Admiral john Aquilino ? General Laura
Richardson dr William in Baden , MS .
Leanne Caret and moderator , David
Ignatius of the Washington post .
I guess we yes ,
ladies and gentlemen , welcome from
your photogenic panel . I hope
everybody had a good coffee break and
is well caffeinated for our discussion
of advancing security through alliances
and partnerships . I don't have to tell
this audience that this is a moment in
which we have threats around the world
that are concerning . We have uh in the
Washington post this morning a report
that 100 and 75,000 Russian troops may
be prepared to line up along the
Ukraine border posing an extraordinary
threat to Ukraine and indeed to the to
the NATO alliance in Vienna talks to
restore the J . C . P . O . A just
appear to have broken down big concern
for for our allies and partners . And
in uh Asia Admiral actually
knows the area of responsibility ,
severe and rising concerns about
china in this world of danger . The
United States has a unique asset and
that is this network of alliances and
partnerships that we have around the
world . And so that's our our starting
point is this precious thing that that
we have gathered over the years . But
I want to begin with a question for
each member of our panel . I'll put it
to each of you in turn At a time when
the theme of America 1st and
pulling back to this country has
residents in both our political parties .
Uh there is some concern among
some allies and partners that I talked
to about our staying power about our
our credibility as their partner . So I
want to ask each of the panelists in
turns starting with Admiral Aquilino to
respond to that . What do you see in
the part of the world that you cover
and what can we do whatever the level
of credibility is now to expand it .
Admiral . Actually , no , you're you're
living in the age of Aucas and maybe
Aucas is the , is the answer that we
ought to think about as a baseline .
But tell us how that question looks to
you . Thanks David . It's great to see
you again . Uh and it's an honor to be
here with this distinguished set of
panel members . Um , so as I looked
through the pacific Uh , you know , we
have to remember for 80 years we have
generated the security and prosperity
that's existed throughout the indo
pacific . The U . S . Is a pacific
nation . We've been there , we've been
with these allies and partners for all
those years . So what I have seen in my
travels and I've just recently over the
past seven months come back in the
execution of realignment or excuse me ,
the The validation of
our five treaty alliances . So
japan Korea Thailand
Australia and the Philippines and
everything I see from those nations as
well as the rest of the nations in the
region is there is no concern about
the strength of the U . S . Alliances
and partnerships . Again , our value
and the value of our partners is clear
in this region . So for me
it is validated in every one of my
meetings . Additionally on the Aucas
piece , that is certainly a benefit .
When you look at the different sets of
security relationships , whether
they're bilateral , whether their
exercises and experiments and other
things we do multilaterally . You know ,
august is additive . So trilateral
relationship with Japan Korea and the
United States , the Asean
uh nations who get together
the quad . Right ? So Aucas is a
different and an additive security
relationship that will be extremely
helpful to keep that peace and
prosperity in the region . So I
certainly welcome it . Australia has
made a big step and I think it will
increase the security in the region for
the solution sets long term it is our
allies and partners coming together to
demonstrate the adherence international
rule based order for the stability in
the region and to continue that . So we
are stronger when we're together . And
again , I think that will be the focus
of this panel . So we welcome all of
our allies and partners for all of our
ops and and execution . I want to come
back to Aucas with you in a few minutes
but let me turn to General Richardson
who has just taken over the U . S .
Southern command . We have some great
allies and partners in your area of
responsibility but they don't get the
headlines . I want to ask you whether
you worry that we're in danger of
ignoring the partnerships that are in
our own backyard , sometimes in our at
least political debate in Washington .
And how again to go back to my basic
question this time when people are
asking questions about America's
forward commitment , how would we
demonstrate that better to people in
the western hemisphere who are part of
your A . R . Well , thank you very much
and thank you for having me on the
panel . Uh and it's my pleasure to talk
about the south calm area of operations .
And I've been in the seat five weeks
and I've been able to travel to
Colombia and Brazil so far two of our
biggest security partners . And I'm
happy to say , you know , as Admiral
Aquilino talked about , they've been by
our side um our allies and partners for
a really long time . And Colombia
fought with us uh in the in the korean
war , brazil fought with us in the
World War Two . So we have a long
history with our allies and partners in
the region and they want to partner
with us uh and they want to be with the
US . They want to do things with us .
In fact , in brazil , it was kind of
scratching our heads as to why why
don't we do more ? Ah and what can we
do more ? Because all of the challenges
that we have , the crosscutting threats
challenge our collective security
across all domains . And uh and quite
honestly we need to work together
stronger . I think our allies and
partners exponentially make us stronger .
And so I think we have to look at that
from that perspective of what they have
to bring , what we have to bring . We
have to look at it from their
perspective and their lens . Um a lot
of times we look only through , I think
our lens , I learned that working in
north calm and working with Mexico ,
you know , um on how we look at the
border issue and uh in the southwest
border and things coming to our United
States border , they also look at it ,
that's their northern border . And so
they look at it from a different
perspective and understanding those two
different perspectives , I think helps
us work closer together . I see a lot
of opportunity . Um you know , we can
talk a lot about all the challenges ,
but I think the , you know , in terms
of the headlines are exactly right ,
David , uh this a or doesn't get the
the headlines . And when you're talking
about the things that have happened in
Africa , some of those things that have
happened in Africa with our adversaries
are now happening in the south com
region . And that doesn't get any
headlines . And so , you know , I'd
like to say , I always like to use the
football analogy , you gotta be on the
field with their Jersey , on your
number on and you gotta be there
looking them in the eye because they
want to , they want to partner with us ,
they want to partner and they want to
be teammates with us all the time .
They prefer that we don't have to ,
we're not pulling them kicking and
screaming to come partner with us and
do exercises there there . They want to
do it and they want to do more . And I
think that we just got to capitalize
upon that general Richardson before I
move on . I just want to take you up on
your comment that some of our allies
and partners in Southern Command want
us to be doing more are looking for
more from us as an ally . What are some
of the things that you hear them asking
for ? Not to say that you're ready .
It's a policy decision . What are you
hearing ? They love to do exercises
with us and uh , and quite honestly
that the exercises lead to things that
happen . You know , for example , the
the Haiti earthquake that occurred a
few months ago . Uh not a lot was heard .
The big news story was operationalize
welcome and bringing our afghan guests
out of Afghanistan into the country .
Well , meanwhile , South com was
working very closely with nine partner
nations responding to that Haiti
earthquake 7.2 earthquake that occurred
in Haiti . And so um , you know , you
just look at the uh , the partner
nations that we have the relationships
that we have in that region is really
tremendous . And so I think the the
exercises Our exercise program is
decreased a little bit this year ,
we're going from 11 down to eight
exercises . But when you look at some
of these exercises Unitas panamax
trade winds . These are all names of
exercises that many of you have already
heard of and that have been around for
many , many years . But it gives the
opportunity to showcase the
professional militaries that we do have
and that these partner nations have .
But then it also helps train them .
They become key exporters of security
as well in the region . Uh , so we're
not only just participating in an
exercise to work towards another one ,
it actually trains them to be able to
be better security partners in the
region as well . That's a helpful
specific . I just want to remind this
audience and people who may be watching
streaming that you can get in this
conversation , ask your own questions ,
send them via the app , the R . N . D .
F . App or via twitter hashtag R N . D .
F . And they'll land on my screen as
some just did this minute . So I want
to turn to uh dr Will Bowden who was
uh in addition to to running the
Clements Center now was the Director of
Strategic Planning for the Bush 43 .
Nsc has thought about these issues a
lot . Um allies are fickle
and there they can be a nuisance and
they're a nuisance sometimes because
they really don't pay their fair share .
They they look to us for security . But
as the NATO debate during the Reagan
presidency showed , they're just they
just don't pay what they promised .
They will from your perspective , over
many , many years , talk about the ups
and downs of alliances and where you
see us now , whether you think I'm
right in worrying that we may be losing
a little bit of credibility , well ,
David , I'll try to both affirm and
reassure your worries there . So , um I
think for as long as the United States
has had allies and alliances , we've
had frustrations with our allies and
alliances and our allies have had
frustrations with us . Um I know Eliot
Cohen is here at the conference today
and I'm a big fan of his work and his
book Supreme Command . His profile on
On Winston Churchill . There's a great
quote from Churchill writing in the
1930s , and Churchill says the history
of coalition warfare is the tale of the
reciprocal complaints of allies . Right ?
So this is just it's it's kind of part
of the warp and woof of fighting
alongside each other of doing diplomacy
alongside each other . But going back
to Admiral Aquilino does point about
the last 80 years of american alliances ,
I want to kind of take us back to what
was there before that . And this is one
reason , I think why in America's DNA
there is some skepticism among some
parts of our political leadership in
the body politic , but alliances is
because for the 1st 150 years of our
country's history , going back to
Washington's farewell address , we
didn't have permanent alliances . Uh ,
and they were , you know , they were
seeing there were two big reasons for
that which continue as concerns today .
The first is that allies will drag us
into wars or fights or conflicts that
that aren't in our interests that we
don't want . And the second is that
they won't pay their fair share , that
they'll be , they'll be free riders .
Um , now as someone who is very pro
alliances and I'll get into some
reasons why there , I think it's
important that we remember those parts
of our country's deeper history ,
because those concerns continue to
recur pretty pretty regularly . And
we've seen them in in our in our
debates today . But I think the really
key inflection point is in that , you
know , Postwar moment , 1945-55 , when
so much of the current structure of our
alliance system today was built , uh ,
when we abandon that previous tradition
of no allies and and embraced it . It's
no coincidence that that that's also
when the United States had our great
debut on the world stage as the leading
superpower . Right ? So , so our
embrace of alliances went hand in hand
with our with our our increase in
national power and I think they have
overall been mutually reinforcing since
then . But given that there are these
recurring tensions , we can't be
complacent about and say , oh , just
because we've always had those tensions
that therefore we don't need to worry
about it . The reason we've been able
to manage them is because they take
proactive management each uh with for
each generation , for each generation
of of political political leadership .
Um as mentioned the two areas that I'm
really concerned about our . Well ,
first there's five , I think key key
factors that maintain the sinews of our
alliances , there's our shared
interests . We certainly have those
with the threats from Russia and china
today . Uh they're the treaties
themselves , right . You know ,
designed to transcend political
pressures , especially when we're
speaking about our NATO allies or our
allies in the Asia pacific . Um ,
there's the institutional connections ,
everything from the five Eyes to even ,
you know , the shared NATO round the
same , you know , using the same
cartridge . Those three factors are in
pretty good shape . The next two key
preserving the senior of alliances are
the ones I worry about and those are
presidential leadership and public
opinion . This is not a partisan
comment about the biden administration .
Our last few presidencies I think have
failed to show the commitment to allies
to make the case to the american people .
Why these matter to us ? When was the
last time we heard an american
president gave a full throated
endorsement of alliances and say why
they met her make the case to the
american people , this is why we have
these commitments because of what
they've , what they've , what they've
done for us . And that in turn , of
course is why we're seeing some
diminishing public public support . So
I think it can be turned around , but
it's going to take those last two
factors of presidential leadership in
public and moving the needle in public
opinion because there's other building
blocks the institutional commitments ,
the treaties and the shared interests
are there ? So mr correct ? You run
Boeing's defense and space business ,
curious what you're hearing as you talk
to your international customers ,
customers generally about America's
staying power . And when the question
comes up , how do you answer that ? How
you say ? Yeah , we're , we're here for
you today . We'll be here for you 10
years from now . Well , thank you for
the question . And it's just such an
honor to be on this uh , panel with
Admiral Aquilino and General Richardson .
Uh , you know , we owe them incredible
debts of gratitude for everything that
they do every day for us and as
industry . You know , one of the big ,
big lessons for us has always been
that our proximity to the fight doesn't
define our contribution to the fight .
And so we view ourselves as an
extension of the services . We view
ourselves , um , as wanting to be there
to provide the equipment , the tools ,
the training , the services and before
word thinking in our own investment
strategies to enable that that ties
directly in to what we're hearing
around the globe . And despite the
pandemic , we have maintained operating
rhythm where we are talking to everyone
either in person or as everybody else
zoom and you know the different
technologies and the message is clear
the support from the U . S . Is still
as strong as it's ever been . We have
seen zero downturn in terms of
believing that the US . Is a firm ally
and partner to the nations . As a
matter of fact we're continuing to see
even more progress within the
department . Um in terms of how do we
be more proactive in terms of when
we're working cooperative relationships
when there's um weapons systems support
that is needed . How can we help uh
provide the information necessary so
that not only does that nation get the
benefit of what the US has already done
but in turn how do we take back from
that benefit that we saw with that
developing nation or you know on that
weapon system and bring it back so that
the U . S . Benefits . So we've seen
this reciprocal behavior over the years
and we're seeing it as much now as ever
before . Um So there has been you know ,
David zero in my mind any indication
that there isn't a belief that the that
the U . S . Military is in with the
allies and that that support remains as
strong as ever . Let me take a specific
example our our european
allies in NATO is still a very strong
alliance are are precious to us . But
we hear increasingly from some
Europeans especially France that they
want to focus on an independent
european defense capability . Uh and
they they give all sorts of reasons for
that . You can understand why . Um I'm
curious what that means for a company
like like Boeing whether that's going
to complicate your life as the
Europeans move into their own space .
Always saying yes we're going to be
cooperative with NATO but we want our
own uh is that gonna make life harder
for you ? Well , I'll start by saying
competition is good and you know I
think it's really important to
recognize in this day and age our
ability to uh turn technology faster to
bring forward more innovative and
creative solutions is critical . Uh
it's not just the weapons system itself ,
it's the interoperability . And so as
we think about um moving forward with
nations who have desires for different
products and services . Those they open
up those competitions many times to the
global landscape as well . So we're
competing at home and abroad and it is
up to us as industry to be proactive to
look at where there's leverage
opportunities that interoperability is
so key because when the conflict
happens very rarely do you not see
allies coming together . And so even if
they decide that they want to go invest
and strengthen their industrial base ,
we still want to make sure that we're
giving them an opportunity to offer
them something that they can assess
look at and we can be competitive in
that and we go great service to the U .
S . Government who advocates on behalf
of us products um in those situations .
And so we work very closely with uh the
defense security contract agency with
the State Department to see if what we
have is industry here in the U . S .
Has application around the world . So
Admiral Aquilino I wanna uh drill
down a little deeper on Aucas . Aucas
appears to all of us to be a big
strategic idea . Uh It's it's something
that I had a lot of churn because of
french unhappiness initially . But it's
a it's a it's a big idea . The nuclear
navy has been a jewel of the U . S .
Navy are our undersea capabilities . It
can't have been easy to open . Um the
aperture to truly take in Australia and
Britain as partners in in august . I'd
love to hear . I'm sure the whole
audience would love to hear how aucas
over time will make life different for
indo pay come . What will be done
differently ? And also your first
thoughts about how china is going to
react to this new
extension of the area where we have
extraordinary really unmatched
capability , undersea warfare . How
will the chinese react to that ? Thanks
David . Let me start by I think
highlighting one of the reasons that
august came about , right . So what I
think we're what what I know we're
watching in the region is the largest
military build up we've seen since
World War two . That has driven the
Australians to assess the capabilities
they need . And this was an Australian
decision uh to be able to invest in a
nuclear submarine program that provides
the capabilities they need against the
security threats in the region that
they see . Uh we certainly
endorse their decision as we've
partnered with them , we'll develop
those capabilities . And what I think
you'll see around the rest of the
region is there's real concern from the
nations in the area on the security
challenges that you've heard
articulated by uh my secretary
uh and the focus on the indo pacific
there are true challenges uh caucuses ,
one solution , it is additive to the
other security arrangements . To lee
ANn's point . It's interoperability
with the United States , all those
allies and partners . That is
beneficial . We value that
interoperability and as
the security apparatus works together ,
it does make us stronger if I could
jump on one of Will's points here . The
discussion was the fickleness of allies
and partners . You know , that that's
the problem I'd rather have because the
other side of that coin is being the
nation's with no allies and partners .
And that's what we're looking at in the
region . So from the United States
perspective , you know , we continue to
work with these allies and partners to
laura's point in indo pak calm . We
execute 120 exercises annually
with our allies and partners . And
we're looking to make those more mini
lateral or multilateral
august can contribute to that , whether
it's under sea , on the sea above the
sea or in space and cyberspace . We
want to expand that , whether they're
increased multilateral events . If you
look at the exercise rim of the Pacific ,
which will be upcoming in 22 . Uh last
time there were 27 nations with
maritime forces , ground forces , air
forces , right ? So from where I sit ,
that's what right looks like . That's
what's been going on for 80 years . So
we need to continue down that path . Uh
and we welcome those other sets of
security exercises , relationships .
However you wanna characterize them .
The work with the quad nations
associated with exercise malabar , we
would see that expanding . So
august is a small microcosm that
applies to the entire rest of the
security apparatus and we're here to
support all of our allies and partners
who would like to expand or increase
their capability . So I want to be sure ,
I I understand the specific question of
whether Aucas itself should be as
a few people have begun to suggest
expanded should new Zealand be part of
Aucas . Should other nations that can
contribute specifically to
the mission set of Aucas would be
considered as as additional members or
is this tripartite pact , Find the way
it is for now . I think it's gonna
start there . There's certainly
technology sharing agreements and other
things that would have to work . We
haven't discussed specifically adding
to august with other nations at this
point , but that shouldn't subtract or
detract from our ability to execute
increase cooperations through other
means other than just nuclear
propulsion . We're ready to take on uh
any of those additional efforts that
our partners and allies are interested
in and start those discussions . We'll
come back to the quad in a in a
subsequent around . But I want to turn
to general Richardson as we're talking
about china . And the challenge
is to put it mildly that china presents
one overlooked area is
latin America and your staff sent me
a figure which astonished me That 19
of 31 countries in the hemisphere have
signed up to the belt and road
initiative ah assuming that number is
right , it's startling that china is
making inroads to that extent . Talk
from your perspective as the new
combatant commander about the chinese
presence in your A . O . R . And then
more specifically what we ought to be
doing to counter it . So thank you for
that . I'd like to say that the uh
that china's playbook for Africa is
taking place in uh in latin America now
and so um well there there might be the
news talks about . I watched an article
uh news um program that was
highlighting what's happening in Africa ?
I think the news is a little bit behind
uh and uh it's been happening in Africa
for years and if we're not careful
What's happening in Latin America ,
well in five or 10 years have the
same impacts . And so yes , Out of the
31 countries , 16 dependencies the
those belt and road , those folks that
have countries that have signed up for
the belt and road initiative , the 19
of 31 , I will tell you that I
mentioned the crosscutting threats
earlier that collectively challenge our
make challenges for our security . And
that has to do with Covid and Covid is
still very prevalent in our nations and
countries in latin America have
suffered uh pretty good at the hands of
Covid and are still dealing with that .
And so that that in my mind has changed
the geopolitical landscape for some of
the countries as they continue to deal
with Covid and we continue to try to
help them , vaccines are continuing to
be deployed to the different countries .
I know the U . S . When I was there in
brazil last week It was uh
donating Astrazeneca 2.2 million doses
of vaccine while we were there . So I
continued work that we have to do . But
you know when you when you look at the
effects of that and then you talk about
the project . So if you're if you're
having a problem with your economy
already and uh when the chinese come
with the belt and road initiative with
projects and money and they're ready to
start , uh , it looks very attractive
and uh , to some of our countries that
are having a hard time with their
economies . And so certainly though
there are , uh , what I see over time ,
it will be interesting . Like I said ,
I've only been in the seat five weeks ,
but as I go through this and I see the
things that that the different
countries sign up for , there's a
buyer's remorse at some point because ,
you know , the host nation workers are
not used for these belt and road
initiative chinese workers come in and
then that all uh , in my mind helps
with the spread of the um , of the
PRC and the military bases and the
state owned enterprises that that china
has and is using throughout our a . O .
R in latin America just to
follow up on that one
uh , way in which the United States
might uh combat this , attempt to draw
countries into the belt and road
initiative into china's economic agenda
is greater sharing of
technology ideas relationships .
Uh , there's an interesting component
of august that I want to talk about
further , which is really about broad
technology sharing . But we have a US
eU uh , council that met in in
Pittsburgh where technology discussions
were a big part of it . Same thing with
a quad . We don't have anything like
that that I know of uh , with our own
hemisphere . And I'm wondering whether
you think that's a missing piece ,
brazil's pretty technologically
advanced country . It's got a lot of
things that we probably ought to be
talking with them about . Would that be
a good idea ? Do you think ? I think it
would be a good idea ? And uh you know ,
if you don't mind , I'd just like to uh
just talk briefly about one the
proximity of this , you know , David ,
you said backyard . I'd like to use
neighborhood because neighborhoods
resonates with our allies and partners
in Latin America . Uh , and the
proximity to our homeland uh , here in
the United States , folks don't realize
how close uh the south com kor
and all of these 31 countries in the
Caribbean central America . South
America . I can go to 83% of the
countries in the south com kor uh in a
shorter time distance . And it took
most of you to come from D . C . Here
to this forum . And uh and I was
talking to my father , my my parents
are still living and I went to visit
Colombia . My father was like , are you
in the same time zone ? Like how far
away are you ? How long did it take you
to get there ? And I said dad , you're
in colorado . I can get here faster to
Columbia and then I can to colorado .
Uh and I'm on the same time zone ,
Eastern , you know Eastern time zone ,
uh didn't even change time zones . You
just think about the proximity , but
when you think about what is in latin
America uh in terms of the amazon ,
they call it the lungs of the world ,
You have 31% of the world's fresh water
is in Latin America , You have the
lithium , 60% of the lithium in the
world is in the lithium triangle ,
Argentina , Bolivia , chile . Uh you've
got a lot of rare earth minerals ,
resources and capabilities that in my
mind go hand in hand with what the
chinese are doing with the belt and
road initiative and expanding their
reach into latin America just like they
did in africa . And so a lot of folks
don't understand the all of the rich
resources that are really there in
Latin America and in our Western
hemisphere in terms of trade , I'll
just talk about trade if I talk about
Western hemisphere add Canada and
Mexico to it 1.9 trillion . Uh
Western hemisphere as us is a number
one trading partner with 1.9 trillion .
And so it's just it's off the charts
what with the SEO AR offers . Uh and so
just I want to share that because as
I've learned all of the great things
about this region um I think it's very
vulnerable and so that goes to the
point of why we have to be present all
the time . Working really closely using
all the levers available to work with
our partners as they deal with these
cross cutting challenges dr in Baden ,
I want to continue on this question of
um , technology partnerships as the
next phase in our strategic
partnerships that the biden
administration thinks it has a big idea
here that this network that includes
august , the quad , us eu dialogues is
going to stitch together what over time
they imagine is a kind of alliance of
technologically advanced democracies ,
quasi democracies . But that's that's
the big idea that they're trying to
frame . You've been thinking about
studying appliances like this for a
long time . Do you think this is a good
idea ? Eh b do you think it's realistic
when we have countries like France like
India that are pretty resistant to some
forms of cooperation and what would you
do if it is a good idea , what would
you do to make it better ? I think it's
a great idea . I again , I strongly
strongly affirm it . And this goes back
to thinking about , you know , in our
area of , you know , new era of great
power competition . What are America's
asymmetric advantages and two of the
big asymmetric advantages that we have
that , you know , china and , and
Russia for example , largely don't
first is our alliances . Um , and if we
doubt that . Just look at the view from
Beijing or Moscow . Right . If you're
she Jinping who are your closest
friends in your neighborhood ? Well ,
maybe north Korea maybe cambodia , it's
not a very good list , right ? If
you're Putin , who are your closest
friends , belarus , maybe Serbia , this
is why those guys are spending so much
time trying to , you know , split and
break apart and undermine and weaken
our alliances is even if America
doesn't appreciate how how important
our alliances are the bad guys do and
that gets to the technology part that
you were that you were asking about .
And this is our second big advantages .
The United States is still all things
considered the world's leader in
technology and innovation . You know ,
we're losing our edge in some areas
that this is nothing to be complacent
about . And yet there's a tremendous
multiplier effect , both in terms of
supply chain security and there was a
great panel on that , you know , just
just before us here uh and also in ,
you know , thinking about the next
generation of weapons platforms and
essentially being able to deepen our
alliances through this technology
sharing in partnerships and gain a real
advantage over over our adversaries and
here to invoke our our namesake . I
think there's a great precedent in the
Reagan administration's playbook ,
right , is a it wasn't just Reagan's
deep personal commitment to the allies ,
although that was a big part of it ,
but it was the technology sharing that
was going on uh you know , with the
strategic defense initiative , bringing
japan in as an important partner in
that bringing the United Kingdom in ,
it is an important partner in that
bringing , bringing West West Germany
and right because President Reagan
realized it's not just about
outspending the Soviets , it's about
smarting them and we can outsmart them
with better weapons if we are working
with our allies and leveraging that ,
that joint those joint technology
advantages even with a difficult
country like France , which you asked
about . And again , there are always a
little bit of the outlier and they were ,
you know , they had already withdrawn
from the NATO military command by time
Reagan came along . But as David is a
great , uh , you know , in some ways ,
historian of the intelligence community
will no one of our best uh , most
successful intelligence programs in the
entire Cold War came from a great
technology partnership with France over
the farewell dossier . Right ? Um , and
again , you know , a great book that ,
that can be , that can be written on
that . And so even if there's gonna be
other frictions at the surface level ,
there can be some deep , quiet , potent
uh , joint joint cooperation on the
tech on the tech front . So I think
there's a great precedent for the been
administration to take a page from the
Reagan playbook and and miscreant . I
want to ask you to , to close out this
discussion about technology
partnerships because you really are at
the cutting edge of that in a company
like like Boeing um , this
administration sometimes speaks
language that we associate with
industrial policy , um , kind of
centrally managed White house directed
efforts to mobilize direct the
the private sector . Do you worry about
that ? Um Taking all the obvious
benefits that all the panelists have
noted about about this kind of
cooperation . Do you worry about two
heavier hand and are are you trying to
express that as a company and and make
sure that you still have the freedom to
operate and be innovative ? Um uh
outside of whatever alliances and
partnerships evolve in the technology
sphere ? Well , I'll build on some of
Will's remarks with regard to the the
allies uh that interoperability
working together the collaboration uh
There are different types of
relationships between the U . S . Uh
and different partner nations . And
what we have seen in august is a really
great example of this . Is the
conversation starting to turn about the
sharing of technology uh and how do we
do that within the appropriate channels ?
And what I've actually seen the
department do and has been working on
this for a period of time , which is to
understand what those technologies are ,
where is their comfort and release ,
how do we simplify that process ?
Because probably one of the the biggest
opportunities we have in front of us is
when we are offering a new system , a
new , you know , a new technology ,
whatever it may be . Um what is that
benefit to that Ally nation ? How do
they get the maximum benefit from it ?
And then how do we make sure from a
sharing perspective , we can each learn
from each other . So an easy example
that won't , you know , cause anybody
to , you know , too much stress .
What about when we're testing out a new
system and what level of testing has on
gone here within the US or what is
needed on a different for that same
weapon system or a slightly different
variants of it um in another country ,
how do we share in certification
efforts ? You know , a lot of what we
have opportunity here to do is to make
certain that we're able to deliver
capability faster . And so what I'm
impressed with is we are starting to
have those very real conversations
already . I think august is actually
going to accelerate because it's going
to bring in some certain country
relationships that are going to give us
a benefit to working together and to
that cooperative partnering , that's
that's helpful . So uh and equally , no ,
probably top of mind for most people in
this audience , when they think about
strategic dangers , is Taiwan and the
potential chinese threat to deliver on
their repeated statement that that they
intend to reunify By one with the
mainland . And I want to ask you
straight up what is the United States
doing to strengthen Taiwan's ability to
defend itself against , what china
announces is its goal . Thanks David .
So we are doing what we have been doing
since 1979 at the passage of the Taiwan
Relations Act followed up by the three
communiques and the six assurances . We
are contributing for the ability for
Taiwan to defend itself . That's the
responsibility and the task that's been
provided to me . Uh And we are
operating in accordance with both
policy and law . So ah
we have consultations , we do training
and like I said , we've done the same
things . Despite what you read in the
press on doing different things . We
are not , we are doing exactly what we
have been tasked in accordance with the
law and the U . S . Policy . So I want
to ask you to take that a little bit
further . Um one
issue obviously is what
weapons will best help Taiwan
defend itself against and increasingly
sophisticated chinese threat . I
mentioned to you before our
conversation , there was a very
interesting article in the journal War
on the Rocks that I'm sure many in the
audience read that several weeks ago
asked is Taiwan buying the right things
for its defense against this adversary .
It's buying more subs traditional
legacy systems as they're called . More
subs more jets doesn't need more
swarms of drones . More weapons that
would complicate the chinese
adversaries planning . Obviously you're
not buying weapons for for Taiwan . But
but I'm curious about whether you think
there are ways that uh jointly the U .
S . And Taiwan can think about new
systems , not the traditional hardware
that we've had , You know , going
through the Taiwan strait standing
offshore , but but different kinds of
things that speak better to the ability
to deter this very advanced adversary .
Yeah . Thanks , David . Certainly ,
Taiwan is currently under pressure as
you've read about . And we've seen uh
over the past number of months and you
could argue years recently , we've seen
extensive maritime pressure . We've
seen air pressures or pressures in the
air domain , certainly in the cyber
domain , uh honesty undersea above the
sea . That's a pretty tough
neighborhood and we execute our
responsibility . We talked to the to
Taiwan about capabilities that we think
will be beneficial . That said they get
to choose and because there are numbers
of challenges , they're gonna have to
figure out how to decide which of those
capabilities they want to invest in .
And with the help of the defense
industry , we hope to put those
capabilities in their hands so that
they can ultimately defend themselves
in accordance with the Taiwan relations
act . So , uh we'll come
back again to china . But I want to
turn to to General Richardson ask about
part of the challenge in in the
Western hemisphere , in the countries
that are in your A . O . R . That's
very hard to get your arms around , but
it seems central to their security
issues and that's corruption of which
Narco trafficking is the most visible
part . But sometimes you look at these
countries and you worry that they're
just being eaten from inside out ,
You're a combatant commander ? You
don't run a drug enforcement agency .
But are there ways that you can help
these countries deal with corruption
problems that really do seem in some
cases to erode the the integrity of the
state institutions . Yeah , so um
that's a really good question and I'm
more than happy to talk about it
because I think the what the
transnational criminal organizations
and this problem uh in this in
the Western hemisphere creates the
wedge for corruption , poverty ,
crime , all of those things to flourish .
And then it allows great opportunity
for our our competitors to come in and
capitalize upon that . So I mentioned
Covid before and then you add this on
top of it , It's a $90 billion dollar
business that these transnational
criminal organizations are involved in .
It's very serious . The impact in the
United States is 100,000 deaths a year .
Uh So we are being impacted by this as
well . And so um make no mistake it
affects all of us . And it , you know ,
back to my point about the shared
neighborhood and the proximity matters .
Uh it absolutely matters . I'm very
proud of the organization that that
south com has underneath it . Joint
interagency task force , south of South
for short Out of key West . And I'm
sure many of you know about that
organization . But the fact that I mean
in my mind is a is a obviously a best
practice . 16 law enforcement agencies
are are within Uh that um that
command 22 partner nations . And so
as I talked about earlier about the
exercises and working with our partner
nations , making them stronger training
them to do help themselves . Is that
we think that we can see uh
About 10% of the entire problem .
And within that 10% of our partner
nations are about 60 uh
conducting their own introductions .
And so we help with detection and
monitoring and actionable information
that with those partner nations that
are with RJ out of South and our law
enforcement agencies uh that that is a
that's a good news story . Uh and the
fact that we can share that actionable
information in order for them to do
their their own interdictions uh is
really tremendous , Tremendous . But
it's a big problem . As I said , we
think we're only getting after about
10% of the problem and generally what
comes uh in the what's in the south com
hor ends up in our in our
homeland . And so I think quite
honestly we have to continue to take
that very seriously , continue to work
with our partner nations . Uh the
capabilities that that I need in my
command to be able to see obviously is
very important . And uh so we use very
nonstandard in some cases because of
the the ability to not get enough . We
use a lot of non standard ways of being
able to find the information , use the
information and use it as actionable
information . We've gotten some
good questions from uh our
audience from all over , I don't know
where they come from , but they're on
my screen and I'm going to ask one of
them to dr Imboden because it gets us
to an area that's urgently important .
But we haven't talked about enough .
The question is given its proximity to
Russia and threats to Ukraine . How can
he more strongly encouraged Germany to
take a bigger role in maintaining
global security ? And I'm gonna add a
little add on to that question . Um
Well , how would you rate the biden
administration's efforts over these
recent weeks to deal with this very
menacing Russian threat on the
Ukrainian border . Well , putting
Professor mode on it , if I were to
give them a grade would be an
incomplete um but not not trending too
well . And I were in some ways that the
biden administration is playing playing
catch up there , but um , I was , you
know , critical at the time of the
decision to waive the nord stream two
to sanctions , um , understand the
strategic bet that they were trying to
make , which is that if we give Germany
a pass on this because most of the
pipeline is already built then maybe
Germany will play ball with us in other
areas , but it seems to have not uh not
cultivated anymore goodwill , er um
cooperation from the Germans and has
also uh , you know , sent a sign of , I
think , you know , weakness and a
failure of deterrence to to to Putin .
So I'm I'm I'm I'm I'm pretty worried
again , I'm not privy to whatever is
going on going on internally . And like
I said in some ways they're inheriting
a weekend as far as , you know , the
last , the last several years have not
been good for the US Ukraine
relationship really going beyond to
transcending the past , the past 33
administrations now . Um uh and and and
and it's tough because one of the
unique aspects of this , you know ,
area of great power competition we have
as well , china is the first and
primary threat . Russia is a very
significant one . And you know , Putin
is very savvy . It seems like he
follows american politics and policy
closer than most of us do . And he
knows as we're focusing more on china ,
there may be an opening here for him to
to make a play towards towards Ukraine .
I do worry about the administration
perhaps almost kind of deterring itself
about worrying if they take stronger
actions to whether it's , you know ,
spending more uh you know , lethal
weapons to Ukraine or making a more
explicit defense commitment that it
could cause an escalation spiral . I do
think Putin at the end of the day as a
rational actor is going to take
everything , everything he can , that
he seems that he thinks he can get get
away with it . So I think there needs
to be more , more clear deterrence
there . And and any thoughts on the
specific question raised about Germany ,
we have a new government in Germany
they seem to to be more interested if
anything in defense cooperation with
the United States than Chancellor
Merkel did interesting even though
they're more anomaly more left wing ,
what do , what do you think about that ?
You know , I do think there is a
potential opportunity there there there
there there there right there . Defense
white paper is much more forward
leaning too hawkish on china for
example , than a lot of us have had
expected to see . So I do think there's
some opportunities there . Uh , and
again , sorry , you know , to invoke
our our namesake here . I think Reagan
had a great model of Paula Dobriansky
in the front row , played a key role in
this on the National Security Council
staff of how to deal with some of these
complications with Germany . Uh ,
sometimes if an ally is frustrating you
and not doing not doing enough , you
can either hit him or hug him and
sometimes you need to hit them . And
other times you do need to hug him ,
there can be either , but generally
with Germany , I do think overall the
hug him approach that has worked a
little more in the way that Reagan
grabbed helmut kohl and hugged him
tight and got his support for deploying
the person two's and the ground
launched cruise missiles over
tremendous domestic opposition there
played a key role . And then obviously
what eventually became the I . N . F .
Treaty and getting the Soviets to back
down and and and withdraw withdraw
there . So I think there's a precedent
of embracing Germany a little tighter
but while we're hugging them also
delivering some some some hard words .
And since there is this new government
perhaps a chance , chance for chance
for a reset at the end of the day , the
Germany will need to see that it's in
their own interest to um to take a
stronger line against Russia . MS .
Correct . We have two questions from
our audience that are about the defense
industry issues and I'm gonna put them
to you and you choose what in this you
want to answer or neither . Yeah .
As the speed of warfare increases ,
what role does technology plan being
able to leverage alliances ? Um That's
a complicated one more specific one
does the current export controls
framework , support how we need to
partner with allies . And I assume the
question is here , are we are we to
stinting in what in terms of what we're
willing to share ? You know , stuff
that you're producing that you think
you could easily sell ? Uh is that
something we should we should think
about . And then second question ,
where are we on the burden sharing
debate and where does it need to go ?
How do we balance the defense ,
industrial needs of our allies and our
industry ? Should the US be buying more
from our allies ? So pick and choose
among those ? Well , how about I'll
start again with where I started on the
first question you posed , David ,
which is we work . You know , we are an
extension of the U . S . Government .
And so from a policy perspective from
an export perspective we aren't making
those policy decisions . What we are
doing is making sure we stay in line to
what the U . S . Policy is with regard
to a specific nation country and a
weapons system . And depending on what
that weapon system um is there could be
a lot more latitude in terms of the
purpose of it , where it can go how
much how much additional capability it
can have or have not or what
restrictions might you know , be
applied to it , where it may not be
releasable . What's important for us as
industry in this entire conversation is
to make sure that the US government is
fully informed of what we have to offer ,
understand the development and
understand which is where we do a lot
of information sharing on our research
and development arm in terms of where
we're taking the future . Now how this
all becomes relevant in um in this new
age where and let's be frank , there is
not gonna be near enough money for
everybody to do what they need to do
and the world still needs to figure out
how to pay for the pandemic . And so
we're have actually put ourselves back
in this more for less environment once
again where there are tough choices
that need to be made not only here in
the US but around the world . And so as
we think about the key , which is if we
are truly collaborating together , if
we are truly interoperable with our
partners and our allies , then what is
that right level of information sharing ?
Not only from the key critical
technologies that may be releasable ,
but how do we get mutual benefit from
the efforts were undertaking on any
specific configuration so that we don't
have to redo re certify rework and
drive out time and money . Now , one
way , which we believe you achieve that
is through the how industry for years
has been chasing the Defense
Department's budgets and trying to
anticipate what that next capability is
based on , what that next next conflict
may or may not be . What is even more
interesting as technology has continued
to involve is the how how are we
designing , How are we building ? How
are we testing ? How are we supporting
these weapons systems so that they can
be modernized in a rapid way
relevant for that nation for that ,
that partner . And so that this starts
with our investment in the entire
digital journey and having that digital
life cycle that is from concept to uh
support and it takes our development
programs from a 10 year cycle to
perhaps from concept to first flight in
two or three years and when you start
doing that , the export ability issues
also take on an entirely different
conversation because now you're talking
about what level of digital definition
are you going to release ? What does
the U . S . Government want to have
more control around And how do we build
upon that to keep these weapons systems
relevant for the future fight ? And so
I think it's actually um none of the
questions you posed were easy nor they ,
you know , simple . Yes . No answers .
What I would say is that it as
technology has evolved , it is a
building block . It's a framework in
partnership with the US government
about how do we approach
interoperability so that we can bring
the best capability to the fight
wherever that fight may be and whatever
multiple areas it's occurring . So I
were basically out of time . I have one
more question for Admiral Aquilino . So
it's a one minute um straight at you .
So we talked about the quad . You
mentioned the malabar exercises and
I think we'd all love to know whether
we're on the way to the quad being
a partnership that has more of a
security dimension . I wanna say more
of a military dimension with Japan with
India . Obviously with Australia .
David show that choice is going to be
up to the individual nations . Those
are political discussions . What I can
tell you is the co ordinations
militarily operate together frequently .
But again , as we talk about the
security discussions throughout the
region , I'd almost like to expand it
just for a second to global . So you
know , Laura and I are sitting here and
we're talking about kind of stovepipes
that in this security environment , I
would argue don't exist right . The
problems we're discussing our global ,
we talked about you said belt and road ,
I say one belt , one road , which was
the original name it was given , right ?
And there's a reason it was one belt
one road and that's because it was good
for one nation . But the problem is
global , as my secretary said , the
indo pacific is the most consequential
theater for the US and our partners and
allies future , but it expands . The
quad is one aspect of that . Uh You
talked to will about Germany and the Eu
nations , the United Kingdom just
deployed the Queen Elizabeth to the
indo pacific and recognition of the
importance of the indo pacific globally .
Two thirds of general of GDP flows
through the indo pacific to support the
global set of nations . That's why it's
important . We talked about France
France is a great partner France has
the largest easy in the indo pacific of
anyone and I've operated with them
across the globe since I've been doing
this business and they're a great
partner . So the expansion of these
security relationships with allies and
partners is the key and it's not just
in the indo pacific . Uh Laura has a
number of pacific nations with
coastlines in the pacific that we both
talked to because the region is
important for the security , the
stability and the prosperity globally .
Thanks so we have to end it there . Um
It's a perfect note really on which to
end it . Thank you to all of our panels .
Thank you audience . Uh and let's