WEBVTT

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- So certainly it's time.

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It's certainly it's time as we watch China

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and Russia doing that very thing

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that we're entertaining
in a more robust fashion.

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The challenge with whether
would be adversaries

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what they're doing is a hypersonic weapon

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with different parameters,

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different performance
characteristics, different profiles,

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and certainly where we need
to contend with that is

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to make sure that we can answer
that particular capability.

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Ummmmh we can't allow for
in that competitive space

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for there to be an advantage
where we might be put

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on the horns of a dilemma.

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And I think increasing
our investments here,

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you'll see it's not just
the hypersonic weapon,

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I think that's important

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there's a broader perspective
that has to go behind that.

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Certainly, what can we do
with hypersonic weapons,

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is an important question.

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And why would we go down that path?

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Certainly, you know,
I'm, I'm a bomber pilot,

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I'm a big fan of standoff,

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I'm also a big fan of
stand in with stealth.

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But the ability to add a hypersonic,

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you know, solution to a
long range strike sortie,

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I mean, it's the perfect alignment.

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We can do some very interesting
things with hypersonics.

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I do believe that perhaps
there's an opportunity

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for us in certain scenarios

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and I wouldn't say it's a very
wide ranging set of scenarios

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to be able to hold certain
strategic targets at risk

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that give us an offer
perhaps in a conflict.

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When you have two state actors

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with these kinds of
arsenals at our disposal,

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certainly as we compete
for spheres of influence,

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our sphere of influence as
United States is free democracy,

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freedom of navigation, freedom
of access to the commons,

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be there air of space, cyber,

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you know, in maritime, that
has to be how things operate.

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And we think that's the best path forward,

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not everybody agrees with us.

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But if we have the ability
to hold something at risk

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that could begin to signal, you know,

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our intent to go down a different path,

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then I think that's
something is very helpful.

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Certainly when we consider
Anti-Access/Area Denial

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and when I think of
Anti-Access/Area Denial

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with or would be adversaries,
it is a means to make us pay

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in unreasonably high price and
time, energy, and resources

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to, to achieve an
objective at a lower level.

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And it just puts those things,
you know, out of balance

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and inherently is meant to deter us.

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Hypersonic weapons have
the ability to begin

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to dismantle some of those architectures

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in a way that's very effective.

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And we think if we really are to continue

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in a competitive path
and manage escalation,

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the ability to dismantle
some of those pieces,

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is a very important
capability we need to pursue.

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Hypersonics also allows
us to be very responsive.

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We may see

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in the battle space some fleeting

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strategic target a time
sensitive capability

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and if we've done it
correctly then we can hold

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that particular fleeting
opportunity at risk

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that we otherwise might not
be able to base on the speed.

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And how we do that, of course,
and I'll come back to it

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is by connecting this
into the battle management

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or the advanced battle management system,

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operating under a Chatzi to
join all the main command

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and control concept.

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And so more on that later.

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So what are we doing in this area

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in a global strike command?

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It's part, of course, the
broader Air Force efforts.

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What we're talking about here,
we have been talking about

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the hypersonic conventional strike weapon

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(indistinct) would call the hacksaw

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and the air launch rapid response weapon,

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what we call arrow.

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And you know there's competing
funding priorities here.

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And and we we decided to make,

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you know a decision to
go down a certain path.

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There was good progress being made.

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But when we did the critical
design review this year

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we had to make the decision
about what was our best option.

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Let me just be really clear.

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And I'll just leverage
a quote from Dr. Roper,

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who is, who is a great
compatriot of this organization,

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and someone I enjoy talking
to about, how to move forward

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in the future.

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He said the reason we went with arrow was

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was not that axon was bad.

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I think that's an important point.

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But the error was smaller

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and we can carry twice
as many on the B-52.

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And it's possible it could be on the 15th.

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So consider that we could put
this on a fighter aircraft.

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It's in the class to be able to fit on

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the centerline station

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so we we have greater opportunities

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to apply that weapon and
we think that technology

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is pretty mature.

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So for us, you know the arrow
is really the priority for us.

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And then the second is,
of course, on the hawk.

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So the arrow, you know,

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we're really pushing
the art of the possible.

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I think many of you already
know a lot about this.

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But you know, we're working with DARPA,

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on the tech boost glide
technology and what that gets us.

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And it's focused on
design, test and production

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and readiness and to facilitate better

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prototypes being fielded.

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We also have a MOA with DARPA,
on a cruise missile concept,

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which we think is very important,
which gives us you know

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that, that air breathing threat that

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that Scramjet technology,

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lets us have an even smaller
weapon with greater range

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of different profile.

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And when I consider where,
where we're the cruise missile

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of that capability, and that caliber,

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and what we can do to put
that on other aircraft,

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I think that is incredibly powerful.

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And in the opportunities
there are fantastic.

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So we want to be clearly
part of that conversation

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and global strike command.

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So I'm sure there's some
lingering questions out there.

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And since this is a pre recorded event,

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I'm just gonna try to do
a little bit of the q&a

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actively here as we go.

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And I'll try to put a few things to rest.

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Certainly, there's a
lingering question out there

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about whether or not we do
a nuclear version of this.

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And before I do that, you
know, I want to step back

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and say there's, there's a
more important conversation

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that needs to be revisited

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and make sure that it's in
the forefront of our thinking.

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And that is, of course, the
the triad that we have today.

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A very old set of
systems being modernized.

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Well, I'm very proud to say
that the programs inside

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the Air Force, the bomber,
the cruise missile, the ICBM,

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you know, where we're going
with the gravity weapon,

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and the new bomb, all those things,

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the new ICBM, those programs
are doing incredibly well.

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And I'm very pleased, and and of course,

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I knock on a lot of wood
these days, just to make sure

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all that stays on track, it is 2020.

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So you never know what's gonna happen.

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So, but but I am very
pleased with the move

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to that newer Arsenal, as we watch

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the recapitalisation of all
three legs of the triad,

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we have to be very focused
on what matters here.

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And when I think of the triad, you know,

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there's there's been
a lot of thinkers here

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that have thought about the triad.

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I think one of the
brightest military minds

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of our generation is is
Secretary General Mattis.

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And he came in thinking you
could go to something less

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but but his thoughts were
after really turning it over,

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is that he can't really solve

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the deterrent question
reducing from a triad

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because of the interrelated capabilities.

