WEBVTT 00:04.729 --> 00:07.030 - The Committee meets today to consider the nominations 00:07.030 --> 00:09.560 of General Frank McKenzie 00:09.560 --> 00:11.380 to be Commander of the Central Command 00:11.380 --> 00:14.590 and Lieutenant General Richard Clarke 00:14.590 --> 00:17.360 to be the Commander of the Special Operations Command. 00:17.360 --> 00:20.203 Of course, we appreciate very much 00:20.203 --> 00:23.100 your many years of service and will expect 00:24.310 --> 00:26.980 when you are recognized for your opening statements 00:26.980 --> 00:29.200 that you recognize your family, 00:29.200 --> 00:33.470 that it is a very important part of your being here today. 00:33.470 --> 00:36.140 We do have some required questions 00:36.140 --> 00:40.110 and I'd ask you to answer these questions so that, 00:40.110 --> 00:43.650 audibly, so we'll be able to hear your response. 00:43.650 --> 00:46.200 The first one, have you adhered to the applicable laws 00:46.200 --> 00:49.210 and regulations governing conflicts of interest? 00:49.210 --> 00:50.830 - [Frank] I will. 00:50.830 --> 00:51.663 - I will. 00:51.663 --> 00:52.730 - All right. 00:52.730 --> 00:55.400 Do you agree when asked to give your personal views, 00:55.400 --> 00:58.403 even if those views differ from the administration in power? 00:58.403 --> 00:59.510 - I will. - I will. 00:59.510 --> 01:02.610 - Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions 01:02.610 --> 01:04.810 which would appear to presume 01:04.810 --> 01:07.823 the outcome of the confirmation process? 01:09.300 --> 01:10.193 - No, sir. - No. 01:11.410 --> 01:13.753 - Thank you, prompting does help. 01:16.170 --> 01:18.580 Will you ensure that your staff complies with deadlines 01:18.580 --> 01:21.610 established for requested communications 01:21.610 --> 01:24.000 including questions for the record in hearings? 01:24.000 --> 01:24.833 - I will. - I will. 01:24.833 --> 01:27.500 - Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers 01:27.500 --> 01:30.170 in response to Congressional request? 01:30.170 --> 01:31.170 - I will. - I will. 01:32.633 --> 01:36.720 - Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal 01:36.720 --> 01:39.260 for their testimony or briefings? 01:39.260 --> 01:40.950 - They will. - Yes, sir. 01:40.950 --> 01:44.160 - Do you agree if confirmed to appear and testify 01:44.160 --> 01:46.313 upon request before this Committee? 01:47.220 --> 01:48.053 - I do. - I will. 01:48.053 --> 01:50.350 - And lastly, do you agree to provide documents 01:50.350 --> 01:53.710 including copies of electronic forms of communications 01:53.710 --> 01:55.580 in a timely manner when requested 01:55.580 --> 01:57.430 by a duly constituted Committee 01:57.430 --> 02:00.200 or to consult with the Committee regarding 02:00.200 --> 02:03.580 the basis of any good faith delay or denial 02:03.580 --> 02:07.120 in providing such documents? 02:07.120 --> 02:08.440 - I do. - I will. 02:08.440 --> 02:10.510 - Thank you both for your decades 02:10.510 --> 02:12.830 of service to our country. 02:12.830 --> 02:16.230 We appreciate the great work that you have done. 02:16.230 --> 02:18.570 The Committee recently held a hearing to discuss 02:18.570 --> 02:22.223 the fundings of the National Defense Strategy Commission. 02:23.350 --> 02:26.680 Their report says the Commission assesses unequivocally 02:26.680 --> 02:30.850 that the NDS is not adequately resourced. 02:30.850 --> 02:34.530 It's clear we must provide sufficient sustainable 02:34.530 --> 02:38.450 and predictable funding to make the NDS a reality. 02:38.450 --> 02:41.090 During the hearing, Ambassador Edelman highlighted 02:41.090 --> 02:44.140 the bipartisan conclusions reached by this Commission. 02:44.140 --> 02:46.000 By the way, this Commission Report. 02:46.000 --> 02:48.800 Have both of you read this Commission Report? 02:48.800 --> 02:49.954 - Yes, sir. - I have. 02:49.954 --> 02:51.900 - Yeah, it's one of the best reports 02:51.900 --> 02:56.220 in my years of experience I've heard and put together. 02:56.220 --> 02:58.270 It tells a lot of the hard truths 02:58.270 --> 03:01.343 you don't like to talk about, what our condition is today, 03:01.343 --> 03:04.750 what we need to, how we need to improve it. 03:04.750 --> 03:06.970 General McKenzie, the NDS Commission 03:08.280 --> 03:11.690 Report noted that the National Defense Strategy Talks 03:11.690 --> 03:14.740 are about accepting more risk in the Middle East, 03:14.740 --> 03:19.440 but was vague on where that risk might be taken, 03:19.440 --> 03:21.800 for example, in the fight against ISIS 03:21.800 --> 03:25.090 or containing Iran or in Afghanistan. 03:25.090 --> 03:27.110 Look forward to your views on what 03:27.110 --> 03:31.540 accepting more risk in the Middle East might look like. 03:31.540 --> 03:34.410 General Clarke, if confirmed, you will be responsible 03:34.410 --> 03:37.200 for ensuring our Special Operation Forces 03:37.200 --> 03:40.440 are trained and equipped and ready to implement the NDS 03:40.440 --> 03:43.330 and confront threats across the spectrum. 03:43.330 --> 03:45.780 So appreciate your being here today. 03:45.780 --> 03:48.740 We are going to be interested, particularly, 03:48.740 --> 03:51.140 in your comments on our peer competition 03:52.760 --> 03:53.783 in both, 03:59.547 --> 04:02.730 in the threats that we are faced today. 04:02.730 --> 04:03.850 Senator Reed. 04:03.850 --> 04:05.370 - Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, 04:05.370 --> 04:08.070 and like to join you in welcoming the nominees. 04:08.070 --> 04:10.810 Thank you both for your willingness to serve in positions 04:10.810 --> 04:12.957 of great responsibility in the Department of Defense 04:12.957 --> 04:16.080 and would also like to thank your family members who, 04:16.080 --> 04:18.810 like all military families, sacrifice so much 04:18.810 --> 04:22.030 for the security of our nation, so thank you all. 04:22.030 --> 04:24.410 And I would also note with a heavy heart 04:24.410 --> 04:26.330 the loss of the U.S. 5th Fleet Commander 04:26.330 --> 04:28.823 Vice Admiral Scott Stearney over the weekend. 04:30.250 --> 04:32.360 I think I share the feelings of all our colleagues 04:32.360 --> 04:35.070 as I extend our condolences to his family, 04:35.070 --> 04:36.653 friends, and all who knew him. 04:37.640 --> 04:39.790 General McKenzie and General Clarke, if confirmed, 04:39.790 --> 04:41.860 you will lead combatant commands at the forefront 04:41.860 --> 04:43.410 of protecting our national security 04:43.410 --> 04:46.620 as noted by the National Defense Strategy or the NDS 04:46.620 --> 04:48.620 as the Chairman has indicated. 04:48.620 --> 04:51.420 The long-term strategic competition with China and Russia 04:51.420 --> 04:53.580 are the principal priorities for the Department 04:53.580 --> 04:56.460 and require both increased and sustained investment. 04:56.460 --> 04:59.280 The NDS goes on to say the Department will sustain 04:59.280 --> 05:01.520 its efforts to deter and counter regimes 05:01.520 --> 05:03.560 such as North Korea and Iran, 05:03.560 --> 05:05.560 defeat terrorist threats to the United States, 05:05.560 --> 05:08.160 and consolidate our gains in Iraq and Afghanistan 05:08.160 --> 05:12.060 while moving to a more resource-sustainable approach. 05:12.060 --> 05:13.770 The guidance contained in the NDS 05:13.770 --> 05:15.980 is likely to result in significant changes 05:15.980 --> 05:18.090 for the commands you have been asked to lead. 05:18.090 --> 05:20.277 With respect to U.S. Central Command, CENTCOM, 05:20.277 --> 05:22.790 the NDS forecasts reduced Force structure 05:22.790 --> 05:25.640 and more efficient utilization of what remains. 05:25.640 --> 05:27.870 Managing the implementation of those changes 05:27.870 --> 05:30.140 and any impact they may have on our ability 05:30.140 --> 05:32.530 to carry out counterterrorism operations, 05:32.530 --> 05:35.860 deter Iran, and reassure our allies and partners, 05:35.860 --> 05:37.950 will be significant considerations for CENTCOM 05:37.950 --> 05:39.430 in the coming years. 05:39.430 --> 05:42.010 With respect to U.S. Special Operations Command, SOCOM, 05:42.010 --> 05:44.270 the focus of the NDS raises questions about the role 05:44.270 --> 05:47.220 of Special Operations Forces in the competition 05:47.220 --> 05:49.760 with potential near-peer adversaries. 05:49.760 --> 05:51.320 Given that Special Operations Forces 05:51.320 --> 05:53.380 have been heavily committed to the fight against 05:53.380 --> 05:55.700 violent extremists groups since 9/11, 05:55.700 --> 05:57.940 SOCOM will necessarily have to evaluate 05:57.940 --> 06:00.320 whether its current capabilities are appropriately matched 06:00.320 --> 06:02.610 to the operations its Forces will be asked 06:02.610 --> 06:04.160 to conduct in the future. 06:04.160 --> 06:07.310 Additionally, given the already high operational tempo 06:07.310 --> 06:10.550 on Special Operation Forces, SOCOM will need to be careful 06:10.550 --> 06:12.330 that any additional responsibilities 06:12.330 --> 06:14.470 do not overstress the Force. 06:14.470 --> 06:16.080 I hope both of our nominees will discuss 06:16.080 --> 06:18.030 the expected impact of the NDS 06:18.030 --> 06:20.520 on the commands they have been nominated to lead 06:20.520 --> 06:21.730 and how any challenges 06:21.730 --> 06:24.220 can be mitigated in implementation. 06:24.220 --> 06:26.360 Last week, as the Chairman noted, we held a hearing 06:26.360 --> 06:29.060 with the National Defense Strategy Commission 06:29.060 --> 06:31.500 to discuss their views of the NDS. 06:31.500 --> 06:33.640 The Commission Report states that there is a, 06:33.640 --> 06:36.860 quote, relative imbalance of civilian and military voices 06:36.860 --> 06:38.580 on critical issues of strategy, 06:38.580 --> 06:40.870 development and implementation. 06:40.870 --> 06:42.950 It goes on to state that civilian voices 06:42.950 --> 06:44.660 were relatively muted on issues 06:44.660 --> 06:47.970 at the center of U.S. Defense and national security policy, 06:47.970 --> 06:50.810 undermining the concept of civilian control. 06:50.810 --> 06:52.030 When I read the Commission's Report, 06:52.030 --> 06:53.850 I was struck by these observations 06:53.850 --> 06:56.020 and the consequences that such an imbalance 06:56.020 --> 06:58.280 could have on the development of Defense policy, 06:58.280 --> 06:59.820 the impact it could have on the civilian 06:59.820 --> 07:02.160 and military personnel serving in the Department 07:02.160 --> 07:05.570 and how it may shape the advice provided to the President. 07:05.570 --> 07:07.070 As senior members to the Joint Staff, 07:07.070 --> 07:08.300 I hope both of our nominees 07:08.300 --> 07:10.520 will share their thoughts on the Commission's findings 07:10.520 --> 07:12.640 and how their experience with civilian policymakers 07:12.640 --> 07:13.730 would shape their leadership 07:13.730 --> 07:16.450 of CENTCOM and SOCOM respectively. 07:16.450 --> 07:18.330 On this point, the Committee focused attention 07:18.330 --> 07:21.500 in recent years on strengthening the partnership between 07:21.500 --> 07:24.220 the SOCOM Commander and the Assistant Secretary of Defense 07:24.220 --> 07:26.810 for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict 07:26.810 --> 07:30.320 or the ASD SO/LIC, in particular, Section 1922 07:30.320 --> 07:32.020 of the National Defense Authorization Act 07:32.020 --> 07:36.080 for Fiscal Year 2017 enhanced the role of ASD SO/LIC 07:36.080 --> 07:38.480 to serve as a service secretary-like official 07:38.480 --> 07:41.960 responsible for oversight of and advocacy for 07:41.960 --> 07:43.730 Special Operations Forces. 07:43.730 --> 07:45.560 General Clarke, I look forward to hearing your views 07:45.560 --> 07:47.520 on the implementation of these reforms 07:47.520 --> 07:49.860 and how the ASD SO/LIC-SOCOM partnership 07:49.860 --> 07:51.130 can be further strengthened. 07:51.130 --> 07:53.300 Again, thank you very much for your service. 07:53.300 --> 07:54.970 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 07:54.970 --> 07:56.403 - Thank you, Senator Reed. 07:57.320 --> 07:59.140 We will now hear from our witnesses. 07:59.140 --> 08:01.600 We'll start with you, General McKenzie, and 08:04.510 --> 08:07.410 your entire statement will be made a part of the record, 08:07.410 --> 08:10.813 so you can abbreviate where you so desire, Senator, 08:11.820 --> 08:12.893 General McKenzie. 08:13.790 --> 08:14.930 - Good morning, Chairman Inhofe, 08:14.930 --> 08:17.330 Ranking Member Reed, Members of the Committee. 08:17.330 --> 08:18.920 It's an honor to appear before you today 08:18.920 --> 08:21.300 as the President's nominee to be next Commander 08:21.300 --> 08:23.040 of the United States Central Command. 08:23.040 --> 08:25.380 I'm humbled by President Trump, Secretary Mattis 08:25.380 --> 08:27.390 and Chairman Dunford's faith in me 08:27.390 --> 08:29.150 and grateful for that trust. 08:29.150 --> 08:30.790 If confirmed, I'll look forward to continue 08:30.790 --> 08:33.300 serving our nation alongside the dedicated, 08:33.300 --> 08:34.720 disciplined and honorable men and women 08:34.720 --> 08:36.680 of the United States Central Command. 08:36.680 --> 08:39.230 I'd like to introduce the Committee to my wife Marilyn, 08:39.230 --> 08:40.740 who has been my best friend and partner 08:40.740 --> 08:42.280 in all of our years of service. 08:42.280 --> 08:44.560 While I received much of the credit and attention, 08:44.560 --> 08:48.110 Marilyn has quietly but resolutely supported not only me, 08:48.110 --> 08:49.550 but the men and women of the Joint Force 08:49.550 --> 08:51.600 in all our varied assignments. 08:51.600 --> 08:53.690 I'm very proud of her and thankful for her service 08:53.690 --> 08:55.630 and steady presence in my life. 08:55.630 --> 08:58.590 I'd also like to introduce my son, Kenneth Ray McKenzie 08:58.590 --> 09:02.115 who graduated from the Naval Academy with the class of 2007 09:02.115 --> 09:04.370 and has served two tours of duty in Afghanistan 09:04.370 --> 09:05.800 as a Marine Infantry Officer. 09:05.800 --> 09:08.710 He's now employed in the railroad business in Alabama. 09:08.710 --> 09:12.330 Also here is his wife Kristen and my sister Andrea. 09:12.330 --> 09:15.320 Safely tucked away with a friend are our two grandsons, 09:15.320 --> 09:18.320 ages three and five, whom I have I think wisely 09:18.320 --> 09:21.100 chosen not to inflict on the Committee today. 09:21.100 --> 09:22.440 I'd like to talk just a moment 09:22.440 --> 09:24.460 about the officer seated next me. 09:24.460 --> 09:26.900 In my opinion, the President could not have nominated 09:26.900 --> 09:29.660 anyone better to be the next SOCOM Commander 09:29.660 --> 09:31.570 than Lieutenant General Richard Clarke. 09:31.570 --> 09:33.990 He's an exceptionally talented, morally grounded, 09:33.990 --> 09:36.020 and strategically-minded officer. 09:36.020 --> 09:38.750 And if we're confirmed, I look forward to the opportunity 09:38.750 --> 09:41.220 to continue to march alongside him in Tampa 09:41.220 --> 09:42.840 and across the Theater. 09:42.840 --> 09:44.550 I would also like to pay a brief tribute to 09:44.550 --> 09:47.650 General Joe Votel, the current Central Command Commander. 09:47.650 --> 09:49.270 I believe he is one of the finest generals 09:49.270 --> 09:52.030 the U.S. Army has ever produced, our nation is safer 09:52.030 --> 09:54.630 and stronger because of his selfless service. 09:54.630 --> 09:56.860 As this Committee is aware, the 20 countries that make up 09:56.860 --> 09:59.680 the U.S. CENTCOM area of responsibility 09:59.680 --> 10:02.430 are as richly diverse and unique as any in the world. 10:02.430 --> 10:05.080 They also present a set of vexing challenges. 10:05.080 --> 10:07.566 We have vital strategic interest in the Central Command 10:07.566 --> 10:10.290 area of responsibility and we're going to need 10:10.290 --> 10:13.060 to stay engaged to address these issues. 10:13.060 --> 10:15.560 Under Joe L. Votel, Central Command has fostered 10:15.560 --> 10:19.330 outstanding relationships across its area of responsibility 10:19.330 --> 10:22.130 with myriad senior, civilian, and military leaders, 10:22.130 --> 10:24.390 including those from Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf States 10:24.390 --> 10:26.080 and across Central Asia. 10:26.080 --> 10:28.840 He has also worked tirelessly with our Department of State, 10:28.840 --> 10:30.730 the Agency for International Development, 10:30.730 --> 10:31.960 and a host of other government 10:31.960 --> 10:33.900 and nongovernment organizations. 10:33.900 --> 10:36.340 I pledge to continue that interaction. 10:36.340 --> 10:38.260 The work of our colleagues in the Department of State 10:38.260 --> 10:40.920 is critical, and if confirmed, supporting them will be 10:40.920 --> 10:43.920 a very high priority for me personally. 10:43.920 --> 10:46.600 An interaction with allies and partners across the region 10:46.600 --> 10:49.490 will also be a matter of great importance. 10:49.490 --> 10:50.790 I hope to lead a new generation 10:50.790 --> 10:52.940 of CENTCOM professionals to carry on the work 10:52.940 --> 10:55.540 of General Votel and those leaders who came before him 10:55.540 --> 10:57.320 in meeting these challenges. 10:57.320 --> 11:00.890 CENTCOM remains a dangerous theater of war 11:00.890 --> 11:03.600 and we've seen the cost as recently as last week. 11:03.600 --> 11:06.090 I am certainly mindful of the burden we have borne 11:06.090 --> 11:09.560 in the past and that unfortunately we will continue to bear. 11:09.560 --> 11:11.910 I would also like to mention the death of my friend, 11:11.910 --> 11:14.330 Vice Admiral Scott Stearney, the Fifth Fleet Commander, 11:14.330 --> 11:17.690 over the weekend in Bahrain, he will be missed. 11:17.690 --> 11:20.140 I vow to this Committee that I will faithfully pursue 11:20.140 --> 11:21.820 the policies and orders of the President 11:21.820 --> 11:24.690 and the Secretary of Defense within the authorities 11:24.690 --> 11:26.820 you have provided combatant commanders, 11:26.820 --> 11:28.900 and moreover, that I will be open and transparent 11:28.900 --> 11:30.660 with you and the rest of Congress. 11:30.660 --> 11:31.810 Thank you for considering me 11:31.810 --> 11:33.470 and I look forward to answering your questions. 11:33.470 --> 11:34.680 - [James] Thank you, General McKenzie. 11:34.680 --> 11:35.533 General Clarke? 11:39.230 --> 11:41.440 - Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, 11:41.440 --> 11:42.880 Members of the Committee. 11:42.880 --> 11:45.800 Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today 11:45.800 --> 11:48.900 regarding my nomination to be the next Commander 11:48.900 --> 11:51.540 of the United States Special Operations Command. 11:51.540 --> 11:54.820 I'm grateful to the President, Secretary Mattis, 11:54.820 --> 11:56.600 and Chairman Dunford for the trust 11:56.600 --> 11:59.250 and confidence in this nomination. 11:59.250 --> 12:00.660 Serving our nation has been 12:00.660 --> 12:02.870 the greatest privilege of my life, 12:02.870 --> 12:05.820 and I come before you grateful and humbled 12:05.820 --> 12:09.210 to be considered for the opportunity to continue to serve 12:09.210 --> 12:13.520 with the thousands of dedicated Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, 12:13.520 --> 12:17.810 Marines, and civilians in the Special Operations Command 12:17.810 --> 12:20.580 that have been and remain on the front lines 12:20.580 --> 12:24.190 around the world to keep our nation safe. 12:24.190 --> 12:25.580 I'm honored to share this table 12:25.580 --> 12:28.460 with my friend and fellow Joint Staff member, 12:28.460 --> 12:30.877 a Marine for whom I have the greatest respect, 12:30.877 --> 12:34.120 due to his intellect, his knowledge of the region, 12:34.120 --> 12:35.510 and as a leader who applies 12:35.510 --> 12:38.310 common sense touch to every problem. 12:38.310 --> 12:41.050 There is none better than Frank McKenzie 12:41.050 --> 12:43.850 to assume the U.S. CENTCOM mantle. 12:43.850 --> 12:46.990 If confirmed, our preexisting relationship 12:46.990 --> 12:50.320 and shared mutual respect will benefit the fight we have 12:50.320 --> 12:53.393 against terrorism and specifically in the CENTCOM AOR. 12:54.870 --> 12:57.940 In the audience is my wife and soulmate 12:57.940 --> 13:02.060 of almost 30 years, Suzanne, my bedrock and my best friend 13:02.060 --> 13:05.420 since we first met in Berlin American High School 13:05.420 --> 13:07.710 and who has been tremendously supportive 13:07.710 --> 13:11.530 of countless Army families during numerous deployments. 13:11.530 --> 13:15.380 She is accompanied by our son Will, a senior in high school. 13:15.380 --> 13:18.650 Our daughter Madeline is a college junior in Boston, 13:18.650 --> 13:22.140 and is unable to join us, as she gets ready to close out 13:22.140 --> 13:25.100 this semester at Tufts University. 13:25.100 --> 13:28.800 Suzanne and I are fortunate products of proud Army families 13:28.800 --> 13:32.820 that instilled the values of duty, honor, country, 13:32.820 --> 13:35.060 upon us from the earliest age. 13:35.060 --> 13:38.150 While Suzanne's mom and dad cannot be here today, 13:38.150 --> 13:40.630 we are grateful for the attendance of my parents, 13:40.630 --> 13:41.970 Dick and Gail Clarke, 13:41.970 --> 13:44.880 and thankful for both of our fathers' service 13:44.880 --> 13:46.550 as career Army officers 13:46.550 --> 13:51.550 to include combat in Vietnam and in the Korean conflict. 13:51.590 --> 13:54.050 I would like to thank General Tony Thomas 13:54.050 --> 13:56.250 for his leadership and example, 13:56.250 --> 13:59.770 not only as commander of SOCOM for three years, 13:59.770 --> 14:01.860 but throughout his storied career. 14:01.860 --> 14:04.280 It is an honor to be considered by this Committee 14:04.280 --> 14:06.083 to follow in his footsteps. 14:07.010 --> 14:09.160 Most importantly, I would be remiss 14:09.160 --> 14:12.270 if I failed to acknowledge the fallen and their families 14:12.270 --> 14:15.690 who have made the ultimate sacrifice for this nation. 14:15.690 --> 14:17.420 The human toll hits close to home 14:17.420 --> 14:19.240 and serves as a personal reminder 14:19.240 --> 14:22.210 of the considered responsibility of this position 14:22.210 --> 14:26.053 as four of our recent fallen were all SOCOM warriors. 14:27.060 --> 14:29.890 For the past 31 years, your Special Operations Forces 14:29.890 --> 14:32.260 provided critical capabilities and options 14:32.260 --> 14:35.250 for challenging problems to the Department and our nation 14:35.250 --> 14:37.030 as a result in large measure 14:37.030 --> 14:39.590 to the prescient leadership of this Congress 14:39.590 --> 14:42.360 with the enactment of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment. 14:42.360 --> 14:46.400 Our world continues to evolve and increase in complexity, 14:46.400 --> 14:48.830 while violent extremism persists, 14:48.830 --> 14:50.660 challenging regional stability 14:50.660 --> 14:52.270 and threatening our interests. 14:52.270 --> 14:56.200 Near-peer competitors grow in both capability and intent 14:56.200 --> 14:58.830 to contest our vital national interest. 14:58.830 --> 15:02.060 The United States requires capabilities across all elements 15:02.060 --> 15:05.140 of national power and Special Operations remains 15:05.140 --> 15:07.420 a critical part of our defense. 15:07.420 --> 15:09.030 If confirmed by this committee, 15:09.030 --> 15:12.290 I pledge to work tirelessly with your support 15:12.290 --> 15:13.710 to continue to provide our nation 15:13.710 --> 15:16.810 with the world's most capable, agile, and lethal 15:16.810 --> 15:19.640 Special Operations Forces the world has known. 15:19.640 --> 15:22.130 Thank you again, Chairman, Ranking Member, 15:22.130 --> 15:25.350 and those on the Committee for your consideration. 15:25.350 --> 15:26.900 - Thank both of you. 15:26.900 --> 15:28.600 We're gonna be confronted with 15:30.470 --> 15:32.053 some difficult decisions. 15:33.410 --> 15:36.290 To kind of set the stage for it, in 2010, 15:39.810 --> 15:43.190 the budget was, we used constant dollars, 15:43.190 --> 15:45.600 let's say 2018 dollars. 15:45.600 --> 15:50.600 In 2010, the budget was at $794 billion. 15:51.780 --> 15:55.630 In 2015, using the same constant dollars, 15:55.630 --> 15:58.580 it was down to $586. 15:58.580 --> 16:00.837 Now, that's a drop of 200, 16:02.280 --> 16:05.670 well, actually 24 percent is the best way to look at that. 16:05.670 --> 16:07.880 So, that's where we found ourselves. 16:07.880 --> 16:11.150 And so consequently we made the decision 16:11.150 --> 16:15.340 for fiscal years '18 to go up to $700 billion, 16:15.340 --> 16:19.560 fiscal year '19 up to $716 billion, 16:19.560 --> 16:23.660 and the strategy or the agreement, I should say, 16:23.660 --> 16:25.830 both of you read that Commission Report, 16:25.830 --> 16:27.980 and you remember in that report they talked about 16:27.980 --> 16:30.653 the necessity of increasing, 16:31.840 --> 16:36.420 minimum increase of three to five percent over inflation. 16:36.420 --> 16:38.350 Now, that's what everyone agreed on. 16:38.350 --> 16:40.610 That's what the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed on. 16:40.610 --> 16:43.430 That's what the Secretary agreed on. 16:43.430 --> 16:47.190 Now, when the President came out with the original budget, 16:47.190 --> 16:51.313 it was $733 billion dollars for the fiscal year '20. 16:52.190 --> 16:53.680 If you do the math on this thing 16:53.680 --> 16:57.260 and you go from $716 to $733, 16:57.260 --> 17:01.390 the increase is 2.1 percent, which is actually below 17:03.010 --> 17:07.370 the amount that they are, that everyone has been prescribing 17:07.370 --> 17:10.940 and saying is gonna be necessary to meet the competition, 17:10.940 --> 17:13.280 it's a different competition than we've ever had before, 17:13.280 --> 17:14.770 at least in my opinion. 17:14.770 --> 17:17.810 I would like to ask both of you to comment on that 17:17.810 --> 17:20.930 if you consider in light of that 17:20.930 --> 17:25.340 the $733 to be a floor as opposed to a ceiling? 17:25.340 --> 17:26.773 What do you think, General? 17:28.230 --> 17:29.750 - Senator, thank you for the question. 17:29.750 --> 17:33.448 The $733 figure was arrived at 17:33.448 --> 17:35.780 by the Department carefully looking at the requirements 17:35.780 --> 17:37.290 of the National Defense Strategy. 17:37.290 --> 17:39.400 It reflects our best projection 17:39.400 --> 17:42.300 of a strategy-informed budget. 17:42.300 --> 17:44.950 We recognize there could have been a higher number, 17:44.950 --> 17:47.543 as you said, three to five percent, but we also recognize 17:47.543 --> 17:50.240 that the Department exists within a larger government, 17:50.240 --> 17:51.120 inputs and trades there 17:51.120 --> 17:53.350 are just a natural part of the process. 17:53.350 --> 17:56.720 Anything below $733 would increase risk 17:56.720 --> 17:59.280 and that risk would be manifested across the Force. 17:59.280 --> 18:01.340 We are in the process now very carefully 18:01.340 --> 18:03.820 across the Department examining the details 18:03.820 --> 18:05.700 of what the nature of that risk would be, 18:05.700 --> 18:07.670 who would it be imposed upon, and the nature of it. 18:07.670 --> 18:10.563 - Good, good, General Clarke? 18:12.210 --> 18:16.760 - Sir, I associate myself with General McKenzie's remarks, 18:16.760 --> 18:21.170 and would state that the sustained predictable, 18:21.170 --> 18:23.640 but then the key is the adequate funding 18:23.640 --> 18:26.370 that is required by the Department, and once looked upon, 18:26.370 --> 18:28.910 and if confirmed for SOCOM, have to look at specifically 18:28.910 --> 18:30.970 what that means to SOCOM's budget, 18:30.970 --> 18:32.750 and where that risk would be assumed, 18:32.750 --> 18:34.750 whether it's in readiness, 18:34.750 --> 18:39.070 whether or not it is in technologies required 18:39.070 --> 18:41.733 or whether it is in what we're doing forward. 18:43.670 --> 18:44.503 - I appreciate that. 18:44.503 --> 18:45.840 In my opening statement, 18:45.840 --> 18:49.820 we talked about our peer competitors Russia and China, 18:49.820 --> 18:52.710 and it's difficult for those of us 18:53.670 --> 18:55.230 on this side of the table, 18:55.230 --> 18:58.270 when we're talking to groups outside of government, 18:58.270 --> 19:00.650 to explain to them that in some cases 19:00.650 --> 19:03.690 both China and Russia have things that we don't have. 19:03.690 --> 19:05.030 I have a long list of things, 19:05.030 --> 19:09.170 including statements on our artillery, 19:09.170 --> 19:11.540 we are outgunned, outranged. 19:12.810 --> 19:16.670 So, we have problems now that I don't think we had before. 19:16.670 --> 19:19.910 Now, from SOCOM's perspective, what's the best way 19:19.910 --> 19:23.440 do you think to confront these problems 19:23.440 --> 19:25.240 that we have not experienced before? 19:26.650 --> 19:29.570 - Senator, you talked about the things that we don't have. 19:29.570 --> 19:31.910 What I would qualify is things that we do have, 19:31.910 --> 19:33.700 that Russia and China don't have. 19:33.700 --> 19:36.190 We do have asymmetric advantages 19:37.090 --> 19:39.650 that we have looked at and you're familiar with, 19:39.650 --> 19:41.400 the joint military and that assessment. 19:41.400 --> 19:42.710 The other thing that we have, Senator, 19:42.710 --> 19:46.040 that those two countries don't have is, allies and partners, 19:46.040 --> 19:48.040 and in our position around the world, 19:48.040 --> 19:50.210 and specifically with SOCOM, with our Special Operations, 19:50.210 --> 19:52.820 their rapport, do provide us that advantage. 19:52.820 --> 19:53.653 - Yeah, that's good. 19:53.653 --> 19:56.750 General McKenzie, there's been a lot of talk 19:56.750 --> 20:00.667 about the S-400 and the threat to the United States 20:00.667 --> 20:02.623 and the coalition force in Syria. 20:03.650 --> 20:05.040 What's your thought about that, 20:05.040 --> 20:08.540 evaluating that and how much of a threat that does pose? 20:08.540 --> 20:12.010 - Senator, the S-400, once activated 20:12.010 --> 20:13.960 will increase the threat to our Forces 20:13.960 --> 20:16.530 and those of our coalition partners flying over Syria. 20:16.530 --> 20:17.830 There will be a manifest difference 20:17.830 --> 20:19.680 in the capabilities of the system though, 20:19.680 --> 20:21.370 depending whether it's manned by the Syrians 20:21.370 --> 20:23.610 or the Russians, and we're working to figure out 20:23.610 --> 20:25.630 how it's actually going to be executed. 20:25.630 --> 20:27.980 - [James] Yeah, thank you, Senator Reed? 20:27.980 --> 20:28.813 - Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, 20:28.813 --> 20:30.210 and thank you, gentlemen. 20:30.210 --> 20:31.960 As I mentioned in my opening statement, 20:31.960 --> 20:36.420 the National Defense Commission talked about the private 20:38.730 --> 20:41.390 civilian leadership in terms of interaction 20:41.390 --> 20:43.260 with the military, and we talked about this before, 20:43.260 --> 20:45.053 previously, but for the record, 20:46.180 --> 20:48.120 just your reaction to those comments, 20:48.120 --> 20:49.550 there's several possibilities. 20:49.550 --> 20:53.130 One, they could be noting the absence of civilian leadership 20:53.130 --> 20:55.400 by not enough people have been confirmed yet 20:55.400 --> 20:59.090 or nominated or they are not involved in some way, 20:59.090 --> 21:03.300 shape or form, or there's a gap, a cultural gap, 21:03.300 --> 21:06.710 between the civilians and the military that's growing. 21:06.710 --> 21:09.530 General McKenzie, if you start, then General Clarke. 21:09.530 --> 21:12.080 - Senator, I believe that in the Department of Defense, 21:12.080 --> 21:14.470 final decisions are made by civilians, 21:14.470 --> 21:16.880 final policy recommendations are made by civilians. 21:16.880 --> 21:19.127 It's informed by robust dialog between the military 21:19.127 --> 21:22.240 and the civilians, but when it's all said and done, 21:22.240 --> 21:24.110 the Secretary makes the final decision, 21:24.110 --> 21:25.610 and probably the last person in the room 21:25.610 --> 21:27.530 is gonna be his Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 21:27.530 --> 21:29.150 the Honorable John Rood. 21:29.150 --> 21:31.540 I would argue just for my observation, 21:31.540 --> 21:34.960 that much of this may stem from the slowness 21:34.960 --> 21:36.620 of filling appointed positions 21:36.620 --> 21:38.270 within the Department early on. 21:38.270 --> 21:40.140 I do not believe this reflects a structural 21:40.140 --> 21:42.623 or a cultural problem, but rather a temporary problem, 21:42.623 --> 21:44.880 that I believe, if it existed, it has largely 21:44.880 --> 21:46.180 been corrected. - Thank you. 21:46.180 --> 21:47.990 General Clarke, please? 21:47.990 --> 21:51.430 - Senator, I concur with General McKenzie's comments. 21:51.430 --> 21:53.070 The thing I would add on top is 21:53.070 --> 21:56.200 I work closely with Secretary Rood on a daily basis 21:56.200 --> 21:57.960 and I don't believe this exists, 21:57.960 --> 22:01.370 but you stated in your opening 22:01.370 --> 22:05.083 about SOCOM, and specific, the SO/LIC, 22:06.040 --> 22:08.860 aspect of the ASD SO/LIC being given control, 22:08.860 --> 22:10.470 direction authority, over SOCOM. 22:10.470 --> 22:11.750 I welcome that. 22:11.750 --> 22:13.610 I think the advocacy for SOCOM 22:13.610 --> 22:15.440 and having that civilian leadership, 22:15.440 --> 22:18.010 I clearly understand the military-civilian bounds 22:18.010 --> 22:19.970 and will work closely 22:19.970 --> 22:24.120 and directly with ASD West, if confirmed. 22:24.120 --> 22:26.350 - Thank you, and again, let me address this question 22:26.350 --> 22:29.900 to both of you because it involves both of your commands 22:29.900 --> 22:31.890 and that's the situation in Afghanistan, 22:31.890 --> 22:35.060 which is becoming more complicated, 22:35.060 --> 22:38.260 and it was always was complicated, but again, 22:38.260 --> 22:40.573 we've lost several service members this week. 22:42.690 --> 22:46.250 General Dunford said up in the Halifax Conference 22:46.250 --> 22:47.650 that we were in a stalemate. 22:49.270 --> 22:52.210 How is that stalemate gonna affect our operation? 22:52.210 --> 22:53.360 I'll start with General McKenzie 22:53.360 --> 22:55.170 and then ask General Clarke. 22:55.170 --> 22:59.680 In addition with Ambassador Khalilzad on the ground, 22:59.680 --> 23:00.603 what role will he play? 23:00.603 --> 23:03.050 This will be one of your principal missions. 23:03.050 --> 23:04.220 General McKenzie? 23:04.220 --> 23:07.880 - Senator, I believe the operational military situation 23:07.880 --> 23:09.320 is largely stalemated 23:09.320 --> 23:11.080 so I agree with the Chairman and his assessment 23:11.080 --> 23:12.690 of what's happening on the ground. 23:12.690 --> 23:14.810 I believe, however, that what has changed 23:14.810 --> 23:17.540 and what is new are the efforts of Ambassador Khalilzad. 23:17.540 --> 23:19.260 That is a new element in the equation that 23:19.260 --> 23:22.490 we have not had before, working to actually try to form, 23:22.490 --> 23:24.360 to come to some form of reconciliation 23:24.360 --> 23:26.230 and a political end state to the conflict 23:26.230 --> 23:28.290 that we've been unable to approach before. 23:28.290 --> 23:30.230 There are multiple lines of effort that are working. 23:30.230 --> 23:32.670 The military effort which is stalemated is one of them. 23:32.670 --> 23:34.600 The diplomatic line of effort is alive 23:34.600 --> 23:36.570 and being vigorously pursued now 23:36.570 --> 23:38.920 by he and other actors in the region. 23:38.920 --> 23:41.370 - Thank you, General Clarke, in particular, since 23:44.090 --> 23:48.160 most outcomes still remaining on the battleground field 23:48.160 --> 23:50.620 are terrorist elements, 23:50.620 --> 23:53.540 in fact, there is a number of them, I think, 23:53.540 --> 23:56.830 a long, long list, so that Special Operations 23:56.830 --> 23:59.570 would be concerned going forward with 24:01.030 --> 24:03.100 these threats, even if there was some 24:03.100 --> 24:05.220 political settlement in another dimension. 24:05.220 --> 24:06.450 So, could you comment? 24:06.450 --> 24:10.220 - Senator, you hit the nail on the head. 24:10.220 --> 24:14.330 The Al Qaeda presence remains in the outback region 24:14.330 --> 24:17.810 and ISIS presence that is there 24:17.810 --> 24:21.010 currently pose direct threats to the homeland 24:21.010 --> 24:24.440 and that's where the SOCOM and the task force 24:24.440 --> 24:27.500 that is in Afghanistan continues to support 24:27.500 --> 24:28.790 General Miller's efforts. 24:28.790 --> 24:30.450 The other piece in the Afghan strategy 24:30.450 --> 24:33.630 that I would highlight is the effort 24:33.630 --> 24:36.870 to realign our Forces with double the amount 24:36.870 --> 24:41.300 of Afghan commandos to be able to help with the strategy, 24:41.300 --> 24:42.860 to put the pressure on the Taliban. 24:42.860 --> 24:45.690 And I think that that effort is bearing fruit 24:45.690 --> 24:49.490 and SOCOM will remain in direct support of General Miller 24:49.490 --> 24:52.850 and General McKenzie throughout this effort. 24:52.850 --> 24:53.870 - Thank you very much, gentlemen. 24:53.870 --> 24:58.190 Mr. Chairman, I must recognize General Clarke's father 24:58.190 --> 25:00.700 because without his tutelage, 25:00.700 --> 25:04.500 I would never have survived plebe swimming at West Point 25:04.500 --> 25:07.653 and so I owe you a lot, thank you, sir. 25:09.700 --> 25:10.533 Thank you. 25:11.720 --> 25:12.553 - [James] Duly noted. 25:12.553 --> 25:14.060 Thank you, Senator Reed. 25:14.060 --> 25:15.440 Senator Wicker. 25:15.440 --> 25:16.910 - General McKenzie, let me just follow up 25:16.910 --> 25:18.930 with Senator Reed's questions. 25:18.930 --> 25:21.090 How significant is it that 25:22.120 --> 25:26.090 the Afghan government formerly controlled 25:26.090 --> 25:29.960 72 percent of the geographic area of Afghanistan, 25:29.960 --> 25:33.063 now controls only 56 percent of the country? 25:34.160 --> 25:36.840 - Senator, it's concerning, but it's not a critical factor. 25:36.840 --> 25:39.000 They have chosen to defend areas 25:39.000 --> 25:41.700 where if the population exists which has been a trade off 25:41.700 --> 25:44.350 in giving up more sparsely populated areas. 25:44.350 --> 25:46.040 You'd always prefer to control more, 25:46.040 --> 25:48.080 but in a practical military sense, 25:48.080 --> 25:51.210 it does reflect most of the country is under their control. 25:51.210 --> 25:55.440 - So a lot of these new areas are sparsely populated? 25:55.440 --> 25:56.790 - Many of them are, sir. 25:56.790 --> 25:58.270 Again I would note that you'd prefer 25:58.270 --> 25:59.763 to eventually control more-- - Sure. 25:59.763 --> 26:02.920 - Than we have now, but I would agree with that. 26:02.920 --> 26:03.753 - Okay. 26:03.753 --> 26:08.753 And you mentioned, Ambassador Khalilzad's efforts. 26:08.920 --> 26:10.397 We're certainly optimistic about that 26:10.397 --> 26:13.000 and we think he, at least from my standpoint, 26:13.000 --> 26:16.220 I think he knows the issues, he knows the people 26:16.220 --> 26:19.030 and I think we'll be well-served there. 26:19.030 --> 26:22.520 What would letting up on military pressure 26:22.520 --> 26:25.790 do to his diplomatic efforts at this point? 26:25.790 --> 26:27.400 - Sir, we believe that it is important 26:27.400 --> 26:30.130 to convince the Taliban, even as we are in a stalemate, 26:30.130 --> 26:32.480 so they are in a stalemate and they will be unable 26:32.480 --> 26:34.660 to find a path to victory on the battlefield 26:34.660 --> 26:36.280 by the actions of the forces on the ground. 26:36.280 --> 26:38.570 So therefore, it is critical to maintain 26:38.570 --> 26:40.520 unrelenting pressure on the Taliban, 26:40.520 --> 26:42.420 so that they see the virtue of actually choosing 26:42.420 --> 26:45.700 to deal with the diplomatic approach 26:45.700 --> 26:47.500 which Ambassador Khalilzad embodies. 26:48.580 --> 26:52.130 - Now, let's differentiate the parties there. 26:52.130 --> 26:55.640 How large would you say the Taliban is 26:55.640 --> 26:58.723 in terms of manpower in Afghanistan? 26:58.723 --> 27:01.360 - Sir, I would say 20,000 or more, 27:01.360 --> 27:03.660 depends who you choose to do the counting. 27:03.660 --> 27:06.910 It's substantial, substantial group of people on the ground. 27:06.910 --> 27:08.910 They're not a monolithic mass, 27:08.910 --> 27:11.060 and it's important to understand that also. 27:11.940 --> 27:14.780 - So there are different opinions and different loyalties 27:14.780 --> 27:17.030 within the Taliban? - Sir, they are. 27:17.030 --> 27:20.320 - And then in terms of counterterrorism, 27:20.320 --> 27:22.720 we are fighting ISIS, 27:22.720 --> 27:26.950 Al Qaeda, and other terrorist organizations. 27:26.950 --> 27:29.300 Tell us about them, the size and strength 27:29.300 --> 27:30.680 of those organizations? 27:30.680 --> 27:34.840 - Sir, ISIS is a fairly small organization, 27:34.840 --> 27:37.360 hundreds to thousands, probably low thousands, 27:37.360 --> 27:40.460 in Eastern Afghanistan, they pose a direct threat 27:40.460 --> 27:42.470 to the United States by aspiration. 27:42.470 --> 27:44.490 However, right now, they're severely constricted 27:44.490 --> 27:45.880 both by our operations 27:45.880 --> 27:49.430 and the Taliban has put pressure on ISISk as well. 27:49.430 --> 27:51.240 Al Qaeda, much smaller, 27:51.240 --> 27:53.200 but with good global interconnections, 27:53.200 --> 27:56.450 they also maintain a long-term aspirational goal 27:56.450 --> 27:59.660 to attack the West and the United States in particular. 27:59.660 --> 28:01.530 What keeps them from being able to do that 28:01.530 --> 28:04.740 is the direct pressure that's maintained on them every day 28:04.740 --> 28:08.330 by the CT Forces in the region, assisted by the ecosystem 28:08.330 --> 28:11.030 that is part of the Afghan Army and the Afghan government. 28:11.030 --> 28:12.780 So that's an important part of the pressure 28:12.780 --> 28:14.930 that we place on them as well. 28:14.930 --> 28:17.260 - To what extent do, 28:17.260 --> 28:20.723 do our military and diplomatic leaders, 28:21.910 --> 28:25.500 are they able to assess public opinion 28:25.500 --> 28:28.290 in Afghanistan about our involvement? 28:28.290 --> 28:30.327 - Sir, I believe the Department of State monitors that 28:30.327 --> 28:33.800 through a variety of polling mechanisms. 28:33.800 --> 28:34.910 They look at it pretty hard 28:34.910 --> 28:37.720 and they have the lead for that element of the campaign. 28:37.720 --> 28:39.177 - Okay, they have the lead for it, 28:39.177 --> 28:41.550 but what is your impression? 28:41.550 --> 28:44.380 Do the Afghan people wish we would leave? 28:44.380 --> 28:46.680 Or they're happy that we're there 28:47.586 --> 28:49.650 and do they support our effort to fight 28:49.650 --> 28:51.190 these terrorist organizations 28:51.190 --> 28:54.700 and bring the Taliban to the table? 28:54.700 --> 28:57.340 - Senator, I believe the Afghan people are weary of war. 28:57.340 --> 28:59.250 I think they're a proud people and in general, 28:59.250 --> 29:02.700 they prefer to not have occupation forces, 29:02.700 --> 29:04.480 as some of them would view it, in their country, 29:04.480 --> 29:07.610 but they also recognize the brutality of the Taliban regime. 29:07.610 --> 29:10.370 The Taliban enjoys fairly, very low actually, 29:10.370 --> 29:13.060 polling numbers with the Afghan public. 29:13.060 --> 29:16.327 People remember what it was like back in 2000 and 2001. 29:16.327 --> 29:19.200 And Afghanistan was not a good place for women 29:19.200 --> 29:20.980 and for a variety of other elements 29:20.980 --> 29:22.360 of the Afghan population. 29:22.360 --> 29:25.804 People clearly remember that, as with any kind of nation, 29:25.804 --> 29:29.790 the data is complex, but there's no agreed, 29:29.790 --> 29:32.713 for example, Afghans don't all want us to leave. 29:33.650 --> 29:34.910 Elements of the population do, 29:34.910 --> 29:37.500 but lot of Afghans don't want the Taliban to remain, 29:37.500 --> 29:39.973 to come back and reassert themselves either. 29:39.973 --> 29:43.990 - They remember those days prior to 9/11, 29:43.990 --> 29:46.170 do not want them to return. 29:46.170 --> 29:48.070 - Sir, that is very clear in the data. 29:48.990 --> 29:50.200 - What do we say to the families 29:50.200 --> 29:52.360 of the 13 American Servicemen 29:52.360 --> 29:54.590 who have been killed in Afghanistan this year? 29:54.590 --> 29:59.550 Or the 1,000 Afghan forces that have been killed 29:59.550 --> 30:00.970 in Afghanistan this year? 30:00.970 --> 30:03.300 - Sir, what we are doing is we are protecting 30:03.300 --> 30:05.420 the Homeland of the United States from being attacked. 30:05.420 --> 30:07.800 That's what you say to the Americans and that's a clear, 30:07.800 --> 30:12.520 visible, tangible effort that we can honor them for. 30:12.520 --> 30:14.100 For the Afghans who have died, 30:14.100 --> 30:16.880 it's an attempt to come to a long peaceful 30:16.880 --> 30:18.550 political settlement in their country 30:18.550 --> 30:20.630 and I think that too is an honorable goal. 30:20.630 --> 30:23.260 I think Afghans and Americans who have died in action 30:23.260 --> 30:25.260 in Afghanistan have all been pursuing 30:25.260 --> 30:27.390 an honorable and reasonable objective. 30:27.390 --> 30:28.840 - Is the Afghan military 30:29.938 --> 30:32.470 in better shape from top to bottom 30:32.470 --> 30:34.740 than it's been in recent years? 30:34.740 --> 30:36.240 - I think it's in better shape. 30:36.240 --> 30:39.110 It has a long way to go, I believe it is better shape. 30:39.110 --> 30:40.230 - Thank you. 30:40.230 --> 30:43.290 Good wishes to you, thank you for your service. 30:43.290 --> 30:45.580 - [James] Thank you, Senator Wicker. 30:45.580 --> 30:47.210 Senator Shaheen. 30:47.210 --> 30:48.310 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 30:48.310 --> 30:52.260 Thank you both for your willingness to consider taking on 30:52.260 --> 30:55.670 these assignments at this critical time in our country. 30:55.670 --> 31:00.250 I want to go, General McKenzie, to another hot spot 31:00.250 --> 31:03.310 in the Middle East, Syria. 31:03.310 --> 31:07.480 I appreciated your meeting with me last week and I think 31:07.480 --> 31:10.930 at that time I raised the concerns that I had 31:10.930 --> 31:12.700 based on my visit there this summer, 31:12.700 --> 31:15.180 that we have made significant gains 31:15.180 --> 31:17.840 in northeast section of Syria 31:17.840 --> 31:20.390 and have beaten back ISIS 31:20.390 --> 31:22.900 and life is returning to normal 31:22.900 --> 31:24.997 for the people who live there. 31:24.997 --> 31:29.190 I'm concerned about the fact that 31:29.190 --> 31:32.300 right now there is a hold on the stabilization funds 31:32.300 --> 31:33.880 for that part of Syria. 31:33.880 --> 31:38.070 So can you talk about how we can continue to maintain 31:38.070 --> 31:39.940 the gains that we have there 31:39.940 --> 31:42.693 without that stabilization money? 31:44.220 --> 31:47.530 - Senator, thank you, eventually to maintain our gains 31:47.530 --> 31:51.220 we're gonna have to adequately resource what follows, 31:51.220 --> 31:53.860 which is local security under civilian control, 31:53.860 --> 31:55.900 generally speaking, east of the Euphrates River. 31:55.900 --> 31:58.950 That's gonna require monetary assistance. 31:58.950 --> 31:59.970 If it comes from this country, 31:59.970 --> 32:00.890 it can come from this country. 32:00.890 --> 32:03.530 It could also come, I think, from partners in the region 32:03.530 --> 32:04.930 who need to step up to the plate because 32:04.930 --> 32:06.820 the problems in Syria are all actually 32:06.820 --> 32:08.750 closer to them than they are to us. 32:08.750 --> 32:11.460 So I think, but your point is exactly right. 32:11.460 --> 32:14.187 The long-term solution has to be a stability solution, 32:14.187 --> 32:16.020 but it has to be local and it has to be 32:16.020 --> 32:18.670 appropriately resourced and that remains a challenge. 32:21.090 --> 32:23.744 - I agree with you, wholeheartedly. 32:23.744 --> 32:26.860 One of the things that we have heard from the administration 32:26.860 --> 32:31.860 is that they support the enduring defeat of ISIS. 32:32.000 --> 32:34.500 What does that look like to you in the Middle East? 32:34.500 --> 32:37.822 What does that mean, the enduring defeat of ISIS? 32:37.822 --> 32:39.800 - Senator, the enduring defeat of ISIS 32:39.800 --> 32:43.220 is not gonna be the absence of ISIS. 32:43.220 --> 32:46.260 ISIS, if defeated in the lower Euphrates River valley, 32:46.260 --> 32:48.550 is gonna transition to an insurgency 32:48.550 --> 32:51.100 and there are gonna be continued attacks from ISIS 32:51.100 --> 32:53.830 and derivatives of ISIS, both in the region, 32:53.830 --> 32:55.040 and really globally. 32:55.040 --> 32:57.510 But our goal would be that those attacks typically 32:57.510 --> 32:59.420 would be of an intensity and a scope 32:59.420 --> 33:02.010 where they'd able to be contained by local forces 33:02.010 --> 33:04.370 that would not necessarily require our assistance, 33:04.370 --> 33:05.340 it's getting to that point. 33:05.340 --> 33:07.640 I want to emphasize it won't be, 33:07.640 --> 33:10.150 for a while it won't be pretty, it won't be silent. 33:10.150 --> 33:13.600 There will be pockets that are gonna continue to crop up. 33:13.600 --> 33:14.433 - Thank you. 33:17.230 --> 33:18.233 General Clarke. 33:20.440 --> 33:22.930 One of the things that we heard from 33:22.930 --> 33:26.050 the Commission Report on the NDS 33:26.050 --> 33:29.350 from Ambassador Edelman was that 33:30.370 --> 33:33.970 he questioned the NDS suggestion that 33:33.970 --> 33:38.310 we are at a point where we can take risk in the Middle East 33:39.250 --> 33:43.515 of terrorist attacks in order to address 33:43.515 --> 33:47.530 the major power conflict that we're facing again. 33:47.530 --> 33:49.650 Can you talk about how 33:49.650 --> 33:52.783 SOCOM should balance those two challenges? 33:55.050 --> 33:56.250 - Yes, Senator. 33:56.250 --> 33:59.590 The first thing that the NDS allows us to do 33:59.590 --> 34:02.900 and I think it's important is relook our strategies 34:02.900 --> 34:05.453 and look, relook what we're doing and prioritize. 34:06.710 --> 34:11.470 We still have to maintain the counterterrorism pressure 34:11.470 --> 34:13.847 on those that are most likely 34:13.847 --> 34:17.750 and are aspired and want to attack in our homeland. 34:17.750 --> 34:19.100 We have to keep that pressure up. 34:19.100 --> 34:22.060 But at the same time, Special Operations Command 34:22.060 --> 34:26.460 is uniquely qualified with its experienced operators, 34:26.460 --> 34:28.460 with the maturity of the Force 34:28.460 --> 34:31.050 and with the relationships that we have established 34:31.050 --> 34:33.670 around the globe with many of our partners 34:33.670 --> 34:36.430 through our Theater Special Operations Command, 34:36.430 --> 34:40.700 that exist inside each combatant commander 34:40.700 --> 34:42.730 to be able to give a global look 34:42.730 --> 34:47.090 and to look at allies and partners who those great powers, 34:47.090 --> 34:51.200 specifically Russia and China, that through our actions, 34:51.200 --> 34:53.893 we can counter some of their malign activities. 34:55.270 --> 34:57.233 - And would you agree with the, 34:58.610 --> 35:01.910 the conclusion that the Commission drew that right now, 35:01.910 --> 35:04.740 we got to do more if we're going to be proactive 35:04.740 --> 35:09.240 about addressing the gray zone issues with 35:09.240 --> 35:12.633 Russia and China and also some of the cyber threats? 35:13.860 --> 35:14.820 - Senator, I do. 35:14.820 --> 35:19.390 One of the key aspects of the National Defense Strategy 35:19.390 --> 35:21.880 is expanding the competitive space. 35:21.880 --> 35:23.960 Secretary Mattis is clear on that. 35:23.960 --> 35:27.700 And I do believe that SOCOM, as I stated earlier, 35:27.700 --> 35:30.080 about the capabilities exist within the Command 35:30.080 --> 35:32.700 allow us to expand that competitive space going forward 35:32.700 --> 35:35.550 and if confirmed, I assure the Committee 35:35.550 --> 35:37.630 that I will personally look into this. 35:37.630 --> 35:40.380 There is a Committee Report from SOCOM 35:40.380 --> 35:43.924 through ASD/SOLIC that is due to this Committee 35:43.924 --> 35:45.340 in the springtime and I will make sure 35:45.340 --> 35:47.030 I pay attention to that report. 35:47.030 --> 35:48.380 - Good, thank you. 35:48.380 --> 35:52.150 Also, I'm out of time, but can you just briefly address 35:52.150 --> 35:55.100 the additional challenges that you see SOCOM facing 35:55.100 --> 35:58.207 with the taking on the responsibility for WMD? 36:01.070 --> 36:04.010 - Senator, the Weapons of Mass Destruction mission 36:04.010 --> 36:07.453 that was given to SOCOM two years ago, 36:08.428 --> 36:10.500 it didn't come with no resources. 36:10.500 --> 36:14.850 It came with almost 100 personnel positions from StratCom. 36:14.850 --> 36:19.650 But the same approach that SOCOM takes 36:19.650 --> 36:22.080 to countering the violent extremist organization, 36:22.080 --> 36:25.370 which it has a global responsibility, can still be applied 36:25.370 --> 36:27.143 to the Weapons of Mass Destruction mission. 36:27.143 --> 36:29.400 It's the appropriate mission for SOCOM. 36:29.400 --> 36:31.890 I know General Thomas has taken on wholeheartedly, 36:31.890 --> 36:34.080 and if confirmed I will do the same. 36:34.080 --> 36:35.521 - Thank you again, thank you both, 36:35.521 --> 36:37.140 and thank you for taking time to meet with me. 36:37.140 --> 36:40.713 - [James] Thank you, Senator Shaheen, Senator Fischer. 36:41.920 --> 36:42.940 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 36:42.940 --> 36:45.630 Thank you, gentlemen for being here today. 36:45.630 --> 36:49.620 General Clarke, in your answers to Senator Shaheen, 36:49.620 --> 36:52.430 you and I have discussed the same issue, 36:52.430 --> 36:56.410 when we see a focus now in great power competition 36:56.410 --> 36:58.610 with Russia and with China, 36:58.610 --> 37:00.167 what does that do for your Forces? 37:00.167 --> 37:03.930 I have been told for many years 37:03.930 --> 37:08.000 that there are heavy demands on SOCOM 37:08.000 --> 37:13.000 and the demand far exceeds the supply that we have. 37:13.890 --> 37:18.410 You seem to be saying that working with partners and allies 37:18.410 --> 37:22.920 is going to pick up even more of that extra demand 37:22.920 --> 37:24.210 that we're going to be facing. 37:24.210 --> 37:25.883 Did I understand you correctly? 37:26.850 --> 37:29.190 - Senator, I think working with allies and partners 37:29.190 --> 37:32.100 is a critical component to this. 37:32.100 --> 37:34.470 I would also state that we are already working with 37:34.470 --> 37:36.740 allies and partners in most places 37:36.740 --> 37:39.303 through our Theater Special Operations Command. 37:41.230 --> 37:44.010 - Where do you think the focus needs to be for 37:44.010 --> 37:47.260 the resources that you would have then? 37:47.260 --> 37:52.260 And in many cases, they may be limited resources 37:52.330 --> 37:53.320 that you're going to have. 37:53.320 --> 37:55.890 Where is the investment going to be? 37:55.890 --> 37:58.780 What are you going to prioritize 37:58.780 --> 38:00.770 with the revenues that you receive? 38:03.530 --> 38:07.350 - Senator, I believe the most important 38:07.350 --> 38:10.360 aspect of SOCOM are the people, 38:10.360 --> 38:13.400 and the people that are performing the mission 38:13.400 --> 38:15.950 wherever it is, whether it's counterterrorism, 38:15.950 --> 38:20.560 countering terrorism in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, 38:20.560 --> 38:22.580 or whether they are 38:22.580 --> 38:25.450 inside the Theater Special Operations Command, 38:25.450 --> 38:28.650 for example, inside the European Command 38:28.650 --> 38:31.120 where they are working with our allies and partners. 38:31.120 --> 38:35.780 They're conducting training with Special Operations Forces 38:35.780 --> 38:38.420 from nations that are within 38:38.420 --> 38:41.340 NATO and with Russia's near abroad. 38:41.340 --> 38:45.770 - Would you be asking for increased numbers of personnel? 38:45.770 --> 38:48.910 - Senator, right now, I believe that 38:48.910 --> 38:52.710 the personnel within SOCOM are adequate. 38:52.710 --> 38:56.640 I think, if confirmed by this Committee, 38:56.640 --> 38:59.310 I will take a very hard look myself 38:59.310 --> 39:02.390 at how this applies to great power competition. 39:02.390 --> 39:04.190 One thing that I would highlight is that 39:04.190 --> 39:07.470 we should look at all missions across the globe 39:07.470 --> 39:10.610 as the Secretary has reprioritized with the NDS, 39:10.610 --> 39:12.980 and that Special Operations Command 39:12.980 --> 39:15.770 should only do those missions 39:15.770 --> 39:18.613 that are suited for Special Operations Command. 39:19.590 --> 39:21.740 And those missions that can be adjusted 39:21.740 --> 39:24.760 to conventional Forces should also go, 39:24.760 --> 39:26.540 should go to those conventional Forces. 39:26.540 --> 39:30.840 So we have to look at a prioritization of requirements. 39:30.840 --> 39:33.760 - The missions that would be more suited to your command, 39:33.760 --> 39:38.760 would those be counterterrorism, rather than great power? 39:38.770 --> 39:41.840 - Senator, I do believe there some unique capabilities 39:41.840 --> 39:43.710 within Special Operations Command. 39:43.710 --> 39:44.960 I didn't talk about the specifics, 39:44.960 --> 39:48.560 but things like Military Information Support Operations 39:48.560 --> 39:51.713 is one aspect, civil affairs, 39:53.551 --> 39:56.840 and our Military Information Support professionals 39:56.840 --> 39:59.830 that exist within the Theater Special Operations Command, 39:59.830 --> 40:03.780 some are actually stationed in embassies 40:03.780 --> 40:06.100 around the world in support of the chief of mission 40:06.100 --> 40:09.590 at those embassies, those help build a network. 40:09.590 --> 40:10.830 So no, I'm not advocating 40:10.830 --> 40:12.250 for additional resources at this time, 40:12.250 --> 40:14.310 but I am looking for to make sure 40:14.310 --> 40:17.530 that the people are prioritized in the right places. 40:17.530 --> 40:21.260 - And I would say I would certainly support 40:21.260 --> 40:23.100 any resources that you would need 40:23.100 --> 40:25.550 to complete the missions you are given, sir. 40:25.550 --> 40:28.100 - Thank you. - General McKenzie. 40:28.100 --> 40:32.690 According to the GAO's October report on Afghan security, 40:32.690 --> 40:35.740 the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces 40:35.740 --> 40:38.570 have improved some fundamental capabilities, 40:38.570 --> 40:40.890 such as high-level operational planning, 40:40.890 --> 40:43.060 but they continue to rely 40:43.060 --> 40:45.520 on the United States and coalition support 40:45.520 --> 40:48.920 to fill several key capability gaps. 40:48.920 --> 40:51.390 Where do you believe the biggest shortfalls remain 40:51.390 --> 40:54.230 in terms of the Security Force's ability 40:54.230 --> 40:56.230 to conduct its missions, 40:56.230 --> 40:58.370 and how do you believe the United States should work 40:58.370 --> 41:03.370 to make the Afghan forces more sufficient, self-sufficient? 41:03.620 --> 41:08.620 I know we, in your follow up here to Senator Wicker, 41:08.750 --> 41:11.730 when we were talking about the losses that we suffer 41:12.723 --> 41:17.600 as a country when we lose brave military men and women, 41:17.600 --> 41:20.330 the Afghan soldiers and police, 41:20.330 --> 41:24.970 just last year alone, lost more than the total 41:24.970 --> 41:29.635 that we've seen in the American death toll in 17 years. 41:29.635 --> 41:33.743 How can we more effectively support them? 41:34.940 --> 41:35.773 - Senator, thank you. 41:35.773 --> 41:37.250 I think one of the most important things 41:37.250 --> 41:39.080 that we can help the Afghans with 41:39.080 --> 41:42.490 is continuing to refine their force generation process. 41:42.490 --> 41:44.390 How they recruit, how they train, 41:44.390 --> 41:47.150 and how they present forces for actual execution. 41:47.150 --> 41:49.470 As you noted, their losses have been very high. 41:49.470 --> 41:50.460 They are fighting hard, 41:50.460 --> 41:52.880 but their losses are not gonna be sustainable 41:52.880 --> 41:54.460 unless we correct this problem. 41:54.460 --> 41:56.810 I know it has General Miller's direct attention 41:56.810 --> 41:58.210 and if confirmed, it would be something 41:58.210 --> 41:59.580 that I would like to work with him on 41:59.580 --> 42:01.210 as a matter of great importance. 42:01.210 --> 42:03.820 The other part of your question talks about the capabilities 42:03.820 --> 42:06.000 that we provide them actually in the field. 42:06.000 --> 42:08.560 They range from close air support, 42:08.560 --> 42:10.570 which they are now beginning to generate themselves, 42:10.570 --> 42:12.050 but we still assist them with, 42:12.050 --> 42:16.650 with Intelligence, with CASEVAC under certain situations 42:16.650 --> 42:18.890 and all the maintenance activities that go into 42:18.890 --> 42:21.340 putting a large complex army in the field. 42:21.340 --> 42:22.670 These are all areas where 42:22.670 --> 42:24.330 additional work needs to be done. 42:24.330 --> 42:25.690 These are areas that are being addressed 42:25.690 --> 42:27.640 by General Miller today in the Theater. 42:28.490 --> 42:29.567 - Thank you both. 42:29.567 --> 42:32.610 Thank you both for visiting with me prior to this hearing. 42:32.610 --> 42:34.880 I look forward to working with you in the future. 42:34.880 --> 42:37.520 Thank you. - Thank you, Senator Fischer. 42:37.520 --> 42:38.353 Senator Peters. 42:38.353 --> 42:40.130 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, 42:40.130 --> 42:41.860 thank you for your testimony today 42:41.860 --> 42:44.063 and also for your willingness to take on 42:44.063 --> 42:47.730 some very difficult jobs, so we all appreciate that. 42:47.730 --> 42:50.260 General McKenzie, I want to follow up on some my colleagues' 42:50.260 --> 42:53.290 questions related to the National Defense Strategy 42:53.290 --> 42:55.760 that we had presented to us last week. 42:55.760 --> 42:58.300 I want to read a portion of that report 42:58.300 --> 43:01.590 that I think is particularly significant and I quote, 43:01.590 --> 43:04.330 while the United States was focused on counterterrorism 43:04.330 --> 43:07.720 and defeating insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, 43:07.720 --> 43:11.380 Russia and China were focused on acquiring capabilities 43:11.380 --> 43:13.840 to overcome America's technological edge 43:13.840 --> 43:15.650 and operational reach. 43:15.650 --> 43:19.730 As a result, America has been losing its military advantage 43:19.730 --> 43:23.380 in a number of key war fighting areas, is the quote, 43:23.380 --> 43:25.700 which I think is significant and one that, 43:25.700 --> 43:28.400 certainly one that is very significant 43:28.400 --> 43:29.430 to the work that this Committee does 43:29.430 --> 43:31.570 and the work that you do each and every day. 43:31.570 --> 43:34.130 The report goes on to suggest that Congress needs to invest 43:34.130 --> 43:37.690 in new capabilities and operational concepts. 43:37.690 --> 43:39.840 That leads to my concern about Afghanistan, 43:39.840 --> 43:43.400 where we are still spending $45 billion 43:43.400 --> 43:46.060 dollars a year in Afghanistan, 43:46.060 --> 43:49.200 and given the focus of the new National Defense Strategy, 43:49.200 --> 43:52.380 my question to you, sir, is, if confirmed, 43:52.380 --> 43:56.900 how will you adjust requested requirements for Afghanistan, 43:56.900 --> 44:00.543 given the Strategy's focus on great power competition? 44:02.030 --> 44:04.170 - Sir, I'd like to begin by completely agreeing 44:04.170 --> 44:06.250 with the NDS Commission's assessment. 44:06.250 --> 44:09.560 In fact, over the last decade and a half and even longer, 44:09.560 --> 44:12.480 our two principal competitors, Russia and China, 44:12.480 --> 44:14.820 have carefully studied us while we've been engaged 44:14.820 --> 44:17.640 in principally in the CENTCOM Theater. 44:17.640 --> 44:19.600 They have used that opportunity to steal a march 44:19.600 --> 44:21.220 and they have made those investments 44:21.220 --> 44:24.870 based on a very careful study of our potential weaknesses. 44:24.870 --> 44:27.160 I think it's very good analysis. 44:27.160 --> 44:29.310 Senator, I think the way forward in Afghanistan 44:29.310 --> 44:31.620 is to try to reach a political settlement 44:31.620 --> 44:34.870 that is gonna allow us to remove elements of our presence 44:34.870 --> 44:35.890 that are there now. 44:35.890 --> 44:37.570 The key thing though, that we need to bear in mind 44:37.570 --> 44:39.620 as we look at a future in Afghanistan is 44:39.620 --> 44:41.810 our long-term interest is preventing attacks 44:41.810 --> 44:43.860 being generated against the Homeland. 44:43.860 --> 44:46.310 We have to provide for that in any potential 44:46.310 --> 44:48.020 future political settlement 44:48.020 --> 44:50.970 and that is what we are looking to Ambassador Khalilzad 44:50.970 --> 44:52.210 to work on right now. 44:52.210 --> 44:54.817 I believe that does present a long-term way forward 44:54.817 --> 44:56.420 and I think we're gonna know more about it 44:56.420 --> 44:57.620 here in the near future. 44:58.720 --> 45:00.410 - We've been hearing about this, for as long as 45:00.410 --> 45:02.580 I've been in Congress, I've been hearing about the need 45:02.580 --> 45:04.739 for the political settlement and having 45:04.739 --> 45:07.830 Department of State involved, so this isn't a new strategy, 45:07.830 --> 45:10.377 at least in terms of what I've been hearing over many years. 45:10.377 --> 45:11.670 The other thing that I've heard 45:11.670 --> 45:14.220 and I think I heard it again here today from you as well, 45:14.220 --> 45:18.160 is the necessary capability requirements 45:18.160 --> 45:20.410 for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. 45:20.410 --> 45:22.110 Ultimately, they have to be able to stand up 45:22.110 --> 45:23.840 and defend their country. 45:23.840 --> 45:26.320 That's gonna be also critical to get a political settlement 45:26.320 --> 45:28.600 is to have security forces in Afghanistan 45:28.600 --> 45:32.120 with Afghan people defending themselves. 45:32.120 --> 45:33.640 My question to you directly is, 45:33.640 --> 45:36.300 is how far are the Afghan Security Forces 45:36.300 --> 45:39.840 from having the capability to secure their country 45:39.840 --> 45:44.230 without the presence of 15,000 United States 45:44.230 --> 45:45.830 Soldiers and Marines and Airmen? 45:47.260 --> 45:49.280 - Senator, I will reply equally directly. 45:49.280 --> 45:50.280 They are not there yet 45:50.280 --> 45:53.520 and if we left precipitously right now, 45:53.520 --> 45:54.740 I do not believe they would be able 45:54.740 --> 45:56.510 to successfully defend their country. 45:56.510 --> 45:59.460 I think it's a conditions-based approach. 45:59.460 --> 46:00.610 We're gonna go through this winter. 46:00.610 --> 46:01.443 We'll see how they do 46:01.443 --> 46:04.560 in the fourth generation phase of this winter, 46:04.560 --> 46:07.010 but I don't know how long it's gonna take. 46:07.010 --> 46:09.120 I think that one of the things that would actually 46:09.120 --> 46:11.470 provide the most damaging to them 46:11.470 --> 46:13.350 would be if we put a timeline on it. 46:13.350 --> 46:15.670 We said we're going out at a certain point of time, 46:15.670 --> 46:17.700 as we've seen when we precipitously withdrew 46:17.700 --> 46:19.840 from Iraq earlier, certain effects 46:19.840 --> 46:21.483 probably follow from that. 46:22.600 --> 46:24.480 Senator, I don't know how long it will take. 46:24.480 --> 46:26.420 I do know that we're working it very hard. 46:26.420 --> 46:28.280 I do know they are making improvements. 46:28.280 --> 46:31.030 I do know that today, it would be very difficult 46:31.030 --> 46:32.400 for them to survive without, 46:32.400 --> 46:34.570 and our coalition partners' assistance, 46:34.570 --> 46:36.660 and we should remember that NATO and a number 46:36.660 --> 46:40.306 of other nations are with us on the ground in Afghanistan. 46:40.306 --> 46:42.970 - I'm not asking you to put a number on when we withdraw. 46:42.970 --> 46:45.520 I agree, you cannot put just a time out there 46:45.520 --> 46:47.040 to say we're gonna be pulling out. 46:47.040 --> 46:49.080 You want to make sure that the Afghan forces 46:49.080 --> 46:51.003 have the capability to stand up 46:51.003 --> 46:53.870 and do the work on their own. 46:53.870 --> 46:57.240 But we've been at it for 17 years. 46:57.240 --> 46:59.283 17 years is a long time. 47:00.450 --> 47:02.030 What are we doing differently when it comes to 47:02.030 --> 47:03.770 the Afghan Security Forces that we haven't done 47:03.770 --> 47:07.000 for 17 years while being focused on this? 47:07.000 --> 47:09.250 - Senator, I understand your frustration. 47:09.250 --> 47:12.290 I've been there twice, my son's been there twice. 47:12.290 --> 47:13.440 I would say two things. 47:13.440 --> 47:15.750 First, we are doing things significantly different 47:15.750 --> 47:18.100 with the Afghan Security Forces. 47:18.100 --> 47:19.280 They are doing the fighting. 47:19.280 --> 47:22.310 Americans are still risk and as we saw tragically last week, 47:22.310 --> 47:24.190 Americans are still gonna go in harm's way 47:24.190 --> 47:25.400 and some of them may die, 47:25.400 --> 47:26.900 but we are no longer doing the fighting. 47:26.900 --> 47:27.733 They are doing the fighting. 47:27.733 --> 47:30.120 They're doing it imperfectly, but they are doing it 47:30.120 --> 47:32.470 with our assistance in those niche capabilities 47:32.470 --> 47:34.110 that we talked about a little, before. 47:34.110 --> 47:35.730 So that is actually a new thing. 47:35.730 --> 47:37.190 The other thing, Senator, that is new 47:37.190 --> 47:40.750 and I completely understand your reference that we've been, 47:40.750 --> 47:44.230 we've been pursuing a diplomatic solution for 17 years. 47:44.230 --> 47:46.270 Not in the manner in which we are now. 47:46.270 --> 47:48.410 Not with an empowered envoy that is actually 47:48.410 --> 47:50.210 talking directly to the Taliban 47:50.210 --> 47:52.110 where we have the opportunity to bring them together. 47:52.110 --> 47:54.050 Senator, I believe this is a new thing. 47:54.050 --> 47:56.580 I may be wrong, but I believe this is a new opportunity 47:56.580 --> 47:58.150 for us and the military campaign 47:58.150 --> 47:59.750 is in direct support of that. 47:59.750 --> 48:00.700 - [Gary] Thank you. 48:01.610 --> 48:02.710 - [James] Thank you, Senator Peters. 48:02.710 --> 48:03.603 Senator Cotton. 48:04.810 --> 48:06.277 - Thank you, gentlemen for appearance today 48:06.277 --> 48:08.000 and your willingness to continue 48:08.000 --> 48:09.590 to serve our country in new positions. 48:09.590 --> 48:11.290 Thanks to your families for loaning you 48:11.290 --> 48:13.150 to our country for so long. 48:13.150 --> 48:17.580 General Clarke, let's speak about SOCOM's budget. 48:17.580 --> 48:19.720 In a time of tight budgets when some of the administration 48:19.720 --> 48:21.590 are already talking about cutting five percent 48:21.590 --> 48:22.920 from the Department of Defense budget. 48:22.920 --> 48:25.690 Many people say, but that's okay 48:25.690 --> 48:27.300 because the Special Operations Command 48:27.300 --> 48:30.970 which is bearing so much of the fight will be fully funded. 48:30.970 --> 48:34.670 Can you talk about your dependence on 48:34.670 --> 48:37.460 the rest of the conventional military 48:37.460 --> 48:39.690 and how our Special Operations Forces fight with them 48:39.690 --> 48:42.930 and why stable predictable and increasing funding 48:42.930 --> 48:44.060 for those conventional Forces 48:44.060 --> 48:47.060 is so important for the Special Operations Command? 48:47.060 --> 48:48.333 - Senator, thanks. 48:49.220 --> 48:52.110 There are five Special Operations truths. 48:52.110 --> 48:54.970 The fifth truth of that is, most Special Operations 48:54.970 --> 48:58.600 require non-Special Operations Force assistance. 48:58.600 --> 49:01.950 I believe in that, that truth 49:01.950 --> 49:04.440 and we see it apparent every day in the operations 49:04.440 --> 49:08.560 in which Special Operations conduct. 49:08.560 --> 49:11.610 Especially for longer term enduring missions 49:11.610 --> 49:15.517 for Special Operations, we need the support of the services 49:15.517 --> 49:18.170 and all of those in the conventional Force. 49:18.170 --> 49:21.920 The other aspect I think I'd be remiss if I didn't highlight 49:21.920 --> 49:23.830 is that Special Operations Command 49:23.830 --> 49:26.230 is made up of the Services. 49:26.230 --> 49:27.961 Much of the recruitment, 49:27.961 --> 49:32.650 much of the Force is actually started in conventional Force 49:32.650 --> 49:34.170 and actually came up through the ranks 49:34.170 --> 49:37.270 and they were identified as some of the best of breed 49:37.270 --> 49:39.460 in that particular service in which they served 49:39.460 --> 49:42.800 and then they raised their hand and volunteered 49:42.800 --> 49:43.890 for the Special Operations. 49:43.890 --> 49:48.113 So, the services are inherently important to SOCOM. 49:49.150 --> 49:50.170 - Thank you. 49:50.170 --> 49:52.020 General McKenzie, there's already been 49:52.020 --> 49:54.220 a lot of talk this morning about the implications 49:54.220 --> 49:56.620 of the National Defense Strategy both for Central Command 49:56.620 --> 49:59.883 and for Special Operations Command, and, 50:01.200 --> 50:05.400 it's focused on near-peer or peer competition, 50:05.400 --> 50:07.310 what it means for the Middle East, 50:07.310 --> 50:10.320 where we primarily fought counterinsurgency wars 50:10.320 --> 50:12.220 over the last 15 years. 50:12.220 --> 50:15.020 But obviously there is one power in the Middle East 50:15.020 --> 50:16.870 that has the resources 50:16.870 --> 50:19.350 and the power of a nation-state, Iran. 50:19.350 --> 50:22.640 It's not a peer competitor, or even a near-peer competitor, 50:22.640 --> 50:25.490 but it does have the abilities that only a nation-state 50:25.490 --> 50:28.790 can marshal to threaten U.S. interests. 50:28.790 --> 50:31.500 Can you talk about what the National Defense Strategy 50:31.500 --> 50:34.420 means for you in Central Command 50:34.420 --> 50:36.143 relative to the threat of Iran? 50:37.430 --> 50:39.250 - Senator, thank you. 50:39.250 --> 50:41.740 The long-term enduring significant, most significant threat 50:41.740 --> 50:44.070 in the U.S. CENTCOM AOR is Iran 50:44.070 --> 50:46.740 and Iran's malign hegemonistic ambitions 50:46.740 --> 50:49.040 across the Theater and indeed globally. 50:49.040 --> 50:51.082 That's clearly recognized in the NDS. 50:51.082 --> 50:53.210 There are five principal threats to the nation 50:53.210 --> 50:55.750 that identified in the National Defense Strategy, 50:55.750 --> 50:57.080 Iran is one of those. 50:57.080 --> 51:00.300 It is below the threats of Russia, which can destroy us, 51:00.300 --> 51:02.270 and China, which can seriously injure us, 51:02.270 --> 51:04.040 but Iran also has that capability 51:04.040 --> 51:06.580 and they're exploiting their malign views 51:06.580 --> 51:07.960 every day in the Theater. 51:07.960 --> 51:10.010 So how the Central Command AOR, 51:10.010 --> 51:12.570 the Central Command will be forced to deal with those 51:12.570 --> 51:14.880 is first of all recognize that there is gonna be 51:14.880 --> 51:17.710 a forced reposture to some degree in Central Command. 51:17.710 --> 51:19.650 We've already begun to see elements of that 51:19.650 --> 51:21.760 as we talk about how often carriers 51:21.760 --> 51:23.550 come into the Central Command AOR. 51:23.550 --> 51:25.490 It's gonna require the Command to adopt 51:25.490 --> 51:28.360 innovative new techniques to maintain deterrence 51:28.360 --> 51:31.140 against Iran because that is sort of the underpinning 51:31.140 --> 51:33.300 of everything else that will go on in the Theater, 51:33.300 --> 51:37.023 is the ability to deter Iran and respond if required to. 51:38.050 --> 51:41.130 - If Iran's leadership were to miscalculate 51:41.130 --> 51:44.010 and to challenge a U.S. Navy vessel in the Persian Gulf 51:44.010 --> 51:46.110 or say close to straight up our moves 51:46.110 --> 51:49.520 do you have any doubt that the U.S. military is postured 51:49.520 --> 51:52.420 in the Central Command Area of Responsibility 51:52.420 --> 51:53.920 to meet that challenge? 51:53.920 --> 51:56.190 - Senator, I'm confident we can respond. 51:56.190 --> 51:58.810 What I would also caveat a little bit, 51:58.810 --> 52:00.990 the element of risk would be the time it would take us 52:00.990 --> 52:03.890 to reassert ourselves, and we can do it very quickly, 52:03.890 --> 52:05.080 or it might be a little bit later, 52:05.080 --> 52:07.460 but when it's all said and done, we're gonna, 52:07.460 --> 52:10.233 we will reassert the status quo ante bellum. 52:11.090 --> 52:12.670 - While we're talking about Iran, 52:12.670 --> 52:14.350 can we talk about what's happening in Yemen 52:14.350 --> 52:17.040 and the extent to which Iran is supporting 52:17.040 --> 52:20.150 the Houthi forces in Yemen and the implications 52:20.150 --> 52:23.170 for U.S. Security and our partner security there? 52:23.170 --> 52:24.140 - Sir, when we talk about Yemen, 52:24.140 --> 52:26.730 I think it's important to remember that Iran is behind 52:26.730 --> 52:28.530 the irresponsible behavior that actually led 52:28.530 --> 52:30.270 to the overthrow of the government of Yemen 52:30.270 --> 52:31.980 and actually created the situation 52:31.980 --> 52:34.680 that we now have in Yemen itself. 52:34.680 --> 52:38.260 Iran has been extraordinarily irresponsive as a nation 52:38.260 --> 52:41.560 in what they've done in Yemen and that is a large factor 52:41.560 --> 52:43.690 in driving the conflict forward. 52:43.690 --> 52:45.170 - Ballistic missiles being launched from 52:45.170 --> 52:47.780 Houthi-controlled territory into Saudi Arabia 52:47.780 --> 52:50.700 to include the vicinity of Saudi Arabia's 52:50.700 --> 52:53.110 international airport in Riyadh 52:53.110 --> 52:55.070 where Americans fly in and out of every day. 52:55.070 --> 52:57.210 I'm not aware of ballistic missile 52:57.210 --> 53:00.330 manufacturing companies in Yemen, are you? 53:00.330 --> 53:01.163 - Sir, I am not. 53:01.163 --> 53:03.130 We are confident those missiles come from another place, 53:03.130 --> 53:05.380 they're smuggled in, they're typically assembled there 53:05.380 --> 53:07.210 with Iranian assistance and then they're employed 53:07.210 --> 53:10.170 by the Houthis, both against the kingdom 53:10.170 --> 53:13.490 as well as against UAE, and as you know also, 53:13.490 --> 53:16.270 irresponsibly into the Bab-el-Mandeb area 53:16.270 --> 53:20.460 and into the Red Sea where vital oil transport occurs. 53:20.460 --> 53:22.900 - My time has expired, thank you again, gentlemen. 53:22.900 --> 53:24.750 - [James] Thank you, Senator Cotton. 53:24.750 --> 53:25.663 Senator Kaine. 53:26.500 --> 53:28.500 - Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks to the witnesses. 53:28.500 --> 53:30.310 Congratulations on the nominations. 53:30.310 --> 53:31.910 Look forward to working together with you, 53:31.910 --> 53:33.223 should you be confirmed. 53:34.380 --> 53:36.180 General McKenzie, I want to start off talking about 53:36.180 --> 53:39.210 Afghanistan, as many have, one of the recent deaths 53:39.210 --> 53:42.960 in Afghanistan was a Virginian, Army Captain Andrew Ross, 53:42.960 --> 53:45.930 who has family in both Lexington and Richmond, 53:45.930 --> 53:47.300 very beloved individual 53:47.300 --> 53:51.490 and we feel that very deeply, his death. 53:51.490 --> 53:52.990 You've been asked a number of questions, 53:52.990 --> 53:54.400 I just want to ask this. 53:54.400 --> 53:58.390 The stalemate's disappointing and I was in Halifax as well 53:58.390 --> 54:00.980 when General Dunford talked about the stalemate. 54:00.980 --> 54:02.410 But it's one thing to have a stalemate 54:02.410 --> 54:04.520 with 14,000 American troops there. 54:04.520 --> 54:06.700 It's another thing to a stalemate with 100,000. 54:06.700 --> 54:09.980 We're down from a peak of 100,000 to 14,000 54:09.980 --> 54:12.270 and it seems to be that that's about the number 54:12.270 --> 54:15.990 that's required right now to provide the ancillary support 54:15.990 --> 54:17.750 to enable the Afghans to have this fight. 54:17.750 --> 54:20.230 Are you aware of any plans by this administration 54:20.230 --> 54:23.770 to significantly in the near or medium-term 54:23.770 --> 54:27.320 change that number of U.S. Troops in Afghanistan? 54:27.320 --> 54:29.060 - Senator, I am not aware of any plans. 54:29.060 --> 54:30.560 - Okay, thank you for that. 54:30.560 --> 54:32.560 Let me ask you about Syria, General McKenzie. 54:32.560 --> 54:35.050 How do you define, how do you understand 54:35.050 --> 54:38.140 the U.S. military mission in Syria? 54:38.140 --> 54:40.400 - Senator, the U.S. military mission in Syria is designed 54:40.400 --> 54:43.620 to finish ISIS, the physical caliphate of ISIS, off 54:43.620 --> 54:45.230 in the lower Euphrates River valley. 54:45.230 --> 54:47.100 That is the principal objective of our operations 54:47.100 --> 54:48.540 in Syria. - Principal objective. 54:48.540 --> 54:50.810 One of the things that I've been confused on the Committee 54:50.810 --> 54:52.810 is that that is always stated as either 54:52.810 --> 54:55.260 the objective or the principal objective. 54:55.260 --> 54:57.790 There is sort of a good faith debate 54:57.790 --> 54:59.600 in this Committee and elsewhere about whether 54:59.600 --> 55:02.840 the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force 55:02.840 --> 55:04.110 covers that objective, 55:04.110 --> 55:06.820 but many scholars believe that it does. 55:06.820 --> 55:08.740 But we also occasionally read or hear 55:08.740 --> 55:11.500 at committee meetings like this, 55:11.500 --> 55:13.030 figures from the administration 55:13.030 --> 55:16.500 articulate additional objectives where the legal rationale 55:16.500 --> 55:21.300 is not frankly even covered by the 2001 Authorization. 55:21.300 --> 55:23.700 So, for example, the United States has taken action 55:23.700 --> 55:25.310 against the Syrian government, 55:25.310 --> 55:27.270 twice launching missile strikes 55:27.270 --> 55:28.840 against the Syrian government 55:28.840 --> 55:30.580 in response to use of chemical weapons, 55:30.580 --> 55:33.250 but it's also undertaken military action 55:33.250 --> 55:35.010 against the Syrian government 55:35.010 --> 55:36.820 when the Syrian government has made gains 55:36.820 --> 55:38.120 against the free Syrian Army 55:38.120 --> 55:41.930 in space where ISIS is not that much of a factor. 55:41.930 --> 55:44.140 Do you understand the mission in Syria, 55:44.140 --> 55:47.810 the American mission in Syria, to include a pushing back 55:47.810 --> 55:50.080 or attempting to topple the Syrian government? 55:50.080 --> 55:51.680 - Sir, I do not believe the mission in Syria 55:51.680 --> 55:53.010 includes that objective. 55:53.010 --> 55:56.270 - It has often been stated both by Cabinet Secretaries, 55:56.270 --> 55:58.360 especially Secretary of State 55:58.360 --> 55:59.840 that part of the mission in Syria 55:59.840 --> 56:02.300 is to provide a check against Iran. 56:02.300 --> 56:04.320 Do you understand that as a reason 56:04.320 --> 56:06.700 for American military presence in Syria? 56:06.700 --> 56:09.400 - Senator, that may possibly be a derived effect 56:09.400 --> 56:10.810 of our presence on the ground. 56:10.810 --> 56:13.120 That is not a mission that we are undertaking. 56:13.120 --> 56:16.580 - Is Iran working in tandem with ISIS, as far as you know? 56:16.580 --> 56:19.180 - Iran is certainly not doing a lot against ISIS. 56:19.180 --> 56:20.970 They're pursuing other objectives there. 56:20.970 --> 56:23.430 They are intermittently working against ISIS, 56:23.430 --> 56:27.210 but not as consistently as for example, we are. 56:27.210 --> 56:29.330 - Iran is backing up the Syrian government. 56:29.330 --> 56:31.960 Is the Syrian government working against ISIS, 56:31.960 --> 56:33.050 or indifferent to ISIS? 56:33.050 --> 56:35.030 - I think they're, I think they have, 56:35.030 --> 56:36.760 pretty much consider the ISIS threat over. 56:36.760 --> 56:39.380 They're turning to crush the last remnants of opposition 56:39.380 --> 56:41.510 against the Assad government now, Senator. 56:41.510 --> 56:45.330 - We often hear it stated in press and even in this hearing 56:45.330 --> 56:47.500 that part of the U.S. military presence in Syria 56:47.500 --> 56:50.410 is to provide a check against Russian influence. 56:50.410 --> 56:53.360 Is that your understanding as an objective of U.S. military 56:53.360 --> 56:54.780 presence in Syria? - Sir, it is not. 56:54.780 --> 56:57.040 Again, it may be a derived observed effect. 56:57.040 --> 57:00.040 It is clearly not an objective of our presence in Syria. 57:00.040 --> 57:01.910 - Last thing I want to do is just say a word about 57:01.910 --> 57:03.770 the debate we're currently having about Yemen, 57:03.770 --> 57:06.650 to follow up a little bit on Senator Cotton's questions, 57:06.650 --> 57:09.230 and this is just sort of a statement to share with you. 57:09.230 --> 57:11.840 I think one of the reasons that this body 57:11.840 --> 57:14.860 is considering on the floor a declaration 57:14.860 --> 57:17.730 that we are not involved in, that we 57:17.730 --> 57:20.027 are not to be considered or take military actions 57:20.027 --> 57:23.410 for the Saudis in the Yemeni civil war. 57:23.410 --> 57:24.750 One of the reasons we're having a debate 57:24.750 --> 57:27.150 is sort of a credibility issue, including credibility 57:27.150 --> 57:29.630 of what we've been told by the military. 57:29.630 --> 57:32.720 We have had military leaders look at the Senate and say that 57:32.720 --> 57:36.540 we are not involved in hostilities to support 57:36.540 --> 57:39.390 either side in the Yemeni civil war. 57:39.390 --> 57:42.300 When we've pointed out that the U.S. is refueling 57:42.300 --> 57:46.550 Saudi jets on the way to bombing runs in Yemen, 57:46.550 --> 57:49.190 we're told that that's not assisting in the hostilities. 57:49.190 --> 57:52.210 The War Powers Resolution 1973 57:52.210 --> 57:55.470 defines hostilities to include aiding allies 57:55.470 --> 57:57.550 and moving troops into hostilities, 57:57.550 --> 58:00.010 but we've had military leadership look us in the face 58:00.010 --> 58:02.530 and tell us that refueling Saudi jets 58:02.530 --> 58:05.870 on the way to bombing runs is not hostilities. 58:05.870 --> 58:08.610 Many of the bombs that have killed civilians in Yemen 58:08.610 --> 58:09.740 are made in the United States 58:09.740 --> 58:12.950 and either provided to Saudi Arabia via military sales 58:12.950 --> 58:15.320 or from U.S. companies, but again, 58:15.320 --> 58:18.190 we're told the U.S. is not involved in hostilities. 58:18.190 --> 58:21.370 I think one of the reasons that we're having this debate 58:21.370 --> 58:24.280 on a matter that's pending before the Senate right now is 58:24.280 --> 58:26.300 we don't like being told, 58:26.300 --> 58:28.810 and we're proxies for the American public, 58:28.810 --> 58:31.670 we don't like being told we're not involved in hostilities 58:31.670 --> 58:33.960 when bombs are falling that are made in the United States 58:33.960 --> 58:35.810 and when U.S. jets are involved 58:35.810 --> 58:38.525 in refueling Saudi bombing runs into Yemen. 58:38.525 --> 58:40.390 We're insulted by that. 58:40.390 --> 58:41.800 I think we just need to be candid 58:41.800 --> 58:44.380 about what we're doing and not doing. 58:44.380 --> 58:46.440 And I'm not asking for a response 58:46.440 --> 58:48.280 from either of you on this, but I'm just saying, 58:48.280 --> 58:50.470 one of the reasons we're having this debate 58:50.470 --> 58:52.550 I'm convinced right now is because 58:52.550 --> 58:55.380 we've been told some things from the administration, 58:55.380 --> 58:57.180 from military leadership, in the last months 58:57.180 --> 58:59.080 that we find, frankly, incredible. 58:59.080 --> 59:01.420 And we don't find that to be believable. 59:01.420 --> 59:06.230 And so, the debate will clarify as a matter of policy 59:06.230 --> 59:07.700 from the Article I Branch 59:07.700 --> 59:11.140 that's supposed to be the declarer of war, 59:11.140 --> 59:15.223 military action, especially against a nation, 59:16.200 --> 59:17.600 this will be a clarifying debate 59:17.600 --> 59:18.677 and I think it's one we need to have. 59:18.677 --> 59:20.637 And with that, thank you, Mr. Chair. 59:25.870 --> 59:29.113 - [James] Thank you, let's see. 59:29.113 --> 59:30.363 Thank you, Senator Kaine. 59:32.400 --> 59:33.780 Senator Rounds. 59:33.780 --> 59:35.790 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 59:35.790 --> 59:37.940 General Clarke and General McKenzie, 59:37.940 --> 59:40.330 I want to thank you both and your families 59:40.330 --> 59:42.430 for your decades of service to our nation. 59:43.370 --> 59:46.190 General Clarke, there's been considerable discussion 59:46.190 --> 59:49.430 on the stress of the Special Operations Force 59:49.430 --> 59:51.707 after 17 years of continuous operations 59:51.707 --> 59:55.360 and the doubling of a force during that same timeframe. 59:55.360 --> 59:58.370 Can you discuss from your perspective the difference 59:58.370 --> 01:00:00.660 in the quality of individual special operators, 01:00:00.660 --> 01:00:05.560 in 2001 and now, and the challenges the Command faces 01:00:05.560 --> 01:00:07.800 in maintaining that quality? 01:00:07.800 --> 01:00:11.110 And what do you need from Congress proactively 01:00:11.110 --> 01:00:14.570 to make certain that special operator quality 01:00:14.570 --> 01:00:18.900 remains unmatched in the face of operational requirements, 01:00:18.900 --> 01:00:21.713 which we all know will not be reduced? 01:00:24.160 --> 01:00:26.410 - Senator, thanks for that question, 01:00:26.410 --> 01:00:27.470 and thanks for your support. 01:00:27.470 --> 01:00:32.150 The quality of Special Operations since 2001. 01:00:32.150 --> 01:00:33.870 I think, has actually increased. 01:00:33.870 --> 01:00:36.500 The experience that our Special Operations, 01:00:36.500 --> 01:00:40.180 operators have gained throughout the world in the activities 01:00:40.180 --> 01:00:42.840 in which they have participated have made them better 01:00:42.840 --> 01:00:44.693 and have made them stronger. 01:00:45.981 --> 01:00:49.050 I still stick with that the quality 01:00:49.050 --> 01:00:54.020 is more important than the quantity, one of the soft truths. 01:00:54.020 --> 01:00:56.830 And so as we look at that quality, 01:00:56.830 --> 01:00:59.030 the standards have not changed. 01:00:59.030 --> 01:01:03.350 We have not lowered standards within SOCOM 01:01:03.350 --> 01:01:06.530 in any of the specialties that support. 01:01:06.530 --> 01:01:08.250 They all have their individual standards 01:01:08.250 --> 01:01:09.450 which they have to meet. 01:01:10.510 --> 01:01:15.510 The other piece I would highlight for the Committee is, 01:01:16.160 --> 01:01:19.000 you specifically mentioned stress on the force. 01:01:19.000 --> 01:01:23.140 As the Secretary has stated, first line of effort 01:01:23.140 --> 01:01:27.324 is build a more lethal and agile force, an adaptive force. 01:01:27.324 --> 01:01:29.493 A lot about goes to readiness, 01:01:29.493 --> 01:01:31.840 and the readiness of the force that we have. 01:01:31.840 --> 01:01:34.860 The Secretary has given guidance to the Department 01:01:34.860 --> 01:01:37.710 in terms of having a two to one dwell ratio. 01:01:37.710 --> 01:01:42.200 So for every month deployed, a Special Operations warrior 01:01:42.200 --> 01:01:45.140 has to be back home for two months to reset. 01:01:45.140 --> 01:01:47.780 So that three months would equate to nine. 01:01:47.780 --> 01:01:52.260 I think those things as we look at our Force are crucial. 01:01:52.260 --> 01:01:53.877 As far as what Congress can do 01:01:53.877 --> 01:01:55.410 and what this Committee can do, 01:01:55.410 --> 01:02:00.410 I think it's the sustainable, predictable funding for SOCOM 01:02:00.720 --> 01:02:05.720 that allow it to have a special programs that it does have 01:02:06.053 --> 01:02:09.390 and the unique equipment that has been recognized 01:02:09.390 --> 01:02:12.420 by this Committee as crucial to our mission. 01:02:12.420 --> 01:02:13.880 - Thank you. 01:02:13.880 --> 01:02:16.413 General Clarke, or I'm sorry, General McKenzie, 01:02:17.300 --> 01:02:20.400 you come into CENTCOM during a time in which 01:02:20.400 --> 01:02:23.370 there is clearly a discussion here within the Senate 01:02:23.370 --> 01:02:26.843 with regards to the role that we would play in Yemen. 01:02:28.450 --> 01:02:30.600 Most recently, and I think the discussion was here 01:02:30.600 --> 01:02:32.530 in which you didn't get an opportunity to respond 01:02:32.530 --> 01:02:35.640 with your thoughts concerning the role that this country 01:02:35.640 --> 01:02:39.003 plays in the activity in Yemen today. 01:02:40.450 --> 01:02:43.160 I'd like, from your perspective, 01:02:43.160 --> 01:02:45.920 based upon what's going on there today, 01:02:45.920 --> 01:02:49.190 your thoughts about the need to either 01:02:49.190 --> 01:02:54.140 support the efforts there to come to a (coughs) excuse me, 01:02:54.140 --> 01:02:59.070 a peaceful resolution, and what the role of our nation 01:02:59.070 --> 01:03:03.050 should be in trying to bring all of the different sides 01:03:03.050 --> 01:03:06.510 to the negotiating tables, and the critical need 01:03:06.510 --> 01:03:09.640 at this juncture to maintain a steady course. 01:03:09.640 --> 01:03:11.520 Could you talk a little bit about the role 01:03:11.520 --> 01:03:14.970 that you see right now from a policy perspective 01:03:16.070 --> 01:03:18.860 with regard to the activities in Yemen? 01:03:18.860 --> 01:03:21.320 - Senator, thank you for the question. 01:03:21.320 --> 01:03:22.153 When we look at Yemen, 01:03:22.153 --> 01:03:23.340 there are really two things we look at, 01:03:23.340 --> 01:03:25.510 and the most important thing remains 01:03:25.510 --> 01:03:28.060 the ability to apply direct CT pressure 01:03:28.060 --> 01:03:30.230 to Al Qaeda on the Arabian peninsula 01:03:30.230 --> 01:03:32.210 and to ISIS on the Arabian peninsula. 01:03:32.210 --> 01:03:34.740 We should all remember that before 2001, 01:03:34.740 --> 01:03:36.540 an attack against a U.S. warship 01:03:36.540 --> 01:03:39.700 initiated by AQAP down in Aden 01:03:39.700 --> 01:03:41.250 was actually one of the early attacks 01:03:41.250 --> 01:03:42.960 of this long war that we're in now. 01:03:42.960 --> 01:03:45.780 So they have an aspiration to attack the United States. 01:03:45.780 --> 01:03:48.250 They are prevented from generating that only because 01:03:48.250 --> 01:03:50.290 of the direct pressure that remains on them. 01:03:50.290 --> 01:03:52.860 So that is a clear, unequivocal national interest 01:03:52.860 --> 01:03:54.090 of the United States. 01:03:54.090 --> 01:03:56.580 Senator, I believe that the best solution in Yemen 01:03:56.580 --> 01:03:59.860 would be a negotiated solution that we are hopefully 01:03:59.860 --> 01:04:01.680 beginning to maybe see the leading edge of now, 01:04:01.680 --> 01:04:04.610 with Martin Griffin and other Members of the United Nations 01:04:04.610 --> 01:04:06.910 that are attempting to bring parties to a cease-fire 01:04:06.910 --> 01:04:09.140 that will allow for the distribution of food, 01:04:09.140 --> 01:04:11.930 and the Houthis bear a large measure of that blame 01:04:11.930 --> 01:04:13.530 for not distributing that food, 01:04:13.530 --> 01:04:15.280 but an attempt to get to a situation 01:04:15.280 --> 01:04:16.720 where the large fraction, 01:04:16.720 --> 01:04:18.830 almost two-thirds of the population of Yemen 01:04:18.830 --> 01:04:23.590 is at food risk now, can be appropriately addressed. 01:04:23.590 --> 01:04:25.020 I think that is an important thing. 01:04:25.020 --> 01:04:27.340 I believe our ability to participate 01:04:27.340 --> 01:04:29.340 and drive those discussions require 01:04:29.340 --> 01:04:33.310 that we remain in contact with both UAE 01:04:33.310 --> 01:04:35.580 and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 01:04:35.580 --> 01:04:36.413 - Thank you. 01:04:36.413 --> 01:04:37.490 My time has expired. 01:04:37.490 --> 01:04:39.395 Thank you both for your service. 01:04:39.395 --> 01:04:41.539 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. - Thank you, Senator Brown. 01:04:41.539 --> 01:04:42.496 Senator Warren. 01:04:42.496 --> 01:04:44.507 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you General McKenzie 01:04:44.507 --> 01:04:47.290 and General Clarke for being here today. 01:04:47.290 --> 01:04:50.160 So I wanna go back to Yemen. 01:04:50.160 --> 01:04:54.170 For over three years, the Saudi Arabia-led 01:04:54.170 --> 01:04:58.160 coalition warplanes refueled and armed with missiles 01:04:58.160 --> 01:05:01.200 by the United States have been bombing Yemeni territory 01:05:01.200 --> 01:05:03.540 to counter Iranian-backed militias 01:05:03.540 --> 01:05:05.910 as part of a dangerous proxy war 01:05:05.910 --> 01:05:08.060 between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 01:05:08.060 --> 01:05:10.910 And this week, the Senate advanced a resolution 01:05:10.910 --> 01:05:12.850 that would if it became law, 01:05:12.850 --> 01:05:16.360 cut off all U.S. support for Saudi-led coalitions 01:05:16.360 --> 01:05:18.770 bombing campaign in Yemen. 01:05:18.770 --> 01:05:20.330 So I just want to make sure that 01:05:20.330 --> 01:05:22.250 we're all clear about what's going on. 01:05:22.250 --> 01:05:24.890 I think will be helpful for the American people 01:05:24.890 --> 01:05:28.000 to understand how we have directly contributed 01:05:28.000 --> 01:05:32.880 to the situation in Yemen since March of 2015. 01:05:32.880 --> 01:05:34.650 We seem to have had some challenges 01:05:34.650 --> 01:05:37.780 in getting this on the record, so let me start here. 01:05:37.780 --> 01:05:41.900 General McKenzie, we provide both Intelligence support 01:05:41.900 --> 01:05:43.960 and military advice to the Saudis 01:05:43.960 --> 01:05:47.890 for targeting Houthi and Saleh aligned forces in Yemen. 01:05:47.890 --> 01:05:48.913 Is that correct? 01:05:50.040 --> 01:05:52.000 - Senator, it is with the important exception that 01:05:52.000 --> 01:05:54.009 the Intelligence we're providing them 01:05:54.009 --> 01:05:56.990 is not target-level Intelligence. 01:05:56.990 --> 01:05:58.700 - Well, it is Intelligence, 01:05:58.700 --> 01:05:59.750 I just wanna make sure I've got this. 01:05:59.750 --> 01:06:03.670 Are you saying we provide Intelligence support 01:06:03.670 --> 01:06:05.370 and military advice, is that right? 01:06:05.370 --> 01:06:07.060 - That is correct. - Okay. 01:06:07.060 --> 01:06:09.920 And until November 11 of this year, 01:06:09.920 --> 01:06:14.340 we refueled Saudi-led coalition strike air force 01:06:14.340 --> 01:06:17.200 that bombed these targets in Yemen, is that right? 01:06:17.200 --> 01:06:18.500 - Senator, that is correct. 01:06:18.500 --> 01:06:21.570 - And Saudi aircraft routinely drop 01:06:21.570 --> 01:06:24.200 both guided and unguided bombs, 01:06:24.200 --> 01:06:29.200 some of which are sold by U.S. Defense contractors, 01:06:29.300 --> 01:06:31.210 drop them on these targets in Yemen. 01:06:31.210 --> 01:06:33.240 Is that correct? - Senator, that is correct. 01:06:33.240 --> 01:06:35.460 - So, we've got Intelligence. 01:06:35.460 --> 01:06:38.520 We've got refueling, we've got bombs. 01:06:38.520 --> 01:06:41.720 We've got military advice. 01:06:41.720 --> 01:06:44.740 You and I talked yesterday about our military relationship 01:06:44.740 --> 01:06:47.660 with Saudi Arabia, and I know that you think 01:06:47.660 --> 01:06:51.860 that continuing the campaign in Yemen is in our interest, 01:06:51.860 --> 01:06:55.110 but I respectfully disagree on this. 01:06:55.110 --> 01:06:59.310 Yemen is a largest humanitarian crisis in the world. 01:06:59.310 --> 01:07:02.010 Millions of people are on the brink of starvation. 01:07:02.010 --> 01:07:06.090 It is the worst cholera outbreak in modern history. 01:07:06.090 --> 01:07:08.580 Thousands of civilians have been killed. 01:07:08.580 --> 01:07:10.240 Thousands more wounded. 01:07:10.240 --> 01:07:12.470 Children have starved to death. 01:07:12.470 --> 01:07:14.457 Neither side is winning this proxy war 01:07:14.457 --> 01:07:17.130 and the Yemeni people are suffering. 01:07:17.130 --> 01:07:19.960 I think it is time to reevaluate our relationship 01:07:19.960 --> 01:07:22.220 with Saudi Arabia in light of its actions, 01:07:22.220 --> 01:07:23.870 not only in Yemen, 01:07:23.870 --> 01:07:27.680 but with the assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. 01:07:27.680 --> 01:07:30.970 And we need to ask ourselves if the benefits 01:07:30.970 --> 01:07:34.870 of this relationship with Saudi Arabia is worth the costs, 01:07:34.870 --> 01:07:37.690 if this kind of behavior continues. 01:07:37.690 --> 01:07:41.060 And that's why I cosponsored this bipartisan resolution 01:07:41.060 --> 01:07:42.880 that would stop our involvement 01:07:42.880 --> 01:07:45.330 in Saudi military operations in Yemen, 01:07:45.330 --> 01:07:50.010 unless Congress provides specific authorization for it. 01:07:50.010 --> 01:07:54.630 So, I wanna ask about one other area while I have time. 01:07:54.630 --> 01:07:57.270 That is the nuclear deal between the United States 01:07:57.270 --> 01:08:00.930 and five partner nations, and Iran, 01:08:00.930 --> 01:08:03.620 that placed Iran's nuclear program 01:08:03.620 --> 01:08:05.562 under limits and inspections 01:08:05.562 --> 01:08:08.600 so that it could not develop a nuclear weapon. 01:08:08.600 --> 01:08:10.630 So far, this deal has worked 01:08:10.630 --> 01:08:13.760 and Iran's compliance has been verified repeatedly 01:08:13.760 --> 01:08:16.080 by international inspectors, 01:08:16.080 --> 01:08:18.590 but President Trump has put this deal at risk 01:08:18.590 --> 01:08:21.030 when he unilaterally withdrew the United States 01:08:21.030 --> 01:08:23.603 and imposed all sanctions on Iran 01:08:23.603 --> 01:08:26.630 that were meant to be suspended as a condition 01:08:26.630 --> 01:08:29.110 of Iran's compliance with the agreement. 01:08:29.110 --> 01:08:31.180 Now, the Director of National Intelligence 01:08:31.180 --> 01:08:35.020 Worldwide Threat Assessment from this year said in part 01:08:35.020 --> 01:08:39.060 that the Iran deal has quote, extended the amount of time 01:08:39.060 --> 01:08:42.010 Iran would need to produce fissile material 01:08:42.010 --> 01:08:45.580 for a nuclear weapon from a few months to about one year, 01:08:45.580 --> 01:08:48.750 and quote, has enhanced the transparency 01:08:48.750 --> 01:08:51.000 of Iran's nuclear activities. 01:08:51.000 --> 01:08:52.660 General McKenzie, do you agree with 01:08:52.660 --> 01:08:55.512 the Intelligence Community's assessment? 01:08:55.512 --> 01:08:57.340 - Senator, I do agree with the assessment. 01:08:57.340 --> 01:08:59.730 - And aside from the current nuclear agreement, 01:08:59.730 --> 01:09:02.870 at this time, are you aware of any alternative 01:09:02.870 --> 01:09:06.350 binding diplomatic agreement that would prevent Iran 01:09:06.350 --> 01:09:08.193 from developing a nuclear weapon? 01:09:09.160 --> 01:09:10.380 - Senator, I am not. 01:09:10.380 --> 01:09:12.470 - And since the Trump administration 01:09:12.470 --> 01:09:14.090 violated the nuclear deal 01:09:14.090 --> 01:09:16.450 by unilaterally withdrawing from it 01:09:16.450 --> 01:09:19.960 and re-imposing sanctions, has the Iranian government 01:09:19.960 --> 01:09:24.340 significantly reduced its destabilizing activities? 01:09:24.340 --> 01:09:28.600 - Iranian destabilizing activities across the region 01:09:28.600 --> 01:09:30.960 were active before, during, and after-- 01:09:30.960 --> 01:09:33.013 - Okay, so no effect. 01:09:33.013 --> 01:09:35.670 There's no other binding diplomatic agreement 01:09:35.670 --> 01:09:38.280 to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, 01:09:38.280 --> 01:09:41.660 and we know that Iran's government is a bad actor, 01:09:41.660 --> 01:09:44.082 but I think it's easier to counter 01:09:44.082 --> 01:09:48.650 Iran's destabilizing behavior if it has no nuclear weapon 01:09:48.650 --> 01:09:52.310 than it would be if it did have nuclear weapons. 01:09:52.310 --> 01:09:56.320 If Iran maintains itself in compliance, 01:09:56.320 --> 01:09:58.500 then I believe the President should reverse 01:09:58.500 --> 01:10:01.280 his reckless decision to withdraw from the nuclear deal 01:10:01.280 --> 01:10:05.130 and reimpose sanctions, because the deal 01:10:05.130 --> 01:10:08.090 makes America safer, and makes the world safer. 01:10:08.090 --> 01:10:09.473 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:10:10.952 --> 01:10:11.959 - [James] Thank you, Senator Warren. 01:10:11.959 --> 01:10:13.230 Senator Ernst. 01:10:13.230 --> 01:10:14.670 - Thank you, Mr. Chair. 01:10:14.670 --> 01:10:17.270 Gentlemen, thank you very much for your years of service 01:10:17.270 --> 01:10:20.710 to our wonderful, great United States of America. 01:10:20.710 --> 01:10:24.470 I want to thank your families as well for being here today. 01:10:24.470 --> 01:10:26.570 We understand how important they are 01:10:26.570 --> 01:10:29.723 to your success as well, so thank you very much. 01:10:30.580 --> 01:10:33.850 We understand that SOCOM and CENTCOM 01:10:33.850 --> 01:10:37.040 have been really centrist in our fight 01:10:37.040 --> 01:10:40.040 against terrorism in the last 17 years, 01:10:40.040 --> 01:10:43.640 and now that we see the National Defense Strategy 01:10:43.640 --> 01:10:47.790 rightly prioritizing the great power competition 01:10:47.790 --> 01:10:51.170 with adversaries like China and Russia, 01:10:51.170 --> 01:10:54.430 we still have to understand that there continues the fight, 01:10:54.430 --> 01:10:55.850 the counterterrorism fight, 01:10:55.850 --> 01:11:00.310 and the fight against VEOs in the CENTCOM region, 01:11:00.310 --> 01:11:03.730 so as my position as the Subcommittee Chair 01:11:03.730 --> 01:11:05.560 on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, 01:11:05.560 --> 01:11:08.760 I do look forward to continuing to work with you 01:11:08.760 --> 01:11:12.070 and focusing on the Middle East so that we can 01:11:12.070 --> 01:11:15.510 put as much pressure on those organizations as possible. 01:11:15.510 --> 01:11:18.113 So thank you for the great work in that area. 01:11:20.030 --> 01:11:22.770 Senator Reed, I know that earlier you said 01:11:22.770 --> 01:11:25.030 as we focus on families, 01:11:25.030 --> 01:11:27.660 that Mr. Clarke had been very helpful to you. 01:11:27.660 --> 01:11:30.163 I wanna acknowledge, were you in ROC Swimming? 01:11:31.462 --> 01:11:33.713 - [Jack] Yes, I was in ROC Swimming. 01:11:34.600 --> 01:11:36.577 And barely graduated because of that. 01:11:36.577 --> 01:11:38.580 But I know your daughter is probably 01:11:38.580 --> 01:11:40.460 the best swimmer in her class. 01:11:40.460 --> 01:11:42.890 - Well, she is a swimmer. 01:11:42.890 --> 01:11:45.060 I won't say the best swimmer. 01:11:45.060 --> 01:11:48.370 But because we do focus very heavily on our families 01:11:48.370 --> 01:11:52.440 and especially with SOF, it is very important 01:11:52.440 --> 01:11:57.210 that we focus on all aspects of our special operators, 01:11:57.210 --> 01:12:01.220 whether it is their training and qualifications, 01:12:01.220 --> 01:12:04.000 the family support, it is very important. 01:12:04.000 --> 01:12:07.720 And General Clarke, you brought up the soft truths 01:12:07.720 --> 01:12:09.950 that exist out there, there are five of them. 01:12:09.950 --> 01:12:12.930 One of them is that Special Operations 01:12:12.930 --> 01:12:15.860 cannot be mass-produced either. 01:12:15.860 --> 01:12:20.530 And on Friday, I had the honor of attending 01:12:20.530 --> 01:12:23.200 Naval Special Warfare Command in Coronado 01:12:24.210 --> 01:12:27.550 where I had the great honor of securing 01:12:27.550 --> 01:12:32.550 the latest Hell Week class with the newest BUD/s there 01:12:33.200 --> 01:12:35.530 as well as speaking to the SQT, 01:12:35.530 --> 01:12:37.810 the SEAL Qualification Training course 01:12:37.810 --> 01:12:39.713 before they pinned on their Tridents. 01:12:40.870 --> 01:12:45.750 These young men really have spent months and months, 01:12:45.750 --> 01:12:50.320 if not years, enduring some of the toughest 01:12:50.320 --> 01:12:53.680 physical and mental challenges 01:12:53.680 --> 01:12:57.860 known to our fighting men and women. 01:12:57.860 --> 01:13:02.860 And we want to do all that we can to support them. 01:13:02.880 --> 01:13:04.710 This has been discussed earlier, 01:13:04.710 --> 01:13:08.230 but the pool of qualified folks that are able 01:13:08.230 --> 01:13:11.630 to go into Special Operations is very small, 01:13:11.630 --> 01:13:12.960 and you acknowledged that they come 01:13:12.960 --> 01:13:14.900 from all service branches. 01:13:14.900 --> 01:13:17.850 So what can we do to further recruit 01:13:17.850 --> 01:13:21.230 and retain the best of the best, 01:13:21.230 --> 01:13:24.983 knowing that we do need these elite special fighters? 01:13:27.220 --> 01:13:30.380 - Senator, one of the most important things we do 01:13:30.380 --> 01:13:33.180 is work through the Services for that. 01:13:33.180 --> 01:13:35.670 It's critical that the Services 01:13:35.670 --> 01:13:39.850 also have the tools and means, and a lot of that is funding. 01:13:39.850 --> 01:13:41.770 As the Secretary said last week, 01:13:41.770 --> 01:13:44.200 and this is not just an all-voluntary force, 01:13:44.200 --> 01:13:46.948 but this is also a recruited force for our nation. 01:13:46.948 --> 01:13:49.980 We have opened up, as you well know, 01:13:49.980 --> 01:13:53.250 Special Operations Forces across all genders. 01:13:53.250 --> 01:13:57.270 We want the best of the people who have the physical, 01:13:57.270 --> 01:14:00.030 the intellectual, and the desire to serve 01:14:00.030 --> 01:14:02.290 in our Special Operations community 01:14:02.290 --> 01:14:05.260 to be able to serve in our Special Operations community. 01:14:05.260 --> 01:14:07.403 And then specifically, some of the things 01:14:07.403 --> 01:14:10.571 that this Committee has done is 01:14:10.571 --> 01:14:15.120 provide the tools and the resources for SOF to be able 01:14:15.120 --> 01:14:17.560 to take care of its service members and families, 01:14:17.560 --> 01:14:19.856 specifically, the preservation of the-- 01:14:19.856 --> 01:14:21.510 - Thank you. - Force and family 01:14:21.510 --> 01:14:23.900 program, and the warrior care 01:14:24.740 --> 01:14:28.220 that is given to our SOCOM operators 01:14:28.220 --> 01:14:31.100 as a SOF-specific piece, 'cause our operators 01:14:31.100 --> 01:14:32.860 have to work in the shadows. 01:14:32.860 --> 01:14:35.030 They have to work in places that are sensitive, 01:14:35.030 --> 01:14:38.460 things they can't talk about, and to have, 01:14:38.460 --> 01:14:42.020 to have a program that is specific to their needs 01:14:42.020 --> 01:14:44.160 of them that are on the front lines, 01:14:44.160 --> 01:14:45.670 but then it's their families 01:14:45.670 --> 01:14:49.120 who are waiting for them to come home. 01:14:49.120 --> 01:14:50.760 This has been a critical part 01:14:50.760 --> 01:14:52.920 for our Special Operations Command 01:14:52.920 --> 01:14:54.260 and I thank this Committee for that. 01:14:54.260 --> 01:14:55.120 - Yes, and thank you. 01:14:55.120 --> 01:14:56.880 And thank you for acknowledging PODF. 01:14:56.880 --> 01:14:58.590 That's where I was going to drive next, 01:14:58.590 --> 01:15:02.220 because PODF is an incredible combination 01:15:02.220 --> 01:15:06.100 of support for our warriors as well as for our families, 01:15:06.100 --> 01:15:07.450 which again I want to acknowledge 01:15:07.450 --> 01:15:10.610 are so very important to the men that serve 01:15:10.610 --> 01:15:13.250 in your organization as well as women. 01:15:13.250 --> 01:15:15.750 But I was able to also while I was at Coronado 01:15:15.750 --> 01:15:18.480 spend some time with their PODF team 01:15:18.480 --> 01:15:20.740 and visiting with their psychologist. 01:15:20.740 --> 01:15:22.870 I think it's incredible that we are actually 01:15:22.870 --> 01:15:24.990 able to embed our psychologist 01:15:24.990 --> 01:15:28.620 with our various teams of operators across the Force 01:15:28.620 --> 01:15:32.120 and understanding that we not only need to make sure 01:15:32.120 --> 01:15:35.340 that they are physically and spiritually ready 01:15:35.340 --> 01:15:38.820 but also mentally capable to drive on to their next mission. 01:15:38.820 --> 01:15:40.880 So thank you so much. 01:15:40.880 --> 01:15:42.950 Again, gentlemen, take you for years of service 01:15:42.950 --> 01:15:43.783 and to your families. 01:15:43.783 --> 01:15:46.430 God bless you for the great support that you give. 01:15:46.430 --> 01:15:47.803 Thank you, Mr. Chair. 01:15:50.470 --> 01:15:52.050 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:15:52.050 --> 01:15:56.039 Thank you both, it's good to see both of you again, aloha. 01:15:56.039 --> 01:15:59.870 These are two questions that I ask of every nominee 01:15:59.870 --> 01:16:02.860 who comes before any of the five committees on which I sit. 01:16:02.860 --> 01:16:06.210 It's part of my responsibility to ensure the fitness 01:16:06.210 --> 01:16:09.020 of nominees for appointments to senior positions, 01:16:09.020 --> 01:16:13.554 and positions of power within the administration. 01:16:13.554 --> 01:16:16.930 I'd like to ask each of you the following two questions. 01:16:16.930 --> 01:16:19.200 I'll start with you, General McKenzie. 01:16:19.200 --> 01:16:20.620 Since you became a a legal adult, 01:16:20.620 --> 01:16:23.900 have you ever made unwanted requests for sexual favors 01:16:23.900 --> 01:16:26.550 or committed any verbal or physical harassment 01:16:26.550 --> 01:16:28.750 or assault of a sexual nature? 01:16:28.750 --> 01:16:29.980 - Never, Senator. 01:16:29.980 --> 01:16:30.830 - General Clarke? 01:16:31.810 --> 01:16:33.470 - Never, Senator. - Second question. 01:16:33.470 --> 01:16:36.140 Have ever faced discipline or entered into a settlement 01:16:36.140 --> 01:16:38.270 relating to this kind of conduct? 01:16:38.270 --> 01:16:40.983 - I have not, Senator. - No, I have not, Senator. 01:16:42.200 --> 01:16:43.060 - Thank you. 01:16:43.060 --> 01:16:45.540 General McKenzie, I am concerned that there 01:16:45.540 --> 01:16:48.560 is not enough effort being put to our diplomatic regions 01:16:48.560 --> 01:16:50.620 in the CENTCOM region and I brought this up 01:16:50.620 --> 01:16:53.840 in our discussion earlier when we met. 01:16:53.840 --> 01:16:56.340 The fact that we do not have an ambassador to Egypt 01:16:56.340 --> 01:16:58.870 or Pakistan and just recently nominated 01:16:58.870 --> 01:17:01.470 an ambassador to Saudi Arabia suggests that 01:17:01.470 --> 01:17:04.540 the administration hasn't taken all of the steps it should 01:17:04.540 --> 01:17:07.220 to support diplomacy in the region. 01:17:07.220 --> 01:17:10.830 Will you support fully staffing the diplomatic missions 01:17:10.830 --> 01:17:13.120 in the region and work with them to increase 01:17:13.120 --> 01:17:16.403 regional stability? - Senator, I will. 01:17:17.650 --> 01:17:20.280 - That means lending your voice to the fact that 01:17:20.280 --> 01:17:22.143 we need to fill these positions. 01:17:23.400 --> 01:17:27.310 You mentioned in your testimony, 01:17:27.310 --> 01:17:29.680 General McKenzie, that we are in 01:17:29.680 --> 01:17:32.170 a military stalemate in Afghanistan. 01:17:32.170 --> 01:17:36.940 And in fact, that's also acknowledged by Chairman Dunford. 01:17:36.940 --> 01:17:41.370 And the only path to peace in Afghanistan 01:17:41.370 --> 01:17:42.953 is a diplomatic path. 01:17:43.900 --> 01:17:45.890 General McKenzie, in your response to questions 01:17:45.890 --> 01:17:47.470 from this Committee, you said that there is 01:17:47.470 --> 01:17:52.470 a role for Pakistan in reaching this kind of settlement. 01:17:54.270 --> 01:17:56.000 So why did you say that? 01:17:56.000 --> 01:17:58.650 Are there any indications that Pakistan wishes to play 01:17:58.650 --> 01:18:01.690 that kind of a role with regard to Afghanistan? 01:18:01.690 --> 01:18:05.810 - Senator, I do believe that any solution in Afghanistan 01:18:05.810 --> 01:18:08.560 is gonna require the assistance of Pakistan. 01:18:08.560 --> 01:18:09.970 It has to be a regional solution, 01:18:09.970 --> 01:18:13.460 not just a solution centered in Afghanistan. 01:18:13.460 --> 01:18:16.410 It is in Pakistan's long-term interests 01:18:16.410 --> 01:18:20.045 to have a government in Afghanistan that is stable, 01:18:20.045 --> 01:18:22.660 that they can do business with. 01:18:22.660 --> 01:18:25.600 I think Pakistan has not shown indications 01:18:25.600 --> 01:18:27.470 by and large over the last few years 01:18:27.470 --> 01:18:29.560 of being a serious partner in this regard. 01:18:29.560 --> 01:18:31.890 Ambassador Khalilzad is meeting with the Pakistanis 01:18:31.890 --> 01:18:35.010 very soon to see if we can find some way forward. 01:18:35.010 --> 01:18:36.580 It will be hard to reach a settlement 01:18:36.580 --> 01:18:38.880 without some form of assistance from Pakistan. 01:18:39.760 --> 01:18:42.300 - And you say that Pakistan has still not acknowledged 01:18:42.300 --> 01:18:45.063 that it has a potential major role to play. 01:18:46.780 --> 01:18:49.150 - Probably Pakistan knows very clearly that 01:18:49.150 --> 01:18:50.900 their assistance will be required to reach 01:18:50.900 --> 01:18:52.113 an end state in Afghanistan. 01:18:52.113 --> 01:18:54.580 I think the task that we have is to make it 01:18:54.580 --> 01:18:56.290 attractive to them so that they see that 01:18:56.290 --> 01:18:58.480 it is in their best interest to do that. 01:18:58.480 --> 01:19:00.650 - I think when you use the words like attractive to them, 01:19:00.650 --> 01:19:03.220 that means that they would want something from us 01:19:03.220 --> 01:19:07.750 in return for playing any kind of a positive role 01:19:07.750 --> 01:19:09.700 in bringing about a reconciliation. 01:19:09.700 --> 01:19:12.870 Which by the way, reconciliation in Afghanistan means that 01:19:12.870 --> 01:19:16.543 the Taliban will have a role to play, a major role to play, 01:19:17.520 --> 01:19:20.000 for the governance of Afghanistan. 01:19:20.000 --> 01:19:22.020 - Senator, I believe that it does and if I could 01:19:22.020 --> 01:19:24.620 just very briefly, I'd like to correct an earlier remark. 01:19:24.620 --> 01:19:27.740 I noted the size of Taliban in Afghanistan at being 20,000. 01:19:27.740 --> 01:19:30.410 I believe, would say is actually about 60,000. 01:19:30.410 --> 01:19:32.063 Revise that earlier number. 01:19:35.470 --> 01:19:38.080 - General McKenzie, you were asked some questions about 01:19:38.080 --> 01:19:40.840 the nuclear deal that the United States 01:19:40.840 --> 01:19:42.653 entered into with other nations. 01:19:45.580 --> 01:19:48.640 You said today that Iran has not ceased 01:19:48.640 --> 01:19:52.200 or cut back on its malign activities in the Middle East 01:19:52.200 --> 01:19:55.050 before, during, or after the nuclear deal. 01:19:55.050 --> 01:19:57.720 The nuclear deal did not have anything to do 01:19:57.720 --> 01:20:00.390 with stopping Iran from these kinds 01:20:00.390 --> 01:20:02.997 of activities in the Middle East, correct? 01:20:02.997 --> 01:20:04.750 - Senator, that is correct. 01:20:04.750 --> 01:20:05.970 - So why do you think the President 01:20:05.970 --> 01:20:09.150 used Iran's malign activities in the Middle East 01:20:09.150 --> 01:20:11.420 as a reason for unilaterally 01:20:11.420 --> 01:20:13.540 pulling out of the nuclear deal? 01:20:13.540 --> 01:20:16.630 - Senator, I can't speculate. - I think that's called a 01:20:17.570 --> 01:20:18.773 rhetorical question. 01:20:20.500 --> 01:20:25.410 Let me get to you, General Clarke, excuse me. 01:20:25.410 --> 01:20:28.883 How many personnel are there in SOCOM? 01:20:30.410 --> 01:20:33.020 - Senator, there's 70,000. - 70,000. 01:20:33.020 --> 01:20:36.100 - Personnel. - And you testified today that 01:20:38.680 --> 01:20:41.530 SOCOM should only be involved in those missions 01:20:41.530 --> 01:20:43.900 suited for SOCOM and that missions suited for 01:20:43.900 --> 01:20:46.730 conventional forces should remain or go 01:20:46.730 --> 01:20:48.230 to the conventional forces. 01:20:48.230 --> 01:20:51.100 Is this kind of delineation clear 01:20:51.100 --> 01:20:52.973 within the Department of Defense? 01:20:54.270 --> 01:20:58.093 Is that reflected in what SOCOM does? 01:20:59.560 --> 01:21:02.590 - Senator, I believe the Secretary has been very clear 01:21:02.590 --> 01:21:04.530 in those lines that SOCOM 01:21:04.530 --> 01:21:07.610 should be specific to SOCOM missions. 01:21:07.610 --> 01:21:09.820 So I don't think there's any, 01:21:09.820 --> 01:21:11.930 there is any issue with delineation 01:21:11.930 --> 01:21:14.090 within the Department of Defense for that. 01:21:14.090 --> 01:21:17.140 - This is because of our understanding that 01:21:17.140 --> 01:21:20.060 SOCOM has been deployed often 01:21:20.060 --> 01:21:24.820 to the point where there is major stress on SOCOM. 01:21:24.820 --> 01:21:29.530 I think you mentioned that there are attempts underfoot, 01:21:29.530 --> 01:21:32.200 ongoing I should say, to relieve the stress 01:21:32.200 --> 01:21:34.510 on the deployments of SOCOM. 01:21:34.510 --> 01:21:38.050 So is that because of the understanding 01:21:38.050 --> 01:21:41.027 that the delineation for what SOCOM should be doing 01:21:41.027 --> 01:21:44.200 and what our conventional forces should be doing 01:21:44.200 --> 01:21:46.913 really needs to be adhered to? 01:21:48.910 --> 01:21:50.560 - Senator, with the publishing 01:21:50.560 --> 01:21:52.907 of the National Defense Strategy 01:21:52.907 --> 01:21:55.013 and relooking the prioritization of the Force, 01:21:55.013 --> 01:21:58.520 it's given us very good opportunity to relook 01:21:58.520 --> 01:22:00.630 all of our deployments, look where the Forces are 01:22:00.630 --> 01:22:03.420 to make sure SOCOM Forces are, in fact, 01:22:03.420 --> 01:22:07.340 dedicated to the missions that are most important 01:22:07.340 --> 01:22:10.780 and are specific to Special Operations Forces. 01:22:10.780 --> 01:22:11.613 - Thank you. 01:22:11.613 --> 01:22:14.810 Thank you both for your responses to our questions. 01:22:14.810 --> 01:22:16.010 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:22:16.960 --> 01:22:18.960 - Thank you, Senator Hirono. 01:22:20.270 --> 01:22:21.440 Senator Kyle. 01:22:21.440 --> 01:22:22.780 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:22:22.780 --> 01:22:25.210 I join my colleagues in thanking both of you gentlemen 01:22:25.210 --> 01:22:28.700 for your willingness to continue to serve our country 01:22:28.700 --> 01:22:31.390 and also to join those who have noted the families 01:22:31.390 --> 01:22:33.140 and the sacrifices they make. 01:22:33.140 --> 01:22:36.300 I join in that thanks as well. 01:22:36.300 --> 01:22:38.230 There's been a great deal of discussion here today 01:22:38.230 --> 01:22:40.200 about the new National Defense Strategy 01:22:40.200 --> 01:22:43.200 and the Commission Report on that strategy. 01:22:43.200 --> 01:22:45.660 I had the good fortune of both serving 01:22:45.660 --> 01:22:47.560 as a member of that Commission 01:22:47.560 --> 01:22:50.860 to the time that we finished our deliberations, 01:22:50.860 --> 01:22:53.710 and then having gotten appointed to the Senate. 01:22:53.710 --> 01:22:57.200 Now, I'm in a position to try to do something about it. 01:22:57.200 --> 01:22:59.180 One of the things is to help bring attention 01:22:59.180 --> 01:23:03.810 to what the Strategy and the Commission's Report 01:23:03.810 --> 01:23:06.160 about that Strategy really require. 01:23:06.160 --> 01:23:09.690 I'd like to just make a comment and then get your reaction. 01:23:09.690 --> 01:23:11.840 Everybody has noted the fact that 01:23:11.840 --> 01:23:14.250 the new Defense Strategy, the Secretary 01:23:15.680 --> 01:23:20.680 has dramatically reprioritized U.S. interest, 01:23:20.790 --> 01:23:23.920 putting the potential threat from China and Russia 01:23:23.920 --> 01:23:28.400 at the top of the list, and then relegating the threats 01:23:28.400 --> 01:23:30.870 from countries like Iran and North Korea, 01:23:30.870 --> 01:23:33.880 and the terrorist threats to a subsidiary level. 01:23:33.880 --> 01:23:36.450 And that's in contrast what we have been doing 01:23:36.450 --> 01:23:39.280 over the last eight to 10 years. 01:23:39.280 --> 01:23:43.580 What the Commission has noted is that that re-prioritization 01:23:43.580 --> 01:23:47.390 has certain consequences. 01:23:47.390 --> 01:23:51.260 One of the consequences is what we spend our money on. 01:23:51.260 --> 01:23:55.890 The money will need to be spent on being able to defeat 01:23:55.890 --> 01:23:58.080 and, therefore, and this is of course the key, 01:23:58.080 --> 01:24:00.630 deterring Russia and China 01:24:00.630 --> 01:24:04.460 from ever seeking to have conflict with us. 01:24:04.460 --> 01:24:07.190 That means that we're going to have to, instead of putting 01:24:07.190 --> 01:24:10.170 our first available dollars into readiness, 01:24:10.170 --> 01:24:12.910 to support worn-out troops and equipment 01:24:12.910 --> 01:24:15.830 that's been used in the Middle East, for example, 01:24:15.830 --> 01:24:17.270 we're going to have to put the first dollars 01:24:17.270 --> 01:24:20.810 into long-term expensive research and development 01:24:20.810 --> 01:24:23.270 and acquisition projects to take advantage 01:24:23.270 --> 01:24:24.840 of a lot of new technology, 01:24:24.840 --> 01:24:26.810 and to try to blunt some of the new technology 01:24:26.810 --> 01:24:31.060 that these peer adversaries have been developing against us. 01:24:31.060 --> 01:24:34.070 This has to do with hypersonics and directed energy 01:24:34.070 --> 01:24:35.940 and space of all of those things that 01:24:36.910 --> 01:24:40.083 require some new ways of conducting war. 01:24:41.140 --> 01:24:43.110 It requires some 01:24:44.880 --> 01:24:47.690 continuing work and greater dedication 01:24:47.690 --> 01:24:50.690 to the modernization of our nuclear deterrent. 01:24:50.690 --> 01:24:52.700 Unfortunately, some bills are coming due 01:24:52.700 --> 01:24:56.290 all at the same time, not only the life extension 01:24:56.290 --> 01:24:58.030 of the nuclear weapons and the rebuilding 01:24:58.030 --> 01:25:00.210 of the laboratory complexes, 01:25:00.210 --> 01:25:04.410 but also all three parts of our triad 01:25:04.410 --> 01:25:07.300 wearing out and, therefore, having to be redeveloped 01:25:07.300 --> 01:25:09.410 and deployed at the same time, the air leg, 01:25:09.410 --> 01:25:12.880 the missile leg, and the submarine leg. 01:25:12.880 --> 01:25:15.560 And as has been noted, it's costing upwards 01:25:15.560 --> 01:25:18.120 of a trillion dollars over 30 years, 01:25:18.120 --> 01:25:21.900 but that still represents at its peak 01:25:21.900 --> 01:25:26.840 maybe 6.2 or three percent of the Defense budget. 01:25:26.840 --> 01:25:28.440 We're going to have to position, 01:25:28.440 --> 01:25:30.260 take advantage of allies and assist them, 01:25:30.260 --> 01:25:32.240 and position ourselves as close as we can get 01:25:32.240 --> 01:25:34.510 to potential areas of conflict. 01:25:34.510 --> 01:25:37.440 We're going to have to have more sea and air transport, 01:25:37.440 --> 01:25:40.770 because the new strategy calls for 01:25:41.670 --> 01:25:44.177 having to move things around in the event of a conflict, 01:25:44.177 --> 01:25:45.630 and we don't have enough now 01:25:45.630 --> 01:25:47.250 to be able to have everything we need 01:25:47.250 --> 01:25:50.470 in every theater against every potential enemy. 01:25:50.470 --> 01:25:52.300 So we'd have to reposition forces 01:25:52.300 --> 01:25:54.500 from Europe to Southeast Asia, for example. 01:25:54.500 --> 01:25:57.060 Now, we also noted, the Commission noted 01:25:57.060 --> 01:25:59.710 that the Forces in Southeast Asia are not necessarily 01:25:59.710 --> 01:26:02.180 the ones you would want to fight a land war in Europe, 01:26:02.180 --> 01:26:04.120 likewise, the land war Forces in Europe 01:26:04.120 --> 01:26:07.060 are not necessarily the ones that would be, 01:26:07.060 --> 01:26:09.600 best to be sending to a potential area of conflict 01:26:09.600 --> 01:26:11.763 with the Chinese in Southeast Asia. 01:26:12.650 --> 01:26:16.080 Meanwhile, though we'll do our best to do all of that 01:26:16.080 --> 01:26:19.050 with the capability we have, 01:26:19.050 --> 01:26:20.730 we understand that there will be risks 01:26:20.730 --> 01:26:23.640 that will have to be taken, where are those risks? 01:26:23.640 --> 01:26:26.720 Unfortunately, fall right into your lap 01:26:26.720 --> 01:26:28.260 because they deal with the threats 01:26:28.260 --> 01:26:30.610 you have to deal with all of the time. 01:26:30.610 --> 01:26:32.800 I just wanted to ask you if you understand that 01:26:32.800 --> 01:26:37.210 that is the strategy that is being suggested here. 01:26:37.210 --> 01:26:40.410 And do you understand the risks to that strategy 01:26:40.410 --> 01:26:45.150 that the Commission has notified, has reported on, 01:26:45.150 --> 01:26:46.350 and to tell us just a little bit 01:26:46.350 --> 01:26:47.760 about your thoughts on that. 01:26:47.760 --> 01:26:49.070 I know, General Clarke, for example, 01:26:49.070 --> 01:26:51.677 you said we need to sustainable and predictable funding, 01:26:51.677 --> 01:26:53.970 and that's exactly what the Commission said we needed, 01:26:53.970 --> 01:26:56.730 in addition to more of the top line, 01:26:56.730 --> 01:26:59.070 above three to five percent above inflation. 01:26:59.070 --> 01:27:00.763 So your thoughts on all of that. 01:27:03.210 --> 01:27:06.470 - Senator, I'll begin and then turn it over to Rich here. 01:27:06.470 --> 01:27:11.390 I was, the J5 in a prior life, Rich relieved me in that job. 01:27:11.390 --> 01:27:13.070 So I was present at the creation, 01:27:13.070 --> 01:27:14.790 I'm intimately familiar with the NDS 01:27:14.790 --> 01:27:18.510 and I in fact fully embrace the principles that it has. 01:27:18.510 --> 01:27:22.070 I recognize that in my AOR in particular, if confirmed, 01:27:22.070 --> 01:27:23.470 that there would be increased risk. 01:27:23.470 --> 01:27:25.780 We're gonna have to be prepared to shift forces. 01:27:25.780 --> 01:27:27.370 But I think the answer to that, Senator, 01:27:27.370 --> 01:27:30.360 just to select one thing to briefly talk about, 01:27:30.360 --> 01:27:33.130 would be that we have to examine all problems globally. 01:27:33.130 --> 01:27:35.660 And we have a thought process in mind 01:27:35.660 --> 01:27:37.970 that would allow us to rapidly shift forces 01:27:37.970 --> 01:27:39.990 across the globe to respond. 01:27:39.990 --> 01:27:43.080 And that dynamic force employment is what we know that term, 01:27:43.080 --> 01:27:45.410 the term of art we used inside the Joint Staff, 01:27:45.410 --> 01:27:47.550 but because those margins that you described 01:27:47.550 --> 01:27:49.000 have grown so narrow, 01:27:49.000 --> 01:27:51.690 they are no longer purely regional solutions to anything. 01:27:51.690 --> 01:27:53.790 Every solution, even a regional one, 01:27:53.790 --> 01:27:55.380 has to have a global component. 01:27:55.380 --> 01:27:56.733 And I'll pause there. 01:27:58.850 --> 01:28:00.973 - Senator, as the current J5, 01:28:02.269 --> 01:28:06.420 having relieved the gentleman sitting next to me, 01:28:06.420 --> 01:28:09.850 also familiar with the National Defense Strategy. 01:28:09.850 --> 01:28:13.030 The central idea also of the National Defense Strategy 01:28:13.030 --> 01:28:15.950 is to compete, deter, and win. 01:28:15.950 --> 01:28:20.020 I think that competition aspect so that we compete 01:28:20.020 --> 01:28:20.870 and we're able to deter 01:28:20.870 --> 01:28:22.830 so we don't have to fight that fight, 01:28:22.830 --> 01:28:25.110 it does go to the readiness of the Force 01:28:26.390 --> 01:28:29.920 and it does go to the technologies that are required 01:28:29.920 --> 01:28:31.638 to be able to deter our enemies. 01:28:31.638 --> 01:28:33.580 And I think that is a balance we have to look at. 01:28:33.580 --> 01:28:35.320 It's gonna be up to the Secretary to determine 01:28:35.320 --> 01:28:39.010 where those risks, inputs or takes are here going forward, 01:28:39.010 --> 01:28:41.070 but it's something we are very familiar with, 01:28:41.070 --> 01:28:44.163 and support the National Defense Strategy. 01:28:45.520 --> 01:28:47.100 - Gentlemen, I would just conclude. 01:28:47.100 --> 01:28:52.100 The Commission concluded that the strategy 01:28:52.170 --> 01:28:55.213 could be a very effective strategy if adequately resourced, 01:28:55.213 --> 01:28:57.870 and that's the caveat that we attached to it. 01:28:57.870 --> 01:29:00.220 I thank you again very much for your testimony. 01:29:01.150 --> 01:29:02.370 - Thank you, Senator Kyle. 01:29:02.370 --> 01:29:03.513 Senator Cruz. 01:29:07.290 --> 01:29:10.113 - Gentlemen, welcome, thank you for your service. 01:29:12.260 --> 01:29:14.150 Let's start by talking about Iran. 01:29:14.150 --> 01:29:16.720 General McKenzie, could you give your thoughts 01:29:16.720 --> 01:29:21.720 as to the short-term and long-term threat posed by Iran? 01:29:22.350 --> 01:29:25.836 - Senator, the most significant long and short-term threat 01:29:25.836 --> 01:29:28.640 in the Central Command Theater is Iran 01:29:28.640 --> 01:29:30.510 and Iran's ambitions both in the Theater 01:29:30.510 --> 01:29:32.213 and to a degree, globally. 01:29:34.640 --> 01:29:37.700 - How do you assess the impact 01:29:37.700 --> 01:29:40.040 of the President's decision pulling out 01:29:40.040 --> 01:29:41.620 of the Iranian nuclear deal? 01:29:41.620 --> 01:29:43.670 - Sir, as we spoke just a few moments ago, 01:29:43.670 --> 01:29:46.840 I would say that Iran's malign behavior in the Theater 01:29:46.840 --> 01:29:48.550 hasn't abated from before, during, 01:29:48.550 --> 01:29:50.330 or after the nuclear deal, 01:29:50.330 --> 01:29:52.260 and the other domains which I see, 01:29:52.260 --> 01:29:54.230 which is their development of ballistic missiles, 01:29:54.230 --> 01:29:56.167 their activities both in Syria and in Yemen 01:29:56.167 --> 01:29:57.973 and in other nations across the AOR. 01:29:59.270 --> 01:30:01.200 - Let's take those one piece at a time. 01:30:01.200 --> 01:30:04.600 In terms of ballistic missiles, what are we seeing, 01:30:04.600 --> 01:30:05.780 what's their capability, 01:30:05.780 --> 01:30:07.859 and what is the threat of those ballistic missiles? 01:30:07.859 --> 01:30:12.240 - Iran has chosen to substitute ballistic missiles, 01:30:12.240 --> 01:30:14.540 both short and medium and long-range 01:30:14.540 --> 01:30:17.300 for their paucity of aviation assets. 01:30:17.300 --> 01:30:19.660 They have aggressive developmental program going forward 01:30:19.660 --> 01:30:22.863 that would include an aspiration to develop an ICBM. 01:30:25.280 --> 01:30:28.185 - How close do you assess they are to having an ICBM 01:30:28.185 --> 01:30:30.760 that could hit the continental United States? 01:30:30.760 --> 01:30:32.580 - Well, they're testing, and we watched 01:30:32.580 --> 01:30:35.150 their space launch vehicle with great interest, 01:30:35.150 --> 01:30:37.440 because as we have seen in other places around the world, 01:30:37.440 --> 01:30:39.920 that is technology that is easily transferred 01:30:39.920 --> 01:30:43.623 from a space launch vehicle to an ICBM of significant range. 01:30:45.920 --> 01:30:48.330 - What would be the national security threat 01:30:48.330 --> 01:30:50.110 posed to the United States 01:30:50.110 --> 01:30:52.483 if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons? 01:30:54.930 --> 01:30:57.130 - Should Iran acquire nuclear weapons, 01:30:57.130 --> 01:31:01.060 I think that they have been inimically opposed to us 01:31:01.060 --> 01:31:02.860 for many years, you would always, 01:31:02.860 --> 01:31:05.030 and so you can only speculate what they might do 01:31:05.030 --> 01:31:06.830 with those weapons, but I can't imagine 01:31:06.830 --> 01:31:08.700 that anything good would proceed from Iran 01:31:08.700 --> 01:31:11.070 possessing a weapon of great striking power 01:31:11.070 --> 01:31:12.413 and ability to destroy. 01:31:14.090 --> 01:31:16.870 - How would it impact the region 01:31:16.870 --> 01:31:19.230 if Iran were to become a nuclear power? 01:31:19.230 --> 01:31:21.230 - Senator, I believe it would be destabilizing 01:31:21.230 --> 01:31:23.650 in the region, if Iran procured nuclear weapons. 01:31:23.650 --> 01:31:26.090 It would possibly lead to other nations 01:31:26.090 --> 01:31:27.590 pursuing nuclear weapons, 01:31:27.590 --> 01:31:29.640 it would lead to the worst of all outcomes for us, 01:31:29.640 --> 01:31:31.310 which would be widespread proliferation 01:31:31.310 --> 01:31:33.110 of those weapons across the Theater. 01:31:35.920 --> 01:31:39.200 - Describe for this Committee Iran's conduct 01:31:39.200 --> 01:31:43.910 in terms of spreading and fomenting and funding terror. 01:31:43.910 --> 01:31:46.210 - Senator, we see it active in Yemen. 01:31:46.210 --> 01:31:49.470 Actually, the humanitarian tragedy that we confront in Yemen 01:31:49.470 --> 01:31:52.220 is the child of Iranian ambitions in Yemen 01:31:52.220 --> 01:31:53.620 and their support for the Houthis 01:31:53.620 --> 01:31:57.050 and trying to create a Hezbollah-like state there, 01:31:57.050 --> 01:31:58.870 so that proceeds directly from them. 01:31:58.870 --> 01:32:01.670 We see the same activities in Syria as well 01:32:01.670 --> 01:32:03.930 where they are actively supported, 01:32:03.930 --> 01:32:06.150 actively participating in supporting 01:32:06.150 --> 01:32:08.500 the government of Bashar Al-Assad 01:32:08.500 --> 01:32:09.667 and all that proceeds from that, 01:32:09.667 --> 01:32:13.020 and the terror that he has inflicted on his own people. 01:32:13.020 --> 01:32:14.773 Just to cite two examples, Senator. 01:32:17.270 --> 01:32:19.690 - What's been the state of the Iranian economy 01:32:20.970 --> 01:32:23.550 following our withdrawal from the nuclear deal? 01:32:23.550 --> 01:32:26.460 - Pressure remains on the Iranian economy. 01:32:26.460 --> 01:32:28.890 As you know, Senator, it's hard to say there. 01:32:28.890 --> 01:32:31.470 We looked, but it's hard, hard to know, 01:32:31.470 --> 01:32:33.860 but I believe there is pressure on the Iranian economy. 01:32:33.860 --> 01:32:36.677 It remains to be seen if they are gonna be able 01:32:36.677 --> 01:32:39.810 to work with other countries that will seek to circumvent 01:32:40.700 --> 01:32:42.270 some of the sanctions that are on them. 01:32:42.270 --> 01:32:43.380 Don't know the answer to that 01:32:43.380 --> 01:32:45.890 and I'm probably not the best person to describe that, 01:32:45.890 --> 01:32:48.720 but I believe there is pressure on the Iranian economy. 01:32:48.720 --> 01:32:51.410 - But even with that pressure on the economy, 01:32:51.410 --> 01:32:54.420 have you seen any indications of their scaling back 01:32:54.420 --> 01:32:56.340 their terror activity funding 01:32:56.340 --> 01:32:59.860 of Hezbollah and Houthis and other terrorists? 01:32:59.860 --> 01:33:02.360 - I have seen nothing appreciable change, Senator. 01:33:05.540 --> 01:33:07.150 - What's your assessment? 01:33:07.150 --> 01:33:11.890 We saw earlier this year significant protests 01:33:11.890 --> 01:33:14.660 against the Ayatollah and the mullahs. 01:33:14.660 --> 01:33:17.240 What's your assessment of 01:33:18.700 --> 01:33:20.890 the degree of unrest and dissatisfaction 01:33:20.890 --> 01:33:25.640 among the Iranian people with the regime? 01:33:25.640 --> 01:33:27.350 - Senator, it's an authoritarian regime 01:33:27.350 --> 01:33:31.430 that responds very harshly, and so I haven't seen anything. 01:33:31.430 --> 01:33:33.670 And I defer to the Intelligence community 01:33:33.670 --> 01:33:35.640 for a better look at that, but I haven't seen anything 01:33:35.640 --> 01:33:37.590 that I would characterize as spreading 01:33:37.590 --> 01:33:40.770 or essentially threatening the fundamental nature 01:33:40.770 --> 01:33:41.870 of the Iranian regime. 01:33:42.970 --> 01:33:44.600 - Now, we've certainly seen in the past 01:33:44.600 --> 01:33:47.870 that Iran has a long history of making promises 01:33:47.870 --> 01:33:50.723 and then breaking those promises. 01:33:52.120 --> 01:33:54.530 What do you see as the likelihood 01:33:54.530 --> 01:33:58.520 that they either have initiated or will initiate again 01:33:58.520 --> 01:34:02.340 a nuclear program working to develop nuclear weapons? 01:34:02.340 --> 01:34:05.060 - Senator, I think we should watch very closely. 01:34:05.060 --> 01:34:07.820 We should watch very closely that possibility. 01:34:07.820 --> 01:34:09.963 - Gentlemen, thank you both for your service. 01:34:12.240 --> 01:34:13.340 - Thank you, Senator Cruz. 01:34:13.340 --> 01:34:15.360 Senator Nelson. 01:34:15.360 --> 01:34:16.660 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:34:17.950 --> 01:34:20.123 General McKenzie, that was a, 01:34:21.110 --> 01:34:24.450 a very good dialogue with Senator Cruz. 01:34:24.450 --> 01:34:29.003 I commend you for your quick and sharp responses. 01:34:30.350 --> 01:34:31.720 Given the fact that 01:34:32.590 --> 01:34:34.880 the U.S.-supported coalition 01:34:35.820 --> 01:34:39.860 has really routed ISIS 01:34:41.260 --> 01:34:43.853 in Syria, in Iraq, 01:34:45.170 --> 01:34:46.363 what's next? 01:34:48.060 --> 01:34:52.890 And weave your answer in with not necessarily just ISIS, 01:34:52.890 --> 01:34:55.400 but Al Qaeda and other groups 01:34:57.230 --> 01:35:00.340 in the area such as Yemen, 01:35:00.340 --> 01:35:03.850 anyplace that there is chaos, 01:35:03.850 --> 01:35:06.273 some of the regions of North Africa, 01:35:07.140 --> 01:35:08.963 the Horn of Africa, et cetera. 01:35:10.200 --> 01:35:12.020 - Senator, thank you for that question. 01:35:12.020 --> 01:35:13.490 I would say this. 01:35:13.490 --> 01:35:17.087 We are seeing the fruits of the military campaign in Iraq, 01:35:17.087 --> 01:35:19.730 where the government is in the process of seating itself, 01:35:19.730 --> 01:35:21.440 where we're now prepared to move forward 01:35:21.440 --> 01:35:24.450 to true building partner capacity activities 01:35:24.450 --> 01:35:26.330 with the government of Iraq going forward. 01:35:26.330 --> 01:35:28.730 So, we're seeing the fruits of some success there. 01:35:28.730 --> 01:35:30.030 I don't want to oversell it, 01:35:30.030 --> 01:35:34.134 because ISIS is still active in pockets in Iraq, 01:35:34.134 --> 01:35:38.100 but Iraqi security forces are generally proving effective 01:35:38.100 --> 01:35:40.100 at squashing them when they appear. 01:35:40.100 --> 01:35:42.180 As I noted earlier, I believe that 01:35:42.180 --> 01:35:45.020 the long-term success for ISIS is not gonna be 01:35:45.020 --> 01:35:47.240 the complete disappearance of the entity, 01:35:47.240 --> 01:35:49.630 but rather, the ability of local security forces 01:35:49.630 --> 01:35:52.060 to be able to deal with the problem when it does arise. 01:35:52.060 --> 01:35:53.580 So that's in Iraq. 01:35:53.580 --> 01:35:55.880 Senator, in Syria, I think that we are very close 01:35:55.880 --> 01:35:58.370 to finishing the physical destruction of the caliphate. 01:35:58.370 --> 01:35:59.560 The same thing will obtain, 01:35:59.560 --> 01:36:01.890 they will transition to a counterinsurgency. 01:36:01.890 --> 01:36:03.620 More activity will be needed. 01:36:03.620 --> 01:36:05.830 I think the solution in Syria that we would like to see 01:36:05.830 --> 01:36:08.260 would be a politically-informed solution, 01:36:08.260 --> 01:36:10.200 where all parties have a seat at the table, 01:36:10.200 --> 01:36:11.580 and we'll see how that goes forward, 01:36:11.580 --> 01:36:14.170 but the military component of that is coming to, 01:36:14.170 --> 01:36:17.150 is coming to a, very near to an end. 01:36:17.150 --> 01:36:18.510 I wouldn't want to put a timeline on it, 01:36:18.510 --> 01:36:19.550 but it's coming close. 01:36:19.550 --> 01:36:20.500 Senator, very briefly, 01:36:20.500 --> 01:36:22.750 the last thing I'll just talk about is Yemen, 01:36:22.750 --> 01:36:25.200 where we maintain unrelenting pressure 01:36:25.200 --> 01:36:28.320 on both ISIS in the Arabian Peninsula, 01:36:28.320 --> 01:36:31.060 as well as Al Qaeda in the Iranian Peninsula, 01:36:31.060 --> 01:36:33.070 because Al Qaeda in the Iranian Peninsula 01:36:33.070 --> 01:36:35.780 is actually the last entity to successfully 01:36:35.780 --> 01:36:38.280 generate an attack against the United States 01:36:38.280 --> 01:36:41.180 back in 2009, the Christmas Day Bomber. 01:36:41.180 --> 01:36:43.350 So we need to keep unrelenting pressure on. 01:36:43.350 --> 01:36:45.960 In that area, Iran is not helpful at all. 01:36:45.960 --> 01:36:48.860 They fomented and began the war that now exists, 01:36:48.860 --> 01:36:50.860 the civil war that now exists in Yemen, 01:36:50.860 --> 01:36:53.780 that admits suffering to that part of the world, 01:36:53.780 --> 01:36:55.560 and it is a definite factor 01:36:55.560 --> 01:36:58.850 as we pursue operations against ISIS. 01:36:58.850 --> 01:37:02.140 So if I were to pull back and finish by just saying 01:37:02.140 --> 01:37:04.390 the largest strategic deal is, 01:37:04.390 --> 01:37:09.050 we are close to finishing the physical heart of ISIS. 01:37:09.050 --> 01:37:11.610 AQ is similarly suppressed. 01:37:11.610 --> 01:37:13.560 It will require continual pressure 01:37:13.560 --> 01:37:15.610 to prevent them from resurging. 01:37:15.610 --> 01:37:18.200 They also have tentacles though, that reach out 01:37:18.200 --> 01:37:20.270 into Sub-Saharan Africa, as you noted, 01:37:20.270 --> 01:37:21.860 and in other parts of the world, 01:37:21.860 --> 01:37:24.540 and that's where the larger coalition of nations 01:37:24.540 --> 01:37:26.230 that have the same interests that we have 01:37:26.230 --> 01:37:28.290 in preventing the return of ISIS 01:37:28.290 --> 01:37:30.690 are gonna be a critical factor as we go forward. 01:37:32.100 --> 01:37:35.293 - What's the latest on al-Baghdadi? 01:37:36.410 --> 01:37:38.800 - Sir, I think he is a very scared man running for his life 01:37:38.800 --> 01:37:41.250 somewhere in the desert near the Euphrates River. 01:37:46.630 --> 01:37:51.630 - And as, obviously that's a major goal, to get him, 01:37:52.000 --> 01:37:56.950 as we try to continue to mop up the caliphate. 01:37:56.950 --> 01:37:59.740 - Sir, I would just note, as long as you are concerned about 01:37:59.740 --> 01:38:01.890 whether you're gonna die in the next hour or so, 01:38:01.890 --> 01:38:04.143 it's hard to plot attacks against Detroit. 01:38:05.700 --> 01:38:06.533 - There you go. 01:38:08.760 --> 01:38:09.933 General Clarke. 01:38:14.150 --> 01:38:15.113 Tell me, 01:38:16.200 --> 01:38:20.593 since SOCOM is involved in all of these areas, 01:38:24.100 --> 01:38:26.300 sometimes you might have, 01:38:26.300 --> 01:38:29.250 even though you've gotten a lot of resources, 01:38:29.250 --> 01:38:32.780 you, SOCOM, over the years, 01:38:32.780 --> 01:38:35.653 you have to worry about getting stretched too thin. 01:38:37.700 --> 01:38:40.190 What can the Congress do 01:38:40.190 --> 01:38:43.783 to help you so that you're not getting too thin? 01:38:46.390 --> 01:38:49.010 - Senator, thanks for that question. 01:38:49.010 --> 01:38:52.110 I think critical force, SOCOM, in a little bit, 01:38:52.110 --> 01:38:55.820 I'll follow along with what General McKenzie just stated. 01:38:55.820 --> 01:38:58.010 SOCOM has to have the global view 01:38:59.589 --> 01:39:02.310 of the threat, in that role, looking at 01:39:04.126 --> 01:39:07.290 the flow of fighters, looking at the resources, 01:39:07.290 --> 01:39:09.300 and looking at the messaging 01:39:09.300 --> 01:39:12.700 that is going across COCOM boundaries, 01:39:12.700 --> 01:39:14.000 and in order to have that, 01:39:14.920 --> 01:39:18.890 to ensure that SOCOM is not stretched too thin, 01:39:18.890 --> 01:39:20.237 we gotta continue to get the sustained 01:39:20.237 --> 01:39:23.060 and predictable and adequate funding 01:39:23.060 --> 01:39:27.693 for the force and for our budget going forward. 01:39:30.150 --> 01:39:31.493 - General McKenzie. 01:39:34.490 --> 01:39:37.250 Do you see U.S. troops 01:39:38.160 --> 01:39:43.160 continuing to help you mop up ISIS and Al Qaeda, 01:39:43.430 --> 01:39:47.333 even in these areas that are contested, like Yemen? 01:39:48.470 --> 01:39:50.790 - Senator, right now, and in Yemen in particular, 01:39:50.790 --> 01:39:54.920 we provide unique capabilities that get after Al Qaeda NAQ. 01:39:54.920 --> 01:39:57.480 In the long-term, our view would be 01:39:57.480 --> 01:40:00.890 you want to create conditions where local security forces 01:40:00.890 --> 01:40:02.890 are gonna be able to contain those threats. 01:40:02.890 --> 01:40:05.290 We are not at that level yet, 01:40:05.290 --> 01:40:06.993 but that remains our clear goal. 01:40:09.004 --> 01:40:12.093 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:40:12.093 --> 01:40:14.840 - Thank you, Senator Nelson. 01:40:14.840 --> 01:40:17.670 And we thank both of our witnesses for your patience, 01:40:17.670 --> 01:40:21.960 and also thank your families for being here to support you. 01:40:21.960 --> 01:40:24.750 And we are adjourned, thank you.