WEBVTT

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Welcome teammates . I'm Lieutenant

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Colonel Dan Cannon , Cobra 07 , senior

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cavalry trainer here at Fort Irw

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California National Training Center .

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In this episode of TA Talks , I'd like

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to talk about transitions specifically

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on how commanders identify , set

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conditions for , plan , and execute

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them . So let's start with the

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definition out of FM 396 . So we are

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talking on the same sheet of music .

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Transitions occur when the commander

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makes an assessment that the unit must

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change its focus from one element of

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decisive action to another . So how are

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commanders , how are we making that

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assessment ? Well , doctrine gives us 4

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conditions that drive transitions

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culmination , consolidation of gains ,

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exploitation of the initiative in the

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form of a sequel or a branch , and

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change of mission as directed by higher .

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So given these conditions , let's take

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a case study pulled from the number one

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reason units meet transition criteria

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here at the National Training Center .

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And if you haven't already guessed it .

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It's culmination , and there are a

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myriad of different reasons why

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culmination occurs , but it almost

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always comes down to our understanding

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of three factors , the terrain , the

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enemy , and friendly forces . So let's

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talk about them . Let's break them down .

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Terrain . On average , units develop a

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good understanding of the terrain and

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the effect it'll have on both friendly

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and enemy forces . When it comes to the

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enemy , most units develop an accurate

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enemy sit , and their collection plan

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enables them to see the enemy in time

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and space pretty well . But when it

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comes to friendly forces , this is

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where units struggle to see themselves

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in relation to time , terrain , and the

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enemy . The reason why it takes us back

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to what triggers our transitions in the

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first place , and if culmination

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remains the leading cause , let's

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consider some anticipated results units

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should prepare for . So number one , we

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don't anticipate culmination , so we

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rarely plan for it . Number 2 ,

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culminations rarely manifest as a

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result of a commander's decision and

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therefore we are reacting to it rather

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than being proactive . And then finally ,

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most importantly , I would argue we

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failed to set conditions necessary for

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transition in the way of rehearsals ,

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adjacent unit coordination , or

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sequencing . Bottom line up front ,

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transitions are inevitable . So how are

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we going to set conditions for them ?

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Here's where the cal squadron can help .

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We are your best tool to enable

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transition by design . Tasked

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appropriately , the calf can place you

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in a position of advantage relative to

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both the enemy and the terrain . FM 398

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states that cavalry squadrons provide

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BCT commanders with the freedom of

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movement and action to create

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advantageous conditions for future

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operations to seize , retain , and

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exploit the initiative . The squadron

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retains experts in identifying when

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conditions are set for transition ,

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specifically relative to both the enemy

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and terrain . They have the ability to

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leverage the push versus pull method

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through the execution of both

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reconnaissance and security , but most

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importantly , they're designed to

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facilitate the brigade's transition .

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So how is the cab squadron going to

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execute transition ? Inevitably we are

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going to insist on a forward or

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rearward passage of lines . Now I'll

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pause here and acknowledge that there

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are many leaders who think that the F

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pole R pole is an unnecessary tactical

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task . It can be avoided or replaced

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with another form of movement and or

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maneuver . So let's discuss the facts

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and the trends associated with the F

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pole . Fact , the F pole will possibly

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be the highest risk to force task that

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we conduct because . It places two

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separate maneuver elements in the same

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battle space . Another fact is that

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this task presents the highest risk to

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fratricide , especially if controls are

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not put into place and units do not

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rehearse them . Another clear fact is

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that the passage of lines is one of the

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most executed tactical tasks we will

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conduct on the Lisco battlefield . Also

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a fact F poles enable the maintaining

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of tempo and sequencing in the offense ,

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and the R poles preserve your ground

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reconnaissance forces in the defense

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for follow on missions . So let's talk

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about the trends . Units who opt to

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offset their cal units forward in

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terrain or direct them to go to ground

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in an attempt to maintain tempo almost

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always open up a scene between the

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maneuver units that are inevitably

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exploited by the opposing forces .

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Bottom line , F poles and our polls are

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just as inevitable as transitions , but

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if done well , they'll enable tempo ,

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not disrupt it , but they must be

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rehearsed and they must be executed

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just like any . Other battle drill . If

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we can execute an F pole or pole at the

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same level of proficiency as a

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prescribed battle drill , unplanned

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culmination that triggers a transition

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will keep staffs and commanders from

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becoming reactive , enabling units to

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transition seamlessly from the offense

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to the defense , thereby buying time to

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set conditions to go back on the

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initiative . I'll leave you with a

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parting shot . Commanders at all

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echelons , we highly recommend that you

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command direct F pole R pole rehearsals .

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Not just between the calf or of the

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cave and the task force scouts with the

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maneuver battalions , but with the

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maneuver units involved in the passage

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of lines . Doing so will inevitably set

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conditions to maintain tempo and more

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importantly , it'll mitigate the

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overall risk of force . If you're

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interested in more detailed information

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on passage of lines . Please view our

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TA talks on the subject or just reach

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out . We on the COBR team hope this

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discussion was helpful , and we

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encourage you to reach out to start a

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dialogue . You will be hard pressed to

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find a more dedicated team of war

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fighters who are ready for a passionate

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discussion on reconnaissance and

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security . Answer any of the questions

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you have , or help your team build much

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needed readiness . Again , I'm

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Lieutenant Colonel Dan Cannon . Thank

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you for watching this episode of Tack

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Talks . Train the force .