WEBVTT 00:08.940 --> 00:12.180 I had the real great fortune to command 00:12.180 --> 00:14.347 at philadelphia , what was then called 00:14.350 --> 00:16.540 D SCP Defense Supply center 00:16.540 --> 00:19.270 Philadelphia from 2000 and 3 to 2000 00:19.270 --> 00:21.381 and five . Prior to that I was in the 00:21.381 --> 00:23.381 Joint Staff . So I was already in a 00:23.381 --> 00:25.603 joint environment and then after that I 00:25.603 --> 00:27.881 was deployed into Iraq and Afghanistan . 00:27.881 --> 00:29.992 And in terms of working in a civilian 00:29.992 --> 00:32.103 workforce , I had had some experience 00:32.103 --> 00:34.326 with that . I also went and talked to a 00:34.326 --> 00:36.620 number of former commanders that had 00:36.620 --> 00:39.960 commanded DSC P . And uh each to a 00:39.960 --> 00:42.071 person . They talked about this great 00:42.071 --> 00:44.071 environment , this great team up in 00:44.071 --> 00:46.016 philadelphia . They said they're a 00:46.016 --> 00:48.016 tough group , you got to earn their 00:48.016 --> 00:50.182 respect . And that's fair enough . And 00:50.182 --> 00:52.460 I hope I did that during my time there . 00:52.460 --> 00:54.640 But it was just an incredible 00:54.650 --> 00:56.817 leadership experience and I learned so 00:56.817 --> 01:00.260 much . When I 01:00.260 --> 01:03.080 arrived in 2000 and three , we were 01:03.090 --> 01:05.540 just gone into uh into Iraq the year 01:05.540 --> 01:07.707 before when I was on the joint staff , 01:07.707 --> 01:09.873 I did a lot of that work , Afghanistan 01:09.873 --> 01:11.707 continued on . So we were really 01:11.707 --> 01:13.870 building up our capabilities , uh 01:13.880 --> 01:15.991 pushing the enterprise of D . L . A . 01:15.991 --> 01:18.280 Forward into the battle space . Um you 01:18.280 --> 01:20.670 know , obviously a big part of D . L . 01:20.670 --> 01:23.500 A . Is Class nine , but in our case we 01:23.500 --> 01:25.444 were talking about food , which is 01:25.444 --> 01:27.667 obviously a basic necessity in a combat 01:27.667 --> 01:29.778 environment , all the different kinds 01:29.778 --> 01:31.722 of food they are there and we were 01:31.722 --> 01:34.260 transitioning from M . R . Es too hot 01:34.260 --> 01:35.930 chow . And and so the team in 01:35.930 --> 01:38.900 philadelphia was really working that uh 01:38.910 --> 01:41.021 day in and day out . There were a lot 01:41.021 --> 01:43.440 of uniform issues and equipping issues 01:43.440 --> 01:45.718 of the individual soldier , body armor , 01:45.718 --> 01:47.980 for example , the medical supplies . 01:47.980 --> 01:50.147 The other supply chain in philadelphia 01:50.147 --> 01:54.130 was also very engaged on pushing Class 01:54.140 --> 01:56.362 eight medical supplies forward into the 01:56.362 --> 01:58.520 battlefield . So we were primarily 01:58.520 --> 02:01.840 focused on making sure that the forces 02:01.850 --> 02:04.080 in Iraq had what they needed . And 02:04.080 --> 02:06.247 there was a smaller force at that time 02:06.247 --> 02:08.413 in Afghanistan . But we didn't want to 02:08.413 --> 02:08.180 forget about that . Make sure that they 02:08.180 --> 02:10.630 were also fully kidded with everything 02:10.630 --> 02:12.963 they needed to conduct those operations . 02:15.440 --> 02:17.051 B . S . M . Business systems 02:17.051 --> 02:20.030 modernization was dlRS effort to really 02:20.030 --> 02:22.480 bring the the organization in the 21st 02:22.480 --> 02:24.591 century from an I . T . Perspective , 02:24.591 --> 02:28.440 huge S . A . P . Product . Um and it 02:28.440 --> 02:30.662 was going to dramatically change how we 02:30.662 --> 02:32.496 did our day to day processes are 02:32.496 --> 02:34.496 business organization . So it was a 02:34.496 --> 02:36.829 huge undertaking . Uh I will tell you D . 02:36.829 --> 02:38.940 L . A . Headquarters managed it in my 02:38.940 --> 02:42.610 opinion , expertly it wasn't uh it was 02:42.620 --> 02:44.787 it was tough to do . You had to really 02:44.787 --> 02:47.240 have very strict project management . 02:47.240 --> 02:49.350 And I think under Admiral Lippert , 02:49.350 --> 02:51.461 then the D . L . A . Director and his 02:51.461 --> 02:53.683 his team up here , they did a super job 02:53.683 --> 02:55.906 of that . The other thing they did that 02:55.906 --> 02:58.128 I thought was so important and this has 02:58.128 --> 03:00.294 paid me well later on in my career was 03:00.294 --> 03:00.200 you have to have this project 03:00.200 --> 03:02.367 management , but you also have to look 03:02.367 --> 03:04.478 at the human side what I call the art 03:04.478 --> 03:06.644 of it and make sure you're bringing in 03:06.644 --> 03:08.922 the team . And so they had a B . S . M . 03:08.922 --> 03:08.680 Roadshow that went around all the 03:08.680 --> 03:10.990 different organizations kind of pumped 03:10.990 --> 03:13.101 everybody up , gave him a little view 03:13.101 --> 03:15.212 of that . So we spent a lot of time , 03:15.212 --> 03:17.434 not only the technical side of it , but 03:17.434 --> 03:19.657 really making sure that the users would 03:19.657 --> 03:19.340 get comfortable . You know , there's 03:19.340 --> 03:21.173 that learning curve . People are 03:21.173 --> 03:23.451 somewhat resistant sometimes to change , 03:23.451 --> 03:27.100 they like the system , they had my 03:27.100 --> 03:30.620 leadership approach . Um I hope 03:30.630 --> 03:33.330 is focused on people , people first 03:33.330 --> 03:35.770 missions always important . Absolutely . 03:35.780 --> 03:38.113 And there's those give and take of that . 03:38.113 --> 03:40.058 Um , you know , I had read the one 03:40.058 --> 03:42.113 minute manager and kind of looked at 03:42.113 --> 03:44.169 that , but I felt like I already had 03:44.169 --> 03:46.447 the personality for that kind of thing . 03:46.447 --> 03:48.280 I spent a lot of time out in the 03:48.280 --> 03:50.336 organization , visiting , you know , 03:50.336 --> 03:52.350 folks talking to him , just walking 03:52.350 --> 03:54.461 around management by walking around . 03:54.461 --> 03:56.628 And one of the things I learned from a 03:56.628 --> 03:58.683 General officer , jim Wright , who's 03:58.683 --> 04:00.906 since passed away , Great Quartermaster 04:00.906 --> 04:03.128 officer I served with in the pentagon . 04:03.128 --> 04:05.350 Um , he used to do a thing , you know , 04:05.350 --> 04:07.640 we have these things called c mess 04:07.650 --> 04:09.650 right where you bring the team into 04:09.650 --> 04:12.240 your office , see me . And he kind of 04:12.240 --> 04:14.407 had this thing where it was called See 04:14.407 --> 04:16.629 you . So he would leave his office , he 04:16.629 --> 04:18.684 would go down to the different , you 04:18.684 --> 04:20.684 know , staff sections and I learned 04:20.684 --> 04:22.573 that and so I tried to do that in 04:22.573 --> 04:24.740 philadelphia as well where I would not 04:24.740 --> 04:26.962 have people come to my office , I would 04:26.962 --> 04:29.073 go to their workspace and I would sit 04:29.073 --> 04:31.073 with them and I see the pictures of 04:31.073 --> 04:33.018 their family and I would see their 04:33.018 --> 04:32.180 hobbies and we have a little 04:32.180 --> 04:34.402 conversation about that and so you have 04:34.402 --> 04:36.458 that human touch . And to me I think 04:36.458 --> 04:38.590 that that built that relationship 04:38.600 --> 04:40.767 because it was a big organization , it 04:40.767 --> 04:42.822 was thousands of people and I really 04:42.822 --> 04:44.767 wanted to understand what were the 04:44.767 --> 04:47.980 challenges they were facing for 04:47.980 --> 04:50.500 positioning . Great initiative again by 04:50.500 --> 04:52.611 the D . L . A . Headquarters team and 04:52.611 --> 04:54.833 then also all the supply chains . Again 04:54.833 --> 04:56.722 it was this term of extending the 04:56.722 --> 04:58.944 enterprise deep into the battle space . 04:59.240 --> 05:02.430 Um the challenge of course is battles 05:02.430 --> 05:04.520 change so frequently . It's a very 05:04.520 --> 05:07.070 dynamic environment . You want to have 05:07.070 --> 05:09.181 your capabilities as close to that as 05:09.181 --> 05:11.370 possible . Uh those resources , those 05:11.370 --> 05:13.481 repair parts , those uniforms , those 05:13.481 --> 05:15.648 that food that can be moved around the 05:15.648 --> 05:17.759 battle space based on , you know what 05:17.759 --> 05:20.360 is happening . And so just having 05:20.370 --> 05:23.380 position stocks back in Conus or far 05:23.380 --> 05:25.660 away from the battlefield , you want to 05:25.660 --> 05:27.882 have those as well . But as much as you 05:27.882 --> 05:30.360 can push that forward , that minimizes 05:30.360 --> 05:32.650 the time distance factor so that you 05:32.650 --> 05:35.450 can meet the needs of the warfighter as 05:35.450 --> 05:37.830 rapidly as possible . And it also gives 05:37.830 --> 05:39.886 them confidence . They can just look 05:39.886 --> 05:42.052 back over their shoulder and they know 05:42.052 --> 05:44.052 that the D . L . A . Team is pretty 05:44.052 --> 05:45.997 close by in case something doesn't 05:45.997 --> 05:48.320 quite go as planned as we all know . Uh 05:48.330 --> 05:50.497 plans don't survive first contact with 05:50.497 --> 05:52.960 the enemy so that for positioning gave 05:52.960 --> 05:54.960 the commanders in the field and the 05:54.960 --> 05:57.220 leaders in the field flexibility and 05:57.220 --> 06:01.120 confidence hurricane 06:01.120 --> 06:03.350 that hit the hit the gulf , 06:03.360 --> 06:06.020 specifically Louisiana and new Orleans . 06:06.030 --> 06:08.820 Uh here we were conducting operations 06:08.820 --> 06:10.764 in Iraq and Afghanistan . All of a 06:10.764 --> 06:13.490 sudden we had a domestic , you know , 06:13.490 --> 06:16.840 emergency . And so we had to kind of do 06:16.840 --> 06:18.896 both at the same time . And all of a 06:18.896 --> 06:21.007 sudden it became a huge requirement , 06:21.007 --> 06:23.173 especially for stuff in philadelphia , 06:23.173 --> 06:26.450 Food , water , 10 image , all kinds of 06:26.450 --> 06:29.240 just basic human needs . So we set up 06:29.240 --> 06:32.230 an Operation Center . At that time we 06:32.230 --> 06:34.174 were handling Iraq and Afghanistan 06:34.174 --> 06:36.286 through our normal processes and that 06:36.286 --> 06:38.508 was going pretty well . But we had this 06:38.508 --> 06:40.563 new event occurred and we knew , you 06:40.563 --> 06:40.330 know , how important it was to the 06:40.330 --> 06:42.870 nation . We set up an operation center 06:42.870 --> 06:44.481 in the basement there of the 06:44.481 --> 06:46.537 headquarters and staff . It was some 06:46.537 --> 06:49.110 great young officers and N . C . O . S . 06:49.110 --> 06:51.680 And some GS workers and we were able to 06:51.680 --> 06:53.860 focus in on Katrina and also do Iraq 06:53.860 --> 06:55.971 and Afghanistan . We ended up keeping 06:55.971 --> 06:57.971 that operation center in place even 06:57.971 --> 07:00.740 after Krotine Katrina kind of subsided 07:00.750 --> 07:02.583 and I think that became a lesson 07:02.583 --> 07:05.460 learned and a best practice that a , 07:05.540 --> 07:07.484 you know , you have a , you know , 07:07.484 --> 07:09.540 headquarters that's kind of garrison 07:09.540 --> 07:12.190 focused , you know , kind of fixed 07:12.190 --> 07:14.079 focus . But this operation center 07:14.079 --> 07:16.390 really became the heartbeat of that 07:16.390 --> 07:18.390 operation and really kept us in the 07:18.390 --> 07:20.501 battle rhythm that much better as far 07:20.501 --> 07:22.557 as I know that there had not been an 07:22.557 --> 07:24.668 operation center like that because we 07:24.668 --> 07:26.612 talked about it , you know , where 07:26.612 --> 07:28.446 could we take any lessons from a 07:28.446 --> 07:30.557 previous time And really there was no 07:30.557 --> 07:32.668 institutional knowledge , it may have 07:32.668 --> 07:34.668 happened , but we couldn't find any 07:34.668 --> 07:34.650 institutional knowledge that said , 07:34.650 --> 07:36.706 this is what it ought to look like . 07:36.706 --> 07:38.761 This is the kind of capabilities you 07:38.761 --> 07:40.983 need , this is the staff and you need . 07:40.983 --> 07:43.261 We kind of built it from scratch . And , 07:43.261 --> 07:45.317 uh , again , had some had some great 07:45.317 --> 07:44.760 young folks at philadelphia's , some 07:44.760 --> 07:47.038 not so young , uh , making that happen . 07:47.440 --> 07:47.650 Thanks .