WEBVTT

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(faintly speaking)

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- Well, good afternoon.

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Suspense is killing me.

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- Okay.

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Well, trying to do my moderator's job.

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So, my name's Michael Gordon.

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I'm from the Wall Street Journal.

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I'm the moderator today

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for this panel discussion

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which I think could be very interesting.

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I think a lot of that is also gonna depend

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on you, the audience,

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because we've set aside a good 40 minutes

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or so for questions.

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So, I hope they're gonna be
hard and provocative questions,

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'cause as a journalist
those are the kind I favor.

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And, the subject for this

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discussion is a term
that I think is used more

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by the military than
in the civilian realm,

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but left of conflict, near
peer threats on the horizon.

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But, I think the way the world
situation is we might drift

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a little bit in the discussion
to just plain old conflict

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and preparations for it.

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But left of conflict is
really the main focus.

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And, as you can see, we have
a pretty good group here.

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We have Lieutenant General Eric Wesley

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who's Deputy Commanding
General of Army Futures Command

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who I believe I first met
in some miserable location

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in Kuwait and then another
miserable location,

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a couple of them in Iraq.

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And he's gonna be the first speaker.

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And then Dr. Kath Hicks who's at CSIS

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and was a senior DOD
policy official working

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a lot of important strategy issues.

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And Major General Mike
Fantini who my neighbor,

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Dave Deptula, calls Fan Man
whenever he introduces him

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at the Mitchell Center who
runs AFWIC which is really

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the Army, the Air Force's
future warfare planning office.

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They're equivalent to
Army's Future Command

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which is doing a lot of innovative things.

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And then another Kath,
Major General Kath Toohey

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who's gonna give us a perspective,

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an allied perspective from the vantage

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point of the Australian Army.

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And so, I think what, just

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to kick it off, what I
thought I'd do is just ask

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the panelists just sort of
a straightforward question.

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What is left of conflict,

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and what is the challenge, the problem,

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the mission that you're trying

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to solve here or address here?

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- So thanks Michael.

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First, let me just say

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in 2014 everybody will remember
that Russia annexed Crimea

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without firing a shot.

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So, left of conflict
has to mean something.

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It's gotta be relevant if you
had a international, change

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in international borders in that space.

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And do we wanna influence
it would be the question.

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There's two problems that I
would highlight that we've seen

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in the international
environment with our peers.

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The first is our peer adversaries, Russia

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and China, have invested in
multiple layers of standoff.

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That is, they've have
sought to keep us at bay,

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away from the space that can
influence their behaviors.

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And at the same time,

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you've probably heard of Valery Gerasimov,

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the Chief of the General Staff

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in Russia who has adopted this approach,

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some call it the Gerasimov Doctrine,

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but to escalate to de-escalate.

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And it is essentially
to achieve operational

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and strategic objectives left of conflict.

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And if those objectives interfere

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with our own national security interests,

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we would want to know
how to influence them.

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We would want to get into that space.

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I point out that it's not just

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Russia that is doing these things.

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I think we see China doing the same.

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But we see two peers that has watched us

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in close combat, and they've
determined that they want

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to have the ability to
leverage the competition space

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to achieve their objectives.

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That's important, because I
think it has, in effect, diluted

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our ability to deter operationally.

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And so, solving that problem, how

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to compete left of conflict,

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to protect our national security framework

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and to pursue our own interests,

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I think is the problem we have to solve.

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- [Michael] Go head Kath.

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- Yep, thanks very much
and thanks especially

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to AUSA for bringing to
Kaths together on a panel.

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That's a first for me, so very exciting.

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I completely agree with
the way General Wesley put

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the frame around this.

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I think what's really important

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to understand is that US security

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interests can be significantly decremented

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without a shot being fired

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or at least not being fired directly

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at the United States military.

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And there's a lot of space in there.

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What I think I would just frame

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maybe just slightly differently
or add to is that we tend

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to be very doctrinaire,
shall we say, particularly

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on the military side.

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We like clean lines.

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What is war, what is not war?

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If we have learned nothing else

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from the Vietnam error

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forward hopefully it is

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we have learned that this
is much messier than that.

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It's very difficult to
put plain categories

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around some of these things.

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And I think what we see today

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in what is often called

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in DOD the competition
space, we would expect

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to see in the conflict space as well,

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information as a significant domain.

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That's gonna be true in
statecraft and peace time.

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It's gonna be true in the gray zone

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or in this area of competition
as some like to say,

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and it's gonna be vital

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in terms of actually winning a conflict.

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Cyber-operations, space
operations, proxy force issues,

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state controlled militias,
all of these matter

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throughout if you will
the spectrum of conflict.

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And, the difference between the US

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and some of these adversaries

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it appears today is they get that.

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And they are very fluid about it.

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And the norms and institutions
that we have long felt

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would prevent those
kinds of uses are failing

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or we are failing them

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or something is not working
that is allowing these forces

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to go forward without
that effective deterrent.

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So, good news, we seem to be holding

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at a conventional and nuclear level.

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We wanna continue that.

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That's vital.

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We don't want to have to go to
war to secure our interests.

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But bad news, our interests
are being decremented,

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and it's happening without anyone having

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to go to that level.

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So we gotta get better in that space.

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A lot of that is not about the military.

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And this is sort of a reckoning that we've

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long had to deal with.

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9/11 made that clear

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in terms of the types of, for instance,

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homeland security and
counter terrorism operations

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and approaches we needed.

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We certainly knew that about
stabilization operations

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from the 1990s forward to today.

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And now, I think these gray zone threats

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or this competition
space is really bringing

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home that it takes a suite
of national security tools.

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It takes allies and partners.

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It takes working across public
and private sector divides

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in order to compete effectively.

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And that's just gonna
take a whole lot more than

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this room can control.

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And, it is going to take either a crisis

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or leadership to get to the point where

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the American people wanna invest in that.

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- [Michael] General Fantini
from an Air Force perspective,

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what does it mean to compete
in the gray zone space?

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And what specific efforts
are, is the Air Force making

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to, in its realm with
the authorities it has,

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to get better at that?

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- Well, before, sorry Michael.

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I'm gonna answer the
question I wanna answer.

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(audience and panelists laughter
drown out Michael Fantini)

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And I'll say thanks to
General Wesley for the invite

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and to AUSA in general.

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It's really a neat opportunity to be here.

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To your first question, though, I mean,

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I think, I agree with Dr. Hicks

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in that there's this,
it's a little confusing.

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It's a bit gray, right,
this left of conflict thing.

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But I think we need to
establish what would we think

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to be, what makes conflict when we plan

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to spend blood and treasure of our nation,

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what's gonna make it worth it, right.

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So, there's this national
discussion that you brought up.

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And I kinda think of it as, let's just say

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when we're gonna declare hostilities

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towards some other entity,
declare hostilities,

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whether that's kinetic,
non-kinetic, you name it.

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And so, now we're worked
to the left of that.

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I believe we can't answer a question

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in this space without bringing

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out the bible of the National
Defense Strategy, right.

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That document has allowed us

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to really pivot as a
Department of Defense,

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to focus, better focus

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on peer adversaries as
well as keeping others

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at bay, Iran and North Korea

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and continuing the fight on
countering violent extremism.

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So, there's that, how do

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you balance that which is

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an amazingly challenging discussion.

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But, it's gonna force us to have this talk

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about trades and how do we
focus for this peer fight.

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And I think that will
allow us to really be able

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to compete and deter.

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So, what do you mean

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by working left of launch,
compete, and deter?

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I think, one, it's making sure

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we have foundational nuclear security.

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That has to be, because
these peer adversaries,

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you know when you go by
the way, that'll work right

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up until you need to control deterrence

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or you need to control escalations,

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because they have nuclear weapons.

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So that is a big challenge that
our nation has not wrestled

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with substantively in my opinion

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for about 25 years, arguably.

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We need to continue to obviously make sure

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we can defend the homeland appropriately.

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And then you have to build
conventional capabilities

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against these peer

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adversaries that have
nuclear capabilities.

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And so, that to me is where I see,

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from a Department of Defense

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and Air Force perspective
where we owe our nation

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our best answers towards that.

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And that's where you hear
a lot of our discussion

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about multi-domain operations,
the concept of being able

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to converge effects across the joint force

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at a time and place of our choosing.

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How do we pull that together, I think, is

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the challenge that Army Futures
Command are working towards.

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The Air Force and our war
fighting integration capability,

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we're working towards that.

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And so, I'm happy to get

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into more specificity as we
kinda move on there Michael.

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- [Michael] Okay, for a (mumbles)

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allied perspective, Australia.

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- Yeah, thank you very much,
and if I could just echo

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my thanks for the
invitation to be here today.

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I should say the question

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about competition, Australia
is a sport loving country.

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And of course, competition is all

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about the Rugby World Cup at the moment.

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I'm not sure if there's anyone
in the audience from Japan.

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Yeah, seriously, the team to
beat may even take New Zealand.

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Who knows?

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Hey, in Australia we don't have

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a multi-domain operations concept.

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What we do have is something
called accelerated warfare.

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And it's an idea, if you
like, of what our operating

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environment looks like today

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and may look like in the future.

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There are absolutely synergies with MDO.

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Accelerated warfare talks about

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the convergence across domains.

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It also talks about the operational

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continuum of cooperation,
competition, and conflict.

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We believe all of those can
be simultaneously occur.

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And I think all countries
are probably competing today.

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It's just the extent to which our

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militaries are participating
in that competition.

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In Australia we live in a pretty
dynamic part of the world,

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the Indo-Pacific region.

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We have recently initiated what

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our government is calling
the Pacific Step-up.

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It is really about ensuring that we've got

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a whole of government engagement
program within our region.

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We are coordinating that
out of our Deployable

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Joint Force Headquarters out of Brisbane.

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What does that look like?

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What does that competition

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to be the strategic partner
of choice look like?

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It looks like a whole

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bunch of military
exercises and operations.

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It looks like a whole
lot of cultural events.

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Of course, being Australia,
it means that we're

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out in the region playing sport.

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It also does mean that
we're building capacity

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in our region, and we are coordinating

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a whole bunch of infrastructure projects.

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I think competition is
one of those things.

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It means everything, and it means nothing.

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For the Australian Army it really is

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about winning without fighting.

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- I think just jump in, one other

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problem Michael that I think's important.

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The question was what is
this competition thing.

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Can't we just call it conflict?

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And part of that is cultural.

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And I speak publicly, and I talk

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about this a lot, that we
have an cultural affinity

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for having a very high
bar for defining conflict.

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Most Western democratic
nations, but particularly

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in the United States,

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with our Judeo-Christian
ethic, you could argue that we

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really don't see ourselves
as a war fighting people.

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And we see warfare or conflict
as an anomaly that needs

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to be reconciled, so you go back

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to the norm which is peace time.

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So, when we see things, I
agree with Dr. Hicks, that we,

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with the military tends to see things

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in sequence with clean lines.

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But I would argue our entire
culture looks as it that way,

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because all of our laws, our policies,

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our legislation reflects that behavior.

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The fact that we have Title 10

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and Title 20, the fact that we have

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titles implies that we
have a very high threshold

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for distinguishing the difference

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between conflict and competition.

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- General Wesley in your
initial presentation

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you were talking about how practiced

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the Russians are at this.

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And I lived there once four years during

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the Second Chechnen War period.

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And a lot of thee things
with a lot of continuity

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in terms of what they
do, but they're practiced

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at information, disinformation, signaling,

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the use of military forces

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for political effects and vice versa.

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I take your point that
military forces can be used

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short of conflict to compete
with our adversaries.

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But I'd like to get your perspective

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on something that happened
today that really struck me

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which is that today the
American forces earlier

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this week, really, vacated
Manbij area in Syria.

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And today the Russians moved in

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and became the protectors
of that population.

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And in Moscow, there's no
fighting going on there.

15:52.570 --> 15:55.590
This is the use of forces
for kinda political ends.

15:55.590 --> 16:00.303
In Moscow, this was celebrated
as a huge propaganda victory.

16:01.370 --> 16:04.490
Is that another example in which
the United States is losing

16:04.490 --> 16:06.460
out to the Russians

16:06.460 --> 16:10.050
in left of conflict use of
force for political effects?

16:10.050 --> 16:12.070
- I can always count on a good journalist

16:12.070 --> 16:15.130
to set the trap for the three-star.

16:15.130 --> 16:16.081
But, he also knows--

16:16.081 --> 16:18.120
- [Michael Fantini] Better you than me.

16:18.120 --> 16:20.990
- Well I'm sure, Kath can get
into some of the specifics.

16:20.990 --> 16:22.838
But, here's what I will say.

16:22.838 --> 16:23.970
- [Kath] The other Kath.

16:23.970 --> 16:28.340
- I think what your point
is is that everything

16:28.340 --> 16:33.240
we do carries a message
in that it will influence

16:33.240 --> 16:34.440
the behaviors of others.

16:34.440 --> 16:39.000
It's a dialectic that is
continuing all the time.

16:39.000 --> 16:44.000
And, I think that the idea
that you're raising is that

16:44.510 --> 16:48.660
we have to understand the
implications of these decisions

16:48.660 --> 16:52.870
as it relates particularly
to our influence.

16:52.870 --> 16:55.910
Our market share of influence
is the way we call it.

16:55.910 --> 16:59.270
One of the things I would
point out is even if there

16:59.270 --> 17:02.480
some doubters that says, I
don't think we're gonna go

17:02.480 --> 17:06.400
to war with China or Russia
in the next 10, 20, 30 years.

17:06.400 --> 17:09.330
The fact that we see
these things happening,

17:09.330 --> 17:13.400
Crimea is an example,
means that we are losing

17:13.400 --> 17:16.890
market share of influence
in an incremental way.

17:16.890 --> 17:19.780
So, if you care about
the United States having

17:19.780 --> 17:22.160
the ability to preserve

17:22.160 --> 17:26.270
through a strategic defense our
national security interests,

17:26.270 --> 17:29.520
and you don't wanna lose
market share of influence,

17:29.520 --> 17:31.040
then you've gotta be in the space

17:31.040 --> 17:33.510
and you've gotta be
cognizant of these actions

17:33.510 --> 17:35.623
and ensure they have a coherent output.

17:37.200 --> 17:40.540
- [Michael] Anybody else
want to address this example?

17:40.540 --> 17:42.350
It's a real world example happening today.

17:42.350 --> 17:45.300
- Yeah, I think I'm the one person who's,

17:45.300 --> 17:47.060
for whom this is relatively easy,

17:47.060 --> 17:49.710
since I am not an employee
of the federal government.

17:51.190 --> 17:56.190
Look, I think the challenge
that we have is that the way

17:57.500 --> 18:00.150
in which Russia has combined,
let me just put it simply

18:00.150 --> 18:02.280
and then I'll move to
the exact issues, the way

18:02.280 --> 18:04.860
in which Russia has combined action

18:04.860 --> 18:07.240
and the information spear,

18:07.240 --> 18:12.240
the messaging of that
action, is unsurprising given

18:12.440 --> 18:16.240
their finesse at this been swift.

18:16.240 --> 18:20.870
It has capitalized on actions
that they have undertaken

18:20.870 --> 18:22.110
and that we have undertaken.

18:22.110 --> 18:26.340
And so, then you get things
like the heading story

18:26.340 --> 18:30.820
in RT last night, being
the view of a column of US

18:30.820 --> 18:33.920
tanks moving out and
Russia, Assad's tanks moving

18:33.920 --> 18:34.870
in, those sorts of things,

18:34.870 --> 18:37.883
and then, as you just
referenced, the flag going up.

18:39.080 --> 18:40.700
You know, sort of priceless

18:40.700 --> 18:44.130
for Russian information operations

18:44.130 --> 18:46.720
and to General Wesley's point, in general,

18:46.720 --> 18:49.600
toward the ability to win influence,

18:49.600 --> 18:51.350
to show, demonstrate in word

18:51.350 --> 18:56.350
and deed that it has an
ability to sway events.

18:56.920 --> 18:58.240
We're in a very different world.

18:58.240 --> 19:00.610
The United States obviously cannot have

19:00.610 --> 19:03.870
military forces everywhere all the time.

19:03.870 --> 19:06.800
I don't think these are the
only alternatives we have,

19:06.800 --> 19:09.430
either have military forces
everywhere all the time

19:09.430 --> 19:12.943
or pull them out without any
coordinated message and action.

19:14.010 --> 19:16.560
And I think that's,
it's really that the way

19:16.560 --> 19:17.850
in which we have operated

19:17.850 --> 19:22.730
over the last week that
demonstrates how poorly right now

19:22.730 --> 19:24.290
we are executing this

19:24.290 --> 19:27.410
kind of understanding of
the coordination of our

19:27.410 --> 19:32.220
information operations and
our foreign policy in general.

19:32.220 --> 19:34.090
It's very challenging, and I think it goes

19:34.090 --> 19:38.730
to the heart of how you have
competition that can have

19:38.730 --> 19:40.410
elements of conflict for sure.

19:40.410 --> 19:42.060
And they are, by the
way, of course, we have

19:42.060 --> 19:44.190
elements of non-kinetic conflict right now

19:44.190 --> 19:46.510
in terms of cyberspace et cetera,

19:46.510 --> 19:49.220
and certainly there's
proxy force action going

19:49.220 --> 19:52.453
on, both with regard to China
and with regard to Russia.

19:53.490 --> 19:55.330
So, I think this is the real challenge

19:55.330 --> 19:56.840
which is recognizing that we're

19:56.840 --> 19:59.900
in a different environment,
that the structural

19:59.900 --> 20:01.910
elements of the international
environment have shifted.

20:01.910 --> 20:05.180
And by that I mean the United
States is not standing alone.

20:05.180 --> 20:08.270
We have tremendous power
and potential power

20:08.270 --> 20:10.730
in our economy, in our alliance networks,

20:10.730 --> 20:15.360
in our military of course,
and most importantly

20:15.360 --> 20:19.320
in our society, but we are not
currently orchestrating those

20:19.320 --> 20:22.233
in the finest possible way
for the defense of US good.

20:23.260 --> 20:26.350
- [Michael] I'd like to
throw out one more big.

20:26.350 --> 20:27.780
- Well, and the only thing--
- Do you wanna address this?

20:27.780 --> 20:28.613
I don't wanna--

20:28.613 --> 20:31.690
- I'd add on to, this is highlighting,

20:31.690 --> 20:33.930
General Wesley illuminated
the fact that there second

20:33.930 --> 20:35.990
and third order effects
to these decisions.

20:35.990 --> 20:39.150
And, I think it highlights
the fact that we need

20:39.150 --> 20:42.070
to be as a nation much more agile,

20:42.070 --> 20:45.440
because it's not, every decision is good

20:45.440 --> 20:47.690
or bad or indifferent, right.

20:47.690 --> 20:49.240
You're gonna make decisions.

20:49.240 --> 20:51.060
You have to be able to
respond quickly as well.

20:51.060 --> 20:52.440
And, I think as we're doing

20:52.440 --> 20:55.160
this refocusing to peer competition.

20:55.160 --> 20:57.200
It's just education
that we have to be able

20:57.200 --> 20:59.023
to be agile in our response as well.

21:00.380 --> 21:02.470
- [Michael] I'd like to throw
out one more big question

21:02.470 --> 21:03.700
and then drill down a little more

21:03.700 --> 21:05.833
on this left of conflict thing.

21:06.760 --> 21:11.760
The National Defense Strategy
asserts that the principal

21:12.780 --> 21:14.690
challenges facing the United States

21:14.690 --> 21:16.990
in the future are Russia and China.

21:16.990 --> 21:20.893
Russia's the more proximate
threat through the late 2020's,

21:22.215 --> 21:25.350
and then China is the greater threat

21:25.350 --> 21:30.270
or challenge if you prefer after that.

21:30.270 --> 21:32.640
And, yes, there is North Korea,

21:32.640 --> 21:35.290
and there's Iran and terrorism.

21:35.290 --> 21:39.060
But there acknowledged but
treated as lesser included cases,

21:39.060 --> 21:42.460
and there's a notion in
there that we're supposed to,

21:42.460 --> 21:45.400
to the extent one can, conserve resources

21:45.400 --> 21:50.330
by not getting involved in
these detours, let's say,

21:50.330 --> 21:52.630
in the Middle East, unless it's necessary.

21:52.630 --> 21:55.750
But in the last few weeks
we've seen Iran attack

21:55.750 --> 21:59.220
Saudi Arabia, and shutdown
half of their oil production

21:59.220 --> 22:00.910
for a period of time.

22:00.910 --> 22:02.590
We have a lot of tensions

22:02.590 --> 22:06.660
with Iran such that Sencom
has received additional forces

22:06.660 --> 22:08.480
at Prince Sultan Air Base.

22:08.480 --> 22:09.700
We have a situation now

22:09.700 --> 22:12.470
in Syria where it's not, we
thought ISIS had been defeated,

22:12.470 --> 22:14.470
and now we're not so sure,

22:14.470 --> 22:16.040
'cause of the chaos in that country,

22:16.040 --> 22:19.163
whoever's fault it might be,
probably, principally, Turkey.

22:20.460 --> 22:22.213
That threat might reemerge.

22:23.300 --> 22:28.093
So my question is, and
Afghanistan is still unclear.

22:29.570 --> 22:31.493
Is this really the right strategy?

22:32.650 --> 22:37.650
It sounds, to focus so
much to such an extent

22:37.950 --> 22:40.280
on Russia and China when it's quite clear

22:40.280 --> 22:42.010
the Middle East is still unsettled

22:42.010 --> 22:43.740
and there's a lot of tension there

22:43.740 --> 22:46.930
or if it is the right strategy do we have

22:46.930 --> 22:50.649
to maybe make a mid-course
correction or adjust it some

22:50.649 --> 22:55.050
so that we be sure we
retain sufficient capability

22:55.050 --> 22:58.103
to deal with these threats
in the Middle East AOR?

23:00.290 --> 23:02.950
- Well, sir, I would tell
you it is a good strategy.

23:02.950 --> 23:04.560
It's probably the best strategy we've had

23:04.560 --> 23:08.070
at the national level
in the last 20, 25 years

23:08.070 --> 23:12.340
in that I think it describes
the world as it is, right.

23:12.340 --> 23:13.617
And so, when you're,

23:13.617 --> 23:16.060
and from an Army perspective,
when you're trying

23:16.060 --> 23:18.920
to design an army you
can't build five armies.

23:18.920 --> 23:20.920
Now, the NDS does talk
about Russia and China.

23:20.920 --> 23:23.270
It does talk about Iran and North Korea,

23:23.270 --> 23:26.130
and it talks about VEO,
but it says, particularly

23:26.130 --> 23:28.640
in the defense planning
guidance for the Army

23:28.640 --> 23:31.160
to build an army against a pacing threat.

23:31.160 --> 23:33.280
And for us, for the Army, that's Russia,

23:33.280 --> 23:35.220
'cause you can't build five armies.

23:35.220 --> 23:36.810
Now, what's a pacing threat?

23:36.810 --> 23:39.180
I think a pacing threat
is the one that presents

23:39.180 --> 23:41.750
the existential problem, because first

23:41.750 --> 23:44.820
and foremost I think
that's our responsibility.

23:44.820 --> 23:47.570
But it doesn't say we
abdicate on the others.

23:47.570 --> 23:50.180
So, as we wrote, multi-domain
operations, it takes

23:50.180 --> 23:53.070
into context the fact that
China is on the horizon.

23:53.070 --> 23:55.877
So, the concept is written
saying that both China

23:55.877 --> 23:58.420
and Russia are different, but
they're sufficiently similar

23:58.420 --> 24:01.070
to build a framework against.

24:01.070 --> 24:03.410
The lesser includeds can be accommodated

24:03.410 --> 24:05.350
with the way we described conflict.

24:05.350 --> 24:08.170
So, I think it's a
(mumbles) strategy we need

24:08.170 --> 24:09.910
and very effective for the Army

24:09.910 --> 24:11.723
to build a modernization strategy.

24:13.350 --> 24:14.430
- I'd absolutely agree, and

24:14.430 --> 24:17.010
I think that's, the tension that we have

24:17.010 --> 24:18.990
within the Department, first of all,

24:18.990 --> 24:21.960
it's the National Defense
Strategy, the, we wrote

24:21.960 --> 24:25.520
a national defense strategy or
a national military strategy.

24:25.520 --> 24:27.830
There's a national security strategy.

24:27.830 --> 24:30.770
The nice thing is
they're somewhat aligned.

24:30.770 --> 24:32.170
But, we don't have, I mean,

24:32.170 --> 24:35.463
what's the true national
response to this, right?

24:37.220 --> 24:38.820
And, I think there's a lot of think tanks

24:38.820 --> 24:40.620
and folks that are doing work right now

24:40.620 --> 24:44.660
to understand that if we're
truly gonna counter this

24:44.660 --> 24:46.920
at a national level, it needs

24:46.920 --> 24:49.093
to be part of a national effort.

24:50.190 --> 24:53.210
A couple of years back
in 2016, 2015 we stood

24:53.210 --> 24:55.110
up to defeat ISIS task force.

24:55.110 --> 24:58.580
That's kind of in my mind, the
nearest thing that we tried

24:58.580 --> 25:02.700
to do as a nation to coordinate
across multiple departments

25:02.700 --> 25:05.130
at the National Security Council level

25:05.130 --> 25:07.110
the execution of those activities.

25:07.110 --> 25:08.620
So, I think you're gonna see slowly

25:08.620 --> 25:10.120
these things come together.

25:10.120 --> 25:11.260
If you bring it back down

25:11.260 --> 25:14.700
to just the Department of
Defense level, you have,

25:14.700 --> 25:17.942
we agree we see a very
similar pacing threat

25:17.942 --> 25:20.460
with China, very similar.

25:20.460 --> 25:22.100
If we're good with China,
we're gonna have good,

25:22.100 --> 25:24.553
we're gonna have
capabilities against Russia.

25:26.440 --> 25:31.440
But, what you want and what
you get that's risk, right.

25:32.980 --> 25:37.020
And so, that's the conversation
that we're gonna have

25:37.020 --> 25:39.070
in the department and in the services

25:39.070 --> 25:44.070
about what risk is gonna
be appropriately accepted.

25:44.320 --> 25:46.890
And what is the best joint partner

25:46.890 --> 25:50.020
or joint mix of capabilities
that are gonna come together,

25:50.020 --> 25:54.530
whether it's land, whether it's
maritime, whether it's space

25:54.530 --> 25:55.950
or cyber or air.

25:55.950 --> 25:59.050
That's, I think, how we
mix these things together

25:59.050 --> 26:01.520
from an integration
perspective is some of where

26:01.520 --> 26:04.070
the secret sauce needs to come together.

26:04.070 --> 26:07.470
And again, I look at it as a
perspective of there's gonna be

26:07.470 --> 26:11.930
a balance, 'cause everybody's
not gonna get what they want.

26:11.930 --> 26:13.420
And then we're gonna have the delta

26:13.420 --> 26:16.260
between what we're able
to resource compared

26:16.260 --> 26:18.950
to what we'll, and that'll
be a risk discussion right.

26:18.950 --> 26:20.410
That's the way I view the world.

26:20.410 --> 26:21.530
- [Michael] Let me ask for an

26:21.530 --> 26:23.430
Australian perspective General Toohey.

26:24.530 --> 26:26.110
The US, one thing that's striking

26:26.110 --> 26:27.580
about the American National Defense

26:27.580 --> 26:29.870
Strategy is that it kinda names names.

26:29.870 --> 26:31.970
It says Russia and China, they're just

26:31.970 --> 26:36.850
point blank, are the potential

26:36.850 --> 26:39.550
adversaries that one
needs to plan against.

26:39.550 --> 26:41.400
From an Australian
perspective, do you have a

26:41.400 --> 26:44.100
national defense strategy
that identifies China

26:44.100 --> 26:45.780
as your principal adversary,

26:45.780 --> 26:48.780
and how do you work kinda

26:50.900 --> 26:54.000
with the Americans, given their strategy?

26:54.000 --> 26:55.740
And as explicit as it is.

26:55.740 --> 26:57.960
- Hey, thank you for that question.

26:57.960 --> 27:00.577
If I could just go back
to the previous question,

27:00.577 --> 27:03.450
and I can't comment on
what the US is doing,

27:03.450 --> 27:06.170
but in Australia we, we're required

27:06.170 --> 27:09.647
to support three missions,
defense of Australia,

27:09.647 --> 27:12.030
the contribution to the immediate region,

27:12.030 --> 27:15.200
and then a contribution to
rules based global order.

27:15.200 --> 27:18.870
I think the world is so complex
it can't just be one thing.

27:18.870 --> 27:20.220
It's gotta be many things,

27:20.220 --> 27:23.023
and we need to provide our
government with options.

27:24.210 --> 27:27.350
There's a lot of similarities
between Australia and the US.

27:27.350 --> 27:30.690
And we're pretty up front that
our defense strategy is based

27:30.690 --> 27:32.460
on our alliance with the US.

27:32.460 --> 27:35.940
And we've been great
partners over many years.

27:35.940 --> 27:38.120
But, there are differences.

27:38.120 --> 27:41.520
And the big difference is
the US is a superpower,

27:41.520 --> 27:43.373
and we are a middle power.

27:44.655 --> 27:45.710
We're fortunate.

27:45.710 --> 27:47.590
We are prosperous.

27:47.590 --> 27:51.010
We're a pretty successful G20 nation,

27:51.010 --> 27:53.630
but we are still a middle power.

27:53.630 --> 27:55.760
When we look at the world we need

27:55.760 --> 27:58.610
to look at the world
through a different lens.

27:58.610 --> 28:03.470
And threat, if you like,
is capability plus intent.

28:03.470 --> 28:07.460
We very much focus on the capability.

28:07.460 --> 28:10.290
And we are focused on making
sure that we are doing

28:10.290 --> 28:13.157
everything we can to
ensure that our region,

28:13.157 --> 28:16.860
the Indo-Pacific region
remains as secure, stable,

28:16.860 --> 28:18.393
and prosperous as possible.

28:20.040 --> 28:23.441
- So if maybe we return to left
of conflict where we started

28:23.441 --> 28:25.720
at for Kath Hicks.

28:25.720 --> 28:30.053
General Wesley mentioned
Title 10, different titles,

28:30.940 --> 28:34.560
and also the challenges that poses

28:34.560 --> 28:39.010
or potential obstacles that
poses for this sort of strategy.

28:39.010 --> 28:41.860
Can you, I know you've
thought a lot about that, can

28:41.860 --> 28:44.047
you explain that a little bit?

28:44.047 --> 28:46.090
What is the issue there?

28:46.090 --> 28:48.320
Are there potential pitfalls there?

28:48.320 --> 28:52.250
Is this a problem for
the Pentagon in trying

28:52.250 --> 28:56.763
to carry out a left of
conflict strategy or not?

28:58.460 --> 29:00.300
- There are challenges for sure.

29:00.300 --> 29:02.870
I think if we start at the
national lens that's always

29:02.870 --> 29:05.250
the most appropriate for
left of conflict, right,

29:05.250 --> 29:07.180
because that's why we build all these up,

29:07.180 --> 29:10.500
in theory why we should have
other tools in the toolkit.

29:10.500 --> 29:12.430
So, I wanna say that and then bookend

29:12.430 --> 29:14.150
the other piece of this upfront

29:14.150 --> 29:16.460
to say covert action is
obviously very important

29:16.460 --> 29:20.290
but should always be a small,
supporting element relative

29:20.290 --> 29:21.770
to the overall US foreign policy.

29:21.770 --> 29:23.460
So, let's take that as
a given, that there's

29:23.460 --> 29:25.590
Title 22 covert stuff going, excuse

29:25.590 --> 29:27.220
not (mumbles) 22, it's just state.

29:27.220 --> 29:30.800
There's Title 50 covert
action operations happening.

29:30.800 --> 29:33.800
There's conflict level Title 10.

29:33.800 --> 29:36.260
And then there's a lot of
space here in the middle.

29:36.260 --> 29:38.390
And I think back to what
General Wesley said,

29:38.390 --> 29:43.390
we have a set of codifications
statutorily, legally,

29:44.270 --> 29:46.720
in international law that haven't caught

29:46.720 --> 29:49.300
up to some of the challenges
that we face today.

29:49.300 --> 29:51.660
And you can see that most
clearly in cyberspace.

29:51.660 --> 29:54.470
But we will see it in other areas as well.

29:54.470 --> 29:55.640
You can also see it, of course,

29:55.640 --> 29:58.260
on areas like detention
policy that have been

29:58.260 --> 29:59.683
with us since 9/11.

30:00.810 --> 30:05.280
So, I think the department is...

30:05.280 --> 30:07.760
So, often what we are
doing is we are testing

30:07.760 --> 30:12.760
out in advance of fully developed
policy inside legal frame

30:13.440 --> 30:15.110
but in front of policy.

30:15.110 --> 30:16.990
So, I think too often we focus

30:16.990 --> 30:20.120
on the legal piece of
it which is important,

30:20.120 --> 30:22.330
but I think we are pretty good in general

30:22.330 --> 30:25.920
in staying inside of the legal
bounds, given that we have

30:25.920 --> 30:28.610
strong congressional oversight we hope.

30:28.610 --> 30:30.247
But it's the policy bounds that are

30:30.247 --> 30:33.210
and the normative bounds that
have now been developed yet.

30:33.210 --> 30:34.210
And this goes back

30:34.210 --> 30:36.510
to what is the appropriate
role of the military

30:36.510 --> 30:38.890
inside this selective conflict zone.

30:38.890 --> 30:41.630
And, the reality is, I
think just put it simply,

30:41.630 --> 30:43.910
we keep relying on the military lever,

30:43.910 --> 30:46.730
because it's the lever
we keep investing in,

30:46.730 --> 30:50.190
and we don't invest in other
levers, most other levers.

30:50.190 --> 30:54.620
So, we don't have them to
turn to in times of crisis.

30:54.620 --> 30:57.070
So, you can think,
certainly on the cyber-side

30:57.070 --> 30:59.410
about the challenges the
Department of Homeland Security,

30:59.410 --> 31:02.900
for example, has had in
managing the lead role

31:02.900 --> 31:04.310
in the federal government on cyber.

31:04.310 --> 31:06.610
Whereas DOD, under its
appropriate Title 10

31:06.610 --> 31:09.180
authority, has been able
to build out cyber-com,

31:09.180 --> 31:12.020
and of course has the NSA
piece on the intel side

31:12.020 --> 31:12.853
and has been able

31:12.853 --> 31:16.080
to leverage that as has
been reported publicly

31:16.080 --> 31:18.050
for the persistent engagement approach

31:18.890 --> 31:21.410
in cyber, such as it
used reportedly during

31:21.410 --> 31:26.040
the 2018 mid-term election cycle.

31:26.040 --> 31:30.330
So, that's good that DOD is
trying to find creative ways

31:30.330 --> 31:31.350
to use its authorities

31:31.350 --> 31:33.990
in ways that advance the
deterrent which is important

31:33.990 --> 31:36.050
and actually keep us out of conflict

31:36.050 --> 31:38.560
by minimizing escalation and threats

31:38.560 --> 31:41.560
to core US interests, like
our institutions, like our

31:41.560 --> 31:43.253
democracy, but other things.

31:44.090 --> 31:48.730
But the bad news is it's
having to sort of be

31:48.730 --> 31:53.730
out on the western prairie
creating the landscape of law

31:53.930 --> 31:56.000
on policy, because it's,

31:56.000 --> 31:58.490
we don't have the policy
structures in place.

31:58.490 --> 32:02.490
What I would like to see is
a more fully formed civilian

32:02.490 --> 32:04.060
toolkit to be pulled on.

32:04.060 --> 32:07.350
What I would like to
see is thoughtful policy

32:07.350 --> 32:09.950
with action following
it, in terms of what are

32:09.950 --> 32:12.210
the right bounds of, on cyber.

32:12.210 --> 32:15.220
Where should DOD lead, and
where should others lead

32:15.220 --> 32:17.730
in ways that actually can
advance our deterrent?

32:17.730 --> 32:20.020
And that's the conversation
we should be having,

32:20.020 --> 32:21.910
but it's a challenging time,

32:21.910 --> 32:23.960
and we're not having those conversations.

32:25.850 --> 32:26.902
- [Michael] Do you agree with that?

32:26.902 --> 32:28.380
- General Fantini mentioned that we have

32:28.380 --> 32:31.030
to have agility in this process.

32:31.030 --> 32:32.840
And I keep, what you hear

32:32.840 --> 32:35.860
in our narrative is this,
again, demarcations.

32:35.860 --> 32:36.693
Is it state's role?

32:36.693 --> 32:38.220
Is it the military's role?

32:38.220 --> 32:39.053
And so it uses,

32:39.053 --> 32:43.840
and that's largely cultural
relative to our competitors.

32:43.840 --> 32:46.270
When I mentioned earlier that Crimea fell

32:46.270 --> 32:47.130
without firing a shot.

32:47.130 --> 32:49.000
That wasn't without some work.

32:49.000 --> 32:50.220
There was a lot of preparatory work,

32:50.220 --> 32:52.593
some IO work, sone unconditional warfare.

32:53.460 --> 32:57.840
And so, the question is if in the future

32:57.840 --> 33:02.840
in Tallinn, Estonia, we see
ethnic Russians demonstrating

33:03.640 --> 33:08.280
against maybe oppression in a
NATO, within a NATO country.

33:08.280 --> 33:09.690
What's our response to that?

33:09.690 --> 33:11.410
Do we even react to it?

33:11.410 --> 33:14.220
Is there a coherent strategy of messaging?

33:14.220 --> 33:16.410
And is the military able to reinforce it

33:16.410 --> 33:18.280
alongside the State Department?

33:18.280 --> 33:19.610
Do we have the capacity

33:19.610 --> 33:22.200
to have a coherent
strategy across the reason,

33:22.200 --> 33:25.720
because in our post-Westphalian
culture we typically rely

33:25.720 --> 33:28.720
on the country team, et cetera,

33:28.720 --> 33:31.600
and the embassy which is all correct.

33:31.600 --> 33:34.500
But what mechanism to
what Dr. Hicks is talking

33:34.500 --> 33:35.680
about that allows you

33:35.680 --> 33:39.030
to unfold a toolkit
that's fully integrated

33:39.030 --> 33:40.900
across the inter-agency?

33:40.900 --> 33:43.250
And right now I would
argue that we don't have

33:43.250 --> 33:46.570
the apparatus to do that in either theater

33:46.570 --> 33:49.340
in an effective way that is also agile,

33:49.340 --> 33:51.750
to react to things on a daily basis.

33:51.750 --> 33:54.990
You remember the famous election

33:54.990 --> 33:57.400
in 1992 of the Clinton administration.

33:57.400 --> 34:00.170
And they got credit for having
this thing called a war room

34:00.170 --> 34:03.680
where they're responding to
messages every single day.

34:03.680 --> 34:07.900
What's the analogous equivalent regionally

34:07.900 --> 34:09.977
in both INDOPACOM and EUCOM?

34:11.220 --> 34:13.430
- And I just wanna
two-finger on that which is

34:13.430 --> 34:15.944
to say if you go out to EUCOM

34:15.944 --> 34:19.160
and INDOPACOM, J39s are
doing a bang-up job.

34:19.160 --> 34:22.790
There's other, the soft
elements are doing a great job.

34:22.790 --> 34:24.310
They're thinking through these issues.

34:24.310 --> 34:27.370
But the challenges really
extend beyond DOD, right,

34:27.370 --> 34:28.897
and the authorities that DOD has

34:28.897 --> 34:30.710
and the appropriate role for DOD

34:30.710 --> 34:33.880
and the reach and expanse of
the toolkit, right, the ability

34:33.880 --> 34:38.880
to connect to civil society,
local media, all of that.

34:39.910 --> 34:42.370
That is largely in the basket
of the State Department.

34:42.370 --> 34:44.220
There are some things that USAID can do,

34:44.220 --> 34:48.290
but they are not, if you will,
up-armored to do that work.

34:48.290 --> 34:50.450
And they have not been since the 90s,

34:50.450 --> 34:52.970
and even then under the
US Information Agency,

34:52.970 --> 34:55.320
there were a lot of questions
about how effective we were.

34:55.320 --> 34:57.700
So, we got a lot of work to do as a nation

34:57.700 --> 35:01.280
to get to a point where we
see strategic narrative as a

35:01.280 --> 35:04.490
central element of how we
operate in this competition.

35:04.490 --> 35:07.090
We're gonna have to get
there if we hope to succeed.

35:08.730 --> 35:12.100
- Well, what I hear you
saying a lot is there's,

35:12.100 --> 35:15.640
to be effective left of
conflict there are things

35:15.640 --> 35:19.270
State should do, perhaps
the NSC should do,

35:19.270 --> 35:21.830
other apparatus of the
government should do.

35:21.830 --> 35:23.100
You don't control that.

35:23.100 --> 35:26.010
So, in the areas you do control,

35:26.010 --> 35:29.017
in the military, what
is it that you can do

35:29.017 --> 35:32.510
and what are you doing, General
Wesley and General Fantini,

35:32.510 --> 35:35.650
to try to, within you authorities,

35:35.650 --> 35:38.400
within your programs and your budgets

35:38.400 --> 35:40.610
to kinda work at this problem?

35:40.610 --> 35:42.380
- So, I'll take the first swing at that.

35:42.380 --> 35:45.490
I think, we have to challenge ourselves

35:46.930 --> 35:49.440
from what we've done in the past compared

35:49.440 --> 35:51.880
to what we wanna do in the future.

35:51.880 --> 35:55.470
And, there's no better way
to challenge yourself is

35:55.470 --> 35:57.730
to look at the budget
and realize, okay, am I

35:57.730 --> 35:59.910
at the top line of where I'm ever gonna be

36:00.780 --> 36:05.150
or do I have to figure
out how do we do things

36:06.760 --> 36:09.220
from a more integrated perspective.

36:09.220 --> 36:12.340
That's one of the reasons
my organization stood up.

36:12.340 --> 36:16.710
And do we have advanced
concepts that we look

36:16.710 --> 36:20.130
to in the future, and
what does that look like?

36:20.130 --> 36:22.280
And try and envision that.

36:22.280 --> 36:25.400
And then the Chief of
Staff, General Goldfein,

36:25.400 --> 36:29.300
he gave me my marching
orders of you can have

36:29.300 --> 36:31.860
all the grandiose concepts
you want in the future

36:32.740 --> 36:36.320
but not unless you draw
a resourcing line back

36:36.320 --> 36:39.070
to where that concept is gonna go.

36:39.070 --> 36:40.720
You have to impact the resourcing

36:40.720 --> 36:42.890
to show how we're gonna get there.

36:42.890 --> 36:45.560
So that's the tension of,

36:45.560 --> 36:48.570
and it's challenging some
element of the conventional

36:48.570 --> 36:52.410
wisdom of what does a
future concept look like.

36:52.410 --> 36:56.910
And, that's why we see, we have not,

36:56.910 --> 36:58.760
as a Department of
Defense, as an Air Force

36:58.760 --> 37:03.010
in particular taking
advantage of modern IT

37:03.010 --> 37:06.223
technology like we should
have or like we should.

37:07.080 --> 37:09.430
So, that's part of what
we see of being able

37:09.430 --> 37:11.533
to leverage things moving into the future.

37:12.700 --> 37:14.930
And the whole analogies
of people hand, holding

37:14.930 --> 37:18.870
up iPhones and things like
that, they're very apropos.

37:18.870 --> 37:21.630
The reason we use it as an
analogy is we wanna be able

37:21.630 --> 37:24.780
to change things overnight
to create more dilemma

37:24.780 --> 37:26.610
for the enemy more quickly.

37:26.610 --> 37:28.630
We're not able to do that right now.

37:28.630 --> 37:32.370
And so, that's one of the
things that we're developing

37:32.370 --> 37:36.610
within the Air Force war
fighting integration area

37:36.610 --> 37:38.620
to kind of go how do we
better leverage that.

37:38.620 --> 37:40.160
That takes a strong partnership

37:40.160 --> 37:42.370
with the acquisition community

37:42.370 --> 37:46.857
and the resourcing community
which Army Futures Command,

37:46.857 --> 37:48.550
the way their organized.

37:48.550 --> 37:49.610
There's advantages there.

37:49.610 --> 37:53.690
The way we're organized
create certain challenges,

37:53.690 --> 37:56.180
'cause two stars have a
much different say than

37:56.180 --> 38:00.470
four stars, blinding flash of the obvious.

38:00.470 --> 38:03.868
But that's where, that's
okay I'm working it.

38:03.868 --> 38:07.210
(panelists laugh)

38:07.210 --> 38:09.580
But that's, so that's where
we see where we're able

38:09.580 --> 38:10.746
to go in the future.

38:10.746 --> 38:15.040
And, this is hard work,
and it's gonna take time.

38:15.040 --> 38:17.630
A lot of folks want answers tomorrow.

38:17.630 --> 38:20.570
This whole precision third offset

38:20.570 --> 38:22.130
probably took 30 plus years

38:22.130 --> 38:24.630
to truly realize, right.

38:24.630 --> 38:26.560
When you really draw the thread back

38:26.560 --> 38:29.350
to the concept of how do you do precision

38:29.350 --> 38:33.333
and what is the utilization
of that, that took 30 years.

38:33.333 --> 38:35.760
And, you can just google
it up on Wikipedia

38:35.760 --> 38:37.690
to get that answer.

38:37.690 --> 38:40.690
So, that's what we're
doing in the Air Force,

38:40.690 --> 38:43.600
and then more specifically
we're really looking

38:43.600 --> 38:46.503
to leverage automated capabilities.

38:47.640 --> 38:50.640
How do you generate fire from distance?

38:50.640 --> 38:54.020
How do you generate
fires from under attack,

38:54.020 --> 38:55.693
inside the proverbial bubble?

38:56.960 --> 38:59.250
The true high ground is really space.

38:59.250 --> 39:03.270
Are we truly leveraging space
for war fighting capabilities?

39:03.270 --> 39:06.470
That's an, we couldn't even
really have that conversation

39:06.470 --> 39:08.810
12, 18 months ago.

39:08.810 --> 39:10.620
So, that's nice that we're doing that.

39:10.620 --> 39:11.800
And, that's where we wanna go

39:11.800 --> 39:13.310
and pivot to the ultimate high ground.

39:13.310 --> 39:14.340
And, then we wanna be able

39:14.340 --> 39:18.610
to have decision advantage,
decision advantage

39:18.610 --> 39:21.790
over the enemy, which is
as simple as an OODA loop,

39:21.790 --> 39:25.470
but being able to build
that at scale and range

39:25.470 --> 39:27.611
from a global mindset is

39:27.611 --> 39:29.853
some of the advanced thought that we have.

39:30.990 --> 39:32.654
- Could I jump in.

39:32.654 --> 39:33.740
I need to have a chat to you afterwards,

39:33.740 --> 39:36.300
'cause I wonder if we have a similar role.

39:36.300 --> 39:38.540
My current role is head force integration

39:38.540 --> 39:43.540
for the ADF which means,
amongst other things, I help

39:43.680 --> 39:48.100
our vice chief develop joint
doctrine, joint lessons,

39:48.100 --> 39:52.120
and most importantly, joint C4ISR

39:52.120 --> 39:54.550
to ensure that no longer have

39:54.550 --> 39:56.830
we got three individual services.

39:56.830 --> 39:58.910
We've actually got an integrated

39:58.910 --> 40:03.910
ADF ensuring that we do get
that decision superiority.

40:03.940 --> 40:05.840
We're quite conscious, particularly

40:05.840 --> 40:09.050
in competition, that it's not just

40:09.050 --> 40:12.150
inter-operability amongst the services.

40:12.150 --> 40:15.390
We've gotta make sure that
we maintain inter-operability

40:15.390 --> 40:18.333
with whole of government and
of course with our allies.

40:19.440 --> 40:22.560
HAR Board's warfare, what
does the adversary do?

40:22.560 --> 40:24.760
They exploit the seams.

40:24.760 --> 40:27.230
Inter-operability is about ensuring that

40:27.230 --> 40:29.193
we're managing those seams.

40:30.370 --> 40:33.360
Perhaps an example from Australia,

40:33.360 --> 40:35.450
our government has recently called

40:35.450 --> 40:39.123
out concern with foreign interference.

40:40.290 --> 40:43.823
They've been calling out
concern in our universities.

40:44.680 --> 40:46.710
They've been calling out concern

40:46.710 --> 40:49.260
with respect to our infrastructure.

40:49.260 --> 40:51.610
And you may be aware that the Australian

40:51.610 --> 40:53.830
government did not allow Huawei

40:53.830 --> 40:56.453
to bid for our 5G infrastructure.

40:57.580 --> 40:59.870
And, our government's also concerned

40:59.870 --> 41:03.160
about foreign interference
in our political system.

41:03.160 --> 41:07.030
And with effect January this year,

41:07.030 --> 41:10.420
we no longer take donations
from foreign entities.

41:10.420 --> 41:14.010
So, it is really up

41:14.010 --> 41:17.760
to the whole government,
inclusive of the military

41:17.760 --> 41:20.830
to make sure that we
are managing competition

41:20.830 --> 41:22.400
and we are alert

41:22.400 --> 41:25.683
to what the adversary might
be doing in our backyard.

41:27.100 --> 41:29.190
- So, let me give it to you
from the Army perspective.

41:29.190 --> 41:31.610
I think I can agree with a
lot of what was shared here.

41:31.610 --> 41:35.250
But, the real issue is, you
had the question you asked is

41:35.250 --> 41:37.470
what do you need to be
doing or what are you doing

41:37.470 --> 41:38.680
to solve these problems.

41:38.680 --> 41:43.680
And, my opening point would
be is we are not doing enough,

41:43.820 --> 41:46.940
and we are currently
insufficiently postured

41:46.940 --> 41:49.260
to do the things that we should be doing.

41:49.260 --> 41:51.070
And so, let me just
describe that a little bit.

41:51.070 --> 41:52.530
So, the first question
you might ask is okay

41:52.530 --> 41:54.480
to what end, what are
you trying to achieve.

41:54.480 --> 41:56.053
How do you win in competition?

41:57.910 --> 42:01.010
Kath indicated that we are a superpower

42:01.010 --> 42:02.850
which may not have indicated
to you, but we like that.

42:02.850 --> 42:05.270
So, because we like that, we are frankly

42:05.270 --> 42:07.090
in a strategic defense, right.

42:07.090 --> 42:09.230
We wanna maintain the status quo.

42:09.230 --> 42:12.740
So, the definition of winning
in competition is maintaining

42:12.740 --> 42:15.730
the status quo or
changing it to our benefit

42:15.730 --> 42:18.050
in any way that might be possible.

42:18.050 --> 42:21.410
So, I said upfront that
we're losing market share.

42:21.410 --> 42:23.610
So that doesn't sound like status quo

42:23.610 --> 42:27.410
to me which is why we've developed
the concept that we have.

42:27.410 --> 42:29.010
We have to change the Army,

42:29.010 --> 42:31.700
and I would suggest change
a larger portion of DOD

42:31.700 --> 42:34.260
and even the way the inter-agency behaves

42:34.260 --> 42:36.830
in order to counter this effort.

42:36.830 --> 42:39.090
And so, from the Army's perspective,

42:39.090 --> 42:43.160
the concern we see is that
the winner of the first

42:43.160 --> 42:48.160
battle of the next war
likely may win the war.

42:48.300 --> 42:52.220
So, winning that first battle
or even before that being able

42:52.220 --> 42:54.400
to deter in the competition space

42:54.400 --> 42:56.850
and maintain status quo is far preferable

42:56.850 --> 42:58.830
to a protracted conflict.

42:58.830 --> 42:59.890
So, from the Army,

42:59.890 --> 43:02.260
in our concept, what we
write is that we need

43:02.260 --> 43:04.980
to, we need to do three
things in competition.

43:04.980 --> 43:08.340
The first is to counter
unconventional warfare

43:08.340 --> 43:11.640
and to counter informational
warfare right up front.

43:11.640 --> 43:14.070
As I said earlier, you have
to have a coherent approach

43:14.070 --> 43:16.200
to do that across the inter-agency,

43:16.200 --> 43:18.800
and we are not effectively
doing that right now.

43:18.800 --> 43:20.540
The second one is operational

43:20.540 --> 43:22.350
preparation of the environment.

43:22.350 --> 43:24.940
If you wanna win a very rapid conflict

43:24.940 --> 43:26.990
or defeat a fait accompli, you have

43:26.990 --> 43:28.670
to be actively engaged

43:28.670 --> 43:31.260
in identifying the order of battle of your

43:31.260 --> 43:33.440
opponent every single day.

43:33.440 --> 43:34.870
Ask yourself what operational

43:34.870 --> 43:36.430
headquarters is doing that right

43:36.430 --> 43:38.190
now across the inter-agency.

43:38.190 --> 43:41.420
And, then you have to demonstrate
some kind of deterrence.

43:41.420 --> 43:42.930
And the idea of competing

43:42.930 --> 43:46.360
in that space then we would
hope forces them, unlike

43:46.360 --> 43:50.200
maybe now, to recalculate their intentions

43:50.200 --> 43:53.070
because of our aggressive
approach to competition

43:53.070 --> 43:55.200
so we maintain that status quo.

43:55.200 --> 43:58.200
And that would be the idea
of aggressively competing.

43:58.200 --> 43:59.860
Now, but again, we aren't there now,

43:59.860 --> 44:01.100
and that's why we drew the concept.

44:01.100 --> 44:03.040
And so, there's some
things that we could pull

44:03.040 --> 44:05.730
on that thread if you wish
that we have to change

44:08.000 --> 44:10.810
- One question I have is

44:10.810 --> 44:13.840
since the National Defense
Strategy was promulgated

44:13.840 --> 44:18.510
each of the services have
come out pretty actively

44:18.510 --> 44:22.240
with different ideas and
programs and concepts

44:22.240 --> 44:23.250
for how to go about it.

44:23.250 --> 44:26.620
So, the Army has, what,
multi-domain operations

44:26.620 --> 44:31.360
in one theater moving to
multi-domain capability

44:31.360 --> 44:33.950
in multiple theaters over a timeline

44:33.950 --> 44:37.470
and with and training among programs

44:37.470 --> 44:38.730
and its cross-functional teams

44:38.730 --> 44:40.470
and developing its capability.

44:40.470 --> 44:43.000
The Marine Corps Commandant recently put

44:43.000 --> 44:45.030
out some pretty far reaching guidance

44:46.050 --> 44:48.050
which has gotten some
attention, where he said, look

44:48.050 --> 44:49.800
we can't do certain things like launch

44:49.800 --> 44:52.180
amphibious landings on the coast of China.

44:52.180 --> 44:56.340
We have to accept certain capabilities are

44:56.340 --> 45:00.150
kind of vestigial and move on from there.

45:00.150 --> 45:03.840
The Air Force, General Goldfein
has put a lot of emphasis

45:03.840 --> 45:05.850
on kinda multi-domain kinda command

45:05.850 --> 45:08.400
and control, any sensor, any shooter.

45:08.400 --> 45:12.840
It's a pretty bold vision if
it can be achieved of what

45:12.840 --> 45:15.480
the future warfare might look like.

45:15.480 --> 45:20.207
My question for our generals here is when

45:24.380 --> 45:29.380
and how were all these disparate
visions be put together

45:30.040 --> 45:33.050
or unified or rationalized
into a common approach.

45:33.050 --> 45:34.960
What I sense now since we're

45:34.960 --> 45:37.750
in the early phase of this,
with the NDS just came

45:37.750 --> 45:41.770
out two years ago is an
Army, Marine exploring,

45:41.770 --> 45:44.510
what it should be, Air
Force with a bold vision.

45:44.510 --> 45:47.590
But, who in DOD is gonna
pull this all together

45:48.650 --> 45:53.650
and at what point so that
there's a single coherent program

45:54.050 --> 45:56.850
and not multiple service perspectives?

45:56.850 --> 45:58.940
Not saying it's wrong to
have these perspectives

45:58.940 --> 46:01.110
at this stage of the game.

46:01.110 --> 46:03.050
- I was hoping we could
get Fantini on the record

46:03.050 --> 46:04.189
for when that will be.

46:04.189 --> 46:05.430
(panelists laugh)

46:05.430 --> 46:07.650
- So, it's actually, it's ongoing, right.

46:07.650 --> 46:08.730
And so, the folks that work

46:08.730 --> 46:10.170
in the building, my apologies to you

46:10.170 --> 46:12.790
or congratulations you're
out of the building.

46:12.790 --> 46:15.570
You know that OSD policy

46:15.570 --> 46:20.290
and OSD CAPE are leading an
effort that under the previous

46:20.290 --> 46:22.750
secretary and now current
secretary of looking

46:22.750 --> 46:25.890
at China win, China defeat,
Russia win, Russia defeat

46:25.890 --> 46:27.730
to kind of determine and validate

46:27.730 --> 46:29.380
in my mind, it's really, it was an effort

46:29.380 --> 46:31.110
to validate and get the Department

46:31.110 --> 46:33.950
on kind of the same
sheet of music of whether

46:33.950 --> 46:35.867
we truly believe the
National Defense Strategy

46:35.867 --> 46:38.320
and the theories that it promulgates.

46:38.320 --> 46:39.960
And, the answer to that question,

46:39.960 --> 46:42.450
I believe, is going to be yes.

46:42.450 --> 46:44.920
I don't know win that will
officially be published.

46:44.920 --> 46:46.350
It's not.

46:46.350 --> 46:51.350
But, what's the crazy thing,
as we have collaborated

46:51.640 --> 46:53.410
with Army Futures Command
and General Wesley

46:53.410 --> 46:58.410
in particular, we're actually
pretty reasonably aligned

46:59.810 --> 47:01.430
across the services in what

47:01.430 --> 47:05.560
we believe that future
conflict will look like

47:05.560 --> 47:06.740
and the capabilities that we

47:06.740 --> 47:09.590
should be developing towards that.

47:09.590 --> 47:12.700
Each has their own service
perspective towards that.

47:12.700 --> 47:16.400
And I, so that's kind of
encouraging in my mind.

47:16.400 --> 47:18.810
All, I believe, the services believe

47:18.810 --> 47:21.520
in the criticality of that
command and control piece.

47:21.520 --> 47:24.880
And so, when you talk about
any sensor to any shooter,

47:24.880 --> 47:28.127
and you talk about we'll
say multi-domain command

47:30.530 --> 47:33.700
and control or joint
aldermate command and control.

47:33.700 --> 47:35.913
To me, they're synonymous.

47:38.810 --> 47:41.020
Realize that when you
talk about any sensor

47:41.020 --> 47:45.000
to any shooter folks
will talk, they'll say,

47:45.000 --> 47:47.473
hey, you're talking
about boiling the ocean.

47:48.520 --> 47:50.970
So, the answer to that
question is, well, maybe.

47:50.970 --> 47:54.150
That's the vision, but
what we owe the department,

47:54.150 --> 47:57.370
and what we owe as
services is what do we have

47:57.370 --> 48:01.010
as a game plan and what do
we demonstrate as progress.

48:01.010 --> 48:03.840
And so, that's how we see
this multi-domain command

48:03.840 --> 48:05.800
and control and advance battle

48:05.800 --> 48:09.670
or, yeah, advanced battle
management is establishing

48:09.670 --> 48:13.680
a vision but also
demonstrating via prototyping

48:13.680 --> 48:16.820
and demonstrations on
what does that look like

48:17.848 --> 48:20.160
from a progress perspective.

48:20.160 --> 48:23.320
And then the next tough question is okay,

48:23.320 --> 48:24.320
how do you scale it.

48:25.250 --> 48:29.230
And then what are you
gonna give up to scale it?

48:29.230 --> 48:32.460
So, if it's truly your number
one priority that's gonna be

48:32.460 --> 48:35.410
the answer, those will be the
answers that we will be owing

48:35.410 --> 48:38.630
to the joint staff in OSD.

48:38.630 --> 48:42.050
And I'd say the joint staff
is reasonably far along

48:42.050 --> 48:45.310
in terms of assure joint power projection

48:45.310 --> 48:48.390
and these types of documents
which actually bring

48:48.390 --> 48:51.620
in the National Defense Strategy of build

48:51.620 --> 48:53.020
a more lethal force, allies

48:53.020 --> 48:56.340
and partners, reform your activities,

48:56.340 --> 49:00.410
which all dovetails very well
with these various concepts.

49:00.410 --> 49:02.810
- Yeah, I wanna reinforce
what he says, said that this

49:02.810 --> 49:03.710
idea, we were essentially,

49:03.710 --> 49:05.700
what General Fantini's
saying is you gotta have

49:05.700 --> 49:08.870
a joint concept to
effectively fight in this era

49:08.870 --> 49:10.470
and with multi-domain operations.

49:10.470 --> 49:11.850
And I think this,

49:11.850 --> 49:14.893
the secretary has said as much
that we need a joint concept.

49:14.893 --> 49:16.440
Now, you didn't necessarily have

49:16.440 --> 49:18.110
to do that with air, land battle.

49:18.110 --> 49:21.810
You could, the services
could have distinct concepts

49:23.410 --> 49:24.760
and you federate them, bring them

49:24.760 --> 49:28.020
together, synchronize
them, and it was a fairly

49:28.020 --> 49:30.650
industrial approach to synchronization.

49:30.650 --> 49:31.483
But, in this error

49:31.483 --> 49:34.100
with a very hyperactive
battle field, it's gotta have

49:34.100 --> 49:35.710
much more agility, and
to have that you have

49:35.710 --> 49:39.000
to have a common view of the
battlefield and how you fight.

49:39.000 --> 49:40.800
- So what I would offer.
- Go ahead please.

49:40.800 --> 49:45.260
- Kath, you brought up, you
brought inter-operability up.

49:45.260 --> 49:48.733
We wanna have a conversation
about true interdependence.

49:50.070 --> 49:53.510
Can you really be interdependent
with another service?

49:53.510 --> 49:55.130
And arguably, we kinda do that now.

49:55.130 --> 49:57.770
We coordinate, we
synchronize, we de-conflict.

49:57.770 --> 49:59.450
But are we, do we trust each other enough

49:59.450 --> 50:01.013
to truly be interdependent?

50:02.200 --> 50:05.020
So, the fact that we're here today talking

50:05.020 --> 50:06.460
about it, maybe that's step one

50:06.460 --> 50:08.670
on going to interdependency anonymous.

50:08.670 --> 50:09.790
But.

50:09.790 --> 50:11.331
(audience laughs)

50:11.331 --> 50:13.500
- (drowned out by the other
general) a good thing.

50:13.500 --> 50:16.940
- I think that's a good thing
that's occurring right now.

50:16.940 --> 50:18.230
I'm sorry Kath.

50:18.230 --> 50:19.063
- No.

50:20.010 --> 50:22.580
So, I mentioned earlier
accelerated warfare

50:22.580 --> 50:24.500
which is our idea

50:24.500 --> 50:27.440
about what the operating
environment looks like.

50:27.440 --> 50:29.560
We haven't yet developed the response

50:29.560 --> 50:31.750
to that, and we've looked very closely

50:31.750 --> 50:34.510
at MDO by the US Army.

50:34.510 --> 50:36.470
It's a great body of work.

50:36.470 --> 50:39.870
There are real advantages
in being a fast follower,

50:39.870 --> 50:43.070
'cause we are having a very
close look at that at the moment

50:43.070 --> 50:47.120
in terms of how it relates to our context.

50:47.120 --> 50:50.030
I think it will probably
be somewhat easier

50:50.030 --> 50:54.260
in the ADF to develop a joint concept,

50:54.260 --> 50:59.190
because back in 2016 our
department was reorganized

50:59.190 --> 51:04.190
such that the vice chief,
my boss, controls the money.

51:04.200 --> 51:07.950
So, he is the individual
that allocates the funding

51:07.950 --> 51:11.600
to the three services
to deliver capability.

51:11.600 --> 51:16.600
He's also responsible for joint
concepts and joint design.

51:16.660 --> 51:21.660
So, he who controls the
money has great influence

51:22.090 --> 51:25.610
in the ADF, much smaller organization.

51:25.610 --> 51:28.310
Have I mentioned, we're
only a middle power.

51:28.310 --> 51:31.820
It might be a bit straight,
a bit more straightforward.

51:31.820 --> 51:33.870
The capability that we're going

51:33.870 --> 51:38.220
after first is integrated
air and missile defense.

51:38.220 --> 51:43.220
We, Army is delivering the
inner tier of integrated air

51:43.640 --> 51:46.940
and missile defense, the NASAMS system.

51:46.940 --> 51:49.860
But, there is a joint program to look

51:49.860 --> 51:52.350
at how we're gonna integrate that with our

51:52.350 --> 51:54.213
fifth generation Air Force,

51:55.320 --> 51:58.400
with long range air, defense effectuals

51:58.400 --> 52:01.490
and also with our Navy and in particular

52:01.490 --> 52:03.310
with the Aegis Combat System.

52:03.310 --> 52:07.610
So, it is absolutely a joint program.

52:07.610 --> 52:12.530
To demonstrate how joint it
was, when Army was taking

52:12.530 --> 52:17.120
forward the NASAMS system,
Air Force gave us money

52:17.120 --> 52:19.760
to ensure that we could
afford the whole capability.

52:19.760 --> 52:22.500
So, for us that we'll be a very

52:22.500 --> 52:25.750
important test of really demonstrating

52:25.750 --> 52:29.173
the delivery of a multi-domain capability.

52:30.870 --> 52:32.170
- [Michael] I have a
question for Kath Hicks,

52:32.170 --> 52:33.730
but she also wants to make a point.

52:33.730 --> 52:36.570
- I should have paid
you for that question,

52:36.570 --> 52:39.490
because you have hit upon
my favorite rant topic.

52:39.490 --> 52:43.053
So, I'll now attempt to contain
myself as much as possible.

52:44.020 --> 52:46.690
This is not new territory
for the United States.

52:46.690 --> 52:50.470
We have wildly under-invested
in joint experimentation

52:50.470 --> 52:53.240
and scaling and rapid experimentation.

52:53.240 --> 52:57.600
And, we don't look at combined exercises

52:57.600 --> 53:01.070
and joint exercises and
investment pools as a way

53:01.070 --> 53:02.610
to incent the services.

53:02.610 --> 53:06.230
All of whom, of course, are
full of patriotic people looking

53:06.230 --> 53:07.720
to do the right thing, but they live

53:07.720 --> 53:09.300
inside cultures and bureaucracies.

53:09.300 --> 53:12.490
And at the end of the day,
the incentives matter.

53:12.490 --> 53:14.920
We have had various
attempts to change this,

53:14.920 --> 53:18.470
from Goldwater-Nichols to
the, if anyone remembers,

53:18.470 --> 53:20.970
the Galactic Radiator if you were around

53:20.970 --> 53:25.970
for the JROC's sort of early
push post-Goldwater-Nichols

53:26.290 --> 53:29.100
to the Office of Force
Transformation created

53:29.100 --> 53:33.530
by Secretary Rumsfeld to
the Joint Forces Command,

53:33.530 --> 53:35.070
subsequently created to that.

53:35.070 --> 53:37.910
And here we are today,
and there is nothing.

53:37.910 --> 53:40.910
And, not necessarily any one
of those things would have been

53:40.910 --> 53:44.290
the right solution, but we keep
returning to this challenge.

53:44.290 --> 53:49.290
Inter-dependency was the
clarion call of the 2005,

53:49.493 --> 53:54.100
2006 QDR effort on, which
had a subset of issues

53:54.100 --> 53:57.410
on roles and missions which I
had the misfortune of running.

53:57.410 --> 54:00.080
And that was sort of where we were then.

54:00.080 --> 54:01.620
And here we are again, right.

54:01.620 --> 54:05.370
And, I'm a little cynical
on this point unless

54:05.370 --> 54:07.760
and until we actually put
some joint money forward

54:07.760 --> 54:09.350
and put some real heft

54:09.350 --> 54:12.340
behind the idea that if
we're gonna actually compete

54:12.340 --> 54:14.610
in the future, we have
to do these, we have

54:14.610 --> 54:17.480
to pursue the concepts but also experiment

54:17.480 --> 54:21.130
at scale with them and start
to do some rapid innovating.

54:21.130 --> 54:23.120
And I have not seen that yet.

54:23.120 --> 54:24.820
- [Michael] Kath, I have
one follow-up question for.

54:24.820 --> 54:27.020
You were associated with the,

54:27.020 --> 54:29.650
you were part of the
congressionally mandated Commission

54:29.650 --> 54:31.010
on the National Defense Strategy.

54:31.010 --> 54:31.843
Correct?

54:31.843 --> 54:32.676
- Correct.

54:32.676 --> 54:37.410
- [Michael] So that report which
I wrote about as did others

54:37.410 --> 54:42.410
at the time was extremely
critical of the DOD's

54:42.490 --> 54:46.150
analytical capabilities
and said that they had,

54:46.150 --> 54:48.280
particular, I think, on the civilian side,

54:48.280 --> 54:52.220
and said that they had
really atrophied over time

54:52.220 --> 54:54.330
and weren't as good as they used to be

54:54.330 --> 54:56.640
and that this was a
huge problem, especially

54:56.640 --> 55:01.430
in trying to come up
with a proper strategy.

55:01.430 --> 55:03.010
And you also made the point

55:03.010 --> 55:05.630
in this report that as
a consequence of this,

55:05.630 --> 55:07.700
the Civ-Mil relationship was out of whack

55:07.700 --> 55:10.200
and the joint staff was overpowering

55:10.200 --> 55:11.760
the civilians in the DOD.

55:11.760 --> 55:13.860
Do you still believe that?

55:13.860 --> 55:15.770
- I believe, yes, I
believed that at the time.

55:15.770 --> 55:17.810
I do think there are some
changes that have happened

55:17.810 --> 55:21.910
on both of those issues
in the intervening period.

55:21.910 --> 55:23.663
It's always interesting
when you do one of these.

55:23.663 --> 55:25.230
It's on my first commission.

55:25.230 --> 55:27.360
And it's interesting when you participate

55:27.360 --> 55:29.720
in these you think you know
the message you're trying

55:29.720 --> 55:31.890
to send and then there's
the message that's received.

55:31.890 --> 55:32.740
And like it or not,

55:32.740 --> 55:34.980
the message that's received
is the one that matters.

55:34.980 --> 55:37.290
What we thought we were
doing, what I thought

55:37.290 --> 55:39.130
we were doing was much
more on what I just talked

55:39.130 --> 55:40.600
about which is pointing

55:40.600 --> 55:41.677
out that you're not gonna buy your

55:41.677 --> 55:44.227
out of this crisis,
that win on competition.

55:44.227 --> 55:46.150
And you're really gonna
have to be innovative,

55:46.150 --> 55:48.160
and you're going to
have to start investing

55:48.160 --> 55:49.920
in that innovation ecosystem

55:49.920 --> 55:53.520
to include the concept
piece very fundamentally.

55:53.520 --> 55:56.090
And to do that, to the
point you were just asking

55:56.090 --> 55:58.950
about, you need to have
the analytics that help

55:58.950 --> 56:01.430
you understand how effective you can be.

56:01.430 --> 56:03.270
And those analytics are not singular.

56:03.270 --> 56:04.810
There a lot of things
that go into analytics.

56:04.810 --> 56:07.440
They can, of course, be, have war games.

56:07.440 --> 56:11.390
They can be about metric
space professional judgment,

56:11.390 --> 56:15.350
inputs both objective and subjective.

56:15.350 --> 56:17.670
And it can be about
modeling and simulation.

56:17.670 --> 56:19.670
It can be about leveraging AI

56:19.670 --> 56:22.470
in terms of getting very rapid turns.

56:22.470 --> 56:25.070
And the Department of Defense

56:25.070 --> 56:27.470
for the amount of taxpayer
dollars it consumes

56:27.470 --> 56:29.930
let's be frank is very under invested

56:29.930 --> 56:32.730
in how it proves out these challenges.

56:32.730 --> 56:34.170
As somebody whose had to go up to the Hill

56:34.170 --> 56:37.920
and talk about why DOD is
making certain choices,

56:37.920 --> 56:40.850
I can tell you, it's,
they are underwhelmed

56:40.850 --> 56:42.160
by what you can bring to bear.

56:42.160 --> 56:43.510
The services tend to have

56:43.510 --> 56:46.670
much stronger analytic
capabilities individually.

56:46.670 --> 56:47.940
And back to my prior point,

56:47.940 --> 56:50.030
it's the joint piece
that has been very weak.

56:50.030 --> 56:52.160
So, we did highlight that and again

56:52.160 --> 56:54.590
my understanding is that
there's been some investment

56:54.590 --> 56:56.510
there, some prioritization there.

56:56.510 --> 56:59.060
Civ-Mil I think we had
something like three paragraphs

56:59.060 --> 57:01.440
on Civ-Mil and frankly
pretty lightly stated,

57:01.440 --> 57:04.330
but very poorly received.

57:04.330 --> 57:05.940
We hit a nerve, for sure, there.

57:05.940 --> 57:08.320
I think what the commission
said is that it seemed

57:08.320 --> 57:09.800
to us there were some core things

57:09.800 --> 57:12.370
in which you wanna have
a secretary of defense

57:12.370 --> 57:15.860
and his senior staff in
some cases, according

57:15.860 --> 57:18.930
to statute, such as on war plans engaged

57:18.930 --> 57:21.390
in, that we weren't seeing happen

57:21.390 --> 57:23.910
below the level of the secretary
and that was worrisome.

57:23.910 --> 57:25.940
It's a recruit and retain problem.

57:25.940 --> 57:27.930
The United States has civilian
control of the military

57:27.930 --> 57:30.960
as a core constitutional,
fundamental element.

57:30.960 --> 57:32.940
And to continue that you have

57:32.940 --> 57:35.290
to have strong capable
civilians who are engaged

57:35.290 --> 57:38.010
in the process or you'll
atrophy that capability away.

57:38.010 --> 57:40.000
And that is what we have been seeing,

57:40.000 --> 57:40.833
because they are not,

57:40.833 --> 57:42.970
they have not been engaged in the process.

57:42.970 --> 57:45.960
Again, I think Secretary
Esper has taken that on board,

57:45.960 --> 57:47.970
and we've seen return

57:47.970 --> 57:50.360
to routine review of war plans, including

57:50.360 --> 57:52.830
both military, of course,
and, who should be there

57:52.830 --> 57:54.530
and civilians at the table

57:54.530 --> 57:57.320
and some other signs
that he takes seriously

57:57.320 --> 57:59.580
this idea that you need to
have the Civ and the Mil

57:59.580 --> 58:02.210
at the table to have that
balanced perspective.

58:02.210 --> 58:04.770
The military, of course, brings
the operational expertise,

58:04.770 --> 58:07.690
but civilians do bring
particular expertise,

58:07.690 --> 58:11.020
whether it's regional or functional or

58:11.020 --> 58:12.540
around the politics, if you will,

58:12.540 --> 58:13.890
the foreign policy element.

58:13.890 --> 58:17.710
So, I'm encouraged with the
direction things are going.

58:17.710 --> 58:22.620
- So, at this point we're
gonna turn to questions

58:22.620 --> 58:24.503
from you the audience.

58:25.380 --> 58:27.880
And they come to me on these little cards

58:27.880 --> 58:29.330
which I'm gonna read.

58:29.330 --> 58:31.090
But we don't have all that many of them.

58:31.090 --> 58:33.550
So, if anybody has provocative

58:33.550 --> 58:36.750
and good question please
can, please write 'em up,

58:36.750 --> 58:38.930
and they'll hand them to me.

58:38.930 --> 58:42.840
And, also after this event ends

58:42.840 --> 58:47.840
at I think four 45, there's
gonna be a media round table

58:48.200 --> 58:51.680
for you journalists out there
who wanna save your questions

58:51.680 --> 58:54.666
for that event with General Wesley

58:54.666 --> 58:57.080
and possibly General Fantini.

58:57.080 --> 58:58.860
He hasn't decided by--

58:58.860 --> 58:59.693
- [Michael] I'm in.

58:59.693 --> 59:00.526
- You're in.
- I'm in.

59:00.526 --> 59:02.310
- Okay, so he'll be there too.

59:02.310 --> 59:05.210
So, if you have really tough
questions save them for that.

59:06.139 --> 59:10.770
So, one question is from Russ Read

59:10.770 --> 59:13.597
from the Washington Examiner
is it's a good question.

59:13.597 --> 59:15.383
"Given all the advances that Russia

59:15.383 --> 59:18.287
"and China have made in their weapons,

59:18.287 --> 59:21.077
"in their programs and
their technology, is

59:21.077 --> 59:24.987
"near peer really an accurate term

59:24.987 --> 59:27.600
"or are they peer at this point?"

59:27.600 --> 59:29.340
It's just the Pentagon likes

59:29.340 --> 59:32.460
to think that it's still a step ahead.

59:32.460 --> 59:33.790
Are they near peer or peer?

59:33.790 --> 59:34.623
What do you think?

59:34.623 --> 59:35.710
- I'm content with peer.

59:35.710 --> 59:37.317
It's shorter, first of all.

59:37.317 --> 59:38.570
(panelists laugh)

59:38.570 --> 59:41.840
But the second reason is I'm not convinced

59:41.840 --> 59:44.050
the body politic are, the American people

59:44.050 --> 59:46.860
or citizens of the Western nations,

59:46.860 --> 59:50.920
on a daily basis are thinking
through this seriously enough.

59:50.920 --> 59:54.910
And so, to raise the stakes
here is I think important.

59:54.910 --> 59:56.210
That is, to make a compelling

59:56.210 --> 59:59.860
case that one's destiny
isn't necessarily destined

59:59.860 --> 01:00:01.490
if you're not investing.

01:00:01.490 --> 01:00:02.760
And peer doesn't mean the same.

01:00:02.760 --> 01:00:03.690
It just means peer.

01:00:03.690 --> 01:00:05.850
And (mumbles) that there's
some things they're doing,

01:00:05.850 --> 01:00:07.050
I think, better than us.

01:00:08.130 --> 01:00:09.021
- Yeah, I agree.

01:00:09.021 --> 01:00:12.320
I think near just makes us
feel good about ourselves.

01:00:12.320 --> 01:00:14.390
(panelists and audience laugh)

01:00:14.390 --> 01:00:18.013
To be frank, I'm totally
content with peer.

01:00:19.110 --> 01:00:21.850
So you got what was written
in the document two years ago

01:00:21.850 --> 01:00:22.950
and then you have the pragmatic

01:00:22.950 --> 01:00:24.110
reality of what we're facing.

01:00:24.110 --> 01:00:27.623
And so, let's just face
it head on and get at it.

01:00:28.720 --> 01:00:30.593
- [Michael] Where do you
think they're ahead of us?

01:00:35.480 --> 01:00:39.610
- I think they're ahead
of us from the ability

01:00:39.610 --> 01:00:42.140
to take action at a, what I would assume

01:00:42.140 --> 01:00:43.030
to be, well not assume,

01:00:43.030 --> 01:00:46.290
but at a national level when you look

01:00:46.290 --> 01:00:48.590
at some of the things that have occurred,

01:00:48.590 --> 01:00:53.590
and then when you look at the
lack of a substantive response

01:00:53.610 --> 01:00:55.520
from the Western world in general,

01:00:55.520 --> 01:00:57.943
I think that's one
advantage that they have.

01:00:59.170 --> 01:01:00.980
I mean, from a technical perspective

01:01:00.980 --> 01:01:03.800
and a functional, tactical I think

01:01:03.800 --> 01:01:05.840
at a tactical level we could go toe-to-toe

01:01:05.840 --> 01:01:07.490
with them, per se.

01:01:07.490 --> 01:01:11.200
But, all the indication and
analysis indicates that we're,

01:01:11.200 --> 01:01:12.140
as that moves into

01:01:12.140 --> 01:01:17.140
the future, that ability
is gonna continue to erode.

01:01:17.500 --> 01:01:18.360
And so, that's what we need

01:01:18.360 --> 01:01:21.653
to kinda figure out and stop and reverse.

01:01:23.270 --> 01:01:24.717
- [Michael] Okay, here's another question,

01:01:24.717 --> 01:01:29.717
"Left of the fight needs a
balance of hard and soft power.

01:01:30.527 --> 01:01:31.887
"What should be the role of the US

01:01:31.887 --> 01:01:34.997
"and allies to project
soft power effectively?"

01:01:37.200 --> 01:01:39.447
- I'm happy to go, but I
think you wanna say something.

01:01:39.447 --> 01:01:40.710
You wanna combine them.

01:01:40.710 --> 01:01:45.580
- I wonder if the US's
competitive advantage,

01:01:45.580 --> 01:01:48.130
and of course I'm biased
here, but it's your allies

01:01:49.060 --> 01:01:51.350
and the CSA spoke at lunchtime.

01:01:51.350 --> 01:01:53.530
And I wrote down what
he wrote, what he said.

01:01:53.530 --> 01:01:55.757
He said, "We never wanna fight alone.

01:01:55.757 --> 01:01:59.520
"We are all best when we are
fighting shoulder-to-shoulder."

01:01:59.520 --> 01:02:02.930
And, I recall General Mattis when he was

01:02:02.930 --> 01:02:05.807
the secretary said, "The only
thing harder than fighting

01:02:05.807 --> 01:02:10.000
"with your allies is not
fighting with your allies."

01:02:10.000 --> 01:02:15.000
I think that perhaps you need
to take that in mind as well.

01:02:15.370 --> 01:02:17.080
- [Kath] Yeah, I think
it's fun, I'm sorry.

01:02:17.080 --> 01:02:17.913
- No, go ahead.

01:02:17.913 --> 01:02:18.950
- [Kath] I think it's fundamentally

01:02:18.950 --> 01:02:22.910
about the ability of the United States

01:02:22.910 --> 01:02:27.400
to project itself in a
positive, affirmative way.

01:02:27.400 --> 01:02:30.240
And that includes a lot
of soft power tools.

01:02:30.240 --> 01:02:31.960
Again, I think the hard power

01:02:31.960 --> 01:02:33.550
piece is very important for deterrence.

01:02:33.550 --> 01:02:35.250
I think that matters.

01:02:35.250 --> 01:02:37.780
But, a lot of this
competition is about winning

01:02:37.780 --> 01:02:41.740
over others to your way of life,

01:02:41.740 --> 01:02:46.080
to having in our case what we
value democracy, free markets.

01:02:46.080 --> 01:02:48.060
And we're gonna have
to do that with others,

01:02:48.060 --> 01:02:50.140
if we're gonna have throw
weight, right, especially

01:02:50.140 --> 01:02:54.040
against a China, let
alone, if you had a China,

01:02:54.040 --> 01:02:59.040
Russia convenient transactional marriage.

01:03:00.010 --> 01:03:02.850
So, we, yeah, we will absolutely have

01:03:02.850 --> 01:03:07.560
to have an affirmative,
positive message that's not just

01:03:07.560 --> 01:03:10.860
about saying don't go work with China.

01:03:10.860 --> 01:03:13.690
It's about what can the United
States bring to the table.

01:03:13.690 --> 01:03:18.130
And a lot of that is in the
soft power areas of economics,

01:03:18.130 --> 01:03:19.340
politics, as I mentioned.

01:03:19.340 --> 01:03:23.168
Cultural suasion and information
are all important to that.

01:03:23.168 --> 01:03:24.380
- And I like what Kath said.

01:03:24.380 --> 01:03:27.262
The competitive advantages, in
fact our partners and allies.

01:03:27.262 --> 01:03:30.290
When you practice
tributary trade practices

01:03:30.290 --> 01:03:33.903
it doesn't necessarily increase
your committed friendships.

01:03:34.975 --> 01:03:37.700
And then if you have a
revanchist view of the world,

01:03:37.700 --> 01:03:39.320
particularly when those
are the, that those who are

01:03:39.320 --> 01:03:40.360
the target of that used

01:03:40.360 --> 01:03:43.680
to be under a pretty heavy
hand, you can see that we've got

01:03:43.680 --> 01:03:47.200
some coalition partners and
allies that we should leverage

01:03:47.200 --> 01:03:48.550
in a big way in this space.

01:03:49.810 --> 01:03:53.370
- Finally, what I'd say is
part of this is to figure

01:03:53.370 --> 01:03:57.120
out where folks can play
to their strengths as well.

01:03:57.120 --> 01:03:59.430
And so, absolutely, allies

01:03:59.430 --> 01:04:03.880
and partners have strengths
that the United States doesn't.

01:04:03.880 --> 01:04:07.150
And that's what we would wanna
be able to leverage, right.

01:04:07.150 --> 01:04:10.550
I was a commander in Kandahar
Airfield, the NATO commander.

01:04:10.550 --> 01:04:13.970
So I had all the responsibility
and none of the authority.

01:04:13.970 --> 01:04:18.570
But, those countries,
Bulgaria, Romania, you name it.

01:04:18.570 --> 01:04:20.360
They came with their air game,

01:04:20.360 --> 01:04:23.400
and they plugged in holes
that we didn't have to fill

01:04:25.327 --> 01:04:27.060
from a United States perspective.

01:04:27.060 --> 01:04:29.090
And, it was a fantastic experience.

01:04:29.090 --> 01:04:32.780
And that's where I think the
real powerful, power will come.

01:04:32.780 --> 01:04:34.700
That's part of, in my mind
leadership is figuring

01:04:34.700 --> 01:04:36.820
out who, how do you
figure out who's playing

01:04:36.820 --> 01:04:39.490
to their strengths, position those folks

01:04:39.490 --> 01:04:43.203
or countries or entities to
maximize your synergy there.

01:04:45.040 --> 01:04:47.810
- [Michael] Here's a question
from a Joint Staff officer.

01:04:47.810 --> 01:04:51.180
It's really kind of a Joint
Staff perspective, I think.

01:04:51.180 --> 01:04:53.357
It says, "The competition with China

01:04:53.357 --> 01:04:56.157
"and Russia is global really

01:04:56.157 --> 01:04:57.527
"and across the spectrum

01:04:57.527 --> 01:05:00.257
"and that they, these
powers have been involved

01:05:00.257 --> 01:05:04.737
"in one way or another
in some of the crises

01:05:04.737 --> 01:05:07.577
"in the Americas, Venezuela,

01:05:07.577 --> 01:05:10.127
"Nicaragua, Chile, Argentina, Cuba.

01:05:10.127 --> 01:05:15.127
"Why is there so much focus on
the two combatant commands?"

01:05:18.786 --> 01:05:19.733
- You're talking about
EUCOM and INDOPACOM.

01:05:19.733 --> 01:05:21.830
- EUCOM and PACOM, 'cause when you look

01:05:21.830 --> 01:05:24.480
at conflict, maybe not left of conflict,

01:05:24.480 --> 01:05:27.677
but conflict, the focus
is on EUCOM and INDOPACOM.

01:05:28.870 --> 01:05:33.870
But, the competition with Russia
and China is really global.

01:05:35.100 --> 01:05:37.200
And if you just use my own example

01:05:37.200 --> 01:05:40.180
from earlier, I mean, Russia's in Syria.

01:05:40.180 --> 01:05:41.610
So, but we're leaving the Middle East

01:05:41.610 --> 01:05:44.500
to focus on great power
competition in Europe

01:05:44.500 --> 01:05:47.510
and the Pacific and ceding the middle,

01:05:47.510 --> 01:05:52.510
Syria anyway to Russia, I
guess is the logic of it.

01:05:53.040 --> 01:05:53.930
But, and, to return

01:05:53.930 --> 01:05:57.240
to the question, what do
you make of that point,

01:05:57.240 --> 01:05:59.690
'cause I do sense in the
Joint Staff there's more of a

01:05:59.690 --> 01:06:02.550
global perspective and also
there's more of a focus

01:06:02.550 --> 01:06:03.720
on these two commands.

01:06:03.720 --> 01:06:05.770
- Well, yeah, I think Kath
probably has commented

01:06:05.770 --> 01:06:07.740
on this, but to be fair the Joint Staff

01:06:07.740 --> 01:06:11.300
and under the previous
chairman, he was uncomfortable

01:06:11.300 --> 01:06:13.740
with this delineation of co-COMS.

01:06:13.740 --> 01:06:17.640
And therefore, the idea that
you've got a global dynamic

01:06:17.640 --> 01:06:20.850
I think is what the Joint
Staff has been trying to drive.

01:06:20.850 --> 01:06:25.850
In the case of the Army, it's
largely a resourcing thing.

01:06:26.230 --> 01:06:31.230
You can posture Army forces
in a way that allows you

01:06:31.960 --> 01:06:35.920
to compete more effectively
in some regions than others.

01:06:35.920 --> 01:06:39.350
And in fact, sometimes
you gotta, all the time

01:06:39.350 --> 01:06:42.090
you gotta be there if you
wanna effectively compete.

01:06:42.090 --> 01:06:43.580
So, you've gotta bet.

01:06:43.580 --> 01:06:45.380
Where are your greatest risks?

01:06:45.380 --> 01:06:49.190
Because in order, if you
wanna win the first battle,

01:06:49.190 --> 01:06:50.900
you can't necessarily count

01:06:50.900 --> 01:06:55.740
on many, many months of
mobilization and deployment.

01:06:55.740 --> 01:06:59.720
So, when we talk about INDOPACOM
and EUCOM we're talking

01:06:59.720 --> 01:07:02.693
about how you bet in
terms of posturing forces.

01:07:03.780 --> 01:07:07.560
- Yeah, I mean, yes, these
are global challenges.

01:07:07.560 --> 01:07:10.100
They're, it's not unusual for
us to have global challenges.

01:07:10.100 --> 01:07:12.040
The Soviet Union was
clearly a global challenge.

01:07:12.040 --> 01:07:17.040
Counter-terrorism and ISIS
itself have been portrayed as

01:07:17.050 --> 01:07:19.653
global, the global war
on terror, for example.

01:07:20.510 --> 01:07:23.580
So, there's nothing that
should surprise us about that.

01:07:23.580 --> 01:07:25.280
And yet, we, I'll go back to what I said

01:07:25.280 --> 01:07:27.040
before, we have limited resources, right.

01:07:27.040 --> 01:07:31.980
So, the question is where do
you prioritize the m vis a vis

01:07:31.980 --> 01:07:34.480
how you prioritize other things.

01:07:34.480 --> 01:07:38.080
And it does seem to me that
our greatest economic interests

01:07:38.080 --> 01:07:41.210
and our strongest and most
important alliances are

01:07:41.210 --> 01:07:43.430
in the two theaters of reference.

01:07:43.430 --> 01:07:45.330
It doesn't mean you
ignore everything else.

01:07:45.330 --> 01:07:47.200
And in fact, you need to understand,

01:07:47.200 --> 01:07:51.610
to your point Michael, that
these conflicts that happen

01:07:51.610 --> 01:07:56.140
far afield of the direct theater can

01:07:56.140 --> 01:07:59.250
in fact shape the outcome
of the competition.

01:07:59.250 --> 01:08:00.730
We should never lose sight of that.

01:08:00.730 --> 01:08:04.360
I think the Middle East is
the hardest piece of this.

01:08:04.360 --> 01:08:06.860
And it's plagued us before this NDS.

01:08:06.860 --> 01:08:08.250
I didn't comment on this before,

01:08:08.250 --> 01:08:10.560
but this has been the real challenge

01:08:10.560 --> 01:08:14.720
for US strategy for
quite literally decades.

01:08:14.720 --> 01:08:17.620
If you look at the Defense
Strategic Guidance of 2012

01:08:17.620 --> 01:08:20.060
which most closely approximates the look

01:08:20.060 --> 01:08:25.060
and feel of the NDS, it had the
re-balance element in there.

01:08:26.040 --> 01:08:27.840
And of course, then, that's when

01:08:27.840 --> 01:08:29.190
ISIS rolled across the border.

01:08:29.190 --> 01:08:31.793
So, we shouldn't, we
should never be surprised.

01:08:32.886 --> 01:08:37.260
And we shouldn't bank on
things that we can't control.

01:08:37.260 --> 01:08:39.900
But, we will have to make
some investment choices

01:08:39.900 --> 01:08:41.260
and that kind of just drives you

01:08:41.260 --> 01:08:43.240
to a portfolio approach that says

01:08:43.240 --> 01:08:45.340
your blue chips are in NATO.

01:08:45.340 --> 01:08:48.360
And they're in the Pacific alliances.

01:08:48.360 --> 01:08:50.850
Obviously, we take for
granted the Monroe Doctrine.

01:08:50.850 --> 01:08:53.030
We made that may come back to bite us if

01:08:53.030 --> 01:08:55.680
in fact we have true problems

01:08:55.680 --> 01:08:59.410
on our borders that we relate to the m.

01:08:59.410 --> 01:09:01.910
But by and large, I think
that's a smart strategy

01:09:01.910 --> 01:09:03.940
while understanding we
shouldn't just assume

01:09:03.940 --> 01:09:06.170
we're gonna be able to
pull all our resources

01:09:06.170 --> 01:09:08.970
out of the Middle East, and
it will take care of itself.

01:09:11.520 --> 01:09:12.550
- [Michael] There's a question.

01:09:12.550 --> 01:09:13.383
- [Michael] Well said.

01:09:13.383 --> 01:09:15.530
Every time I've had a
point, Kath covered it.

01:09:16.702 --> 01:09:17.535
- [Michael] There's a question here

01:09:17.535 --> 01:09:18.980
on influence market share.

01:09:18.980 --> 01:09:22.020
It's addressed to General
Wesley and Dr. Hicks,

01:09:22.020 --> 01:09:25.940
but I think anyone on the
panel can also join in.

01:09:25.940 --> 01:09:27.757
I guess it's from a officer.

01:09:27.757 --> 01:09:32.757
"Sir, you mentioned there's
a market share of influence

01:09:32.987 --> 01:09:34.407
"in your opening remarks.

01:09:34.407 --> 01:09:36.417
"Do you think that the difference

01:09:36.417 --> 01:09:38.687
"in the market share between us

01:09:38.687 --> 01:09:39.897
"and say the Russians.

01:09:39.897 --> 01:09:41.157
"Do you think that's

01:09:41.157 --> 01:09:45.677
"the result of the
increase in competition?"

01:09:47.130 --> 01:09:49.127
It says, "Do you think the difference

01:09:49.127 --> 01:09:51.747
"in the market share's a
function of the adversarial's

01:09:51.747 --> 01:09:54.800
"capabilities or a decrease
in our willingness?"

01:09:54.800 --> 01:09:55.633
I see.

01:09:55.633 --> 01:09:56.466
"Is it because they're better

01:09:56.466 --> 01:09:57.997
"at what they're doing or a decrease

01:09:57.997 --> 01:09:59.677
"in our willingness to commit resources

01:09:59.677 --> 01:10:02.357
"and capital to this competition?

01:10:02.357 --> 01:10:04.547
"That being said, is the
concept of multi-domain

01:10:04.547 --> 01:10:07.287
"operations enough to preserve influence

01:10:07.287 --> 01:10:08.967
"or do we need to reinvest attention

01:10:08.967 --> 01:10:12.150
"to bolstering alliances
and global partnerships?"

01:10:12.150 --> 01:10:14.414
- So I think there's a number
of reasons that you've got

01:10:14.414 --> 01:10:16.010
the delta in the market share.

01:10:16.010 --> 01:10:18.980
The first is we have some
cultural inhibitions to it.

01:10:18.980 --> 01:10:20.100
And I talked to that earlier

01:10:20.100 --> 01:10:22.100
in that we see a big distinction

01:10:22.100 --> 01:10:23.110
between peace and war.

01:10:23.110 --> 01:10:27.330
Whereas our peers see a
continuum of conflict.

01:10:27.330 --> 01:10:29.010
And so, we find it unattractive

01:10:29.010 --> 01:10:31.800
to aggressively compete
just left of conflict,

01:10:31.800 --> 01:10:35.110
because we see it contrary to our origins.

01:10:35.110 --> 01:10:36.220
So, that's the first thing.

01:10:36.220 --> 01:10:38.670
The second thing is we
withdrew from the continent.

01:10:38.670 --> 01:10:40.010
We withdrew from the peninsula.

01:10:40.010 --> 01:10:42.210
It makes it more difficult,
at least for the,

01:10:42.210 --> 01:10:43.970
from the United States'
perspective to compete.

01:10:43.970 --> 01:10:47.410
You can't compete effectively
if you aren't there.

01:10:47.410 --> 01:10:50.100
The third issue is I think our peer

01:10:50.100 --> 01:10:52.770
adversaries have identified
to some degree what

01:10:52.770 --> 01:10:54.940
they perceive is an Achilles heel.

01:10:54.940 --> 01:10:56.570
That is, because of what I've described

01:10:56.570 --> 01:10:59.150
up front, that is, those
cultural inhibitions,

01:10:59.150 --> 01:11:01.480
if they can leverage
the Gerasimov Doctrine

01:11:01.480 --> 01:11:03.320
and achieve their objectives

01:11:03.320 --> 01:11:05.750
left of conflict, then they will.

01:11:05.750 --> 01:11:08.350
And so, I say it's those three

01:11:08.350 --> 01:11:10.280
issues that have created this problem,

01:11:10.280 --> 01:11:12.610
and all we're doing is highlighting

01:11:12.610 --> 01:11:14.760
the problem and potential solutions.

01:11:14.760 --> 01:11:16.980
To the last question, whether we need

01:11:16.980 --> 01:11:19.350
to leverage partners and allies et cetera

01:11:19.350 --> 01:11:21.530
in order to solve this, absolutely.

01:11:21.530 --> 01:11:24.333
And I think that that
is part of the concept.

01:11:26.200 --> 01:11:31.090
- But, multi-domain
operations is not, I mean,

01:11:31.090 --> 01:11:34.110
you unpack that and just rely

01:11:34.110 --> 01:11:36.390
on those three lines of effort of become

01:11:36.390 --> 01:11:38.770
a more lethal force, execute multi-domain

01:11:38.770 --> 01:11:41.180
operations, become a more

01:11:41.180 --> 01:11:46.000
or ensure that you have
partners and allies, okay.

01:11:46.000 --> 01:11:47.660
Make sure partners and allies are playing

01:11:47.660 --> 01:11:48.700
to their strengths, and they have

01:11:48.700 --> 01:11:52.160
capabilities that are gonna contribute

01:11:52.160 --> 01:11:54.460
to this compete and deter.

01:11:54.460 --> 01:11:57.960
And then reform the way you do business.

01:11:57.960 --> 01:12:01.000
You have to get things
that are more agile.

01:12:01.000 --> 01:12:02.300
When people look at their watches

01:12:02.300 --> 01:12:04.600
and they're satisfied that
you get capability delivered

01:12:04.600 --> 01:12:09.600
in 2038 we should be absolutely
appalled at that, right.

01:12:10.490 --> 01:12:14.183
I mean, you can fight multiple
world wars in that time.

01:12:15.260 --> 01:12:16.170
It's ridiculous.

01:12:16.170 --> 01:12:19.283
So, that's where we have to get faster.

01:12:21.130 --> 01:12:24.580
- Perhaps if I could just add Australia's

01:12:24.580 --> 01:12:29.580
in the Indo-Pacific, smack
bang between two oceans.

01:12:29.620 --> 01:12:32.080
Occasionally, you can be forgiven

01:12:32.080 --> 01:12:35.400
for thinking that our region is all

01:12:35.400 --> 01:12:38.290
about our Navy and our Air Force.

01:12:38.290 --> 01:12:41.120
I'm not sure if there's a similar issue

01:12:41.120 --> 01:12:44.340
with INDOPACOM and the US.

01:12:44.340 --> 01:12:49.340
But, in our region 50% of
the world's population lives

01:12:50.320 --> 01:12:51.660
in the Indo-Pacific.

01:12:51.660 --> 01:12:55.327
And 100% of them live on the land.

01:12:55.327 --> 01:12:57.880
(panelists and audience laugh)

01:12:57.880 --> 01:13:01.880
We, the Australian Army is very much

01:13:01.880 --> 01:13:04.770
part of our specific step-up.

01:13:04.770 --> 01:13:09.270
We are out and about
every day developing those

01:13:09.270 --> 01:13:13.020
relationships, making sure
that we're on the ground

01:13:13.020 --> 01:13:16.810
so that when we do need to call

01:13:16.810 --> 01:13:19.690
in those relationships we're actually

01:13:19.690 --> 01:13:21.560
in a position to be able to do so.

01:13:21.560 --> 01:13:23.090
And, I really love

01:13:23.090 --> 01:13:28.090
an expression that General
Brown from USARPAC uses.

01:13:28.280 --> 01:13:32.200
It's along the lines of
you can't surge trust.

01:13:32.200 --> 01:13:35.370
And therefore, armies, people out

01:13:35.370 --> 01:13:39.080
on the ground developing
relationships, it's a very

01:13:39.080 --> 01:13:40.863
powerful part of competition.

01:13:45.190 --> 01:13:47.743
- [Michael] Here's a
question for General Wesley.

01:13:49.547 --> 01:13:52.667
"General Perkins used to talk
about how the Army was unknown

01:13:52.667 --> 01:13:54.357
"and unknowable, and the mitigation

01:13:54.357 --> 01:13:57.297
"for this is the Army's
mission command philosophy.

01:13:57.297 --> 01:14:00.297
"Has MDO retained or emphasized

01:14:00.297 --> 01:14:02.957
"mission command leadership
as a foundational element?

01:14:02.957 --> 01:14:05.857
"Is this good, bad or
indifferent now that we think

01:14:05.857 --> 01:14:07.377
"we know who the enemy is?"

01:14:09.820 --> 01:14:11.110
- First of all, I think

01:14:11.110 --> 01:14:13.430
in the, even though we've
identified a pacing threat,

01:14:13.430 --> 01:14:15.720
and we've got a concept to reconcile it,

01:14:15.720 --> 01:14:17.480
the battlefield that we envision is going

01:14:17.480 --> 01:14:19.870
to be so hyperactive, I would
argue that there's still going

01:14:19.870 --> 01:14:23.090
to be things that are
unknown and unknowable.

01:14:23.090 --> 01:14:25.570
To that point, when
General Perkins referred

01:14:25.570 --> 01:14:28.500
to mission command and our
embrace of mission command,

01:14:28.500 --> 01:14:31.860
a battlefield that is
hyperactive as the one,

01:14:31.860 --> 01:14:35.230
and lethal as we
described, will require us

01:14:35.230 --> 01:14:36.840
to leverage mission command

01:14:36.840 --> 01:14:41.420
on a scale that our generation
has never seen, if it ends

01:14:41.420 --> 01:14:43.410
in conflict with a peer state.

01:14:43.410 --> 01:14:45.120
So, what we're arguing,

01:14:45.120 --> 01:14:47.570
and it's one of, part of the three tenets.

01:14:47.570 --> 01:14:50.800
The third tenet is convergence,
that mission command

01:14:50.800 --> 01:14:54.000
in order to converge capabilities
across the joint force

01:14:54.000 --> 01:14:56.170
and to leverage our opportunities

01:14:56.170 --> 01:14:59.210
on a battlefield that we
described will require

01:14:59.210 --> 01:15:01.830
subordinate commands
to make decisions based

01:15:01.830 --> 01:15:05.290
on opportunities and be
empowered and trained

01:15:05.290 --> 01:15:08.010
to do so in ways we're not used to.

01:15:08.010 --> 01:15:10.040
And one reason, I won't go

01:15:10.040 --> 01:15:12.520
on too long here is
that we are comfortable

01:15:12.520 --> 01:15:14.330
in our generation with

01:15:14.330 --> 01:15:18.560
communications that is
redundant and ubiquitous.

01:15:18.560 --> 01:15:20.320
And that has a tendency

01:15:20.320 --> 01:15:23.740
to reduce the effects of mission command,

01:15:23.740 --> 01:15:25.950
because you always have tacit approval

01:15:25.950 --> 01:15:27.680
if you can always talk.

01:15:27.680 --> 01:15:29.950
In this environment, you
won't be able to talk.

01:15:29.950 --> 01:15:33.070
And you'd have to go back
probably to the 19th century

01:15:33.070 --> 01:15:36.730
to get an understanding of
the scale of decision making

01:15:36.730 --> 01:15:38.790
without contact or communications,

01:15:38.790 --> 01:15:40.550
because there's sometimes
you won't be able

01:15:40.550 --> 01:15:43.200
to communicate and you have
to seize that initiative.

01:15:45.290 --> 01:15:47.160
- [Michael] Here's a
question for General Wesley,

01:15:47.160 --> 01:15:49.093
General Fantini, but I'll open it up

01:15:49.093 --> 01:15:53.217
from Doug Greenlaw, from
Research Innovations.

01:15:53.217 --> 01:15:56.077
"How do we execute command
and control left of conflict?"

01:15:58.160 --> 01:15:59.423
- Go head Mike.

01:15:59.423 --> 01:16:02.310
(panelists and audience laugh)

01:16:02.310 --> 01:16:05.560
- So you gotta have the ability
to sense the environment.

01:16:05.560 --> 01:16:07.290
You have to have some semblance of pipes

01:16:07.290 --> 01:16:09.530
to transport that information.

01:16:09.530 --> 01:16:11.720
Then you gotta make a decision about it.

01:16:11.720 --> 01:16:13.280
And then you gotta execute.

01:16:13.280 --> 01:16:16.173
So, you gotta observe,
orient, decide, and act.

01:16:17.521 --> 01:16:20.540
And, I mean, and in my
mind that's, that needs

01:16:20.540 --> 01:16:25.540
to be occurring daily
at various levels, so.

01:16:26.200 --> 01:16:29.570
I mean, and that's actually
our operating concept

01:16:29.570 --> 01:16:32.513
on how we see it working in the future.

01:16:33.930 --> 01:16:35.320
- You know one of the
things you could help us

01:16:35.320 --> 01:16:36.980
with Dr. Hicks, and I'd be interested

01:16:36.980 --> 01:16:38.723
in your thoughts on this.

01:16:40.290 --> 01:16:43.100
You wanna do that, but we
all agree that there is

01:16:43.100 --> 01:16:45.610
an inter-agency role in all this.

01:16:45.610 --> 01:16:50.010
So, we have commands in
theater that can make

01:16:50.010 --> 01:16:53.200
military decisions left of conflict,

01:16:53.200 --> 01:16:55.760
but not on the side of policy.

01:16:55.760 --> 01:16:57.850
We have ambassadors in each nation.

01:16:57.850 --> 01:17:01.740
We have regional directors.

01:17:01.740 --> 01:17:03.790
How do we solve or if you have thoughts

01:17:03.790 --> 01:17:06.440
on solving the inter-agency
problem, left of conflict

01:17:06.440 --> 01:17:07.890
in theater in near real time?

01:17:08.850 --> 01:17:10.350
- Couple thoughts on that.

01:17:10.350 --> 01:17:13.870
I mean, first, there's a storied

01:17:13.870 --> 01:17:18.010
history of inter-agency reform efforts.

01:17:18.010 --> 01:17:20.270
Obviously, we have the
1947 National Security Act.

01:17:20.270 --> 01:17:22.090
That was a result of a reform effort.

01:17:22.090 --> 01:17:26.257
We have the post 9/11 package
of reforms that created ANCTC

01:17:26.257 --> 01:17:28.870
and DHS, Goldwater-Nichols before that.

01:17:28.870 --> 01:17:31.810
But in terms of the
inter-agency that created

01:17:31.810 --> 01:17:33.320
inter-agency reform.

01:17:33.320 --> 01:17:34.153
But it's extraordinarily difficult.

01:17:34.153 --> 01:17:37.980
If you think about that, those
are huge generational jumps.

01:17:37.980 --> 01:17:41.970
So, I'm gonna put that to
the side for the moment.

01:17:41.970 --> 01:17:45.200
The way we have our current
inter-agency statutorily,

01:17:45.200 --> 01:17:47.640
if you will, you cannot avoid

01:17:47.640 --> 01:17:50.970
the reality that you need
the NSC to be effective

01:17:50.970 --> 01:17:52.810
and functioning and able to coordinate

01:17:52.810 --> 01:17:57.810
across the various statutory
and capabilities that come

01:17:57.980 --> 01:18:00.120
with that statutory authority that are

01:18:00.120 --> 01:18:02.170
in the different departments and agencies.

01:18:02.170 --> 01:18:04.770
And so, we have done
quite a bit of research

01:18:04.770 --> 01:18:06.180
on gray zone operations.

01:18:06.180 --> 01:18:08.370
And we have come to the conclusion at CSIS

01:18:08.370 --> 01:18:10.020
in a series of studies that we just put

01:18:10.020 --> 01:18:12.800
out, if anyone's interested
in reading them, called

01:18:12.800 --> 01:18:15.000
By Other Means, that you need

01:18:15.000 --> 01:18:17.450
to have a combination
of excellent warning.

01:18:17.450 --> 01:18:18.717
Actually, we haven't even
talked about this yet,

01:18:18.717 --> 01:18:20.010
and that's my fault.

01:18:20.010 --> 01:18:22.270
But I thank you very much General

01:18:22.270 --> 01:18:25.883
for raising the point on
the sensing and observing.

01:18:26.737 --> 01:18:30.180
To just get on top of the
warning challenge that gray

01:18:30.180 --> 01:18:32.000
zone presents, you have to be looking

01:18:32.000 --> 01:18:35.560
for patterns in things you
weren't even thinking about.

01:18:35.560 --> 01:18:37.837
Obviously, this gets to the
global question that came up,

01:18:37.837 --> 01:18:40.290
but it also gets to what's going on

01:18:40.290 --> 01:18:42.930
in private enterprise, political coercion,

01:18:42.930 --> 01:18:46.300
economic coercion, a lot of
the issues that Kath mentioned

01:18:46.300 --> 01:18:47.880
Australia's had to deal with.

01:18:47.880 --> 01:18:49.820
These are things we haven't looked at,

01:18:49.820 --> 01:18:52.150
and we certainly haven't
been trying to sense

01:18:52.150 --> 01:18:54.090
in a holistic pattern in order

01:18:54.090 --> 01:18:56.990
to determine if we should
have a decision point

01:18:56.990 --> 01:18:59.280
for a policy or action.

01:18:59.280 --> 01:19:03.300
So, it starts with making
sure we have that system

01:19:03.300 --> 01:19:04.410
up and running well.

01:19:04.410 --> 01:19:06.520
Of course, the NIC is
what we have right now

01:19:06.520 --> 01:19:09.230
as the central coordinating element there.

01:19:09.230 --> 01:19:11.430
A lot of the challenges in gray zone are

01:19:11.430 --> 01:19:14.230
about domestic as well as foreign.

01:19:14.230 --> 01:19:16.640
So, you cannot avoid the
reality that you're gonna have

01:19:16.640 --> 01:19:20.870
to be crossing over between,
for instance, FBI authorities

01:19:20.870 --> 01:19:24.680
and CIA authorities, just as an example.

01:19:24.680 --> 01:19:25.890
So, you gotta have that sensing

01:19:25.890 --> 01:19:27.160
piece that's really at the NIC.

01:19:27.160 --> 01:19:30.210
And you have to have that
inter-agency action piece that has

01:19:30.210 --> 01:19:34.140
to be run up under the NSC,
under our current operations.

01:19:34.140 --> 01:19:37.540
And then you oughta have a routine forum

01:19:37.540 --> 01:19:39.580
in which you're bringing
those pieces together.

01:19:39.580 --> 01:19:41.840
And we argue for a
little bit of a taskforce

01:19:41.840 --> 01:19:45.320
to pull from the departments
and agencies, working

01:19:45.320 --> 01:19:49.050
under the leadership of a
senior director at the NSC.

01:19:49.050 --> 01:19:52.880
I'll note to you that in
the last NDAA that passed

01:19:52.880 --> 01:19:55.530
there's a requirement to have someone

01:19:55.530 --> 01:19:59.410
at the NSC with the role of
countering malign influence.

01:19:59.410 --> 01:20:01.390
That has been assigned, I
believe it's been assigned

01:20:01.390 --> 01:20:02.250
at the director level.

01:20:02.250 --> 01:20:04.250
We argue that should be at
the senior director level

01:20:04.250 --> 01:20:05.270
and expanded a bit.

01:20:05.270 --> 01:20:06.780
Malign influence should be expanded

01:20:06.780 --> 01:20:11.300
to cover a bit more of the
operations we're talking about.

01:20:11.300 --> 01:20:14.130
But unfortunately, if you
will, that's as much as

01:20:14.130 --> 01:20:18.700
you can really build out
of the system that we have.

01:20:18.700 --> 01:20:20.520
Now, we often, I'll just end on this.

01:20:20.520 --> 01:20:25.520
We often wish we had a much
more centralized system.

01:20:25.630 --> 01:20:28.880
We wish we were Putin sometimes or Xi.

01:20:28.880 --> 01:20:31.450
But there's a lot of fragility
built into that, right.

01:20:31.450 --> 01:20:35.050
There is, there's a brittleness

01:20:35.050 --> 01:20:39.310
to dictatorship that we
have appropriately sought

01:20:39.310 --> 01:20:41.510
to avoid here in the United States.

01:20:41.510 --> 01:20:44.030
So, the results though is that we have

01:20:44.030 --> 01:20:45.600
to have of course this balance

01:20:45.600 --> 01:20:50.270
across our congress, the
executive branch, and the courts.

01:20:50.270 --> 01:20:54.790
And then inside that inter-agency
system there is, it is,

01:20:54.790 --> 01:20:57.900
it does fight against
agility in this sense,

01:20:57.900 --> 01:21:00.080
but hopefully drives to much

01:21:00.080 --> 01:21:02.920
smarter, better decision making.

01:21:02.920 --> 01:21:06.140
Hopefully, we wouldn't go
into Hong Kong, for example,

01:21:06.140 --> 01:21:07.920
and make a decision that a single leader

01:21:07.920 --> 01:21:10.100
would make that's regrettable.

01:21:10.100 --> 01:21:14.330
Gonna try to avoid any
parallels to the last 24 hours,

01:21:14.330 --> 01:21:18.190
but I will simply say
in our system, sorry,

01:21:18.190 --> 01:21:22.360
in our system in theory we
can bring the unity of best

01:21:22.360 --> 01:21:26.180
minds if we use the system
the way it's intended.

01:21:26.180 --> 01:21:29.120
And that's where we would
have to take action if we were

01:21:29.120 --> 01:21:31.950
to get better, in terms
of C2 in the gray zone,

01:21:31.950 --> 01:21:34.610
'cause then you'd have
the president authorizing

01:21:34.610 --> 01:21:37.270
to the department or agency
that has the relevant

01:21:37.270 --> 01:21:39.270
responsibility and statutory authority

01:21:39.270 --> 01:21:41.270
and you'd have the coordination mechanisms

01:21:41.270 --> 01:21:43.640
to try to make sure these pieces move out

01:21:44.984 --> 01:21:46.463
in some kind of coherent manner.

01:21:49.760 --> 01:21:51.737
- [Michael] Here's a question, "How do

01:21:51.737 --> 01:21:53.257
"We compete with adversaries

01:21:53.257 --> 01:21:56.650
"without employing similar
unethical practices?"

01:21:56.650 --> 01:22:00.410
The questioner doesn't give
an example of what those are,

01:22:00.410 --> 01:22:04.520
but I could imagine when
you get into cyber issues

01:22:04.520 --> 01:22:06.880
or information and disinformation

01:22:08.860 --> 01:22:11.323
those kinda ethical questions would arise.

01:22:14.122 --> 01:22:15.680
- Well, first of all I
think that one of the, well,

01:22:15.680 --> 01:22:17.300
one of the things we talk
about in the concept is

01:22:17.300 --> 01:22:21.640
in order to be more agile you
have to migrate authorities

01:22:21.640 --> 01:22:25.800
downward at the operational
level to a degree.

01:22:25.800 --> 01:22:29.100
And that may be scaled in time, depending

01:22:29.100 --> 01:22:31.990
on what, to what degree
you're in conflict.

01:22:31.990 --> 01:22:33.800
But that doesn't change
our ethics and mores.

01:22:33.800 --> 01:22:36.210
What we're looking for
is agility, not a change

01:22:36.210 --> 01:22:37.960
in our culture, not a
change in our behaviors.

01:22:37.960 --> 01:22:41.060
And I think we have a culture that has,

01:22:41.060 --> 01:22:44.530
the world changed because
the export of our culture.

01:22:44.530 --> 01:22:46.360
And so, there's a lot of benefit there.

01:22:46.360 --> 01:22:49.880
And we said earlier, our
greatest asset is our partners

01:22:49.880 --> 01:22:51.530
and allies who have similar culture.

01:22:51.530 --> 01:22:55.010
So, we want the ability to
manifest or reflect our culture.

01:22:55.010 --> 01:22:56.170
We just wanna push it down

01:22:56.170 --> 01:22:58.340
to authorities that
can do it with agility.

01:22:58.340 --> 01:23:01.520
And therefore,
accountability of commanders

01:23:01.520 --> 01:23:03.700
with that authority is going to have

01:23:03.700 --> 01:23:05.580
to be the automatic solution

01:23:05.580 --> 01:23:08.283
to maintaining the
ethics that we hold dear.

01:23:12.690 --> 01:23:17.690
- There a number of
questions here that of which

01:23:17.840 --> 01:23:19.780
there's a little bit of overlap,

01:23:19.780 --> 01:23:22.940
and so instead of reading
them out separately maybe I'll

01:23:22.940 --> 01:23:26.793
just kinda pick from each
and throw them out here.

01:23:29.027 --> 01:23:31.277
"Is the problem that our
militaries can't compete

01:23:31.277 --> 01:23:34.047
"before conflict or that our respective

01:23:34.047 --> 01:23:36.917
"governments can't agree
on the need and priority?"

01:23:38.447 --> 01:23:40.127
"Does being a democracy mean we have

01:23:40.127 --> 01:23:42.040
"to give up the initiative?"

01:23:42.040 --> 01:23:43.950
That was one question.

01:23:43.950 --> 01:23:44.783
- No.

01:23:44.783 --> 01:23:45.860
- No.

01:23:45.860 --> 01:23:47.260
- Okay, well go answer that.

01:23:48.640 --> 01:23:49.962
- And no.

01:23:49.962 --> 01:23:53.430
(panelists laugh)

01:23:53.430 --> 01:23:54.791
- Do you wanna?

01:23:54.791 --> 01:23:55.821
- You want me to expound on that.

01:23:55.821 --> 01:23:57.971
(panelists and audience laugh)

01:23:57.971 --> 01:23:59.471
I think, I mean...

01:24:02.740 --> 01:24:04.380
I don't know, geeze.

01:24:04.380 --> 01:24:07.390
We're doing exercises globally.

01:24:07.390 --> 01:24:09.390
We exercise at home.

01:24:09.390 --> 01:24:12.750
At the tactical level,
units everyday are doing

01:24:12.750 --> 01:24:14.710
some semblance of training.

01:24:14.710 --> 01:24:16.233
So that's ongoing.

01:24:17.270 --> 01:24:22.270
What I think in order to better be ready

01:24:22.470 --> 01:24:27.340
and ensure that we compete
and deter is that we need

01:24:27.340 --> 01:24:29.340
to better focus that activity.

01:24:29.340 --> 01:24:31.480
What are we training against?

01:24:31.480 --> 01:24:33.057
What's that level of threat?

01:24:33.057 --> 01:24:34.283
Are we ready?

01:24:35.990 --> 01:24:40.990
And, so, as an example, since
Desert Storm I we would argue

01:24:41.800 --> 01:24:44.330
in the Air Force it's been
a relatively permissive

01:24:44.330 --> 01:24:48.160
environment for air
power, relatively right.

01:24:48.160 --> 01:24:50.270
I mean, we didn't lose 5,000

01:24:50.270 --> 01:24:52.690
airplanes like we did in Vietnam.

01:24:52.690 --> 01:24:54.440
I don't know how many
Army helicopters were lost

01:24:54.440 --> 01:24:56.420
in Vietnam, but a fair amount I'd say,

01:24:56.420 --> 01:24:58.863
at least 5,000 airplanes.

01:25:00.200 --> 01:25:03.360
So, we haven't experienced
over this last 25

01:25:03.360 --> 01:25:07.140
to 30 years that same level of loss.

01:25:07.140 --> 01:25:11.340
And our society is kinda, they
set these expectations now,

01:25:11.340 --> 01:25:14.430
and we've just changed the
playing field to this peer.

01:25:14.430 --> 01:25:18.510
And, it's not, if we get
in, if we don't deter

01:25:18.510 --> 01:25:21.370
and compete appropriately we're gonna be

01:25:21.370 --> 01:25:26.120
in a much different boat that our

01:25:26.120 --> 01:25:29.510
society is not quite ready for frankly.

01:25:29.510 --> 01:25:33.540
So, I'd say we do that, but
I would argue that we need

01:25:33.540 --> 01:25:36.613
to ensure that we better focus
our activities appropriately.

01:25:37.830 --> 01:25:41.830
- I was just gonna say being
proactive, being, having

01:25:41.830 --> 01:25:45.670
initiative is not necessary
about schwacking, if you will.

01:25:45.670 --> 01:25:46.840
It can be.

01:25:46.840 --> 01:25:50.860
But, we can live our
values, right with that.

01:25:50.860 --> 01:25:53.210
Our soft power is what got us

01:25:53.210 --> 01:25:56.100
to this point that others
are coming after us

01:25:56.100 --> 01:25:57.360
with the power they can use

01:25:57.360 --> 01:25:59.330
which is not very effective soft power.

01:25:59.330 --> 01:26:01.360
This is why you end up with transactional

01:26:01.360 --> 01:26:04.140
approaches like building
a road, et cetera.

01:26:04.140 --> 01:26:06.770
That's their attempt to
counter what they see

01:26:06.770 --> 01:26:10.290
as very effective US alliance
building essentially,

01:26:10.290 --> 01:26:13.270
economic, bridge building
and alliance building.

01:26:13.270 --> 01:26:16.610
So, moving from our values
absolutely is initiative.

01:26:16.610 --> 01:26:18.480
It's about security cooperation,

01:26:18.480 --> 01:26:19.690
if we're gonna talk just defense.

01:26:19.690 --> 01:26:23.260
It's about building out
partnerships and alliances.

01:26:23.260 --> 01:26:26.270
It's about securing freedom
of the seas and airwaves

01:26:26.270 --> 01:26:28.900
and cyber and space so our commerce moves.

01:26:28.900 --> 01:26:32.650
That's initiative as well as
of course the more punitive

01:26:32.650 --> 01:26:35.180
piece that I think our
heads go to right away.

01:26:35.180 --> 01:26:38.770
Now, can the US move in
the gray zone punitively?

01:26:38.770 --> 01:26:40.680
Absolutely with initiative.

01:26:40.680 --> 01:26:42.220
But do we do it in concert

01:26:42.220 --> 01:26:45.500
or in alignment, excuse me, with our laws?

01:26:45.500 --> 01:26:46.740
Yes, right.

01:26:46.740 --> 01:26:49.320
And that's, we have ways to do that.

01:26:49.320 --> 01:26:51.100
I mentioned before there is a covert

01:26:51.100 --> 01:26:52.820
action piece that the US does.

01:26:52.820 --> 01:26:55.510
We execute our covert action
in accordance with our laws.

01:26:55.510 --> 01:26:58.710
We have congressional
oversight of our covert action.

01:26:58.710 --> 01:27:02.090
That's a bit different than
I suspect how they execute

01:27:02.090 --> 01:27:04.860
covert action in China or in Russia.

01:27:04.860 --> 01:27:08.360
So, I think we have to move
from our values focused foremost

01:27:08.360 --> 01:27:11.550
on the positive pieces
of what our agenda is.

01:27:11.550 --> 01:27:13.780
Of course, bring military power to bear.

01:27:13.780 --> 01:27:15.970
Of course, be able to
bring sanctions to bear.

01:27:15.970 --> 01:27:19.790
But also, remember that we have
incredible persuasive power,

01:27:19.790 --> 01:27:22.290
both economically in our
statecraft in building

01:27:22.290 --> 01:27:26.480
out economic arrangements,
so for instance the BILD Act

01:27:26.480 --> 01:27:27.313
for those who are

01:27:27.313 --> 01:27:29.030
aware of that piece of
legislation that passed

01:27:29.030 --> 01:27:30.670
about a year ago.

01:27:30.670 --> 01:27:33.630
That's really good proactive initiative

01:27:33.630 --> 01:27:35.690
as is of course anything that we do

01:27:35.690 --> 01:27:37.900
in terms exercises et cetera.

01:27:37.900 --> 01:27:40.290
So, yeah, I don't think
that's a problem for us.

01:27:40.290 --> 01:27:42.380
And I think we need to get
out of the mindset of being

01:27:42.380 --> 01:27:47.020
jealous of the free
reign of the dictators.

01:27:47.020 --> 01:27:48.820
- I'll be a contrarian just

01:27:48.820 --> 01:27:50.820
for the sake of keeping everybody awake.

01:27:51.827 --> 01:27:53.890
But I'll come full circle in the end.

01:27:53.890 --> 01:27:57.930
So, the answer is no we don't
have to cede initiative.

01:27:57.930 --> 01:27:59.970
However, I think we are agreeing

01:27:59.970 --> 01:28:01.200
and the whole reason we're having

01:28:01.200 --> 01:28:05.660
this panel is that for
democracies our initiative is

01:28:05.660 --> 01:28:09.340
at risk, if we don't
consider this topic, one,

01:28:09.340 --> 01:28:12.400
and two if we don't make some changes

01:28:12.400 --> 01:28:15.453
to enable the agility
that was just described.

01:28:16.540 --> 01:28:17.620
You all heard about the attack

01:28:17.620 --> 01:28:18.960
on the oil fields in Saudi Arabia.

01:28:18.960 --> 01:28:21.750
It took nine days for
there to be consensus

01:28:21.750 --> 01:28:25.350
amongst key allies as
to who perpetrated it.

01:28:25.350 --> 01:28:28.460
It's five years after MH17 was shot down

01:28:28.460 --> 01:28:31.200
over the Ukraine, and
there's still some debate

01:28:31.200 --> 01:28:32.033
on that out there.

01:28:32.033 --> 01:28:36.120
So, the ambiguity of
the gray zone does call

01:28:36.120 --> 01:28:39.050
into question the agility
of Western democracies

01:28:39.050 --> 01:28:40.520
if we don't open our eyes

01:28:40.520 --> 01:28:42.730
or reconcile some of the
challenges that we have

01:28:42.730 --> 01:28:44.610
right now I think.

01:28:44.610 --> 01:28:46.890
- If I could just add
one of the challenges

01:28:46.890 --> 01:28:49.280
we're having is we're going

01:28:49.280 --> 01:28:51.730
through a major recapitalization of our

01:28:51.730 --> 01:28:53.760
defense capability at the moment.

01:28:53.760 --> 01:28:56.647
It's the largest since
the end of World War II,

01:28:56.647 --> 01:29:00.000
$200 billion worth of
additional investment.

01:29:00.000 --> 01:29:02.000
One of the challenges we've got is

01:29:02.000 --> 01:29:05.120
to understand how to weight the capability

01:29:05.120 --> 01:29:07.420
across competition and conflict,

01:29:07.420 --> 01:29:09.610
because the type of capabilities you need

01:29:09.610 --> 01:29:13.040
in competition are it's
information warfare,

01:29:13.040 --> 01:29:15.600
it's language skills in your people,

01:29:15.600 --> 01:29:20.600
it's cultural awareness,
it's the soft power versus

01:29:20.620 --> 01:29:22.580
the type of capabilities you need

01:29:22.580 --> 01:29:26.570
to be able a credible
and lethal combat force.

01:29:26.570 --> 01:29:30.290
That is a very difficult balance to get.

01:29:30.290 --> 01:29:33.200
It's a very important
balance to get right though,

01:29:33.200 --> 01:29:36.580
because our experience
in the Pacific, for us

01:29:36.580 --> 01:29:39.960
to be the security
partner of choice, we need

01:29:39.960 --> 01:29:41.740
to have that big stick.

01:29:41.740 --> 01:29:45.130
We need to be seen to
be credible and capable

01:29:45.130 --> 01:29:48.217
in high intensity war fighting.

01:29:48.217 --> 01:29:49.870
- I know General Wesley you mentioned

01:29:49.870 --> 01:29:52.980
the attack on the oil
fields, the Iranian attack

01:29:52.980 --> 01:29:53.813
on the oil fields.

01:29:53.813 --> 01:29:57.500
I think it's pretty obvious
that Iran executed that.

01:29:57.500 --> 01:30:01.300
But it's another
interesting example of how,

01:30:01.300 --> 01:30:03.360
I don't know what you wanna
call it, the inter-agency

01:30:03.360 --> 01:30:08.360
or the wholly government approach,
has handled the conflict,

01:30:09.030 --> 01:30:12.070
because to this day, you say
it took 'em a while to respond

01:30:12.070 --> 01:30:15.930
and identify the culprit, right.

01:30:15.930 --> 01:30:16.850
But to this day,

01:30:16.850 --> 01:30:20.533
the administration has not
presented any evidence.

01:30:21.700 --> 01:30:23.090
There's been an investigation.

01:30:23.090 --> 01:30:27.830
None of this has been declassified
and explained to anybody.

01:30:27.830 --> 01:30:30.330
I was up at the UN, and
everyone was waiting

01:30:30.330 --> 01:30:32.480
for this great briefing
that never materialized.

01:30:32.480 --> 01:30:33.650
I don't know whether that's because

01:30:33.650 --> 01:30:35.906
the administration is, doesn't want

01:30:35.906 --> 01:30:40.490
to point a finger, since it
doesn't wanna, it's decided

01:30:40.490 --> 01:30:44.520
military action's not
appropriate in that thing or not.

01:30:44.520 --> 01:30:45.720
But that's just the case.

01:30:45.720 --> 01:30:48.247
So just pointed, it's just
sort of dropped the thing.

01:30:48.247 --> 01:30:49.920
The thing kinda faded away.

01:30:49.920 --> 01:30:53.537
Here's a question, "Practically,
how do exercises like

01:30:53.537 --> 01:30:55.527
"the Defender series effect competition?

01:30:55.527 --> 01:30:57.747
"Is it primarily via messaging?"

01:30:59.300 --> 01:31:01.400
- Well, I think that a couple things.

01:31:01.400 --> 01:31:05.190
It's preparation and that
is that we're starting

01:31:05.190 --> 01:31:08.460
to integrate more and conduct operations

01:31:08.460 --> 01:31:11.620
to allow the interdependence, not only

01:31:11.620 --> 01:31:13.200
with the other services but also

01:31:13.200 --> 01:31:15.200
with our partners and allies.

01:31:15.200 --> 01:31:19.070
So, that's probably the most,
the foremost aspect of it.

01:31:19.070 --> 01:31:22.880
Secondly, it allows us
to practice, rehearse,

01:31:22.880 --> 01:31:26.290
war games some of these
concepts that we talk about.

01:31:26.290 --> 01:31:29.180
And the Defender series for our,

01:31:29.180 --> 01:31:31.740
in our case, we take
multi-domain operations

01:31:31.740 --> 01:31:33.190
and apply it to the degree possible.

01:31:33.190 --> 01:31:34.773
So we can validate it or not.

01:31:37.510 --> 01:31:38.470
Mike you have?

01:31:39.370 --> 01:31:40.203
- I agree.

01:31:40.203 --> 01:31:42.577
- "Should there be an inter-agency

01:31:42.577 --> 01:31:44.397
"version of Goldwater-Nichols

01:31:44.397 --> 01:31:46.887
"to enable the whole of
government approach?"

01:31:48.270 --> 01:31:49.860
- I think the United States is overdue

01:31:49.860 --> 01:31:51.170
for inter-agency reform.

01:31:51.170 --> 01:31:52.990
It's extraordinarily hard to get there.

01:31:52.990 --> 01:31:57.590
It just, I regret to say it,
almost always takes a crisis

01:31:57.590 --> 01:32:00.453
and has to be perceived
as a crisis if you will.

01:32:01.380 --> 01:32:05.240
And I think the biggest
areas one would look

01:32:05.240 --> 01:32:07.490
at would be in this space
that's the topic of the

01:32:07.490 --> 01:32:09.330
conversation today which is how

01:32:09.330 --> 01:32:13.200
you navigate challenges
that don't fit cleanly

01:32:13.200 --> 01:32:16.340
and what the 1947 Act saw as the roles

01:32:16.340 --> 01:32:18.220
and responsibilities of
different departments.

01:32:18.220 --> 01:32:19.710
And again, we've been challenged

01:32:19.710 --> 01:32:22.870
on this clearly very,
and probably before this,

01:32:22.870 --> 01:32:25.060
but clearly from the '90s forward

01:32:25.060 --> 01:32:27.010
because of issues like stabilization

01:32:27.010 --> 01:32:28.100
and who does what.

01:32:28.100 --> 01:32:30.383
Again, counter-terrorism, who does what.

01:32:31.270 --> 01:32:33.930
The issues around law of war

01:32:33.930 --> 01:32:36.060
and issues around information operations.

01:32:36.060 --> 01:32:37.890
Cyber and space, I think, are going

01:32:37.890 --> 01:32:40.563
to just explode that even further.

01:32:41.540 --> 01:32:44.380
So, I think it makes
sense to do a re-look.

01:32:44.380 --> 01:32:47.020
There have been several
outside studies in the past,

01:32:47.020 --> 01:32:48.830
but there hasn't been one honestly

01:32:48.830 --> 01:32:52.950
since the onset of the cyber era.

01:32:52.950 --> 01:32:55.410
So, it's, there's a
cyber solarium right now

01:32:55.410 --> 01:32:57.480
which is a congressionally mandated group.

01:32:57.480 --> 01:32:58.800
I'm hoping they're gonna come out

01:32:58.800 --> 01:33:01.010
with some, I understand
that they're gonna come out

01:33:01.010 --> 01:33:03.740
with some recommendations
that may fit in this category.

01:33:03.740 --> 01:33:05.250
But it will be limited to cyber.

01:33:05.250 --> 01:33:06.570
And I think we'll see a couple other

01:33:06.570 --> 01:33:08.520
stovepipe pieces like that.

01:33:08.520 --> 01:33:10.370
So, I hope there's something broader.

01:33:13.300 --> 01:33:14.420
- I can't read this entirely,

01:33:14.420 --> 01:33:15.337
but I can read most of it.

01:33:15.337 --> 01:33:18.623
"Given the under resourcing
of theater, Army,

01:33:18.623 --> 01:33:20.557
"and Corps land headquarters

01:33:20.557 --> 01:33:22.107
"and a pool of officers who grew up

01:33:22.107 --> 01:33:25.537
"with COIN and stability
ops, are we really prepared

01:33:25.537 --> 01:33:28.507
"to challenge peer
competitors left of war?"

01:33:31.330 --> 01:33:32.163
- Yes.

01:33:33.550 --> 01:33:35.450
That's clear, one of
the, you saw the video.

01:33:35.450 --> 01:33:38.300
You're looking at the best
military in the world.

01:33:38.300 --> 01:33:40.350
I mean, let's be clear on that.

01:33:40.350 --> 01:33:43.550
What we've identified is
some challenges that we need

01:33:43.550 --> 01:33:46.690
to fix, one of which, the person
that asked the question hit

01:33:46.690 --> 01:33:47.950
on a key aspect of it.

01:33:47.950 --> 01:33:50.803
We need to return to campaign quality,

01:33:51.700 --> 01:33:54.280
a campaign quality
military that can conduct

01:33:54.280 --> 01:33:56.950
large scale combat operations
in a theater of war.

01:33:56.950 --> 01:34:01.950
And we did go to a BCT
centric organization

01:34:02.100 --> 01:34:05.180
in the Army, because we could
at the time in that era.

01:34:05.180 --> 01:34:07.640
Now, that we have peers that
are challenging us, we need

01:34:07.640 --> 01:34:09.760
to rebuild echelons above brigade

01:34:09.760 --> 01:34:11.923
and a campaign quality military.

01:34:13.363 --> 01:34:17.090
- So I'd say, again, I take it back

01:34:17.090 --> 01:34:20.560
to this focus aspect
of being able to focus

01:34:20.560 --> 01:34:22.163
on the appropriate threat,

01:34:23.200 --> 01:34:26.583
and then you should orient
your training towards that.

01:34:27.951 --> 01:34:32.150
And that's where we see the ability

01:34:32.150 --> 01:34:33.991
to connect the joint force, the ability

01:34:33.991 --> 01:34:36.760
to dominate in space.

01:34:36.760 --> 01:34:38.670
How do you generate combat power?

01:34:38.670 --> 01:34:41.000
And then you have to
support it logistically.

01:34:41.000 --> 01:34:43.690
All of those four points
of light are where

01:34:43.690 --> 01:34:45.610
we see the Air Force moving in the future.

01:34:45.610 --> 01:34:48.627
And then, that's at an
operational strategic level

01:34:48.627 --> 01:34:50.500
and then down towards the tactical point.

01:34:50.500 --> 01:34:53.290
It, tactically we need to be training

01:34:53.290 --> 01:34:57.060
against peer adversary
capabilities period dot.

01:34:57.060 --> 01:34:59.560
And that's one issue
that we have identified

01:34:59.560 --> 01:35:01.340
in the Air Force from a readiness

01:35:01.340 --> 01:35:06.150
and training perspective of
having used units that have

01:35:06.150 --> 01:35:09.540
specific operational
capability statements that say

01:35:09.540 --> 01:35:11.820
you're supposed to be
ready to do x mission.

01:35:11.820 --> 01:35:13.250
They've been out doing y mission,

01:35:13.250 --> 01:35:16.063
and we're re-focusing back
to regain that readiness.

01:35:17.500 --> 01:35:21.790
- Okay, I'm gonna ask one last question

01:35:21.790 --> 01:35:23.527
from the Australian Army.

01:35:23.527 --> 01:35:25.167
"People are our greatest weapon.

01:35:25.167 --> 01:35:27.947
"How do we improve our intellectual edge,

01:35:27.947 --> 01:35:31.027
"individual and collective
to maintain overmatch?

01:35:31.027 --> 01:35:34.247
"What training and professional
development allows us

01:35:34.247 --> 01:35:36.767
"to develop the cognitive edge?"

01:35:40.172 --> 01:35:41.710
- I love that I'm the Australian Army.

01:35:41.710 --> 01:35:42.679
It's great.

01:35:42.679 --> 01:35:44.680
- Are you gonna answer the
only Australian Army question?

01:35:44.680 --> 01:35:45.910
- Yes, I would love to.

01:35:45.910 --> 01:35:48.480
Hey, really interesting listening

01:35:48.480 --> 01:35:51.230
to your CSA speak at lunch time.

01:35:51.230 --> 01:35:54.020
The fact that he's assumed command

01:35:54.020 --> 01:35:56.880
on a platform of people being

01:35:56.880 --> 01:35:59.460
your most important capability.

01:35:59.460 --> 01:36:03.060
It's exactly the same
as our chief of Army.

01:36:03.060 --> 01:36:06.510
In fact, our mantra is ready now,

01:36:06.510 --> 01:36:09.763
future ready, so further synergies.

01:36:11.600 --> 01:36:14.510
It kind of rolls off the tongue.

01:36:14.510 --> 01:36:16.780
I think we need to hold
ourselves to account

01:36:16.780 --> 01:36:19.640
to really think about what it means.

01:36:19.640 --> 01:36:21.920
I'm very positive when it comes

01:36:21.920 --> 01:36:25.880
to the generation of soldiers

01:36:25.880 --> 01:36:28.040
and young officers coming through.

01:36:28.040 --> 01:36:29.660
They are smart.

01:36:29.660 --> 01:36:31.560
They are educated.

01:36:31.560 --> 01:36:33.160
They are curious.

01:36:33.160 --> 01:36:35.800
They are very technically savvy.

01:36:35.800 --> 01:36:39.230
I think it's up to us as leaders

01:36:39.230 --> 01:36:41.503
to really unlock their potential.

01:36:42.560 --> 01:36:46.863
Leadership, the way we approach
leadership needs to change.

01:36:47.700 --> 01:36:50.570
It's really about enabling leadership.

01:36:50.570 --> 01:36:54.830
It's about ensuring that
the experts have a voice

01:36:54.830 --> 01:36:56.393
and a seat at the table.

01:36:58.110 --> 01:37:02.300
We're going through a
training transformation

01:37:02.300 --> 01:37:04.060
in the Army at the moment.

01:37:04.060 --> 01:37:06.610
We've still got lots of classrooms.

01:37:06.610 --> 01:37:08.600
We still have instructors that stand

01:37:08.600 --> 01:37:13.600
at the front and really engage
in a one way conversation.

01:37:14.170 --> 01:37:18.030
That's not the way that young
men and women learn anymore.

01:37:18.030 --> 01:37:21.520
That's not the way they're
being taught in schools.

01:37:21.520 --> 01:37:23.440
We're reversing that.

01:37:23.440 --> 01:37:28.440
We're looking to make
greater use of technology.

01:37:28.480 --> 01:37:31.800
We're also looking to better value time,

01:37:31.800 --> 01:37:33.860
because the time people sit

01:37:33.860 --> 01:37:38.020
in classrooms, unnecessarily time.

01:37:38.020 --> 01:37:40.683
It's time that they're
not out in their units.

01:37:42.010 --> 01:37:44.490
It's a really big question.

01:37:44.490 --> 01:37:46.740
Perhaps if I could just end when

01:37:46.740 --> 01:37:50.340
the chief of Army released
accelerated warfare,

01:37:50.340 --> 01:37:53.630
he intentionally did
not put out the response

01:37:53.630 --> 01:37:56.480
to accelerated warfare, because he called

01:37:56.480 --> 01:37:58.880
for a contest of ideas.

01:37:58.880 --> 01:38:00.030
And that is happening

01:38:00.030 --> 01:38:02.940
across the Australian Army at the moment.

01:38:02.940 --> 01:38:04.970
We have an initiative group,

01:38:04.970 --> 01:38:07.940
and they are collecting
ideas from the length

01:38:07.940 --> 01:38:09.900
and the breadth of the Army

01:38:09.900 --> 01:38:14.010
to understand how we are
gonna best prepare ourselves

01:38:14.010 --> 01:38:16.910
for that future that we
define in accelerated warfare.

01:38:16.910 --> 01:38:19.950
So, people are absolutely our

01:38:19.950 --> 01:38:22.740
greatest capability, very positive.

01:38:22.740 --> 01:38:25.590
I tell you what, there's
a lot of impressive men

01:38:25.590 --> 01:38:26.593
and women out there.

01:38:27.510 --> 01:38:29.960
- So, at this point I'm
gonna close the event.

01:38:29.960 --> 01:38:33.170
And I'd like to thank
our panel for engaging

01:38:33.170 --> 01:38:36.847
in a pretty wide ranging
and interesting discussion.

01:38:36.847 --> 01:38:39.940
I'd like to thank AUSA for hosting this

01:38:39.940 --> 01:38:40.880
which is what I was supposed

01:38:40.880 --> 01:38:42.830
to do at the start of the presentation,

01:38:42.830 --> 01:38:44.480
so better late than never.

01:38:44.480 --> 01:38:47.256
But let's have a hand for
the (faintly speaking).

01:38:47.256 --> 01:38:50.256
(audience applauds)