WEBVTT 00:08.840 --> 00:11.440 I was in the army for two years . I had 00:11.440 --> 00:13.662 gone to college for a couple of years . 00:13.662 --> 00:15.650 I was doing well enough to uh to 00:15.650 --> 00:18.680 continue . I mean I wasn't failing but 00:18.690 --> 00:21.500 it was it was just sort of continuation 00:21.500 --> 00:24.890 of high school . So I left 00:24.900 --> 00:28.750 school , applied for the draft and 00:28.940 --> 00:31.470 went to the army for two years . I was 00:31.480 --> 00:34.750 stationed at During the night the 00:34.750 --> 00:38.610 Vietnam 1968 - 70 . I was stationed in 00:38.610 --> 00:42.060 new york and then I was stationed in in 00:42.070 --> 00:45.130 Germany , came out of the military . I 00:45.130 --> 00:47.074 went back to college , finished my 00:47.074 --> 00:49.130 degree and always wanted to work for 00:49.130 --> 00:51.130 the government . I started actually 00:51.130 --> 00:53.680 with GSA in Washington . Uh and after 00:53.680 --> 00:55.624 about 10 years with G . S . A . in 00:55.624 --> 00:57.569 Washington . And in Philadelphia I 00:57.569 --> 00:59.680 really decided I either want to leave 00:59.680 --> 01:01.624 the government or find a different 01:01.624 --> 01:03.791 agency . So I applied for a job in D . 01:03.791 --> 01:05.847 O . D . Which happened to be here in 01:05.847 --> 01:08.013 philadelphia at the Defense Industrial 01:08.013 --> 01:10.180 Supply Center . I was fortunate enough 01:10.180 --> 01:12.720 to get the job . So I began my career 01:12.730 --> 01:14.900 in D . L . A . At the Defense 01:14.900 --> 01:18.250 Industrial Supply center , disk 1982 . 01:19.040 --> 01:22.630 I was with disk from 1982 01:22.630 --> 01:26.330 until about 1993 . 01:26.760 --> 01:29.860 I went from North Philadelphia 01:30.240 --> 01:32.510 Defense Industrial Supply Center to 01:32.510 --> 01:34.960 South philadelphia Defense Personnel 01:34.960 --> 01:37.720 Support Center and I was with them 01:37.730 --> 01:40.300 until the BRAC decisions which occurred 01:40.310 --> 01:43.050 and put two activities together back in 01:43.050 --> 01:46.930 north philadelphia . Uh From my time 01:46.930 --> 01:49.900 moving from disk two D . PSC Defense 01:49.910 --> 01:52.800 Personnel Support Center , we became 01:52.800 --> 01:54.411 the defense supply center of 01:54.411 --> 01:57.510 philadelphia and then eventually 01:57.520 --> 02:00.660 became Defense DLA troop support . 02:03.040 --> 02:05.590 The disk was really a hardware weapons 02:05.590 --> 02:08.980 systems support activity . Um All of D . 02:08.980 --> 02:11.660 L . A . Is is similar in the sense that 02:11.670 --> 02:13.503 the different activities support 02:13.503 --> 02:16.870 different commodities . Uh the hardware 02:16.870 --> 02:19.460 centers as they were known then . 02:19.840 --> 02:21.507 That's columbus . Richmond in 02:21.507 --> 02:25.230 philadelphia uh bought spare parts 02:25.240 --> 02:27.880 mostly for weapons systems used by the 02:27.880 --> 02:30.047 maintenance activities in the military 02:30.047 --> 02:32.550 services , the shipyards , the aircraft 02:32.550 --> 02:35.310 overhaul facilities , the big bases 02:35.310 --> 02:37.532 where maintenance activities take place 02:37.640 --> 02:39.862 and then the rest of the other parts of 02:39.862 --> 02:43.410 the ah by fuel or buy food , clothing 02:43.410 --> 02:45.688 and medicine as troop support does now . 02:46.140 --> 02:48.473 But they're all really commodity buyers . 02:48.473 --> 02:50.529 They just have often times different 02:50.529 --> 02:53.090 customers may be in the same service , 02:53.100 --> 02:55.830 but to different customers and they 02:55.830 --> 02:58.110 work in different markets spaces . So 02:58.110 --> 03:00.150 they buy from different types of 03:00.150 --> 03:03.090 commercial activities . Uh It makes 03:03.090 --> 03:06.270 them , it changes their mission to some 03:06.270 --> 03:09.040 degree , but they're really supplying 03:09.050 --> 03:12.200 products to the military wherever that 03:12.200 --> 03:15.060 might be . What was fascinating here in 03:15.060 --> 03:17.920 philadelphia was the group of people 03:17.920 --> 03:21.830 who brought hardware disk dealt 03:21.830 --> 03:24.052 with different customers than the group 03:24.052 --> 03:26.163 of people in philadelphia that bought 03:26.163 --> 03:28.386 food , clothing and medicine . And when 03:28.386 --> 03:30.608 those two came together , it was a , it 03:30.608 --> 03:32.830 was a real blend of cultures . It was a 03:32.830 --> 03:35.610 real blend of market space is a blend 03:35.610 --> 03:38.270 of different contracting activities . 03:38.280 --> 03:41.610 Uh , it was really fascinating all 03:41.610 --> 03:44.860 because of that infamous Breck and the 03:44.860 --> 03:48.260 decisions made by braque disk and GPS 03:48.260 --> 03:50.880 see joined together as a result of a 03:50.880 --> 03:52.980 BRAC decision . And the feeling was 03:52.980 --> 03:55.202 that you really couldn't justify having 03:55.202 --> 03:58.130 two separate facilities to separate uh , 03:58.140 --> 04:00.120 back offices to separate command 04:00.120 --> 04:02.320 structures in the same time . So they 04:02.320 --> 04:04.376 brought the two together even though 04:04.376 --> 04:06.950 the mission was significantly different . 04:07.540 --> 04:09.740 But I made some big changes elsewhere 04:09.740 --> 04:11.851 at the same time , which were kind of 04:11.851 --> 04:14.660 important . They shifted the hardware 04:14.660 --> 04:17.520 centers away from commodity buying to 04:17.520 --> 04:19.631 support of customers during the first 04:19.631 --> 04:22.540 gulf war , desert shield that did not 04:22.540 --> 04:24.840 have a big role . Most of the stuff 04:24.840 --> 04:26.951 that they bought where it was weapons 04:26.951 --> 04:29.680 systems , spare parts and when you move 04:29.680 --> 04:31.780 troops into a given area , they 04:31.790 --> 04:33.901 typically have enough of that initial 04:33.901 --> 04:36.070 supply of spare parts that they travel 04:36.070 --> 04:39.910 with it . Um Whereas uh two years 04:39.910 --> 04:42.220 after Desert Shield , Desert Storm I 04:42.220 --> 04:44.053 arrived in south philadelphia to 04:44.053 --> 04:46.230 defense personnel support center and 04:46.230 --> 04:48.960 their mission was significantly in uh 04:48.970 --> 04:51.570 impacted by the Desert Shield desert 04:51.570 --> 04:54.660 Storm operation . Just as one example , 04:55.540 --> 04:59.310 um the medical director in D . P . S . 04:59.310 --> 05:02.570 C . At the time held several $100 05:02.570 --> 05:05.320 million worth of inventory in the , in 05:05.320 --> 05:07.970 the warehouse is ready to deploy . When 05:07.990 --> 05:10.101 something like Desert Shield , Desert 05:10.101 --> 05:12.490 Storm would occur when all the troops 05:12.490 --> 05:14.490 were sent in the Middle East . They 05:14.490 --> 05:16.712 didn't requisition any of that material 05:16.712 --> 05:18.750 from the medical director . All the 05:18.750 --> 05:22.210 doctors who were mostly reserve 05:22.220 --> 05:24.930 officers doctors . They ordered all the 05:24.930 --> 05:27.097 stuff they were used to using in their 05:27.097 --> 05:29.670 private Life medical realized that they 05:29.670 --> 05:32.070 no longer had a mission If they were 05:32.070 --> 05:35.680 buying their own packaged O . D . Green 05:35.710 --> 05:39.180 medical supplies that Kaz Medical to 05:39.180 --> 05:41.740 shift to the prime vendor mall . It was 05:41.740 --> 05:45.060 a huge change . Medical went from 05:45.800 --> 05:48.080 $800 million dollars worth of medical 05:48.080 --> 05:50.890 supplies down to virtually Less than a 05:50.890 --> 05:53.330 100 million and and doing the same 05:53.330 --> 05:56.140 mission and today they do billions of 05:56.140 --> 05:58.084 dollars worth of work for multiple 05:58.084 --> 06:01.620 agencies with uh , almost no supplies 06:01.620 --> 06:03.787 sitting in the depot . So the shift of 06:03.787 --> 06:05.953 commercial practices was really caused 06:05.953 --> 06:09.310 by desert shield Desert storm . What's 06:09.310 --> 06:12.220 medical got the initial program going 06:12.220 --> 06:14.442 and they did it in the national capital 06:14.442 --> 06:16.530 region . Food finally realized they 06:16.530 --> 06:19.290 could do the same thing . So I as a 06:19.290 --> 06:23.020 soldier in 1978 79 and 06:23.030 --> 06:26.880 80 would sit at a mess hall eating 06:26.880 --> 06:29.950 cereal that was ugly 06:30.640 --> 06:33.780 and goofy packaging that was 06:33.790 --> 06:37.430 designed by the military . Yeah . Uh , 06:37.440 --> 06:39.640 subsistence realized that that sort of 06:39.650 --> 06:41.872 food supply was never going to last for 06:41.872 --> 06:43.817 the long term , particularly after 06:43.817 --> 06:45.650 medical was able to shift to the 06:45.650 --> 06:47.872 commercial practices . Subsistence then 06:47.872 --> 06:50.770 virtually did the same thing . And to 06:50.770 --> 06:53.220 the point where I don't think there's 06:53.230 --> 06:55.900 any food left in the warehouses any 06:55.900 --> 06:57.678 longer . It's all bought from a 06:57.678 --> 07:00.060 commercial store . So the shift , the 07:00.060 --> 07:02.350 desert seal , desert shield , desert 07:02.350 --> 07:04.370 storm cost was really pretty 07:04.370 --> 07:06.481 significant . I don't think the shift 07:06.481 --> 07:08.426 deprived vendors was difficult for 07:08.426 --> 07:11.160 employees . Um , what it really did 07:11.160 --> 07:13.327 more than anything else is to shift to 07:13.327 --> 07:15.420 prime vendors or the use of the 07:15.420 --> 07:17.531 commercial supply chains . It reduced 07:17.531 --> 07:20.230 the workforce , but the workforce was 07:20.230 --> 07:22.490 really adduced reduced by attrition . 07:22.500 --> 07:25.100 So the impact wasn't , I don't think 07:25.100 --> 07:27.260 significant in the employee's minds . 07:27.740 --> 07:31.430 Um , what was significant was in 07:31.440 --> 07:33.551 philadelphia was a perfect example of 07:33.551 --> 07:36.240 this . The people at disk buying 07:36.240 --> 07:40.020 hardware from commercial manufacturers 07:40.030 --> 07:42.360 and weapons systems support providers 07:42.370 --> 07:45.660 were buying things completely 07:45.660 --> 07:48.730 differently than the buyers of food , 07:48.730 --> 07:51.630 clothing and medicine who had moved to 07:51.630 --> 07:54.500 commercial practices . So there was a 07:54.510 --> 07:57.020 sort of a difference in the way de ella 07:57.020 --> 07:59.350 approach things . Eventually , the 07:59.350 --> 08:03.180 hardware centers and the the 08:03.190 --> 08:05.640 customer support centers began to do 08:05.640 --> 08:07.640 the same thing . The big shift that 08:07.640 --> 08:09.584 came out of the Defense Industrial 08:09.584 --> 08:12.910 Supply Center was a shift from working 08:12.910 --> 08:15.090 in a functional silo and a functional 08:15.090 --> 08:18.390 stovepipe to working to our commodity 08:18.390 --> 08:21.150 based , uh , customer based commodity 08:21.160 --> 08:23.600 business units so that we put the 08:23.600 --> 08:25.720 functional people together and they 08:25.720 --> 08:28.410 started to work uh , in a given 08:28.410 --> 08:30.354 commodity . So all the people that 08:30.354 --> 08:32.243 bought a certain type of hardware 08:32.243 --> 08:34.900 worked side by side with the supplying 08:34.910 --> 08:37.440 supply representatives and the quality 08:37.440 --> 08:40.060 representatives for that same commodity . 08:40.540 --> 08:43.850 And that that shift really started the 08:43.850 --> 08:46.240 change from working purely in 08:46.240 --> 08:48.680 stovepipes , working purely within 08:48.680 --> 08:50.980 within the , you know , one or another 08:50.980 --> 08:53.147 director to working towards supporting 08:53.147 --> 08:54.924 the customer . They were called 08:54.924 --> 08:56.980 commodity business units back then . 08:57.340 --> 08:59.650 And uh and it was it was enabled 08:59.660 --> 09:02.610 because uh and there was a lot of 09:02.610 --> 09:05.150 collaboration between Richmond columbus 09:05.150 --> 09:07.094 in philadelphia , the disk part of 09:07.094 --> 09:10.070 philadelphia back then to move in that 09:10.070 --> 09:11.903 direction . And that that's what 09:11.903 --> 09:15.700 eventually caused the shift to the 09:15.710 --> 09:18.640 customer facing organizations that 09:18.640 --> 09:20.751 exist in the hardware centers today . 09:21.040 --> 09:24.860 Um The the 09:25.940 --> 09:28.370 the initiative really came because 09:28.380 --> 09:30.547 people working instead of pipes forgot 09:30.547 --> 09:32.491 why they were doing what they were 09:32.491 --> 09:34.602 doing . They wanted to be the perfect 09:34.602 --> 09:36.510 quality person or the perfect 09:36.520 --> 09:38.409 procurement person or the perfect 09:38.409 --> 09:41.170 supply person and individually those . 09:41.180 --> 09:43.800 Uh if you don't collaborate between 09:43.800 --> 09:46.960 those functional specialties and the 09:46.960 --> 09:49.090 customer doesn't get served , and I 09:49.090 --> 09:52.890 think probably what you see today is D . 09:52.890 --> 09:55.750 L . A . Focus more on the customer . Um 09:55.760 --> 09:58.050 then we were back in 1982 when I 09:58.050 --> 10:00.660 started back when I started we were 10:00.660 --> 10:04.160 focused on what was our job , What do 10:04.160 --> 10:06.049 we do at our desk ? And we really 10:06.049 --> 10:08.104 didn't focus on the customer support 10:08.104 --> 10:11.870 part of that . But 10:11.870 --> 10:13.926 business systems modernization was a 10:13.926 --> 10:16.910 big change . Um and and I remember 10:16.910 --> 10:19.600 talking to the guys that had initially 10:19.600 --> 10:22.110 been part of the Sam's introduction 10:22.120 --> 10:25.550 back when Sam's came in in the 50s and 10:25.550 --> 10:29.440 60s and it lasted 2025 years . But as 10:29.440 --> 10:33.260 I was becoming a senior leader in uh in 10:33.260 --> 10:36.080 disk , SAM's was getting old . SaM's 10:36.080 --> 10:38.302 was getting tired . SaM's was no longer 10:38.302 --> 10:40.610 functional . So the move to be SM was 10:40.610 --> 10:42.388 really something was absolutely 10:42.388 --> 10:45.660 necessary . The the folks that I knew 10:45.660 --> 10:47.771 that had been part of the switch over 10:47.771 --> 10:50.150 to Sam's told me it was gonna be rotten 10:50.160 --> 10:52.690 hard , very difficult . But the change 10:52.690 --> 10:54.857 was absolutely necessary . And I think 10:54.857 --> 10:57.140 that the L . A . Uh in the B . S . M . 10:57.140 --> 11:00.040 Change pulled off quite a , quite an 11:00.040 --> 11:02.151 accomplishment to get that , get that 11:02.151 --> 11:05.110 system in place and working well . And 11:05.110 --> 11:07.110 it wasn't easy . There are a lot of 11:07.110 --> 11:09.054 changes that took place in the way 11:09.054 --> 11:11.221 people did work then and that probably 11:11.221 --> 11:13.166 had more effect than all the other 11:13.166 --> 11:14.560 organizational changes . 11:17.540 --> 11:20.050 It was a push . And what what I always 11:20.050 --> 11:23.780 found is uh initially the 11:23.790 --> 11:26.350 forward deployment was with the 11:26.350 --> 11:28.183 commodities of food , clothing , 11:28.183 --> 11:30.490 medicine , and fuel . That also then 11:30.490 --> 11:32.657 moved to the commodities of hardware , 11:32.657 --> 11:34.768 the very hardware centers and then to 11:34.768 --> 11:36.879 disposition and distribution for that 11:36.879 --> 11:39.820 matter . But what I always found is 11:39.820 --> 11:43.370 that the people who the folks really 11:43.380 --> 11:45.680 liked the opportunity to deploy and get 11:45.680 --> 11:47.791 close to the customers . So , so when 11:47.791 --> 11:50.710 we had a position that was open for uh 11:50.720 --> 11:54.050 deployment to europe or even the Middle 11:54.050 --> 11:56.600 East , there was no lack of people who 11:56.600 --> 11:59.130 were willing and able to uh volunteer 11:59.130 --> 12:01.840 to take that job . And in fact , some 12:01.840 --> 12:04.062 people went over there and never wanted 12:04.062 --> 12:07.940 to come back . But uh the the 12:07.950 --> 12:10.200 as I said , it started with started 12:10.200 --> 12:12.367 with the commodities that are directly 12:12.367 --> 12:15.340 related to troops , food , clothing , 12:15.340 --> 12:18.070 and medicine , fuel , uh and then it's 12:18.080 --> 12:20.170 basically moved to all the other 12:20.180 --> 12:22.760 functions and support factors and 12:22.760 --> 12:23.816 develop provides . 12:27.040 --> 12:30.240 When I first came to disk , I was a the 12:30.250 --> 12:32.360 deputy Director of 12:34.140 --> 12:37.910 Plans and policy , and it was a Systems 12:37.910 --> 12:40.950 analysis manpower management kind of a 12:40.950 --> 12:44.290 function . Uh And it was the old what 12:44.290 --> 12:47.060 the code was disk L 12:47.640 --> 12:49.760 and it was it was really sort of a 12:49.760 --> 12:52.440 centralized management analysis 12:52.440 --> 12:56.330 organization . Um The the 12:56.330 --> 12:59.220 director at the time retired or uh 12:59.230 --> 13:01.970 actually had a bicycle accident riding 13:01.970 --> 13:04.930 to work and retired as a result of that . 13:04.940 --> 13:07.107 And they offered me the opportunity to 13:07.107 --> 13:09.162 become the director . So I I'm quite 13:09.162 --> 13:11.680 happy to do that . I moved from men to 13:11.680 --> 13:13.970 be the comptroller of Defense 13:13.970 --> 13:16.750 Industrial Supply Center . Um and it 13:16.750 --> 13:18.694 was during that time when a lot of 13:18.694 --> 13:20.920 changes were taking place and the 13:20.930 --> 13:22.930 comptroller's organization was very 13:22.930 --> 13:25.097 involved with both the supply function 13:25.097 --> 13:27.430 and the procurement function as control . 13:27.430 --> 13:29.541 Though I got involved in an awful lot 13:29.541 --> 13:31.486 of things that were throughout the 13:31.486 --> 13:33.708 organization and uh I found that job be 13:33.708 --> 13:36.490 very rewarding . Big change occurred 13:36.490 --> 13:38.450 when I was comptroller was the 13:38.750 --> 13:40.972 Department of Defense established , Deb 13:40.972 --> 13:43.430 off Defense Business Operations Fund , 13:43.430 --> 13:45.652 now known as the Working Capital Fund . 13:46.040 --> 13:48.450 Uh That was a very significant change 13:48.450 --> 13:51.010 because it changed the way delay was 13:51.010 --> 13:53.940 funded . It changed the ability of 13:53.940 --> 13:56.940 delay to make good decisions on how 13:56.940 --> 13:59.850 they bought product and and how they 13:59.850 --> 14:02.250 manage the organization . It brought 14:02.250 --> 14:04.790 with it the dreaded word , the 14:04.790 --> 14:07.730 surcharge , which is now known as the 14:07.730 --> 14:11.590 cost recovery rate . But what it really 14:11.590 --> 14:15.110 did is it focused the use of a cost 14:15.110 --> 14:18.030 recovery rate , focus the customer on 14:18.040 --> 14:21.490 how much Della costs them to do the 14:21.490 --> 14:23.630 work that they could otherwise do for 14:23.630 --> 14:26.920 themselves . Um And that made the L . A . 14:26.920 --> 14:29.930 Focused really heavily on on cost on 14:29.930 --> 14:32.041 reducing the cost of doing business . 14:32.041 --> 14:34.670 So it was a significant change . It was 14:34.680 --> 14:37.240 um it wasn't as hard to implement as 14:37.240 --> 14:39.460 you might have thought . Uh There were 14:39.460 --> 14:41.516 pockets of resistance throughout the 14:41.516 --> 14:43.690 military and in some cases pockets of 14:43.690 --> 14:46.080 resistance in D . L . A . But it was 14:46.090 --> 14:48.810 largely accepted and it really did 14:48.810 --> 14:51.780 benefit everybody because it forced the 14:51.780 --> 14:54.950 L . A . To prove the value of the order 14:54.960 --> 14:57.580 of the work they did in the and what 14:57.580 --> 14:59.302 they brought to the customer . 15:02.040 --> 15:04.040 When the Marine Corps changed their 15:04.040 --> 15:06.040 uniforms . I was working as part of 15:06.040 --> 15:07.960 troop support and 15:08.740 --> 15:11.680 the S . E . S . And Marine Corps log 15:11.680 --> 15:14.120 command called me up and said to me at 15:14.120 --> 15:17.390 one point if we change our uniforms is 15:17.390 --> 15:20.230 the price going to change . So I went 15:20.230 --> 15:22.341 back to the clearly in textiles folks 15:22.341 --> 15:24.710 and I asked that same question and 15:24.710 --> 15:27.770 their their best answer was probably 15:27.770 --> 15:30.680 not . So I went back to the Marine 15:30.680 --> 15:33.740 Corps and said probably not . So we 15:33.750 --> 15:37.690 we took the do design built the new 15:37.690 --> 15:41.310 uniform generated the head of 15:41.310 --> 15:43.421 manufactured and sent them to him and 15:43.421 --> 15:45.532 the price changed . And at that point 15:45.532 --> 15:47.532 Marine Corps went ballistic because 15:47.532 --> 15:50.050 they couldn't justify that change . 15:50.050 --> 15:51.717 They felt they could do it by 15:51.717 --> 15:53.994 themselves without having to pay D . L . 15:53.994 --> 15:56.161 A . Surcharge , which means they would 15:56.161 --> 15:58.328 do all the procurement , they would do 15:58.328 --> 16:00.494 all the design , they would do all the 16:00.494 --> 16:02.606 quality assurance etcetera . Um , but 16:02.606 --> 16:04.439 it was a significant issue . The 16:04.439 --> 16:06.606 director called me up one day and said 16:06.606 --> 16:09.310 George what happened ? And I went 16:09.310 --> 16:11.640 through that with him and uh he was 16:11.640 --> 16:13.862 satisfied with that . And but he had to 16:13.862 --> 16:17.180 go report back to uh OSD at the time uh 16:17.190 --> 16:19.910 to uh one of the assistant secretaries 16:19.910 --> 16:21.966 offense . Her name was Diane Morales 16:22.440 --> 16:25.850 and explain to her what had what had 16:25.850 --> 16:27.906 happened there . But uh Marine Corps 16:27.906 --> 16:29.794 was unhappy with the price of the 16:29.794 --> 16:31.906 uniform . Uh despite what we tried to 16:31.906 --> 16:34.072 do to make it the same price as it had 16:34.072 --> 16:36.294 been before . But I was on the hot seat 16:36.294 --> 16:38.294 for a period of time for having a , 16:38.294 --> 16:40.406 having worked through that eventually 16:40.406 --> 16:44.140 they came back in . The the issue 16:44.140 --> 16:47.750 is , yeah , the big 16:49.240 --> 16:51.018 point of discussion between the 16:51.018 --> 16:53.780 military services and LA typically is 16:54.340 --> 16:56.770 what does the law do that they can't do 16:56.770 --> 16:59.060 for themselves ? And does the L . A . 16:59.060 --> 17:01.910 Do it cheaper ? And if you consolidate 17:01.910 --> 17:04.077 or centralize the work , you typically 17:04.077 --> 17:08.060 can get it done in a better way by , by 17:08.060 --> 17:10.171 the practices that if you allow every 17:10.171 --> 17:12.171 individual service , you need to do 17:12.171 --> 17:14.393 their own work . You don't duplicate as 17:14.393 --> 17:16.004 much as you would have . You 17:16.004 --> 17:17.893 consolidate within LA . I was the 17:17.893 --> 17:20.250 comptroller disk and I was promoted to 17:20.250 --> 17:24.240 the to be the deputy commander of disk 17:24.250 --> 17:28.130 was my first S . E . S . Position And 17:28.130 --> 17:31.100 that was in 1970 , 17:31.730 --> 17:35.460 Um at that point the BRAC decision 17:35.460 --> 17:39.240 was uh the only black decision was to 17:39.240 --> 17:41.240 close the clothing factory in South 17:41.240 --> 17:44.100 philadelphia and to move that activity 17:44.100 --> 17:46.520 off that base . Close that base , move 17:46.520 --> 17:49.260 them onto this base . That was the BRAC 17:49.260 --> 17:52.460 decision . Soon after I became the 17:52.460 --> 17:55.630 deputy at disk . The next BRAC decision 17:55.630 --> 17:57.060 was closed disk . 17:59.040 --> 18:02.460 Um So I am I 18:03.440 --> 18:05.551 I moved to South philadelphia and the 18:05.551 --> 18:07.273 people that disk thought I was 18:07.273 --> 18:09.273 abandoning the sinking ship because 18:09.273 --> 18:11.329 they had been closed . The people in 18:11.329 --> 18:13.551 South philadelphia thought I was coming 18:13.551 --> 18:15.662 down there to bring all the jobs from 18:15.662 --> 18:17.773 the disk people uh to D . P . S . C . 18:18.340 --> 18:22.220 Um so there was a there was a a 18:22.230 --> 18:24.810 bit of tension between the units in 18:24.810 --> 18:27.032 Philadelphia until we were finally able 18:27.032 --> 18:30.420 to bring them together in 1999 on site 18:30.430 --> 18:32.820 in North philadelphia . But there was 18:32.830 --> 18:34.941 there were times when there were real 18:34.941 --> 18:37.680 real concerns on both parts that they 18:37.680 --> 18:39.736 were they were jobs were going to be 18:39.736 --> 18:43.590 affected . I was fortunate 18:43.590 --> 18:45.757 enough to work with a lot of directors 18:45.757 --> 18:47.646 sort of one on 1 . I had a lot of 18:47.646 --> 18:49.960 interaction with a lot of them . Um 18:50.540 --> 18:53.430 just to pick out a few that 18:53.440 --> 18:55.440 particularly impressed me . Admiral 18:55.440 --> 18:58.370 straw . Admiral straw changed the way 18:58.370 --> 19:01.230 the agency worked , The agency was very 19:01.240 --> 19:03.760 headquarters centered , headquarters 19:03.760 --> 19:07.240 focused , everything was top down and 19:07.240 --> 19:10.560 Admiral straw really turned a lot of 19:10.560 --> 19:14.160 the old guard old school , 19:14.230 --> 19:17.160 turned them around and made them think 19:17.170 --> 19:19.337 different ways . In some cases he made 19:19.337 --> 19:22.340 some of them move . In other cases he 19:22.340 --> 19:24.340 made them so uncomfortably may have 19:24.340 --> 19:27.640 left . But what he did do was he really 19:27.650 --> 19:30.900 uh empowered the uh subordinate 19:30.900 --> 19:32.960 activities , the field commands to 19:32.970 --> 19:35.850 begin to act for themselves and and 19:35.850 --> 19:38.750 develop some innovation . And it was 19:38.750 --> 19:40.972 frankly , it was Admiral straw that was 19:40.972 --> 19:42.917 around when prime vendor started , 19:42.917 --> 19:45.028 which was one of the most significant 19:45.028 --> 19:47.083 things that occurred . I remember at 19:47.083 --> 19:50.480 one point he went to the contracting 19:50.480 --> 19:52.720 officer and subsistence and said , so 19:52.730 --> 19:54.730 how soon can you put prime entering 19:54.730 --> 19:58.130 around the world ? Uh And 19:58.140 --> 20:00.960 and frankly he did it during his tenure . 20:00.970 --> 20:03.360 So he was a very significant director . 20:04.140 --> 20:06.660 One of his proteges was Admiral Lippert . 20:07.540 --> 20:09.873 The two of them between the two of them , 20:09.873 --> 20:12.760 they had more time in , in the 20:12.760 --> 20:14.710 director's chair than probably any 20:14.710 --> 20:16.821 other directors that I can remember . 20:18.140 --> 20:21.360 Admiral liberate was , was was 20:22.040 --> 20:24.580 perhaps the most professional 20:24.860 --> 20:26.450 and 20:28.440 --> 20:31.590 his leadership style was very , 20:32.240 --> 20:35.540 very mild mannered , very direct . He 20:35.540 --> 20:37.762 understood exactly what he wanted to do 20:37.762 --> 20:39.762 and how he wanted to do it . And he 20:39.762 --> 20:41.762 made it clear to who he was working 20:41.762 --> 20:43.984 with and he did it in a way that uh you 20:43.984 --> 20:46.230 couldn't , it was hard to ever say no 20:46.230 --> 20:48.670 to Admiral operate or hard to ever 20:48.670 --> 20:52.640 argue with because he he knew 20:52.640 --> 20:54.807 what he was doing , he thought through 20:54.807 --> 20:57.770 things in well in advance and he he was 20:57.780 --> 21:00.010 very well prepared for this job . And 21:00.010 --> 21:03.290 he led the agency during some of the 21:03.290 --> 21:05.401 most difficult times in the agency to 21:05.401 --> 21:06.790 include many of the BRAC 21:06.790 --> 21:10.350 implementations . Um So and then 21:10.360 --> 21:13.160 general listen , uh general listen , 21:13.160 --> 21:16.100 had been a uh he'd been in philadelphia 21:16.100 --> 21:18.640 when I was here , but when he was in D . 21:18.640 --> 21:21.170 P . S . C . When I was in D . I . S . C . 21:21.640 --> 21:24.060 Um So I worked with him somewhat 21:25.640 --> 21:28.470 and he was he was in D . P . S . C . 21:28.470 --> 21:31.670 When the clothing factory was shut down 21:32.340 --> 21:34.540 and when some of the black decisions 21:34.540 --> 21:37.170 were made and he understood before I 21:37.170 --> 21:40.560 did , he understood the implications 21:40.940 --> 21:43.230 of closing south philadelphia , moving 21:43.230 --> 21:45.990 everyone into North philadelphia , and 21:46.000 --> 21:49.920 he did his best to try to make that 21:49.930 --> 21:53.460 a smooth transition before he left . Um 21:53.940 --> 21:56.162 And then when he became the director of 21:56.162 --> 22:00.070 the agency , he he perhaps more 22:00.070 --> 22:02.780 than anyone around , he he brought 22:02.780 --> 22:05.960 about the focus on the customer . So 22:05.960 --> 22:09.690 the development of deploying people 22:09.690 --> 22:11.857 overseas really began in earnest under 22:11.857 --> 22:15.440 him . Yeah the focus on 22:15.450 --> 22:17.506 talking to the customer and find out 22:17.506 --> 22:19.394 what the customer wants . All the 22:19.394 --> 22:21.450 things we do today , the D . L . A . 22:21.450 --> 22:23.561 Army days , the deal Air Force days . 22:23.561 --> 22:25.672 Those all began under General General 22:25.672 --> 22:28.890 Listen . Um So very very very strong 22:28.890 --> 22:31.550 leadership from those three . Um 22:34.640 --> 22:36.890 I don't I don't know that I had really 22:36.890 --> 22:39.340 strong relationships with any of the 22:39.340 --> 22:42.020 others uh that I should bring up . But 22:42.020 --> 22:44.020 those three were really amongst the 22:44.020 --> 22:46.580 three that I thought were crucial to 22:46.580 --> 22:50.560 the agency's growth . So 22:50.560 --> 22:53.580 I stayed with the L . A . Uh And and 22:53.590 --> 22:57.020 you know , I cannot imagine having to 22:57.020 --> 22:59.960 spend a better 23:00.740 --> 23:02.962 part of my career than the time I spent 23:02.962 --> 23:06.410 in De La and particularly after the 23:06.420 --> 23:08.550 merger of the two elements in 23:08.550 --> 23:12.550 philadelphia , but um where I stayed in 23:12.550 --> 23:15.560 the L . A . Because it was well run . 23:16.540 --> 23:20.370 Mhm . You you had the opportunity 23:20.380 --> 23:24.290 to speak your piece and to apply 23:24.290 --> 23:27.260 innovation . Uh You really had the 23:27.260 --> 23:29.316 opportunity to grow as an individual 23:29.316 --> 23:32.210 and you um as I got in more leadership 23:32.210 --> 23:34.321 roles , the opportunity to help other 23:34.321 --> 23:37.260 people grow was there as well ? Um I 23:37.260 --> 23:41.250 can't imagine a a more 23:41.250 --> 23:44.720 rewarding career than uh than my D . L . 23:44.720 --> 23:45.270 A . Career .