WEBVTT 00:00.140 --> 00:02.473 Hello and welcome to this virtual event . 00:02.473 --> 00:04.362 That's the institute . My name is 00:04.362 --> 00:06.529 Rebecca . Higher if some senior fellow 00:06.529 --> 00:08.473 at Hudson and I am joined today by 00:08.473 --> 00:10.418 Doctor Marc J . Lewis , who is the 00:10.418 --> 00:12.251 director of defense research and 00:12.251 --> 00:14.084 engineering for modernization in 00:14.084 --> 00:16.196 Houston . For being here with us . We 00:16.196 --> 00:18.550 are going to talk about your 11 00:18.550 --> 00:20.870 priorities in your portfolio . We are 00:20.870 --> 00:23.550 going to focus on the top three , I 00:23.550 --> 00:25.494 believe , and you can feel free to 00:25.494 --> 00:27.661 correct me if I'm wrong there . Uh , I 00:27.661 --> 00:29.606 like to start off by talking about 00:29.606 --> 00:31.606 microelectronics , and then we will 00:31.606 --> 00:33.661 move into five G and the night My my 00:33.661 --> 00:35.960 intense , is to camp out a longer on 00:35.960 --> 00:38.670 the subject of hypersonic weapons of 00:38.670 --> 00:41.070 both offense and defense . So on 00:41.070 --> 00:43.660 microelectronics , you have said that 00:43.660 --> 00:45.850 we need to operate and develop trusted 00:45.850 --> 00:48.750 components in zero trust environments . 00:49.340 --> 00:51.618 Can you explain for us what that means ? 00:51.690 --> 00:53.912 Sure . So ? So , to be specific , we're 00:53.912 --> 00:55.920 not really looking at making the 00:55.920 --> 00:58.660 components themselves trusted . All 00:58.660 --> 01:01.130 right , What we're looking at doing is 01:01.130 --> 01:03.740 establishing the infrastructure and 01:03.740 --> 01:06.230 standards so that we can trust what 01:06.230 --> 01:08.341 comes out of whatever microelectronic 01:08.341 --> 01:10.397 components were using . So by way of 01:10.397 --> 01:12.397 explanation , Let me Let me kind of 01:12.397 --> 01:14.619 explain where we are now and then where 01:14.619 --> 01:17.990 we want to go . So today , um , we buy 01:18.020 --> 01:21.130 trusted electronic components from from 01:21.130 --> 01:23.352 what we think are of as trusted sources 01:23.352 --> 01:25.570 the trusted foundries and a trusted 01:25.580 --> 01:27.747 foundry . A foundry is a facility that 01:27.747 --> 01:30.950 manufacturers microelectronics . Um , 01:31.540 --> 01:33.596 they're very expensive facilities to 01:33.596 --> 01:35.429 build , take significant capital 01:35.429 --> 01:37.651 investment . Uh , not not only to build 01:37.651 --> 01:39.873 them , but to maintain them and to keep 01:39.873 --> 01:39.360 them state of the art . 01:39.370 --> 01:41.314 Microelectronics is an industry is 01:41.314 --> 01:43.203 always advancing . They're always 01:43.203 --> 01:45.092 looking at at ways to upgrade and 01:45.092 --> 01:47.314 update the products that they produce . 01:47.314 --> 01:50.050 In the trusted foundry model , you 01:50.340 --> 01:52.790 essentially establish one or several 01:52.790 --> 01:55.190 foundries where you have total control 01:55.190 --> 01:57.468 of the manufacturing process . That is , 01:57.520 --> 01:59.409 you control everything going in , 01:59.409 --> 02:01.353 everything going out , you control 02:01.353 --> 02:03.464 everything . Everyone who touches the 02:03.464 --> 02:05.520 microelectronics , you do background 02:05.520 --> 02:07.576 checks on everyone . You have fences 02:07.576 --> 02:07.300 and guards and gates surrounding your 02:07.300 --> 02:10.110 foundry . Um , it's a model that the 02:10.110 --> 02:11.943 United States Department defense 02:11.943 --> 02:15.250 embraced , uh , in the nineties and 02:15.740 --> 02:18.480 in large measure , Um , I think we can 02:18.480 --> 02:20.536 say it hasn't worked out very well , 02:20.536 --> 02:24.020 and I'll explain why so First , um , 02:24.030 --> 02:26.260 the department offense is a relatively 02:26.260 --> 02:28.340 small purchaser of electron ICS 02:28.340 --> 02:30.890 compared to the global market . Unlike 02:30.970 --> 02:33.248 aircraft carriers were the only buyers , 02:33.540 --> 02:35.580 Um , and you know much , many other 02:35.580 --> 02:38.450 technologies directed energy and ah , 02:38.600 --> 02:41.170 and parts of space . The department 02:41.170 --> 02:43.337 defense is just a couple of percentage 02:43.337 --> 02:46.670 of the total microelectronics by , and 02:46.680 --> 02:48.680 the result is that it's it's really 02:48.680 --> 02:50.791 hard for industry to build a business 02:50.791 --> 02:52.902 case solely based on the needs of the 02:52.902 --> 02:55.150 department defense . So what we've 02:55.150 --> 02:57.261 tended to see happen is the companies 02:57.261 --> 02:59.428 that have have have gone down the path 02:59.428 --> 03:01.761 of establishing these trusted foundries . 03:01.761 --> 03:03.761 I found it . It's very difficult to 03:03.761 --> 03:05.928 make the case toe , continue to update 03:05.928 --> 03:08.094 and upgrade and make sure that they're 03:08.094 --> 03:10.317 at the state of the art . So the result 03:10.317 --> 03:10.200 has been that at the department , 03:10.200 --> 03:12.089 defense is not buying parts , not 03:12.089 --> 03:14.311 buying components that are state of the 03:14.311 --> 03:16.422 art . Some cases they're a generation 03:16.422 --> 03:18.422 or two behind , so that's a problem 03:18.422 --> 03:20.644 right there . The other problem is that 03:20.644 --> 03:22.533 it creates a vulnerability in the 03:22.533 --> 03:24.756 supply chain because if you've only got 03:24.756 --> 03:26.644 one or two trusted sources , then 03:26.644 --> 03:28.811 suddenly if those sources disappears , 03:28.811 --> 03:30.756 thought manufacturing for whatever 03:30.756 --> 03:32.644 reason , well , obviously it into 03:32.644 --> 03:34.644 interferes with the supply of those 03:34.644 --> 03:36.922 components into the department offense . 03:36.922 --> 03:39.089 But there's 1/3 part of this that that 03:39.089 --> 03:38.450 we're very concerned about as well . 03:39.240 --> 03:41.670 And that is it . The whole philosophy 03:41.670 --> 03:44.360 trusted foundries can lead to a false 03:44.360 --> 03:46.638 sense of security . I think we've seen , 03:46.790 --> 03:50.110 um , unfortunately had several examples 03:50.110 --> 03:52.054 where we realize that our greatest 03:52.054 --> 03:54.470 intelligence vulnerabilities sometimes 03:54.470 --> 03:56.526 coming from the insider threat , you 03:56.526 --> 03:58.581 know , think about the Snowden is of 03:58.581 --> 04:00.581 the world who are inside . We think 04:00.581 --> 04:02.414 they're trusted . We've done the 04:02.414 --> 04:01.750 background checks , we've done the 04:01.750 --> 04:03.972 background searches . Then we found out 04:03.972 --> 04:05.806 No , actually , they represented 04:05.806 --> 04:08.028 vulnerability . And so when you go down 04:08.028 --> 04:09.861 the path of a of a fully trusted 04:09.861 --> 04:12.180 facility , you run the risk of frankly 04:12.180 --> 04:14.291 fooling yourself into thinking you've 04:14.291 --> 04:17.430 got You've got secure capabilities when 04:17.430 --> 04:19.541 in fact you don't . You could often , 04:19.541 --> 04:21.097 you know , miss the biggest 04:21.097 --> 04:23.319 vulnerability . So the approach that we 04:23.319 --> 04:25.208 are pursuing , the one that we're 04:25.208 --> 04:27.374 interested in in our office is what we 04:27.374 --> 04:29.430 call the zero trust approach , where 04:29.430 --> 04:31.374 you no longer depend on guards and 04:31.374 --> 04:31.040 fences and gates and guns and 04:31.040 --> 04:34.410 background checks . Instead , you first 04:34.420 --> 04:36.820 by commercial components that you're 04:36.830 --> 04:38.774 always at state of the art so that 04:38.774 --> 04:40.941 you're leveraging the investments that 04:40.941 --> 04:43.052 are being made in the commercial side 04:43.052 --> 04:45.274 and then use various techniques again , 04:45.274 --> 04:48.050 standards the protocols that you build 04:48.050 --> 04:49.939 in the way you handle the data to 04:49.939 --> 04:53.060 ensure yourself that the parts that 04:53.060 --> 04:55.227 you're buying that you're putting into 04:55.227 --> 04:57.338 your into your your systems , they're 04:57.338 --> 04:59.504 doing what you think they're doing and 04:59.504 --> 05:01.227 you're protecting the data and 05:01.227 --> 05:03.560 protecting the information in many ways . 05:03.560 --> 05:06.500 Old Ron analogy to To the cyber defense 05:06.500 --> 05:08.860 world You know , early cyber efforts 05:08.860 --> 05:11.410 were focused in large measure toe kind 05:11.410 --> 05:13.521 of building cyber fences , you know , 05:13.521 --> 05:15.743 establishing a if you will , ah , cyber 05:15.743 --> 05:17.854 firewall and then convincing yourself 05:17.854 --> 05:19.910 that everything inside the fence was 05:19.910 --> 05:22.077 safe and secure and everything outside 05:22.077 --> 05:24.243 the fence was was questionable . We've 05:24.243 --> 05:23.850 realized that doesn't work very well , 05:24.240 --> 05:26.890 And and so just as the cybersecurity 05:26.890 --> 05:29.057 world has moved on , we think that the 05:29.057 --> 05:31.168 microelectronics world has to move on 05:31.168 --> 05:33.410 as well . That's great . Thank you for 05:33.410 --> 05:35.940 that . Um , let's let's talk a little 05:35.940 --> 05:39.380 bit about five G again if we could If 05:39.380 --> 05:43.150 you could explain on five G uh , 05:44.090 --> 05:46.034 why this is so important . I think 05:46.034 --> 05:48.146 sometimes we can assume your audience 05:48.146 --> 05:47.980 knows that we're talking about here . 05:48.110 --> 05:50.221 Why is so important as we look at the 05:50.221 --> 05:52.332 national defense strategy for back to 05:52.332 --> 05:54.499 major power competition ? We're really 05:54.499 --> 05:56.666 concerned about the Chinese and five G 05:56.666 --> 05:58.777 networks in particular , and why it's 05:58.777 --> 06:00.832 so important to the United States to 06:00.832 --> 06:02.999 have that right . So So you're right . 06:02.999 --> 06:02.870 We consider five you to be absolutely 06:02.870 --> 06:06.020 critical . And , you know , for your 06:06.020 --> 06:08.131 viewers who are maybe not as familiar 06:08.131 --> 06:10.353 with five g I'm the way I like to think 06:10.353 --> 06:13.120 about it is it's much more than just a 06:13.120 --> 06:16.130 slightly faster Internet , all right , 06:16.140 --> 06:19.150 it's It's much more data . It's much 06:19.150 --> 06:21.350 smaller . Layton , see , So it allows 06:21.350 --> 06:23.461 you to do so many more things than we 06:23.461 --> 06:25.461 can currently do with is the way we 06:25.461 --> 06:28.580 handle our data . Um , the way we 06:28.580 --> 06:30.802 interact , interconnect our systems the 06:30.802 --> 06:33.024 way we reconnect our various fighters , 06:33.024 --> 06:35.200 For example , um , are people in the 06:35.200 --> 06:37.422 field the sorts of capabilities that we 06:37.422 --> 06:40.940 can bring for training ? Um , the whole 06:40.950 --> 06:42.783 Internet of things where we have 06:42.783 --> 06:45.200 various components are linked , Ah , 06:45.210 --> 06:47.266 through information sharing that all 06:47.266 --> 06:49.266 starts become possible as we pursue 06:49.266 --> 06:51.043 these five G capabilities , and 06:51.043 --> 06:53.043 probably at this point , give me to 06:53.043 --> 06:55.210 point out we don't see five g is being 06:55.210 --> 06:57.266 a single goal post so we don't think 06:57.266 --> 06:59.099 you get some point . You declare 06:59.099 --> 07:01.321 victory . We've got five g . We won the 07:01.321 --> 07:03.432 race . Let's let's stop here We see a 07:03.432 --> 07:05.654 continue evolution . We talk about five 07:05.654 --> 07:07.877 g two next G because we see a continual 07:07.877 --> 07:10.043 development of increased data handling 07:10.043 --> 07:12.210 reduced late and see more kick bowling 07:12.210 --> 07:11.530 assistant . Alright , So why is this 07:11.530 --> 07:15.220 important ? Well , we dont want to be 07:15.220 --> 07:17.442 able to operate in any environment . We 07:17.442 --> 07:19.331 want to be able to do information 07:19.331 --> 07:21.164 exchange in either a friendly or 07:21.164 --> 07:23.250 hostile information environment and 07:23.250 --> 07:25.361 five G is gonna be critical to that . 07:25.361 --> 07:27.880 Um , we need to have robust systems . 07:27.890 --> 07:29.890 We need to have systems that are in 07:29.890 --> 07:31.834 some cases , self healing that are 07:31.834 --> 07:33.779 interconnected because we see that 07:33.779 --> 07:33.720 information exchange is really at the 07:33.720 --> 07:35.720 heart of the battle of the future . 07:35.720 --> 07:37.776 It's that full conductivity , making 07:37.776 --> 07:39.831 sure our various weapons systems are 07:39.831 --> 07:41.998 connected . Make sure our services air 07:41.998 --> 07:44.109 connected , um , make best use of you 07:44.109 --> 07:46.164 know , our the sense is that we have 07:46.164 --> 07:48.276 available on the options that we have 07:48.276 --> 07:48.090 available to bring bring to the fight 07:48.340 --> 07:51.130 as we see five years being one of those 07:51.130 --> 07:53.352 enabling capabilities that factors into 07:53.352 --> 07:55.408 a lot of the work that we're talking 07:55.408 --> 07:57.463 about doing in fully network command 07:57.463 --> 07:59.686 control Communications is as one of our 07:59.686 --> 08:01.741 future modernization goals . Um , we 08:01.741 --> 08:03.852 think the United States has to lead , 08:03.852 --> 08:06.019 and by lead the United States needs to 08:06.019 --> 08:08.130 set the international standards . And 08:08.130 --> 08:09.963 we're taking the lesson from the 08:09.963 --> 08:11.908 previous generation for G . So the 08:11.908 --> 08:13.963 United States that an amazing job of 08:13.963 --> 08:16.130 leading the international's efforts in 08:16.130 --> 08:18.241 establishing the standards for four G 08:18.241 --> 08:20.352 and that put us and by us I mean none 08:20.352 --> 08:22.408 of the government but industry and a 08:22.408 --> 08:24.408 key in a key place for deciding the 08:24.408 --> 08:26.463 future of that technology will . Now 08:26.463 --> 08:28.686 we're seeing the same thing with five , 08:28.686 --> 08:30.852 and and frankly , we're seeing some of 08:30.852 --> 08:33.130 our pure competitors trying to step up . 08:33.130 --> 08:32.760 You mentioned China . So China , 08:32.760 --> 08:34.927 obviously is , is making a big play on 08:34.927 --> 08:37.093 the hardware side , but also in trying 08:37.093 --> 08:39.260 to set those international standards . 08:39.260 --> 08:41.371 And he who set so standards basically 08:41.371 --> 08:43.704 gets to decide what this all looks like . 08:43.704 --> 08:46.960 So we have ah , very robust program in 08:46.970 --> 08:49.026 five G . We're doing , for example , 08:49.026 --> 08:50.950 Siris of experiments at various 08:50.950 --> 08:53.330 military installations . I've got a 08:53.340 --> 08:55.562 technical director for five g . My Name 08:55.562 --> 08:57.896 of Joe Evans . Joe joined us from DARPA , 08:57.896 --> 09:00.007 and he's overseeing these experiments 09:00.007 --> 09:02.173 and one of the things about department 09:02.173 --> 09:02.010 defenses . It's It's easy first , to do 09:02.010 --> 09:03.677 these sort of laboratory type 09:03.677 --> 09:05.732 experiments . No military facilities 09:05.732 --> 09:07.843 are in some cases , the perfect Petri 09:07.843 --> 09:10.066 dish for doing these sorts of tests and 09:10.066 --> 09:12.121 experiments were doing . We're doing 09:12.121 --> 09:13.899 experiments it'll look at using 09:13.899 --> 09:16.010 resemble virtual reality for training 09:16.030 --> 09:18.086 enabled by five G . We're looking at 09:18.086 --> 09:20.141 spectrum sharing . That's one of our 09:20.141 --> 09:22.010 other key issues . Ah , as we go 09:22.010 --> 09:24.380 forward in five and we hope that the 09:24.380 --> 09:26.102 department fence can therefore 09:26.102 --> 09:28.047 essentially lead in these national 09:28.047 --> 09:30.269 efforts and help enable industry to not 09:30.269 --> 09:32.158 only meet the needs of department 09:32.158 --> 09:34.269 events , but but but the country as a 09:34.269 --> 09:38.050 whole . Great . I could 09:38.170 --> 09:40.420 I could to ask about three more follow 09:40.420 --> 09:42.309 ups on five G , but in the insert 09:42.309 --> 09:44.253 interest of time . Because I am so 09:44.253 --> 09:47.110 interested in talking a little bit 09:47.110 --> 09:49.000 hypersonic , both offensive and 09:49.000 --> 09:52.220 defensive plans for that , Then I'm 09:52.220 --> 09:54.164 gonna go ahead and just leave that 09:54.164 --> 09:57.150 there and turned now to hyper sonics . 09:57.820 --> 10:00.550 Um , you , I think , have been , um , 10:01.140 --> 10:03.840 very eloquent on explaining that what 10:03.840 --> 10:05.618 we want right now . If you want 10:05.618 --> 10:07.770 battlefield dominance when we're 10:07.770 --> 10:09.881 talking about major power competition 10:10.140 --> 10:13.920 and we've we lost that and some , 10:13.930 --> 10:17.090 uh , some domains in some areas on 10:17.100 --> 10:19.211 others , it's it's closed or it's too 10:19.211 --> 10:22.040 close for comfort , right ? Can you Can 10:22.040 --> 10:25.270 you talk about hypersonic ? Why ? Why 10:25.270 --> 10:27.050 do we care so much about these 10:27.050 --> 10:29.106 particular weapons systems ? And why 10:29.106 --> 10:32.180 the Russians and the Chinese again 10:32.180 --> 10:34.513 going back the natural defense strategy ? 10:34.513 --> 10:36.569 What ? Why ? Why is it so concerning 10:36.569 --> 10:38.570 that those that those two countries 10:38.570 --> 10:40.910 have invested so heavily in this 10:40.910 --> 10:43.021 particular kind of weapons system and 10:43.021 --> 10:45.132 why it matters that the United States 10:45.132 --> 10:47.250 hasn't and why it matters , that we 10:47.250 --> 10:49.472 needed me to move pretty quickly out on 10:49.472 --> 10:51.194 this particular capabilities ? 10:51.194 --> 10:53.250 Absolutely . So So , our interest in 10:53.250 --> 10:55.472 hyper Sonics really comes about because 10:55.472 --> 10:57.480 we're interested in penetrating for 10:57.480 --> 10:59.750 long range is with 11:00.740 --> 11:04.650 with tremendous resiliency , right way 11:04.650 --> 11:06.928 want to be able to reach out and touch , 11:07.140 --> 11:11.090 um , potential adversaries . Um , um , 11:11.100 --> 11:14.650 be able to survive , uh , in doing that . 11:15.240 --> 11:17.480 And so So we think hypersonic gives us 11:17.490 --> 11:19.601 gives us that capability , you know , 11:19.601 --> 11:21.768 is that sometimes we joke in my office 11:21.768 --> 11:23.934 if we thought jellyfish would allow us 11:23.934 --> 11:25.990 to travel , you know , 1000 nautical 11:25.990 --> 11:28.046 miles Ah , and and and and and be be 11:28.046 --> 11:29.768 unstoppable . We'd be pursuing 11:29.768 --> 11:31.934 jellyfish , but we don't We think it's 11:31.934 --> 11:31.690 hyper sonics . And what is it about 11:31.690 --> 11:33.912 hypersonic settle ? Let's let's just do 11:33.912 --> 11:36.079 that . Well , hyper Sonics actually is 11:36.079 --> 11:38.301 often , ah , thought of only as speed . 11:38.301 --> 11:40.134 But it's actually combination of 11:40.134 --> 11:41.857 several things its speed , its 11:41.857 --> 11:43.857 maneuverability . And then it's the 11:43.857 --> 11:45.968 altitude . So trajectories with which 11:45.968 --> 11:47.968 these systems operate , so speed is 11:47.968 --> 11:50.079 important . Speed gives you Ah , pity 11:50.079 --> 11:52.246 of action gives you a quick response . 11:52.246 --> 11:54.412 It also challenges your adversary . It 11:54.412 --> 11:56.023 allows you to get inside the 11:56.023 --> 11:58.190 adversaries . You dilute the observe , 11:58.190 --> 12:00.246 Orient , decide and act loop that we 12:00.246 --> 12:02.579 talked about frequently in the Pentagon . 12:02.579 --> 12:04.746 Right . As we're flying at Mach five , 12:04.746 --> 12:06.857 you're traveling at hypersonic speeds 12:06.857 --> 12:06.470 Mach five . You're covering about a 12:06.470 --> 12:09.400 mile of second , so that doesn't give 12:09.400 --> 12:11.570 your potential adversary a lot of time 12:11.570 --> 12:13.570 to figure out what you are beside . 12:13.570 --> 12:15.681 That you're coming and then take some 12:15.681 --> 12:17.903 action , decide what you're planning on 12:17.903 --> 12:17.350 doing and take some corrective action . 12:18.610 --> 12:20.832 So speed is essential . Maneuverability 12:20.832 --> 12:22.999 is also really important . So we build 12:22.999 --> 12:25.730 hypersonic systems today , every I C B 12:25.730 --> 12:27.810 m that's reentering for space is 12:27.810 --> 12:29.977 traveling at hypersonic speeds . Every 12:29.977 --> 12:31.866 spacecraft , you know , the space 12:31.866 --> 12:34.088 shuttle came in hypersonic speeds , but 12:34.088 --> 12:33.910 we talk about hyper sciences . It's 12:33.910 --> 12:35.799 really a shorthand for hypersonic 12:35.880 --> 12:38.460 inside the atmosphere . So systems that 12:38.460 --> 12:40.627 would use aerodynamics for maneuvering 12:40.627 --> 12:42.627 so that the trajectory becomes less 12:42.627 --> 12:44.849 predictable . All right , So it again , 12:44.849 --> 12:47.071 harder to stop . And then finally , the 12:47.071 --> 12:46.990 trajectory . So hypersonic systems , 12:46.990 --> 12:49.212 because during the atmosphere they wind 12:49.212 --> 12:51.101 up being in a sweet spot at their 12:51.101 --> 12:53.046 relatively hard to detect from the 12:53.046 --> 12:55.268 ground . But they can also be difficult 12:55.268 --> 12:57.546 detect from higher altitude from space . 12:57.546 --> 12:59.712 Not impossible , by the way , but more 12:59.712 --> 13:01.879 difficult . So those attributes coming 13:01.879 --> 13:03.823 together , we believe , produced a 13:03.823 --> 13:06.157 category a class of weapons system that , 13:06.157 --> 13:10.050 um is , uh , frankly , um , heart 13:10.050 --> 13:12.217 hard to counter . And that's why we're 13:12.217 --> 13:14.217 interested in also , that's why our 13:14.217 --> 13:16.106 potential adversaries AARP , your 13:16.106 --> 13:18.328 competitors are interested in as well . 13:18.328 --> 13:21.600 So why is this so important ? Um , I'll 13:21.600 --> 13:23.860 argue that ah , hypersonic tactical 13:23.860 --> 13:26.470 system suddenly has strategic 13:26.480 --> 13:28.530 implications . So if someone could 13:28.530 --> 13:31.380 build a tactical hypersonic weapon that 13:31.380 --> 13:33.720 could say , hold one of our carrier 13:33.720 --> 13:36.510 test forces at risk , then suddenly , 13:36.520 --> 13:38.687 suddenly they've got a tactical system 13:38.687 --> 13:40.853 which will , which can match our first 13:40.853 --> 13:43.400 class Navy without there having a first 13:43.400 --> 13:45.344 class . Think if they can hold our 13:45.344 --> 13:47.400 airfields at risk . If they can take 13:47.400 --> 13:49.567 out our aircraft before they ever take 13:49.567 --> 13:51.622 to the air , then they can with this 13:51.622 --> 13:54.110 tactical system applies strategic level 13:54.110 --> 13:56.332 capabilities against our first rate air 13:56.332 --> 13:58.554 force . So we we really do think it's a 13:58.554 --> 14:00.610 game changer . Um , there's another 14:00.610 --> 14:02.499 element of this , and that is for 14:02.499 --> 14:04.721 obviously for many decades , the United 14:04.721 --> 14:06.443 States has invested in stealth 14:06.443 --> 14:08.499 technology as being are leading edge 14:08.499 --> 14:10.554 defining technology . And there's no 14:10.554 --> 14:10.500 question that the stealth revolution 14:10.500 --> 14:12.722 was absolutely phenomenal . Book of the 14:12.722 --> 14:14.778 impact that self had and some of the 14:14.778 --> 14:16.667 conflict that we were involved in 14:16.667 --> 14:18.722 starting in the in the nineties with 14:18.722 --> 14:20.944 the first Gulf War , Um , Stealth lived 14:20.944 --> 14:23.278 up to all of its promises and then some . 14:23.278 --> 14:25.700 Well , entire world has now had three 14:25.700 --> 14:27.700 decades to see how we use stealth . 14:28.140 --> 14:30.140 They've been able develop their own 14:30.140 --> 14:32.140 stealth capabilities . They've been 14:32.140 --> 14:32.010 ableto think through how they would 14:32.010 --> 14:34.177 counter are our stealth capabilities , 14:34.177 --> 14:36.232 and so we no longer have that avenge 14:36.232 --> 14:39.590 that we once had . Um , so what's next ? 14:39.590 --> 14:41.760 Well , on a very simple level stealth 14:41.760 --> 14:45.400 means they can't see me . Um , if they 14:45.400 --> 14:47.400 conceive me anyway that I think the 14:47.400 --> 14:49.344 next step is the hypersonic step , 14:49.344 --> 14:51.511 which means they may be conceived me . 14:51.511 --> 14:53.511 But they'll see me a little bit too 14:53.511 --> 14:53.260 late to do anything . And if they try 14:53.260 --> 14:55.538 to do something , it will be extremely , 14:55.538 --> 14:57.450 extremely difficult . Something 14:57.460 --> 14:59.627 sometimes been accused of saying Speed 14:59.627 --> 15:02.460 is a new stealth Like , uh um , it's 15:02.460 --> 15:04.238 bit of a bit of a bit of a glib 15:04.238 --> 15:06.238 catchphrase , but I think there's a 15:06.238 --> 15:08.404 truth , the truth to that and that its 15:08.404 --> 15:11.120 next trend , I believe in in in weapons 15:11.120 --> 15:14.160 technology , Um , in terms of kind of a 15:14.160 --> 15:16.160 troubling aspect of this . So , you 15:16.160 --> 15:18.271 know , as as as your question alludes 15:18.271 --> 15:20.650 to , we've seen our competitors invest 15:20.650 --> 15:22.650 very , very heavily in hypersonic . 15:22.650 --> 15:24.910 It's , um , I I've been quoted on 15:24.910 --> 15:27.077 occasions saying we did their homework 15:27.077 --> 15:29.077 for them . I mean , this is a field 15:29.077 --> 15:31.021 that we invented . Um , we did the 15:31.021 --> 15:32.854 fundamental work . I'm at the 19 15:32.854 --> 15:34.688 fifties . We did the fundamental 15:34.688 --> 15:36.799 research . We developed concepts . We 15:36.799 --> 15:39.021 did the experiments , we did the ground 15:39.021 --> 15:41.021 test . We did the first significant 15:41.021 --> 15:43.188 flight test , and then we kind of took 15:43.188 --> 15:45.077 our foot off the gas . We weren't 15:45.077 --> 15:47.188 moving at a sufficient pace , and and 15:47.188 --> 15:49.410 we did even worse because we produced a 15:49.410 --> 15:51.466 number of policy documents that that 15:51.466 --> 15:53.688 describe the attributes of hyper sonics 15:53.688 --> 15:53.420 and why I was so valuable to the future 15:53.420 --> 15:55.476 fight . And then we didn't listen to 15:55.476 --> 15:57.309 our own advice . And it gave our 15:57.309 --> 15:59.390 potential competitors a significant 15:59.390 --> 16:01.600 opportunity with with big investments 16:01.870 --> 16:03.981 to play , catch up and build build on 16:03.981 --> 16:05.981 our work . And so now we're in this 16:05.981 --> 16:08.320 situation where we are truly in a three 16:08.320 --> 16:11.220 way race and we feel that sense of like 16:11.270 --> 16:14.670 alacrity , right ? And on that point to , 16:14.900 --> 16:17.011 you know , it's not . Not because the 16:17.011 --> 16:19.122 United States has done something that 16:19.122 --> 16:20.733 has incited these other pure 16:20.733 --> 16:22.622 competitors toe , then go ahead , 16:22.622 --> 16:24.789 invest in these technologies . They're 16:24.789 --> 16:24.180 investing in these technologies because 16:24.180 --> 16:26.513 they see it in their national interests , 16:26.513 --> 16:28.940 and we're the ones that are behind . I 16:28.950 --> 16:31.006 thought this was interesting , too . 16:31.006 --> 16:33.228 You've been working on these issues and 16:33.228 --> 16:33.200 focusing on them . You're very familiar 16:33.200 --> 16:36.430 with the history of them . Um , what is 16:36.430 --> 16:38.541 different ? You have mentioned in the 16:38.541 --> 16:41.160 past that we have failed way we've 16:41.160 --> 16:43.382 invested in or we look that examine and 16:43.382 --> 16:44.938 done a lot of work on these 16:44.938 --> 16:47.104 technologies in the past , But then we 16:47.104 --> 16:49.271 failed to transition from research and 16:49.271 --> 16:51.850 development or from snt over two 16:51.860 --> 16:53.749 applications , weapons systems to 16:53.749 --> 16:55.971 actually get them . Field it . And then 16:55.971 --> 16:58.082 you said that really , that's changed 16:58.082 --> 17:00.320 today is different , and we really are 17:00.510 --> 17:02.750 serious this time about getting these 17:02.750 --> 17:04.861 things to the warfighter and to do it 17:04.861 --> 17:08.680 quickly . What has changed and how , 17:08.690 --> 17:10.912 practically speaking , is this going to 17:10.912 --> 17:12.801 be different ? So I think there's 17:12.801 --> 17:14.968 several things have changed the versus 17:15.020 --> 17:17.890 the personalities involved . Um uh , we 17:17.890 --> 17:19.946 have leadership now that understands 17:19.946 --> 17:21.779 the value and the impact of this 17:21.779 --> 17:24.490 technology . And although we had in the 17:24.490 --> 17:26.490 past some leaders who did recognise 17:26.490 --> 17:28.546 this , I think the consensus now the 17:28.546 --> 17:30.550 strong consensus is overwhelmingly 17:30.550 --> 17:32.661 supportive and understanding why this 17:32.661 --> 17:34.717 is an important technology . So that 17:34.717 --> 17:36.828 has changed . I think the other thing 17:36.828 --> 17:38.828 that has changed is our recognition 17:38.828 --> 17:40.994 that we are in a race . I , you know , 17:40.994 --> 17:43.161 report that reporting that came out of 17:43.161 --> 17:45.161 the intelligence community starting 17:45.161 --> 17:47.200 really in the early 20 tens , but 17:47.400 --> 17:49.960 peaking in the mid 2010 . Um , let us 17:49.960 --> 17:52.071 all to realize that we were , in some 17:52.071 --> 17:54.127 cases , resting on our laurels while 17:54.127 --> 17:56.390 other people were not , um , there was 17:56.390 --> 17:58.334 an element of humors to it that we 17:58.334 --> 18:00.446 thought we were so far ahead . And we 18:00.446 --> 18:02.557 were We were the ones developing this 18:02.557 --> 18:02.390 technology that no one could possibly 18:02.390 --> 18:04.930 hope to catch up to us . And I think , 18:04.940 --> 18:06.829 um , when when this story started 18:06.829 --> 18:08.551 getting getting out , we start 18:08.551 --> 18:10.730 understanding the level of investments 18:10.730 --> 18:12.841 overseas , especially in China . They 18:12.841 --> 18:14.952 haven't . They haven't been shy about 18:14.952 --> 18:17.008 it . You can go online . You can see 18:17.008 --> 18:19.174 YouTube videos out of China where they 18:19.174 --> 18:21.008 will show up the facilities that 18:21.008 --> 18:20.780 they've been building . You know , they 18:20.960 --> 18:23.071 did their their military parade where 18:23.071 --> 18:25.349 they're showing off their capabilities . 18:25.349 --> 18:27.349 So so that , I think , has been eye 18:27.349 --> 18:29.571 opening . And it has really changed the 18:29.571 --> 18:32.280 conversation . Yeah , um and , um and I 18:32.280 --> 18:34.502 would say to their , you know , there's 18:34.502 --> 18:36.502 a I think there's been a sea change 18:36.502 --> 18:38.613 politically . And how would you , the 18:38.613 --> 18:40.502 China , our relationship with the 18:40.502 --> 18:42.613 Chinese , how it's it's really been a 18:42.613 --> 18:44.280 policy of engagement now were 18:44.280 --> 18:46.336 understanding that , um , it is more 18:46.336 --> 18:48.502 perhaps adversarial than would be ? It 18:48.502 --> 18:50.558 wanted it to be over the many , many 18:50.558 --> 18:52.502 years , and so these these weapons 18:52.502 --> 18:54.502 systems are very problematic . I do 18:54.502 --> 18:56.336 want such I'm just a another , a 18:56.336 --> 18:58.447 different , more technical . He's , I 18:58.447 --> 19:00.780 think , would be useful for our viewers . 19:00.780 --> 19:02.724 The benefit for the United because 19:02.724 --> 19:04.780 we're still looking at what kinds of 19:04.780 --> 19:06.836 systems we're going t to develop and 19:06.836 --> 19:08.836 invest in . Um might have plenty of 19:08.836 --> 19:10.947 prototypes that don't never grow into 19:10.947 --> 19:13.058 more mature systems than that . We're 19:13.058 --> 19:12.580 trying to figure out what works best . 19:12.870 --> 19:14.481 Which ones fulfill different 19:14.481 --> 19:16.814 requirements that we that we still have . 19:17.060 --> 19:19.227 What is the difference between for the 19:19.227 --> 19:21.227 United States purposes ? What's the 19:21.227 --> 19:23.393 benefit of a hypersonic cruise missile 19:23.393 --> 19:25.282 versus a hypersonic boost ? Glide 19:25.282 --> 19:27.393 system , Right , So So you're exactly 19:27.393 --> 19:29.616 right that right now we've got a number 19:29.616 --> 19:31.671 of prototype programs and and I'd be 19:31.671 --> 19:31.650 surprised if each and every one of 19:31.650 --> 19:33.650 those prototype programs manifested 19:33.650 --> 19:35.539 itself finally , in a program , a 19:35.539 --> 19:38.640 record . Um , but I do generally 19:38.640 --> 19:40.751 categorised hyper sonics in those two 19:40.751 --> 19:42.973 systems . There the boost glide systems 19:42.973 --> 19:45.029 where you have a rocket based system 19:45.029 --> 19:47.251 that accelerates up to speed , and then 19:47.251 --> 19:49.418 what we call the air breathing systems 19:49.418 --> 19:51.529 where there is ah , essentially a jet 19:51.529 --> 19:53.696 engine , um , and and the way to think 19:53.696 --> 19:53.210 about is the following . All right , So , 19:53.640 --> 19:56.910 um , a a rocket is a divisive carries 19:57.040 --> 19:59.610 both its fuel and it's oxidizer on 19:59.610 --> 20:01.721 board , right ? So in order to make a 20:01.721 --> 20:03.721 rocket work , you combined fuel and 20:03.721 --> 20:05.832 oxidizer . They combust , they burn , 20:05.832 --> 20:07.999 they release energy . That energy goes 20:07.999 --> 20:10.166 into the exhaust products . That gives 20:10.166 --> 20:09.570 you an exhaust . Yet that gives you 20:09.570 --> 20:12.020 thrust that makes you go forward . A 20:12.020 --> 20:15.360 jet engine only has fuel on board . And 20:15.360 --> 20:18.550 then for the oxidizer it swallows air 20:18.760 --> 20:20.760 uses oxygen in the air to burn with 20:20.760 --> 20:23.090 fuel . So if I can swallow air , if I 20:23.300 --> 20:25.522 have an inlet hole in the front where I 20:25.522 --> 20:27.356 bring Aaron , that means I'm not 20:27.356 --> 20:29.300 carrying the oxygen with me . So I 20:29.300 --> 20:31.356 don't need the way to the few of the 20:31.356 --> 20:33.522 oxidizer . I don't need the way to the 20:33.522 --> 20:35.467 tanks to carry the oxidizer . That 20:35.467 --> 20:34.850 leads to a much more efficient 20:34.850 --> 20:36.739 propulsion system . It's just one 20:36.739 --> 20:38.906 example , you know . Ah , conventional 20:38.906 --> 20:41.072 airliners are obviously powered by jet 20:41.072 --> 20:43.294 engines . Jet engines have big inlets , 20:43.294 --> 20:45.406 air comes in , and the option of that 20:45.406 --> 20:47.572 air burns with the jet fuel inside the 20:47.572 --> 20:49.739 combust er as opposed to a rocket like 20:49.739 --> 20:52.300 on the space shuttle or ah , an Atlas 20:52.300 --> 20:54.467 five . We're all both the fuel and the 20:54.467 --> 20:56.800 oxidizer is stored in tanks . All right , 20:56.800 --> 20:58.633 so I think about the differences 20:58.633 --> 21:00.633 between those two systems . Rockets 21:00.633 --> 21:02.800 produce lots of thrust compared to the 21:02.800 --> 21:04.689 weight of the engine itself . Jet 21:04.689 --> 21:06.911 engines ? Not so much . But jet engines 21:06.911 --> 21:09.133 produced lots of thrust compared to the 21:09.133 --> 21:09.120 amount of weight of fuel they're 21:09.120 --> 21:11.730 consuming because they're not carrying 21:11.730 --> 21:13.841 that option with him . And that means 21:13.841 --> 21:16.008 you have no less . You're not carrying 21:16.008 --> 21:15.570 the way to the oxygen . You're not 21:15.570 --> 21:17.792 caring . Wayto thanks so it can lead to 21:17.792 --> 21:19.903 a more efficient design . If you want 21:19.903 --> 21:21.737 to travel a long distance in the 21:21.737 --> 21:23.681 atmosphere , you're obviously much 21:23.681 --> 21:25.792 better off with a jet engine . You're 21:25.792 --> 21:25.330 better off not trying to carry that 21:25.330 --> 21:27.441 option with you . You want to swallow 21:27.441 --> 21:29.663 it through an inlet . If you want to go 21:29.663 --> 21:31.552 into space , you obviously want a 21:31.552 --> 21:33.552 rocket because there's no oxygen in 21:33.552 --> 21:35.719 space , Right ? So those of the trades 21:35.719 --> 21:37.941 in the hypersonic realm we wind up kind 21:37.941 --> 21:39.997 of being on the boundary between air 21:39.997 --> 21:42.108 and space , and that's why we look at 21:42.108 --> 21:43.997 both systems . In the case of the 21:43.997 --> 21:46.052 rocket boost glide , we're investing 21:46.052 --> 21:48.219 all the energy in front . So we've got 21:48.219 --> 21:50.330 a rocket that burns fuel and oxidizer 21:50.330 --> 21:52.219 gets the system up to really fast 21:52.219 --> 21:54.386 speeds very quickly . And then a glide 21:54.386 --> 21:56.274 body weapon or some other systems 21:56.274 --> 21:58.219 separates and glides at hypersonic 21:58.219 --> 22:00.330 speed to the target , usually without 22:00.330 --> 22:02.552 any additional propulsion system . On a 22:02.552 --> 22:04.710 cruise missile side , we often get up 22:04.710 --> 22:06.766 to speed with a smaller rocket . But 22:06.766 --> 22:08.821 once it gets up the hypersonic speed 22:08.821 --> 22:10.932 the jet engine takes over and so it's 22:10.932 --> 22:13.154 continuing to provide thrust . Continue 22:13.154 --> 22:12.990 to power all through the atmosphere . 22:13.230 --> 22:15.452 Alright , what ? The difference is that 22:15.452 --> 22:17.452 in those technologies , well on the 22:17.452 --> 22:19.286 rocket boost glide , the biggest 22:19.286 --> 22:21.286 challenges I have toe overspeed the 22:21.286 --> 22:21.080 system , because I have to get up to a 22:21.080 --> 22:22.858 much higher speed , is I'm then 22:22.858 --> 22:25.080 bleeding off energy because I'm gliding 22:25.080 --> 22:27.247 the rest away . Down Haier speed means 22:27.247 --> 22:29.469 more heating . It means more stress for 22:29.469 --> 22:31.802 the materials on the air breathing site . 22:31.802 --> 22:33.469 For the jet engine side , the 22:33.469 --> 22:35.580 challenges are well , I need to build 22:35.580 --> 22:34.870 an engine . I need to build an engine 22:34.870 --> 22:37.148 which can swallow air through an inlet . 22:37.148 --> 22:39.259 I need to be able to inject fuel into 22:39.259 --> 22:41.481 that airstream , mixed it efficiently , 22:41.481 --> 22:43.648 burning quickly and produce thrust out 22:43.648 --> 22:45.814 the back , and that's that's also very 22:45.814 --> 22:47.537 difficult to dio . But the air 22:47.537 --> 22:49.703 breathing system applies that energy , 22:49.703 --> 22:51.926 if you will . It's constantly releasing 22:51.926 --> 22:51.650 that , and it's a more gradual release 22:51.650 --> 22:53.870 the energy . So if you look at the way 22:53.870 --> 22:55.703 those systems package , what you 22:55.703 --> 22:57.703 generally find is the air breathing 22:57.730 --> 22:59.508 systems , the everything cruise 22:59.508 --> 23:01.563 missiles package smaller . Are there 23:01.563 --> 23:03.786 more compact cause they're not carrying 23:03.786 --> 23:06.008 the option with that produces a smaller 23:06.008 --> 23:07.952 missile , so I get more of them on 23:07.952 --> 23:10.119 board , right ? They maybe don't go as 23:10.119 --> 23:12.230 far , but they've got these packaging 23:12.230 --> 23:14.230 advantages . The rocket boost glide 23:14.230 --> 23:16.286 systems . They go further , but they 23:16.286 --> 23:18.452 stress materials . They tend to stress 23:18.452 --> 23:20.619 the limits of our knowledge of how toe 23:20.619 --> 23:22.508 to construct these designs . Um , 23:22.508 --> 23:24.563 everything systems a little bit less 23:24.563 --> 23:26.786 maneuverable because I'm worrying about 23:26.786 --> 23:26.640 the way the errors behaving as it goes 23:26.640 --> 23:28.640 in the front of the engine that the 23:28.640 --> 23:30.696 rocket boost system . Once it starts 23:30.696 --> 23:33.029 gliding , I can bank and dive and glide . 23:33.029 --> 23:32.920 I don't care about the state of the air 23:32.920 --> 23:35.050 coming in front . So as I like to 23:35.050 --> 23:37.217 emphasize , these systems really don't 23:37.217 --> 23:39.494 compete there , actually complimentary . 23:39.640 --> 23:41.640 We want both of these . We want the 23:41.640 --> 23:43.696 everything cruise missiles . But you 23:43.696 --> 23:45.584 also want the boost glide systems 23:45.584 --> 23:47.418 because they each have their own 23:47.418 --> 23:49.640 benefits , their own drawbacks and used 23:49.640 --> 23:51.862 in combination . I think of them really 23:51.862 --> 23:53.973 is a high low mix , very much like we 23:53.973 --> 23:53.720 have the high low mix and fighters . He 23:53.720 --> 23:56.400 had 15 in the F 16 . So I think we need 23:56.400 --> 23:58.289 the high , low mix and hypersonic 23:58.289 --> 24:00.400 between the boost gliders and the air 24:00.400 --> 24:03.350 breathers . That's great . Um , I 24:03.740 --> 24:07.030 you you talked to you about the need . 24:07.170 --> 24:09.392 This has been a theme from the Pentagon 24:09.392 --> 24:11.503 as we moved forward Spectra Esper has 24:11.503 --> 24:13.503 made these made this point over and 24:13.503 --> 24:13.220 over and over again that they need to 24:13.220 --> 24:16.990 go fast . And , um and 24:17.000 --> 24:19.222 you just said that we need to embrace , 24:19.222 --> 24:21.930 uh , paraphrasing a higher degree of 24:21.940 --> 24:24.162 risk that there certainly rest . Forget 24:24.162 --> 24:26.218 it . We're not going to get it right 24:26.218 --> 24:28.273 right away , and we're going to have 24:28.273 --> 24:30.384 some kind of failures . But there's a 24:30.384 --> 24:30.190 difference . Doing good , there's good 24:30.190 --> 24:32.301 failures , and there's bad failures . 24:32.301 --> 24:34.301 And you didn't need to embrace this 24:34.301 --> 24:34.210 idea of having some good failures 24:34.210 --> 24:36.830 because we learn from them . Um , I 24:36.830 --> 24:39.110 want you to touch on that , and I also 24:39.110 --> 24:41.280 though it would be great then if you 24:41.280 --> 24:45.270 could think about going to that how How 24:45.270 --> 24:47.437 industry should be thinking about this 24:47.437 --> 24:49.603 Because you've talked about we need to 24:49.603 --> 24:51.548 go to scale . We need be producing 24:51.548 --> 24:51.320 these things that scale . But right now , 24:51.330 --> 24:53.274 we still don't really know exactly 24:53.274 --> 24:55.497 where we're gonna You know what ? Which 24:55.497 --> 24:57.552 some of these systems we're gonna go 24:57.552 --> 24:57.450 with that becomes very difficult , 24:57.450 --> 24:59.506 Especially as you think about supply 24:59.506 --> 25:01.506 chains and making sure that we have 25:01.506 --> 25:03.506 supply chains prepared to be ableto 25:03.506 --> 25:06.040 ramp up and produce that feel . So , uh , 25:06.050 --> 25:08.900 so testing and embracing failure . And 25:08.900 --> 25:11.011 then how can we be preparing for this 25:11.011 --> 25:13.067 and how you're thinking about supply 25:13.067 --> 25:15.011 chains , right ? So you're exactly 25:15.011 --> 25:16.956 right that we need to be less risk 25:16.956 --> 25:19.178 averse , and that doesn't mean way seek 25:19.178 --> 25:21.233 to maximise risk . But it also means 25:21.233 --> 25:23.400 we're not afraid to take risks . We're 25:23.400 --> 25:25.511 not afraid to fail as long as they're 25:25.511 --> 25:27.567 what I term noble failures . Right ? 25:27.567 --> 25:26.750 There are dumb failures and noble 25:26.750 --> 25:28.694 failures . Noble failures are when 25:28.694 --> 25:30.694 something didn't work . But but you 25:30.694 --> 25:32.806 learned a lot , and it was an unknown 25:32.806 --> 25:34.806 that you've now . You've now , uh , 25:34.806 --> 25:36.806 added information . You've got data 25:36.806 --> 25:39.028 that allows you to understand what went 25:39.028 --> 25:38.860 wrong . Thumb failures are when 25:38.860 --> 25:40.860 something fails , it really have no 25:40.860 --> 25:42.860 business failing . So let me let me 25:42.860 --> 25:45.027 give you an example of one of the best 25:45.027 --> 25:47.249 explanation . Second half , um , in the 25:47.249 --> 25:49.360 20 tens , the United States Air Force 25:49.360 --> 25:51.471 had a program which which I think has 25:51.471 --> 25:51.270 been one of our most successful 25:51.270 --> 25:54.030 hypersonic programs was called X 51 and 25:54.030 --> 25:55.919 X 51 did four flights . The first 25:55.919 --> 25:58.680 flight was mostly successful . Towards 25:58.680 --> 26:00.680 the end of the flight , there was a 26:00.680 --> 26:02.680 little bit of a burn through in the 26:02.680 --> 26:04.791 nozzle . Second flight failed , third 26:04.791 --> 26:06.902 flight failed . Four flight was fully 26:06.902 --> 26:06.690 successful . Now let's talk about that 26:06.690 --> 26:08.634 program , not tell you what we did 26:08.634 --> 26:10.746 right , but also tell you what we did 26:10.746 --> 26:12.801 wrong , all right , after that first 26:12.801 --> 26:14.801 flight or where mostly worked , the 26:14.801 --> 26:16.857 engine worked . We power the vehicle 26:16.857 --> 26:19.079 for most of its trajectory , but we had 26:19.079 --> 26:20.968 that failure in the end , to burn 26:20.968 --> 26:23.190 through , um , people front , frankly , 26:23.190 --> 26:25.134 in a panic because we had set that 26:25.134 --> 26:27.790 program up with on Lee four plates . So 26:27.790 --> 26:29.734 we at first we just used the first 26:29.734 --> 26:31.790 flight up . All right . We had three 26:31.790 --> 26:33.901 left and there was a sense of Oh , my 26:33.901 --> 26:36.068 gosh , we need to know everything that 26:36.068 --> 26:38.179 went wrong because that second flight 26:38.179 --> 26:40.401 can't fail because then we'll only have 26:40.401 --> 26:42.457 two left . So we spent a really long 26:42.457 --> 26:42.220 time trying to figure out what went 26:42.220 --> 26:45.030 wrong . And Flight One side note , we 26:45.030 --> 26:47.252 kind of knew what went wrong and Flight 26:47.252 --> 26:49.252 one on the first day . I mean , you 26:49.252 --> 26:48.320 could look at the data . You could see 26:48.320 --> 26:50.153 exactly what would happen , what 26:50.153 --> 26:52.209 happened . But because we had so few 26:52.209 --> 26:54.431 flights in the program , we spent a lot 26:54.431 --> 26:56.653 of time figuring that we went to flight 26:56.653 --> 26:58.431 to Flight two . We took so long 26:58.431 --> 27:00.598 figuring out what went wrong and fight 27:00.598 --> 27:02.764 one . By the time we got the flight to 27:02.764 --> 27:04.764 the pilot , who'd flown the carrier 27:04.764 --> 27:06.820 aircraft that dropped the first x 51 27:06.820 --> 27:08.987 had retired out of the Air Force , the 27:08.987 --> 27:10.931 co pilot , how to be recalled from 27:10.931 --> 27:13.153 another duty station owner to fly the B 27:13.153 --> 27:12.970 52 mother craft that carried airplane 27:12.970 --> 27:15.650 so we had allows loss of expertise . Um , 27:15.810 --> 27:17.720 about 70% of the ground crew that 27:17.720 --> 27:19.776 worked on the first flight of its 51 27:19.776 --> 27:21.720 was no longer there for the second 27:21.720 --> 27:23.831 flight . So now the second fight . We 27:23.831 --> 27:25.887 had a failure , and it was frankly , 27:25.887 --> 27:25.500 was a noble failure . Something went 27:25.500 --> 27:27.722 wrong with publishing system that we we 27:27.722 --> 27:29.833 it's time . Didn't understand what we 27:29.833 --> 27:31.889 click Me quickly learned what went , 27:31.889 --> 27:33.833 what went wrong . We geared up for 27:33.833 --> 27:36.000 Flight three . Took us a lot of time , 27:36.000 --> 27:38.167 though , to study that we get to fight 27:38.167 --> 27:39.778 three . Flight three is a an 27:39.778 --> 27:41.889 embarrassing failure . Ah , Finn fell 27:41.889 --> 27:44.111 off the vehicle . That happens a lot in 27:44.111 --> 27:43.950 hypersonic testing . All right now , we 27:43.950 --> 27:46.800 had one flight left , and by gosh , we 27:46.800 --> 27:49.022 had people in the program saying What ? 27:49.022 --> 27:51.189 We can't fly that vehicle because what 27:51.189 --> 27:53.300 if it fails ? I've never had needs to 27:53.300 --> 27:55.522 realize the conversations like , Well , 27:55.522 --> 27:57.467 if we don't , we pay for it . It's 27:57.467 --> 27:57.100 sitting in the hangar . Why wouldn't we 27:57.100 --> 27:59.211 fly it ? Well , but if we fly it , if 27:59.211 --> 28:01.489 it doesn't work , then we're done . Um , 28:01.740 --> 28:03.851 we did finally fly it , but there was 28:03.851 --> 28:06.073 so much hand wringing there was so much 28:06.073 --> 28:07.962 worry about this about what would 28:07.962 --> 28:10.220 happen if and that kind of all 28:10.230 --> 28:12.397 illustrates the situation we've gotten 28:12.397 --> 28:14.508 ourselves into . No . Let me give the 28:14.508 --> 28:16.619 contrast . The 19 sixties NASA in the 28:16.619 --> 28:18.674 Air Force and the Navy had a program 28:18.674 --> 28:20.619 called X 15 . The X 15 resulted in 28:20.619 --> 28:22.841 three vehicles being built to are still 28:22.841 --> 28:25.063 around . One . Is the National Airspace 28:25.063 --> 28:27.008 Museum down in the mall ? Ah , the 28:27.008 --> 28:26.910 other is of the Air Force Museum in 28:26.910 --> 28:29.420 Dayton , Ohio . That's 15 program flew 28:29.430 --> 28:33.300 199 flights , roughly 28:33.300 --> 28:35.570 once every two weeks . When things went 28:35.570 --> 28:37.626 wrong , they figured out immediately 28:37.626 --> 28:39.681 what went wrong , and they got those 28:39.681 --> 28:41.903 vehicles back in the air . They had one 28:41.903 --> 28:41.710 case where a vehicle landed hard , 28:41.710 --> 28:43.654 broken , half . That's a great who 28:43.654 --> 28:45.710 wanted to make one little bit longer 28:45.710 --> 28:47.599 anyway , all right , they weren't 28:47.599 --> 28:49.599 afraid of failure . They even had a 28:49.599 --> 28:51.710 tragedy tragedy in the program . They 28:51.710 --> 28:50.990 lost one of the vehicles . They lost 28:50.990 --> 28:53.390 the pilot . It didn't end the program , 28:53.600 --> 28:55.711 right ? So that's kind of the mindset 28:55.711 --> 28:57.711 that we're trying to get into , all 28:57.711 --> 28:59.878 right . And part of that comes down to 28:59.878 --> 29:01.767 doing things , often flying often 29:01.767 --> 29:03.822 building programs so that when we're 29:03.822 --> 29:05.933 testing , we're not testing onesies . 29:05.933 --> 29:07.822 Twosies . We've got a robust test 29:07.822 --> 29:09.989 program , so we learn as we're doing , 29:09.989 --> 29:11.989 we're not . We're not constantly re 29:11.989 --> 29:14.211 learning how to do what we used to know 29:14.211 --> 29:14.160 how to Dio , and that that , I think is 29:14.160 --> 29:16.271 is the secret , I think , is the path 29:16.271 --> 29:18.327 we're trying to get ourselves on . I 29:18.327 --> 29:20.438 would just have to somebody I used to 29:20.438 --> 29:22.604 work in the Congress for a congressman 29:22.604 --> 29:24.827 on the House Armed Services Committee , 29:24.827 --> 29:26.993 and then the political environment has 29:26.993 --> 29:26.960 to be conducive for that kind of 29:26.960 --> 29:29.180 testing to we can't The Congress needs 29:29.180 --> 29:31.402 to kind of settle in and be patient and 29:31.402 --> 29:33.513 understand that there's testing . And 29:33.513 --> 29:35.791 there are some , uh , testing failures . 29:35.791 --> 29:37.902 They might be noble failures , and it 29:37.902 --> 29:40.069 doesn't mean that it's time to end the 29:40.069 --> 29:39.810 program or switch the program , or no 29:39.810 --> 29:42.410 longer where the idea that there's 29:42.410 --> 29:44.577 going to be , we're gonna have to have 29:44.577 --> 29:46.521 a higher tolerance , my bipartisan 29:46.690 --> 29:49.023 perspective , congressional perspective , 29:49.023 --> 29:50.968 because there has to be a national 29:50.968 --> 29:52.968 commitment to making sure that this 29:52.968 --> 29:54.968 technology , um , is successful and 29:54.968 --> 29:57.190 then , you know , winds up in the hands 29:57.190 --> 30:00.780 of those out in the field , right ? You 30:00.780 --> 30:02.891 talk about the supply chain issued to 30:02.891 --> 30:04.780 and how we can be , how we can be 30:04.780 --> 30:06.891 preparing and thinking about this . I 30:06.891 --> 30:08.724 know it's It's a little bit of a 30:08.724 --> 30:10.891 dilemma right now because some of this 30:10.891 --> 30:10.720 stuff is still classified . We don't 30:10.720 --> 30:12.831 wanna give timelines because we don't 30:12.831 --> 30:14.887 want the adversary to Notre ones are 30:14.887 --> 30:17.053 What ? Do you know what we're favoring 30:17.053 --> 30:19.220 at this point ? But at the same time , 30:19.220 --> 30:21.220 we can get costs down , too , if we 30:21.220 --> 30:23.442 have a long enough , the times a plan , 30:23.442 --> 30:25.553 especially as he wants to ramp up and 30:25.553 --> 30:27.664 produced that scale as well . We have 30:27.664 --> 30:29.553 to have a robust industrial . I'm 30:29.553 --> 30:31.498 capability to be able to do that , 30:31.498 --> 30:33.664 right ? So So I really appreciate your 30:33.664 --> 30:35.831 talking about industrial base and also 30:35.831 --> 30:35.010 about costs , cause I think you've hit 30:35.010 --> 30:37.232 about one of one of the key issues also 30:37.232 --> 30:39.566 in this technology area . Um , you know , 30:39.566 --> 30:41.650 when When people ask me , why do we 30:41.650 --> 30:43.650 want hypersonic systems ? I tend to 30:43.650 --> 30:46.050 counter with the question Why wouldn't 30:46.050 --> 30:48.161 we want hypersonic systems ? And I'll 30:48.161 --> 30:50.328 start with the thought experiment if I 30:50.328 --> 30:52.550 could take an existing cruise missile . 30:52.550 --> 30:54.494 And if I could replace that cruise 30:54.494 --> 30:54.290 missile with a hypersonic system , so 30:54.290 --> 30:56.346 does everything the existence system 30:56.346 --> 30:58.810 does . But does it seven times faster . 30:59.340 --> 31:01.780 Well , why wouldn't I want that ? The 31:01.780 --> 31:03.724 answer is I might no want it if it 31:03.724 --> 31:05.780 doesn't completely replicate all the 31:05.780 --> 31:08.002 capabilities . For example , if I don't 31:08.002 --> 31:09.947 get the same range or there's some 31:09.947 --> 31:12.113 vulnerabilities , but I also might not 31:12.113 --> 31:14.280 want it if it's extremely expensive so 31:14.280 --> 31:16.447 that I can afford the weapon . So cost 31:16.447 --> 31:16.250 is a very important aspect of this . 31:16.250 --> 31:18.361 And I'm happy to say that a couple of 31:18.361 --> 31:20.361 our prototype efforts have a really 31:20.361 --> 31:22.528 strong focus on what the systems costs 31:22.528 --> 31:24.750 will be . Especially the DARPA programs 31:24.750 --> 31:26.750 right now have have costs as one of 31:26.750 --> 31:28.861 their metrics , right ? So So we have 31:28.861 --> 31:30.972 to pay attention that I personally is 31:30.972 --> 31:33.083 inside . By the way , I think it is a 31:33.083 --> 31:35.250 miss number . That hyper son existence 31:35.250 --> 31:37.306 immediately translate into expensive 31:37.306 --> 31:37.040 systems . Take the example of a 31:37.040 --> 31:38.873 scramjet powered , air breathing 31:38.873 --> 31:40.984 hypersonic cruise missile . Well , is 31:40.984 --> 31:43.318 pushing state of the art in development . 31:43.318 --> 31:45.429 But ah , hypersonic jet engine . What 31:45.429 --> 31:47.484 we call a scramjet engine supersonic 31:47.484 --> 31:49.484 combusting ramjet is in principle a 31:49.484 --> 31:51.540 very simple engine . It doesn't have 31:51.540 --> 31:53.540 very many moving parts . It doesn't 31:53.540 --> 31:52.930 have turbines , it doesn't have 31:52.930 --> 31:54.490 compressors . So the actual 31:54.490 --> 31:56.730 manufacturing shouldn't be that much 31:56.730 --> 31:58.730 more expensive . That could be less 31:58.730 --> 32:00.341 expensive than a lower speed 32:00.341 --> 32:02.174 alternative . So , yeah , you're 32:02.174 --> 32:04.341 investing a front in the development . 32:04.341 --> 32:06.341 But the per unit cost should not be 32:06.341 --> 32:08.563 astronomical , as as some folks I think 32:08.563 --> 32:10.841 mistakenly believes would be necessary . 32:10.841 --> 32:12.897 Be true for hypersonic systems . All 32:12.897 --> 32:14.841 right , so with that focus on cost 32:14.841 --> 32:17.008 exactly right , we need to be focusing 32:17.008 --> 32:16.190 on supply chain . There's several 32:16.190 --> 32:18.301 elements of that . One is . Make sure 32:18.301 --> 32:20.301 we've got the supply chain that can 32:20.301 --> 32:22.860 produce at scale and at at at 32:22.870 --> 32:26.080 reasonable cost , but also to make sure 32:26.080 --> 32:28.191 that we don't have vulnerabilities in 32:28.191 --> 32:30.358 that supply chain that we don't have . 32:30.358 --> 32:32.580 Pure competitors who are looking at key 32:32.580 --> 32:34.747 aspects of that supply chain trying to 32:34.747 --> 32:36.636 get into that supply chain may be 32:36.636 --> 32:38.913 tapping into , ah , advanced materials , 32:38.913 --> 32:40.913 high temperature materials that are 32:40.913 --> 32:43.136 essential to the creation of hypersonic 32:43.136 --> 32:45.302 systems . One of the things that we're 32:45.302 --> 32:47.191 trying to do in our office is the 32:47.191 --> 32:49.330 single to industry that that , uh , 32:49.340 --> 32:51.340 that we need them to step up to the 32:51.340 --> 32:53.451 plate that this Israel that is coming 32:53.451 --> 32:55.284 from the secretary on down , the 32:55.284 --> 32:57.229 secretary that deputy the chairman 32:57.229 --> 32:59.229 really the deal . The leadership is 32:59.229 --> 33:01.229 saying this is a technology that we 33:01.229 --> 33:03.340 understand is essential to the modern 33:03.340 --> 33:06.300 battlefield , and we're communicating 33:06.300 --> 33:10.000 that in basically various ways . But 33:10.010 --> 33:12.177 my my boss Mike Griffin has been , has 33:12.177 --> 33:14.510 been pretty public and telling industry , 33:14.510 --> 33:16.510 We need you to understand that this 33:16.510 --> 33:18.621 Israel we need you to to to plan your 33:18.621 --> 33:20.788 investments accordingly . And it's not 33:20.788 --> 33:22.732 just the primes , but it's looking 33:22.732 --> 33:24.899 further down in the supply chain , and 33:24.899 --> 33:27.121 I'm actually happy to report that we've 33:27.121 --> 33:29.399 seen the primes really step up to that . 33:29.399 --> 33:31.566 Several of the major aerospace defence 33:31.566 --> 33:33.677 companies have have been looking down 33:33.677 --> 33:35.843 their supply chain looking at how they 33:35.843 --> 33:35.340 make the supply chain more robust . 33:35.510 --> 33:37.566 Have been working with their various 33:37.566 --> 33:40.240 suppliers to make sure that when when 33:40.240 --> 33:43.220 we give that call that that that we'll 33:43.220 --> 33:46.520 have the supply chain available in our 33:46.520 --> 33:48.631 remaining time , I want to talk about 33:48.631 --> 33:51.700 hypersonic defense . Um , if you if you 33:51.700 --> 33:54.930 could answer the question of how we're 33:54.930 --> 33:57.770 prioritizing offense versus defense and 33:57.770 --> 33:59.992 for me , for my perspective , I've been 33:59.992 --> 34:02.214 making the argument for a long time now 34:02.214 --> 34:04.214 that we have to have defense . That 34:04.214 --> 34:06.381 offense is not defense audiences often 34:06.381 --> 34:08.548 defense's defense , and it's important 34:08.548 --> 34:10.780 that we do have active defences against 34:10.780 --> 34:13.002 what are your competitors have in these 34:13.002 --> 34:16.510 highly contested height , height areas . 34:16.510 --> 34:19.640 I like contested areas and in what 34:19.640 --> 34:23.100 we're doing as a department to to 34:23.100 --> 34:26.700 invest in things like H BTS says the 34:27.710 --> 34:30.070 hypersonic and ballistic track ings 34:30.120 --> 34:33.210 stay sense sensor program . Why we have 34:33.210 --> 34:35.488 to have that . And you touched on that . 34:35.488 --> 34:37.710 You talked about how there these things 34:37.710 --> 34:39.932 are hard to see , um , in their hard to 34:39.932 --> 34:39.420 see and in the heart of track . And if 34:39.420 --> 34:41.364 you can't see him in track and you 34:41.364 --> 34:43.476 can't hit him , there's also value in 34:43.476 --> 34:45.587 being able to Steve them attractive , 34:45.587 --> 34:47.642 even if you can't get them . But you 34:47.642 --> 34:49.753 are able to see them and track them , 34:49.753 --> 34:51.698 at least initially . So talk to us 34:51.698 --> 34:53.531 about the importance of having a 34:53.531 --> 34:55.698 defense of capability , why it is so , 34:55.698 --> 34:58.110 so important and what we're doing to 34:58.110 --> 35:00.830 invest in the kinds of of invest of 35:00.840 --> 35:03.062 technologies that we need to be able to 35:03.062 --> 35:05.340 have some kind of active defense . Yes , 35:05.340 --> 35:07.229 that we don't need to have a 100% 35:07.229 --> 35:09.340 defense . We're not trying to be able 35:09.340 --> 35:11.396 to intercept every single hypersonic 35:11.396 --> 35:13.562 weapons system that exists , but we do 35:13.562 --> 35:15.451 need to have have some incredible 35:15.451 --> 35:17.507 defense against these things for our 35:17.507 --> 35:19.229 most critical , uh , bases and 35:19.229 --> 35:21.396 strategic interests in these regions , 35:21.396 --> 35:23.173 right or so Rebecca , Your your 35:23.173 --> 35:25.396 question actually said it better than I 35:25.396 --> 35:27.618 think I could in any answer that I give 35:27.618 --> 35:29.562 you . Um , so So , um , you know , 35:29.562 --> 35:31.673 hypersonic . I said hyper . Sonics is 35:31.673 --> 35:33.562 very difficult to stop . It's not 35:33.562 --> 35:33.450 impossible stuff . We know there are 35:33.450 --> 35:35.617 various technologies , various options 35:35.617 --> 35:37.783 that are available Teoh interfere with 35:37.783 --> 35:39.950 the operation of a hypersonic system . 35:39.950 --> 35:41.950 Um , and we've got efforts underway 35:41.950 --> 35:44.890 examining that . But as you correctly 35:44.890 --> 35:47.220 point out , the first step in stopping 35:47.220 --> 35:49.400 it is detecting it . And you mentioned 35:49.410 --> 35:51.260 the efforts underway with Space 35:51.260 --> 35:53.204 Development Agency Missile Defense 35:53.204 --> 35:55.820 Agency were convinced that the best way 35:55.820 --> 35:58.160 to do that is from is from space , and 35:58.160 --> 35:59.880 it requires a proliferated 35:59.880 --> 36:01.880 constellation system that allows to 36:01.880 --> 36:03.991 detect these things . Um , you know , 36:03.991 --> 36:06.910 defense will be 100% . Um , we do 36:06.910 --> 36:08.743 believe that eventually the best 36:08.743 --> 36:10.799 defense will be , ah , layer defense 36:10.799 --> 36:12.521 with with multiple aspects and 36:12.730 --> 36:14.952 hypersonic says many things . It's it's 36:14.960 --> 36:16.627 it's long range systems , its 36:16.627 --> 36:18.849 intermediate range systems , its rocket 36:18.849 --> 36:21.071 boost , fly systems , its air breathing 36:21.071 --> 36:23.182 systems . Each of those would require 36:23.182 --> 36:24.960 ah , particular pick particular 36:24.960 --> 36:26.960 response . But But in the end , you 36:26.960 --> 36:28.738 know , I draw an analogy to the 36:28.738 --> 36:30.849 kamikaze waves that we faced in World 36:30.849 --> 36:32.627 War Two , the way we eventually 36:32.627 --> 36:34.849 defeated them , I was with with a layer 36:34.849 --> 36:37.071 defense . And what started out is as an 36:37.071 --> 36:39.182 unstoppable problem became a tragical 36:39.182 --> 36:41.460 problem . When once we understood that , 36:41.460 --> 36:43.682 um , if you look at the portfolio right 36:43.682 --> 36:45.516 now , the balance is clearly tip 36:45.516 --> 36:47.849 towards offensive investments right now . 36:47.849 --> 36:49.960 And we're pushing very , very hard in 36:49.960 --> 36:52.127 our office to emphasize the importance 36:52.127 --> 36:54.293 of of defense . I do think offense and 36:54.293 --> 36:56.293 defense go hand in hand and that in 36:56.293 --> 36:58.460 order to in order to understand how to 36:58.460 --> 36:58.040 defend against these systems , you have 36:58.040 --> 37:00.207 to understand what goes into designing 37:00.207 --> 37:02.151 them if you need to understand the 37:02.151 --> 37:04.318 offensive technology in order to get a 37:04.318 --> 37:06.484 handle on the ways that you would stop 37:06.484 --> 37:08.596 them and defend against them , I also 37:08.596 --> 37:08.250 think that there is a deterrent element 37:08.250 --> 37:10.417 to it . You know , you may not be able 37:10.417 --> 37:12.528 to stop it , but if you know where it 37:12.528 --> 37:14.750 came from and if you can respond on the 37:14.750 --> 37:16.639 time scales that they're using to 37:16.639 --> 37:18.861 attack you , then it gives you , ah , a 37:18.861 --> 37:20.806 turn capability . They may get the 37:20.806 --> 37:22.806 first shot in , but if you can make 37:22.806 --> 37:24.750 sure they don't get the 2nd 3rd or 37:24.750 --> 37:26.694 fourth shot in then then that that 37:26.694 --> 37:28.680 could be a powerful defensive 37:28.680 --> 37:32.400 capability in and of itself . Um , you 37:32.400 --> 37:35.470 know , I I think I can tell you that 37:35.470 --> 37:37.414 we're seeing a significant ramp up 37:37.414 --> 37:39.581 right now in our in our efforts on the 37:39.581 --> 37:41.692 defensive side that the folks who are 37:41.692 --> 37:43.914 working on defense are working hand and 37:43.914 --> 37:46.137 glove with . The people were developing 37:46.137 --> 37:48.248 the offensive capabilities . And , um 37:48.248 --> 37:50.414 and it's an area , though , that we're 37:50.414 --> 37:50.200 continuing to focus on and investing . 37:52.350 --> 37:54.870 How are our shooters ? How are our 37:54.870 --> 37:56.703 current interceptors that we are 37:56.703 --> 37:59.190 current systems that we have today ? Um , 37:59.200 --> 38:02.280 how are they as being able to interest 38:02.280 --> 38:04.340 at some of these more sophisticated 38:04.340 --> 38:06.118 threats that are no longer just 38:06.118 --> 38:07.896 predictably ballistic and their 38:07.896 --> 38:10.030 trajectories ? Because there's done , 38:10.040 --> 38:12.240 we're some people try to make the case 38:12.240 --> 38:14.407 that you have . Some of these regional 38:14.407 --> 38:16.573 systems were have it . If they if they 38:16.573 --> 38:18.684 simply had their network better , and 38:18.684 --> 38:18.390 if they were able to cooperate better 38:18.390 --> 38:20.612 that they would actually have some kind 38:20.612 --> 38:22.779 of defense against hypersonic threat . 38:22.779 --> 38:24.810 What was your sense of that ? So so 38:24.810 --> 38:26.977 some of our existing systems have have 38:26.977 --> 38:29.199 some some capabilities that could bring 38:29.199 --> 38:31.310 that you could bring to bear , but it 38:31.310 --> 38:31.300 really depends on what you're going 38:31.300 --> 38:34.330 against , right ? So as just one 38:34.330 --> 38:36.497 measure , here's a good technical rule 38:36.497 --> 38:38.870 of thumb . If you're trying to stop an 38:38.880 --> 38:41.380 incoming weapons , then you're 38:41.380 --> 38:43.480 maneuverability has to have roughly 38:43.480 --> 38:45.720 three times the acceleration capability 38:46.080 --> 38:48.920 as the thing you're trying to stop . So 38:48.930 --> 38:50.930 if the incoming weapon can maneuver 38:50.930 --> 38:53.100 with 15 G's , then you have to be able 38:53.100 --> 38:55.960 to maneuver at 45 G's . That's really 38:55.960 --> 38:58.127 tough . It's not impossible , but it's 38:58.127 --> 39:00.349 tough . So that's one of the challenges 39:00.349 --> 39:02.680 that we've that we have in addressing 39:02.680 --> 39:05.260 this threat . There are other systems 39:05.260 --> 39:07.371 that you might bring about . Directed 39:07.371 --> 39:09.538 energy , for example , is a technology 39:09.538 --> 39:11.704 that could have important applications 39:11.704 --> 39:13.871 in defending against hypersonic . Um , 39:13.871 --> 39:15.982 still capability is being developed . 39:15.982 --> 39:17.871 We've seen tremendous advances in 39:17.871 --> 39:20.690 recent years . Um , um , we're looking 39:20.690 --> 39:22.912 at systems that , if not existing today 39:22.912 --> 39:24.968 will be will be in place very soon . 39:24.968 --> 39:27.190 That may have some capabilities against 39:27.190 --> 39:29.246 these threats , but , you know , I I 39:29.246 --> 39:31.357 guess I put it in the category , work 39:31.357 --> 39:33.610 in progress and and and and and limited 39:33.620 --> 39:35.842 in details that I can offer limited and 39:35.842 --> 39:37.842 exactly what I can say no . I think 39:37.842 --> 39:40.064 that's great . I think it's important . 39:40.064 --> 39:42.120 Just a foot stomp the point that you 39:42.120 --> 39:41.840 just made previously , though , that 39:41.850 --> 39:43.961 even having the ability to have birth 39:43.961 --> 39:46.017 to death tracking , which is what HB 39:46.017 --> 39:48.430 TSS would give us in the context of the 39:48.430 --> 39:50.500 hypersonic threat and that in and of 39:50.500 --> 39:52.920 itself would be a dramatic advantage 39:52.920 --> 39:55.300 for the United States and would bolster 39:55.300 --> 39:57.880 our deterrent effect . Because all of 39:57.880 --> 40:00.102 this is meant not toe hopefully fight a 40:00.102 --> 40:03.290 war with China , but to deter one . And 40:03.290 --> 40:05.560 so we're trying to have trying to 40:05.560 --> 40:07.449 present multiple dilemmas for the 40:07.449 --> 40:10.130 adversary . Impose costs on them is 40:10.130 --> 40:12.297 that they're busy trying to figure out 40:12.297 --> 40:15.720 better ways to , um to gain the 40:15.730 --> 40:17.619 dominant position over the United 40:17.619 --> 40:19.286 States in the Indo Pacific in 40:19.286 --> 40:21.508 particular . Well , if I could just , I 40:21.508 --> 40:23.730 want it just end with the last point of 40:23.730 --> 40:25.674 Giger thoughts on You know , Advil 40:25.674 --> 40:27.341 Davidson , I think , has been 40:27.341 --> 40:29.508 incredibly articulate and staying back 40:29.508 --> 40:31.619 to your theme about the importance of 40:31.619 --> 40:33.674 testing , and you gave that that the 40:33.674 --> 40:35.730 example of the testing program where 40:35.730 --> 40:37.952 there's hundreds of tests that also has 40:37.952 --> 40:39.508 deterrent effect because it 40:39.508 --> 40:41.619 communicates to our adversaries . The 40:41.619 --> 40:41.190 political will we have to get this 40:41.190 --> 40:43.301 right . And so sometimes , you know , 40:43.301 --> 40:45.170 we've been , you know , kind of 40:45.170 --> 40:47.490 secretive and afraid that if we test 40:47.500 --> 40:49.722 and there is a failure , that that will 40:49.722 --> 40:51.778 make us look bad or it will show the 40:51.778 --> 40:53.444 enemy that we don't have this 40:53.444 --> 40:55.444 capability . But in fact , if we're 40:55.444 --> 40:57.667 going fast and demonstrating that we do 40:57.667 --> 40:59.722 have the will to get this done , you 40:59.722 --> 41:01.889 can actually have a positive effect in 41:01.889 --> 41:03.833 bolstering the credibility of your 41:03.833 --> 41:05.833 deterrence . They were going to get 41:05.833 --> 41:05.500 this right . And if you could comment 41:05.500 --> 41:07.722 on that and then just give us some sort 41:07.722 --> 41:09.833 of timeline . Where do you expect the 41:09.833 --> 41:11.778 United States to pull ahead ? Um , 41:11.778 --> 41:13.944 against are your competitors in this ? 41:13.944 --> 41:16.670 So So you know , our competitors should 41:16.670 --> 41:19.730 have no doubt that , um , 41:20.310 --> 41:22.680 we are moving out on a very big way in 41:22.680 --> 41:24.736 this technology area . Um , and they 41:24.736 --> 41:26.791 should not be mistaken to think that 41:26.791 --> 41:29.013 they've got a technological advantage , 41:29.013 --> 41:31.236 that we we we will be unable to counter 41:31.236 --> 41:33.458 eso . So I appreciate your making those 41:33.458 --> 41:35.569 points . Um , were so so We do have a 41:35.569 --> 41:37.750 very , very aggressive program , and 41:37.750 --> 41:40.110 it's it cuts across the services . So 41:40.110 --> 41:42.110 you've got Army . You've got Navy . 41:42.110 --> 41:44.380 You've got Air Force . Um , all moving 41:44.380 --> 41:46.547 ever aggressively working very hand in 41:46.547 --> 41:48.713 glove with Darboe . We've got multiple 41:48.713 --> 41:50.658 programs at DARPA that are feeding 41:50.658 --> 41:52.713 directly into those programs in ways 41:52.713 --> 41:54.769 that that , frankly , it's it's it's 41:54.769 --> 41:56.991 It's amazing how well , all those those 41:56.991 --> 41:59.213 those programs were integrated , that's 41:59.213 --> 42:01.269 across the rocket boost glide across 42:01.269 --> 42:03.436 the air breeding . Um , our goal is to 42:03.436 --> 42:05.547 deliver what we say deliver its scale 42:05.547 --> 42:07.910 by the mid 2020 . And , um , you know , 42:07.910 --> 42:10.077 obviously we're a little bit bigger on 42:10.077 --> 42:12.410 our dates Are competitors could do math . 42:12.410 --> 42:14.680 They can add up numbers . Um , but we 42:14.690 --> 42:16.750 were looking at moving beyond beyond 42:16.750 --> 42:19.290 the prototype stage . Certainly by the 42:19.290 --> 42:22.420 second half of this decade , Um , 42:23.000 --> 42:25.167 they're a couple elements that what is 42:25.167 --> 42:27.580 well , we'll see a vastly increased 42:27.580 --> 42:29.691 rate of testing , and that's just not 42:29.691 --> 42:31.747 just we've been testing a lot of the 42:31.747 --> 42:33.524 ground . You're gonna see a big 42:33.524 --> 42:33.440 increase in the rate of flight testing , 42:33.440 --> 42:35.607 getting back to the earlier point that 42:35.607 --> 42:37.718 we need to fly early . We need to fly 42:37.718 --> 42:39.940 often . We need to to become proficient 42:39.940 --> 42:42.560 at that part of the technology . And so 42:42.560 --> 42:44.727 we're looking in the next four years . 42:44.727 --> 42:46.616 We're looking up the 40 different 42:46.616 --> 42:48.838 flight tests of various systems to help 42:48.838 --> 42:51.310 bring them to maturity . Um , same time 42:51.310 --> 42:53.532 were , you know , reinvesting in ground 42:53.532 --> 42:55.754 test facilities . You see , significant 42:55.754 --> 42:57.810 testing , evaluation facility , uh , 42:57.810 --> 42:59.754 capabilities are ramping up in the 42:59.754 --> 43:01.810 United States . You know , it's it's 43:01.990 --> 43:04.212 it's really across the board across the 43:04.212 --> 43:06.157 department . Um , are are ever his 43:06.157 --> 43:08.268 adversaries and potential competitors 43:08.268 --> 43:10.870 should be under No , no mistake . That 43:10.880 --> 43:12.970 that were We're we're meeting the 43:12.970 --> 43:15.810 challenge in this area , and I think 43:15.810 --> 43:18.580 that that also just , you know , makes 43:18.580 --> 43:20.691 the point very , very powerfully that 43:20.691 --> 43:23.320 that we need to maintain a bipartisan 43:23.320 --> 43:25.510 consensus from policymakers . This is 43:25.510 --> 43:27.788 gonna go . This is gonna be , you know , 43:27.788 --> 43:29.954 several years into the future . And we 43:29.954 --> 43:32.066 need t carry on this momentum that we 43:32.066 --> 43:34.177 have a country . So to make sure that 43:34.177 --> 43:36.490 we're back and competing with major 43:36.490 --> 43:38.601 power competition , that's that's the 43:38.601 --> 43:40.601 challenge of our day . Thank you so 43:40.601 --> 43:42.630 much . Talk to Lewis for your your 43:42.770 --> 43:45.160 expertise . Your service weapon . Thank 43:45.160 --> 43:47.104 you so much . I really enjoyed the 43:47.104 --> 43:47.920 conversation . Thanks .