WEBVTT

00:03.270 --> 00:04.150
thank you

00:07.240 --> 00:08.240
is a

00:08.240 --> 00:11.710
video .

00:13.940 --> 00:16.051
The soldier reading these pages would

00:16.051 --> 00:18.051
do well to reflect on the wisdom of

00:18.051 --> 00:20.218
this statement exhibited in a Japanese

00:20.218 --> 00:22.350
shrine . What want to him who has not

00:22.360 --> 00:25.140
tasted defeat ? Defeat brings into

00:25.140 --> 00:27.140
sharp focus the causes that lead to

00:27.140 --> 00:30.180
failure and provides a fruitful field

00:30.180 --> 00:32.291
of study for those soldiers in layman

00:32.291 --> 00:34.458
who seek in the past . Lessons for the

00:34.458 --> 00:37.930
future . Orlando Ward , Chief of

00:37.930 --> 00:40.560
military history , 1952 .

00:42.240 --> 00:46.210
So hes screaming the Earth . How much

00:48.970 --> 00:49.970
for me now ,

00:51.340 --> 00:55.230
e . You want my opinion ?

00:56.040 --> 00:57.430
Our team you take

01:05.240 --> 01:07.296
mere hours after the attack on Pearl

01:07.296 --> 01:09.629
Harbor , Japanese forces attacked the U .

01:09.629 --> 01:11.796
S . Commonwealth of the Philippines as

01:11.796 --> 01:13.962
part of its Pacific wide plan to seize

01:13.962 --> 01:16.040
much needed resource is and Manila

01:16.040 --> 01:18.700
strategically important harbor . Over

01:18.700 --> 01:20.700
the next five months , American and

01:20.700 --> 01:22.478
Filipino forces would conduct a

01:22.478 --> 01:24.590
stalwart defense of the islands that

01:24.590 --> 01:27.190
would cost many lives and end in defeat

01:27.340 --> 01:29.350
while disrupting Japan's plan for

01:29.350 --> 01:31.850
conquest in the region . Mhm

01:42.840 --> 01:45.770
by 7 December 1941 . The Philippines ,

01:45.780 --> 01:48.060
a chain of 7000 islands in the Pacific ,

01:48.440 --> 01:50.496
have been a US territory for over 40

01:50.496 --> 01:53.830
years , located over 11,000 kilometers

01:53.830 --> 01:56.260
from San Francisco , but just under

01:56.260 --> 01:58.770
3000 kilometers from Tokyo . It was

01:58.770 --> 02:00.992
America's first line of defense against

02:00.992 --> 02:03.159
the threat of Japanese expansionism in

02:03.159 --> 02:05.290
the Pacific , which Japan already in

02:05.290 --> 02:07.512
control of the island of Formosa to the

02:07.512 --> 02:09.457
north , the Marshal , Caroline and

02:09.457 --> 02:11.234
Gilbert Islands to the east and

02:11.234 --> 02:13.346
occupying a significant part of China

02:13.346 --> 02:15.457
to the northwest . The U . S military

02:15.457 --> 02:17.457
garrison in the Philippines was all

02:17.457 --> 02:19.679
that prevented Japan from consolidating

02:19.679 --> 02:21.734
its gains and driving south to seize

02:21.734 --> 02:23.957
the Dutch East Indies valuable resource

02:23.957 --> 02:26.470
is of oil and rubber . The American

02:26.470 --> 02:28.770
military , however , had concerns about

02:28.770 --> 02:30.603
the feasibility of defending the

02:30.603 --> 02:33.960
Philippines as early as 1914 . Then

02:33.960 --> 02:36.071
second Lieutenant George C . Marshall

02:36.071 --> 02:37.860
was able to demonstrate during

02:37.860 --> 02:39.638
maneuvers simulating a Japanese

02:39.638 --> 02:41.760
invasion of Luzon , how easily the

02:41.760 --> 02:43.816
capital city of Manila and its major

02:43.816 --> 02:46.370
port could fall to aggressors with the

02:46.370 --> 02:48.703
coastline longer than the United States .

02:48.750 --> 02:50.639
The military appreciated just how

02:50.639 --> 02:52.639
difficult it would be to defend the

02:52.639 --> 02:54.790
Philippines effectively . Various

02:54.790 --> 02:57.040
changes in US policy also undermined

02:57.040 --> 02:59.151
the defense of the Philippines . He's

02:59.151 --> 03:01.207
included the Washington Naval Treaty

03:01.207 --> 03:03.640
signed in 1922 which halted US

03:03.640 --> 03:05.751
construction of new fortifications in

03:05.751 --> 03:07.700
the Pacific in exchange for Japan

03:07.710 --> 03:10.500
limiting the size of its fleet . With

03:10.500 --> 03:12.830
only one reinforced stronghold said at

03:12.830 --> 03:14.941
the mouth of Manila Bay on the island

03:14.941 --> 03:17.108
of Corregidor , Philippines , Defenses

03:17.108 --> 03:21.020
were questionable . The Navy

03:21.020 --> 03:23.680
expects to solve the naval defense

03:23.690 --> 03:26.430
problems that may confront the United

03:26.440 --> 03:29.680
States in the Navy's traditional way .

03:29.770 --> 03:33.460
Without a land , it expects to stand on

03:33.460 --> 03:36.600
its own feet in providing protection to

03:36.600 --> 03:39.540
the United States . This realization

03:39.540 --> 03:41.429
was evident in the joint Army and

03:41.429 --> 03:43.096
Navy's basic war plan for the

03:43.096 --> 03:45.262
Philippines . Updated in the spring of

03:45.262 --> 03:48.890
1941 or Plan Orange three prescribed a

03:48.890 --> 03:51.112
limited defense of the Philippines that

03:51.112 --> 03:53.334
focused primarily on denying an invader

03:53.334 --> 03:55.710
the use of Manila Bay . It also

03:55.710 --> 03:57.877
outlined a predetermined fallback plan

03:57.877 --> 03:59.654
for civilians and soldiers that

03:59.654 --> 04:01.821
acknowledged the difficulty of halting

04:01.821 --> 04:03.877
a Japanese invasion force that U . S

04:03.877 --> 04:05.821
intelligence estimated could reach

04:05.821 --> 04:08.500
300,000 troops in a month's time as the

04:08.500 --> 04:10.940
Japanese established a blockade against

04:10.950 --> 04:13.190
U . S . Reinforcements and resupply .

04:13.740 --> 04:15.851
As such , the plan for the defense of

04:15.851 --> 04:18.073
the Philippines is best understood as a

04:18.073 --> 04:21.060
delay if properly reinforced . It was

04:21.060 --> 04:23.171
hoped that the islands garrison could

04:23.171 --> 04:25.282
delay Japanese forces long enough for

04:25.282 --> 04:27.060
additional troops to arrive and

04:27.060 --> 04:29.570
partners to commit to the fight . A

04:29.570 --> 04:32.450
variation of a retrograde A delay is

04:32.450 --> 04:34.672
when a force under pressure trade space

04:34.672 --> 04:36.728
for time by slowing down the enemy's

04:36.728 --> 04:38.990
momentum and inflicting maximum damage

04:39.000 --> 04:40.970
on enemy forces without becoming

04:40.970 --> 04:42.160
decisively engaged .

04:54.340 --> 04:57.220
In 1935 the U . S . Congress voted to

04:57.220 --> 04:59.400
make the Philippines a commonwealth

04:59.410 --> 05:01.770
with full autonomy at the end of a 10

05:01.770 --> 05:04.380
year transitional period . This change

05:04.380 --> 05:06.102
to self governance shifted the

05:06.102 --> 05:08.213
responsibility for the defense of the

05:08.213 --> 05:10.324
islands to the Philippines government

05:10.324 --> 05:11.991
and its people . However , it

05:11.991 --> 05:13.991
complicated command and control and

05:13.991 --> 05:16.102
unity of effort between US forces and

05:16.102 --> 05:18.610
the Philippine army . In response , the

05:18.610 --> 05:20.721
Philippine National Assembly voted to

05:20.721 --> 05:22.832
stand up a force of 10,000 soldiers ,

05:22.832 --> 05:26.350
supplemented by 400,000 reserve troops ,

05:26.840 --> 05:28.784
at the request of President Manuel

05:28.784 --> 05:30.970
Kison . Douglas MacArthur , recently

05:30.970 --> 05:32.970
retired from the U . S . Army , was

05:32.970 --> 05:35.026
asked to oversee the creation of the

05:35.026 --> 05:37.081
Philippine army as field marshal and

05:37.081 --> 05:39.137
military advisor to the Commonwealth

05:39.137 --> 05:41.192
Government of the Philippines . From

05:41.192 --> 05:43.192
the start , MacArthur faced serious

05:43.192 --> 05:45.359
difficulties in training and preparing

05:45.359 --> 05:47.414
the Filipino forces for the future .

05:47.414 --> 05:49.414
With some 65 languages spoken among

05:49.414 --> 05:51.370
them , Filipino troops were often

05:51.370 --> 05:53.592
unable to effectively communicate among

05:53.592 --> 05:55.537
themselves or with their leaders .

05:55.640 --> 05:57.751
Additionally , the absence of schools

05:57.751 --> 05:59.807
for commissioned and noncommissioned

05:59.807 --> 06:01.751
officers was a serious obstacle to

06:01.751 --> 06:04.050
standardizing tactics , techniques and

06:04.050 --> 06:06.210
procedures across the highly diverse

06:06.210 --> 06:09.070
force . Severe shortages of weapons ,

06:09.080 --> 06:11.500
uniforms and housing also hampered the

06:11.500 --> 06:13.222
Philippine army's training and

06:13.222 --> 06:15.111
preparation . Such handicaps were

06:15.111 --> 06:17.000
magnified by the lack of military

06:17.000 --> 06:18.833
vehicles and permanent roads for

06:18.833 --> 06:20.870
transporting soldiers , a feature

06:20.870 --> 06:23.037
particularly ominous for forces tasked

06:23.037 --> 06:24.814
with conducting a delay . We're

06:24.814 --> 06:26.926
maintaining a mobility advantage over

06:26.926 --> 06:28.870
the attacking force is a necessary

06:28.870 --> 06:30.980
prerequisite for success . Thes

06:30.980 --> 06:32.758
handicaps were complicated by a

06:32.758 --> 06:34.869
military communication infrastructure

06:34.980 --> 06:36.869
that relied heavily on unreliable

06:36.869 --> 06:38.702
civilian telephone and telegraph

06:38.702 --> 06:41.310
systems . The Philippine army , however ,

06:41.320 --> 06:43.542
was not the only military unit training

06:43.542 --> 06:45.764
on Luzon prior to the Japanese attack .

06:46.260 --> 06:49.050
1941 the U . S . Army's Philippine

06:49.050 --> 06:51.272
Department , under the command of Major

06:51.272 --> 06:52.828
General George Gruner , was

06:52.828 --> 06:54.717
headquartered out of Fort William

06:54.717 --> 06:56.772
McKinley with over 22,000 soldiers .

06:57.210 --> 06:59.099
Its largest unit , the Philippine

06:59.099 --> 07:01.040
Division , was commanded by Major

07:01.040 --> 07:03.750
General Jonathan M . Wainwright and led

07:03.750 --> 07:06.210
by American officers . Though these two

07:06.210 --> 07:08.154
forces were originally intended to

07:08.154 --> 07:10.043
operate independently , the U . S

07:10.043 --> 07:12.210
forces under Gruner and the Philippine

07:12.210 --> 07:14.360
Army under MacArthur began combined

07:14.360 --> 07:17.950
training exercises in July 1941 as war

07:17.950 --> 07:20.860
with Japan appeared more likely . Japan ,

07:20.870 --> 07:23.070
a member of the Axis Alliance , had

07:23.070 --> 07:24.903
moved military units into French

07:24.903 --> 07:26.792
Indochina and assume protectorate

07:26.792 --> 07:29.360
status over the territory for the two

07:29.360 --> 07:31.750
generals . This posturing indicated

07:31.750 --> 07:33.806
that the Japanese could be preparing

07:33.806 --> 07:35.972
for additional offensive operations in

07:35.972 --> 07:38.139
Southeast Asia and the South Pacific .

07:38.540 --> 07:40.484
They say trouble always comes in .

07:40.484 --> 07:43.950
Three . Take a good close look at this

07:43.950 --> 07:46.960
trio . Remember these faces ?

07:48.040 --> 07:51.180
Yeah , remember them well . Did you

07:51.180 --> 07:53.450
ever meet them ? Don't hesitate .

07:54.540 --> 07:56.770
Intelligence analysts assess adversary

07:56.770 --> 07:58.992
actions and the posture of their forces

07:59.240 --> 08:01.560
to determine their intent and identify

08:01.560 --> 08:03.782
indications that can be used to warn of

08:03.782 --> 08:06.090
a pending attack . Indications and

08:06.090 --> 08:08.090
warnings are tied to timelines that

08:08.090 --> 08:10.257
informed commanders of how long before

08:10.257 --> 08:12.600
adversary is capable of attacking , in

08:12.600 --> 08:14.711
which course of action they're likely

08:14.711 --> 08:16.822
to pursue . Thes timelines enable the

08:16.822 --> 08:18.767
planning and response framework to

08:18.767 --> 08:20.878
react in accordance with the severity

08:20.878 --> 08:22.878
of the indication and the estimated

08:22.878 --> 08:25.100
enemy course of action . Commanders can

08:25.100 --> 08:27.044
then execute measures to deter the

08:27.044 --> 08:29.044
enemy from continued hostile acts ,

08:29.044 --> 08:30.989
while posturing friendly forces to

08:30.989 --> 08:33.740
respond if deterrence fails . The

08:33.740 --> 08:35.510
occupation of French Indochina

08:35.520 --> 08:37.576
triggered a response from the United

08:37.576 --> 08:39.576
States designed to ward off further

08:39.576 --> 08:41.770
aggression by the Japanese . After

08:41.770 --> 08:43.770
placing a freeze on all U . S based

08:43.770 --> 08:46.030
Japanese assets , President Franklin

08:46.030 --> 08:47.974
Roosevelt then halted shipments of

08:47.974 --> 08:50.540
rubber , iron and fuel to Japan and

08:50.540 --> 08:52.318
began planning for the military

08:52.318 --> 08:54.262
reinforcement of the Philippines .

08:54.840 --> 08:56.618
President Roosevelt's actions ,

08:56.620 --> 08:58.564
designed to deter further Japanese

08:58.564 --> 09:00.676
aggression in the region are examples

09:00.676 --> 09:03.250
of flexible deterrent options or f Dios

09:04.140 --> 09:06.029
f . Dios are established to deter

09:06.029 --> 09:08.680
actions before or during a crisis and

09:08.680 --> 09:10.513
maybe used to prepare for future

09:10.513 --> 09:12.580
operations . They're developed and

09:12.580 --> 09:14.469
executed using each instrument of

09:14.469 --> 09:16.136
national power , diplomatic ,

09:16.140 --> 09:18.560
informational , military and economic ,

09:19.040 --> 09:21.040
but are most effective when used in

09:21.040 --> 09:23.370
concert . F d oes provide options for

09:23.370 --> 09:25.537
decision makers during emerging crises

09:25.537 --> 09:27.426
to allow for gradual increases in

09:27.426 --> 09:29.314
pressure to avoid unintentionally

09:29.314 --> 09:31.314
provoking full scale combat , while

09:31.314 --> 09:33.300
simultaneously enabling leaders to

09:33.300 --> 09:35.522
develop the situation and gain a better

09:35.522 --> 09:37.467
understanding of the adversaries ,

09:37.467 --> 09:39.690
capabilities and intentions . Already

09:39.690 --> 09:41.523
reeling under trade restrictions

09:41.523 --> 09:43.746
imposed the previous year , this action

09:43.746 --> 09:45.746
pushed Japanese military leadership

09:45.746 --> 09:47.950
into a corner , lacking the necessary

09:47.950 --> 09:50.061
materials to continue their plans for

09:50.061 --> 09:52.283
conquest . They made the decision to go

09:52.283 --> 09:55.080
to war by December 1941 if negotiations

09:55.080 --> 09:56.970
failed to reverse US sanctions .

10:04.240 --> 10:08.090
Sensing the coming conflict , President

10:08.090 --> 10:09.757
Roosevelt moved to defend the

10:09.757 --> 10:11.368
Philippines by combining the

10:11.368 --> 10:13.646
territorial Philippine army with the U .

10:13.646 --> 10:15.812
S Army units already stationed there .

10:16.040 --> 10:18.207
He then placed MacArthur in command of

10:18.207 --> 10:20.373
the newly combined force designated as

10:20.373 --> 10:23.130
United States Army Forces Far East or

10:23.130 --> 10:24.970
use a fee , and charged him with

10:24.970 --> 10:27.380
defending the islands . MacArthur was

10:27.380 --> 10:29.602
also recalled the active duty in the US

10:29.602 --> 10:31.769
Army and was soon promoted to the rank

10:31.769 --> 10:35.240
of general earlier that Spring War plan

10:35.240 --> 10:37.530
Orange three have been included as part

10:37.530 --> 10:39.530
of the National War plan , known as

10:39.530 --> 10:42.290
Rainbow Five . National Plan was based

10:42.290 --> 10:44.457
on a recently signed agreement between

10:44.457 --> 10:46.568
the United States and Great Britain ,

10:46.568 --> 10:48.401
this gay priority for supply and

10:48.401 --> 10:50.512
support to the war in Europe over all

10:50.512 --> 10:53.050
other areas of conflict . Establishing

10:53.050 --> 10:55.050
a timetable for completion by April

10:55.050 --> 10:58.250
1942 . The general's plan called for a

10:58.250 --> 11:00.430
reinforced defense that incorporated

11:00.430 --> 11:02.710
the islands natural terrain features to

11:02.710 --> 11:04.910
stop and repulse attacking forces on

11:04.910 --> 11:07.470
the beaches while relying heavily on U .

11:07.470 --> 11:09.940
S Army air power to actively attrit the

11:09.940 --> 11:12.700
enemy . By building his defense around

11:12.700 --> 11:14.589
the terrain and natural obstacles

11:14.589 --> 11:16.367
present on the island , General

11:16.367 --> 11:18.478
MacArthur illustrated a central tenet

11:18.478 --> 11:20.710
of defensive operations According to

11:20.710 --> 11:22.930
Army doctrine , Commander always takes

11:22.930 --> 11:25.097
advantage of the terrain when planning

11:25.097 --> 11:27.041
how to position forces and conduct

11:27.041 --> 11:29.410
operations . The terrain dictates where

11:29.410 --> 11:31.632
a delaying force can orient on a moving

11:31.632 --> 11:33.770
enemy force and ambush it . Ah

11:33.770 --> 11:35.881
commander , conducting operations and

11:35.881 --> 11:37.714
compartmentalized terrain select

11:37.714 --> 11:39.714
locations that restrict the enemy's

11:39.714 --> 11:41.770
movement and prevent the enemy force

11:41.770 --> 11:43.603
from fully exploiting its combat

11:43.603 --> 11:46.740
superiority . Chief of Staff General

11:46.740 --> 11:48.684
George C . Marshall was personally

11:48.684 --> 11:50.684
familiar with the Philippines and ,

11:50.684 --> 11:52.573
after reviewing McArthur's plan ,

11:52.573 --> 11:54.740
authorized immediate transportation of

11:54.740 --> 11:56.240
the essential supplies and

11:56.240 --> 11:58.296
reinforcements that he had requested

12:06.740 --> 12:09.210
to reinforce . The Philippines Army

12:09.210 --> 12:11.266
leadership deployed several National

12:11.266 --> 12:13.760
Guard units , the 200 Coastal Artillery

12:13.760 --> 12:17.590
Regiment and the 192nd and 194th Tank

12:17.590 --> 12:19.850
battalions equipped with M three Stuart

12:19.850 --> 12:22.350
tanks . MacArthur also received

12:22.350 --> 12:24.250
reinforcements for his air arm to

12:24.250 --> 12:27.110
include P 40 Warhawk fighter planes and

12:27.110 --> 12:30.240
B 17 Flying Fortress bombers . However ,

12:30.430 --> 12:32.652
shortages and shipping space meant that

12:32.652 --> 12:34.597
some items were delayed or did not

12:34.597 --> 12:37.450
arrive . In one instance , air crews

12:37.450 --> 12:39.283
arrived in Manila ahead of their

12:39.283 --> 12:41.172
aircraft just before the start of

12:41.172 --> 12:43.690
hostilities in December . Since

12:43.690 --> 12:45.690
delivery of their A 24 banshee dive

12:45.690 --> 12:47.746
bombers never occurred . Thes airman

12:47.746 --> 12:49.801
spent the rest of the war , fighting

12:49.801 --> 12:52.040
his infantry to compensate for his lack

12:52.040 --> 12:54.151
of updated equipment and well trained

12:54.151 --> 12:56.400
personnel . McArthur's plan relied

12:56.400 --> 12:58.511
heavily on close integration with the

12:58.511 --> 13:01.460
Filipino forces . Recalling all 10

13:01.460 --> 13:03.571
divisions of the Philippine army from

13:03.571 --> 13:06.080
reserve for training and refitting , he

13:06.080 --> 13:08.247
task organized them into five distinct

13:08.247 --> 13:11.060
forces . The North Luzon Force , under

13:11.060 --> 13:13.393
the command of Major General Wainwright ,

13:13.540 --> 13:15.707
defended strategically important areas

13:15.707 --> 13:17.950
of Luzon . He's included the only

13:17.950 --> 13:20.700
beaches wide enough and deep enough to

13:20.700 --> 13:22.756
accommodate a large scale amphibious

13:22.756 --> 13:25.490
landing . The North Luzon Force also

13:25.490 --> 13:27.379
had responsibility for the Bataan

13:27.379 --> 13:29.600
Peninsula war plan . Orange is

13:29.600 --> 13:31.800
designated fallback area should the

13:31.800 --> 13:33.967
Japanese invasion proved unstoppable .

13:34.840 --> 13:37.610
Organizationally , North Luzon forces

13:37.610 --> 13:39.499
consisted of the horse mounted 26

13:39.499 --> 13:41.540
Cavalry Regiment and the first

13:41.540 --> 13:44.120
Battalion , 45th Infantry , both of

13:44.120 --> 13:45.787
which were fully equipped and

13:45.787 --> 13:48.009
extensively trained Philippine scouts .

13:48.640 --> 13:50.584
Thes units were accompanied by two

13:50.584 --> 13:53.190
batteries of 155 millimeter artillery

13:53.280 --> 13:56.040
and one battery of 2.95 inch mountain

13:56.040 --> 13:59.170
guns . Three Philippine Army infantry

13:59.170 --> 14:02.810
divisions the 11th 21st and the 31st

14:03.120 --> 14:04.842
completed Wainwright's command

14:05.240 --> 14:07.240
MacArthur plan to support the North

14:07.240 --> 14:09.351
Luzon Force with the Philippines 71st

14:09.351 --> 14:11.640
Infantry Division held in reserve at

14:11.640 --> 14:13.790
Manila . This division could only be

14:13.790 --> 14:15.846
released with MacArthur's permission

14:16.240 --> 14:18.570
following the war . Wainwright recall

14:18.570 --> 14:20.792
the situation when he took over command

14:20.792 --> 14:23.530
of the North Luzon Force . Let me give

14:23.530 --> 14:25.641
you an example of the training status

14:25.641 --> 14:27.863
of the Philippine armies divisions . On

14:27.863 --> 14:29.863
the eve of the attack , infantrymen

14:29.863 --> 14:31.974
trained on an average of 3 to 4 weeks

14:31.974 --> 14:33.697
before being forced to fight .

14:33.697 --> 14:35.641
Engineers got no training at all .

14:35.641 --> 14:37.863
Artillery never fired a practice shot .

14:37.863 --> 14:40.530
Indeed , its first shot . It was aimed

14:40.530 --> 14:42.308
in the general direction of the

14:42.308 --> 14:44.280
approaching enemy Infantry had no

14:44.280 --> 14:46.336
combat practice , no combat training

14:47.460 --> 14:49.571
and little or no rifle or machine gun

14:49.571 --> 14:52.010
practice . The divisions did not have a

14:52.010 --> 14:54.350
full complement of artillery . There

14:54.350 --> 14:56.517
was no means of transportation for any

14:56.517 --> 14:58.740
artillery . We got practically no

14:58.740 --> 15:01.610
transportation for any purpose . The

15:01.610 --> 15:04.520
divisions were badly undermanned . They

15:04.520 --> 15:06.700
were all short of ammunition . We were

15:06.700 --> 15:10.260
terribly short hand grenades , 50

15:10.260 --> 15:12.590
caliber machine gun , an infantry

15:12.590 --> 15:15.510
mortar ammunition . My command was

15:15.510 --> 15:19.170
spread over an area 75 miles from north

15:19.170 --> 15:22.560
to south , 100 miles from east to west ,

15:23.140 --> 15:25.140
But the only means of communication

15:25.140 --> 15:27.307
with the various divisions was through

15:27.307 --> 15:30.250
the public telephone lines . South

15:30.250 --> 15:32.220
Luzon force commanded by Brigadier

15:32.220 --> 15:34.670
General George M . Parker Jr . Was

15:34.670 --> 15:36.559
responsible for defending his own

15:36.559 --> 15:38.726
covering the capital of Manila all the

15:38.726 --> 15:41.540
way south to the tip of Luzon . His

15:41.540 --> 15:43.762
forces were comprised of two Philippine

15:43.762 --> 15:46.050
Army infantry divisions , the 41st and

15:46.050 --> 15:48.320
51st . They found themselves in the

15:48.320 --> 15:50.376
same training and equipment shortage

15:50.376 --> 15:52.431
situation as the North Luzon Force .

15:52.900 --> 15:54.900
They were supplemented by a battery

15:54.900 --> 15:56.956
from the 86th Field Artillery of the

15:56.956 --> 15:59.240
Philippine Scouts . MacArthur's third

15:59.240 --> 16:01.407
force was organized to defend the busy

16:01.407 --> 16:04.270
in Mindanao island's area . It fell

16:04.270 --> 16:06.492
under the commander , Brigadier General

16:06.492 --> 16:08.659
William F . Sharp , and included three

16:08.659 --> 16:11.000
Philippine Army infantry divisions 61st

16:11.010 --> 16:14.700
81st and 101st The Harbor Defense

16:14.700 --> 16:16.560
Force under the command of Major

16:16.560 --> 16:18.490
General George F . More , was

16:18.490 --> 16:20.370
MacArthur's fourth force and was

16:20.370 --> 16:22.537
comprised of four regiments of coastal

16:22.537 --> 16:24.760
artillery and one regiment of air

16:24.760 --> 16:27.750
defense artillery . The fifth and final

16:27.750 --> 16:30.300
force , located north of Manila , was

16:30.300 --> 16:32.300
the reserve force under MacArthur's

16:32.300 --> 16:35.120
direct command along with You Saffy

16:35.120 --> 16:37.342
headquarters , the reserves operational

16:37.342 --> 16:39.430
forces consistent of the Philippine

16:39.430 --> 16:41.430
91st Division and the U . S .

16:41.430 --> 16:43.430
Philippine Division , consisting of

16:43.430 --> 16:45.263
three infantry regiments and the

16:45.263 --> 16:47.860
division artillery or Dave Rt . It also

16:47.860 --> 16:49.860
included the first provisional Tank

16:49.860 --> 16:52.193
group consisting of two tank battalions .

16:55.240 --> 16:57.073
Rounding out General MacArthur's

16:57.073 --> 16:59.110
command was the Far East Air Force

16:59.470 --> 17:01.590
commanded by Major General Lewis H .

17:01.590 --> 17:04.810
Brereton , which in December of 1941

17:05.050 --> 17:07.161
was the largest concentration of Army

17:07.161 --> 17:09.110
Air Corps aircraft outside of the

17:09.110 --> 17:12.160
continental United States . Logistical

17:12.160 --> 17:14.560
support , including food , ammunition ,

17:14.570 --> 17:16.890
weapons and medical supplies , were

17:16.890 --> 17:19.001
transferred from depots on Bataan and

17:19.001 --> 17:20.800
the island of Corregidor and

17:20.800 --> 17:22.911
distributed to each defending force .

17:23.260 --> 17:25.316
This was done to support MacArthur's

17:25.316 --> 17:27.260
desire to defend as far forward as

17:27.260 --> 17:29.990
possible . The 16th Naval District ,

17:30.000 --> 17:31.889
under the command of Rear Admiral

17:31.889 --> 17:34.240
Francis W . Rockwell , was also a vital

17:34.240 --> 17:36.730
part of the defense force , with

17:36.730 --> 17:39.010
installation that cavity , Olongapo and

17:39.010 --> 17:41.070
Corregidor . It included cruisers ,

17:41.180 --> 17:44.900
destroyers , submarines , patrol

17:44.900 --> 17:47.170
boats and the fourth Marine Regiment .

17:48.640 --> 17:50.584
The Wonder orders to assist in the

17:50.584 --> 17:52.362
defense of the Philippines . It

17:52.362 --> 17:54.500
remained independent of use a fee and

17:54.500 --> 17:56.611
instead reported to the U . S Asiatic

17:56.611 --> 17:58.840
fleet , headquartered in Manila under

17:58.840 --> 18:01.180
the command of Admiral Thomas C . Heart ,

18:01.640 --> 18:03.807
a testament to the early growing pains

18:03.807 --> 18:06.084
associated with creating a joint force .

18:06.300 --> 18:08.467
This lack of a unified command was not

18:08.467 --> 18:10.578
unique to the Philippines and plagued

18:10.578 --> 18:12.633
US operations throughout much of the

18:12.633 --> 18:14.880
Pacific campaign from MacArthur and

18:14.880 --> 18:17.600
Rockwell , it upset unity of effort and

18:17.600 --> 18:19.656
further complicated their defense of

18:19.656 --> 18:20.460
the island .

18:28.040 --> 18:29.929
Running low on resource is in the

18:29.929 --> 18:32.760
summer of 1941 . The Japanese

18:32.760 --> 18:34.816
prioritized the seizing of the Dutch

18:34.816 --> 18:37.090
East Indies and the Malay Peninsula

18:37.100 --> 18:39.322
ahead of all other goals . They were in

18:39.322 --> 18:41.322
their way , way had to be removed ,

18:41.440 --> 18:44.120
committed the Japanese way to do this .

18:44.130 --> 18:46.186
They understood that the U . S naval

18:46.186 --> 18:48.408
forces stationed at Pearl Harbor needed

18:48.408 --> 18:50.574
to be neutralized on that . The threat

18:50.574 --> 18:52.797
from U . S . Naval and air power in the

18:52.797 --> 18:54.686
Philippines had to be addressed .

18:54.686 --> 18:56.908
Deciding on his final attack plans . In

18:56.908 --> 18:58.741
mid November , Japanese Imperial

18:58.741 --> 19:00.408
General Headquarters assigned

19:00.408 --> 19:02.900
Lieutenant General Masaharu Homma and

19:02.900 --> 19:04.511
his 14th Army to conquer the

19:04.511 --> 19:06.678
Philippines . Lieutenant General Hamas

19:06.678 --> 19:09.180
army was made up of the 16th and 48th

19:09.190 --> 19:11.450
Infantry divisions , augmented with

19:11.450 --> 19:13.283
additional armored regiments and

19:13.283 --> 19:15.450
mountain artillery brigades . Although

19:15.450 --> 19:17.561
they were called regiments , Japanese

19:17.561 --> 19:19.506
armor regiments were equivalent to

19:19.506 --> 19:21.672
American armor battalions and Japanese

19:21.672 --> 19:23.728
tanks were of poor quality . They're

19:23.728 --> 19:25.672
medium tank being smaller than the

19:25.672 --> 19:27.561
American Stewart light tank . The

19:27.590 --> 19:29.646
Japanese invasion of the Philippines

19:29.646 --> 19:31.790
was planned down to the hour and by

19:31.790 --> 19:33.960
integrating land , sea and air power ,

19:33.970 --> 19:35.790
they quickly overwhelmed US and

19:35.790 --> 19:38.410
Filipino forces , establishing several

19:38.410 --> 19:41.700
key lodge mints . Japanese plans called

19:41.700 --> 19:43.922
for the complete destruction of the Far

19:43.922 --> 19:45.811
East air force and the seizure of

19:45.811 --> 19:47.867
several key airfields throughout the

19:47.867 --> 19:49.811
island chain . This would give the

19:49.811 --> 19:51.811
Japanese air superiority , enabling

19:51.811 --> 19:53.867
homeless divisions to attack without

19:53.867 --> 19:55.867
being harassed from the air . To do

19:55.867 --> 19:57.922
this , Japanese infantry would seize

19:57.922 --> 19:59.922
the key airfield on Bataan Island ,

19:59.922 --> 20:01.922
north of Luzon , while fighters and

20:01.922 --> 20:03.867
bombers stationed on Formosa would

20:03.867 --> 20:06.620
attack airfields on Luzon . Japanese

20:06.630 --> 20:08.741
infantry would then continue to other

20:08.741 --> 20:11.560
fields at a party , Vegan and Legaspi

20:11.570 --> 20:13.670
further south , culminating with the

20:13.670 --> 20:15.781
seizure of the airfield at the bow on

20:15.781 --> 20:18.003
the large island of Mindanao , south of

20:18.003 --> 20:20.250
Luzon . With air superiority

20:20.250 --> 20:22.139
established and several airfields

20:22.139 --> 20:24.350
secured , the 14th Army would be free

20:24.350 --> 20:27.010
to begin its main landings on Luzon .

20:27.640 --> 20:29.807
The 14th army's main effort would then

20:29.807 --> 20:32.420
come ashore at Lingayen Gulf , some 200

20:32.420 --> 20:34.930
kilometers north of Manila , and begin

20:34.930 --> 20:37.010
attacking towards the capital . A

20:37.010 --> 20:39.660
smaller force would land at Lemon Bay ,

20:39.670 --> 20:42.580
120 kilometers south of Manila , and

20:42.580 --> 20:44.469
proceed north to link up with the

20:44.469 --> 20:46.580
larger force in a combined assault on

20:46.580 --> 20:49.160
the city after capturing the capital .

20:49.380 --> 20:51.602
The Japanese could then sees Manila Bay

20:51.780 --> 20:53.970
and defeat any remaining U . S and

20:53.970 --> 20:56.800
Philippine forces on Luzon , placing

20:56.800 --> 20:59.022
them in firm control of the largest and

20:59.022 --> 21:00.633
most important island in the

21:00.633 --> 21:02.180
Philippines . Yeah

21:09.840 --> 21:12.070
theater attack on Pearl Harbor signaled

21:12.070 --> 21:13.903
the start of the invasion of the

21:13.903 --> 21:16.630
Philippines . US . Asiatic fleet

21:16.630 --> 21:18.852
headquarters in Manila was the first to

21:18.852 --> 21:21.740
be notified at 0 to 30 hours local time

21:21.750 --> 21:24.930
on 8 December . General MacArthur ,

21:24.930 --> 21:27.152
however , was not notified of the event

21:27.152 --> 21:29.263
until an hour later when his chief of

21:29.263 --> 21:31.374
staff heard the news over the radio .

21:31.580 --> 21:33.802
MacArthur immediately put his troops on

21:33.802 --> 21:35.858
alert , attacked four months earlier

21:35.858 --> 21:38.080
than intelligence estimates predicted ,

21:38.080 --> 21:40.136
MacArthur had only a fraction of the

21:40.136 --> 21:42.136
necessary equipment and supplies he

21:42.136 --> 21:44.358
needed to defend the Philippines as the

21:44.358 --> 21:46.136
Japanese began their invasion .

21:46.136 --> 21:48.247
Majority of MacArthur soldiers and in

21:48.247 --> 21:50.469
particular the Philippine Army troops ,

21:50.469 --> 21:52.650
lack even the most basic necessities ,

21:52.660 --> 21:55.060
from boots and helmets to serviceable

21:55.060 --> 21:57.240
rifles and ammunition . More

21:57.240 --> 21:59.296
importantly , they lack the training

21:59.296 --> 22:01.296
necessary to fight his units in the

22:01.296 --> 22:04.070
field . In contrast , the Japanese

22:04.070 --> 22:06.070
forces were better trained and well

22:06.070 --> 22:08.020
equipped with units having prior

22:08.020 --> 22:10.300
battlefield experience obtained during

22:10.300 --> 22:12.460
the ongoing Sino Japanese war .

22:13.440 --> 22:15.273
Concerned that his airfields and

22:15.273 --> 22:17.440
aircraft might suffer the same fate as

22:17.440 --> 22:19.218
those in Hawaii , Major General

22:19.218 --> 22:21.440
Brereton requested permission for his B

22:21.440 --> 22:23.218
seventeens to begin bombing the

22:23.218 --> 22:26.210
Japanese airfields on Formosa . However ,

22:26.330 --> 22:28.274
due to delays , a miscommunication

22:28.274 --> 22:30.386
between Britain and MacArthur's staff

22:30.740 --> 22:32.907
for origins , fighters and bombers did

22:32.907 --> 22:35.018
not mount an attack against Formosa .

22:35.340 --> 22:38.450
Instead , Japanese fighters and bombers

22:38.460 --> 22:40.450
based only 800 kilometers away on

22:40.450 --> 22:42.950
Formosa arrived over Clark and Eva

22:42.950 --> 22:45.340
airfields with little opposition from

22:45.340 --> 22:47.630
antiquated anti aircraft guns . Thea

22:47.640 --> 22:49.362
Enemy attack both facilities ,

22:49.740 --> 22:51.796
destroying their radar equipment and

22:51.796 --> 22:53.907
strafing or bombing the aircraft that

22:53.907 --> 22:55.851
had been holding for permission to

22:55.851 --> 22:59.130
attack the Japanese . According to plan .

22:59.220 --> 23:01.570
Japanese infantry landed unopposed on

23:01.570 --> 23:04.660
Bataan Island that same morning . They

23:04.660 --> 23:06.827
then proceeded to seize and secure the

23:06.827 --> 23:08.670
US airfield located there and to

23:08.670 --> 23:10.726
establish a base for the short range

23:10.726 --> 23:12.980
fighters . More importantly , the

23:12.980 --> 23:15.036
destruction of over half of Army Air

23:15.036 --> 23:17.390
Force assets at Clark and Eva airfields

23:17.810 --> 23:20.110
established Japanese air superiority

23:20.120 --> 23:22.500
over the Philippines on the first day

23:22.500 --> 23:23.500
of the war .

23:30.240 --> 23:31.240
Yeah ,

23:36.040 --> 23:39.070
the theme . Next day , 9 December ,

23:39.440 --> 23:41.610
Japanese bombers from Formosa struck

23:41.610 --> 23:43.570
Nichols Field , destroying more

23:43.570 --> 23:45.570
aircraft and seriously damaging the

23:45.570 --> 23:48.860
installation . Opposition was light

23:49.440 --> 23:51.607
understanding that his ships could not

23:51.607 --> 23:53.773
expect protection from aerial attack .

23:53.773 --> 23:55.884
Admiral Heart dispatched the majority

23:55.884 --> 23:57.773
of his fleet south to Australia .

23:57.773 --> 24:00.090
Following their departure , Japanese

24:00.090 --> 24:02.034
attacked the naval facilities that

24:02.034 --> 24:05.620
cavity on 10 December as cavity burned

24:05.630 --> 24:08.290
Japanese infantry , supported by naval

24:08.290 --> 24:10.480
aircraft and gunfire from the Japanese

24:10.480 --> 24:13.080
fleet , landed on Comedian Island north

24:13.080 --> 24:15.880
of Luzon . The few US aircraft left

24:15.880 --> 24:17.890
operational attacked units of the

24:17.890 --> 24:20.001
second for most a regiment as it came

24:20.001 --> 24:22.400
ashore at Vegan and a party , sinking

24:22.400 --> 24:24.567
one Japanese mine sweeper and damaging

24:24.567 --> 24:27.560
four other vessels comprised of third

24:27.560 --> 24:29.338
battalion and half of the first

24:29.338 --> 24:31.616
Battalion , second for most a regiment .

24:31.616 --> 24:34.160
The 2000 strong Cano detachment came

24:34.160 --> 24:36.900
ashore at Vegan , another similarly

24:36.900 --> 24:39.040
sized force known as the Tanaka

24:39.040 --> 24:41.180
Detachment , comprised of the second

24:41.180 --> 24:43.291
Battalion and the other half of first

24:43.291 --> 24:45.458
Battalion . Second for most a regiment

24:45.458 --> 24:47.740
attacked at a party . Thes multiple

24:47.740 --> 24:49.796
landings were supported by two heavy

24:49.796 --> 24:52.540
cruisers . Two destroyers and defensive

24:52.540 --> 24:54.400
counter air provided by fighter

24:54.400 --> 24:57.170
aircraft from Baton Island over the

24:57.170 --> 24:59.780
next few days to detachments broke out

24:59.780 --> 25:02.002
from their initial arguments at a party

25:02.002 --> 25:03.950
and vegan and began moving south

25:03.950 --> 25:06.480
towards Manila along the coast on Route

25:06.480 --> 25:10.460
three on 12 December 2500 Japanese

25:10.460 --> 25:12.182
soldiers , known as the Kimura

25:12.182 --> 25:14.349
Detachment , came ashore approximately

25:14.349 --> 25:17.140
500 kilometers southeast of Manila . At

25:17.140 --> 25:20.010
Legaspi . General Parker , commander of

25:20.010 --> 25:22.410
the South Luzon Force , sent untried

25:22.410 --> 25:24.720
elements from the 41st and 51st

25:24.720 --> 25:26.960
Philippine Army divisions to counter

25:26.960 --> 25:29.450
attack . But these were soon routed by

25:29.450 --> 25:32.120
the better train Japanese . After

25:32.120 --> 25:34.231
successfully seizing its objective at

25:34.231 --> 25:36.570
Legaspi , the commuter detachment began

25:36.570 --> 25:39.280
its march north on Route one to link up

25:39.280 --> 25:41.336
with the forces landing at Lemon Bay

25:41.336 --> 25:42.891
for the advance on Manila .

26:00.670 --> 26:02.920
Keeping to lieutenant general homeless

26:02.920 --> 26:04.698
Timetable for the taking of the

26:04.698 --> 26:07.160
Philippines enemy landings until now

26:07.320 --> 26:09.890
have been minor incursions . However ,

26:09.900 --> 26:12.440
on 22 December homeless , main effort

26:12.450 --> 26:14.760
came ashore along the Lingayen Gulf ,

26:15.540 --> 26:17.970
comprised of the entire Japanese 48

26:17.970 --> 26:20.137
division with attached elements of the

26:20.137 --> 26:22.900
16th division Hamas Lingayen Force

26:22.910 --> 26:25.260
Total just over 40,000 soldiers .

26:25.940 --> 26:28.100
Following a carefully time plan that

26:28.100 --> 26:30.267
called for landings at three different

26:30.267 --> 26:32.550
locations along a 24 kilometer stretch

26:32.550 --> 26:34.330
of the Gulf , the first wave of

26:34.330 --> 26:36.441
Japanese landing craft approached the

26:36.441 --> 26:40.140
beaches at 0 500 beginning in the south

26:40.150 --> 26:42.690
units of the 47th Infantry Regiment and

26:42.700 --> 26:44.922
elements of the 48th Mountain artillery

26:44.922 --> 26:47.110
landed at the village of Agu ,

26:47.120 --> 26:49.210
overcoming rough seas and weak

26:49.210 --> 26:51.432
resistance from unseasoned units of the

26:51.432 --> 26:53.654
11th Philippine Infantry Division . The

26:53.654 --> 26:55.710
Japanese landed most of their forces

26:55.710 --> 26:58.470
with minimal loss . The middle landing

26:58.480 --> 27:00.480
was conducted by units of the first

27:00.480 --> 27:02.830
Formosa Infantry Regiment on elements

27:02.840 --> 27:05.070
of the 40th Mountain artillery at the

27:05.070 --> 27:07.330
village of Our in Gay . The landings

27:07.330 --> 27:09.274
were virtually unopposed , and the

27:09.274 --> 27:11.497
first foremost troops soon turned south

27:11.497 --> 27:13.608
on Route three to join their comrades

27:13.608 --> 27:15.750
of the 47th Infantry Regiment who had

27:15.750 --> 27:18.470
landed at a booth . Final landing two

27:18.470 --> 27:20.840
hours later by units of the comedy

27:20.840 --> 27:23.062
Media Catchment , composed primarily of

27:23.062 --> 27:25.229
the ninth Infantry Regiment , occurred

27:25.229 --> 27:27.562
further north at the village of Bo Wang .

27:27.562 --> 27:29.618
Moving ashore through rough waters ,

27:29.618 --> 27:31.340
they briefly encountered stiff

27:31.340 --> 27:33.284
resistance from troops of the 12th

27:33.284 --> 27:35.284
Philippine Infantry Regiment before

27:35.284 --> 27:37.780
seizing the village . Breaking out from

27:37.780 --> 27:39.613
their lodge mint , they dispatch

27:39.613 --> 27:41.550
patrols along Route three to make

27:41.560 --> 27:43.227
contact with Colonel Tanaka's

27:43.227 --> 27:45.338
detachment as it came south along the

27:45.338 --> 27:47.500
road , advancing against light

27:47.500 --> 27:50.010
resistance . Ah , unit of the comic Jim ,

27:50.010 --> 27:52.350
A detachment attacked along the bow ,

27:52.350 --> 27:54.780
Wang Beg , you wrote , that ran to

27:54.780 --> 27:56.502
Rosario through the Cordillera

27:56.502 --> 27:58.920
Mountains and then seized the airfield

27:58.930 --> 28:01.530
at No . Gillian the enemy success

28:01.530 --> 28:04.100
forced the 71st Philippine Regiment and

28:04.110 --> 28:05.888
elements of the 11th Philippine

28:05.888 --> 28:09.050
Division to withdraw . Meanwhile , the

28:09.050 --> 28:11.217
main body of the Kamajii Me detachment

28:11.217 --> 28:13.217
sees the village of bag you further

28:13.217 --> 28:15.310
east to prevent US forces from

28:15.310 --> 28:17.410
outflanking the landing force and to

28:17.410 --> 28:19.521
act as a rearguard for the Japanese .

28:19.521 --> 28:22.110
Advance on Manila As the enemy began

28:22.110 --> 28:24.360
its move inland , Wainwright's 21st

28:24.360 --> 28:26.590
division defended the southern shores

28:26.600 --> 28:28.800
this'll f the soldiers of the 26

28:28.800 --> 28:31.040
Calvary Philippine scouts led by

28:31.040 --> 28:33.360
Colonel Clinton a pierce to defend

28:33.360 --> 28:35.471
against Japanese movement south along

28:35.471 --> 28:37.830
Route three from the village of Peugeot .

28:37.830 --> 28:41.210
Rovio advancing south along Route three .

28:41.220 --> 28:43.690
Colonel He Fumi Mayes , first foremost

28:43.690 --> 28:46.050
a regiment on elements of the 48th

28:46.050 --> 28:48.106
Mountain Artillery , received little

28:48.106 --> 28:50.217
opposition from the inexperienced and

28:50.217 --> 28:52.380
lightly armed 11th Division . Has he

28:52.380 --> 28:54.380
advanced towards the village of Dom

28:54.380 --> 28:56.547
Ortiz . Along the way , they linked up

28:56.550 --> 28:58.494
with the 48th reconnaissance ninth

28:58.494 --> 29:00.550
Infantry Regiment on the fourth Tank

29:00.550 --> 29:02.800
Regiment . Both had come ashore earlier

29:02.810 --> 29:05.820
north of Dar Marti's . After advancing

29:05.820 --> 29:08.160
out of a goo , Colonel Issam You , You ,

29:08.160 --> 29:11.260
Nagy's 47th Infantry and a battalion of

29:11.260 --> 29:13.850
the 40th Mountain Artillery face weak

29:13.850 --> 29:16.072
resistance from a battalion of the 11th

29:16.072 --> 29:17.890
Infantry Division , which then

29:17.890 --> 29:20.740
retreated to damn Ortiz . Aware of the

29:20.740 --> 29:23.010
growing advance on Marty's , General

29:23.010 --> 29:25.630
Wainwright ordered the 26th Calvary to

29:25.630 --> 29:28.450
move from Poos Arrobio through Rosario

29:28.460 --> 29:30.620
and onto damn Ortiz to aid in its

29:30.620 --> 29:34.190
defense . When the 26 scout car platoon

29:34.200 --> 29:36.510
arrived down Marti's , they found the

29:36.510 --> 29:39.120
town on occupied the platoon , then

29:39.120 --> 29:41.231
moved north on Route three , where it

29:41.231 --> 29:43.340
made contact with the Japanese 48th

29:43.340 --> 29:45.673
Reconnaissance and Fourth Tank Regiment .

29:46.340 --> 29:48.340
Unable to advance , the platoon

29:48.340 --> 29:50.390
returned to Dar Marty's , where the

29:50.390 --> 29:52.930
26th Calvary was ordered . Toe hold in

29:52.930 --> 29:54.986
a delaying action should have forced

29:54.986 --> 29:56.986
withdrawal of the North Luzon force

29:56.986 --> 30:00.090
become necessary . At 1300 Japanese

30:00.090 --> 30:02.240
aircraft , armor and infantry units

30:02.250 --> 30:05.180
began the attack on Dom Ortiz . In

30:05.180 --> 30:07.180
response , Colonel Pierce asked for

30:07.180 --> 30:08.958
additional support from General

30:08.958 --> 30:11.180
Wainwright , who requested a company of

30:11.180 --> 30:13.124
tanks from Brigadier General James

30:13.124 --> 30:15.124
Weaver , the Provisional Tank Group

30:15.124 --> 30:17.180
commander . Due to a fuel shortage .

30:17.180 --> 30:19.347
Weaver was only able to send a platoon

30:19.347 --> 30:21.236
of five tanks , all of which were

30:21.236 --> 30:23.124
either destroyed or damaged by 47

30:23.124 --> 30:25.080
millimeter anti tank fire or the

30:25.080 --> 30:29.010
enemy's tanks by 1600 additional

30:29.010 --> 30:31.470
Japanese units joined the battle and by

30:31.470 --> 30:33.980
1900 damn Ortiz had fallen into

30:33.980 --> 30:36.840
Japanese hands . Order to withdraw .

30:36.850 --> 30:38.961
Colonel Pierce's Calvary paid a heavy

30:38.961 --> 30:41.090
price in lives and horses while

30:41.090 --> 30:43.257
performing successful delaying actions

30:43.257 --> 30:45.368
to protect the 11th divisions , right

30:45.368 --> 30:48.400
flank attacked by the Japanese Upon

30:48.400 --> 30:51.380
their arrival in Rosario , 26 Calvary

30:51.380 --> 30:53.436
Regiment was forced withdraw again ,

30:53.740 --> 30:55.970
this time further to the south , where

30:55.970 --> 30:57.914
they were ordered to hold the road

30:57.914 --> 30:59.970
junction between Rosario and bag you

30:59.970 --> 31:02.170
until his defenses became untenable .

31:10.040 --> 31:12.260
By the morning of 23 December ,

31:12.640 --> 31:15.050
elements of the 71st division were in

31:15.050 --> 31:17.780
place along Route three south of C San ,

31:17.850 --> 31:19.850
preparing their defense , while the

31:19.850 --> 31:21.970
26th Calvary past south through their

31:21.970 --> 31:24.460
position on their way to pose arrobio .

31:25.140 --> 31:26.980
Although it may seem simple , a

31:26.980 --> 31:28.980
rearward passage of lines conducted

31:28.980 --> 31:31.147
under pressure from an attacking enemy

31:31.200 --> 31:33.530
is a difficult operation that requires

31:33.530 --> 31:35.752
close coordination and planning between

31:35.752 --> 31:37.752
the stationary and passing units to

31:37.752 --> 31:40.330
prevent fratricide , reroute passage of

31:40.330 --> 31:42.330
lines are also important , enabling

31:42.330 --> 31:44.270
operations for a delay or other

31:44.270 --> 31:46.760
retrograde maintaining enemy contact

31:46.770 --> 31:48.714
while allowing for the recovery of

31:48.714 --> 31:50.870
security or other forward forces .

31:51.340 --> 31:53.562
While similar in planning and execution

31:53.562 --> 31:55.451
to a forward passage of lines , a

31:55.451 --> 31:57.340
rearward passage of lines is more

31:57.340 --> 31:59.451
difficult , as the enemy likely has .

31:59.451 --> 32:01.673
The initiative and the rearward passing

32:01.673 --> 32:03.396
soldiers are often fatigue and

32:03.396 --> 32:05.396
disorganized from battle . Friendly

32:05.396 --> 32:07.451
forces may also be more difficult to

32:07.451 --> 32:09.340
recognize because the enemy maybe

32:09.340 --> 32:11.284
intermixed with them . To mitigate

32:11.284 --> 32:13.007
these issues , the passing and

32:13.007 --> 32:14.840
stationary units co locate their

32:14.840 --> 32:16.896
command posts and agree upon clearly

32:16.896 --> 32:19.030
defined , often restrictive control

32:19.030 --> 32:21.620
measures . Three . Identify a battle

32:21.620 --> 32:24.170
handover line to delineate the area

32:24.170 --> 32:26.392
that the stationary unit commander will

32:26.392 --> 32:28.448
assume control of once two thirds of

32:28.448 --> 32:31.400
the passing force has crossed . They

32:31.400 --> 32:33.470
coordinate for fires and ensure the

32:33.470 --> 32:35.580
stationary force is capable of

32:35.580 --> 32:38.120
providing indirect fire support for the

32:38.120 --> 32:40.750
rearward passing force . Finally , if

32:40.750 --> 32:42.750
time is available , the units wreck

32:42.750 --> 32:44.890
annoyed with contact points , passage

32:44.890 --> 32:47.640
points , lanes and assembly areas the

32:47.640 --> 32:49.751
passing unit will use to pass through

32:49.751 --> 32:51.870
the stationary force . They also

32:51.870 --> 32:54.090
identify any obstacles and friendly

32:54.090 --> 32:56.890
battle positions in the A O . The

32:56.890 --> 32:59.001
rearward passage of lines begins when

32:59.001 --> 33:00.946
the passing unit links up with the

33:00.946 --> 33:03.112
guides from the stationary unit at the

33:03.112 --> 33:07.040
predetermined contact points guides ,

33:07.040 --> 33:08.984
then lead the passing force to the

33:08.984 --> 33:10.929
passage points and along the lanes

33:10.929 --> 33:13.330
through the stationary force . The

33:13.330 --> 33:15.552
order of March is typically sustainment

33:15.552 --> 33:17.497
units first , followed by the main

33:17.497 --> 33:19.790
command post functional units such as

33:19.790 --> 33:23.140
engineers and finally combat units . If

33:23.140 --> 33:25.362
the enemy force continues to press this

33:25.362 --> 33:27.362
attack during the passage , passing

33:27.362 --> 33:29.418
unit controls the battle , while the

33:29.418 --> 33:31.640
stationary unit monitors the passage of

33:31.640 --> 33:33.918
lines until the battle handover occurs .

33:34.440 --> 33:36.273
Once the passing unit hands over

33:36.273 --> 33:38.496
control of the battle to the stationary

33:38.496 --> 33:40.600
unit , the stationary unit initiates

33:40.730 --> 33:42.897
and clears calls for all fires forward

33:42.897 --> 33:45.680
of its location , while the 26 Calvary

33:45.680 --> 33:47.902
Regiment executed its rear with passage

33:47.902 --> 33:50.890
of lines . The 91st division , recently

33:50.890 --> 33:53.001
attached to the North Luzon Force and

33:53.001 --> 33:55.070
held in reserve , sent the 91st

33:55.070 --> 33:57.710
Regimental Combat Team to reinforce the

33:57.710 --> 34:00.540
71st division by taking up a position

34:00.660 --> 34:02.716
just north of Puzzle Rubio along the

34:02.716 --> 34:04.990
road . The first attack of the morning

34:05.000 --> 34:07.330
was made by the Japanese 47th Infantry

34:07.330 --> 34:09.670
Regiment against the 71st division ,

34:10.040 --> 34:12.151
who's artillery held up their advance

34:12.151 --> 34:14.820
until noon . Reinforced by the 48th

34:14.820 --> 34:16.542
reconnaissance and fourth tank

34:16.542 --> 34:18.764
regiments , Japanese directed close air

34:18.764 --> 34:20.870
support on their positions , forcing

34:20.870 --> 34:23.440
the 71st to fall back toe a line in

34:23.440 --> 34:25.440
front of the town of Poos Arrobio ,

34:25.440 --> 34:27.440
where they were to link up with the

34:27.440 --> 34:29.551
91st Regimental Combat Team , already

34:29.551 --> 34:32.030
in place after a hasty meeting of the

34:32.030 --> 34:34.740
American commanders . The 26 Cavalry

34:34.740 --> 34:36.907
Regiment was then ordered to retire to

34:36.907 --> 34:39.129
been alone in and set up an outpost for

34:39.129 --> 34:41.129
the division to fall back through .

34:41.129 --> 34:43.250
Should it become necessary . The

34:43.250 --> 34:45.250
Japanese entered the town of season

34:45.250 --> 34:48.080
around 1900 while the 26 Calvary

34:48.080 --> 34:50.400
Regiment moved south and the 91st

34:50.400 --> 34:52.344
combat team prepared their defense

34:52.344 --> 34:54.850
outside pose Arrobio . Later that same

34:54.850 --> 34:57.560
night , Japanese attacked the 91st and

34:57.560 --> 34:59.550
secured the town , placing them in

34:59.550 --> 35:01.717
position to seize the critical bridges

35:01.717 --> 35:03.994
across the egg . No river to the south .

35:04.140 --> 35:06.196
General Wainwright , recognizing the

35:06.196 --> 35:08.529
staggering pace of the Japanese advance ,

35:08.840 --> 35:11.080
realize that McArthur's plan to repulse

35:11.080 --> 35:13.191
the enemy on the loose on beaches was

35:13.191 --> 35:15.150
no longer viable . Intending to

35:15.150 --> 35:17.317
strengthen his right flank long enough

35:17.317 --> 35:19.150
to prepare a counter attack , he

35:19.150 --> 35:20.817
requested permission from UCF

35:20.817 --> 35:22.983
headquarters to direct his soldiers to

35:22.983 --> 35:25.600
withdraw behind the Magno River . With

35:25.600 --> 35:27.490
his request approved and while

35:27.490 --> 35:29.550
preparing his plan of attack , he

35:29.550 --> 35:31.439
received a call from headquarters

35:31.439 --> 35:33.217
notifying him that MacArthur it

35:33.217 --> 35:35.328
scrapped his defense plan and put the

35:35.328 --> 35:37.494
original war plan Orange into effect ,

35:37.740 --> 35:39.962
Wainwright later wrote in his memoirs .

35:40.690 --> 35:43.670
It was a bitter pill to swallow for war

35:43.670 --> 35:45.970
plan Orange Number three meant the last

35:45.970 --> 35:49.470
ditch the long ago planned desperation

35:49.470 --> 35:52.610
withdrawal to Baton . That was not all

35:52.940 --> 35:56.020
MacArthur , I learned was about to

35:56.020 --> 35:58.580
leave Manila . Take his headquarters to

35:58.580 --> 36:01.630
Keurig . Adore soldiers . World is

36:01.630 --> 36:04.360
where he is fighting . Mine was falling

36:04.370 --> 36:07.200
to pieces . Wainwright could not have

36:07.200 --> 36:09.380
known it at the time . The MacArthur's

36:09.380 --> 36:11.640
decision to revert the war plan Orange

36:11.660 --> 36:14.030
and fall back to Baton would have set

36:14.030 --> 36:16.252
homeless timetable enough that it would

36:16.252 --> 36:18.363
delay Japanese war plans . Across the

36:18.363 --> 36:19.670
entire South Pacific .

36:29.130 --> 36:31.297
Christmas Eve arrived with the landing

36:31.297 --> 36:33.700
of Japan's Lamone Bay Force , 322

36:33.700 --> 36:35.922
kilometers to the south of the Lingayen

36:35.922 --> 36:38.089
Gulf , under the command of Lieutenant

36:38.089 --> 36:40.820
General Suma Morioka , coming ashore

36:40.820 --> 36:43.490
with 7000 soldiers of the 16th division

36:43.750 --> 36:45.972
at three different locations that could

36:45.972 --> 36:47.917
not have picked a better moment to

36:47.917 --> 36:50.150
attack , having been denied permission

36:50.160 --> 36:52.271
to move any artillery . Defending the

36:52.271 --> 36:54.438
Western approach to Manila , the South

36:54.438 --> 36:57.030
Luzon force was also in the process of

36:57.030 --> 36:59.197
repositioning its maneuver forces when

36:59.197 --> 37:02.050
the Japanese began landing . The first

37:02.050 --> 37:04.540
attack came a Taliban where elements of

37:04.540 --> 37:06.651
the first Regiment , Philippine first

37:06.651 --> 37:08.873
regular division , defended against the

37:08.873 --> 37:10.910
enemy by laying down effective

37:10.920 --> 37:14.780
inflating fire . By 08 30

37:15.200 --> 37:17.530
Japanese had seized my album and forced

37:17.530 --> 37:19.363
the defenders to fall back eight

37:19.363 --> 37:21.870
kilometers to the west . There they

37:21.880 --> 37:23.936
vigorously defended their position ,

37:23.936 --> 37:26.102
delaying the enemy's further advance .

37:26.530 --> 37:29.590
Further south , at the town of C on the

37:29.590 --> 37:31.701
second landing force came ashore at 0

37:31.701 --> 37:35.030
700 met with little resistance . The

37:35.030 --> 37:37.086
Japanese then divided their forces ,

37:37.086 --> 37:39.086
advancing elements along the Manila

37:39.086 --> 37:41.410
Railroad towards Iowa's Bay , while

37:41.410 --> 37:43.577
other units move south to link up with

37:43.577 --> 37:45.521
the community attachment currently

37:45.521 --> 37:47.743
marching up Route one Along some a long

37:47.743 --> 37:49.910
day , the third and main landing force

37:49.910 --> 37:52.420
came ashore south of Antimony . We're

37:52.420 --> 37:55.210
engaged with company , A 52nd Infantry

37:55.210 --> 37:57.470
Regiment , Philippine 51st division .

37:58.130 --> 38:00.950
Japanese seized the town at 1100 .

38:02.120 --> 38:03.860
A Japanese reconnaissance unit

38:04.250 --> 38:06.630
supported by light bombers also

38:06.630 --> 38:08.750
advanced to seize the town of Malik

38:08.750 --> 38:11.450
Bhai . Sustained attacks by enemy

38:11.450 --> 38:13.720
aircraft forced the defenders to fall

38:13.720 --> 38:15.820
back from the village and set up

38:15.820 --> 38:18.680
defensive positions 6.4 kilometers to

38:18.680 --> 38:22.180
the west near the town of Benny Han by

38:22.180 --> 38:24.520
the evening of the 24th , while still

38:24.520 --> 38:26.464
attempting to delay the enemy from

38:26.464 --> 38:28.298
advancing along Route one toward

38:28.298 --> 38:30.320
Pagdilao . The defenders were

38:30.320 --> 38:33.240
overwhelmed and fell back under cover

38:33.240 --> 38:36.310
of darkness . Day ended with MacArthur

38:36.310 --> 38:38.790
ordering General Parker , South Luzon

38:38.790 --> 38:40.920
force commander toe , organize the

38:40.920 --> 38:43.240
Baton Defense Force and prepare the

38:43.240 --> 38:46.990
peninsula's defenses . 24 December was

38:46.990 --> 38:48.990
a difficult day for the North Luzon

38:48.990 --> 38:51.910
forces . Well , with the Japanese

38:51.910 --> 38:54.132
already advancing on the egg no river ,

38:54.132 --> 38:56.490
the 26th Calvary Regiment attempted to

38:56.490 --> 38:58.712
delay them north and west of been alone

38:58.712 --> 39:02.070
in mounting a fierce defense , 26

39:02.070 --> 39:04.126
stopped the first attack made by the

39:04.126 --> 39:06.181
Imperial Japanese Army's fourth Tank

39:06.181 --> 39:08.440
Regiment tanks then swung to the west

39:08.780 --> 39:11.270
to bypass the 26th , but the Calvary

39:11.270 --> 39:13.270
counterattack and the Japanese were

39:13.270 --> 39:16.270
once again unable to advance . Japanese

39:16.270 --> 39:18.381
then sent up more tanks in the second

39:18.381 --> 39:20.603
for most a regiment as reinforcements .

39:20.920 --> 39:23.142
Let's put the cavalry at serious risk ,

39:23.360 --> 39:25.360
but they were too deeply engaged to

39:25.360 --> 39:27.640
break contact . General Wainwright ,

39:27.650 --> 39:29.872
who was in been alone in when the heavy

39:29.872 --> 39:32.094
fighting began , ordered Colonel Pierce

39:32.094 --> 39:34.800
and his 26 Calvary Regiment now reduced

39:34.800 --> 39:37.780
only 450 soldiers to fight a delaying

39:37.780 --> 39:39.780
action while falling back southeast

39:39.790 --> 39:43.630
from the egg no river to tie you For

39:43.630 --> 39:45.797
more than four hours , the outnumbered

39:45.797 --> 39:48.440
calvary delayed the enemy until finally

39:48.440 --> 39:50.551
leaving been alone in to the Japanese

39:50.551 --> 39:53.250
around 15 30 by the end of Christmas

39:53.250 --> 39:57.100
Eve 1941 Japanese , Lingayen , Gulf and

39:57.100 --> 39:59.770
Lemon Bay forces at both established

39:59.770 --> 40:01.690
their beachheads secured . Their

40:01.690 --> 40:04.210
initial objectives on were in positions

40:04.210 --> 40:06.266
to the north and south to advance on

40:06.266 --> 40:08.377
Manila and it strategically important

40:08.377 --> 40:09.840
harbor . Mhm .

40:12.310 --> 40:13.310
I'm going

40:22.010 --> 40:25.480
I the Whistler know many things for I

40:25.480 --> 40:27.930
walk by night way interrupt our

40:27.930 --> 40:30.041
previously scheduled program to bring

40:30.041 --> 40:31.986
you this important news bulletin .

40:31.986 --> 40:34.097
Japanese soldiers have seized control

40:34.097 --> 40:36.041
of the Philippines capital city of

40:36.041 --> 40:38.041
Manila and are marching against our

40:38.041 --> 40:40.208
remaining forces dug in on Bataan . As

40:40.208 --> 40:42.152
a result , President Roosevelt has

40:42.152 --> 40:44.263
ordered General Douglas MacArthur toe

40:44.263 --> 40:46.430
lead the territory immediately without

40:46.430 --> 40:48.263
the ability to send supplies and

40:48.263 --> 40:50.152
reinforcements or to rescue those

40:50.152 --> 40:52.374
soldiers remaining behind there . Now ,

40:52.374 --> 40:54.430
left to rely more than ever on their

40:54.430 --> 40:56.263
skills , encouraged to survive .

41:00.310 --> 41:00.820
Yeah ,

41:11.850 --> 41:17.920
e

41:24.980 --> 41:27.240
a lot of fun .

41:41.110 --> 41:45.060
E

41:50.860 --> 41:51.290
Okay .

42:14.110 --> 42:18.020
Yeah . These

42:18.030 --> 42:20.086
people know how toe work the kind of

42:20.090 --> 42:21.979
people that idolize this American

42:21.979 --> 42:24.250
because he stands for everything we

42:24.250 --> 42:26.280
promised and are doing for the

42:26.290 --> 42:27.150
Philippines