WEBVTT

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first , let me just say what a great

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honor it is to be here . It's , it's

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frankly very humbling , uh , to be

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among the crowd here , Many of which

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you guys are the example of what made

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me want to join special forces when I

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was a younger man . Um , and then the

01:08.683 --> 01:10.961
speakers are just inspirational so far .

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Um , the opportunity to present this is ,

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is really important to me because

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frankly , uh , it's obviously very

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personal . I think it's a great story ,

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but I also think it's largely still

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unknown in the Socom community . Uh , I

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travel around a lot . I used to do a

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bit of teaching with Jason and I'm

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still , and I just asked a friend of

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mine in the front row question and I'm

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still amazed how little the community

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really knows about what really happened .

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So I think this is a great opportunity

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that I'm really personally very excited

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about . Um , so let me just kinda give

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you an idea of some promises I'm gonna

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make , what I'm gonna tell you in the

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next hour . I'm gonna tell you some

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things that are gonna make you really

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proud of the regiment . You're gonna be

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inspired if you're an sf guy , I would

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expect you're gonna sit there and think ,

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man , I wish I was a part of that piece .

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You're gonna hear things that make you

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wish you were on that mission . You're

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gonna hear some things that are gonna

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make you say , how is it possible ? I

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don't know that you're gonna hear a

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couple of things that you're gonna make .

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I see you snuck in down . I saw you .

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Uh you're gonna ask how did that really

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happen ? That couldn't have really

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happened and you might hear a couple

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things toward the end . They're gonna

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make you go , that's really frustrating

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and almost makes me angry that that

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really happened . Um , so if I don't

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achieve one of those for you , let me

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know later and I owe you a beer , but

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I'm pretty confident , I will keep you

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entertained uh with enough stories

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laced in for the next hour , you know ,

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the first like chris so of course with

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all briefings , let me just give you a

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speck of context and bring us back

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normally with crowds by the way , if

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you don't , if you haven't done this

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when I speak to people in uniform , I

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actually have to explain 9 11 , not ,

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not what it was , but I find out that

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many of them weren't alive . This crowd

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looks like most of you remember it as

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an actual event . Yeah , but that's

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actually important because when I used

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to give this pitch 15 years ago , it

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was personal . We all knew things now I

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realized we all don't . Um , but right ,

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right after 9 11 , we were in a fairly

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unique place mentally um , things that

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we had tolerated for the better part of

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a decade were no longer considered

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acceptable and I'm talking about

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specifically the condition in Iraq um ,

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chris advanced to the next one . Um ,

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if you're not familiar following the

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1991 Gulf War , we sort of contained

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the threat from Saddam Hussein in Iraq

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for the better part of 10 years and we

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did that by committing a significant

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amount of our military in the north and

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the Gulf and down south in Saudi Arabia

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and Kuwait He generally violated

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sanctions or defied sanctions for the

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better part of that 10 years . Every

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time you violated the sanctions , we

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usually responded with some sort of

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military show of force that was fairly ,

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I don't wanna say cost expensive to us ,

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but it took a lot of resources . And

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then there was the question of , is he

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still working on his weapons of mass

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destruction ? And again , it's very

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easy to look back now and come up with

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conclusions that we've been told , you

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know , in the , in the aftermath . But

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at the time , uh , it was very

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concerning that he was still

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potentially holding onto or working on

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a weapons of mass destruction

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capability . Just simple rhetorical

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question , I'll give you the answer in

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a second . Does anybody know how many

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times Saddam Hussein used weapons of

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mass destruction . Now again ,

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rhetorical question , some of you were

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like , yeah , I heard about that event .

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Okay , it's actually about three dozen ,

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you know , between and I'm talking from

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1980 to 1991 there's about three dozen

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incidents and actually in military

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circles , um he does hold , I'll say

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the record for the most successful use

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of chemical weapons in warfare against

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the Iranians . There's several events

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he conducted that as much as they were

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horrific . They were also incredibly

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effective in wiping out entire army

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units of the Iranian army . And then

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most famously in 1988 uh , he used

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chemical weapons to crush the kurdish

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resistance in the area of Halabja and

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I'll talk about that 5000 civilians

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were killed . Um , so that , that feeds

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into where our mindset was after 9 11 .

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Now again , I just tell you this part

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of the story , um , knowing we had just

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started in Afghanistan , there was a

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reality understanding that we cannot go

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after Al Qaeda and all of their

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affiliates , while we're still

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committing half of our military to

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contain this individual who appears to

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be problematic . That was the mindset .

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Um , so the theory was relatively sound ,

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that we are no longer going to tolerate

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that we're gonna remove that as a

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problem , solve it and then we'll be

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able to move on with the other efforts .

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Um , I say that because in the

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aftermath , I've heard a bunch of

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different stories about how we were

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trying to tie Saddam to Al Qaeda . That

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was never the case . It was clearly a

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military endeavor of , we can't

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continue to have half our military

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circling Iraq when we're trying to do

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something else . Um , so I just want to

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basically quickly talk about the

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terrain , the enemy and the general

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situation . These are two simple maps

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of Iraq , I suspect several of you have

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been there , but most of you probably

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have not uh , what you can see here is ,

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it's this border mountain area that I

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want to talk about first . Iraq is not

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all flat desert , it actually has a

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fairly significant mountainous area .

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I'll show you pictures of a second and

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this area here corresponds to this area

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here . There's two kurdish factions

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once called the KdP , once called the

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puk . That's not particularly important

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at this point , but these are the two

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factions of the kurdish , I'm gonna say

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kurdish resistance that have habitually

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been a problem for Saddam Hussein . Um ,

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just talking about them , the KdP is

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the more dominant one . It has about

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30,000 fighters that they called

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Peshmerga . Peshmerga is the kurdish

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term for one who faces death and the

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puk has about 22,000 . So there's a

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significant amount of manpower fighting

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manpower here , that's been threatening

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Saddam Hussein for quite a while next ,

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like chris All right , so , when I

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talk about those mountains , Yep ,

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that's them , that's what I'm talking

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about . That actually is the Iranian

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border . So it's a rack on this side

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and right over the ridge , it's Iran ,

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it's about 9 , 10,000 ft . Um it looks

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a lot like the Rocky Mountain National

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Park . And then that's also what

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typical kurdish fighters look like .

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Next line , please . Okay , let's talk

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about the enemy situation . Um you're

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gonna hear me also say a lot of stuff

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that again , put yourself in that

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mindset of if you if this is your

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mission , you know , you're gonna hear

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a lot of stuff that it's not exactly

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ideal . You know , stuff that that's

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really what we're dealing with . So in

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the wake of the gulf war , Saddam lost

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a significant amount of his military

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was destroyed in the current situation .

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He has 20 divisions at his disposal to

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still use to defend Iraq . 13 of those

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divisions are north of Baghdad . So as

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the U . S . Military is starting to key

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up for an invasion of Iraq , it's super

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important understand that 60% of his

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combat power is north of Baghdad and

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this is the way it's a raid doesn't

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really matter the names of them , but

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there's 13 divisions arrayed that way .

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Um Two of them are Republican guard

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divisions and one is an armored

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division . Again , from a military

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perspective , that should note in the

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back of your head of , I'm concerned

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about those entities . There's also a

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weird little piece down here called the

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M . E . K . That stands for um these

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are Persian exiles that fled Iran after

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the fall of the Shah . It's a brigade

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sized element and I'll just explain it

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this way . If the Republican Guard was

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the elite that Saddam used to keep an

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eye on the military . The M . E . K .

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Is the elite that he uses to keep an

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eye on the Republican guard . The

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theory of it is they have nowhere to go .

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They have no families in Iraq . They're

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not culturally or ethnically from Iraq ,

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they're outsiders . So Saddam has some

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leverage over them . They're right down

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here somewhere . And then and now if

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you're like oh that's a pretty bad

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situation , there's this little thing

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over here , this little isolated pocket ,

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that's the Iranian border area . I just

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talked about . Um there is an extremist

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group there that is affiliated with Al

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Qaeda , It's called Ansar al Islam and

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it has about 1000 fighters . It's

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entrenched in the mountains around the

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area of Halabja that I talked about ,

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The historic area that saw the chemical

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attack in 1988 . Um and we know we the

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US government know that this extremist

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group is experimenting with biological

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and chemical weapons . That's that's

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the enemy situation . Was that bad

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enough for you next . Like chris okay ,

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just to give you a little more picture

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of the terrain as you get away from the

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mountains and you're looking west ,

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That's what it looks like . It's

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extremely rolling terrain , it looks

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sort of like the Dakotas . And then if

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you get past that , it turns into this ,

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which is what the rest of Iraq looks

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like . That's the Iraq . Everybody

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thinks of that's not the Iraq we're

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dealing with in this scenario . I'm

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sorry , can you go back one , Chris I

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also want to point something out . You

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can kind of see on this map , this is

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what's called the green line . The

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green line essentially is what we in

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military terms would call a flat or a

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feta . It's the demarcation line

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between the Iraqi forces and the

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kurdish forces , meaning after the gulf

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war , when Saddam lost some of his

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forces , he had to pull back what

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military had and defend the train , he

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could , he could hold that green line

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represents that . Now , what that means

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is it's where the mountains and the

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rolling hills stop . It's not for any

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particular reason other than the

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terrain becomes harder to defend . If

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the Iraqi forces go into the hills

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because then the kurdish guerrillas can

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attack them . So that's what caused the

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green line to grow up where it is .

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Historic kurdish territory actually

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goes a bit beyond that green line and

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it encompasses the two main two main

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cities in the north . There's gonna be

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a test on this by the way . So you need

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to pay attention . It encompasses the

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two main cities in the north Kirkuk and

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Mosul . Um , if anybody is a religious

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history buff , just to let you know ,

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Kirk Cook is the burial site for Daniel

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from Daniel in the Lion's Den and Mosul

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is where Jonah from joan and the Wales

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from . And I just tell you that is when

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you're in Kirkuk , there's a huge

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monument to where Daniel's buried

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apparently . Uh , if you get thrown

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into alliance then and don't get eaten ,

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it's a big deal that people remember uh

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and and it's not regarded as a

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christian thing or a jewish or muslim ,

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it's regarded as the guy who was thrown

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into the lion's den and didn't get

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eaten and that's incurred cook . It's

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really , really interesting . Iraq is a

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great country actually . Um But I tell

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you this also because the oil industry

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for Iraq is half based out of the north ,

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it's predominantly in the space between

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Kirkuk and Mosul . So Saddam needs this ,

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He needs that , particularly if he's

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going to lose the south . How does he

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retain a country that has some

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viability if he does it by having still

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an oil revenue capacity in those oil

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fields . Okay , um Okay , go back to

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the next like chris next . Alright , so

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that's the friendly enemy and terrain

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situation . I know that's a lot to

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throw at you , but I just wanna give

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you some of that context . I also want

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to talk about what was going on at

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centcom and the U . S . Forces at this

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time . As I said . Keep in mind , Mark

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Rosen Guard is in the in the mountains

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of Afghanistan doing what he's doing

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right now . You know , the US

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government is fighting a war in

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Afghanistan and it's not going as good

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as it was going three months ago , it's

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starting to concern us . So the bulk of

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Centcom's real bandwidth is fighting

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that war , but now we've also decided

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we're thinking about going to war here

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too . So I'm gonna just tell you half

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the centcom staff is focused on this

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war and I'm talking about this is the

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springtime of 2002 . There is a written

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war plan for this thing and it's called

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10 or three victor and it was written

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15 years prior . So it doesn't make any

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sense . It talks about a military with

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30 divisions that we don't have . Um so

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as much as there was a written plan ,

12:27.083 --> 12:29.194
centcom now realizes that's not gonna

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work . So they come up with another

12:31.194 --> 12:31.120
plan and that plan was called running

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Start and this plan was great . It was

12:33.550 --> 12:35.772
gonna be super fast and super light and

12:35.772 --> 12:37.939
not nearly enough forces to do what we

12:37.939 --> 12:39.994
need to do . Now I say this this way

12:39.994 --> 12:42.050
because we're not abandoning this is

12:42.050 --> 12:44.217
all true , we're not abandoning the 10

12:44.217 --> 12:46.439
03 victor plan . Half the centcom staff

12:46.439 --> 12:48.606
is gonna continue to work on that plan

12:48.606 --> 12:48.340
even though we know it's not viable .

12:48.350 --> 12:50.572
But now I'm gonna pull off some of that

12:50.572 --> 12:52.906
staff to work on the running Start plan .

12:52.906 --> 12:52.400
That I think is a really good idea .

12:52.400 --> 12:54.400
But we also kind of no , that's not

12:54.400 --> 12:57.250
viable either . We work . We they work

12:57.250 --> 12:59.083
on this for about six months and

12:59.083 --> 13:00.917
there's massive arguing going on

13:00.917 --> 13:03.028
internal to US channels that that's a

13:03.028 --> 13:05.194
ridiculous plan . It's not viable . So

13:05.194 --> 13:04.240
then they finally come up with the

13:04.240 --> 13:06.407
fourth plan , which is called hybrid .

13:06.407 --> 13:08.407
And it was a combination of running

13:08.407 --> 13:10.351
start and the original 10 or three

13:10.351 --> 13:12.407
victor plan . So there are literally

13:12.407 --> 13:14.573
four different planning groups working

13:14.573 --> 13:16.573
in centcom breaking up the manpower

13:16.573 --> 13:18.518
into force to do this . Planning .

13:18.518 --> 13:18.500
That's important , understand because

13:18.500 --> 13:20.556
I'm just gonna tell you the planning

13:20.556 --> 13:22.278
was not spectacular . Um to my

13:22.278 --> 13:24.520
knowledge , centcom never produced an

13:24.520 --> 13:26.940
actual order that we as a subordinate

13:26.940 --> 13:30.120
got . Um And subsequently R . T . Sock

13:30.130 --> 13:32.670
socks also didn't produce a subsequent

13:32.670 --> 13:35.730
order . If you're not a former military

13:35.730 --> 13:37.786
person , I will just tell you that's

13:37.786 --> 13:39.730
that's a big deal . It's it's it's

13:39.730 --> 13:41.674
really hard to be effective if you

13:41.674 --> 13:43.841
haven't gotten a plan from your higher

13:43.841 --> 13:47.330
headquarters . Um go to my next line .

13:49.230 --> 13:51.563
Okay . Actually I'm sorry , back up one .

13:51.563 --> 13:53.730
I'm gonna hold that for a second . You

13:53.730 --> 13:53.430
don't need to hear about this quite

13:53.440 --> 13:55.630
just yet . So I give you this

13:55.630 --> 13:57.852
background , it's a really really fluid

13:57.852 --> 13:59.797
environment . It's really , really

13:59.797 --> 14:02.180
challenging and confusing . So in the

14:02.180 --> 14:05.170
summer time of 2002 we started to get

14:05.170 --> 14:07.490
indications that this is for real we at

14:07.490 --> 14:09.434
least got a warning order from our

14:09.434 --> 14:11.490
various higher headquarters to start

14:11.490 --> 14:13.657
considering this . Now I'm glad to see

14:13.657 --> 14:15.879
there's a there's a handful of veterans

14:15.879 --> 14:15.800
from this operation in the room . You

14:15.800 --> 14:19.210
will remember , we always were told off

14:19.220 --> 14:21.276
off to the side it's going to happen

14:21.276 --> 14:23.276
next month . Does anybody else have

14:23.276 --> 14:25.442
scar tissue from that still we we were

14:25.442 --> 14:27.609
actually , we were usually told it was

14:27.609 --> 14:29.831
gonna be next weekend this weekend . We

14:29.831 --> 14:31.887
got told that from August till about

14:31.887 --> 14:34.109
February . It was , I can joke about it

14:34.109 --> 14:37.030
now . It's extremely painful to keep

14:37.030 --> 14:39.141
telling soldiers and their families .

14:39.141 --> 14:41.363
It's going to be this weekend and to do

14:41.363 --> 14:43.720
that for 30 weeks . Um and then also

14:43.720 --> 14:46.053
trying to plan out what you're gonna do .

14:46.053 --> 14:48.510
So I tell you these things because now

14:48.510 --> 14:50.566
I'm gonna take this down to a single

14:50.566 --> 14:54.060
battalion . Um I was debating what

14:54.060 --> 14:56.116
stories I'm going to talk about . We

14:56.116 --> 14:58.393
call this task force viking . I got me ,

14:58.393 --> 15:00.560
I know I got at least one any veterans

15:00.560 --> 15:00.370
in the room that we're actually at the

15:00.370 --> 15:02.703
group headquarters . Just sort of level .

15:02.860 --> 15:05.027
Alright , great . I can talk bad about

15:05.027 --> 15:07.680
them Then . It's the nature of the

15:07.690 --> 15:09.801
beast as a , as a lower unit . You're

15:09.801 --> 15:12.023
always gonna have some issues with your

15:12.023 --> 15:14.023
higher , we weren't actually called

15:14.023 --> 15:16.134
Task force viking . None of us called

15:16.134 --> 15:18.357
ourselves Task force viking . That name

15:18.357 --> 15:20.246
materialized during the operation

15:20.246 --> 15:22.468
toward the end . So it was very weird .

15:22.468 --> 15:24.579
And it was , it still is weird for me

15:24.579 --> 15:26.801
when people like Task force viking , we

15:26.801 --> 15:26.650
were called just sort of north , you

15:26.650 --> 15:28.817
know , and and God bless God bless the

15:28.817 --> 15:30.983
just sort of staff in the group . They

15:30.983 --> 15:33.206
came up with all these viking names for

15:33.206 --> 15:32.670
things that were really , really cool

15:32.670 --> 15:34.614
and none of us knew what they were

15:34.614 --> 15:36.781
talking about . I can remember the day

15:36.781 --> 15:36.370
when they said to us , hey , you need

15:36.370 --> 15:38.481
to come to the meeting at Loki Base .

15:38.481 --> 15:40.426
We had no idea what that was . And

15:40.426 --> 15:42.648
we're like , you mean mobile , that's a

15:42.648 --> 15:44.759
city name . And they're like , yeah ,

15:44.759 --> 15:44.560
they had all these really cool names

15:44.560 --> 15:46.616
and it just kind of gave you a weird

15:46.616 --> 15:48.671
feeling of see you guys been working

15:48.671 --> 15:50.782
hard up at the Chisso to . Um , but I

15:50.782 --> 15:52.949
tell you that is about that . That was

15:52.949 --> 15:52.790
a group thing that never really

15:52.800 --> 15:54.856
materialized internal to the force .

15:54.856 --> 15:57.040
But here's the group's plan . The

15:57.040 --> 15:59.040
group's concept is we're gonna have

15:59.040 --> 16:01.151
three battalions in this task force ,

16:01.151 --> 16:03.373
it's gonna be second battalion from the

16:03.373 --> 16:05.429
10th , third battalion from the 10th

16:05.429 --> 16:07.484
and third of the third . We couldn't

16:07.484 --> 16:10.380
get first of the 10th , uh , I'm always

16:10.380 --> 16:12.491
gonna use people's actual rank at the

16:12.491 --> 16:14.602
time . I actually wish , I hope Major

16:14.602 --> 16:16.713
General Robinson gets to come back in

16:16.713 --> 16:18.824
here . Uh , Colonel Cleveland was the

16:18.824 --> 16:18.570
decisive commander and the 10th group

16:18.570 --> 16:20.560
commander and he actually did an

16:20.560 --> 16:22.770
amazing job frankly , but he tried

16:22.770 --> 16:24.992
really , really hard to get 1 10 and he

16:24.992 --> 16:27.214
used the term , he got shot in the face

16:27.214 --> 16:29.381
several times that Yukon was not going

16:29.381 --> 16:31.381
to relinquish it and didn't want to

16:31.381 --> 16:31.070
hear it again . So you're getting a

16:31.070 --> 16:33.126
third of the third as your round out

16:33.126 --> 16:35.270
battalion . Um , I'm just gonna tell

16:35.270 --> 16:38.240
you that wasn't a great fit for both .

16:38.240 --> 16:40.240
A bunch of reasons , we didn't know

16:40.240 --> 16:42.407
them . They didn't know us . We didn't

16:42.407 --> 16:42.130
understand the capabilities . We didn't

16:42.130 --> 16:44.241
come up with good missions for them .

16:44.241 --> 16:46.463
And the two units never really meshed .

16:46.463 --> 16:48.630
That was just a bad fit . We also were

16:48.630 --> 16:51.260
given uh , m squadron of the Sbs , the

16:51.260 --> 16:53.920
british SBS and we were giving them

16:53.920 --> 16:56.540
specifically to conduct a raid on a

16:56.550 --> 16:58.883
specific site that I'm gonna talk about .

16:58.883 --> 17:00.994
So that's basically the force package

17:00.994 --> 17:02.994
that we had . The mission starts to

17:02.994 --> 17:05.440
materialize where we know we're going

17:05.440 --> 17:07.740
to conduct unconventional warfare and

17:07.740 --> 17:09.851
we know there's two factions . If you

17:09.851 --> 17:11.740
think back to that original map ,

17:11.740 --> 17:13.740
there's the KDp and the puk . So we

17:13.740 --> 17:15.684
kind of know it's one battalion of

17:15.684 --> 17:15.020
peace is going to work with those two

17:15.020 --> 17:18.160
factions to promote resistance to cause

17:18.160 --> 17:21.310
problems for the Northern front . Um ,

17:21.320 --> 17:23.760
what we didn't do is actually focus on

17:23.760 --> 17:25.990
the whole , just so to the whole , just

17:25.990 --> 17:28.130
the group is responsible for all the

17:28.130 --> 17:30.297
terrain , all the way up to the Syrian

17:30.297 --> 17:32.574
border . So , I tell you this , I wish ,

17:32.574 --> 17:34.741
I wish Mark Rosenberg was still in the

17:34.741 --> 17:36.741
room . One of the comments you made

17:36.741 --> 17:35.930
earlier , we were talking about mission

17:35.930 --> 17:38.152
statements and , you know , the mission

17:38.152 --> 17:40.486
to conduct , you w former instructor me ,

17:40.486 --> 17:42.541
I'll just tell you it's dangerous to

17:42.541 --> 17:44.597
use words like that because when you

17:44.597 --> 17:46.652
start quoting a type of operation as

17:46.652 --> 17:48.930
the task that becomes the task to do

17:48.930 --> 17:51.152
that type of operation , not to have an

17:51.152 --> 17:53.319
effect . Our mission wasn't to conduct

17:53.319 --> 17:55.374
unconventional warfare . Our mission

17:55.374 --> 17:57.486
was to disrupt the Iraqi combat power

17:57.486 --> 17:59.597
in the north . We thought we would do

17:59.597 --> 18:01.930
it by conducting unconventional warfare .

18:01.930 --> 18:03.819
But we also thought we'd do it by

18:03.819 --> 18:05.986
having rat patrol teams run around the

18:05.986 --> 18:08.208
west , harassing enemy formations where

18:08.208 --> 18:10.840
they could . Um , so that's just a

18:10.840 --> 18:13.118
really , really important point of way .

18:13.118 --> 18:15.284
That mission statement can kind of get

18:15.284 --> 18:14.860
away from forces and you can start to

18:14.860 --> 18:17.150
get locked in on types of operations .

18:17.160 --> 18:19.327
I will just say this , I don't want to

18:19.327 --> 18:21.438
talk too much about like just sort of

18:21.438 --> 18:23.604
south , which became just sort of west

18:23.604 --> 18:25.882
and fifth group in the south and socks .

18:25.882 --> 18:25.780
And , but there was a lot of emphasis

18:25.790 --> 18:27.901
almost on like looking at what we did

18:27.901 --> 18:30.012
in the gulf war and saying , let's do

18:30.012 --> 18:32.179
the same stuff . Scud hunting became a

18:32.179 --> 18:34.123
huge topic of discussion for fifth

18:34.123 --> 18:36.420
group . There was no scud requirement .

18:36.430 --> 18:38.208
Scuds were not a threat in this

18:38.208 --> 18:40.319
conflict , but there was a tremendous

18:40.319 --> 18:42.486
amount of mental bandwidth about going

18:42.486 --> 18:44.597
after scuds . So I just tell you it's

18:44.597 --> 18:46.708
an example of , we need to be precise

18:46.708 --> 18:48.708
in our terminology and we generally

18:48.708 --> 18:50.986
were um , I'm also just gonna say this ,

18:50.986 --> 18:52.819
I'm not gonna talk about the sbs

18:52.819 --> 18:54.819
portion too much , but if anybody's

18:54.819 --> 18:56.986
familiar with bravo 20 during the gulf

18:56.986 --> 18:59.097
war . If you're not talking to one of

18:59.097 --> 19:01.319
the people next to you on the head . It

19:01.319 --> 19:03.319
was , it was a huge bit of a fiasco

19:03.319 --> 19:05.430
event during the gulf war , much like

19:05.430 --> 19:07.652
Sequels to all good movies , you know ,

19:07.652 --> 19:09.708
it's a bigger plot , It's just , you

19:09.708 --> 19:11.930
know , greater action scenes . This was

19:11.930 --> 19:13.763
like that . Uh , they decided to

19:13.763 --> 19:15.708
infiltrate into the western desert

19:15.708 --> 19:17.874
without actually telling the Chisso to

19:17.874 --> 19:17.780
and they were gonna do some rat patrol

19:17.780 --> 19:20.640
stuff . It went really , really badly .

19:20.650 --> 19:23.160
Um , yeah , so I'm not gonna harp on

19:23.160 --> 19:25.271
that , but it was exactly a sequel to

19:25.271 --> 19:27.493
bravo 20 . So that's the sbs portion to

19:27.493 --> 19:30.050
just sort of north . Okay , so having

19:30.050 --> 19:32.050
said that , let me just keep keep ,

19:32.050 --> 19:34.170
keep moving on . The group Was

19:34.170 --> 19:36.330
struggling because socks and and

19:36.330 --> 19:38.608
centcom didn't really give them a plan .

19:38.608 --> 19:40.608
So subsequently they didn't exactly

19:40.608 --> 19:42.552
solidify a plan either , which was

19:42.552 --> 19:44.774
really problematic . We made a decision

19:44.774 --> 19:48.060
in at least 3rd battalion to write an

19:48.060 --> 19:50.171
order and issued to our subordinate .

19:50.171 --> 19:52.282
And I'm saying that with , with a bit

19:52.282 --> 19:54.449
of caution , it's very , very easy for

19:54.449 --> 19:57.350
higher commands to rationalize that

19:57.360 --> 19:59.582
they don't need to do the same things .

19:59.582 --> 20:01.749
We always tell our subordinate to do .

20:01.749 --> 20:03.916
It's very easy to rationalize that the

20:03.916 --> 20:02.770
world is different up here . It's

20:02.770 --> 20:04.992
complicated . It's so complex . I don't

20:04.992 --> 20:07.159
have to give one third of , you know ,

20:07.159 --> 20:09.214
one third , two thirds of my time to

20:09.214 --> 20:08.910
subordinate the plan . That's in the

20:08.910 --> 20:10.910
real world , It's , there's tons of

20:10.910 --> 20:12.966
that , everybody was doing that . We

20:12.966 --> 20:14.966
didn't do that . We made a decision

20:14.966 --> 20:14.890
that we're gonna write in order , we're

20:14.890 --> 20:17.112
gonna give guidance and we're gonna let

20:17.112 --> 20:19.279
our teams have time to actually plan .

20:20.160 --> 20:22.216
So in july . Um , and I should point

20:22.216 --> 20:24.160
out if you forget , you don't know

20:24.160 --> 20:25.827
these things . I was actually

20:25.827 --> 20:27.882
operations officer for the battalion

20:27.882 --> 20:27.870
Lieutenant Colonel Toivo , now ,

20:27.870 --> 20:30.092
Retired General Togo that you guys will

20:30.092 --> 20:32.203
hopefully here saturday speak was the

20:32.203 --> 20:33.981
battalion commander . We made a

20:33.981 --> 20:36.148
decision to write a plan . We told our

20:36.148 --> 20:38.259
O . D . A . S , you've got four weeks

20:38.259 --> 20:40.426
to do whatever training you want to do

20:40.426 --> 20:40.200
and then you're going into isolation

20:40.200 --> 20:42.450
planning uh , for some of you older

20:42.450 --> 20:44.580
guys , you know , Yeah , we meant old

20:44.580 --> 20:46.636
school style isolation and I'll talk

20:46.636 --> 20:49.860
about that in a second . I've seen as

20:49.860 --> 20:52.570
an instructor , I've seen probably 100

20:52.580 --> 20:54.650
isolation planning events and I've

20:54.650 --> 20:56.928
always been frustrated with the forces ,

20:56.928 --> 20:58.983
not clarity , lack of clarity on how

20:58.983 --> 21:01.206
this goes in the schoolhouse . It's not

21:01.206 --> 21:03.372
uncommon for visitor brief back takers

21:03.372 --> 21:06.250
to treat teams like stump the chump or

21:06.260 --> 21:08.371
thinking , I'm gonna pick your course

21:08.371 --> 21:10.371
of action . We didn't do that . And

21:10.371 --> 21:12.482
this is , this is in my opinion , one

21:12.482 --> 21:12.040
of the most important points about our

21:12.040 --> 21:14.240
success Togo . And I have a very very

21:14.240 --> 21:17.720
similar mindset about this process . We

21:17.720 --> 21:19.831
treated the teams like we know them ,

21:19.831 --> 21:22.053
which we did . There are subordinates ,

21:22.053 --> 21:24.331
There was no question if they're ready ,

21:24.331 --> 21:26.553
if they're good enough , they're ours ,

21:26.553 --> 21:26.100
you know , if they weren't good enough ,

21:26.100 --> 21:28.211
I should have said something about it

21:28.211 --> 21:30.267
yesterday , not suddenly , there's a

21:30.267 --> 21:32.600
real world mission . So we did sit down .

21:32.600 --> 21:32.040
We actually talked about the teams were

21:32.040 --> 21:34.151
added them all , you know , 1 to 15 .

21:34.151 --> 21:36.151
We only have 15 ideas and battalion

21:36.151 --> 21:38.207
back then . And uh , we did find out

21:38.207 --> 21:40.318
who we thought we should go on . What

21:40.318 --> 21:42.429
missions there was 100% confidence in

21:42.429 --> 21:42.210
our teams . It wasn't , we didn't have

21:42.210 --> 21:44.432
to do like a little try out or anything

21:44.432 --> 21:48.040
like that . We , we put the teams into

21:48.560 --> 21:50.504
um , if anybody familiar with fort

21:50.504 --> 21:52.250
Carson , we have a really kick

21:52.630 --> 21:54.186
isolation facility which we

21:54.186 --> 21:56.380
deliberately chose not to use because

21:56.380 --> 21:59.020
it's 100 m from the group headquarters

21:59.030 --> 22:01.252
and it has a whole bunch of other stuff

22:01.252 --> 22:03.419
occupying rooms because you can't just

22:03.419 --> 22:05.363
keep a gigantic isolation facility

22:05.363 --> 22:07.419
empty for decades . So it had like a

22:07.419 --> 22:06.500
gymnasium in there . It had the

22:06.500 --> 22:09.740
mountain locker , had an irish pub .

22:11.370 --> 22:15.340
It does . Um , so we , we

22:15.340 --> 22:17.590
made the unpopular decision to actually

22:17.590 --> 22:19.970
drive out to Opinion Canyon , which is

22:19.970 --> 22:22.026
a three hour drive one way from fort

22:22.026 --> 22:24.400
Carson and there is nothing out there .

22:24.410 --> 22:26.688
I mean it is tarpaper shacks that have ,

22:26.688 --> 22:28.577
you know , barely electricity and

22:28.577 --> 22:30.743
barely running water and the , and the

22:30.743 --> 22:32.910
teams all complained about this . Like

22:32.910 --> 22:34.854
why are we doing that ? Why are we

22:34.854 --> 22:37.021
doing that after we did it ? Everybody

22:37.021 --> 22:36.930
came back and said that was the right

22:36.930 --> 22:40.750
thing to do . Now I'll also say we put

22:40.760 --> 22:43.010
three companies through the isolation

22:43.010 --> 22:45.232
planning one company a month , that was

22:45.232 --> 22:47.840
what we could handle . Togo and I drove

22:47.840 --> 22:50.007
from fort Carson , the three hours one

22:50.007 --> 22:52.290
way on Tuesday and friday of every one

22:52.290 --> 22:54.290
of those weeks when we would get to

22:54.290 --> 22:56.234
opinion canyon , we would spend 10

22:56.234 --> 22:58.940
hours two hours per od a talking with

22:58.940 --> 23:01.860
them about their mission . And again ,

23:01.860 --> 23:04.082
it sounds probably , you probably wanna

23:04.082 --> 23:06.193
hear more about fire fights and stuff

23:06.193 --> 23:08.416
like that . But it was critical that we

23:08.416 --> 23:10.527
sat down with teams and we didn't act

23:10.527 --> 23:12.527
like it was an audition . We picked

23:12.527 --> 23:12.070
their brain and said , do you

23:12.070 --> 23:14.237
understand what I'm asking you to do ?

23:14.237 --> 23:16.403
And more of that , half the teams were

23:16.403 --> 23:18.459
unclear , you know , and we got to a

23:18.459 --> 23:18.290
point where they really , really

23:18.290 --> 23:21.180
understood what was important to us and

23:21.190 --> 23:23.412
we work through their mission statement

23:23.412 --> 23:25.579
and we got them to just really be in a

23:25.579 --> 23:27.746
good place . Obviously it goes without

23:27.746 --> 23:29.746
saying that Togo and I were utterly

23:29.746 --> 23:31.857
exhausted after doing , you know , 16

23:31.857 --> 23:33.801
hour days , twice a week for three

23:33.801 --> 23:35.912
weeks . But at the end of it , we had

23:35.912 --> 23:37.968
complete confidence in our teams and

23:37.968 --> 23:40.190
this is gonna be really important later

23:40.190 --> 23:38.960
because you're gonna see what we're

23:38.960 --> 23:40.516
gonna do in terms of how we

23:40.516 --> 23:42.682
decentralized cutaway teams and said ,

23:42.682 --> 23:44.738
call me when you can , which I don't

23:44.738 --> 23:44.650
think is very common . I don't think

23:44.650 --> 23:47.420
it's actually happened since . Um , so

23:47.420 --> 23:49.587
we put everybody through the isolation

23:49.587 --> 23:51.476
planet and I really stressed , we

23:51.476 --> 23:53.142
treated them like they're the

23:53.142 --> 23:55.309
commanders of the , we're giving you a

23:55.309 --> 23:57.309
mission . I had one team and you're

23:57.309 --> 23:59.309
gonna hear this number again . 81 .

23:59.309 --> 24:01.364
It's one of our really , really good

24:01.364 --> 24:03.420
teams . Did some great stuff . Worst

24:03.420 --> 24:05.587
briefers I've ever seen . Uh not a lot

24:05.587 --> 24:07.809
of uniform guys in here . Colonel Brown

24:07.809 --> 24:09.809
who just gave up 10th group about a

24:09.809 --> 24:12.470
year ago . He was the team leader . Uh

24:12.480 --> 24:14.591
worst , worst briefers I've ever seen

24:14.920 --> 24:17.230
after the briefing the team by three

24:17.230 --> 24:19.397
guys on the team that I know pulled me

24:19.397 --> 24:21.452
aside , panicking , begging to still

24:21.452 --> 24:23.674
get the mission . And I laughed . I was

24:23.674 --> 24:23.300
like , what are you talking about ?

24:23.310 --> 24:25.366
Yeah , you're going , yeah , I'm not

24:25.366 --> 24:27.532
sending you to brief . Thank God . You

24:27.532 --> 24:29.710
know , I know you , I know you guys

24:29.710 --> 24:32.730
enough , I know you know what to do .

24:32.740 --> 24:35.240
Your briefing skills by the way . But

24:35.240 --> 24:37.296
that's but I mean , but that's the ,

24:37.296 --> 24:39.351
that's the relationship we have with

24:39.351 --> 24:41.351
our teams . Um So that was really ,

24:41.351 --> 24:43.407
really important . So we got through

24:43.407 --> 24:43.010
isolation and we still , again going

24:43.010 --> 24:45.232
back to what I said , we always thought

24:45.232 --> 24:45.180
it's next week , we're leaving in a

24:45.180 --> 24:47.347
week . So it was really hard to figure

24:47.347 --> 24:49.513
out what do you do with your time . Um

24:50.040 --> 24:51.818
We did a lot of pre pre mission

24:51.818 --> 24:53.651
training stuff that you probably

24:53.651 --> 24:55.596
wouldn't think about . We did live

24:55.596 --> 24:57.762
tissue training on goats , we did some

24:57.762 --> 24:57.160
close air support training . We did

24:57.160 --> 25:00.080
media ambush training . Um We drove to

25:00.080 --> 25:02.370
fort Leonard Wood so we could go into a

25:02.370 --> 25:04.537
live chemical agent chamber , which is

25:04.537 --> 25:06.703
the most anti climactic training . You

25:06.703 --> 25:08.814
could possibly imagine if you've ever

25:08.814 --> 25:10.981
been to Fort Leonard wood , that's not

25:10.981 --> 25:13.092
very exciting in itself . But imagine

25:13.092 --> 25:15.314
imagine this , this is like the best of

25:15.314 --> 25:17.537
all worlds , a 16 hour one way bus ride

25:17.537 --> 25:19.930
to go to Fort Leonard Wood to put on

25:19.930 --> 25:23.050
NBC equipment to then go into a room

25:23.050 --> 25:25.217
that frankly , I don't know if there's

25:25.217 --> 25:27.383
anything in this room or not , none of

25:27.383 --> 25:27.120
us died , but I really don't know if it

25:27.120 --> 25:29.120
was just an empty room that they're

25:29.120 --> 25:29.010
like , tell them there's nerve agent in

25:29.010 --> 25:31.232
there , you stand there for a half hour

25:31.232 --> 25:33.288
moving around . Then we come out and

25:33.288 --> 25:35.510
you get to take the NBC equipment again

25:35.510 --> 25:37.621
and they get back in the bus . That's

25:37.621 --> 25:39.621
good training soldiers were excited

25:39.621 --> 25:41.810
about that . But that's the kind of

25:41.810 --> 25:44.032
stuff we were doing . You know , I joke

25:44.032 --> 25:46.254
about it , but that's the kind of stuff

25:46.254 --> 25:46.200
we were trying to make use of our time .

25:46.210 --> 25:48.321
We put everybody through two weeks of

25:48.321 --> 25:50.321
language school . Everybody went to

25:50.321 --> 25:52.488
either Arabic Turkish or kurdish . Now

25:52.488 --> 25:54.654
you might think two weeks isn't much .

25:54.654 --> 25:56.710
Yeah , that's right . It's not , you

25:56.710 --> 25:56.140
know , the difference between nothing

25:56.150 --> 25:58.810
and two weeks is its massive , nothing

25:58.810 --> 26:01.310
is nothing . Two weeks allows you to do

26:01.310 --> 26:03.532
the pointy talkie , you know , and walk

26:03.532 --> 26:05.143
your way through rudimentary

26:05.143 --> 26:07.199
instructions . We did that for every

26:07.199 --> 26:09.143
guy and that was a big a big money

26:09.143 --> 26:11.160
maker for us . Um I had to go to

26:11.160 --> 26:13.271
centcom a couple of times . I went to

26:13.271 --> 26:15.271
centcom in Tampa and I had to go to

26:15.271 --> 26:15.140
centcom and cutter to talk about the

26:15.140 --> 26:17.084
plant and I want to point this out

26:17.084 --> 26:19.140
because this is it's relevant to the

26:19.140 --> 26:21.140
overall mission . Again when I came

26:21.140 --> 26:23.140
down to centcom , I was in the room

26:23.140 --> 26:25.140
with all the centcom planners and a

26:25.140 --> 26:27.084
debate broke out about what is our

26:27.084 --> 26:29.362
mission and I don't mean me 10th group .

26:29.362 --> 26:31.584
I mean us like the mission you know for

26:31.584 --> 26:33.751
centcom and there was a question about

26:33.751 --> 26:35.973
is the mission to remove Saddam Hussein

26:35.973 --> 26:37.918
or remove his WMD capability and a

26:37.918 --> 26:40.140
sergeant major in the room who was from

26:40.140 --> 26:42.251
our scent which is the army component

26:42.251 --> 26:42.180
for centcom said , hey sir that's way

26:42.180 --> 26:44.402
above our pay grade . That's not for us

26:44.402 --> 26:46.624
to debate . And I literally said to him

26:46.624 --> 26:46.170
was like what are you talking about ?

26:46.170 --> 26:48.281
Some major , there's nobody else like

26:48.281 --> 26:50.503
this is it . This is the last , there's

26:50.503 --> 26:52.726
not another room with smarter people in

26:52.726 --> 26:54.726
it . And that was that was really ,

26:54.726 --> 26:54.420
that was really important understand

26:54.420 --> 26:57.080
that centcom wasn't particularly clear

26:57.080 --> 26:59.730
on what , why are we doing this ? Like

26:59.730 --> 27:01.619
it started to get mixed up in old

27:01.619 --> 27:03.730
mission statements like from the gulf

27:03.730 --> 27:05.897
war . Then we went out to cutter and I

27:05.897 --> 27:08.063
was telling chris about this earlier ,

27:08.063 --> 27:10.174
this is just the soft people that the

27:10.174 --> 27:09.670
socks and people we all met in Qatar

27:09.680 --> 27:12.760
for a gigantic rock drill ? A very Ntc

27:12.760 --> 27:14.927
style rock drill okay in your brains .

27:14.927 --> 27:17.149
You should be like , that doesn't sound

27:17.149 --> 27:19.149
like an appropriate thing to do for

27:19.149 --> 27:21.482
special operations . Absolutely correct .

27:21.482 --> 27:23.538
It made no sense whatsoever that the

27:23.538 --> 27:23.110
navy seals that are gonna go sees , go

27:23.110 --> 27:25.277
plants in the south of basra . Need to

27:25.277 --> 27:27.388
hear me brief about my mission in the

27:27.388 --> 27:29.499
north of Iraq and this was an example

27:29.499 --> 27:31.554
of , we're doing army things that we

27:31.554 --> 27:33.610
were learned somewhere that are good

27:33.610 --> 27:35.554
for the army . They're not special

27:35.554 --> 27:37.666
operations things and it was the most

27:37.666 --> 27:39.610
ridiculous drill standing around ,

27:39.610 --> 27:41.666
reciting our mission for people like

27:41.666 --> 27:41.020
I'm potentially going into enemy

27:41.020 --> 27:43.480
territory , I should not hear what the

27:43.480 --> 27:45.424
navy seals are gonna be doing down

27:45.424 --> 27:47.591
south , you know , and what night it's

27:47.591 --> 27:49.813
kicking off . That was a real , So this

27:49.813 --> 27:49.070
all ties again together that we were

27:49.070 --> 27:51.070
not clear on what we were doing and

27:51.070 --> 27:53.480
socks and at that time particularly

27:53.490 --> 27:56.550
demonstrated they had no visibility ,

27:56.560 --> 27:58.671
they had no visibility with Jason was

27:58.671 --> 28:00.671
planning and they were very unclear

28:00.671 --> 28:02.671
about what we were planning meaning

28:02.970 --> 28:05.303
from their perspective , they were like ,

28:05.303 --> 28:07.860
you guys are just going to do you w and

28:07.860 --> 28:09.860
I stress again , that's not really

28:09.860 --> 28:11.693
accurate . Um , we were there to

28:11.693 --> 28:14.830
disrupt the enemy . Uh , and I promise

28:14.830 --> 28:16.886
I'm gonna get off the planning stuff

28:16.886 --> 28:16.780
and actually talk about the operation

28:16.780 --> 28:18.947
in a second . They kept using the word

28:18.947 --> 28:21.002
fix , they kept saying yeah you guys

28:21.002 --> 28:23.224
are gonna fix the enemy in the north um

28:23.224 --> 28:25.169
chris can you go back to the enemy

28:25.169 --> 28:27.391
slide , okay , this is this is the kind

28:27.391 --> 28:29.391
of stuff if you ever happen to find

28:29.391 --> 28:31.558
yourself planning an invasion which it

28:31.558 --> 28:33.724
could happen . Um I didn't think I was

28:33.724 --> 28:36.002
gonna be planning invasion before 9 11 .

28:36.210 --> 28:38.432
I want to point out like so where let's

28:38.432 --> 28:40.599
say we're here , right , this is where

28:40.599 --> 28:42.766
the U . S . Forces are , these are the

28:42.766 --> 28:44.988
forces we're talking about , The more I

28:44.988 --> 28:47.154
study the enemy situation , the more I

28:47.154 --> 28:49.266
started to understand what Saddam was

28:49.266 --> 28:48.500
thinking and it actually made a lot of

28:48.500 --> 28:51.280
sense . Uh and this is really important .

28:51.280 --> 28:53.169
I don't want to screw the way I'm

28:53.169 --> 28:55.280
explaining this up . Saddam's plan is

28:55.280 --> 28:57.540
to these are the two Republican guard

28:57.540 --> 28:59.484
divisions , he needs to be able to

28:59.484 --> 29:01.540
retain flexibility to counter attack

29:01.540 --> 29:03.484
south with these , he doesn't care

29:03.484 --> 29:05.960
about these . So frankly we could kill

29:05.970 --> 29:08.070
all of them as long as we don't

29:08.080 --> 29:11.110
interfere with the nebuchadnezzar and

29:11.110 --> 29:13.130
the divisions , he achieves his

29:13.130 --> 29:15.870
objectives . And I think the american

29:15.870 --> 29:18.390
mindset was very frontal attack ,

29:18.400 --> 29:20.456
killing were like , we're gonna just

29:20.456 --> 29:22.622
kill a whole bunch of these guys . And

29:22.622 --> 29:24.733
the question comes up , are you gonna

29:24.733 --> 29:26.956
kill enough of them that you'll be able

29:26.956 --> 29:29.178
to stop the ones on the back from going

29:29.178 --> 29:31.400
south and I mean , I don't know if this

29:31.400 --> 29:33.622
will resonate , but explain it this way

29:33.622 --> 29:32.970
when you're looking at a map , it's two

29:32.970 --> 29:35.081
dimensional , when you're actually on

29:35.081 --> 29:37.303
the ground , it's not two dimensional ,

29:37.303 --> 29:39.526
it's like this . And what I'm saying is

29:39.526 --> 29:41.581
you are the american forces , You're

29:41.581 --> 29:43.470
touching this edge of the paper ,

29:43.470 --> 29:45.692
you're trying to have an effect on this

29:45.692 --> 29:45.530
edge of the paper . So suddenly it

29:45.530 --> 29:47.474
becomes evident that it's not just

29:47.474 --> 29:49.419
about killing and attacking , it's

29:49.419 --> 29:52.260
about having an effect . That effect is

29:52.260 --> 29:54.820
gonna be to compel Saddam from not

29:54.820 --> 29:57.042
moving his forces south . I hope you're

29:57.042 --> 29:59.280
if you're you can follow this , I can't

29:59.280 --> 30:01.270
force him to not go south and the

30:01.280 --> 30:04.060
military word fix in military lingo

30:04.070 --> 30:06.550
implies I can pin him down with fire

30:06.560 --> 30:08.616
and force him from not going south .

30:08.616 --> 30:10.727
This is important for centcom because

30:10.727 --> 30:12.949
I'm not physically in a position to fix

30:12.949 --> 30:15.240
him . I have to compel him . So how do

30:15.240 --> 30:17.462
you compel someone to do something have

30:17.462 --> 30:19.684
to threaten him in a way that makes him

30:19.684 --> 30:22.070
afraid to move these guys south and I

30:22.070 --> 30:24.292
go back to I can kill all of his forces

30:24.292 --> 30:26.514
and he's actually fine with that . What

30:26.514 --> 30:28.610
he's not fine with is if I take her

30:28.610 --> 30:30.850
cooking Mosul because if I take her

30:30.850 --> 30:33.840
cooking Mosul , he loses the oil . I

30:33.840 --> 30:35.618
tell you this from the strategy

30:35.618 --> 30:37.896
perspective , this was lost on centcom .

30:37.896 --> 30:40.118
They were like yeah , yeah , go do your

30:40.118 --> 30:42.284
special ops thing , you w whatever you

30:42.284 --> 30:44.396
call it , fix the enemy and these are

30:44.396 --> 30:46.507
really , really important discussions

30:46.507 --> 30:46.050
because it's gonna have bearing on the

30:46.050 --> 30:48.217
timing and how we're gonna do things .

30:48.217 --> 30:50.670
I will also say this the group also

30:50.670 --> 30:53.180
misunderstood this and the sectors they

30:53.190 --> 30:55.900
gave us ended at the green line . So ,

30:55.900 --> 30:58.122
again , from a military perspective , I

30:58.122 --> 31:00.233
wanna make sure you understand this .

31:00.233 --> 31:02.456
I'm giving you a task to have an effect

31:02.456 --> 31:04.622
outside of the sector . I'm giving you

31:04.622 --> 31:06.622
on on forces that you can't reach .

31:06.622 --> 31:08.456
That's your task . That's really

31:08.456 --> 31:10.622
important . Understand . I'm so glad .

31:10.622 --> 31:12.733
Yeah , that's the way I felt about it

31:12.733 --> 31:15.011
too . Okay , so let me keep going this .

31:15.011 --> 31:17.178
I think I've set the stage for this is

31:17.178 --> 31:19.400
gonna be really easy . This is gonna be

31:19.400 --> 31:21.622
a pretty straightforward mission . Um ,

31:21.622 --> 31:23.733
in the early summer , the CIA came to

31:23.733 --> 31:25.590
us and they told us they were re

31:25.590 --> 31:27.701
establishing contact with the kurds .

31:27.701 --> 31:29.701
And I'm gonna just I'll just say it

31:29.701 --> 31:31.757
this way . Our relationship with the

31:31.757 --> 31:33.979
CIA and this particular operation could

31:33.979 --> 31:33.630
not have been better . I got nothing

31:33.630 --> 31:35.630
but affection for those guys . They

31:35.630 --> 31:38.030
were fantastic partners . Um , I talked

31:38.030 --> 31:41.550
about the two kurdish factions . We had

31:41.550 --> 31:43.550
a presence in Northern Iraq up till

31:43.550 --> 31:47.500
1996 . From the gulf war on , If any ,

31:47.500 --> 31:49.556
recall at the end of the Gulf War we

31:49.556 --> 31:51.556
conducted provide comfort , sort of

31:51.556 --> 31:53.778
setting up a refugee safe haven for the

31:53.778 --> 31:56.056
fleeing Kurds . The Kurds , by the way ,

31:56.056 --> 31:58.167
all remember President Bush , sort of

31:58.167 --> 32:00.278
implying you guys should take matters

32:00.278 --> 32:02.333
into your own hands , which they did

32:02.333 --> 32:01.620
because they thought we were gonna be

32:01.620 --> 32:03.787
behind them and we weren't and it went

32:03.787 --> 32:05.953
really really badly for him and that's

32:05.953 --> 32:07.842
kind of what then perpetrated the

32:07.842 --> 32:09.953
further refugee crisis . So the Kurds

32:09.953 --> 32:09.380
all kind of remembered that that we

32:09.380 --> 32:12.300
sort of let them down in 1986 . Sort of

32:12.300 --> 32:14.300
the same thing happened . From the

32:14.300 --> 32:16.800
kurdish perspective , it's reasonably

32:16.800 --> 32:19.022
well documented . The CIA operatives on

32:19.022 --> 32:21.244
the ground said you guys should conduct

32:21.244 --> 32:23.411
a coup in an uprising , which they did

32:23.411 --> 32:27.060
and it went extremely badly . There was

32:27.060 --> 32:29.171
a bit of a scandal if that was ever a

32:29.171 --> 32:31.504
sanctioned coup by the U . S . Governor .

32:31.504 --> 32:33.671
Not the CIA operatives say it wasn't .

32:33.671 --> 32:33.510
That's a that's a different story . But

32:33.510 --> 32:35.677
the bottom line is the U . S . Kind of

32:35.677 --> 32:37.677
panicked and we withdrew all forces

32:37.677 --> 32:39.621
from Northern Iraq that were there

32:39.621 --> 32:41.843
doing their C . I . A business . But we

32:41.843 --> 32:43.621
were also there in a monitoring

32:43.621 --> 32:45.843
relationship with the kurds . Um the we

32:45.843 --> 32:48.010
actually evacuated what was called the

32:48.010 --> 32:50.410
Saku House in 1996 . The Kurds were

32:50.410 --> 32:52.354
freaked out because they knew were

32:52.354 --> 32:55.060
overreacting the young team leader that

32:55.060 --> 32:58.530
evacuated the house was a Captain Pat

32:58.530 --> 33:01.010
Robertson . Okay for most of you in the

33:01.010 --> 33:03.121
room that don't make the connection .

33:03.121 --> 33:05.288
I'm talking about Major general robert

33:05.288 --> 33:04.380
that was sitting here earlier today .

33:04.390 --> 33:07.660
He was the last captain in Iraq in 1996 .

33:07.670 --> 33:09.892
So this is actually important to the Ci

33:09.892 --> 33:12.059
is telling us they're going to go back

33:12.059 --> 33:14.226
in and re establish these contacts and

33:14.226 --> 33:16.337
they want us to send guys with them a

33:16.337 --> 33:18.750
term we used as a as a pilot team . We

33:18.750 --> 33:20.750
had had a bunch of guys that we had

33:20.750 --> 33:22.917
detailed to the agency for Afghanistan

33:22.917 --> 33:25.083
already , they already told us , hey ,

33:25.083 --> 33:27.250
we want the same guys , Sergei sitting

33:27.250 --> 33:26.850
there , he's one of them and it was an

33:26.860 --> 33:30.050
easy done deal that each battalion had

33:30.050 --> 33:32.320
one team of six guys pre identifying

33:32.320 --> 33:36.000
trained as a pilot team uh 66 and 76

33:36.010 --> 33:38.121
that went to the agency detailed with

33:38.121 --> 33:40.177
them and now it's gonna be a part of

33:40.177 --> 33:42.399
the pilot team effort . The C . I . A .

33:42.399 --> 33:44.454
Went back in in july our pilot teams

33:44.454 --> 33:46.566
joined them on the ground and I think

33:46.566 --> 33:48.510
october november . Um and that was

33:48.510 --> 33:50.288
really , really critical to our

33:50.288 --> 33:52.288
planning to have guys on the ground

33:52.288 --> 33:54.288
talking to the kurdish leadership ,

33:54.288 --> 33:56.399
send information back . So here's how

33:56.399 --> 33:58.510
everything I just explained to you is

33:58.510 --> 34:00.566
what we knew . Here's how we now got

34:00.566 --> 34:02.677
the kurdish perspective of , are they

34:02.677 --> 34:04.843
interested in this plant ? Basically ,

34:04.843 --> 34:06.954
it's like a used car salesman and I'm

34:06.954 --> 34:09.121
I'm talking about my pilot team leader

34:09.121 --> 34:11.121
Andy Gremlin , who I've known , you

34:11.121 --> 34:13.288
know , for 10 years before this , from

34:13.288 --> 34:15.454
my time in Stuttgart , basically , the

34:15.454 --> 34:17.677
Kurds . The question was , hey we wanna

34:17.677 --> 34:19.399
go fight Saddam , are you guys

34:19.399 --> 34:21.510
interested ? I know , I know I've let

34:21.510 --> 34:23.677
you down a few times before , but this

34:23.677 --> 34:25.843
one's for real . Um and the kurds were

34:25.843 --> 34:27.843
like , hey that sounds great , we'd

34:27.843 --> 34:31.790
love to do it . The problem is uh

34:31.800 --> 34:34.022
I got this this problem in my rear area

34:34.022 --> 34:35.800
called on serial Islam , that's

34:35.800 --> 34:37.911
actually the bigger threat . And also

34:37.911 --> 34:40.133
by the way , since 1986 , we've kind of

34:40.133 --> 34:42.133
been in a brutal civil war with our

34:42.133 --> 34:44.244
kurdish faction here . So of my , for

34:44.244 --> 34:46.133
example , of my 22,000 fighters ,

34:46.133 --> 34:48.300
10,000 of them are here , 8000 of them

34:48.300 --> 34:50.467
are here and the remaining old men are

34:50.467 --> 34:52.633
men in this line . So , you know , I'd

34:52.633 --> 34:54.689
love to go fight the Iraqis with you

34:54.689 --> 34:56.744
but I kind of got a couple of things

34:56.744 --> 34:58.856
going on . So the pilot team was in a

34:58.856 --> 35:01.133
position to say , what's it gonna take ,

35:01.133 --> 35:03.244
what do I gotta do to get you to go ?

35:03.244 --> 35:05.244
This is exactly the way this went ,

35:05.244 --> 35:07.300
what's it gonna take for you to come

35:07.300 --> 35:09.244
and fight the Iraqis with me and I

35:09.244 --> 35:11.356
joked about my politics and basically

35:11.356 --> 35:10.630
I'm gonna write a figure on a piece of

35:10.630 --> 35:13.060
paper , you know , sliding across . And

35:13.060 --> 35:15.880
it was when I when I got to talk to my

35:15.880 --> 35:17.936
pilot team later , you know , it was

35:17.936 --> 35:20.158
almost like , hey , good news , they've

35:20.158 --> 35:22.324
agreed to it . I'm like that's great ,

35:22.324 --> 35:24.269
what do we got to do ? It's pretty

35:24.269 --> 35:26.324
simple . All we gotta do is wipe out

35:26.324 --> 35:28.158
this hard entrenched , fanatical

35:28.158 --> 35:30.269
faction up in the mountains , we wipe

35:30.269 --> 35:32.324
them out and then they're good . I'm

35:32.324 --> 35:34.602
like that shouldn't be an issue . Cool .

35:34.602 --> 35:36.769
So are you guys you guys up for this ?

35:36.769 --> 35:38.936
All right . That's the situation we're

35:38.936 --> 35:41.970
facing . Um at some point the pilot

35:41.970 --> 35:44.490
team which was detailed to the agency

35:44.500 --> 35:46.333
was supposed to be sending their

35:46.333 --> 35:48.444
reports through other channels to get

35:48.444 --> 35:50.770
to me . Nothing was getting to me

35:50.780 --> 35:53.720
whether it's the agency , the pentagon ,

35:53.730 --> 35:55.890
the joint staff centcom socks sent

35:55.900 --> 35:58.880
group someone between me and my pilot

35:58.880 --> 36:01.102
team thinks they know the answer better

36:01.102 --> 36:03.158
and is either not giving it to me or

36:03.158 --> 36:05.900
fixing the answer . Um when I finally

36:05.900 --> 36:08.067
talked to the pilot team in person the

36:08.067 --> 36:10.289
next time they had sent me over me like

36:10.289 --> 36:12.511
to me specifically over 200 reports , I

36:12.511 --> 36:14.289
saw none of them and there were

36:14.289 --> 36:16.456
numerous R . F . I . S . That we asked

36:16.456 --> 36:18.880
like what uniform of the kurds wearing .

36:18.890 --> 36:21.001
We were told there were in D . C . Us

36:21.001 --> 36:23.112
there . In fact wearing BTUs . Cool .

36:23.112 --> 36:25.168
That's good to know because you look

36:25.168 --> 36:27.334
you look like a jackass if you show up

36:27.334 --> 36:29.557
in the wrong uniform and they're all in

36:29.557 --> 36:29.080
BTUs and you're the only guy in Dc us .

36:29.090 --> 36:32.460
We asked if the airfield in the puk

36:32.460 --> 36:34.900
territory was viable , we were told no

36:34.900 --> 36:37.011
it's all created . That's incorrect .

36:37.011 --> 36:39.178
It's not created . So I mean there was

36:39.178 --> 36:41.289
a bunch of decisions that were really

36:41.289 --> 36:41.070
really important to plan that I'm

36:41.070 --> 36:43.126
getting the opposite of the accurate

36:43.126 --> 36:45.181
information and through a roundabout

36:45.181 --> 36:47.181
way I eventually found out that the

36:47.181 --> 36:49.181
pilot team wasn't getting the stuff

36:49.181 --> 36:51.292
through . One of the policy members ,

36:51.292 --> 36:51.160
daughter was sick , he had to be

36:51.160 --> 36:53.327
emergency extracted because she had to

36:53.327 --> 36:55.570
have brain surgery . So while he was in

36:55.570 --> 36:58.440
Colorado springs we argued for a week

36:58.450 --> 37:00.672
with the various levels of command if I

37:00.672 --> 37:03.790
could talk to . So and so and the

37:03.790 --> 37:05.734
answer was no , he's involved in a

37:05.734 --> 37:07.901
compartmented operation and you're not

37:07.901 --> 37:10.012
cleared to know what he's involved in

37:10.012 --> 37:09.660
which I knew what he was involved . It

37:09.660 --> 37:11.549
was kind of ridiculous . One hour

37:11.549 --> 37:13.604
before he left for the airfield , we

37:13.604 --> 37:15.604
just decided enough is enough and I

37:15.604 --> 37:17.771
went and talked to him and he answered

37:17.771 --> 37:19.827
100 of my questions . Um and then we

37:19.827 --> 37:21.382
coordinate a new method for

37:21.382 --> 37:23.549
communicating on an Iridium cell phone

37:23.549 --> 37:25.327
where I would just talk to them

37:25.327 --> 37:25.080
directly and we would start getting

37:25.080 --> 37:27.700
questions answered that was critical to

37:27.700 --> 37:29.700
our success . It was a game changer

37:30.720 --> 37:32.442
shouldn't have been that way .

37:32.442 --> 37:31.940
Unfortunately .

37:36.130 --> 37:38.297
One of the things about the pilot team

37:38.297 --> 37:40.463
and then I'll then I'll keep moving on

37:40.463 --> 37:42.408
the pilot team on the ground . The

37:42.408 --> 37:44.630
situation was really , really desperate

37:44.630 --> 37:46.797
for the kurds , particularly this this

37:46.797 --> 37:49.019
entity called Ansar al Islam . They had

37:49.019 --> 37:51.130
recently conducted an operation where

37:51.130 --> 37:53.186
they lost a piece of key terrain and

37:53.186 --> 37:55.297
they lost a significant think in your

37:55.297 --> 37:57.297
head , the five best generals , you

37:57.297 --> 37:57.220
know , in the american military . Now

37:57.220 --> 37:59.442
imagine if all of them were killed next

37:59.442 --> 38:01.664
week in an operation that's kind of the

38:01.664 --> 38:03.720
way this was they had lost their top

38:03.720 --> 38:06.090
generals in this attack . It was really ,

38:06.090 --> 38:08.520
really brutal Um out in the Hinterland

38:08.520 --> 38:10.742
by the Iranian border . They have these

38:10.742 --> 38:12.964
man made hills that are like 300ft tall

38:12.964 --> 38:15.131
called Gordy's that's the kurdish term

38:15.131 --> 38:17.409
for them and their their ancient forts .

38:17.409 --> 38:19.242
That that's how they control the

38:19.242 --> 38:21.464
terrain . They lost one of these to the

38:21.464 --> 38:23.409
answer faction in an effort now to

38:23.409 --> 38:25.640
retake it . Their generals were killed

38:25.650 --> 38:27.817
in this attack because they don't have

38:27.817 --> 38:30.039
enough ammunition . They don't have the

38:30.039 --> 38:32.261
resources they need during the attack .

38:32.261 --> 38:31.140
Three members of the pilot team , one

38:31.140 --> 38:33.362
of them sitting right there uh did some

38:33.362 --> 38:35.529
incredibly heroic stuff and alleviated

38:35.529 --> 38:37.362
the pressure against the kurdish

38:37.362 --> 38:39.480
fighters by directing fire from the

38:39.480 --> 38:41.591
single artillery piece that the kurds

38:41.591 --> 38:43.590
had and they significantly exposed

38:43.590 --> 38:45.740
themselves to fire to do this . And

38:45.740 --> 38:47.240
it's that I described that

38:47.240 --> 38:50.970
correctly . Well , it's a

38:50.970 --> 38:54.670
look close enough decided to

38:54.680 --> 38:57.890
visit the troops leadership and we just

38:57.890 --> 39:00.590
happened to fire for effect when you

39:00.590 --> 39:04.540
were visiting . Yeah , But but this

39:04.540 --> 39:07.210
is the kind of stuff that and if you're

39:07.210 --> 39:09.377
all wondering man , where's that guy ?

39:09.377 --> 39:11.488
What country is that guy from ? Uh if

39:11.488 --> 39:13.821
you're this is the kind of thing though ,

39:13.821 --> 39:15.821
that the pilot team built immediate

39:15.821 --> 39:18.099
credibility and rapport with the kurds .

39:18.099 --> 39:20.266
We have failed on 10 other promises to

39:20.266 --> 39:22.432
come through . But we started to build

39:22.432 --> 39:24.377
credibility on our presence . I am

39:24.377 --> 39:26.488
committed . I'm here with you and I'm

39:26.488 --> 39:28.543
fairly competent in battle . I can I

39:28.543 --> 39:30.599
can be value at it . That's a really

39:30.599 --> 39:32.940
really important event . So as we're

39:32.940 --> 39:34.940
struggling with this back and forth

39:34.940 --> 39:37.162
Carson we're trying to figure out we're

39:37.162 --> 39:36.130
doing , we don't know if we're going

39:36.130 --> 39:38.352
we're working on the plan , we're going

39:38.352 --> 39:40.580
to P . M . T . Uh an opportunity arises

39:40.590 --> 39:42.423
and it's another compartment and

39:42.423 --> 39:44.646
opportunity . It's for 10 . D . B . And

39:44.646 --> 39:46.868
60 . D . A . S . Three from each of the

39:46.868 --> 39:49.034
two battalions are gonna go forward to

39:49.034 --> 39:51.090
europe and do some kind of train the

39:51.090 --> 39:53.257
trainer program where we're gonna pull

39:53.257 --> 39:52.600
people out of country and train them up

39:52.600 --> 39:55.380
on uh on anti tank missiles . That

39:55.390 --> 39:58.380
mission fell apart . But the O . D . B .

39:58.380 --> 40:00.547
That was tagged to do it was now Major

40:00.547 --> 40:02.602
Pat Robertson again for those of you

40:02.602 --> 40:04.713
that are connecting the dots . Former

40:04.713 --> 40:04.570
Captain Pat Robertson , now Major

40:04.570 --> 40:07.340
General Pat Robertson and the six Ods .

40:07.350 --> 40:09.510
But while in studio guard waiting to

40:09.510 --> 40:11.510
try to do this mission there was an

40:11.510 --> 40:13.621
opportunity to accompany a diplomatic

40:13.630 --> 40:15.741
effort that was going to drive across

40:15.741 --> 40:17.963
the border from Turkey and go visit the

40:17.963 --> 40:20.130
kurdish leadership . So they basically

40:20.130 --> 40:22.130
passed themselves off as a security

40:22.130 --> 40:24.750
detail for uh this delegation and they

40:24.750 --> 40:26.917
got on a bus and they drove across the

40:26.917 --> 40:29.083
border and never came back . The Turks

40:29.083 --> 40:31.194
figured it out . And they stopped the

40:31.194 --> 40:34.230
16 from crossing the border 095 um

40:34.480 --> 40:36.258
which then came home to us very

40:36.258 --> 40:38.202
disappointed . But we now have two

40:38.202 --> 40:40.610
pilot teams in country and 50 . D . A .

40:40.610 --> 40:42.888
S . And 10 . D . B . And this is about ,

40:42.888 --> 40:45.110
let's say january . This is also really

40:45.110 --> 40:47.443
important because I think the community ,

40:47.443 --> 40:49.666
the conventional and the soft community

40:49.666 --> 40:51.666
both think we infiltrated the night

40:51.666 --> 40:51.610
before and made magic . They don't

40:51.610 --> 40:53.832
understand the commitment of you've got

40:53.832 --> 40:55.777
to assume some risk if you want to

40:55.777 --> 40:57.554
assume if you want to reap some

40:57.554 --> 40:59.777
benefits . So once we got these guys on

40:59.777 --> 41:01.943
the ground it made a huge difference .

41:01.943 --> 41:01.590
We were starting to show a little bit

41:01.590 --> 41:05.440
more presence . Um returning back to

41:05.440 --> 41:07.650
Fort Carson , there's a series of

41:07.650 --> 41:09.817
things that are hard to believe really

41:09.817 --> 41:12.250
happened again . I can't get into all

41:12.250 --> 41:14.306
of them unfortunately time . But but

41:14.306 --> 41:16.194
the biggest one that happened was

41:16.194 --> 41:18.361
Turkey started to get cold feet . Some

41:18.361 --> 41:20.350
soccer had done a great job of

41:20.360 --> 41:22.650
infiltrating equipment and buying us

41:22.650 --> 41:25.080
land rovers in Europe six at a time so

41:25.080 --> 41:27.247
it wouldn't create a giant signature .

41:27.247 --> 41:29.413
And they eventually pushed all of that

41:29.413 --> 41:31.413
equipment to diyarbakir Turkey . We

41:31.413 --> 41:33.302
also rebuilt the airfield for the

41:33.302 --> 41:35.358
Turkish military . You know , so now

41:35.358 --> 41:37.247
imagine 300 land rovers have been

41:37.247 --> 41:39.358
shuttled to Turkey . All of our heavy

41:39.358 --> 41:39.120
equipment , all of our heavy weapons ,

41:39.120 --> 41:41.342
a bunch of ammunition is all stockpiled

41:41.342 --> 41:43.509
in Turkey . And then turkey breaks the

41:43.509 --> 41:45.676
news to us that they're really feeling

41:45.676 --> 41:47.676
uncomfortable about this and they'd

41:47.676 --> 41:49.898
rather not participate and we can't use

41:49.898 --> 41:52.120
their airspace . This is a problem . So

41:52.120 --> 41:54.176
soccer turns to this again , this is

41:54.176 --> 41:56.064
how this really happened . Soccer

41:56.064 --> 41:55.740
quickly turns to all the eastern

41:55.740 --> 41:57.962
european countries basically with a who

41:57.962 --> 42:00.720
wants to be part of NATO . And actually

42:00.720 --> 42:02.942
the first country that said you can use

42:02.942 --> 42:05.164
our country to invade Iraq was Poland ,

42:05.164 --> 42:07.276
which thank you , thank you very much

42:07.276 --> 42:09.498
for that kind offer . We're looking for

42:09.498 --> 42:09.110
something a little bit closer than

42:09.110 --> 42:12.860
Poland . Uh , again , this is how it

42:12.860 --> 42:14.749
really happened and we settled on

42:14.749 --> 42:16.749
Romania , Romania raised the 10 and

42:16.749 --> 42:18.916
said you can launch your invasion from

42:18.916 --> 42:20.860
our country . So we , we agreed on

42:20.860 --> 42:23.082
Constanta Romania . Now some of you may

42:23.082 --> 42:22.000
be like , I'm not that good at

42:22.000 --> 42:24.222
geography . I wasn't aware that Romania

42:24.222 --> 42:27.450
borders Iraq . It does not . It's

42:27.450 --> 42:30.140
actually , it's actually remember

42:30.140 --> 42:32.362
before I was like , hey , all you gotta

42:32.362 --> 42:32.150
do is just conduct a frontal attack in

42:32.150 --> 42:34.372
daylight up in mountainous terrain . It

42:34.372 --> 42:36.483
shouldn't be that big of a deal . The

42:36.483 --> 42:36.380
infill is basically the same . It's

42:36.380 --> 42:39.990
just 1000 miles farther . Um , and I

42:39.990 --> 42:42.157
should point out the original plan for

42:42.157 --> 42:44.101
infiltration was all of the second

42:44.101 --> 42:46.268
battalion teams are gonna drive across

42:46.268 --> 42:48.490
the border and third Battalion is going

42:48.490 --> 42:50.712
to drive half of its teams and fly half

42:50.712 --> 42:50.530
of its teams . Now we're in a situation

42:50.530 --> 42:52.419
where everybody would have to fly

42:52.900 --> 42:54.900
that's significant because we don't

42:54.900 --> 42:57.011
have enough aircraft , you know , and

42:57.011 --> 42:59.178
it's also a question of , you can't do

42:59.178 --> 42:58.640
this over multiple nights because the

42:58.640 --> 43:00.862
Iraqis will figure it out . And the two

43:00.862 --> 43:02.650
airfields that we do have are

43:02.660 --> 43:04.630
technically within maximum rocket

43:04.640 --> 43:06.940
artillery range for the Iraqi forces .

43:06.950 --> 43:09.172
These two airfields , by the way , were

43:09.172 --> 43:11.339
built in 1988 by Saddam to continue to

43:11.339 --> 43:13.617
push the Iran Iraq war . The war ended .

43:13.617 --> 43:15.672
So there are two airfields that have

43:15.672 --> 43:17.561
never had an aircraft land on and

43:17.561 --> 43:19.672
that's what the pilot team is working

43:19.672 --> 43:21.783
out . And as an example when I said ,

43:21.783 --> 43:21.290
the pilot team did great stuff for me .

43:21.330 --> 43:23.497
One of the things they figured out was

43:23.830 --> 43:26.580
Uh , can an American see 1:30 land on

43:26.580 --> 43:28.580
this airfield . And if you have all

43:28.580 --> 43:30.802
these cool notions of yeah , those guys

43:30.802 --> 43:30.780
will land on a farmer's field . No ,

43:30.780 --> 43:33.040
they won't , they won't . And we did

43:33.040 --> 43:35.151
all the testing required to determine

43:35.151 --> 43:37.610
that the runway is missing one inch ,

43:37.610 --> 43:40.290
two inches of asphalt . So we worked

43:40.290 --> 43:42.346
with the kurdish partners and said ,

43:42.346 --> 43:44.234
hey , who put the asphalt on this

43:44.234 --> 43:46.401
runway to which some local kurdish guy

43:46.401 --> 43:48.346
was like , I did like again , what

43:48.346 --> 43:50.568
would it take to add two more inches of

43:50.568 --> 43:52.512
asphalt . And I mean that's how it

43:52.512 --> 43:54.401
happened . So that the pilot team

43:54.401 --> 43:56.568
actually refurbished the airfields for

43:56.568 --> 43:56.550
me so we can now land Erica . That's

43:56.550 --> 43:59.330
the plan . But we're in Romania and we

43:59.330 --> 44:01.330
got to try to figure out how we can

44:01.330 --> 44:04.110
still get Romania into country . So

44:04.120 --> 44:06.342
again , it's getting to the point where

44:06.342 --> 44:08.453
we're pretty confident we're going to

44:08.453 --> 44:08.300
war but there's still this kind of on

44:08.300 --> 44:12.170
and off we're not sure um Colin

44:12.170 --> 44:14.337
Powell , if you all recall came on the

44:14.337 --> 44:16.559
floor of the U . N . Said a whole bunch

44:16.559 --> 44:18.614
of stuff . One of the things he said

44:18.614 --> 44:20.670
that was actually there's a bunch of

44:20.670 --> 44:20.290
things most people don't remember this ,

44:20.300 --> 44:23.010
he said Saddam has one more chance . Oh

44:23.010 --> 44:25.232
that was a bad thing to say because the

44:25.232 --> 44:27.343
Iraqis were ready to rise up and then

44:27.343 --> 44:29.510
they heard that like one more chance .

44:29.510 --> 44:31.566
What do you mean ? One more chance ?

44:31.566 --> 44:33.621
Rumsfeld came on and basically did a

44:33.621 --> 44:35.732
robert Deniro impression and was like

44:35.732 --> 44:37.843
he's dead , his family dead serious .

44:37.843 --> 44:40.000
And the kurds love that . And we

44:40.000 --> 44:42.111
actually sent that back , we actually

44:42.111 --> 44:44.640
sent that back in a report saying you

44:44.640 --> 44:46.640
know and this is kurdish language ,

44:46.640 --> 44:48.640
they were like the black general is

44:48.640 --> 44:50.862
scaring us when he says he has one more

44:50.862 --> 44:54.550
chance , we like the other guy . Um but

44:54.550 --> 44:56.494
those were real things . So it was

44:56.494 --> 44:58.494
really questionable . Is this gonna

44:58.494 --> 45:00.606
happen or not ? Turkey now says we're

45:00.606 --> 45:02.828
out and if you you wouldn't know this ,

45:02.828 --> 45:05.050
but the United States was also planning

45:05.050 --> 45:04.530
on Fourth Infantry Division coming

45:04.530 --> 45:06.752
through Turkey to attack in the north .

45:06.752 --> 45:08.863
It would appear there's a good chance

45:08.863 --> 45:10.919
the entire northern front is off the

45:10.919 --> 45:13.141
table from Saddam's perspective this is

45:13.141 --> 45:15.252
this is exactly what he wanted , he's

45:15.252 --> 45:17.419
gonna be able to fight a one front war

45:17.419 --> 45:19.641
with the majority of his forces back so

45:19.641 --> 45:21.530
he can counter attack and I would

45:21.530 --> 45:23.697
speculate Saddam's plan was he'll lose

45:23.697 --> 45:25.586
the south reposition from Baghdad

45:25.586 --> 45:27.586
probably to create as his alternate

45:27.586 --> 45:29.586
capital and then he will bloody the

45:29.586 --> 45:31.697
american forces very , very badly and

45:31.697 --> 45:33.808
he'll sue for some kind of negotiated

45:33.808 --> 45:35.808
peace . It's a pretty good plan and

45:35.808 --> 45:37.863
he's making it work by doing what he

45:37.863 --> 45:39.919
does best . Like he convinced Turkey

45:39.919 --> 45:42.086
it's not in your interest to do this .

45:42.086 --> 45:41.950
He's now reaching out to the two

45:41.950 --> 45:44.430
kurdish factions and saying you guys

45:44.430 --> 45:46.541
should reconsider your support to the

45:46.541 --> 45:48.652
americans and much like the joker and

45:48.652 --> 45:50.763
batman basically says I have room for

45:50.763 --> 45:52.874
one kurdish faction in my new country

45:52.874 --> 45:54.874
discuss amongst yourselves who it's

45:54.874 --> 45:57.097
going to be and and actually the KD the

45:57.097 --> 46:00.130
KDP answered , we're interested the

46:00.130 --> 46:03.200
puk awesome was like no way we're all

46:03.200 --> 46:05.790
in your debt , so I mean , but this is

46:05.790 --> 46:07.623
what we're dealing with with our

46:07.623 --> 46:09.623
faction . So it was really , really

46:09.623 --> 46:11.846
tenuous . So Colonel Cleveland had this

46:11.846 --> 46:14.068
uh great idea to demonstrate commitment

46:14.068 --> 46:16.640
to the kurdish alliance um and maybe we

46:16.640 --> 46:18.807
had one more chance to infiltrate some

46:18.807 --> 46:21.140
other people so we decided from Romania ,

46:21.140 --> 46:22.862
hey let's infiltrate , the two

46:22.862 --> 46:22.820
battalion commanders and the two ops

46:22.820 --> 46:25.090
officers to which you know , I remember

46:25.090 --> 46:27.257
my head thinking I was like okay , act

46:27.257 --> 46:29.312
like it's no big deal . Alright cool

46:29.312 --> 46:31.646
tonight we're going tonight , Yeah 7:30 ,

46:31.646 --> 46:33.930
that sounds good . Um we went in the

46:33.930 --> 46:36.080
next day and and I did that sort of

46:36.080 --> 46:38.540
joke was that you know we need to send

46:38.540 --> 46:40.429
somebody with some rank that it's

46:40.429 --> 46:42.429
serious enough that they know we're

46:42.429 --> 46:44.651
committed but not somebody who well you

46:44.651 --> 46:46.873
know if we lost them it wouldn't be the

46:46.873 --> 46:50.510
end of the world . Um There's a grab me

46:50.510 --> 46:52.677
tonight for a beer . I'll tell you the

46:52.677 --> 46:54.732
rest of the story . Like my my crazy

46:54.732 --> 46:56.899
infiltration story is a whole separate

46:56.899 --> 46:56.540
deal of how bizarre that was . But the

46:56.540 --> 46:59.180
bottom line is we flew to Turkey um

46:59.190 --> 47:01.357
from Turkey , we drove across Turkey .

47:01.357 --> 47:03.246
See I actually transported across

47:03.246 --> 47:06.470
Turkey to the uh the Iraqi border and

47:06.470 --> 47:08.414
we kind of knew when we got to the

47:08.414 --> 47:10.650
border , the Turks are gonna probably

47:10.650 --> 47:13.130
arrest us for espionage to make a point

47:13.130 --> 47:15.241
to the U . S . We all joke that we're

47:15.241 --> 47:17.297
gonna be well we all joke that we're

47:17.297 --> 47:19.519
going to a Turkish prison . When we got

47:19.519 --> 47:21.630
to the border , the Turks did exactly

47:21.630 --> 47:23.741
what we expected they were gonna do .

47:23.741 --> 47:22.770
They started rooting through our

47:22.770 --> 47:24.881
equipment , they started arguing with

47:24.881 --> 47:27.048
us . And second battalion's pilot team

47:27.048 --> 47:29.270
was right there in their cars . There's

47:29.270 --> 47:31.381
a bridge crossing the Euphrates River

47:31.381 --> 47:33.603
are tigers were excuse me And there was

47:33.603 --> 47:35.714
almost a question of if we would have

47:35.714 --> 47:37.659
just crossed the bridge would they

47:37.659 --> 47:40.270
chase us ? So while they were arguing

47:40.270 --> 47:42.492
and the ci personnel who were logistics

47:42.492 --> 47:44.437
personnel were great . They played

47:44.437 --> 47:46.326
their role perfectly tying up the

47:46.326 --> 47:48.437
border officers . The four of us just

47:48.437 --> 47:50.437
grabbed our rucksacks and basically

47:50.437 --> 47:52.492
slipped across the border got in the

47:52.492 --> 47:52.390
pilot teams cars , which were all

47:52.390 --> 47:54.900
family cars and we just drove away and

47:54.900 --> 47:57.233
later we know the Turks lost their mind .

47:57.233 --> 47:59.456
We all joked that our faces were on the

47:59.456 --> 48:01.567
back of Turkish milk cartons . Um and

48:01.567 --> 48:03.456
I'm actually glad to say I was in

48:03.456 --> 48:05.567
Turkey three months ago for the first

48:05.567 --> 48:05.240
time wondering if I was gonna get

48:05.240 --> 48:07.910
arrested in the airport ? Um because we

48:07.910 --> 48:10.132
kind of knew like right now we can't go

48:10.132 --> 48:12.132
out through Turkey , like they will

48:12.132 --> 48:14.243
arrest us . Uh and they did close the

48:14.243 --> 48:16.299
border to all other that sealed it ,

48:16.299 --> 48:18.410
that they're out . Incursions are not

48:18.410 --> 48:20.577
happening , but now the four of us are

48:20.577 --> 48:22.688
in country and we were , we linked up

48:22.688 --> 48:25.080
with major roberson . We connected with

48:25.080 --> 48:28.060
our two kurdish factions , Kdp and puk

48:28.070 --> 48:30.800
and we had by all accounts , what was

48:30.800 --> 48:33.390
exactly like every g meeting G chief

48:33.390 --> 48:35.668
meeting you've ever seen in Robin Sage .

48:35.668 --> 48:37.890
You know that first meeting ? It was we

48:37.890 --> 48:39.890
were totally exhausted . We've been

48:39.890 --> 48:41.890
driving all night . Uh we linked up

48:41.890 --> 48:44.057
with them and now we start to talk and

48:44.057 --> 48:46.223
it was good . And the puk particularly

48:46.223 --> 48:48.057
really , really good during that

48:48.057 --> 48:50.223
meeting . Uh one of the team guys came

48:50.223 --> 48:52.446
in and said it was really interesting .

48:52.446 --> 48:54.668
It was tim fuller from a to whispers in

48:54.668 --> 48:56.834
my ear . I just want to make you aware

48:56.834 --> 48:58.946
there appears to be Iraqi jets flying

48:58.946 --> 49:00.946
over our head , like good to know ,

49:00.946 --> 49:03.112
good to know . And one of the , and it

49:03.112 --> 49:05.168
was , it was , it was two Iraqi jets

49:05.168 --> 49:07.334
buzzing over our location . One of the

49:07.334 --> 49:09.557
team guys kind of sort of freaked out .

49:09.557 --> 49:11.557
Uh and it was a case of look at the

49:11.557 --> 49:13.680
kurds , they're , they're cool and

49:13.680 --> 49:15.680
they're like , they do this all the

49:15.680 --> 49:17.569
time , don't worry about it . And

49:17.569 --> 49:17.350
frankly from my perspective , I was

49:17.350 --> 49:19.572
like , oh thank God , we've got nothing

49:19.572 --> 49:21.517
outside like a humvee or something

49:21.517 --> 49:21.090
stupid that would imply , you know ,

49:21.100 --> 49:23.260
americans are here . So that was kind

49:23.260 --> 49:25.250
of interesting . We threw on some

49:25.250 --> 49:27.361
kurdish uniforms and they insisted on

49:27.361 --> 49:29.361
taking us to the front by front . I

49:29.361 --> 49:31.472
mean , the answer area by the Iranian

49:31.472 --> 49:33.583
border , You gotta see this . Come on

49:33.583 --> 49:35.583
again , we haven't slept in like 36

49:35.583 --> 49:37.694
hours , were totally exhausted and we

49:37.694 --> 49:39.806
put on kurdish uniforms , we drive to

49:39.806 --> 49:39.620
the front about a two hour drive to

49:39.620 --> 49:42.360
that front . When we get there ,

49:43.020 --> 49:45.131
I'll show you a picture in a minute .

49:45.950 --> 49:47.960
When we get there , we go into a

49:47.960 --> 49:51.520
building to meet the Halabja commander .

49:51.530 --> 49:53.752
It's good meeting . We're talking about

49:53.752 --> 49:56.086
what we want to do , the frontal attack .

49:56.086 --> 49:58.308
We're planning on conducting in about a

49:58.308 --> 50:00.363
week . Uh , you know , it all sounds

50:00.363 --> 50:02.474
really good . We , we walk out of the

50:02.474 --> 50:04.697
building and I'm sorry , I'm just gonna

50:04.697 --> 50:06.808
make these are stupid analogies , but

50:06.808 --> 50:09.030
has everybody ever seen the movie , the

50:09.030 --> 50:11.197
jerk with steve martin . It's an older

50:11.197 --> 50:13.308
crowd . Um , you know the scene where

50:13.308 --> 50:12.920
there's a sniper shooting at the bullet

50:12.920 --> 50:14.809
of the soda cans and he's kind of

50:14.809 --> 50:17.031
looking like these cans are defective .

50:17.080 --> 50:19.024
You always remember the first time

50:19.024 --> 50:21.860
somebody rockets you uh we stepped

50:21.860 --> 50:24.120
outside , there's probably 1000 kurds

50:24.130 --> 50:26.650
in the street all milling about and a

50:26.660 --> 50:28.660
katyusha 107 rocket comes screaming

50:28.660 --> 50:30.827
from the hills and I didn't realize it

50:30.827 --> 50:33.049
was one of seven rocket at the time and

50:33.049 --> 50:34.993
it smacked into a transformer on a

50:34.993 --> 50:37.049
telephone pole , which made a really

50:37.049 --> 50:39.049
twangy explosion sound . And I just

50:39.049 --> 50:40.993
remember when it did it . Togo was

50:40.993 --> 50:40.910
right next to me . We both did this .

50:40.910 --> 50:43.670
We both like , that's weird and we

50:43.670 --> 50:45.670
didn't make the connection . Yeah ,

50:45.670 --> 50:47.892
it's a rocket . The second , the second

50:47.892 --> 50:49.948
rocket came in and literally hit the

50:49.948 --> 50:52.170
wall of the building where we were just

50:52.170 --> 50:54.226
having a meeting and it ripped right

50:54.226 --> 50:56.337
through the wall and devastated where

50:56.337 --> 50:58.337
we were all standing a minute ago ,

50:58.337 --> 51:00.448
everybody starts freaking out running

51:00.448 --> 50:59.800
in all directions were jumping in these

50:59.800 --> 51:02.710
like rickety pickup trucks and we all

51:02.710 --> 51:03.780
started racing .

51:06.410 --> 51:08.632
We all start , I'm really glad I didn't

51:08.632 --> 51:10.743
hit the deck . We all start racing to

51:10.743 --> 51:12.854
where the rockets are coming from and

51:12.854 --> 51:14.966
I'm not sure if that was deliberate .

51:14.966 --> 51:17.132
As much as like the Peshmerga privates

51:17.132 --> 51:19.243
driving the vehicles were told that's

51:19.243 --> 51:18.220
where we're going before the shooting

51:18.220 --> 51:20.331
started . So we jumped in the vehicle

51:20.331 --> 51:22.553
and we're like go there like right , so

51:22.553 --> 51:24.664
now we're all racing at full speed to

51:24.664 --> 51:26.776
the area we're getting shot at from ,

51:26.776 --> 51:28.887
which was really , really interesting

51:28.887 --> 51:30.831
cause the whole time we're driving

51:30.831 --> 51:30.720
mortar rounds are hitting on both sides

51:30.730 --> 51:32.674
of the road , but we're just still

51:32.674 --> 51:34.920
driving past it . We got past it , we

51:34.920 --> 51:36.753
got up to a lookout point to now

51:36.753 --> 51:39.270
observe the enemy positions to which I

51:39.270 --> 51:41.270
kind of felt like no , I got it , I

51:41.270 --> 51:43.500
know where they are now . Um and we had

51:43.500 --> 51:45.722
a really , really good perspective of ,

51:45.722 --> 51:47.944
okay , here's what we're dealing with .

51:47.944 --> 51:50.167
Got it . Then we went back returned and

51:50.167 --> 51:52.389
we started to kind of like conduct what

51:52.389 --> 51:54.444
I would call normal F . O . B . Like

51:54.444 --> 51:56.556
operations . Um So now try to picture

51:56.556 --> 51:59.790
where we are . We've got the forces and

51:59.790 --> 52:01.568
country that I talked about the

52:01.568 --> 52:03.568
situation is bad . We have not come

52:03.568 --> 52:05.790
through with the forces . We promised ,

52:05.790 --> 52:07.957
I don't think they're gonna get here .

52:07.957 --> 52:07.860
They're stuck in Romania . We have not

52:07.860 --> 52:09.971
delivered any lethal aid to make them

52:09.971 --> 52:12.027
more powerful . We told them we were

52:12.027 --> 52:14.027
going to deliver them bags of money

52:14.027 --> 52:16.193
which we have not um we told them they

52:16.193 --> 52:18.304
would be close air support to support

52:18.304 --> 52:20.138
their fight , which there is not

52:20.138 --> 52:22.304
because of Turkey's out tactical close

52:22.304 --> 52:21.880
air support aircraft can't come . The

52:21.880 --> 52:24.047
only thing that can show up our B 52 s

52:24.047 --> 52:26.213
or stuff off a carrier , which is like

52:26.213 --> 52:28.269
really , really limited . So we have

52:28.269 --> 52:30.491
failed in five of our six promises . It

52:30.491 --> 52:32.380
looks really bad and I expect the

52:32.380 --> 52:34.440
invasion to start any day . So we're

52:34.440 --> 52:36.551
kind of freaked out that the majority

52:36.551 --> 52:38.607
of our forces are sitting in Romania

52:38.607 --> 52:40.718
which by the way I gotta point out if

52:40.718 --> 52:42.884
you're an old 10th grouper there was a

52:42.884 --> 52:45.360
psychological scar in 10th group before

52:45.360 --> 52:47.416
this that we had let these guys down

52:47.416 --> 52:49.416
and I'm serious as a heart attack .

52:49.416 --> 52:51.527
When I tell you this , when I got the

52:51.527 --> 52:51.150
10th group of 95 as a team leader , it

52:51.150 --> 52:53.372
was very evident that people were still

52:53.372 --> 52:56.310
harboring significant emotional guilt

52:56.320 --> 52:58.431
from letting the kurds down after the

52:58.431 --> 53:00.653
gulf war . So there was a real emphasis

53:00.653 --> 53:02.598
of we've got a chance to make this

53:02.598 --> 53:04.487
right from 1/10 group credibility

53:04.487 --> 53:06.487
perspective the guys in Romania and

53:06.487 --> 53:08.320
they are chomping at the bit now

53:08.320 --> 53:07.820
because it looks like we're gonna fail

53:07.820 --> 53:09.460
again . Really really bad .

53:11.690 --> 53:15.050
On 19 March . The president

53:15.060 --> 53:17.860
authorized the shock and awe the start

53:17.860 --> 53:19.910
of the shock and awe campaign . Um

53:19.920 --> 53:22.087
You've all heard that but if you don't

53:22.087 --> 53:24.309
understand what happened , it literally

53:24.309 --> 53:26.364
was a surprise to everyone . I don't

53:26.364 --> 53:28.420
remember what triggered it , there's

53:28.420 --> 53:30.642
some event but even centcom didn't know

53:30.642 --> 53:32.790
like that wasn't the plan so suddenly

53:32.790 --> 53:35.570
we were told attack and even where we

53:35.570 --> 53:37.848
were we got a message , I was at the C .

53:37.848 --> 53:40.390
I . A building and we got a message

53:40.390 --> 53:42.650
direct from Secretary Rumsfeld and it

53:42.650 --> 53:44.761
just said execute , execute , execute

53:44.761 --> 53:46.872
which was one of the few times I lost

53:46.872 --> 53:49.094
my temper because it was implying as if

53:49.094 --> 53:51.317
we were standing outside the door ready

53:51.317 --> 53:53.428
to attack the answer compound , which

53:53.428 --> 53:55.428
we obviously weren't . So we had to

53:55.428 --> 53:57.372
kind of calm down and be like okay

53:57.372 --> 53:59.150
we've got 40 guys in country 40

53:59.150 --> 54:01.317
american green Berets , probably 20 to

54:01.317 --> 54:03.483
25 C . A personnel , what are we gonna

54:03.483 --> 54:05.706
do ? So we talked about our plan and we

54:05.706 --> 54:07.770
broke up as much as we could . We

54:07.780 --> 54:10.180
actually wrote a pretty good letter

54:10.190 --> 54:13.040
that we , it was like a telemarketing

54:13.040 --> 54:16.050
letter . You know dear general blank .

54:16.060 --> 54:17.949
We have deliberately selected you

54:17.949 --> 54:20.116
because of your , you are well thought

54:20.116 --> 54:22.116
of among the military and the Iraqi

54:22.116 --> 54:24.171
people , we Iraq needs you right now

54:24.171 --> 54:26.338
but time is limited act now . No , I'm

54:26.338 --> 54:28.570
serious . And we listed like five ways

54:28.570 --> 54:30.792
to get in touch with us because we kept

54:30.792 --> 54:33.014
thinking like the gulf war , everyone's

54:33.014 --> 54:32.840
gonna want to surrender . We thought

54:32.840 --> 54:34.951
there would be mass surrenders . What

54:34.951 --> 54:37.062
we didn't realize was Saddam is doing

54:37.062 --> 54:39.284
an amazing job on his side applying the

54:39.284 --> 54:41.173
lessons learned to the gulf war .

54:41.173 --> 54:43.396
Making it clear hey , if anybody thinks

54:43.396 --> 54:43.200
about surrendering , I'm gonna kill you

54:43.200 --> 54:45.256
when I catch you and I'm killing all

54:45.256 --> 54:47.089
your family and I'm killing your

54:47.089 --> 54:49.422
neighbors too . So people are like okay ,

54:49.422 --> 54:51.533
surrender is not a good option . Um ,

54:51.533 --> 54:53.644
but we wrote this letter , we printed

54:53.644 --> 54:55.756
it in Arabic and english , you know ,

54:55.756 --> 54:57.978
one on each side . We actually embossed

54:57.978 --> 54:59.867
it with the 10th group , like the

54:59.867 --> 55:01.700
Notary 10th group thing . And we

55:01.700 --> 55:03.811
laminated , we gave it to underground

55:03.811 --> 55:05.950
contacts to deliver to various Iraqi

55:05.950 --> 55:08.930
commanders . I think our underground

55:08.930 --> 55:11.480
contact was killed . We also found out

55:11.480 --> 55:13.702
that something Saddam did . And again ,

55:13.702 --> 55:15.702
you gotta like Saddam's insanity is

55:15.702 --> 55:17.924
actually like pretty amazing . He would

55:17.924 --> 55:19.702
call meetings with his division

55:19.702 --> 55:23.310
commanders and to prevent any schemes

55:23.320 --> 55:25.860
from brewing amongst them . And this is

55:25.860 --> 55:28.027
what was described to us . Hey , let's

55:28.027 --> 55:30.082
start the meeting . Hey , I was just

55:30.082 --> 55:32.138
thinking before we start , everybody

55:32.138 --> 55:34.249
get up and take a seat to your left .

55:34.249 --> 55:36.130
That's your new division . Like

55:36.140 --> 55:38.251
literally totally switched . Who's in

55:38.251 --> 55:40.473
charge of what divisions and it totally

55:40.473 --> 55:42.473
screwed us up because we're sending

55:42.473 --> 55:44.807
letters to the eight division commander ,

55:44.807 --> 55:44.100
the new eight division commanders like ,

55:44.100 --> 55:45.933
hey sir , just to let you know ,

55:45.933 --> 55:48.100
college got this letter from the kurds

55:48.100 --> 55:51.250
yesterday . Uh , yeah , it was really ,

55:51.250 --> 55:53.306
really effective . And it was in the

55:53.306 --> 55:55.306
same token I said , we were getting

55:55.306 --> 55:57.583
information from the underground on uh ,

55:57.583 --> 55:59.806
you gotta be careful what you're saying

55:59.806 --> 56:02.028
on the U . N . Floor . One of the other

56:02.028 --> 56:01.400
things we got , that was super

56:01.400 --> 56:03.780
fascinating . Uh , and it's the way the

56:03.780 --> 56:05.891
kurds would talk to us . They would ,

56:05.891 --> 56:08.058
it's , it's an Arabic thing too . They

56:08.058 --> 56:10.280
would be very polite . They would imply

56:10.280 --> 56:12.447
something you would have to , you have

56:12.447 --> 56:14.669
to see it and realize you want , do you

56:14.669 --> 56:14.640
want to tell me something and they're

56:14.770 --> 56:16.881
like no no no no that's that's not my

56:16.881 --> 56:19.048
business . It's not important . You go

56:19.048 --> 56:21.381
and tell me you don't want to . No , no .

56:21.381 --> 56:23.492
I do want to know . Apparently Arabic

56:23.492 --> 56:25.603
is a really tricky language . And the

56:25.603 --> 56:27.659
message the U . S . Had been sending

56:27.659 --> 56:31.210
about surrender . Um what the kurds

56:31.210 --> 56:33.340
told us was , why would you say it to

56:33.340 --> 56:35.507
them that way ? We're like , what do I

56:35.507 --> 56:35.480
don't know what you're talking about

56:35.480 --> 56:37.647
man ? You need to be clear . It's just

56:37.647 --> 56:40.170
we know you hate Iraqis . It just

56:40.170 --> 56:42.430
doesn't seem appropriate . I wouldn't ,

56:42.440 --> 56:44.440
I'm not gonna get into your stuff .

56:44.440 --> 56:46.384
That's that's your business and we

56:46.384 --> 56:46.170
really have to pull them . What is the

56:46.180 --> 56:48.347
issue ? Like ? It's fairly disgraceful

56:48.347 --> 56:50.291
the way you're taunting them . Why

56:50.291 --> 56:52.347
would you use a woman's voice in the

56:52.347 --> 56:54.458
effeminate to ask them to surrender .

56:54.458 --> 56:56.402
Now what's happening is here as an

56:56.402 --> 56:58.347
american . We're just trying to be

56:58.347 --> 57:00.402
polite . That's being interpreted on

57:00.402 --> 57:02.513
the other side because we're also not

57:02.513 --> 57:04.680
used to asking people to surrender and

57:04.680 --> 57:04.440
like you gotta stop and think about

57:04.440 --> 57:07.240
this by suggesting , I think you should

57:07.240 --> 57:09.462
consider , I would like you to consider

57:09.462 --> 57:11.573
surrendering . You understand why I'm

57:11.573 --> 57:13.629
doing this . There's the implication

57:13.629 --> 57:15.851
there that you strike me as the kind of

57:15.851 --> 57:15.800
guy that surrendered would fit your

57:15.800 --> 57:18.810
lifestyle well versus no

57:18.840 --> 57:21.310
versus if I put a gun and I apologize ,

57:21.310 --> 57:23.477
I'm looking at Alan cause I know him .

57:23.477 --> 57:25.643
If I put a gun to your head and said I

57:25.643 --> 57:27.810
think you should surrender . I'm gonna

57:27.810 --> 57:29.810
kill you in the arab culture like I

57:29.810 --> 57:31.532
have no choice . That's that's

57:31.532 --> 57:33.754
acceptable as a man . I can accept that

57:33.754 --> 57:35.532
offer to surrender . But if you

57:35.532 --> 57:37.532
actually don't force me and you you

57:37.532 --> 57:39.699
offer it to me , you're suggesting I'm

57:39.699 --> 57:41.810
a coward and you do it with a woman's

57:41.810 --> 57:41.590
voice . This is and they they were like

57:41.590 --> 57:43.900
there's absolutely no way any man could

57:43.900 --> 57:45.844
accept that surrender even if they

57:45.844 --> 57:47.844
wanted to be like oh that's good to

57:47.844 --> 57:51.520
know we sent that back . We actually

57:51.520 --> 57:53.576
got a response from Condoleezza Rice

57:53.576 --> 57:55.798
thanking us for that feedback . We also

57:55.798 --> 57:57.631
by the way has anybody ever seen

57:57.631 --> 57:59.576
pictures of like Iraqi aircraft or

57:59.576 --> 58:01.798
tanks buried ? Yeah and and the U . S .

58:01.798 --> 58:04.020
Military stuff . We don't know why they

58:04.020 --> 58:04.000
did that . I can tell you why they did

58:04.000 --> 58:05.889
it because apparently the word in

58:05.889 --> 58:08.111
Arabic for burying abandoned is similar

58:08.111 --> 58:09.833
and we told them to bury their

58:09.833 --> 58:11.944
equipment to which many of the Iraqis

58:11.944 --> 58:11.890
were like we buried the plane . I don't

58:11.890 --> 58:14.057
know why you want us to do it . But we

58:14.057 --> 58:17.530
did it true story . Ok so staying on

58:17.540 --> 58:21.400
staying on my script . What's that ?

58:21.410 --> 58:24.190
Okay . Got to go to the next line .

58:26.560 --> 58:28.504
We got we didn't get surprised but

58:28.504 --> 58:32.130
Colonel Cleveland had um he had been

58:32.130 --> 58:35.420
brokering with centcom to fly the force

58:35.420 --> 58:37.642
in on the six M . C . One thirties load

58:37.642 --> 58:39.753
him up to max 1988 . 30 . D . B . S .

58:39.753 --> 58:42.170
Fly him from Romania to Jordan and

58:42.170 --> 58:45.460
across the border . Next slide this is

58:45.460 --> 58:47.627
the route . Let me just ask this is an

58:47.627 --> 58:49.738
actual question how many you've heard

58:49.738 --> 58:51.904
of ? Ugly baby ? Okay this is actually

58:51.904 --> 58:53.849
it's called ugly baby . That's the

58:53.849 --> 58:55.849
actual the actual code name for the

58:55.849 --> 58:57.904
operation . Six M . C . One thirties

58:57.904 --> 59:00.127
across the border . As soon as they get

59:00.127 --> 58:59.720
across the border they're actually good

58:59.720 --> 59:01.776
for about an hour . They go into the

59:01.776 --> 59:03.942
Iraqi air defense belts and just start

59:03.942 --> 59:06.109
getting hammered . They're blacked out

59:06.109 --> 59:08.770
there flying at about 100 100 to 50 ft

59:08.770 --> 59:11.520
off the ground at full speed . This is

59:11.520 --> 59:13.742
what M . C . One thirties were designed

59:13.742 --> 59:15.853
to do during the gulf war . Or excuse

59:15.853 --> 59:17.964
me during the Cold War . What the air

59:17.964 --> 59:19.909
Force guys from three 52nd did was

59:19.909 --> 59:22.020
utterly amazing . One of the aircraft

59:22.020 --> 59:24.131
got hit 19 times . The picture in the

59:24.131 --> 59:26.076
upper left hand corner is actually

59:26.076 --> 59:25.850
small arms bullets in the pilot's

59:25.850 --> 59:29.800
window . Um The six aircraft sort of

59:29.800 --> 59:31.800
made it three to my airfield in the

59:31.800 --> 59:35.060
south to to the airfield north of May .

59:35.070 --> 59:37.350
That one and the sixth aircraft had to

59:37.350 --> 59:39.406
do an emergency divert landing up in

59:39.406 --> 59:41.517
Turkey and basically did a controlled

59:41.517 --> 59:43.572
emergency landing . And that kind of

59:43.572 --> 59:45.739
freaked the Turks out after that . The

59:45.739 --> 59:48.030
Turks opened up the airspace and they

59:48.030 --> 59:49.641
were back in the game and we

59:49.641 --> 59:51.586
infiltrated more teams in when the

59:51.586 --> 59:53.752
teams landed on the blackout runways .

59:53.810 --> 59:55.921
This goes to another thing , I talked

59:55.921 --> 59:58.143
about in isolation planning . We didn't

59:58.143 --> 01:00:00.310
have any vehicles , We had family cars

01:00:00.310 --> 01:00:02.700
from kurds . A team would get off the

01:00:02.710 --> 01:00:05.810
plane as big as can be and I would grab

01:00:05.810 --> 01:00:08.032
them , pull them off to the side , give

01:00:08.032 --> 01:00:10.143
a 15 minute intel brief and tell them

01:00:10.143 --> 01:00:09.290
what's going on and say , look , here's

01:00:09.290 --> 01:00:11.290
the deal . You got four family cars

01:00:11.290 --> 01:00:13.512
here or you got a school bus and a dump

01:00:13.512 --> 01:00:15.568
truck , put your guys in there . The

01:00:15.568 --> 01:00:15.460
guy driving doesn't speak english , but

01:00:15.460 --> 01:00:17.404
I was here with an english speaker

01:00:17.404 --> 01:00:19.516
earlier this morning . He knows where

01:00:19.516 --> 01:00:19.290
to take you to your kurdish commander

01:00:19.290 --> 01:00:21.690
counterpart . Here's my iridium phone

01:00:21.690 --> 01:00:24.620
number . Call me when you can . Are you

01:00:24.620 --> 01:00:27.100
good . And guys moved out . This is

01:00:27.100 --> 01:00:31.080
critical because once we dispersed the

01:00:31.090 --> 01:00:33.257
in my sector , I think it was 12 Ods .

01:00:33.257 --> 01:00:35.479
Once we dispersed the bulk of the ODS ,

01:00:35.479 --> 01:00:37.590
this was considered like the decisive

01:00:37.590 --> 01:00:39.757
point where Saddam couldn't disrupt us

01:00:39.757 --> 01:00:41.979
anymore . I'm not necessarily winning ,

01:00:41.979 --> 01:00:44.250
but my ability to win is much better .

01:00:44.260 --> 01:00:46.371
Saddam can't stop me . He can kill me

01:00:46.371 --> 01:00:48.427
in the F . O . B . Tomorrow . But my

01:00:48.427 --> 01:00:50.038
ODS are dispersed with their

01:00:50.038 --> 01:00:52.093
counterparts . We pulled this off in

01:00:52.093 --> 01:00:54.149
one single night . It was it was the

01:00:54.149 --> 01:00:56.427
most important event that we conducted .

01:00:56.730 --> 01:00:58.841
So now that we've done this next line

01:00:59.220 --> 01:01:01.220
now , we are actually in business .

01:01:01.220 --> 01:01:03.442
We've got all of our Ods and all of our

01:01:03.442 --> 01:01:05.664
O . D . B . S . And country . We've got

01:01:05.664 --> 01:01:05.530
a linked up with our kurdish

01:01:05.530 --> 01:01:07.530
counterparts were just a little bit

01:01:07.530 --> 01:01:09.474
behind the power curve because the

01:01:09.474 --> 01:01:11.641
invasion technically started yesterday

01:01:11.641 --> 01:01:14.050
on the 19th . This is the 20th . Um We

01:01:14.050 --> 01:01:17.290
quickly take C company and its five

01:01:17.290 --> 01:01:19.457
assigned ODS Don Bennett's here , he's

01:01:19.457 --> 01:01:21.512
a member of that company and we push

01:01:21.512 --> 01:01:23.457
them out to the Halabja area where

01:01:23.457 --> 01:01:25.512
they're going to conduct this attack

01:01:25.512 --> 01:01:27.623
against Ansar al Islam . Now , I want

01:01:27.623 --> 01:01:29.679
to point out , I said surrealism , I

01:01:29.679 --> 01:01:31.679
think I said 1000 it's actually 600

01:01:31.679 --> 01:01:33.846
fighters entrenched in the mountains .

01:01:33.846 --> 01:01:36.012
The kurdish plan that we have brokered

01:01:36.012 --> 01:01:37.901
with them is to have 10,000 kurds

01:01:37.901 --> 01:01:40.123
attack it in five axes of advance going

01:01:40.123 --> 01:01:42.234
up up into the mountains . It's gonna

01:01:42.234 --> 01:01:44.234
be a daylight frontal attack in the

01:01:44.234 --> 01:01:46.457
mountains . Point out this is this is a

01:01:46.457 --> 01:01:48.623
true fact that people think is weird .

01:01:48.623 --> 01:01:50.734
This is actually Colonel Togo's map .

01:01:50.734 --> 01:01:53.740
See this the blank spot . The United

01:01:53.740 --> 01:01:55.962
States Government did not have coverage

01:01:55.962 --> 01:01:58.550
of Iran from maps in 2003 .

01:01:59.590 --> 01:02:01.701
Yeah , you gotta think about that one

01:02:01.701 --> 01:02:03.701
for a second . Um So this is the no

01:02:03.701 --> 01:02:05.590
kidding map we are using . We are

01:02:05.590 --> 01:02:07.701
fighting here . We are fighting along

01:02:07.701 --> 01:02:09.868
the border and we have no map coverage

01:02:09.868 --> 01:02:12.034
on the back side . But the bottom line

01:02:12.034 --> 01:02:14.090
is this is the Sargon area where the

01:02:14.090 --> 01:02:16.201
chemical testing facility is and this

01:02:16.201 --> 01:02:18.312
is a thing called dark con it's where

01:02:18.312 --> 01:02:20.830
the foreign fighters are housed .

01:02:21.780 --> 01:02:24.300
Bottom line , we bombed this area

01:02:24.310 --> 01:02:26.366
intermittently because we didn't get

01:02:26.366 --> 01:02:28.477
the aircraft we needed for about four

01:02:28.477 --> 01:02:30.588
days . We kept that four days for the

01:02:30.588 --> 01:02:32.199
teams to actually meet their

01:02:32.199 --> 01:02:34.366
counterparts and plan and practice and

01:02:34.366 --> 01:02:36.421
rehearse . The day before the actual

01:02:36.421 --> 01:02:38.477
attack , we got a shipment of lethal

01:02:38.477 --> 01:02:40.699
aid , an influx of lethal aid which was

01:02:40.699 --> 01:02:43.080
critical . Um , The attack kicked off

01:02:43.080 --> 01:02:46.670
on the 26th . It was um , it was

01:02:46.680 --> 01:02:49.090
frankly , it was medieval to watch

01:02:49.100 --> 01:02:51.322
where I was standing . I could actually

01:02:51.322 --> 01:02:53.433
see the bulk of the columns , I could

01:02:53.433 --> 01:02:55.990
see 5 1000 person columns advancing

01:02:55.990 --> 01:02:58.046
across a large open field until they

01:02:58.046 --> 01:03:00.046
got to the foothills . And then the

01:03:00.046 --> 01:03:02.101
fighting would start . And the teams

01:03:02.101 --> 01:03:04.268
were able to utilize close air support

01:03:04.268 --> 01:03:06.101
and some other stuff that we had

01:03:06.101 --> 01:03:08.323
brought with us like antitank weapons ,

01:03:08.323 --> 01:03:10.546
CS grenades for clearing caves . We had

01:03:10.546 --> 01:03:12.712
brought a thing called a pops pops our

01:03:12.712 --> 01:03:14.768
backpack . Line charges for clearing

01:03:14.768 --> 01:03:16.823
minefields . I'll just tell you this

01:03:16.823 --> 01:03:18.990
quick one story and then start to kind

01:03:18.990 --> 01:03:21.101
of wrap it up a little bit . Um , you

01:03:21.101 --> 01:03:23.268
take two backpacks , put them together

01:03:23.268 --> 01:03:23.180
and it fires a charge and it clears a

01:03:23.180 --> 01:03:25.124
path in the minefield . One of the

01:03:25.124 --> 01:03:27.347
kurdish young kids misunderstood that .

01:03:27.347 --> 01:03:29.790
And when we did it for real blue line

01:03:29.800 --> 01:03:32.022
through the field and said , let's go ,

01:03:32.022 --> 01:03:34.244
young kid got up and just charged , ran

01:03:34.244 --> 01:03:34.140
right into a minefield blew up and it

01:03:34.140 --> 01:03:36.473
was jay johnson that told me that story .

01:03:36.473 --> 01:03:38.418
He was like , the kid was all just

01:03:38.418 --> 01:03:40.196
disappeared next to me as we're

01:03:40.196 --> 01:03:42.418
assaulting this is an incredibly brutal

01:03:42.418 --> 01:03:44.529
fight . When the fight concluded that

01:03:44.529 --> 01:03:46.640
night , we had captured 81 , that was

01:03:46.640 --> 01:03:48.473
the one that got to Stargate had

01:03:48.473 --> 01:03:50.473
captured an Al Qaeda suicide bomber

01:03:50.473 --> 01:03:52.362
whose vest didn't detonate . They

01:03:52.362 --> 01:03:54.584
captured him in a hand to hand fight 94

01:03:54.780 --> 01:03:57.900
That made it to darkish icon . Um got

01:03:57.910 --> 01:03:59.966
eyes on the foreign fighter training

01:03:59.966 --> 01:04:02.132
camp and we got into a debate with the

01:04:02.132 --> 01:04:04.021
air force that they couldn't drop

01:04:04.021 --> 01:04:06.021
ordinance because they thought they

01:04:06.021 --> 01:04:08.243
were too close to the border . My rules

01:04:08.243 --> 01:04:10.243
of engagement , I can actually drop

01:04:10.243 --> 01:04:12.521
ordinance and pursue five km into Iran .

01:04:12.521 --> 01:04:14.632
But we got into this big debate . All

01:04:14.632 --> 01:04:16.632
the foreign fighters are getting on

01:04:16.632 --> 01:04:16.120
trucks and driving into Iran and we

01:04:16.120 --> 01:04:18.650
lost the opportunity . I will just tell

01:04:18.650 --> 01:04:21.220
you , you know that phrasing for the

01:04:21.220 --> 01:04:23.387
want of a nail . We lost the shoe , we

01:04:23.387 --> 01:04:25.664
lost a shoe . We lost the horse . Okay ,

01:04:25.664 --> 01:04:25.530
Foreign fighters , one of the foreign

01:04:25.530 --> 01:04:27.641
fighters that most likely was at that

01:04:27.641 --> 01:04:29.910
site was Zarqawi . That name doesn't

01:04:29.910 --> 01:04:31.970
ring a bell to you . He became the

01:04:31.970 --> 01:04:33.914
leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq that we

01:04:33.914 --> 01:04:35.970
hunted for a really long time and Al

01:04:35.970 --> 01:04:37.970
Qaeda in Iraq eventually became the

01:04:37.970 --> 01:04:39.859
forerunner to ISIS . So we had an

01:04:39.859 --> 01:04:41.970
opportunity to kill him and we missed

01:04:41.970 --> 01:04:41.540
it because we misunderstood the rules

01:04:41.540 --> 01:04:44.030
of engagement . But the good news is

01:04:44.040 --> 01:04:46.240
after this fight and there's so much

01:04:46.240 --> 01:04:48.296
more , I wish I could tell you about

01:04:48.296 --> 01:04:47.740
this fight . That's really pretty

01:04:47.740 --> 01:04:49.962
amazing . The second day it turned into

01:04:49.962 --> 01:04:52.950
a rout . We're just running fleeing

01:04:53.600 --> 01:04:55.600
Either prisoners or soon to be dead

01:04:55.600 --> 01:04:57.711
members all over the mountain space .

01:04:57.711 --> 01:04:59.711
And we're picking up weapons on the

01:04:59.711 --> 01:05:01.933
battlefield . And now we're taking 10 ,

01:05:01.933 --> 01:05:04.156
of the 10,000 fighters from this attack

01:05:04.156 --> 01:05:06.100
are not gonna be repurposed to the

01:05:06.100 --> 01:05:08.211
green line . And we did this and this

01:05:08.211 --> 01:05:10.322
is really , really important . We did

01:05:10.322 --> 01:05:12.544
this in time . You know , cause centcom

01:05:12.544 --> 01:05:14.767
started saying , hey , maybe we can put

01:05:14.767 --> 01:05:13.970
this off till after the invasion . They

01:05:13.970 --> 01:05:16.081
missed . They missed the point , this

01:05:16.081 --> 01:05:18.192
was meant to be done so that we could

01:05:18.192 --> 01:05:20.026
leverage it to the green line to

01:05:20.026 --> 01:05:21.970
prevent the Iraqis from dispersing

01:05:21.970 --> 01:05:24.160
south and we pulled it off next line .

01:05:26.000 --> 01:05:28.400
So now we are in the position to do

01:05:28.410 --> 01:05:32.000
what we came to do . Let's say it's 26

01:05:32.000 --> 01:05:34.000
march . I just want to point out at

01:05:34.000 --> 01:05:36.167
this point , this is this is the night

01:05:36.167 --> 01:05:38.167
the one 73rd parachutes into bashar

01:05:38.167 --> 01:05:40.333
airfield . Don't laugh . Um , but sure

01:05:40.333 --> 01:05:43.380
airfield is 40 miles behind the Iraqi

01:05:43.380 --> 01:05:45.690
front lines in a safe direction . Just

01:05:45.690 --> 01:05:48.023
gonna leave that one there for you . Um ,

01:05:49.140 --> 01:05:51.280
from our perspective though , we now

01:05:51.280 --> 01:05:53.447
start to attack on the green line . We

01:05:53.447 --> 01:05:55.613
are now attacking with motivated fired

01:05:55.613 --> 01:05:57.724
up forces with equipment . The key to

01:05:57.724 --> 01:05:59.724
this picture , I wanted to show you

01:05:59.724 --> 01:05:59.210
this one . That's the green line .

01:05:59.210 --> 01:06:01.321
Those are Iraqi positions . We had an

01:06:01.321 --> 01:06:03.488
event where aircraft was very sparse .

01:06:03.488 --> 01:06:05.821
We had a beef to common station and say ,

01:06:05.821 --> 01:06:07.988
does anybody have any targets ? It was

01:06:07.988 --> 01:06:10.043
raining that day . So all the Iraqis

01:06:10.043 --> 01:06:12.210
were in their bunkers , 83 Joel Osteen

01:06:12.210 --> 01:06:14.321
who just pinned on one star general .

01:06:14.321 --> 01:06:16.543
Two weeks ago , I spent about two hours

01:06:16.543 --> 01:06:18.543
plotting all of these positions and

01:06:18.543 --> 01:06:20.654
transmitted them to the B 52 . The B-

01:06:20.654 --> 01:06:22.877
52 then dropped the ordinance . However

01:06:22.877 --> 01:06:24.877
many bombs are in a B- 52 . I think

01:06:24.877 --> 01:06:26.988
it's like 61 bomb through the roof of

01:06:26.988 --> 01:06:29.210
every single bunker , totally , totally

01:06:29.210 --> 01:06:31.266
wiped out an entire battalion in one

01:06:31.266 --> 01:06:33.488
strike . Now that was extremely lucky .

01:06:33.488 --> 01:06:35.599
But there's another point to this and

01:06:35.599 --> 01:06:37.710
this is the sort of last thing I want

01:06:37.710 --> 01:06:39.821
to talk about the PSyops component to

01:06:39.821 --> 01:06:39.580
this . That was a great strike . We

01:06:39.580 --> 01:06:41.960
killed a lot of people , but we took

01:06:41.960 --> 01:06:43.793
the opportunity to then transmit

01:06:43.793 --> 01:06:46.400
messages to the Iraqis and say one . We

01:06:46.400 --> 01:06:48.622
did that to that battalion because they

01:06:48.622 --> 01:06:50.344
killed a woman at a checkpoint

01:06:50.344 --> 01:06:52.567
yesterday for smuggling gasoline . They

01:06:52.567 --> 01:06:54.733
poured it on her and lit her on fire .

01:06:54.733 --> 01:06:56.733
We said that's punishment for doing

01:06:56.733 --> 01:06:58.900
that to civilians . We can kill all of

01:06:58.900 --> 01:07:01.067
you at any time we want , which is not

01:07:01.067 --> 01:07:03.233
true . But we said we're trying to get

01:07:03.233 --> 01:07:05.233
you guys to capitulate , that's the

01:07:05.233 --> 01:07:07.344
actual term because that allows us to

01:07:07.344 --> 01:07:09.567
turn them around and put them back into

01:07:09.567 --> 01:07:09.550
the fight . We've sent letters to your

01:07:09.550 --> 01:07:11.990
commanders , if you think I'm lying ,

01:07:12.000 --> 01:07:14.167
Where's your commander ? Have you seen

01:07:14.167 --> 01:07:16.333
him recently ? So we started to really

01:07:16.333 --> 01:07:18.389
use this to seed subversive messages

01:07:18.389 --> 01:07:20.920
into the regular soldiers because we

01:07:20.920 --> 01:07:23.170
knew the officers were not responding

01:07:23.180 --> 01:07:25.291
and the officers were also fleeing to

01:07:25.291 --> 01:07:27.513
Syria . Just a couple of quick comments

01:07:27.513 --> 01:07:29.624
about this . So the way we did this ,

01:07:29.680 --> 01:07:31.513
this is where Kirk Cook is . And

01:07:31.513 --> 01:07:33.569
basically similar things happened in

01:07:33.569 --> 01:07:35.736
brazil , but I'm gonna talk more about

01:07:35.736 --> 01:07:37.958
her Cook . Um , we started tackling the

01:07:37.958 --> 01:07:40.013
green line . We knew from historical

01:07:40.013 --> 01:07:42.069
experience cutting the town south of

01:07:42.069 --> 01:07:44.236
Kirkuk was the first thing you do . We

01:07:44.236 --> 01:07:46.236
know that because the kurds told us

01:07:46.236 --> 01:07:48.347
that's the way they always do it . We

01:07:48.347 --> 01:07:50.458
did a lot of subversive psychological

01:07:50.458 --> 01:07:52.791
op stuff in the town of Kirkuk leaflets ,

01:07:52.791 --> 01:07:55.710
radio broadcasts , uh , spray paint ,

01:07:55.710 --> 01:07:57.877
that said , you know , Saddam has done

01:07:57.877 --> 01:08:00.099
that sort of thing , doesn't sound like

01:08:00.099 --> 01:08:02.321
a big deal , but it had a huge effect .

01:08:02.321 --> 01:08:04.432
Second battalion up here actually did

01:08:04.432 --> 01:08:04.070
quite a bit of sabotage , cutting rail

01:08:04.070 --> 01:08:06.126
lines with underground components as

01:08:06.126 --> 01:08:07.848
well . This is really , really

01:08:07.848 --> 01:08:09.903
important because what I'm trying to

01:08:09.903 --> 01:08:11.959
paint is it's not just about calling

01:08:11.959 --> 01:08:14.126
close air support and ground attacks .

01:08:14.126 --> 01:08:16.348
It's the combined effect of underground

01:08:16.348 --> 01:08:18.459
efforts deep And then surrounding the

01:08:18.459 --> 01:08:21.740
city , at least on three sides , trying

01:08:21.740 --> 01:08:24.018
to make it like I used the description ,

01:08:24.018 --> 01:08:26.129
I have ever seen a video of , like an

01:08:26.129 --> 01:08:25.890
old construction building , like being

01:08:25.890 --> 01:08:28.001
demolished and falling in on itself .

01:08:28.001 --> 01:08:30.112
That's what we're trying to do here .

01:08:30.112 --> 01:08:32.168
We're not trying to just destroy the

01:08:32.168 --> 01:08:34.501
city , we're trying to make it collapse ,

01:08:34.501 --> 01:08:34.240
but in a controlled way and that's what

01:08:34.240 --> 01:08:35.907
we did and it was through the

01:08:35.907 --> 01:08:38.018
underground and the multiple guerilla

01:08:38.018 --> 01:08:40.760
attacks um the one last thing I'm gonna

01:08:40.760 --> 01:08:42.871
say on this slide and then I'll start

01:08:42.871 --> 01:08:44.760
to wrap it up um this is what the

01:08:44.760 --> 01:08:46.927
typical teams and their guys look like

01:08:46.927 --> 01:08:48.950
attacking along the green line . Uh

01:08:48.960 --> 01:08:51.500
this is john Davis , I bring up his

01:08:51.500 --> 01:08:53.300
picture because when they were

01:08:53.300 --> 01:08:55.411
assaulting his kurdish commander next

01:08:55.411 --> 01:08:57.590
to him was shot and killed and when he

01:08:57.590 --> 01:08:59.701
dropped , john literally did the fort

01:08:59.701 --> 01:09:01.812
Benning things stood up and shouted ,

01:09:01.812 --> 01:09:03.923
follow me and continued the assault .

01:09:03.923 --> 01:09:06.201
He made sure the momentum didn't break ,

01:09:06.201 --> 01:09:08.146
just regarded as centcom seemed to

01:09:08.146 --> 01:09:07.570
think that was just regular sf team

01:09:07.570 --> 01:09:09.737
leader stuff it's expected of him . Um

01:09:10.880 --> 01:09:12.880
the other , I should also point out

01:09:12.880 --> 01:09:14.824
that surgery , Sergei sit standing

01:09:14.824 --> 01:09:17.440
right there . Um Kirk Cook was the

01:09:17.440 --> 01:09:20.270
first city seized on April 10 and it

01:09:20.270 --> 01:09:22.660
was seized in very very good condition .

01:09:22.670 --> 01:09:24.250
Um next line please ,

01:09:26.620 --> 01:09:29.480
when we seized it , we quickly

01:09:29.490 --> 01:09:32.450
coordinated with the kurds uh to

01:09:32.450 --> 01:09:34.920
stabilize it and I can't stress this

01:09:34.920 --> 01:09:36.753
point enough that it wasn't just

01:09:36.753 --> 01:09:38.531
violence like now we we had the

01:09:38.531 --> 01:09:40.930
underground warning people not to blow

01:09:40.930 --> 01:09:43.041
up oil fields because we were telling

01:09:43.041 --> 01:09:45.152
them , we know who you are and you're

01:09:45.152 --> 01:09:47.263
getting orders from Saddam to blow up

01:09:47.263 --> 01:09:46.720
the oil field , we know who you are .

01:09:46.720 --> 01:09:48.720
You will be prosecuted if not , you

01:09:48.720 --> 01:09:52.580
know , killed . Um , everybody

01:09:52.580 --> 01:09:55.090
came out the day we took the city to

01:09:55.090 --> 01:09:56.923
now air every possible grievance

01:09:56.923 --> 01:09:58.979
they've ever had and I'll just point

01:09:58.979 --> 01:10:01.146
this out . Major General Robinson here

01:10:01.146 --> 01:10:03.312
remember this ? There was a guy in the

01:10:03.312 --> 01:10:05.534
crowd waving a giant set of keys , like

01:10:05.534 --> 01:10:07.812
a school principal or a school janitor .

01:10:07.812 --> 01:10:07.430
When we finally asked that guy , what

01:10:07.430 --> 01:10:09.597
are you saying ? He's like , I run the

01:10:09.597 --> 01:10:11.597
power plant were like , okay , he's

01:10:11.597 --> 01:10:13.597
like , no , we need to go now cause

01:10:13.597 --> 01:10:13.380
it's gonna get looted . We went to the

01:10:13.380 --> 01:10:15.602
power plant , he literally opened it up

01:10:15.602 --> 01:10:17.547
and like the most cartoon like old

01:10:17.547 --> 01:10:19.602
times switches , flip the switches ,

01:10:19.602 --> 01:10:21.769
the power came back on to probably 80%

01:10:21.769 --> 01:10:23.936
of the city . And there was a point to

01:10:23.936 --> 01:10:26.213
that when the power came back on , the ,

01:10:26.213 --> 01:10:28.102
the , the , the intensity of like

01:10:28.102 --> 01:10:30.102
wanting to kill your neighbors just

01:10:30.102 --> 01:10:32.102
disappeared . Everybody was totally

01:10:32.102 --> 01:10:31.560
cool . Life went back to normal . The

01:10:31.560 --> 01:10:34.630
city was in great , great shape . Um ,

01:10:34.640 --> 01:10:36.940
we eventually got the 173rd to join us

01:10:36.940 --> 01:10:39.400
in the city . It took a couple of days .

01:10:39.410 --> 01:10:42.340
Um , there's some other good stories

01:10:42.340 --> 01:10:44.173
about that , that I'll really in

01:10:44.173 --> 01:10:46.396
another time . The last thing I want to

01:10:46.396 --> 01:10:46.070
say , this is the part I was gonna say

01:10:46.070 --> 01:10:47.792
is this is the stuff that will

01:10:47.792 --> 01:10:49.848
disappoint you . Uh , everything was

01:10:49.848 --> 01:10:51.848
starting to fall into our favor and

01:10:51.848 --> 01:10:53.959
here's the last series of things that

01:10:53.959 --> 01:10:56.070
were disappointing . When we got into

01:10:56.070 --> 01:10:58.560
the city we started wearing U . S .

01:10:58.560 --> 01:11:00.671
Flags and I'll say with the C . I A .

01:11:00.671 --> 01:11:02.616
When we drove into the city looked

01:11:02.616 --> 01:11:04.671
exactly the liberation of paris like

01:11:04.671 --> 01:11:04.200
thousands of people in the streets

01:11:04.200 --> 01:11:06.367
cheering my C A counterpart jumped out

01:11:06.367 --> 01:11:08.700
of the vehicle and said , hey come here .

01:11:08.700 --> 01:11:10.867
He had a box of american flags . I had

01:11:10.867 --> 01:11:10.280
never thought about this literally

01:11:10.280 --> 01:11:12.447
thousands of small american flags . We

01:11:12.447 --> 01:11:14.780
ran around handing them out to everyone .

01:11:14.780 --> 01:11:16.836
So now the optic when you're driving

01:11:16.836 --> 01:11:16.580
around the streets was hundreds of

01:11:16.580 --> 01:11:18.280
american flags everywhere and

01:11:18.290 --> 01:11:20.346
legitimately they were excited . The

01:11:20.346 --> 01:11:22.346
journalists then we're keying in on

01:11:22.346 --> 01:11:24.512
that and I lied to journalists through

01:11:24.512 --> 01:11:26.512
the whole city . They're like , hey

01:11:26.512 --> 01:11:28.568
like we would actually , I would say

01:11:28.568 --> 01:11:30.623
something like you're a journalist ,

01:11:30.623 --> 01:11:30.430
Sergei bring the vehicles up and

01:11:30.430 --> 01:11:32.152
they're like oh my gosh you're

01:11:32.152 --> 01:11:34.208
americans and we would act like they

01:11:34.208 --> 01:11:33.840
caught us and they're like what are you

01:11:33.840 --> 01:11:35.673
doing here ? And we said we were

01:11:35.673 --> 01:11:37.784
paratroopers and we said we were part

01:11:37.784 --> 01:11:39.951
of the paratrooper brigade . Where did

01:11:39.951 --> 01:11:42.007
you just come from ? I came from the

01:11:42.007 --> 01:11:41.110
airfield there at the governor's

01:11:41.110 --> 01:11:43.332
building and we told everyone there was

01:11:43.332 --> 01:11:45.499
an american paratrooper brigade in the

01:11:45.499 --> 01:11:46.666
city , there was not

01:11:50.250 --> 01:11:52.472
okay , sorry , I'm sorry , I'm going on

01:11:52.472 --> 01:11:54.694
the next day we shave our mustaches put

01:11:54.694 --> 01:11:56.528
on Dc us to portray ourselves as

01:11:56.528 --> 01:11:58.639
conventional soldiers and that's when

01:11:58.639 --> 01:12:00.583
we got the one semi third end . We

01:12:00.583 --> 01:12:02.472
wrote a letter to general Mariano

01:12:02.472 --> 01:12:04.694
Odierno as we were departing explaining

01:12:04.694 --> 01:12:06.917
all the things the kurds had done in an

01:12:06.917 --> 01:12:09.083
effort to stabilize the relationship ,

01:12:09.083 --> 01:12:08.980
which we were pretty successful in

01:12:08.990 --> 01:12:11.268
doing alright . I've gone over my time ,

01:12:11.268 --> 01:12:13.323
There's plenty more stories I wish I

01:12:13.323 --> 01:12:15.490
had time to tell you , but I hope that

01:12:15.490 --> 01:12:15.460
was at least entertaining if not

01:12:15.460 --> 01:12:17.627
somewhat interesting for you . I don't

01:12:17.627 --> 01:12:19.738
know if you have time for questions .

01:12:19.738 --> 01:12:18.580
Probably not .

01:12:25.420 --> 01:12:27.890
Mark , thanks for that . We got time

01:12:27.890 --> 01:12:30.760
for like half a question . Okay ,

01:12:30.760 --> 01:12:32.816
somebody's gotta question the back ,

01:12:32.816 --> 01:12:34.927
let's get a microphone in your hand ,

01:12:34.927 --> 01:12:38.040
choke up on it and I'll hang around

01:12:38.040 --> 01:12:40.040
outside later . You guys can ask me

01:12:40.040 --> 01:12:42.151
questions offline . So , so this is a

01:12:42.151 --> 01:12:44.318
repeat of the last sessions question ,

01:12:44.318 --> 01:12:46.484
right . A lot of what you talked about

01:12:46.484 --> 01:12:48.810
to me seems like you w up . Um , given

01:12:48.810 --> 01:12:52.500
what you guys did versus what is being

01:12:52.510 --> 01:12:54.732
either now no longer taught or is being

01:12:54.732 --> 01:12:56.899
taught differently . What is , what is

01:12:56.899 --> 01:12:59.010
your opinion with regards to where we

01:12:59.010 --> 01:13:01.066
need to go as a regiment . Thank you

01:13:01.066 --> 01:13:03.177
and you and I talk to people say this

01:13:03.177 --> 01:13:05.232
quickly and we'll talk later off The

01:13:05.232 --> 01:13:07.399
last 20 years has taught us that we're

01:13:07.399 --> 01:13:09.454
getting too heavy in command control

01:13:09.454 --> 01:13:11.566
and we're losing agility . I was able

01:13:11.566 --> 01:13:13.621
to do more with 25 to 50 guys than I

01:13:13.621 --> 01:13:16.230
was with 300 person headquarters . I've

01:13:16.230 --> 01:13:18.452
watched our procedures over the last 20

01:13:18.452 --> 01:13:20.286
years evolved where we just keep

01:13:20.286 --> 01:13:22.452
getting bigger and bigger and we think

01:13:22.452 --> 01:13:24.619
it makes us better , but I don't think

01:13:24.619 --> 01:13:26.674
it does . And we need to just become

01:13:26.674 --> 01:13:26.610
more comfortable with doing things with

01:13:26.610 --> 01:13:28.840
a lower footprint and giving people

01:13:28.840 --> 01:13:31.007
authority and not having 25 systems of

01:13:31.007 --> 01:13:33.062
checks . That's my quick answer your

01:13:33.062 --> 01:13:35.396
question . All right . We appreciate it .

01:13:35.396 --> 01:13:37.618
Mark . Thanks a lot . Let me give you a

01:13:37.618 --> 01:13:39.618
little shifty thing here . It's our

01:13:39.618 --> 01:13:42.170
convention coin on a flash for sale

01:13:42.170 --> 01:13:43.360
next door .

01:13:46.360 --> 01:13:49.050
It's our low cost certificate , awesome .

01:13:49.660 --> 01:13:52.050
Mark . Thank you very much .