before we get started . I want to
recognize a moment of silence for the
victims of the white supremacist hate
crime in buffalo new york . The
subcommittee has focused intently on
that threat in both open and closed
hearings . It is utterly devastating to
see more victims of this violence .
Buffalo , our heart breaks for you .
With that . I ask my colleagues to join ,
pardon me . We will now turn to the
business of this hearing .
More than 50 years ago , the US
government ended project Blue Book an
effort to catalog and understand
sightings of objects in the air that
could not otherwise be explained . For
more than 20 years . That project had
treated unidentified anomalies in our
airspace as a national security threat
to be monitored and investigated . In
2017 , we learned for the first time
that the Department of Defense had
quietly restarted a similar
organization tracking what we now call
unidentified aerial phenomena or you .
A . P . S . Last year . Congress
rewrote the charter for that
organization now called the airborne
object identification and management
synchronization group or aim sog
for short today we will bring that
organization out of the shadows . This
hearing and oversight work has a simple
idea at its core ,
unidentified aerial phenomena are a
potential national security threat and
they need to be treated that way for
too long . The stigma associated with
you . A PS has gotten in the way of
good intelligence analysis pilots
avoided reporting or were laughed at
when they did D . O . D . Officials
relegated the issue to the backroom or
swept it under the rug . Entirely
fearful of a skeptical national
security community today . We know
better . You . A . P . S . Are
unexplained . It's true but they are
real . They need to be investigated and
many threats they poles need to be
mitigated . Undersecretary of Moultrie
Mr bray . Thank you for coming today .
First we need you to update us on the
status of em sock . The legislation
creating it was passed in december .
The deadline for implementation is fast
approaching but the group does not even
have a name director . We need to know
sirs , the status of the organization
and the obstacle to getting it up and
running . Secondly , you have to
convince the audience today and most
especially our military and civilian
aviators . The culture has changed
that those who report you A P . S .
Will be treated as witnesses , not as
cooks . Thirdly , you need to show us
congress and the american public whose
imaginations you have captured . You
are willing to follow the facts where
they lead . You know , we fear
sometimes that the D . O . D . Is
focused more on emphasizing what it can
explain . Not investigating what it can .
I'm looking for you to assure us today
that all conclusions are on the table .
One final note , we are mindful today
that um song is not starting from
scratch . This is the third version of
this task force in D . O . D . And
civil society groups like the mutual
UFO network . Mr Korbel and others
have been collecting data on this issue
for years . I hope you'll explain how
you can leverage the knowledge and
experience of our prior work on this
matter to move the aim song along the
last time Congress had a hearing on you ,
A PS was half a century ago . I hope
that it does not take 50 more years for
Congress to hold another because
transparency is desperately needed and
now turn to ranking member Crawford for
comments he'd like to make . Thank you
Mr Chairman um honorable Moultrie Mr
bray . Thank you for coming here today .
We appreciate it to begin the open
dialogue between Congress and the
executive branch on this important
topic . While this topic evokes
creative imaginations of many , aside
from all the hype and speculation ,
there are important underlying issues
posed by you A PS . Despite the serious
nature of this topic , I have to say ,
I'm more interested in our
understanding of chinese and Russian
hypersonic weapon development or
understanding why this administration
was so slow to share actionable
intelligence with the Ukrainians .
However , as much as this topic may
help us better understand unknown
activities of Russia and china . I am
on board . The intelligence community
has a serious duty to our taxpayers to
prevent potential adversaries such as
china and Russia from surprising us
with unforeseen new technologies as
overseers of the intelligence community .
This committee has an obligation to
understand what you are doing to
determine whether any U a PSR new
technologies or not and if they are
where they're coming from in general ,
the Icy spends much of its time and
resources trying to understand what we
call known unknowns . When it comes to
foreign nations , weapons systems and
sensors . Known unknowns are those
features that we don't fully understand
yet . The challenge associated with you
A . P is that they are completely
unknown and require a more expansive
collection analysis effort . The
intelligence community must balance
addressing known threats to our nation
national security . With preventing
technical surprise . We must continue
to follow the facts where they lead us
and ensure that there are no technical
surprises . The Icy must take it
seriously when there are credible
observations of phenomena that seem to
perform in ways that could pose a
threat to safe flight operations . Or
they could be signs of a foreign
adversaries attempt to develop a
strategic technological surprise
against the United States . It's also
essential that our pilots and others
feel they can report you a PS they
observe without any stigma for doing so .
This is the open unclassified portion
of our hearing . We'll have a closed
classified part later . It's important
for the public to know that the
classification of information exists to
protect national security not to try to
hide the truth . When we're trying to
determine if any you a PSR new
technologies being developed by foreign
governments . We are inevitably going
to run into classified information
about what new systems and technologies
we do know are in the works here or
abroad , but where information does not
risk national security , it should be
shared with our allies and the public
when feasible . I hope that we can have
your assurance to this in today . It's
my hope that the intelligence community
will continue to try to determine the
nature of you A . P . S we've observed
and will keep Congress fully apprised
of all developments . I look forward to
this hearing and can you continue
dialogue and oversight with the
intelligence community on this topic
And without a yield back , Gentleman
yields back . And now we turn to our
distinguished chairman Adam Schiff for
any comments he wishes to make . Thank
you Chairman Carson for holding this
open hearing on unidentified aerial
phenomenon and for your leadership on
this issue . Holding a portion of our
discussion today . An open session is
critical to the cause of transparency
and openness which was Congress's
intent in authorizing and funding this
new task force . The larger effort that
is being undertaken to study and
characterized the AP Reports is an
important step towards understanding
these phenomenon . What we know and
don't know . And I look forward to
hearing more during both the open
session and the clothes setting about
how D . O . D . And the I see are
undertaking that task . You AP Reports
have been around for decades and yet we
haven't had an orderly way for them to
be reported without stigma and to be
investigated . That needs to change you
ap reports need to be understood as a
national security matter and that
message needs to go out across the O .
D . The I . C . And the whole of the U .
S . Government . When we spot something
we don't understand or can't identify
in our airspace . It's the job of those
we entrust with our national security
to investigate and to report back .
That is why it's important that we hold
this open hearing for the public to
hear directly from the Department of
Defense on the steps it's taking to
track , analyze and transparently
communicate the work that is being done
on this issue . It is also the
responsibility of our government and
this panel to share as much as we can
with the american people . Since
excessive secrecy only breeds distrust
and speculation . I look forward to
hearing how the U . Ap task forces
being stood up . What challenges they
still face and how this committee can
make sure the task force is able to
shed light on one of the world's most
enduring mysteries . I think you
gentlemen for your work and I'll be
very interested to hear what you have
to say to me . Among the most
fascinating questions are these
phenomenon that we can measure . That
is uh instruments report . There is
something there it is not the human eye ,
confusing objects in the sky . There is
something there measurable my multiple
instruments and yet it seems to move in
directions that are inconsistent with
what we know of physics or science more
broadly and uh that to me poses
questions of of tremendous interest and
as well as potential national security
significance . So we look forward to
hearing what you're able to report to
us today in open session . And I want
to thank Chairman Carson again for his
extraordinary leadership on this issue
and I yield back the chairman yields
back thank you . With that we will
start our hearing undersecretary
Moultrie . The floor is yours sir .
Thank you . Chairman Schiff committee
Chairman Carson ranking member Crawford .
Distinguished members of the
subcommittee . It's a privilege to be
here with you today to address your
questions regarding unidentified aerial
phenomenon or you ap I'm pleased to be
joined by Mr Scott bray , the deputy
director of Naval Intelligence will
speak to the Navy's unidentified aerial
phenomenon Task force which laid the
foundation for the efforts we will
discuss today . First I'd like to thank
Congress for supporting the
department's you ap efforts . The N . D .
A . For fiscal year 2022 has helped us
to establish a dedicated office to
oversee processes and procedures for
the timely collection , processing
analysis and reporting of U . Ap
related data . What are you a p . Put
simply you ap or airborne objects that
when encountered cannot be immediately
identified . However , it is the
department's contention that by
combining appropriately structured
collected data with rigorous scientific
analysis . Any object that we encounter
can likely be isolated ,
characterized , identified and if
necessary , mitigated . We know that
our service members have encountered
unidentified aerial phenomenon and
because you A . P . S . Pose potential
flight safety and general security risk .
We are committed to a focused effort to
determine their origins . Our effort
will include the thorough examination
of adversarial platforms and potential
breakthrough technologies , U . S .
Government or commercial platforms ,
allied or partner systems and other
natural phenomenon .
We also understand that there has been
a cultural stigma surrounding you . Ap
Our goal is to eliminate the stigma by
fully incorporating our operators and
mission personnel into a standardized
data gathering process . We believe
that making you ap reporting a mission
imperative will be instrumental to the
effort's success . The Defense
Intelligence and Security Enterprise
provides real time support to our war
fighters and mission personnel across
all domains . To optimize the
department's you ap work , we are
establishing an office within the
office of the Secretary of Defense .
That offices function is clear to
facilitate the identification of
previously unknown or unidentified
airborne objects in a methodical ,
logical and standardized manner . These
goals will ensure that we are working
closely with operational personnel on
training and reporting requirements ,
developing data and intelligence
requirements , standardizing and
integrating processes and procedures
for collection , operational
surveillance analysis and reporting ,
leveraging our research and development
capabilities to improve detection ,
characterization and identification of
you . A ps developing mitigating
solutions and procedures and
identifying strategy and policy
solutions . This effort will maximize
collaboration and build upon already
existing relationships with the office
of the Director of National
Intelligence , the F . A . A . DHS and
the FBI . We are also committed to
strong partnerships with the Department
of Energy , Noah , the D . E . A . Nasa
and the national labs and just as
importantly , our international
partners and allies with regard to the
importance of transparency . The
department is fully committed to the
principle of openness and
accountability to the american people .
However , we are also mindful of our
obligation to protect sensitive sources
and methods . Our goal is to strike
that delicate balance , one that
enables us to maintain the public's
trust while preserving those
capabilities that are vital to the
support of our service personnel in
closing the department is committed to
this effort and welcomes the challenge .
We thank you for your committed support
and look forward to your questions .
Mhm .
Chairman Schiff Chairman , Carson
ranking member Crawford and committee
members . Thank you very much for the
opportunity to be here today to
highlight the ongoing work of the
Department of Defense regarding
unidentified aerial phenomena . Since
the early 2000's . Uh we have seen an
increasing number of unauthorized and
or unidentified aircraft or objects in
military controlled training areas and
training ranges and other designated
airspace . Reports of sightings are
frequent and continuing . We attribute
this increase in reporting to a number
of factors , including our work to de
stigmatize reporting an increase in the
number of new systems such as quad
copters and unmanned aerial systems
that are in our airspace identification
of what we can classify as clutter
mylar balloons and other types of their
trash . And improvements in the
capabilities of our various sensors to
detect things in our airspace . Almost
two years ago , in august of 2020
Deputy Secretary Defense Norquist
directed the establishment of the
unidentified aerial phenomena task
force within the Department of the Navy .
The AP Task force was built on the
foundation of the Navy's initial
efforts to respond to the reports from
our aviators on unidentified objects
observed in our training ranges . The
basic issues then and now are twofold .
First incursions in our training ranges
by unidentified objects represent
serious hazards to safety of flight .
In every aspect of naval aviation ,
safety of our aircrews is paramount .
Second intrusions by unknown aircraft
or objects pose potential threats to
the security of our operations . Our
aviators train as they would fight so .
Any intrusions that may compromise the
security of our operations by revealing
our capabilities are tactics techniques
and procedures are of great concern to
the Navy and the Department of Defense .
From the very beginning , we took these
reports very seriously . We instituted
a data driven approach to the
investigations where we could collect
as much data as possible and use all
available resources to analyze and make
informed decisions on the best ways to
address our findings . Our main
objective was to transition you ap
efforts from an anecdotal or narrative
based approach to a rigorous science
and technology engineering focus .
Study this data driven approach
requires input from a wide variety of
sources . In the early stages the task
force worked to standardize the
reporting mechanisms and processes to
make it as easy as possible for
personnel to report any engagement so
that we were getting that wide range of
reporting that we needed . We also
spent considerable efforts engaging
directly with our naval aviators and
building relationships to help de
stigmatize the act of reporting
sightings or encounters . And we worked
with naval aviation leadership to
provide additional equipment to record
any encounter . Navy and Air Force
crews now have step by step procedures
for reporting on the U . Ap on their
knee board uh in there in the cockpit
and in their post flight debrief
procedures . The direct result of those
efforts has been increased reporting
with increased opportunities to focus a
number of sensors on any objects . The
message is now clear . If you see
something you need to report it . And
the message has been received . In fact
recently I received a call from a
senior naval aviator with over 2000
flight hours . He called me personally
from the flight line after landing to
talk about an encounter that he had
just experienced . Those were just the
initial steps . We also made a
concerted effort to assemble subject
matter experts from across the
Department of Defense and the
intelligence community and other U . S .
Government agencies and departments .
We forged partnerships with the
research development and acquisition
communities with industry partners and
with academic research labs and we
brought many allies and international
partners into our discussions on you .
Ap Additionally subject matter experts
from a wide variety of fields including
physics , optics , metallurgy ,
meteorology . Just to name a few have
been brought into uh to expand our
understanding in areas where meet we
may not have organic expertise . In
short we have endeavored to bring an
all hands on deck approach to the to
better understand this phenomenon . So
what have we learned so far any given
observation may be fleeting Or longer
it may be recorded or not . It may be
observable by one or multiple assets .
In short there's rarely an easy answer .
For example , let me share with you the
first video that we have here today
which shows an observation in real time
there it was . That's in many cases
that's all that report may include and
in many other cases we have far less
than this as we detailed in both the
unclassified and classified versions of
the preliminary assessment released by
the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence last june this often
limited amount of high quality data uh
and reporting hampers our ability to
draw firm conclusions about the nature
or intent of you ap as detailed in the
O . D . N . I . Report . If and when
individual you ap incidents are
resolved , they likely fall into one of
five potential explanatory categories .
Airborne clutter natural atmospheric
phenomena , US government or U . S .
Industry developmental programs ,
foreign adversary systems or a other
bin that allows for a holding bin of
difficult cases and for the possibility
of surprise and potential scientific
discovery . We stand by those initial
results . Since the release of that
preliminary report . You ap Task Force
database has now grown to contain
approximately 400 reports . The stigma
has been reduced . We've also made
progress in resolving the character of
a limited number of U . AP encounters .
For example , let me show you a couple
of another video and image taken years
apart in different areas . In this
video , US Navy personnel recorded what
appears to be triangle , some flashing
recorded several years ago off the
coast of the United States . This was
recorded while the U . S . Navy ship
observed a number of small unmanned
aerial systems in the area . And
importantly , the video was taken
through night vision goggles with a
single lens reflex camera . These
remained unresolved for several years .
Several years later and off a different
coast . Us Navy personnel again in a
swarm of unmanned aerial systems and
again through night vision goggles and
an SLR camera recorded this image .
But this time , other U . S . Navy
assets also observed unmanned aerial
systems nearby and we're now reasonably
confident that these triangles
correlate the unmanned aerial systems
in the area . The triangular appearance
is a result of light passing through
the night vision goggles and then being
recorded by an SLR camera . I don't
mean to suggest that everything that we
observe is identifiable , but
um , the uh it but this is a great
example of how it takes considerable
effort to understand what we're seeing
uh in the examples that we are able to
collect . Um , in this example , we
accumulate sufficient data from two
similar encounters from two different
time periods in two different
geographic areas To help us draw the
these conclusions . That's not always
the case though . We recognize that
that can be unsatisfying or
insufficient in the eyes of many .
There's a popular topic in our nation
with various theories as to what these
objects may be and where they originate
by nature . We're all curious and we
seek to understand the unknown . And as
a lifelong intelligence professional ,
I'm impatient . I want immediate
explanations for this as much as anyone
else . However understanding can take
significant time and effort . It's why
we've endeavored to concentrate on this
data driven process to dr fact based
results . And given the nature of our
business , national Defense , we've had
to sometimes be less forthcoming with
information in open forums than many
would hope if you ap do indeed
represent a potential threat to our
security . Then the capabilities ,
systems , processes and sources . We
used to observe , recorded study or
analyze these phenomena need to be
classified at appropriate levels . We
do not want , we do not want potential
adversaries to know exactly what we're
able to see or understand or how we
come to the conclusions we make .
Therefore public disclosures must be
carefully considered on a case by case
basis . So what's next ? We're
concentrating on a seamless transition
to the new organization and future
analysis of complicated issues of you
ap issues will greatly benefit from the
infrastructure of the process and the
procedures that we've developed to date .
I'm confident that the task force under
Navy leadership has forged a path
forward that will allow us to anchor
assessments in science and engineering .
Vice anecdotal evidence . We remain
committed to that goal as I know the U .
S . D . I . The organization does as
well . So thank you very much for your
interest in continuing support for the
U . AP task force . The team has made a
lot of progress but we really are just
establishing the foundation for the
more detailed analysis that's yet to be
done . And with your continued support
we can sustain that momentum necessary
to produce data centric analysis and
understanding the phenomena . Look
forward to your questions . Thank you .
Thank you Mr bray . This is the third
version of this task force and to be
frank . One of congress's concerns is
that the executive branch an
administration both parties has been
sweeping concerns about you a PS under
the rug by focusing on events that can
be explained and avoiding events that
cannot be explained . What can you what
what what what what what can you say to
give the american people confidence
that you aren't just focusing our
attention on low hanging fruit with
easy explanations .
Congressman . I'll start and then Mr
bray . Um please feel free to uh to
weigh in . So the way that we're
approaching us is with more
thorough standardized methodology and
what we have in the past . First and
foremost , the Secretary of Defense is
chartering this effort . This is not
someone lower in the Department of
Defense and he has assigned that task
to the Office of Secretary of Defense .
Uh the undersecretary for Intelligence
and Security . That's me because I'm
responsible for looking at intelligence
matters . I'm responsible for security
matters . This is potentially both . So
when you start um concerning the
ourselves with the safety of our
personnel , the safety of our
installations and bases , there is no
other higher priority than what we have
than actually getting after this . And
and as you have stated , we have been
assigned that task to actually stand up
in office the aim song which I believe
the name server will likely change but
we have moved forward in terms of
moving to establish that office we have
as of this week um take the
director for that effort very
established and and uh accomplished
individual . We've identified spaces ,
we've worked with personnel across the
Department of Defense with the services
and we've worked with the I . C . Which
is on board and helping us work through
this standardized methodology for now
bringing in data , analyzing that data
and reporting that data in the
appropriate method appropriate means .
So we can either get it to our service
personnel to ensure their safety or get
it to you in the Congress and to the
public to ensure that you have
oversight to what we're doing so
chartered by the Secretary of Defense
Standardize and really a methodical
approach . It's something that we're
doing that has not been done before .
Can we get some kinds of assurances
that your analysts will follow the
facts where they lead and assess all
hypotheses ? Absolutely . So we're open
to all hypotheses were open to any
conclusions that that we may encounter
quickly before I pass it to the ranking
member and and Chairman Schiff . I want
to thank you both for taking the time
and I had a good time meeting with you
last week . Director Moultrie
Undersecretary Moultrie . Um It's fair
to say that you are a science fiction
fan , is that correct ? It's fair to
say that I am an inquisitive mind who
has uh spent 40 years in the
intelligence field and has focused on
both science and science fiction . That
is fair . Could you tell us about it ?
Yeah , well look , my generation grew
up uh looking at space Sagas and
and the Apollo program . So all of us
who grew up in the sixties were we're
just thrilled by watching um our first
astronaut land on the moon . That was a
momentous occasion to people who we're
of different generations . Uh Some of
them didn't believe that happened . I
still have relatives and friends who
don't believe it happened , right ,
Science fiction to them . But to us it
was no , that's the progress that we've
made . And so I was enthralled by that
and I've taken that to heart . I enjoy
um uh the challenge of what may be out
there . I have mentioned to you that
yes , I have followed science fiction .
I have gone to conventions even . I'll
say it on the record . Uh uh I got to
break the ice somehow , but you know ,
I have done that right , but there's
nothing wrong with that . Um don't
necessarily dress up , but I do uh you
know , I do believe that it's important
to show that the Department of Defense
has um you know , we have character and
we're people just like you just like
the american people , we have our we
have our our inquisitiveness , we have
our questions , we want to know what's
out there as much as you want to know
what's out there . We get the questions ,
not just from you , we get it from
family members and we get them night
and day . Uh not just in committee
hearings . So finding what's out there
is important , but first and foremost
it's important for us to do that so
that we can ensure that our people ,
our personnel , our aviators are bases
and installations are safe . Um and
then that curiosity factor is something
else that that we just want to know
because that's the human race , it's
just you know , that insatiable desire
to know . Thank you sir , Ranking
member Crawford Mr walter . You said
you don't necessarily dress up .
That wasn't a real strong
statement , gentlemen , thank you for
being here today . We appreciate it .
Um and thank you Mr mulder for breaking
the Dennis . The way you did appreciate
that the inability to understand
objects and are sensitive operating
areas is tantamount to an intelligence
failure that we certainly want to avoid
is not about finding alien spacecraft
but about delivering dominant
intelligence across the tactical
operational and strategic spectrum . So
my question is how can aim sog lead to
prevention of intelligence surprises ?
Sure , I'll start with that . So the
goal of our effort is to integrate it
into what we already do on a normal
basis , which is look for the unknown
unknowns congressman as you stated in
your opening remarks across all domains .
So we've been doing this for decades .
We've been looking at the space domain ,
looking at space objects , looking at
space , weather , looking at space
phenomenon . We've been looking at
things in the air domain and we as you
know , we um and I'll talk more about
this and classified session , but we
have a very concerted effort to
understand adversarial platforms and
adversarial developmental programs and
we do that also on the ground domain .
And of course we're very interested in
what happens in the in the underwater
or C domain if you will subsurface
domain . So if there are objects that
are aviators or air crews are
encountering in this air domain and
their sensors are are discovering or
detecting some of these objects , we
want to just bring that in to the
normal process that we have for
identifying unknown unknowns . We want
to make sure we have the intelligence
requirements that allow us not only to
look at that event from the time that
occurs forward , but maybe
retrospectively we want to go back and
see if we can get to the left of that
event to say was there some
developmental program that we to get to
your technical surprise issue sir that
we should have known about ? And if so ,
how do we put that intelligence
requirement in place to ensure that we
are following an adversarial
development or any other development
that may be out there . So that's what
we we want to do in terms of
normalizing this and bring it into the
normal process of how we identify
unknown unknowns . So you mentioned
Fidelity and I think it's important to
talk about the relationship from the
navy is the lead agency on this . How
do you interact with um Space Force Air
Force to create that degree of fidelity ?
We're talking about sensors and so on .
And I guess where I have some concerns
that many of the images that we see
commonly um in this committee and even
an open source , the resolution and the
clarity um that would allow a robust
technical intelligence analysis is
challenging . So is um Sog prepared to
address the quality and quantity of
data collected on you ap to advance
intelligence collection . And do you
have the adequate sensors ? You need to
collect that high quality data ? One of
the lines of effort that we have is
looking at our sensor capabilities and
to understand whether or not as the
video showed that Mr bray um displayed .
Sometimes it's very fleeting data that
we have on some of these objects . And
we want to make sure that one our
systems are calibrated uh to actually
be able to collect on the objects . You
know , our sensors today or they're
calibrated for specific things . We
want to make sure that calibrated for
things of this nature , things of this
size , things of this philosophy . If I
can use that term , we want to make
sure that once we have that that that
data is stored in some standardized
methods that we can then extract and
that we can feed into our system real
time . So we do not want this to take
some uh prolonged period of time for us
to get that data . But our goal is
absolutely to have that high fidelity
information that we get from all
sensors and we want to be able to
integrate that with what we may have
off of ground based center . So
whatever you may have on the platform ,
whatever you may have on the ground ,
whatever we may have from other sensors
that we may have in different domains .
We wanna be able to integrate that all
and get this integrated picture as we
would as I said with any other
unidentified objects or things that
we're tracking um as a part of our
normal intelligence responsibilities .
Thank you . Last question . Mr bray .
If you would uh I'm a Navy pilot , I've
encountered Au AP walked me through the
reporting protocol . Um Once I see
something that I think needs reported .
Uh The first thing that aviator would
do after landing is a part of their
normal debriefing is they would contact
their intelligence officer . Their
intelligence officer would then walk
them through first filing a first
actually data preservation to ensure
that that whatever sensor data uh maybe
on the aircraft that we preserve that
so that it's available for for later
analysis . Um Second they would
actually fill out a form that that
includes details like where they were
operating altitudes they were operating
speeds what they observed whatever
since the data sensor data they may
have recorded from that And then that
report is filed it goes to places one
it goes through through the operational
uh chain of command so that operational
units are aware of what what's being
observed and also uh to the U . Ap task
force so that they can take that data
database . It uh and quite often
have individuals from the task force uh
contact the aviator uh and asked them
additional questions if there were
things that weren't clear in the in the
report . That thing goes into a into a
database where we begin to compare it
with other observations that we have .
Again comparing for locations ,
comparing for altitude speeds , shapes .
Uh If any are f emissions were detected
from the platform all of that so that
we can try to reach some conclusions on
that . Thank you . You're back
Gentleman yields back . Chairmanship .
Thanks chairman . Um Mr Break can you
rerun that first image that looked like
it was outside of a plane window And if
you wouldn't mind going up to the
screen and tell us what we're what
we're seeing . Not that you can
necessarily tell us what we're seeing
but explain what we should be looking
at in that first image ? Absolutely .
And Alexey , what I'll ask is if you
can stop it at a certain point
And are we looking outside of a
civilian aircraft window ? Is that what
we're looking at ?
Okay .
What were
one
you're
is that it right there .
Can you point to the screen again what
we're supposed to be looking at ?
It is right okay if you could stop that
frame , that's nothing . All right
Alexa just push play . Let's see it .
Here's what you'll see coming up right
here is a tier one . Now , back in
spherical object right here zooms by
the window , right in this area . Right
here we go . Good to see that part
right there again , Going by , I think
we're having a hard time stopping in
the right spot .
Okay , so as you can see it's difficult .
Um the laptop we're working with is not
as easy for us stopping that video in
the right spot . We'll describe what
what we have seen in that . What are we
observing ? What you see here is uh
aircraft that is operating in a uh in
the U . S . Navy training range that
has observed spherical object
uh in that area . And as they fly by it ,
they take a video . You see a um it
looks reflective in this video ,
somewhat reflective and it quickly
passes by the cockpit of the of the
aircraft . And is this one of the
phenomenon that we can't explain ? I do
not have an explanation for what this
this specific object is . And is this
one of the situations where it is ?
That's that's the object that we're
looking at right there . Thank you . Um
And is this a situation where it was
observed by the pilot and it was also
recorded by the aircraft's instruments .
We'll talk about the multi center part
in a later session .
Mhm . But in this case , uh we have at
least that um in , in the
Director of National Intelligence 2021
unclassified report , Um the Ot and I
reported 140 for you , a peace between
2004 and 2021 , 80% of which
were recorded on multiple instruments .
Um and I take it with respect to some
of those You had the pilot , a pilot
seeing them , it was observed by a
pilot and you had multiple instruments
recording it . So you really have three
sensors , the human sensor and two
technical sensors detecting the object .
Is that for the majority of
uh incidents that we had in the last
year's report , the majority had multi
sensor data . When I talk about the 400
reports that we have now , uh that
number will certainly go down because a
lot of those uh new reports that we
have are actually historic reports that
our narrative based . So that
percentage will go down just as a
factor of the fact that the that the de
stigmatization has resulted in more
narrative reports . And that's the
object we're looking at right there .
Now , that's it right there . Okay . Um
Last year's report also said that of
the 144 , 18 of them
reportedly appeared to exhibit unusual
flight characteristics appear to
demonstrate advanced technology . Uh
and some of them appear to remain
stationary and winds aloft move against
the wind , maneuver abruptly or move at
considerable speed without discernible
means of propulsion . Um , that's
pretty intriguing
and and if you're able to answer this
in this setting , are we aware of any
foreign adversary capable of moving
objects without any discernible means
of propulsion ? Um , I
think I would , without discernible
means of propulsion . I would say that
we're not aware of any adversary that
can move an object without discernible
means of propulsion . The question then
becomes in many of these cases where we
don't have a discernible means of
propulsion in the data that we have ,
um in some cases , uh um there is
likely sensor artifacts that that may
be hiding some of that . Uh , there's
certainly some degree of uh of
something that looks like signature
management that we have seen from some
of these . Uh , you a p but I
would I would caution , I would simply
say that there are a number of uh of
events in which we do not have an
explanation in which then there are a
small handful in which there are flight
characteristics or signature management ,
um that we can't explain with the data
that we have . Um , we'll continue
those are obviously the ones that are
of most interest to us earlier When we
asked about how you avoid technological
surprise , the biggest way you avoid
technological surprises by collecting
this type of data and by importantly um
calibrating the assumptions that you go
into with how you do that analysis ,
I'll tell you within the U . Ap task
Force . We have one basic assumption
and that is that generally speaking ,
generally speaking are sensors operate
as designed . Um and we make that
assumption because many times these are
multi sensor collections , we make no
assumptions about the origin of this or
that there may or may not be some sort
of technology that we don't understand .
That's I think the key to avoiding
technological surprises by calibrating
those assumptions . And finally um with
respect to the second two videos
showing the small triangles . Um the
hypothesis is that those are uh
commercial drones that because of the
use of night vision goggles appear like
triangles , is that the operating
assessment , some type of drone , some
type of unmanned aerial system . Uh And
it is simply that that light source
resolves itself through the through the
night vision goggles onto the SLR
camera as a triangle . And have we in
order to prove that hypothesis , flown
a drone uh and observed it with that
same technology to see whether we can
reproduce the effect . The task force
is aware of studies that have done that .
Thank you . Mr Chairman , I yield back .
Gentleman yields back dr Lindstrom .
Thank you Mr Chairman , thank you all
for being here . Um My first question
is throughout this process where
there's been sightings , have the
sightings been stationary or have they
always been sighted from a moving
object from a plane or a ship that may
be moving ? Have these reports ever
come from a stationary object being
observed in the sky . The task Force
does have reports from stationary ,
from state reports from a stationary
observer because there's a difference
observing something when you're moving
as well . It's it's physics , right ?
That's why I asked that question . Are
we capable or have we made any
breakthroughs or anyone made any
breakthroughs to be able to cite
something and make some determination
at all of its composition whether it's
a solid or a gas . Do . Is there any
such capability ?
Um , from not asking what I've just
from from some of the returns . I mean ,
it's clear that , uh , that the
majority , but it's clear that many of
the observations we have , our physical
objects from the sensor data that we
have . Well , gas is physical , is a
physical object , it can be . And so ,
and you see where I'm going with this ,
I'm trying to determine what it is
we're looking at . So , if we can
decide if something is a solid or gas
and if there had been any conclusion on
its capabilities like its capabilities
of movement of turning , going , you
know , 180 degrees or 90 degree turn
anything along that line that we've
been able to determine within the and
again , I should point out that , you
know , that there is not a single
explanation for you . A p they make up ,
there are a lot of different things
that are unidentified aerial phenomena
basically we really don't know much on .
That's that's all I'm trying to get it
and I'm pleased that you have protocol
right now for our military . But are
there any non military reports coming
forward of similar events or is it all
coming from military ? The task force
has a very good working relationship
with the FAA . They have very good
working relationship with other parts
of the U . S . Government so that we
can ingest reports from . Do we have
any reports ? Nonmilitary ? Yes . Thank
you . That's that's that's my question .
Um And do we need to put out protocol
for civilians that may be in that arena ?
Like through FAA . Do you think that
would be appropriate and helpful ? I
think standardized reporting without a
doubt is key to helping us get to the
to ascertain what some of these are . I
think it would be important as well .
Do we um There are other people besides
the U . S . That have had these
experiences and reported them . Is that
correct ? There are that's correct . Is
it all of our allies or is it allies
and adversaries ? What have we learned
publicly ? So some of that ? I think
sir will save for closed session . Well
that goes my next question publicly .
Have others that made anything which
would not have to be considered closed .
I don't want you to answer what they've
said necessarily allies have have seen
these china has established its own
version of a U . AP task force . So
clearly a number of countries have
observations of of things in the air
space that they can identify . And do
we share data with some with all are
they sharing with us ? We share data
with some and some share data with us
but not necessarily all that have
publicly reported something . That's
correct . Okay . Um and I think that's
an important thing and for the other
session actually that we we don't
discuss that now um because
you know obviously something like this
can be a national security challenge
for us . No doubt about it . If they're
developed by an adversary um through
some breakthrough technology they can
be very disruptive to our military
actions or at least serve as the
destruction . And so my caution would
be uh be careful who we share our data
with and don't necessarily trust some
of the data we may get from someone
else . And with that I yield back
Gentleman yields back . Mr . Himes .
Okay thank you Mr Chairman . One of the
objectives of this open hearing is to
um try to erode some of the stigma that
attaches to in particular our military
men and women reporting this . It's
obviously really very serious because
should one of our adversaries have
developed a technology that we don't
know about it . We need to know about
it yesterday and obviously any sort of
stigma that prevents our military
from reporting this data as
comprehensively as possible as a
national security threat . So I really
just have two questions in the service
of that goal . Uh The first is um the
chairman asked that we run that video
again , most people when they see a
video , we're all used to seeing things
from a car , Seeing things from a
sidewalk . Very few people have the
experience of observing something
through night vision goggles at Mach
1.5 . So just talk for a minute about
if you would , uh , whichever of you is
most appropriate . How radically
different observation is at high speed
and three dimensions than it is for
most of us who walk around and drive
cars . Um , so the first thing I think
it's important to note about this is
there are lots of things when you are
moving very fast and an object is
between you and a stationary reference
point , like the ground . Uh it gives a
lot of different impressions about how
quickly something is or isn't moving .
And it actually um means that it is a
challenge , especially with narrative
based data to get a lot of information
on that . That's why the sensor data is
so important because things do happen
very quickly as you see there . Um ,
and sometimes things that happen very
quickly , something maybe moving very
slow . That aircraft is moving quite
fast . How fast that object is moving
that goes by is probably very slow . So
I guess I guess my point is that an
observation . Either a visual
observation or a electronic
observation infrared or whatever looks
radically different than it does to
most people . Um Even instruments uh
instruments are on gimbals and that
sort of thing . So that creates a very
unusual view to again those of us who
are used to seeing things on in two
dimensions largely . Um The second
question um I think mr bray you said
something that I want to unpack a
little bit of a number of these U . A .
P . S . You said we can't explain again
in the service of sort of reducing
speculation and conspiracy theories we
can't explain can range from a visual
observation that was distant on a foggy
night . We don't know what it is to we
found an organic material that we can
identify . Right , those are radically
different worlds worlds . So when you
say we can't explain . Give the public
a little bit better sense of where on
that spectrum of we can't explain . We
are are we holding materials organic or
inorganic that we don't know about ?
Are we you know , picking up emanations
that are something other than light or
infrared that could be deemed to be
communications . Give us a sense for
what you mean when you say we can't
explain . Sure . When I say we can't
explain I mean exactly as you described
there that there is a lot of
information like the video that we
showed in which there's simply too
little data to create a reasonable
explanation . There are a small handful
of cases in which we have more data um
that our analysis simply hasn't been
able to uh to fully pull together a
picture of what happened . Um The uh
and those are the cases where we talk
about where we see some indications of
flight characteristics or signature
management that are not what we had
expected when it comes to material that
we have we have no material . We have
detected no emanations within the task
force that that is uh that would
suggest it's anything non terrestrial
in origin . So there's when I say
unexplained , I mean everything from
too little too little data to we simply
the data that we have doesn't point us
towards an explanation but we'll go
wherever the data takes us . Again ,
we've made no assumptions about what
this is or isn't we're committed to
understanding these and so we'll go
wherever that data takes us . Thank
thank you . That's that's very helpful .
And so I think it bears emphasis when
you say we can't explain . Everything
that you can't explain is in a bucket
called data . Is that correct ? And
that would mean data collected by
sensors , visual observations ,
everything that we can't explain ,
quote unquote is in a bucket called
data write a narrative report from from
the early 2000s if it just had a little
bit of information on it would be in
our database and it would be unresolved ,
I would add to that . It's insufficient
data . I mean that's one of the
challenges . We have insufficient data
either on the event itself , the object
itself or insufficient data or plug in
with some other organization or agency
that may have had something in that
space at that time . So it's a data
issue that we're that we're facing in
many of these instances congressman
understood . Thank you very much .
Field back gentleman yields back . Mr
Gallagher . Thank you . Mr Chairman
thank you for allowing me to join this
hearing . Um I really appreciate the
witness's testimony . Um Mr Moultrie as
the chairman mentioned uh duty had
initiative to study UFOs in the 19
sixties called Project Blue Book . It's
also been well reported , you know ,
briefing and in other places that we
have more have more recent projects ,
specifically a tip . Could you describe
any other initiatives that the D O . D .
Or D . O . D . Contractors have managed
after ? Project Blue Book ended and
prior to a tip beginning . Did anything
also predate Project Blue Book . So I I
can't speak to what may have predated
Project Blue Book . I mean of course
there's Roswell and all these other
things that people have talked about
over the years . Um I'm familiar with
Blue Book , I'm familiar with with a
tip . I haven't seen other documented
studies that have been done by D . O .
D . In that regard . So you're not
aware of anything in between Project
Blue Book and a tip . I'm not aware of
anything that's official that was done
in between those two hasn't been
brought to my attention . Okay .
Additionally are you aware of any other
D . O . D . Or D . O . D . Contract
programs focused on you ? A ps from a
technological engineering perspective .
And by that , I mean are you aware of
any technology initiatives focused on
this topic other than initiatives
focused on the individual case
investigations ? I'm not aware of any
contractual programs that are focused
on any anything related to
this other than what we are doing in
the Navy Task force and what we're
about to launch in terms of our effort .
Same question for you . Mr Brown . The
same answer . Not aware of anything
outside what we are doing in the U . AP
task force . So just to confirm ,
you're not aware of any technology or
engineering resources that have been
focused on these efforts . Besides what
we've mentioned today , once again I'll
say no contractual uh
or programmatic efforts that are
involved in the reason why I I qualify .
Yeah . Let me qualify it that way . I I
can't speak to what people may be
looking at in the department . Somebody
says I'm looking at something . I'm
looking at something that may be
unidentified and I can't speak to that .
Speak to official programs that we have
on the record . It's also been reported
that there have been um p observed and
interacting with and flying over
sensitive military facilities ,
particularly not just ranges but uh
some facilities housing our strategic
Nuclear Forces . One such incident
allegedly occurred uh at Malmstrom Air
Force Base in which 10 of our nuclear I .
C . B . M . S were rendered inoperable .
At the same time glowing red orb was
observed overhead . I'm not commenting
on the accuracy of this . I'm simply
asking you whether you're aware of it
and whether you have any comment on the
accuracy of that report that to Mr bray ,
if you've been looking at the last
three years , that data is not within
the holdings of the Ap task force .
Okay . But are you aware of the report ?
But that the data exists somewhere ? I
have I have heard stories , I have not
seen the official data on that . So
you've just seen informal stories , no
official assessment that you've done or
exist within D . O . D . That you're
aware of regarding the Malmstrom
incident . All I can speak to is , you
know , what's within my cognizance .
The U . AP task force . And we have not
looked at that incident . Well , I
would say it's a pretty high profile
incident . I don't claim to be an
expert on this but that's out there in
the ether . You're you're the guys
investigating it . I mean who else is
doing it . If something was officially
brought to our attention , we would
look at it . There are many things that
are out there in the ether that aren't
officially brought to our attention ,
How would it have to be officially
brought to you ? I'm bringing it to
your attention . This is pretty
official . So we'll go back and take a
look at it . But generally there is
some authoritative figure that says
there is an incident that occurred .
We'd like you to look at this , but in
terms of just tracking what may be in
the media that says that something
occurred at this time at this place .
Um there's probably a lot of leads that
we would have to follow up on . I don't
think we have resources to do that
right now . Well , I don't claim to be
an authoritative figure , but for what
it's worth , I would like you to look
into it . And for another reason you
could dismiss it and say this is not
worth wasting resources on . And then
finally , are are you aware of a
document that appeared around 2019
sometimes called the Admiral Wilson
memo or E . W . Notes memo ? I am , I
am , I'm not I'm not personally aware
of that . Okay , this is a document in
which again , I'm not commenting on the
veracity . I was hoping you would help
me with that in which the former Head
of Dia claims to have had a
conversation with the doctor , eric
Wilson and claims to have sort of been
made aware of certain um contractors or
duty programs um that he tried to get a
fuller access to and was denied access
to . Um so you're not aware of that .
Delaware congressman in my 10 seconds
remaining then I guess I just would ask
Mr Chairman unanimous consent to enter
that memo into the record without
objection . Thank you . Mr Chairman
appreciate it . Mr Krishnamurthy ,
thank you Mr Chair and thank you to
both of you for appearing today and for
your public service . First question is
uh there have been no collisions
between any US assets and one of these
you A . P . S . Correct ? We have not
had a collision . We've had at least 11
near misses though . And Maybe we'll
talk about those 11 near misses or any
place where there's close proximity .
Um , I assume tell me if I'm wrong ,
there's been no attempt , there's no
communications or any kind of
uh communication signals that emanate
from those objects that we've detected ,
correct ? That's correct . And have we
attempted to communicate with those
objects and No , so
we don't we don't even put out alerts
saying you know us um
identity , you know , identify yourself ,
you are you know within our flight path
or something like that . We we haven't
said anything like that . We have not
put anything out like that . Generally
speaking what , you know , for example ,
in the video that we showed earlier .
Uh it appears to be something that is
unmanned appears to be something that
may or may not be in controlled flight .
And so we have not attempted any
communication with that . Okay . So
um and I assume we've never discharged
any armaments against you . Ap correct .
That's correct . Um How about wreckage ?
Have we come across any wreckage of any
kind of um object that
has now been examined by you ? The U .
Ap Task force doesn't have any wreckage
that isn't explainable that that isn't
consistent with being of terrestrial
origin . Do we have any sensors
underwater to um detect on
submerged U . A . P . S . Anything that
is in the ocean or in the seas ? So I
think that would be more appropriate
addressed in closed session . Um
I think one of the biggest questions
that that I have is um We
say with a lot of probability we say
they quote unquote probably do
represent physical objects . Close
quote . Um When we say
probably is that because we cannot
conclusively say that they are physical
objects in the task force
report . When when I say probably
represent physical objects uh Most of
them represent physical objects . There
could be some that are more of a of a
meteorological phenomena . Something
like that . That may not . Maybe a
physical object in the In the sense
that most people think of something you
would go up and touch . But the ones
where you say most of them represent
physical objects . Can you say that
they are definitely like with 100%
certainty that they are physical
objects . I can say with certainty that
a number of these are physical objects .
Okay so there we can't rule out that
some of them may not be physical
objects . That some certainly could be
a sensor anomaly or something like that .
Some could be . Now . How about with
regard to U . A . P . S . We've talked
about you I PS . On training areas but
obviously um there's some sensor bias I
would think we we put sensors and
training areas . Um How about with
regards to non training areas , do we
track what's an open source um and what
civilians and others have tracked ? And
have we found similarities to um what
they've observed in terms of you a PS .
And non training areas to the ones that
are in training areas . Uh The um the
task force has worked very hard to to
make sure the data set that we're
working with is a is a data set that we
have very good control over that data .
So we have some partnerships with FAA .
So that we get some of that so we get
that reporting in . Um But if it comes
to just you know open source reports or
someone says that they saw something
that generally does not make it into
our database . So basically it sounds
like we have a good partnership with F .
A . A . Um But apart from FAA . We
don't have partnerships with other
agencies or other entities that might
be tracking so that we could enlarge
our data set to make comparison . We
will , so that's the goal of this next
effort will be to expand that
relationship with the rest of
government in the inter agency so we
can understand what they're seeing ,
what we're seeing . We can correlate on
each other's holdings . Sorry to
interrupt . But I think that we're we
might have a bias right now going on
with regards to just reporting on you a
PS being in training areas when we
don't really track what's happening
elsewhere . Last question . Have our
encounters with you a PS altered the
development of our either our offense
or offensive or defensive capabilities
or even our sensor capabilities ? It
would say that for the closed session ?
Okay . Great . Thank you . Mr Lahood .
Thank you . Mr Chairman and I want to
thank the witnesses for being here
today . Obviously this topic of you A
PS has attracted a lot of interest in
people that are um curious
about this this hearing today as we
talk about . Um And I would say there's
a lot of what I would call uh amateur
interest groups that are involved in
the U . AP field . My question is when
um there are unsubstantiated claims or
manufactured claims of you A PS or kind
of false information that's put out
there . What are the consequences for
people that are involved with that or
groups that are involved with that .
So one of the concerns that we have is
that there are a lot of uh
individuals and groups that are are
putting information out there . That
that could be considered to be somewhat
self serving . We're trying to do
what's in the , what's in the best
interests of one , the Department of
Defense and then to what's in the best
interests of the public to ensure that
we can put factual based information
back into the mainstream and back into
the bloodstream of the reporting media
that we have . So people understand
what's there . It's important because
we are attempting um as this hearing as
has drawn out to understand One what
may just be natural phenomenon to what
may be censored phenomenology or things
that were happening with sensors three .
What may be legitimate
counterintelligence threats to places
that we have our bases or installations
or security threats to our platforms
and anything that diverts us off of
what we have with the resources that
have been allocated to us send us off
in the spurious chases and hunts that
are just not helpful . And they also
helped whether they also contribute to
the undermining of the confidence that
the congress and the american people
have that we are trying to get to the
root cause of what's happening here ,
report on that and then feed that back
into our national security apparatus .
So we are able to protect the american
people and our allies . So it is
harmful . It is hurtful . But hopefully
if we get more information out there
will start to lessen the impact of some
of those spurious reports . So just
taking that a step further . So those
that misinformation , false narratives
manufactured . So what are the
consequences ? Are there legal
consequences ? Are there examples that
you can give us where people have been
held accountable by this misinformation
or disinformation ? I can't give you
any examples where somebody has been
legally held liable for putting
something out there . But well I guess
what's the deterrent from people
engaging in this activity ? Yeah . I
don't I don't know why I don't have
that answer . I that's something that ,
you know , welcome to dialogue with
Congress to talk about that with the
members who uh you know , help
legislate those laws to say what should
be the legal ramifications that we
could use to potentially hold
individuals accountable whether it be
citizens or information that might be
injected into our media by
other other forces or other countries
if you will . And in terms of D . O . D .
S . And uh you know , review and
analysis in this field ? I mean , is
there is there a standard in place when
it comes to you ? A P . S . I mean , is
there any guidance you look too that's
codified in law or otherwise within D .
O . D . That that kind of sets out the
standards for you A PS and what to look
for . I think that's part of what the
group that we're standing up now will
be charted to do . We're actually from
my organization , will be looking at
policy and standards that we have to um
come to you and work with you to
actually put in place and promulgate
across our government . Thank you . I
yield back . Gentleman yields back . Mr .
Welch , thank you . I'm gonna I'm gonna
follow on the the line of questions
from Mr Lahood . Uh Gentlemen , what
seems incredibly difficult for you is
that there's two almost competing but
different uh narratives . One is it's
no one knows whether there's
extraterrestrial life . It's a big
universe and it would be pretty
presumptuous to have a hard and fast
conclusion . And then if there is uh
it's not beyond the realm of
possibility that there is some
exploration coming here . Uh and that
underlies a lot of the reports you get .
I think Mr Lahood was asking about that .
People think there must be
extraterrestrial life and it's not at
all beyond the pale that there would be
a visit here on the other hand , as the
D . O . D . You have the responsibility
to make sure uh that our national
security is protected and that if there
are surveillance drones or active
drones that can disable our systems
that has to be analyzed has to be
stopped . So how do you divide the
these how do you separate your
responsibilities where you get all
these reports from folks who may
be in good faith . Maybe not . I
believe that you should be
investigating every possible
report of a extraterrestrial incident ?
I'll start with you Mr Moultrie . Sure
indeed , congressman and thank you for
the question . Um , it's important that
we um , as a part of this effort um
really build out the relationship that
we have with feathers including Nasa
and and for the reason that you just
pointed out . So there are elements in
our government that are engaged in
looking for life and other places and
they have been doing that for decades .
They've been searching for
extraterrestrial life . Uh , there are
astrobiologists who have been doing
this too , were part of that same
government . And so our goal is not to
um potentially cover up something . If
we were to find something , it's to
understand what may be out there , um ,
examine what um , what it may mean for
us , if there are any , from a defense
perspective , any national security
implications or ramifications . But
then the work with organizations as
appropriate if it's a weather
phenomenology with no if it's uh
potential for extraterrestrial life or
an indication of extreme to life with
someone like nasa transparency ,
transparency actually is very important
completely for public consumption .
We're gonna have a classified briefing
and without going into the details of
what kinds of secrets that we can't
share here . Uh what is it , what are
we protecting ? I don't know if you can
answer this question in this open
forum , but in fact uh your
perception of what it is , we have to
quote . So I think right now what's
really important for us to protect is
how we know certain things . So there
are a lot of things that we know
whether it be about um the thinking of
other leaders around the world , the
weapons systems are being developed or
how we detect things that may be
threats to us . Many of those things
are the result of some of our most
sensitive sources and methods and we'll
use those things , not just for this
effort , but those same sources and
methods are used to help protect us
from adversaries and from others who
might mean to do us harm . There aren't
separate you ap sensors . There's not a
a separate u ap processing computer is
not a separate you ap dissemination
chain or whatever . So it's the same
process . It's it's the same system
that we have that helps us do all that
we need to protect that because this is
something that that we're looking at .
But we're sure there's gonna be other
things that we'll look at in the future
that will need those same censors .
We'll need those same sources and
methods to help us do . So we're
protecting the fact of the that this
nation has developed capabilities that
enable us to know what may be threats
to us and to counter those threats
before they become something of a
national issue . Thank you very much .
I want to thank both you . Mr Brown and
you mr military for your parents .
Today I yield back Denman yields back .
Gentlemen . Beyond videos . Is there a
range of other information um that the
executive branch has that would be
valuable to the american people while
protecting sources and methods ?
Obviously the details of individual
encounters including the time place and
details of an encounter . And does the
aim song have a clear and repeatable
process for considering public
release as part of the process ?
Chairman Carson , do you commit to
building that process if it's not in
place ? The U . AP task force uh you
know the security classification guide
that that the task force has been
operating under that I approved really
was meant to protect those sources and
methods and meant to protect any
knowledge that an adversary
intelligence entity may gain from under
from understanding what we're tracking
how we track it or um when we're
tracking it or if we're not . Um And so
that has been an important piece in the
balance between transparency uh and
preserving our warfighting advantage
because the U . S . Military does train
as it would fight . Um what I will
commit to is at least for that material
that's under my authority as the deputy
director of Naval Intelligence um for
information that we have when it does
not involve sources and methods or and
when we can with a reasonable degree of
confidence determined that it does not
pose a foreign intelligence or national
security threat and it's within my
authority to do so , I commit to
declassifying that . So I I believe
very much in the transparency of this .
Uh and we work very hard to balance
that with our national security needs
and I'll just add congressman um just
over the last 34 months I think that
the The intelligence community and the
national defense apparatus have
disclosed more information on various
events than it has and probably see the
previous 10 years . Um you have our
commitment to work closely with the
Director of National Intelligence and
uh others in the declassification and
downgrading of intel apparatus to
ensure that we can get whatever
information that we can out to the
american people and to the public at
large greatly appreciate it . Sir .
Ranking member Crawford . Thank you .
Mr Chairman . Um Representative
Stefanik is en route I believe just
real quickly . But in the interim , if
I could , if you'll indulge me , I just
have one a couple of real small
questions . One is uh do we have an
example , Can you cite a specific
example of an object that can't be
explained as having been human made or
natural ? So
I mean the the The
example that that I would say that we
that is still unresolved that I think
everyone understands quite well as the
2004 incident from from Nimitz . Uh we
have data on that and it simply remains
unresolved , uh does not mean it
resolves to being something right that
is easily explainable or difficulty or
well obviously it resolved to being
something that is difficult to explain .
But I I can't point to something that
definitively was not man made , but I
can point to a number of examples in
which remain unresolved . Gotcha with
regard to videos that have appeared in
open source channels . For example ,
the Tiktok video does EMC maintain
control of videos . And how do you
prevent leaks of potentially classified
videos or other material ? Yeah . So
the aim slogans , we established an
organization , we will have a a process
for classified and compartmented
holdings and we will find a way of
getting positive control over those .
We have um are sensitive access
programs and special access programs
that allow us to put what we call saps
around things . And then there's
controlled access programs that allow
us to put caps around things . So we'll
have that in place . Our goal will be
um ensuring that we're sharing that
with the appropriate analysts and the
appropriate exploiters . If you will ,
who can look at that data to what we
don't want to do is bring something
into a D O D database for a D O D
holding and then have so many rapids
around . It's not available to those
who really need to look at it and to
exploit it . And that's one of the
reasons that we're establishing
relationships with the inter agency
with the I . C . And others to be able
to do that sir . But we will do our
best to maintain positive control of
the materials that we have within our
holdings . Thank you . Chairmanship .
Thank you . Mr . Chairman . Just going
back to the 2021 report um you know
under the category of You ap appeared
to demonstrate advanced technology .
Those 18 incidents uh in
which uh some of the U . I . P . Appear
to remain stationary winds aloft , move
against the wind , maneuver abruptly or
move at considerable speed without
discernible means of propulsion . It
goes on to say in a small number of
cases military aircraft systems
processed radio frequency energy
associated with U . AP sightings . Um I
couldn't tell from that whether that
small number of cases was a part of the
subset of 18 . That is Among the 18
which appeared to move with unusual
pattern of flight characteristics to
some of those . Um Also
emit radio frequency energy .
I would have to check with Ru aP task
force on that I I believe without
getting into specifics that we can do
in the in the closed session at least
some that we have detected our f
emissions from were not behaving
oddly otherwise . And and the
significance of uh measuring that
radio frequency energy is what that we
suspect that this was some form of
aircraft in which there were radio
transmissions . The biggest thing that
you're looking for . There is any
indication of of an effort to jam uh
whatever sensors that we may have
looking at it . But I would also add to
that that radio frequency , as you know ,
congressman is used to control various
platforms too . So the fact of uh
emanations coming off of any platform ,
whether it be a U . A . V . Or another
platform could be radio frequency
activity related to that entity
transmitting out or something
transmitting to that platform . And of
course we have a sensitivity with our
airborne platforms of picking it up .
Which is one of the reasons that we try
to prevent people from using your cell
phones on airplanes and things like
that . It's very sensitive to our f
emanation . So that's a part of what
we'll be looking at in the aim song .
What is this ? Is this something that
we can collect on and can we start to
characterize the signaling environment
around the emanations that may be
coming off of some of these you A . P .
S . So that that energy then um that
was recorded could be either an effort
to jam or it could be an effort to
control U . A . V . Um
or any other communication with that
craft , I would say . That's accurate .
Right . Thank you mr Chairman . Thank
you Chairman . Um as the OD and I
report makes clear one possible
explanation for you a . P . S . Is that
we are detecting us aircraft . Either
secret air programs or even test
prototypes . Okay . I won't ask you in
this setting obviously to describe any
secret D . O . D . Programs that said ,
I do want to make sure the U . S .
Government isn't chasing its own tail
firstly . Do you have a clear and
repeatable process to check with
compartmented programs about whether au
ap citing is attributable to a U . S .
Aircraft ? Secondly , do does the aim
song staff have the clearances and read
on that . They need to investigate all
of these incidents . And and and and
thirdly when your staff cannot be read
on ah are your questions to those who
are red on even being answered ? So
I'll start and then I'll pass that to
to Mr bray . So we're very conscious of
the potential blue on blue issue or us
on us . And so we've established
relationships with organizations and
entities that that are uh potentially
flying or developing platforms for
their own interests if you will . And
our goal is to continue and we have a
repeatable process . I think we've had
that process for some time to
deconflict activities that we may have
to ensure that we are not potentially
reporting on something that may be a
developmental platform or a U . S .
Operational platform that is performing
either testing or performing a mission .
So we will have that in place . We've
already had those discussions with
organizations and entities . We want to
ensure that we're protecting their
equities . We want to ensure that we're
protecting their sources and methods
while also getting at what we have here
and we want to be able to deconflict
those Absolutely . You ap task forces
had a process in place to work with
other elements of Department Defense
and other elements of the government to
ensure that uh that that there is an uh
as simple a way as possible to
deconflict those . And when we
reference that in the in the report , I
should say that we were um simply
accounting for the fact that there
could possibly be one or two data
points that had that had leaked through .
But we were quite confident that was
not the explanation . Um how how how
are you all liaison ng with um Space
Command specifically ? How are you
partnering with the parts of the U . S .
Space Command responsible for Space
domain awareness . And how if at all
you partnering with the Space Force to
analyze you ? A . P . S . The U . Ap
Task force has uh has a very good
relationship with Space Force as it
does with the rest of the Department of
Defense . We have pulled analysts in
from Space Force to ensure that uh that
were availing ourselves of that
expertise as well as uh any
any other material they may have that
would be helpful and congressman as you
know um uh Space Force and Space
Command , they have responsibility for
Space domain awareness . So what we've
done , we coordinated with with Space
Force , we coordinate with your J . Two
and um she is on board in terms of
helping us plug into what they have and
for us to have this interactive
exchange of information and data . And
we're doing that with all the services ,
not just with Space Force . Space
Command . Thank you sir , frank
remember any additional question .
Alright . Chairmanship . Alright with
that . I want to thank you all for for
taking the time out . I also want to
thank my colleagues on both sides of
the aisle for participating in this
very historical and important hearing .
I think it's one of the few times we
can demonstrate some degree of
bipartisanship around you A PS and UFOs .
So I love it . I appreciate it . Thank
you . And we will see you all . We will
recess this hearing for the moment and
return in a closed session at noon .