've really got to

41:15.530 --> 41:19.120
do , um . More as a congress as a

41:19.120 --> 41:21.176
co-equal branch of government to try

41:21.176 --> 41:23.398
and rein in , uh , what I think is just

41:23.398 --> 41:26.790
a really um negative , um , you know ,

41:26.800 --> 41:29.133
dynamic that's being put into place and ,

41:29.133 --> 41:31.244
and , you know , we , we're all gonna

41:31.244 --> 41:33.356
find out tomorrow the , the extent of

41:33.356 --> 41:35.679
the next level of these tariffs but um

41:35.679 --> 41:38.439
it it it's impossible for I think

41:38.439 --> 41:40.495
anyone to argue reasonably that it's

41:40.495 --> 41:42.699
not impacting . The ability of us to

41:42.699 --> 41:45.179
interact with our um allies when their

41:45.179 --> 41:47.235
governments are being put under such

41:47.235 --> 41:49.620
strain uh and pressure um with with

41:49.620 --> 41:51.649
these policies that are that are um

41:51.939 --> 41:54.610
again um seem to be cascading out every

41:54.610 --> 41:58.050
single day um so and and again just ,

41:58.169 --> 42:00.379
uh , Admiral , uh , the general

42:00.379 --> 42:02.570
referred to the fact that the Russian

42:02.570 --> 42:04.820
naval presence uh does make it way into

42:04.820 --> 42:06.969
your area of command maybe you could

42:06.969 --> 42:09.191
just sort of allude to that in my final

42:09.191 --> 42:11.830
minute . Yes , Congressman , since 2008

42:11.830 --> 42:14.000
we've had over 40 Russian every

42:14.000 --> 42:16.229
deplorers into the region . So again

42:16.229 --> 42:18.285
working with us , uh , Northcom , we

42:18.285 --> 42:20.396
make sure we do some type of relay to

42:20.396 --> 42:22.507
make sure we can keep pace on those .

42:22.507 --> 42:24.340
Uh , I would say that we have to

42:24.340 --> 42:26.562
continue to have , uh , presence , uh ,

42:26.562 --> 42:25.750
and again presence of power . We have

42:25.750 --> 42:27.917
to meet presence with presence . If we

42:27.917 --> 42:29.972
don't do that , then we're gonna see

42:29.972 --> 42:29.909
this space , right ? So we have to make

42:29.909 --> 42:32.131
sure we stay in their face and have our

42:32.131 --> 42:34.459
assets ready to , uh , engage . No ,

42:34.580 --> 42:36.636
and , and SOCOM usually has been the

42:36.636 --> 42:38.802
poor cousin in terms of navy sort of ,

42:38.802 --> 42:41.189
uh , allocation of , of , uh , ships

42:41.189 --> 42:43.356
and so I mean , I think your point , I

42:43.356 --> 42:45.578
think is really an important one for us

42:45.578 --> 42:47.689
to , uh , to hear and without a yield

42:47.689 --> 42:50.870
back . Yeah , and we , we need to

42:50.870 --> 42:53.270
change that . Uh , there's a lot more

42:53.270 --> 42:55.270
resource needs to be going to South

42:55.270 --> 42:57.437
America , uh , our presence there than

42:57.437 --> 42:59.659
we've had been doing in the past , same

42:59.659 --> 43:01.714
thing with AFRICO . With that , I'll

43:01.714 --> 43:03.826
recognize General from Georgia , Mr .

43:03.826 --> 43:03.719
Scott , for 5 minutes . Thank you , Mr .

43:03.750 --> 43:06.030
Chairman . I'll also want to reiterate

43:06.030 --> 43:07.697
the importance of the Western

43:07.697 --> 43:09.808
Hemisphere working together to , uh ,

43:09.808 --> 43:12.860
combat the . Axis of evil as we've

43:12.860 --> 43:15.719
called it in the past , uh . Admiral

43:15.719 --> 43:17.719
Halsey , I want to start with you .

43:17.719 --> 43:20.052
You're from Peach County , Georgia , uh ,

43:20.052 --> 43:22.219
just outside of my district , but I go

43:22.219 --> 43:24.330
through it a couple of times a week ,

43:24.330 --> 43:26.760
uh , home of , uh , Fort Valley State .

43:27.979 --> 43:30.035
Bluebird Bus Company . So welcome to

43:30.035 --> 43:32.146
Washington . You're from a great part

43:32.146 --> 43:34.368
of the world . Uh , I want to talk with

43:34.368 --> 43:35.923
you a little bit about drug

43:35.923 --> 43:38.610
interdiction and , um , what percentage

43:38.610 --> 43:40.610
of drug trafficking activity do you

43:40.610 --> 43:42.777
estimate that SOCOM is able to observe

43:42.777 --> 43:45.320
and collect intelligence on with the ,

43:45.449 --> 43:47.782
uh , ISR and other assets that you have ?

43:48.899 --> 43:51.010
Congressman , we , we typically can ,

43:51.010 --> 43:53.177
uh , action about 10% of what we see .

43:53.379 --> 43:55.101
So again I think we have to be

43:55.101 --> 43:57.268
consistent President engaged with this

43:57.268 --> 43:59.323
piece , and so more ISRSS definitely

43:59.323 --> 44:01.601
required , uh , to get after this . OK .

44:01.601 --> 44:03.570
So , so I want to reiterate for

44:03.570 --> 44:05.681
everybody who's listening that of the

44:06.340 --> 44:10.209
Um Drug trafficking that we see that

44:10.209 --> 44:12.909
we have actionable intelligence on , we

44:12.909 --> 44:16.310
only have the assets to

44:16.870 --> 44:19.389
stop about 10% of it , even when we

44:19.389 --> 44:21.667
have actual intel . And that's correct ,

44:21.667 --> 44:25.159
sir . What additional

44:25.159 --> 44:28.600
assets and authorities do you need to

44:28.600 --> 44:31.800
move that from 10% ? To

44:31.800 --> 44:34.399
25% . And thank you for that ,

44:34.409 --> 44:36.076
Congressman . I think we need

44:36.076 --> 44:38.187
consistent , uh , persistent presence

44:38.187 --> 44:40.242
to interdict and engage . We have to

44:40.242 --> 44:42.465
continue to do that . I think as I look

44:42.465 --> 44:44.409
at more maritime assets , aviation

44:44.409 --> 44:46.353
assets , ISR assets , and then the

44:46.353 --> 44:48.353
security cooperation is continue to

44:48.353 --> 44:50.298
build up our partners cap building

44:50.298 --> 44:52.520
capacity . Over 80% of our interdiction

44:52.520 --> 44:54.798
last year , our partners actually , uh ,

44:54.798 --> 44:56.965
help us out . And that's based off our

44:56.965 --> 44:56.385
security cooperation , but definitely

44:56.385 --> 44:58.329
at this point , uh , more aviation

44:58.329 --> 45:00.385
assets , and more maritime assets to

45:00.385 --> 45:02.218
stop the flow , and we also have

45:02.218 --> 45:04.552
something called a ship special mission ,

45:04.552 --> 45:06.718
uh , which actually takes our partners

45:06.718 --> 45:08.885
out with interceptors to get after the

45:08.885 --> 45:11.163
fight right now we're on a record pace ,

45:11.163 --> 45:13.385
but I know I could do , uh , a lot more

45:13.385 --> 45:15.607
with a lot more assets . OK , so , so .

45:15.689 --> 45:17.689
We talked about the assets . Do you

45:17.689 --> 45:19.967
have all the authorities that you need ?

45:20.610 --> 45:22.979
To sink the pangas Yes , sir . I do

45:22.979 --> 45:25.312
have authorities . Uh , we do , uh , do ,

45:25.312 --> 45:27.423
uh , warning shots and disabling fire

45:27.423 --> 45:29.312
from time to time , but , uh , no

45:29.312 --> 45:31.535
authorities do for kinetic . That's not

45:31.535 --> 45:33.757
what we're doing at this point , but we

45:33.757 --> 45:35.757
are , uh , again , we do do warning

45:35.757 --> 45:37.979
shots and disabling fire . I think for

45:37.979 --> 45:40.270
some of us , we see , we see sinking

45:40.270 --> 45:42.739
the panga is actually saving lives

45:42.739 --> 45:45.260
because of the tons of drugs that come

45:45.260 --> 45:47.371
into the United States and the damage

45:47.371 --> 45:49.739
that it does , uh , inside . Um ,

45:50.840 --> 45:54.179
America . Uh , with that , I'm gonna

45:54.250 --> 45:56.209
shift over to , um ,

45:58.860 --> 46:01.709
You , General Guo , uh , you've got ,

46:01.719 --> 46:03.775
uh , General Tom Carden working with

46:03.775 --> 46:05.775
you , one of the finest people I've

46:05.775 --> 46:07.969
ever met , uh , National Guard , uh ,

46:08.239 --> 46:11.080
Georgia National Guard , and , uh , he

46:11.080 --> 46:13.247
speaks highly obvious . That's kind of

46:13.247 --> 46:16.000
all I , I need to know about you , um .

46:16.979 --> 46:19.201
When we , when we talk about threats to

46:19.201 --> 46:21.368
the homeland , uh , no one understands

46:21.368 --> 46:23.479
the whole picture of our supply chain

46:23.479 --> 46:25.535
vulnerabilities against the PRC with

46:25.535 --> 46:27.423
respect to , um , IT software and

46:27.423 --> 46:30.419
hardware with our , uh , critical

46:30.419 --> 46:33.750
infrastructure . Uh , but we do know

46:33.750 --> 46:35.830
that we're vulnerable . Uh , what

46:35.830 --> 46:37.441
advice do you have for us or

46:37.441 --> 46:39.497
recommendation do you have for us to

46:39.497 --> 46:41.663
ensure the defense and security of our

46:41.663 --> 46:43.663
nation's infrastructure against the

46:43.663 --> 46:45.941
PRC's non-kinetic threat ? Congressman ,

46:45.941 --> 46:48.108
first , thanks for , uh , pointing out

46:48.108 --> 46:50.219
the outstanding service of Lieutenant

46:50.219 --> 46:52.219
General Tom Carden . He is a , uh ,

46:52.219 --> 46:54.497
phenomenal , uh , deputy commander and ,

46:54.497 --> 46:56.830
uh , leader , as you , as you mentioned ,

46:56.830 --> 46:56.550
and we're very fortunate to have him in

46:56.550 --> 46:58.860
our command , uh , regarding defense ,

46:58.989 --> 47:01.830
uh , critical infrastructure , uh , I

47:01.830 --> 47:04.110
feel that , uh , I look at it in two

47:04.110 --> 47:06.229
different ways . One is the cyber

47:06.229 --> 47:08.229
threat , and then the other is the

47:08.229 --> 47:10.507
physical threat . For the cyber threat ,

47:10.507 --> 47:12.729
I'm very encouraged by the relationship

47:12.729 --> 47:14.729
that that Northern Command has with

47:14.729 --> 47:17.100
Cyber Command . And CISA to address not

47:17.100 --> 47:19.500
only the DOD networks but the uh

47:19.500 --> 47:21.722
critical infrastructure and the defense

47:21.722 --> 47:24.179
industrial base to ensure that they're

47:24.179 --> 47:26.939
protected from hundreds and thousands

47:26.939 --> 47:29.620
of attempted cyber attacks that happen

47:29.620 --> 47:32.459
each day . Uh , people ask often if the

47:32.459 --> 47:34.626
homeland is under attack or what would

47:34.626 --> 47:36.681
it take for the homeland to be under

47:36.681 --> 47:38.848
attack . We are under attack every day

47:38.848 --> 47:38.820
in the cyber domain , as you pointed

47:38.820 --> 47:41.449
out . The physical , I'm down about 20

47:41.449 --> 47:43.616
seconds , but I just want to reiterate

47:43.616 --> 47:45.727
what you've said . We're under attack

47:45.727 --> 47:47.727
every day , uh , predominantly from

47:47.727 --> 47:51.239
China and , and China's proxies in our

47:51.239 --> 47:53.295
infrastructure systems , both in our

47:53.295 --> 47:55.295
defense systems and in our civilian

47:55.295 --> 47:57.239
systems that we depend on . In the

47:57.239 --> 47:59.295
cyber domain , yes , sir . Yes sir ,

47:59.295 --> 48:01.517
absolutely . Thank you very much , Mr .

48:01.517 --> 48:03.517
Chairman . My time's expired . Uh ,

48:03.517 --> 48:05.572
chair I recognize the gentleman from

48:05.572 --> 48:07.850
California , Mr . Carvajal . Thank you ,

48:07.850 --> 48:10.072
Mr . Chairman . We can clearly see that

48:10.072 --> 48:12.183
the Belt and Road Initiative in South

48:12.183 --> 48:14.350
America has been a goal for China that

48:14.350 --> 48:16.572
continues to come to fruition . I would

48:16.572 --> 48:18.719
say they have been successful as some

48:18.719 --> 48:20.830
of these countries have withdrawn the

48:20.830 --> 48:23.739
recognition of Taiwan . Both China and

48:23.739 --> 48:25.850
Russia negotiate with the governments

48:25.850 --> 48:27.961
of South America to build up military

48:27.961 --> 48:29.795
and commercial interest in those

48:29.795 --> 48:31.906
countries . Let's compare that to our

48:31.906 --> 48:34.060
own foreign aid which has been

48:34.060 --> 48:36.129
decimated over the last few months

48:36.659 --> 48:39.129
significantly weakening our soft power

48:39.540 --> 48:42.449
and allowing China and Russia in turn

48:42.449 --> 48:44.560
to further solidify their influence .

48:45.129 --> 48:48.379
Admiral Halsey What is Cocom doing to

48:48.379 --> 48:50.659
combat the growing Chinese and Russian

48:50.659 --> 48:53.419
influence in South America ? And does

48:53.419 --> 48:55.641
our diminishing soft power make it more

48:55.641 --> 48:57.590
challenging to accomplish this ?

48:59.919 --> 49:02.197
Congressman , thanks for that question .

49:02.197 --> 49:04.363
Uh , at SOCOM , we continue to use the

49:04.363 --> 49:06.419
security cooperation support that we

49:06.419 --> 49:08.586
have . Basically , I look at the joint

49:08.586 --> 49:10.697
exercise program . That's a great way

49:10.697 --> 49:10.429
to bring , uh , our partners together ,

49:10.560 --> 49:12.282
build interoperability , trust

49:12.282 --> 49:14.393
capability . We continue to do that .

49:14.393 --> 49:16.449
We have several projects ongoing now

49:16.449 --> 49:18.560
with our security cooperation again ,

49:18.560 --> 49:20.671
building cyber operation centers , so

49:20.671 --> 49:22.727
we'll continue to go that route with

49:22.727 --> 49:22.353
regards specifically . To , uh , the

49:22.353 --> 49:24.575
lack of , uh , some of the soft power ,

49:24.575 --> 49:26.742
I have to use the tools that I have so

49:26.742 --> 49:28.909
I think about , uh , the , uh , Lamont

49:28.909 --> 49:31.020
exercise which is ongoing right now .

49:31.020 --> 49:33.242
We've already done over 4000 encounters

49:33.242 --> 49:35.520
with , uh , across the Caribbean doing ,

49:35.520 --> 49:37.631
uh , medical procedures and surgeries

49:37.631 --> 49:39.575
over 300 surgeries . I look at the

49:39.575 --> 49:41.742
continuing promise what's gonna happen

49:41.742 --> 49:43.575
this summer , another soft power

49:43.575 --> 49:43.272
initiative where we're gonna have the

49:43.272 --> 49:45.545
USNS . Comfort to go out to over 8

49:45.545 --> 49:47.767
nations and treat thousands of people .

49:47.767 --> 49:49.489
I try to continue to build the

49:49.489 --> 49:51.434
resilience that we have . And last

49:51.434 --> 49:53.489
thing I was mention that we have the

49:53.489 --> 49:52.946
trade winds exercise it's gonna start

49:52.946 --> 49:55.385
next month , uh , in , uh , Trinity

49:55.385 --> 49:57.666
Tobago to do humanitarian assistance

49:57.666 --> 49:59.610
disaster relief type response . So

49:59.610 --> 50:01.277
we're building capability and

50:01.277 --> 50:03.333
resiliency of our partners , uh , to

50:03.333 --> 50:05.444
help them , uh , be ready , and we'll

50:05.444 --> 50:07.610
stand shoulder to shoulder with them .

50:07.610 --> 50:09.729
So Admiral , if you could just answer

50:09.729 --> 50:11.396
the question yes or no , does

50:11.396 --> 50:13.396
diminishing soft power make it more

50:13.396 --> 50:15.673
challenging to accomplish your mission ?

50:15.739 --> 50:17.850
Yeah , definitely , we , we always do

50:17.850 --> 50:20.017
soft power , right ? So that's part of

50:20.017 --> 50:22.239
my job as well to that . So yes , thank

50:22.239 --> 50:24.350
you , Admiral Holte , can you discuss

50:24.350 --> 50:26.128
how the special forces tactical

50:26.128 --> 50:26.120
surveillance reconnaissance and

50:26.489 --> 50:29.139
tracking program has assisted you in

50:29.139 --> 50:32.010
carrying out missions in your AOR ? And

50:32.409 --> 50:34.298
do you think this is a program we

50:34.298 --> 50:36.576
should continue to make investments in ?

50:36.576 --> 50:38.631
Yes , in the past it provides , uh ,

50:38.631 --> 50:40.687
information , uh , and from an intel

50:40.687 --> 50:42.909
standpoint to help us out . So yes , it

50:42.909 --> 50:44.798
is a , uh , a program that I'm in

50:44.798 --> 50:47.699
support of . Thank you , General Guo .

50:47.949 --> 50:50.629
There are over 6500 , 6500 troops

50:50.629 --> 50:52.518
deployed to the southern border ,

50:52.669 --> 50:54.502
helping , helping with detention

50:54.502 --> 50:57.510
activities . 6500 troops seem like a

50:57.510 --> 51:00.429
lot and an excessive number to me . I

51:00.429 --> 51:02.540
can't imagine there is enough work to

51:02.540 --> 51:04.651
go around since they can can't assist

51:04.651 --> 51:06.318
directly with law enforcement

51:06.318 --> 51:08.550
activities . Can you speak to what

51:08.550 --> 51:10.772
exactly your military members are doing

51:10.772 --> 51:13.629
in the southern border ? Congressman ,

51:13.669 --> 51:15.836
yes , uh , first I'd like to point out

51:15.836 --> 51:17.669
they are not doing any detention

51:17.669 --> 51:20.459
activities , uh , so the 6500 are all ,

51:20.780 --> 51:22.891
uh , performing roles in support of ,

51:22.891 --> 51:25.510
uh , customs and Border Protection or

51:25.510 --> 51:27.830
providing unique military capabilities

51:27.830 --> 51:30.550
such as airborne ISR and the uh

51:30.550 --> 51:32.750
surveillance of the uh destroyers off

51:32.750 --> 51:35.929
of each coast . Uh , about 90% of what

51:35.929 --> 51:38.151
the , uh , active forces are doing down

51:38.151 --> 51:40.318
there is in what we call detection and

51:40.318 --> 51:42.207
monitoring where they're using uh

51:42.207 --> 51:45.020
advanced systems to , uh , monitor the

51:45.020 --> 51:47.260
border and detect anybody that's trying

51:47.260 --> 51:49.379
to illegally cross and as you pointed

51:49.379 --> 51:52.159
out , once they see that they vector in

51:52.159 --> 51:55.300
the border patrol or uh uh a proper law

51:55.300 --> 51:57.522
enforcement agency to actually make the

51:57.522 --> 52:00.739
apprehensions . Thank you . I know all

52:00.739 --> 52:02.739
these service members are following

52:02.739 --> 52:05.072
their orders and will continue to do so ,

52:05.379 --> 52:07.601
but when do you think these troops will

52:07.601 --> 52:09.823
be able to return to their families and

52:09.823 --> 52:11.990
in the case of the guard their primary

52:11.990 --> 52:12.990
jobs .

52:15.770 --> 52:18.570
Congressman , as Mr . Sa uh said

52:18.570 --> 52:21.030
previously , I think it'll be , uh ,

52:21.209 --> 52:23.409
probably , uh , in , in measured in

52:23.409 --> 52:25.850
years , not in months . Uh , the

52:25.850 --> 52:28.409
initial results of sealing the border

52:28.409 --> 52:30.576
have been fantastic if you look at the

52:30.576 --> 52:33.129
stats , uh , but , but , uh , we need

52:33.129 --> 52:35.129
to make sure that , uh , one , that

52:35.129 --> 52:37.296
that's lasting and it goes through all

52:37.296 --> 52:39.351
the cycles of , of illegal migration

52:39.351 --> 52:41.989
that we see seasonal , uh , um ,

52:42.409 --> 52:44.576
seasonal impact is , is significant on

52:44.576 --> 52:46.798
on this . And then we need to make sure

52:46.798 --> 52:48.909
that it's , it's sealed , uh , and it

52:48.909 --> 52:51.076
remains sealed , uh , and I think that

52:51.076 --> 52:53.187
will take , uh , probably a couple of

52:53.187 --> 52:55.242
years . What has been the decline in

52:55.242 --> 52:58.219
the migration since the build up ? Sir ,

52:58.260 --> 53:00.850
all the stats that we see is that uh

53:00.850 --> 53:03.929
the numbers of detections , incursions ,

53:04.300 --> 53:08.149
uh , apprehensions are all uh 90 to

53:08.149 --> 53:11.659
95% to 97% less than they were before

53:11.659 --> 53:14.540
the um executive orders were issued .

53:15.209 --> 53:17.209
Thank you very much , chair , and I

53:17.209 --> 53:19.542
recognized gentleman from Virginia , Mr .

53:19.542 --> 53:21.653
Whitman . Thank you , Mr . Chairman .

53:21.653 --> 53:20.840
I'd like to thank our witnesses for

53:20.840 --> 53:23.062
joining us today . Uh , General Gio , I

53:23.062 --> 53:25.062
want to begin with you . We had had

53:25.062 --> 53:27.118
some conversations about , uh , what

53:27.118 --> 53:29.173
happened December 2023 at Joint Base

53:29.173 --> 53:30.896
Langley Eustace , where we had

53:30.896 --> 53:32.840
incursion of UAS's small UAS's for

53:32.840 --> 53:35.149
almost a two month period . Uh , we got

53:35.149 --> 53:37.780
briefs about , uh , what happened there .

53:38.030 --> 53:40.086
They came in well lit . They weren't

53:40.086 --> 53:42.141
trying to hide anything . I felt bad

53:42.141 --> 53:44.030
for the base commander because he

53:44.030 --> 53:45.919
wanted to do something and wasn't

53:45.919 --> 53:48.141
getting backing from folks up the chain

53:48.141 --> 53:47.229
of command . We had a bunch of

53:47.229 --> 53:49.118
resources there where we could do

53:49.118 --> 53:51.340
things , uh , none of those were used ,

53:51.669 --> 53:53.891
uh , if it wasn't for NASA Langley next

53:53.891 --> 53:55.947
door , we wouldn't have even had the

53:55.947 --> 53:57.891
sensors to be able to sense , uh ,

53:57.891 --> 54:00.058
those unmanned aerial systems that are

54:00.058 --> 54:02.550
there on site . Let me ask this , uh ,

54:02.560 --> 54:05.689
we have from a hearing then asked for a

54:05.689 --> 54:08.000
priority list under 130I . What base is

54:08.000 --> 54:10.600
our priority ? What's being done to

54:10.600 --> 54:12.656
protect those bases ? Uh , how do we

54:12.656 --> 54:14.600
make sure those things don't occur

54:14.600 --> 54:16.800
again ? I believe that our adversaries

54:16.800 --> 54:19.022
are probing , trying to figure out what

54:19.022 --> 54:21.479
we can do , what we can't do , uh , and

54:21.479 --> 54:23.840
that's very telling to them what they

54:23.840 --> 54:26.062
saw that day or what they saw over that

54:26.062 --> 54:28.229
month it was very telling to them that

54:28.229 --> 54:30.396
there wasn't the type of reaction that

54:30.396 --> 54:32.507
was necessary . My question is this .

54:32.507 --> 54:34.673
What has been done in the meantime for

54:34.673 --> 54:36.896
us to be assured that NorthCO and NORAD

54:36.896 --> 54:39.007
is doing everything possible on these

54:39.007 --> 54:41.679
bases to protect them from these UAS

54:41.679 --> 54:43.623
threats ? What's our counter UAS ?

54:43.639 --> 54:45.472
Where are we with priority prior

54:45.560 --> 54:48.110
prioritizing these bases ? Where are we

54:48.110 --> 54:50.879
with training our security forces on

54:50.879 --> 54:53.101
base to protect those bases ? Where are

54:53.101 --> 54:55.520
we with supplying kit to at least the

54:55.520 --> 54:57.770
priority bases or have some network of

54:57.770 --> 54:59.881
equipment that necessary to make sure

54:59.881 --> 55:01.603
we're protecting these bases .

55:02.110 --> 55:04.277
Congressman , since the , uh , Langley

55:04.277 --> 55:07.070
incursions of , uh , December 2023 ,

55:07.360 --> 55:09.919
NORAD , or excuse me , NorthCO has

55:09.919 --> 55:12.520
requested , and then last November was

55:12.520 --> 55:15.040
given the responsibility to synchronize

55:15.040 --> 55:17.600
the DOD and if necessary interagency

55:17.600 --> 55:19.439
response to counter UA uh to UAS

55:19.439 --> 55:23.050
incursions . Uh , during that time , uh ,

55:23.219 --> 55:25.649
we've , we've conducted , uh , 3

55:25.649 --> 55:27.889
assisted responses where we can , uh ,

55:27.899 --> 55:30.330
use our new responsibilities to bring ,

55:30.629 --> 55:32.639
uh , capabilities to a base , uh ,

55:32.860 --> 55:35.419
similar to what you saw at at Langley ,

55:35.739 --> 55:37.850
uh , but this time with the authority

55:37.850 --> 55:39.961
to operate those systems based on our

55:39.961 --> 55:41.795
headquarters close ties with the

55:41.795 --> 55:43.906
interagency and Eano's to get the FAA

55:43.906 --> 55:46.017
and other , uh , authorities that are

55:46.017 --> 55:48.620
that are uh necessary uh to operate

55:48.620 --> 55:51.429
once they land . The responsibility for

55:51.429 --> 55:54.429
defending bases uh resides with the

55:54.429 --> 55:56.485
services and with the installation ,

55:56.550 --> 55:58.989
but what Northcom has done is proposed

55:58.989 --> 56:01.550
a uh process where we would bring in

56:01.550 --> 56:04.969
flyaway kits to supplement

56:05.270 --> 56:08.070
or , uh , in a case where there are no

56:08.070 --> 56:10.014
capabilities , provide the initial

56:10.014 --> 56:12.350
capability at that base , uh , to , to

56:12.350 --> 56:14.294
defeat that now we , we don't have

56:14.294 --> 56:16.669
those kits yet , uh but uh we're in the

56:16.669 --> 56:19.699
process of , of acquiring those . I

56:19.699 --> 56:21.866
would say there's certainly a sense of

56:21.866 --> 56:23.977
urgency there and making sure that we

56:23.977 --> 56:26.143
get that done , especially here at the

56:26.143 --> 56:28.310
homeland , sir , I share that sense of

56:28.310 --> 56:30.477
urgency . Thank you , Admiral Halsey .

56:30.477 --> 56:32.810
I want to , um , point to , um , a , uh ,

56:32.810 --> 56:35.032
study being done or or project I should

56:35.032 --> 56:37.143
say at College of William Mary called

56:37.143 --> 56:39.255
Aid Data and Aid data is looking at ,

56:39.255 --> 56:41.032
uh , how China has dramatically

56:41.032 --> 56:43.032
expanded its footprint and critical

56:43.032 --> 56:45.143
mineral extraction around the world ,

56:45.143 --> 56:47.143
but specifically in South America ,

56:47.143 --> 56:49.510
specifically Peru . There are two large

56:49.510 --> 56:52.270
copper mines there that are mining at

56:52.270 --> 56:54.590
record pace . Uh , China's putting a

56:54.590 --> 56:56.757
significant amount of money into those

56:56.757 --> 56:59.030
regions , much the same way they did in

56:59.030 --> 57:01.141
Africa and places like the Democratic

57:01.141 --> 57:03.308
Republic of Congo where they own 16 of

57:03.308 --> 57:05.308
the 18 mines . You know , we in the

57:05.308 --> 57:07.474
United States can talk about resurging

57:07.474 --> 57:09.530
manufacturing and building all these

57:09.530 --> 57:11.979
semiconductor plants , but if we don't

57:11.979 --> 57:14.870
have access to critical minerals and

57:14.870 --> 57:16.981
rare earth elements , those things to

57:16.981 --> 57:19.037
the left in the value chain . And we

57:19.037 --> 57:21.203
can build all the plants we want , but

57:21.203 --> 57:23.537
none of that's come to come to fruition .

57:23.537 --> 57:25.759
Give us your perspective on how you see

57:25.759 --> 57:27.703
the Chinese footprint expanding in

57:27.703 --> 57:29.648
South America , specifically as it

57:29.648 --> 57:31.759
relates to critical minerals and rare

57:31.759 --> 57:33.703
earth elements . And Congressman ,

57:33.703 --> 57:35.926
thank you for that question . Uh , it's

57:35.926 --> 57:38.148
no doubt that , uh , China continues to

57:38.148 --> 57:39.926
or would like to uh control the

57:39.926 --> 57:39.760
abundance of resources and rare

57:39.760 --> 57:41.982
minerals in the in the region . We know

57:41.982 --> 57:44.149
that , uh , so I think what we have to

57:44.149 --> 57:46.371
do is have a solution . Uh , recently ,

57:46.371 --> 57:48.538
uh , it's last year with Exim Bank was

57:48.538 --> 57:50.649
able to finance a , a , uh , a copper

57:50.649 --> 57:52.760
mine or mine in Peru , but we have to

57:52.760 --> 57:54.593
continue to up that , right ? So

57:54.593 --> 57:56.649
Officer C Capital , uh , Development

57:56.649 --> 57:58.482
Finance Corporation , we have to

57:58.482 --> 58:00.316
continue to raise the profile of

58:00.316 --> 58:02.538
companies willing to go down there when

58:02.538 --> 58:02.419
we go to these regions , they know they

58:02.419 --> 58:04.475
have , uh , uh , someone who's gonna

58:04.475 --> 58:06.308
respect their laws , respect the

58:06.308 --> 58:08.475
environmental concerns , right ? So we

58:08.475 --> 58:07.770
have to continue to get that , sir .

58:07.979 --> 58:10.257
Very good . Thank you . With that , Mr .

58:10.257 --> 58:12.368
Chairman , are you back . Chair and I

58:12.368 --> 58:14.646
recognizegen from Colorado , Mr . Crow .

58:16.979 --> 58:19.090
Thank you , Chairman . um , thank you

58:19.090 --> 58:21.368
to all of you for your testimony today .

58:21.368 --> 58:23.479
Uh , General , I wanted to start with

58:23.479 --> 58:25.701
you . Uh , the , the Air National Guard

58:25.701 --> 58:27.923
plays a very critical role in America's

58:27.923 --> 58:30.035
national security . Uh , however , of

58:30.035 --> 58:31.923
the current 25 Air National Guard

58:31.923 --> 58:34.030
fighter squadrons , 15 do not have a

58:34.030 --> 58:36.141
recapitalization plan , including the

58:36.141 --> 58:38.989
140th wing of the , uh , Colorado Air

58:38.989 --> 58:41.211
National Guard headquartered at Buckley

58:41.211 --> 58:43.489
Space Force Base in my district . Uh ,

58:43.500 --> 58:45.444
that's why my , my good friend Don

58:45.444 --> 58:47.570
Bacon and I introduced a bipartisan

58:47.570 --> 58:49.570
legislation to stop the decline of

58:49.570 --> 58:51.939
fighter readiness and stabilize the Air

58:51.939 --> 58:53.995
Force fighter force structure across

58:53.995 --> 58:55.889
the active duty guard and reserve

58:55.889 --> 58:58.229
components . Uh , your written

58:58.229 --> 59:00.396
testimony stated that the Air National

59:00.396 --> 59:02.618
Guard is critical to generating greater

59:02.618 --> 59:04.562
readiness against high-end threats

59:04.562 --> 59:06.396
through enhanced campaigning and

59:06.396 --> 59:08.507
training while remaining available to

59:08.507 --> 59:10.451
NORAD when indications and warning

59:10.451 --> 59:12.396
triggers are met . I , of course ,

59:12.396 --> 59:14.562
couldn't agree more with you as , uh ,

59:14.562 --> 59:16.830
Mr . Bacon and many of us on thisIA uh

59:16.830 --> 59:20.080
have advanced uh just that cause . So

59:20.760 --> 59:23.790
Uh , being in Colorado and being in

59:23.790 --> 59:26.389
close proximity to the 140th wing ,

59:26.669 --> 59:29.350
your predecessor testified not too long

59:29.350 --> 59:32.879
ago , uh , that , um , it was key

59:33.189 --> 59:35.550
to have a fighter wing at Buckley Space

59:35.550 --> 59:37.870
Force Base to protect all of the stuff

59:37.870 --> 59:39.814
within the Western United States ,

59:39.814 --> 59:41.981
including the , the mini facilities in

59:41.981 --> 59:44.203
Colorado . Is it your opinion that that

59:44.203 --> 59:46.370
is still the case that having an alert

59:46.370 --> 59:48.820
squadron . In close proximity to to

59:48.820 --> 59:51.580
NORAD and NORCO and the facilities in

59:51.580 --> 59:53.802
Colorado and surrounding communities is

59:53.802 --> 59:56.100
still still essential . Congressman ,

59:56.250 --> 59:58.250
absolutely , uh , the , the Buckley

59:58.250 --> 01:00:00.530
unit is outstanding unit , uh , does a

01:00:00.530 --> 01:00:02.649
fantastic job in air defense , and

01:00:02.649 --> 01:00:04.760
they're , uh , critical to protecting

01:00:04.760 --> 01:00:07.093
not only Colorado but the region's , uh ,

01:00:07.093 --> 01:00:09.149
critical infrastructure . And what's

01:00:09.149 --> 01:00:13.040
the if there weren't a unit at Buckley ,

01:00:13.250 --> 01:00:15.361
what would be the next closest unit ?

01:00:17.679 --> 01:00:20.830
It would , um , most probably be , uh ,

01:00:20.840 --> 01:00:23.800
Tucson or Tulsa . OK , a considerable

01:00:23.800 --> 01:00:26.159
distance , yes , sir , and we , we , we

01:00:26.159 --> 01:00:28.492
map that , sir , all the time with , uh ,

01:00:28.560 --> 01:00:30.449
you know , the , the range of the

01:00:30.449 --> 01:00:32.449
aircraft , how far they can fly and

01:00:32.449 --> 01:00:34.750
refueled , refueled , and keeping , uh ,

01:00:35.560 --> 01:00:37.616
Buckley and the capability they have

01:00:37.616 --> 01:00:39.504
there is essential to for our air

01:00:39.504 --> 01:00:41.282
defense as well as for critical

01:00:41.282 --> 01:00:43.560
infrastructure . Thank you and um , uh ,

01:00:43.560 --> 01:00:45.671
you know , the projections where I've

01:00:45.671 --> 01:00:47.727
seen a couple of different scenarios

01:00:47.727 --> 01:00:49.338
that if the 140th wing isn't

01:00:49.338 --> 01:00:51.979
recapitalized and phases out , they

01:00:51.979 --> 01:00:53.757
would still have to then have a

01:00:53.757 --> 01:00:55.868
rotational unit because of the things

01:00:55.868 --> 01:00:58.035
you just described , there would still

01:00:58.035 --> 01:01:00.201
have to be fighter aircraft there that

01:01:00.201 --> 01:01:02.257
would have to be rotated in and that

01:01:02.257 --> 01:01:04.368
has cost to it , right ? In fact , in

01:01:04.368 --> 01:01:06.368
some ways rotating in units is more

01:01:06.368 --> 01:01:08.257
expensive than just maintaining a

01:01:08.257 --> 01:01:10.479
permanent unit . Yes sir , the location

01:01:10.479 --> 01:01:12.590
is is critical and as you said , if ,

01:01:12.590 --> 01:01:14.423
if the uh the Buckley guard unit

01:01:14.423 --> 01:01:16.646
weren't there , we would have to rotate

01:01:16.646 --> 01:01:18.590
a unit in and you lose a lot of uh

01:01:18.590 --> 01:01:20.812
efficiencies and effectiveness when you

01:01:20.812 --> 01:01:22.979
rotate versus having permanently based

01:01:22.979 --> 01:01:24.535
so it sounds like your your

01:01:24.535 --> 01:01:26.646
professional military opinion is that

01:01:26.646 --> 01:01:28.479
it's essential to have a unit at

01:01:28.479 --> 01:01:30.646
Buckley to protect the homeland in the

01:01:30.646 --> 01:01:32.701
western region . Yes , sir , that is

01:01:32.701 --> 01:01:35.035
correct . OK . Thank you , General . Um ,

01:01:35.035 --> 01:01:37.370
Admiral , uh , to you , uh , can you ,

01:01:37.439 --> 01:01:41.010
um , Explain to me the , the current

01:01:41.010 --> 01:01:43.449
security situation in Colombia . I've

01:01:43.449 --> 01:01:46.479
been watching uh Petro administration

01:01:46.479 --> 01:01:48.701
with a lot of uh interest over the last

01:01:48.701 --> 01:01:50.646
couple of years . It appears to be

01:01:50.646 --> 01:01:52.868
degrading pretty rapidly . I would just

01:01:52.868 --> 01:01:55.035
love your thoughts on the situation in

01:01:55.035 --> 01:01:57.639
Colombia . Thank you , Congressman . I

01:01:57.639 --> 01:01:59.750
think it's a very challenging problem

01:01:59.750 --> 01:02:01.695
set . I will share with you that I

01:02:01.695 --> 01:02:03.861
think from a male to male relationship

01:02:03.861 --> 01:02:06.028
we're very tight and very tight . Uh ,

01:02:06.028 --> 01:02:05.560
I can say right now they're in a fight

01:02:05.560 --> 01:02:07.520
today when it comes to , uh , the

01:02:07.520 --> 01:02:10.250
counter TCOs , ELN , FARC , we continue

01:02:10.250 --> 01:02:12.149
to support them with our current

01:02:12.149 --> 01:02:14.260
authorities , but I think that , uh ,

01:02:14.260 --> 01:02:16.538
it becomes more tenuous every day , uh ,

01:02:16.538 --> 01:02:16.280
but they are in the fight . They're

01:02:16.280 --> 01:02:18.502
committed to work with us , uh , one of

01:02:18.502 --> 01:02:20.669
our strongest partners in the region .

01:02:20.669 --> 01:02:22.669
And what more should we be doing to

01:02:22.669 --> 01:02:24.613
engage and to assist our Colombian

01:02:24.613 --> 01:02:26.447
partners with that deteriorating

01:02:26.447 --> 01:02:28.558
situation ? I think across the uh the

01:02:28.558 --> 01:02:30.502
spectrum it comes back to security

01:02:30.502 --> 01:02:32.780
cooperation , our partnerships , right ?

01:02:32.780 --> 01:02:34.780
So , uh , with this joint excise uh

01:02:34.780 --> 01:02:36.891
training we do joint exercises , uh ,

01:02:36.891 --> 01:02:38.669
well it's the different type of

01:02:38.669 --> 01:02:40.891
hardware and equipment we can give them

01:02:40.891 --> 01:02:40.389
intelligence sharing and we'll continue

01:02:40.389 --> 01:02:42.500
to do that but we have to continue to

01:02:42.500 --> 01:02:44.556
stay at the forefront and understand

01:02:44.556 --> 01:02:46.500
their needs and work with them and

01:02:46.500 --> 01:02:48.722
you've also mentioned in your testimony

01:02:48.722 --> 01:02:50.899
that . Uh , diplomacy and , um , you

01:02:50.899 --> 01:02:53.121
know , non-military means of engagement

01:02:53.121 --> 01:02:54.843
are essential for you as a , a

01:02:54.843 --> 01:02:57.010
combatant commander . Does that remain

01:02:57.010 --> 01:02:59.121
true ? And are , is that an essential

01:02:59.121 --> 01:03:01.343
tool for you that we continue to invest

01:03:01.343 --> 01:03:03.510
in humanitarian and diplomatic efforts

01:03:03.510 --> 01:03:05.566
and . The Southern hemisphere , so I

01:03:05.566 --> 01:03:05.310
think it's a whole of government

01:03:05.310 --> 01:03:07.421
approach , right ? So I think we have

01:03:07.421 --> 01:03:09.699
to work across the whole of government .

01:03:09.699 --> 01:03:09.360
I think from a Department of State have

01:03:09.360 --> 01:03:11.193
a diplomats in place and they're

01:03:11.193 --> 01:03:13.527
working with us , right ? So again , uh ,

01:03:13.527 --> 01:03:15.304
I have a very small , uh , uh ,

01:03:15.304 --> 01:03:17.471
footprint as far as , uh , forces . So

01:03:17.471 --> 01:03:19.527
every engagement , every handshake ,

01:03:19.527 --> 01:03:21.749
every look and eye matters . So we have

01:03:21.749 --> 01:03:21.320
to be very committed and continue to do

01:03:21.320 --> 01:03:23.320
that . time expired , chair , and I

01:03:23.320 --> 01:03:24.931
recognize the gentleman from

01:03:24.931 --> 01:03:27.098
Mississippi , Mr . Kelly . Yes , sir ,

01:03:27.098 --> 01:03:29.639
and general , uh , do you feel like our

01:03:29.639 --> 01:03:32.520
southern border is more or less secure

01:03:32.520 --> 01:03:35.040
today now that we don't have just

01:03:35.040 --> 01:03:37.399
unknown threats pouring through every

01:03:37.399 --> 01:03:39.510
single moment of every single day who

01:03:39.510 --> 01:03:41.677
mayor intended do you think we're more

01:03:41.677 --> 01:03:43.621
or less safe today on the southern

01:03:43.621 --> 01:03:45.566
border ? Congressman , we are more

01:03:45.566 --> 01:03:47.788
secure today on the southern border and

01:03:47.788 --> 01:03:49.899
talking a little bit , uh , Admiral ,

01:03:49.899 --> 01:03:52.520
just , um , in SOCOM , I think that is

01:03:52.520 --> 01:03:54.353
one of the areas we can have the

01:03:54.353 --> 01:03:56.639
greatest impact . So , um , what are we

01:03:56.639 --> 01:03:59.139
doing state partnership program wise ?

01:03:59.439 --> 01:04:01.495
What are we doing , uh , back when I

01:04:01.495 --> 01:04:03.495
was a young lieutenant they used to

01:04:03.495 --> 01:04:05.550
send engineer units to build roads ,

01:04:05.550 --> 01:04:07.717
basically combat trails for us , but .

01:04:07.717 --> 01:04:09.995
Roads , they would build soccer fields ,

01:04:09.995 --> 01:04:12.217
do infrastructure , help with schools .

01:04:12.217 --> 01:04:14.383
What are we doing in South America now

01:04:14.383 --> 01:04:14.300
with our guard and reserve units where

01:04:14.300 --> 01:04:16.189
they get a cool overseas training

01:04:16.189 --> 01:04:18.356
ribbon and we get to actually impact a

01:04:18.356 --> 01:04:20.467
country's view of the United States .

01:04:20.467 --> 01:04:22.578
What , what , what are your intent to

01:04:22.578 --> 01:04:24.244
use some of those things ? So

01:04:24.244 --> 01:04:26.411
Congressman , that's one of my biggest

01:04:26.411 --> 01:04:26.379
levers I have in the region is a , uh ,

01:04:26.389 --> 01:04:28.611
raft of security cooperation . I always

01:04:28.611 --> 01:04:30.833
talk about state partnership programs .

01:04:30.833 --> 01:04:33.000
We currently have 24 states partnering

01:04:33.000 --> 01:04:35.056
with 30 countries in the region , so

01:04:35.056 --> 01:04:34.709
it's a very powerful lever . They do

01:04:34.709 --> 01:04:36.709
everything from , uh , uh , subject

01:04:36.709 --> 01:04:38.542
matter experts exchanges , cyber

01:04:38.542 --> 01:04:40.653
aviation ops . They're all in on us ,

01:04:40.653 --> 01:04:42.709
and I can't do without them . Yeah ,

01:04:42.709 --> 01:04:45.042
and going back to those projects though ,

01:04:45.042 --> 01:04:46.987
we used to send engineer units and

01:04:46.987 --> 01:04:49.209
other type of . It's routinely to South

01:04:49.209 --> 01:04:50.987
America , which again gave them

01:04:50.987 --> 01:04:53.153
engagements and gave them familiar but

01:04:53.153 --> 01:04:55.265
also gave support , uh , soft support

01:04:55.265 --> 01:04:57.209
to , uh , are , are you looking at

01:04:57.209 --> 01:04:59.320
reiterating that thing that we did in

01:04:59.320 --> 01:05:01.542
the 90s and 2000s ? So that's ongoing ,

01:05:01.542 --> 01:05:03.765
sir , that as well as the US Army Corps

01:05:03.765 --> 01:05:05.987
of Engineers , we're totally engaged in

01:05:05.987 --> 01:05:08.320
the region with the assets that we have .

01:05:08.320 --> 01:05:07.935
Yes , sir . And then back to you ,

01:05:07.945 --> 01:05:10.419
general , um . I'm really concerned ,

01:05:10.669 --> 01:05:12.502
uh , you know , we had a , a , a

01:05:12.502 --> 01:05:14.725
Chinese air balloon fly over the United

01:05:14.725 --> 01:05:16.836
States and , uh , and , and basically

01:05:16.836 --> 01:05:19.002
surveilled the whole United States and

01:05:19.002 --> 01:05:21.225
we shot it down after it got everything

01:05:21.225 --> 01:05:23.169
that it wanted , um . We , uh , we

01:05:23.169 --> 01:05:25.770
continue to have folks who surveil or

01:05:25.770 --> 01:05:28.479
send drones over our bases or put

01:05:28.479 --> 01:05:30.479
infrastructure things that have the

01:05:30.479 --> 01:05:32.969
potential to surveil . uh , how serious

01:05:32.969 --> 01:05:35.810
are we in NorthCO in the protection in

01:05:35.810 --> 01:05:37.754
protecting and hardening our bases

01:05:38.000 --> 01:05:40.222
against surveillance and also attacks ?

01:05:43.030 --> 01:05:45.141
Congressman , uh , between both NORAD

01:05:45.141 --> 01:05:47.141
and NORCO , uh , we're , we're very

01:05:47.141 --> 01:05:49.810
engaged in what you described NORAD to

01:05:49.810 --> 01:05:52.050
ensure that the , uh , the air

01:05:52.050 --> 01:05:54.290
sovereignty of the United States and

01:05:54.290 --> 01:05:56.770
Canada are maintained , uh , NorthCO

01:05:56.770 --> 01:05:59.290
for the uh UAS challenge that that you

01:05:59.290 --> 01:06:01.510
mentioned . And uh we're we're working

01:06:01.510 --> 01:06:03.399
uh with the services and with the

01:06:03.399 --> 01:06:05.399
department to increase not only the

01:06:05.399 --> 01:06:07.729
capability but also to expand the

01:06:07.729 --> 01:06:10.189
authorities we have to uh knock out not

01:06:10.189 --> 01:06:13.590
only uh aircraft or UASs that are uh a

01:06:13.590 --> 01:06:15.368
direct threat but also that are

01:06:15.368 --> 01:06:17.423
surveilling uh over the installation

01:06:17.423 --> 01:06:19.479
and I'd like to even see it expanded

01:06:19.479 --> 01:06:21.646
beyond the installation to ensure they

01:06:21.646 --> 01:06:23.646
can't see anything sensitive on our

01:06:23.646 --> 01:06:23.469
basis . Thank you , General . In the

01:06:23.469 --> 01:06:25.580
balance of my time , I yield to Mr .

01:06:25.590 --> 01:06:26.590
McGuire .

01:06:34.750 --> 01:06:37.780
The new guy . All right , Admiral

01:06:37.780 --> 01:06:40.002
Halsey , US sanctioned Iranian warships

01:06:40.002 --> 01:06:42.113
have been spotted in your AO over the

01:06:42.113 --> 01:06:44.280
last few years . Last May , an Iranian

01:06:44.280 --> 01:06:46.391
warship reportedly equipped with long

01:06:46.391 --> 01:06:48.169
range missiles crossed into the

01:06:48.169 --> 01:06:50.336
southern hemisphere . How troubled are

01:06:50.336 --> 01:06:52.699
you by this increased Iranian navy

01:06:52.699 --> 01:06:56.500
presence in our near your AO ? I'm

01:06:56.500 --> 01:06:58.722
always concerned right ? so uh again we

01:06:58.722 --> 01:07:00.556
must be credible , present , and

01:07:00.556 --> 01:07:02.667
engaged . I can't be more clear about

01:07:02.667 --> 01:07:04.722
that . So when it comes to resources

01:07:04.722 --> 01:07:04.540
and assets to meet presence with

01:07:04.540 --> 01:07:07.860
presence , we must do that . Again this

01:07:07.860 --> 01:07:09.971
will be for , uh , Admiral Halsey and

01:07:09.971 --> 01:07:12.193
Mr . Leonardo . Under the belt and road

01:07:12.193 --> 01:07:14.138
initiative , China has established

01:07:14.138 --> 01:07:15.860
itself as a dominant player in

01:07:15.860 --> 01:07:17.693
telecommunication infrastructure

01:07:17.693 --> 01:07:19.749
throughout Latin America . How could

01:07:19.749 --> 01:07:21.582
China use their command of Latin

01:07:21.582 --> 01:07:23.360
American telecommunications and

01:07:23.360 --> 01:07:25.416
infrastructure to threaten America's

01:07:25.416 --> 01:07:27.638
network ? Thank you for that question ,

01:07:27.638 --> 01:07:29.416
Congressman . As you know , the

01:07:29.416 --> 01:07:31.638
president , uh , is the first and , and

01:07:31.638 --> 01:07:33.804
of many to finally , uh , place a high

01:07:33.804 --> 01:07:33.239
emphasis on the western hemisphere

01:07:33.239 --> 01:07:35.295
given how closely connected it is to

01:07:35.295 --> 01:07:37.461
the defense of the homeland . And with

01:07:37.461 --> 01:07:39.295
this increased focus , uh , just

01:07:39.295 --> 01:07:41.461
specifically on Panama , for example ,

01:07:41.461 --> 01:07:43.572
um , working with those partners over

01:07:43.572 --> 01:07:45.850
there , uh , they've successfully , um ,

01:07:45.850 --> 01:07:45.100
withdrawn from the Belt and Road

01:07:45.100 --> 01:07:47.389
Initiative knowing that , um , that

01:07:47.389 --> 01:07:49.611
influence in that region , particularly

01:07:49.611 --> 01:07:51.445
with the Panama Canal , would be

01:07:51.445 --> 01:07:53.333
extremely detrimental to American

01:07:53.333 --> 01:07:55.222
interests . So , um , I think the

01:07:55.222 --> 01:07:55.030
administration is very proud of that

01:07:55.030 --> 01:07:57.141
increased , um , emphasis on that and

01:07:57.141 --> 01:07:59.030
making sure that we encourage our

01:07:59.030 --> 01:08:00.863
partners in the region to , uh ,

01:08:00.863 --> 01:08:02.863
withdraw , Admiral . So we're laser

01:08:02.863 --> 01:08:04.641
focused on the possible Chinese

01:08:04.641 --> 01:08:04.449
encouragement from the standpoint of

01:08:04.449 --> 01:08:06.671
cyber , right ? So when you think , put

01:08:06.671 --> 01:08:08.671
Chinese technology on your critical

01:08:08.671 --> 01:08:10.671
infrastructure , whether it's 5G or

01:08:10.671 --> 01:08:12.782
safe city smart city technology , our

01:08:12.782 --> 01:08:14.949
job is try to illuminate and make sure

01:08:14.949 --> 01:08:14.729
our partners understand what they're

01:08:14.729 --> 01:08:16.785
dealing with and then try to find an

01:08:16.785 --> 01:08:18.896
option , right ? So again , uh , some

01:08:18.896 --> 01:08:18.509
of our partners work very closely with

01:08:18.509 --> 01:08:20.580
us . We use cyber exchanges all the

01:08:20.580 --> 01:08:22.636
time . Every exercise we do has some

01:08:22.636 --> 01:08:24.691
cyber component to it to try to make

01:08:24.691 --> 01:08:26.747
sure we can help our partners . this

01:08:26.747 --> 01:08:28.802
time expired . Chair and I recognize

01:08:28.802 --> 01:08:28.229
General Lee from California , Miss .

01:08:28.279 --> 01:08:30.974
Jay . Thank you Mr . Chairman . um ,

01:08:31.003 --> 01:08:33.225
General Gio , I , I'd like to follow up

01:08:33.225 --> 01:08:35.225
on some of the questions um that my

01:08:35.225 --> 01:08:37.225
colleague asked um you specifically

01:08:37.225 --> 01:08:39.225
said that DOD will not be doing any

01:08:39.225 --> 01:08:41.403
detention of migrants at the southern

01:08:41.403 --> 01:08:43.292
border , but we've uh seen recent

01:08:43.292 --> 01:08:44.923
reporting indicate that the

01:08:44.923 --> 01:08:46.979
administration intends to use active

01:08:46.979 --> 01:08:48.756
duty military personnel to hold

01:08:48.756 --> 01:08:50.867
migrants at the border . So could you

01:08:50.867 --> 01:08:52.701
talk about what exact activities

01:08:52.701 --> 01:08:54.812
constitute holding migrants if troops

01:08:54.812 --> 01:08:56.812
are explicitly not detaining them ?

01:08:57.859 --> 01:09:00.319
Congresswoman , uh , I said that we are

01:09:00.319 --> 01:09:03.029
not currently doing any detention and ,

01:09:03.160 --> 01:09:05.680
uh , I have no orders to conduct any

01:09:05.680 --> 01:09:09.209
detention . OK , and

01:09:09.450 --> 01:09:11.529
are military personnel currently or

01:09:11.529 --> 01:09:13.640
will they at any point be responsible

01:09:13.640 --> 01:09:15.696
for physically transporting migrants

01:09:15.696 --> 01:09:17.585
from one location to another , or

01:09:17.585 --> 01:09:19.640
facilitating their transfer into DHS

01:09:19.640 --> 01:09:23.258
custody ? The , the , uh , Northern

01:09:23.258 --> 01:09:26.418
Command , Title 10 forces , uh , at

01:09:26.418 --> 01:09:28.929
this point are not allowed to , uh ,

01:09:28.938 --> 01:09:32.079
transport any , uh , any migrants , uh ,

01:09:32.179 --> 01:09:35.259
illegal aliens or , or other . OK ,

01:09:35.419 --> 01:09:37.740
great . And will military personnel be

01:09:37.740 --> 01:09:39.779
operating checkpoints , conducting

01:09:39.779 --> 01:09:42.020
crowd or traffic control , or

01:09:42.020 --> 01:09:44.259
performing any surveillance of migrants

01:09:44.259 --> 01:09:47.528
or border area residents ? Well , to

01:09:47.528 --> 01:09:49.695
the first two , the answer is no . Can

01:09:49.695 --> 01:09:51.695
you repeat the last part , please ,

01:09:51.695 --> 01:09:53.806
ma'am , on surveillance ? Sure , um .

01:09:53.806 --> 01:09:55.528
So they will not be conducting

01:09:55.528 --> 01:09:57.417
checkpoints , conducting crowd or

01:09:57.417 --> 01:09:59.639
traffic control . Will they perform any

01:09:59.639 --> 01:10:01.861
surveillance of migrants or border area

01:10:01.861 --> 01:10:03.750
residents ? Well , the , we do do

01:10:03.750 --> 01:10:05.861
detection and monitoring , uh , which

01:10:05.861 --> 01:10:08.240
includes surveillance of , of the uh of

01:10:08.240 --> 01:10:10.184
the border and the region near the

01:10:10.184 --> 01:10:12.407
border to ensure that , uh , no illegal

01:10:12.407 --> 01:10:14.629
crossings , uh , are either underway or

01:10:14.629 --> 01:10:16.629
about to happen . Uh , if we detect

01:10:16.629 --> 01:10:18.518
those , we , we notify the border

01:10:18.518 --> 01:10:20.407
patrol , and they take any action

01:10:20.407 --> 01:10:22.729
necessary , but the action is not taken

01:10:22.729 --> 01:10:25.779
by the Title 10 forces . OK , thank you .

01:10:25.859 --> 01:10:29.180
And so then do troops have access to

01:10:29.180 --> 01:10:31.660
DHS surveillance tools , databases , or

01:10:31.660 --> 01:10:33.771
intelligence systems ? That collector

01:10:33.771 --> 01:10:35.938
store information about US citizens or

01:10:35.938 --> 01:10:38.395
lawful border residents ? No , we are

01:10:38.395 --> 01:10:40.506
very careful to ensure that we follow

01:10:40.506 --> 01:10:42.794
all intel oversight requirements and we

01:10:42.794 --> 01:10:45.194
regularly inspect to ensure that all of

01:10:45.194 --> 01:10:47.416
the Title 10 forces that are in support

01:10:47.416 --> 01:10:49.975
of the Border Patrol follow those rules .

01:10:50.314 --> 01:10:52.595
Excellent . And then when your military

01:10:52.595 --> 01:10:55.964
personnel come in contact with a

01:10:55.964 --> 01:10:58.930
migrant , they're not . Eligible to

01:10:58.930 --> 01:11:01.569
detain them , but what happens if a

01:11:01.569 --> 01:11:03.347
border patrol personnel are not

01:11:03.347 --> 01:11:05.402
immediately available ? What are the

01:11:05.402 --> 01:11:07.569
processes ? Congressman , what they do

01:11:07.569 --> 01:11:09.839
is they continue to surveil them , uh ,

01:11:09.850 --> 01:11:12.072
using the , the sensors and the systems

01:11:12.072 --> 01:11:14.294
that they have so they can give updated

01:11:14.294 --> 01:11:16.517
locations to the border patrol agents ,

01:11:16.517 --> 01:11:18.628
uh , but as you mentioned , they will

01:11:18.628 --> 01:11:21.520
not stop , uh , or impede the , uh ,

01:11:21.529 --> 01:11:23.640
illegal migrants . Uh , that's only a

01:11:23.640 --> 01:11:25.973
law enforcement action . OK , excellent .

01:11:25.973 --> 01:11:28.640
And as you know , General Gio , um ,

01:11:28.810 --> 01:11:31.088
the law is quite clear on this , right ?

01:11:31.088 --> 01:11:33.609
Um , the Posse Comatitis Act explicitly

01:11:33.609 --> 01:11:35.720
states that it shall not be lawful to

01:11:35.720 --> 01:11:37.665
employ any part of the army of the

01:11:37.665 --> 01:11:39.831
United States as a posse commatitis or

01:11:39.831 --> 01:11:41.553
otherwise for the purpose . Of

01:11:41.553 --> 01:11:43.776
executing the laws except in such cases

01:11:43.776 --> 01:11:45.831
and under such circumstances as such

01:11:45.831 --> 01:11:45.455
employment of said force may be

01:11:45.455 --> 01:11:47.011
expressly authorized by the

01:11:47.011 --> 01:11:49.233
Constitution or by an act of Congress ,

01:11:49.233 --> 01:11:51.344
and no money appropriated by this act

01:11:51.344 --> 01:11:53.122
shall be used to pay any of the

01:11:53.122 --> 01:11:55.288
expenses incurred in the employment of

01:11:55.288 --> 01:11:55.015
any troops in violation of the section .

01:11:55.390 --> 01:11:57.390
General , can you explicitly assure

01:11:57.390 --> 01:11:59.501
this committee today that NorthHCOM's

01:11:59.501 --> 01:12:01.709
activities at the border fully comply

01:12:01.709 --> 01:12:03.598
with this law and that under your

01:12:03.598 --> 01:12:05.820
command our military personnel will not

01:12:05.820 --> 01:12:07.931
be put into positions that compromise

01:12:07.931 --> 01:12:10.042
the foundational principle separating

01:12:10.042 --> 01:12:12.209
civilian law enforcement from military

01:12:12.209 --> 01:12:14.542
authority ? Congresswoman Congresswoman ,

01:12:14.542 --> 01:12:14.069
I can assure you that we are very

01:12:14.069 --> 01:12:16.549
familiar with that law , and we , uh ,

01:12:16.560 --> 01:12:19.549
follow it to every detail . Excellent .

01:12:19.830 --> 01:12:22.240
And what specific training and guidance

01:12:22.240 --> 01:12:24.462
have service members received regarding

01:12:24.462 --> 01:12:27.129
these legal constraints ? When the

01:12:27.129 --> 01:12:29.729
units are identified to come down to

01:12:29.729 --> 01:12:31.840
support the NorthCO mission , they go

01:12:31.840 --> 01:12:33.729
through an extensive period of of

01:12:33.729 --> 01:12:35.951
training both at their home station and

01:12:35.951 --> 01:12:37.951
then once they arrive on the border

01:12:37.951 --> 01:12:40.173
during what we call the RSONI process ,

01:12:40.173 --> 01:12:42.285
uh , which can take several days to a

01:12:42.285 --> 01:12:44.396
couple weeks to ensure that they have

01:12:44.396 --> 01:12:46.562
all the required training to include ,

01:12:46.562 --> 01:12:48.785
uh , the , uh , standards on the use of

01:12:48.785 --> 01:12:51.819
force and the posse comitatus . Great .

01:12:52.319 --> 01:12:54.375
Since January 20th , have there been

01:12:54.375 --> 01:12:56.486
any revisions or contemplated changes

01:12:56.486 --> 01:12:58.708
to the rules of engagement or rules for

01:12:58.708 --> 01:13:00.708
use of force for military personnel

01:13:00.708 --> 01:13:02.819
deployed at the southern border ? The

01:13:02.819 --> 01:13:05.041
only one that I've proposed is a change

01:13:05.041 --> 01:13:07.208
to the rule of force which would allow

01:13:07.208 --> 01:13:11.069
us to uh uh uh shoot down or

01:13:11.069 --> 01:13:13.236
bring down drones that are surveilling

01:13:13.236 --> 01:13:15.859
over our deployed and mobile troops .

01:13:16.149 --> 01:13:18.205
That's the only change to the use of

01:13:18.205 --> 01:13:20.371
force that I've proposed . Excellent .

01:13:20.371 --> 01:13:22.538
And um are service members deployed at

01:13:22.538 --> 01:13:24.990
the border armed ? Yes , uh , I've

01:13:24.990 --> 01:13:27.157
directed that all service members that

01:13:27.157 --> 01:13:29.379
are operating in close proximity to the

01:13:29.379 --> 01:13:31.434
border will be armed with the weapon

01:13:31.434 --> 01:13:33.601
that they are trained to use , whether

01:13:33.601 --> 01:13:35.601
that's a long rifle or a side arm .

01:13:35.601 --> 01:13:37.712
Gladies' time expired . Chair , and I

01:13:37.712 --> 01:13:39.490
recognize gentleman from , uh ,

01:13:39.490 --> 01:13:41.768
Nebraska , Mr . Bacon . Thank you , Mr .

01:13:41.768 --> 01:13:43.879
Chairman . I'm on the right side over

01:13:43.879 --> 01:13:46.046
here or your left . Uh , thank you for

01:13:46.046 --> 01:13:48.212
being here , and uh I gotta brag I did

01:13:48.212 --> 01:13:50.379
serve with the Colonel Glo back in the

01:13:50.379 --> 01:13:50.350
day . Uh , we both got to command the

01:13:50.350 --> 01:13:52.517
greatest wing in the United States Air

01:13:52.517 --> 01:13:54.739
Force , the fifty-fifth wing . My first

01:13:54.739 --> 01:13:56.850
question is to Joel uh Gio . Tracking

01:13:56.850 --> 01:13:58.961
hypersonics is a big concern for many

01:13:58.961 --> 01:14:01.017
of us . I know for you as well . Can

01:14:01.017 --> 01:14:02.850
you talk about the challenges of

01:14:02.850 --> 01:14:05.017
tracking hypersonics and and also what

01:14:05.017 --> 01:14:07.128
is the time for if it's a hypersonics

01:14:07.128 --> 01:14:09.239
launched in China , how long could it

01:14:09.239 --> 01:14:11.350
reach the continental United States ?

01:14:12.819 --> 01:14:15.041
Congressman , and I share you the shout

01:14:15.041 --> 01:14:17.263
out for the fight in fifty-fifth , uh ,

01:14:17.263 --> 01:14:18.930
and thank you for that . Uh ,

01:14:18.930 --> 01:14:20.986
hypersonics are very destabilizing .

01:14:20.986 --> 01:14:22.930
They're tremendous challenge to us

01:14:22.930 --> 01:14:25.152
because they start off in a ballistic ,

01:14:25.152 --> 01:14:27.319
often in a ballistic manner , which is

01:14:27.319 --> 01:14:29.263
very easy to predict where they're

01:14:29.263 --> 01:14:31.375
gonna eventually impact , but because

01:14:31.375 --> 01:14:32.763
of their speed and their

01:14:32.763 --> 01:14:34.819
maneuverability , uh , all that goes

01:14:34.819 --> 01:14:37.041
away once they enter the hypersonic and

01:14:37.041 --> 01:14:39.939
the glide portion of their profile , uh .

01:14:40.569 --> 01:14:43.129
So , uh , I think it also because the

01:14:43.129 --> 01:14:45.185
speed cuts down , uh , the amount of

01:14:45.185 --> 01:14:47.407
time , uh , sometimes to as little as 5

01:14:47.407 --> 01:14:49.629
minutes to detect , track , and predict

01:14:49.629 --> 01:14:51.851
where it's going to go , but because of

01:14:51.851 --> 01:14:51.770
the endgame maneuverability that they

01:14:51.770 --> 01:14:53.970
have , really , uh , we don't know

01:14:53.970 --> 01:14:56.026
until the very end where where these

01:14:56.026 --> 01:14:58.359
could go because of the maneuverability .

01:14:58.540 --> 01:15:00.651
What kind of capabilities do you need

01:15:00.660 --> 01:15:02.716
to better track this ? What can we ,

01:15:02.716 --> 01:15:04.938
what , what should we be funding , uh ,

01:15:04.938 --> 01:15:08.060
in Congress ? The , uh , the

01:15:08.060 --> 01:15:11.060
HBTSS , the hypersonic ballistic

01:15:11.060 --> 01:15:14.100
tracking , uh , and sensing system , is

01:15:14.100 --> 01:15:16.240
an extremely promising , uh ,

01:15:16.259 --> 01:15:18.779
satellite-based capability to detect

01:15:18.779 --> 01:15:20.612
and track , uh , the hypersonics

01:15:20.612 --> 01:15:22.390
through the regimes that I just

01:15:22.390 --> 01:15:24.557
described . Um , and then I think that

01:15:24.557 --> 01:15:26.890
we're gonna have to , uh , increase our ,

01:15:26.890 --> 01:15:28.723
uh , commitment to , um , defeat

01:15:28.723 --> 01:15:30.890
mechanisms , uh , which are challenged

01:15:30.890 --> 01:15:32.723
for the same reasons that I just

01:15:32.723 --> 01:15:34.946
mentioned , the maneuverability and the

01:15:34.946 --> 01:15:37.112
speed , uh , we have some great defeat

01:15:37.112 --> 01:15:36.450
mechanisms , but they aren't geared

01:15:36.450 --> 01:15:38.561
towards the speed and maneuverability

01:15:38.561 --> 01:15:40.728
that hypersonics bring . Sounds like a

01:15:40.728 --> 01:15:42.894
good priority for us to , to work on .

01:15:42.894 --> 01:15:44.950
We would appreciate it . Yes , sir .

01:15:44.950 --> 01:15:46.672
CJSC2 and AI and those growing

01:15:46.672 --> 01:15:48.894
importance for your air defense command

01:15:48.894 --> 01:15:51.006
control . you talk a little bit about

01:15:51.006 --> 01:15:52.894
the importance of the MAVEN smart

01:15:52.894 --> 01:15:54.959
system . Uh , congressman , Maiden

01:15:54.959 --> 01:15:57.126
smart system has become the staple for

01:15:57.126 --> 01:15:59.520
our , uh , joint all domain command and

01:15:59.520 --> 01:16:02.160
control system , uh , because it not

01:16:02.160 --> 01:16:04.271
only presents , uh , a , uh , picture

01:16:04.271 --> 01:16:06.604
of the battle space in multiple domains ,

01:16:06.604 --> 01:16:08.759
uh , most systems show one domain or

01:16:08.759 --> 01:16:10.759
another , but , but you can get all

01:16:10.759 --> 01:16:12.815
domains in Maven smart systems . And

01:16:12.815 --> 01:16:14.981
the increasing number of layers , live

01:16:14.981 --> 01:16:17.203
layers of live data that can be brought

01:16:17.203 --> 01:16:19.203
in everything from undersea through

01:16:19.203 --> 01:16:21.315
space sensors , uh , displayed at the

01:16:21.315 --> 01:16:23.481
same time . So it's a staple , uh , to

01:16:23.481 --> 01:16:25.648
both NORAD and NORTHCOM , and I see it

01:16:25.648 --> 01:16:27.815
growing in the future . Thank you , Ed

01:16:27.815 --> 01:16:29.981
Holsey . uh , what , what , what's the

01:16:29.981 --> 01:16:32.203
biggest gap that you have for , for the

01:16:32.203 --> 01:16:34.426
counter drug mission and , and what can

01:16:34.426 --> 01:16:33.819
Congress be doing to help you ?

01:16:35.490 --> 01:16:37.712
Congressman , I think the biggest gap ,

01:16:37.712 --> 01:16:39.768
uh , remains , uh , assets . Uh , we

01:16:39.768 --> 01:16:41.990
have to be consistent president engaged

01:16:41.990 --> 01:16:44.101
and have a consistent presence , uh ,

01:16:44.101 --> 01:16:46.212
on the waters in the air to deter and

01:16:46.212 --> 01:16:48.268
interdict . So I think from a , uh ,

01:16:48.268 --> 01:16:50.434
air standpoint , maritime standpoint ,

01:16:50.434 --> 01:16:52.601
and ISR , uh , all is very critical to

01:16:52.601 --> 01:16:54.768
the mission . Thank you . Wanna follow

01:16:54.768 --> 01:16:56.823
up on a question that General Gi got

01:16:56.823 --> 01:16:58.990
earlier about cyber . I appreciate you

01:16:58.990 --> 01:17:01.101
talking about it's not just ballistic

01:17:01.101 --> 01:17:03.212
missile threat or hypersonics cyber .

01:17:03.212 --> 01:17:05.323
And you gotta work with Cyber Command

01:17:05.323 --> 01:17:07.268
and CISA , which is there's a seam

01:17:07.268 --> 01:17:09.601
there we're trying to close those seams .

01:17:09.601 --> 01:17:11.657
Are there any additional authorities

01:17:11.657 --> 01:17:13.490
that you need to work with Cyber

01:17:13.490 --> 01:17:15.839
Command and CISA ? Sir , I think we

01:17:15.839 --> 01:17:18.061
have the authorities that we need , and

01:17:18.061 --> 01:17:20.006
I should point out the FBI is very

01:17:20.006 --> 01:17:22.061
active as well in our , in our cyber

01:17:22.061 --> 01:17:23.728
defense . Having those , uh ,

01:17:23.728 --> 01:17:25.395
organizations resident in our

01:17:25.395 --> 01:17:27.339
headquarters is helpful . Frequent

01:17:27.339 --> 01:17:29.061
talks with General Hawk , uh ,

01:17:29.061 --> 01:17:31.061
sometimes weekly on , on , uh , the

01:17:31.061 --> 01:17:33.283
threat , and every time I ask him if he

01:17:33.283 --> 01:17:35.117
can take action , he has had the

01:17:35.117 --> 01:17:37.339
authorities necessary to do that on our

01:17:37.339 --> 01:17:39.617
behalf , uh , so I don't have any , uh ,

01:17:39.617 --> 01:17:41.839
authority requests at this time for the

01:17:41.839 --> 01:17:43.950
cyber domain . One last question with

01:17:43.950 --> 01:17:45.839
my final minute . You know , I've

01:17:45.839 --> 01:17:47.950
worked in NATO , I've worked with the

01:17:47.950 --> 01:17:50.172
Canadians , I've worked with the uh the

01:17:50.172 --> 01:17:52.395
Danes . And I'm concerned about some of

01:17:52.395 --> 01:17:54.561
the comments that these are our allies

01:17:54.561 --> 01:17:56.720
and so uh so . As a traditional

01:17:56.720 --> 01:17:58.942
Republican , I hate to see the friction

01:17:58.942 --> 01:18:01.164
with our allies . Are you seeing any of

01:18:01.164 --> 01:18:03.759
those frictions at all at NORAD or or

01:18:03.759 --> 01:18:06.890
NorthCO ? Congressman , uh , as you

01:18:06.890 --> 01:18:09.001
know , in NORAD , we have several 100

01:18:09.001 --> 01:18:11.112
Canadians that work side by side with

01:18:11.112 --> 01:18:13.223
us as well as at the installations at

01:18:13.223 --> 01:18:15.001
the military to military , uh ,

01:18:15.001 --> 01:18:17.169
relationship level . Uh , we have zero

01:18:17.419 --> 01:18:19.641
problems or concerns . Uh , everybody's

01:18:19.641 --> 01:18:22.029
focused on , on defending our continent ,

01:18:22.089 --> 01:18:24.145
and , uh , and I'm real proud of the

01:18:24.145 --> 01:18:26.256
effort that they're putting into it .

01:18:26.256 --> 01:18:28.589
Thank you . Uh , good to hear , uh , Mr .

01:18:28.589 --> 01:18:30.533
Chair , you're back . Jim's back ,

01:18:30.533 --> 01:18:32.645
chair , and I recognize gen lady from

01:18:32.645 --> 01:18:34.756
Hawaii , Mr . Kuta . Thank you , Mr .

01:18:34.756 --> 01:18:36.700
Chair . You know , when we visited

01:18:36.700 --> 01:18:38.645
Guantanamo Bay , we were told that

01:18:38.645 --> 01:18:38.370
there were service members there from

01:18:38.370 --> 01:18:41.220
every branch minus space force . Um ,

01:18:41.250 --> 01:18:43.361
the question I have is where are they

01:18:43.361 --> 01:18:45.194
being reassigned from and are we

01:18:45.194 --> 01:18:47.250
compromising our readiness and . And

01:18:47.250 --> 01:18:49.306
posture in other areas where they're

01:18:49.306 --> 01:18:51.528
now being uh detoured and reassigned to

01:18:51.528 --> 01:18:53.850
Gitmo and what kind of military

01:18:53.850 --> 01:18:56.017
commitment both people and costs would

01:18:56.017 --> 01:18:58.017
be required if in fact we reach the

01:18:58.017 --> 01:19:00.339
president's threshold of housing 30,000

01:19:00.339 --> 01:19:02.561
migrants there , um . Clearly there's a

01:19:02.561 --> 01:19:04.783
lot of additional costs , but even just

01:19:04.783 --> 01:19:07.006
the living facilities for 30,000 troops

01:19:07.006 --> 01:19:09.117
right now you have service members in

01:19:09.117 --> 01:19:11.228
tents , um , at Guantanamo Bay . What

01:19:11.228 --> 01:19:13.339
would be the cost and personal impact

01:19:13.339 --> 01:19:15.283
and will this impact our readiness

01:19:15.283 --> 01:19:17.283
posture , um , elsewhere from where

01:19:17.283 --> 01:19:18.783
they're being reassigned ?

01:19:21.649 --> 01:19:23.705
Congresswoman from the standpoint of

01:19:23.705 --> 01:19:25.871
the where the troops are coming from ,

01:19:25.871 --> 01:19:27.927
uh , the as a force , uh , user , if

01:19:27.927 --> 01:19:30.038
you will , uh , we put our effort and

01:19:30.038 --> 01:19:32.205
request for forces and the forces come

01:19:32.205 --> 01:19:34.538
to us . We ask for a specific , uh . Uh ,

01:19:34.640 --> 01:19:36.862
requirements and , and problems that so

01:19:36.862 --> 01:19:38.862
they actually send the forces to us

01:19:38.862 --> 01:19:40.862
from all over the , the nation . So

01:19:40.862 --> 01:19:40.660
again , uh , really over to the

01:19:40.660 --> 01:19:42.604
services to show the impact of the

01:19:42.604 --> 01:19:44.938
readiness of their command from my , uh ,

01:19:44.938 --> 01:19:46.882
command itself , the folks who are

01:19:46.882 --> 01:19:48.993
working for me that down there , uh ,

01:19:48.993 --> 01:19:51.104
from the redist reporting tool , they

01:19:51.104 --> 01:19:53.271
are not , uh , showing any degradation

01:19:53.271 --> 01:19:55.493
in training or readiness at this time .

01:19:55.493 --> 01:19:57.382
OK , so you're telling me that we

01:19:57.382 --> 01:19:59.604
really don't know if it's impacting any

01:19:59.604 --> 01:20:01.771
kind of readiness or posture in uh any

01:20:01.771 --> 01:20:03.771
other theater . We don't know where

01:20:03.771 --> 01:20:02.919
they're coming from . We have to ask

01:20:02.919 --> 01:20:05.919
every branch specifically . Yes ,

01:20:06.120 --> 01:20:08.660
Congresswoman , how about the cost if

01:20:08.660 --> 01:20:10.882
we have over 1000 service members there

01:20:11.000 --> 01:20:12.944
to basically oversee at the at the

01:20:12.944 --> 01:20:15.870
height , maybe 200 , 177 individuals

01:20:16.120 --> 01:20:19.000
there if we have 30,000 migrants at

01:20:19.000 --> 01:20:21.080
Guantanamo , what kind of military

01:20:21.080 --> 01:20:23.160
presence would you expect to have to

01:20:23.160 --> 01:20:24.882
have there at Guantanamo Bay ?

01:20:27.560 --> 01:20:29.893
So , uh , uh , Congresswoman , the , uh ,

01:20:29.979 --> 01:20:32.790
SOCOM always postures and plans for a

01:20:32.790 --> 01:20:34.790
migrant operation . Uh , we've done

01:20:34.790 --> 01:20:36.568
that in the past , uh , for our

01:20:36.568 --> 01:20:38.790
planning shows that if we were to go up

01:20:38.790 --> 01:20:40.790
to 30,000 , if we were to do that ,

01:20:40.790 --> 01:20:43.012
we're not , we have not been told to do

01:20:43.012 --> 01:20:45.123
that , it's approximately 9000 plus ,

01:20:45.123 --> 01:20:47.457
uh , service members to do that mission ,

01:20:47.457 --> 01:20:47.209
but right now we're in a tailor

01:20:47.209 --> 01:20:49.464
approach and . We have not , uh , gone

01:20:49.464 --> 01:20:51.785
beyond , uh , any , anything over 1000

01:20:51.785 --> 01:20:53.896
at this point . OK , so the president

01:20:53.896 --> 01:20:56.145
has said 30,000 will be at Guantanamo

01:20:56.145 --> 01:20:58.312
Bay . Everyone's talking about meeting

01:20:58.312 --> 01:21:00.534
the president's mission . You're saying

01:21:00.534 --> 01:21:02.701
it's 9000 service members . What's the

01:21:02.701 --> 01:21:04.923
estimated cost and is that inclusive of

01:21:04.923 --> 01:21:07.256
their housing , their meals , transport ,

01:21:07.256 --> 01:21:09.034
all of these different things .

01:21:11.799 --> 01:21:13.855
Uh , congressman , I don't , I don't

01:21:13.855 --> 01:21:16.310
have the cost , uh , for . If someone

01:21:16.310 --> 01:21:18.310
could get me that , if you have the

01:21:18.310 --> 01:21:20.310
projection scenario of 9000 service

01:21:20.310 --> 01:21:22.532
members , there must be at least a back

01:21:22.532 --> 01:21:24.754
of an envelope estimate on cost . Now I

01:21:24.754 --> 01:21:26.754
don't know if this question came up

01:21:26.754 --> 01:21:26.229
already , but when we went there , over

01:21:26.229 --> 01:21:28.229
30% of the migrants , they were low

01:21:28.229 --> 01:21:30.396
threat . Which means that they did not

01:21:30.396 --> 01:21:32.285
have a criminal record other than

01:21:32.285 --> 01:21:34.396
having illegally crossed the border ,

01:21:34.396 --> 01:21:36.600
so that being said , does it make

01:21:36.600 --> 01:21:38.959
financial sense and also military

01:21:38.959 --> 01:21:41.126
security sense in terms of where we're

01:21:41.126 --> 01:21:43.015
taking these individuals to house

01:21:43.015 --> 01:21:45.560
upwards of 30% of migrants at

01:21:45.560 --> 01:21:47.680
Guantanamo Bay that are actually low

01:21:47.680 --> 01:21:51.109
threat , low risk . So , uh ,

01:21:51.279 --> 01:21:53.600
Congressman , um , obviously we work

01:21:53.600 --> 01:21:56.240
very closely with ICE and DHS and CBP

01:21:56.240 --> 01:21:58.709
on this . They make the determination

01:21:58.709 --> 01:22:01.950
of who goes to the housing areas , um ,

01:22:02.240 --> 01:22:04.407
and obviously there's a capacity issue

01:22:04.407 --> 01:22:06.462
for housing that they have , so they

01:22:06.462 --> 01:22:09.120
will make a determination , um , who to

01:22:09.120 --> 01:22:11.279
send the Gitmo , whether it's high

01:22:11.279 --> 01:22:14.080
threat illegal aliens or or lower

01:22:14.080 --> 01:22:16.302
threat illegal aliens and what we do is

01:22:16.302 --> 01:22:18.302
we provide . Uh , the capability to

01:22:18.302 --> 01:22:20.469
house them temporarily . OK , so let's

01:22:20.469 --> 01:22:22.524
talk about housing capability then .

01:22:22.524 --> 01:22:24.747
Let's say 30,000 individuals do come to

01:22:24.747 --> 01:22:26.969
Guantanamo that are in fact high risk .

01:22:26.969 --> 01:22:29.302
We were told by ICE that they cannot be ,

01:22:29.302 --> 01:22:31.358
um , housed in soft sided tents like

01:22:31.358 --> 01:22:33.413
the tents that are currently sitting

01:22:33.413 --> 01:22:35.580
vacant right now . Do we have the hard

01:22:35.580 --> 01:22:37.691
structure capacity . to house upwards

01:22:37.691 --> 01:22:39.915
30,000 potentially high risk migrants

01:22:39.915 --> 01:22:41.804
at Guantanamo Bay in hard sighted

01:22:41.804 --> 01:22:44.104
facilities . Currently we do not have

01:22:44.104 --> 01:22:46.215
that capability . So basically you're

01:22:46.215 --> 01:22:48.437
telling me that the president's plan to

01:22:48.437 --> 01:22:50.326
have the hardened most aggressive

01:22:50.326 --> 01:22:52.382
criminals , 30,000 of them housed at

01:22:52.382 --> 01:22:54.660
Guantanamo is unfeasible . Well , at

01:22:54.660 --> 01:22:56.771
this time we don't have the housing ,

01:22:56.771 --> 01:22:59.379
but if we were directed to house high

01:22:59.379 --> 01:23:02.580
threat illegal aliens at large numbers

01:23:02.580 --> 01:23:05.819
at Gitmo , we would absolutely execute

01:23:05.819 --> 01:23:08.180
that mission . OK , I know I have 26

01:23:08.180 --> 01:23:09.847
seconds of my time , so we'll

01:23:09.847 --> 01:23:11.847
definitely have that chair . I have

01:23:11.847 --> 01:23:14.069
more questions , but specifically we've

01:23:14.069 --> 01:23:16.236
now been told that military bases will

01:23:16.236 --> 01:23:18.347
be co-used to house migrants . As the

01:23:18.347 --> 01:23:20.236
great granddaughter of a Japanese

01:23:20.236 --> 01:23:22.402
attorney , Fort Bliss was one of those

01:23:22.402 --> 01:23:24.513
particular camps that actually housed

01:23:24.513 --> 01:23:26.513
them years , generations ago . What

01:23:26.513 --> 01:23:28.347
impact your readiness and budget

01:23:28.347 --> 01:23:30.513
constraints would this have on our ONM

01:23:30.513 --> 01:23:32.624
and Milcom dollars if you now have to

01:23:32.624 --> 01:23:34.736
do a dual , uh , use in terms of both

01:23:34.736 --> 01:23:36.680
be a military base and a migrant .

01:23:36.790 --> 01:23:38.901
Thank you . I'll ask that question in

01:23:38.901 --> 01:23:41.310
writing . Thank you . She recognized

01:23:41.310 --> 01:23:43.143
gentle lady from Virginia , Miss

01:23:43.143 --> 01:23:45.189
Higgins . Thank you Mr . Chair and

01:23:45.189 --> 01:23:47.356
thank you so much to our panelists for

01:23:47.356 --> 01:23:49.578
being here today and , uh , and for the

01:23:49.578 --> 01:23:51.745
update . Thank you for the work you're

01:23:51.745 --> 01:23:51.149
doing in the southern border ,

01:23:51.310 --> 01:23:53.366
especially I think we're , we're all

01:23:53.366 --> 01:23:55.366
sleeping a little more soundly just

01:23:55.366 --> 01:23:57.643
knowing that our border is secure , uh ,

01:23:57.643 --> 01:23:59.366
but for the work you do , give

01:23:59.366 --> 01:24:01.588
Northcom's responsibility for defending

01:24:01.588 --> 01:24:03.921
against nation state cyber threats . Uh ,

01:24:03.921 --> 01:24:03.270
let's see , what's your assessment of

01:24:03.270 --> 01:24:05.214
the military's readiness to defend

01:24:05.214 --> 01:24:07.214
critical infrastructure , including

01:24:07.214 --> 01:24:09.048
power ports and logistic nodes ?

01:24:11.020 --> 01:24:14.620
Congresswoman , the uh . I , I think

01:24:14.620 --> 01:24:17.290
it's the , the , the ability to defend

01:24:17.290 --> 01:24:19.910
in cyber for the DOD network is strong

01:24:19.910 --> 01:24:23.220
and then , uh , for the ports , uh , we

01:24:23.220 --> 01:24:25.979
rely heavily on CISA and Cyber command

01:24:25.979 --> 01:24:28.540
to identify , uh , weaknesses and there

01:24:28.540 --> 01:24:30.651
are some , uh , there are , there are

01:24:30.651 --> 01:24:32.873
teams that go out and check this , uh ,

01:24:32.873 --> 01:24:34.929
I think it's improving . And I think

01:24:34.929 --> 01:24:37.096
there's a lot of awareness on it , but

01:24:37.096 --> 01:24:39.151
there are still some vulnerabilities

01:24:39.151 --> 01:24:39.089
out there , especially when you get

01:24:39.089 --> 01:24:41.640
into the , uh , defense industrial base

01:24:41.640 --> 01:24:43.640
and in critical infrastructure that

01:24:43.640 --> 01:24:45.696
need to be addressed . Do you see it

01:24:45.696 --> 01:24:47.751
improving or is it continuing to get

01:24:47.751 --> 01:24:50.270
worse by the day ? Um , ma'am , I think

01:24:50.270 --> 01:24:52.549
it is , uh , at least from the , the

01:24:52.549 --> 01:24:54.382
results that I'm seeing from the

01:24:54.382 --> 01:24:56.759
inspections , it is improving . That's

01:24:56.759 --> 01:24:59.319
good to hear . And then , uh , for both

01:24:59.319 --> 01:25:01.208
North and SouthCOM , both of your

01:25:01.208 --> 01:25:03.375
commands rely heavily on military seal

01:25:03.375 --> 01:25:05.541
of command for logistics , transport ,

01:25:05.541 --> 01:25:07.708
and resupply , whether it's supporting

01:25:07.708 --> 01:25:09.819
contingency operations , humanitarian

01:25:09.819 --> 01:25:11.819
missions , or routine sustainment .

01:25:11.819 --> 01:25:13.708
Right now , MSC is facing serious

01:25:13.708 --> 01:25:15.486
challenges with Manning and the

01:25:15.486 --> 01:25:17.597
availability of ships . How are these

01:25:17.597 --> 01:25:19.819
readiness issues impacting your ability

01:25:19.819 --> 01:25:21.708
to plan and execute missions that

01:25:21.708 --> 01:25:23.263
depend on sealift support ?

01:25:25.479 --> 01:25:27.646
I'll speak briefly from the standpoint

01:25:27.646 --> 01:25:29.646
of our mission we're doing in uh in

01:25:29.646 --> 01:25:31.923
Haiti right now , uh , since , uh , uh ,

01:25:31.923 --> 01:25:34.146
November since the airport was closed ,

01:25:34.146 --> 01:25:36.201
we've been able to fly 62 flights in

01:25:36.201 --> 01:25:38.368
there providing supplies to the MSS so

01:25:38.368 --> 01:25:40.479
no impact there . I think as you look

01:25:40.479 --> 01:25:42.590
at , uh , uh , some resources we flow

01:25:42.590 --> 01:25:42.470
down to the island as well as , as the ,

01:25:42.509 --> 01:25:44.750
uh , the commercial , uh , shipping and

01:25:44.750 --> 01:25:47.083
so we've been , uh , safe there as well .

01:25:47.083 --> 01:25:49.306
So I think it's still , uh , we have to

01:25:49.306 --> 01:25:49.109
continue to look at it and just make

01:25:49.109 --> 01:25:51.276
sure we , uh , notice our impacts that

01:25:51.276 --> 01:25:53.498
we're seeing , but right now minimal on

01:25:53.498 --> 01:25:55.720
my part from SOCOM . Good , thank you .

01:25:55.720 --> 01:25:57.887
And Congresswoman , based on where our

01:25:57.887 --> 01:25:59.998
locations are on the continent , uh ,

01:25:59.998 --> 01:26:02.165
we primarily use air and rail and have

01:26:02.165 --> 01:26:04.387
very little , uh , requirements that go

01:26:04.387 --> 01:26:06.609
by sea lift . That's good to hear . And

01:26:06.609 --> 01:26:08.831
then recently we were in uh New Zealand

01:26:08.831 --> 01:26:11.310
with a Co down listening to uh to some

01:26:11.310 --> 01:26:13.930
of the influence from China , uh , with

01:26:13.930 --> 01:26:16.041
some similar to kind of the Belt Belt

01:26:16.041 --> 01:26:18.319
and Road initiative that they're doing ,

01:26:18.319 --> 01:26:20.597
uh , in , in Central and South America ,

01:26:20.597 --> 01:26:22.430
but Uh , the New Zealanders were

01:26:22.430 --> 01:26:24.263
talking about kind of the shoddy

01:26:24.263 --> 01:26:24.200
workmanship from the Chinese and that

01:26:24.200 --> 01:26:26.422
they didn't use local employees , local

01:26:26.422 --> 01:26:28.533
workers , uh , they would come in and

01:26:28.533 --> 01:26:30.644
build bridges , infrastructure , then

01:26:30.644 --> 01:26:32.867
that would then fall apart . So , so it

01:26:32.867 --> 01:26:35.033
was almost like they , the Chinese had

01:26:35.033 --> 01:26:37.144
attempted to , to make some inroads ,

01:26:37.144 --> 01:26:39.256
uh , places like New Zealand and some

01:26:39.256 --> 01:26:38.720
of the island chains out in the South

01:26:38.720 --> 01:26:40.776
Pacific , but then , The people were

01:26:40.776 --> 01:26:42.998
really kind of catching on to , to what

01:26:42.998 --> 01:26:45.053
was going on and , and almost seeing

01:26:45.053 --> 01:26:47.276
through uh what was happening . So , do

01:26:47.276 --> 01:26:49.498
you feel like that , that same thing is

01:26:49.498 --> 01:26:51.664
happening in Central and South America

01:26:51.664 --> 01:26:53.553
or is , are they making continued

01:26:53.553 --> 01:26:55.553
progress and really um just helping

01:26:55.553 --> 01:26:57.664
with community development and people

01:26:57.664 --> 01:26:59.942
are buying that . Congresswoman , they ,

01:26:59.942 --> 01:27:01.831
they're not buying it . They're ,

01:27:01.831 --> 01:27:01.560
they're seeing it . I think by the time

01:27:01.560 --> 01:27:03.671
they realized they've been duped with

01:27:03.671 --> 01:27:05.782
these , these relationships , again ,

01:27:05.782 --> 01:27:07.893
uh , more interest , uh , poor , poor

01:27:07.893 --> 01:27:10.227
construction . Uh , resource extraction ,

01:27:10.370 --> 01:27:12.592
uh , again , it goes on and on and on ,

01:27:12.592 --> 01:27:14.592
right ? So I think , uh , our , our

01:27:14.592 --> 01:27:16.703
goal is to try to have an alternative

01:27:16.703 --> 01:27:15.970
to them , right ? So these state owned

01:27:15.970 --> 01:27:18.026
enterprises , they know what they're

01:27:18.026 --> 01:27:19.692
doing . They're exploring the

01:27:19.692 --> 01:27:21.914
instability , the corruption , the weak

01:27:21.914 --> 01:27:23.914
economies , and the lack of foreign

01:27:23.914 --> 01:27:26.137
lending shortfall to embed and get in .

01:27:26.137 --> 01:27:28.303
So I think we have to continue to look

01:27:28.303 --> 01:27:30.081
for ways to bring more economic

01:27:30.081 --> 01:27:30.049
stability to the region . Uh , we have

01:27:30.049 --> 01:27:32.216
an economic strategic working group we

01:27:32.216 --> 01:27:34.327
stood about South . A year and a half

01:27:34.327 --> 01:27:36.327
or so ago , so we're trying to find

01:27:36.327 --> 01:27:38.605
ways to get Exim Bank , uh , the , the ,

01:27:38.605 --> 01:27:40.716
the Development Finance Corporation ,

01:27:40.716 --> 01:27:42.827
others officersgic Capital to come in

01:27:42.827 --> 01:27:44.938
and , you know , fill that void , and

01:27:44.938 --> 01:27:44.774
we have to continue to do that . Yeah ,

01:27:44.935 --> 01:27:46.991
no , I agree , and I appreciate your

01:27:46.991 --> 01:27:49.046
comments when you talked about , you

01:27:49.046 --> 01:27:48.825
know , every handshake , every time you

01:27:48.825 --> 01:27:50.769
look in someone's eye . That stuff

01:27:50.769 --> 01:27:52.714
matters just that people to people

01:27:52.714 --> 01:27:54.881
exchange . So along those same lines ,

01:27:54.881 --> 01:27:56.881
you know , we enjoy close relations

01:27:56.881 --> 01:27:58.992
with . Latin American countries , but

01:27:58.992 --> 01:28:00.825
how , how can we work with Latin

01:28:00.825 --> 01:28:02.881
American allies even more closely to

01:28:02.881 --> 01:28:02.180
achieve these close security

01:28:02.180 --> 01:28:04.069
cooperation on immigration , drug

01:28:04.069 --> 01:28:05.847
smuggling , and counter Chinese

01:28:05.847 --> 01:28:08.069
influence ? I think our , uh , security

01:28:08.069 --> 01:28:10.347
cooperation , one of my biggest lovers ,

01:28:10.347 --> 01:28:12.236
uh , provides that subject matter

01:28:12.236 --> 01:28:14.291
expert exchanges , uh , joint excise

01:28:14.291 --> 01:28:16.347
program , those things put me on the

01:28:16.347 --> 01:28:18.347
ground , right ? So now I can train

01:28:18.347 --> 01:28:20.291
side by side , uh , we , it builds

01:28:20.291 --> 01:28:22.347
confidence , trust . And really just

01:28:22.347 --> 01:28:22.064
that knowing that we're there for him ,

01:28:22.125 --> 01:28:24.014
so we have to continue to do that

01:28:24.014 --> 01:28:26.292
cooperation . I agree and just to echo ,

01:28:26.305 --> 01:28:28.416
Trent Kelly's words as well and , and

01:28:28.416 --> 01:28:30.583
my dad just growing up , he was in the

01:28:30.583 --> 01:28:32.749
Army reserves and , and used to always

01:28:32.749 --> 01:28:34.527
go down there and work on those

01:28:34.527 --> 01:28:34.504
projects that that he mentioned . I

01:28:34.504 --> 01:28:36.726
remember that and I think those , those

01:28:36.726 --> 01:28:38.726
one on one things that we can do to

01:28:38.726 --> 01:28:38.424
help their communities are so

01:28:38.424 --> 01:28:40.535
meaningful . So thank you so much . I

01:28:40.535 --> 01:28:42.257
back . Chair and I recognize a

01:28:42.257 --> 01:28:44.091
gentleman from New Mexico , Mr .

01:28:44.091 --> 01:28:46.091
Pasquez . Thank you Mr . Chairman .

01:28:46.091 --> 01:28:48.313
Thank you for the witnesses uh that are

01:28:48.313 --> 01:28:50.535
here today . Thank you for your service

01:28:50.535 --> 01:28:52.813
to our country and for your time today ,

01:28:52.813 --> 01:28:54.702
um . I represent New Mexico's 2nd

01:28:54.702 --> 01:28:56.924
district that includes 180 miles of the

01:28:56.924 --> 01:28:59.091
US-Mexico border . I know nearly every

01:28:59.091 --> 01:29:01.202
mile very intimately , as well as our

01:29:01.202 --> 01:29:03.257
three ports of entry , uh , with our

01:29:03.257 --> 01:29:05.368
southern neighbor in Mexico . Now for

01:29:05.368 --> 01:29:07.591
decades , the Department of Defense has

01:29:07.591 --> 01:29:09.535
operated joint Task Force North to

01:29:09.535 --> 01:29:11.591
support law enforcement's efforts to

01:29:11.591 --> 01:29:13.591
identify and interdict drugs before

01:29:13.591 --> 01:29:13.509
they enter the United States . That's

01:29:13.509 --> 01:29:15.287
why I was proud to have secured

01:29:15.287 --> 01:29:18.520
bipartisan language in the FY25 NDAA ,

01:29:18.569 --> 01:29:20.402
which requires the Department of

01:29:20.402 --> 01:29:22.236
Defense to make countering drugs

01:29:22.236 --> 01:29:23.958
entering the United States the

01:29:23.958 --> 01:29:26.236
department's top counter drug priority .

01:29:26.236 --> 01:29:28.291
Uh , my first question is for , uh ,

01:29:28.291 --> 01:29:30.402
General Glo and Admiral Holsey . Uh ,

01:29:30.402 --> 01:29:32.402
the DOD has historically engaged in

01:29:32.402 --> 01:29:34.458
several counter drug campaigns . The

01:29:34.458 --> 01:29:36.680
dynamics of illicit drug smuggling have

01:29:36.680 --> 01:29:38.736
shifted over the years , and it's no

01:29:38.736 --> 01:29:40.847
secret that there's been an influx of

01:29:40.847 --> 01:29:42.569
fentanyl . And other precursor

01:29:42.569 --> 01:29:44.680
chemicals coming to the United States

01:29:44.680 --> 01:29:46.902
from places like China , could you give

01:29:46.902 --> 01:29:49.125
me an example of how the department has

01:29:49.125 --> 01:29:50.791
shifted its focus to prior to

01:29:50.791 --> 01:29:52.680
prioritize countering the flow of

01:29:52.680 --> 01:29:56.629
fentanyl into the United States ? Oh

01:29:56.629 --> 01:29:58.685
sorry , dear , at least from a SOCOM

01:29:58.685 --> 01:30:00.796
standpoint , uh , we continue to work

01:30:00.796 --> 01:30:02.851
across the agency to try to identify

01:30:02.851 --> 01:30:05.073
those , uh , crucial hotspots right now

01:30:05.073 --> 01:30:07.185
we know that the precursors are going

01:30:07.185 --> 01:30:09.407
into Mexico first , so we're not seeing

01:30:09.407 --> 01:30:11.462
a lot in the , uh , in the SOCOMOR .

01:30:11.462 --> 01:30:13.685
We'd have some potential hotspots being

01:30:13.685 --> 01:30:15.740
Honduras , Guatemala , and Dominican

01:30:15.740 --> 01:30:17.962
Republic . So inter agency work support

01:30:17.962 --> 01:30:20.018
uh doing that we continue to see the

01:30:20.018 --> 01:30:22.240
cocaine , uh , the prices drop , so the

01:30:22.240 --> 01:30:24.296
cocaine cocaine continues to come in

01:30:24.296 --> 01:30:23.805
and we're getting at that at record

01:30:23.805 --> 01:30:25.972
pace this year and I can do a lot more

01:30:25.972 --> 01:30:28.194
with , uh , more assets but right now I

01:30:28.194 --> 01:30:30.083
think from a fentanyl we're still

01:30:30.083 --> 01:30:29.995
studying that very hardly work very

01:30:29.995 --> 01:30:32.217
hard with our partners in our agency to

01:30:32.217 --> 01:30:35.310
get after it . Thank you . And

01:30:35.310 --> 01:30:37.532
Congressman , first I've , uh , visited

01:30:37.532 --> 01:30:39.970
Santa Ana Monument 3 and a number of

01:30:39.970 --> 01:30:42.149
the , uh , locations along your

01:30:42.149 --> 01:30:44.260
district , and , uh , I'm always very

01:30:44.260 --> 01:30:46.316
proud of the great work that's being

01:30:46.316 --> 01:30:48.093
done there , uh , regarding the

01:30:48.093 --> 01:30:50.260
fentanyl , uh , we've seen the numbers

01:30:50.260 --> 01:30:50.229
drop significantly over the last two

01:30:50.229 --> 01:30:52.118
months as we've sealed off , uh ,

01:30:52.118 --> 01:30:53.896
portions of the border and also

01:30:53.896 --> 01:30:56.290
established , uh , maritime blocks , uh ,

01:30:56.430 --> 01:30:58.597
for this , uh , we're we're waiting to

01:30:58.597 --> 01:31:00.763
see . What's the next way that they're

01:31:00.763 --> 01:31:03.620
gonna try to get that across ? Uh , we

01:31:03.620 --> 01:31:06.410
established a joint intelligence task

01:31:06.410 --> 01:31:08.410
force that is bringing in the inter

01:31:08.410 --> 01:31:10.490
agency and , uh , the , uh , intel

01:31:10.490 --> 01:31:12.729
community along with uh B patrol and

01:31:12.729 --> 01:31:15.520
DOD intel experts , uh , that's really

01:31:15.520 --> 01:31:17.850
illuminating that flow in as you

01:31:17.850 --> 01:31:19.850
mentioned with the precursors where

01:31:19.850 --> 01:31:21.906
it's being , uh , assembled and then

01:31:21.906 --> 01:31:23.961
how they try to get it , uh , across

01:31:23.961 --> 01:31:26.183
the border . Uh , I think this is gonna

01:31:26.183 --> 01:31:29.279
take more time , uh , but , uh , I , I

01:31:29.279 --> 01:31:31.279
think that we're on the , the , the

01:31:31.279 --> 01:31:34.459
right track to , to , um , find and put

01:31:34.459 --> 01:31:36.819
the pressure on the cartels , uh , in

01:31:36.819 --> 01:31:39.529
ways that they haven't had , uh ,

01:31:39.540 --> 01:31:41.651
pressure put on them before , uh , to

01:31:41.651 --> 01:31:43.873
make them find other ways to earn money

01:31:43.873 --> 01:31:45.984
than fentanyl . Thank you , General ,

01:31:45.984 --> 01:31:48.740
and I think . Best resources are used

01:31:48.740 --> 01:31:52.109
in the ability to both uh counterdict

01:31:52.109 --> 01:31:54.276
the smuggling activities that happened

01:31:54.276 --> 01:31:56.276
but more importantly the the actual

01:31:56.276 --> 01:31:58.220
precursors that are coming in from

01:31:58.220 --> 01:32:00.220
China and the manufacturing and the

01:32:00.220 --> 01:32:02.387
laboratory facilities that the cartels

01:32:02.387 --> 01:32:04.553
are using to then move that uh product

01:32:04.553 --> 01:32:06.665
across the country . I believe that's

01:32:06.665 --> 01:32:08.720
one of the best resources for DOD to

01:32:08.720 --> 01:32:08.430
continue its focus on so thank you for

01:32:08.430 --> 01:32:10.879
that , um , and I remain committed to

01:32:10.879 --> 01:32:13.101
working with the department to stop the

01:32:13.101 --> 01:32:15.323
spread of fentanyl in our country now ,

01:32:15.323 --> 01:32:17.379
uh . I do have some serious concerns

01:32:17.379 --> 01:32:19.379
about a recent shift in DOD posture

01:32:19.379 --> 01:32:20.990
when it comes to immigration

01:32:20.990 --> 01:32:23.157
enforcement . Uh , and it is DHS's job

01:32:23.157 --> 01:32:25.157
to enforce our domestic immigration

01:32:25.157 --> 01:32:27.323
laws , and I believe DOD has to remain

01:32:27.323 --> 01:32:29.435
focused on preparing to fight and win

01:32:29.435 --> 01:32:31.657
America's wars , and I'm very concerned

01:32:31.657 --> 01:32:33.879
the department is wasting some of these

01:32:33.879 --> 01:32:35.935
precious resources , which I've seen

01:32:35.935 --> 01:32:38.157
firsthand from talking to DOD personnel

01:32:38.157 --> 01:32:40.323
at places like Santa Ana Monument 3 in

01:32:40.323 --> 01:32:42.490
the Santa Teresa Port of entry and the

01:32:42.490 --> 01:32:42.240
Santa Teresa Sunland Park , uh ,

01:32:42.259 --> 01:32:44.370
station . Now it's been reported that

01:32:44.370 --> 01:32:46.537
there's plans for department to detain

01:32:46.537 --> 01:32:48.759
and process immigrants at installations

01:32:48.759 --> 01:32:50.926
like Fort Bliss and Kirtland Air Force

01:32:50.926 --> 01:32:53.037
Base . Uh , Mr . Leonardo , are there

01:32:53.037 --> 01:32:54.926
any plans to house individuals or

01:32:54.926 --> 01:32:56.592
families at Kirtland or other

01:32:56.592 --> 01:32:58.815
installations in the region ? Thank you

01:32:58.815 --> 01:33:00.981
for your question , Mr . Vasquez , and

01:33:00.981 --> 01:33:02.870
uh the administration shares your

01:33:02.870 --> 01:33:02.839
concern about the flow of fentanyl ,

01:33:02.850 --> 01:33:05.072
which is why we're eager to support the

01:33:05.072 --> 01:33:07.239
Department of Homeland Security in any

01:33:07.239 --> 01:33:09.461
way that we can . Uh , I'll note , um ,

01:33:09.461 --> 01:33:11.294
as I mentioned earlier , uh , by

01:33:11.294 --> 01:33:13.294
General GO , uh , the Department of

01:33:13.294 --> 01:33:13.209
Defense and it's , uh , military

01:33:13.209 --> 01:33:15.042
service members do not do direct

01:33:15.042 --> 01:33:16.987
attention . Uh , this is always in

01:33:16.987 --> 01:33:19.098
support of ICE and CBP . Uh , and the

01:33:19.098 --> 01:33:21.042
Department of Homeland Security at

01:33:21.042 --> 01:33:23.153
large , thank you , Mr . Leonardo . I

01:33:23.153 --> 01:33:25.209
have 20 seconds and that was not the

01:33:25.209 --> 01:33:27.431
question that I asked . My question was

01:33:27.431 --> 01:33:27.120
about immigrants being housed at

01:33:27.120 --> 01:33:29.740
Kirtland or Fort , uh , Fort Bliss . So

01:33:29.990 --> 01:33:31.546
just in terms of the actual

01:33:31.546 --> 01:33:33.546
expenditures that we're spending to

01:33:33.546 --> 01:33:35.657
potentially use Department of Defense

01:33:35.657 --> 01:33:37.712
facilities for migrant detention , I

01:33:37.712 --> 01:33:39.823
believe takes away from that critical

01:33:39.823 --> 01:33:41.879
mission . Of counterdicting fentanyl

01:33:41.879 --> 01:33:43.934
traffic and so I'd love to see those

01:33:43.934 --> 01:33:45.990
millions of dollars actually used to

01:33:45.990 --> 01:33:48.157
protect Americans and I believe that's

01:33:48.157 --> 01:33:50.379
best used , uh , by making sure that we

01:33:50.379 --> 01:33:49.660
can stop the flow of fentanyl .

01:33:49.689 --> 01:33:51.800
Gentleman's expired . I recognize you

01:33:51.800 --> 01:33:53.911
from Louisiana , Mr . Higgins . Thank

01:33:53.911 --> 01:33:55.911
you , Mr . Chairman . General Gio ,

01:33:55.911 --> 01:33:57.967
you're familiar with the , the joint

01:33:57.967 --> 01:34:00.300
reserve base at Bell Chase in Louisiana .

01:34:01.129 --> 01:34:04.109
Yes sir , I am on the house the 159th

01:34:04.109 --> 01:34:06.759
fighter wing . Um , they do a hell of a

01:34:06.759 --> 01:34:09.359
job defending our , our border at the

01:34:09.359 --> 01:34:11.526
coast . They , they work together , of

01:34:11.526 --> 01:34:13.359
course , with their , with their

01:34:13.359 --> 01:34:15.399
partners and , and they , they fly

01:34:15.399 --> 01:34:19.000
F-15Cs . You're familiar ? Sir , I'm

01:34:19.000 --> 01:34:21.000
very familiar . Yes , sir . I would

01:34:21.000 --> 01:34:24.180
imagine you are , um . I've been

01:34:24.180 --> 01:34:26.430
advised that the that the Air Force

01:34:26.430 --> 01:34:29.470
plans to uh . To send

01:34:29.799 --> 01:34:32.839
F-15EX's to the Kadina Air Base in

01:34:32.839 --> 01:34:36.649
Okinawa . And my sources state

01:34:36.649 --> 01:34:39.569
that That , uh , Okinawa to have

01:34:39.569 --> 01:34:41.791
difficulty supporting some of these new

01:34:41.791 --> 01:34:44.049
aircraft and and in defense of our

01:34:44.049 --> 01:34:46.459
homeland , which is the subject of

01:34:46.459 --> 01:34:50.310
today's hearing primarily . It

01:34:50.310 --> 01:34:52.390
would seem to a reasonable American

01:34:52.390 --> 01:34:55.620
that perhaps we should deploy uh these

01:34:55.620 --> 01:34:59.479
F-15EXs to the 159th fighter wing

01:34:59.830 --> 01:35:02.629
to defend our coast to replace his

01:35:02.629 --> 01:35:05.359
older craft as opposed to sending them

01:35:05.359 --> 01:35:08.729
to Japan . And would you

01:35:09.189 --> 01:35:11.950
potentially meet with this committee to

01:35:11.950 --> 01:35:14.061
discuss that ? What are your thoughts

01:35:14.061 --> 01:35:16.172
on that which you can discuss in this

01:35:16.172 --> 01:35:18.394
setting ? Sir , I would be glad to meet

01:35:18.394 --> 01:35:20.506
with the committee and discuss the uh

01:35:20.506 --> 01:35:22.561
air defense needs . Uh , the F-15C ,

01:35:22.561 --> 01:35:24.979
although old , is still unmatched in

01:35:24.979 --> 01:35:27.580
air to air combat , and , uh , it does

01:35:27.580 --> 01:35:29.636
a great job , but as you mentioned ,

01:35:29.636 --> 01:35:31.858
being old , uh , maintenance problems ,

01:35:31.858 --> 01:35:34.609
reliability problems , uh . And fatigue

01:35:34.609 --> 01:35:36.831
on the aircraft is setting in . I would

01:35:36.831 --> 01:35:38.720
love to see all of our F-15 units

01:35:38.720 --> 01:35:41.053
replaced with ES . So , so respectfully ,

01:35:41.053 --> 01:35:43.331
General , if , if the old aircraft are ,

01:35:43.331 --> 01:35:45.399
are , are , are cool water , we need

01:35:45.399 --> 01:35:48.669
new ones . Well , as I mentioned , the ,

01:35:48.790 --> 01:35:50.846
the main ones are newer and better ,

01:35:50.846 --> 01:35:52.846
right ? The new ones are better . I

01:35:52.846 --> 01:35:54.957
would like to see place to defend our

01:35:54.957 --> 01:35:57.123
coast , regular Americans might expect

01:35:57.123 --> 01:35:59.234
that we might use the best . I'm just

01:35:59.234 --> 01:36:01.346
putting this out there . We might use

01:36:01.346 --> 01:36:03.568
the best and most modern aircraft to to

01:36:03.568 --> 01:36:05.457
defend the Gulf of America and to

01:36:05.457 --> 01:36:08.220
patrol the . Gulf of America as opposed

01:36:08.220 --> 01:36:10.331
to sending them overseas , so all I'm

01:36:10.331 --> 01:36:12.498
asking respectfully , sir , is that we

01:36:12.498 --> 01:36:14.387
have that conversation and we can

01:36:14.387 --> 01:36:16.553
engage in that conversation in another

01:36:16.553 --> 01:36:18.776
setting . Will you , will you commit to

01:36:18.776 --> 01:36:20.609
that to me in my office and this

01:36:20.609 --> 01:36:22.776
committee ? Yes sir , absolutely , and

01:36:22.776 --> 01:36:24.998
I , and I wanna make sure I was clear .

01:36:24.998 --> 01:36:27.220
I would love to have the F-15 EX . Well

01:36:27.220 --> 01:36:29.442
that's a real good answer . We're gonna

01:36:29.442 --> 01:36:31.609
stop there at the on the F-15s because

01:36:31.609 --> 01:36:33.776
I , I want them in Louisiana . I think

01:36:33.776 --> 01:36:36.560
it's a real good idea . Um , uh , you

01:36:36.560 --> 01:36:40.040
mentioned earlier , General , regarding

01:36:40.040 --> 01:36:42.270
the northern trajectory , my colleagues

01:36:42.680 --> 01:36:46.439
across the aisle are . Are quite upset

01:36:46.439 --> 01:36:49.479
about corrective actions to that uh

01:36:49.839 --> 01:36:51.839
that the executive branch is taking

01:36:51.839 --> 01:36:53.990
regarding our relations with with our

01:36:53.990 --> 01:36:56.459
allies and adversaries alike across the

01:36:56.459 --> 01:36:58.560
world you mentioned the northern

01:36:58.560 --> 01:37:00.799
trajectory was brought in , brought up

01:37:00.799 --> 01:37:03.640
as a concern so when you when you

01:37:03.640 --> 01:37:05.529
described the northern trajectory

01:37:05.529 --> 01:37:08.000
talking about tracking ICBMs is that

01:37:08.000 --> 01:37:10.970
correct ? Yes sir , and cruise missiles .

01:37:10.979 --> 01:37:14.529
OK , so ICBMs and cruise missiles ,

01:37:14.939 --> 01:37:18.649
so the American technologies for

01:37:18.649 --> 01:37:22.259
on sea-based and and land based and

01:37:22.259 --> 01:37:24.979
space-based technologies that track

01:37:24.979 --> 01:37:27.089
these launches along . Of a cruise

01:37:27.089 --> 01:37:29.129
missile or an intercontinental

01:37:29.129 --> 01:37:31.359
ballistic missile from a northern

01:37:31.359 --> 01:37:34.810
trajectory from a uh that an adversary

01:37:34.810 --> 01:37:38.399
most likely used to make a fast and

01:37:38.399 --> 01:37:40.621
effective approach to the United States

01:37:40.621 --> 01:37:42.788
can we , can we track that with Canada

01:37:42.788 --> 01:37:45.479
or not ? Without Canada or not .

01:37:47.450 --> 01:37:50.549
We can , we can do the detection and

01:37:50.549 --> 01:37:52.271
the mid course tracking , uh ,

01:37:52.310 --> 01:37:54.421
depending on the route . There's some

01:37:54.421 --> 01:37:56.588
routes where we could track it without

01:37:56.588 --> 01:37:58.810
Canada . Others , if it goes straight ,

01:37:58.810 --> 01:37:58.500
you know , in the 12 o'clock position ,

01:37:58.669 --> 01:38:01.470
we would need Canadian assets . So the

01:38:01.470 --> 01:38:03.692
Canadian assets that you're that you're

01:38:03.692 --> 01:38:06.490
describing , would you , would you

01:38:06.490 --> 01:38:08.910
clarify the way those joint operations

01:38:08.910 --> 01:38:11.350
work when it comes to tracking ICBM ?

01:38:12.419 --> 01:38:15.850
Does this not transcend uh trade

01:38:15.850 --> 01:38:18.259
negotiations and we're talking about an

01:38:18.259 --> 01:38:21.490
incoming nuclear missile . For for

01:38:21.490 --> 01:38:24.089
ICBMs , the capabilities are all United

01:38:24.089 --> 01:38:26.330
States . Canada has a policy that they

01:38:26.330 --> 01:38:28.552
don't conduct ballistic missile defense

01:38:28.552 --> 01:38:30.774
for the cruise missiles , we would rely

01:38:30.774 --> 01:38:33.080
on some of the radars and the fighters ,

01:38:33.450 --> 01:38:35.799
uh , that Canada has depending on the

01:38:35.810 --> 01:38:37.866
the route of the cruise missile . So

01:38:37.866 --> 01:38:40.290
you've worked with our Canadian allies

01:38:40.290 --> 01:38:42.401
for a long time , correct , General .

01:38:42.401 --> 01:38:45.000
Can you , can you envision any scenario

01:38:45.000 --> 01:38:47.319
under any conditions where it would be

01:38:47.319 --> 01:38:50.049
an incoming cruise missile ICBM

01:38:50.279 --> 01:38:52.399
detected by our Canadian allies that

01:38:52.560 --> 01:38:55.479
that or or by American tech that we

01:38:55.479 --> 01:38:57.535
would not share that with Canada and

01:38:57.535 --> 01:38:59.368
vice versa . Gentleman's time is

01:38:59.368 --> 01:39:01.479
expired . Have to answer that for the

01:39:01.479 --> 01:39:01.459
record , uh , chair , and I recognize

01:39:01.459 --> 01:39:03.515
gentleman from North Carolina , Mr .

01:39:03.515 --> 01:39:05.792
Davis . Thank you , Mr . Chairman . Uh ,

01:39:06.250 --> 01:39:08.930
thank you so much , Mr . Chair , and to

01:39:08.930 --> 01:39:11.160
the witnesses for being with us today .

01:39:12.810 --> 01:39:15.830
My question is , and I would love to

01:39:15.830 --> 01:39:19.750
hear , um , General G and

01:39:19.750 --> 01:39:23.509
from the Admiral , um , Halsey . How

01:39:23.509 --> 01:39:27.390
is SOCOM and Northcom working together ?

01:39:29.250 --> 01:39:31.970
With Latin America and others in

01:39:31.970 --> 01:39:35.080
particular I continue to hear a theme

01:39:35.609 --> 01:39:39.049
identifying new ways that the

01:39:39.049 --> 01:39:42.959
cartels are now looking at making

01:39:43.290 --> 01:39:45.589
a path for illegal drugs into our

01:39:45.589 --> 01:39:49.580
country . Congressman ,

01:39:49.700 --> 01:39:52.529
two , new ways that I think , um ,

01:39:52.540 --> 01:39:54.859
illustrate how SOCOM and Northcom are

01:39:54.859 --> 01:39:57.069
working together . One is we recently

01:39:57.069 --> 01:39:59.580
established the Joint Intelligence Task

01:39:59.580 --> 01:40:01.691
Force southern border , uh , which is

01:40:01.691 --> 01:40:03.524
headquartered in , uh , Tucson ,

01:40:03.700 --> 01:40:06.779
Arizona , along with at a CBP , uh ,

01:40:06.790 --> 01:40:09.609
facility , and what we do is we bring

01:40:09.609 --> 01:40:13.379
in inter agency , DOD and

01:40:13.379 --> 01:40:16.160
Intel Community . Uh , feeds and fuse

01:40:16.160 --> 01:40:18.479
it and redistribute that information

01:40:18.479 --> 01:40:21.270
from there that has led to , uh ,

01:40:21.279 --> 01:40:23.879
unparalleled sharing of intelligence

01:40:23.879 --> 01:40:26.870
data on this , uh , mission set , um ,

01:40:26.879 --> 01:40:29.069
that used to , you know , be available

01:40:29.069 --> 01:40:31.270
but not uh all process from one

01:40:31.270 --> 01:40:33.492
location and Admiral Halsey's team is a

01:40:33.492 --> 01:40:35.659
is a strong participant in that . Uh ,

01:40:35.659 --> 01:40:37.881
the other is , as we've deployed , uh ,

01:40:37.881 --> 01:40:40.214
ships into the Gulf of America and also ,

01:40:40.270 --> 01:40:42.430
uh , off the Pacific coast , uh , to

01:40:42.430 --> 01:40:45.100
counter illegal drug and , and , uh ,

01:40:45.109 --> 01:40:47.870
migrant flow , uh , we built into the

01:40:47.870 --> 01:40:50.109
plan that , uh , we could seamlessly

01:40:50.109 --> 01:40:52.276
move these ships , uh , further to the

01:40:52.276 --> 01:40:54.276
south if required to benefit , uh ,

01:40:54.276 --> 01:40:56.442
Admiral Halsey's , uh , giant of South

01:40:56.442 --> 01:40:59.000
Mission . Uh , or his resources could

01:40:59.000 --> 01:41:01.040
move more to the north , uh , to

01:41:01.040 --> 01:41:03.151
seamlessly , uh , address the illegal

01:41:03.151 --> 01:41:06.319
flow of drugs and illegal migrants , uh ,

01:41:06.359 --> 01:41:08.700
around , uh , you know , the , the ,

01:41:08.720 --> 01:41:10.887
the Gulf or in the Pacific Ocean , you

01:41:10.887 --> 01:41:13.220
know , around San Diego up to the coast .

01:41:13.220 --> 01:41:15.779
We've never had that level of , um , of ,

01:41:15.839 --> 01:41:18.399
of cooperation between our two commands

01:41:18.399 --> 01:41:22.399
before . I would just add that as

01:41:22.399 --> 01:41:24.510
I look at the uh jet up South , there

01:41:24.510 --> 01:41:26.455
remained the gold standard for the

01:41:26.455 --> 01:41:28.677
detection and monitoring mission and so

01:41:28.677 --> 01:41:30.788
we a great collaboration with General

01:41:30.788 --> 01:41:32.732
Gio but also I , I have to say our

01:41:32.732 --> 01:41:34.843
partner nations , right , so security

01:41:34.843 --> 01:41:36.510
cooperation 80% of our , uh ,

01:41:36.510 --> 01:41:38.566
interdiction last year was conducted

01:41:38.566 --> 01:41:40.843
along by with and through our partners .

01:41:40.843 --> 01:41:43.066
We have something called a ship special

01:41:43.066 --> 01:41:45.288
mission where we can position ourselves

01:41:45.288 --> 01:41:45.069
and then use the interceptors to get

01:41:45.069 --> 01:41:47.236
after it . Another thing we're working

01:41:47.236 --> 01:41:49.458
really hard with uh . Uh , jet of South

01:41:49.458 --> 01:41:51.625
is this AI machine learning . So now ,

01:41:51.625 --> 01:41:53.736
based off that technology , based off

01:41:53.736 --> 01:41:55.902
time of year , size uh ship aircraft ,

01:41:55.902 --> 01:41:57.902
we can predict where it's going and

01:41:57.902 --> 01:41:59.958
make sure we can have assets there .

01:41:59.958 --> 01:42:01.902
But again , consistent presence is

01:42:01.902 --> 01:42:01.810
required . I have to continue to do

01:42:01.810 --> 01:42:05.410
that . I wanna say I really emphasize

01:42:05.410 --> 01:42:07.729
this work , um , because too many

01:42:07.729 --> 01:42:09.930
people , too many American lives have

01:42:09.930 --> 01:42:12.850
died , and we have to stay in front of

01:42:12.850 --> 01:42:14.517
it and that's what I'm really

01:42:14.517 --> 01:42:16.683
emphasizing here , staying in front of

01:42:16.683 --> 01:42:18.879
it . Um , I want to shift gears , if I

01:42:18.879 --> 01:42:21.600
may for a second , uh , was honored to

01:42:21.600 --> 01:42:24.189
be able to travel with , um , our chair

01:42:24.189 --> 01:42:26.399
and other committee members , um , to

01:42:26.399 --> 01:42:29.640
Guantanamo Bay . Uh , my question is ,

01:42:29.750 --> 01:42:33.569
as we've seen now Guantanamo Bay exists

01:42:33.959 --> 01:42:36.479
as an alternative while Homeland

01:42:36.479 --> 01:42:39.000
Security is actually increasing

01:42:39.000 --> 01:42:42.120
capacity , uh , what do you see as

01:42:42.120 --> 01:42:43.953
Homeland Security increases that

01:42:43.953 --> 01:42:46.560
capacity , the long term term role than

01:42:46.560 --> 01:42:49.500
what Guantanamo Bay ? Mr . Sells ,

01:42:50.069 --> 01:42:52.236
Congressman , thank you . Um , again ,

01:42:52.259 --> 01:42:54.315
the department is , is in support of

01:42:54.315 --> 01:42:57.660
DHS and ICE and CBP , so as they gain

01:42:57.660 --> 01:43:00.029
more capability to , to house , it , it

01:43:00.029 --> 01:43:02.500
could lead to us not needing our

01:43:02.500 --> 01:43:04.611
certain capabilities . But until that

01:43:04.611 --> 01:43:06.722
threshold has been determined , which

01:43:06.722 --> 01:43:08.611
it is not at this point , we will

01:43:08.611 --> 01:43:10.611
continue to provide that support at

01:43:10.611 --> 01:43:13.680
Gitmo . In a follow up there , do you

01:43:13.680 --> 01:43:15.600
anticipate or see any level of a

01:43:15.600 --> 01:43:18.600
timeline in terms of dealing with the

01:43:18.600 --> 01:43:21.560
capacity ? I know that uh ICE is

01:43:21.560 --> 01:43:23.990
working very hard at trying to identify

01:43:24.359 --> 01:43:27.359
uh additional housing um but I think

01:43:27.359 --> 01:43:29.248
they will continue to rely on the

01:43:29.248 --> 01:43:31.415
defense department to support that for

01:43:31.415 --> 01:43:34.310
the near future . OK . Thank you again

01:43:34.310 --> 01:43:36.669
for being with us today , uh , and you

01:43:36.669 --> 01:43:38.669
all to remain balance of my time as

01:43:38.669 --> 01:43:40.839
chair . Gentlemen , yields back and I

01:43:40.839 --> 01:43:43.006
recognize myself for five minutes of ,

01:43:43.006 --> 01:43:45.172
uh , questioning . Admiral Halsey , by

01:43:45.172 --> 01:43:47.283
the way , great name . Uh , you , you

01:43:47.283 --> 01:43:49.450
had to be a navy man , right ? You had

01:43:49.450 --> 01:43:51.339
to be , right ? OK , um , Admiral

01:43:51.339 --> 01:43:53.640
Halsey , uh , do Cuba , Venezuela , and

01:43:53.640 --> 01:43:55.862
Nicaragua pose a security threat , uh ,

01:43:55.862 --> 01:43:58.509
to the United States ? Yes ,

01:43:58.709 --> 01:44:01.042
Congressman , how big a security threat ?

01:44:01.180 --> 01:44:03.402
I think it's very challenging , I think

01:44:03.402 --> 01:44:05.513
as I look at the region and watch the

01:44:05.513 --> 01:44:07.402
engagement . I can see out of air

01:44:07.402 --> 01:44:09.458
deplorers come in , uh , from Russia

01:44:09.458 --> 01:44:11.458
and uh pull into , uh , Cuba when I

01:44:11.458 --> 01:44:13.347
watch Iranian ships come over and

01:44:13.347 --> 01:44:15.402
deliver , uh . Um , you know , goods

01:44:15.402 --> 01:44:17.569
and services to Venezuela becomes very

01:44:17.569 --> 01:44:19.736
challenging and so we have to continue

01:44:19.736 --> 01:44:21.902
to keep our eye on that piece and make

01:44:21.902 --> 01:44:24.180
sure , but I again I can be more clear .

01:44:24.180 --> 01:44:26.402
I gotta be consistent present engaged ,

01:44:26.402 --> 01:44:28.624
and when I have aircraft assets , ships

01:44:28.624 --> 01:44:30.402
in the region I can block those

01:44:30.402 --> 01:44:32.347
maneuvers . And , and would regime

01:44:32.347 --> 01:44:34.402
change in those three countries make

01:44:34.402 --> 01:44:36.569
your life easier and also make America

01:44:36.569 --> 01:44:38.569
much more secure ? That's more of a

01:44:38.569 --> 01:44:38.339
policy question . I think anything

01:44:38.339 --> 01:44:40.620
that's gonna make us more secure our

01:44:40.620 --> 01:44:42.731
support , but that's more of a policy

01:44:42.731 --> 01:44:44.842
question . Well , if they , if Cuba ,

01:44:44.842 --> 01:44:46.676
Venezuela , and Nicaragua became

01:44:46.676 --> 01:44:48.842
friends instead of uh the way they are

01:44:48.842 --> 01:44:48.500
right now , enemies , would that make

01:44:48.500 --> 01:44:50.556
your life easier ? Yes , if they are

01:44:50.556 --> 01:44:52.778
friends , uh , that'd be totally , uh ,

01:44:52.778 --> 01:44:54.944
a Democrat right now we have 28 , uh ,

01:44:54.944 --> 01:44:57.222
democracy in the region , so if we had ,

01:44:57.222 --> 01:44:59.167
uh , 31 , that'd be great . Do you

01:44:59.167 --> 01:44:58.899
think Cuba is the head of the snake in ,

01:44:58.910 --> 01:45:01.021
uh , in stirring up trouble in , uh ,

01:45:01.021 --> 01:45:03.589
in the region and also , uh , helping ,

01:45:03.709 --> 01:45:05.709
uh , Russia , Iran , and especially

01:45:05.709 --> 01:45:07.820
China in the region . So I would just

01:45:07.820 --> 01:45:09.820
say this , let's be clear , I don't

01:45:09.820 --> 01:45:11.987
they do it because they know they have

01:45:11.987 --> 01:45:14.042
the backing of some of the nefarious

01:45:14.042 --> 01:45:16.265
actors where it's China and Russia , so

01:45:16.265 --> 01:45:16.220
I think it's a little bit of both . And

01:45:16.220 --> 01:45:18.442
I , I , um , I share your concern about

01:45:18.442 --> 01:45:20.810
the , the intrusion or the incursion of

01:45:21.180 --> 01:45:25.049
Russia , Iran , North Korea , and , uh ,

01:45:25.060 --> 01:45:27.338
and especially China in our hemisphere ,

01:45:27.338 --> 01:45:29.393
and I think for far too long we have

01:45:29.393 --> 01:45:31.830
been . Maybe not blind to it , but

01:45:31.830 --> 01:45:33.941
certainly not paying the attention to

01:45:33.941 --> 01:45:36.052
what's going on in South America that

01:45:36.052 --> 01:45:38.330
uh with these uh nefarious actors , uh ,

01:45:38.330 --> 01:45:40.552
right in our own backyard , and I think

01:45:40.552 --> 01:45:42.441
we need to start paying much more

01:45:42.441 --> 01:45:44.663
attention to . Do you agree with that ?

01:45:44.663 --> 01:45:44.379
I totally agree with that , sir . OK ,

01:45:44.549 --> 01:45:46.629
um , General Gio , um .

01:45:51.330 --> 01:45:53.850
How many cartel members are there in

01:45:53.850 --> 01:45:57.399
the in the southern border ? When you

01:45:57.399 --> 01:45:59.510
estimate how many , how many actually

01:45:59.510 --> 01:46:01.677
are are members of the cartel ? Number

01:46:01.677 --> 01:46:03.788
of people , yeah , number of people ,

01:46:03.788 --> 01:46:06.010
number of cartel members , yeah . So my

01:46:06.010 --> 01:46:08.121
estimate would be , uh , certainly in

01:46:08.121 --> 01:46:11.430
the thousands as there's 20 or 25 to 30

01:46:11.430 --> 01:46:14.209
different cartels , uh , that we're

01:46:14.209 --> 01:46:16.431
tracking and watching . Can you give me

01:46:16.431 --> 01:46:18.750
an estimate of how many thousands ? Uh ,

01:46:18.850 --> 01:46:21.017
no , sir , I can't , but I will follow

01:46:21.017 --> 01:46:22.961
up with that . OK . So , but those

01:46:22.961 --> 01:46:25.899
thousands are killing 50,000 . Through

01:46:25.899 --> 01:46:28.810
the fentanyl , yes sir , OK , and while

01:46:28.810 --> 01:46:31.490
we've had great success in stopping the

01:46:31.490 --> 01:46:33.546
flow of migrants , I mean we're down

01:46:33.546 --> 01:46:36.049
90% , which by the way runs counter to

01:46:36.049 --> 01:46:37.938
everything we were hearing in the

01:46:37.938 --> 01:46:39.827
previous administration said they

01:46:39.827 --> 01:46:42.160
needed a lot more money , money , money ,

01:46:42.160 --> 01:46:42.129
and really all they needed was policy

01:46:42.129 --> 01:46:45.089
and will to do it , um .

01:46:45.979 --> 01:46:48.146
What are what are your records or what

01:46:48.146 --> 01:46:50.146
do you indicate is happening in the

01:46:50.146 --> 01:46:51.923
southern border with regards to

01:46:51.923 --> 01:46:54.229
fentanyl , which is killing 50,000

01:46:54.229 --> 01:46:56.451
Americans every single year . So , what

01:46:56.451 --> 01:46:58.750
we're seeing is the uh the amount

01:46:58.750 --> 01:47:00.972
moving across that they're detecting is

01:47:00.990 --> 01:47:04.950
is at about 40% of , of what it was

01:47:04.950 --> 01:47:07.189
before , so significant drop but not to

01:47:07.189 --> 01:47:09.379
the same rate as , as the , uh ,

01:47:09.450 --> 01:47:11.689
migrant flow . And then , uh , what

01:47:11.689 --> 01:47:14.609
we're also seeing is that the , um , a

01:47:14.609 --> 01:47:17.169
lot of frustration with the cartels at

01:47:17.169 --> 01:47:19.336
their inability to get fentanyl across

01:47:19.336 --> 01:47:21.280
the border and so they're pursuing

01:47:21.280 --> 01:47:23.339
other uh locations to send it other

01:47:23.339 --> 01:47:26.830
than the United States . OK , and so

01:47:26.830 --> 01:47:28.997
they've been , they've been labeled as

01:47:28.997 --> 01:47:31.163
terrorist organizations , right ? They

01:47:31.163 --> 01:47:33.219
have , sir . What are we doing about

01:47:33.219 --> 01:47:35.330
that ? What are we doing about that ?

01:47:35.330 --> 01:47:34.680
What are we doing about it ? They've

01:47:34.680 --> 01:47:36.902
been killing 50 , well , they've killed

01:47:36.902 --> 01:47:39.013
probably half a million Americans and

01:47:39.013 --> 01:47:41.180
they're killing still 50,000 Americans

01:47:41.180 --> 01:47:43.013
every year . They're a terrorist

01:47:43.013 --> 01:47:45.236
organization . They're right across the

01:47:45.236 --> 01:47:44.259
border . What are we doing about it ?

01:47:44.750 --> 01:47:46.759
Well , for the last two months that

01:47:46.759 --> 01:47:48.926
Northcom has had the mission , we've ,

01:47:48.926 --> 01:47:51.890
uh , uh , significantly increased , uh ,

01:47:51.910 --> 01:47:53.799
several hundredfold the amount of

01:47:53.799 --> 01:47:56.077
intelligence that we're gathering . Uh ,

01:47:56.077 --> 01:47:58.188
on the cartel members , and you think

01:47:58.188 --> 01:48:00.299
intelligence alone is gonna stop them

01:48:00.299 --> 01:48:02.188
from shipping fentanyl across the

01:48:02.188 --> 01:48:04.021
United States and killing 50,000

01:48:04.021 --> 01:48:06.188
Americans ? Well , I think it , it can

01:48:06.188 --> 01:48:08.299
not alone , no , sir , but I think it

01:48:08.299 --> 01:48:10.410
contributes to the other actions that

01:48:10.410 --> 01:48:12.632
we're taking that is stopping it at the

01:48:12.632 --> 01:48:12.589
borders and that's stopping it , uh ,

01:48:12.620 --> 01:48:15.149
from going . Ah , through the maritime ,

01:48:15.359 --> 01:48:17.581
do you think it's , ah , the duty , the

01:48:17.581 --> 01:48:19.415
number one duty of government to

01:48:19.415 --> 01:48:21.637
protect its citizens ? Yes sir , I do .

01:48:21.637 --> 01:48:21.120
And do you think we've been doing a

01:48:21.120 --> 01:48:23.287
really good job of protecting American

01:48:23.287 --> 01:48:25.342
citizens from the poison that's been

01:48:25.342 --> 01:48:27.453
flowing through the southern border ?

01:48:27.453 --> 01:48:27.419
Sir , I think we've been doing an

01:48:27.419 --> 01:48:30.029
increasingly better job uh since ,

01:48:30.299 --> 01:48:32.899
since we picked up this mission . Fair

01:48:32.899 --> 01:48:35.700
enough . Uh , I guess , uh , my time is

01:48:35.700 --> 01:48:37.660
up and now I recognize , uh , the

01:48:37.660 --> 01:48:39.493
gentleman from California , Mr .

01:48:39.493 --> 01:48:41.660
Cisneros , for 5 minutes . Thank you ,

01:48:41.660 --> 01:48:43.882
Mr . Chairman , and if I could just say

01:48:43.882 --> 01:48:46.049
the Department of Defense is not a law

01:48:46.049 --> 01:48:48.271
enforcement agency , nor should it ever

01:48:48.271 --> 01:48:50.438
become a law enforcement agency . Um ,

01:48:50.438 --> 01:48:52.660
that's not its purpose , that's not its

01:48:52.660 --> 01:48:54.882
mission , but with that , general , I'm

01:48:54.882 --> 01:48:54.779
gonna kinda change locations on you

01:48:54.779 --> 01:48:57.740
here a little bit . Um , I'm concerned

01:48:57.740 --> 01:48:59.851
about the accelerated rate of climate

01:48:59.851 --> 01:49:01.962
change and its impact on the Arctic .

01:49:01.990 --> 01:49:04.479
Um , the melting of the polar ice caps

01:49:04.479 --> 01:49:06.319
is creating , uh , an opening of

01:49:06.319 --> 01:49:08.541
ceilings up there . It's kind of making

01:49:08.541 --> 01:49:10.875
it quicker , easier path for , you know ,

01:49:11.049 --> 01:49:13.240
China shipping , China military , uh ,

01:49:13.250 --> 01:49:15.472
the Russians as well to kind of transit

01:49:15.472 --> 01:49:17.528
that way and with quicker access not

01:49:17.528 --> 01:49:19.750
only to Alaska but down into the , uh ,

01:49:19.799 --> 01:49:23.069
west coast of the United States . So

01:49:23.080 --> 01:49:24.913
with that , um , how is Northcon

01:49:24.913 --> 01:49:27.080
adapting , adapting to the operational

01:49:27.080 --> 01:49:29.080
strategies to address the increased

01:49:29.080 --> 01:49:31.191
security challenges among the PRC and

01:49:31.191 --> 01:49:33.413
Russia and really how is that impacting

01:49:33.413 --> 01:49:35.959
NORAD and their mission , um , as far

01:49:35.959 --> 01:49:37.839
as monitoring , uh , air patrols

01:49:37.839 --> 01:49:40.879
overseeing that area . And as far as

01:49:40.879 --> 01:49:43.046
the navy goes , is this something that

01:49:43.046 --> 01:49:45.212
we need to increase , start increasing

01:49:45.212 --> 01:49:47.439
other than submarines , naval patrols

01:49:47.439 --> 01:49:49.661
out there in that area as well in order

01:49:49.661 --> 01:49:51.772
to show the flag and show there and ,

01:49:51.772 --> 01:49:53.883
and not let them take over this , the

01:49:53.883 --> 01:49:55.828
shipping lanes . Congressman , the

01:49:55.828 --> 01:49:57.939
Arctic is extremely important to both

01:49:57.939 --> 01:50:00.106
NORAD and Northcom as it makes up over

01:50:00.106 --> 01:50:02.217
half of our area of operations . Uh ,

01:50:03.000 --> 01:50:05.167
excuse me . What we've seen over the ,

01:50:05.167 --> 01:50:07.479
the past year is unprecedented presence

01:50:07.479 --> 01:50:09.669
by the Chinese in the Arctic region .

01:50:09.879 --> 01:50:12.046
Uh , for the first time we had bombers

01:50:12.046 --> 01:50:14.157
that flew , uh , Chinese bombers that

01:50:14.157 --> 01:50:16.268
flew in , into the Arctic region in ,

01:50:16.268 --> 01:50:18.060
in , uh , July . Uh , that we

01:50:18.060 --> 01:50:20.060
intercepted and escorted out of the

01:50:20.060 --> 01:50:22.227
area , uh , but at the same time there

01:50:22.227 --> 01:50:24.393
was also the highest number of ships ,

01:50:24.393 --> 01:50:26.560
all dual use , uh , under the guise of

01:50:26.560 --> 01:50:28.671
being scientific but also certainly ,

01:50:28.671 --> 01:50:30.950
um , military purpose there to map out ,

01:50:31.220 --> 01:50:35.180
uh , we presume , uh , China's ability

01:50:35.180 --> 01:50:37.339
to operate , uh , both subsurface and

01:50:37.339 --> 01:50:39.561
on the . Surface in that region so it's

01:50:39.561 --> 01:50:41.728
a big concern . What we're doing about

01:50:41.728 --> 01:50:43.728
that is uh we're operating with the

01:50:43.728 --> 01:50:45.839
Canadian military , the Coast Guard ,

01:50:46.060 --> 01:50:48.540
and uh United States Pacific Command ,

01:50:48.810 --> 01:50:51.032
uh , to make sure that we have presence

01:50:51.032 --> 01:50:53.254
both on the surface and uh in the air ,

01:50:53.254 --> 01:50:55.540
uh , to monitor this uh this traffic

01:50:55.540 --> 01:50:57.959
and also we've also uh expanded . At

01:50:57.959 --> 01:51:00.700
our intelligence gathering with the uh

01:51:00.700 --> 01:51:03.240
other Arctic nations all of with the

01:51:03.240 --> 01:51:05.184
exception of Russia , all our NATO

01:51:05.184 --> 01:51:07.184
members , uh , to ensure that we're

01:51:07.184 --> 01:51:09.129
sharing information with the other

01:51:09.129 --> 01:51:11.680
seven Arctic nations on that . As far

01:51:11.680 --> 01:51:13.847
as naval forces go , is that something

01:51:13.847 --> 01:51:16.069
that we need to start seeing more naval

01:51:16.069 --> 01:51:18.236
ships in the region ? Do we need , you

01:51:18.236 --> 01:51:20.458
know , I'm a former Navy guy , Westpacs

01:51:20.458 --> 01:51:22.347
met cruises . Do we need to start

01:51:22.347 --> 01:51:24.970
having a . Uh , North Pole polar cruise

01:51:24.970 --> 01:51:27.850
now . I , I would like to see more , uh ,

01:51:27.930 --> 01:51:30.041
maritime presence , naval presence up

01:51:30.041 --> 01:51:32.263
there . Uh , I , I would point out that

01:51:32.263 --> 01:51:34.486
Admiral Paparo is , is , is very , uh ,

01:51:34.486 --> 01:51:37.169
helpful in , in sharing ships , uh , up

01:51:37.169 --> 01:51:39.280
there , but we could use more in that

01:51:39.280 --> 01:51:41.391
region as , you know , because of the

01:51:41.391 --> 01:51:43.558
strategic nature of that region , OK .

01:51:43.799 --> 01:51:46.529
And Admiral , um You know ,

01:51:46.799 --> 01:51:49.009
consideration for SOCOM , um , an

01:51:49.009 --> 01:51:50.953
increased US presence in South and

01:51:50.953 --> 01:51:53.009
Central America , it's no secret the

01:51:53.009 --> 01:51:55.120
region is expanding its ties with the

01:51:55.120 --> 01:51:57.287
PRC , uh , through the , uh , Belt and

01:51:57.287 --> 01:52:00.720
Road Initiative , so . Again , not a

01:52:00.720 --> 01:52:04.339
lot of assets in , in SOCOM , um , you

01:52:04.339 --> 01:52:06.339
know , again we do Westpacs , we do

01:52:06.620 --> 01:52:08.453
Mediterranean cruises , we don't

01:52:08.453 --> 01:52:10.676
typically go down there every once in a

01:52:10.676 --> 01:52:12.898
while . We'll send a ship down there to

01:52:12.898 --> 01:52:15.419
kind of show the flag , but , um , how

01:52:15.419 --> 01:52:17.530
do we partner with these countries to

01:52:17.530 --> 01:52:19.752
promote stability and do we need to see

01:52:19.752 --> 01:52:22.459
an increased naval presence in South

01:52:22.459 --> 01:52:24.660
America where maybe we now need to

01:52:24.660 --> 01:52:27.180
start considering um routine

01:52:27.180 --> 01:52:29.479
deployments down in the area . Uh ,

01:52:29.490 --> 01:52:31.712
100% , sir . We need more assets in the

01:52:31.712 --> 01:52:33.934
region . Again , I said before , I said

01:52:33.934 --> 01:52:35.712
in my statement , we need to be

01:52:35.712 --> 01:52:37.934
credible , present , and engaged . Uh ,

01:52:37.934 --> 01:52:39.823
presence means power . It sends a

01:52:39.823 --> 01:52:39.720
strong signal to our partners and

01:52:39.720 --> 01:52:41.839
allies and also it sends an even

01:52:41.839 --> 01:52:43.783
stronger signal to , uh , would-be

01:52:43.783 --> 01:52:45.783
adversaries , PRC , Russia , Iran .

01:52:45.783 --> 01:52:47.839
They have to see us and we must meet

01:52:47.839 --> 01:52:50.061
presence with presidents . So I'll take

01:52:50.061 --> 01:52:49.680
those ships from the , uh , Arctic and

01:52:49.680 --> 01:52:51.791
you bring them down to the Antarctica

01:52:51.791 --> 01:52:54.069
and I'll take them . Well , hey , look ,

01:52:54.140 --> 01:52:56.362
we need to do more to increase the size

01:52:56.362 --> 01:52:58.529
of our navy , um , but we need to have

01:52:58.529 --> 01:53:00.584
those ships kind of in those areas ,

01:53:00.584 --> 01:53:02.696
and I , I , I know the , uh , the big

01:53:02.696 --> 01:53:04.807
struggle with NorthCO and SouthCO has

01:53:04.807 --> 01:53:06.918
always been assets , um , but we need

01:53:06.918 --> 01:53:09.084
to figure out a way so that we can get

01:53:09.084 --> 01:53:10.918
the assets to you as well , um ,

01:53:10.918 --> 01:53:12.973
because those regions definitely are

01:53:12.973 --> 01:53:15.140
becoming more important and , um , you

01:53:15.140 --> 01:53:17.140
know , I'm willing to work with the

01:53:17.140 --> 01:53:17.020
administrations so we can do that and

01:53:17.020 --> 01:53:19.076
with that , Mr . Chairman , I yelled

01:53:19.076 --> 01:53:22.419
back my time . You

01:53:24.089 --> 01:53:26.089
Chair and I recognize the gentleman

01:53:26.089 --> 01:53:28.311
from Wisconsin , Mr . Van Orden . Thank

01:53:28.311 --> 01:53:30.367
you , Mr . Chairman . Uh , thank you

01:53:30.367 --> 01:53:32.367
all for coming . I'd like to give a

01:53:32.367 --> 01:53:34.533
shout out to my two e-dogs in the back

01:53:34.533 --> 01:53:36.589
there , Chief Master Sergeant Storms

01:53:36.589 --> 01:53:38.756
and Sergeant Major Rodriguez . Um , we

01:53:38.756 --> 01:53:40.811
know who's really running the show ,

01:53:40.811 --> 01:53:43.890
gentlemen . Um , I want to assuage some

01:53:43.890 --> 01:53:46.057
of the fears of my Democrat colleagues

01:53:46.057 --> 01:53:48.057
that are concerned about the Panama

01:53:48.057 --> 01:53:50.759
Canal and remind them that in 1956 when

01:53:50.759 --> 01:53:53.250
Gamal Abdel Nasser sees the Suez Canal ,

01:53:53.290 --> 01:53:55.512
the British and the French got together

01:53:55.512 --> 01:53:57.568
with the Israelis and they took that

01:53:57.568 --> 01:53:59.568
back and then the only way that was

01:53:59.568 --> 01:54:01.346
resolved is that there was a UN

01:54:01.346 --> 01:54:03.346
peacekeeping mission that took over

01:54:03.346 --> 01:54:05.600
security for the . Suez Canal in 1989

01:54:05.600 --> 01:54:09.270
when Manuel Noriega was acting up ,

01:54:09.479 --> 01:54:11.680
we did use military force to seize the

01:54:11.680 --> 01:54:13.847
Panama Canal in Operation Just Cause ,

01:54:14.279 --> 01:54:16.446
so there is precedent for this because

01:54:16.446 --> 01:54:19.080
those are the only two strategic canals

01:54:19.080 --> 01:54:22.160
on the entire planet . And if we need

01:54:22.160 --> 01:54:24.359
to act in the best interests of the

01:54:24.359 --> 01:54:26.415
United States as we have done in the

01:54:26.415 --> 01:54:28.415
past or our allies , we shall , and

01:54:28.415 --> 01:54:30.748
that should not be controversial at all ,

01:54:30.748 --> 01:54:33.250
um , General Godot , Godot correct ?

01:54:33.700 --> 01:54:36.319
Gio Gio , my bad . Sorry , hey , so the

01:54:36.319 --> 01:54:38.439
blimp thing in your testimony you

01:54:38.439 --> 01:54:41.569
mentioned . You

01:54:41.859 --> 01:54:45.700
mentioned the word . Um , you , you

01:54:45.700 --> 01:54:47.811
didn't mention balloon or dirigible .

01:54:49.509 --> 01:54:53.000
You mentioned UAS 17 times , Chinese

01:54:53.569 --> 01:54:56.209
3 times , China 7 times , but you never

01:54:56.209 --> 01:54:58.376
connected the dots between the Chinese

01:54:58.376 --> 01:55:01.600
balloon . Or Chinese UAS and so I'm

01:55:01.600 --> 01:55:05.359
gonna ask you , Mr . Leonardo has

01:55:05.359 --> 01:55:07.399
the Department of Defense given the

01:55:07.399 --> 01:55:10.140
general the authorities to shoot down

01:55:10.140 --> 01:55:13.549
anything that is up and around our

01:55:13.549 --> 01:55:15.327
sensitive military bases or the

01:55:15.327 --> 01:55:18.919
airspace of the United States , theseSs

01:55:18.919 --> 01:55:21.030
does he have to call you or can he do

01:55:21.030 --> 01:55:23.500
it himself ? Uh , congressman , thank

01:55:23.500 --> 01:55:25.500
you for that question . Um , as you

01:55:25.500 --> 01:55:27.500
know , it's , it's difficult in the

01:55:27.500 --> 01:55:29.667
homeland . Yes or no ? I , I don't , I

01:55:29.667 --> 01:55:31.889
had to take that question that specific

01:55:31.889 --> 01:55:31.459
question for the record , sir , so we

01:55:31.459 --> 01:55:33.459
need to have the authorities pushed

01:55:33.459 --> 01:55:35.570
down to the general , and the general

01:55:35.570 --> 01:55:35.390
needs to push it down to the person on

01:55:35.390 --> 01:55:37.557
the base . And when you mentioned that

01:55:37.557 --> 01:55:39.668
you don't have the capabilities , but

01:55:39.668 --> 01:55:39.580
you know you want to because of the

01:55:39.580 --> 01:55:41.524
procurement system , that's a real

01:55:41.524 --> 01:55:43.524
issue . It's been two years , so we

01:55:43.524 --> 01:55:45.747
have to learn , sir . I want you to not

01:55:45.747 --> 01:55:47.858
have to call him . And uh Pete Hegi ,

01:55:47.858 --> 01:55:50.080
who I trust explicitly , implicitly , I

01:55:50.080 --> 01:55:51.858
mean he's a great dude , but he

01:55:51.858 --> 01:55:53.969
shouldn't have to make that call . He

01:55:53.969 --> 01:55:56.136
shouldn't have to make that call , nor

01:55:56.136 --> 01:55:55.729
should you . I just wanna make sure

01:55:55.729 --> 01:55:57.785
that that is very clear , sir . I do

01:55:57.785 --> 01:55:59.840
have the authority to do right now ,

01:55:59.840 --> 01:56:02.118
you can , but you over an installation ,

01:56:02.118 --> 01:56:04.340
over an installation or a threat to the

01:56:04.340 --> 01:56:06.673
United States coming in , uh , you know ,

01:56:06.673 --> 01:56:08.896
from the outside . I have the authority

01:56:08.896 --> 01:56:08.839
to . It's a threat . It was a Chinese

01:56:08.839 --> 01:56:10.895
balloon and the Biden administration

01:56:10.895 --> 01:56:13.117
lied to every single person saying that

01:56:13.117 --> 01:56:15.339
they couldn't penetrate that stuff that

01:56:15.339 --> 01:56:17.561
we're blocking them . That's not true .

01:56:17.561 --> 01:56:17.279
You need proximity and unless a plane

01:56:17.279 --> 01:56:19.919
was flying with uh ECM jammers , that's

01:56:19.919 --> 01:56:21.919
not true . The Biden administration

01:56:21.919 --> 01:56:24.030
lied to everybody . I wanna make sure

01:56:24.030 --> 01:56:23.399
you can shoot down something over

01:56:23.399 --> 01:56:25.510
Canada . You can shoot down something

01:56:25.510 --> 01:56:27.566
over the United States . So I have 2

01:56:27.566 --> 01:56:29.879
minutes left . Admiral Halsey , holy

01:56:29.879 --> 01:56:32.000
beanbags . I would not want to have

01:56:32.000 --> 01:56:35.240
been Ensign Halsey in 1988 for Pete's

01:56:35.240 --> 01:56:37.184
sakes . You weren't even a tin can

01:56:37.184 --> 01:56:39.518
sailor , were you ? Did you get heavies ?

01:56:41.129 --> 01:56:43.240
Actually I started on frigates in the

01:56:43.240 --> 01:56:45.351
stores . OK , that's , it doesn't say

01:56:45.351 --> 01:56:47.573
destroyers , it says frigates in your ,

01:56:47.573 --> 01:56:49.629
uh , in your , um , bio here , sir .

01:56:49.629 --> 01:56:51.839
Hey , um , you said . In your estimate

01:56:52.069 --> 01:56:54.509
we can only interdict 10% of the things

01:56:54.509 --> 01:56:57.390
that we see , correct ? So 90% of the

01:56:57.390 --> 01:56:59.612
stuff that we're seeing that are people

01:56:59.612 --> 01:57:01.834
bringing this poison into the country ,

01:57:01.834 --> 01:57:03.946
90% is just gonna go because we don't

01:57:03.946 --> 01:57:06.279
have the ability to stop that , correct ?

01:57:06.279 --> 01:57:08.390
That's correct . OK and you said that

01:57:08.390 --> 01:57:10.668
the precursor chemicals go into Mexico ,

01:57:10.668 --> 01:57:12.723
correct ? Where did they come from ?

01:57:12.723 --> 01:57:14.946
China , uh-huh , OK , so let me ask you

01:57:14.946 --> 01:57:16.612
this question , sir . In your

01:57:16.612 --> 01:57:18.612
professional military opinion , put

01:57:18.612 --> 01:57:20.834
aside everything policy as an admiral ,

01:57:20.834 --> 01:57:23.168
if we just started killing these people .

01:57:23.839 --> 01:57:26.859
That are killing Americans 250,000 ,

01:57:26.870 --> 01:57:29.109
300,000 Americans about the amount of

01:57:29.109 --> 01:57:32.029
people that died in World War Two , why

01:57:32.029 --> 01:57:34.419
aren't we just killing these people ?

01:57:37.069 --> 01:57:39.069
Now are you talking about the ships

01:57:39.069 --> 01:57:41.236
coming across or are you talking about

01:57:41.236 --> 01:57:40.709
talking about the ships . I'm talking

01:57:40.709 --> 01:57:42.669
about these narco terrorists . Why

01:57:42.669 --> 01:57:44.836
aren't we just killing the people that

01:57:44.836 --> 01:57:46.780
are killing American citizens ? It

01:57:46.780 --> 01:57:49.740
makes absolutely no sense to me . Comes

01:57:49.740 --> 01:57:51.851
down to authorities . It's policy and

01:57:51.851 --> 01:57:53.851
authority , right ? OK , so in your

01:57:53.851 --> 01:57:55.962
professional military opinion , if we

01:57:55.962 --> 01:57:58.018
started killing narco terrorists and

01:57:58.018 --> 01:58:00.240
sinking Chinese ships that are bringing

01:58:00.240 --> 01:58:00.049
poison into the Western Hemisphere ,

01:58:00.180 --> 01:58:02.291
would that reduce the amount of stuff

01:58:02.291 --> 01:58:04.458
coming into the Western Hemisphere and

01:58:04.458 --> 01:58:06.624
reduce the amount of American citizens

01:58:06.624 --> 01:58:06.319
that are being poisoned to death ? Well ,

01:58:06.459 --> 01:58:08.237
just to be clear , professional

01:58:08.237 --> 01:58:10.292
military . Well , the ships that are

01:58:10.292 --> 01:58:12.237
come across are the , the way they

01:58:12.237 --> 01:58:14.459
bring across is legal , right ? So it's

01:58:14.459 --> 01:58:16.403
coming in illegal , the precursors

01:58:16.403 --> 01:58:18.459
can't do that . So is that a yes ? I

01:58:18.459 --> 01:58:20.348
have 10 seconds . General , if we

01:58:20.348 --> 01:58:19.529
started killing the people that are

01:58:19.529 --> 01:58:21.473
killing American citizens , do you

01:58:21.473 --> 01:58:23.585
think less American citizens would be

01:58:23.585 --> 01:58:25.473
killed by this poison ? No policy

01:58:25.473 --> 01:58:28.000
military . Well , I , I think if we

01:58:28.250 --> 01:58:30.361
aggressively stop them , it will , it

01:58:30.361 --> 01:58:32.583
will bring it down . Gentleman's time's

01:58:32.583 --> 01:58:34.583
expired . Chair and I recognize the

01:58:34.583 --> 01:58:36.417
gentle lady from Maryland , Miss

01:58:36.417 --> 01:58:38.583
Elfreth . Thank you , Mr . Chair , and

01:58:38.583 --> 01:58:40.806
my friend from California broke the ice

01:58:40.806 --> 01:58:40.700
for me a little bit , uh , talking

01:58:40.700 --> 01:58:42.922
about climate change and the impacts in

01:58:42.922 --> 01:58:44.867
the Arctic , particularly as we're

01:58:44.867 --> 01:58:46.867
seeing increased and frankly , very

01:58:46.867 --> 01:58:48.978
brazen presence from China and Russia

01:58:48.978 --> 01:58:51.759
into shipping lanes , um . I , I want

01:58:51.759 --> 01:58:54.092
to drill down on that just a little bit .

01:58:54.092 --> 01:58:56.259
This , as you know , this committee is

01:58:56.259 --> 01:58:56.240
very focused on acquisition reform ,

01:58:56.279 --> 01:58:58.223
but we're also gonna be focused on

01:58:58.223 --> 01:59:00.168
shipbuilding this year . I want to

01:59:00.168 --> 01:59:02.279
speak to or ask about a very specific

01:59:02.279 --> 01:59:04.168
type of ship icebreakers . And in

01:59:04.168 --> 01:59:06.168
general , you mentioned , uh , last

01:59:06.168 --> 01:59:08.335
year in front of Sask that the lack of

01:59:08.335 --> 01:59:10.501
icebreakers , it's my understanding we

01:59:10.501 --> 01:59:12.612
have two functional icebreakers , one

01:59:12.612 --> 01:59:14.668
of which might also be going down to

01:59:14.668 --> 01:59:16.890
Australia on occasion . Uh , that those

01:59:16.890 --> 01:59:19.001
lack of icebreakers limit our freedom

01:59:19.001 --> 01:59:21.223
of maneuver in that region . Since your

01:59:21.223 --> 01:59:23.446
statement last year , what actions have

01:59:23.446 --> 01:59:25.557
you taken to mitigate this , this gap

01:59:25.557 --> 01:59:29.089
in Arctic operations and have our

01:59:29.089 --> 01:59:31.649
allies help fill that gap since we are

01:59:31.649 --> 01:59:33.990
clearly , uh . Underperforming .

01:59:35.310 --> 01:59:37.310
Congresswoman , we are still , uh ,

01:59:37.310 --> 01:59:40.720
severely underperforming in , in , uh ,

01:59:40.729 --> 01:59:43.529
icebreakers . Uh , we work very closely

01:59:43.529 --> 01:59:45.251
with the Coast Guard to try to

01:59:45.251 --> 01:59:47.585
prioritize the Arctic region , and then ,

01:59:47.585 --> 01:59:49.729
uh , I've made proposals to see if we

01:59:49.729 --> 01:59:52.189
could contract , uh , the capability

01:59:52.189 --> 01:59:55.009
from , uh , Nordic states that produce

01:59:55.009 --> 01:59:56.640
those while we wait for the

01:59:56.640 --> 01:59:58.696
shipbuilding , uh , to , to catch up

01:59:58.696 --> 02:00:00.696
with the demand . OK , can you give

02:00:00.696 --> 02:00:02.862
this committee any type of timeline on

02:00:02.862 --> 02:00:05.540
those partnerships ? Uh , I , I

02:00:05.540 --> 02:00:07.979
personally can't . I , I'm , uh , I'm a

02:00:07.979 --> 02:00:10.035
recipient of this and so I hope it's

02:00:10.035 --> 02:00:12.257
very , I hope it's very soon . OK , but

02:00:12.257 --> 02:00:14.312
we agree that it's important for our

02:00:14.312 --> 02:00:16.479
national defense extremely important .

02:00:16.479 --> 02:00:18.479
Yes , ma'am . Thank you . And , and

02:00:18.479 --> 02:00:20.646
again , while we wait for shipbuilding

02:00:20.646 --> 02:00:20.500
to pick up as we wait for our partners

02:00:20.500 --> 02:00:23.459
to fill the gap , uh , we've also

02:00:23.459 --> 02:00:25.626
spoken about the importance of missile

02:00:25.626 --> 02:00:27.737
defense in the Arctic and , and our ,

02:00:27.737 --> 02:00:29.792
and our allies both in detection and

02:00:29.792 --> 02:00:31.681
and defense . Um , I'm new to the

02:00:31.681 --> 02:00:33.903
committee , but would it be fair to say

02:00:33.903 --> 02:00:36.126
that the importance of strong diplomacy

02:00:36.126 --> 02:00:38.319
and strategic allyship would not

02:00:38.319 --> 02:00:41.479
include threats of seizing a territory

02:00:41.479 --> 02:00:43.201
of an ally by military force ?

02:00:47.740 --> 02:00:50.240
I , I , I , I'm not trying to be cool

02:00:50.240 --> 02:00:52.296
here . I really don't understand the

02:00:52.296 --> 02:00:54.240
question . OK , so we are now in a

02:00:54.240 --> 02:00:56.790
position as a nation in which we are ,

02:00:57.250 --> 02:00:59.319
our leadership is threatening the

02:00:59.319 --> 02:01:01.640
territory of certain allies with the

02:01:01.640 --> 02:01:03.799
use of potential military force to

02:01:03.799 --> 02:01:07.479
seize that territory . My contention is

02:01:07.479 --> 02:01:10.279
that that is in direct contradiction of

02:01:10.279 --> 02:01:12.399
our ability to form strategic ally

02:01:12.399 --> 02:01:15.799
ships to the end of , of national

02:01:15.799 --> 02:01:19.629
security . Would

02:01:19.629 --> 02:01:22.069
you agree with that statement ? I agree

02:01:22.069 --> 02:01:25.209
in the importance of partnerships and

02:01:25.209 --> 02:01:27.410
building allies , uh , for a common

02:01:27.410 --> 02:01:30.569
defense given that , uh , the task that

02:01:30.569 --> 02:01:33.009
we face with the , uh , multiple

02:01:33.009 --> 02:01:35.680
threats , you know , 4 or 5 different ,

02:01:35.810 --> 02:01:37.866
uh , nation states that can threaten

02:01:37.866 --> 02:01:39.930
our , our country , uh , we need to

02:01:39.930 --> 02:01:42.097
handle it with partners we can't do it

02:01:42.097 --> 02:01:44.041
alone . And again , just putting a

02:01:44.041 --> 02:01:45.986
finer point on it when it comes to

02:01:45.986 --> 02:01:48.189
detection . Missile defense , but also

02:01:48.189 --> 02:01:50.189
these critical icebreakers as we're

02:01:50.189 --> 02:01:52.270
seeing ice then as we're seeing

02:01:52.709 --> 02:01:54.931
particularly post invasion of Ukraine ,

02:01:54.931 --> 02:01:56.910
a great Russian incursion into the

02:01:56.910 --> 02:01:59.270
Arctic , those strategic partnerships

02:01:59.270 --> 02:02:01.310
and i ships are have never been so

02:02:01.310 --> 02:02:03.254
important in that region . I would

02:02:03.254 --> 02:02:05.254
agree with everything that you just

02:02:05.254 --> 02:02:07.588
said , ma'am . OK , thank you very much ,

02:02:07.588 --> 02:02:09.643
Mr . Chair . I yield my time . Chair

02:02:09.643 --> 02:02:11.477
and I recognize a gentleman from

02:02:11.477 --> 02:02:13.588
Virginia , Mr . McGuire . Thank you ,

02:02:13.588 --> 02:02:15.588
Mr . Chairman and thank you for our

02:02:15.588 --> 02:02:17.921
witnesses for coming here today to , uh ,

02:02:17.921 --> 02:02:20.143
speak to the committee . Um , I believe

02:02:20.143 --> 02:02:19.770
that the number one priority , as

02:02:19.770 --> 02:02:21.992
President Trump has said , is to , uh ,

02:02:21.992 --> 02:02:24.214
protect the homeland , and , um , I , I

02:02:24.214 --> 02:02:26.381
have some , a bunch of questions , but

02:02:26.381 --> 02:02:28.437
we gotta have time to get them , and

02:02:28.437 --> 02:02:30.492
I'll ask each of you one at a time ,

02:02:30.492 --> 02:02:32.603
would you agree that China has , um ,

02:02:32.603 --> 02:02:34.850
more ability to attack the homeland

02:02:34.850 --> 02:02:37.419
today than they did 4 years ago ? We'll

02:02:37.419 --> 02:02:41.399
start with the admiral . Uh , yes . Yes ,

02:02:41.479 --> 02:02:44.750
they do , sir . Absolutely , yes ,

02:02:44.910 --> 02:02:47.029
Congressman , you know , I , uh , I

02:02:47.029 --> 02:02:49.140
recently , um , and we , by the way ,

02:02:49.140 --> 02:02:52.649
we need to have reliable allies , uh ,

02:02:52.990 --> 02:02:55.750
not reliant allies , and so , you know ,

02:02:55.910 --> 02:02:58.132
under President Reagan we were spending

02:02:58.132 --> 02:03:00.243
6% of our GDP on national defense and

02:03:00.243 --> 02:03:02.466
it's dwindled down close to 2% . And so

02:03:02.466 --> 02:03:04.299
I'm a big support at keeping the

02:03:04.299 --> 02:03:06.466
American people safe , and I think the

02:03:06.466 --> 02:03:08.688
decisions that President Trump has made

02:03:08.688 --> 02:03:10.743
has caused our allies to step up and

02:03:10.743 --> 02:03:12.743
actually be reliable partners , not

02:03:12.743 --> 02:03:14.854
reliant partners , and I think for us

02:03:14.854 --> 02:03:18.500
to deal with North Korea , Iran , uh ,

02:03:18.640 --> 02:03:20.859
China , Russia , we've got to

02:03:20.859 --> 02:03:22.970
strengthen those relationships and we

02:03:22.970 --> 02:03:25.137
can't do it alone and so I think we're

02:03:25.137 --> 02:03:27.303
moving in the right direction . um , I

02:03:27.303 --> 02:03:29.303
recently participate in a CODEL and

02:03:29.303 --> 02:03:31.359
SOCOM . And by the way , I served in

02:03:31.359 --> 02:03:33.526
the Navy SEALs . Most of my experience

02:03:33.526 --> 02:03:35.470
was SOCOM , and I learned that the

02:03:35.470 --> 02:03:37.526
cartels will watch cheat steal , and

02:03:37.526 --> 02:03:39.637
they will kill you to get their way ,

02:03:39.637 --> 02:03:41.859
and there is no way they're giving up a

02:03:41.859 --> 02:03:43.915
billion dollar business . Now , um ,

02:03:43.915 --> 02:03:45.970
when we were down at the border , we

02:03:45.970 --> 02:03:48.081
talked with the mayor , the sheriff ,

02:03:48.081 --> 02:03:49.970
business owners , we met with ICE

02:03:49.970 --> 02:03:52.081
agents , uh , border patrol , and the

02:03:52.081 --> 02:03:54.192
10th Mountain Division . And we asked

02:03:54.192 --> 02:03:55.970
them , you know , what are your

02:03:55.970 --> 02:03:55.839
concerns , what's going on ? and they

02:03:55.839 --> 02:03:57.895
said that on one particular Saturday

02:03:57.895 --> 02:04:00.229
border crossings were 0 compared to

02:04:00.229 --> 02:04:03.399
2000 crossings a year before . And so I

02:04:03.399 --> 02:04:05.566
think as I heard one of the uh members

02:04:05.566 --> 02:04:07.677
say is we didn't need new policies we

02:04:07.677 --> 02:04:09.843
needed a new president who was serious

02:04:09.843 --> 02:04:11.843
about protecting the homeland , but

02:04:11.843 --> 02:04:14.066
that being the case , what I heard from

02:04:14.066 --> 02:04:16.232
every one of those groups was they can

02:04:16.232 --> 02:04:20.040
see drones coming from . Uh , Mexico ,

02:04:20.120 --> 02:04:22.287
they can see where they're coming from

02:04:22.287 --> 02:04:24.453
and they're hovering around our border

02:04:24.453 --> 02:04:26.398
patrol vehicles . They're hovering

02:04:26.398 --> 02:04:28.564
around our military bases in general ,

02:04:28.564 --> 02:04:30.787
I heard you say that you had permission

02:04:30.787 --> 02:04:33.009
to shoot them down , but I spoke with 5

02:04:33.009 --> 02:04:35.231
different agencies and they all as of a

02:04:35.231 --> 02:04:35.200
couple of weeks ago said they were not

02:04:35.200 --> 02:04:38.319
sure , so it is not clear . So I'd like

02:04:38.319 --> 02:04:40.560
to hear what the answer is can they or

02:04:40.560 --> 02:04:42.727
can they not shoot these drones down ?

02:04:43.600 --> 02:04:46.540
They , when I said we could shoot them

02:04:46.540 --> 02:04:48.859
down , that's over an installation that

02:04:48.859 --> 02:04:52.379
is covered under 130i . The forces on

02:04:52.379 --> 02:04:55.009
the border at this time are not because

02:04:55.009 --> 02:04:57.176
they're they're mobile and so I've put

02:04:57.176 --> 02:05:00.020
in a request for 130 to be expanded to

02:05:00.020 --> 02:05:02.939
include uh US forces within 5 miles of

02:05:02.939 --> 02:05:05.050
the border . I understand where there

02:05:05.050 --> 02:05:07.106
are many ways to possibly solve this

02:05:07.106 --> 02:05:09.272
problem . We're looking at legislation

02:05:09.272 --> 02:05:08.979
that takes a different approach , but

02:05:08.979 --> 02:05:11.035
we'll talk about that later , but we

02:05:11.035 --> 02:05:13.090
should have had this settled 2 years

02:05:13.090 --> 02:05:15.035
ago . You basically there are many

02:05:15.035 --> 02:05:17.257
times in our history where our soldiers

02:05:17.299 --> 02:05:19.466
have been caught with their pants down

02:05:19.466 --> 02:05:21.632
and they're . Reactive not proactive ,

02:05:21.632 --> 02:05:23.632
and we should be able to detect and

02:05:23.632 --> 02:05:25.632
engage far before they get anywhere

02:05:25.632 --> 02:05:27.688
near our soldiers or installations .

02:05:27.688 --> 02:05:29.799
Let's talk about fentanyl . I call it

02:05:29.799 --> 02:05:31.910
Chinese chemical warfare . It's being

02:05:31.910 --> 02:05:31.814
produced in China , coming across our

02:05:31.814 --> 02:05:33.703
southern border and poisoning the

02:05:33.703 --> 02:05:35.814
American people . China believes that

02:05:35.814 --> 02:05:37.981
everything can be used as a weapon and

02:05:37.981 --> 02:05:40.147
should be used as a weapon . And if it

02:05:40.147 --> 02:05:42.640
were 10 people a year dying from

02:05:42.640 --> 02:05:44.418
fentanyl overdose , it would be

02:05:44.418 --> 02:05:46.529
egregious and I heard a member say it

02:05:46.529 --> 02:05:48.584
was 50,000 people , but I've heard a

02:05:48.584 --> 02:05:50.640
number of over 100,000 people a year

02:05:50.640 --> 02:05:52.862
dying from fentanyl poisoning and if we

02:05:52.862 --> 02:05:54.918
don't make a strong stance such as .

02:05:55.080 --> 02:05:57.191
Shoot the people that are bringing it

02:05:57.191 --> 02:05:59.080
over . If the penalty is not high

02:05:59.080 --> 02:06:01.247
enough , they could continue to poison

02:06:01.247 --> 02:06:01.120
us . Now you think about we've had

02:06:01.120 --> 02:06:03.359
skirmishes with adversaries in the

02:06:03.359 --> 02:06:05.526
history of our country where less than

02:06:05.526 --> 02:06:07.637
100,000 people died in the skirmish .

02:06:07.637 --> 02:06:09.748
And we are , I think we're at war and

02:06:09.748 --> 02:06:11.803
we don't wanna admit it and so we've

02:06:11.803 --> 02:06:13.915
got to do something about it . What ,

02:06:13.915 --> 02:06:16.137
how has I saw a video where the cartels

02:06:16.137 --> 02:06:18.410
undercover said that they were actually

02:06:18.410 --> 02:06:20.299
using the northern coming through

02:06:20.299 --> 02:06:22.521
Canada trying to get the fentanyl in is

02:06:22.521 --> 02:06:24.743
that true or false and what can we do ?

02:06:25.990 --> 02:06:28.399
Sir , it is true that they use uh

02:06:28.399 --> 02:06:30.790
avenues other than the South , uh come

02:06:30.790 --> 02:06:32.790
to the north , uh comes through the

02:06:32.790 --> 02:06:34.846
mail , comes through uh all sorts of

02:06:34.846 --> 02:06:37.899
different uh mechanisms to get into the

02:06:37.899 --> 02:06:40.799
uh United States . What can we do as a

02:06:40.799 --> 02:06:42.779
Congress to help you logistically

02:06:43.200 --> 02:06:45.759
better protect our homeland and make

02:06:45.759 --> 02:06:47.592
sure that if we're gonna put our

02:06:47.592 --> 02:06:49.759
soldiers and assets on the border that

02:06:49.759 --> 02:06:52.589
they are safe and they are proactive ,

02:06:52.600 --> 02:06:54.711
so they got a better chance of coming

02:06:54.711 --> 02:06:57.160
home . So , the first , uh , request I

02:06:57.160 --> 02:06:59.779
would have would be to uh expand the

02:06:59.779 --> 02:07:03.379
130I so we can shoot down drones not

02:07:03.379 --> 02:07:05.268
just that are in self-defense but

02:07:05.268 --> 02:07:07.546
anything that's surveilling , planning ,

02:07:07.546 --> 02:07:09.657
uh , planning the next attack on us ,

02:07:09.729 --> 02:07:11.729
uh , within 5 miles of the border .

02:07:12.379 --> 02:07:14.490
Thank you . I yell back . Gentlemen ,

02:07:14.490 --> 02:07:16.546
yells back , Chair , and I recognize

02:07:16.546 --> 02:07:18.601
the gentleman from California , Mr .

02:07:18.601 --> 02:07:20.879
Whitesides . Thank you , Mr . Chairman ,

02:07:20.879 --> 02:07:22.990
um , and thank you all for being here

02:07:22.990 --> 02:07:25.189
today . Uh , this is a time with novel

02:07:25.189 --> 02:07:27.189
challenges in these AORs , and your

02:07:27.189 --> 02:07:29.411
testimony is very timely . I know there

02:07:29.411 --> 02:07:31.578
has been a lot of discussion on moving

02:07:31.578 --> 02:07:33.689
sensing missions to space , namely to

02:07:33.689 --> 02:07:35.411
be put into a proliferated Leo

02:07:35.411 --> 02:07:37.578
constellations . Most of my career has

02:07:37.578 --> 02:07:39.745
been focused on securing US leadership

02:07:39.745 --> 02:07:41.911
in space , both from an economic and a

02:07:41.911 --> 02:07:43.967
national security perspective . With

02:07:43.967 --> 02:07:46.189
that in mind , I would not be the first

02:07:46.189 --> 02:07:48.245
to say that space-based sensing is a

02:07:48.245 --> 02:07:50.522
vital part of our sensing capabilities .

02:07:50.522 --> 02:07:52.633
But not the only part . I'm concerned

02:07:52.633 --> 02:07:54.633
that recent reports of novel weapon

02:07:54.633 --> 02:07:56.745
systems being placed into orbit could

02:07:56.745 --> 02:07:58.800
result in a strategic surprise if we

02:07:58.800 --> 02:08:00.856
don't have redundancy across domains

02:08:00.856 --> 02:08:02.689
when it comes to sensing air and

02:08:02.689 --> 02:08:04.911
missile threats . General Gio , can you

02:08:04.911 --> 02:08:07.133
share your view of the appropriate role

02:08:07.133 --> 02:08:09.189
and relationship between space-based

02:08:09.189 --> 02:08:11.300
sensing capabilities and the need for

02:08:11.300 --> 02:08:13.411
sensing redundancies across domains ?

02:08:14.250 --> 02:08:16.629
Congressman , uh , I do , uh , I'm very

02:08:16.629 --> 02:08:18.796
encouraged by the increased capability

02:08:18.796 --> 02:08:20.907
that space brings us and sensors from

02:08:20.907 --> 02:08:23.073
there , uh , but I've always advocated

02:08:23.073 --> 02:08:25.185
for a layered approach that goes from

02:08:25.185 --> 02:08:27.351
the undersea , the , uh , land , air ,

02:08:27.351 --> 02:08:29.573
and space to ensure that we aren't over

02:08:29.573 --> 02:08:31.729
reliant on one , domain , and we can

02:08:31.729 --> 02:08:34.049
layer the approach for detecting , uh ,

02:08:34.089 --> 02:08:35.978
threats to the continental United

02:08:35.978 --> 02:08:38.270
States . Thank you so much . Now , as

02:08:38.270 --> 02:08:40.326
we all know , NORHCOM's AOR has seen

02:08:40.326 --> 02:08:42.548
increased threats not only from foreign

02:08:42.548 --> 02:08:44.714
adversaries but from natural disasters

02:08:44.714 --> 02:08:46.603
like wildfires , hurricanes , and

02:08:46.603 --> 02:08:48.437
floods . It's no secret that the

02:08:48.437 --> 02:08:50.659
increased cadence and severity of these

02:08:50.659 --> 02:08:52.826
disasters pose a serious threat to our

02:08:52.826 --> 02:08:55.048
Kona military installations . Readiness

02:08:55.048 --> 02:08:57.270
into our homeland itself , uh , General

02:08:57.270 --> 02:08:59.492
Gio and Admiral , uh , can you speak to

02:08:59.492 --> 02:09:01.603
the utility of , to the extent , uh ,

02:09:01.603 --> 02:09:03.770
you can , can you speak to the utility

02:09:03.770 --> 02:09:05.714
of the National Guard's fire guard

02:09:05.714 --> 02:09:07.770
program which uses satellite sensing

02:09:07.770 --> 02:09:09.937
capabilities for near term , uh , near

02:09:09.937 --> 02:09:11.937
real time wildfire intelligence not

02:09:11.937 --> 02:09:13.826
only as a means of protecting our

02:09:13.826 --> 02:09:13.765
constituents but of safeguarding our

02:09:13.765 --> 02:09:15.805
ability to effectively protect our

02:09:15.805 --> 02:09:18.660
homeland . Sir , I can tell you that

02:09:18.669 --> 02:09:20.836
that system is , uh , of great benefit

02:09:20.836 --> 02:09:24.589
to us as we hit the ever expanding , uh ,

02:09:24.600 --> 02:09:27.250
wildfire season , uh , used to be more ,

02:09:27.290 --> 02:09:29.457
uh , closely defined . Now it's almost

02:09:29.457 --> 02:09:31.623
year round as we saw , you know , with

02:09:31.623 --> 02:09:35.049
the tragic fires and , uh . In Southern

02:09:35.049 --> 02:09:37.105
California earlier this year , so we

02:09:37.105 --> 02:09:39.689
use that and we know , uh , based on

02:09:39.689 --> 02:09:41.911
what we're seeing through those sensors

02:09:41.911 --> 02:09:43.856
where we might need to provide DOD

02:09:43.856 --> 02:09:47.399
assistance to NISI and uh others uh if

02:09:47.399 --> 02:09:51.129
it exceeds their capacity . Um ,

02:09:51.399 --> 02:09:53.830
uh , you get huge points for Noah Nsy

02:09:53.830 --> 02:09:56.163
and all that , so thank you so much for ,

02:09:56.163 --> 02:09:58.163
for your comments on that . I think

02:09:58.163 --> 02:09:58.029
it's a very important thing and I would

02:09:58.029 --> 02:09:59.990
love to work with you , um , as we

02:09:59.990 --> 02:10:02.268
think about those things in the future .

02:10:02.268 --> 02:10:04.660
Um , I just close with a , a tough one ,

02:10:04.669 --> 02:10:06.891
and maybe it's more of a statement than

02:10:06.891 --> 02:10:09.113
a than a comment , and I know it's been

02:10:09.113 --> 02:10:09.069
addressed here , uh , extensively

02:10:09.069 --> 02:10:11.291
already , but I think the recent quotes

02:10:11.291 --> 02:10:13.458
of the Prime Minister of Canada . Uh ,

02:10:13.490 --> 02:10:15.601
who said it's clear that the US is no

02:10:15.601 --> 02:10:17.434
longer a reliable partner . It's

02:10:17.434 --> 02:10:18.990
possible with comprehensive

02:10:18.990 --> 02:10:21.046
negotiations we could reestablish an

02:10:21.046 --> 02:10:23.212
element of confidence , but there will

02:10:23.212 --> 02:10:23.200
be no going backwards . The old

02:10:23.200 --> 02:10:25.200
relationship we had with the United

02:10:25.200 --> 02:10:27.311
States based on deepening integration

02:10:27.311 --> 02:10:29.533
of our economies and tight security and

02:10:29.533 --> 02:10:31.700
military cooperation is over , he said

02:10:31.700 --> 02:10:33.700
that's the Prime Minister of Canada

02:10:33.700 --> 02:10:35.867
said that how does this posture impact

02:10:35.867 --> 02:10:37.756
your ability to defend the United

02:10:37.756 --> 02:10:39.811
States from threats conveyed through

02:10:39.811 --> 02:10:41.589
the Arctic and through other uh

02:10:41.589 --> 02:10:44.459
Northern territories . Congressman ,

02:10:44.520 --> 02:10:48.290
we've been fortunate that the uh . The

02:10:48.290 --> 02:10:50.457
military to military relationship with

02:10:50.457 --> 02:10:52.401
Canada , uh , primarily in NORAD ,

02:10:52.401 --> 02:10:54.457
which is a binational command , uh ,

02:10:54.770 --> 02:10:57.990
has , has been as strong as ever , uh ,

02:10:58.089 --> 02:11:00.311
over the recent months , uh , and we're

02:11:00.311 --> 02:11:02.256
all dedicated to detecting air and

02:11:02.256 --> 02:11:04.089
maritime threats and , and , and

02:11:04.089 --> 02:11:05.978
ensuring that we can defeat those

02:11:05.978 --> 02:11:08.033
threats , uh , to protect the US and

02:11:08.033 --> 02:11:10.145
Canada . And , and so I have not seen

02:11:10.145 --> 02:11:13.169
any um negative ramifications , uh , at

02:11:13.169 --> 02:11:15.580
the military to military level . Thank

02:11:15.580 --> 02:11:17.802
you , sir . I yield back my time , Mr .

02:11:17.859 --> 02:11:19.915
Chairman . Gentlemen , yields back ,

02:11:19.915 --> 02:11:21.748
and I recognize a gentleman from

02:11:21.748 --> 02:11:23.748
Indiana , Mr . Mesmer . Thank you ,

02:11:23.748 --> 02:11:25.915
Chairman . Uh , General Gio , I'd like

02:11:25.915 --> 02:11:27.970
to follow up on a question , uh , my

02:11:27.970 --> 02:11:29.915
colleague asked earlier about your

02:11:29.915 --> 02:11:31.970
testimony that in 2024 , the Russian

02:11:31.970 --> 02:11:33.748
Navy part partook in a training

02:11:33.748 --> 02:11:35.581
exercise with their submarines ,

02:11:35.581 --> 02:11:37.803
nuclear subs in in the Atlantic Ocean .

02:11:37.803 --> 02:11:39.581
If these will become more of an

02:11:39.581 --> 02:11:41.803
occurrence , would you continue to task

02:11:41.803 --> 02:11:41.620
the navy with the same tempo of

02:11:41.620 --> 02:11:43.899
material time and manpower , uh , for

02:11:43.899 --> 02:11:45.899
all future Russian vessel visits in

02:11:45.899 --> 02:11:49.049
your area of responsibility ? Sir ,

02:11:49.250 --> 02:11:51.361
depending on the type of uh vessels ,

02:11:51.361 --> 02:11:54.830
uh , yes , OK , thank you . Um , also

02:11:54.830 --> 02:11:56.997
in your testimony , you mentioned that

02:11:56.997 --> 02:11:59.163
air missile air missile threats to the

02:11:59.163 --> 02:12:01.108
United States from our adversaries

02:12:01.108 --> 02:12:03.274
continue to mount as North Korea tests

02:12:03.274 --> 02:12:05.386
ICBMs , Russia and China expand their

02:12:05.386 --> 02:12:07.608
stockpiles of long range missiles . One

02:12:07.608 --> 02:12:09.663
program that falls on the Northcom's

02:12:09.663 --> 02:12:11.719
purview of current activities is the

02:12:11.719 --> 02:12:13.663
next generation interceptor . Your

02:12:13.663 --> 02:12:15.552
testimony states that it's a high

02:12:15.552 --> 02:12:17.386
priority for NorthCO to have the

02:12:17.386 --> 02:12:19.552
on-time fielding of this interceptor .

02:12:19.552 --> 02:12:21.719
Uh , what would be the implications if

02:12:21.719 --> 02:12:24.052
fielding this system were to be delayed ,

02:12:24.052 --> 02:12:23.620
Congressman , if the , uh , fielding of

02:12:23.620 --> 02:12:25.379
the NGI or the next generation

02:12:25.379 --> 02:12:27.601
interceptor were delayed , we would run

02:12:27.601 --> 02:12:29.768
the risk of falling behind our ability

02:12:29.768 --> 02:12:33.250
to defeat any rogue nation , uh , ICBM

02:12:33.250 --> 02:12:35.250
that were that threatens the United

02:12:35.250 --> 02:12:37.528
States . Thank you . Uh , additionally ,

02:12:37.600 --> 02:12:39.822
ground-based interceptors are dedicated

02:12:39.822 --> 02:12:41.989
to defending against threats that come

02:12:41.989 --> 02:12:43.933
from places such as Iran and North

02:12:43.933 --> 02:12:45.989
Korea due to increasing threats from

02:12:45.989 --> 02:12:47.989
other adversaries such as China and

02:12:47.989 --> 02:12:50.156
Russia . Should policies be changed to

02:12:50.156 --> 02:12:52.378
allow for defense defense against those

02:12:52.378 --> 02:12:54.378
countries as well , Congressman , I

02:12:54.378 --> 02:12:54.200
think that we should always look at our

02:12:54.200 --> 02:12:56.839
policies and , and , uh , while they've

02:12:56.839 --> 02:12:59.006
served us well to this point , I think

02:12:59.006 --> 02:13:01.339
we should look at them against the , uh ,

02:13:01.339 --> 02:13:03.395
current and expected threat and make

02:13:03.395 --> 02:13:05.728
sure that the policies are aligned . OK ,

02:13:05.728 --> 02:13:07.839
thank you , um . Those interceptors ,

02:13:07.839 --> 02:13:09.895
uh , only are only effective against

02:13:09.895 --> 02:13:12.061
ballistic threats given your testimony

02:13:12.061 --> 02:13:14.283
about increasing hypersonic threat . Do

02:13:14.283 --> 02:13:16.061
you think the president needs a

02:13:16.061 --> 02:13:17.728
space-based interceptor to to

02:13:17.728 --> 02:13:19.839
effectively , effectively counter our

02:13:19.839 --> 02:13:21.819
adversaries ? Sir , I think , uh ,

02:13:21.830 --> 02:13:23.886
similar to the answer I just gave on

02:13:23.886 --> 02:13:25.941
detecting , I think having a layered

02:13:25.941 --> 02:13:28.108
approach , uh , with both , uh , space

02:13:28.108 --> 02:13:29.886
and , uh , ground base would be

02:13:29.886 --> 02:13:31.830
effective . And then also , as you

02:13:31.830 --> 02:13:34.052
mentioned , hypersonics , the fact that

02:13:34.052 --> 02:13:36.163
they can maneuver and game means that

02:13:36.163 --> 02:13:38.219
we need to invest in capabilities to

02:13:38.219 --> 02:13:40.163
defeat that threat , which is very

02:13:40.163 --> 02:13:39.979
different from a ballistic threat .

02:13:40.470 --> 02:13:44.299
Thank you . Uh , Admiral

02:13:44.299 --> 02:13:46.466
Halsey , over the past several years ,

02:13:46.466 --> 02:13:48.859
China has , uh , made worrying advances

02:13:48.859 --> 02:13:50.970
in building influence with militaries

02:13:50.970 --> 02:13:52.970
within our hemisphere . Beijing has

02:13:52.970 --> 02:13:54.859
bolstered its equipment sales and

02:13:54.859 --> 02:13:57.081
donations and offer attractive training

02:13:57.081 --> 02:13:59.299
and exchange opportunities , uh , to

02:13:59.299 --> 02:14:01.560
regional militaries . As this has

02:14:01.560 --> 02:14:03.782
happened , the US has placed increasing

02:14:03.782 --> 02:14:05.393
restrictions on its military

02:14:05.393 --> 02:14:07.393
cooperation and reduced its overall

02:14:07.393 --> 02:14:09.616
offering to Latin American militaries .

02:14:09.616 --> 02:14:11.782
Uh , what is SOCOM doing differently ,

02:14:11.782 --> 02:14:14.004
differently this year and going forward

02:14:14.004 --> 02:14:16.116
to respond to this worrying dynamic ?

02:14:18.020 --> 02:14:19.853
So that's a very uh , uh , great

02:14:19.853 --> 02:14:21.964
question . As I look at the region in

02:14:21.964 --> 02:14:23.964
general , I try to reach out to our

02:14:23.964 --> 02:14:26.076
partners and meet them where they are

02:14:26.076 --> 02:14:28.242
and ask them what is it that they need

02:14:28.242 --> 02:14:27.919
time and time again , security

02:14:27.919 --> 02:14:29.863
cooperation at the very top , uh ,

02:14:29.863 --> 02:14:32.299
maritime domain awareness , uh , cyber

02:14:32.299 --> 02:14:34.466
support , space support . So right now

02:14:34.466 --> 02:14:36.632
we're trying to meet them right and in

02:14:36.632 --> 02:14:38.466
fact I look at just from a cyber

02:14:38.466 --> 02:14:38.379
standpoint we've been able to work with

02:14:38.379 --> 02:14:40.546
our partners , specifically Paraguay .

02:14:40.546 --> 02:14:42.768
And Costa Rica and others in the region

02:14:42.768 --> 02:14:45.046
to help build their cyber capabilities .

02:14:45.046 --> 02:14:47.101
That's one of the key things they're

02:14:47.101 --> 02:14:48.990
asking , uh , in Canada in , uh ,

02:14:48.990 --> 02:14:48.629
Colombia right now . Our partners ask

02:14:48.629 --> 02:14:50.680
for counter US technology . Uh ,

02:14:50.770 --> 02:14:52.839
they're learning lessons that FARC ,

02:14:52.890 --> 02:14:55.410
EPLN learning lessons from Ukraine and

02:14:55.410 --> 02:14:57.930
using basic rudimentary , uh , UAVs to

02:14:57.930 --> 02:15:00.152
attack our partners . So again , trying

02:15:00.152 --> 02:15:02.041
to meet them where they're at and

02:15:02.041 --> 02:15:01.970
deliver at the point of , point of need .

02:15:02.169 --> 02:15:04.169
OK , um , our current resource

02:15:04.169 --> 02:15:06.649
allotments for SOCOM sufficient to , to

02:15:06.649 --> 02:15:09.089
accomplish this ? Uh , no . OK , thank

02:15:09.089 --> 02:15:11.899
you . Um , also , uh , today the US

02:15:11.899 --> 02:15:13.788
military has nearly 40 bases with

02:15:13.788 --> 02:15:16.060
100,000 troops across Europe . By

02:15:16.060 --> 02:15:18.171
contrast , the US has only 2 military

02:15:18.171 --> 02:15:20.116
bases in Latin America and none in

02:15:20.116 --> 02:15:22.430
South America . At the same time , uh

02:15:22.430 --> 02:15:24.263
Beijing is ramped up , uh , it's

02:15:24.263 --> 02:15:26.319
increasingly militarized presence in

02:15:26.319 --> 02:15:28.486
Latin America , including through dual

02:15:28.486 --> 02:15:30.597
use infrastructure , uh , that can be

02:15:30.597 --> 02:15:32.990
used easily to target the US or disrupt

02:15:32.990 --> 02:15:35.220
uh critical uh supply chains such as

02:15:35.220 --> 02:15:37.540
the Panama Canal . Uh , the US also

02:15:37.540 --> 02:15:39.596
faces deadly threats from within our

02:15:39.596 --> 02:15:41.429
hemisphere from drug cartels and

02:15:41.429 --> 02:15:43.540
weaponized mass migration , that

02:15:43.540 --> 02:15:46.209
increasingly require , uh , central , a

02:15:46.209 --> 02:15:48.153
central role for the US military ,

02:15:48.153 --> 02:15:50.549
given all this . Is it appropriate and

02:15:50.549 --> 02:15:52.605
sufficient for the US to have such a

02:15:52.605 --> 02:15:54.716
limited operational presence presence

02:15:54.716 --> 02:15:56.827
so close to home ? No , Congressman ,

02:15:56.827 --> 02:15:59.020
we need to , we need to increase our

02:15:59.020 --> 02:16:01.669
ability to engage and respond again ,

02:16:01.830 --> 02:16:04.052
credible president engage more assets ,

02:16:04.069 --> 02:16:06.069
again that tells a strong , sends a

02:16:06.069 --> 02:16:08.013
strong signal to our partners that

02:16:08.013 --> 02:16:10.125
we're there with them , and we're not

02:16:10.125 --> 02:16:10.100
doing that now . Thank you . I yield

02:16:10.100 --> 02:16:13.700
back my time . Jimmy's back . Chair and

02:16:13.700 --> 02:16:15.756
I recognize the gentle lady from New

02:16:15.756 --> 02:16:18.089
Hampshire , Ms . Goodlander . Thank you ,

02:16:18.089 --> 02:16:20.033
Mr . Chairman and thank you to our

02:16:20.033 --> 02:16:22.033
witnesses for being here today . My

02:16:22.033 --> 02:16:24.319
home state , New Hampshire shares a 58

02:16:24.319 --> 02:16:27.149
mile border with Canada . Um , it's a

02:16:27.149 --> 02:16:29.205
border that's been peaceful . It's a

02:16:29.205 --> 02:16:31.482
relationship as you have all testified ,

02:16:31.482 --> 02:16:33.538
that is really important to American

02:16:33.538 --> 02:16:35.371
national security . Um , Winston

02:16:35.371 --> 02:16:37.260
Churchill said that it's , it's a

02:16:37.260 --> 02:16:39.371
border that has been peaceful because

02:16:39.371 --> 02:16:41.538
it's guarded by our neighborly respect

02:16:41.538 --> 02:16:43.371
and honorable obligations to one

02:16:43.371 --> 02:16:45.593
another . General , starting with you ,

02:16:45.593 --> 02:16:45.499
could you tell us why does the

02:16:45.499 --> 02:16:47.666
relationship between the United States

02:16:47.666 --> 02:16:51.179
and Canada matter ? Uh , congresswoman ,

02:16:51.219 --> 02:16:53.330
from my perspective , it's because we

02:16:53.330 --> 02:16:55.570
are part of a binational command in

02:16:55.570 --> 02:16:59.209
NORAD , um , and we , we share

02:16:59.209 --> 02:17:02.730
the strong and important burden of

02:17:02.730 --> 02:17:05.700
defending , uh . Canada and the United

02:17:05.700 --> 02:17:07.980
States against air and maritime threats

02:17:07.980 --> 02:17:10.339
and it's that's built on capability and

02:17:10.339 --> 02:17:12.700
trust . So the North American Aerospace

02:17:12.700 --> 02:17:14.500
Defense Command NORAD , you you

02:17:14.500 --> 02:17:16.290
mentioned it's the world's only

02:17:16.290 --> 02:17:18.512
binational command . What would it mean

02:17:18.512 --> 02:17:20.401
for American national security if

02:17:20.401 --> 02:17:22.123
Canada were to pull out of its

02:17:22.123 --> 02:17:24.346
cooperation with our country in NORAD ?

02:17:24.919 --> 02:17:27.086
Well we'd have to fundamentally change

02:17:27.086 --> 02:17:28.975
how we approached air defense and

02:17:28.975 --> 02:17:31.141
maritime warning , uh , because of the

02:17:31.141 --> 02:17:33.308
shared and distributed nature of the ,

02:17:33.308 --> 02:17:35.475
of the command and it's , uh , and its

02:17:35.475 --> 02:17:38.759
capabilities today . And how would you

02:17:38.759 --> 02:17:40.870
go about doing that ? What would that

02:17:40.870 --> 02:17:43.548
require ? Well , to be honest , I

02:17:43.548 --> 02:17:45.715
haven't put , uh , thought to it , but

02:17:45.715 --> 02:17:47.881
obviously resources , we would need uh

02:17:47.881 --> 02:17:49.937
additional radar coverage . We would

02:17:49.937 --> 02:17:51.937
need additional aircraft and , uh ,

02:17:51.937 --> 02:17:53.992
maritime assets to cover , uh , what

02:17:53.992 --> 02:17:56.669
Canada provides today . You mentioned

02:17:56.669 --> 02:17:58.990
air and maritime cooperation . What

02:17:58.990 --> 02:18:01.101
about land cooperation ? What , where

02:18:01.101 --> 02:18:03.530
has in your assessment , where have our

02:18:03.530 --> 02:18:05.709
Canadian partners fallen short with

02:18:05.709 --> 02:18:07.931
respect to the security of our homeland

02:18:07.931 --> 02:18:09.820
and our border security along our

02:18:09.820 --> 02:18:13.570
northern border ? Well , the , uh , as

02:18:13.570 --> 02:18:17.179
we look at securing the borders and

02:18:17.179 --> 02:18:19.410
having a territorial integrity , I have

02:18:19.410 --> 02:18:21.354
talked to with the uh chief of the

02:18:21.354 --> 02:18:23.577
defense staff , uh , General Catignon ,

02:18:23.577 --> 02:18:25.521
about , uh , the potential that we

02:18:25.521 --> 02:18:28.440
would look at , uh , looking to seal

02:18:28.440 --> 02:18:30.690
the north border . Uh , they have a

02:18:30.690 --> 02:18:32.857
system similar to ours where they have

02:18:32.857 --> 02:18:34.523
a government but non-military

02:18:34.523 --> 02:18:36.857
capability that's augmented by military .

02:18:36.857 --> 02:18:38.746
Uh , while we haven't started any

02:18:38.746 --> 02:18:40.579
planning , we recognize that any

02:18:40.579 --> 02:18:42.634
planning to seal the northern border

02:18:42.634 --> 02:18:45.249
would be done jointly . Is there a

02:18:45.249 --> 02:18:47.360
national security crisis ? Is there a

02:18:47.360 --> 02:18:49.305
national emergency at our northern

02:18:49.305 --> 02:18:51.416
border right now ? There has not been

02:18:51.416 --> 02:18:53.471
one established , uh , although it's

02:18:53.471 --> 02:18:55.693
something that we watch closely to , to

02:18:55.768 --> 02:18:58.088
watch , you know , both borders to see

02:18:58.088 --> 02:18:59.921
what's coming across in terms of

02:18:59.921 --> 02:19:02.449
illegal migration or illegal drugs or

02:19:02.449 --> 02:19:05.319
other illegal activities . So to be

02:19:05.319 --> 02:19:07.486
clear , as as you see it , there is no

02:19:07.486 --> 02:19:09.430
national emergency at our northern

02:19:09.430 --> 02:19:11.860
border . Well I think there's , uh , I ,

02:19:11.940 --> 02:19:13.996
I don't wanna get into semantics . A

02:19:13.996 --> 02:19:15.773
national emergency has not been

02:19:15.773 --> 02:19:17.996
declared on the northern border like it

02:19:17.996 --> 02:19:20.218
was on the southern border , uh , but I

02:19:20.218 --> 02:19:22.440
do think that we need to look at all of

02:19:22.440 --> 02:19:22.379
our borders and the security of them

02:19:22.379 --> 02:19:25.689
with a high level of urgency . So is a

02:19:25.689 --> 02:19:27.800
trade war with Canada justified right

02:19:27.800 --> 02:19:29.800
now based on your assessment of our

02:19:29.800 --> 02:19:32.022
security at our northern border ? Man ,

02:19:32.022 --> 02:19:34.245
that's not my place to answer . I can ,

02:19:34.245 --> 02:19:36.189
I can tell you on the mill to mill

02:19:36.189 --> 02:19:38.078
relationship , which , which I've

02:19:38.078 --> 02:19:40.189
stated is very strong with Canada and

02:19:40.189 --> 02:19:42.022
their strong partners in NORAD .

02:19:42.022 --> 02:19:44.245
Suppose a trade war will have an impact

02:19:44.245 --> 02:19:46.356
on our mill to mill relationship with

02:19:46.356 --> 02:19:49.200
Canada . Would it be justified ? Ma'am ,

02:19:49.269 --> 02:19:51.436
that's a hypothetical that I don't , I

02:19:51.436 --> 02:19:53.436
don't think I should address . I do

02:19:53.750 --> 02:19:56.230
think that the , um , again , that this

02:19:56.230 --> 02:19:57.990
relationship in NORAD with the

02:19:57.990 --> 02:20:00.580
Canadians is very strong , and , uh ,

02:20:00.589 --> 02:20:03.769
my goal is to keep it strong . General

02:20:03.769 --> 02:20:05.991
Admiral , I wanna ask you , uh , you've

02:20:05.991 --> 02:20:07.825
both served our country well and

02:20:07.825 --> 02:20:10.830
faithfully for many years . What is the

02:20:10.830 --> 02:20:14.389
role of military lawyers in in our

02:20:14.389 --> 02:20:16.549
national security and and in having a

02:20:16.549 --> 02:20:18.660
military that operates under the rule

02:20:18.660 --> 02:20:20.493
of law , Admiral , have military

02:20:20.493 --> 02:20:22.660
lawyers been important throughout your

02:20:22.660 --> 02:20:24.882
long career of service to our country ?

02:20:26.070 --> 02:20:28.292
Congressman , throughout my career I've

02:20:28.292 --> 02:20:30.403
had , uh , military lawyers advise me

02:20:30.403 --> 02:20:32.570
at the appropriate time , uh , dealing

02:20:32.570 --> 02:20:32.509
dealing with different , uh , justice

02:20:32.509 --> 02:20:35.809
cases , so they've been helpful . So

02:20:35.809 --> 02:20:38.031
was the firing of senior judge advocate

02:20:38.031 --> 02:20:41.339
generals justified ? That's a

02:20:41.339 --> 02:20:43.980
policy decision . I'm gonna refer to

02:20:43.980 --> 02:20:46.219
the uh policy . But your testimony

02:20:46.219 --> 02:20:48.690
today is that military lawyers have

02:20:48.690 --> 02:20:51.099
played an important role in your career

02:20:51.099 --> 02:20:53.266
and in the functioning of our military

02:20:53.266 --> 02:20:55.459
under a system of rule of law . Yes ,

02:20:55.540 --> 02:20:57.262
they've been helping in , uh ,

02:20:57.262 --> 02:20:59.207
providing advice for me . Yes , in

02:20:59.207 --> 02:21:00.929
general , can you speak to the

02:21:00.929 --> 02:21:03.040
importance of military lawyers in our

02:21:03.040 --> 02:21:05.389
system ? They're extremely important .

02:21:05.450 --> 02:21:07.394
I rely on them heavily . In fact ,

02:21:07.394 --> 02:21:09.561
there's one in this room right now . I

02:21:09.561 --> 02:21:11.672
won't tell you who it is , but , uh ,

02:21:11.672 --> 02:21:13.839
on our staff , uh , so we use them all

02:21:13.839 --> 02:21:15.617
the time . Well , thank you . I

02:21:15.617 --> 02:21:17.839
appreciate your testimony on that front

02:21:17.839 --> 02:21:19.950
because I think there's a real threat

02:21:19.950 --> 02:21:22.283
to the rule of law in our country today .

02:21:22.283 --> 02:21:24.506
And from what I've seen in in expired .

02:21:24.506 --> 02:21:26.561
You're not recognized gentleman from

02:21:26.561 --> 02:21:29.440
Colorado , huh . Oh , you just snuck in

02:21:29.440 --> 02:21:32.309
on me . The gentleman , I'm sorry , Mr .

02:21:32.400 --> 02:21:35.629
Crank , Mr . Fallon stole your thunder .

02:21:36.209 --> 02:21:38.759
Gentleman from Texas has recognized my

02:21:38.759 --> 02:21:41.870
deepest apologies . Uh , thank you all

02:21:41.870 --> 02:21:43.814
for coming . General , uh , what's

02:21:43.814 --> 02:21:46.780
Northcom's primary mission ? Sir , it's

02:21:46.780 --> 02:21:49.058
homeland defense . Defend the homeland ,

02:21:49.058 --> 02:21:50.780
right ? That's right . OK . Do

02:21:50.780 --> 02:21:52.836
transnational gangs and Mexican drug

02:21:52.836 --> 02:21:54.613
cartels present a threat to our

02:21:54.613 --> 02:21:56.780
homeland ? Yes , they do . Fair to say

02:21:56.780 --> 02:21:56.339
that you're , uh , could be described

02:21:56.339 --> 02:21:58.228
as evil , heartless , sociopathic

02:21:58.228 --> 02:22:01.150
criminal . I would agree with that . So

02:22:01.150 --> 02:22:03.230
it's saying a reason that disrupting

02:22:03.230 --> 02:22:05.341
their illegal activities and reducing

02:22:05.341 --> 02:22:07.469
their revenue and upsetting their

02:22:07.469 --> 02:22:09.799
organization and planning would weaken

02:22:10.150 --> 02:22:12.261
transnational gangs and the cartels .

02:22:13.450 --> 02:22:15.506
Yes , sir . And that would be a very

02:22:15.506 --> 02:22:18.290
good thing for the United States . Yes

02:22:18.290 --> 02:22:20.401
sir . General , over the past 80 days

02:22:20.401 --> 02:22:22.457
have the Mexican drug cartels indeed

02:22:22.457 --> 02:22:25.129
been disrupted ? Uh , yes sir , I think

02:22:25.129 --> 02:22:27.185
they have . And uh has the revenue ,

02:22:27.650 --> 02:22:29.594
I'm sorry , oh no , go ahead , not

02:22:29.594 --> 02:22:31.817
fully disrupted but but disrupted , yes

02:22:31.817 --> 02:22:34.150
sir . Uh , has the revenue been reduced ?

02:22:34.150 --> 02:22:36.261
It has and has their organization and

02:22:36.261 --> 02:22:38.690
planning been upset ? It has been so

02:22:38.690 --> 02:22:40.857
they've been weakened . They have been

02:22:40.857 --> 02:22:42.968
weakened . Uh , and by the way , good

02:22:42.968 --> 02:22:45.759
job on that . So illegal immigration

02:22:45.759 --> 02:22:47.537
presents certain dangers to the

02:22:47.537 --> 02:22:49.703
homeland too , does it not ? As far as

02:22:49.703 --> 02:22:51.759
vetting , we don't really know a lot

02:22:51.759 --> 02:22:51.650
who a lot of these folks are . Uh ,

02:22:51.730 --> 02:22:53.730
there's a stress on schools and and

02:22:53.730 --> 02:22:55.897
medical services if people are allowed

02:22:55.897 --> 02:22:58.063
to stay in the country . And it also ,

02:22:58.063 --> 02:22:59.897
and more , more importantly , it

02:22:59.897 --> 02:23:02.119
enriches the cartels . They they profit

02:23:02.119 --> 02:23:04.341
greatly from the they charge a tax or a

02:23:04.341 --> 02:23:06.508
fee or whatever you call it and . Uh ,

02:23:06.508 --> 02:23:08.397
they make a lot of money into the

02:23:08.397 --> 02:23:08.389
billions of dollars and in fact

02:23:08.389 --> 02:23:10.611
annually maybe estimates are as much as

02:23:10.611 --> 02:23:12.500
that into the tens of billions of

02:23:12.500 --> 02:23:14.679
dollars now . OK , when you reduce ,

02:23:14.879 --> 02:23:16.768
given that , then when you reduce

02:23:16.768 --> 02:23:18.712
illegal migration , you're denying

02:23:18.712 --> 02:23:20.823
revenue to the Mexican drug cartels .

02:23:20.849 --> 02:23:23.071
Yes , that's correct . So in that sense

02:23:23.071 --> 02:23:25.293
and in uh and in many others , reducing

02:23:25.293 --> 02:23:27.238
illegal immigration is in the best

02:23:27.238 --> 02:23:29.293
interests of the United States . Yes

02:23:29.293 --> 02:23:31.740
sir . So in 80 days , is that's what's

02:23:31.740 --> 02:23:34.339
happened , has , uh , illegal migration

02:23:34.339 --> 02:23:37.150
gone down ? Uh , by most estimates

02:23:37.150 --> 02:23:39.709
about 97% , so dramatically like a

02:23:39.709 --> 02:23:41.931
collapse , not even a reduction , but a

02:23:41.931 --> 02:23:43.987
collapse . That's right . And , uh ,

02:23:43.987 --> 02:23:46.098
what , what's changed ? I mean , when

02:23:46.098 --> 02:23:48.098
you look at the last four years and

02:23:48.098 --> 02:23:47.910
some of the record profits that the

02:23:47.910 --> 02:23:50.269
cartels were making , uh , in fact , in

02:23:50.269 --> 02:23:52.325
December 2023 , I believe the number

02:23:52.325 --> 02:23:55.230
was about 304,000 illegal encounters in

02:23:55.230 --> 02:23:57.452
one month . What were the encounters in

02:23:57.452 --> 02:23:59.563
February this year ? Uh , they , they

02:23:59.563 --> 02:24:02.230
dropped down from about 6000 a day to

02:24:02.230 --> 02:24:05.669
somewhere around 100 to 150 a day on

02:24:05.669 --> 02:24:07.891
average . I think if I'm not mistaken ,

02:24:07.891 --> 02:24:10.058
it's about 8300 or give or take , uh .

02:24:10.879 --> 02:24:13.889
In February , total , yeah , yes , sir .

02:24:13.980 --> 02:24:17.339
OK , so that's , so December 2023 would

02:24:17.339 --> 02:24:21.179
be 3,800% higher than February

02:24:21.179 --> 02:24:24.709
25 . It's been dramatic or put it your

02:24:24.709 --> 02:24:28.400
way , 97% reduction yes sir . And ,

02:24:28.480 --> 02:24:30.480
and what orders were you , were you

02:24:30.480 --> 02:24:32.480
given new orders on in January this

02:24:32.480 --> 02:24:34.702
year ? I was , sir , on , on the , uh ,

02:24:34.702 --> 02:24:38.389
21st of January we , uh ,

02:24:38.400 --> 02:24:40.456
Northcom significantly increased our

02:24:40.456 --> 02:24:42.959
presence , uh , in support of CBP and

02:24:42.959 --> 02:24:45.349
also , uh , really for the first time

02:24:45.349 --> 02:24:47.293
that that I'm aware of began using

02:24:47.293 --> 02:24:50.110
unique military capabilities to , uh ,

02:24:50.349 --> 02:24:53.679
uh , seal and repel at the border . So

02:24:53.679 --> 02:24:55.790
the new orders you were given by your

02:24:55.790 --> 02:24:58.012
new commander in chief Donald J . Trump

02:24:58.012 --> 02:25:01.809
have . Helped secure the homeland

02:25:02.669 --> 02:25:04.891
we that along with policy . I , I don't

02:25:04.891 --> 02:25:07.113
wanna say that the military has done it

02:25:07.113 --> 02:25:09.336
all , but uh the military and certainly

02:25:09.336 --> 02:25:11.447
the Customs and Border Patrol . I , I

02:25:11.447 --> 02:25:13.669
actually really truly and being a Texan

02:25:13.669 --> 02:25:16.620
feel safer today than I have in a very

02:25:16.620 --> 02:25:18.787
long time . Yes sir , it's and it is a

02:25:18.787 --> 02:25:20.953
team effort , as you said , but uh the

02:25:20.953 --> 02:25:23.176
numbers are significantly down since we

02:25:23.176 --> 02:25:25.342
became . Uh , increasingly involved in

02:25:25.342 --> 02:25:27.564
the kudos to you and Admiral Halsey and

02:25:27.564 --> 02:25:29.731
the great men and women we have on the

02:25:29.731 --> 02:25:31.898
border , uh , and the federal agencies

02:25:31.898 --> 02:25:31.495
as well . And general , my final

02:25:31.495 --> 02:25:33.785
question is , uh , NorthCO is NorthO

02:25:33.785 --> 02:25:36.165
collaborating with Department of , uh ,

02:25:36.174 --> 02:25:39.094
Homeland Security to integrate new and ,

02:25:39.214 --> 02:25:41.047
uh , innovative technologies and

02:25:41.047 --> 02:25:43.047
strategies into the border security

02:25:43.047 --> 02:25:45.290
operations ? Yes sir , um , and

02:25:45.559 --> 02:25:47.629
directly with the CBP , uh , we've ,

02:25:47.639 --> 02:25:49.695
I've established a , uh , technology

02:25:49.695 --> 02:25:51.917
working group that's looking to see how

02:25:51.917 --> 02:25:53.972
in the near and and long term we can

02:25:53.972 --> 02:25:56.740
transition some of the , uh , uh ,

02:25:57.040 --> 02:25:59.870
manpower into , into technological

02:25:59.870 --> 02:26:02.639
means to keep the border sealed and the

02:26:02.639 --> 02:26:05.269
threat repelled just all options open .

02:26:05.400 --> 02:26:07.622
All yes , we're looking at everything .

02:26:07.622 --> 02:26:09.733
Yes , sir . I gonna tell you a little

02:26:09.733 --> 02:26:09.719
story in Texas when I was in the

02:26:09.719 --> 02:26:11.663
legislature , they were using deer

02:26:11.663 --> 02:26:13.663
blinds . I mean just something that

02:26:13.663 --> 02:26:15.830
simple and put hundreds of them on the

02:26:15.830 --> 02:26:15.200
border and that was just helping as

02:26:15.200 --> 02:26:17.422
well so uh thank you very much Chairman

02:26:17.422 --> 02:26:19.599
Ay back . Thank you . Char and I

02:26:19.599 --> 02:26:21.932
recognize the gentleman from California ,

02:26:21.932 --> 02:26:23.877
Mr . Tran . Thank you Mr . Chair .

02:26:24.139 --> 02:26:26.361
Thank you for , uh , testifying today .

02:26:26.361 --> 02:26:28.583
Like all of you , I am deeply concerned

02:26:28.583 --> 02:26:31.179
with the CCP's encroachment in NorthCOM

02:26:31.179 --> 02:26:34.139
and SOCOM's AOR the CCP is using a

02:26:34.139 --> 02:26:36.750
multi-pronged strategy that blends

02:26:36.750 --> 02:26:38.780
economic , diplomatic , cyber , and

02:26:38.780 --> 02:26:41.299
military tools to attempt to displace

02:26:41.299 --> 02:26:43.580
US influence in and around the Western

02:26:43.580 --> 02:26:45.580
hemisphere . We'll start with you ,

02:26:45.620 --> 02:26:47.731
Admiral . How are how is NorthCOM and

02:26:47.731 --> 02:26:49.799
SOCOM . Uh , synchronizing their

02:26:49.799 --> 02:26:51.639
efforts to address the growing

02:26:51.639 --> 02:26:54.759
influence of the PRC across both AORs .

02:26:56.660 --> 02:26:58.882
So first of all , uh , thanks Frank for

02:26:58.882 --> 02:27:01.049
a question , Congressman . So Northcom

02:27:01.049 --> 02:27:03.160
and SOCOM , we always work together ,

02:27:03.160 --> 02:27:05.160
uh , very deliberate faction , uh ,

02:27:05.160 --> 02:27:07.382
whether it's a drug , uh , trade and or

02:27:07.382 --> 02:27:09.660
but specifically as I look at the , uh ,

02:27:09.660 --> 02:27:11.771
China is the joint exercise program ,

02:27:11.771 --> 02:27:13.993
we continue to do that every exercise ,

02:27:13.993 --> 02:27:16.160
every , every , uh . Um , a conference

02:27:16.160 --> 02:27:18.216
we do , we always invite , uh , NoFO

02:27:18.216 --> 02:27:19.938
partners there . We invite the

02:27:19.938 --> 02:27:19.759
ambassador to Mexico to our partners to

02:27:19.759 --> 02:27:21.870
our , uh , training as well . Again ,

02:27:21.870 --> 02:27:24.037
it's that , uh , overarching effort to

02:27:24.037 --> 02:27:26.320
identify threats and get after it , uh ,

02:27:26.330 --> 02:27:28.274
but again , we have to continue to

02:27:28.274 --> 02:27:30.497
build partner capacity to get as well .

02:27:30.497 --> 02:27:32.608
Thank you , General , anything that ?

02:27:32.839 --> 02:27:34.950
No , sir , uh , everything he said is

02:27:34.950 --> 02:27:37.172
exactly the same from our perspective .

02:27:37.172 --> 02:27:39.395
Appreciate it . uh , going on , how are

02:27:39.395 --> 02:27:41.339
both NorthCOM and SOCOM working to

02:27:41.339 --> 02:27:43.339
build military relationships in the

02:27:43.339 --> 02:27:45.283
region that counterbalance China's

02:27:45.283 --> 02:27:47.117
growing defense cooperation with

02:27:47.117 --> 02:27:49.228
countries like Venezuela and Brazil ,

02:27:49.228 --> 02:27:51.506
uh , general , you wanna take this one ?

02:27:52.330 --> 02:27:54.769
Sure , we , uh , we strive , sir , to

02:27:54.769 --> 02:27:57.459
have a strong mill to mill relationship

02:27:57.459 --> 02:27:59.719
so that the , uh , our partner nation

02:27:59.929 --> 02:28:02.530
looks to us first . Uh , we do that so

02:28:02.530 --> 02:28:04.474
we have three , countries that are

02:28:04.474 --> 02:28:07.330
partners in Northcom uh with Mexico we

02:28:07.330 --> 02:28:09.552
have . Strong mill to mill relationship

02:28:09.552 --> 02:28:12.344
based on uh built on a foundation of

02:28:12.344 --> 02:28:14.622
exercises and subject matter exchanges .

02:28:14.665 --> 02:28:16.776
Uh , we also do with the Bahamas is a

02:28:16.776 --> 02:28:18.887
third country in our region . I would

02:28:18.887 --> 02:28:21.054
say that the mill to mill relationship

02:28:21.054 --> 02:28:23.294
is strong there . However , uh , I am

02:28:23.945 --> 02:28:25.778
increasingly concerned about the

02:28:25.778 --> 02:28:28.325
vulnerability uh to Chinese actions

02:28:28.325 --> 02:28:30.325
outside of the military , and we're

02:28:30.325 --> 02:28:32.325
trying to see if we can take , uh ,

02:28:32.325 --> 02:28:34.492
outsized efforts in the Bahamas to try

02:28:34.492 --> 02:28:37.139
to curb that . Thank you , Admiral .

02:28:37.549 --> 02:28:39.771
Yes , thank you . So as I look at the ,

02:28:39.771 --> 02:28:41.938
the region , I go to what our partners

02:28:41.938 --> 02:28:44.049
are asking for . They continue to ask

02:28:44.049 --> 02:28:46.216
for our presence again , uh , maritime

02:28:46.216 --> 02:28:46.009
presence ships and everything else , uh ,

02:28:46.049 --> 02:28:48.080
maritime domain awareness , cyber

02:28:48.080 --> 02:28:50.024
support . So again we're trying to

02:28:50.024 --> 02:28:51.969
build a cap building capacity with

02:28:51.969 --> 02:28:54.191
cyber . They have more and more they're

02:28:54.191 --> 02:28:56.302
asking for space support as you . May

02:28:56.302 --> 02:28:58.358
be aware they have uh more space and

02:28:58.358 --> 02:29:00.302
labor infrastructure in SOCOMA are

02:29:00.302 --> 02:29:00.115
second only to mainland China , right ?

02:29:00.195 --> 02:29:03.254
So again , so cyberspace , uh , so all

02:29:03.254 --> 02:29:05.254
our joint exercises that we do have

02:29:05.254 --> 02:29:07.365
some component of cyber and our space

02:29:07.365 --> 02:29:09.421
uh again , uh , well , it's unitas ,

02:29:09.421 --> 02:29:11.587
different exercises we do try to build

02:29:11.587 --> 02:29:13.754
that capability capacity . Thank you .

02:29:13.754 --> 02:29:15.754
And as you sit here today , can you

02:29:15.754 --> 02:29:17.921
identify any additional authorities or

02:29:17.921 --> 02:29:20.032
resources um that your department may

02:29:20.032 --> 02:29:22.032
need to effectively counter China's

02:29:22.032 --> 02:29:24.143
influence in the Western hemisphere ?

02:29:24.143 --> 02:29:26.087
Certainly , so right now the first

02:29:26.087 --> 02:29:28.032
thing I would point to is security

02:29:28.032 --> 02:29:30.254
cooperation . That's my largest lever .

02:29:30.254 --> 02:29:32.587
So when I get , uh , more support there ,

02:29:32.587 --> 02:29:34.810
I can do more , right ? I can do more ,

02:29:34.810 --> 02:29:34.610
uh , we're right now we're building a

02:29:34.610 --> 02:29:36.554
cyber support center in two of the

02:29:36.554 --> 02:29:38.721
countries in the region . Those things

02:29:38.721 --> 02:29:40.888
help me out . So again , any way I can

02:29:40.888 --> 02:29:40.379
get more support for security

02:29:40.379 --> 02:29:42.268
cooperation that builds my , uh ,

02:29:42.268 --> 02:29:44.809
portfolio . General , sir , I do not

02:29:44.809 --> 02:29:46.642
like any authorities required to

02:29:46.642 --> 02:29:48.753
counter , uh , Chinese presence . How

02:29:48.753 --> 02:29:51.580
about resources ? Uh , I'll always take

02:29:51.580 --> 02:29:53.860
more , but , uh , actually I , I don't

02:29:53.860 --> 02:29:56.193
have any unfilled requests at this time .

02:29:56.193 --> 02:29:58.360
Thank you , Mr . Chair , you're back .

02:29:59.360 --> 02:30:01.638
I've never heard that before , General .

02:30:03.730 --> 02:30:05.452
first time I have ever heard a

02:30:05.452 --> 02:30:07.740
combatant commander that . Yeah , I ,

02:30:07.980 --> 02:30:09.813
and I recognize a gentleman from

02:30:09.813 --> 02:30:12.179
Colorado , Mr . Crank . Thank you Mr .

02:30:12.190 --> 02:30:14.412
Chairman . um , thank you all for being

02:30:14.412 --> 02:30:16.639
here and testifying today uh , General

02:30:16.639 --> 02:30:18.870
Gio , it took you a long time to get to

02:30:18.870 --> 02:30:21.037
your hometown congressman , but here I

02:30:21.037 --> 02:30:23.259
go . Thank you . I'm very proud to have

02:30:23.259 --> 02:30:25.549
Northern Command in uh Colorado Springs

02:30:25.549 --> 02:30:27.660
and , and the wonderful work that you

02:30:27.660 --> 02:30:29.882
do . I'm especially proud and it's been

02:30:29.882 --> 02:30:31.993
noted here by you and by others about

02:30:31.993 --> 02:30:34.105
the great work that you've been doing

02:30:34.105 --> 02:30:36.559
since January 21st to execute the new

02:30:36.559 --> 02:30:38.950
authorities given to you . By President

02:30:38.950 --> 02:30:40.894
Trump at the southern border and I

02:30:40.894 --> 02:30:43.629
think it's a very clear message that

02:30:43.629 --> 02:30:45.750
most people here on Capitol Hill have

02:30:45.750 --> 02:30:47.806
gotten that the American people want

02:30:47.806 --> 02:30:50.349
that problem solved and not everybody

02:30:50.349 --> 02:30:52.349
here's gotten the memo yet but uh I

02:30:52.349 --> 02:30:54.516
think most people have and I know that

02:30:54.549 --> 02:30:56.716
all Americans are very appreciative of

02:30:56.716 --> 02:30:58.882
the efforts that that you're doing . I

02:30:58.882 --> 02:31:00.889
also want to discuss the great work

02:31:00.889 --> 02:31:03.389
that Northern Command and Fort Carson's

02:31:03.389 --> 02:31:06.190
4th Infantry division are doing there

02:31:06.190 --> 02:31:09.250
at the southern border . Um , and just

02:31:09.250 --> 02:31:11.500
incredible that in 2 months you've got

02:31:11.500 --> 02:31:14.669
illegal border crossings down 97% ,

02:31:14.769 --> 02:31:17.339
just incredible work , but I also want

02:31:17.339 --> 02:31:19.240
to talk about another priority .

02:31:19.250 --> 02:31:21.169
President Trump made securing the

02:31:21.169 --> 02:31:24.169
homeland from missiles a major priority

02:31:24.169 --> 02:31:26.089
for his administration , and I'm

02:31:26.089 --> 02:31:28.256
excited for the Golden Dome initiative

02:31:28.256 --> 02:31:30.367
and what it means for NorthCO and for

02:31:30.367 --> 02:31:32.700
our national security , and as you know .

02:31:33.059 --> 02:31:35.115
There's ongoing conversations on the

02:31:35.115 --> 02:31:38.370
Hill about how much spectrum DOD needs

02:31:38.370 --> 02:31:40.410
to fulfill its mission , um , and

02:31:40.410 --> 02:31:42.809
General Gio , can you share how a

02:31:42.809 --> 02:31:44.769
sizable reduction in spectrum

02:31:44.769 --> 02:31:46.969
allocations for the department could

02:31:46.969 --> 02:31:49.929
affect Northcom's ability to fulfill

02:31:49.929 --> 02:31:52.559
its duties and as a follow up to , uh ,

02:31:52.570 --> 02:31:55.129
Chairman Rogers' question about Golden

02:31:55.129 --> 02:31:57.650
Dome . Understanding that details

02:31:57.650 --> 02:31:59.889
aren't finalized , but if DOD was

02:31:59.889 --> 02:32:02.179
required to vacate the lower three

02:32:02.179 --> 02:32:04.530
spectrum bands , would that simply

02:32:04.530 --> 02:32:06.929
delay the ability of the department to

02:32:06.929 --> 02:32:09.009
get Golden Dome to full operational

02:32:09.009 --> 02:32:11.209
capabilities , or would it render it

02:32:11.209 --> 02:32:14.370
impossible to deploy ? And can you help

02:32:14.370 --> 02:32:16.849
me understand the magnitude of the

02:32:16.849 --> 02:32:19.209
value of the spectrum in deploying

02:32:19.209 --> 02:32:21.709
Golden Dome ? Congressman , first ,

02:32:21.750 --> 02:32:24.419
it's a pleasure to be in , uh ,

02:32:24.429 --> 02:32:26.707
headquartered in Colorado Springs , uh ,

02:32:26.707 --> 02:32:29.330
very supportive community . Uh , the

02:32:29.330 --> 02:32:31.830
spectrum is having full use of the

02:32:31.830 --> 02:32:34.269
spectrum is essential , uh , for the

02:32:34.269 --> 02:32:36.380
Homeland Defense mission , uh , based

02:32:36.380 --> 02:32:38.436
on the variety of , uh , sensors and

02:32:38.436 --> 02:32:40.380
capabilities , uh , that must work

02:32:40.380 --> 02:32:42.669
together , uh , to build that network

02:32:42.669 --> 02:32:44.860
of detection and defeat capabilities .

02:32:45.299 --> 02:32:47.521
Uh , in particular , the , uh , part of

02:32:47.521 --> 02:32:50.230
the spectrum that is most , uh , often ,

02:32:50.679 --> 02:32:53.959
um , challenged would be from basically

02:32:53.959 --> 02:32:57.750
3 to 3.5 gigahertz , and because of ,

02:32:57.759 --> 02:33:00.160
uh , physics that gives us the best

02:33:00.160 --> 02:33:03.160
ability to combine range and fidelity .

02:33:03.860 --> 02:33:06.870
And which together help us track

02:33:06.870 --> 02:33:09.599
inbound threats , uh , so you couldn't

02:33:09.599 --> 02:33:11.655
move to another part of the spectrum

02:33:11.655 --> 02:33:14.309
and get the same capability so uh I'm ,

02:33:14.389 --> 02:33:17.019
I'm very concerned about losing access

02:33:17.019 --> 02:33:19.500
uh to that part of the spectrum , uh ,

02:33:19.509 --> 02:33:21.509
because of the , um , importance it

02:33:21.509 --> 02:33:23.731
plays in our homeland defense systems .

02:33:24.349 --> 02:33:28.280
So given that this is a priority of

02:33:28.280 --> 02:33:31.169
President Trump . How how concerned

02:33:31.169 --> 02:33:33.336
should we be as members of Congress as

02:33:33.336 --> 02:33:35.225
we're sitting and looking at this

02:33:35.225 --> 02:33:37.336
possibility of selling off spectrum ?

02:33:39.219 --> 02:33:41.441
Congressman , I would , I would suggest

02:33:41.441 --> 02:33:43.163
that you'd be very concerned ,

02:33:43.163 --> 02:33:45.386
especially in the key key ranges that ,

02:33:45.386 --> 02:33:47.497
uh , you know , your military experts

02:33:47.497 --> 02:33:49.497
will help describe , uh , to ensure

02:33:49.497 --> 02:33:51.441
that we don't have to , to lose or

02:33:51.441 --> 02:33:53.799
share that spectrum , uh , because of

02:33:53.799 --> 02:33:55.910
the importance to our mission . Thank

02:33:55.910 --> 02:33:58.132
you . And any other thoughts on on that

02:33:58.132 --> 02:34:00.021
from any of the other witnesses ?

02:34:01.700 --> 02:34:04.129
No ? OK . uh , thank you , Mr .

02:34:04.219 --> 02:34:06.330
Chairman . I'll give back the balance

02:34:06.330 --> 02:34:08.386
of my time . Gentleman , yields back

02:34:08.386 --> 02:34:10.497
chair and I recognized gentleman from

02:34:10.497 --> 02:34:12.669
Virginia , Mr . Binman . Thank you ,

02:34:12.709 --> 02:34:15.349
Chair . John Guo , um , the United

02:34:15.349 --> 02:34:17.589
States and Canada have shared a and

02:34:17.589 --> 02:34:19.629
prospered from a strong bilateral

02:34:19.629 --> 02:34:22.360
partnership for several decades . NORAD

02:34:22.360 --> 02:34:24.582
is a critical component of our homeland

02:34:24.582 --> 02:34:26.749
defense and provides aerospace warning

02:34:26.749 --> 02:34:28.860
and control for North America , which

02:34:28.860 --> 02:34:30.971
includes detection , validation , and

02:34:30.971 --> 02:34:32.749
warning of attacks , as well as

02:34:32.749 --> 02:34:34.749
monitoring of aircraft suspected of

02:34:34.749 --> 02:34:36.804
illegal drug trafficking , a layered

02:34:36.804 --> 02:34:39.190
all-domain defense . However , the

02:34:39.190 --> 02:34:41.134
administration has threatened this

02:34:41.134 --> 02:34:43.357
relationship with comments about making

02:34:43.357 --> 02:34:45.301
Canada a 51st state , and dramatic

02:34:45.301 --> 02:34:47.301
changes to our trade relationship .

02:34:47.301 --> 02:34:49.357
Because of this , Canadian officials

02:34:49.357 --> 02:34:51.301
are starting to reassess whether a

02:34:51.301 --> 02:34:53.190
bilateral partnership . Again , a

02:34:53.190 --> 02:34:55.190
relationship what makes us safer is

02:34:55.190 --> 02:34:57.190
beneficial . At the same time , our

02:34:57.190 --> 02:34:59.190
competitors have the capability and

02:34:59.190 --> 02:35:01.079
capacity to threaten all of North

02:35:01.079 --> 02:35:03.246
America with a wide range of threats .

02:35:03.620 --> 02:35:05.842
If Canada and the United States were to

02:35:05.842 --> 02:35:07.564
halt our longstanding military

02:35:07.564 --> 02:35:09.564
cooperation , would it be harder to

02:35:09.564 --> 02:35:11.787
fulfill the current NORAD mission ? And

02:35:11.787 --> 02:35:13.990
uh increase the threat on the United

02:35:13.990 --> 02:35:17.719
States . Congressman , the binational

02:35:17.719 --> 02:35:19.719
relationship , uh , excuse me , the

02:35:19.719 --> 02:35:22.129
binational command that we enjoy , uh ,

02:35:22.219 --> 02:35:24.620
in NORAD between the Canadians and the

02:35:24.620 --> 02:35:26.787
United States , as you mentioned , has

02:35:26.787 --> 02:35:29.049
been established for almost 70 years .

02:35:29.929 --> 02:35:32.290
Everything that we do in the aerospace

02:35:32.290 --> 02:35:34.179
warning , aerospace control , and

02:35:34.179 --> 02:35:36.480
maritime warning is interwoven , uh ,

02:35:36.490 --> 02:35:38.330
between the US and Canadian

02:35:38.330 --> 02:35:40.940
capabilities . If we were to lose that .

02:35:41.129 --> 02:35:43.280
I , I , is the answer , it would be ,

02:35:43.410 --> 02:35:45.490
it would be , um , more difficult to

02:35:45.490 --> 02:35:47.490
fulfill the mission . If we were to

02:35:47.490 --> 02:35:49.601
lose that , there are certain avenues

02:35:49.601 --> 02:35:51.690
of approach that we could not cover

02:35:51.690 --> 02:35:53.690
alone from the United States . OK ,

02:35:53.690 --> 02:35:55.912
thank you . And so with the president's

02:35:55.912 --> 02:35:59.059
proposal for a golden dome . Um , would

02:35:59.059 --> 02:36:01.059
that make the implementation of the

02:36:01.059 --> 02:36:03.059
Golden Dome , and I understand this

02:36:03.059 --> 02:36:05.170
still needs to be fleshed out exactly

02:36:05.170 --> 02:36:07.115
what it is . Would it make it more

02:36:07.115 --> 02:36:09.170
difficult to implement that system ?

02:36:09.170 --> 02:36:11.281
Sir , not at this time because , uh ,

02:36:11.281 --> 02:36:13.503
Canada has a policy , a national policy

02:36:13.503 --> 02:36:13.259
against , uh , conducting ballistic

02:36:13.259 --> 02:36:15.037
missile defense . So all of our

02:36:15.037 --> 02:36:17.429
ballistic missile defense , uh ,

02:36:17.660 --> 02:36:20.219
capabilities are solely US . If we're

02:36:20.219 --> 02:36:22.386
looking at early warning and the other

02:36:22.386 --> 02:36:24.719
aspects of that relationship , would it ,

02:36:24.719 --> 02:36:26.830
would it affect those aspects ? Early

02:36:26.830 --> 02:36:28.941
warning for ballistic missiles is all

02:36:28.941 --> 02:36:31.052
the United States . Early warning for

02:36:31.052 --> 02:36:30.540
cruise missiles is a shared

02:36:30.540 --> 02:36:32.651
responsibility between Canada and the

02:36:32.651 --> 02:36:35.120
United States . Thank you . Um , and

02:36:35.120 --> 02:36:37.599
can you tell me in the July 24

02:36:37.599 --> 02:36:39.780
intercept , did Canada participate in

02:36:39.780 --> 02:36:43.070
that intercept ? The , uh , July 24 ,

02:36:43.129 --> 02:36:45.296
uh , I assume you're talking about the

02:36:45.296 --> 02:36:47.518
combined bomber patrol with Russian and

02:36:47.518 --> 02:36:49.351
Chinese aircraft . Uh , yes , we

02:36:49.351 --> 02:36:51.685
intercepted with three sets of fighters .

02:36:51.685 --> 02:36:53.740
One of those , uh , sets of fighters

02:36:53.740 --> 02:36:55.962
was a Canadian flight of CF-18s . Thank

02:36:55.962 --> 02:36:58.790
you . Uh , Mr . Cillias , uh , you were

02:36:58.790 --> 02:37:00.957
acting Secretary of Defense , uh , for

02:37:00.957 --> 02:37:02.957
a short period of time in the Trump

02:37:02.957 --> 02:37:05.179
administration , is that correct ? That

02:37:05.179 --> 02:37:07.123
is correct . And that's an immense

02:37:07.123 --> 02:37:09.234
responsibility and honor , isn't it ?

02:37:09.234 --> 02:37:11.401
It is incredible honor . And , and you

02:37:11.401 --> 02:37:13.457
took that responsibility seriously .

02:37:13.457 --> 02:37:15.568
Absolutely . Were you , uh , involved

02:37:15.568 --> 02:37:18.200
in any , uh , signal chats , uh ,

02:37:18.209 --> 02:37:20.730
either a small group PC or anything

02:37:20.730 --> 02:37:22.897
that sounds like an NSA type meeting ,

02:37:22.897 --> 02:37:26.650
PC PCC , DC . Uh , during your time

02:37:26.650 --> 02:37:29.530
as acting secretary , I , no , I was

02:37:29.530 --> 02:37:31.863
not . I don't even have signal jet . OK .

02:37:32.620 --> 02:37:36.469
And um Part of your

02:37:36.469 --> 02:37:39.469
responsibility as a secretary was to um

02:37:39.469 --> 02:37:41.636
enforce good order and discipline , is

02:37:41.636 --> 02:37:43.858
that correct ? That is correct . And if

02:37:43.858 --> 02:37:45.525
a service member had violated

02:37:45.525 --> 02:37:48.349
operational security , um , would you

02:37:48.349 --> 02:37:50.469
expect that there would be charges um

02:37:50.469 --> 02:37:52.889
on that service member ? We have

02:37:52.889 --> 02:37:55.019
policies that govern what we do and

02:37:55.019 --> 02:37:58.179
security violations . And so , um ,

02:38:00.870 --> 02:38:03.037
Have you , have you read uh the signal

02:38:03.037 --> 02:38:05.203
chats that , uh , the , the reports on

02:38:05.203 --> 02:38:07.450
the signal chats ? No , I have not ,

02:38:07.459 --> 02:38:09.740
and based on it being under review , I

02:38:09.740 --> 02:38:11.684
think it's inappropriate for me to

02:38:11.684 --> 02:38:13.796
comment on that . OK , but , uh , you

02:38:13.796 --> 02:38:15.796
have not read the , the chats , the

02:38:15.796 --> 02:38:18.018
article you're not familiar with that .

02:38:18.018 --> 02:38:17.860
I'm familiar that it's out there . I

02:38:17.860 --> 02:38:21.290
haven't read it , but would , OK , um ,

02:38:21.459 --> 02:38:23.459
would you , you said you don't have

02:38:23.459 --> 02:38:25.403
signals , is that correct ? That's

02:38:25.403 --> 02:38:27.459
correct . OK . Well , it's , it's my

02:38:27.459 --> 02:38:29.626
opinion , uh , and the opinion of many

02:38:29.626 --> 02:38:31.900
that the , uh , especially for my time

02:38:31.900 --> 02:38:34.280
as a , um . A member of the National

02:38:34.280 --> 02:38:36.502
Security Council staff that those chats

02:38:36.502 --> 02:38:38.613
were completely inappropriate . I was

02:38:38.613 --> 02:38:40.836
frankly floored seeing that there was a

02:38:40.836 --> 02:38:42.947
small group PC that was on the signal

02:38:43.230 --> 02:38:45.940
and and a non secure government

02:38:46.290 --> 02:38:48.959
non-government system and as a service

02:38:48.959 --> 02:38:50.759
member , uh , as a commander I

02:38:50.759 --> 02:38:52.815
certainly would have been preferring

02:38:52.815 --> 02:38:55.037
charges on somebody that committed that

02:38:55.037 --> 02:38:57.092
violation as a jag officer I've been

02:38:57.092 --> 02:38:59.440
preparing to prosecute those and when

02:38:59.440 --> 02:39:01.339
you have a spill . You have to

02:39:01.339 --> 02:39:03.339
investigate the spill , you have to

02:39:03.339 --> 02:39:05.172
remediate it because you have to

02:39:05.172 --> 02:39:07.395
understand the full scope of the damage

02:39:07.395 --> 02:39:09.728
and you have to hold people accountable ,

02:39:09.728 --> 02:39:09.500
and I haven't seen that yet , and

02:39:09.500 --> 02:39:11.667
that's a major problem . Thank you . I

02:39:11.667 --> 02:39:13.722
yield back . Gentlemen , yields back

02:39:13.722 --> 02:39:15.778
chair and I recognizes the gentleman

02:39:15.778 --> 02:39:17.889
from Guam , Mr . Morlan . Thank you ,

02:39:17.889 --> 02:39:20.000
Mr . Chairman . Assistant Secretary ,

02:39:20.000 --> 02:39:22.070
thank you for meeting with me , uh ,

02:39:22.080 --> 02:39:24.080
just last week during your visit to

02:39:24.080 --> 02:39:26.191
Guam with Secretary Head staff . Uh ,

02:39:26.191 --> 02:39:28.302
the secretary demonstrated a historic

02:39:28.302 --> 02:39:30.480
commitment to support Guam and build

02:39:30.480 --> 02:39:32.536
out the right missile defense system

02:39:32.536 --> 02:39:34.519
for the island . Uh , another

02:39:34.519 --> 02:39:36.575
administration priority has been the

02:39:36.575 --> 02:39:38.759
development of the Golden Dome to

02:39:38.759 --> 02:39:41.919
protect the entire United States . So

02:39:41.919 --> 02:39:44.200
how will Guam's missile defense be part

02:39:44.440 --> 02:39:47.000
of this Golden Dome approach ? And how

02:39:47.000 --> 02:39:49.111
would the Golden Dome make the people

02:39:49.111 --> 02:39:51.959
of Guam safer ? Thank you , Congressman ,

02:39:52.000 --> 02:39:54.056
and it was a pleasure to meet you as

02:39:54.056 --> 02:39:56.111
well , um , as , as you noted , uh ,

02:39:56.111 --> 02:39:58.333
Secretary Hegset actually was the first

02:39:58.333 --> 02:40:00.278
secretary since Donald Rumsfeld to

02:40:00.278 --> 02:40:00.269
visit Guam , uh , so he was very proud

02:40:00.269 --> 02:40:02.380
to be able to do that and note that ,

02:40:02.380 --> 02:40:04.602
uh , Guam is part of the homeland . And

02:40:04.602 --> 02:40:06.602
so , um , as , as you know , it's a

02:40:06.602 --> 02:40:08.713
high priority to appropriately defend

02:40:08.713 --> 02:40:10.936
Guam , uh , and that will definitely be

02:40:10.936 --> 02:40:13.047
part of considerations as we consider

02:40:13.047 --> 02:40:12.919
the , the larger Golden Dome , um ,

02:40:12.950 --> 02:40:16.910
initiative . Excellent , um , let's see ,

02:40:16.950 --> 02:40:19.117
a program that I also supported is the

02:40:19.117 --> 02:40:20.950
National Guard State Partnership

02:40:20.950 --> 02:40:24.299
Program which SOCOM often relies upon ,

02:40:24.469 --> 02:40:26.580
uh , to work with regional partners .

02:40:26.610 --> 02:40:28.443
I'm particularly proud of Guam .

02:40:28.443 --> 02:40:30.499
National Guard's work in their state

02:40:30.499 --> 02:40:32.740
partnership with the Republic of Palau

02:40:32.740 --> 02:40:35.629
and the Philippines . So Admiral , uh ,

02:40:35.669 --> 02:40:38.269
given that there was 18 US states that

02:40:38.269 --> 02:40:40.047
have established National Guard

02:40:40.047 --> 02:40:41.880
partnerships with Latin American

02:40:41.880 --> 02:40:44.240
countries . And 30 participating

02:40:44.240 --> 02:40:46.559
partner nations within your area of

02:40:46.559 --> 02:40:48.959
responsibility , have you gained any

02:40:48.959 --> 02:40:51.200
insight which can help Congress further

02:40:51.200 --> 02:40:53.839
support the state partnership program ?

02:40:55.629 --> 02:40:57.573
Thank you , Congressman . Uh , the

02:40:57.573 --> 02:40:59.518
state partnership actually have 24

02:40:59.518 --> 02:41:01.629
states supporting 30 countries in the

02:41:01.629 --> 02:41:03.685
region . Uh , they do typically over

02:41:03.685 --> 02:41:05.907
325 , uh , activities in the , in the ,

02:41:05.907 --> 02:41:07.962
uh , hemisphere . So there's a great

02:41:07.962 --> 02:41:10.185
lever . It's probably one of my largest

02:41:10.185 --> 02:41:12.296
levers next to security cooperation .

02:41:12.296 --> 02:41:11.950
Again , I can't get enough of it , so

02:41:11.950 --> 02:41:14.228
we're looking for more opportunity and ,

02:41:14.228 --> 02:41:16.339
and definitely from the standpoint of

02:41:16.339 --> 02:41:18.450
uh joint excise program they're going

02:41:18.450 --> 02:41:17.870
down , they're doing aviation ops ,

02:41:17.910 --> 02:41:19.854
they're doing cyber ops , so these

02:41:19.854 --> 02:41:22.077
things are all very important to , uh ,

02:41:22.077 --> 02:41:24.410
build our partner cap building capacity .

02:41:24.410 --> 02:41:26.466
Uh thank you . Uh , then for NorthCO

02:41:26.466 --> 02:41:28.769
and SOCOM are are actively monitoring

02:41:28.769 --> 02:41:31.070
and countering the influence of

02:41:31.519 --> 02:41:34.400
external state actors including China

02:41:34.400 --> 02:41:36.879
and Russia . These concerns also have a

02:41:36.879 --> 02:41:38.660
significant impact on Guam , in

02:41:38.660 --> 02:41:41.120
particular , Guam and the CNMI have

02:41:41.120 --> 02:41:43.120
seen a notable noticeable rise in

02:41:43.120 --> 02:41:45.639
illegal Chinese immigration . With

02:41:45.639 --> 02:41:47.861
individuals using our shores as a point

02:41:47.861 --> 02:41:49.972
of entry into the US , additionally ,

02:41:50.030 --> 02:41:52.252
Guam has been grappling with the influx

02:41:52.252 --> 02:41:54.230
of drugs including fentanyl and

02:41:54.230 --> 02:41:56.709
methamphetamine . In your testimony ,

02:41:56.790 --> 02:41:58.623
you have thoroughly outlined the

02:41:58.623 --> 02:42:01.030
efforts , uh , your commands have

02:42:01.030 --> 02:42:03.110
undertaken to secure our southern

02:42:03.110 --> 02:42:04.740
border and to carry out

02:42:05.070 --> 02:42:07.509
counter-narcotic missions . This

02:42:07.509 --> 02:42:09.565
question is for both the admiral and

02:42:09.565 --> 02:42:12.299
the general . Uh , what have been your

02:42:12.299 --> 02:42:14.019
most effective strategies for

02:42:14.019 --> 02:42:15.963
addressing illegal immigration and

02:42:15.963 --> 02:42:18.179
narcotic trafficking across the

02:42:18.179 --> 02:42:22.009
southern border ? Congressman ,

02:42:22.089 --> 02:42:24.530
the most effective technique we've used

02:42:24.530 --> 02:42:27.040
is a partnership with the Border patrol .

02:42:27.730 --> 02:42:30.889
Uh , we , we serve , uh , in 9

02:42:30.889 --> 02:42:33.056
different missionaries that are border

02:42:33.056 --> 02:42:35.056
patrol missionaries where they just

02:42:35.056 --> 02:42:37.333
lack the capacity , not the capability ,

02:42:37.333 --> 02:42:39.278
but the capacity , uh , and so our

02:42:39.278 --> 02:42:41.500
ability to , um , fill in with military

02:42:41.500 --> 02:42:43.778
capability there has been helpful . Um ,

02:42:44.290 --> 02:42:46.346
but over the last two months , being

02:42:46.346 --> 02:42:48.401
able to also provide unique military

02:42:48.401 --> 02:42:50.568
capabilities that aren't resident in ,

02:42:50.568 --> 02:42:53.690
uh , DHS to help complement those , uh ,

02:42:53.969 --> 02:42:57.929
um , missionaries that are has led

02:42:57.929 --> 02:43:00.290
to , uh , or contributed to the

02:43:00.290 --> 02:43:02.401
dramatic reductions that we've talked

02:43:02.401 --> 02:43:05.870
about here today . With regard to the

02:43:05.870 --> 02:43:08.092
uh counter drug piece and and migration

02:43:08.092 --> 02:43:10.459
both , I think the uh first of all ,

02:43:10.469 --> 02:43:12.691
consistent presence is required for the

02:43:12.691 --> 02:43:14.858
inner to interdict and uh that mission

02:43:14.858 --> 02:43:17.025
there for the drug . So we'll continue

02:43:17.025 --> 02:43:19.191
to do that . We work that very closely

02:43:19.191 --> 02:43:21.302
with our partners right so our allies

02:43:21.302 --> 02:43:23.469
and partners contribute to over 80% of

02:43:23.469 --> 02:43:23.224
our . In Dixson last year along with us .

02:43:23.434 --> 02:43:25.490
So again that , uh , we look at that

02:43:25.490 --> 02:43:27.434
piece here building capability and

02:43:27.434 --> 02:43:29.545
capacity for our partners . I look at

02:43:29.545 --> 02:43:31.601
the Panamanian , uh , example , uh ,

02:43:31.601 --> 02:43:33.712
specifically going through the Darien

02:43:33.712 --> 02:43:33.195
gap . They've been able to close that

02:43:33.195 --> 02:43:35.362
gap down again so work on our partners

02:43:35.362 --> 02:43:37.306
is , uh , and security cooperation

02:43:37.306 --> 02:43:39.195
helps them to , to achieve that .

02:43:41.669 --> 02:43:43.891
OK , the Guam missile defense system is

02:43:43.891 --> 02:43:45.947
being built to protect the people of

02:43:45.947 --> 02:43:47.836
Guam and it's a critical military

02:43:47.836 --> 02:43:50.169
logistical hub in the Indo-Pacific , uh ,

02:43:50.169 --> 02:43:52.113
from ballistic missiles , and this

02:43:52.113 --> 02:43:54.280
question is for general . uh , in your

02:43:54.280 --> 02:43:56.391
testimony you spoke about the need to

02:43:56.391 --> 02:43:58.613
improve our ability to detect and track

02:43:58.613 --> 02:43:58.580
incoming threats such as missiles from

02:43:58.580 --> 02:44:00.820
our adversaries . Our current systems

02:44:00.820 --> 02:44:02.931
being developed and implemented going

02:44:02.931 --> 02:44:04.876
into providing tracking across the

02:44:04.876 --> 02:44:07.259
Pacific to also support Guam missile

02:44:07.259 --> 02:44:10.320
defense system , and if not . Uh , what

02:44:10.320 --> 02:44:12.320
else are we doing to ensure that it

02:44:12.320 --> 02:44:14.900
does ? Congressman , my responsibility

02:44:14.900 --> 02:44:16.900
is to defend , uh , the continental

02:44:16.900 --> 02:44:19.099
United States , Alaska , and , uh ,

02:44:19.110 --> 02:44:21.950
Hawaii , but the systems that and

02:44:21.950 --> 02:44:24.389
EndoPACO is responsible for defending

02:44:24.389 --> 02:44:26.111
Guam . However , the systems ,

02:44:26.111 --> 02:44:28.389
gentleman's expired . T I recognize Mr .

02:44:28.389 --> 02:44:32.099
Bell of Missouri . Thank you Chairman

02:44:32.099 --> 02:44:35.019
Rogers and Ranking Member Smith . Hello

02:44:35.019 --> 02:44:37.809
General Gio and Admiral Halsey , Mr .

02:44:37.900 --> 02:44:41.230
Leonardo and Mr . Celestis . Uh , last

02:44:41.230 --> 02:44:44.030
year we saw a notable increase in drone

02:44:44.030 --> 02:44:46.910
and UAV activity near sensitive

02:44:46.910 --> 02:44:49.389
infrastructure including military

02:44:49.389 --> 02:44:52.150
installations . In my home state of

02:44:52.150 --> 02:44:54.700
Missouri , we're proud to host several

02:44:54.700 --> 02:44:57.230
crucial and vital military and

02:44:57.230 --> 02:45:00.110
intelligence installations , including

02:45:00.110 --> 02:45:03.299
NGA West in my district in Saint Louis .

02:45:04.190 --> 02:45:06.259
I'm deeply concerned regarding the

02:45:06.259 --> 02:45:09.660
threats unauthorized drones posed to

02:45:09.660 --> 02:45:11.620
our intelligence operations and

02:45:11.620 --> 02:45:14.959
military personnel . General Gio ,

02:45:15.490 --> 02:45:17.690
are there additional authorizations

02:45:17.690 --> 02:45:20.839
NORAD and NORCO need that could help

02:45:21.129 --> 02:45:23.459
enhance their ability to detect and

02:45:23.459 --> 02:45:26.459
counter unauthorized drones and UA

02:45:26.459 --> 02:45:29.839
UAS's ? Congressman ,

02:45:29.969 --> 02:45:32.809
the , uh , the biggest benefit that we

02:45:32.809 --> 02:45:35.200
would get would be from expanding , uh ,

02:45:35.209 --> 02:45:38.769
130I authorities to include , uh ,

02:45:38.889 --> 02:45:41.209
information sharing with on on those

02:45:41.209 --> 02:45:44.679
tracks with , uh , federal , state ,

02:45:44.769 --> 02:45:47.799
and local law enforcement would be to ,

02:45:47.809 --> 02:45:51.519
uh . Classify all DOD

02:45:51.519 --> 02:45:55.469
installations as uh covered under 130I

02:45:55.469 --> 02:45:57.759
instead of just select ones . And then

02:45:57.759 --> 02:45:59.919
also to expand the area that we can

02:45:59.919 --> 02:46:02.790
engage a UAS instead of being limited

02:46:02.790 --> 02:46:05.080
to the perimeter of the installation to

02:46:05.080 --> 02:46:07.559
go slightly outside so we can get uh

02:46:07.559 --> 02:46:10.009
UAVs that might be looking across into

02:46:10.240 --> 02:46:12.719
our installations or somebody that we

02:46:12.719 --> 02:46:14.941
detected and is trying to get away that

02:46:14.941 --> 02:46:17.163
we can get them and capture whatever it

02:46:17.163 --> 02:46:19.163
is that they uh surveilled over our

02:46:19.163 --> 02:46:21.280
installations given the critical role

02:46:21.280 --> 02:46:23.599
that geospatial intelligence plays in

02:46:23.599 --> 02:46:25.879
air defense . With the development of

02:46:25.879 --> 02:46:27.990
hypersonic weapons and advanced drone

02:46:27.990 --> 02:46:30.759
technologies by our adversaries , how

02:46:30.759 --> 02:46:33.400
does NorthCO collaborate with NGA West

02:46:33.400 --> 02:46:36.209
to enhance and optimize the operational

02:46:36.209 --> 02:46:38.320
effectiveness and mission planning of

02:46:38.320 --> 02:46:41.679
our Air Force Air Force's assets ? Sir ,

02:46:41.719 --> 02:46:43.441
they're , they're an extremely

02:46:43.441 --> 02:46:45.552
important partner with us . In fact ,

02:46:45.552 --> 02:46:47.719
we have a presence in our headquarters

02:46:47.719 --> 02:46:49.886
of NGA personnel , um , because of the

02:46:49.886 --> 02:46:51.997
day to day reliance we have in all of

02:46:51.997 --> 02:46:53.997
our mission areas , uh , to , to be

02:46:53.997 --> 02:46:55.839
clear that , uh , every advanced

02:46:55.839 --> 02:46:59.410
mission we do , uh , includes NGA

02:46:59.410 --> 02:47:02.690
capabilities . Uh , Admiral Halsey ,

02:47:02.889 --> 02:47:05.330
um , given the Trump administration's

02:47:05.330 --> 02:47:08.129
waiver for funding the multinational

02:47:08.129 --> 02:47:11.259
security support mission in Haiti . And

02:47:11.259 --> 02:47:13.459
the recent delivery of $6 million in

02:47:13.459 --> 02:47:16.299
armed vehicles and heavy equipment to

02:47:16.299 --> 02:47:19.059
Haitian National Police to combat gang

02:47:19.059 --> 02:47:21.820
violence with SOCOM playing a key role

02:47:21.820 --> 02:47:23.940
in delivering this support , can you

02:47:23.940 --> 02:47:26.700
outline whether SOTHCOM plans to

02:47:26.700 --> 02:47:28.820
provide additional equipment or

02:47:28.820 --> 02:47:31.259
resources to the MSS or Haitian

02:47:31.259 --> 02:47:33.900
National Police ? Congresswoman , there ,

02:47:33.980 --> 02:47:36.147
there's no , there's been no decrement

02:47:36.147 --> 02:47:38.313
in funding at this point . Uh , I have

02:47:38.313 --> 02:47:40.202
funding to the end of the year to

02:47:40.202 --> 02:47:42.424
support the Haiti , uh , Haitian police

02:47:42.424 --> 02:47:44.536
and the MSS mission . So right now my

02:47:44.536 --> 02:47:46.647
role is to logistics supplies service

02:47:46.647 --> 02:47:48.813
and support . I've done that since the

02:47:48.813 --> 02:47:50.980
airport was closed , and I continue to

02:47:50.980 --> 02:47:53.147
do that to this day . And how does the

02:47:53.147 --> 02:47:55.091
ongoing insecurity in Haiti impact

02:47:55.091 --> 02:47:56.869
SOCOM's operational readiness ,

02:47:56.950 --> 02:47:58.894
particularly in addressing broader

02:47:58.894 --> 02:48:01.589
regional security challenges ? I think

02:48:01.589 --> 02:48:03.811
I would watch this , uh , the Haiti pro

02:48:03.811 --> 02:48:06.145
very closely . It's one of the key , uh ,

02:48:06.145 --> 02:48:05.820
items I've been watching for the last

02:48:05.820 --> 02:48:07.931
couple of years . I would say that as

02:48:07.931 --> 02:48:10.264
we , uh , continue to go down this path ,

02:48:10.264 --> 02:48:12.153
if the unrest continues , it will

02:48:12.153 --> 02:48:14.320
require more support and we look for a

02:48:14.320 --> 02:48:15.987
continue to push and hope the

02:48:15.987 --> 02:48:18.098
international community would come in

02:48:18.098 --> 02:48:20.264
as well to do a , uh , UN peacekeeping

02:48:20.264 --> 02:48:19.820
mission . That's probably the way

02:48:19.820 --> 02:48:22.490
forward . Thank you , now you're back .

02:48:24.290 --> 02:48:26.346
Gentlemen , years back , chair and I

02:48:26.346 --> 02:48:28.234
recognized a gentleman from North

02:48:28.234 --> 02:48:30.401
Carolina , Mr . Harrigan . General and

02:48:30.401 --> 02:48:32.401
Admiral , thanks for your testimony

02:48:32.401 --> 02:48:34.623
today . Genuinely appreciate it and I'm

02:48:34.623 --> 02:48:37.809
certainly very thankful for a 97%

02:48:37.809 --> 02:48:40.240
reduction in illegal immigration coming

02:48:40.240 --> 02:48:42.184
from our southern border . I think

02:48:42.184 --> 02:48:44.379
that's a phenomenal testament to your

02:48:44.379 --> 02:48:46.450
work , uh , the work of the men and

02:48:46.450 --> 02:48:48.410
women who serve underneath your

02:48:48.410 --> 02:48:50.889
commands , and , uh , my only

02:48:50.889 --> 02:48:53.009
encouragement is to go stop the other

02:48:53.009 --> 02:48:56.000
three . So from the American people ,

02:48:56.290 --> 02:48:58.679
thank you , and , uh , Chairman , I

02:48:58.679 --> 02:48:59.679
yell back .

02:49:03.440 --> 02:49:05.329
General from Massachusetts , Mr .

02:49:05.329 --> 02:49:08.219
Keating . Thank you Mr . Chairman , at

02:49:08.219 --> 02:49:10.552
the beginning of the opening statements ,

02:49:10.552 --> 02:49:12.552
uh , I noticed our witnesses talked

02:49:12.552 --> 02:49:14.700
about , uh , the importance , uh , in

02:49:14.700 --> 02:49:16.922
the western hemisphere in the north and

02:49:16.922 --> 02:49:18.978
the south from countering , uh , the

02:49:18.978 --> 02:49:21.580
importation of the authoritarian model

02:49:21.580 --> 02:49:25.419
of government . I noticed also that uh

02:49:25.419 --> 02:49:27.475
to counter this , that our witnesses

02:49:27.475 --> 02:49:30.419
said we could do this by our bonding

02:49:30.419 --> 02:49:33.790
and relationship with arms sales . With

02:49:33.790 --> 02:49:37.440
rule of law . And disaster

02:49:37.440 --> 02:49:40.059
assistance , all things that you said

02:49:40.059 --> 02:49:42.150
were important in the relationship .

02:49:42.849 --> 02:49:45.679
And also in questioning uh heard people

02:49:45.679 --> 02:49:48.120
say when they're saying the recent

02:49:48.120 --> 02:49:51.280
events affect our relationship with

02:49:51.280 --> 02:49:53.502
these partners that are so important in

02:49:53.502 --> 02:49:55.730
the hemisphere saying that well it's a

02:49:55.730 --> 02:49:58.360
whole of government approach and it's

02:49:58.360 --> 02:50:00.582
military to military it's fine but it's

02:50:00.582 --> 02:50:03.049
whole of government so I just wanna

02:50:03.049 --> 02:50:05.271
look at it a couple of issues here arms

02:50:05.271 --> 02:50:07.493
sales one of the things that bonds us .

02:50:07.493 --> 02:50:09.493
You know , 8 countries participated

02:50:09.493 --> 02:50:12.540
together on the F-35 partnership .

02:50:13.709 --> 02:50:17.240
And the successor F-47 , President

02:50:17.240 --> 02:50:19.879
Trump said the version sold to our

02:50:19.879 --> 02:50:23.190
allies would be deliberately downgraded

02:50:23.879 --> 02:50:26.830
because someday . They won't be our

02:50:26.830 --> 02:50:29.830
allies . Does that sound , Mr .

02:50:29.870 --> 02:50:31.814
Leonardo like the kind of whole of

02:50:31.814 --> 02:50:33.926
government approach that we should be

02:50:33.926 --> 02:50:36.940
taking ? Sir , as you noted , um ,

02:50:37.009 --> 02:50:38.842
working alongside our allies and

02:50:38.842 --> 02:50:41.009
partners is key to securing the region

02:50:41.009 --> 02:50:43.065
and uh all of the work that we do in

02:50:43.065 --> 02:50:45.120
the Department of Defense across the

02:50:45.120 --> 02:50:47.287
world , uh , we definitely rely on our

02:50:47.287 --> 02:50:49.509
allies and partners to do that . Well ,

02:50:49.509 --> 02:50:51.398
glad you said that , but it's not

02:50:51.398 --> 02:50:53.509
conforming with reality and the facts

02:50:53.509 --> 02:50:55.676
are being done . You see the results .

02:50:55.676 --> 02:50:57.842
Canada just made a $4.2 billion dollar

02:50:57.842 --> 02:51:00.410
agreement with Australia . Uh , just

02:51:00.410 --> 02:51:03.129
this past month , uh , in dealing with

02:51:03.129 --> 02:51:05.990
the cutting edge radar and . They're

02:51:05.990 --> 02:51:08.950
now engaged in talks publicly with the

02:51:08.950 --> 02:51:12.870
EU in their discrete defense uh

02:51:12.870 --> 02:51:15.429
building . Separate from the United

02:51:15.429 --> 02:51:19.040
States . These are the results that

02:51:19.040 --> 02:51:21.389
we're getting in our hemisphere , uh ,

02:51:21.400 --> 02:51:23.122
from this kind of the whole of

02:51:23.122 --> 02:51:25.067
government approach that President

02:51:25.067 --> 02:51:27.929
Trump is issuing in Brazil they're just

02:51:27.929 --> 02:51:30.200
continuing to trade with China and

02:51:30.200 --> 02:51:32.559
they're doing it in Chinese currency .

02:51:33.769 --> 02:51:35.880
Putting our dollar on the sidelines .

02:51:36.879 --> 02:51:39.046
And disaster relief that's supposed to

02:51:39.046 --> 02:51:41.700
bond us all together . President Trump

02:51:41.700 --> 02:51:45.070
just cut USAID money

02:51:45.070 --> 02:51:47.839
drastically the same disaster relief

02:51:47.839 --> 02:51:50.061
that we're talking about that will bond

02:51:50.061 --> 02:51:51.919
us together uh in the Western

02:51:51.919 --> 02:51:55.740
hemisphere . And and I can't imagine ,

02:51:56.209 --> 02:51:58.376
uh , do you think Mr . Leonardo that .

02:51:59.080 --> 02:52:01.349
Saying to Canada that they should be

02:52:01.349 --> 02:52:04.080
the 54th state is a whole of government

02:52:04.080 --> 02:52:06.302
approach bringing our allies together .

02:52:07.450 --> 02:52:09.339
Sir , I just recently met with my

02:52:09.339 --> 02:52:11.561
counterpart in Canada , uh , and , uh ,

02:52:11.561 --> 02:52:13.561
as , as noted earlier , the mill to

02:52:13.561 --> 02:52:15.728
mill relationship is strong . So you ,

02:52:15.728 --> 02:52:15.650
so you're saying they like this in

02:52:15.650 --> 02:52:17.817
Canada , sir ? Are you happy with that

02:52:17.817 --> 02:52:20.094
statement in Canada ? As noted earlier ,

02:52:20.094 --> 02:52:22.206
we want to make sure we have reliable

02:52:22.206 --> 02:52:24.428
partners and not reliant partners , and

02:52:24.428 --> 02:52:26.650
at times with our friends we have to be

02:52:26.650 --> 02:52:28.872
firm . So , so having statehood . Is is

02:52:28.872 --> 02:52:31.094
good . You don't think that's demeaning

02:52:31.094 --> 02:52:33.206
to the country of Canada , sir , uh ,

02:52:33.206 --> 02:52:35.150
as noted , what about , what about

02:52:35.150 --> 02:52:37.261
taking over Greenland if necessary by

02:52:37.261 --> 02:52:40.195
force ? Is that making uh us bond with

02:52:40.195 --> 02:52:41.806
our people here ? What about

02:52:42.075 --> 02:52:44.554
threatening to invade Mexico ? Is that

02:52:44.554 --> 02:52:48.105
making us bond with them or , or Panama

02:52:48.434 --> 02:52:50.519
for that matter ? I mean , these are

02:52:50.519 --> 02:52:52.360
things you think the whole of

02:52:52.360 --> 02:52:54.559
government approach bringing us

02:52:54.559 --> 02:52:57.179
together and and what about the rule of

02:52:57.179 --> 02:53:00.000
law ? What about the rule of law that

02:53:00.000 --> 02:53:02.111
one of the things that was referenced

02:53:02.111 --> 02:53:04.278
in the beginning holding us together .

02:53:04.278 --> 02:53:06.056
Do you think that having a vice

02:53:06.056 --> 02:53:08.179
president that says that well if the

02:53:08.179 --> 02:53:10.940
courts here say one thing , what are

02:53:10.940 --> 02:53:13.379
they gonna do ? They can't make us

02:53:13.379 --> 02:53:15.601
implement that is that a good statement

02:53:15.601 --> 02:53:17.712
in a whole of government to for these

02:53:17.712 --> 02:53:19.935
bonding things we talked about right at

02:53:19.935 --> 02:53:22.157
the outset of this hearing uh I am just

02:53:22.157 --> 02:53:25.129
Mr . Leonardo . Maybe you found the one

02:53:25.129 --> 02:53:27.259
person in Canada that wasn't offended

02:53:27.929 --> 02:53:30.096
by saying it wasn't , they don't , you

02:53:30.096 --> 02:53:32.096
know , the president didn't want to

02:53:32.096 --> 02:53:34.151
make him the fifty-first state , but

02:53:34.151 --> 02:53:36.151
what about the rest of Canada ? You

02:53:36.151 --> 02:53:38.262
can't close your eyes to these things

02:53:38.262 --> 02:53:40.429
and I understand the military is gonna

02:53:40.429 --> 02:53:42.262
work in there , you know , their

02:53:42.262 --> 02:53:44.485
universe , but you're here representing

02:53:44.485 --> 02:53:46.540
the administration . You can you sit

02:53:46.540 --> 02:53:48.762
there and tell me these are things that

02:53:48.762 --> 02:53:51.349
bond us together the same way that the

02:53:51.349 --> 02:53:54.769
initial testimony indicated . After

02:53:54.769 --> 02:53:57.070
many administrations' attempts to have

02:53:57.070 --> 02:53:59.237
our allies and partners increase their

02:53:59.237 --> 02:54:01.459
investment in defense , President Trump

02:54:01.459 --> 02:54:03.570
was the first to get the Europeans to

02:54:03.570 --> 02:54:05.792
pay more . I think sometimes we need to

02:54:05.792 --> 02:54:05.509
have tough love with our allies and

02:54:05.509 --> 02:54:07.620
partners so that we can be reliable .

02:54:07.620 --> 02:54:09.342
Well , I'd say this if I could

02:54:09.342 --> 02:54:11.453
gentleman's time expired . You're not

02:54:11.453 --> 02:54:11.389
recognized gentleman from Georgia , Mr .

02:54:11.469 --> 02:54:14.059
McCormick . Thank you Mr . Chair , and

02:54:14.059 --> 02:54:16.003
with your permission , I'd like to

02:54:16.003 --> 02:54:18.170
yield 30 seconds to Representative Van

02:54:18.170 --> 02:54:20.392
Hoden . Mr . Leonardo , if someone in a

02:54:20.392 --> 02:54:22.615
previous administration on the National

02:54:22.615 --> 02:54:24.448
Security Council conspired to to

02:54:24.448 --> 02:54:26.170
unlawfully disclose classified

02:54:26.170 --> 02:54:28.392
information to start something like the

02:54:28.392 --> 02:54:30.559
Russia collusion hoax , should they be

02:54:30.559 --> 02:54:32.781
able to hold a security clearance ? Yes

02:54:32.781 --> 02:54:35.003
or no ? No , thank you . I yield back .

02:54:35.003 --> 02:54:37.115
Thank you . Uh , first of all , great

02:54:37.115 --> 02:54:39.392
to see you . I , I just , uh , general ,

02:54:39.392 --> 02:54:41.670
I just talked to , uh , General Carnes .

02:54:41.670 --> 02:54:43.837
He's a big fan of yours . He's working

02:54:43.837 --> 02:54:43.410
well with you up from I understand you

02:54:43.410 --> 02:54:45.077
guys are doing great things .

02:54:45.077 --> 02:54:47.299
Appreciate you . Also , you know , it's

02:54:47.299 --> 02:54:49.354
funny as a Marine , I remember I saw

02:54:49.354 --> 02:54:51.410
majors , you know , I always like to

02:54:51.410 --> 02:54:51.290
see that scow on the second roll . It

02:54:51.290 --> 02:54:53.290
makes me feel much more at home . I

02:54:53.290 --> 02:54:55.123
appreciate that . I got a box of

02:54:55.123 --> 02:54:57.290
crowyons for you when we get done , it

02:54:57.290 --> 02:54:57.009
would be awesome . We'll , we'll we'll

02:54:57.009 --> 02:54:59.799
eat together . Um , I appreciate

02:54:59.799 --> 02:55:01.966
everything we're doing right now . One

02:55:01.966 --> 02:55:04.077
of the big questions I had for , uh ,

02:55:04.077 --> 02:55:03.519
actually I wanna start with Admiral

02:55:03.519 --> 02:55:05.790
Halsey if you don't mind . Uh , the

02:55:05.790 --> 02:55:07.568
Chinese fishing fleet is really

02:55:07.568 --> 02:55:09.512
worrisome to me . Obviously it's a

02:55:09.512 --> 02:55:11.623
paramilitary unit that's used to kind

02:55:11.623 --> 02:55:13.790
of confound our issues , especially in

02:55:13.790 --> 02:55:13.669
the western hemisphere . I'm very

02:55:13.669 --> 02:55:16.769
concerned about that . Uh , our

02:55:16.769 --> 02:55:18.769
maritime sovereignty in the Western

02:55:18.769 --> 02:55:20.825
Hemisphere in the Monroe Doctrine is

02:55:20.825 --> 02:55:20.389
very important to me . I think we've

02:55:20.389 --> 02:55:22.333
really led up on that . We've seen

02:55:22.333 --> 02:55:24.389
incursions by China and Russia , the

02:55:24.389 --> 02:55:26.167
influence they have in Brazil ,

02:55:26.167 --> 02:55:29.070
Venezuela , Cuba , Panama . I mean ,

02:55:29.120 --> 02:55:30.842
just to name a few , it's very

02:55:30.842 --> 02:55:32.898
concerning to me . What do you think

02:55:32.898 --> 02:55:35.009
our best tools are to combat that not

02:55:35.009 --> 02:55:37.400
only militarily but also from aIOS ? I

02:55:37.400 --> 02:55:39.567
think the best , uh , tool , uh , goes

02:55:39.567 --> 02:55:41.733
for me is goes with presence , right ?

02:55:41.733 --> 02:55:43.622
Presence means power . It sends a

02:55:43.622 --> 02:55:45.567
strong message , but also security

02:55:45.567 --> 02:55:47.733
cooperation allows us to give a chance

02:55:47.733 --> 02:55:46.900
to build our partner capability

02:55:46.900 --> 02:55:48.956
capacity . One of the key things our

02:55:48.956 --> 02:55:50.956
partners are asking for is maritime

02:55:50.956 --> 02:55:52.956
domain awareness to get the fishing

02:55:52.956 --> 02:55:55.067
fleet . They don't have the assets to

02:55:55.067 --> 02:55:54.059
get out there . They don't actually see

02:55:54.059 --> 02:55:56.170
what's out there , right ? So right ,

02:55:56.170 --> 02:55:58.170
we have to make sure we continue to

02:55:58.170 --> 02:55:58.049
build their capability capacity and

02:55:58.049 --> 02:56:00.639
have assets to support them . Thank you .

02:56:00.650 --> 02:56:02.872
And what , what assets are we lacking ?

02:56:02.872 --> 02:56:04.650
I know that when you talk about

02:56:04.650 --> 02:56:06.706
paramilitary force that it's hard to

02:56:06.706 --> 02:56:08.706
confront directly obviously we know

02:56:08.706 --> 02:56:07.969
what they're doing for intel we know

02:56:07.969 --> 02:56:09.969
what they're doing to confound us .

02:56:09.969 --> 02:56:11.747
What can we do better as far as

02:56:11.747 --> 02:56:13.969
supplying you with the necessary assets

02:56:13.969 --> 02:56:16.302
to combat this ? So to be , to be clear ,

02:56:16.302 --> 02:56:18.580
as I look at the , uh , my Navy assets ,

02:56:18.580 --> 02:56:20.802
I have one navy ship today , right ? So

02:56:20.802 --> 02:56:20.320
I gotta do more . I mean I do more

02:56:20.320 --> 02:56:22.431
assets throughout the region and also

02:56:22.431 --> 02:56:24.542
uh when I look at the uh partners and

02:56:24.542 --> 02:56:26.764
what they don't have . I think security

02:56:26.764 --> 02:56:28.876
cooperation gets those the tools they

02:56:28.876 --> 02:56:30.876
need . We've got some great support

02:56:30.876 --> 02:56:33.209
with Exim Bank to try to , uh , buy and ,

02:56:33.209 --> 02:56:32.639
and get in front of the foreign

02:56:32.639 --> 02:56:34.695
military sales process . But again ,

02:56:34.695 --> 02:56:36.806
having them the assets so they can do

02:56:36.806 --> 02:56:39.028
their own , and we can support them . I

02:56:39.028 --> 02:56:38.679
mean our defense of this homeland is

02:56:38.679 --> 02:56:40.790
tied to their resiliency , security ,

02:56:40.790 --> 02:56:42.901
and stability . So we gotta make sure

02:56:42.901 --> 02:56:45.012
we continue to support them as well ,

02:56:45.012 --> 02:56:47.179
OK ? And what can we do from a partner

02:56:47.179 --> 02:56:47.040
aspect of encouraging these nations ,

02:56:47.320 --> 02:56:49.487
especially those ones that are tipping

02:56:49.487 --> 02:56:51.598
right now , the ones that are , are ,

02:56:51.598 --> 02:56:53.764
are right on the . Birds are basically

02:56:53.764 --> 02:56:55.931
handing it over to the bad guys . What

02:56:55.931 --> 02:56:57.931
do we do better as a nation , as in

02:56:57.931 --> 02:57:00.098
diplomacy to keep them tight , to , to

02:57:00.098 --> 02:56:59.959
bring them back over to where we want

02:56:59.959 --> 02:57:02.070
them to be ? I think a starting point

02:57:02.070 --> 02:57:01.919
is you have to make sure our

02:57:01.919 --> 02:57:04.030
ambassadors are in place , right , so

02:57:04.030 --> 02:57:06.141
they continue to work with them , and

02:57:06.141 --> 02:57:08.030
then we start looking for ways to

02:57:08.030 --> 02:57:10.252
increase the economic engagement . Uh ,

02:57:10.252 --> 02:57:09.959
we have an economic strategic working

02:57:09.959 --> 02:57:12.126
group we started a couple of years ago

02:57:12.126 --> 02:57:12.089
with , uh , working with the Department

02:57:12.089 --> 02:57:14.830
of Commerce to look to find that direct

02:57:14.830 --> 02:57:16.997
investment from the United States . We

02:57:16.997 --> 02:57:19.219
have to do that . Excellent . General ,

02:57:19.370 --> 02:57:21.370
appreciate you being here . I don't

02:57:21.370 --> 02:57:23.481
have many questions for you to please

02:57:23.481 --> 02:57:25.814
give General Carnes my absolute regards .

02:57:25.814 --> 02:57:27.759
He is a stud . Thank you , sir . I

02:57:27.759 --> 02:57:29.870
agree with that a yield , sir . Jimmy

02:57:29.870 --> 02:57:29.530
Yal's back . This will be the last

02:57:29.530 --> 02:57:31.610
questioner in the open session , a

02:57:31.610 --> 02:57:33.629
gentleman from New York , uh , Mr .

02:57:33.730 --> 02:57:37.139
Ryan . Thank you Mr . Chairman .

02:57:37.419 --> 02:57:39.830
I appreciate you all being here and as

02:57:39.830 --> 02:57:41.941
we approach 3 hours , appreciate your

02:57:42.580 --> 02:57:45.179
resilience and endurance uh through all

02:57:45.179 --> 02:57:48.030
of our , our questions . Um , I'll try

02:57:48.030 --> 02:57:50.900
to be , uh , relatively , relatively ,

02:57:51.030 --> 02:57:53.419
uh , respectful and , and gentle here ,

02:57:53.509 --> 02:57:56.679
um , two topics I want to hit on . Uh ,

02:57:56.919 --> 02:57:59.141
first , uh , some of my colleagues have

02:57:59.141 --> 02:58:01.197
talked about this several on counter

02:58:01.197 --> 02:58:02.863
UAS , um , but I want to just

02:58:02.863 --> 02:58:04.808
reemphasize the importance of this

02:58:04.808 --> 02:58:06.975
point and , and share in my district .

02:58:06.975 --> 02:58:06.730
Uh , we have a really interesting set

02:58:06.730 --> 02:58:09.349
up where we have , uh , Stuart Air

02:58:09.349 --> 02:58:11.460
National Guard Base , which is both ,

02:58:11.460 --> 02:58:13.793
uh , Air National Guard , but also , uh ,

02:58:13.793 --> 02:58:15.905
uh , an actual international civilian

02:58:15.905 --> 02:58:17.682
airport which presents a lot of

02:58:17.682 --> 02:58:19.793
complexities and , and late last year

02:58:19.793 --> 02:58:22.160
we actually had . Um , a series of

02:58:22.160 --> 02:58:24.382
controlled airspace drone incursions in

02:58:24.382 --> 02:58:28.360
December 2024 , including several very ,

02:58:28.450 --> 02:58:30.610
very sizable , uh , drones that were

02:58:30.610 --> 02:58:34.469
within 25 ft of our C-17 fleet at

02:58:34.490 --> 02:58:36.601
at Stuart . Uh , the airport actually

02:58:36.601 --> 02:58:39.370
had to close down under , um , on the

02:58:39.370 --> 02:58:41.889
FAA side , which is in and of itself

02:58:41.889 --> 02:58:44.269
unprecedented . And in conversations

02:58:44.269 --> 02:58:46.940
with uh leadership there at Stewart ,

02:58:47.190 --> 02:58:49.160
they are still doing their best

02:58:49.160 --> 02:58:51.216
certainly and working very very hard

02:58:51.216 --> 02:58:53.216
but feel that they still don't have

02:58:53.216 --> 02:58:55.104
full clarity on authorities and I

02:58:55.104 --> 02:58:55.030
appreciate some of your answers on that

02:58:55.030 --> 02:58:57.400
General Gio today . Um , and also

02:58:57.400 --> 02:59:00.040
certainly don't have the tech and , and

02:59:00.040 --> 02:59:02.262
some of the , uh , other support pieces

02:59:02.262 --> 02:59:04.596
that I that they need . So on that note ,

02:59:04.596 --> 02:59:06.651
General Gios , um , you talked about

02:59:06.651 --> 02:59:08.959
130I . Have you actually recommended to

02:59:08.959 --> 02:59:11.349
the secretary that all installations

02:59:11.599 --> 02:59:13.599
have that ? I know you said that in

02:59:13.599 --> 02:59:15.377
your previous answer . Has that

02:59:15.377 --> 02:59:17.210
recommendation been made ? Yes ,

02:59:17.210 --> 02:59:16.740
Congressman , I have made that

02:59:16.740 --> 02:59:18.740
recommendation . Is your sense that

02:59:18.740 --> 02:59:20.860
that's moving quickly or that there's

02:59:20.860 --> 02:59:22.971
anything we can do to accelerate that

02:59:22.971 --> 02:59:25.138
given the , the urgency ? So it's been

02:59:25.138 --> 02:59:27.027
uh well received and I think it's

02:59:27.027 --> 02:59:29.027
moving quickly . That and the other

02:59:29.027 --> 02:59:31.249
three elements that I brought up that ,

02:59:31.249 --> 02:59:33.249
uh , I think we need to , to better

02:59:33.249 --> 02:59:35.193
address this threat , this growing

02:59:35.193 --> 02:59:37.360
threat . Thank you , um , and I know I

02:59:37.360 --> 02:59:39.471
think it was , uh , my colleague Mr .

02:59:39.471 --> 02:59:41.582
Whitman spoke about sort of deploying

02:59:41.582 --> 02:59:43.360
some sort of relatively rapidly

02:59:43.360 --> 02:59:46.110
deployable . Set of tools is that

02:59:46.110 --> 02:59:48.110
something that uh the committee can

02:59:48.110 --> 02:59:50.277
support or that that we can support to

02:59:50.277 --> 02:59:52.388
push on ? Congressman , I'll take any

02:59:52.388 --> 02:59:54.610
help I can get there . Uh , we have the

02:59:54.610 --> 02:59:56.790
authority now to use flyaway kits . I

02:59:56.790 --> 02:59:58.846
think we have the great relationship

02:59:58.846 --> 03:00:01.068
with FAA that would allow us to operate

03:00:01.068 --> 03:00:03.068
them quickly . Uh , we just need to

03:00:03.068 --> 03:00:05.123
procure and , you know , field those

03:00:05.123 --> 03:00:07.457
kits so we can respond to Picatinny and ,

03:00:07.457 --> 03:00:09.512
and , and Stewart in a , in a fast ,

03:00:09.512 --> 03:00:11.623
you know , my goal would be inside of

03:00:11.623 --> 03:00:14.040
24 hours being able to respond . And

03:00:14.040 --> 03:00:16.262
just to to build on that very quickly ,

03:00:16.262 --> 03:00:18.373
to their credit on the ground and and

03:00:18.373 --> 03:00:20.596
partnering with the the tag in New York

03:00:20.596 --> 03:00:22.818
State , there are , there are some very

03:00:22.818 --> 03:00:24.762
uh sophisticated tech capabilities

03:00:24.762 --> 03:00:24.559
there at Stewart at that they're

03:00:24.559 --> 03:00:26.615
exercising and practicing now and so

03:00:26.615 --> 03:00:28.670
figuring out to the chairman's point

03:00:28.670 --> 03:00:30.781
and the ranking member's point how to

03:00:30.781 --> 03:00:33.003
speed up the procurement of those exact

03:00:33.003 --> 03:00:32.679
kind of capabilities , I think it's

03:00:32.679 --> 03:00:34.846
something we're we're all keen to push

03:00:34.846 --> 03:00:37.190
on . Uh , very quickly , um , I wanted

03:00:37.190 --> 03:00:39.523
to shift to a different topic and , and ,

03:00:39.523 --> 03:00:41.746
uh , bring both general and the Admiral

03:00:41.746 --> 03:00:44.079
into this , um , and , and possibly you ,

03:00:44.079 --> 03:00:46.301
Mr . Leonardo as well if we have time .

03:00:46.301 --> 03:00:48.412
There was very concerning reporting ,

03:00:48.412 --> 03:00:50.634
uh , about a potential consolidation of

03:00:50.634 --> 03:00:52.746
NorthCom and SouthCom into into a new

03:00:52.746 --> 03:00:54.634
entity , um , not a lot of public

03:00:54.634 --> 03:00:56.990
details available , um , but I , I

03:00:56.990 --> 03:00:59.157
wanna commend and , and acknowledge my

03:00:59.157 --> 03:01:01.212
colleagues including Chairman Rogers

03:01:01.212 --> 03:01:03.379
and and Sasse Chairman Wicker speaking

03:01:03.379 --> 03:01:05.434
out saying at a minimum . We're very

03:01:05.434 --> 03:01:07.657
concerned about reports that this uh is

03:01:07.657 --> 03:01:09.712
being considered and quote , we will

03:01:09.712 --> 03:01:11.823
not accept significant changes to our

03:01:11.823 --> 03:01:13.879
war fighting structure that are made

03:01:13.879 --> 03:01:16.157
without a rigorous interagency process ,

03:01:16.157 --> 03:01:18.323
coordination with combatant commanders

03:01:18.323 --> 03:01:20.379
in the joint staff and collaboration

03:01:20.379 --> 03:01:22.323
with Congress . Um , actually I'll

03:01:22.323 --> 03:01:22.280
start actually with you , Mr . Leonardo

03:01:22.280 --> 03:01:24.502
is that happening right now ? Is this ,

03:01:24.502 --> 03:01:26.502
is this real ? Is this just another

03:01:26.502 --> 03:01:28.724
thing that's sort of been put out there

03:01:28.724 --> 03:01:28.639
or is there an actual interagency

03:01:28.639 --> 03:01:30.750
process playing along and do you plan

03:01:30.750 --> 03:01:32.528
to update the Congress and this

03:01:32.528 --> 03:01:34.709
committee on that ? Um , I , I don't

03:01:34.709 --> 03:01:36.265
wanna get ahead of internal

03:01:36.265 --> 03:01:38.487
deliberations , but I will note we want

03:01:38.487 --> 03:01:40.820
to maintain a strong collaboration , uh ,

03:01:40.820 --> 03:01:42.987
with Congress to make sure that , uh ,

03:01:42.987 --> 03:01:45.098
you have up to date information . And

03:01:45.098 --> 03:01:45.019
I'll also note , as I started today ,

03:01:45.269 --> 03:01:47.309
the homeland and , uh , and Western

03:01:47.309 --> 03:01:49.531
Hemisphere are high priorities for this

03:01:49.531 --> 03:01:51.698
administration . So any such decisions

03:01:51.698 --> 03:01:53.531
would have to weigh against what

03:01:53.531 --> 03:01:55.531
resources are necessary in order to

03:01:55.531 --> 03:01:55.349
fulfill the missions that we need to do

03:01:55.349 --> 03:01:57.669
in those areas . Do you acknowledge and

03:01:57.669 --> 03:01:59.669
does the administration acknowledge

03:01:59.669 --> 03:02:01.780
that this would require an actual act

03:02:01.780 --> 03:02:03.891
of Congress to do ? Uh , I wouldn't ,

03:02:03.891 --> 03:02:06.169
uh , like to speak on the hypothetical ,

03:02:06.169 --> 03:02:08.447
uh , questions , it's not hypothetical .

03:02:08.447 --> 03:02:10.336
I'm asking you , would removing a

03:02:10.336 --> 03:02:12.280
combatant command , which has been

03:02:12.280 --> 03:02:14.447
proposed require or merging to , to be

03:02:14.447 --> 03:02:17.150
specific , require congressional , uh ,

03:02:17.360 --> 03:02:19.416
approval and , and , uh , ultimately

03:02:19.416 --> 03:02:21.638
authorization ? I have to , uh , review

03:02:21.638 --> 03:02:23.749
with the lawyers , sir , um , whether

03:02:23.749 --> 03:02:25.582
or not that would require , um ,

03:02:25.582 --> 03:02:27.916
congressional authorization . I know we ,

03:02:27.916 --> 03:02:29.971
well , I , I'm , I'm out of time . I

03:02:29.971 --> 03:02:29.080
appreciate it and I know we're at the

03:02:29.080 --> 03:02:31.024
end . Thank you , Mr . Chair , for

03:02:31.024 --> 03:02:33.429
giving me the time . Uh , gentlemen ,

03:02:33.509 --> 03:02:36.389
Yo's back . We will now , uh , recess

03:02:36.389 --> 03:02:38.870
this open session and move to

03:02:38.870 --> 03:02:42.559
2212 for the closed session of the

03:02:42.559 --> 03:02:45.030
hearing which will start at 10 minutes

03:02:45.030 --> 03:02:46.450
after 1 o'clock .

03:02:49.639 --> 03:02:50.900
committee stands adjourned .