WEBVTT 00:16.979 --> 00:19.180 Slowly the darkness enveloped the 00:19.180 --> 00:22.569 surrounding countryside . Having 00:22.569 --> 00:24.402 completed preparations for their 00:24.402 --> 00:26.530 upcoming operation . The soldiers of 00:26.530 --> 00:28.641 Company K were attempting to pass the 00:28.641 --> 00:31.090 time . Some of them slept . Those too 00:31.090 --> 00:33.049 anxious to rest gathered in small 00:33.049 --> 00:35.610 groups , chatting . For most of the 00:35.610 --> 00:37.832 company , this would be its first major 00:37.832 --> 00:41.200 operation and morale was high . Just 00:41.200 --> 00:43.089 beyond their line of sight in the 00:43.089 --> 00:45.419 gathering darkness loomed their 00:45.419 --> 00:49.380 objective . This is the story of 00:49.380 --> 00:51.900 a small bitterly contested fight for 00:51.900 --> 00:53.919 two featureless hills in the late 00:53.919 --> 00:57.860 spring of 1944 . The setting was the 00:57.860 --> 01:00.169 normally placid Italian countryside 01:00.569 --> 01:02.819 made a battleground during World War 01:02.819 --> 01:05.430 Two . It's less a story of grand 01:05.430 --> 01:08.110 strategy than the close combat that 01:08.110 --> 01:10.332 allowed the Allies to defeat the German 01:10.332 --> 01:12.430 army and bring peace to the European 01:12.430 --> 01:14.949 continent . At the lowest level of 01:14.949 --> 01:17.309 warfare , chance and uncertainty played 01:17.309 --> 01:20.389 a greater role than technology and 01:20.389 --> 01:21.199 generalship . 01:24.879 --> 01:27.069 The allies had been fighting in Italy 01:27.069 --> 01:30.269 for 8 exhausting months . The campaign 01:30.269 --> 01:33.790 began in September 1943 with multiple 01:33.790 --> 01:36.269 Allied amphibious landings across the 01:36.269 --> 01:38.436 southern portion of the Italian boot , 01:38.510 --> 01:41.239 followed by slow but steady progress up 01:41.239 --> 01:43.470 the peninsula . By this phase of the 01:43.470 --> 01:45.470 war , the German forces in Italy 01:45.470 --> 01:47.750 possessed few tactical or operational 01:47.750 --> 01:49.694 advantages over the Allies still . 01:50.569 --> 01:53.080 Numerical parity with the allies and 01:53.080 --> 01:54.969 the mountainous topography of the 01:54.969 --> 01:57.569 peninsula favored the defense . As the 01:57.569 --> 02:00.190 Allies pushed north towards Rome , the 02:00.190 --> 02:02.510 Germans used the terrain and fought a 02:02.510 --> 02:05.110 series of delays to buy time to 02:05.110 --> 02:07.277 complete the construction of defensive 02:07.277 --> 02:09.499 barriers between the central portion of 02:09.499 --> 02:12.070 the peninsula and Rome . The Prussian 02:12.070 --> 02:13.740 military philosopher Karl von 02:13.740 --> 02:16.710 Clausewitz stated that defense is the 02:16.710 --> 02:19.410 strongest form of war . The Germans 02:19.410 --> 02:22.119 worked hard to exploit every advantage 02:22.119 --> 02:24.570 the defense could offer . The allies 02:24.570 --> 02:26.649 fought their way north , attacking 02:26.649 --> 02:28.427 across the width of the Italian 02:28.427 --> 02:32.279 peninsula . Between late December 1943 02:32.279 --> 02:35.800 and January 1944 , the Allies made 02:35.800 --> 02:37.800 contact with the Germans' extensive 02:37.800 --> 02:41.350 defensive positions . The winter line 02:41.350 --> 02:43.990 was 3 defensive belts comprised of 1 02:43.990 --> 02:47.270 primary and 2 secondaries . The Germans 02:47.270 --> 02:49.589 designed this line to a trip and stop 02:49.589 --> 02:52.149 allied movement , avert penetration of 02:52.149 --> 02:54.710 the leery and Po River valleys , and 02:54.710 --> 02:56.960 prevent the capture of Rome . The 02:56.960 --> 02:59.119 primary set of defensive belts , the 02:59.119 --> 03:01.119 Gustav Line , extended from the 03:01.119 --> 03:03.175 Tyrannian Sea on the western side of 03:03.175 --> 03:05.440 the peninsula east through the Apennine 03:05.440 --> 03:07.496 Mountains to the mouth of the Sangre 03:07.496 --> 03:10.679 River on the Adriatic coast . The 03:10.679 --> 03:12.901 Gustav line was supported by the Hitler 03:12.901 --> 03:15.600 line and the Bernhardt line . The most 03:15.600 --> 03:17.544 physically imposing portion of the 03:17.544 --> 03:19.759 Gustav line was a series of defenses 03:19.759 --> 03:21.960 centered around the monastery at Monte 03:21.960 --> 03:22.669 Casino . 03:26.289 --> 03:28.570 These defenses constructed by prisoners 03:28.570 --> 03:31.080 of war and forced labor consisted of 03:31.630 --> 03:34.100 wire obstacles in depth to funnel the 03:34.100 --> 03:36.100 enemy into predetermined engagement 03:36.100 --> 03:39.369 areas , complex minefields consisting 03:39.369 --> 03:41.970 of both anti-tank and anti-personnel 03:41.970 --> 03:45.119 mines integrated with wire obstacles 03:45.119 --> 03:47.230 designed to cover dead space and deny 03:47.230 --> 03:50.410 favorable avenues of approach . Finally , 03:50.860 --> 03:53.179 concrete reinforced fighting positions 03:53.179 --> 03:55.580 and pillboxes in addition to 03:55.580 --> 03:57.860 pre-planned indirect fires over 03:57.860 --> 04:00.559 watching these obstacles . These 04:00.559 --> 04:02.781 positions adhered to German doctrine of 04:02.781 --> 04:04.839 the time . Outposts and observation 04:04.839 --> 04:07.006 posts armed with crew serve weapons on 04:07.006 --> 04:09.228 the front slope , all covering possible 04:09.228 --> 04:11.479 avenues of approach and tied into the 04:11.479 --> 04:13.646 natural terrain features with the bulk 04:13.646 --> 04:15.757 of the defending force on the reverse 04:15.757 --> 04:19.040 slope . The defense was supported by a 04:19.040 --> 04:21.920 wide array of German indirect fires 04:21.920 --> 04:23.976 with pre-registered target reference 04:23.976 --> 04:26.070 points along possible avenues of 04:26.070 --> 04:28.359 approach and enemy concentration areas . 04:29.089 --> 04:31.519 The German defenses were nothing if not 04:31.519 --> 04:34.589 thorough . By the beginning of 04:34.589 --> 04:38.109 1944 , the US 5th Army in the west and 04:38.109 --> 04:40.549 the British 8th Army in the east had 04:40.549 --> 04:43.089 tried and failed in multiple attempts 04:43.089 --> 04:45.809 to penetrate these defensive lines . To 04:45.809 --> 04:48.010 overcome these setbacks , something 04:48.010 --> 04:50.809 bold was required an audacious 04:50.809 --> 04:52.642 operation to outblank the German 04:52.642 --> 04:54.769 defenses and bring about the collapse 04:54.769 --> 04:56.713 of the entire German front and the 04:56.713 --> 04:59.170 liberation of Rome . The initial 04:59.170 --> 05:01.420 concept of the operation came to 05:01.420 --> 05:03.142 British Prime Minister Winston 05:03.142 --> 05:05.253 Churchill as he lay in a hospital bed 05:05.253 --> 05:07.670 in Morocco recovering from pneumonia . 05:08.260 --> 05:10.459 It was passed down to 5th Army and 05:10.459 --> 05:12.500 given the code name Shingle . 05:16.769 --> 05:18.769 Operation Shingle was an amphibious 05:18.769 --> 05:21.130 landing near Anzio on the western side 05:21.130 --> 05:23.649 of the peninsula centered around the US 05:23.649 --> 05:26.320 6th Corps . Initially the landings were 05:26.320 --> 05:29.119 a success , but the Allies faltered . 05:29.880 --> 05:31.824 The Germans took advantage of this 05:31.824 --> 05:34.470 indecision with a counterattack that 05:34.470 --> 05:36.630 almost threw the Allies back into the 05:36.630 --> 05:40.160 sea . Only reinforcements , air and 05:40.160 --> 05:42.890 naval power saved the 6 corps lodgement . 05:43.670 --> 05:46.279 By the end of March , 15th Army Group 05:46.279 --> 05:48.720 planners had devised a new operation to 05:48.720 --> 05:51.000 break the deadlock and open the way to 05:51.000 --> 05:54.070 Rome . This time , the code name given 05:54.070 --> 05:57.410 was Diodem . For Operation Diodem , 05:57.600 --> 06:00.000 General Harold Alexander and the 15th 06:00.000 --> 06:02.222 Army Group planners envisioned that the 06:02.222 --> 06:04.167 Germans would most likely fight to 06:04.167 --> 06:07.029 defend the Gustav line . Once this was 06:07.029 --> 06:09.350 endangered , their next likely course 06:09.350 --> 06:11.549 of action would be to displace to a 06:11.549 --> 06:13.910 subsequent defensive position known as 06:13.910 --> 06:16.470 the Hitler Line roughly 9 kilometers 06:16.470 --> 06:19.040 from the Gustav line . The construction 06:19.040 --> 06:21.600 of this defensive line had only begun a 06:21.600 --> 06:23.720 few months prior , so it was far from 06:23.720 --> 06:26.269 complete . Once this was endangered , 06:26.480 --> 06:28.647 they would again displaced to what the 06:28.647 --> 06:31.480 planning group referred to as line C or 06:31.480 --> 06:33.959 the so-called Caesar line immediately 06:33.959 --> 06:36.559 south of Rome . The Germans had barely 06:36.559 --> 06:38.730 begun work on this line as aerial 06:38.730 --> 06:40.674 reconnaissance photos revealed the 06:40.674 --> 06:42.897 Caesar line as nothing more than simple 06:42.897 --> 06:44.769 earthworks . Once this line was 06:44.769 --> 06:46.910 jeopardized , the Germans would then 06:46.910 --> 06:49.021 displace to positions further north . 06:49.920 --> 06:51.809 To shape the battlefield prior to 06:51.809 --> 06:53.880 diadem , the Mediterranean Allied 06:53.880 --> 06:57.160 Tactical Air Forces MATTA initiated 06:57.160 --> 07:00.480 Operation Strangle on 24 March 1944 . 07:01.339 --> 07:03.859 Mattaf envisioned that the air phase of 07:03.859 --> 07:07.760 the plan will win Rome . This was to be 07:07.760 --> 07:10.589 done by cutting lines of communication , 07:10.980 --> 07:13.147 road and rail , and the destruction of 07:13.147 --> 07:15.489 enemy coastal shipping to the point 07:15.489 --> 07:18.019 where they cannot possibly supply the 07:18.019 --> 07:20.980 17 to 20 divisions south of that line . 07:21.880 --> 07:24.040 While Matta were confident that air 07:24.040 --> 07:25.818 power alone could win the day , 07:26.359 --> 07:28.470 Alexander and his maneuver commanders 07:28.470 --> 07:30.700 and their staffs realized that only a 07:30.700 --> 07:33.119 combined arms land operation would 07:33.119 --> 07:35.230 bring about the decisive results they 07:35.230 --> 07:38.600 sought in late April , Alexander 07:38.600 --> 07:40.720 received the go ahead to initiate 07:40.720 --> 07:44.700 diadem . In his operations order of 07:44.700 --> 07:47.579 1 May , Alexander outlined the upcoming 07:47.579 --> 07:50.649 operation . His intent was to destroy 07:50.649 --> 07:52.927 the right wing of the German 10th Army , 07:52.980 --> 07:54.980 to drive what remains of it and the 07:54.980 --> 07:58.079 German 14th Army north of Rome . The 07:58.079 --> 08:00.350 scheme of maneuver would see the allies 08:00.350 --> 08:02.572 abandon their broad front strategy from 08:02.572 --> 08:04.950 earlier in the campaign . Instead , 08:05.279 --> 08:07.446 through a combination of night marches 08:07.446 --> 08:09.557 and deception operations , the Allies 08:09.557 --> 08:11.720 had moved the entire British 8th Army 08:11.720 --> 08:14.070 from the Adriatic coast undetected , 08:14.589 --> 08:17.089 leaving behind a token force . They 08:17.089 --> 08:18.867 then readjusted the British and 08:18.867 --> 08:20.367 American unit boundaries , 08:20.489 --> 08:22.410 concentrating them along a much 08:22.410 --> 08:24.730 narrower front of no more than 30 08:24.730 --> 08:27.019 kilometers from the Tyrannian Sea in 08:27.019 --> 08:29.480 the west to the Leary River . On the 08:29.480 --> 08:31.690 eastern wing , the British 8th Army 08:31.690 --> 08:33.912 would seek to penetrate the Leary River 08:33.912 --> 08:36.049 Valley , continue the attack towards 08:36.049 --> 08:38.280 Rome with a limit of advance north of 08:38.280 --> 08:41.289 the city . The US 5th Army was to 08:41.289 --> 08:43.400 attack through the Arunzi Mountains , 08:43.400 --> 08:45.289 link up with the 6th Corps forces 08:45.289 --> 08:47.400 breaking out of the ANZIO perimeter , 08:47.400 --> 08:49.456 and cut off or destroy the forces of 08:49.456 --> 08:51.799 the German 10th Army . Diodem would 08:51.799 --> 08:55.200 commence across the front at 2300 on 11 08:55.200 --> 08:58.900 May 1944 . The natural terrain of the 08:58.900 --> 09:01.099 region featured steep rugged mountains 09:01.099 --> 09:03.266 with a short coastal strip west of the 09:03.266 --> 09:05.700 city of Minturno and a small plain 09:05.700 --> 09:08.109 north of the Leary River . Because of 09:08.109 --> 09:10.220 this restrictive terrain , there were 09:10.220 --> 09:12.276 minimal all-season roads available . 09:12.380 --> 09:14.491 There was Highway 7 in the west along 09:14.491 --> 09:17.210 the coast and Highway 6 north of the 09:17.210 --> 09:19.650 Leary River which ran roughly along the 09:19.650 --> 09:22.010 boundary between the US 5th Army and 09:22.010 --> 09:24.849 the British 8th Army . One smaller 09:24.849 --> 09:27.250 seasonal road split off from Highway 7 09:27.250 --> 09:30.130 in German occupied territory which the 09:30.130 --> 09:32.289 Germans used primarily to resupply 09:32.289 --> 09:35.320 their units along the front . A piece 09:35.320 --> 09:37.542 of key terrain that would be an initial 09:37.542 --> 09:39.598 objective in the upcoming attack was 09:39.598 --> 09:42.250 San Martino Hill . This was essentially 09:42.250 --> 09:45.369 two hilltops , Hill 66 and Hill 09:45.369 --> 09:48.570 69 with a saddle in between . Hill 09:48.570 --> 09:51.809 69 dropped to the Capodi Aqua Creek , a 09:51.809 --> 09:54.299 stream with a deceptively swift current 09:54.690 --> 09:57.210 approximately 5 m wide and a little 09:57.210 --> 09:59.799 over 1 m in depth at its deepest point . 10:00.330 --> 10:02.440 The vegetation between the creek and 10:02.440 --> 10:05.690 Hill 66 was extremely sparse with only 10:05.690 --> 10:08.619 a few trees . The area on the western 10:08.619 --> 10:10.859 edge of the Allied line was occupied by 10:10.859 --> 10:13.299 the US Second Corps with the unit 10:13.299 --> 10:15.466 immediately to its northeast being the 10:15.466 --> 10:17.900 French expeditionary Corps . The two 10:17.900 --> 10:20.500 cops occupied a front from the Tyhenian 10:20.500 --> 10:22.619 Sea to the southern edge of the Leary 10:22.619 --> 10:25.750 River valley . For its part in the 10:25.750 --> 10:28.190 upcoming Operation Diodem , the 2nd 10:28.190 --> 10:30.309 Corps consisted of the 85th Infantry 10:30.309 --> 10:32.669 Division and the 88th Infantry Division . 10:34.210 --> 10:36.321 How were American infantry division's 10:36.321 --> 10:40.299 task organized in 1944 ? During the 10:40.299 --> 10:42.577 latter portion of the Second World War , 10:42.577 --> 10:45.020 an American rifle squad consisted of 12 10:45.020 --> 10:48.049 soldiers , 10 armed with M1 rifles , 10:48.460 --> 10:50.571 one with a browning automatic rifle , 10:50.780 --> 10:54.580 BAR , and one with an M1903 Springfield 10:54.580 --> 10:57.700 sniper rifle . Three of these squads 10:57.700 --> 11:00.409 constituted a rifle platoon . A weapons 11:00.409 --> 11:03.700 platoon consisted of 230 caliber light 11:03.700 --> 11:06.429 machine guns , 360 millimeter mortars , 11:06.659 --> 11:09.099 3 bazookas , and a 50 caliber machine 11:09.099 --> 11:11.900 gun . A rifle company was comprised of 11:11.900 --> 11:14.260 3 rifle platoons plus the weapons 11:14.260 --> 11:17.320 platoon . A battalion contained 3 such 11:17.320 --> 11:19.770 rifle companies plus a heavy weapons 11:19.770 --> 11:23.549 company . The three regiments of the 11:23.549 --> 11:26.250 85th were the 337th , 11:26.260 --> 11:30.150 338th , and 339th . The 11:30.150 --> 11:32.030 division employed 3 artillery 11:32.030 --> 11:35.070 battalions equipped with 105 millimeter 11:35.070 --> 11:37.950 howitzers and one battalion equipped 11:37.950 --> 11:41.619 with 155 millimeter guns . Each 11:41.619 --> 11:43.730 division additionally had an attached 11:43.730 --> 11:47.030 armor battalion . An engineer battalion , 11:47.239 --> 11:49.406 a cavalry troop , and other supporting 11:49.406 --> 11:51.840 units to include its own organic 11:51.840 --> 11:54.780 transportation assets . All three of 11:54.780 --> 11:57.002 these regiments were true combined arms 11:57.002 --> 12:00.919 formations . During the month of 12:00.919 --> 12:03.840 April 1944 , the Corps prepared for its 12:03.840 --> 12:06.062 role in the upcoming Operation Diodem . 12:06.719 --> 12:08.886 In the eighty-fifth division , each of 12:08.886 --> 12:11.108 the maneuver battalions were rotated to 12:11.108 --> 12:13.330 the forward area to conduct patrols and 12:13.330 --> 12:16.090 gain familiarity with the ground . In 12:16.090 --> 12:18.489 the rear areas , equipment was repaired 12:18.489 --> 12:22.400 or replaced . Class 135 , 12:22.409 --> 12:25.010 and 9 was stockpiled for the inevitable 12:25.010 --> 12:27.770 expenditure to come . Those units not 12:27.770 --> 12:29.881 on the front line actively patrolling 12:30.169 --> 12:32.849 trained for the impending attack . On 12:32.849 --> 12:35.099 the evening of 13 April , the 3rd 12:35.099 --> 12:38.090 Battalion 339th Regiment took its turn 12:38.090 --> 12:40.830 along the line . Company K was led to 12:40.830 --> 12:43.380 its position by guides from the 88th 12:43.380 --> 12:45.409 Infantry division . The company 12:45.409 --> 12:48.020 occupied this position until 11 May 12:48.020 --> 12:51.619 1944 . On the morning of the 12:51.619 --> 12:53.820 11th , the 3rd battalion continued to 12:53.820 --> 12:55.849 occupy its defensive positions . 12:56.460 --> 12:58.659 Company L , with the addition of a 12:58.659 --> 13:00.715 machine gun platoon from Company M , 13:00.940 --> 13:04.940 occupied Hill's 127119 and the 13:04.940 --> 13:08.219 western side of Hill 113 . Companies I 13:08.219 --> 13:12.140 and K occupied Hill 103 south of 13:12.140 --> 13:15.140 Tremanoli with Company I on the western 13:15.140 --> 13:17.940 side and Company K plus a machine gun 13:17.940 --> 13:20.219 platoon from Company M on the eastern 13:20.219 --> 13:22.500 side . The battalion's 81 millimeter 13:22.500 --> 13:24.059 mortar platoon were located 13:24.059 --> 13:27.609 approximately 275 m south of Tremanoli 13:28.340 --> 13:31.739 for its attack on Hills 66 and 69 , the 13:31.739 --> 13:34.020 battalion's scheme of maneuver was to 13:34.020 --> 13:36.020 move to the line of departure , the 13:36.020 --> 13:38.099 Capodi Aqua Creek , in a column 13:38.099 --> 13:40.609 formation with L Company in the lead , 13:40.969 --> 13:43.719 followed by I and K Companies . The 13:43.719 --> 13:45.386 soldiers of L Company had the 13:45.386 --> 13:47.479 additional task of laying two wooden 13:47.479 --> 13:49.940 planks across the creek to facilitate 13:49.940 --> 13:52.349 the battalion's further movement . They 13:52.349 --> 13:54.349 were to then seize and hold the 13:54.349 --> 13:57.229 southwestern portion of Hill 69 . Once 13:57.229 --> 13:59.562 they crossed the creek using the planks . 13:59.710 --> 14:01.750 I Company would seize and hold the 14:01.750 --> 14:04.669 northeastern side of Hill 69 . K 14:04.669 --> 14:07.349 Company would pass L Company on the 14:07.349 --> 14:10.950 southwest and attack Hill 66 . Once the 14:10.950 --> 14:13.061 companies had seized their objectives 14:13.061 --> 14:15.283 and consolidated on the far side , they 14:15.283 --> 14:17.561 were to prepare to continue the attack . 14:17.570 --> 14:19.770 The machine gun platoons of M Company 14:20.039 --> 14:22.280 were to be in direct support of I and K 14:22.280 --> 14:24.760 Companies . The 81 millimeter mortars 14:24.760 --> 14:26.816 were to be in general support of the 14:26.816 --> 14:30.479 battalion . Beginning at each 14:30.479 --> 14:32.419 hour , a 30 minute artillery 14:32.419 --> 14:35.500 preparation was to be fired on hills 66 , 14:35.520 --> 14:39.440 69 , and targets beyond . The 4.2 inch 14:39.440 --> 14:41.162 mortars of the second chemical 14:41.162 --> 14:43.273 battalion would reinforce the planned 14:43.273 --> 14:46.520 fires by placing 1200 high explosive 14:46.520 --> 14:50.359 rounds on Hill 66 from H hour to H 14:50.359 --> 14:54.200 + 5 . The 155 millimeter guns of the 14:54.200 --> 14:57.479 131st Field artillery would place a 5 14:57.479 --> 14:59.646 minute artillery concentration on Hill 14:59.646 --> 15:02.840 69 , then shift fire to Hill 66 for 10 15:02.840 --> 15:06.510 minutes . At 1600 on 11 May , K 15:06.510 --> 15:08.732 Company's commander issued the order to 15:08.732 --> 15:10.899 the platoon leaders . Each of them was 15:10.899 --> 15:13.010 given aerial reconnaissance photos of 15:13.010 --> 15:15.177 their objective . This was their first 15:15.177 --> 15:17.232 opportunity to study the ground over 15:17.232 --> 15:19.919 which they would be attacking . Platoon 15:19.919 --> 15:21.752 leaders then briefed their squad 15:21.752 --> 15:24.750 leaders and conducted PCIs and PCCs . 15:25.159 --> 15:28.210 These were completed by 2100 . Each 15:28.210 --> 15:30.570 hour was set for 2300 that evening . 15:31.469 --> 15:33.710 The role of uncertainty and warfare 15:33.710 --> 15:35.377 appeared almost immediately . 15:44.929 --> 15:46.818 Moving in a single file column in 15:46.818 --> 15:49.010 darkness proved more difficult than 15:49.010 --> 15:52.159 anticipated . L Company , the lead 15:52.159 --> 15:54.326 element in the battalion , encountered 15:54.326 --> 15:56.437 several challenges which slowed their 15:56.437 --> 15:58.159 movement . The battalion had a 15:58.159 --> 16:00.599 difficult time maintaining a consistent 16:00.599 --> 16:03.239 pace which caused an accordion-like 16:03.239 --> 16:05.859 effect up and down the column . There 16:05.859 --> 16:09.059 is a maxim in war that the enemy always 16:09.059 --> 16:12.809 gets a vote . At 23:30 , just as the 16:12.809 --> 16:14.969 initial fires lifted , the Germans 16:14.969 --> 16:16.747 commenced firing with mortars , 16:16.890 --> 16:18.969 artillery , and their destructive 16:18.969 --> 16:20.747 rocket launchers known as naval 16:20.747 --> 16:23.450 verifers . Rather than waste rounds in 16:23.450 --> 16:25.617 the darkness on counter battery fire , 16:25.640 --> 16:27.809 the Germans fired on pre-designated 16:27.809 --> 16:29.489 targets along where their 16:29.489 --> 16:31.600 reconnaissance had determined was the 16:31.600 --> 16:34.409 most likely avenues of approach . This 16:34.409 --> 16:36.239 lasted for roughly 30 minutes . 16:38.460 --> 16:41.219 As the German fires began to lift , the 16:41.219 --> 16:43.580 company executive officer who had been 16:43.580 --> 16:45.191 traveling with the company's 16:45.191 --> 16:47.024 headquarters platoon in the rear 16:47.024 --> 16:49.358 reached the front of the company column . 16:49.358 --> 16:51.524 In the confusion of the German fires , 16:51.524 --> 16:53.739 K Company had lost contact with First 16:53.739 --> 16:55.906 Platoon , the company's lead element . 16:56.539 --> 16:58.710 The XO attempted to determine the next 16:58.710 --> 17:00.766 course of action for the rest of the 17:00.766 --> 17:03.270 company . After almost 15 minutes of 17:03.270 --> 17:05.829 inactivity , the weapons platoon leader 17:05.829 --> 17:08.119 went forward to determine why they had 17:08.119 --> 17:11.020 yet to move . The dust and smoke of the 17:11.020 --> 17:13.829 fires combined with the darkness had 17:13.829 --> 17:16.219 caused the exo to become misoriented . 17:16.790 --> 17:19.012 He could not determine the direction of 17:19.012 --> 17:21.540 the objective . Fortunately for K 17:21.540 --> 17:23.670 Company , the weapons platoon leader 17:23.670 --> 17:25.392 had led a patrol in the area . 17:26.099 --> 17:28.321 Remembering all of his compass bearings 17:28.321 --> 17:30.321 from his previous missions , he was 17:30.321 --> 17:32.810 able to lead the company down a draw to 17:32.810 --> 17:35.599 where it finally reached the LD . Once 17:35.599 --> 17:37.710 there , the company realized that the 17:37.710 --> 17:39.821 wooden planks which were to assist in 17:39.821 --> 17:42.739 the crossing were useless . The bank of 17:42.739 --> 17:45.260 the creek on the far side extended 17:45.260 --> 17:48.459 straight up almost 3 m . It was here 17:48.459 --> 17:50.626 that the company regained contact with 17:50.626 --> 17:52.626 the company commander and the other 17:52.626 --> 17:54.515 members of 1st and 3rd platoons . 17:55.010 --> 17:57.000 Crossing the creek proved another 17:57.000 --> 17:59.400 challenge as the deceptively swift 17:59.400 --> 18:01.510 current caused the loss of several 18:01.510 --> 18:04.359 bandoliers of ammunition and some vital 18:04.359 --> 18:07.640 equipment . Once they were across , 18:07.969 --> 18:09.969 several members of K Company became 18:09.969 --> 18:12.080 casualties when they triggered German 18:12.080 --> 18:15.130 anti-personnel mines . Fortunately , no 18:15.130 --> 18:17.297 German soldiers were overwatching this 18:17.297 --> 18:19.709 obstacle . At approximately 18:19.709 --> 18:23.630 003012 May , the company reached the 18:23.630 --> 18:26.719 southwestern portion of Hill 69 . The 18:26.719 --> 18:28.775 first platoon leader reorganized his 18:28.775 --> 18:30.886 remaining soldiers for the assault on 18:30.886 --> 18:33.160 Hill 66 while second Platoon's platoon 18:33.160 --> 18:35.709 sergeant did the same with his soldiers . 18:36.329 --> 18:38.589 K Company had yet to regain contact 18:38.589 --> 18:40.520 with L Company , who were to have 18:40.520 --> 18:42.910 secured this portion of Hill 69 . 18:43.560 --> 18:46.119 Visibility finally began to improve as 18:46.119 --> 18:48.739 the moon crested the mountains . The 18:48.739 --> 18:50.906 weapons platoon leader had 2nd platoon 18:50.906 --> 18:53.650 occupy hasty defensive positions along 18:53.650 --> 18:56.709 the southwestern slope of Hill 69 . The 18:56.709 --> 18:58.653 company commander was still at the 18:58.653 --> 19:00.709 creek assisting the other members of 19:00.709 --> 19:04.310 the company across . The SRC 536 radios 19:04.310 --> 19:06.750 failed to function , so communications 19:06.750 --> 19:09.099 with 1st and 3rd platoons could not be 19:09.099 --> 19:12.229 reestablished . By this time , a light 19:12.229 --> 19:14.030 machine gun section and the 60 19:14.030 --> 19:16.197 millimeter mortars were now across the 19:16.197 --> 19:18.197 creek . The machine gun section was 19:18.197 --> 19:20.510 integrated into 2nd platoon while the 19:20.510 --> 19:22.454 mortars were set along the eastern 19:22.454 --> 19:25.310 slope of Hill 69 . The commander 19:25.310 --> 19:27.510 rejoined the company , positioning 19:27.510 --> 19:30.530 himself with the mortar section . At 19:30.530 --> 19:32.530 about this time , the first platoon 19:32.530 --> 19:34.363 leader returned to the company's 19:34.363 --> 19:36.419 positions . He reported that 1st and 19:36.419 --> 19:38.910 3rd platoon had reached Hill 66 , where 19:38.910 --> 19:40.910 they became involved in a firefight 19:40.910 --> 19:43.021 with two fortified enemy positions on 19:43.021 --> 19:45.510 the front slope , as well as receiving 19:45.510 --> 19:47.790 indirect fire from the German mortars 19:47.790 --> 19:50.400 on the reverse slope . The company 19:50.400 --> 19:52.289 commander then integrated the two 19:52.289 --> 19:54.622 platoons into their defensive perimeter . 19:54.989 --> 19:56.767 The Germans were aware that the 19:56.767 --> 19:59.609 Americans were occupying Hill 69 . The 19:59.609 --> 20:01.849 company began to receive indirect fire 20:01.849 --> 20:04.880 from the north , west , and southwest , 20:05.170 --> 20:08.449 concentrated on the hill . K Company 20:08.449 --> 20:10.719 was incapable of contacting the rest of 20:10.719 --> 20:13.680 the battalion because their SCR 300 20:13.680 --> 20:16.239 radio was lost during the difficult 20:16.239 --> 20:18.930 crossing of the creek . Additionally , 20:19.349 --> 20:22.380 none of the platoon's SCR 536 radios 20:22.380 --> 20:24.819 were functioning . This meant that K 20:24.819 --> 20:26.979 Company had to rely on runners to 20:26.979 --> 20:28.812 communicate with the rest of the 20:28.812 --> 20:32.319 battalion . At 0300 , the commander of 20:32.319 --> 20:34.599 L Company made face to face contact 20:34.599 --> 20:37.130 with K Company's commander . He stated 20:37.130 --> 20:39.479 that his company was located just to 20:39.479 --> 20:42.199 the east of K Company's positions , but 20:42.199 --> 20:45.359 he only had 40 soldiers uninjured . He 20:45.359 --> 20:48.099 did have a functioning SCR 300 and 20:48.099 --> 20:49.932 communication with the battalion 20:49.932 --> 20:53.000 observation post OP on the western side 20:53.000 --> 20:56.119 of Hill 113 . He also informed K 20:56.119 --> 20:58.920 Company that I Company was just east of 20:58.920 --> 21:01.410 L Company's positions , but they only 21:01.410 --> 21:05.219 had around 70 soldiers left . Once the 21:05.219 --> 21:07.359 battalion was informed of K Company's 21:07.359 --> 21:09.579 situation , the entire battalion was 21:09.579 --> 21:11.819 ordered to dig in and prepare for the 21:11.819 --> 21:13.930 probable German counterattack , which 21:13.930 --> 21:16.650 was expected to begin at 0500 , 21:16.660 --> 21:19.410 daybreak . During the remaining hours 21:19.410 --> 21:21.770 of darkness , the Germans continued to 21:21.770 --> 21:24.130 fire artillery concentrations on Hill 21:24.130 --> 21:27.709 69 . The Germans initiated their 21:27.709 --> 21:31.189 counterattack at 0500 with a 15 minute 21:31.189 --> 21:33.510 artillery concentration on Hill 69 . 21:34.469 --> 21:36.500 Simultaneously German soldiers were 21:36.500 --> 21:39.989 observed moving on Hill 66 . L 21:39.989 --> 21:41.767 Company's commander immediately 21:41.767 --> 21:43.822 communicated the enemy's location to 21:43.822 --> 21:46.660 the battalion OP . In less than 5 21:46.660 --> 21:48.819 minutes , artillery fire was brought 21:48.819 --> 21:51.489 down on Hill 66 , breaking up the 21:51.489 --> 21:54.680 attempted German counterattack . During 21:54.680 --> 21:56.780 this fire mission , a short round 21:56.780 --> 21:58.780 landed on the L Company commander's 21:58.780 --> 22:01.199 foxhole , killing him , one of his 22:01.199 --> 22:03.255 platoon leaders , and destroying the 22:03.255 --> 22:06.920 SCR 300 radio . Once again , the 22:06.920 --> 22:08.719 remnants of K Company lost 22:08.719 --> 22:10.663 communication with the rest of the 22:10.663 --> 22:12.770 battalion . For the remainder of the 22:12.770 --> 22:14.930 morning , the Germans would fire 10 22:14.930 --> 22:17.152 minute artillery concentrations on Hill 22:17.152 --> 22:19.359 69 every 30 minutes . 22:21.339 --> 22:23.859 At approximately 1300 on 12 May , 22:24.420 --> 22:26.520 German observers spotted an American 22:26.520 --> 22:28.699 company-sized element moving to the 22:28.699 --> 22:32.339 rear of K Company between Hills 127 and 22:32.339 --> 22:35.150 113 . When this party reached the 22:35.150 --> 22:37.579 saddle between the two hilltops , the 22:37.579 --> 22:39.746 Germans immediately fired an artillery 22:39.746 --> 22:42.339 concentration on the area . Only 10 22:42.339 --> 22:46.109 soldiers survived . At 1400 , 22:46.160 --> 22:49.489 the first battalion , 337th Infantry 22:49.489 --> 22:52.770 supported by B Company 756 Tank 22:52.770 --> 22:54.826 Battalion passed through K Company's 22:54.826 --> 22:58.729 positions . By 1500 , this task force 22:58.729 --> 23:02.449 was fighting its way uphill 66 . German 23:02.449 --> 23:04.729 artillery fire forced the task force to 23:04.729 --> 23:06.951 displace back to the base of the hill . 23:07.130 --> 23:09.170 A second attack that started in the 23:09.170 --> 23:11.729 late afternoon finally succeeded in 23:11.729 --> 23:15.410 taking Hill 66 . At 2030 on 23:15.410 --> 23:17.920 12th May , the soldiers of K Company , 23:18.170 --> 23:19.892 along with the rest of the 3rd 23:19.892 --> 23:22.003 Battalion were ordered to withdraw to 23:22.003 --> 23:23.948 an assembly area just south of the 23:23.948 --> 23:26.319 village of Tremanoli . The company 23:26.329 --> 23:29.199 arrived in the assembly area at 2145 23:30.089 --> 23:33.530 during the period 13 to 14 May 1944 . 23:33.569 --> 23:35.680 The company received replacements and 23:35.680 --> 23:37.847 was brought back up to full strength . 23:38.050 --> 23:40.439 At the same time , the battered yet 23:40.439 --> 23:42.569 unbroken Germans began a complete 23:42.569 --> 23:44.810 withdrawal along the entire length of 23:44.810 --> 23:47.400 the 339th Infantry sector . 23:49.119 --> 23:52.239 All 3 battalions of the 339th Infantry 23:52.239 --> 23:54.239 struggled to seize their objectives 23:54.239 --> 23:57.459 during the period of 11 to 12 May . The 23:57.459 --> 24:00.739 taking of Hills 66 and 69 was not 24:00.739 --> 24:03.770 without serious challenges . While 24:03.770 --> 24:06.099 operational and strategic surprise was 24:06.099 --> 24:08.219 achieved across the front , the 24:08.219 --> 24:10.500 tactical element of surprise was lost 24:10.500 --> 24:12.719 by the 3rd battalion when the fires 24:12.719 --> 24:14.552 were shifted , while much of the 24:14.552 --> 24:16.663 battalion was still well short of the 24:16.663 --> 24:19.680 LD . Additionally , the decision to 24:19.680 --> 24:21.880 move the entire battalion in a column 24:21.880 --> 24:24.359 formation to the LD was perplexing . 24:25.229 --> 24:27.689 The hours of darkness , especially 24:27.689 --> 24:29.911 before the moon crested the mountains , 24:29.911 --> 24:31.911 contributed to the lengthy movement 24:31.911 --> 24:34.650 time . As it turns out , it took K 24:34.650 --> 24:37.479 Company almost 2 hours to reach the LD . 24:38.790 --> 24:41.300 A debate remains as to whether the 24:41.300 --> 24:43.660 attack on Hill 66 should have been 24:43.660 --> 24:46.540 conducted by a company , battalion , or 24:46.540 --> 24:49.229 multiple battalions . Despite these 24:49.229 --> 24:52.109 challenges , Operation Diadem was a 24:52.109 --> 24:53.910 success , creating multiple 24:53.910 --> 24:55.930 penetrations of the Gustav line , 24:56.430 --> 24:58.910 forcing a German withdrawal and opening 24:58.910 --> 25:01.689 the door to Rome . For K Company and 25:01.689 --> 25:03.890 the rest of the 3rd Battalion , the 25:03.890 --> 25:07.569 success came at a cost . They lost 398 25:07.569 --> 25:09.625 soldiers either killed or wounded in 25:09.625 --> 25:10.625 the fighting . 25:15.550 --> 25:17.630 As the bulk of our supplies was 25:17.630 --> 25:20.119 directed to England for the forthcoming 25:20.119 --> 25:23.229 invasion . Operations in Italy had to 25:23.229 --> 25:25.869 be conducted on an extremely limited 25:25.869 --> 25:29.660 scale . Thus it came about . That 25:29.660 --> 25:31.771 during the winter months , the number 25:31.771 --> 25:34.020 of allied divisions in Italy was 25:34.020 --> 25:37.420 greatly reduced . Yet so determined was 25:37.420 --> 25:39.780 their effort that they succeeded in 25:39.780 --> 25:43.020 holding in Italy a very large number of 25:43.020 --> 25:45.020 German divisions . During the 25:45.020 --> 25:48.920 pre-invasion period . San Pietro in the 25:48.920 --> 25:51.609 5th Army sector was the key to the 25:51.609 --> 25:55.060 Leary Valley . We knew it and the enemy 25:55.060 --> 25:58.300 knew it . We had to take it even though 25:58.300 --> 26:01.660 the immediate cost would be high . The 26:01.660 --> 26:03.438 response of our 5th Army troops 26:03.438 --> 26:05.930 provides an inspiring page in our 26:05.930 --> 26:09.569 military history . To these individuals 26:09.569 --> 26:12.949 living and dead . And to those who now 26:12.949 --> 26:14.979 continue in their tradition , this 26:14.979 --> 26:16.459 picture is dedicated .