WEBVTT 00:01.540 --> 00:03.290 - The Senate Armed Services Committee today 00:03.290 --> 00:06.370 meets to continue receiving the posture statements 00:06.370 --> 00:08.600 from our combatant commands. 00:08.600 --> 00:13.125 Testifying today are General Curtis Scaparrotti, 00:13.125 --> 00:16.790 commander of the United States European Command, 00:16.790 --> 00:19.840 and General Stephen Lyons, 00:19.840 --> 00:22.443 commander of United States Transportation Command. 00:22.443 --> 00:23.987 I welcome both of you here. 00:23.987 --> 00:26.143 And thank you for your service. 00:27.390 --> 00:29.730 The Senate Armed Services Committee's top priority 00:29.730 --> 00:31.730 is to ensure the effective implementation 00:31.730 --> 00:34.000 of the National Defense Strategy. 00:34.000 --> 00:34.833 That's our blueprint. 00:34.833 --> 00:39.031 We pretty much agreed to that. 00:39.031 --> 00:41.550 It means we need urgent change at significant scale 00:41.550 --> 00:42.920 to address the challenges. 00:42.920 --> 00:46.283 Strategic competition with Russia and China. 00:47.466 --> 00:52.466 Just got back from Munich, Kosovo, Djibouti, Algeria. 00:54.330 --> 00:55.575 These areas. 00:55.575 --> 00:58.820 That's where Russia and China is. 00:58.820 --> 01:01.117 We need to be aware of the strength 01:01.117 --> 01:02.803 and what the competition is. 01:03.800 --> 01:05.707 Putin has demonstrated both the capability 01:05.707 --> 01:08.250 and the intent to use force to achieve his objective. 01:08.250 --> 01:13.230 Most notably in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria. 01:13.230 --> 01:14.900 Putin won't hesitate to use 01:14.900 --> 01:17.210 other tools in his arsenal, as well. 01:17.210 --> 01:20.480 Whether it's cyber attacks, election meddling, 01:20.480 --> 01:23.200 or assassinations with chemical weapons. 01:23.200 --> 01:25.910 Perceived weakness will only provoke 01:25.910 --> 01:27.863 further aggression from Putin. 01:30.570 --> 01:32.040 That's why efforts such as 01:32.040 --> 01:36.990 full support for the European Deterrence Initiative. 01:36.990 --> 01:41.770 That's made up of primarily the old Soviet Union countries 01:41.770 --> 01:45.204 and provides the defensive lethal assistance to Ukraine. 01:45.204 --> 01:47.060 Why they're so important. 01:47.060 --> 01:49.120 Likewise, we need a defense budget that 01:49.120 --> 01:50.930 is of sufficient size 01:50.930 --> 01:54.180 and invests in key capabilities we need in Europe. 01:54.180 --> 01:56.390 Areas like long range fires, 01:56.390 --> 01:59.580 cruise missile defense, anti-submarine warfare, 01:59.580 --> 02:01.950 and the supporting infrastructure. 02:01.950 --> 02:03.217 I was in Munich two weeks ago. 02:03.217 --> 02:05.970 And it was clear that we can't be successful 02:05.970 --> 02:09.350 in the strategic competition with Russia 02:09.350 --> 02:12.600 without a strong, unified NATO alliance. 02:12.600 --> 02:15.423 America is safer and stronger because of our NATO alliance. 02:15.423 --> 02:16.980 And, General Scaparrotti, 02:16.980 --> 02:20.660 I look forward to your thoughts along these issues. 02:20.660 --> 02:25.060 General Lyons, you have had a long history with TransCom 02:25.060 --> 02:29.060 serving as its deputy commander for two years 02:29.060 --> 02:30.750 before assuming your current role. 02:30.750 --> 02:32.760 I look forward to hearing your assessment 02:32.760 --> 02:35.700 of the services and the resources that you have there. 02:35.700 --> 02:39.170 'Cause I know that there's some discussion, even, 02:39.170 --> 02:41.660 of some privatization in that area. 02:41.660 --> 02:45.590 So, we'll be anxious to hear your statements. 02:45.590 --> 02:47.060 Before I turn to Senator Reed, 02:47.060 --> 02:49.350 I'd like to remind all of our members that 02:49.350 --> 02:52.590 we will have a classified, closed briefing, 02:52.590 --> 02:56.983 informal briefing, at 2:30 in the visitor's center 02:56.983 --> 02:59.240 with both of our witnesses. 02:59.240 --> 03:00.710 Senator Reed. 03:00.710 --> 03:02.020 - Thank you very much, mister chairman. 03:02.020 --> 03:04.240 Let me join you in welcome our witnesses this morning. 03:04.240 --> 03:06.370 General Scaparrotti is returning to testify 03:06.370 --> 03:08.080 before the committee for the third time 03:08.080 --> 03:11.260 on the US military posture in programs in Europe. 03:11.260 --> 03:13.557 He's dual hat as commander of US European Command 03:13.557 --> 03:16.910 and NATO supreme allied commander, the SACEur. 03:16.910 --> 03:18.150 Welcome, General Scaparrotti. 03:18.150 --> 03:19.520 General Lyons, I want to welcome you 03:19.520 --> 03:22.340 to your first posture hearing before this committee. 03:22.340 --> 03:23.900 Let me thank both of you for 03:23.900 --> 03:26.630 your many decades of military service. 03:26.630 --> 03:28.980 And please extend our appreciation 03:28.980 --> 03:31.570 to the dedicated men and women serving under your command. 03:31.570 --> 03:33.560 Thank them very much for us. 03:33.560 --> 03:34.610 Over the last several years, 03:34.610 --> 03:37.420 the security challenges in the US European Command 03:37.420 --> 03:39.660 have grown increasingly complex. 03:39.660 --> 03:42.260 Russia has reemerged as an aggressive opponent 03:42.260 --> 03:44.440 of the rules-based international order. 03:44.440 --> 03:45.920 Which Russia views as a counter 03:45.920 --> 03:49.670 to its strategic interests in reclaiming great power status. 03:49.670 --> 03:52.320 The National Defense Strategy issued last year 03:52.320 --> 03:53.853 highlights the need to counter 03:53.853 --> 03:57.030 Russia with incredible military deterrent 03:57.030 --> 03:59.230 that demonstrates that any military aggression 03:59.230 --> 04:01.886 against the sovereignty and integrity of NATO members 04:01.886 --> 04:05.260 or threat of such aggression will not succeed. 04:05.260 --> 04:07.770 General Scaparrotti, I'm interested in your assessment 04:07.770 --> 04:10.090 of the progress of our force posture in Europe 04:10.090 --> 04:12.650 in meeting NDS requirements. 04:12.650 --> 04:14.257 In addition to its military modernization 04:14.257 --> 04:16.300 and aggressive military posturing, 04:16.300 --> 04:19.230 Russia is conducting a campaign of hybrid warfare 04:19.230 --> 04:21.360 below the level of military conflict 04:21.360 --> 04:23.450 using all tools of national power 04:23.450 --> 04:25.660 to advance its strategic interest. 04:25.660 --> 04:27.900 Our democracy was attacked in 2016 04:27.900 --> 04:30.920 and we have been persistently under attack ever since. 04:30.920 --> 04:33.820 Including during last year's midterm elections. 04:33.820 --> 04:36.000 I would be interested in hearing from General Scaparrotti 04:36.000 --> 04:38.870 whether EuCom is getting the cyber resources 04:38.870 --> 04:40.430 and personnel it needs 04:40.430 --> 04:42.650 and whether we are investing in the right 04:42.650 --> 04:45.060 nonmilitary tools of national power 04:45.060 --> 04:47.303 to counter this hybrid warfare. 04:47.303 --> 04:49.730 An additional challenge is the unprecedented strain 04:49.730 --> 04:52.100 on alliance cohesion within NATO. 04:52.100 --> 04:53.490 Former Secretary of Defense Mattis 04:53.490 --> 04:55.100 stressed that the United States' strength 04:55.100 --> 04:58.250 is inextricably linked to our system 04:58.250 --> 05:00.050 of alliance and partnerships. 05:00.050 --> 05:02.350 Yet a recent report from the Harvard Belfer Center 05:02.350 --> 05:05.410 by Ambassador Doug Lute and Ambassador Nicholas Burns 05:05.410 --> 05:07.230 describes a crisis within NATO 05:07.230 --> 05:08.620 which they attribute in large part 05:08.620 --> 05:11.230 to the absence of strong US leadership. 05:11.230 --> 05:12.960 The Senate and Congress as a whole 05:12.960 --> 05:14.240 have repeatedly gone on record 05:14.240 --> 05:16.590 to reaffirm our strong commitment to NATO 05:16.590 --> 05:18.130 and the transatlantic relationship 05:18.130 --> 05:21.470 as a core element of US national security. 05:21.470 --> 05:25.130 There should be no doubt among our allies or our adversaries 05:25.130 --> 05:26.730 regarding the United States' resolve 05:26.730 --> 05:30.370 to meet its NATO commitments to collective defense. 05:30.370 --> 05:33.260 Turning to TransCom, the men and women of TransCom 05:33.260 --> 05:34.460 perform duties that sustain 05:34.460 --> 05:36.070 the whole Department of Defense effort 05:36.070 --> 05:38.310 in protecting our nation's security. 05:38.310 --> 05:40.000 With the competitive edge in its ability 05:40.000 --> 05:42.490 to deploy and sustain America's armed forces, 05:42.490 --> 05:45.690 TransCom provides DoD with unique capabilities 05:45.690 --> 05:47.040 that we have come to expect 05:47.040 --> 05:50.420 and, perhaps too frequently, take for granted. 05:50.420 --> 05:52.210 TransCom forces are busy supporting 05:52.210 --> 05:54.310 all of the combatant commanders every day. 05:54.310 --> 05:55.670 And, without them, the United States 05:55.670 --> 05:57.770 would be at a significant disadvantage 05:57.770 --> 05:59.760 almost everywhere in the world. 05:59.760 --> 06:02.060 The Ready Reserve Force, or RRF, 06:02.060 --> 06:04.270 is a group of cargo ships held in readiness 06:04.270 --> 06:06.070 by the Maritime Administration. 06:06.070 --> 06:08.280 But it is aging and will need to be modernized 06:08.280 --> 06:09.930 over the next decade. 06:09.930 --> 06:11.710 Two years ago, the committee authorized 06:11.710 --> 06:13.170 the department to start a program 06:13.170 --> 06:15.490 to recapitalize the Ready Reserve Force 06:15.490 --> 06:17.310 by authorizing DoD to purchase 06:17.310 --> 06:19.370 up to two foreign-built vessels 06:19.370 --> 06:22.050 while the Navy designed a family of auxiliary vessels 06:22.050 --> 06:23.370 for a number of uses. 06:23.370 --> 06:26.850 Including recapitalizing the Ready Reserve Force. 06:26.850 --> 06:29.290 Then, last year, Congress authorized the department 06:29.290 --> 06:31.790 to buy five more foreign-built vessels 06:31.790 --> 06:33.280 as soon as the department put forward 06:33.280 --> 06:34.900 a funded plan to build new ships 06:34.900 --> 06:37.240 for the RRF in US shipyards. 06:37.240 --> 06:39.550 General Lyons, I'm interested in the status 06:39.550 --> 06:44.550 and the next steps for RRF recapitalization in FY2020. 06:44.620 --> 06:46.450 The Defense Department also needs to ensure 06:46.450 --> 06:50.180 that the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, or CRAF Program, 06:50.180 --> 06:53.390 which provides as much as 40% of wartime airlift needs, 06:53.390 --> 06:57.040 remains viable after operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 06:57.040 --> 06:58.510 and will be able to provide 06:58.510 --> 07:00.620 needed surge capacity in the future. 07:00.620 --> 07:03.020 General Lyons, I'm interested in your view 07:03.020 --> 07:04.220 on the state of this fleet 07:04.220 --> 07:05.430 and if anything needs to be done 07:05.430 --> 07:08.550 to ensure these capabilities and their readiness. 07:08.550 --> 07:10.480 Our global transportation capability, 07:10.480 --> 07:12.420 owned and managed by TransCom, 07:12.420 --> 07:17.040 is one of our asymmetric advantages for many years now. 07:17.040 --> 07:18.260 However, we cannot assume that 07:18.260 --> 07:20.800 potential adversaries will allow us free reign 07:20.800 --> 07:22.440 in this area in the future. 07:22.440 --> 07:24.770 Last year, General McDew told the committee that 07:24.770 --> 07:27.320 TransCom has been conducting analyses 07:27.320 --> 07:29.620 to assess requirements for an environment 07:29.620 --> 07:31.970 where our mobility forces will be challenges. 07:31.970 --> 07:33.280 And his assessment was that 07:33.280 --> 07:35.970 additional investment in lift would be needed. 07:35.970 --> 07:37.650 However, when we received the report, 07:37.650 --> 07:40.130 that analysis and mobility requirement study, 07:40.130 --> 07:41.370 earlier this year, 07:41.370 --> 07:43.120 the study's conclusions differed 07:43.120 --> 07:44.900 from General McDew's assessment. 07:44.900 --> 07:46.870 General Lyons, perhaps you could give us an update 07:46.870 --> 07:48.460 on why there was a change. 07:48.460 --> 07:51.710 Finally, TransCom also faces a unique set of cyber threats 07:51.710 --> 07:53.970 because of the command's extensive network 07:53.970 --> 07:55.310 with private sector entities 07:55.310 --> 07:57.470 in the transportation and shipping industries. 07:57.470 --> 08:00.030 General Lyons, I would like to get an update from you 08:00.030 --> 08:01.820 on progress in the cybersecurity efforts 08:01.820 --> 08:03.410 you have made since last year. 08:03.410 --> 08:04.940 Once again, let me thank the witnesses 08:04.940 --> 08:07.103 for their service and for their testimony. 08:07.103 --> 08:09.150 - Thank you, Senator Reed. 08:09.150 --> 08:10.740 You guys know the drill. 08:10.740 --> 08:12.990 First, you're gonna have five minutes. 08:12.990 --> 08:14.480 Try not to exceed five minutes. 08:14.480 --> 08:16.620 But your entire statement will be made part of the record. 08:16.620 --> 08:18.803 We'll start with you, General Scaparrotti. 08:20.790 --> 08:22.760 - Chairman Imhofe, Ranking Member Reed, 08:22.760 --> 08:25.130 distinguished members of the committee, 08:25.130 --> 08:27.040 good morning and thank you for the opportunity 08:27.040 --> 08:28.140 to appear before you today 08:28.140 --> 08:31.210 as the commander of the United States European Command. 08:31.210 --> 08:33.330 I'm honored to be here today, this morning, 08:33.330 --> 08:36.320 with General Steve Lyons, as well. 08:36.320 --> 08:38.060 First and foremost, I want to thank you 08:38.060 --> 08:39.933 for Congress's support of the service members, 08:39.933 --> 08:42.770 civilians, and families in Europe. 08:42.770 --> 08:45.720 These warriors demonstrate selfless service and dedication 08:45.720 --> 08:47.580 to Euro-Atlantic defense. 08:47.580 --> 08:50.060 A mission that is essential to our national security 08:50.060 --> 08:53.230 and to maintaining global peace and prosperity. 08:53.230 --> 08:54.520 We, as a nation, are blessed 08:54.520 --> 08:56.893 by their voluntary and exceptional service. 08:57.880 --> 09:00.380 Thank you again for your steadfast support 09:00.380 --> 09:02.503 of these patriots and their mission. 09:03.520 --> 09:05.077 The threats facing US interests 09:05.077 --> 09:07.260 in the EuCom area of responsibility, 09:07.260 --> 09:10.770 which includes Israel, are real and growing. 09:10.770 --> 09:12.870 They are complex, trans-regional, 09:12.870 --> 09:15.119 all domain, and multifunctional. 09:15.119 --> 09:17.850 This remains one of the most dynamic periods 09:17.850 --> 09:20.260 in recent history in my view. 09:20.260 --> 09:22.200 Russia has continued its reemergence 09:22.200 --> 09:23.650 as a strategic competitor 09:23.650 --> 09:25.170 and remains the primary threat 09:25.170 --> 09:28.570 to a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment. 09:28.570 --> 09:29.718 While the United States maintains 09:29.718 --> 09:32.840 a global military superiority over Russia, 09:32.840 --> 09:34.510 evolving Russian capabilities 09:34.510 --> 09:37.570 threaten to erode our competitive military advantage, 09:37.570 --> 09:41.390 challenge our ability to operate uncontested in all domains, 09:41.390 --> 09:44.790 and diminish our ability to deter Russian aggression. 09:44.790 --> 09:46.360 In light of Russia's modernizing, 09:46.360 --> 09:48.440 increasingly aggressive force posture, 09:48.440 --> 09:50.150 EuCom recommends augmenting 09:50.150 --> 09:52.000 our assigned interventional forces 09:52.000 --> 09:53.710 to enhance our deterrence posture. 09:53.710 --> 09:57.270 EuCom also recommends further investments 09:57.270 --> 09:59.847 that enhance European logistical structure 09:59.847 --> 10:02.480 and capacity to support rapid deployment 10:02.480 --> 10:04.803 and multi-domain US forces in Europe. 10:05.940 --> 10:07.550 In addition to the threat from Russia, 10:07.550 --> 10:10.170 the risk of terrorism in Europe remains high. 10:10.170 --> 10:11.970 Despite a decline in fatalities 10:11.970 --> 10:14.520 from terrorist attacks in 2018. 10:14.520 --> 10:17.050 Violent extremists present a clear and present threat 10:17.050 --> 10:20.040 to Europe's people and their infrastructure. 10:20.040 --> 10:21.890 Thankfully, the United States is not alone 10:21.890 --> 10:23.520 in facing these other challenges 10:23.520 --> 10:25.570 across the Euro-Atlantic theater. 10:25.570 --> 10:27.760 As our National Defense Strategy states, 10:27.760 --> 10:30.800 the NATO alliance deters Russian adventurism, 10:30.800 --> 10:32.910 contributes to the defeat of terrorism, 10:32.910 --> 10:36.430 and addresses instability along NATO's periphery. 10:36.430 --> 10:38.530 Our allies and partners play a vital role 10:38.530 --> 10:39.874 in our collective security 10:39.874 --> 10:42.200 and they have made significant progress 10:42.200 --> 10:45.650 in increasing cash contributions and capabilities 10:45.650 --> 10:47.950 that provide our common defense. 10:47.950 --> 10:50.010 For almost 70 years, NATO has been 10:50.010 --> 10:52.830 the cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic security. 10:52.830 --> 10:56.800 As NATO adapts to remain relevant and fit for purpose, 10:56.800 --> 10:58.550 we will find, as we always have, 10:58.550 --> 11:01.653 that every challenge is best addressed as an alliance. 11:02.700 --> 11:05.940 Let me close by, again, thanking Congress and this committee 11:05.940 --> 11:07.290 for your continued support. 11:07.290 --> 11:08.977 Especially the sustained funding 11:08.977 --> 11:11.473 of the European Deterrence Initiative, EDI. 11:12.486 --> 11:14.620 EuCom's future success in implementing 11:14.620 --> 11:17.660 our National Defense Strategy and fulfilling our mission 11:17.660 --> 11:20.360 is only possible with Congress's support. 11:20.360 --> 11:21.193 Thank you. 11:21.193 --> 11:22.902 And I look forward to your questions, chairman. 11:22.902 --> 11:24.420 - [Jim] Thank you, General Scaparrotti. 11:24.420 --> 11:25.583 General Lyons. 11:26.612 --> 11:29.420 - Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, 11:29.420 --> 11:30.543 distinguished members, 11:33.400 --> 11:36.360 it is an honor to testify before you today 11:36.360 --> 11:38.070 and represent the men and women 11:38.070 --> 11:40.270 of the United States Transportation Command. 11:41.530 --> 11:43.660 I'm pleased to join General Scaparrotti. 11:43.660 --> 11:46.150 He's one of several, but very important, 11:46.150 --> 11:47.840 supported commands to 11:47.840 --> 11:50.360 the United States Transportation Command. 11:50.360 --> 11:52.400 And his more than 40 years of exceptional leadership 11:52.400 --> 11:54.963 remains a stellar example for all of us. 11:56.140 --> 11:58.650 I could not be more proud of 11:58.650 --> 12:01.660 the more than 120,000 soldiers, 12:01.660 --> 12:03.910 sailors, airmen, Marines, and coastguardsmen 12:04.800 --> 12:06.470 and civil servants that are assigned 12:06.470 --> 12:09.225 to the United States Transportation Command. 12:09.225 --> 12:13.623 They project and sustain the joint force every day. 12:15.090 --> 12:18.740 The department's global deployment networks, 12:18.740 --> 12:23.733 transportation capacity in air, on land, and over the sea, 12:25.022 --> 12:27.210 and our global command and control capabilities 12:27.210 --> 12:31.310 combine to provide the United States 12:31.310 --> 12:33.160 with a strategic competitive advantage 12:33.160 --> 12:34.893 unmatched around the world. 12:36.130 --> 12:37.503 Somewhere on the globe, 12:38.350 --> 12:41.603 a TransCom aircraft is touching down every three minutes. 12:42.668 --> 12:44.702 TransCom ships are underway. 12:44.702 --> 12:47.713 Aerial refueling missions are orbiting overhead. 12:48.610 --> 12:50.870 And planes converted to intensive care units 12:50.870 --> 12:54.153 are moving our nation's ill and injured. 12:56.490 --> 12:57.760 I should remind everybody, though, 12:57.760 --> 13:01.280 that the key to our success is global access. 13:01.280 --> 13:02.750 And I would like to highlight that 13:02.750 --> 13:04.570 our allies and like-minded partners 13:04.570 --> 13:08.320 that provide access to key regions, 13:08.320 --> 13:13.260 support substantial basing, and reinforce DoD's global reach 13:13.260 --> 13:14.763 are critical to our mission. 13:16.550 --> 13:19.233 We know we must never take our success for granted. 13:20.080 --> 13:23.290 For decades, we could generally deploy our forces 13:23.290 --> 13:26.950 when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, 13:26.950 --> 13:28.523 and operate how we wanted. 13:29.670 --> 13:32.350 With the rise of great power competition, 13:32.350 --> 13:35.383 we no longer assume that we can operate with impunity. 13:37.110 --> 13:39.250 Before closing, I'd like to acknowledge 13:39.250 --> 13:41.200 the letters that are received 13:41.200 --> 13:43.820 from more than a dozen members of Congress 13:43.820 --> 13:46.565 concerning the Defense Personal Property Program 13:46.565 --> 13:48.640 which relocates the household goods 13:48.640 --> 13:51.943 for our service members, civilians, and their families. 13:53.130 --> 13:55.853 Simply put, I agree. 13:56.700 --> 13:59.262 We lack the capacity during peak season 13:59.262 --> 14:02.883 and we lack measures to hold industry accountable. 14:04.320 --> 14:07.170 Our most important resource is our people 14:07.170 --> 14:08.383 and we owe them better. 14:09.500 --> 14:11.800 So, in consultation with the service secretaries 14:11.800 --> 14:13.650 and the service chiefs 14:13.650 --> 14:16.000 and on behalf of the department, 14:16.000 --> 14:17.510 TransCom is leading an initiative 14:17.510 --> 14:19.764 to restructure our relationship with industry 14:19.764 --> 14:22.240 in an effort to improve 14:22.240 --> 14:25.493 quality, capacity, and accountability. 14:26.583 --> 14:31.080 In closing, I'm proud to support DoD's enduring mission 14:31.080 --> 14:34.080 of providing a combat-credible military force 14:34.080 --> 14:38.240 to deter war and protect the security of our nation. 14:38.240 --> 14:39.360 Our nation relies on 14:39.360 --> 14:41.630 the United States Transportation Command 14:41.630 --> 14:44.973 to respond with immediate force on such short notice 14:44.973 --> 14:46.640 and seamlessly transition to 14:46.640 --> 14:50.140 project a decisive force when needed. 14:50.140 --> 14:51.470 I'm fully committed to retaining 14:51.470 --> 14:53.463 this strategic competitive advantage. 14:54.320 --> 14:56.330 Thank you for your support to the department 14:56.330 --> 14:57.170 and your support to 14:57.170 --> 14:59.660 the United States Transportation Command. 14:59.660 --> 15:00.493 - [Jim] Thank you, general. 15:00.493 --> 15:01.410 - I look forward to your questions. 15:01.410 --> 15:02.689 - Thank you, General Lyons. 15:02.689 --> 15:05.430 Senator Reed brought up in his opening statement 15:05.430 --> 15:07.373 the question as to whether or not, 15:08.620 --> 15:12.820 General Scaparrotti, that we have the right posture 15:12.820 --> 15:15.194 and capabilities in EuCom to handle 15:15.194 --> 15:16.670 the credible deterrence 15:16.670 --> 15:19.168 against Russian aggression in Europe. 15:19.168 --> 15:21.023 What's your feeling about that? 15:22.920 --> 15:24.490 - Chairman, thank you. 15:24.490 --> 15:27.915 We've clearly made progress in European Command 15:27.915 --> 15:31.010 thanks to the support of Congress. 15:31.010 --> 15:34.260 We've added forces and capabilities. 15:34.260 --> 15:36.420 We've improved the readiness. 15:36.420 --> 15:39.070 But I would tell you, in response to your question, 15:39.070 --> 15:40.700 that I'm not comfortable yet 15:40.700 --> 15:42.840 with the deterrent posture that we have in Europe 15:42.840 --> 15:45.250 in support of the National Defense Strategy. 15:45.250 --> 15:47.500 - Where are the shortfalls, as you see them? 15:47.500 --> 15:51.850 - Sir, I have shortfalls in our land component 15:53.250 --> 15:56.640 and the depth of forces there. 15:56.640 --> 15:57.987 I'd like to get into more detail on that 15:57.987 --> 15:59.970 in the closed hearing. 15:59.970 --> 16:02.840 And in our maritime component, as well. 16:02.840 --> 16:04.140 Both of those, in particular, 16:04.140 --> 16:07.580 when you look at both the building capability 16:07.580 --> 16:10.020 and the modernization of the Russian forces 16:10.020 --> 16:11.940 that we face there. 16:11.940 --> 16:14.520 And then, finally, of concern is 16:14.520 --> 16:17.653 my intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capacity. 16:18.670 --> 16:22.810 Given that increasing and growing threat of Russia. 16:22.810 --> 16:25.120 I need more ISR. 16:25.120 --> 16:27.612 And, again, in a closed hearing, I can go into detail. 16:27.612 --> 16:31.270 - Okay, you'll have that opportunity at 2:30 today. 16:31.270 --> 16:36.250 General Scaparrotti, we keep hearing from sources 16:37.427 --> 16:42.427 that maybe we have some redundancy in our nuclear program. 16:42.560 --> 16:45.400 Now, we've been guilty, I think, for a long period of time 16:45.400 --> 16:48.750 in not addressing our nuclear modernization. 16:48.750 --> 16:50.890 We now are faced with a situation. 16:50.890 --> 16:53.113 We have both Russia and China with 16:53.113 --> 16:55.742 what we call a triad system. 16:55.742 --> 16:59.920 And I think that people with your background 16:59.920 --> 17:03.740 need to respond as to why a triad system 17:03.740 --> 17:06.253 is not redundant and is necessary. 17:07.670 --> 17:09.040 - Well, sir, first of all, 17:09.040 --> 17:13.854 our strategic nuclear force is critical 17:13.854 --> 17:16.383 to our deterrents and our security. 17:17.260 --> 17:21.220 And a triad as a part of that force is important, as well. 17:21.220 --> 17:22.150 The triad gives. 17:22.150 --> 17:24.010 Each one of those legs of the component 17:24.010 --> 17:27.370 give us specific qualities that are somewhat different. 17:27.370 --> 17:29.360 And we need those different qualities 17:29.360 --> 17:32.770 just for a safeguard within the components itself. 17:32.770 --> 17:36.150 But also to make it complex for our adversaries 17:36.150 --> 17:38.270 to determine or believe that they have 17:38.270 --> 17:43.190 the opportunity to strike and gain dominance. 17:43.190 --> 17:45.660 And I think, with a triad, I'm certain that they can't. 17:45.660 --> 17:48.470 I would note that they also have a triad, as well. 17:48.470 --> 17:50.420 - Yeah, and it needs to be repeated. 17:50.420 --> 17:53.893 'Cause the suggestions keep coming on. 17:55.180 --> 18:00.180 In Ukraine, Russia's now in their sixth year at war there. 18:00.520 --> 18:04.430 We've talked about and we've actually had language 18:04.430 --> 18:06.540 in our defense authorization bills 18:06.540 --> 18:09.330 to send lethal help to Ukraine. 18:09.330 --> 18:13.360 And, to my knowledge, there's only been one case 18:13.360 --> 18:17.360 where we actually were using lethal assistance. 18:17.360 --> 18:18.627 That was in the Javelin. 18:18.627 --> 18:21.480 Can you tell us why we have not 18:21.480 --> 18:23.470 been able to successfully do that 18:23.470 --> 18:25.203 since the authorization is there? 18:27.770 --> 18:30.970 - Senator, I think, is it works as 18:31.900 --> 18:33.550 recommendations for the Ukraine, 18:33.550 --> 18:35.490 particularly in the lethal side, work its way, 18:35.490 --> 18:37.730 it has to go through the policy deliberations 18:37.730 --> 18:41.270 that provide authority to 18:41.270 --> 18:43.120 deploy those kinds of weapon systems. 18:43.120 --> 18:46.540 And, as you stated, we got the authority with Javelin. 18:46.540 --> 18:50.560 The Ukrainians, in my view, have trained very well 18:50.560 --> 18:51.620 for the use of that. 18:51.620 --> 18:52.547 They've been responsible in 18:52.547 --> 18:54.960 the security and deployment of it. 18:54.960 --> 18:56.350 And we watch that closely. 18:56.350 --> 18:57.770 So, they've handled that well. 18:57.770 --> 19:00.070 There are other systems. 19:00.070 --> 19:02.790 Sniper systems, ammunition. 19:02.790 --> 19:05.640 And, perhaps, looking at the Kerch Straits, 19:05.640 --> 19:09.630 perhaps consideration for naval systems, as well, 19:09.630 --> 19:12.120 here in the future as we move forward. 19:12.120 --> 19:14.330 - We have an authorization bill coming up. 19:14.330 --> 19:15.350 Is this something you think 19:15.350 --> 19:17.333 we might need some more language on? 19:19.550 --> 19:22.980 - Well, as you will see, I'll have recommendations for that. 19:22.980 --> 19:26.310 And I would like consideration of those recommendations. 19:26.310 --> 19:27.903 - Okay, I appreciate that. 19:29.770 --> 19:33.140 General Lyons, I know there's a problem 19:33.140 --> 19:38.140 in trying to get all the service materials 19:39.400 --> 19:41.380 transported out where they are needed. 19:41.380 --> 19:44.060 And, recently, there's been some suggestion that 19:44.060 --> 19:48.320 maybe some of that should be contracted out. 19:48.320 --> 19:50.360 Now, we have gone through some problems 19:50.360 --> 19:53.510 with the housing program recently when contracting out. 19:53.510 --> 19:54.894 Do you have any comments to make about that 19:54.894 --> 19:58.395 as being one of the solutions to the problem that we face? 19:58.395 --> 20:00.263 Getting this material out. 20:01.890 --> 20:03.530 - Chairman, if you're referring to 20:03.530 --> 20:05.590 the Joint Deployment Enterprise, 20:05.590 --> 20:09.090 we're inextricably linked to industry on multiple levels. 20:09.090 --> 20:10.260 If we're referring specifically 20:10.260 --> 20:12.660 about the Household Good Program. 20:12.660 --> 20:14.690 I think that's what you're referring to, sir. 20:14.690 --> 20:15.950 - That's what I'm referring to. 20:15.950 --> 20:18.603 And that's where the suggestion has come out. 20:18.603 --> 20:19.840 - Yes, sir. 20:19.840 --> 20:23.997 What I would say on that is that's 100% commercial industry. 20:23.997 --> 20:26.450 It's not an effort to privatize whatsoever. 20:26.450 --> 20:27.920 But it is an effort to restructure 20:27.920 --> 20:30.320 our relationship with industry in a way that 20:30.320 --> 20:33.329 delivers higher quality, capacity, 20:33.329 --> 20:35.890 and holds carriers and the government accountable. 20:35.890 --> 20:36.961 - Good. 20:36.961 --> 20:38.420 Senator Reed. 20:38.420 --> 20:40.230 - Thank you very much, mister chairman. 20:40.230 --> 20:43.720 Again, gentlemen, thank you for your service this morning. 20:43.720 --> 20:45.100 Last March, General Scaparrotti, 20:45.100 --> 20:46.897 you testified before the committee, 20:46.897 --> 20:49.440 "I don't believe there is an effective unification 20:49.440 --> 20:50.910 across the interagency, 20:50.910 --> 20:53.660 with the energy and the focus that we can attain." 20:53.660 --> 20:55.283 Is that still your view? 20:56.710 --> 20:57.580 - Yes, senator. 20:57.580 --> 20:58.413 It's still my view. 20:58.413 --> 20:59.630 We've improved. 20:59.630 --> 21:01.853 And Congress, as you know, has committed funding 21:01.853 --> 21:04.150 to some of the entities in the interagency 21:04.150 --> 21:05.060 to help us with this. 21:05.060 --> 21:06.620 But it's still my view. 21:06.620 --> 21:08.350 - And we. 21:08.350 --> 21:10.880 I presume, based on your response, 21:10.880 --> 21:13.350 we need a synchronized campaign 21:13.350 --> 21:16.980 prosecuted in a unified manner across the interagency, 21:16.980 --> 21:19.728 which is multiple institutions, 21:19.728 --> 21:22.141 to counter Russian hybrid warfare 21:22.141 --> 21:24.390 and to deter anything greater than that. 21:24.390 --> 21:25.520 Is that accurate? 21:25.520 --> 21:26.380 - That's correct, senator. 21:26.380 --> 21:28.680 We need a whole of government approach to this. 21:28.680 --> 21:30.828 - Where are the gaps right now? 21:30.828 --> 21:35.440 Where are we not making the investments, in your view? 21:35.440 --> 21:37.020 - Well, I think, actually, 21:37.020 --> 21:42.000 we need to probably get greater focus and energy into it. 21:42.000 --> 21:44.120 Actually, a strategy. 21:44.120 --> 21:47.330 Multifaceted strategy to counter Russia. 21:47.330 --> 21:51.470 As you know, General Gerasimov just made another speech 21:51.470 --> 21:56.450 that underscored their view of indirect activity, 21:56.450 --> 21:59.360 the use of whole of government activities, 21:59.360 --> 22:01.960 as part of their spectrum of warfare. 22:01.960 --> 22:05.591 We have to approach this in a way that we can counter that. 22:05.591 --> 22:10.240 And I think, specifically, within information operations, 22:10.240 --> 22:12.070 challenging their disinformation 22:12.070 --> 22:15.340 in cyber areas that we need to continue to press. 22:15.340 --> 22:17.974 - And that would presumably require 22:17.974 --> 22:20.173 State Department activity. 22:21.460 --> 22:24.720 Again, I'm old enough to recall the Voice of America, 22:24.720 --> 22:28.760 which is something that was very pronounced 22:28.760 --> 22:30.363 in the '50s and the '60s. 22:31.200 --> 22:34.590 Those types of very proactive information campaigns. 22:34.590 --> 22:37.070 They're not being conducted at this point, are they? 22:37.070 --> 22:39.520 - Not in the way that you recall and I recall. 22:39.520 --> 22:41.883 And I think we have the talent to pursue. 22:42.800 --> 22:45.290 Particularly when it goes to underscoring our values, 22:45.290 --> 22:46.713 which I think is important. 22:47.760 --> 22:50.310 - And all of this is designed, obviously, 22:50.310 --> 22:55.310 to deter and to disrupt Putin's plans or aspirations. 22:55.690 --> 22:58.870 And, without it, he has more of an open field. 22:58.870 --> 23:00.220 Is that correct? 23:00.220 --> 23:02.510 - Well, they have a good deal of agility. 23:02.510 --> 23:04.910 And they seem to have no constraints 23:04.910 --> 23:08.630 on what they're willing to say publicly. 23:08.630 --> 23:09.670 - Thank you. 23:09.670 --> 23:12.267 General Lyons, thank you for mentioning in your comments 23:12.267 --> 23:15.276 the Defense Personal Property Program, the DP3. 23:15.276 --> 23:18.400 As the chairman indicated, we're receiving some comments. 23:18.400 --> 23:20.340 And I'm gonna follow up with 23:20.340 --> 23:22.450 some specific questions for the record. 23:22.450 --> 23:24.550 'Cause I think this is an important issue. 23:25.600 --> 23:29.740 There is a proposal to move to a single mover manager. 23:29.740 --> 23:32.650 Again, this has some echoes 23:32.650 --> 23:34.330 of some of the discussions we're having currently 23:34.330 --> 23:36.980 about housing issues in the military. 23:36.980 --> 23:39.620 So, we want to be ahead of the game. 23:39.620 --> 23:42.830 So, we'll send those questions to you for your response. 23:42.830 --> 23:44.291 - Sure thing. 23:44.291 --> 23:47.020 - Even before you took charge of TransCom, 23:47.020 --> 23:50.496 the command was concerned about war planning. 23:50.496 --> 23:53.450 For many years, we assumed that we would be operating 23:53.450 --> 23:54.920 in a benign atmosphere. 23:54.920 --> 23:58.040 We could fly civilian aircraft in unprotected. 23:58.040 --> 23:59.900 We could move ships in unprotected. 23:59.900 --> 24:00.970 Et cetera. 24:00.970 --> 24:03.410 Last year, General McDew, your predecessor, 24:03.410 --> 24:07.670 hinted that, for example, the KC-46 tanker that we're buying 24:07.670 --> 24:09.430 might be too expensive to purchase 24:09.430 --> 24:12.030 because the number we would need 24:12.030 --> 24:15.536 in a challenge situation to replace 24:15.536 --> 24:18.030 and to overmatch the adversary 24:18.030 --> 24:21.600 would be significantly more than projected. 24:21.600 --> 24:24.030 As a result, we asked TransCom to produce 24:24.030 --> 24:26.170 a mobility requirement study. 24:26.170 --> 24:28.050 And the report essentially came back and said 24:28.050 --> 24:29.020 there's no problem with 24:29.020 --> 24:31.090 our ability to support contingencies. 24:31.090 --> 24:32.750 We've got the right mix. 24:32.750 --> 24:37.750 It essentially was disconnected 24:38.210 --> 24:39.360 with the comments that I heard. 24:39.360 --> 24:40.740 At least to my perception. 24:40.740 --> 24:42.840 With what General McDew was talking about. 24:44.290 --> 24:45.493 What's changed? 24:46.640 --> 24:48.780 We all make the. 24:48.780 --> 24:50.690 We all recognize this is gonna be 24:50.690 --> 24:53.500 a much more hostile environment to move equipment in. 24:53.500 --> 24:57.460 And we don't seem to be responding in an appropriate way. 24:57.460 --> 24:59.130 Your comments, sir. 24:59.130 --> 25:00.466 - Sir, thanks for the question. 25:00.466 --> 25:01.980 I think you're referring to 25:01.980 --> 25:03.830 the Mobility Capabilities Requirement Study 25:03.830 --> 25:07.930 that the NDA directed in '18. 25:07.930 --> 25:09.820 And that study was directed 25:09.820 --> 25:11.410 between the department and TransCom 25:11.410 --> 25:13.190 to look at for sizing and sufficiency 25:13.190 --> 25:16.280 of the mobility force against the program 25:16.280 --> 25:18.794 essentially out to 2023. 25:18.794 --> 25:20.040 We did that. 25:20.040 --> 25:21.975 And we did that based on the demand signal 25:21.975 --> 25:26.190 from the existing plans that exist on the books today. 25:26.190 --> 25:27.760 But I would acknowledge to you today that 25:27.760 --> 25:30.470 I think General McDew was alluding to this. 25:30.470 --> 25:32.470 As we emerge our defense planning scenarios 25:32.470 --> 25:34.320 to be more reflective of the defense strategy 25:34.320 --> 25:37.920 as we emerge and develop globally integrated plans 25:37.920 --> 25:40.700 which are happening right now in the joint staff, 25:40.700 --> 25:41.991 we do see the potential for 25:41.991 --> 25:44.150 an increased mobility requirement. 25:44.150 --> 25:46.700 Particularly in the area of aerial refuel, 25:46.700 --> 25:49.520 which is the lifeblood of the joint force. 25:49.520 --> 25:50.823 - So that we are. 25:52.550 --> 25:56.330 What you sent up to us has been overtaken by events? 25:56.330 --> 25:57.163 More or less. 25:59.060 --> 26:03.760 - Sir, I would say we still have work to do on the plans 26:03.760 --> 26:04.930 of which it's based. 26:04.930 --> 26:08.180 So, the demand signal is emerging right in front of us. 26:08.180 --> 26:11.390 We'll adapt the study to the plans as they evolve. 26:11.390 --> 26:12.630 Yes, sir. 26:12.630 --> 26:13.663 - [Jack] Thank you. 26:13.663 --> 26:14.496 Thank you, mister chairman. 26:14.496 --> 26:15.329 - Thank you, Senator Reed. 26:15.329 --> 26:16.162 Senator Wicker. 26:16.162 --> 26:17.230 - Thank you, mister chairman, 26:17.230 --> 26:19.160 General Scaparrotti, and General Lyons. 26:19.160 --> 26:22.070 Thank you very much for your work. 26:22.070 --> 26:24.605 And I think it's clear that we have great leadership 26:24.605 --> 26:28.080 in your area of responsibility. 26:28.080 --> 26:32.510 General Scaparrotti, about three weeks ago, 26:32.510 --> 26:36.800 this Congress sent five delegations, House and Senate, 26:36.800 --> 26:39.501 to the Munich Security Conference. 26:39.501 --> 26:42.900 That show of force was followed 26:42.900 --> 26:47.350 by a delegation going to the NATO parliamentary assembly 26:47.350 --> 26:50.530 and another delegation going on a week later 26:50.530 --> 26:53.200 to the OSCE parliamentary assembly. 26:53.200 --> 26:58.200 Does that volume of participation 26:59.730 --> 27:02.920 by House and Senate members send a positive statement? 27:02.920 --> 27:06.922 Is it helpful to you in dealing with your friends in Europe? 27:06.922 --> 27:08.183 With our friends in Europe? 27:09.330 --> 27:10.320 - Yes, sir. 27:10.320 --> 27:11.430 It's very helpful. 27:11.430 --> 27:13.840 And it's helpful to us, as a nation. 27:13.840 --> 27:15.220 You know, at Munich, 27:15.220 --> 27:17.550 that was the largest congressional delegation 27:17.550 --> 27:18.560 they've ever had there. 27:18.560 --> 27:19.970 That was noted by everyone. 27:19.970 --> 27:21.890 That, in and of itself, is a strong message 27:21.890 --> 27:24.210 of commitment to our allies in Europe. 27:24.210 --> 27:26.300 And then I would tell you the congressional delegations 27:26.300 --> 27:29.490 that traveled during the year to different spots 27:29.490 --> 27:33.310 within European command have a very positive influence. 27:33.310 --> 27:36.440 Again, another sign of commitment and actual discussion 27:36.440 --> 27:38.170 about the issues of the day. 27:38.170 --> 27:41.410 I routinely get feedback from the chiefs of defense, 27:41.410 --> 27:42.710 ministers of defense, and others 27:42.710 --> 27:44.650 when our congressional delegations visit. 27:44.650 --> 27:46.330 So, I know that it has an impact. 27:46.330 --> 27:49.530 - Okay, well, I guess we could have a debate 27:49.530 --> 27:51.180 about whether there's a crisis in NATO. 27:51.180 --> 27:52.013 I hope there isn't. 27:52.013 --> 27:56.460 But I do hope that the strong statement 27:56.460 --> 27:59.210 of wanting to be involved was heard. 27:59.210 --> 28:01.770 And I appreciate your comments in that regard. 28:01.770 --> 28:05.980 General Scaparrotti, you are recommending 28:05.980 --> 28:07.843 augmenting our forces in Europe. 28:09.726 --> 28:13.270 Specifically with regard to seapower. 28:13.270 --> 28:14.870 What are your suggestions? 28:14.870 --> 28:19.800 For example, there are four destroyers in Rota, Spain now. 28:19.800 --> 28:21.420 Do we need six? 28:21.420 --> 28:23.470 And what else needs to be done? 28:23.470 --> 28:28.274 What specifically can you tell us in an open hearing 28:28.274 --> 28:30.240 that would help with regard to 28:30.240 --> 28:32.573 our seapower aspect of helping you? 28:35.060 --> 28:36.410 - Well, as you know, 28:36.410 --> 28:38.490 specifically for the maritime component, 28:38.490 --> 28:40.620 what we're looking at is we're looking at 28:40.620 --> 28:43.743 an evolving and modernizing Russian fleet. 28:45.006 --> 28:47.110 And, in a closed hearing, I plan to go through 28:47.110 --> 28:49.200 just the changes I've seen in the three years 28:49.200 --> 28:50.950 that I've been in European Command. 28:51.843 --> 28:56.843 If we want to remain dominant in the maritime domain, 28:57.430 --> 29:00.440 and particularly undersea, which we are today, 29:00.440 --> 29:02.030 we've got to continue to modernize. 29:02.030 --> 29:04.010 And I think we need to build our capacity. 29:04.010 --> 29:05.760 So, specifically for destroyers, 29:05.760 --> 29:09.540 yes, I've asked for two more destroyers within EuCom. 29:09.540 --> 29:11.730 I'd like to go into a little more detail on that 29:11.730 --> 29:13.510 in the closed hearing rather than here. 29:13.510 --> 29:16.140 But, again, we do need greater capacity. 29:16.140 --> 29:18.240 Particularly given the modernization and growth 29:18.240 --> 29:20.560 of the fleets, the Russian fleets in Europe. 29:20.560 --> 29:23.028 - In addition to the two destroyers, 29:23.028 --> 29:27.180 can you tell us, publicly, what else you're asking for 29:27.180 --> 29:29.580 in terms of ships? 29:29.580 --> 29:33.080 - Well, this primarily has to do with capabilities 29:33.080 --> 29:37.957 that deal with the numbers of Russian ships 29:40.370 --> 29:43.380 that we see within our theater today. 29:43.380 --> 29:45.760 And also for antisubmarine warfare. 29:45.760 --> 29:46.593 And I'd like to go into 29:46.593 --> 29:48.550 the more detailed piece in a closed hearing. 29:48.550 --> 29:51.283 - Are we gonna need more ships or fewer ships? 29:52.660 --> 29:57.070 - Well, you know, that's a service question as to how they. 29:57.070 --> 29:58.390 - [Roger] In your area. 29:58.390 --> 29:59.690 - In my area, more. 29:59.690 --> 30:02.300 And I would like to see at least 30:02.300 --> 30:04.919 a rotation of naval component, 30:04.919 --> 30:07.830 carrier strike groups, amphibious strike groups, 30:07.830 --> 30:09.930 at a little better pace than I've seen 30:09.930 --> 30:11.940 in the three years that I've been in command. 30:11.940 --> 30:16.226 - General, at the Halifax Security Conference 30:16.226 --> 30:19.110 and at the Munich Security Conference, 30:19.110 --> 30:21.380 a number of us met individually 30:21.380 --> 30:24.263 with the defense minister from Turkey. 30:27.360 --> 30:31.622 At the military level, are we doing better with Turkey 30:31.622 --> 30:35.467 than it would appear on the front pages of the newspapers? 30:35.467 --> 30:38.160 What's the news out of Turkey recently 30:38.160 --> 30:40.330 and is there any good news? 30:40.330 --> 30:42.340 - Well, I would say, first of all, 30:42.340 --> 30:45.480 that we have a very strong mil to mil relationship 30:45.480 --> 30:47.163 with our counterparts in Turkey. 30:48.220 --> 30:50.570 I know very well their chief of defense 30:50.570 --> 30:51.640 and their minister of defense 30:51.640 --> 30:53.410 who was the chief prior to this. 30:53.410 --> 30:55.011 Prior to him becoming the minister. 30:55.011 --> 30:57.477 We do have some differences, as you know. 30:57.477 --> 30:58.860 And you can see in the paper. 30:58.860 --> 31:01.360 But we have very candid and frank conversations 31:01.360 --> 31:03.940 and we've been very successful at working through 31:04.820 --> 31:06.573 mutual interests to this point. 31:07.530 --> 31:09.130 Our mil to mil relationship, 31:09.130 --> 31:12.130 as it reflects in the deployment of our forces, 31:12.130 --> 31:15.880 in my view, has improved over the past year. 31:15.880 --> 31:18.360 And so, that's what I would hope that 31:18.360 --> 31:20.370 our work together will continue to do here 31:20.370 --> 31:22.590 as we look at the tough issues we've yet to face 31:22.590 --> 31:24.110 within European Command. 31:24.110 --> 31:26.230 - So, in terms of military to military, 31:26.230 --> 31:28.680 things are a little better than they were a year ago? 31:28.680 --> 31:29.513 - They are. 31:29.513 --> 31:30.346 They've improved. 31:30.346 --> 31:33.370 And I think we have a good, candid relationship. 31:33.370 --> 31:34.573 - [Roger] Thank you, sir. 31:36.701 --> 31:38.108 - Thank you, Senator Wicker. 31:38.108 --> 31:39.191 Senator King. 31:40.060 --> 31:41.317 - Thank you, mister chairman. 31:41.317 --> 31:43.240 First, General Lyons, I noted your concern 31:43.240 --> 31:45.900 about the movement of personal items 31:45.900 --> 31:47.770 and want to volunteer as a consultant. 31:47.770 --> 31:51.210 50 years ago, I worked for Allied Van Lines in this area 31:51.210 --> 31:52.690 moving military families. 31:52.690 --> 31:54.550 So, if you need technical assistance, 31:54.550 --> 31:55.640 it's a lot better, for example, 31:55.640 --> 31:59.566 to pick up a carton of lampshades than it is books. 31:59.566 --> 32:01.483 I learned that the hard way. 32:02.380 --> 32:04.280 Anyway, I couldn't resist. 32:04.280 --> 32:05.530 You brought back a lot of memories 32:05.530 --> 32:07.350 when you talked about moving furniture 32:07.350 --> 32:08.793 for military families. 32:10.038 --> 32:13.460 General Scaparrotti, I know you touched on this. 32:13.460 --> 32:18.110 But game out for me what happens 32:18.110 --> 32:22.660 if little green men appear in Lithuania or Latvia? 32:22.660 --> 32:23.493 How do we. 32:23.493 --> 32:27.790 Have we war gamed what happened in the Ukraine and Crimea? 32:27.790 --> 32:28.863 How do we respond? 32:28.863 --> 32:31.250 This seems to me this is a real challenge 32:31.250 --> 32:33.023 for our whole deterrent posture. 32:34.690 --> 32:37.431 - Yes, we've taken a close look at 32:37.431 --> 32:39.440 both what's happened in the past 32:39.440 --> 32:40.840 and what we think could 32:40.840 --> 32:43.040 potentially happen here in the future. 32:43.040 --> 32:46.423 The first thing I would say is, as a result of that, 32:47.560 --> 32:49.680 we've worked with our allies in the Baltics, 32:49.680 --> 32:52.880 Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, along the eastern border 32:53.730 --> 32:56.240 on what we've learned and also on the capabilities 32:56.240 --> 32:58.580 that we think we need as an alliance, both them and us, 32:58.580 --> 33:00.310 in order to deter this. 33:00.310 --> 33:03.016 And our first perspective is what do we do today 33:03.016 --> 33:05.810 to ensure that Russia fully understands 33:05.810 --> 33:08.260 the commitment of Article Five for an alliance? 33:08.260 --> 33:12.150 - But the question is what's the definition of attack? 33:12.150 --> 33:16.450 It seems to me that's the gray area that we're in. 33:16.450 --> 33:18.380 To know when and how to respond 33:18.380 --> 33:20.960 when it's not clear that it's. 33:20.960 --> 33:23.070 Tanks aren't rolling across the border. 33:23.070 --> 33:23.903 - Well, that's. 33:23.903 --> 33:24.920 You've hit it on. 33:24.920 --> 33:26.580 I mean, the thing that I worry about most. 33:26.580 --> 33:27.470 - [Angus] You can continue that. 33:27.470 --> 33:28.620 You hit it on the head, senator. 33:28.620 --> 33:29.453 I liked that in the record. 33:29.453 --> 33:30.563 - Well, you did. 33:31.710 --> 33:33.770 The thing that's difficult is not necessarily 33:33.770 --> 33:35.580 an actual attack that you can see coming. 33:35.580 --> 33:39.700 It's actually the kind of subversive undermining 33:39.700 --> 33:42.593 of both the nation's authority. 33:42.593 --> 33:44.990 One of the nations that they're undermining. 33:44.990 --> 33:46.540 Which is what they do. 33:46.540 --> 33:47.990 In other elements of power that 33:47.990 --> 33:49.340 aren't necessarily military. 33:49.340 --> 33:50.970 The military would be one of the last 33:50.970 --> 33:52.365 that they want to use. 33:52.365 --> 33:54.040 So, that's the most difficult. 33:54.040 --> 33:57.150 But we also work with our interagency 33:57.150 --> 33:59.180 to the point that Senator Reed made. 33:59.180 --> 34:02.410 That's the importance of all of our elements of power here. 34:02.410 --> 34:05.680 When you can combine 29 nations, 34:05.680 --> 34:08.573 with their elements of power, in response to Russia's, 34:09.877 --> 34:10.960 there's no. 34:10.960 --> 34:11.810 It's a slam dunk. 34:11.810 --> 34:13.380 There's no doubt that we can handle this 34:13.380 --> 34:14.360 and they'll be deterred. 34:14.360 --> 34:15.760 But we got to work together. 34:16.740 --> 34:19.230 - A question about funding and budgets. 34:19.230 --> 34:20.550 We haven't seen a budget yet. 34:20.550 --> 34:24.350 But there's talk that there will be a significant increase 34:24.350 --> 34:25.646 in military budget. 34:25.646 --> 34:30.646 But primarily in OCO as opposed to line items. 34:30.700 --> 34:33.530 Give me your thoughts about having money in OCO 34:33.530 --> 34:37.710 rather than allocations and authorizations 34:37.710 --> 34:41.413 that you can put to work in your AOR. 34:42.800 --> 34:47.800 - Well, primarily, those budgets that come in 34:49.920 --> 34:52.780 within the base budgets itself 34:52.780 --> 34:55.890 laid out in a FDAP give me greater stability 34:55.890 --> 34:57.880 and knowledge of what's coming in the future. 34:57.880 --> 35:00.760 So, really, what we need is predictability. 35:00.760 --> 35:04.113 OCO tends to fluctuate each year. 35:05.060 --> 35:08.220 And so, I personally underscore 35:08.220 --> 35:10.530 the greater predictability we have 35:10.530 --> 35:13.190 and stability in our budget as we look forward. 35:13.190 --> 35:15.800 Obviously, the more efficient we can be with our funding, 35:15.800 --> 35:17.610 the more sure that what we need, 35:17.610 --> 35:20.690 in terms of force capability, readiness, et cetera, 35:20.690 --> 35:22.870 can be planned and we can deliver. 35:22.870 --> 35:23.954 - Thank you. 35:23.954 --> 35:24.787 I appreciate that. 35:26.070 --> 35:28.770 General Lyons, you mentioned in your testimony 35:28.770 --> 35:31.740 and it's clear that a large part of your responsibility 35:31.740 --> 35:35.060 is met through civilian enterprises. 35:35.060 --> 35:37.540 Shipping, airplanes. 35:37.540 --> 35:38.373 Are you. 35:38.373 --> 35:39.640 And I know you talked about this. 35:39.640 --> 35:42.720 But please outline for us your level of satisfaction 35:42.720 --> 35:45.107 and confidence in the cybersecurity 35:45.107 --> 35:47.393 of the private sector partners. 35:48.710 --> 35:51.280 - Sir, we acknowledge this is a significant challenge. 35:51.280 --> 35:53.150 We work very closely with our industry partners. 35:53.150 --> 35:55.850 Matter of fact, we've introduce language into our contracts. 35:55.850 --> 35:57.398 We require self-assessments. 35:57.398 --> 35:59.957 We do a level of analysis on that. 35:59.957 --> 36:02.995 And we work more closely to ensure that 36:02.995 --> 36:05.350 their resiliency is improving. 36:05.350 --> 36:07.485 However, I would admit to you that, 36:07.485 --> 36:09.810 if an advanced persistent threat actor 36:09.810 --> 36:11.710 were on their systems today, it would be problematic. 36:11.710 --> 36:13.238 There's no question about that. 36:13.238 --> 36:15.100 Unfortunately, we have multiple. 36:15.100 --> 36:17.470 - Do you red team their systems? 36:17.470 --> 36:21.710 Self-analysis doesn't make me sleep a lot better at night. 36:21.710 --> 36:23.810 Do you have a red team capacity 36:23.810 --> 36:26.020 where you can mock attack them 36:26.020 --> 36:27.660 to show them their vulnerabilities? 36:27.660 --> 36:28.860 - No, senator, we do not. 36:28.860 --> 36:30.960 - I would urge you to consider that as an option. 36:30.960 --> 36:32.160 In other areas of the government, 36:32.160 --> 36:33.230 that's been very effective. 36:33.230 --> 36:35.000 It has a way of waking people up 36:35.000 --> 36:38.143 when a skull and crossbones appears on the CEO's computer. 36:39.088 --> 36:40.316 - [Stephen] Sir, I agree with that. 36:40.316 --> 36:41.149 - Thank you, general. 36:41.149 --> 36:42.997 Thanks, mister chairman. 36:42.997 --> 36:44.970 - [Jim] Senator Fischer. 36:44.970 --> 36:46.350 - Thank you, mister chairman. 36:46.350 --> 36:47.810 General Lyons, as you know, 36:47.810 --> 36:52.160 Nebraska's the home of the 155th Air Refueling Wing. 36:52.160 --> 36:53.690 And that plays an important role, 36:53.690 --> 36:58.240 especially during deployment, with your command. 36:58.240 --> 37:00.090 I'm proud of those airmen. 37:00.090 --> 37:03.460 I just met with them a couple weeks ago back in Nebraska. 37:03.460 --> 37:05.343 But my question to you is, 37:06.194 --> 37:10.100 when we're looking at the challenges 37:10.100 --> 37:11.590 and the risks that we're facing 37:11.590 --> 37:14.270 in order to meet the future demands. 37:14.270 --> 37:16.653 You kind of touched on that earlier. 37:17.520 --> 37:19.590 What is the biggest issue you see 37:19.590 --> 37:23.363 contributing to the limiting capacity in the fleet? 37:24.670 --> 37:27.059 - Ma'am, specifically in the area of aerial refuel? 37:27.059 --> 37:28.810 - [Deb] Yes. 37:28.810 --> 37:29.900 - I think you alluded to this. 37:29.900 --> 37:32.440 I mean, aerial refueling is the lifeblood 37:32.440 --> 37:35.800 of the joint forces' ability to project power immediately. 37:35.800 --> 37:37.772 There's nothing in the joint force we can do 37:37.772 --> 37:39.271 without that capability. 37:39.271 --> 37:42.280 And so, I was very pleased to see the Air Force 37:42.280 --> 37:45.370 accept the KC-46 and begin that modernization process. 37:45.370 --> 37:48.730 I think that's a very important first step. 37:48.730 --> 37:51.170 The other initiatives that the services are working. 37:51.170 --> 37:52.630 Service, in this case, the Air Force. 37:52.630 --> 37:56.019 Is improve readiness against the KC-135 fleet 37:56.019 --> 37:59.010 and a potential deferment of divestiture 37:59.010 --> 38:00.280 of some of those weapons systems 38:00.280 --> 38:03.560 so that we don't have a dip in capability over time. 38:03.560 --> 38:05.010 - I'm happy to hear you say that. 38:05.010 --> 38:08.470 As you know, the KC-46, it's online. 38:08.470 --> 38:10.520 But it's going to take quite a while 38:10.520 --> 38:15.470 to make it an important part of the fleet. 38:15.470 --> 38:19.390 And, as we look at the 135, there's maintenance issues 38:19.390 --> 38:21.730 and we've seen delays in that. 38:21.730 --> 38:25.080 Are you confident that there's a good balance 38:25.080 --> 38:28.265 between active, reserve, and guard 38:28.265 --> 38:31.273 when it comes to refueling? 38:32.420 --> 38:33.740 - Ma'am, I am. 38:33.740 --> 38:36.960 I'll defer to the service on the force mix specifically. 38:36.960 --> 38:38.660 But I think you know very well 38:38.660 --> 38:40.470 we have guardsmen on alert. 38:40.470 --> 38:41.953 Two hour strip alert today. 38:42.787 --> 38:45.810 It is a total force effort in everything we're doing. 38:45.810 --> 38:48.710 And, you know, over 60% of our capability 38:48.710 --> 38:51.460 does exist in the Guard and Reserve. 38:51.460 --> 38:54.330 - What would you offer us as suggestions 38:54.330 --> 38:58.270 so that we can mitigate some of the obstacles 38:58.270 --> 39:02.853 we're facing with that limited refueling fleet that we have 39:02.853 --> 39:03.980 with our capacity? 39:03.980 --> 39:05.930 Do you have any suggestions for us? 39:05.930 --> 39:07.040 - Well, ma'am, in the near term, 39:07.040 --> 39:09.740 it's really about generating high levels of readiness. 39:10.700 --> 39:13.110 So, in the KC-135 fleet, for example, 39:13.110 --> 39:16.130 we're able to meet that 85% goal. 39:16.130 --> 39:18.440 The Air Force is working very, very hard 39:18.440 --> 39:19.870 to improve that readiness. 39:19.870 --> 39:21.220 In the near term, that will generate 39:21.220 --> 39:23.550 more tails available for mission. 39:23.550 --> 39:24.470 - Thank you. 39:24.470 --> 39:27.730 General Scaparrotti, I'd like to ask you about 39:27.730 --> 39:32.193 some logistic challenges that I think you face in EuCom. 39:32.193 --> 39:37.193 There's been quotes in the past, in fact, from you 39:37.400 --> 39:39.510 when you said "The expansion of the alliance 39:39.510 --> 39:42.240 to include former Eastern Bloc countries 39:42.240 --> 39:47.240 has exacerbated the lack of common transportation networks 39:47.800 --> 39:49.870 between the newer NATO members in the east 39:49.870 --> 39:52.880 and the more established allies in the west." 39:52.880 --> 39:55.970 For example, Germany just allows 39:55.970 --> 40:00.910 trucks loaded with tanks to be on their highways 40:00.910 --> 40:03.770 at night on weekdays. 40:03.770 --> 40:06.100 The rails on the Baltic railroads, 40:06.100 --> 40:10.220 the gauge is set wider apart 40:10.220 --> 40:12.980 than we have in the western standard. 40:12.980 --> 40:13.910 So, trains have to. 40:13.910 --> 40:15.410 It's my understanding trains have to be 40:15.410 --> 40:17.130 unloaded and then reloaded 40:17.130 --> 40:20.400 near Poland's border with Lithuania. 40:20.400 --> 40:24.345 As we're looking at movement of troops 40:24.345 --> 40:26.800 and to be able to respond quickly 40:26.800 --> 40:29.986 to some of the possible challenges 40:29.986 --> 40:33.000 that we're looking at in that area, 40:33.000 --> 40:35.710 how serious is this issue today 40:35.710 --> 40:40.183 and what steps have you taken in order to address that? 40:41.360 --> 40:42.710 - Well, thank you. 40:42.710 --> 40:44.530 It is true what you stated 40:44.530 --> 40:48.220 in terms of the status today in Europe. 40:48.220 --> 40:49.660 It's a serious issue. 40:49.660 --> 40:54.070 Because we need to be able to move 360 within Europe. 40:54.070 --> 40:57.210 With our forces and the allies', as well. 40:57.210 --> 41:01.113 If there's good news, the good news is that we, as you know. 41:01.113 --> 41:04.510 Congress has supported, particularly through EDI, 41:04.510 --> 41:07.490 some of the key infrastructure improvements that we need, 41:07.490 --> 41:10.630 particularly in the east, to support our movements, 41:10.630 --> 41:12.000 reception of our troops, 41:12.000 --> 41:14.140 support of the troops we put in place there. 41:14.140 --> 41:16.087 But also it helps the allies. 41:16.087 --> 41:19.050 And the allies, as well, are financing, 41:19.050 --> 41:21.617 along with many of those projects, 41:21.617 --> 41:24.600 things that they should do with regard to airfields, 41:24.600 --> 41:26.683 fuel lines, rail, et cetera. 41:27.690 --> 41:28.523 - Are we trying. 41:28.523 --> 41:30.160 I apologize for interrupting you. 41:30.160 --> 41:34.390 But are we trying to facilitate some changes 41:34.390 --> 41:38.540 so that our allies, our NATO allies, can make those changes? 41:38.540 --> 41:41.960 And are they working together, as well? 41:41.960 --> 41:43.550 - They are. 41:43.550 --> 41:45.640 So, within NATO and EU both, 41:45.640 --> 41:47.957 NATO had a study within the infrastructure 41:47.957 --> 41:50.220 and logistic support that needed to happen. 41:50.220 --> 41:53.120 EuCom was very involved in that. 41:53.120 --> 41:54.880 We provided help with them. 41:54.880 --> 41:56.730 And we also provided to the EU 41:56.730 --> 41:58.940 who did a mobilization study. 41:58.940 --> 42:02.890 That's resulted in about $7 billion 42:02.890 --> 42:06.580 the EU's gonna invest in logistics and infrastructure 42:06.580 --> 42:09.210 over the next five or six years. 42:09.210 --> 42:13.570 Much of what we recommended was, in fact, accepted. 42:13.570 --> 42:16.530 So, we now have a study. 42:16.530 --> 42:18.100 We know what our issues are. 42:18.100 --> 42:21.480 We've got insight within both EU and NATO on that. 42:21.480 --> 42:23.440 And we've got to follow up and make sure that 42:23.440 --> 42:25.520 that investment goes to the right places 42:25.520 --> 42:29.272 and actually makes a difference in military mobility. 42:29.272 --> 42:31.020 - And to be able to have a rapid response. 42:31.020 --> 42:31.930 - [Curtis] That's correct. 42:31.930 --> 42:33.155 - Thank you, sir. 42:33.155 --> 42:34.711 - [Jim] Thank you, Senator Fischer. 42:34.711 --> 42:36.500 Senator Peters. 42:36.500 --> 42:37.828 - Thank you, mister chairman. 42:37.828 --> 42:39.540 And, our witnesses, thank you for your testimony 42:39.540 --> 42:41.930 and your service over many years. 42:41.930 --> 42:44.580 General Scaparrotti, you're well aware that, 42:44.580 --> 42:47.090 if there's ever a major conflict in Europe, 42:47.090 --> 42:50.130 the first shots are likely to be cyber. 42:50.130 --> 42:51.530 They're not gonna be kinetic. 42:51.530 --> 42:53.760 And we have to be prepared for that. 42:53.760 --> 42:55.990 And I know, since the Russian attack 42:55.990 --> 42:58.720 against Estonia in 2007, 42:58.720 --> 43:01.271 the Baltic countries have been really leaning into this 43:01.271 --> 43:04.050 in a pretty major way. 43:04.050 --> 43:06.410 Estonia created the Cyber Defense League, 43:06.410 --> 43:07.410 established NATO's 43:07.410 --> 43:09.910 Cooperative Cyberdefense Centre of Excellence, 43:09.910 --> 43:12.060 and, as you know, Latvia is home to 43:12.060 --> 43:14.850 NATO's Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. 43:14.850 --> 43:17.700 But I'd like you to give us an update 43:17.700 --> 43:19.220 and share some of your thoughts 43:19.220 --> 43:21.330 on what you're seeing in the Baltic countries, 43:21.330 --> 43:24.070 lessons learned, things that we may want to be 43:24.070 --> 43:26.320 replicating in other places around the world. 43:27.920 --> 43:30.850 - Well, you noted the changes that have taken place. 43:30.850 --> 43:32.850 I would add, as well, that, 43:32.850 --> 43:37.300 after NATO determined that cyber was, in fact, a domain, 43:37.300 --> 43:40.750 which needed to happen to give me SACEur authorities, 43:40.750 --> 43:44.350 we've now have a cyber center that operates within NATO. 43:44.350 --> 43:46.260 It's connected with each of our nations. 43:46.260 --> 43:49.100 Most of them are building a cyber capability. 43:49.100 --> 43:51.730 You noted the Cyber Centre of Excellence, for instance. 43:51.730 --> 43:52.910 I think it's a very good one. 43:52.910 --> 43:54.967 It's important because it's through that process. 43:54.967 --> 43:56.690 That's one of those nodes that 43:56.690 --> 44:01.110 we're able to advance lessons learned, do training, 44:01.110 --> 44:05.420 ensure that we can help with defense within NATO. 44:05.420 --> 44:08.120 But also specific nations. 44:08.120 --> 44:10.250 So, like anything in cyber, though, 44:10.250 --> 44:11.580 it's a very dynamic world. 44:11.580 --> 44:12.898 We've got. 44:12.898 --> 44:16.290 We're facing Russia, who is very agile in this 44:16.290 --> 44:17.563 and good at it. 44:18.869 --> 44:20.210 And so, we really can't rest. 44:20.210 --> 44:22.780 We've got a lot to do yet in cyber. 44:22.780 --> 44:24.050 Particularly capacity. 44:24.050 --> 44:27.943 We have to build the skills we need to man these centers. 44:29.060 --> 44:31.580 - You know, one idea that has come to me. 44:31.580 --> 44:33.260 And I'd love to have your comments on it. 44:33.260 --> 44:37.050 As we try to provide more resources into that 44:37.050 --> 44:39.550 and really leverage some of the state partnerships 44:39.550 --> 44:41.020 we have with the National Guard. 44:41.020 --> 44:42.240 So, for example, in Michigan, 44:42.240 --> 44:44.380 we have a cyber unit in Michigan. 44:44.380 --> 44:47.140 But those are around the country, as well. 44:47.140 --> 44:49.480 And I know our partners in the Baltics 44:49.480 --> 44:52.140 would love to have more presence of US forces 44:52.140 --> 44:54.760 in country there, as well. 44:54.760 --> 44:55.849 Talk to me a little bit about 44:55.849 --> 44:57.870 whether or not it makes sense 44:57.870 --> 44:59.870 to have rotations of 44:59.870 --> 45:02.416 particularly cyber National Guard units. 45:02.416 --> 45:04.050 This would be good for morale. 45:04.050 --> 45:05.400 It would be great for retention. 45:05.400 --> 45:06.620 It would be great for recruiting. 45:06.620 --> 45:08.810 It would allow them to be at the tip of the spear 45:08.810 --> 45:10.280 while exchanging great ideas. 45:10.280 --> 45:12.460 Is that something that makes sense to you? 45:12.460 --> 45:13.723 - Absolutely makes sense. 45:13.723 --> 45:15.490 And it's something we're already doing. 45:15.490 --> 45:17.655 Particularly, we have state partnership programs, 45:17.655 --> 45:20.010 because they have a level of trust that's been built. 45:20.010 --> 45:21.349 Some for over 25 years. 45:21.349 --> 45:23.360 And they have that expertise. 45:23.360 --> 45:24.640 And it helps me, in EuCom, 45:24.640 --> 45:27.760 because, otherwise, I pull from my cyber center expertise 45:27.760 --> 45:29.624 and I send that team out to a nation. 45:29.624 --> 45:32.300 Here, we can rotate forces through 45:32.300 --> 45:34.920 from a state with the same expertise and ability 45:34.920 --> 45:36.650 to build that capacity. 45:36.650 --> 45:37.870 So, we're actually beginning to do 45:37.870 --> 45:39.840 more of that in Europe today. 45:39.840 --> 45:41.240 - I understand there might be some need 45:41.240 --> 45:43.930 for additional funding through the National Guard to do that 45:43.930 --> 45:45.730 or are there adequate resources 45:45.730 --> 45:46.920 for you to conduct that program 45:46.920 --> 45:48.080 or will you need more? 45:48.080 --> 45:49.900 - You would have to ask the National Guard 45:49.900 --> 45:51.290 for the specific answer to that. 45:51.290 --> 45:52.810 But my general response is, 45:52.810 --> 45:54.660 when you pick up an op tempo like that, 45:54.660 --> 45:55.810 you bring them in. 45:55.810 --> 45:58.877 And, generally, for the Guard, there's a funding issue. 45:58.877 --> 46:01.340 And one of us has to pick that up. 46:01.340 --> 46:02.880 - Okay, so, we can explore that further. 46:02.880 --> 46:05.410 'Cause I think that's necessary for us to do that. 46:05.410 --> 46:09.220 General Lyons, I am a former Supply Corps officer 46:09.220 --> 46:10.590 in the US Navy Reserve. 46:10.590 --> 46:12.840 And so, I think there's a lot of truth 46:12.840 --> 46:14.808 in General Omar Bradley's maxim that 46:14.808 --> 46:19.420 amateurs talk tactics and professionals study logistics. 46:19.420 --> 46:20.760 And so, it's good to have you here. 46:20.760 --> 46:22.860 I wanted you to comment a little bit about 46:22.860 --> 46:26.513 a recent Defense Science Board task force 46:26.513 --> 46:30.170 survivability logistics publication that came out 46:30.170 --> 46:33.100 that talked about the decay in logistic readiness 46:33.100 --> 46:36.550 was perhaps a result of insufficient war gaming 46:36.550 --> 46:38.050 that incorporated logistics. 46:38.050 --> 46:41.840 And a lot of war games are typically just wished away. 46:41.840 --> 46:44.010 We know professionals can't wish away logistics 46:44.010 --> 46:46.780 or you're in a world of hurt pretty quickly. 46:46.780 --> 46:48.180 Could you comment on that report 46:48.180 --> 46:50.277 and give us an update on how you're integrating 46:50.277 --> 46:53.040 combatant commanders with exercises 46:53.040 --> 46:55.480 so that logistics is an integral part of war gaming? 46:55.480 --> 46:57.190 And a real part of war gaming. 46:57.190 --> 46:58.860 Not just wished away. 46:58.860 --> 47:00.210 - Senator, thanks for the question. 47:00.210 --> 47:01.764 I am familiar with the report. 47:01.764 --> 47:04.560 There are efforts actually ongoing now, 47:04.560 --> 47:06.163 given the defense strategy 47:06.163 --> 47:07.263 and the security environment 47:07.263 --> 47:09.089 that will operate in the future, 47:09.089 --> 47:11.810 to better connect logistics outcomes, 47:11.810 --> 47:13.770 for example, in TransCom's case, 47:13.770 --> 47:16.873 mobility outputs and our ability to generate the force, 47:17.760 --> 47:20.030 with campaign analysis. 47:20.030 --> 47:22.160 Which is currently disconnected. 47:22.160 --> 47:23.920 So, we're working with the department 47:23.920 --> 47:26.763 to move in that direction in the future. 47:27.947 --> 47:29.700 - General Scaparrotti, briefly, 47:29.700 --> 47:30.720 I know we're running out of time. 47:30.720 --> 47:33.420 But how is that being incorporated in your war gaming? 47:34.650 --> 47:37.880 - We work very closely here in terms of our war gaming 47:37.880 --> 47:40.840 and do a transportation feasibility in each one of those. 47:40.840 --> 47:44.700 So, our planners, in fact, work with his 47:44.700 --> 47:47.210 either coming back or they come and we do our war planning. 47:47.210 --> 47:50.190 And that's just a standard part of what we do. 47:50.190 --> 47:52.990 - [Gary] And you don't think it's just being wished away? 47:52.990 --> 47:55.080 The logistics challenges in a war game. 47:55.080 --> 47:56.040 - No, I don't. 47:56.040 --> 47:58.770 In fact, if anything, we've leaned into this 47:58.770 --> 48:03.770 in trying to be very factual about what our problems will be 48:04.550 --> 48:06.770 and particularly with respect to those in Europe, 48:06.770 --> 48:07.960 as we mentioned earlier. 48:07.960 --> 48:09.031 - [Gary] Great. 48:09.031 --> 48:10.781 Thank you, gentlemen. 48:13.050 --> 48:14.040 - Thank you, mister chairman. 48:14.040 --> 48:15.050 Thank you, gentlemen. 48:15.050 --> 48:17.110 General Scaparrotti, welcome to your last hearing. 48:17.110 --> 48:19.070 And, General Lyons, to your first hearing. 48:19.070 --> 48:21.290 I'm sure there are no jokes made at General Lyons's expense 48:21.290 --> 48:23.963 before this hearing began by General Scaparrotti. 48:24.800 --> 48:27.290 General Lyons, with that smile on your face, 48:27.290 --> 48:30.970 I'd like to address some issues I've heard 48:30.970 --> 48:33.990 from logistics companies, including some in Arkansas, 48:33.990 --> 48:35.470 about dealing not just with your command, 48:35.470 --> 48:37.060 but with the federal government as a whole. 48:37.060 --> 48:39.360 But, obviously, your command is one of the largest, 48:39.360 --> 48:40.980 if not the largest, in the entire government 48:40.980 --> 48:43.967 when it comes to moving things and equipment. 48:43.967 --> 48:48.530 They express frustrations with the inscrutability 48:48.530 --> 48:52.210 or perplexed at the bureaucratic challenges 48:52.210 --> 48:53.043 of dealing with the government. 48:53.043 --> 48:55.070 A lot of these companies are either run by veterans 48:55.070 --> 48:57.840 or they have a large veteran workforce. 48:57.840 --> 48:59.868 Given the training that the military gives 48:59.868 --> 49:02.560 its personnel in logistics. 49:02.560 --> 49:05.340 They would like to work more with the government 49:05.340 --> 49:07.000 and with TransCom in particular. 49:07.000 --> 49:09.330 They just sometimes find it to be a challenge. 49:09.330 --> 49:12.140 What kind of working groups, if any, 49:12.140 --> 49:14.940 does TransCom have with private industry 49:14.940 --> 49:18.160 to try to make what you do more transparent to them 49:18.160 --> 49:23.160 so they can better serve our personnel through your command? 49:23.320 --> 49:24.970 - Senator, it's a great question. 49:24.970 --> 49:27.550 We are inextricably linked in our relationship with industry 49:27.550 --> 49:30.050 in our ability to generate the force. 49:30.050 --> 49:32.500 We have a relationship with our industry partners 49:32.500 --> 49:33.440 at multiple echelons. 49:33.440 --> 49:36.560 All the way from action officer to executive working groups 49:36.560 --> 49:39.360 that my three star deputy leads. 49:39.360 --> 49:42.225 I also meet at least two times a year 49:42.225 --> 49:45.810 with the senior executives from our industry partners. 49:45.810 --> 49:48.750 And I acknowledge your point that, from time to time, 49:48.750 --> 49:50.480 based on our federal acquisition regulations, 49:50.480 --> 49:53.930 it can be a bit of an obstacle to work with the government. 49:53.930 --> 49:56.630 And so, we try to minimize that as much as possible. 49:56.630 --> 49:58.540 In fact, that's really, senator, 49:58.540 --> 50:01.080 what's driving some of our restructure initiatives 50:01.080 --> 50:02.620 in the household goods side of the house 50:02.620 --> 50:05.930 to open up the market to more capacity. 50:05.930 --> 50:07.120 - Good. 50:07.120 --> 50:11.040 I'd just like to encourage that kind of linkage to continue. 50:11.040 --> 50:11.873 Especially. 50:11.873 --> 50:12.730 I mean, it's a logistics industry. 50:12.730 --> 50:14.220 Changes so rapidly through 50:14.220 --> 50:16.120 the use of information technology. 50:16.120 --> 50:18.870 The more connections you can have to 50:18.870 --> 50:21.800 private sector leaders and to the people 50:21.800 --> 50:22.860 that are out doing these on front lines, 50:22.860 --> 50:24.450 I think will just be beneficial 50:24.450 --> 50:26.810 to the personnel that you're serving on the front lines. 50:26.810 --> 50:29.010 Whether it's moving his household goods in summer months 50:29.010 --> 50:31.350 or getting material downrange, as well. 50:31.350 --> 50:33.340 And I'd like to have my office 50:33.340 --> 50:34.850 continue to work with your command 50:34.850 --> 50:37.070 to try to facilitate some of those conversations. 50:37.070 --> 50:37.903 - That'll be great. 50:37.903 --> 50:38.970 Thank you. 50:38.970 --> 50:41.740 - General Scaparrotti, I noted with great interest that 50:41.740 --> 50:45.220 Vladimir Putin yesterday directed Russia to withdraw from 50:45.220 --> 50:47.150 the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 50:47.150 --> 50:48.400 which I find somewhat ironic, 50:48.400 --> 50:49.460 since they've been violating 50:49.460 --> 50:52.540 their commitment to the INF treaty for the last 10 years. 50:52.540 --> 50:54.440 Do you have any thoughts on that news? 50:55.715 --> 50:57.740 - It would only be to underscore what you just suggested. 50:57.740 --> 50:58.610 And that was the fact that 50:58.610 --> 51:01.000 they left the INF treaty some time ago. 51:01.000 --> 51:02.054 Years ago. 51:02.054 --> 51:07.054 By very deliberately producing a weapon in violation. 51:07.680 --> 51:09.850 And they've been deploying that weapon. 51:09.850 --> 51:11.570 - And the United States government 51:11.570 --> 51:13.970 has publicly recognized these violations 51:13.970 --> 51:15.450 under both the Obama administration 51:15.450 --> 51:16.790 and the Trump administration. 51:16.790 --> 51:18.350 We recently announced our intent 51:18.350 --> 51:20.004 to withdraw from the INF treaty. 51:20.004 --> 51:24.080 Was there any public opposition from a NATO partner 51:24.080 --> 51:25.730 or was it uniform NATO support 51:25.730 --> 51:28.445 for the United States decision to withdraw from that treaty? 51:28.445 --> 51:30.277 - NATO, both in December and February, 51:30.277 --> 51:32.621 produced a very strong statement 51:32.621 --> 51:34.602 in support of each step that we took 51:34.602 --> 51:37.800 in terms of our withdrawal from the INF treaty. 51:37.800 --> 51:41.370 I would say that our NATO allies understand that 51:41.370 --> 51:44.580 the INF is a very important component 51:44.580 --> 51:47.657 to European security from their view. 51:47.657 --> 51:49.170 They will emphasize. 51:49.170 --> 51:50.320 I'm sure you've heard them. 51:50.320 --> 51:53.120 With each step that they would hope that 51:53.120 --> 51:54.130 we would continue to work 51:54.130 --> 51:56.030 to bring Russia back into compliance 51:56.030 --> 51:57.210 before we're fully out. 51:57.210 --> 51:59.040 The six month period. 51:59.040 --> 52:01.860 Or that we would look forward from that, then, 52:01.860 --> 52:04.790 to perhaps a new treaty that would 52:04.790 --> 52:06.940 encompass the new weapons system, et cetera. 52:06.940 --> 52:09.460 So, they very much understand the importance of this. 52:09.460 --> 52:12.170 But they did support us strongly, 52:12.170 --> 52:16.750 29 nations strongly, in our decision. 52:16.750 --> 52:18.260 - Thank you. 52:18.260 --> 52:19.940 Obviously, one reason why it's in 52:19.940 --> 52:21.240 our national security interest 52:21.240 --> 52:22.870 to withdraw from the INF treaty, 52:22.870 --> 52:25.490 besides Russia's noncompliance with the treaty, 52:25.490 --> 52:27.130 is that China has been free to build 52:27.130 --> 52:28.217 intermediate range missiles 52:28.217 --> 52:31.910 at unlimited rates for decades now. 52:31.910 --> 52:34.950 And, as you know from your time at US Forces Korea, 52:34.950 --> 52:37.220 that has a significant impact on our security interests 52:37.220 --> 52:38.210 in the Pacific region. 52:38.210 --> 52:39.490 But China's not just limited there. 52:39.490 --> 52:41.020 It wants to be a global player. 52:41.020 --> 52:43.430 I noted with interest last year that 52:43.430 --> 52:45.930 the government of Denmark agreed to 52:45.930 --> 52:48.750 build some airports at Greenland, which it controls. 52:48.750 --> 52:52.440 Not exactly considered a traditional EuCom area, 52:52.440 --> 52:55.100 but it is within your area of operations. 52:55.100 --> 52:57.600 What are the implications of Chinese presence, 52:57.600 --> 52:58.940 if they were to get a foothold, 52:58.940 --> 53:00.370 which they were largely denied 53:00.370 --> 53:03.060 in that airport construction project last year, 53:03.060 --> 53:04.183 in the High North? 53:05.570 --> 53:07.480 - Well, it could have an absolute impact. 53:07.480 --> 53:08.920 I mean, I'm concerned, personally, 53:08.920 --> 53:11.220 about the strategic investments 53:11.220 --> 53:14.110 that we see by China throughout Europe 53:14.110 --> 53:17.006 in air and seaports or vicinities of that 53:17.006 --> 53:21.080 and critical technologies and companies that hold that. 53:21.080 --> 53:23.107 Particularly in the High North where you note 53:23.107 --> 53:28.107 Greenland and Iceland both are important bodies 53:28.122 --> 53:31.670 in that line of communication. 53:31.670 --> 53:34.990 So, I think we need to watch carefully 53:34.990 --> 53:37.430 China's investment in these ports. 53:37.430 --> 53:39.450 And, as you know, many of their commercial companies 53:39.450 --> 53:41.570 are actually state owned. 53:41.570 --> 53:42.403 - Thank you. 53:42.403 --> 53:43.730 General Scaparrotti, I want to thank you 53:43.730 --> 53:47.020 for your service to our nation for over 40 years. 53:47.020 --> 53:49.560 I know you've been wearing that fourth star on your shoulder 53:49.560 --> 53:52.910 for longer than anyone else in the armed forces right now. 53:52.910 --> 53:55.200 You've well earned the retirement 53:55.200 --> 53:56.770 that you have ahead of you. 53:56.770 --> 53:58.730 But I think I speak for most members of this committee 53:58.730 --> 54:00.650 when we say that we would like to see you 54:00.650 --> 54:03.823 back in the employ of Uncle Sam sometime in the future. 54:12.930 --> 54:14.390 - Thank you both for being here 54:14.390 --> 54:18.120 and for your service to the country. 54:18.120 --> 54:19.830 General Lyons, I'm gonna follow up 54:19.830 --> 54:21.810 on some of the concerns that have been raised 54:21.810 --> 54:23.630 by Senator Reed and Fischer about 54:23.630 --> 54:27.250 the phasing out of our KC-135s 54:27.250 --> 54:30.470 and when the KC-46s are gonna arrive. 54:30.470 --> 54:32.580 It's my understanding that, in New Hampshire, 54:32.580 --> 54:35.680 where we have the 157th Air Refueling Wing, 54:35.680 --> 54:37.480 that there will be a period of months 54:37.480 --> 54:40.330 between the time the 135 is phased out 54:40.330 --> 54:42.500 and the 46 is delivered given that 54:42.500 --> 54:44.320 it's already behind schedule. 54:44.320 --> 54:47.150 Can you comment on what we should assume 54:47.150 --> 54:48.720 will happen during those months 54:48.720 --> 54:52.220 when there's no refueling capacity 54:52.220 --> 54:54.630 and whether the intent will be to try 54:54.630 --> 54:57.460 and keep the 135s around longer 54:57.460 --> 54:59.653 until the delivery of the 46s? 55:00.670 --> 55:03.690 - Ma'am, from my perspective, that's the key issue 55:03.690 --> 55:05.840 is to maintain operational capability 55:05.840 --> 55:07.661 throughout the conversion. 55:07.661 --> 55:10.780 And the Air Force is working that very issue. 55:10.780 --> 55:13.610 In fact, they're working currently 55:13.610 --> 55:17.500 to delay the divestiture of a select number of KC-135s 55:17.500 --> 55:19.577 so that we don't have this exorbitant dip 55:19.577 --> 55:21.800 in capability over time. 55:21.800 --> 55:24.233 And so, the service is working that, ma'am. 55:25.226 --> 55:28.930 - And should we assume that that's gonna happen? 55:28.930 --> 55:31.050 I mean, I appreciate that the service is working it. 55:31.050 --> 55:33.670 But does that mean that we are 55:33.670 --> 55:36.030 gonna see that extension happen? 55:36.030 --> 55:38.160 - Senator, it's been my request. 55:38.160 --> 55:39.520 It's been well received by 55:39.520 --> 55:41.720 both the air component and the chief. 55:41.720 --> 55:43.370 Obviously, it's gonna cost some money. 55:43.370 --> 55:45.270 And, when the money is put into the program, 55:45.270 --> 55:46.480 that's when we'll know. 55:46.480 --> 55:51.330 But the intent is to retain 28 weapons systems 55:51.330 --> 55:55.510 beyond their currently scheduled retirement. 55:55.510 --> 55:56.420 - Thank you. 55:56.420 --> 56:00.910 And, in terms of Boeing's delivery of the 46s, 56:00.910 --> 56:03.893 I know that they have accepted. 56:05.473 --> 56:09.300 Or made a commitment to address some of the concerns 56:09.300 --> 56:12.827 that have been expressed about the tankers. 56:12.827 --> 56:16.410 Do we know whether that's gonna 56:16.410 --> 56:18.710 speed up the further delivery 56:18.710 --> 56:20.410 or should we assume that 56:20.410 --> 56:22.043 we're gonna see further delays? 56:23.570 --> 56:26.450 - Ma'am, the decision to deliver I think was a good one. 56:26.450 --> 56:29.240 Right now, we're on a pause, as you may know, 56:29.240 --> 56:33.728 based on some Boeing issues with foreign object. 56:33.728 --> 56:38.170 So, I don't have a sense, until that's cleared up, 56:38.170 --> 56:40.440 for what the impact on the program. 56:40.440 --> 56:43.033 But I'll talk to the Air Force about that. 56:43.990 --> 56:44.823 - Thank you. 56:44.823 --> 56:45.656 I appreciate that. 56:45.656 --> 56:48.360 And I'm sure that all of us hope that Boeing 56:48.360 --> 56:50.400 will do everything they can to make sure 56:50.400 --> 56:52.570 those deliveries are done 56:52.570 --> 56:56.190 to address the concerns that have been raised. 56:56.190 --> 57:00.260 General Scaparrotti, you mention in your testimony 57:00.260 --> 57:04.670 the concern about Turkey acquiring the S-400 57:04.670 --> 57:06.870 at the same time they're supposed to take delivery 57:06.870 --> 57:10.060 of the F-35s. 57:10.060 --> 57:14.400 And I know that there has been an effort underway 57:14.400 --> 57:17.080 to try and encourage Turkey 57:17.080 --> 57:19.520 to look at other alternatives. 57:19.520 --> 57:23.270 And that there was an offer made early in January 57:23.270 --> 57:25.620 for the sale of the Patriot system. 57:25.620 --> 57:28.050 They have until the end of March, it's my understanding, 57:28.050 --> 57:29.620 to decide whether they're gonna 57:29.620 --> 57:31.550 take delivery of that or not. 57:31.550 --> 57:34.160 But the question I have is, 57:34.160 --> 57:37.400 if Turkey moves forward with the agreement 57:37.400 --> 57:39.236 with Russia on the S-400, 57:39.236 --> 57:42.480 do we assume that they should 57:42.480 --> 57:44.740 receive delivery of the F-35s 57:44.740 --> 57:49.740 and what does that do to their accessing that technology? 57:52.030 --> 57:53.720 - Senator, I would say, first of all, 57:53.720 --> 57:58.720 if they accept the S-400 to establish it within Turkey, 57:58.920 --> 58:01.520 there's, first of all, an issue that 58:01.520 --> 58:04.150 it's not interoperable with NATO's systems 58:04.150 --> 58:06.110 nor is it interoperable inside of 58:06.110 --> 58:08.040 our integrated air missile defense system. 58:08.040 --> 58:09.980 So, that presents one problem. 58:09.980 --> 58:11.970 The second has to do with the F-35. 58:11.970 --> 58:14.290 It presents a problem to all of our aircraft. 58:14.290 --> 58:17.230 Specifically the F-35, I believe. 58:17.230 --> 58:19.920 And my best military advice would be that 58:19.920 --> 58:24.850 we don't then follow through with the F-35. 58:24.850 --> 58:28.820 Flying it or working with ally 58:28.820 --> 58:31.140 that's working with Russian systems. 58:31.140 --> 58:33.360 Particularly air defense systems. 58:33.360 --> 58:34.760 With one of our. 58:34.760 --> 58:38.530 What I would say is probably one of our most advanced 58:38.530 --> 58:41.383 technological capabilities. 58:42.611 --> 58:46.382 - I'm pleased to hear you say that. 58:46.382 --> 58:48.360 The question I guess I have is 58:48.360 --> 58:50.810 I understand that some of the parts for the F-35 58:50.810 --> 58:51.870 are being made in Turkey. 58:51.870 --> 58:55.270 And what happens to that assembly 58:55.270 --> 58:58.130 and who picks up that slack 58:58.130 --> 59:00.813 if Turkey can't receive the F-35? 59:01.690 --> 59:04.620 - Well, that's one of the issues that's being considered 59:04.620 --> 59:06.550 and will be considered, I'm sure, as you know. 59:06.550 --> 59:09.564 But, for them, I would just underscore the fact that 59:09.564 --> 59:12.270 this is a huge decision for Turkey. 59:12.270 --> 59:13.840 And we've continuously. 59:13.840 --> 59:15.030 I've talked to them personally, 59:15.030 --> 59:17.520 as all of our leadership has. 59:17.520 --> 59:20.160 It connects in many different ways. 59:20.160 --> 59:25.160 To the employment and the integration 59:27.930 --> 59:31.170 they have within the system itself, the F-35. 59:31.170 --> 59:33.330 But also to FMS and other systems 59:33.330 --> 59:37.180 that we sell to Turkey, as well. 59:37.180 --> 59:40.260 And so, I would hope that they would reconsider 59:40.260 --> 59:42.360 this one decision on S-400. 59:42.360 --> 59:43.600 One system. 59:43.600 --> 59:48.600 But potentially forfeit many of the other systems 59:48.920 --> 59:51.930 and one of the most important systems 59:51.930 --> 59:53.904 that we provide them. 59:53.904 --> 59:54.737 - Well, thank you. 59:54.737 --> 59:55.570 I share that view. 59:55.570 --> 59:57.060 I think Turkey is an important ally. 59:57.060 --> 59:59.913 But it's one that we hope to be able to depend on. 01:00:00.830 --> 01:00:02.550 Thank you, mister chairman. 01:00:02.550 --> 01:00:03.980 - Thank you, Senator Shaheen. 01:00:03.980 --> 01:00:06.510 Let me inform you that 01:00:08.033 --> 01:00:11.080 some of the KC-46s have been delivered. 01:00:11.080 --> 01:00:13.760 In fact, I flew the right seat of a KC-46 01:00:13.760 --> 01:00:16.620 from Seattle, Washington to Altus. 01:00:16.620 --> 01:00:17.823 It's running fine. 01:00:18.890 --> 01:00:20.650 Senator Sullivan. 01:00:20.650 --> 01:00:21.630 - Thank you, mister chairman. 01:00:21.630 --> 01:00:25.250 And, gentlemen, thank you for being here and your service. 01:00:25.250 --> 01:00:27.820 General Scaparrotti, I want to talk about a few things. 01:00:27.820 --> 01:00:28.970 First, there's a narrative that 01:00:28.970 --> 01:00:30.690 I think is played out a lot in the media 01:00:30.690 --> 01:00:32.963 that the administration or what you're doing 01:00:32.963 --> 01:00:35.280 in your capacity is somehow being 01:00:35.280 --> 01:00:38.500 weak on Russia and Putin. 01:00:38.500 --> 01:00:42.483 So, I just want to talk about a few actions that, 01:00:43.370 --> 01:00:45.330 under your leadership, we've been taking. 01:00:45.330 --> 01:00:47.278 Because isn't it true that 01:00:47.278 --> 01:00:49.340 the one thing that Putin understands 01:00:49.340 --> 01:00:50.793 more than anything is power? 01:00:52.970 --> 01:00:54.365 Would you agree with that? 01:00:54.365 --> 01:00:55.198 - I would agree. 01:00:55.198 --> 01:00:57.430 - Our military forces, energy production. 01:00:57.430 --> 01:01:00.560 Not words, but actual power. 01:01:00.560 --> 01:01:02.620 So, does it help that we have now 01:01:02.620 --> 01:01:07.620 our forces deployed in countries like Poland and the Baltics 01:01:08.597 --> 01:01:10.500 and the European Reassurance Initiative, 01:01:10.500 --> 01:01:13.850 which this committee's supported in a bipartisan fashion? 01:01:13.850 --> 01:01:14.683 - Yes, sir. 01:01:14.683 --> 01:01:15.516 Very important. 01:01:15.516 --> 01:01:17.082 - How about. 01:01:17.082 --> 01:01:18.030 It doesn't get a lot of press. 01:01:18.030 --> 01:01:21.890 But my colleague Senator Ernst was recently in Ukraine. 01:01:21.890 --> 01:01:24.870 And, as you know, the previous administration 01:01:24.870 --> 01:01:28.040 was reluctant and never helped the Ukrainians 01:01:28.040 --> 01:01:30.180 with defensive weapon systems 01:01:30.180 --> 01:01:32.833 that they could use to protect themselves. 01:01:33.910 --> 01:01:36.010 Under Secretary Mattis's leadership, 01:01:36.010 --> 01:01:40.530 when he got involved, we did provide the Ukrainians 01:01:40.530 --> 01:01:44.070 the Javelin anti-tank missile system. 01:01:44.070 --> 01:01:46.030 How is that working out? 01:01:46.030 --> 01:01:47.870 - Well, senator, first of all, 01:01:47.870 --> 01:01:50.090 as I said earlier in testimony, 01:01:50.090 --> 01:01:51.660 they've received the system. 01:01:51.660 --> 01:01:53.180 I've been impressed with their training 01:01:53.180 --> 01:01:54.930 and their preparation to utilize it. 01:01:54.930 --> 01:01:58.530 - You think that makes Russian T-72 tank drivers 01:01:58.530 --> 01:02:00.440 in the eastern Ukraine a little more nervous? 01:02:00.440 --> 01:02:01.330 - I think it does. 01:02:01.330 --> 01:02:03.840 I think the fact they have a Javelin 01:02:03.840 --> 01:02:05.590 they could employ and they know how to employ it 01:02:05.590 --> 01:02:06.440 is a deterrent. 01:02:06.440 --> 01:02:09.880 - Are we seeing any force posture indications 01:02:09.880 --> 01:02:12.180 that they're taking that into consideration 01:02:12.180 --> 01:02:14.260 when they're moving those kind of forces? 01:02:14.260 --> 01:02:16.630 I'm talking about the Russian forces. 01:02:16.630 --> 01:02:18.060 - Not directly. 01:02:18.060 --> 01:02:22.020 Because we've not employed them right on the line. 01:02:22.020 --> 01:02:23.220 The Ukrainians haven't. 01:02:23.220 --> 01:02:24.850 But I'm sure that they're aware of them. 01:02:24.850 --> 01:02:27.090 And they take that in consideration 01:02:27.090 --> 01:02:28.500 in the employment of their forces 01:02:28.500 --> 01:02:29.333 and where they put them. 01:02:29.333 --> 01:02:31.080 They know that it would be a. 01:02:31.080 --> 01:02:32.840 It's a lethal weapon system. 01:02:32.840 --> 01:02:33.740 - Okay, thank you. 01:02:36.060 --> 01:02:36.970 I don't know if you mentioned it. 01:02:36.970 --> 01:02:37.803 I'm sorry. 01:02:37.803 --> 01:02:39.730 I had to step out prior to your testimony. 01:02:39.730 --> 01:02:42.170 But could you talk a little bit about 01:02:42.170 --> 01:02:44.360 the Vostok-2018 exercise? 01:02:44.360 --> 01:02:49.333 My understanding was it involved 300,000 Russian troops, 01:02:50.670 --> 01:02:55.100 80 ships, notably 3200 Chinese troops, 01:02:55.100 --> 01:02:58.379 including up to as many as 900 Chinese tanks. 01:02:58.379 --> 01:03:00.490 Are those reports accurate? 01:03:00.490 --> 01:03:05.490 And should we be concerned about that? 01:03:05.790 --> 01:03:08.650 - Well, first of all, the numbers that they publicized 01:03:08.650 --> 01:03:11.490 are higher than what was factually present. 01:03:11.490 --> 01:03:13.030 I can talk in more detail on this 01:03:13.030 --> 01:03:17.020 in the classified hearing this afternoon. 01:03:17.020 --> 01:03:18.350 It wasn't that large. 01:03:18.350 --> 01:03:19.280 But it was large. 01:03:19.280 --> 01:03:21.560 And, yes, we should take notice. 01:03:21.560 --> 01:03:24.430 Primarily because it was designed for them, 01:03:24.430 --> 01:03:27.270 at a very strategic operational level, 01:03:27.270 --> 01:03:30.900 to be able to command and control large forces 01:03:30.900 --> 01:03:34.428 in a force-on-force type of exercise scenario. 01:03:34.428 --> 01:03:39.428 It connected them with multiple of their regional commands. 01:03:41.470 --> 01:03:45.200 Specifically in order to practice that. 01:03:45.200 --> 01:03:46.940 Yet covered both 01:03:46.940 --> 01:03:51.940 conventional long range precision munitions training 01:03:52.290 --> 01:03:55.863 as well as nuclear training offset toward the end. 01:03:56.989 --> 01:03:58.710 And it included China, as you noted. 01:03:58.710 --> 01:04:00.970 Which is the first time I can recall them 01:04:00.970 --> 01:04:05.970 providing forces in a partner training scenario, 01:04:06.440 --> 01:04:08.310 which is quite unusual. 01:04:08.310 --> 01:04:12.020 So, the size of it, the complexity of it, 01:04:12.020 --> 01:04:14.320 the communications that they demonstrated, 01:04:14.320 --> 01:04:15.966 the fact that it was a hybrid 01:04:15.966 --> 01:04:19.760 conventional and nuclear exercise 01:04:19.760 --> 01:04:21.760 I think is all important. 01:04:21.760 --> 01:04:22.593 - Let me ask. 01:04:22.593 --> 01:04:23.426 Thank you for that. 01:04:23.426 --> 01:04:25.290 General Lyons, you and I had a discussion. 01:04:25.290 --> 01:04:29.100 And the chairman, I see, is talking about the KC-46 01:04:29.100 --> 01:04:30.450 and the deployment of that. 01:04:30.450 --> 01:04:32.880 I know that's not ultimately your call. 01:04:32.880 --> 01:04:34.480 But certainly you're an advocate. 01:04:34.480 --> 01:04:35.540 And you have a lot of knowledge. 01:04:35.540 --> 01:04:37.280 I'm gonna ask just a couple quick questions 01:04:37.280 --> 01:04:39.930 that I just appreciate quick answers to. 01:04:39.930 --> 01:04:42.210 But, when you look at the places 01:04:42.210 --> 01:04:43.490 where you would want to deploy that, 01:04:43.490 --> 01:04:46.053 either CONUS or OCONUS decisions, 01:04:47.260 --> 01:04:49.894 the National Defense Strategy prioritizes 01:04:49.894 --> 01:04:53.590 great power competition with China and Russia, 01:04:53.590 --> 01:04:55.630 decisive action against North Korea. 01:04:55.630 --> 01:04:58.640 Would it make sense to place KC-46s 01:04:58.640 --> 01:05:03.180 in a part of American territory, state or otherwise, 01:05:03.180 --> 01:05:06.950 that's closely proximate to those places? 01:05:06.950 --> 01:05:08.600 - Senator, just to be clear, 01:05:08.600 --> 01:05:11.680 Alaska is clearly a strategic location. 01:05:11.680 --> 01:05:13.486 - [Dan] So, you're getting to my punchline already. 01:05:13.486 --> 01:05:15.780 I haven't even gone through the list. 01:05:15.780 --> 01:05:17.479 Let me go through the list. 01:05:17.479 --> 01:05:18.387 - Go ahead. 01:05:18.387 --> 01:05:21.330 - So, we're close to all those places. 01:05:21.330 --> 01:05:22.460 We're the only state where 01:05:22.460 --> 01:05:24.350 you're actually right at the seams of 01:05:24.350 --> 01:05:28.776 EuCom, PaCom, NorthCom, StratCom. 01:05:28.776 --> 01:05:32.743 The state of Alaska's in the seams of every one of those. 01:05:33.640 --> 01:05:35.930 The old plans that support contingencies 01:05:35.930 --> 01:05:39.340 all focus on Alaska. 01:05:39.340 --> 01:05:42.790 It has the fourth largest fuel storage area of the Air Force 01:05:42.790 --> 01:05:44.960 in any place in the world. 01:05:44.960 --> 01:05:48.790 It's gonna have over 100 5th generation fighters 01:05:48.790 --> 01:05:50.840 in the next two years. 01:05:50.840 --> 01:05:51.673 100. 01:05:51.673 --> 01:05:53.130 No other place on the planet Earth 01:05:53.130 --> 01:05:57.260 will have 100 combat-coded 5th gen fighters. 01:05:57.260 --> 01:05:59.470 It has the existing infrastructure to support 01:05:59.470 --> 01:06:02.240 aerial refueling operations. 01:06:02.240 --> 01:06:04.570 And JPARC will be the best training place 01:06:04.570 --> 01:06:07.260 for 5th gen aircraft anywhere in the world. 01:06:07.260 --> 01:06:10.760 So, is your advocating for the KC-46. 01:06:10.760 --> 01:06:12.150 I mean, of course I'm advocating 01:06:12.150 --> 01:06:13.860 for the state I represent. 01:06:13.860 --> 01:06:15.595 But I wouldn't do it unless I though it made 01:06:15.595 --> 01:06:18.060 100% strategic sense. 01:06:18.060 --> 01:06:21.220 So, just give me your thoughts on that very quickly. 01:06:21.220 --> 01:06:23.070 - Sir, I know the Air Force is still developing. 01:06:23.070 --> 01:06:25.020 Their basing plan is not complete yet. 01:06:25.020 --> 01:06:27.747 Particularly in the future years. 01:06:27.747 --> 01:06:29.360 I do have confidence that 01:06:29.360 --> 01:06:31.870 they'll look completely at the operational range 01:06:31.870 --> 01:06:33.760 and capability to be able to swing 01:06:33.760 --> 01:06:35.480 and give us the flexibility of TransCom 01:06:35.480 --> 01:06:37.680 to employ that important weapon system. 01:06:37.680 --> 01:06:40.076 And I'm sure that Alaska's part of that discussion. 01:06:40.076 --> 01:06:42.100 I just don't know the details, sir. 01:06:42.100 --> 01:06:42.983 - Thank you. 01:06:42.983 --> 01:06:44.483 Thank you, mister chairman. 01:06:49.180 --> 01:06:50.100 - Thank you, mister chairman. 01:06:50.100 --> 01:06:51.330 I hope, on that right seat ride, 01:06:51.330 --> 01:06:52.163 you didn't try to get them 01:06:52.163 --> 01:06:55.022 to do a hammerhead or anything, did you? 01:06:55.022 --> 01:06:56.593 With any aerobatic maneuvers. 01:06:57.678 --> 01:06:59.928 (laughter) 01:07:02.200 --> 01:07:05.400 Stay within the restrictions. 01:07:05.400 --> 01:07:09.430 Gentlemen, thank you so much for your participation today. 01:07:09.430 --> 01:07:11.820 General Scaparrotti, I want to return to the discussion 01:07:11.820 --> 01:07:14.260 about logistics challenges, 01:07:14.260 --> 01:07:17.140 especially in the Eastern European area. 01:07:17.140 --> 01:07:19.550 Illinois National Guard has been 01:07:19.550 --> 01:07:22.760 the sponsor in the State Partnership for Peace Program 01:07:22.760 --> 01:07:26.170 with the nation of Poland for 28 years now, I believe. 01:07:26.170 --> 01:07:27.210 27 plus years. 01:07:27.210 --> 01:07:29.850 So, through my service, I'm somewhat familiar with 01:07:29.850 --> 01:07:32.283 the challenges that we face there. 01:07:33.460 --> 01:07:35.970 Could you update us on how the establishment 01:07:35.970 --> 01:07:38.570 of the NATO Joint Support and Enabling Command is going? 01:07:38.570 --> 01:07:42.280 And remind us of why it was created 01:07:42.280 --> 01:07:45.030 and what it will better enable you to do, in theory, 01:07:45.030 --> 01:07:46.590 to respond to Russian aggression. 01:07:46.590 --> 01:07:48.933 When would this command be fully operational? 01:07:51.370 --> 01:07:54.863 - The establishment of JSEC, as you called it, 01:07:54.863 --> 01:07:57.560 is moving, I think, on timeline. 01:07:57.560 --> 01:07:59.743 It's actually ahead of pace, in my view. 01:08:00.620 --> 01:08:02.689 The Germans, who were the framework nation 01:08:02.689 --> 01:08:06.563 for this headquarters in Ulm, Germany, have. 01:08:07.400 --> 01:08:09.290 In my view, they've really leaned into this. 01:08:09.290 --> 01:08:11.880 So, they've already got their commander designated. 01:08:11.880 --> 01:08:14.340 They have a portion of the staff there. 01:08:14.340 --> 01:08:17.430 They've been present in my headquarters and SHAPE 01:08:17.430 --> 01:08:20.660 to do the further planning that needs to take place 01:08:20.660 --> 01:08:22.450 to ensure that it's right sized. 01:08:22.450 --> 01:08:24.470 To make sure that the planning, the understandings, 01:08:24.470 --> 01:08:27.010 roles, and responsibilities are correct. 01:08:27.010 --> 01:08:29.350 So, that's really the piece that we're doing right now. 01:08:29.350 --> 01:08:31.543 But it's moving along very well. 01:08:32.400 --> 01:08:34.200 This fall is IOC. 01:08:34.200 --> 01:08:36.760 And it's another year before it'd be fully operational. 01:08:36.760 --> 01:08:38.086 So, we've got some time here 01:08:38.086 --> 01:08:40.427 before it'd be fully operational. 01:08:40.427 --> 01:08:42.659 But I would say to you that I think 01:08:42.659 --> 01:08:44.980 they will be ahead of that in terms of real output. 01:08:44.980 --> 01:08:46.495 They're already making a difference 01:08:46.495 --> 01:08:49.409 in terms of our logistics planning 01:08:49.409 --> 01:08:54.409 with other logistics commands within the headquarters 01:08:55.742 --> 01:08:57.370 and throughout the components. 01:08:57.370 --> 01:08:59.490 So, I think they'll actually be leaning into that 01:08:59.490 --> 01:09:03.204 before they're actually fully established, so to speak. 01:09:03.204 --> 01:09:05.050 Why did we set that up? 01:09:05.050 --> 01:09:10.050 Primarily because, in a European environment 01:09:10.360 --> 01:09:13.497 where we've got to be able to support and move 360. 01:09:13.497 --> 01:09:16.970 Not just to the eastern border, but north to the High North, 01:09:16.970 --> 01:09:19.500 south, and west. 01:09:19.500 --> 01:09:21.550 With a threat that's actually 360. 01:09:21.550 --> 01:09:23.990 And then we needed to protect 01:09:25.280 --> 01:09:27.460 the central lines of communication, 01:09:27.460 --> 01:09:31.250 critical ports, seaports, and infrastructure in doing that. 01:09:31.250 --> 01:09:33.010 Because, as has been testified to here 01:09:33.010 --> 01:09:35.100 and by General Lyons, 01:09:35.100 --> 01:09:36.910 we're now in a contested environment. 01:09:36.910 --> 01:09:40.430 We needed a headquarters that both looked logistically, 01:09:40.430 --> 01:09:43.280 as well as protection of those key assets. 01:09:43.280 --> 01:09:45.650 And that's really why we stood up that command. 01:09:45.650 --> 01:09:46.740 And it's well placed. 01:09:46.740 --> 01:09:49.470 Being in kind of the central, the heartland of Europe, 01:09:49.470 --> 01:09:52.090 so to speak, in central Germany. 01:09:52.090 --> 01:09:56.790 So, it's a very important step for NATO to take. 01:09:56.790 --> 01:09:59.569 And I think it demonstrates NATO's focus 01:09:59.569 --> 01:10:04.569 on making sure that it will be relevant 01:10:05.150 --> 01:10:07.640 to the environment that we're in today. 01:10:07.640 --> 01:10:08.473 - Thank you, general. 01:10:08.473 --> 01:10:11.880 General Lyons, how would TransCom plug into the JSEC? 01:10:11.880 --> 01:10:13.590 And has this been tested yet? 01:10:13.590 --> 01:10:14.660 I mean, how would you plug it in 01:10:14.660 --> 01:10:16.230 during times of conflict, for example, 01:10:16.230 --> 01:10:17.600 and have we tested it? 01:10:17.600 --> 01:10:20.270 - Senator, first, let me say thank you 01:10:20.270 --> 01:10:22.320 for your understanding of logistics 01:10:22.320 --> 01:10:24.330 and importance of logistics to warfighting. 01:10:24.330 --> 01:10:26.100 I really appreciate that. 01:10:26.100 --> 01:10:27.950 I've actually been to Europe several times. 01:10:27.950 --> 01:10:29.500 And I've met with the leadership 01:10:29.500 --> 01:10:30.790 that were developing the JSEC. 01:10:30.790 --> 01:10:32.300 And I understand the concept very well. 01:10:32.300 --> 01:10:34.110 I think it's a great initiative 01:10:34.110 --> 01:10:37.240 that General Scaparrotti and his team are moving out on. 01:10:37.240 --> 01:10:38.740 I don't know that we plug in directly. 01:10:38.740 --> 01:10:42.160 We plug in directly to his EuCom headquarters 01:10:42.160 --> 01:10:45.815 through a European deployment distribution operation center. 01:10:45.815 --> 01:10:50.180 And then across that echelon to include his headquarters. 01:10:50.180 --> 01:10:51.960 And we would take the signals that 01:10:51.960 --> 01:10:55.170 he would be sending on his priorities for mobility 01:10:55.170 --> 01:10:56.670 and then meet them accordingly. 01:10:56.670 --> 01:10:57.880 And he would have the role, then, 01:10:57.880 --> 01:11:00.750 to integrate that from a coalition perspective. 01:11:00.750 --> 01:11:01.650 - Thank you. 01:11:01.650 --> 01:11:02.500 I'd like to. 01:11:02.500 --> 01:11:04.700 With that, I'd like to return, General Scaparrotti, 01:11:04.700 --> 01:11:08.280 to an understanding about sealift. 01:11:08.280 --> 01:11:09.770 We had a discussion earlier today. 01:11:09.770 --> 01:11:11.650 And I understand that, recently, NATO reactivated 01:11:11.650 --> 01:11:13.610 its Atlantic Command to guard the sealanes 01:11:13.610 --> 01:11:16.510 of approach into Europe in the event of war. 01:11:16.510 --> 01:11:17.940 Can you describe for me, in general terms, 01:11:17.940 --> 01:11:19.470 the amount of sealift that would be required 01:11:19.470 --> 01:11:22.080 to move significant US forces to Europe 01:11:22.080 --> 01:11:23.300 in the event of conflict? 01:11:23.300 --> 01:11:24.330 And are you comfortable with 01:11:24.330 --> 01:11:27.650 the amount of sealift at your disposal right now 01:11:27.650 --> 01:11:29.013 in the event of a conflict? 01:11:31.060 --> 01:11:33.070 - Well, senator, when we get into the closed section, 01:11:33.070 --> 01:11:34.680 I could probably get into more detail on that. 01:11:34.680 --> 01:11:36.200 But I would say it's significant. 01:11:36.200 --> 01:11:38.470 And, because of the types of forces I move, 01:11:38.470 --> 01:11:40.960 and Steve would agree that we rely on 01:11:40.960 --> 01:11:45.483 sealift largely for a lot of that bulk and heavy movement. 01:11:47.450 --> 01:11:49.060 I'm aware of the challenges 01:11:49.060 --> 01:11:52.865 particularly to our reserve force for naval forces 01:11:52.865 --> 01:11:55.530 and our commercial support. 01:11:55.530 --> 01:11:58.667 That's all important if we had a full conflict in Europe. 01:11:58.667 --> 01:12:00.040 And so, I would just underscore 01:12:00.040 --> 01:12:02.081 the importance of funding that. 01:12:02.081 --> 01:12:06.770 Making sure that we have the readiness in the right place. 01:12:06.770 --> 01:12:08.320 'Cause we'll rely on it heavily 01:12:09.350 --> 01:12:11.510 for any crisis in Europe. 01:12:11.510 --> 01:12:12.576 - Thank you. 01:12:12.576 --> 01:12:13.870 I'll probably try to follow up in the session later today. 01:12:13.870 --> 01:12:15.120 Thank you, gentlemen. 01:12:15.120 --> 01:12:16.670 - Thank you, Senator Duckworth. 01:12:16.670 --> 01:12:17.540 Let me just. 01:12:17.540 --> 01:12:20.853 Since you brought up the KC-46. 01:12:21.940 --> 01:12:25.850 Remind all of us here that's replacing, 01:12:25.850 --> 01:12:28.400 eventually, the KC-135. 01:12:28.400 --> 01:12:33.100 The first KC-135 that was delivered to Altus Air Force Base 01:12:33.100 --> 01:12:36.030 was in 1959. 01:12:36.030 --> 01:12:37.970 So, it's been operating for 60 years. 01:12:37.970 --> 01:12:41.710 It gives you an idea of the significance of the KC-46 01:12:41.710 --> 01:12:46.710 to the distant future of that capability. 01:12:50.110 --> 01:12:51.293 Senator Hawley. 01:12:52.680 --> 01:12:53.540 - Thank you, mister chairman. 01:12:53.540 --> 01:12:54.750 General Scaparrotti, General Lyons, 01:12:54.750 --> 01:12:55.770 thank you both for being here. 01:12:55.770 --> 01:12:57.460 Thank you for your exemplary service. 01:12:57.460 --> 01:12:59.680 And thank you to the men and women under your command. 01:12:59.680 --> 01:13:02.540 General Scaparrotti, if I could just start with you, 01:13:02.540 --> 01:13:03.830 I want to talk a little bit about 01:13:03.830 --> 01:13:06.780 the NDS Strategy Commission. 01:13:06.780 --> 01:13:09.430 The NDS Commission, various RAND studies, and others 01:13:09.430 --> 01:13:10.830 have clearly indicated that 01:13:10.830 --> 01:13:13.630 we are not optimally postured 01:13:13.630 --> 01:13:16.610 to deal with a Russian assault into the Baltics. 01:13:16.610 --> 01:13:19.260 In particular, the NDS clearly states 01:13:19.260 --> 01:13:20.900 the joint force has got to be prepared 01:13:20.900 --> 01:13:25.390 to blunt this assault to prevent a Russian fait accompli. 01:13:25.390 --> 01:13:27.810 My question is, building on the positive work 01:13:27.810 --> 01:13:29.880 in the previous year's European defense initiatives 01:13:29.880 --> 01:13:30.713 and other activities, 01:13:30.713 --> 01:13:32.286 could you give us a progress report? 01:13:32.286 --> 01:13:33.678 I understand you may want to save some of this 01:13:33.678 --> 01:13:35.880 for the closed session. 01:13:35.880 --> 01:13:37.920 But can you give us a progress report 01:13:37.920 --> 01:13:40.460 on our force posturing developments 01:13:40.460 --> 01:13:42.590 to prevent that fait accompli? 01:13:42.590 --> 01:13:45.663 Where are we on this, in your judgment? 01:13:47.430 --> 01:13:50.090 - We've made clear progress, as I stated up front, 01:13:50.090 --> 01:13:51.250 in this regard. 01:13:51.250 --> 01:13:54.770 And largely thankful to the support of Congress, 01:13:54.770 --> 01:13:56.970 particularly EDI, in funding the changes 01:13:56.970 --> 01:13:57.803 that we need to make. 01:13:57.803 --> 01:13:59.660 So, we've made progress, I would tell you, 01:13:59.660 --> 01:14:02.447 in every domain that's important to that. 01:14:02.447 --> 01:14:05.393 Including cyber in that, for instance. 01:14:06.757 --> 01:14:10.430 But we're not postured yet where we need to be. 01:14:10.430 --> 01:14:12.810 And, as you cited, the studies have come out recently 01:14:12.810 --> 01:14:13.800 have underscored that. 01:14:13.800 --> 01:14:16.500 So, in a closed session, I would like the opportunity 01:14:16.500 --> 01:14:17.930 to talk to you more specifically 01:14:17.930 --> 01:14:19.590 about where we're at and what we're short. 01:14:19.590 --> 01:14:21.550 But, for instance, you know, 01:14:21.550 --> 01:14:23.360 we now have rotational brigades. 01:14:23.360 --> 01:14:25.350 An armor brigade, a cav in the east, 01:14:25.350 --> 01:14:28.210 an battalion taskforce that's a part of NATO. 01:14:28.210 --> 01:14:29.990 We have rotational air forces. 01:14:29.990 --> 01:14:32.056 We have rotational bomber forces. 01:14:32.056 --> 01:14:35.269 We have had, twice now. 01:14:35.269 --> 01:14:37.240 Well, three times, actually. 01:14:37.240 --> 01:14:38.860 A carrier strike group. 01:14:38.860 --> 01:14:40.390 Once already in the High North 01:14:40.390 --> 01:14:42.313 for the first time in 20 years. 01:14:44.050 --> 01:14:45.640 We started. 01:14:45.640 --> 01:14:49.030 At the beginning of my time here three years ago, 01:14:49.030 --> 01:14:52.450 we were moving one brigade at a time and challenged. 01:14:52.450 --> 01:14:54.910 A month ago, I moved four brigades, 01:14:54.910 --> 01:14:58.000 two armored, two cav, simultaneously in Europe. 01:14:58.000 --> 01:14:59.880 That's progress. 01:14:59.880 --> 01:15:04.460 And, thanks to TransCom and others that help us do the work, 01:15:04.460 --> 01:15:07.920 provide the assets, increase the infrastructure, 01:15:07.920 --> 01:15:08.810 make that happen. 01:15:08.810 --> 01:15:10.100 So, clearly progress. 01:15:10.100 --> 01:15:11.570 But we're not there yet. 01:15:11.570 --> 01:15:14.210 - And, again, with the reservation I realize 01:15:14.210 --> 01:15:16.230 you want to save the specifics for the closed session. 01:15:16.230 --> 01:15:18.210 But I think it's important to get some of this on the record 01:15:18.210 --> 01:15:19.500 as we're about to, as you know, 01:15:19.500 --> 01:15:21.840 go into the authorization season here 01:15:21.840 --> 01:15:23.210 and then the appropriations season 01:15:23.210 --> 01:15:25.020 where we'll need to be making the case 01:15:25.020 --> 01:15:29.220 for authorizing and then spending what is necessary 01:15:29.220 --> 01:15:30.540 in order to get you what you need. 01:15:30.540 --> 01:15:33.160 So, can you give us an overview, at least, 01:15:33.160 --> 01:15:36.320 about what more you think we need, generally speaking, 01:15:36.320 --> 01:15:39.423 to get you to the posture that the NDS recommends? 01:15:40.760 --> 01:15:43.790 - Well, first of all, we'll start with the cyber domain. 01:15:43.790 --> 01:15:47.430 There is a plan and an increase in my cyber capability. 01:15:47.430 --> 01:15:51.060 And I have been increased by CyberCom as a priority. 01:15:51.060 --> 01:15:52.540 So, that's happened. 01:15:52.540 --> 01:15:55.415 But I still have personnel and skills 01:15:55.415 --> 01:15:59.940 in the numbers of around 50 personnel yet 01:15:59.940 --> 01:16:03.100 that would be very helpful to have them in place. 01:16:03.100 --> 01:16:05.030 So, that's one of those. 01:16:05.030 --> 01:16:06.410 If you go to the land component, 01:16:06.410 --> 01:16:09.550 I need greater land component capability. 01:16:09.550 --> 01:16:14.090 Not only in armored elements, but with my enablers. 01:16:14.090 --> 01:16:16.370 And I'll go into more detail in that and the other. 01:16:16.370 --> 01:16:17.680 I mentioned maritime. 01:16:17.680 --> 01:16:21.248 Greater capacity there, as well as specific capabilities, 01:16:21.248 --> 01:16:25.890 to stay ahead of, frankly, the modernization that 01:16:25.890 --> 01:16:29.880 we see in Russia's maritime forces. 01:16:29.880 --> 01:16:32.370 The Air Force is presently in a rotational basis 01:16:32.370 --> 01:16:34.520 providing 5th gen aircraft to me. 01:16:34.520 --> 01:16:35.930 Bomber aircraft, et cetera. 01:16:35.930 --> 01:16:38.490 Which we need to employ for deterrent factor 01:16:38.490 --> 01:16:42.030 and also to ensure our readiness and capability. 01:16:42.030 --> 01:16:44.330 Looking forward to those being stationed permanently 01:16:44.330 --> 01:16:46.333 in some numbers within Europe, as well. 01:16:47.210 --> 01:16:48.117 - Thank you. 01:16:48.117 --> 01:16:50.550 Let me ask you about our European allies. 01:16:50.550 --> 01:16:51.920 Can you give us a report? 01:16:51.920 --> 01:16:53.700 You mentioned some of this in your written testimony. 01:16:53.700 --> 01:16:55.830 Can you give us a report on the work 01:16:55.830 --> 01:16:58.820 with our European allies, especially Germany, 01:16:58.820 --> 01:17:02.120 to ensure that they are meeting their NATO commitments 01:17:02.120 --> 01:17:04.303 and have a plan to do so going forward? 01:17:05.490 --> 01:17:06.323 - Well, as you know, 01:17:06.323 --> 01:17:07.950 we've been working with all of our allies. 01:17:07.950 --> 01:17:11.550 And I've mentioned, up front, the cash contribution. 01:17:11.550 --> 01:17:16.470 So, since 2016, our allies have put 01:17:16.470 --> 01:17:19.550 another $41 billion into defense. 01:17:19.550 --> 01:17:21.480 By 2020, it'll be 100 billion 01:17:21.480 --> 01:17:22.490 based on the plans that 01:17:22.490 --> 01:17:25.030 they had to provide here in December. 01:17:25.030 --> 01:17:27.310 Their contributions have stepped up. 01:17:27.310 --> 01:17:29.740 We asked for greater force structure 01:17:29.740 --> 01:17:32.090 to assist in Afghanistan. 01:17:32.090 --> 01:17:33.643 Our allies responded. 01:17:35.360 --> 01:17:37.220 So, I think, when you look at that, 01:17:37.220 --> 01:17:39.250 you know, they're clearly responding. 01:17:39.250 --> 01:17:41.560 But we have a ways to go yet. 01:17:41.560 --> 01:17:44.600 Germany, in particular, has responded, as well. 01:17:44.600 --> 01:17:48.793 They plan to bring their defense investment up to 1.5%. 01:17:49.628 --> 01:17:52.370 That's not 2% yet. 01:17:52.370 --> 01:17:53.730 That's where it needs to be. 01:17:53.730 --> 01:17:58.730 But they're clearly refocused on their contribution, 01:17:59.860 --> 01:18:01.594 as well as their readiness. 01:18:01.594 --> 01:18:04.460 As you know, they've got some readiness issues. 01:18:04.460 --> 01:18:05.950 That's been in the paper. 01:18:05.950 --> 01:18:08.750 I believe that's true from what I have seen. 01:18:08.750 --> 01:18:11.990 But they are providing the very high joint task force, 01:18:11.990 --> 01:18:13.260 for instance, for NATO. 01:18:13.260 --> 01:18:14.790 And they make sure that they produce 01:18:14.790 --> 01:18:16.580 the force that was ready and credible. 01:18:16.580 --> 01:18:17.720 And I've seen it. 01:18:17.720 --> 01:18:19.510 We operated with that force 01:18:19.510 --> 01:18:21.393 in Trident Juncture, for instance. 01:18:22.470 --> 01:18:25.140 So, they understand the issue 01:18:26.563 --> 01:18:28.480 and they're working hard to get their readiness 01:18:28.480 --> 01:18:29.530 up to where it's going to be. 01:18:29.530 --> 01:18:32.720 But they spend a good deal of time, in particular. 01:18:32.720 --> 01:18:33.630 As many of the other. 01:18:33.630 --> 01:18:34.780 We did, as well. 01:18:34.780 --> 01:18:38.240 But European nations where they rested 01:18:38.240 --> 01:18:39.850 and they didn't invest in their defense. 01:18:39.850 --> 01:18:41.960 And now they're having to invest heavily 01:18:41.960 --> 01:18:43.701 to get back up on step. 01:18:43.701 --> 01:18:44.534 - Great. 01:18:44.534 --> 01:18:45.367 Thank you, general. 01:18:45.367 --> 01:18:46.200 Thank you, mister chairman. 01:18:46.200 --> 01:18:47.033 - [Jim] Thank you, Senator Hawley. 01:18:47.033 --> 01:18:48.285 Senator Warren. 01:18:48.285 --> 01:18:49.330 - Thank you, mister chairman. 01:18:49.330 --> 01:18:52.290 So, I want to discuss a national security threat 01:18:52.290 --> 01:18:54.130 that can't be addressed by 01:18:54.130 --> 01:18:56.210 traditional military power at all. 01:18:56.210 --> 01:18:58.700 And that is climate change. 01:18:58.700 --> 01:19:01.880 The unclassified worldwide threat assessment 01:19:01.880 --> 01:19:04.240 by the director of national intelligence said, 01:19:04.240 --> 01:19:05.767 and I'm gonna quote here, 01:19:05.767 --> 01:19:08.820 "Global, environmental, and ecological degradation, 01:19:08.820 --> 01:19:10.403 as well as climate change, 01:19:10.403 --> 01:19:13.910 are likely to fuel competition for resources, 01:19:13.910 --> 01:19:17.460 economic distress, and social discontent 01:19:17.460 --> 01:19:20.200 through 2019 and beyond." 01:19:20.200 --> 01:19:21.330 End quote. 01:19:21.330 --> 01:19:24.027 That assessment also said, quote, 01:19:24.027 --> 01:19:27.640 "Damage to communication, energy, and transportation 01:19:27.640 --> 01:19:31.750 infrastructure could affect low-lying military bases, 01:19:31.750 --> 01:19:33.610 inflict economic costs, 01:19:33.610 --> 01:19:37.580 and cause human displacement and loss of life." 01:19:37.580 --> 01:19:40.150 I've asked this question to other combatant commanders. 01:19:40.150 --> 01:19:43.210 So, I want to make sure that I get this on the record. 01:19:43.210 --> 01:19:45.490 General Scaparrotti and General Lyons, 01:19:45.490 --> 01:19:47.930 do you agree with the intelligence community's 01:19:47.930 --> 01:19:50.963 assessment of the climate change threat? 01:19:53.670 --> 01:19:54.503 - I do. 01:19:54.503 --> 01:19:56.250 And I believe that, as you noted, 01:19:56.250 --> 01:19:59.130 much of this will be drivers for potential conflict. 01:19:59.130 --> 01:20:01.200 Or, at least, very difficult situations 01:20:01.200 --> 01:20:03.010 that the nations have to deal with. 01:20:03.010 --> 01:20:04.979 The second I would point you to the High North. 01:20:04.979 --> 01:20:09.563 And that's the increasing opening of the northern sea route. 01:20:10.700 --> 01:20:11.940 And the challenges that presents 01:20:11.940 --> 01:20:13.520 from a security perspective. 01:20:13.520 --> 01:20:14.720 - Yes, thank you. 01:20:14.720 --> 01:20:15.674 Thank you. 01:20:15.674 --> 01:20:17.380 General Lyons, do you also agree? 01:20:17.380 --> 01:20:18.900 - Ma'am, I agree. 01:20:18.900 --> 01:20:20.630 These are sources of conflict. 01:20:20.630 --> 01:20:22.860 We certainly have to be prepared to respond to them. 01:20:22.860 --> 01:20:23.693 - Good. 01:20:23.693 --> 01:20:25.630 Could I ask each of you, very briefly, 01:20:25.630 --> 01:20:27.770 'cause we have very limited time, 01:20:27.770 --> 01:20:30.410 just to describe how climate change 01:20:30.410 --> 01:20:33.930 impacts your operations in your commands 01:20:33.930 --> 01:20:37.640 and what you're doing to adapt to these changes? 01:20:37.640 --> 01:20:40.700 General Scaparrotti, would you like to start? 01:20:40.700 --> 01:20:42.180 - Well, I think most apparent to me 01:20:42.180 --> 01:20:43.410 is the one that I noted. 01:20:43.410 --> 01:20:45.003 And that's in the Arctic. 01:20:45.850 --> 01:20:46.850 We're going. 01:20:46.850 --> 01:20:49.530 We already are seeing longer periods of time 01:20:49.530 --> 01:20:52.580 that the northern sea route is open. 01:20:52.580 --> 01:20:54.070 And so, as a part of that, 01:20:54.070 --> 01:20:57.320 there is an increased interest in 01:20:57.320 --> 01:21:01.130 commercial and resource capabilities there. 01:21:01.130 --> 01:21:04.270 China, for instance, is pressing to get into the High North 01:21:04.270 --> 01:21:08.550 and have some presence there. 01:21:08.550 --> 01:21:11.870 And so, that creates competition. 01:21:11.870 --> 01:21:14.690 Russia, because that northern sea route is one 01:21:14.690 --> 01:21:18.750 that follows most closely to their borders, 01:21:18.750 --> 01:21:22.523 has increased, reopened 10 of their airports there. 01:21:22.523 --> 01:21:26.410 They now have RADAR systems up. 01:21:26.410 --> 01:21:28.870 They've begun to move, on periodic times, 01:21:28.870 --> 01:21:32.080 different weapon systems up there for control of the area. 01:21:32.080 --> 01:21:33.430 So, those are all things that. 01:21:33.430 --> 01:21:34.263 - [Elizabeth] That's serious. 01:21:34.263 --> 01:21:35.760 - That I have to bring into my planning. 01:21:35.760 --> 01:21:38.843 - So, what has been your response to that? 01:21:40.283 --> 01:21:41.600 Just briefly. 01:21:41.600 --> 01:21:43.010 - Briefly, we've changed. 01:21:43.010 --> 01:21:46.640 We've updated our plans as a result of that. 01:21:46.640 --> 01:21:51.000 We've had to change the posture of some of our forces. 01:21:51.000 --> 01:21:55.740 We've changed our operational patterns so that we, 01:21:55.740 --> 01:21:57.850 in fact, deter and we send a signal 01:21:57.850 --> 01:21:59.780 of the importance of the Arctic to us. 01:21:59.780 --> 01:22:01.960 Those are just some of the ways on day to day 01:22:01.960 --> 01:22:05.150 that we've made changes in our normal routine 01:22:05.150 --> 01:22:07.360 in order to demonstrate significance 01:22:07.360 --> 01:22:08.880 and capability in the Arctic. 01:22:08.880 --> 01:22:09.984 - Thank you. 01:22:09.984 --> 01:22:11.757 General Lyons. 01:22:11.757 --> 01:22:14.020 - Ma'am, anything that degrades our ability 01:22:14.020 --> 01:22:15.860 to project and sustain power globally 01:22:15.860 --> 01:22:17.890 at our time and place of choosing is a concern. 01:22:17.890 --> 01:22:19.110 We know that we have to operate 01:22:19.110 --> 01:22:21.163 in any conditions whatsoever. 01:22:22.660 --> 01:22:25.823 - So, what are you doing by way of response? 01:22:27.630 --> 01:22:32.260 - Ma'am, in other words, in our planning and so forth, 01:22:32.260 --> 01:22:33.674 we consider all environments. 01:22:33.674 --> 01:22:36.180 But, more specific to General Scap's point 01:22:36.180 --> 01:22:38.430 about the more scientific piece of it is. 01:22:38.430 --> 01:22:41.350 That's maybe a little bit out of my area of expertise. 01:22:41.350 --> 01:22:42.210 - Fair enough. 01:22:42.210 --> 01:22:45.800 I really wasn't looking for much of a scientific answer. 01:22:45.800 --> 01:22:48.400 But, as General Scaparrotti said, 01:22:48.400 --> 01:22:50.620 how you have to kind of readjust where you are 01:22:50.620 --> 01:22:51.890 and what you're doing. 01:22:51.890 --> 01:22:54.510 If I can, I just want to say 01:22:54.510 --> 01:22:58.010 adapting to climate change impacts our military readiness. 01:22:58.010 --> 01:23:00.780 And I'm glad you both take this threat seriously. 01:23:00.780 --> 01:23:02.240 I appreciate that. 01:23:02.240 --> 01:23:04.730 In my remaining time, I just want to ask very briefly, 01:23:04.730 --> 01:23:07.749 if I can, about the INF treaty. 01:23:07.749 --> 01:23:11.520 We all know this is a landmark arms control treaty 01:23:11.520 --> 01:23:13.930 with Russia negotiated in 1987 01:23:13.930 --> 01:23:16.100 by President Ronald Reagan. 01:23:16.100 --> 01:23:18.610 The treaty prohibits both of our countries 01:23:18.610 --> 01:23:19.890 from testing and deploying 01:23:19.890 --> 01:23:23.159 ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles 01:23:23.159 --> 01:23:27.130 with a range of 500 to 5500 kilometers. 01:23:27.130 --> 01:23:28.550 Yes, we know that Russia's in 01:23:28.550 --> 01:23:31.600 violation of the treaty since 2014. 01:23:31.600 --> 01:23:34.340 But, rather than use the mechanisms within the treaty 01:23:34.340 --> 01:23:36.310 or other tools available to us 01:23:36.310 --> 01:23:39.120 to try to get Russia back into compliance, 01:23:39.120 --> 01:23:42.630 the administration is abandoning the treaty entirely. 01:23:42.630 --> 01:23:43.890 So, I just want to ask. 01:23:43.890 --> 01:23:45.880 What is our plan to prevent Russia 01:23:45.880 --> 01:23:50.835 from building more INF treaty prohibited missiles 01:23:50.835 --> 01:23:53.950 in the absence of the treaty? 01:23:53.950 --> 01:23:55.760 Do we have a plan here? 01:23:55.760 --> 01:23:56.713 General Lyons? 01:24:00.378 --> 01:24:01.211 - Ma'am, I'd have to defer on that. 01:24:01.211 --> 01:24:03.529 That's a little bit out of my area of expertise. 01:24:03.529 --> 01:24:04.362 - [Elizabeth] Okay. 01:24:04.362 --> 01:24:06.430 General Scaparrotti? 01:24:06.430 --> 01:24:08.720 - Well, senator, I think that 01:24:08.720 --> 01:24:10.970 we're still in a six month period here 01:24:10.970 --> 01:24:13.260 where we're looking at what our options are. 01:24:13.260 --> 01:24:17.340 We, in fact, have told our allies in NATO 01:24:17.340 --> 01:24:20.690 that we will do this planning in collaboration with them. 01:24:20.690 --> 01:24:22.200 We've begun that. 01:24:22.200 --> 01:24:23.970 So, I don't know that we have a plan today. 01:24:23.970 --> 01:24:25.130 I know that we're working on 01:24:25.130 --> 01:24:26.990 what we think that plan might be. 01:24:26.990 --> 01:24:29.860 I personally think that it has to be multidimensional. 01:24:29.860 --> 01:24:32.010 It has to be across all of our domains. 01:24:32.010 --> 01:24:34.212 It has to be whole of government. 01:24:34.212 --> 01:24:36.510 In order to respond to that. 01:24:36.510 --> 01:24:39.810 I would finally say that, from my point of view, 01:24:39.810 --> 01:24:42.460 that, when you have a peer competitor, 01:24:42.460 --> 01:24:44.123 and particularly a modernizing one 01:24:44.123 --> 01:24:47.795 that will be challenging us, such as Russia, 01:24:47.795 --> 01:24:50.770 that we should look toward treaty capabilities 01:24:50.770 --> 01:24:54.133 in order to provide some stability. 01:24:58.860 --> 01:25:01.240 To provide signals and communications 01:25:01.240 --> 01:25:04.050 and limits that we understand and we can work from. 01:25:04.050 --> 01:25:06.390 - Well, I'm glad to hear that 01:25:06.390 --> 01:25:08.440 you are trying to work with our allies. 01:25:08.440 --> 01:25:10.793 I think the Polish, for example, 01:25:11.690 --> 01:25:15.310 have said that they're concerned about 01:25:15.310 --> 01:25:17.980 missiles on their land. 01:25:17.980 --> 01:25:19.840 I just urge you to think about, 01:25:19.840 --> 01:25:23.160 instead of withdrawing from the INF treaty, 01:25:23.160 --> 01:25:25.300 whether or not we should be redoubling our efforts 01:25:25.300 --> 01:25:28.920 to bring Russia back into compliance with the treaty. 01:25:28.920 --> 01:25:31.410 We know that Putin can't be trusted. 01:25:31.410 --> 01:25:33.930 But we have a responsibility to prevent 01:25:33.930 --> 01:25:37.813 a dangerous and expensive arms race in Europe. 01:25:37.813 --> 01:25:40.327 And, without the treaty, I'm worried that's what will. 01:25:40.327 --> 01:25:41.160 - [Jim] Thank you, senator. 01:25:41.160 --> 01:25:42.190 - I apologize for running. 01:25:42.190 --> 01:25:43.340 - [Jim] Senator Tillis. 01:25:44.690 --> 01:25:46.570 - Thank you, mister chairman. 01:25:46.570 --> 01:25:48.799 Thank you both, gentleman, for being here. 01:25:48.799 --> 01:25:53.210 General Lyons, I was down at Fort Bragg this past Friday 01:25:53.210 --> 01:25:54.840 with Secretary Esper. 01:25:54.840 --> 01:25:57.040 And we were talking with the folks there 01:25:57.040 --> 01:26:00.793 who are in unacceptable housing conditions. 01:26:01.810 --> 01:26:03.050 We also talked a little bit. 01:26:03.050 --> 01:26:05.070 And I've had a number of discussions in the past 01:26:05.070 --> 01:26:06.450 with families about some of 01:26:06.450 --> 01:26:09.180 their household belongings being moved. 01:26:09.180 --> 01:26:12.040 Some of the bottlenecks and unsatisfactory service. 01:26:12.040 --> 01:26:16.283 So, I like the idea of taking the Personal Property Program 01:26:16.283 --> 01:26:17.870 into what I would consider to be 01:26:17.870 --> 01:26:20.780 one throat to choke sort of model. 01:26:20.780 --> 01:26:22.700 But I'd really like to. 01:26:22.700 --> 01:26:24.470 Maybe if you could briefly describe 01:26:24.470 --> 01:26:26.943 where you think this is going to end up. 01:26:26.943 --> 01:26:28.790 I really want to make sure that 01:26:28.790 --> 01:26:32.040 we get this right in terms of accountability, 01:26:32.040 --> 01:26:35.166 predictability, and customer satisfaction 01:26:35.166 --> 01:26:37.970 so that any relationship we create 01:26:37.970 --> 01:26:39.700 with this confederation of movers. 01:26:39.700 --> 01:26:41.510 I get that you're gonna have a consolidator, 01:26:41.510 --> 01:26:42.343 but you're still gonna have 01:26:42.343 --> 01:26:44.730 a number of individual providers. 01:26:44.730 --> 01:26:47.720 We've got to get the compensation and accountability models 01:26:47.720 --> 01:26:51.540 right so that we don't end up here, honestly, 01:26:51.540 --> 01:26:52.630 trying to do a good thing 01:26:52.630 --> 01:26:55.560 and ending up where we are with the housing situation. 01:26:55.560 --> 01:26:57.060 Can you give me some assurances 01:26:57.060 --> 01:26:59.700 or briefly describe how that's going to work? 01:26:59.700 --> 01:27:00.785 - Senator, I can. 01:27:00.785 --> 01:27:03.550 This is definitely not a privatization effort, 01:27:03.550 --> 01:27:04.949 by any stretch of the imagination. 01:27:04.949 --> 01:27:06.817 In fact, what I've offered to 01:27:06.817 --> 01:27:08.720 the service secretaries and service chiefs 01:27:08.720 --> 01:27:11.326 is, instead of this completely deaggregated, 01:27:11.326 --> 01:27:13.420 diffused value chain 01:27:13.420 --> 01:27:16.050 of very little centralized responsibility, 01:27:16.050 --> 01:27:16.980 even inside the government. 01:27:16.980 --> 01:27:20.500 I would look at them and I'd say, "Hold me accountable. 01:27:20.500 --> 01:27:22.920 Allow me to develop an acquisition tool 01:27:22.920 --> 01:27:24.920 to hold industry accountable." 01:27:24.920 --> 01:27:26.630 We have a track record of being able to do that. 01:27:26.630 --> 01:27:27.627 Matter of fact, in other parts of 01:27:27.627 --> 01:27:29.680 the Defense Personal Property Program, 01:27:29.680 --> 01:27:32.283 like personal owned vehicles, we do this today. 01:27:33.990 --> 01:27:36.750 I do know, senator, that there's some concern in industry. 01:27:36.750 --> 01:27:38.180 We get a lot of feedback in industry. 01:27:38.180 --> 01:27:40.740 Some are very, very supportive where we're headed. 01:27:40.740 --> 01:27:43.485 They see opportunities to enter the market. 01:27:43.485 --> 01:27:44.318 We want to grow the market. 01:27:45.355 --> 01:27:46.440 Others are concerned about potential change. 01:27:46.440 --> 01:27:48.530 What I tell them and what I've seen 01:27:48.530 --> 01:27:51.380 in our past acquisitions that have been similar is that, 01:27:51.380 --> 01:27:53.960 below the level, we still need 01:27:53.960 --> 01:27:57.090 the same or greater number of movers out there. 01:27:57.090 --> 01:27:59.090 We just need a level of quality 01:27:59.090 --> 01:28:00.690 and accountability in the system. 01:28:00.690 --> 01:28:02.390 - And some peaking capability. 01:28:02.390 --> 01:28:04.709 I think I'd be very interested in 01:28:04.709 --> 01:28:08.320 maybe having the right people in your organization 01:28:08.320 --> 01:28:10.360 meet with my staff to describe 01:28:10.360 --> 01:28:12.380 what that really looks like operationally. 01:28:12.380 --> 01:28:14.150 You know, in a simplistic way, 01:28:14.150 --> 01:28:19.150 it would almost be this baseline guarantee of capacity 01:28:19.160 --> 01:28:22.100 with some peaking capability that's almost Uber-like 01:28:22.100 --> 01:28:25.730 in terms of having the household know that 01:28:25.730 --> 01:28:27.170 they're gonna get their things moved 01:28:27.170 --> 01:28:28.790 at the appropriate time, hopefully, 01:28:28.790 --> 01:28:31.580 to a house that is in much better condition 01:28:31.580 --> 01:28:32.610 than some of the ones that I saw 01:28:32.610 --> 01:28:34.160 down in Fort Bragg on Friday. 01:28:34.160 --> 01:28:35.160 Separate issue. 01:28:35.160 --> 01:28:37.370 And not your problem. 01:28:37.370 --> 01:28:39.280 General Scaparrotti, I appreciate the time 01:28:39.280 --> 01:28:40.740 you spent in the office yesterday. 01:28:40.740 --> 01:28:43.910 I appreciate your decades of service. 01:28:43.910 --> 01:28:47.410 And I associate myself with Senator Cotton's comments that 01:28:47.410 --> 01:28:49.670 we hope, if you take your uniform off, 01:28:49.670 --> 01:28:52.740 we hope that doesn't mean we won't see you back here 01:28:52.740 --> 01:28:55.170 serving in some other capacity. 01:28:55.170 --> 01:28:56.700 I'm gonna save a lot of my questions 01:28:56.700 --> 01:28:58.790 for the classified briefing. 01:28:58.790 --> 01:29:01.570 But I do want to highlight my concern 01:29:01.570 --> 01:29:06.470 with the Turkey situation. 01:29:06.470 --> 01:29:08.913 Particularly with the S-400s. 01:29:10.200 --> 01:29:11.033 I know. 01:29:11.033 --> 01:29:12.650 And you gave a great briefing on 01:29:12.650 --> 01:29:14.110 where we're working together on 01:29:14.110 --> 01:29:16.520 a legitimate homeland security threat 01:29:16.520 --> 01:29:18.540 that they're dealing with with the PKK. 01:29:18.540 --> 01:29:20.250 So, on the one hand, we're trying to partner 01:29:20.250 --> 01:29:21.870 and continue to build on that relationship. 01:29:21.870 --> 01:29:24.816 Turkey is a vitally important NATO partner 01:29:24.816 --> 01:29:27.817 in the most complicated part of the world. 01:29:27.817 --> 01:29:29.860 So, I understand some of their behaviors. 01:29:29.860 --> 01:29:32.800 But I do not understand, under any circumstances, 01:29:32.800 --> 01:29:35.984 why on Earth they would be considering purchasing 01:29:35.984 --> 01:29:40.470 a missile defense system that would not be inoperable. 01:29:40.470 --> 01:29:44.690 That would require the deployment of capabilities 01:29:44.690 --> 01:29:46.480 on the ground in Turkey that would threaten 01:29:46.480 --> 01:29:48.890 the presence of our joint strike fighter. 01:29:48.890 --> 01:29:52.530 Why on Earth they would be considering a decision 01:29:52.530 --> 01:29:54.400 that would make us have to rethink 01:29:54.400 --> 01:29:55.960 whether or not they can actually even be 01:29:55.960 --> 01:29:58.480 in the supply chain for the joint strike fighter. 01:29:58.480 --> 01:30:01.470 Let alone deploying assets that 01:30:01.470 --> 01:30:03.840 are scheduled to be there in 2020. 01:30:03.840 --> 01:30:05.740 But even raising doubts about 01:30:05.740 --> 01:30:08.540 whether or not we can legitimately manufacture 01:30:08.540 --> 01:30:10.420 and distribute parts in the supply chain 01:30:10.420 --> 01:30:12.890 for the production of joint strike fighters. 01:30:12.890 --> 01:30:14.460 And the message that I want to send 01:30:14.460 --> 01:30:17.820 to the Turkish leadership is this is an area. 01:30:17.820 --> 01:30:19.970 Congress got educated quite a bit 01:30:19.970 --> 01:30:22.530 on the joint strike fighter and on Turkey last year 01:30:22.530 --> 01:30:23.780 when we were dealing with a matter 01:30:23.780 --> 01:30:27.920 involving a pastor from my state. 01:30:27.920 --> 01:30:30.400 I think we're very well briefed on it now 01:30:30.400 --> 01:30:31.720 on some of the risks there. 01:30:31.720 --> 01:30:34.990 So, I would just encourage the Turkish government 01:30:34.990 --> 01:30:38.220 and the leadership to recognize that 01:30:38.220 --> 01:30:41.350 they should not have this one decision 01:30:41.350 --> 01:30:42.997 put all the other great things that we're doing 01:30:42.997 --> 01:30:45.005 and we will do in the future in the balance 01:30:45.005 --> 01:30:47.270 and have Congress potentially in a position 01:30:47.270 --> 01:30:48.433 where we'd have to act. 01:30:50.360 --> 01:30:51.290 - Senator, thank you. 01:30:51.290 --> 01:30:53.500 As you know, we, in the United States, 01:30:53.500 --> 01:30:57.760 have a team there today talking to the Turks. 01:30:57.760 --> 01:31:00.970 And I'm sure that a very candid conversation 01:31:00.970 --> 01:31:03.240 about the S-400 and the potential consequences 01:31:03.240 --> 01:31:04.840 are a part of that conversation. 01:31:06.650 --> 01:31:08.540 - [Jim] Thank you, Senator Tillis. 01:31:08.540 --> 01:31:09.913 Senator Blumenthal. 01:31:12.700 --> 01:31:14.150 - Thank you, mister chairman. 01:31:15.593 --> 01:31:18.280 General Lyons, let me first ask you a question 01:31:18.280 --> 01:31:19.783 about privatization. 01:31:21.960 --> 01:31:26.467 As you are familiar, as you know, 01:31:27.650 --> 01:31:31.750 Army veteran and military spouse Megan Harless 01:31:31.750 --> 01:31:36.750 recently wrote an op-ed that criticized TransCom's plan 01:31:36.920 --> 01:31:39.883 to privatize the Military Move Program. 01:31:42.380 --> 01:31:46.410 She stated that the Military Move advisory panel 01:31:46.410 --> 01:31:51.080 convened by TransCom has not been consulted 01:31:51.080 --> 01:31:53.057 regarding privatization. 01:31:53.057 --> 01:31:56.477 And TransCom also has not solicited feedback 01:31:56.477 --> 01:32:01.193 from military families or from the moving industry. 01:32:02.780 --> 01:32:07.040 Do military families support privatization? 01:32:07.040 --> 01:32:08.443 Does industry support it? 01:32:09.470 --> 01:32:11.390 - Senator, there is no initiative whatsoever 01:32:11.390 --> 01:32:14.595 to privatize the household good industry. 01:32:14.595 --> 01:32:16.200 This is a. 01:32:16.200 --> 01:32:18.950 100%, every task inside that value chain 01:32:18.950 --> 01:32:21.280 is conducted by commercial industry today. 01:32:21.280 --> 01:32:22.680 What we are proposing, however, 01:32:22.680 --> 01:32:25.470 is a restructure of how the government 01:32:25.470 --> 01:32:27.297 approaches this with industry. 01:32:27.297 --> 01:32:30.352 And I think, to be honest with you, senator, 01:32:30.352 --> 01:32:33.243 I've received more letters on this particular issue 01:32:33.243 --> 01:32:35.460 in the six months I've been commander 01:32:35.460 --> 01:32:37.700 than any other issue that TransCom deals with. 01:32:37.700 --> 01:32:41.070 And, in fact, I agree with the criticism to the program 01:32:41.070 --> 01:32:42.190 and I think we need to take action 01:32:42.190 --> 01:32:45.350 to remedy the program as it exists today. 01:32:45.350 --> 01:32:47.443 We've been studying this since 1996. 01:32:48.622 --> 01:32:51.550 - Will you commit to prioritizing 01:32:51.550 --> 01:32:54.030 the needs of those military families 01:32:54.030 --> 01:32:57.820 in any kinds of reforms that you may consider? 01:32:57.820 --> 01:32:59.050 - Sir, there's no question about it. 01:32:59.050 --> 01:33:01.250 This is all about improving curbside service 01:33:01.250 --> 01:33:02.160 for military families. 01:33:02.160 --> 01:33:03.460 That is our north star. 01:33:03.460 --> 01:33:05.840 That is the only reason that we're doing this, sir. 01:33:05.840 --> 01:33:07.730 - And will you commit to consulting 01:33:07.730 --> 01:33:12.363 with the TransCom advisory panel? 01:33:13.270 --> 01:33:14.103 - Yes, sir. 01:33:14.103 --> 01:33:15.880 We consult regularly with industry. 01:33:15.880 --> 01:33:17.690 Some very, very much support where we're headed. 01:33:17.690 --> 01:33:19.823 And some are very, very concerned. 01:33:20.700 --> 01:33:21.770 I do know, senator, 01:33:21.770 --> 01:33:24.410 that the moving associations, for example, 01:33:24.410 --> 01:33:27.723 are drafting language concerning the NDAA 01:33:27.723 --> 01:33:30.360 that would delay any kind of progress in this area. 01:33:30.360 --> 01:33:32.260 Perhaps they'll study it for two more years. 01:33:32.260 --> 01:33:34.340 I can just say I think that would be a gut punch 01:33:34.340 --> 01:33:36.010 for military families. 01:33:36.010 --> 01:33:39.593 - General Scarpotti, talking about the Ukraine. 01:33:40.820 --> 01:33:42.520 Is there evidence of the Russians 01:33:42.520 --> 01:33:46.933 meddling in the Ukrainian elections as their plan? 01:33:48.480 --> 01:33:52.060 - Well, in terms of their influence, 01:33:52.060 --> 01:33:57.060 they certainly are supporting the parties 01:33:57.970 --> 01:34:01.090 where they believe they can have the most influence. 01:34:01.090 --> 01:34:02.960 And those individuals. 01:34:02.960 --> 01:34:06.700 There are certainly disinformation as a part of that. 01:34:06.700 --> 01:34:11.670 They're playing in that way. 01:34:11.670 --> 01:34:14.350 You know, I think, for instance, 01:34:14.350 --> 01:34:19.260 Russia's seizure of their ships and their 24 sailors 01:34:19.260 --> 01:34:22.140 and the fact that they've not been released 01:34:22.140 --> 01:34:24.930 is likely also another way that 01:34:24.930 --> 01:34:27.780 they have some leverage and influence 01:34:27.780 --> 01:34:30.090 on the outcome of that election. 01:34:30.090 --> 01:34:33.630 - Has there been an increase in disinformation 01:34:33.630 --> 01:34:36.140 or other Russian interference? 01:34:36.140 --> 01:34:40.610 - Well, just generally, it's been targeted 01:34:40.610 --> 01:34:45.420 at undermining the present government and the president. 01:34:45.420 --> 01:34:50.420 - What is your command or other American resources 01:34:50.640 --> 01:34:52.730 doing to counter it? 01:34:52.730 --> 01:34:54.410 - Well, both. 01:34:54.410 --> 01:34:55.450 Not only my command. 01:34:55.450 --> 01:34:57.770 I deal with the military aspects of this. 01:34:57.770 --> 01:35:00.760 But there's others, diplomatically, for instance in State, 01:35:00.760 --> 01:35:03.130 that we're working with in this regard. 01:35:03.130 --> 01:35:07.129 But we do have personnel there 01:35:07.129 --> 01:35:10.373 that support, in military means, 01:35:12.450 --> 01:35:17.320 their defense of this information, appropriate information, 01:35:17.320 --> 01:35:19.350 and cyber defense, as well. 01:35:19.350 --> 01:35:22.610 And, in a closed hearing, I can be more specific about 01:35:22.610 --> 01:35:24.620 precisely what we're doing. 01:35:24.620 --> 01:35:29.620 - Just to reassure the American people, 01:35:30.010 --> 01:35:32.160 and that's the purpose of an open hearing, 01:35:32.160 --> 01:35:35.250 really, to inform the American people, 01:35:35.250 --> 01:35:36.980 can you provide some description 01:35:36.980 --> 01:35:41.163 of what is being done in the cyber domain 01:35:41.163 --> 01:35:45.960 by your command to bolster the Ukrainian defenses? 01:35:45.960 --> 01:35:48.010 - Well, I guess I would underscore, 01:35:48.010 --> 01:35:50.460 first of all, what we do with the other 01:35:50.460 --> 01:35:53.690 just to ensure this is a free and fair election. 01:35:53.690 --> 01:35:55.190 And, within the cyber domain, 01:35:55.190 --> 01:35:56.930 mine is just to help them with 01:35:56.930 --> 01:35:59.773 their defense of their systems. 01:36:01.230 --> 01:36:05.910 So, it's not selective by any means at all. 01:36:05.910 --> 01:36:08.740 It's primarily defense and help them understand 01:36:08.740 --> 01:36:10.680 how they ensure that they do, in fact, 01:36:10.680 --> 01:36:12.193 have a free and fair election. 01:36:13.080 --> 01:36:13.913 - [Richard] Thank you. 01:36:13.913 --> 01:36:15.157 Thank you, mister chairman. 01:36:15.157 --> 01:36:16.746 - Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. 01:36:16.746 --> 01:36:18.153 Senator Blackburn. 01:36:18.153 --> 01:36:20.040 - Thank you, mister chairman. 01:36:20.040 --> 01:36:24.000 And, I will tell you, it has been such a pleasure for me 01:36:24.000 --> 01:36:27.500 to go through this series of hearings 01:36:27.500 --> 01:36:32.500 with our different commands in your area of responsibility 01:36:32.640 --> 01:36:35.820 and hear repeatedly from you all 01:36:35.820 --> 01:36:40.040 some of the needs and stepping up our game, if you will, 01:36:40.040 --> 01:36:42.550 in dealing with Russia and China 01:36:42.550 --> 01:36:45.380 and especially with cyber. 01:36:45.380 --> 01:36:50.380 And, General Scaparrotti, I'm from Tennessee. 01:36:51.260 --> 01:36:53.130 And I've got some National Guardsmen 01:36:53.130 --> 01:36:55.799 that are under your command at this point. 01:36:55.799 --> 01:36:58.970 Folks in the Ukraine and Poland. 01:36:58.970 --> 01:37:01.600 And we appreciate their service. 01:37:01.600 --> 01:37:03.170 And we appreciate you. 01:37:03.170 --> 01:37:06.580 And the leadership you have shown throughout your career 01:37:06.580 --> 01:37:08.440 to our men and women in uniform 01:37:08.440 --> 01:37:12.323 and to those that are currently under your command. 01:37:14.920 --> 01:37:19.920 Let me stay with this looking at our enemies, 01:37:21.340 --> 01:37:25.520 Russia, China, the cyber component. 01:37:25.520 --> 01:37:28.670 We'll come back to that this afternoon in the briefing. 01:37:28.670 --> 01:37:33.670 But what I'd like to know, general, as you look at Europe 01:37:34.000 --> 01:37:37.580 and as we talk about the rollout of 5G 01:37:37.580 --> 01:37:41.920 and you're looking at that European Deterrence Initiative, 01:37:41.920 --> 01:37:43.770 do you have what you need? 01:37:43.770 --> 01:37:48.350 Where do we need to be planning forward on that? 01:37:48.350 --> 01:37:51.800 And how are you approaching the integration 01:37:51.800 --> 01:37:54.340 and the utilization for. 01:37:54.340 --> 01:37:58.530 Really, what some of our troops at Fort Campbell, 01:37:58.530 --> 01:38:00.840 when I talked to some of our special ops guys, 01:38:00.840 --> 01:38:04.840 5th Division, 160th, this is very important to them. 01:38:04.840 --> 01:38:08.833 5G and the utilization of that. 01:38:09.720 --> 01:38:12.670 Knowing that's going to help fuel 01:38:12.670 --> 01:38:14.963 artificial intelligence, et cetera. 01:38:16.110 --> 01:38:17.840 Knowing they're going to use that 01:38:17.840 --> 01:38:20.007 with some of the ISR capabilities. 01:38:20.007 --> 01:38:21.980 So, if you'll just touch on that briefly. 01:38:21.980 --> 01:38:25.313 And then we'll explore it a little more this afternoon. 01:38:26.170 --> 01:38:27.197 - Well, first of all, I'll just start with 01:38:27.197 --> 01:38:28.892 the 5G part of this. 01:38:28.892 --> 01:38:31.540 This is a considerably different capability 01:38:31.540 --> 01:38:33.260 than what we have today. 01:38:33.260 --> 01:38:36.520 It's not just a modernization or an upgrade. 01:38:36.520 --> 01:38:37.513 - [Marsha] It's a whole new world. 01:38:37.513 --> 01:38:39.960 It's like going from analog to digital. 01:38:39.960 --> 01:38:40.793 - That's right. 01:38:40.793 --> 01:38:41.840 It's a different world. 01:38:41.840 --> 01:38:43.400 And what we have to know is 01:38:43.400 --> 01:38:46.700 we have a secure 5G capability. 01:38:46.700 --> 01:38:48.140 That's one of the reasons that, 01:38:48.140 --> 01:38:50.010 when you now go to our allies, 01:38:50.010 --> 01:38:53.250 that we've said they need to be very careful 01:38:53.250 --> 01:38:55.590 about Chinese investment. 01:38:55.590 --> 01:38:57.197 - [Marsha] Yeah, no Huawei and no ZTE. 01:38:57.197 --> 01:39:00.920 - And their telecommunications capabilities. 01:39:00.920 --> 01:39:02.470 Because we also want to know that 01:39:02.470 --> 01:39:05.340 we're secure with our allies that we connect with. 01:39:05.340 --> 01:39:06.880 And there may be an outcome where 01:39:06.880 --> 01:39:08.530 we can't connect with our allies 01:39:08.530 --> 01:39:12.400 unless they change the composition of their system. 01:39:12.400 --> 01:39:13.770 So, we're trying to get ahead of that. 01:39:13.770 --> 01:39:17.553 - So, is this an open discussion that you are having? 01:39:17.553 --> 01:39:18.513 Okay. 01:39:18.513 --> 01:39:19.346 - Yes, an open discussion. 01:39:19.346 --> 01:39:22.095 I would say to you that, just as an idea. 01:39:22.095 --> 01:39:25.072 Getting an idea how this has come along. 01:39:25.072 --> 01:39:27.680 Two years ago, this wouldn't have been a topic. 01:39:27.680 --> 01:39:29.643 A year ago, it was starting to come in. 01:39:29.643 --> 01:39:31.092 And, now. 01:39:31.092 --> 01:39:32.943 - [Marsha] It's front and center. 01:39:32.943 --> 01:39:33.857 - And now it's front and center. 01:39:33.857 --> 01:39:36.500 And we're beginning to have the right conversations 01:39:36.500 --> 01:39:39.280 as a security issue. 01:39:39.280 --> 01:39:40.113 - That's great. 01:39:40.113 --> 01:39:45.113 General Lyons, TransCom's had some problems 01:39:45.170 --> 01:39:46.980 with some breaches. 01:39:46.980 --> 01:39:50.980 And I think it was a couple of years ago hackers, 01:39:50.980 --> 01:39:54.333 Chinese hackers, got into the network, like, 20 times. 01:39:55.480 --> 01:39:58.190 What you do and with logistics. 01:39:58.190 --> 01:40:01.500 And we've talked about different points. 01:40:01.500 --> 01:40:05.110 I think Chairman Wicker brought up Rota, Spain. 01:40:05.110 --> 01:40:08.040 And, as you look at the integration 01:40:08.040 --> 01:40:10.373 and all that comes under you, 01:40:11.950 --> 01:40:16.880 give me an update on the security of your systems? 01:40:16.880 --> 01:40:21.620 And then how are you dealing with contractors 01:40:21.620 --> 01:40:25.033 that are a part of your system? 01:40:26.090 --> 01:40:27.450 - Yes, ma'am. 01:40:27.450 --> 01:40:29.660 As you indicated, this is an area of concern. 01:40:29.660 --> 01:40:31.510 It's a high priority for the command. 01:40:32.590 --> 01:40:35.570 You know, I tell folks this is a warfighting domain. 01:40:35.570 --> 01:40:38.689 So, there's no one thing that's gonna solve this. 01:40:38.689 --> 01:40:40.900 So, we've got multiple things going on. 01:40:40.900 --> 01:40:44.140 Everything from just operator discipline 01:40:44.140 --> 01:40:47.360 through cyber hygiene through defense through infrastructure 01:40:47.360 --> 01:40:49.940 and a high level of collaboration with Cyber Command 01:40:49.940 --> 01:40:52.007 to create conditions, potentially costing position, 01:40:52.007 --> 01:40:54.310 to allow us to operate. 01:40:54.310 --> 01:40:56.460 As for our industry partners, 01:40:56.460 --> 01:40:58.670 we're also upping our game there 01:40:58.670 --> 01:40:59.797 through our contractual language 01:40:59.797 --> 01:41:02.520 and their compliance with NIST standards. 01:41:02.520 --> 01:41:03.930 Basically, there are assessments 01:41:03.930 --> 01:41:06.180 in collaboration and information sharing. 01:41:06.180 --> 01:41:09.180 But that is a much more complex area 01:41:09.180 --> 01:41:13.000 outside of the doden where the level of protection is lower. 01:41:13.000 --> 01:41:17.690 And that does become a vulnerability in the enterprise. 01:41:17.690 --> 01:41:19.210 - We'll talk a little more about that 01:41:19.210 --> 01:41:20.830 in this afternoon's hearing. 01:41:20.830 --> 01:41:22.393 Mister chairman, I yield back. 01:41:25.650 --> 01:41:26.483 - Thank you, mister chair. 01:41:26.483 --> 01:41:28.187 And thanks to the witnesses for your service 01:41:28.187 --> 01:41:29.563 and your testimony. 01:41:30.400 --> 01:41:32.690 A House bill to overturn 01:41:32.690 --> 01:41:34.750 President Trump's emergency declaration 01:41:34.750 --> 01:41:37.090 is pending before this committee 01:41:37.090 --> 01:41:40.220 and will likely be voted on in the floor of the Senate 01:41:40.220 --> 01:41:42.000 within the next 10 days or so. 01:41:42.000 --> 01:41:43.290 There's at least two issues that 01:41:43.290 --> 01:41:45.260 senators are grappling with about the bill. 01:41:45.260 --> 01:41:50.260 One, the question of whether there is an emergency. 01:41:50.320 --> 01:41:51.950 General O'Shaughnessy of NorthCom 01:41:51.950 --> 01:41:53.460 testified before us last week and said, 01:41:53.460 --> 01:41:54.750 in a very straightforward way, 01:41:54.750 --> 01:41:58.430 there is no military emergency at the border. 01:41:58.430 --> 01:42:00.010 But the second issue we're grappling with 01:42:00.010 --> 01:42:01.770 is where will the money come from? 01:42:01.770 --> 01:42:04.210 The president has proposed to use $6 billion 01:42:04.210 --> 01:42:06.610 from the Pentagon to direct 01:42:06.610 --> 01:42:08.397 towards this nonmilitary emergency. 01:42:08.397 --> 01:42:11.620 $3.5 billion of MilCon funding 01:42:11.620 --> 01:42:14.670 and $2.5 billion of drug interdiction moneys 01:42:14.670 --> 01:42:16.880 within the DoD budget. 01:42:16.880 --> 01:42:19.870 I want to ask you about these proposals. 01:42:19.870 --> 01:42:21.620 Because we are trying to get information 01:42:21.620 --> 01:42:25.900 about exactly how the moving of the $6 billion 01:42:25.900 --> 01:42:28.270 is gonna affect military operations. 01:42:28.270 --> 01:42:30.310 Have either of you, in your commands, 01:42:30.310 --> 01:42:34.840 been asked to provide lists of MilCon projects 01:42:34.840 --> 01:42:39.673 that should be either delayed or reduced or eliminated? 01:42:40.590 --> 01:42:44.390 With respect to this particular $3.5 billion proposal. 01:42:44.390 --> 01:42:45.300 General Scaparrotti. 01:42:45.300 --> 01:42:47.577 - [Curtis] Not with respect to this proposal. 01:42:47.577 --> 01:42:48.550 No, sir. 01:42:48.550 --> 01:42:49.653 - General Lyons. 01:42:51.230 --> 01:42:52.063 - No, sir. 01:42:52.063 --> 01:42:53.610 But it probably wouldn't be appropriate. 01:42:53.610 --> 01:42:56.490 TransCom relies on services for their MilCon. 01:42:56.490 --> 01:42:59.500 - Right, so, you don't have the big MilCon backlist 01:42:59.500 --> 01:43:00.766 that the others do, I understand. 01:43:00.766 --> 01:43:01.599 - [Stephen] That's correct. 01:43:01.599 --> 01:43:02.950 - And, General Scaparrotti, when you say 01:43:02.950 --> 01:43:04.770 not with respect to this proposal, 01:43:04.770 --> 01:43:07.090 I gather what you mean by that is 01:43:07.090 --> 01:43:10.360 you are often putting together MilCon lists. 01:43:10.360 --> 01:43:13.200 That would be one of the things you would do in EuCom 01:43:13.200 --> 01:43:16.580 is looking at MilCon needs within that command. 01:43:16.580 --> 01:43:18.630 And so, you've been doing that. 01:43:18.630 --> 01:43:22.230 But you haven't been asked with respect to this proposal 01:43:22.230 --> 01:43:24.530 what MilCon projects could be 01:43:24.530 --> 01:43:26.143 reduced, delayed, or eliminated? 01:43:27.050 --> 01:43:28.570 - With respect to the budget as a whole, 01:43:28.570 --> 01:43:30.330 well prior to this question, 01:43:30.330 --> 01:43:32.200 we went through the normal process 01:43:32.200 --> 01:43:37.200 of our discussion within DoD as to 01:43:38.593 --> 01:43:42.550 what the priorities were across the department 01:43:42.550 --> 01:43:44.798 with respect to my MilCon. 01:43:44.798 --> 01:43:45.920 And so, we had to prioritize. 01:43:45.920 --> 01:43:47.010 We did delay some. 01:43:47.010 --> 01:43:49.030 But that was well before this conversation. 01:43:49.030 --> 01:43:53.010 - Do you know if and when a decision is made 01:43:53.010 --> 01:43:56.198 about where the $3.5 billion of MilCon projects 01:43:56.198 --> 01:43:58.830 which will be affected? 01:43:58.830 --> 01:44:01.580 Do you know whether you'll be in that decision loop 01:44:01.580 --> 01:44:04.140 or whether it will be made by others? 01:44:04.140 --> 01:44:05.780 - I expect I'll be in the decision loop. 01:44:05.780 --> 01:44:07.280 I mean, within the department, 01:44:08.160 --> 01:44:09.830 we have a close relationship with them. 01:44:09.830 --> 01:44:10.860 We generally have. 01:44:10.860 --> 01:44:12.210 No one's discussed it with me. 01:44:12.210 --> 01:44:14.950 And I am confident they would when and if that. 01:44:14.950 --> 01:44:17.826 - And the they would probably be the service secretaries 01:44:17.826 --> 01:44:19.252 and the SecDef. 01:44:19.252 --> 01:44:22.160 - It would be the service secretary or the SecDef. 01:44:22.160 --> 01:44:25.383 Probably the SecDef, as well. 01:44:25.383 --> 01:44:28.081 I mean, I actually talked to the SecDef personally 01:44:28.081 --> 01:44:30.870 about the potential delay, et cetera, 01:44:30.870 --> 01:44:32.060 that I just told you about 01:44:32.060 --> 01:44:33.860 as we were going through the budget. 01:44:35.040 --> 01:44:37.137 - Let me ask the second half of the question. 01:44:37.137 --> 01:44:41.730 The other funding that is suggested could be used 01:44:41.730 --> 01:44:43.640 is the $2.5 billion drug interdiction 01:44:43.640 --> 01:44:44.830 account at the Pentagon. 01:44:44.830 --> 01:44:46.700 Reporting suggests that 01:44:46.700 --> 01:44:48.690 there's not $2.5 billion in that account. 01:44:48.690 --> 01:44:50.190 There's about 750 million. 01:44:50.190 --> 01:44:54.160 Of which only 85 million is available for use right now. 01:44:54.160 --> 01:44:55.400 And there is a suggestion that 01:44:55.400 --> 01:44:57.820 what the Pentagon would do would be to 01:44:57.820 --> 01:45:00.180 take moneys out of other accounts 01:45:00.180 --> 01:45:02.120 to fill up the drug interdiction account 01:45:02.120 --> 01:45:04.340 to $2.5 billion prior to using it 01:45:04.340 --> 01:45:07.670 for the emergency proposal that the president has suggested. 01:45:07.670 --> 01:45:09.620 Have either of you been involved 01:45:09.620 --> 01:45:14.620 in any discussions about funds within your bailiwick 01:45:14.950 --> 01:45:16.680 that might be used to pull in 01:45:16.680 --> 01:45:18.553 to the drug interdiction account? 01:45:19.790 --> 01:45:20.910 - No, senator, I haven't. 01:45:20.910 --> 01:45:22.200 - [Tim] General Lyons. 01:45:22.200 --> 01:45:23.290 - [Stephen] No, sir. 01:45:23.290 --> 01:45:25.900 - General Scaparrotti, let me ask you about this. 01:45:25.900 --> 01:45:29.080 70th anniversary of NATO is in April. 01:45:29.080 --> 01:45:30.190 Really important one. 01:45:30.190 --> 01:45:33.140 NATO has a headquarters both in Brussels 01:45:33.140 --> 01:45:36.808 and also in Virginia in the Hampton Roads area. 01:45:36.808 --> 01:45:41.160 I have a proposal bill that is a bipartisan bill 01:45:41.160 --> 01:45:43.197 that would stipulate that NATO, 01:45:43.197 --> 01:45:45.107 the treaty that the Senate ratified, 01:45:45.107 --> 01:45:48.720 the US should not unilaterally withdraw from that 01:45:48.720 --> 01:45:52.820 without either a Senate vote or an act of Congress. 01:45:52.820 --> 01:45:54.090 The bill is a bipartisan one. 01:45:54.090 --> 01:45:55.720 And it's meant to send a strong signal 01:45:55.720 --> 01:45:58.470 of congressional support for the NATO alliance 01:45:58.470 --> 01:45:59.700 at the 70th anniversary. 01:45:59.700 --> 01:46:01.370 Would that message be 01:46:01.370 --> 01:46:04.180 positively received by our NATO allies? 01:46:04.180 --> 01:46:05.440 - Senator, I believe it would. 01:46:05.440 --> 01:46:07.019 And the votes by Congress that 01:46:07.019 --> 01:46:08.643 they have taken in the past to reinforce 01:46:08.643 --> 01:46:11.710 our commitment to our allies have been helpful, as well. 01:46:11.710 --> 01:46:12.856 - Right. 01:46:12.856 --> 01:46:13.689 Thank you. 01:46:13.689 --> 01:46:14.522 No further questions. 01:46:14.522 --> 01:46:16.350 Thanks, mister chair. 01:46:16.350 --> 01:46:18.910 - Thank you, gentlemen, very much for being here today 01:46:18.910 --> 01:46:21.340 and willing to answer questions. 01:46:21.340 --> 01:46:22.610 Like so many of my colleagues, 01:46:22.610 --> 01:46:23.560 I do want to make sure that 01:46:23.560 --> 01:46:26.750 you have the tools and resources necessary 01:46:26.750 --> 01:46:30.800 to enable you in your missions and make you successful. 01:46:30.800 --> 01:46:34.320 As Senator Sullivan mentioned just a little bit earlier, 01:46:34.320 --> 01:46:39.080 I did recently return from a trip to Ukraine. 01:46:39.080 --> 01:46:43.100 And, during that trip, I was able to see firsthand 01:46:43.100 --> 01:46:46.390 the Russian aggression that is being exhibited 01:46:46.390 --> 01:46:49.540 in that region against what is a very important 01:46:49.540 --> 01:46:52.070 strategic partner to us. 01:46:52.070 --> 01:46:55.530 So, not only do we want to push back against Russia 01:46:55.530 --> 01:46:57.300 because of Ukraine and Europe, 01:46:57.300 --> 01:46:59.780 but, of course, for many of our 01:46:59.780 --> 01:47:01.870 other allies around the world, as well. 01:47:01.870 --> 01:47:05.493 And, General Scaparrotti, I'd like to start with you, sir. 01:47:07.064 --> 01:47:08.748 Of course, while I was in Ukraine, 01:47:08.748 --> 01:47:12.390 the Ukrainians expressed a very strong desire 01:47:12.390 --> 01:47:15.340 for military assistance. 01:47:15.340 --> 01:47:20.226 Defensive assistance and lethal assistance. 01:47:20.226 --> 01:47:22.560 And Senator Sullivan mentioned that 01:47:22.560 --> 01:47:27.070 we have provided Javelins to the Ukrainian army. 01:47:27.070 --> 01:47:30.840 So, I met with members of the defense establishment there, 01:47:30.840 --> 01:47:34.484 as well as members of the parliament, Ukrainian parliament. 01:47:34.484 --> 01:47:38.420 And, those that I had the opportunity to meet with in Kiev 01:47:38.420 --> 01:47:41.820 and also the joint forces headquarters 01:47:41.820 --> 01:47:43.080 near the eastern front, 01:47:43.080 --> 01:47:46.370 they really appreciated that assistance. 01:47:46.370 --> 01:47:51.370 What more can we do for the Ukrainians in that regard 01:47:52.040 --> 01:47:53.710 for lethal assistance? 01:47:53.710 --> 01:47:55.500 Is it just simply more Javelins 01:47:55.500 --> 01:47:58.693 or is there additional assistance we can provide? 01:47:59.770 --> 01:48:00.700 - Well, there is. 01:48:00.700 --> 01:48:04.550 I think, personally, and you'll see soon here a list. 01:48:04.550 --> 01:48:06.360 I think it's already been provided to Congress. 01:48:06.360 --> 01:48:07.910 But, as you know, we provide that 01:48:07.910 --> 01:48:10.480 prior to it being authorized. 01:48:10.480 --> 01:48:13.520 The actual purchase from the funding that you've given. 01:48:13.520 --> 01:48:15.046 But, from my point of view, 01:48:15.046 --> 01:48:18.780 the things that we need to continue their support 01:48:18.780 --> 01:48:22.060 for counter-battery, Q-36/37. 01:48:22.060 --> 01:48:24.730 That they have the assets and the systems 01:48:24.730 --> 01:48:26.710 that they need to do that well. 01:48:26.710 --> 01:48:28.886 They've asked us for help in communication 01:48:28.886 --> 01:48:30.880 at an operational level. 01:48:30.880 --> 01:48:33.040 And they do have a distinct need for that. 01:48:33.040 --> 01:48:35.360 Because, while we focus on the line of contact, 01:48:35.360 --> 01:48:37.580 their chief of defense is also focused 01:48:37.580 --> 01:48:41.620 on other areas of the country that are a threat. 01:48:41.620 --> 01:48:43.680 That Russia could present a threat, as well. 01:48:43.680 --> 01:48:44.910 So, he's trying to determine. 01:48:44.910 --> 01:48:47.950 He's trying to establish a good communication system 01:48:47.950 --> 01:48:49.700 for his entire force. 01:48:49.700 --> 01:48:51.815 As well as just the front. 01:48:51.815 --> 01:48:55.740 They've asked us specifically for some assistance 01:48:55.740 --> 01:48:58.180 to help with sniper proficiency, 01:48:58.180 --> 01:49:01.963 the right kind of ammo and weapons, grenade launchers. 01:49:01.963 --> 01:49:04.545 And then, finally, the area that I would say. 01:49:04.545 --> 01:49:09.400 We need to study how we help their maritime component. 01:49:09.400 --> 01:49:10.640 Their navy. 01:49:10.640 --> 01:49:12.730 Which, as you know, is not large to begin with. 01:49:12.730 --> 01:49:15.820 Given the portion of the fleet that Russia took 01:49:15.820 --> 01:49:18.040 when it annexed Crimea. 01:49:18.040 --> 01:49:20.960 And they just lost a couple of ships, as well, 01:49:20.960 --> 01:49:22.280 in the Kerch Strait. 01:49:22.280 --> 01:49:23.940 So, I think there's some areas there 01:49:23.940 --> 01:49:27.700 that we can help them get this navy back up 01:49:27.700 --> 01:49:30.420 and begin to supply it with what they believe they need 01:49:30.420 --> 01:49:34.070 to defend themselves and deter Russia's aggressive actions. 01:49:34.070 --> 01:49:35.820 - I appreciate that very much, sir. 01:49:35.820 --> 01:49:39.140 And thank you for bringing up the Kerch Strait incident, 01:49:39.140 --> 01:49:41.500 because they are still holding those 24 sailors, 01:49:41.500 --> 01:49:43.400 as you referenced earlier. 01:49:43.400 --> 01:49:46.930 And using those sailors as leverage. 01:49:46.930 --> 01:49:49.010 With the elections coming up. 01:49:49.010 --> 01:49:53.440 So, I do appreciate that you think we need to do more 01:49:53.440 --> 01:49:54.973 on the maritime front. 01:49:54.973 --> 01:49:58.870 Not only in assisting them with their navy, 01:49:58.870 --> 01:50:03.870 but is it possible that we, as an American force, 01:50:03.930 --> 01:50:06.100 need to have more of our naval forces 01:50:06.100 --> 01:50:08.083 in the Black Sea region? 01:50:09.080 --> 01:50:12.090 - Both the United States and NATO 01:50:12.090 --> 01:50:14.530 has stepped up its presence in the Black Sea. 01:50:14.530 --> 01:50:16.010 As you know, we just had. 01:50:16.010 --> 01:50:19.749 The Donald Cook just departed yesterday or the day before. 01:50:19.749 --> 01:50:22.054 And it's the second time that 01:50:22.054 --> 01:50:25.410 we've had a destroyer in the Black Sea 01:50:25.410 --> 01:50:26.590 here in the past two months. 01:50:26.590 --> 01:50:31.030 So, we believe there is a need for that. 01:50:31.030 --> 01:50:31.863 We've stepped up. 01:50:31.863 --> 01:50:33.040 And our allies have, as well. 01:50:33.040 --> 01:50:35.620 NATO has a fleet right now in the Black Sea. 01:50:35.620 --> 01:50:37.560 - Do you think it's sending a clear message 01:50:37.560 --> 01:50:39.280 to President Vladimir Putin? 01:50:39.280 --> 01:50:40.383 - I think it is. 01:50:40.383 --> 01:50:43.550 I mean, they frankly don't like us in the Black Sea. 01:50:43.550 --> 01:50:44.870 And it's international waters. 01:50:44.870 --> 01:50:46.610 And we should sail and fly there. 01:50:46.610 --> 01:50:47.510 - And that's a great thing. 01:50:47.510 --> 01:50:48.343 And I love it. 01:50:48.343 --> 01:50:49.513 So, thank you, sir. 01:50:50.700 --> 01:50:52.760 The presidential elections are coming up. 01:50:52.760 --> 01:50:54.430 And I'll just close with this. 01:50:54.430 --> 01:50:56.990 I think it was very important that 01:50:56.990 --> 01:50:59.270 I take this trip to Ukraine 01:50:59.270 --> 01:51:04.270 and spend time with the folks within their defense sector. 01:51:04.540 --> 01:51:07.035 And also spend time with some of 01:51:07.035 --> 01:51:10.622 their brand new special operations forces 01:51:10.622 --> 01:51:14.870 that had just graduated from their Ukrainian cube course. 01:51:14.870 --> 01:51:19.870 Which is run by our American special operations forces. 01:51:20.530 --> 01:51:23.110 I appreciate what we're doing in that region, sir. 01:51:23.110 --> 01:51:25.310 I appreciate your leadership in that region. 01:51:25.310 --> 01:51:27.910 Gentlemen, thank you very much for being here today. 01:51:32.695 --> 01:51:33.528 - Thank you, mister chairman. 01:51:33.528 --> 01:51:34.840 Thank you both for being here today 01:51:34.840 --> 01:51:36.350 and for your service. 01:51:36.350 --> 01:51:37.767 General Scaparrotti, I appreciate you 01:51:37.767 --> 01:51:39.500 coming by the office the other day. 01:51:39.500 --> 01:51:40.960 I enjoyed that very much. 01:51:40.960 --> 01:51:44.563 I also appreciated your candid answers 01:51:44.563 --> 01:51:46.400 concerning climate change. 01:51:46.400 --> 01:51:48.310 I think we sometimes get caught up 01:51:48.310 --> 01:51:50.350 in the political discussions about climate 01:51:50.350 --> 01:51:52.330 and not really focused on 01:51:52.330 --> 01:51:57.140 the real world consequences that are affecting us today. 01:51:57.140 --> 01:51:59.645 Earlier today, you spoke with Senator Cotton 01:51:59.645 --> 01:52:03.710 about China's investments in your AOR. 01:52:03.710 --> 01:52:06.909 And, if you can, I'd like to have you discuss what, 01:52:06.909 --> 01:52:10.010 if any, actions EuCom may be taking 01:52:10.010 --> 01:52:12.803 to counter China's activities in Europe today. 01:52:14.710 --> 01:52:17.560 - Well, most of all, you know, in terms of EuCom, 01:52:17.560 --> 01:52:21.170 it's discussions with our counterparts and leaders 01:52:21.170 --> 01:52:24.640 about the concerns of China's 01:52:24.640 --> 01:52:27.490 what I would say is strategic investments. 01:52:27.490 --> 01:52:30.283 Most of this is diplomatic at this point. 01:52:31.197 --> 01:52:33.450 But we do try to ensure that 01:52:33.450 --> 01:52:36.960 we can point out to them not only economic benefits, 01:52:36.960 --> 01:52:41.460 which China demonstrates and makes sure they're aware of, 01:52:41.460 --> 01:52:44.620 but also the security aspects 01:52:44.620 --> 01:52:48.214 of their control of seaports, airports, 01:52:48.214 --> 01:52:52.360 critical key terrain, investment in infrastructure. 01:52:52.360 --> 01:52:56.200 Particularly with technology that's critical to security. 01:52:56.200 --> 01:52:58.690 So, we try to emphasize the security aspects 01:52:58.690 --> 01:53:00.010 of their investments. 01:53:00.010 --> 01:53:04.110 - Has the administration's tactics 01:53:04.110 --> 01:53:07.310 with regard to the tariffs and European tariffs. 01:53:07.310 --> 01:53:12.310 Have you seen any effect on that with any of our allies? 01:53:12.560 --> 01:53:13.853 The economic impact. 01:53:15.060 --> 01:53:18.278 - Well, you know, there's certainly a point of discussion 01:53:18.278 --> 01:53:19.985 among the allies. 01:53:19.985 --> 01:53:21.500 And one of concern. 01:53:21.500 --> 01:53:24.170 Because our country and Europe 01:53:24.170 --> 01:53:29.170 has a very significant trade and economic linkage there. 01:53:30.957 --> 01:53:35.957 But, in terms of the direct impact for me in the mil-to-mil, 01:53:36.765 --> 01:53:39.090 the mil-to-mil relationships are strong. 01:53:39.090 --> 01:53:42.120 That essentially is dealt with in the diplomatic side. 01:53:42.120 --> 01:53:43.360 - Thank you, sir. 01:53:43.360 --> 01:53:46.010 General Lyons, can I go back to a conversation 01:53:46.010 --> 01:53:49.450 you had with Senator King on cybersecurity? 01:53:49.450 --> 01:53:52.560 If you can in this hearing, 01:53:52.560 --> 01:53:55.500 as opposed to the closed hearing, 01:53:55.500 --> 01:53:58.730 could you please maybe describe the impact 01:53:58.730 --> 01:54:01.470 on operations if a nation state cyber attack 01:54:01.470 --> 01:54:03.540 on TransCom's networks 01:54:03.540 --> 01:54:06.937 and how this could impact your discussions 01:54:06.937 --> 01:54:09.423 and your ability and interaction with CoComs? 01:54:10.670 --> 01:54:13.880 - Senator, anything that would degrade our value 01:54:13.880 --> 01:54:16.150 to project power is a concern. 01:54:16.150 --> 01:54:18.180 Cyber, as a warfighting domain, 01:54:18.180 --> 01:54:20.510 does create an area of vulnerability 01:54:20.510 --> 01:54:24.650 across what's largely an unclassified surface 01:54:24.650 --> 01:54:26.470 of employment. 01:54:26.470 --> 01:54:28.880 And so, we're working very, very hard 01:54:28.880 --> 01:54:31.590 to prioritize and to ensure that we have 01:54:31.590 --> 01:54:33.720 the appropriate level of resiliency 01:54:33.720 --> 01:54:36.700 and to move to an infrastructure that's more secure. 01:54:36.700 --> 01:54:39.448 And we're moving very, very rapidly in that area. 01:54:39.448 --> 01:54:40.380 - Great. 01:54:40.380 --> 01:54:42.130 Well, just staying with you, General Lyons. 01:54:42.130 --> 01:54:44.190 You mentioned earlier that there was a plan 01:54:44.190 --> 01:54:47.340 to improve the household goods shipment process 01:54:47.340 --> 01:54:49.941 using a single contractor to manage 01:54:49.941 --> 01:54:52.820 transportation service providers. 01:54:52.820 --> 01:54:56.970 How will that change, improve the process? 01:54:56.970 --> 01:54:58.020 What will it cost? 01:54:58.020 --> 01:55:00.053 And will it increase accountability? 01:55:01.120 --> 01:55:04.010 - Senator, it will definitely increase accountability. 01:55:04.010 --> 01:55:06.060 And I believe it will also increase capacity. 01:55:06.060 --> 01:55:08.010 And those are the two major issues. 01:55:08.010 --> 01:55:10.000 Those are the two major complaints. 01:55:10.000 --> 01:55:12.820 And the way that enhances capacity is 01:55:12.820 --> 01:55:15.440 it's a longer term investment with our industry partners. 01:55:15.440 --> 01:55:18.360 And so, they're willing to invest in capacity over time, 01:55:18.360 --> 01:55:21.600 as well as reducing barriers to entry into the market 01:55:21.600 --> 01:55:24.349 that we, unfortunately, create for ourselves. 01:55:24.349 --> 01:55:27.280 There's no question it'll improve accountability. 01:55:27.280 --> 01:55:29.220 Today, there are 01:55:29.220 --> 01:55:32.720 950 various transportation service providers 01:55:32.720 --> 01:55:35.643 that compete for work on a transactional basis. 01:55:35.643 --> 01:55:38.630 Very, very difficult to cross the services 01:55:38.630 --> 01:55:41.440 and TransCom to maintain accountability of all that. 01:55:41.440 --> 01:55:44.880 But the business folks know the business. 01:55:44.880 --> 01:55:46.540 And that's the right relationship to have 01:55:46.540 --> 01:55:48.349 with a single move manager. 01:55:48.349 --> 01:55:49.182 - Alright. 01:55:49.182 --> 01:55:50.015 Well, great. 01:55:50.015 --> 01:55:50.848 Thank you both for being here. 01:55:50.848 --> 01:55:53.010 Mister chairman, I yield back the remainder of my time. 01:55:53.010 --> 01:55:53.843 Thank you. 01:55:53.843 --> 01:55:56.250 - Thank you, Senator Jones. 01:55:56.250 --> 01:55:59.620 Well, it looks like we've run out of members here. 01:55:59.620 --> 01:56:01.410 So, we'll call this a close. 01:56:01.410 --> 01:56:02.243 Let me. 01:56:02.243 --> 01:56:06.014 Several people have, during the course of this hearing, 01:56:06.014 --> 01:56:09.900 General Scaparrotti, have speculated this may be 01:56:09.900 --> 01:56:13.570 your last time that you attend this hearing. 01:56:13.570 --> 01:56:18.570 And I notice it's also your birthday today. 01:56:19.170 --> 01:56:21.613 Is this a birthday present to you? 01:56:23.490 --> 01:56:24.323 - Yes, sir. 01:56:24.323 --> 01:56:26.720 It's Congress's birthday present, I assume. 01:56:26.720 --> 01:56:29.910 - Well, we thank you so much for all the service. 01:56:29.910 --> 01:56:30.743 Both of you. 01:56:30.743 --> 01:56:33.860 But particularly you, 'cause you've appeared so many times. 01:56:33.860 --> 01:56:36.640 And, has been pointed out by Senator Reed, 01:56:36.640 --> 01:56:38.720 you've held the fourth star 01:56:38.720 --> 01:56:40.860 longer than anybody else in existence here. 01:56:40.860 --> 01:56:43.890 So, you've served your country in a way that 01:56:43.890 --> 01:56:45.080 many others have not. 01:56:45.080 --> 01:56:47.083 Thank you so much for that service. 01:56:48.657 --> 01:56:49.490 Anything else? 01:56:49.490 --> 01:56:50.323 - No, mister chairman. 01:56:50.323 --> 01:56:53.980 Just let me join in thanking both General Scaparrotti 01:56:53.980 --> 01:56:54.813 and General Lyon. 01:56:54.813 --> 01:56:55.673 Thank you. 01:56:56.940 --> 01:56:57.970 - We're adjourned. 01:56:57.970 --> 01:56:58.803 Thank you.