WEBVTT 00:00.009 --> 00:02.269 The Indo Pacific Visions vodcast is an 00:02.279 --> 00:04.501 official product of the Journal of Indo 00:04.501 --> 00:07.309 Pacific Affairs . The program fosters 00:07.320 --> 00:09.542 intellectual international discourse on 00:09.542 --> 00:11.709 a wide array of topics associated with 00:11.709 --> 00:13.709 the Indo Pacific region , including 00:13.709 --> 00:15.598 international relations , foreign 00:15.598 --> 00:17.709 policy , national security allies and 00:17.709 --> 00:19.850 partners geo economics , military 00:19.860 --> 00:22.620 history and more . It envisions an 00:22.629 --> 00:24.796 inclusive Indo Pacific that spans from 00:24.796 --> 00:26.962 the west coasts of the Americas to the 00:26.962 --> 00:28.851 eastern shores of Africa and from 00:28.851 --> 00:30.962 Antarctica to the Arctic and covering 00:30.962 --> 00:32.851 much of Asia and all of Oceania . 00:33.479 --> 00:36.279 Disclaimer . The views and opinions 00:36.290 --> 00:38.409 expressed or implied in this podcast 00:38.419 --> 00:40.641 are those of the authors and should not 00:40.641 --> 00:42.752 be construed as carrying the official 00:42.752 --> 00:44.863 sanction of the Department of Defence 00:44.863 --> 00:46.752 Department of the Air Force , Air 00:46.752 --> 00:48.808 Education and Training Command , Air 00:48.808 --> 00:50.586 University or other agencies or 00:50.586 --> 00:52.586 departments of the US government or 00:52.586 --> 00:54.752 their international equivalents . Good 00:54.752 --> 00:56.752 afternoon . And welcome to the Indo 00:56.752 --> 00:58.586 Pacific Visions podcast . We are 00:58.586 --> 01:00.641 honored to have as our guest today , 01:00.641 --> 01:02.752 Major General Evan Pettis , Commander 01:02.752 --> 01:04.808 of 12th Air Force Air Combat Command 01:04.808 --> 01:07.069 and Commander of Air Forces Southern US 01:07.080 --> 01:10.000 Southern Command . General Pettis leads 01:10.010 --> 01:12.199 12th Air Force in conducting security 01:12.209 --> 01:14.980 co-operation and providing air space 01:14.989 --> 01:17.129 and cyberspace capabilities to us 01:17.139 --> 01:19.139 Southern Command supporting efforts 01:19.139 --> 01:21.306 across Latin America and the Caribbean 01:21.980 --> 01:24.300 General Pettis is a command pilot with 01:24.309 --> 01:27.989 more than 2700 flying hours . He flew 01:28.000 --> 01:30.389 combat missions in operations including 01:30.400 --> 01:32.730 Northern Watch , Southern Watch Allied 01:32.739 --> 01:34.650 Force , enduring freedom , Iraqi 01:34.660 --> 01:37.480 freedom and inherent resolve . His 01:37.489 --> 01:40.319 previous command was the 378th air 01:40.330 --> 01:42.660 expeditionary wing at Prince Sultan Air 01:42.669 --> 01:46.089 Base , Saudi Arabia . He also served as 01:46.099 --> 01:48.321 commandant of the Air Command and Staff 01:48.321 --> 01:50.970 College at Air University from 2018 to 01:50.980 --> 01:54.599 2020 in his current role , leading 12th 01:54.610 --> 01:56.819 Air Force General Pettis oversees 01:56.830 --> 01:58.669 deterring aggression , defeating 01:58.680 --> 02:01.250 threats , rapidly responding to crises 02:01.260 --> 02:03.260 and building regional capacity with 02:03.260 --> 02:05.204 allies and partners in the western 02:05.204 --> 02:07.879 hemisphere . Your host for this episode 02:07.889 --> 02:10.110 are Doctor Ernest Guner Rockwell , 02:10.119 --> 02:12.286 editor in chief of the Journal of Indo 02:12.286 --> 02:14.230 Pacific Affairs and retired us Air 02:14.230 --> 02:16.063 Force , Lieutenant Colonel Jorge 02:16.130 --> 02:17.963 Serafin , editor in chief of the 02:17.963 --> 02:20.220 Journal of the Americas . This is the 02:20.229 --> 02:22.089 Indo Pacific Visions Podcast , a 02:22.100 --> 02:24.110 product of Air University Press . 02:26.619 --> 02:28.619 Appreciate your time . And uh we're 02:28.619 --> 02:30.786 looking forward to , you know , diving 02:30.786 --> 02:32.563 a little bit deeper into uh the 02:32.563 --> 02:34.675 material that you provided to us . Uh 02:34.675 --> 02:36.508 for your article , the expanding 02:36.508 --> 02:38.563 leverage of the People's Republic of 02:38.563 --> 02:40.508 China and Latin America , uh which 02:40.508 --> 02:42.730 highlighted , you know , the surprising 02:42.730 --> 02:44.897 breadth and scale of China's influence 02:44.897 --> 02:47.809 in Latin America . Um And we were 02:47.820 --> 02:49.876 hoping that you'd be able uh in your 02:49.876 --> 02:51.931 view to tell us what are the most uh 02:51.931 --> 02:53.660 concerning aspects of China's 02:53.669 --> 02:56.220 activities in the region . Well , 02:56.300 --> 02:58.039 thanks doc , I appreciate the 02:58.050 --> 03:00.570 opportunity to speak with you today and 03:00.580 --> 03:02.802 to kind of expand on some of the things 03:02.802 --> 03:04.747 that maybe I couldn't fit into the 03:04.747 --> 03:07.289 article or ideas that I have continued 03:07.300 --> 03:10.320 to develop a sense . You know , I think 03:10.800 --> 03:13.029 uh it's difficult to highlight a most 03:13.039 --> 03:15.150 concerning activity in the region . I 03:15.150 --> 03:17.372 think it really comes together as a sum 03:17.372 --> 03:20.339 of multiple parts . It's my personal 03:20.350 --> 03:23.559 opinion uh that China's 03:23.570 --> 03:26.199 activities across the globe were part 03:26.210 --> 03:28.839 of a , let's call it a well nested 03:28.850 --> 03:32.830 campaign plan uh to reorder the 03:32.839 --> 03:35.100 world order as Elizabeth economy would 03:35.110 --> 03:38.050 say , uh in Latin America , you see 03:38.059 --> 03:40.259 that play out with multiple lines of 03:40.270 --> 03:42.119 effort . And if I were going to 03:42.130 --> 03:45.029 categorize them broadly , I would 03:45.050 --> 03:48.229 categorize it as efforts to dominate 03:48.240 --> 03:50.296 the information space to include the 03:50.300 --> 03:52.189 information technology background 03:52.189 --> 03:55.309 backbone , the energy sector to include 03:55.320 --> 03:58.369 things like power , distribution , key 03:58.380 --> 04:00.699 lines of communication , specifically 04:00.710 --> 04:03.110 with some major port facilities , those 04:03.119 --> 04:05.300 that also that could be used to 04:05.309 --> 04:08.940 dominate trade routes , but also to in 04:08.949 --> 04:11.229 the right future conditions , maybe for 04:11.240 --> 04:15.220 dual basing uh and as well uh 04:15.229 --> 04:17.630 as uh the um 04:18.670 --> 04:22.390 space infrastructure . So in 04:22.399 --> 04:24.750 space infrastructure , those facilities 04:24.760 --> 04:27.029 could have dual purposes for military 04:27.040 --> 04:28.299 purposes as well . 04:31.040 --> 04:33.262 Good afternoon , sir . Uh Indeed , I'll 04:33.262 --> 04:35.151 reiterate uh Doctor Rockwell's uh 04:35.151 --> 04:37.720 opening comments . Uh It is truly an 04:37.730 --> 04:40.279 honor and a pleasure uh to obtain your 04:40.290 --> 04:42.750 perspective today . Uh We'll start uh 04:42.760 --> 04:45.809 with uh can you expand on the level of 04:45.820 --> 04:47.376 threat that China's growing 04:47.376 --> 04:50.010 implementation of uh police slash 04:50.019 --> 04:52.429 security systems and space facilities 04:52.440 --> 04:55.329 in Latin America specifically uh posed 04:55.339 --> 04:57.929 to the exfiltration of critical defense , 04:57.940 --> 05:00.209 economic and personal data from the 05:00.220 --> 05:02.760 region . Yeah , I think I'll expand 05:02.769 --> 05:05.410 that even beyond the police uh systems , 05:05.420 --> 05:07.642 although that definitely plays a role . 05:08.329 --> 05:11.679 Uh I see two potential things at play 05:11.690 --> 05:15.480 here . Uh First , uh the elites of the 05:15.489 --> 05:17.760 Chinese Communist Party are trying to 05:17.769 --> 05:20.730 export their model and by exporting 05:20.739 --> 05:22.739 their model change the rules of the 05:22.739 --> 05:25.109 game . Uh those police systems are part 05:25.119 --> 05:27.230 of that , you know , they have a very 05:27.230 --> 05:29.341 tight information control environment 05:29.341 --> 05:31.579 and you know , kind of an autocratic 05:31.589 --> 05:34.739 model , uh behavior control population 05:34.750 --> 05:37.320 control there in the People's Republic 05:37.329 --> 05:40.709 of China in a region that 05:40.720 --> 05:42.750 challenged with instability and 05:42.760 --> 05:45.279 security control uh concerns uh 05:45.769 --> 05:47.660 violence , transnational criminal 05:47.670 --> 05:50.869 organizations exporting this uh this 05:50.880 --> 05:53.119 tight uh information control 05:53.130 --> 05:54.852 environment , the monitoring , 05:54.852 --> 05:57.130 everything is a very tempting solution . 05:57.170 --> 05:59.350 But beyond that , from a security 05:59.359 --> 06:02.790 perspective , the this equipment and 06:02.799 --> 06:05.690 information background backbone that 06:05.700 --> 06:08.559 goes with these types of systems , the 06:08.570 --> 06:11.450 safe cities with the cameras , two G , 06:11.459 --> 06:14.579 three G , four G , five G networks that 06:14.589 --> 06:18.260 are built not to current international 06:18.269 --> 06:19.936 security standards and may be 06:19.936 --> 06:23.720 vulnerable to exploitation by PC 06:23.730 --> 06:26.059 entities . As you know , there is a law 06:26.279 --> 06:28.570 in the PR C that requires even 06:29.670 --> 06:32.820 private Chinese companies to provide 06:32.829 --> 06:35.130 intelligence to the government when 06:35.140 --> 06:38.100 when requested . Uh that , that 06:38.109 --> 06:40.269 backbone , that information backbone 06:40.279 --> 06:43.660 becomes AAA intelligence threat in 06:43.700 --> 06:45.811 itself . And when you think about the 06:45.811 --> 06:47.756 amount of information from banking 06:47.756 --> 06:49.978 accounts to private information to your 06:49.978 --> 06:52.089 emails and phone calls that flow over 06:52.089 --> 06:52.070 that background , that is a major 06:52.369 --> 06:54.720 security threat from a coercive 06:54.730 --> 06:58.649 standpoint with 06:58.660 --> 07:02.630 regards to space . One of my 07:02.640 --> 07:06.070 concerns is the potential dual use of 07:06.079 --> 07:08.299 some of these facilities . So a lot of 07:08.309 --> 07:10.869 the space infrastructure that the PR C 07:10.880 --> 07:13.649 has sponsored or partnered with Latin 07:13.660 --> 07:15.771 American and Caribbean governments in 07:15.771 --> 07:17.970 place in the region . Is there 07:18.059 --> 07:21.950 ostensibly under civil purposes ? But 07:21.959 --> 07:24.450 it's clear from publicly available 07:24.459 --> 07:26.679 sources . The People's Liberation Army 07:26.690 --> 07:30.029 is involved in some of these facilities 07:30.290 --> 07:33.010 and they could have dual use purposes 07:33.019 --> 07:36.489 for tracking or targeting 07:36.500 --> 07:38.649 us space infrastructure for military 07:38.660 --> 07:40.920 purposes . Thank you , sir . 07:43.070 --> 07:45.014 Yeah , sir . In your article , you 07:45.014 --> 07:46.903 mentioned China's use of economic 07:46.903 --> 07:48.529 entanglements , uh critical 07:48.540 --> 07:50.318 infrastructure investments , uh 07:50.318 --> 07:52.329 coercive diplomacy and information 07:52.339 --> 07:54.339 control to gain leverage over Latin 07:54.339 --> 07:56.529 America . Could you expand on how each 07:56.540 --> 07:58.470 of these tactics undermines us 07:58.480 --> 08:00.536 interests and regional sovereignty ? 08:01.160 --> 08:03.589 Sure , I I think I think I'll kind of 08:03.600 --> 08:06.089 return to the overarching themes which 08:06.100 --> 08:08.690 is when you control the information and 08:08.700 --> 08:10.811 the information infrastructure , when 08:10.811 --> 08:12.899 you control key resources , when you 08:12.910 --> 08:15.420 control lines of communication and when 08:15.429 --> 08:17.596 you control critical infrastructure to 08:17.596 --> 08:19.709 include the energy sector or power 08:19.720 --> 08:23.339 distribution , you have uh what amounts 08:23.350 --> 08:26.690 to almost a perfect coercive engine . 08:26.910 --> 08:29.510 And that coercive engine in combination 08:29.519 --> 08:32.330 means that this authoritarian 08:32.340 --> 08:34.950 government with a record of imposing 08:34.960 --> 08:37.099 its will on what you can say or what 08:37.109 --> 08:39.020 you can do both internally and 08:39.030 --> 08:42.080 externally is increasingly gains , the 08:42.309 --> 08:44.640 gaining the means to do that in the 08:44.650 --> 08:47.289 western hemisphere in multiple nations . 08:47.510 --> 08:49.510 And so that means you can influence 08:49.510 --> 08:51.677 things like political decisions . What 08:51.677 --> 08:53.566 happens on international bodies , 08:53.566 --> 08:55.677 access to resources , access to lines 08:55.677 --> 08:57.840 of communication uh that undermines 08:57.849 --> 08:59.570 sovereignty and it undermines 09:00.179 --> 09:02.068 sovereignty sovereignty for those 09:02.068 --> 09:04.068 nations . Excuse me , it undermines 09:04.068 --> 09:06.290 sovereignty for those nations who would 09:06.290 --> 09:08.512 like to make decisions in the interests 09:08.512 --> 09:10.568 of their own populations rather than 09:10.568 --> 09:12.846 the interests of the elites in Beijing . 09:12.846 --> 09:15.012 But it also undermines us interests in 09:15.012 --> 09:17.235 the region . Simply from the standpoint 09:17.235 --> 09:19.290 of we have deep relations with Latin 09:19.290 --> 09:21.457 America . Uh We have deep partnerships 09:21.457 --> 09:23.735 and friendships were dependent . Uh We , 09:23.735 --> 09:26.200 we say heavily interested in , in trade 09:26.210 --> 09:29.349 and resources uh with Latin America and 09:29.359 --> 09:33.049 the Caribbean and we rely on these 09:33.059 --> 09:35.170 like minded governance for support in 09:35.170 --> 09:37.830 international bodies . So if those 09:38.880 --> 09:41.400 course of mechanisms are allowed to 09:41.409 --> 09:44.659 take full hold , then potentially we 09:44.669 --> 09:47.669 lose both access to resources and uh 09:47.679 --> 09:49.735 influence in international bodies or 09:49.735 --> 09:51.568 friends and international bodies 09:55.760 --> 09:57.871 following up . Uh Do you believe that 09:57.871 --> 10:00.159 uh the Chinese courting of Argentina is 10:00.169 --> 10:02.113 one of the big three powers in the 10:02.113 --> 10:04.340 region together with uh Colombia and 10:04.349 --> 10:07.340 Brazil is meant to establish a foothold 10:07.349 --> 10:11.179 to usurp the US position as a regional 10:11.260 --> 10:14.700 hegemon . Uh How serious is this threat ? 10:16.270 --> 10:19.330 I think that the pr C is attempting to 10:19.340 --> 10:21.507 make inroads at multiple places in the 10:21.507 --> 10:25.489 region , not just Argentina , Brazil , 10:25.500 --> 10:28.169 Colombia , Chile , but also you see it , 10:28.179 --> 10:29.901 they are active in places like 10:29.901 --> 10:32.869 Venezuela , Bolivia , Nicaragua , maybe 10:32.880 --> 10:36.510 places that are we less 10:36.520 --> 10:38.576 friendly diplomatically , the United 10:38.576 --> 10:40.631 States . I do think as you point out 10:40.631 --> 10:42.669 that it is concerning to see the 10:42.679 --> 10:45.570 inroads the PR C government is making 10:45.849 --> 10:48.750 and PR C entities are making 10:48.760 --> 10:52.700 with the major uh political and 10:52.710 --> 10:54.820 economic powers in the region . 10:54.849 --> 10:57.530 Argentina , I believe is , is part of 10:57.539 --> 10:59.799 that effort , but not exclusively in 10:59.809 --> 11:02.289 that effort . And of course , the uh 11:02.299 --> 11:05.219 environment uh ebs and , and uh 11:06.359 --> 11:08.630 you see changes in the environment uh 11:08.719 --> 11:12.000 depending on the political status 11:12.330 --> 11:14.450 in the region . Right now , the Malay 11:14.479 --> 11:16.609 government in Argentina will probably 11:16.619 --> 11:20.460 be more pro us uh than uh than the 11:20.469 --> 11:22.636 previous government . But it's hard to 11:22.636 --> 11:25.900 say they just uh just President Malay 11:25.909 --> 11:28.340 just took office , his public statement 11:28.349 --> 11:30.516 certainly indicate that and you'll see 11:30.516 --> 11:32.516 some shifting back and forth as you 11:32.516 --> 11:34.650 would in any democratic nation . So I 11:34.659 --> 11:36.603 do believe in short answer to your 11:36.603 --> 11:39.150 question that the PR C is absolutely 11:39.159 --> 11:41.400 trying to increase its influence in the 11:41.409 --> 11:43.576 region . And Argentina is part of that 11:43.576 --> 11:46.229 equation . Thank you . 11:48.710 --> 11:51.130 And sir , how can you uh uh how can the 11:51.140 --> 11:52.789 United States sorry uh work 11:52.799 --> 11:54.960 multilaterally with allies in Latin 11:54.969 --> 11:57.400 America and further ad to address the 11:57.409 --> 11:59.742 shared concerns about China's ambitions ? 12:01.469 --> 12:03.636 Well , the first thing I'd I'd say doc 12:03.636 --> 12:05.858 is that , you know , we have to come at 12:05.858 --> 12:07.913 this with a great deal of humility . 12:08.109 --> 12:10.450 These are sovereign nations , they have 12:10.460 --> 12:12.719 significant challenges that they are 12:12.729 --> 12:15.489 trying to address for their populations . 12:15.760 --> 12:17.871 And there's history here , you know , 12:17.871 --> 12:20.580 the US , history is , is not spotless 12:20.590 --> 12:23.739 in Latin America . And so as we , we 12:23.750 --> 12:25.739 seek to work with our partners , I 12:25.750 --> 12:27.528 think the first thing we got to 12:27.528 --> 12:29.750 recognize is that these are , these are 12:29.750 --> 12:31.583 sovereign nations with their own 12:31.583 --> 12:33.806 sovereign interests and they are trying 12:33.806 --> 12:35.806 the best they can . In many cases , 12:35.806 --> 12:37.861 most cases to meet those interests . 12:37.861 --> 12:39.919 And that includes potentially , 12:39.929 --> 12:41.985 sometimes they're looking at they're 12:41.985 --> 12:44.429 doing essentially geopolitical math 12:44.440 --> 12:46.496 that says , hey , I've got a need to 12:46.496 --> 12:48.900 meet for my population . What's my best 12:48.909 --> 12:51.179 way to meet it ? It may even some of 12:51.190 --> 12:53.190 them in their calculus may even say 12:53.349 --> 12:56.549 maybe it's not good to get myself 12:56.559 --> 12:58.781 caught between two elephants by picking 12:58.781 --> 13:00.837 a side . Maybe I need to triangulate 13:00.837 --> 13:03.799 between the major powers at play here . 13:04.309 --> 13:06.460 That being said , I think the best 13:06.469 --> 13:09.880 thing we can do is first illuminate the 13:09.890 --> 13:13.080 risks , uh be very open and transparent 13:13.090 --> 13:15.312 about why we think that there are risks 13:15.312 --> 13:17.590 involved with partnering with the PR C . 13:17.590 --> 13:21.210 Uh There are plenty of open 13:21.219 --> 13:25.179 source examples of why uh the PR 13:25.190 --> 13:28.739 C can be a risky partner . I think 13:28.750 --> 13:31.179 the other thing that we can do is make 13:31.190 --> 13:33.357 ourselves available . Uh You know , we 13:33.357 --> 13:36.080 are not always the easiest country to 13:36.090 --> 13:38.890 partner with , uh , meaning that 13:39.659 --> 13:42.049 for things like , let's just say sales 13:42.059 --> 13:44.059 of military equipment , our foreign 13:44.059 --> 13:45.948 military sales process or foreign 13:45.948 --> 13:48.115 military finance process can be very , 13:48.115 --> 13:50.059 very slow . We have to speed those 13:50.059 --> 13:52.500 things up so that we become a viable 13:52.510 --> 13:54.566 option to meet our partners at their 13:54.566 --> 13:57.820 point of need . Yeah , that's been a 13:57.830 --> 13:59.997 problem throughout the Indo Pacific as 13:59.997 --> 14:02.163 well . It's , uh , one of the things I 14:02.163 --> 14:04.163 harp on about our relationship with 14:04.163 --> 14:06.274 India all the time , you know , we lo 14:06.274 --> 14:06.039 we lost him because of that , you know , 14:06.049 --> 14:08.719 the military acquisitions way back in 14:08.729 --> 14:10.869 the beginning of the Cold War . And , 14:11.349 --> 14:13.071 you know , we're , we're still 14:13.071 --> 14:14.849 struggling to , to , you know , 14:14.849 --> 14:16.849 supplant Russia and other nefarious 14:16.849 --> 14:19.016 characters because of that . So that , 14:19.016 --> 14:21.016 that's a very good point . Yeah , I 14:21.016 --> 14:22.960 think this , that spans across our 14:22.960 --> 14:25.679 interagency doc , you know , I'm not 14:25.690 --> 14:28.479 certain that we have yet calibrated 14:28.489 --> 14:30.640 ourselves as a whole of government 14:30.950 --> 14:34.400 really towards the idea of a strategic 14:34.409 --> 14:37.780 competition with the international 14:37.789 --> 14:40.070 rules based order and the future of our 14:40.080 --> 14:44.070 nation . Uh as the , as the item 14:44.080 --> 14:46.080 that's at risk . We still have , we 14:46.080 --> 14:48.580 have a very bureaucratic set of systems 14:48.590 --> 14:50.701 and processes and we're gonna have to 14:50.701 --> 14:52.701 work with the whole government from 14:52.701 --> 14:54.701 individuals all the way through the 14:54.701 --> 14:57.659 legislature to , to focus ourselves on 14:57.669 --> 14:59.669 being ready to meet the challenge . 15:03.070 --> 15:06.530 How can the uh us help build our allies 15:06.539 --> 15:09.239 uh military institutional capabilities ? 15:09.250 --> 15:11.417 Uh For example , how can we capitalize 15:11.417 --> 15:15.130 on us uh socoms uh recent 15:15.140 --> 15:18.049 efforts in assisting Chile in 15:18.059 --> 15:20.820 establishing their own joint force 15:20.830 --> 15:23.760 initiative . Well , I think uh 15:23.770 --> 15:27.739 being there as partners present on the 15:27.750 --> 15:30.840 field uh to work with our partners 15:30.849 --> 15:33.630 across the theater is really a great 15:33.640 --> 15:35.640 first step . You know , you want to 15:35.640 --> 15:37.307 build trust is the number one 15:37.307 --> 15:40.159 foundational issue and trust requires 15:40.169 --> 15:42.469 contact . It requires information 15:42.479 --> 15:45.349 sharing , it requires working towards 15:45.359 --> 15:48.849 one another with that . We can share 15:48.859 --> 15:51.026 doctrine and ideas . Here's how we did 15:51.026 --> 15:53.248 it . You know , Chile is gonna Chile is 15:53.248 --> 15:56.349 going to need to put a uniquely Chilean 15:56.359 --> 15:58.349 spin on how they build their joint 15:58.359 --> 16:00.859 structure . But certainly our lessons 16:00.890 --> 16:03.929 uh can help provide a guide for 16:03.940 --> 16:06.539 possible ways forward . The other thing 16:06.549 --> 16:08.750 that we can do is really work hard on 16:08.760 --> 16:11.599 interoperability uh also through 16:11.609 --> 16:15.210 sharing doctrine but all but exercising 16:15.219 --> 16:17.169 together , working together , 16:17.190 --> 16:19.830 continuing the exchanges that we do . 16:20.020 --> 16:23.039 Uh relationships really , I think 16:23.049 --> 16:26.559 become foundational and I'll return 16:26.570 --> 16:28.737 back to the foreign military sales for 16:28.737 --> 16:30.626 military financing excess defense 16:30.626 --> 16:33.239 article process , all these processes . 16:33.250 --> 16:35.419 We we want to make as fast as possible 16:35.429 --> 16:38.099 for our partners across the globe and 16:38.109 --> 16:40.650 as well as in Latin America because 16:40.659 --> 16:43.820 they have defense needs and they are 16:43.830 --> 16:47.250 going to look for wherever they can to 16:47.260 --> 16:49.260 fulfill them . If the United States 16:49.260 --> 16:51.409 can't be fast enough to meet point of 16:51.419 --> 16:55.380 need , then in significant detriment 16:55.390 --> 16:58.820 for our interest and for our partners 16:58.830 --> 17:02.719 who may have to turn to a um less 17:02.729 --> 17:05.760 desirable source . Indeed , sir . And 17:05.770 --> 17:08.170 the feedback that we receive is exactly 17:08.180 --> 17:10.380 that , that they want more personal 17:10.390 --> 17:13.619 relationships at all the echelons of uh 17:13.630 --> 17:15.852 leadership in order to build that trust 17:15.852 --> 17:18.140 and that was crucial in the joint 17:18.150 --> 17:20.670 initiative that uh socom did with uh 17:20.680 --> 17:22.680 with their own forces . Thank you . 17:22.680 --> 17:26.209 Yeah . So building on that , 17:26.219 --> 17:29.459 um the , the my last question is uh in 17:29.469 --> 17:31.880 what ways can us Southern Command and 17:31.890 --> 17:34.449 12th Air Force in particular support 17:34.459 --> 17:36.570 Latin American countries as they face 17:36.570 --> 17:38.570 China's coercive diplomacy , debt , 17:38.570 --> 17:40.737 trap lending and information warfare . 17:41.750 --> 17:44.028 Well , we could do all sorts of things , 17:44.028 --> 17:46.400 doc but I think the number one thing we 17:46.410 --> 17:49.780 can do is first to build the trust 17:49.790 --> 17:51.469 that's required to 17:53.479 --> 17:57.089 open our partners . Uh uh 17:57.229 --> 17:59.689 willingness to hear the next part of 17:59.699 --> 18:01.866 the message which is to illuminate the 18:01.866 --> 18:04.359 threat . And that's a tricky , it's a 18:04.369 --> 18:06.660 tricky proposition . You know , it's 18:06.670 --> 18:09.890 very easy for us to go to our partners 18:09.900 --> 18:13.550 and say , hey , uh this 18:13.560 --> 18:16.060 other actor , whether it be China or 18:16.069 --> 18:19.739 Iran or Venezuela or Russia or whoever 18:19.750 --> 18:22.170 it may be , this other actor doesn't 18:22.180 --> 18:24.180 have your best interests at heart . 18:24.180 --> 18:26.660 Don't partner with them . It's kind of 18:26.670 --> 18:30.280 the lecture phase . Um We , we got to 18:30.290 --> 18:32.310 tell him why we got to give them 18:32.319 --> 18:36.310 alternatives . And uh we , we 18:36.319 --> 18:39.780 have to , you know , be present and 18:39.790 --> 18:42.369 helpful in trying to help our partners 18:42.380 --> 18:44.969 solve their problems . Because if , if 18:44.979 --> 18:47.979 all we have to offer is a lecture then 18:48.160 --> 18:50.650 we're probably going to fall short and 18:50.660 --> 18:52.882 the , the , the old adage don't come to 18:52.882 --> 18:54.827 me with a problem that you can't , 18:54.827 --> 18:57.829 can't solve . Right , sir . And uh for 18:57.839 --> 19:00.469 our final question , we'll go back to 19:00.479 --> 19:03.130 uh the space uh topic . Uh How should 19:03.140 --> 19:05.140 the US work with our Latin American 19:05.140 --> 19:07.251 partners to counter the threats posed 19:07.251 --> 19:09.550 by China's expanding Latin American 19:09.560 --> 19:11.116 space footprint ? Are there 19:11.116 --> 19:13.569 opportunities uh for space security 19:13.579 --> 19:15.630 cooper operation between us and our 19:15.640 --> 19:18.609 allies ? I think this is a bright spot 19:18.619 --> 19:20.563 for us . I think that , you know , 19:20.563 --> 19:24.180 perhaps uh we are a little bit 19:24.189 --> 19:27.959 behind the pace of growing pr c space 19:27.969 --> 19:30.819 infrastructure in Latin America . Uh 19:30.829 --> 19:34.310 but we have a lot to offer in space 19:34.550 --> 19:36.729 and I think there's tons of 19:36.739 --> 19:39.800 opportunities for partnership . Uh I'll 19:39.810 --> 19:42.032 give you one example , joint task force 19:42.032 --> 19:44.339 space defense under us . Space com has 19:44.349 --> 19:46.689 the joint commercial space operations 19:46.699 --> 19:49.020 or joint commercial operations , space 19:49.239 --> 19:52.479 initiative . And uh the who does what 19:52.489 --> 19:54.609 to whom is a little complicated even 19:54.619 --> 19:57.719 for me , uh probably too complicated 19:57.729 --> 19:59.451 for me to try to describe it , 19:59.451 --> 20:01.673 especially since the organization is in 20:01.673 --> 20:03.951 the process of being changed right now . 20:03.951 --> 20:06.173 But under joint commercial operations , 20:06.173 --> 20:09.400 you can have multiple partners 20:09.410 --> 20:11.670 contributing to the space Domain 20:11.680 --> 20:14.510 Awareness effort that 20:14.540 --> 20:18.170 allows for free 20:18.180 --> 20:22.050 access and safe access to space , 20:22.060 --> 20:24.250 you know , monitoring what's going on 20:24.520 --> 20:27.119 up in space to include looking for 20:27.130 --> 20:29.660 strange activities that might be taking 20:29.670 --> 20:33.609 place as different nations maneuver 20:33.619 --> 20:36.949 objects around in the , in the in , in 20:36.969 --> 20:40.589 that domain as I understand it . So , 20:40.599 --> 20:43.510 but the bottom line is it's training 20:43.630 --> 20:47.310 its skill sets . It helps our partners 20:47.319 --> 20:49.640 contribute to this international effort 20:49.650 --> 20:52.109 for the peaceful use of the space 20:52.119 --> 20:54.670 domain . There are international 20:54.680 --> 20:56.680 agreements like the Artemis Accords 20:56.680 --> 20:58.458 which relate primarily to space 20:58.458 --> 21:00.729 exploration uh out to the moon 21:00.739 --> 21:03.469 asteroids , other bodies in the space 21:03.479 --> 21:06.010 in between s lunar space . There are 21:06.020 --> 21:09.520 signatures to that set of agreements 21:09.949 --> 21:12.171 that are in Latin America , Argentina , 21:12.171 --> 21:14.282 Brazil , Colombia and Ecuador are the 21:14.282 --> 21:16.449 ones that come to mind immediately for 21:16.449 --> 21:18.671 me . So we can kind of come to not only 21:18.671 --> 21:21.949 a international understanding of how 21:21.959 --> 21:24.910 space should be used , but we can 21:24.920 --> 21:28.020 define rules and norms and call out 21:28.030 --> 21:30.319 folks that don't adhere to those rules 21:30.329 --> 21:32.107 and norms . And I think there's 21:32.107 --> 21:34.329 enormous opportunities to work together 21:34.329 --> 21:36.385 and build capability , whether it be 21:36.385 --> 21:39.494 basic space domain awareness techniques 21:39.505 --> 21:43.035 and skill sets or how to use the 21:43.045 --> 21:45.212 capabilities out there . Again , going 21:45.212 --> 21:47.212 back to the commercial operations , 21:47.212 --> 21:49.156 things like commercially available 21:49.156 --> 21:52.724 imagery that can be helpful in meeting 21:52.734 --> 21:54.678 the needs of population in time of 21:54.678 --> 21:57.645 crisis , whether it be related to uh 21:58.550 --> 22:02.219 hurricane and earthquake , flooding or 22:02.229 --> 22:05.770 drought . In addition to uh 22:05.780 --> 22:08.189 things like climate concerns or 22:08.199 --> 22:11.969 identifying threats like illegal mining 22:11.979 --> 22:14.739 deforestation or even some days , 22:14.750 --> 22:17.089 things speed up . Uh You might be able 22:17.099 --> 22:19.530 to get after the uh 22:19.910 --> 22:23.660 predatory fishing fleets , the uh 22:24.369 --> 22:28.199 illegal unregulated fishing that go 22:28.209 --> 22:30.650 unreported fishing that goes on in our 22:30.660 --> 22:33.260 partners , exclusive economic zones , 22:33.270 --> 22:35.719 primarily by PR C fishing fleets that 22:35.729 --> 22:38.459 conduct incursions into those areas and 22:38.469 --> 22:40.750 really take a lot of resources away 22:40.760 --> 22:42.800 from the populations of those Latin 22:42.810 --> 22:46.260 American and Caribbean nations . Thank 22:46.270 --> 22:48.709 you , sir . As a , as an old space guy 22:48.719 --> 22:50.608 that worked on the last three GPS 22:50.608 --> 22:53.089 launches , uh that is music to my ears . 22:53.099 --> 22:55.210 Uh because we saw the same thing with 22:55.210 --> 22:57.760 the GPS program when it first came out 22:57.770 --> 22:59.937 and the immense impact that it has had 22:59.937 --> 23:02.048 on the civilian side of the house and 23:02.048 --> 23:04.069 commercialization . So great news . 23:04.079 --> 23:06.280 Thank you . Yeah , and correct me to 23:06.290 --> 23:08.729 100% if I got the organizations wrong 23:08.739 --> 23:11.530 there . II , I still struggle to get 23:11.540 --> 23:14.510 the acronyms . Exactly right . We all 23:14.520 --> 23:18.420 do . Thank you . So 23:18.430 --> 23:20.597 that brings us to the end of the , the 23:20.597 --> 23:22.819 pre canned questions . But we wanted to 23:22.819 --> 23:24.930 provide you with uh ample opportunity 23:24.930 --> 23:24.900 to discuss , you know , topics that we 23:24.910 --> 23:27.160 may have missed that may be of interest 23:27.170 --> 23:29.337 to you to , to address . And , and one 23:29.337 --> 23:31.503 of the things that we would ask you to 23:31.503 --> 23:33.726 do is you think about some of the , the 23:33.726 --> 23:35.781 topics that you would like to see us 23:35.781 --> 23:37.726 publish on in our journals that it 23:37.726 --> 23:37.199 would be of benefit to your 23:37.209 --> 23:39.209 organization uh as you , you know , 23:39.209 --> 23:41.265 move forward to implementing some of 23:41.265 --> 23:43.376 the , the uh the concerns that you've 23:43.376 --> 23:45.542 talked about today . Yeah , I think II 23:45.542 --> 23:47.270 I think doc thank you for that 23:47.280 --> 23:51.239 opportunity . I think uh the thing 23:51.250 --> 23:53.199 that I tried to struggle to , I 23:53.209 --> 23:55.329 struggle to articulate a little bit 23:55.339 --> 23:57.729 sometimes . And what the genesis of 23:57.739 --> 24:00.949 this article is is why uh Latin America 24:00.959 --> 24:03.479 matters in an era when we are focused 24:03.489 --> 24:05.910 on the end of Pacific . From the 24:05.920 --> 24:09.619 standpoint of uh a pacing challenge of 24:09.630 --> 24:12.500 the People's Republic of China . Why 24:12.510 --> 24:14.739 does Latin America and the Caribbean , 24:15.130 --> 24:17.920 the South com A or why does it matter ? 24:18.520 --> 24:20.810 And so , you know , from that 24:20.819 --> 24:24.229 standpoint , the competition is global 24:24.239 --> 24:26.959 and we can't ignore the western 24:26.969 --> 24:29.829 hemisphere fear . It is not a given . 24:30.239 --> 24:33.040 In fact , I think it could be a point 24:33.050 --> 24:35.900 of strategic weakness for democratic 24:35.910 --> 24:38.400 governments , you know , like minded 24:38.410 --> 24:41.089 democratic nations if we take uh what's 24:41.099 --> 24:43.839 going on in the southern hemisphere , 24:44.079 --> 24:46.359 uh the southern half of the western 24:46.369 --> 24:49.150 hemisphere for granted . So I'd 24:49.160 --> 24:51.550 reiterate the primary things that I 24:52.839 --> 24:55.270 um the mechanisms that I'm most 24:55.280 --> 24:57.819 concerned about are things like 24:57.829 --> 25:00.160 communications infrastructure to 25:00.170 --> 25:02.489 include control of information 25:02.500 --> 25:06.060 infrastructure , five G networks being 25:06.069 --> 25:08.400 the most recent cloud computing places 25:08.510 --> 25:10.479 where information is at risk , 25:10.790 --> 25:13.939 intelligent risk from safe city 25:13.949 --> 25:16.880 projects , but also efforts to 25:16.890 --> 25:19.760 intimidate journalists or to influence 25:19.770 --> 25:23.290 the uh the the public positions 25:23.579 --> 25:27.050 of politicians or governments 25:27.420 --> 25:29.770 uh using multiple means of coercion , 25:29.780 --> 25:32.369 whether it be economic or otherwise . 25:32.900 --> 25:36.060 Uh the the critical infrastructure , we 25:36.069 --> 25:37.513 talk a lot about critical 25:37.513 --> 25:39.839 infrastructure but don't necessarily 25:39.849 --> 25:42.016 talk about why critical infrastructure 25:42.020 --> 25:44.890 matters . I really focus on the energy 25:44.900 --> 25:47.122 sector , although it's bigger than that 25:47.122 --> 25:49.344 uh that energy sector , things like the 25:49.344 --> 25:52.459 fact that pr C entities which may be 25:52.469 --> 25:55.150 private . But I think it's , it's 25:55.160 --> 25:58.939 relatively well known that these 25:58.949 --> 26:02.410 private entities are increasingly 26:02.420 --> 26:06.160 subjective to political requirements by 26:06.170 --> 26:08.660 the Chinese Communist Party . Anything 26:08.670 --> 26:10.726 from gathering intelligence to maybe 26:10.726 --> 26:14.229 other types of decisions . Uh Bethany 26:14.239 --> 26:16.461 Allen writes a little bit about this in 26:16.461 --> 26:19.430 her book , Beijing Rules that energy 26:19.439 --> 26:22.310 sector talk about a course of mechanism 26:22.319 --> 26:24.989 if you control the power . Uh I read 26:25.000 --> 26:28.459 one source that about 56% of the power 26:28.469 --> 26:31.880 distribution in the nation of Chile is 26:31.890 --> 26:34.839 controlled by PR C entities . That's , 26:35.229 --> 26:38.260 that's a little scary . Uh Lima , I was 26:38.270 --> 26:41.819 doing some reading and uh media 26:41.829 --> 26:45.140 sources that said that PR C entities or 26:45.150 --> 26:47.630 commercial entities were , had been on 26:47.640 --> 26:49.696 the verge of controlling 100% of the 26:49.696 --> 26:51.751 power distribution in the capital of 26:51.751 --> 26:54.040 Peru . Uh That's a little scary . So 26:54.150 --> 26:56.317 good communications , infrastructure , 26:56.317 --> 26:58.094 power , infrastructure lines of 26:58.094 --> 27:00.900 communication , specifically ports is 27:00.910 --> 27:03.180 where I would put the right now . The 27:03.189 --> 27:06.750 most obvious concerns you control a 27:06.760 --> 27:09.630 major port project like the new one 27:09.640 --> 27:13.489 going into uh Peru . I think it , I 27:13.500 --> 27:15.722 can't remember the name of the city but 27:15.722 --> 27:18.410 there is a mega port going in on the on 27:18.420 --> 27:20.476 the west coast of Peru . There , you 27:20.476 --> 27:22.587 are not only controlling , you know , 27:22.587 --> 27:26.140 building the new uh monopoly on a 27:26.150 --> 27:29.040 commercial flow of goods but 27:29.050 --> 27:31.170 potentially you are building a future 27:31.180 --> 27:33.719 military base . Those those types of 27:33.729 --> 27:36.750 projects are all over . Uh 27:36.780 --> 27:40.609 the Latin America and the Caribbean . 27:40.959 --> 27:44.449 I think there are ports built by 27:44.479 --> 27:46.949 and operated by Chinese entities in 27:46.959 --> 27:50.550 places like Jamaica , the Bahamas , 27:50.560 --> 27:54.550 Colombia , Peru , Argentina , 27:54.640 --> 27:56.650 they are all over the place and you 27:56.660 --> 27:58.827 know , potentially they could even one 27:58.827 --> 28:01.104 day in the right political environment , 28:01.104 --> 28:03.271 host warships that can threaten things 28:03.271 --> 28:05.327 like the Panama Canal or straight in 28:05.327 --> 28:07.675 the pass passage or all the above . And 28:07.685 --> 28:09.685 hey , you don't even have to host a 28:09.685 --> 28:11.852 warship to do that . You know that the 28:11.852 --> 28:15.415 Chinese have shown a 28:15.425 --> 28:17.974 willingness to use those type of port 28:17.984 --> 28:20.151 operations in other places , the globe 28:20.151 --> 28:22.206 kind of the mechanism of coercion or 28:22.206 --> 28:24.535 punishment by simply letting goods rot 28:24.545 --> 28:26.795 on the dock . So if you have a Chinese 28:26.805 --> 28:29.074 company that's operating the port 28:29.084 --> 28:31.569 infrastructure , the cranes , the the 28:31.579 --> 28:34.790 cargo handling , not only potentially 28:34.800 --> 28:36.856 those things could be turned into an 28:36.856 --> 28:38.800 intelligence threat , but they are 28:38.800 --> 28:41.069 potentially a mechanism of control or 28:41.079 --> 28:43.890 coercion down the road . So those those 28:43.900 --> 28:46.233 three things are the ones that you know , 28:46.233 --> 28:49.050 concern me the most communications , 28:49.060 --> 28:52.290 energy and uh 28:52.709 --> 28:54.320 infrastructure like lines of 28:54.320 --> 28:56.487 communication like the ports . But you 28:56.487 --> 28:58.880 can add in control of critical 28:58.890 --> 29:01.650 resources like monopolization of 29:01.660 --> 29:03.660 critical minerals , the lithium 29:03.699 --> 29:05.532 triangle in the vertical monopol 29:06.469 --> 29:08.750 monopolization of the supply chain . So 29:08.760 --> 29:11.020 there's a lot of mechanisms there . And 29:11.030 --> 29:12.974 then you know the one thing that I 29:12.974 --> 29:15.170 didn't talk about yet was this idea of 29:15.270 --> 29:17.492 strategic corruption . You mentioned it 29:17.492 --> 29:20.949 in your question uh there's a lot of um 29:22.089 --> 29:26.030 articles and studies that have started 29:26.040 --> 29:30.000 to point at the idea that pr 29:30.010 --> 29:32.121 c entities , sometimes commercial and 29:32.121 --> 29:33.899 private entities risking little 29:33.899 --> 29:35.788 punishment or taking advantage of 29:35.788 --> 29:38.829 corruption or unfair business 29:39.300 --> 29:42.890 practices to get no bid contracts , 29:42.900 --> 29:46.280 uh win contracts , win concessions , 29:46.290 --> 29:49.199 make political decisions , like 29:49.209 --> 29:51.859 permission to build a space station at 29:51.869 --> 29:55.640 the local level using things that the 29:55.650 --> 29:57.900 United States would just outlaw . Uh 29:57.910 --> 30:00.780 but uh can be gotten away with in the 30:00.790 --> 30:02.957 current environment in Latin America . 30:02.957 --> 30:06.260 So all that stuff builds uh to really 30:06.550 --> 30:10.339 a what I think of as a whole of 30:10.349 --> 30:13.099 government . Well , ned I don't think 30:13.109 --> 30:15.410 it's extraordinarily well synchronized 30:15.420 --> 30:18.589 sometimes but well , nestor nted effort 30:18.770 --> 30:21.819 uh to do as exactly as Elizabeth 30:21.829 --> 30:24.000 economy said in this to set the 30:24.010 --> 30:26.121 conditions to reorder the world order 30:27.890 --> 30:30.670 very well stated . Thank you , sir . 30:32.030 --> 30:34.308 Anything else you'd like to talk about ? 30:34.859 --> 30:36.970 I think you got everything that I had 30:36.970 --> 30:39.081 in my head . Great . Well , thank you 30:39.081 --> 30:41.303 so much for joining us today , sir . Uh 30:41.303 --> 30:43.248 It's a , it's a , it's very much a 30:43.248 --> 30:45.470 pleasure . Uh We look forward to future 30:45.470 --> 30:47.692 opportunities to work with you and your 30:47.692 --> 30:47.609 team uh in , in getting , you know , 30:47.619 --> 30:49.675 the word out about uh a lot of these 30:49.675 --> 30:51.841 issues . Uh some of which we were able 30:51.841 --> 30:54.063 to address and the issue where you were 30:54.063 --> 30:55.952 published in and uh some of which 30:55.952 --> 30:58.008 remain to be uh driven home with our 30:58.008 --> 31:00.510 readership . Uh We , we do uh with our 31:00.520 --> 31:02.687 journals , we , we , you know , we are 31:02.687 --> 31:05.130 trying to wake people up and , uh , you 31:05.140 --> 31:07.140 know , provide uh voices , not just 31:07.140 --> 31:09.251 from those that are in uniform and in 31:09.251 --> 31:11.449 government , but uh from academics and 31:11.829 --> 31:14.260 uh think tankers and , and whatnot that , 31:14.270 --> 31:16.270 uh that , that kind of , you know , 31:16.270 --> 31:19.069 gives , give us a uh some support for 31:19.079 --> 31:21.412 what we're trying to , as you mentioned , 31:21.412 --> 31:23.579 you know , tell our allies and friends 31:23.579 --> 31:26.660 in the , in the , the a or that uh you 31:26.670 --> 31:28.614 know , hey , you know , some folks 31:28.614 --> 31:30.837 don't have your , your best interest at 31:30.837 --> 31:33.003 heart . And uh you know , while we may 31:33.003 --> 31:35.170 have a , a checkered past , uh we , we 31:35.170 --> 31:37.489 should have a bright future uh as , as 31:37.500 --> 31:40.219 friends . So uh we , we would welcome 31:40.229 --> 31:42.285 uh future opportunities to work with 31:42.285 --> 31:44.285 your team to get that message out . 31:44.285 --> 31:46.173 Absolutely . I think there's a uh 31:46.173 --> 31:48.640 perception still that this is just 31:48.650 --> 31:50.979 about economics and it may be 31:50.989 --> 31:53.140 authoritarian government , but it's 31:53.150 --> 31:55.150 really about economics and economic 31:55.150 --> 31:57.150 interests and resource security , I 31:57.150 --> 31:59.372 think to a certain extent that's true . 31:59.372 --> 32:01.483 A lot of these efforts started out uh 32:01.483 --> 32:03.550 with that as the first objective 32:03.560 --> 32:05.893 economics and say supply chain security , 32:05.893 --> 32:08.189 things like food . But I think under 32:08.199 --> 32:11.329 the current regime , they've certainly 32:11.339 --> 32:13.395 continued to expand in their scope , 32:13.395 --> 32:17.040 scale and ambition and that uh it's 32:17.050 --> 32:19.560 far bigger than economics and that's 32:19.569 --> 32:21.650 what , what the , you know , a good 32:21.660 --> 32:24.489 percentage of uh of the United States 32:24.500 --> 32:26.839 public may and , and , and certainly 32:26.849 --> 32:28.960 the public in our partner nations may 32:28.960 --> 32:31.329 not understand . Thanks , sir .