WEBVTT

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- I'd like to thank you for joining us

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for this ILW Contemporary Military Forum

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entitled Future Disruptive Threats.

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As your professional association,

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ASA's Institute of Land Warfare

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is proud to provide forums
like this throughout the year

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to broaden the knowledge
base of Army professionals

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and those who support our Army.

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This is one of 10 professional forums

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that we'll be conducting
over the next three days.

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AUSA seeks to amplify
the US Army's narrative

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to audiences inside the Army

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and to help further the
association's mission

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to be the voice for the Army
and support for the soldier.

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Of course, we cannot do this alone.

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AUSA relies on its members
to help tell the Army's story

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and to support the soldiers
and their families.

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A strong membership base
is vitally important

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for advocacy efforts with
Congress and the American people.

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For those of you Army professionals

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who are not yet members of
your professional association,

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we encourage you to join AUSA

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by visiting the membership booth,

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booth 307 in exhibit hall A,

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or sign up online at AUSA.org/membership.

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If you're already a member of AUSA,

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thank you very much for staying with us.

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And now I'd like to turn the floor over

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to Lieutenant General Scott Berrier,

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Headquarters DA G2.

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Thank you.

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(applause)

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- Dan, thank you, and thanks to AUSA

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for your continued support for our Army.

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Ladies and gentlemen,

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good afternoon and welcome to today's

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contemporary military forum number two,

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Future Disruptive Threats.

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It is my honor to moderate
this distinguished panel

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of the nation's foremost
intelligence leaders

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who collectively represent

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the most formidable intelligence
center prize in the world.

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Today, they are here to touch
upon a very timely topic,

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the future of disruptive
threats facing our Army,

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whether it be from nation state powers

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like Russia and China,

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or from regional threats
like Iran and North Korea.

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America expects and relies upon the Army

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to adapt and contend
with these challenges.

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Today's panel discussion

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will address an array of
the most pressing threats

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from each of these antagonists,

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as well as challenges in the
cyber and information domains.

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We'll probably also
touch on malign influence

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and threats in the gray zone.

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These are all timely and
relevant topics of concern,

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so I'm certain this will be a great event.

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Before I continue any further

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I'd like to thank each
one of our panelists

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who have given up their own time,

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on a Monday holiday no less,
and graciously joined us

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because of their genuine
interest in our nation's security

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and the concern for
the future of our Army.

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So on behalf of our host,

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the Association of the United States Army

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and the Chief of Staff of
the United States Army,

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General Mark Milley,

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let me thank all of you
for attending today.

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I also want to acknowledge

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and thank the entire AUSA
team of professionals

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for once again putting together
a fantastic annual meeting

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highlighting that the Army is indeed

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the strength of our nation.

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I anticipate a spirited
panel discussion today,

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and even better question
and answer session,

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and hope that each of you will
learn from the conversation.

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So let me introduce our superb panelists.

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In your handouts you have
the detailed biographies

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of each of our five panelists.

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They are the leaders of our
nation's intelligence agencies,

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and in the interest of
time I won't repeat them,

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but I encourage you all to read them.

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First, let me welcome
the honorable Sue Gordon,

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our Principle Deputy Director
of National Intelligence

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and senior advisor to the DNI,
round of applause, please.

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(applause)

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Next, the commender US Cyber com,

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Director of National Security Agency

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and chief of the Central Security Service,

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General Paul Nakasone.

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(applause)

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Next, the Deputy

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to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence,

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the honorable Kari Bingen.

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(applause)

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Next, the director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency,

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Lieutenant General Bob AShley.

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(applause)

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And finally,

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the director of the National
Geo space Intelligence Agency,

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Director Robert Cardillo.

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(applause)

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During the course of
the panelist's remarks,

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members of the audience
will have the opportunity

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to jot down questions for our panelists

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on three by five cards.

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These will be collected by our staff,

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and selected questions
will be posed to our guests

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at the conclusion of all remarks.

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Honorable Gordon, we'll
begin with you, ma'am.

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- Thanks, Scotty.

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Good afternoon, and thank
you for the opportunity

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to sub for Director Coats.

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As an Army veteran, I
know he wanted to be here,

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but I confess that I'm
happy to take his place

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and to bask in the
wisdom of my colleagues,

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and to be in your presence.

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I'm going to keep my remarks brief

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because I'm well aware
that I'm batting lead off

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for a variable murderer's row of

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leaders that will follow me,
but I also want to make sure

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we have time for your questions.

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So here's what I'm gonna
do. I'm gonna kick off

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with a strategic view of
the threats that we face.

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I wanna talk about the importance

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of understanding our adversary's intent,

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not just their capabilities,
and then I'll talk about

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the promise and the challenge
of data in this world.

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The threats we face are
well known and longstanding.

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They include Russia, China,
Iran, North Korea, terrorism,

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cyber, and I would include transnational,

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organized crime in this.

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But what makes this moment so complex,

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so dynamic, is the nature of these threats

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is evolving at a remarkable pace.

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In my view, this stems from two factors.

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One, digital interconnectedness
and ubiquitous technology

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that are both disruptive and
advantageous at the same time,

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and they are fundamentally
challenging the capability,

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the speed, the reach,

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and even the aspiration
of our adversaries.

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And they're making the
threat increasingly diffuse,

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diverse, and disruptive.

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Diffuse because the
barrier to entry is so low.

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Diverse because the addition of technology

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to what had been a very
classic military capabilities

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is changing the very nature,

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and disruptive because,
as you add technology,

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with the digital interconnectedness,

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you have the ability to attack
not only what is evident,

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but the infrastructure that supports it.

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These threats are changing
the nature of warfare,

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and our adversaries employ a
range of non-kinetic options

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to advance their national interest.

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So let's take a quick
romp around the world,

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and let's see of I can't
summarize the threats.

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Russia is fascinating because,

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in 1980 when I started in this game,

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it was the Soviet Union and
it was massively capable,

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but it was pretty much of a monolith.

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It is no longer.

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It is investing in advanced technologies

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at a remarkable rate,

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it is pressing its reach geographically,

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whether that is into the arctic,

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into the Middle East,
or throughout the globe,

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and it is increasingly brazen

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in its weaponization of cyber tools,

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both in technical tacts and
in influence operations.

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And, as it expands outside its borders,

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it is gaining experience and
operations that will test us

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in different ways than it has before.

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China is also investing
in advanced weaponry,

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but its economic expansionism globally

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that perhaps presents the
most daunting challenge.

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Beijing is employing
a whole of government,

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and probably a whole of country approach

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in its pursuit of economic dominance,

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and it's purposeful in its use
of technological capability

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to achieve this aim.

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In addition to

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the quality of what it's doing,

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I would opine

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that the quantity presents
its own aspect of quality

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in terms of just the numbers
that it can bring to bare.

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Iran's activities in the Middle
East have filled the space

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left by both our successes and
our failures in the region.

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As we have pushed ISIS out
of its comfortable geography,

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Iran has filled the space

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and it is an incredibly malign presence

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not to be confused with
a stabilizing force.

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In its willingness to be a
state sponsor of terrorism

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and to provide weapons to many forces

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presents a fascinating challenge

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from the support of militant Shea groups

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or the Houthis in Yemen.

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And what a moment of
dynamism with North Korea.

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We're, for once, confronted
with the optimism

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of the possibility of
negotiations on denuclearization,

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and the fact that we haven't
seen testing over the past year

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a positive, with the reality

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of the capability that they have possessed

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and what will happen there.

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Terrorism remains a serious threat,

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but it is different in
nature than it was in 9/11.

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It is more diffuse, harder to
come by, and still dangerous.

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Then I'm going to add
transnational organized crime.

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The opioid crisis, let
me put this in context.

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Last year alone, 72,000
Americans died of drug overdoses.

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That's the equivalent of
a 767 crashing every day.

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And if we don't think this poses a threat

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to national security,
we're just not thinking.

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And it's not just the nation states,

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it's the use of cyber and outer space,

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two domains that have the
ability to extend reach

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and capability in ways that
have been our unique domain,

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and now our adversaries
are moving into them.

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Now, my colleagues I'm sure
will talk in greater depth

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on these threats, and you can
ask me, but I will tell you

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that each one of these threats

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tests us to be nimble,

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to be resilient, and to be responsive

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in ways that we may have
not needed to in the past.

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Understanding intent.

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So in the intelligence community,

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our business is to know
the true CB on the horizon

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and allow decision making
before events dictate,

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and for my whole career we
have provided intelligence

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on the capabilities that I just mentioned.

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I will tell you when we're at our best,

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it's when we understand the intent.

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The why an adversary is doing something,

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and how they might employ it.

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Intent is what allows you to
move left out of an attack,

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and it is intent that we
must continue to press,

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especially in a data rich world

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where you have a lot of whats

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but you need to know a lot of whys.

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And we will be pressed to
offer that understanding,

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not just to the intelligence community,

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not just to the policy makers,
not just to our war fighters,

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but increasingly to the private sector,

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because the threat surfaces in the nation

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extend beyond the bounds

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of the government and our private sector

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needs to be a participant

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in how they prepare themselves against us.

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And finally, let me talk about data,

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talk anybody something
with a bane and boon.

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If you're in my business,

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what is happening with these technologies

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and the digital connectiveness
is an abundance of data

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that provides the possibility for answer

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and threatens to overwhelm
us at the same time.

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We are going to have to get
better and better and better

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at using machines as partners

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if we are going to be able
to master this domain,

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have enough clarity inside
on what is happening,

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and be able to respond.

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And the person that dominates data,

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who can understand it and
command it for its use

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a little sooner, a little better,

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is the one that is gonna carry the day.

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So, rampant threats,
intelligence community

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pressing on the notion of intent

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so you have the best advantage
to know how you must respond,

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and not just respond in kind,
but to respond across domains

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and the importance of
being able to command data.

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I think I'll turn it over
to my panel from there.

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Thank you.

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- [Scotty] Honorable Gordon, thank you,

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and for the audience, if any of this

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has spurred you on for a question,

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please get it on a three by five card

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and get it to Mr. Clark
up here in the front.

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General Nakasone.

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- Thanks, Scotty, I appreciate it.

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Director Gordon and fellow panel members,

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thank you so much for
appearing today with me.

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I think this is far superior

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to meeting in a meeting
someplace, someplace in DC,

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but rather talk about

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what we obviously have some
very very strong passions about.

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I'd like to set context today

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with the strategic environment,

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talk a very little bit about threats.

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I think Director Gordon
really laid that out well,

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but didn't get into this idea
of persistent engagement,

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persistent presence,
persistent innovation,

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and then conclude, talk about it.

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What does this really mean to our Army?

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As we meet here today,

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the first of three days for
our annual AUSA convention,

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I think it's important
that we bring this back

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to the center of what does this entail

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for the future of our United States Army.

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So let me set the stage here
in terms of what we see today.

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Often, I begin with this idea.

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For 17 years, our nation
has done a magnificent job

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at pursuing violent
extremist organizations.

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No one has done it better.

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Collection, analysis, dissemination,

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working with the finishing force.

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Think of where we've come over 17 years.

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But as we think to the future,

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and as I would offer,

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the national security
strategy has offered,

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they talk about this
idea of our adversaries

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being able to operate below the threshold

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of military conflict.

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This idea that we are gonna be
challenged within our nation,

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that our allies, our partners
will all be challenged

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by adversaries who are
able to cloak deniability

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around their intentions and their actions.

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And I offer one quite from the
National Security Strategy.

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It says, today's cyberspace

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offers state and non state actors

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the ability to wage campaigns
against American political,

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economic, and security interests

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without ever physically
crossing our borders.

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And then we think about the
National Defense Strategy, which

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has clearly laid out this idea
of great power competition.

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It's reemerged.

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It's interesting for many of us who,

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well, at this panel,
entered government service

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during the 40th President's tenure.

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We would offer that we're coming back

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to see this great power competition again.

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And it's important that
we realize that, because,

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for our entire intelligence community,

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it has different strengths
and different challenges,

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different opportunities
that it offers to all of us.

15:54.910 --> 15:57.410
But clearly for us, as we
start thinking about it,

15:58.020 --> 15:59.720
for us, we are in a period

15:59.720 --> 16:04.720
where our adversaries are
looking to really take us on

16:04.820 --> 16:07.063
below that level of armed conflict,

16:07.570 --> 16:10.893
to be able to steal our
intellectual property,

16:11.360 --> 16:12.250
to be able to leverage

16:12.250 --> 16:14.140
our personally identifiable information,

16:14.140 --> 16:16.960
to be able to so distrust
within our society

16:16.960 --> 16:19.490
and to be able to attempt
to disrupt our elections.

16:19.490 --> 16:22.460
This is what great power
competition looks like today

16:22.870 --> 16:25.753
and it's what we will look
at as we look to the future.

16:28.160 --> 16:30.700
As we think about the
threats, the threats to us

16:30.700 --> 16:32.560
as we look at cyberspace have well moved

16:32.560 --> 16:35.653
on exploitation and
disruption, even destruction.

16:35.740 --> 16:37.890
Think about where we
were just 10 years ago

16:38.000 --> 16:40.870
in terms of being concerned
about our adversaries

16:40.870 --> 16:42.873
spying us in cyberspace,

16:43.160 --> 16:44.530
and that moved onto this idea

16:44.530 --> 16:47.570
of our adversaries being able
to conduct disruptive attacks

16:47.570 --> 16:48.860
like denial of service attacks

16:48.860 --> 16:50.560
against our financial institution,

16:50.640 --> 16:53.380
or even disruptive and destructive attacks

16:53.610 --> 16:56.210
such as we've seen conducted
by both the Iranians

16:56.210 --> 16:58.060
and North Koreans against our nation.

16:59.050 --> 17:00.950
It's moved into this idea of corrosion

17:00.950 --> 17:02.640
and this idea of corrosive effects

17:02.640 --> 17:04.680
that adversaries can take against us.

17:04.680 --> 17:05.513
Whether or not

17:05.513 --> 17:07.540
that's the theft of our
intellectual property,

17:07.550 --> 17:10.430
whether or not it's threats to
our critical infrastructure,

17:10.430 --> 17:12.670
whether or not it's malign
influence operations,

17:12.670 --> 17:13.900
this is the corrosive piece

17:13.900 --> 17:16.260
that we've seen now
move from exploitation,

17:16.260 --> 17:18.943
disruption, destruction,
and now to corrosion.

17:19.838 --> 17:21.150
It's interesting that states

17:21.150 --> 17:23.220
and their surrogates
routinely target governments,

17:23.220 --> 17:25.670
corporations, political
parties, and individuals,

17:25.720 --> 17:27.600
stealing the data and
intellectual property,

17:27.600 --> 17:29.750
gaining insights and
competitive advantage,

17:29.790 --> 17:32.973
eroding bonds of trust in and
between Western democracies.

17:34.130 --> 17:35.060
Meanwhile, it's interesting,

17:35.060 --> 17:36.903
and Director Gordon touched on this,

17:37.070 --> 17:38.920
this idea of the cyber ecospheres

17:38.920 --> 17:41.653
also continue to evolve and expand.

17:41.720 --> 17:43.380
It's creating new opportunities for us,

17:43.380 --> 17:45.083
but also certainly new challenges.

17:45.370 --> 17:47.470
Think about it, fifth generation wireless,

17:47.470 --> 17:48.853
18 months out.

17:50.010 --> 17:53.490
Many people remember
first generation wireless,

17:53.490 --> 17:55.823
to include myself, when it was analog.

17:56.520 --> 17:57.563
Cloaked is digital.

17:58.280 --> 17:59.930
But we're moving on very rapidly

17:59.930 --> 18:03.373
to this idea of massive
increases in data collection.

18:04.670 --> 18:06.700
The opportunities and challenges
of storage of that data,

18:06.700 --> 18:07.870
cloud computing, machine learning,

18:07.870 --> 18:11.363
artificial intelligence, quantum
research and development.

18:12.810 --> 18:15.280
These are all in fields that
bring us great opportunities

18:15.280 --> 18:17.070
throughout our intelligence community

18:17.290 --> 18:19.440
in areas that work on
very very hard today.

18:19.850 --> 18:21.850
It's also areas that we must be first in

18:22.500 --> 18:24.000
and can't afford to be second.

18:25.330 --> 18:27.980
We're adjusting to this new environment

18:27.980 --> 18:30.030
by embracing a strategy
of persistent engagement

18:30.030 --> 18:31.030
against our threats,

18:31.460 --> 18:33.663
continuous action to enable our partners,

18:33.870 --> 18:35.260
and to act against these threats.

18:35.260 --> 18:37.433
Let me talk about persistent engagement.

18:38.205 --> 18:41.750
We originally conceived of
cyberspace probably a decade ago

18:41.750 --> 18:44.420
as a medium for intelligence collection,

18:44.420 --> 18:45.690
and it was an avenue, as we thought,

18:45.690 --> 18:47.453
for terrorist attacks against us.

18:48.280 --> 18:50.830
We invested heavily in the
defense of our networks,

18:51.540 --> 18:53.250
we started to think a little bit more

18:53.250 --> 18:54.660
about defense of our weapon systems,

18:54.660 --> 18:56.363
and even defense of our data.

18:57.840 --> 18:59.100
But in terms of cyberspace,

18:59.100 --> 19:01.103
we were also a very reactionary force.

19:02.240 --> 19:05.940
One prepared to act, but one
not in continuous engagement

19:06.270 --> 19:08.483
with adversaries outside
of our own systems.

19:11.990 --> 19:13.840
We know today that our adversaries

19:13.840 --> 19:16.930
have taken on a continuous
operations, probes, and raids

19:16.930 --> 19:18.960
to exploit both our private sector

19:18.960 --> 19:20.260
and our government sector,

19:20.470 --> 19:22.530
again, either to steal
intellectual property

19:22.530 --> 19:24.630
or position themselves for future attacks.

19:25.361 --> 19:27.440
As many of you know,
our government systems

19:27.440 --> 19:29.803
are continuously
attempting to be exploited.

19:30.460 --> 19:32.210
US Cyber Command and the
National Security Agency

19:32.210 --> 19:34.806
monitor threats 24 hours
a day, seven days a week,

19:34.806 --> 19:39.070
365 days a year, and no day
passes without some adversary

19:39.070 --> 19:42.140
attempting either to enter
our DOD information network

19:42.630 --> 19:46.403
or attempt to exploit
our DOD industrial base.

19:47.750 --> 19:49.070
In cyberspace, as many of you know,

19:49.070 --> 19:51.403
there is no sanctuary operational pause.

19:51.442 --> 19:53.960
In the face of these threats,

19:53.960 --> 19:56.110
I'd offer that our gov has moved out

19:56.370 --> 19:58.470
and we've moved out
rapidly to fill two roles.

19:58.470 --> 20:01.240
First of all, to fill the
role to better partner

20:01.480 --> 20:02.663
and to engage.

20:03.320 --> 20:04.933
Engage with public, private,

20:05.100 --> 20:07.163
and allied efforts to build resiliency.

20:08.060 --> 20:09.890
Second, we're also moving out to act.

20:09.890 --> 20:12.590
Act to identify and counter
threats as they developed,

20:12.640 --> 20:15.993
not solely in response to an
intrusion within our networks.

20:17.030 --> 20:19.150
Persistent engagement as we think of it

20:19.150 --> 20:20.180
and the way we're acting today

20:20.180 --> 20:21.940
sustains advantage in competition

20:22.980 --> 20:26.300
and prepares the cyber force
to support future operations

20:26.300 --> 20:29.100
whether or not they're non
kinetic or kinetic in nature.

20:30.210 --> 20:32.450
Persistent engagement also
keeps our forces better trained

20:32.450 --> 20:34.050
and a higher state of readiness.

20:34.940 --> 20:37.180
It increases the cost to our adversaries

20:37.180 --> 20:38.410
and reduces the return

20:38.720 --> 20:40.773
for these adversary cyber operations.

20:42.809 --> 20:45.240
It's really out of center both defensive

20:45.240 --> 20:46.773
and offensive capabilities.

20:47.630 --> 20:49.710
And I really want to ensure
that I emphasize this idea

20:49.710 --> 20:52.660
that roughly 2/3 of what we
do in persistent engagement

20:53.150 --> 20:55.773
is to enable defensive capabilities.

20:56.730 --> 20:58.710
Defending for it also allows us to learn

20:58.710 --> 21:01.093
adversary intentions, its capabilities,

21:01.350 --> 21:02.623
and its vulnerabilities.

21:03.700 --> 21:07.120
But persistent engagement is
also bolstered by what I offer

21:07.120 --> 21:10.543
as persistent presence
and persistent innovation.

21:10.980 --> 21:13.110
Persistent of presence has two aspects.

21:13.110 --> 21:15.750
First of all, the idea that
working through partnerships

21:15.750 --> 21:17.050
throughout our government,

21:17.420 --> 21:19.610
we're able to see what is happening to us

21:19.610 --> 21:21.533
to identify those future threats.

21:21.660 --> 21:23.763
We share information and enable partners.

21:24.070 --> 21:25.570
We're doing this continuously,

21:25.630 --> 21:27.483
not just in a responsive mode.

21:28.679 --> 21:32.090
Also through persistent
presence in foreign cyberspace

21:32.420 --> 21:34.850
we conduct operations to
identify and counter threats

21:34.850 --> 21:38.970
as they engage and emerge, and
provide improved indications

21:38.970 --> 21:40.420
and warnings to our partners.

21:41.260 --> 21:44.393
Interestingly enough, a
rapidly evolving cyber domain,

21:44.831 --> 21:48.247
which is populated by
learning evolving threats

21:48.247 --> 21:52.053
rewards speed in
innovation and operations.

21:52.460 --> 21:54.550
We work with partners consistently

21:54.550 --> 21:55.850
to ensure that they adapt.

21:56.050 --> 21:57.840
Adapt in their technologies, their tools,

21:57.840 --> 21:58.890
and their approaches.

21:59.630 --> 22:03.207
This idea of a posture
of persistent innovation

22:03.207 --> 22:05.200
across all our partnerships

22:05.200 --> 22:07.453
is critical to counter our adversaries.

22:08.500 --> 22:10.940
But as we think about this
I think it's also important

22:10.940 --> 22:13.210
that we think, what does
this mean for our Army?

22:13.210 --> 22:15.923
I would offer first of
all that, for our Army,

22:16.480 --> 22:20.073
our military must be able
to win should war occur,

22:20.330 --> 22:23.200
and compete below the
level of armed conflict.

22:23.200 --> 22:26.710
For our Army, we have to be
comfortable with this idea

22:26.710 --> 22:29.150
of being able to sustain and operate

22:29.150 --> 22:30.883
below the level of armed conflict.

22:31.340 --> 22:32.173
We're doing this today

22:32.173 --> 22:33.500
in terms of being able to train

22:33.500 --> 22:35.171
at places like the
National Training Center

22:35.171 --> 22:36.863
or the Direct Regional Training Center

22:36.863 --> 22:39.173
to ensure that we have this capability,

22:40.340 --> 22:43.030
to ensure that as our forces
get ready to go off to war

22:43.030 --> 22:45.230
that they're well
prepared and well enabled.

22:46.300 --> 22:47.800
Secondly, I would offer that our Army

22:47.800 --> 22:52.133
must continue this idea of
operating a wartime mindset

22:52.133 --> 22:54.223
in able to fight the network.

22:54.610 --> 22:58.303
Fight our network, fight our
data, fight our weapon systems.

22:59.180 --> 23:00.590
Our DOD information network

23:00.950 --> 23:02.650
facilitates everything that we do

23:03.090 --> 23:05.083
in terms of our military capabilities.

23:05.750 --> 23:07.850
This ability to continue to operate,

23:08.120 --> 23:11.440
to continue to maintain, to
have a measure of resiliency

23:11.690 --> 23:13.190
is critically important to us.

23:14.990 --> 23:16.180
I would also offer that the Army

23:16.180 --> 23:18.560
needs to be front and
center with the Joint Force

23:18.560 --> 23:21.610
in understanding that superiority
in the physical domain

23:22.188 --> 23:27.040
is based upon this idea of being
able to promote superiority

23:27.080 --> 23:28.363
in the cyberspace domain.

23:29.060 --> 23:30.350
We have to secure our weapon systems,

23:30.350 --> 23:32.270
we have to ensure that our dib security

23:32.270 --> 23:34.070
is strong working with our partners.

23:34.230 --> 23:35.180
We have to ensure that,

23:35.180 --> 23:37.208
as our partners look
at their supply chains,

23:37.208 --> 23:41.453
that they're well tended to,
well defended, well enabled.

23:42.540 --> 23:43.840
And the final thing that I would offer

23:43.840 --> 23:45.403
is idea for our armies that,

23:45.403 --> 23:47.460
what we have learned
for 200 plus years is,

23:47.460 --> 23:50.620
at the end of the day,
that partnerships are key

23:50.620 --> 23:52.320
to what we're gonna be able to do.

23:52.520 --> 23:54.470
And these partnerships will sustain us.

23:55.089 --> 23:57.943
Partnerships in a place like
cyberspace are so critical.

23:58.260 --> 23:59.743
If you think that today,

24:00.074 --> 24:02.680
we look at 90% of our
critical infrastructure

24:03.238 --> 24:06.313
outside of our government
with a private sector.

24:07.290 --> 24:08.793
Our army, our Joint Force,

24:09.260 --> 24:11.460
must be enabled to work
with those partners,

24:11.590 --> 24:14.743
not episodically but
on a consistent basis.

24:16.070 --> 24:17.750
I would also offer that these partnerships

24:17.750 --> 24:20.563
extend to our international
partners as well.

24:21.690 --> 24:23.050
Critical international partnerships

24:23.050 --> 24:24.820
that have sustained us for years

24:25.370 --> 24:27.270
will be critical for us in the future.

24:28.297 --> 24:30.510
And finally is this idea
of these partnerships

24:30.510 --> 24:31.960
must all be brought together.

24:32.240 --> 24:34.970
We in the Army understand
after 17-plus years

24:35.480 --> 24:36.980
the importance of a coalition,

24:37.000 --> 24:40.000
and I would offer for all the
threats we face in the future,

24:40.130 --> 24:41.730
the great opportunities await us

24:42.120 --> 24:44.420
are gonna be foundational
to the opportunities

24:44.470 --> 24:46.050
that are maintained with our partnerships.

24:46.050 --> 24:47.050
Thank you very much.

24:47.170 --> 24:49.270
- [Scotty] Thanks, General Nakasone again.

24:49.547 --> 24:51.797
(applause)

24:52.460 --> 24:55.080
I see the questions are beginning to roll,

24:55.080 --> 24:55.950
and we appreciate that.

24:55.950 --> 24:57.490
We'll get to those momentarily,

24:57.490 --> 24:59.410
but for now the honorable Bingen.

24:59.410 --> 25:00.317
Over to you.

25:00.537 --> 25:01.370
- Great, thanks, General Berrier.

25:01.370 --> 25:02.660
I want to thank General Ham

25:02.660 --> 25:03.990
and the whole AUSA crew.

25:03.990 --> 25:06.516
This is an outstanding
conference yet again this year.

25:06.516 --> 25:08.350
I just remember a couple years back

25:08.350 --> 25:09.580
going to the Eisenhower lunch

25:09.580 --> 25:10.413
and General Milley

25:10.413 --> 25:11.570
talking about the missile warfare,

25:11.570 --> 25:12.740
and that has still stuck with me.

25:12.740 --> 25:15.582
So again, outstanding conference
that you all put on here.

25:15.582 --> 25:17.030
It is an absolute privilege

25:17.030 --> 25:18.600
to be part of this distinguished panel

25:18.600 --> 25:21.180
and to discuss how we're
working in close partnership

25:21.180 --> 25:23.140
across both the defense and intelligence

25:23.140 --> 25:24.393
to support the Army.

25:24.610 --> 25:25.950
First, I wanna give a shout out

25:25.950 --> 25:29.328
to the 513th military
intelligence brigade down at--

25:29.328 --> 25:30.264
- [Scotty] Hoo-ah.

25:30.264 --> 25:31.681
- Hoo-ah, hoo-ah.

25:32.070 --> 25:32.903
The Vigilant Knights,

25:32.903 --> 25:34.860
I had an opportunity
to visit them last week

25:34.860 --> 25:36.640
and it was an awesome visit with the team

25:36.640 --> 25:38.590
under the leadership of Colonel Fulmer.

25:38.890 --> 25:40.470
I learned about the
tremendous intelligence

25:40.470 --> 25:41.979
and counterintelligence capabilities

25:41.979 --> 25:44.040
they're providing to four deployed forces

25:44.040 --> 25:44.940
in the CENTCOM AOR

25:45.350 --> 25:47.650
and to meet the dedicated
soldiers down there,

25:47.800 --> 25:50.370
many of whom are constantly
deployed in a theater

25:50.370 --> 25:52.920
and have some of the lowest
deploy to dwell ratios.

25:53.426 --> 25:55.900
This brigade got its
start after World War II

25:56.643 --> 25:59.733
in western Germany to
address the Soviet threat.

25:59.960 --> 26:02.360
They have a strong history
of providing intelligence

26:02.360 --> 26:05.060
and counterespionage support
to the US Army in Europe.

26:05.230 --> 26:09.221
I think the 513th is emblematic
of the challenge before us,

26:09.221 --> 26:11.860
continuing to provide
superior intelligence

26:11.860 --> 26:13.590
to our forces in harm's way today

26:13.590 --> 26:16.290
while also regenerating that muscle memory

26:16.310 --> 26:18.143
on great power competition.

26:18.610 --> 26:20.080
So our focus, our focus

26:20.080 --> 26:22.240
is implementing the
National Defense Strategy,

26:22.240 --> 26:24.580
which I'm sure you've
heard a lot about already

26:24.580 --> 26:26.053
and will continue to do so,

26:26.310 --> 26:31.000
with the return of near and
some cases peer competitors,

26:31.000 --> 26:34.100
emerging technology that is
changing the character of war

26:34.100 --> 26:36.593
and challenges to the
US military advantage.

26:36.730 --> 26:38.403
Our mission is clear.

26:38.720 --> 26:40.870
To deliver timely and
relevant intelligence

26:40.870 --> 26:43.043
to the war fighters and decision makers,

26:43.360 --> 26:46.490
to provide a decisive
and dominant advantage

26:46.490 --> 26:47.853
over our adversaries.

26:48.320 --> 26:51.100
I never wanna see the Army
taking on a fair fight,

26:51.100 --> 26:53.100
I want you to dominate the battle space

26:53.100 --> 26:56.010
and to have every advantage
that our nation can imagine

26:56.010 --> 26:56.993
and can deliver.

26:57.343 --> 26:59.610
So let me just highlight
a few key priorities

26:59.610 --> 27:00.800
of the Under Secretary of Defense

27:00.800 --> 27:02.743
for Intelligence along these lines.

27:03.990 --> 27:05.840
First, to develop the intelligence posture

27:05.840 --> 27:08.060
and capabilities for
contested environments

27:08.110 --> 27:11.250
across all domains, including
space and cyberspace,

27:11.250 --> 27:13.530
and through full spectrum operations,

27:13.530 --> 27:16.220
from nuclear and advanced
conventional environments

27:16.410 --> 27:19.113
to hybrid and information
operations threats.

27:19.320 --> 27:20.780
As General Nakasone mentioned,

27:20.780 --> 27:22.613
that conflict below the,

27:23.345 --> 27:26.563
or the activity below the
threshold of military conflict.

27:26.694 --> 27:28.890
The Army's focus on readiness,

27:28.890 --> 27:30.790
its full spectrum training focus,

27:30.790 --> 27:33.623
we must apply that same
thinking to intelligence,

27:33.730 --> 27:35.233
train as we fight.

27:36.140 --> 27:38.690
We want an air of superiority,
assured communications,

27:38.690 --> 27:40.370
assured logistics in our next fight.

27:40.370 --> 27:42.840
You may send your predator
in, but it may not come out.

27:42.840 --> 27:43.950
This is a different fight

27:43.950 --> 27:46.900
than the last 17-plus years of
the counter terrorism fight.

27:47.410 --> 27:49.170
We must think through how we do PED,

27:49.170 --> 27:51.200
processing exploitation dissemination,

27:51.200 --> 27:52.683
in a contested environment.

27:53.044 --> 27:56.360
We must think about our
Reachback model, our talk model,

27:56.360 --> 27:58.123
how we get intel out to the edge,

27:58.380 --> 28:00.130
supporting the speed of decision making,

28:00.130 --> 28:03.060
maintaining integrity of
data, maintaining OPSEC

28:03.266 --> 28:04.747
when we're under cyber attack

28:04.747 --> 28:06.733
and when our coms are degraded.

28:07.780 --> 28:10.120
You're seeing out of us
greater focus on resilient,

28:10.120 --> 28:13.216
survivable, agile ISR architectures,

28:13.216 --> 28:15.670
resilient communications capabilities,

28:15.670 --> 28:17.800
space direct down links into theater,

28:17.800 --> 28:21.380
DCGS integration and greater
real time accessibility

28:21.620 --> 28:24.023
to other services
intelligence capabilities,

28:24.470 --> 28:26.930
and we're still interested
in those game changers

28:26.930 --> 28:29.230
that give us the advantage
on the battlefield.

28:30.810 --> 28:33.870
Second, we're modernizing
our manual, labor intensive,

28:33.870 --> 28:36.763
data rich intelligence
processes and capabilities,

28:37.050 --> 28:40.920
leveraging commercial technology
and innovative solutions

28:40.920 --> 28:43.600
to deliver intelligence
at speed and at scale,

28:43.600 --> 28:44.893
at speed and at scale.

28:45.400 --> 28:48.250
We must embrace and field AI capabilities.

28:48.250 --> 28:49.893
We have a deluge of data,

28:50.270 --> 28:52.150
don't have enough analysts to analyze,

28:52.150 --> 28:53.873
and we couldn't do it fast enough.

28:54.550 --> 28:55.540
This is a perfect area

28:55.540 --> 28:58.080
for machines that process
large volumes of data

28:58.080 --> 28:59.833
and machines that learn.

29:00.230 --> 29:02.010
I don't want soldiers
staring at video screens,

29:02.010 --> 29:03.550
I want them doing the critical thinking

29:03.550 --> 29:05.513
and the higher order analysis.

29:06.350 --> 29:08.750
Project Maven and the
department is helping here

29:08.880 --> 29:10.410
and is the pathfinder for the department,

29:10.410 --> 29:11.960
we're learning a tremendous amount.

29:11.960 --> 29:14.893
The key is fielding, getting
the users involved early,

29:15.000 --> 29:17.050
getting capability out
to the field quickly,

29:17.050 --> 29:18.943
and then scaling that capability.

29:19.428 --> 29:21.330
We're also looking at how we modernize

29:21.330 --> 29:23.740
our foundational military
intelligence capabilities

29:23.740 --> 29:25.993
under General Ashley's great leadership,

29:26.830 --> 29:28.570
modernizing our targeting databases

29:28.570 --> 29:31.320
as well as we look at these
near peer and peer threats.

29:31.470 --> 29:33.820
Third, we're elevating defense security,

29:33.820 --> 29:35.840
we're transforming our personnel vetting

29:35.840 --> 29:37.440
and protecting critical technology

29:37.440 --> 29:39.773
to deliver uncompromised capabilities.

29:40.150 --> 29:42.130
We're reducing the
security clearance backlog

29:42.130 --> 29:45.540
and transforming today's manual
labor intensive processes

29:46.229 --> 29:51.229
that are part of our background
investigation process.

29:51.550 --> 29:53.690
Through greater use of
automated records checks

29:53.690 --> 29:56.150
and continuous evaluation
and in partnership

29:56.150 --> 29:57.960
and leadership from the DNI and OPM,

29:57.960 --> 30:00.260
we're already seeing a
reduction in the backlog.

30:00.260 --> 30:02.840
In the last six months, it's over 72,000

30:02.840 --> 30:05.373
for defense folks,
mostly army and industry.

30:05.980 --> 30:08.110
We're treating security
as a fourth pillar,

30:08.110 --> 30:10.230
or we must treat security as a
fourth pillar in acquisition,

30:10.230 --> 30:12.663
alongside cost to
schedule and performance.

30:13.180 --> 30:16.093
Our advanced technology is
being comprehensively targeted.

30:16.420 --> 30:17.470
We must have confidence

30:17.470 --> 30:20.170
that industry is delivering
our capabilities, technologies,

30:20.170 --> 30:23.103
weapon systems that are
uncompromised by our adversaries.

30:23.370 --> 30:26.040
This is going to require
strong industry partnerships,

30:26.040 --> 30:28.643
greater sharing of
intelligence and information,

30:28.810 --> 30:31.582
and we also, our defense
security service, DCSS,

30:31.582 --> 30:34.890
is undergoing a change to
move from a checklist approach

30:35.200 --> 30:36.353
to an industrial security approach

30:36.353 --> 30:38.963
that is more comprehensive and risk-based,

30:39.030 --> 30:40.710
and in some cases may be more intrusive

30:40.710 --> 30:42.760
than folks have been used to in the past.

30:43.270 --> 30:44.730
Fourth, we're deepening our reliances

30:44.730 --> 30:46.283
on our foreign partnerships.

30:46.430 --> 30:47.910
You all know far better than I

30:47.910 --> 30:49.683
that we operate in coalitions.

30:49.900 --> 30:52.760
Our combined effectiveness
depends on a shared understanding

30:52.760 --> 30:55.100
of the threats, shared intelligence,

30:55.100 --> 30:58.163
complementary accesses and
complementary capabilities.

30:58.640 --> 31:01.080
Our job is to provide you
those intel sharing policies

31:01.080 --> 31:02.743
and the resources to enable that.

31:04.130 --> 31:06.190
Fifth, we're increasing
enterprise integration.

31:06.190 --> 31:08.410
I'm really proud of the
partnership that we've struck

31:08.410 --> 31:11.010
with Director Coats and
with Deputy Director Gordon,

31:11.010 --> 31:13.526
and all the folks up here on the panel.

31:13.526 --> 31:16.410
There's a clear alignment
of vision of our priorities,

31:16.410 --> 31:19.280
and you see this through our
shared guidance that we issue,

31:19.280 --> 31:22.660
the collaboration and integration
on key initiatives, on AI,

31:22.660 --> 31:25.760
on foundational military
intelligence modernization,

31:25.760 --> 31:27.623
and in our pooling of resources.

31:27.740 --> 31:30.160
At the end of the day, we are
stewards of taxpayer dollars.

31:30.160 --> 31:31.950
Not MIP dollars, not NIP dollars,

31:31.950 --> 31:34.701
but taxpayer dollars, and we
must optimize those resources

31:34.701 --> 31:37.993
to maximum effect for our war fighters.

31:38.490 --> 31:42.030
Lastly, well, we have a lot of work ahead

31:42.030 --> 31:43.521
to implement the NDS.

31:43.521 --> 31:44.920
We have an incredible,

31:44.920 --> 31:46.930
incredible defense intelligence enterprise

31:46.930 --> 31:49.263
and an outstanding Army intelligence team.

31:49.740 --> 31:51.710
These are dedicated
professionals, military,

31:51.710 --> 31:54.235
civilian contractors
deployed around the world

31:54.235 --> 31:55.943
supporting the war fighter.

31:56.040 --> 31:58.020
We have remarkable technical capabilities,

31:58.020 --> 31:59.773
accesses operations,

31:59.840 --> 32:02.108
things that we don't talk about publicly,

32:02.108 --> 32:04.610
but know that there are
folks out there every day

32:04.610 --> 32:05.960
putting themselves in harm's way

32:05.960 --> 32:08.620
doing the things that you
would expect our nation to do

32:08.620 --> 32:09.603
to keep us safe.

32:09.750 --> 32:11.050
So, hoo-ah, thanks Army,

32:11.050 --> 32:13.700
and look forward to the rest
of the panel discussion.

32:13.742 --> 32:15.585
- [Scotty] Thank you, Honorable Bingen.

32:15.585 --> 32:17.835
(applause)

32:18.833 --> 32:21.033
Lieutenant General
Ashley, over to you, sir.

32:21.460 --> 32:22.293
- Scotty, thanks.

32:22.293 --> 32:25.760
And for our panel members
and everybody here today,

32:25.760 --> 32:26.593
thank you.

32:26.710 --> 32:28.293
Thanks to AUSA.

32:28.720 --> 32:31.224
If I could ask all our partner nations

32:31.224 --> 32:34.333
that are here in uniform to
please stand for just a moment.

32:35.104 --> 32:37.554
All the partner nations
that are here in uniform.

32:37.740 --> 32:39.990
(applause)

32:48.139 --> 32:50.120
So a message I would
like to leave you with,

32:50.120 --> 32:51.680
I'll talk a little bit about DIA,

32:51.680 --> 32:54.063
but really I wanna talk about context.

32:54.500 --> 32:56.760
And you've already heard that
from the other panel members

32:56.760 --> 32:59.803
that it's not just a
disruptive piece of technology,

32:59.999 --> 33:02.080
it's the context and the environment

33:02.080 --> 33:03.963
in which that technology is used.

33:04.000 --> 33:05.640
It's the doctrine that underpins it.

33:05.640 --> 33:08.060
It's the organizations that fight it.

33:08.060 --> 33:11.433
It gets into the chief's
comments about readiness.

33:11.535 --> 33:14.563
General Perkins, used to
be the TRADOC commander,

33:14.800 --> 33:15.633
had a great comment.

33:15.633 --> 33:17.980
He said, you have a box,
you have a technology,

33:17.980 --> 33:18.813
you have something,

33:18.813 --> 33:21.384
but until you couple
that to a trained soldier

33:21.384 --> 33:23.493
you do not have a capability.

33:24.430 --> 33:27.140
And that has resonated with me
'cause it gets into training,

33:27.140 --> 33:29.590
it gets into doctrine, it
gets into organization.

33:29.660 --> 33:31.703
It is the context in which we fight.

33:32.250 --> 33:34.530
So I will talk about
disruptive technologies,

33:34.530 --> 33:36.963
but for me, the bigger issue is,

33:37.060 --> 33:39.453
how do you apply that
in a future battlefield?

33:40.630 --> 33:43.612
If you have not read the National
Defense Strategy, grab it.

33:43.612 --> 33:46.070
There are three key lines of operation.

33:46.070 --> 33:49.006
One is lethality, the other
was how we enable our partners

33:49.006 --> 33:52.470
and expand our partners, and
as Bingen just mentioned,

33:52.470 --> 33:57.470
make sure we're good stewards
to the taxpayer's dollars.

33:58.608 --> 34:01.880
For us at DIA, core mission

34:02.357 --> 34:04.420
is to understand foreign militaries

34:04.420 --> 34:07.833
in the operation environment,
and that's where our focus us.

34:09.330 --> 34:11.420
And we are incredibly dependent

34:11.580 --> 34:13.203
on the other members of the IC.

34:14.430 --> 34:16.010
We have collection that is unique to us

34:16.010 --> 34:18.173
that is both technical
in the human domain,

34:18.510 --> 34:20.950
but the all-source
analysis that we provide

34:20.950 --> 34:24.040
is the aggregation of
incredible organizations

34:24.040 --> 34:26.700
that make up our IC, our services,

34:26.700 --> 34:28.200
that we put all that together.

34:28.780 --> 34:30.270
And so we talk about the
first line of effort,

34:30.270 --> 34:31.470
you talk about lethality

34:32.332 --> 34:34.913
and you have this image
of a kinetic strike.

34:35.720 --> 34:37.640
Lethality is just not about kinetics.

34:37.640 --> 34:38.940
So if I talk about lethality

34:38.940 --> 34:41.800
in the context of what
we think about, a DI,

34:41.800 --> 34:43.433
it's a trained analyst.

34:44.672 --> 34:47.253
It's the ability to
provide timely information,

34:47.253 --> 34:49.603
it's the ability to support a war plan.

34:50.610 --> 34:54.673
It's that operational and
strategic indications and warning.

34:54.912 --> 34:57.690
Lethality is the ability
to collect information

34:57.690 --> 34:59.930
that gets after what General
Nakasone talked about,

34:59.930 --> 35:01.443
which was intent.

35:01.888 --> 35:04.800
And having worked for
Secretary Mattis at CENTCOM,

35:04.800 --> 35:06.160
that was one of our hardest lifts,

35:06.160 --> 35:08.280
that one of her biggest
challenges is, he said,

35:08.280 --> 35:11.193
I need to know what is in
the head of my adversary.

35:11.965 --> 35:14.233
That's how you provide decision advantage.

35:14.884 --> 35:18.223
A big piece of that is how we
enable partners and allies,

35:18.657 --> 35:22.053
and integral to that is
how we share intelligence.

35:22.123 --> 35:24.810
Our partners and allies
will have insights,

35:24.810 --> 35:26.330
they will have placement and access,

35:26.330 --> 35:27.780
they will have capabilities

35:28.060 --> 35:30.350
that expand the collective fabric

35:30.350 --> 35:33.403
of what we can do as an
intelligence enterprise,

35:33.650 --> 35:35.240
which is why that is elevated

35:35.240 --> 35:37.040
to one of three key lines of effort.

35:38.040 --> 35:40.363
So I talk about foundational intelligence,

35:40.410 --> 35:42.910
and foreign militaries
think about infrastructure.

35:44.072 --> 35:46.853
But when you think about the
National Defense Strategy,

35:46.960 --> 35:49.010
what's the problem we're trying to solve?

35:49.810 --> 35:53.723
And it's been mentioned already,
it's the competitive space.

35:53.950 --> 35:55.620
We never wanna enter a fair fight,

35:55.620 --> 35:58.540
and that competitive space
from a technological standpoint

35:58.890 --> 35:59.983
is closing.

36:00.910 --> 36:02.960
And that's something we have to preclude.

36:03.140 --> 36:05.040
So that's the operational environment.

36:05.200 --> 36:08.640
Domains that were not contested
over the previous 17 years

36:08.640 --> 36:09.550
is General Nakasone,

36:09.550 --> 36:12.878
and he and I deployed
together into Afghanistan.

36:12.878 --> 36:14.613
It was the ground domain,

36:14.730 --> 36:16.230
it was the one area that was contested.

36:16.230 --> 36:18.930
We didn't worry about cyber,
we didn't worry about space,

36:18.930 --> 36:20.040
we didn't worry about air,

36:20.040 --> 36:21.893
we didn't have to worry about maritime.

36:22.500 --> 36:23.803
That has changed.

36:24.260 --> 36:25.310
But, again, the context

36:25.310 --> 36:29.840
is how our adversaries are
gonna fight us in those domains

36:29.966 --> 36:32.066
and how they're gonna use that technology.

36:33.160 --> 36:34.313
China, for example.

36:35.150 --> 36:37.273
We talk about doctrine in organization.

36:37.565 --> 36:39.987
They've looked at cyberspace,
electronic warfare

36:39.987 --> 36:41.630
and space capabilities

36:41.760 --> 36:44.877
and built that around a
strategies support force.

36:45.070 --> 36:47.540
Russia has a number of
operational constructs

36:47.540 --> 36:51.699
of how they determine they
wanna fight ground, air, space,

36:51.699 --> 36:55.879
with the intent of reducing US
effectiveness in our control

36:55.879 --> 36:59.363
and try to do escalation domination.

36:59.929 --> 37:01.110
So let me talk just a little

37:01.110 --> 37:03.403
about some of those
disruptive technologies,

37:03.439 --> 37:06.560
and it is indeed, China
and Russia looks at this

37:06.560 --> 37:09.723
as a race in the R&D domain

37:09.723 --> 37:12.033
and who's gonna chew
the first breakthrough.

37:12.690 --> 37:14.640
So what are some of those technologies?

37:15.075 --> 37:20.075
Hypersonics, advanced
materials, autonomous systems,

37:21.630 --> 37:24.830
artificial intelligence,
advanced computing

37:25.044 --> 37:27.103
and human performance.

37:27.641 --> 37:30.230
So just think about hypersonic propulsion

37:30.813 --> 37:32.590
and the geometry that's involved

37:32.590 --> 37:34.640
in trying to shoot a bullet with a bullet

37:35.360 --> 37:37.160
when the one that you're shooting at

37:38.910 --> 37:41.693
can turn and adjust its trajectory.

37:42.780 --> 37:44.803
Develops materials such as grapheme,

37:45.682 --> 37:47.670
where you can develop
ultralight and very strong

37:47.670 --> 37:51.143
flexible materials that can
operate in extreme environments,

37:51.253 --> 37:54.590
or photonics and how that
develops in the way of lasers

37:54.610 --> 37:57.653
and the impact on
communications, remote sensing,

37:57.755 --> 38:01.033
and the ability to develop
counter space capabilities.

38:01.506 --> 38:05.040
We think about A2AD, atomic sensors

38:05.040 --> 38:08.693
that allow you to operate
in a GPS denied environment.

38:09.840 --> 38:11.550
Or quantum technologies

38:12.430 --> 38:14.593
that deal with encryption algorithms,

38:15.950 --> 38:17.773
or high speed computers

38:17.773 --> 38:19.330
that you don't necessarily think about

38:19.330 --> 38:21.898
the context of what it
allows you to do for R&D

38:21.898 --> 38:25.450
because it allows you to get
into modeling and simulation

38:25.616 --> 38:28.160
where you learn and you develop,

38:28.160 --> 38:30.000
and you can literally
potentially take years

38:30.000 --> 38:33.163
off the time to develop
new weapons systems.

38:35.380 --> 38:38.340
And we hear a lot of discussions
about China and Russia

38:38.340 --> 38:39.880
in developing high speed computers

38:39.880 --> 38:42.493
and who has the fastest computer.

38:44.500 --> 38:46.850
It's not necessarily who
has the fastest computer,

38:46.850 --> 38:48.400
but what are you doing with it?

38:48.530 --> 38:50.793
What is the problem
you're trying to solve,

38:51.129 --> 38:53.170
and do you have an imagination

38:53.170 --> 38:56.350
to envision the future of the
challenges that we'll face

38:56.420 --> 38:58.570
and the problems that
you'll have to solve?

38:59.624 --> 39:00.457
Elsa Kania

39:00.457 --> 39:03.400
from the Center for New
American Security Technology

39:03.400 --> 39:06.593
had a very insightful
comment when she said,

39:06.910 --> 39:09.743
sometimes when somebody says,
I have a faster computer,

39:09.920 --> 39:11.643
it's really about a status symbol.

39:12.620 --> 39:15.450
The more important piece
is, how are they being used?

39:15.450 --> 39:17.750
What are the problems
they're trying to solve?

39:19.013 --> 39:20.893
Unmanned aerial vehicles,

39:21.610 --> 39:24.693
not only aerial but sub maritime.

39:26.900 --> 39:28.700
Russia's conducting feasibility tests

39:28.700 --> 39:30.540
on unmanned underwater vehicles

39:30.810 --> 39:33.020
with the intent of
delivering nuclear capability

39:33.020 --> 39:34.163
on a global scale.

39:34.823 --> 39:39.120
When we think about A2AD, we
have this very common picture

39:39.120 --> 39:41.623
of what that means for air defense.

39:42.490 --> 39:43.840
What about under the water?

39:45.120 --> 39:47.593
And China both recognized
the long term R&D

39:47.710 --> 39:50.313
of artificial intelligence
and what that means,

39:50.397 --> 39:53.723
not just for security
but for economic issues,

39:53.890 --> 39:57.373
for knowledge management and
how they operate as a nation.

39:59.366 --> 40:01.620
And that R&D and that competitiveness

40:02.060 --> 40:03.860
that happens in all the universities

40:04.080 --> 40:08.563
in the academic institutions
across the globe in education.

40:09.200 --> 40:12.030
China is progressively
pursuing a 2025 strategy

40:12.320 --> 40:15.063
where they want to be
the main driver of AI,

40:15.730 --> 40:16.720
not only for their economic

40:16.720 --> 40:18.520
but their industrial transformation.

40:19.140 --> 40:21.020
Many of you are familiar
with Putin's quote,

40:21.020 --> 40:23.803
whoever becomes master of
AI will rule the world,

40:23.956 --> 40:27.913
and at the same time express
a degree of fear in that idea.

40:28.225 --> 40:30.210
We talked about the nature of war

40:30.210 --> 40:32.850
as defined by Thucydides
was about fear, honor,

40:32.850 --> 40:33.683
and interest,

40:34.144 --> 40:37.533
but the character of war
is constantly changing,

40:37.783 --> 40:39.430
and as we see AI

40:39.480 --> 40:41.939
we see some of these
disruptive technologies,

40:41.939 --> 40:44.623
they continue to change
the character of war,

40:44.870 --> 40:48.553
the complexity and the
speed of human interaction.

40:49.987 --> 40:54.987
But our task is to
understand how they operate.

40:56.320 --> 40:57.963
What's the defeat mechanism?

40:58.380 --> 41:00.603
What's the target system analysis,

41:01.020 --> 41:02.530
and how do we find the vulnerabilities

41:02.530 --> 41:04.480
in those weapon systems to defeat them?

41:06.020 --> 41:07.063
Another key area,

41:07.800 --> 41:09.463
human performance enhancement.

41:10.840 --> 41:13.653
For China, three phases.

41:13.940 --> 41:15.640
They started with the digital age.

41:16.290 --> 41:18.110
It's moving into artificial intelligence

41:18.110 --> 41:21.433
with neural networks,
and then the next step,

41:22.172 --> 41:24.983
the integration of human and machines.

41:27.646 --> 41:31.099
Cognitive advances, not
just in how we think,

41:31.099 --> 41:34.403
but think about stamina
of the individual soldier,

41:35.226 --> 41:37.823
the ability to think through problems.

41:40.615 --> 41:43.113
And think about the ethical impact

41:44.022 --> 41:48.163
of those kinds of technologies
and how they will be applied.

41:50.728 --> 41:54.273
And how does a democracy view
those kinds of technologies?

41:55.070 --> 41:57.623
How will Russia and China leverage those,

41:58.840 --> 41:59.700
and the hard decisions

41:59.700 --> 42:02.623
that we will have to make to keep pace.

42:05.950 --> 42:09.660
So we talked about DI's role,
we look at foreign militaries,

42:09.660 --> 42:11.660
foundational intelligence, and

42:13.151 --> 42:14.730
to leave with you that thought,

42:14.730 --> 42:17.230
we can never divorce ourselves
from the operational context

42:17.230 --> 42:19.363
in which disruptive technology is used.

42:20.370 --> 42:22.290
It reminds me of the
comment by Michael O'Hanlon

42:22.290 --> 42:24.740
in the book he wrote, The
Future of Land Warfare.

42:25.588 --> 42:28.270
And a question I asked Peter
Singer on this very panel

42:28.270 --> 42:31.500
two years ago, I said,
what is the disruptive?

42:31.500 --> 42:34.090
What is that one technology
that you see emerging

42:34.100 --> 42:36.280
that will be a game changer that a nation

42:36.280 --> 42:38.730
will have that will give
them a marked advantage.

42:39.205 --> 42:40.850
And Peter's answer was very similar

42:40.850 --> 42:43.000
to what Michael O'Hanlon
wrote in his book.

42:44.040 --> 42:46.663
He said, it's how you operationalize it.

42:47.840 --> 42:49.740
That's where you'll get the advantage.

42:50.060 --> 42:52.343
And for nations like the United States,

42:53.000 --> 42:55.240
it will make us better at something

42:55.240 --> 42:57.083
we already do very very well.

42:58.500 --> 42:59.940
And so, for me as I think about this,

42:59.940 --> 43:03.823
and I envision that device.

43:04.720 --> 43:05.923
Go back 20 years ago.

43:06.900 --> 43:09.833
Who would have ever thought you
had that power in your hand?

43:11.230 --> 43:13.730
So in many ways, as we think
about disruptive technology,

43:13.730 --> 43:15.083
whether it's dual use,

43:15.570 --> 43:19.020
for everything that has a
positive use for mankind,

43:19.020 --> 43:21.430
someone is gonna look for a nefarious way

43:21.430 --> 43:23.283
to put that into operation.

43:23.918 --> 43:25.050
And so, as we think about

43:25.050 --> 43:28.810
how we counter these different
technologies, for me,

43:28.810 --> 43:32.283
one of the risks becomes
a lack of imagination.

43:33.850 --> 43:36.080
So think about between World
War I and World War II.

43:36.080 --> 43:38.960
A young 24 year old named Victor Krulak

43:39.380 --> 43:41.980
had an idea that he took
the leadership of the Navy.

43:42.440 --> 43:45.733
It was about a concept for
both that could do landings.

43:46.380 --> 43:47.473
It was discounted.

43:48.070 --> 43:50.660
It got picked up by a
man named Andrew Higgins,

43:50.660 --> 43:53.927
and that became the means by which D-day

43:53.927 --> 43:56.643
and so many other assaults
over the shore were launch.

43:57.261 --> 44:00.133
So for me, it's not only
understanding context,

44:00.380 --> 44:03.010
it's making sure that there's
never a lack of imagination

44:03.010 --> 44:07.240
from industry, from our
partners, and from America

44:07.240 --> 44:09.440
in terms of when we
look at the technologies

44:09.660 --> 44:12.293
and what we envision the
future fight might entail.

44:12.410 --> 44:13.243
Thank you.

44:13.690 --> 44:15.024
- [Scotty] Thank you, General Ashley.

44:15.024 --> 44:17.274
(applause)

44:20.630 --> 44:22.430
Director Cardillo, over to you, sir.

44:22.830 --> 44:23.693
- Thanks, Scotty,

44:23.860 --> 44:26.990
and I join in my panel's
mutual admiration,

44:26.990 --> 44:29.640
it's a pleasure to be with you all here.

44:29.640 --> 44:33.800
I have two bosses on the
panel, Kerry and Sue.

44:33.800 --> 44:36.560
Sue started our
conversation with an analogy

44:36.702 --> 44:38.900
using a baseball term, murderer's row,

44:38.900 --> 44:42.280
comes from the '20s and
'30s New York Yankees lineup

44:42.280 --> 44:43.133
at the time.

44:43.330 --> 44:46.722
So I am now at the tail end of that row,

44:46.722 --> 44:49.410
and I apologize to international partners

44:49.410 --> 44:50.760
who don't have a baseball background,

44:50.760 --> 44:55.503
but you tend to put your
weakest hitter, the pitcher,

44:56.007 --> 44:57.380
at the end of the row.

44:57.380 --> 44:58.950
So I'm gonna try to do something

44:58.950 --> 45:00.080
other than a sacrifice bunt.

45:00.080 --> 45:02.463
By the way, we're up four-northing, team,

45:02.660 --> 45:05.193
because you've all hit it out of the park.

45:06.270 --> 45:08.830
Seriously, the real risk
to being in this position

45:08.830 --> 45:13.210
on this table is that a lot of
my points that I have drafted

45:13.346 --> 45:15.570
will have been made. I don't
know if you've noticed,

45:15.570 --> 45:17.480
I was doing some hunting
and pecking over here.

45:17.480 --> 45:19.380
So I'll share with you my remarks now.

45:20.720 --> 45:23.923
I've deleted everything
because it's been covered.

45:25.640 --> 45:28.140
But before you get too excited,

45:28.140 --> 45:30.613
I had some time to
create some new remarks.

45:31.961 --> 45:36.757
Look, in a much more serious
note, it's wonderful to be here

45:36.757 --> 45:40.100
at this convention and having
this conversation because,

45:40.100 --> 45:44.163
as my colleagues have noted,
this is our advantage.

45:45.407 --> 45:48.923
These challenges, these partnerships,

45:49.040 --> 45:50.690
the opportunities that are created

45:50.690 --> 45:53.310
by the conversations that
are created in this room,

45:53.310 --> 45:55.110
but more importantly in that hallway

45:55.320 --> 45:57.230
and at the coffee break,
and tomorrow at breakfast

45:57.230 --> 46:00.150
are exactly what leads to the advantage

46:00.150 --> 46:01.763
that we must protect.

46:02.480 --> 46:03.570
I am privileged enough

46:03.570 --> 46:06.590
to be able to lead the geospatial
intelligence profession

46:06.590 --> 46:07.540
for our government.

46:07.960 --> 46:09.650
I do that both as the functional manager

46:09.650 --> 46:11.083
and the director of MGA.

46:11.330 --> 46:13.230
I stumbled into this profession

46:13.230 --> 46:17.810
under President Reagan's
hiring acceleration in 1983.

46:18.380 --> 46:23.010
Got very very lucky to become
a member of this profession.

46:23.010 --> 46:25.440
I got even luckier with
a series of mentors

46:25.745 --> 46:28.020
who guided my career in such a way

46:28.020 --> 46:30.360
that made this postilion
possible on the other end.

46:30.360 --> 46:32.060
But the reason I bring it up is two-fold.

46:32.060 --> 46:35.210
It's my current job, it's
the profession that I love,

46:35.210 --> 46:40.210
but our ties with the United
States Army are long and true,

46:40.560 --> 46:43.593
and the agency's only 22 years old.

46:43.874 --> 46:46.223
The profession is old as mankind.

46:47.340 --> 46:48.335
We, by the way,

46:48.335 --> 46:53.098
borrow your first commander
in the US Continental Army

46:53.098 --> 46:55.170
as our employee number one

46:55.170 --> 46:57.760
because of his surveying
and map making skills,

46:57.760 --> 47:00.610
and that he chartered both the surveyor

47:00.610 --> 47:03.777
and the cartographer of the Army in 1777.

47:03.777 --> 47:06.743
And if you think about
what Washington was facing,

47:07.200 --> 47:12.200
the world's dominant military
power with under trained,

47:12.225 --> 47:16.824
under-equipped, under-organized
militia, really,

47:16.824 --> 47:21.093
shopkeepers and farmers,
and a few good partners.

47:21.612 --> 47:23.303
How did he do it?

47:23.670 --> 47:25.033
He mastered the terrain.

47:25.760 --> 47:28.180
He saw it and obtained the high ground

47:28.180 --> 47:30.963
in order to see further, as Sue mentioned.

47:31.548 --> 47:36.548
He knew the risks of
employment of inferior forces

47:37.568 --> 47:40.653
given the geography that surrounded them,

47:41.103 --> 47:43.894
and he employed it in a way

47:43.894 --> 47:46.910
in which created asymmetric advantage

47:47.770 --> 47:49.820
which is what all of us
have talked about now

47:49.820 --> 47:52.453
as the dominant military
force on the planet,

47:52.920 --> 47:54.890
our adversaries are gonna look for

47:55.300 --> 47:58.603
and take advantage of
asymmetric advantage.

48:00.306 --> 48:02.705
I think, as we sit here today

48:02.705 --> 48:04.610
and as we think of the advent

48:04.610 --> 48:06.840
and the growth of the profession

48:06.840 --> 48:08.643
that I'm privileged to lead,

48:09.150 --> 48:11.460
you can move from the higher terrain

48:11.460 --> 48:12.870
that Washington may have achieved

48:12.870 --> 48:15.060
through climbing to the
lighter than air vehicles

48:15.060 --> 48:18.663
that were employed in the
Civil War to see further

48:18.663 --> 48:22.483
and understand the threat
during that engagement,

48:23.068 --> 48:28.068
and we should remind ourselves
that, even in the 1860s

48:28.730 --> 48:33.023
Lincoln employed a telegraph
wire to go into the basket

48:33.023 --> 48:36.723
up to the observer to get
real time intelligence.

48:37.810 --> 48:39.533
That's 150 years ago.

48:41.090 --> 48:43.750
Those lighter than air
vehicles became powered flight,

48:43.750 --> 48:45.330
World War I and World War II

48:45.620 --> 48:48.423
and the advance of photography
and camera and lenses,

48:49.150 --> 48:52.827
and then through the wizardry
of those partnerships

48:52.827 --> 48:55.477
and the innovations that I
described at the beginning

48:56.280 --> 48:58.440
were employed by this country

48:58.440 --> 49:01.190
through a government and
industrial partnership

49:01.190 --> 49:06.190
to give President Eisenhower
insight into denied territory,

49:06.280 --> 49:07.693
that being the Soviet Union.

49:08.391 --> 49:10.940
Through an airplane that, at the time,

49:10.940 --> 49:12.840
we thought flew higher than the threat

49:13.490 --> 49:16.114
in order to expose and understand

49:16.114 --> 49:19.993
what exactly the nature of that threat.

49:20.570 --> 49:25.570
That ended May of 1960
because the weapon system,

49:25.995 --> 49:27.730
the Soviet weapon system,

49:27.730 --> 49:30.163
was capable of bringing
down that aircraft.

49:31.298 --> 49:33.390
And it ended the insight
that the president

49:33.390 --> 49:35.813
needed to understand that threat.

49:37.070 --> 49:39.923
And yet, just three months
later, August of 1960,

49:40.238 --> 49:42.890
the United States government
employed its first

49:43.120 --> 49:46.763
imagery intelligence system from space.

49:47.750 --> 49:49.783
That's 58 years ago.

49:50.390 --> 49:52.513
And again, where did that come from?

49:53.143 --> 49:55.210
True wizardry, in this case,

49:55.210 --> 49:59.600
between partners at Langley
and partners in California,

49:59.600 --> 50:04.173
and industry and academic
leaders, and creating, then,

50:04.241 --> 50:05.960
creating, then, a system

50:05.960 --> 50:08.643
by which you could look
into denied territory.

50:10.180 --> 50:15.177
1960, for almost 50 years,
I would offer, that we,

50:15.177 --> 50:16.980
in our profession,

50:16.980 --> 50:19.893
provide an advantage
through exclusive access.

50:20.698 --> 50:24.370
It's the kind of advantage
created the unfair fights,

50:24.370 --> 50:26.860
it created that insight
seeing before events,

50:26.860 --> 50:28.973
acting before events dictate.

50:29.380 --> 50:32.223
All of that was created because
we had exclusive access.

50:33.060 --> 50:35.230
Now, with the commercialization
of technology,

50:35.230 --> 50:38.620
not just the iPhone in
our interconnected world,

50:38.620 --> 50:42.663
but the planet today is simply
being sensed differently,

50:43.070 --> 50:45.860
more holistically, more continually,

50:45.860 --> 50:48.293
more persistently than
it ever has been before.

50:50.210 --> 50:53.123
And I happen to think
that's a wonderful advance.

50:53.690 --> 50:55.850
It's creating an
understanding of our planet

50:55.850 --> 51:00.850
insights into human and
cultural understanding,

51:01.810 --> 51:05.658
better use of land,
better crop management,

51:05.658 --> 51:10.658
better understanding of threats,
be they weather or disease.

51:11.960 --> 51:13.500
And I also believe strongly

51:13.500 --> 51:17.820
that democracies thrive
in that light, and that,

51:17.820 --> 51:22.820
if you can create more
understanding, like minded partners

51:23.970 --> 51:26.753
can see outcomes that can
be mutually beneficial.

51:28.196 --> 51:31.000
But with that advance
and with that sensing now

51:31.150 --> 51:34.583
is a more leveling of the playing field,

51:34.650 --> 51:37.082
and so that exclusive advantage
that we used to provide

51:37.082 --> 51:39.373
is now more common.

51:39.803 --> 51:43.253
So, again, to repeat

51:43.253 --> 51:47.163
and build on an echo
comment you've heard before,

51:48.090 --> 51:49.993
ours is now to operate differently.

51:50.850 --> 51:53.040
We have to innovate inside the cycle

51:53.120 --> 51:55.453
of adversary ill intent.

51:55.550 --> 52:00.550
We have to create the same
outcome, that advantage,

52:00.600 --> 52:03.653
that decision space,
that operational time,

52:03.980 --> 52:05.720
for the commander to be able to act

52:05.720 --> 52:07.240
before that event dictates,

52:07.240 --> 52:08.850
we just have to do it differently.

52:08.850 --> 52:11.810
So at NGA and with
geospatial intelligence,

52:11.810 --> 52:16.810
we're engaging vigorously
with these new communities,

52:17.660 --> 52:20.503
whether those be industry,
whether they be academic,

52:20.503 --> 52:23.363
and whether they be
international partners.

52:23.895 --> 52:27.040
And just as each of those
bring us opportunity,

52:27.040 --> 52:28.340
they also bring risks.

52:28.340 --> 52:31.503
Some of my panel have
mentioned those risks.

52:31.804 --> 52:35.190
So in an era in which we have
more shared understanding,

52:35.190 --> 52:37.580
we also have shared risk

52:39.130 --> 52:41.800
about the fidelity of the information

52:41.800 --> 52:43.700
upon which we have that understanding.

52:43.970 --> 52:46.520
It's the whole issue of
what's real and what's not.

52:46.830 --> 52:48.010
It's the whole issue of,

52:48.010 --> 52:50.220
have you been able to protect your data

52:50.220 --> 52:52.470
in such a way that you
have the confidence in it

52:52.470 --> 52:53.520
to make the decision?

52:54.010 --> 52:58.403
That's been our requirement
from day one in this profession,

52:58.992 --> 53:02.320
because the world is so connected

53:02.320 --> 53:04.570
and because we are so dependent now

53:04.570 --> 53:06.393
on this interconnected world,

53:06.630 --> 53:10.163
we have to get much better at
making sure that our pedigree,

53:10.620 --> 53:14.113
our resilience, is sustained as well.

53:15.060 --> 53:16.900
And I'll finish with the comment that,

53:16.900 --> 53:18.983
again, back to this conference.

53:19.062 --> 53:22.640
The advances that I reflected,

53:22.640 --> 53:24.780
whether they were telegraph wire

53:24.780 --> 53:26.540
up to a lighter than air vehicle

53:26.980 --> 53:29.357
or the corona system in 1960

53:29.357 --> 53:31.393
and all the innovation since then,

53:32.479 --> 53:34.723
all of that happened through partnerships.

53:35.420 --> 53:37.930
All of it happened through
somebody having an idea

53:37.930 --> 53:41.633
that was probably discounted
once or twice, or three times,

53:42.210 --> 53:45.920
and yet somebody persisting in
bringing up that added value

53:46.191 --> 53:49.093
and staying focused on that outcome.

53:49.237 --> 53:51.400
To me, the AUSA convention

53:51.400 --> 53:54.000
is a perfect forum with a great history

53:54.000 --> 53:55.583
of just those conversations,

53:55.930 --> 53:58.620
and I look forward to having
one of those conversations

53:58.620 --> 54:01.123
with you now as we turn to
your questions and answers.

54:01.123 --> 54:02.870
Your questions, our answers.

54:02.870 --> 54:03.703
Thank you very much.

54:03.703 --> 54:05.303
- [Scotty] Thank you, Director Caudillo.

54:06.006 --> 54:08.256
(applause)

54:09.780 --> 54:11.160
Okay, so now comes the fun part.

54:11.160 --> 54:13.780
We've got a number of really
interesting questions here,

54:13.780 --> 54:15.614
and I think the way I'll start this is

54:15.614 --> 54:17.520
I'll throw a few out for the panel,

54:17.520 --> 54:18.870
and then I will get selective

54:18.870 --> 54:20.190
based on questions that have come in

54:20.190 --> 54:21.150
for an individual panelist.

54:21.150 --> 54:24.170
So for the entire panel,
and honorable Gordon,

54:24.170 --> 54:26.047
since you're the closest to
me, we'll have you go first.

54:26.047 --> 54:27.426
- I need to talk to my agent.

54:27.426 --> 54:28.973
- Here's the question.

54:29.010 --> 54:31.413
What and how has our
intelligence community

54:31.413 --> 54:34.510
being changed to move
from a reactive posture

54:34.510 --> 54:38.403
to a proactive posture
that influences operations?

54:38.787 --> 54:43.513
- Probably two things, and
I'd say both surround data.

54:43.713 --> 54:46.010
The first is post 9/11

54:46.010 --> 54:48.340
where we redoubled our efforts
to be able to integrate

54:48.340 --> 54:52.703
across all the members of
the intelligence community

54:52.703 --> 54:55.620
so that anyone had available to them

54:55.620 --> 54:59.340
was what all of us had
to offer, and with that

55:00.088 --> 55:05.088
came the investment in
information infrastructure

55:05.309 --> 55:06.990
that would allow that to happen.

55:06.990 --> 55:11.737
So integration is not just a catchphrase,

55:11.737 --> 55:14.600
it really is just making
sure that we all have,

55:14.600 --> 55:19.183
and you all have the best
of what we have available.

55:19.915 --> 55:22.703
That was work of my predecessors.

55:23.140 --> 55:27.170
I would say the work that
we are now engaged in,

55:27.170 --> 55:29.780
and this is something that
Kari and I worked on a lot,

55:29.780 --> 55:33.120
is to make sure that there
is no artificial boundary

55:33.120 --> 55:37.433
between national intelligence,
military intelligence,

55:37.433 --> 55:39.480
tactical intelligence, as though

55:39.480 --> 55:43.293
that is some sort of
differentiation that matters.

55:43.560 --> 55:47.710
The ability to get from
a strategic question

55:47.710 --> 55:52.710
to a operator use in
the short amount of time

55:54.810 --> 55:57.340
that is required to
respond to a world that

55:57.340 --> 56:01.950
is turning faster than the
systems that we each involve.

56:01.950 --> 56:03.620
So an infrastructure

56:03.630 --> 56:05.550
allows for integration in the best,

56:05.550 --> 56:08.607
and a connection between
national intelligence

56:08.607 --> 56:10.330
and military intelligence

56:10.590 --> 56:14.103
so that operational speeds are possible.

56:15.675 --> 56:16.733
- [Scotty] Hoo-ah.

56:16.890 --> 56:19.440
General Nakasone, shall I
repeat the question, sir?

56:19.930 --> 56:20.820
- No, I think I have it

56:20.820 --> 56:22.660
from the response that
just came there, General,

56:22.660 --> 56:23.493
thanks a lot.

56:23.940 --> 56:24.800
So what did we learn?

56:24.800 --> 56:28.300
I wholly concur with Deputy
Director Gordon here.

56:28.300 --> 56:31.333
This idea over the past 17 years is,

56:31.333 --> 56:35.994
our speed got much better because
we had to get much better.

56:35.994 --> 56:40.633
Think about the 12th of September 2001.

56:41.330 --> 56:43.500
I remember that, being at the
Pentagon the 12th of September

56:43.500 --> 56:45.780
wondering, who were
they, what did they do,

56:45.780 --> 56:49.063
how did they do it, and what
we were gonna do about it.

56:49.345 --> 56:51.310
In a matter of three to four years,

56:51.310 --> 56:54.510
suddenly we had rapidly
transformed ourselves.

56:54.510 --> 56:56.930
We were inside our
adversary's decision loop,

56:56.930 --> 57:00.713
we were passing information
quicker than they could imagine.

57:00.750 --> 57:02.850
We were taking things off the battlefield.

57:02.867 --> 57:04.680
To Honorable Gordon's point,

57:04.680 --> 57:09.680
I would offer also this idea
of whatever was at the endpoint

57:10.600 --> 57:12.020
was always critical for us,

57:12.020 --> 57:13.940
because we had to take it so rapidly

57:14.340 --> 57:17.250
and turn insights for a
number of different partners

57:17.250 --> 57:19.920
that were either
contributing to the answer

57:19.920 --> 57:23.193
that we're looking for
or actioning it rapidly.

57:23.900 --> 57:26.610
That doesn't change in terms
of our ability to be proactive

57:26.610 --> 57:27.443
in the future.

57:28.570 --> 57:31.680
While our threats may
change and the adversaries

57:31.680 --> 57:33.483
that we may face in the future,

57:34.250 --> 57:37.543
this whole idea of speed
is rapidly upon us.

57:37.963 --> 57:41.940
As we think of 10 gigabits
at the endpoint with 5G

57:42.110 --> 57:43.513
and the Internet of Things,

57:44.370 --> 57:46.140
think about how fast our
intelligence system's

57:46.140 --> 57:47.190
gonna have to operate

57:47.900 --> 57:49.760
and how rapidly we're gonna
have to turn that data.

57:49.760 --> 57:51.003
We're doing that today.

57:51.070 --> 57:53.330
We're doing it at places like
the National Security Agency,

57:53.330 --> 57:56.333
NGA, throughout our
intelligence community,

57:56.772 --> 57:59.720
and I am very very very very pleased

57:59.720 --> 58:02.100
in terms of what we're
seeing now, but more and more

58:02.100 --> 58:04.325
I'm also saying I'm very very excited

58:04.325 --> 58:06.123
about what we're gonna
be able to do tomorrow.

58:07.040 --> 58:07.873
- [Scotty] Thank you.

58:07.873 --> 58:08.706
Honorable Bingen?

58:09.522 --> 58:11.603
- I think I have to echo
what others have said.

58:11.603 --> 58:15.913
As Gordon and General
Nakasone hit it well.

58:16.000 --> 58:17.350
The other thing I'd say is,

58:17.593 --> 58:19.410
the first step of recognizing
you have a problem

58:19.410 --> 58:20.840
is recognizing you have a problem,

58:20.840 --> 58:22.890
and I think one of the
common things you've heard

58:22.890 --> 58:24.423
across the panel here was,

58:24.660 --> 58:28.380
we've spent the last 17-plus
years focused on a CT fight,

58:28.380 --> 58:32.060
and rightly so, but you
now have a recognition,

58:32.060 --> 58:35.160
and the National Strategy and
the National Defense Strategy

58:35.160 --> 58:38.620
hit this home that we
have to make a change.

58:38.620 --> 58:40.717
That, while we need to be
doing those kinds of things,

58:40.717 --> 58:42.493
and that threat will still persist,

58:42.600 --> 58:44.950
you have a near peer-to-peer competitor

58:44.950 --> 58:47.850
that is forcing us to change

58:47.850 --> 58:50.780
how we think about our
intelligence capabilities,

58:50.780 --> 58:52.333
our posture, our investments.

58:52.910 --> 58:54.410
I think what's been fascinating now

58:54.410 --> 58:56.403
being among these folks

58:56.403 --> 58:59.742
is seeing some of the
different intelligence areas

58:59.742 --> 59:02.320
that have been stressed now
that haven't been before,

59:02.320 --> 59:05.860
and getting after, getting
ahead of some of these threats.

59:05.860 --> 59:07.120
So economic intelligence,

59:07.120 --> 59:08.550
hadn't seen as much of that before,

59:08.550 --> 59:10.983
but when you look at
where China's heading,

59:10.983 --> 59:13.463
I'm seeing a lot more in that area.

59:14.181 --> 59:15.610
We're seeing a lot of focus now

59:15.610 --> 59:18.480
on research and development
on R&D, and also

59:18.480 --> 59:21.230
we're putting some clear bets
on some game changing areas,

59:21.230 --> 59:24.040
both technologies and
other concepts that, again,

59:24.040 --> 59:26.703
will help us get ahead in
that contested environment.

59:27.760 --> 59:28.930
- [Sue] Can I jump back in?

59:28.930 --> 59:29.980
- [Scotty] Yes, ma'am, go ahead.

59:29.980 --> 59:31.670
- Even though I started this,

59:31.670 --> 59:33.210
I'm taking a second bite of the apple

59:33.210 --> 59:35.060
based on what Kari said.

59:35.060 --> 59:38.220
I think the other thing
that the last few years

59:38.220 --> 59:40.960
has been marked by is the recognition

59:40.960 --> 59:42.710
that this is a one-way transfer

59:43.230 --> 59:46.073
from intelligence to
some sort of endpoint.

59:46.190 --> 59:48.510
Those endpoints have intelligence now,

59:48.510 --> 59:50.893
and they're being fed
back into the system.

59:51.090 --> 59:53.100
So whether that is an
operator in the field,

59:53.100 --> 59:54.500
whether that is a private sector

59:54.500 --> 59:57.998
that understands a cyber
threat is happening,

59:57.998 --> 01:00:02.048
or a company that sees an economic action,

01:00:02.048 --> 01:00:05.310
it's creating this circular
flow of intelligence

01:00:05.310 --> 01:00:08.243
to endpoint back to the main back to it

01:00:08.243 --> 01:00:10.803
that I think is one of the
most different aspects.

01:00:12.245 --> 01:00:13.583
- [Scotty] General Ashley?

01:00:14.050 --> 01:00:15.510
- That's what you were
gonna say, right, Bob?

01:00:15.510 --> 01:00:16.343
- It was.

01:00:16.343 --> 01:00:18.950
And, like Robert, I'm marking off my list.

01:00:19.207 --> 01:00:21.017
I think there's a mindset change,

01:00:21.017 --> 01:00:23.450
and it's reflected in the
National Defense Strategy.

01:00:23.450 --> 01:00:26.967
It is a start, and we'll
iterate our way through it,

01:00:26.967 --> 01:00:29.493
and the mindset is the need to share.

01:00:30.180 --> 01:00:33.100
So in the context of how
are we being more proactive

01:00:33.100 --> 01:00:36.943
as opposed to reactive,
me and my partners,

01:00:36.943 --> 01:00:39.150
that we come back out, I'm
looking at Gary Johnson

01:00:39.150 --> 01:00:41.693
who just came out of Afghanistan.

01:00:41.809 --> 01:00:45.530
When you're in a combat
zone in Afghanistan or Iraq,

01:00:45.530 --> 01:00:49.980
or Syria, you find that you
have a lot more latitude

01:00:49.980 --> 01:00:53.310
to share intelligence, and
you come back to the states

01:00:53.310 --> 01:00:55.090
and you sit down with one of
your partners and go, you know,

01:00:55.090 --> 01:00:56.570
I can share this with
you in a combat zone,

01:00:56.570 --> 01:00:59.323
I can't do anything,
or I'm kind of limited.

01:00:59.509 --> 01:01:02.950
So for me, the mindset that is
in that second line of effort

01:01:02.950 --> 01:01:06.820
that talks about enabling
allies and expanding that

01:01:06.880 --> 01:01:08.883
is a mindset that says,

01:01:08.983 --> 01:01:10.950
let's not wait for the conflict

01:01:10.950 --> 01:01:14.373
to start to start sorting
out what's happening.

01:01:14.693 --> 01:01:17.010
And that mindset is in
that second line of effort,

01:01:17.010 --> 01:01:19.980
which says, hey, let's start
building those coalitions,

01:01:19.980 --> 01:01:22.330
let's start bringing in
non-traditional allies

01:01:22.670 --> 01:01:24.683
into that intel sharing construct,

01:01:25.926 --> 01:01:28.780
and we're gonna have
better placement in access,

01:01:28.780 --> 01:01:30.330
we're gonna better
situational understanding

01:01:30.330 --> 01:01:31.930
of what's taking place globally,

01:01:32.010 --> 01:01:33.900
because so many of those
partners can see and do,

01:01:33.900 --> 01:01:35.070
and understand things.

01:01:35.070 --> 01:01:36.453
Intent, for example.

01:01:37.530 --> 01:01:38.940
I just came back from the Baltics,

01:01:38.940 --> 01:01:41.760
I just spent the last
week with our Lithuanian,

01:01:41.760 --> 01:01:44.950
Latvian and Estonia partners,
and if I wanted to sit down

01:01:44.950 --> 01:01:48.300
and get an understanding
of what's taking place

01:01:48.494 --> 01:01:51.737
in the western military district, boy,

01:01:51.737 --> 01:01:54.043
there's some intellectual
capital right there.

01:01:54.340 --> 01:01:56.590
And for us to have that ability
to be able to share that

01:01:56.590 --> 01:01:57.633
is huge.

01:01:57.920 --> 01:02:01.150
And so, in many ways, we're
pushing on a door that's open.

01:02:01.150 --> 01:02:03.700
There's a little bit of
that Cold War doorstop

01:02:03.700 --> 01:02:06.760
that's kinda stuck that we gotta
push a little bit harder on

01:02:07.370 --> 01:02:09.690
to understand how do we mitigate
the risk as we move ahead.

01:02:09.690 --> 01:02:12.530
The other area I would say
is that we're embracing,

01:02:12.530 --> 01:02:13.870
and there's a lot of work to be done,

01:02:13.870 --> 01:02:15.910
which is in public available information

01:02:15.910 --> 01:02:18.190
or open source intelligence in

01:02:18.190 --> 01:02:19.980
that it doesn't have to be something

01:02:19.980 --> 01:02:21.830
that comes off of a pristine satellite,

01:02:21.830 --> 01:02:25.393
or that has 12 caveats of
classification in front of you.

01:02:25.810 --> 01:02:27.990
As long as you've applied
good analytic trade craft,

01:02:27.990 --> 01:02:29.850
you understand the
source of the information

01:02:29.850 --> 01:02:31.300
and you can tip or queue it

01:02:31.300 --> 01:02:33.233
with other classified information.

01:02:33.580 --> 01:02:37.980
I think that is incredibly
powerful indications and warning

01:02:37.980 --> 01:02:40.330
on a global scale of insights

01:02:40.330 --> 01:02:43.133
that we are just narrowly
beginning to tap into,

01:02:43.145 --> 01:02:45.260
and to be able to do that at scale

01:02:45.260 --> 01:02:47.410
we're gonna need some
pretty good AI tools,

01:02:47.560 --> 01:02:49.383
otherwise we are just gonna drown.

01:02:51.610 --> 01:02:52.610
- [Scotty] Director?

01:02:52.765 --> 01:02:54.483
- Everything my partner said,

01:02:54.960 --> 01:02:57.680
and General Nakasone mentioned

01:02:57.680 --> 01:03:00.493
that feeling on the 12th of
September that we all had,

01:03:00.510 --> 01:03:02.710
actually on the 11th,
'cause it was morning.

01:03:03.147 --> 01:03:07.080
And, I would offer, my position is,

01:03:07.080 --> 01:03:12.080
we collectively had a failure
to imagine planes as weapons

01:03:12.610 --> 01:03:14.760
on the 10th of September,
so we were struck.

01:03:14.760 --> 01:03:16.780
And so our reaction
with what happened to us

01:03:16.780 --> 01:03:21.403
and what do we do next, well,
you shut down air traffic.

01:03:22.340 --> 01:03:24.510
It keeps the next attack from happening

01:03:24.510 --> 01:03:26.130
that happened the morning of the 11th.

01:03:26.130 --> 01:03:29.740
I guess my question,
really, for our panel,

01:03:29.740 --> 01:03:34.163
as we have all made great
progress for 17 years is,

01:03:35.845 --> 01:03:37.943
what will we do next time,

01:03:38.890 --> 01:03:40.923
how much time will we have next time?

01:03:42.170 --> 01:03:43.380
And obviously we want to stop

01:03:43.380 --> 01:03:45.060
everything that we can happening,

01:03:45.060 --> 01:03:47.563
but are we agile enough,

01:03:48.205 --> 01:03:50.790
do we have the imagination
to think through

01:03:50.790 --> 01:03:55.696
how we're going to have
to recreate the security

01:03:55.696 --> 01:03:58.390
if indeed it happens again?

01:03:58.390 --> 01:04:02.910
And so I would just echo that
we've made great progress.

01:04:02.910 --> 01:04:05.560
I was in the community
almost as long before 9/11

01:04:05.560 --> 01:04:07.453
as now I have been after,

01:04:07.730 --> 01:04:11.330
and this is a truly integrated community,

01:04:11.330 --> 01:04:12.680
and not just this panel

01:04:13.000 --> 01:04:15.200
but our industry and
international partners.

01:04:15.890 --> 01:04:19.119
And yet, as soon as we
become comfortable with that

01:04:19.119 --> 01:04:23.170
or complacent, I think we
get into that September 10th

01:04:23.880 --> 01:04:25.513
kind of worry zone.

01:04:26.500 --> 01:04:27.370
- Thanks, sir.

01:04:27.636 --> 01:04:31.960
This next question was
for the Honorable Gordon,

01:04:31.960 --> 01:04:33.901
but I think I'm gonna open it
up a little bit to everybody,

01:04:33.901 --> 01:04:36.351
because I think you will
all have opinions on it.

01:04:37.110 --> 01:04:40.419
So you mention in your remarks
about the opioid crisis

01:04:40.419 --> 01:04:42.483
and transnational crime.

01:04:42.750 --> 01:04:44.233
So the question, really, is,

01:04:44.320 --> 01:04:45.890
I think everybody would agree with you

01:04:45.890 --> 01:04:47.030
those are pretty serious threats.

01:04:47.030 --> 01:04:49.720
What does it take for the
threshold for the nation

01:04:49.720 --> 01:04:53.490
or for the department to add
those to the four plus one,

01:04:53.490 --> 01:04:55.690
two plus three, however
you wanna count that

01:04:55.990 --> 01:04:57.430
and make those official,

01:04:57.430 --> 01:04:59.520
on the books kind of
threats we all talk about

01:04:59.520 --> 01:05:00.870
and start thinking through?

01:05:03.512 --> 01:05:06.027
- Great question, I'll
take the help from my team.

01:05:06.027 --> 01:05:07.640
I'm looking at you, thinking you,

01:05:07.640 --> 01:05:09.653
Kari, so gotta work on this.

01:05:09.700 --> 01:05:11.520
I guess one of the things

01:05:11.523 --> 01:05:13.100
that I think we're in the middle of,

01:05:13.100 --> 01:05:15.000
and it goes a little
bit to Robert's comments

01:05:15.000 --> 01:05:20.000
about imagination, if you look
over the course of my career,

01:05:20.380 --> 01:05:24.880
I think we have really been
a political military threat

01:05:25.572 --> 01:05:26.983
kind of community.

01:05:27.461 --> 01:05:32.461
And you see us now really
focused on economic threats.

01:05:32.553 --> 01:05:34.140
And then, why does this matter?

01:05:34.140 --> 01:05:37.620
'Cause it all is about how
do you go and prosecute

01:05:37.620 --> 01:05:40.140
and find the information that you need

01:05:40.140 --> 01:05:44.533
in order to have wisdom and
insight that allows action.

01:05:45.030 --> 01:05:48.970
So we know where we
would go to find wisdom

01:05:48.970 --> 01:05:52.733
and insight about political
military activities.

01:05:52.780 --> 01:05:56.420
We are learning where we go
to get information and wisdom

01:05:56.420 --> 01:06:00.333
and insight about economic
activities and intent.

01:06:01.220 --> 01:06:04.370
In a very interesting world of constraint

01:06:04.446 --> 01:06:07.240
on what you want government entities to do

01:06:07.240 --> 01:06:10.640
and be able to go, and look,
and I would say the same thing

01:06:10.640 --> 01:06:12.619
with transnational organized crime.

01:06:12.619 --> 01:06:15.777
They used to be able to find
it, to find the nexus for it,

01:06:15.777 --> 01:06:20.240
to be able to devote the
collection resources to go after it

01:06:20.240 --> 01:06:23.250
and to have the expertise
that allows you to understand

01:06:23.500 --> 01:06:25.940
the disparate pieces of information

01:06:26.200 --> 01:06:28.830
and to be able to find the individuals

01:06:28.902 --> 01:06:32.310
different from the
individuals that were involved

01:06:32.310 --> 01:06:35.010
in terrorism in order to be
able to find those networks

01:06:35.010 --> 01:06:35.860
and disrupt them.

01:06:36.520 --> 01:06:37.543
I'm a hopeful gal.

01:06:38.490 --> 01:06:40.954
What the best thing about
the intelligence community

01:06:40.954 --> 01:06:44.710
over my tenure and the
national security community

01:06:44.710 --> 01:06:49.513
is that we have a history
of taking intractable,

01:06:50.500 --> 01:06:53.590
unsolvable problems and solving them.

01:06:53.590 --> 01:06:55.990
In the 1950s, the notion of

01:06:55.990 --> 01:06:59.320
being able to see what
the Soviets was doing

01:06:59.320 --> 01:07:00.650
was beyond our kin,

01:07:00.650 --> 01:07:02.700
and now we have almost transparency.

01:07:02.700 --> 01:07:05.340
So I think it's about
resetting our mindset,

01:07:05.340 --> 01:07:06.410
getting resources

01:07:06.410 --> 01:07:08.510
and being able to understand
where the information is

01:07:08.510 --> 01:07:11.470
and go after and prosecute networks

01:07:11.490 --> 01:07:13.240
that are different from the networks

01:07:13.240 --> 01:07:14.687
that we've seen here before.

01:07:15.685 --> 01:07:17.993
- [Scotty] Any other
thoughts from the panelists?

01:07:18.120 --> 01:07:22.390
- [Bob] So I'd say, losing
72,000, if that was the number--

01:07:22.390 --> 01:07:23.510
- Yep, last year.

01:07:23.510 --> 01:07:24.718
- Of our citizens

01:07:24.718 --> 01:07:28.340
is something that will gather
the attention of the nation,

01:07:28.340 --> 01:07:31.710
I would hope, depending
on how that is promulgated

01:07:31.710 --> 01:07:32.883
and how it's moved out.

01:07:33.260 --> 01:07:34.820
The other part of this is, we think about,

01:07:34.820 --> 01:07:37.723
even in the context of drawing
a parallel and CT threat,

01:07:37.883 --> 01:07:40.160
the foundation of the CT issues

01:07:40.350 --> 01:07:41.650
have to do with ungoverned space,

01:07:41.650 --> 01:07:42.800
they have to do with economics,

01:07:42.800 --> 01:07:45.190
they have to do with
the inability to employ

01:07:45.540 --> 01:07:48.945
a bulge of youth that don't have jobs,

01:07:48.945 --> 01:07:50.380
that don't have a sense of a future.

01:07:50.380 --> 01:07:52.791
So when you think about
transnational crime,

01:07:52.791 --> 01:07:56.103
and the opioids and other
things along those lines,

01:07:56.380 --> 01:08:00.460
I think what the IC can do is
can help illuminate it and,

01:08:00.460 --> 01:08:01.670
much kind of like we talk about

01:08:01.670 --> 01:08:04.960
in the context of what the military

01:08:04.960 --> 01:08:07.730
can do on some of the CT issues is

01:08:07.730 --> 01:08:09.623
we can buy you space and time.

01:08:11.035 --> 01:08:13.150
We can mitigate to a degree the threat,

01:08:13.150 --> 01:08:18.060
but we can't solve it, and
that really is whole of nations

01:08:18.120 --> 01:08:19.700
to look at transnational crimes,

01:08:19.700 --> 01:08:20.880
so the military can get after it

01:08:20.880 --> 01:08:24.284
because we have capacity,
we have the technology,

01:08:24.284 --> 01:08:26.887
and we solve these kinds of problems,

01:08:26.887 --> 01:08:30.290
but really it's binding space and time.

01:08:30.290 --> 01:08:33.040
It will not get down to the
fundamental issue of drug abuse

01:08:33.040 --> 01:08:35.113
and or criminality.

01:08:36.260 --> 01:08:39.223
- So I would offer to
those really good thoughts,

01:08:40.680 --> 01:08:43.283
first of all, the idea of,
there is some threshold.

01:08:43.340 --> 01:08:45.540
There are existential
threats to our nation,

01:08:45.663 --> 01:08:49.070
and we're a global power, and
we will certainly have areas

01:08:49.070 --> 01:08:51.330
where we're going to have
to address the opiate crisis

01:08:51.330 --> 01:08:54.223
and other type of different
crises that we will face.

01:08:54.390 --> 01:08:56.311
The idea of two oceans protecting
our nation well went out

01:08:56.311 --> 01:08:58.403
seven decades ago.

01:08:58.810 --> 01:09:00.760
But if we do think about the threshold,

01:09:00.760 --> 01:09:03.520
if the two in the
strategic power competition

01:09:03.520 --> 01:09:04.870
are so critical, it's really

01:09:04.870 --> 01:09:06.050
because of the criticality

01:09:06.050 --> 01:09:08.360
of the nature of their existential threat

01:09:08.360 --> 01:09:09.820
to he United States

01:09:09.820 --> 01:09:13.773
and their ability to be able
to cause and do us harm.

01:09:15.004 --> 01:09:15.927
- If I can also add,

01:09:15.927 --> 01:09:19.610
I'm gonna steal a sheep from
General Ashley's talking points

01:09:19.610 --> 01:09:21.373
earlier, and it's on coalitions.

01:09:22.844 --> 01:09:25.520
I had an opportunity to
engage recently with Southcom

01:09:25.520 --> 01:09:26.500
with their two there,

01:09:26.500 --> 01:09:28.600
and also with some
South American partners.

01:09:28.600 --> 01:09:31.338
There's some tremendous
capacity access capability

01:09:31.338 --> 01:09:35.600
that they have, and for us,
this is a zero sum game.

01:09:35.600 --> 01:09:38.179
As we look to implement the NDS,

01:09:38.179 --> 01:09:43.179
we are going to have to shift
some of our capabilities

01:09:44.400 --> 01:09:49.070
and assets, but we have strong
coalition partners that,

01:09:49.070 --> 01:09:51.787
if I look at this from a
sum of the parts equation,

01:09:51.787 --> 01:09:54.910
bringing them in, being
interoperable, integrating,

01:09:54.910 --> 01:09:57.691
sharing intelligence, sharing capacity,

01:09:57.691 --> 01:09:59.340
there's a tremendous amount

01:09:59.340 --> 01:10:03.053
that we can collectively do
together to get after this.

01:10:03.390 --> 01:10:04.240
- And if I could,

01:10:04.280 --> 01:10:06.100
having been down to see
Admiral Studeman recently,

01:10:06.100 --> 01:10:08.300
and I'm sure Miss Bingen
would echo this is,

01:10:08.460 --> 01:10:10.610
because they're not one of the COCOMs

01:10:10.610 --> 01:10:13.700
that has lamellate resources,

01:10:13.700 --> 01:10:15.954
they have been incredibly innovative

01:10:15.954 --> 01:10:17.680
in the assets they have.

01:10:17.680 --> 01:10:19.310
So they're doing a lot
to solve the problems

01:10:19.310 --> 01:10:21.260
internal to the resources they do have.

01:10:22.103 --> 01:10:23.012
- Good point.

01:10:23.012 --> 01:10:23.979
- [Scotty] Great, I think we'll move

01:10:23.979 --> 01:10:25.853
into the individual questions.

01:10:25.905 --> 01:10:27.803
Director Cardillo, you're first.

01:10:29.050 --> 01:10:32.510
Please discuss how NGA is buying,

01:10:32.510 --> 01:10:35.480
and I'll add using
commercial satellite imagery,

01:10:35.480 --> 01:10:38.863
and what are the changes
planned to attract new vendors?

01:10:41.187 --> 01:10:44.480
- It refers to the
reality that I described.

01:10:44.480 --> 01:10:45.830
The government at one point

01:10:45.850 --> 01:10:50.467
had near exclusive access
to space, and that changed,

01:10:50.467 --> 01:10:51.723
and I already made the point

01:10:51.723 --> 01:10:55.240
that I think it changed in a
very good way economically,

01:10:55.240 --> 01:10:57.223
socially, culturally, et cetera.

01:10:57.770 --> 01:10:59.843
What NGA's doing now, and by the way,

01:11:00.200 --> 01:11:03.150
this question is more with my
functional management hat on.

01:11:04.057 --> 01:11:08.077
With that hat on, I'm mandated to seek

01:11:09.470 --> 01:11:12.320
as much capability as possible

01:11:12.320 --> 01:11:15.560
to answer the prioritized
needs of those that we serve,

01:11:15.560 --> 01:11:18.966
and so one way to do that most efficiently

01:11:18.966 --> 01:11:22.930
is to leverage commercial capabilities

01:11:22.930 --> 01:11:24.423
to the extent that we can.

01:11:25.140 --> 01:11:28.069
And the idea, the philosophy, then, is,

01:11:28.069 --> 01:11:31.280
if we can grow that commercial foundation,

01:11:31.280 --> 01:11:35.853
if we can acquire or gain access
to that growing capability,

01:11:36.111 --> 01:11:40.920
the government can then focus its assets

01:11:40.920 --> 01:11:44.223
on more exquisite or more
exclusive capabilities.

01:11:44.710 --> 01:11:47.490
And so we have been a long term partner

01:11:47.530 --> 01:11:51.763
of the commercial imagery
industry that continues to grow,

01:11:52.090 --> 01:11:55.150
and we're an equally long term,

01:11:55.150 --> 01:11:58.630
or even a longer term partner
with my mission partner

01:11:58.630 --> 01:12:00.700
at the National Reconnaissance Office.

01:12:00.700 --> 01:12:05.700
So those two capabilities have
always been complementary,

01:12:05.957 --> 01:12:10.040
the opportunity we have now
though is to, if you will,

01:12:10.040 --> 01:12:11.730
move up that capability scale

01:12:11.730 --> 01:12:14.130
on top of a growing
commercial imagery industry.

01:12:16.880 --> 01:12:19.163
- [Scotty] Okay, the next one goes to,

01:12:19.527 --> 01:12:21.551
I think it's a combination
of General Ashley

01:12:21.551 --> 01:12:22.760
and The Honorable Bingen,

01:12:22.760 --> 01:12:25.060
so you may want to dive
into this one as well.

01:12:25.230 --> 01:12:26.500
Given our limited resources,

01:12:26.500 --> 01:12:28.910
how do we maintain all source competency

01:12:29.260 --> 01:12:31.260
across many regions and disciplines

01:12:31.260 --> 01:12:34.493
beyond just the two plus
three slash four plus one?

01:12:35.219 --> 01:12:36.693
General Ashley, over to you.

01:12:37.523 --> 01:12:40.106
(Sue laughing)

01:12:40.110 --> 01:12:41.310
- Such an easy question.

01:12:43.357 --> 01:12:45.370
It becomes a risk calculus.

01:12:45.370 --> 01:12:47.720
So you go back to the
National Defense Strategy,

01:12:47.720 --> 01:12:49.090
and General Nakasone alluded this,

01:12:49.090 --> 01:12:50.740
what are the existential threats?

01:12:50.860 --> 01:12:54.340
So even as a nation,
given all the hard work

01:12:54.340 --> 01:12:55.650
and all of us in part

01:12:56.190 --> 01:12:58.830
with the CT fighter
over the last 17 years,

01:12:58.830 --> 01:13:02.010
we see emergence of
great power competition

01:13:02.010 --> 01:13:04.350
which is gonna cause us, to a degree,

01:13:04.350 --> 01:13:07.396
to rebalance part of those resources

01:13:07.396 --> 01:13:09.893
to be able to look at China and Russia,

01:13:09.893 --> 01:13:11.290
and, to a lesser degree,

01:13:11.290 --> 01:13:13.940
where Iran and North Korea
and violet extremists are.

01:13:14.010 --> 01:13:15.910
We've gotten very very good

01:13:16.490 --> 01:13:19.737
at how we work against violent
extremist organizations.

01:13:19.737 --> 01:13:22.418
It is incredible what
has been accomplished

01:13:22.418 --> 01:13:24.713
over the last couple of decades.

01:13:25.330 --> 01:13:27.690
Very interesting where we were on 9/11

01:13:27.690 --> 01:13:31.170
having seen part of that task force

01:13:31.200 --> 01:13:33.150
that has dealt with that
over the last 17 years,

01:13:33.150 --> 01:13:35.462
where it was in terms of capability.

01:13:35.462 --> 01:13:39.613
And the chief talks about this,
as do other senior leaders,

01:13:39.900 --> 01:13:44.830
our ability to engage in
major combat operations

01:13:45.490 --> 01:13:47.910
is something that is growing
that we're having to build.

01:13:47.910 --> 01:13:49.560
But when you look at those resources,

01:13:49.560 --> 01:13:53.223
it really is, there's something of a cap.

01:13:53.230 --> 01:13:56.230
And so, we gotta look at what
is the real existential threat

01:13:56.620 --> 01:14:01.620
that, if you don't succeed on day one,

01:14:02.014 --> 01:14:03.623
you don't get a day two.

01:14:04.690 --> 01:14:06.380
And so, for us as we look at that,

01:14:06.380 --> 01:14:08.553
China and Russia are those kinds of,

01:14:08.628 --> 01:14:11.270
if you don't win on day one,
you may not get a day two.

01:14:11.270 --> 01:14:13.420
So we're just having to
look at how we reallocate.

01:14:13.420 --> 01:14:14.720
The other part of that is,

01:14:14.760 --> 01:14:17.196
how do we build that expertise
that we had within the IC

01:14:17.196 --> 01:14:19.600
that really understood
how the Soviets thought

01:14:20.010 --> 01:14:21.590
and other nation states

01:14:21.690 --> 01:14:24.740
as they got divested into other areas.

01:14:24.740 --> 01:14:26.280
So part of what we're working on now is,

01:14:26.280 --> 01:14:28.539
how do we build those Russia SMEs,

01:14:28.539 --> 01:14:32.687
how do we build depth into
the bench that we have

01:14:32.687 --> 01:14:35.683
for some of those existential
nuclear threats because,

01:14:35.860 --> 01:14:36.693
at the end of the day,

01:14:36.693 --> 01:14:39.230
is understanding that decision calculus

01:14:39.347 --> 01:14:43.280
and how they are going to
put that strategy in place

01:14:43.420 --> 01:14:47.063
that's gonna give decision
advantage to our assimilators.

01:14:50.350 --> 01:14:51.750
- I'll jump on that as well.

01:14:53.210 --> 01:14:55.660
If everything's a priority,
nothing's a priority.

01:14:55.670 --> 01:14:57.973
So we do have to think
in terms of priorities,

01:14:58.040 --> 01:15:00.473
but I'll echo what some
have said already here.

01:15:02.250 --> 01:15:04.470
We need to be thinking broader

01:15:04.470 --> 01:15:07.670
than just what an
intelligence community person

01:15:07.670 --> 01:15:10.510
or US government or US person can provide

01:15:10.720 --> 01:15:12.100
in terms of duty to warn,

01:15:12.100 --> 01:15:15.453
in terms of preventing the
next strategic surprise.

01:15:15.490 --> 01:15:18.100
We have phenomenal a ta
shays around the world,

01:15:18.100 --> 01:15:21.160
we have phenomenal
coalition partners, again,

01:15:21.160 --> 01:15:24.513
the bench just doesn't have to
be filled by US folks alone,

01:15:24.513 --> 01:15:28.633
and open source, which General
Ashley mentioned earlier.

01:15:28.725 --> 01:15:30.820
Tremendous amount of open source data,

01:15:30.820 --> 01:15:33.560
but then we've gotta have
the big data, the analytics,

01:15:33.560 --> 01:15:35.310
the machine learning, the AI pieces

01:15:35.370 --> 01:15:37.620
to make sure that that
information is useful

01:15:37.690 --> 01:15:40.823
to get after those strategic
surprise kind of challenges.

01:15:42.223 --> 01:15:45.540
- Yeah, so I'll pick up

01:15:45.540 --> 01:15:46.473
where Kari ended.

01:15:46.860 --> 01:15:51.830
I'm a hopeless romantic about
what data can do for it.

01:15:51.830 --> 01:15:54.573
We have to be able to
command it, it is abundant.

01:15:55.513 --> 01:15:58.880
I can imagine the ability for machines

01:15:58.880 --> 01:16:02.240
to help us find patterns
in massive amounts of data

01:16:02.240 --> 01:16:04.023
that we cat here to four.

01:16:04.410 --> 01:16:07.800
We have a tremendous
intelligence community,

01:16:07.800 --> 01:16:11.380
but we have many officers
who are doing manual things

01:16:11.380 --> 01:16:13.283
that don't have to be doing those.

01:16:13.560 --> 01:16:17.513
I think if you have enough
data you can infer intent.

01:16:17.928 --> 01:16:20.710
So if you ask me what I
intend to do this weekend,

01:16:20.710 --> 01:16:21.770
I may give you one answer.

01:16:21.770 --> 01:16:24.720
If you look at all the
data of my easy pass

01:16:24.720 --> 01:16:27.120
on what I do every
weekend and where I drive,

01:16:27.120 --> 01:16:28.840
you are going to probably know

01:16:28.840 --> 01:16:30.290
what I'm actually going to do,

01:16:30.290 --> 01:16:31.480
perhaps even more.

01:16:31.480 --> 01:16:35.220
One, I believe that we will, we must,

01:16:35.220 --> 01:16:36.500
we can get to the point,

01:16:36.500 --> 01:16:40.283
that we're able to see much
more of the world's happenings,

01:16:41.150 --> 01:16:45.890
to pick up on my panel's
comments about imagination.

01:16:45.890 --> 01:16:48.880
I think, however, it will
test us to not be stodgy

01:16:48.880 --> 01:16:52.823
about what out understanding
of those activities is.

01:16:54.048 --> 01:16:56.210
I said when I started the technology

01:16:56.210 --> 01:17:01.210
in ubiquitous connectivity
changes what people can do.

01:17:01.450 --> 01:17:04.380
We cannot afford to be
assessing the activities we see

01:17:04.380 --> 01:17:06.840
with a mindset that we have.

01:17:06.840 --> 01:17:09.983
So many of us, I'm old,

01:17:10.024 --> 01:17:13.250
so I remember the Soviet production model.

01:17:13.250 --> 01:17:17.680
That is not the way production
has to happen anymore.

01:17:17.680 --> 01:17:20.363
With advanced manufacturing,
new materials,

01:17:20.580 --> 01:17:23.100
acquisition of knowledge,
ubiquitous computing,

01:17:23.100 --> 01:17:25.143
things can happen so much faster.

01:17:25.300 --> 01:17:29.413
In a world of cyber where
things can be influenced,

01:17:30.270 --> 01:17:32.130
and so what you see in terms of election

01:17:32.130 --> 01:17:35.220
is not in fact what's happening in that.

01:17:35.220 --> 01:17:39.490
So even as we have the ability
to see the world more clearly

01:17:39.490 --> 01:17:43.470
when data and machine learning
comes into play, we as humans

01:17:43.470 --> 01:17:47.220
are going to have to open out minds again

01:17:48.960 --> 01:17:52.984
to look at what we're seeing
and assess it differently

01:17:52.984 --> 01:17:55.823
than against some pattern that we knew,

01:17:56.280 --> 01:17:59.633
because this is as different
a world as I have ever seen.

01:18:01.284 --> 01:18:02.363
- [Scotty] Thank you.

01:18:02.450 --> 01:18:03.283
Bob, go ahead.

01:18:03.283 --> 01:18:05.243
- Yeah, just one more
followup on that one.

01:18:05.750 --> 01:18:08.380
I had a senior leader a couple
years ago ask me a question,

01:18:08.380 --> 01:18:11.940
and he said, how do you
detect the faint signals,

01:18:11.940 --> 01:18:16.940
the winds of war, that conflict
is coming on a global scale?

01:18:17.347 --> 01:18:20.300
And I went, I'll get back
with you close of business,

01:18:20.300 --> 01:18:22.050
I will have that answer for you.

01:18:22.530 --> 01:18:24.480
So think about the data
and all the information

01:18:24.480 --> 01:18:25.333
that's out there.

01:18:25.890 --> 01:18:26.850
And then, even though

01:18:26.850 --> 01:18:30.020
as the defense intelligence
agency across the dime

01:18:30.020 --> 01:18:32.513
we have to go very very deep into the M,

01:18:33.010 --> 01:18:34.810
I have to be cognizant of what's happening

01:18:34.810 --> 01:18:36.753
in the D, the I, and the E.

01:18:37.490 --> 01:18:41.140
So imagine it's July 1914

01:18:41.565 --> 01:18:44.115
and you had all the tools
that are out there today.

01:18:45.466 --> 01:18:46.723
What was knowable?

01:18:47.530 --> 01:18:50.073
Could you have avoided World War I?

01:18:50.636 --> 01:18:54.653
Was that information
discernible, or was it hidden?

01:18:55.250 --> 01:18:56.680
And so, I think as we start looking

01:18:56.680 --> 01:18:58.820
at how we aggregate
those kinds of insights

01:18:58.820 --> 01:19:01.350
on a global scale, you start
watching what's happening

01:19:01.350 --> 01:19:05.620
in various nations across
diplomatic information, military,

01:19:05.620 --> 01:19:09.920
and economic moves, and a lot
of times that information,

01:19:09.920 --> 01:19:11.480
because of how you file contracts,

01:19:11.480 --> 01:19:14.883
how you work with other nation
states, is discoverable.

01:19:15.384 --> 01:19:16.523
And so you start looking

01:19:16.523 --> 01:19:19.923
and you start getting an idea
of moves that may happen,

01:19:20.840 --> 01:19:24.763
and you get left to that, in time,

01:19:24.890 --> 01:19:26.440
to give you decision advantage.

01:19:27.050 --> 01:19:31.202
And in some cases, and the
Honorable Gordon alluded to this,

01:19:31.202 --> 01:19:35.010
I think it was a book that
General Thomas had recommended.

01:19:35.010 --> 01:19:37.410
And they had an acronym,
it was called the HPPO.

01:19:37.410 --> 01:19:40.530
It was the Highly Paid
Professional Opinion,

01:19:40.530 --> 01:19:42.303
in other words, kind of the CEO.

01:19:42.572 --> 01:19:44.420
And, over time, it was showing

01:19:44.420 --> 01:19:45.610
that the artificial intelligence

01:19:45.610 --> 01:19:47.840
actually had better decision capability

01:19:48.000 --> 01:19:53.000
than some of those senior
leaders and their intuition.

01:19:53.530 --> 01:19:55.030
So it's an interesting dynamic

01:19:55.290 --> 01:20:00.007
to the degree that we can
take and balance what we see

01:20:00.007 --> 01:20:02.810
aggregated by artificial intelligence,

01:20:02.810 --> 01:20:06.013
but at the same time, still
applying good judgment.

01:20:07.767 --> 01:20:10.417
- [Scotty] Okay, this one
is for the Director of DIA,

01:20:10.569 --> 01:20:12.235
and--
- I just answered a question.

01:20:12.235 --> 01:20:14.860
- [Scotty] I'm gonna ask you
to channel the Joint Staff J2

01:20:14.860 --> 01:20:16.560
and get somewhat operational here.

01:20:17.030 --> 01:20:19.220
Can you describe how the
Russian threat has evolved

01:20:19.220 --> 01:20:21.135
in the Middle East and
Europe over the past year--

01:20:21.135 --> 01:20:21.968
- [Sue] Oh my goodness.

01:20:21.968 --> 01:20:24.020
- [Scotty] And what are
you anticipating into 2019?

01:20:24.710 --> 01:20:28.913
- I will give you part of that answer.

01:20:29.051 --> 01:20:31.280
The good thing is it allows us to see

01:20:31.280 --> 01:20:33.173
how they're using some of their kit.

01:20:34.420 --> 01:20:37.110
One of the things we've
watched closely over the last

01:20:39.030 --> 01:20:42.923
decade plus is how they
have learned from us,

01:20:43.920 --> 01:20:47.050
how they've organized
around our lessons learned.

01:20:47.050 --> 01:20:50.380
They went to a BTC centric
because we went BTC centric

01:20:50.780 --> 01:20:52.623
and that's how we did the CT fight.

01:20:53.340 --> 01:20:54.640
And then, as we started to think our way

01:20:54.640 --> 01:20:56.610
through great power competition,

01:20:56.610 --> 01:20:58.640
the Army started asking its questions of,

01:20:58.640 --> 01:21:01.440
I probably need to think about
how I'd fight a division.

01:21:02.078 --> 01:21:04.790
So the Russians started
thinking about reorganizing of,

01:21:04.790 --> 01:21:06.163
how do I fight a division?

01:21:06.300 --> 01:21:08.903
At the same time, they're
going through modernization.

01:21:08.970 --> 01:21:11.110
Some of that modernization
is new equipment,

01:21:11.110 --> 01:21:12.210
some of that modernization

01:21:12.210 --> 01:21:14.570
is nothing more than adding better optics

01:21:14.570 --> 01:21:19.430
and weapons to existing frames
of things that they have.

01:21:19.430 --> 01:21:21.080
So what we've been able to do

01:21:21.420 --> 01:21:24.350
is get a sense of some
of the new equipment,

01:21:24.350 --> 01:21:26.703
some of the capability
as they've deployed it,

01:21:27.110 --> 01:21:29.210
obviously what they're doing on the ground

01:21:29.240 --> 01:21:32.120
is not indicative of
major combat operations,

01:21:32.120 --> 01:21:33.830
and so we watch them closely

01:21:33.830 --> 01:21:36.680
when they do exercise Zapad or Vostok,

01:21:36.680 --> 01:21:39.340
which has just completed,
so that we can have insights

01:21:39.340 --> 01:21:41.663
into how they're evolving their doctrine,

01:21:41.970 --> 01:21:45.453
how they do mobilization,
how they alert forces.

01:21:45.819 --> 01:21:48.370
'cause the one thing that the chairman

01:21:48.500 --> 01:21:52.526
will challenge us to do and
challenge the Joint Staff J2 is,

01:21:52.526 --> 01:21:55.100
I'm not concerned about numbers.

01:21:55.100 --> 01:21:56.280
Don't tell me they have six of these,

01:21:56.280 --> 01:21:57.963
seven of those, 12 of those.

01:21:58.820 --> 01:21:59.970
Tell me how I beat 'em.

01:22:00.900 --> 01:22:02.583
Tell me how they're gonna fight it.

01:22:04.430 --> 01:22:06.060
How are they gonna operationalize it?

01:22:06.060 --> 01:22:07.560
Which goes back to my comment,

01:22:07.630 --> 01:22:08.870
what's the context in which

01:22:08.870 --> 01:22:10.520
they're gonna use that technology

01:22:10.850 --> 01:22:13.000
and how are they gonna
deploy their forces.

01:22:13.170 --> 01:22:14.793
- [Scotty] Anyone else wanna pile on that?

01:22:15.003 --> 01:22:17.254
- I think that General Ashley

01:22:17.254 --> 01:22:19.263
has a number of really good points.

01:22:19.350 --> 01:22:21.632
We watch Vostok with
great interest this year.

01:22:21.632 --> 01:22:23.410
We saw what they were
doing in the Eastern Med,

01:22:23.410 --> 01:22:27.965
we saw what they were doing
as far east as Vladivostok,

01:22:27.965 --> 01:22:30.965
and I think we took a number
of different lessons from that.

01:22:32.040 --> 01:22:36.920
This is not a 10 foot
giant, this is a nation

01:22:36.920 --> 01:22:40.700
that is trying to put together
combined arms capabilities.

01:22:40.700 --> 01:22:44.373
And so I think, at least from
the perspective that we had,

01:22:45.270 --> 01:22:47.520
we saw that they were very interested

01:22:47.520 --> 01:22:48.870
in being able to project their power.

01:22:48.870 --> 01:22:51.450
They were very interested in
looking at different partners

01:22:51.450 --> 01:22:54.140
in terms of how do they
operate in the future together.

01:22:54.140 --> 01:22:56.180
And for us it was like, okay, good.

01:22:56.180 --> 01:22:57.863
We understand that better now.

01:22:58.360 --> 01:22:59.320
But I would also offer

01:22:59.320 --> 01:23:01.720
that we continue to watch
around the entire region.

01:23:01.720 --> 01:23:06.720
What is their interest growing
into time here with Syria?

01:23:07.080 --> 01:23:09.310
What is their interest
in places like Tajikastan

01:23:09.310 --> 01:23:12.047
and the northern elements of Afghanistan,

01:23:12.047 --> 01:23:14.159
and how are they gonna
operate in the future?

01:23:14.159 --> 01:23:16.460
We take that with great seriousness

01:23:16.460 --> 01:23:18.020
and watch it very very carefully.

01:23:18.020 --> 01:23:21.913
- In many ways, I've had it
described as a global spoiler.

01:23:22.621 --> 01:23:24.287
And what their presence look into this

01:23:24.287 --> 01:23:26.050
in the great power competition,

01:23:26.050 --> 01:23:27.603
he wants a seat at the table.

01:23:27.990 --> 01:23:30.223
And so, where they can be that spoiler,

01:23:30.580 --> 01:23:34.150
where they can displace us, be more agile,

01:23:34.150 --> 01:23:35.660
whether it's in military cells

01:23:35.660 --> 01:23:38.053
or other aspects of
relationships with nations.

01:23:38.400 --> 01:23:41.070
As you see with China in
terms of economic underpinning

01:23:41.070 --> 01:23:43.173
and support, they will attempt to do that.

01:23:43.720 --> 01:23:45.480
- But I also think, I
would also offer to that

01:23:45.480 --> 01:23:47.450
that very heartened over the past week

01:23:47.450 --> 01:23:49.340
to see our partners and ourselves

01:23:49.340 --> 01:23:51.194
call out the brazen behavior

01:23:51.194 --> 01:23:54.514
and the ability for us to call
out what the GRA was doing

01:23:54.514 --> 01:23:57.633
so brazenly in places
like the Netherlands.

01:23:57.890 --> 01:23:59.100
I'm sure that,

01:23:59.100 --> 01:24:01.940
from the perspective of
what collective we did,

01:24:01.940 --> 01:24:04.350
that has an impact on
their abilities there,

01:24:04.350 --> 01:24:06.050
and very very pleased to see that.

01:24:06.070 --> 01:24:07.750
- [Bob] So the ability to illuminate that

01:24:07.750 --> 01:24:08.900
is absolutely critical.

01:24:10.310 --> 01:24:11.660
- [Scotty] Okay, thank you.

01:24:11.795 --> 01:24:13.763
This one is for General Nakasone.

01:24:14.080 --> 01:24:14.980
Two part question.

01:24:15.780 --> 01:24:17.970
What do you think is the cyber threat

01:24:17.970 --> 01:24:21.333
to tactical mission command
systems, that's part one.

01:24:22.170 --> 01:24:23.360
Would these systems

01:24:23.360 --> 01:24:27.210
really be the targets of the
threat cyber capabilities

01:24:27.210 --> 01:24:29.560
during conflicts, or do you think

01:24:29.870 --> 01:24:32.570
threats would focus their cyber attacks

01:24:32.670 --> 01:24:35.193
on more operational or strategic targets?

01:24:35.320 --> 01:24:37.173
- So the second question, yes.

01:24:37.700 --> 01:24:38.980
They'll focus on anything

01:24:38.980 --> 01:24:42.033
that they're looking to have an impact on.

01:24:42.080 --> 01:24:44.023
Strategic, tactical, operational.

01:24:44.060 --> 01:24:44.893
We're seeing this

01:24:44.893 --> 01:24:47.963
in terms of some of our
adversaries' capabilities.

01:24:48.100 --> 01:24:51.160
But in terms of what we're
looking at for our own forces,

01:24:51.160 --> 01:24:53.177
brigade combat teams, take
a look at what we're doing

01:24:53.177 --> 01:24:55.160
in places like the
National Training Center,

01:24:55.160 --> 01:24:58.770
where we are looking to
get ahead of an adversary

01:24:58.770 --> 01:25:01.033
that is leveraging social media,

01:25:01.036 --> 01:25:04.420
or an adversary that
is attempting to impact

01:25:04.420 --> 01:25:06.853
the infrastructure
within a town or a city.

01:25:07.155 --> 01:25:08.900
Our challenge, I would offer,

01:25:08.900 --> 01:25:11.740
is not necessarily gonna
be the capabilities,

01:25:11.740 --> 01:25:13.500
but being within the capability

01:25:13.500 --> 01:25:15.963
of the decision loop of our adversary.

01:25:16.185 --> 01:25:20.363
Can se recognize, can we
react, can we respond?

01:25:20.780 --> 01:25:22.520
Can we have an impact on an adversary

01:25:22.520 --> 01:25:23.950
that's thinking so rapidly

01:25:24.290 --> 01:25:27.513
in such a shortened amount of time?

01:25:27.991 --> 01:25:31.510
I think we can, and what
I would offer is that,

01:25:31.510 --> 01:25:33.840
what I've seen to date is that

01:25:33.840 --> 01:25:35.850
these exercises that we've been able to do

01:25:35.850 --> 01:25:38.450
over a period of the past 18 months

01:25:39.040 --> 01:25:42.770
have taught our forces a
tremendous amount of wherewithal

01:25:42.770 --> 01:25:45.593
in terms of how do we
do the collection plan.

01:25:45.830 --> 01:25:48.230
How do we call for the right capabilities

01:25:48.230 --> 01:25:49.993
to be brought to the tactical edge?

01:25:50.230 --> 01:25:51.150
Most importantly,

01:25:51.150 --> 01:25:55.900
how do our commanders
visualize this virtual space

01:25:55.900 --> 01:25:57.150
that they're gonna have to talk about?

01:25:57.150 --> 01:26:00.000
And so this is what I
would offer General Berrier

01:26:00.230 --> 01:26:02.080
for us in the tactical realm

01:26:02.080 --> 01:26:04.463
something that will be
most important to us.

01:26:04.840 --> 01:26:06.843
- [Scotty] Thank you, anyone
else wanna pile on that?

01:26:08.070 --> 01:26:11.453
General Nakasone, that really
gets you another question.

01:26:11.840 --> 01:26:12.673
Sorry about that.

01:26:12.673 --> 01:26:13.940
- I feel like General Ashley.

01:26:14.380 --> 01:26:16.760
- [Scotty] If our
enemies seek to attack us

01:26:16.760 --> 01:26:19.263
below the threshold of military activity,

01:26:19.510 --> 01:26:22.170
do our rules of engagement
allow us to counter this threat

01:26:22.170 --> 01:26:24.843
in cyber, both offensively
and defensively?

01:26:25.500 --> 01:26:26.400
- I think they do.

01:26:26.400 --> 01:26:29.160
I think that we've made
tremendous progress

01:26:29.160 --> 01:26:31.900
in terms of how do we think
about, how do we enable,

01:26:31.900 --> 01:26:33.063
again, our partners,

01:26:33.270 --> 01:26:35.290
partners like the Department
of Homeland Security,

01:26:35.290 --> 01:26:36.590
the Federal Bureau of Investigation,

01:26:36.590 --> 01:26:37.840
other government partners

01:26:38.420 --> 01:26:41.160
to ensure that such things as
our critical infrastructure

01:26:41.160 --> 01:26:42.083
is well protected.

01:26:42.520 --> 01:26:45.264
And in terms of what we are
gonna do against our adversaries

01:26:45.264 --> 01:26:48.490
to act, that comes down to the
things that we've been doing

01:26:48.490 --> 01:26:49.370
for many many years.

01:26:49.370 --> 01:26:50.203
Whether or not

01:26:50.598 --> 01:26:52.720
it's computer network exploitation

01:26:52.720 --> 01:26:54.550
or it's cyberspace
intelligence, surveillance,

01:26:54.550 --> 01:26:55.500
and reconnaissance,

01:26:55.610 --> 01:26:58.000
the ability to understand
what our adversaries are doing

01:26:58.000 --> 01:27:01.260
are important things that we
have done for quite some time,

01:27:01.260 --> 01:27:03.410
and one of the things I'd
offer that will provide

01:27:03.410 --> 01:27:04.490
is that illumination

01:27:04.490 --> 01:27:07.246
to ensure that we don't
lose the imagination

01:27:07.246 --> 01:27:10.473
of what 11th of September,
the future may look like.

01:27:11.208 --> 01:27:12.287
- Thank you.

01:27:12.480 --> 01:27:15.140
The next question is really
directed at the Army,

01:27:15.140 --> 01:27:17.900
so I will take a shot at it
and then throw a lifeline

01:27:17.900 --> 01:27:20.573
to my Army partners, or
anybody else on the panel.

01:27:20.940 --> 01:27:22.691
The question is, how can the JROC,

01:27:22.691 --> 01:27:24.420
AROC, PPBS processes

01:27:24.670 --> 01:27:27.098
sustain a culture of persistent innovation

01:27:27.098 --> 01:27:30.083
against our adversaries
at the speed of relevance?

01:27:30.692 --> 01:27:32.603
If you were across the hall

01:27:32.603 --> 01:27:35.253
in the Army futures command discussion,

01:27:35.530 --> 01:27:37.780
they would probably tell
you that those processes

01:27:37.780 --> 01:27:39.493
have not been all that effective.

01:27:39.850 --> 01:27:41.470
And if you look at what we've
been doing the last 17 years

01:27:41.470 --> 01:27:43.293
and what the panel talked about,

01:27:43.590 --> 01:27:45.940
the reason why we stood up future command

01:27:45.940 --> 01:27:47.920
was so that we could get
ahead of these processes

01:27:47.920 --> 01:27:50.733
and be quicker, faster, and more relevant.

01:27:50.790 --> 01:27:52.483
And I think General Murray,

01:27:52.720 --> 01:27:56.050
the Commander of Futures
Command down in Austin, Texas

01:27:56.050 --> 01:27:56.950
is gonna take this on,

01:27:56.950 --> 01:28:00.303
and I believe that our processes
in the Army will change.

01:28:00.770 --> 01:28:04.003
How those changes will take
effect remains to be seen,

01:28:04.240 --> 01:28:06.720
but the goal of this with
our secretary and our chief

01:28:06.720 --> 01:28:08.288
is to go much much faster

01:28:08.288 --> 01:28:10.700
to develop the kinds of
capabilities that we need

01:28:10.700 --> 01:28:11.533
in the future.

01:28:11.533 --> 01:28:13.080
If anybody has anything to add on that,

01:28:13.080 --> 01:28:14.180
I would appreciate it.

01:28:14.427 --> 01:28:17.890
- Years ago when General
Schumacher was the Chief of Staff

01:28:17.890 --> 01:28:19.963
of the Army, so many of you always heard,

01:28:20.030 --> 01:28:21.963
think creatively outside the box.

01:28:22.490 --> 01:28:24.780
General Schumacher had an
interesting turn of that phrase,

01:28:24.780 --> 01:28:27.523
which was to think
creatively inside the box.

01:28:27.910 --> 01:28:29.117
So when I think about the JROC

01:28:29.117 --> 01:28:31.093
and that entire process,

01:28:31.980 --> 01:28:32.813
think about the people

01:28:32.813 --> 01:28:34.900
that are successful at making that work.

01:28:34.900 --> 01:28:37.913
Those are the ones that have
actually mastered that process.

01:28:38.170 --> 01:28:40.220
So the more that you
understand how that operates,

01:28:40.220 --> 01:28:42.340
the more you can operate inside that box

01:28:42.340 --> 01:28:44.313
with certain degree of speed.

01:28:44.605 --> 01:28:46.070
So when you go back and say, well,

01:28:46.070 --> 01:28:47.650
we need the 5,000 series all changed,

01:28:47.650 --> 01:28:48.940
I don't know if it's necessarily that

01:28:48.940 --> 01:28:51.944
as much as it is allowing
us to educate ourselves

01:28:51.944 --> 01:28:54.340
and make sure we understand,
I know what the rules are

01:28:54.340 --> 01:28:56.260
and I can actually work
with a degree of speed

01:28:56.260 --> 01:28:57.573
inside those rules.

01:28:57.820 --> 01:28:59.855
The other thing is a
bit of a culture change

01:28:59.855 --> 01:29:04.855
within probably DOD, at least
from my time on the Army G2,

01:29:05.647 --> 01:29:09.401
and I think this comes with
the advent of what we've had

01:29:09.401 --> 01:29:13.620
resonate from our overseers in congress,

01:29:13.620 --> 01:29:16.320
which is, don't feel like
you gotta build it yourself.

01:29:16.860 --> 01:29:18.460
'cause industry is ahead of you,

01:29:19.140 --> 01:29:23.516
they probably have an 80%
solution, and to embrace that

01:29:23.516 --> 01:29:25.800
and understand that we
can probably figure out

01:29:25.800 --> 01:29:28.600
what's the last 20%, and
that's gonna solve our problem.

01:29:28.830 --> 01:29:31.010
So, in many ways, instead
of going back under the lab

01:29:31.010 --> 01:29:33.660
and thinking that we've
gotta build this fro scratch,

01:29:34.010 --> 01:29:37.670
we just have to be aggressive
with industry, entice them

01:29:37.670 --> 01:29:40.370
to be interested in the
problem we're trying to solve,

01:29:40.510 --> 01:29:42.217
and chances are you're gonna
find about an 80% solution

01:29:42.217 --> 01:29:44.137
and then you gotta work on that last 20%,

01:29:44.137 --> 01:29:46.363
and I think it's gonna
get you there quicker.

01:29:47.054 --> 01:29:50.101
- So I think persistent innovation for me

01:29:50.101 --> 01:29:53.197
is working with a series
of different partners.

01:29:53.197 --> 01:29:55.625
What we have found very very effective

01:29:55.625 --> 01:29:57.860
at places like the
National Security Agency

01:29:57.860 --> 01:29:59.283
and US Cyber Command is,

01:29:59.680 --> 01:30:02.270
find the partnerships
that really present you

01:30:02.270 --> 01:30:04.226
a number of different ideas

01:30:04.226 --> 01:30:05.950
that you probably may not get

01:30:05.950 --> 01:30:08.560
out of the processes that you
described, General Berrier.

01:30:08.560 --> 01:30:10.210
And so, whether or not
it's been the artist

01:30:10.210 --> 01:30:13.840
formerly known as DIUX, or
it's defense digital services,

01:30:13.840 --> 01:30:16.460
or it's a number of initiatives we've had

01:30:16.460 --> 01:30:18.994
with agencies like DARPA.

01:30:18.994 --> 01:30:21.803
This has provided us great context

01:30:21.803 --> 01:30:24.788
to speed our innovation cycle because,

01:30:24.788 --> 01:30:28.890
as General Ashley mentioned,
all the great ideas

01:30:28.890 --> 01:30:31.110
don't necessarily originate
within government,

01:30:31.110 --> 01:30:33.370
and being able to
leverage those great ideas

01:30:33.470 --> 01:30:35.120
is one of the things we're
always looking to do,

01:30:35.120 --> 01:30:37.010
and I think that these
partnerships have been

01:30:37.010 --> 01:30:38.360
very very effective for us.

01:30:38.530 --> 01:30:40.333
- One thing I'd add to this is,

01:30:40.484 --> 01:30:42.080
so one of the projects we have

01:30:42.080 --> 01:30:45.180
is to reset the modern integrated database

01:30:45.180 --> 01:30:47.352
for how we look at
foundational intelligence.

01:30:47.352 --> 01:30:50.759
And so, for us, that's also
reaching out to our partners

01:30:50.759 --> 01:30:54.143
because it may be it's
not just US industry,

01:30:54.143 --> 01:30:57.990
it could be a partner nation
has solved that problem.

01:30:57.990 --> 01:31:02.453
And so we've gotta cast a
net that's beyond the US.

01:31:02.880 --> 01:31:03.713
- [Sue] So, Scotty,

01:31:03.713 --> 01:31:05.230
I don't think I can
answer an Army question

01:31:05.230 --> 01:31:08.117
being the daughter of
a naval officer, but--

01:31:08.180 --> 01:31:09.630
- [Scotty] Take a stab at it.

01:31:10.420 --> 01:31:13.720
- Just to add, I think
there are two elements

01:31:15.870 --> 01:31:18.340
from the intelligence
community's perspective,

01:31:18.340 --> 01:31:19.830
'cause we have some of
the same challenges.

01:31:19.830 --> 01:31:22.130
Number one is clarity
about what you wanna do,

01:31:24.100 --> 01:31:25.660
which is different from clarity

01:31:25.660 --> 01:31:27.160
about the thing you wanna buy.

01:31:27.888 --> 01:31:30.873
We talk to our partners all the time,

01:31:31.806 --> 01:31:35.120
and whether those partners
are in the private sector

01:31:35.120 --> 01:31:37.870
or whether those partners
are in the acquisition field.

01:31:37.926 --> 01:31:41.090
If you are clear about what you want,

01:31:41.090 --> 01:31:45.173
there's a route to achieve it legally,

01:31:46.045 --> 01:31:48.143
and if you talk to our partners,

01:31:48.200 --> 01:31:50.850
if you are open to different
ways of accomplishing it

01:31:51.220 --> 01:31:52.983
you will find a way there.

01:31:53.229 --> 01:31:54.507
So that's one.

01:31:54.507 --> 01:31:57.320
And the second is, I really
do think we need to focus

01:31:57.320 --> 01:31:59.973
on the notion of scalability
a bit more than we do.

01:32:01.040 --> 01:32:05.313
We are spending a lot of
money on one-off ideas.

01:32:05.799 --> 01:32:10.799
I love that, but we pursue
things that can be used locally

01:32:12.900 --> 01:32:17.900
and we are investing in
things that will never scale.

01:32:19.628 --> 01:32:21.860
And so, one of my challenges

01:32:21.860 --> 01:32:23.360
would be to everyone who is thinking

01:32:23.360 --> 01:32:26.090
about what you wanna do,
think about doing it at scale,

01:32:26.090 --> 01:32:28.970
and we will actually get faster

01:32:29.241 --> 01:32:32.010
because you'll be able to
change once you have it

01:32:32.010 --> 01:32:35.293
much more than if you just have
a bunch of little solutions.

01:32:36.058 --> 01:32:38.660
- [Scotty] I'd like to
follow up on that question

01:32:38.660 --> 01:32:40.400
about persistent innovation,

01:32:40.400 --> 01:32:42.190
and it's really a talent
management question.

01:32:42.190 --> 01:32:43.940
We'll start with Director Cardillo.

01:32:44.270 --> 01:32:46.420
What is your organization doing

01:32:46.420 --> 01:32:48.030
to attract the kind of talent

01:32:48.030 --> 01:32:53.030
that would drive towards
persistent innovation,

01:32:53.270 --> 01:32:55.305
maybe some disruptive
thought in the organization

01:32:55.305 --> 01:32:57.815
that brings about new
actions and activities

01:32:57.815 --> 01:33:00.400
to help get us to the next step ahead?

01:33:00.400 --> 01:33:01.233
- Sure.

01:33:01.568 --> 01:33:05.320
It's probably our most
important area of emphasis,

01:33:05.320 --> 01:33:06.153
quite frankly.

01:33:06.153 --> 01:33:10.024
If we can't, not just refresh and retrain

01:33:10.024 --> 01:33:13.150
and grow the team we have,

01:33:13.150 --> 01:33:17.940
if we're not attracting the
brightest to come join the team,

01:33:17.940 --> 01:33:22.940
then our future value
proposition grows dimmer.

01:33:23.160 --> 01:33:27.220
I've been in this seat for four years now,

01:33:27.220 --> 01:33:32.130
we've literally quadrupled
our intern program

01:33:32.130 --> 01:33:35.704
in order to make sure that we're
at least availing ourselves

01:33:35.704 --> 01:33:40.704
enough of those bright minds
across academic institutions.

01:33:42.391 --> 01:33:44.823
Great return on that investment.

01:33:45.070 --> 01:33:47.740
90% of the interns that we bring in

01:33:47.823 --> 01:33:52.823
are offered full time employment,
90% of those that accept.

01:33:52.950 --> 01:33:55.423
So it's a great feeder.

01:33:55.423 --> 01:34:00.423
Beyond that, because I don't
have the uniform positions

01:34:01.790 --> 01:34:02.833
that I used to have,

01:34:03.060 --> 01:34:05.593
this was one of the
downsides of the 9/11 surge,

01:34:07.005 --> 01:34:11.200
40% of my civilian workforce
has prior military experience.

01:34:11.200 --> 01:34:15.067
So tapping that expertise

01:34:15.067 --> 01:34:17.313
and experience is also very important.

01:34:17.680 --> 01:34:19.143
And then I'll just say, too,

01:34:19.827 --> 01:34:21.397
as much as we're emphasizing
STEM, and we are,

01:34:21.397 --> 01:34:26.180
and data science, and we
have a chief data scientist

01:34:26.242 --> 01:34:31.242
that we hired from San Francisco,
and he still lives there.

01:34:33.840 --> 01:34:36.850
He's on the plane a lot,
but the reason he's there

01:34:36.850 --> 01:34:39.060
is because he taps into a broader pool

01:34:39.060 --> 01:34:41.890
that we now access through
him and his service.

01:34:41.890 --> 01:34:44.423
So we're thinking, and
I would just say, too,

01:34:44.639 --> 01:34:47.040
an area that we'd be interested in

01:34:47.040 --> 01:34:52.040
is some maturation of
federal personnel systems

01:34:53.750 --> 01:34:55.054
in which we could get better

01:34:55.054 --> 01:34:57.290
at welcoming some of these teammates

01:34:57.290 --> 01:34:58.503
to come in for mission.

01:34:59.159 --> 01:35:02.710
New PhDs who might be heading
to the Googles and the Apples,

01:35:02.710 --> 01:35:05.540
give them an opportunity
to help secure the nation

01:35:05.540 --> 01:35:07.260
and our interest for a bit of time,

01:35:07.260 --> 01:35:09.023
go to industry, and then come back.

01:35:09.450 --> 01:35:11.340
And it's just too hard right now.

01:35:11.340 --> 01:35:14.160
That's not an NGA issue,
that's a US government issue

01:35:14.160 --> 01:35:15.450
that we all need to work through,

01:35:15.450 --> 01:35:17.820
but we're working on all fronts

01:35:17.820 --> 01:35:20.170
to make sure we're
refreshing that talent pool.

01:35:21.360 --> 01:35:22.440
- [Scotty] Anyone else
wanna pile on there?

01:35:22.440 --> 01:35:23.640
- Yeah, a couple things.

01:35:24.350 --> 01:35:26.730
My predecessor Vince Stewart
started an innovation center

01:35:26.730 --> 01:35:29.090
inside DA to look at some of the internal,

01:35:29.090 --> 01:35:31.433
smaller-scale problems to solve.

01:35:31.629 --> 01:35:34.750
Our chief information
officer has a pod concept

01:35:34.750 --> 01:35:36.880
where they bring teams together
to look at solved problems

01:35:36.880 --> 01:35:38.173
through the use of pods.

01:35:38.930 --> 01:35:40.687
We do have interns that come in as well,

01:35:40.687 --> 01:35:42.100
and we wanna cultivate that

01:35:42.100 --> 01:35:44.603
as they come back to join the IC.

01:35:44.677 --> 01:35:45.940
But the other thing that we looked at

01:35:45.940 --> 01:35:47.350
on the STEM side of the house, also,

01:35:47.350 --> 01:35:50.880
is the competitiveness
of commercial business

01:35:50.880 --> 01:35:55.760
in terms of raising what
we can afford to target

01:35:55.760 --> 01:35:59.190
some of the particular skillsets
to be able to have bonuses

01:35:59.190 --> 01:36:01.310
and things along those
lines to bring on the board.

01:36:01.310 --> 01:36:04.210
And the other is a
analytic data team concept

01:36:04.210 --> 01:36:06.300
which we started this year is,

01:36:06.300 --> 01:36:10.120
how do we couple traditional
analysts to data scientists,

01:36:10.120 --> 01:36:13.690
engineers, people that kind of
work those kinds of problems

01:36:13.690 --> 01:36:14.840
to bring them together.

01:36:14.900 --> 01:36:16.500
Kind of the generation I grew up on

01:36:16.500 --> 01:36:19.430
is you had the app that
was on your computer

01:36:19.440 --> 01:36:22.770
and you did whatever you
bought when you bought the app,

01:36:22.770 --> 01:36:24.430
and the idea between the ADT

01:36:24.830 --> 01:36:27.360
is that you literally have
the data scientists there

01:36:27.360 --> 01:36:30.180
with the analyst
manipulating the information

01:36:30.180 --> 01:36:31.920
and writing the code, where, in fact,

01:36:31.920 --> 01:36:35.653
that team in many ways becomes the app.

01:36:36.969 --> 01:36:38.704
- So if I mentioned

01:36:38.704 --> 01:36:41.984
that augmenting intelligence with machines

01:36:41.984 --> 01:36:44.620
is one of the intelligence community's

01:36:44.620 --> 01:36:48.760
and the department's preeminent challenges

01:36:48.760 --> 01:36:50.173
and priority areas,

01:36:50.299 --> 01:36:53.863
coupled with it is the right
trusted agile workforce.

01:36:56.480 --> 01:36:58.240
We've talked about
security clearance reform

01:36:58.240 --> 01:37:01.720
'cause that slows the intake of talent,

01:37:01.720 --> 01:37:02.713
but I think one of the things

01:37:02.713 --> 01:37:04.900
that we're gonna have
to really wrestle with

01:37:04.900 --> 01:37:09.900
is what both Robert and Bob mentioned is,

01:37:10.730 --> 01:37:13.290
I've had a career that spanned 38 years,

01:37:13.290 --> 01:37:14.123
all inside the government,

01:37:14.123 --> 01:37:15.790
and I don't think that's
the way it's gonna go

01:37:15.790 --> 01:37:16.623
in the future.

01:37:16.623 --> 01:37:20.300
Not only because that's
not who we're attracting,

01:37:20.300 --> 01:37:23.066
but it also isn't the way
we wanna develop expertise

01:37:23.066 --> 01:37:24.160
necessarily.

01:37:24.160 --> 01:37:25.846
And so, how do we set up a system

01:37:25.846 --> 01:37:29.817
that has Robert's people in school

01:37:29.817 --> 01:37:32.190
that are getting a
clearance early so that,

01:37:32.190 --> 01:37:34.260
when they're ready to come and join us,

01:37:34.260 --> 01:37:36.363
they're right into the workforce?

01:37:36.560 --> 01:37:39.210
I would say the best first five years

01:37:39.210 --> 01:37:43.380
of any STEM student's career

01:37:43.380 --> 01:37:45.280
would be spent with the US government.

01:37:45.734 --> 01:37:48.120
I think this community
provides more opportunity,

01:37:48.120 --> 01:37:50.770
more challenges for those first five years

01:37:51.070 --> 01:37:52.810
than the Googles or the Amazons

01:37:52.810 --> 01:37:56.020
or the anyone else can offer,
but at about five years

01:37:56.020 --> 01:37:58.400
they're ready to keep
advancing their craft

01:37:58.400 --> 01:38:02.180
and we tend to do more
toward the bureaucracy.

01:38:02.180 --> 01:38:03.420
I say we need to find ways

01:38:03.420 --> 01:38:06.130
to get them out of that
five years and come back.

01:38:06.130 --> 01:38:07.790
So what we are going to have to do

01:38:07.790 --> 01:38:09.830
is make it much more fluid,

01:38:09.830 --> 01:38:11.840
but I think there are
opportunities for partnership,

01:38:11.840 --> 01:38:16.840
because, in fact, I think the
collective needs each other,

01:38:17.330 --> 01:38:20.197
and there is not enough if we
are competing with one another

01:38:20.197 --> 01:38:24.150
and we need to think about
how we advance these skills

01:38:24.150 --> 01:38:24.983
within us.

01:38:24.983 --> 01:38:27.500
And I think that includes
our international partners

01:38:27.860 --> 01:38:29.360
as well, and universities.

01:38:29.360 --> 01:38:31.520
We just have to think more completely

01:38:32.110 --> 01:38:34.760
about how we are going
to develop expertise

01:38:34.760 --> 01:38:39.340
and make this very exciting
discipline of national security

01:38:40.200 --> 01:38:42.670
more attractive, more
available for the talent

01:38:42.670 --> 01:38:43.770
that's coming through.

01:38:44.590 --> 01:38:46.903
- And, if I can just echo that too.

01:38:46.934 --> 01:38:49.993
I don't want to lose sight
of what we can offer.

01:38:50.810 --> 01:38:53.860
You have such talented
engineers, mathematicians,

01:38:53.860 --> 01:38:57.233
economists, data scientists,
computer visualization folks.

01:38:57.640 --> 01:39:01.350
They can go off and earn their
millions in Silicon Valley

01:39:01.350 --> 01:39:03.250
and we can't compete with that salary.

01:39:03.453 --> 01:39:06.920
But what we can do is provide challenging,

01:39:06.920 --> 01:39:09.063
fun national security problems.

01:39:09.282 --> 01:39:12.980
Getting into the classified
world also opens your eyes,

01:39:12.980 --> 01:39:14.880
but I would hope that
we'd be tugging a bit

01:39:14.880 --> 01:39:16.870
at their patriotic blood,

01:39:16.870 --> 01:39:18.620
but we have some immense challenges

01:39:18.920 --> 01:39:21.473
that we could definitely
use that talent for.

01:39:22.370 --> 01:39:23.290
- [Scotty] Okay, we're gonna jump back

01:39:23.290 --> 01:39:26.210
into some pretty interesting
threat spectrums here.

01:39:26.210 --> 01:39:28.727
This one has to do with
unmanned aerial systems,

01:39:28.727 --> 01:39:32.140
and the question is, after
the drone attack and explosion

01:39:32.140 --> 01:39:34.000
in Venezuela, how real is the threat

01:39:34.000 --> 01:39:36.913
of unmanned aerial systems
to US national security,

01:39:37.550 --> 01:39:41.540
and what is the IC doing to
invest in counter UAS systems,

01:39:41.540 --> 01:39:43.213
and I'll make that a jump ball.

01:39:44.590 --> 01:39:45.423
- [Sue] Very.

01:39:46.180 --> 01:39:47.013
- Serious.

01:39:48.327 --> 01:39:49.473
- Concern.

01:39:50.780 --> 01:39:51.863
- Strategery.

01:39:52.015 --> 01:39:53.550
(laughter)

01:39:53.550 --> 01:39:54.383
Nah, I'm sorry.

01:39:55.470 --> 01:39:57.477
I've been wanting to do
that for like five panels.

01:39:57.477 --> 01:39:59.899
- That was awesome.

01:39:59.899 --> 01:40:02.100
- So I'll jump a little bit more.

01:40:02.100 --> 01:40:03.153
Obviously concerned.

01:40:03.512 --> 01:40:07.420
When you look at what's taken
place in the combat zones,

01:40:07.420 --> 01:40:09.043
what took place in Venezuela,

01:40:10.974 --> 01:40:13.350
what started gets back to
the imagination conversation.

01:40:13.350 --> 01:40:17.523
What started off as a commercial
toy, a commercial toy.

01:40:17.590 --> 01:40:20.163
So how do we discipline
ourselves to do that?

01:40:20.690 --> 01:40:25.690
My son has a job as a graphic
engineer and videographer,

01:40:26.124 --> 01:40:29.120
and one of the tasks he had was to film

01:40:30.360 --> 01:40:32.073
the renovations to a golf course.

01:40:32.588 --> 01:40:34.950
The good thing is it was a
level of discipline to do that.

01:40:34.950 --> 01:40:37.570
He actually had to get
certified with the FAA

01:40:38.320 --> 01:40:41.020
to fly that quad over the golf course

01:40:41.030 --> 01:40:42.330
to be able to do all that.

01:40:42.870 --> 01:40:45.603
So he's a good, law abiding citizen.

01:40:46.380 --> 01:40:50.040
But from a domestic
standpoint, in law enforcement,

01:40:50.040 --> 01:40:51.480
all kinds of aspects of that,

01:40:51.480 --> 01:40:55.110
but it just gets into the
creativity of how you can imagine

01:40:56.490 --> 01:40:59.373
what may seem the most
innocuous kind of technology.

01:40:59.690 --> 01:41:02.680
And so there's a lot of
things from an R&D standpoint

01:41:03.090 --> 01:41:04.860
which is probably better
fit for another panel

01:41:04.860 --> 01:41:07.890
to look at how we counter UASs.

01:41:07.890 --> 01:41:10.290
There's a lot of technology
that's been fielded,

01:41:10.305 --> 01:41:13.661
and as we saw these kinds of
things come out, the good thing

01:41:13.661 --> 01:41:16.950
was industry came out with
lots of different ideas,

01:41:16.950 --> 01:41:19.010
and we started putting lots of
different things in the field

01:41:19.010 --> 01:41:20.210
to see the best of breed

01:41:20.520 --> 01:41:22.493
so we could embrace the best of breed,

01:41:22.580 --> 01:41:23.780
and that's something that we're teaming

01:41:23.780 --> 01:41:26.500
with some of our other partners as well,

01:41:26.500 --> 01:41:27.680
and how we get that in their hands,

01:41:27.680 --> 01:41:29.560
'cause they're gonna be vulnerable

01:41:29.560 --> 01:41:31.743
to those kinds of attacks.

01:41:32.000 --> 01:41:34.835
But the other part is, what's the next UAS

01:41:34.835 --> 01:41:37.640
kind of device that is coming out?

01:41:37.640 --> 01:41:38.473
- [Paul] Why aren't we concerned about it

01:41:38.473 --> 01:41:42.523
being on the ground or in
the maritime or in space?

01:41:42.615 --> 01:41:44.630
We focus right now on UASs,

01:41:44.630 --> 01:41:47.954
but think of the impact it could have

01:41:47.954 --> 01:41:50.483
in any of those other domains as well.

01:41:51.660 --> 01:41:54.460
This is something that
is going to be central

01:41:54.460 --> 01:41:55.580
to what we're going to be looking at

01:41:55.580 --> 01:41:56.980
for many many years to come.

01:41:57.470 --> 01:42:02.470
- And just picking up on that
point, in the digital domain.

01:42:06.270 --> 01:42:11.270
If there were 300,000 drones,
UASs hovering over our head

01:42:11.590 --> 01:42:14.723
doing nothing, we would take it seriously.

01:42:15.126 --> 01:42:19.490
If you think about out
adversary's presence

01:42:19.560 --> 01:42:23.630
in the digital domain, it's equivalent,

01:42:23.630 --> 01:42:26.223
we just can't see it.

01:42:26.850 --> 01:42:29.280
And so I think this is going
to be our great challenge,

01:42:29.280 --> 01:42:31.420
and it's below the threshold threat.

01:42:31.420 --> 01:42:32.663
When does it cross?

01:42:33.130 --> 01:42:36.300
But the UASs, in addition
to the threat they posed

01:42:36.300 --> 01:42:38.550
in Venezuela, they're just
adding to another layer

01:42:38.550 --> 01:42:39.523
of transparency.

01:42:40.020 --> 01:42:41.840
We were talking about the expansionism

01:42:41.840 --> 01:42:45.273
of Russia and China in terms
of shared space worldwide.

01:42:46.890 --> 01:42:50.880
Those sovereign pieces of
territory that were our bases

01:42:50.880 --> 01:42:54.830
and installations are now
right next door to another

01:42:55.550 --> 01:43:00.150
who would fly a toy over our compound

01:43:00.150 --> 01:43:01.500
to be able to see what we're doing.

01:43:01.500 --> 01:43:04.260
So I think the question is, in addition,

01:43:04.260 --> 01:43:07.730
how are you gonna counter
it, how are you gonna exist

01:43:07.730 --> 01:43:10.723
in a world where everything is seen?

01:43:12.820 --> 01:43:15.520
- And then back to the
acquisition discussion earlier.

01:43:16.070 --> 01:43:19.943
I can't wait for a year-long
AOA requirements documents,

01:43:19.943 --> 01:43:23.445
R&D process, develop
test, operational test.

01:43:23.445 --> 01:43:26.010
We gotta think in terms
of what can you get me.

01:43:26.010 --> 01:43:27.640
It may only be the 70% solution,

01:43:27.640 --> 01:43:29.160
but what can you get me next month?

01:43:29.160 --> 01:43:31.160
What can you get me three
to six months down the road?

01:43:31.160 --> 01:43:33.630
And then just do that agile,
iterative development process,

01:43:33.630 --> 01:43:35.633
development fielding process.

01:43:35.709 --> 01:43:38.100
- But we've already
seen how this has moved

01:43:38.100 --> 01:43:40.923
into its next phase, swarming technology.

01:43:41.103 --> 01:43:45.363
I'm able to shoot down one,
but what if it's hundreds,

01:43:46.659 --> 01:43:50.210
and driven by AI to allows
each of them to operate

01:43:50.210 --> 01:43:51.043
independently?

01:43:51.550 --> 01:43:54.053
So the challenge is only
getting more complex.

01:43:54.702 --> 01:43:57.290
- [Scotty] Okay, we've
got about 15 minutes left

01:43:57.290 --> 01:43:59.820
and I've got one remaining question.

01:43:59.820 --> 01:44:00.653
It's for the panel.

01:44:00.653 --> 01:44:03.130
We're coming to a crescendo,
you can feel the swell here.

01:44:03.130 --> 01:44:07.757
So here it is, and, Sue,
because you're closest to me,

01:44:07.757 --> 01:44:08.590
we're gonna start with you.

01:44:08.590 --> 01:44:09.423
- All right, I'm ready.

01:44:09.423 --> 01:44:10.689
- [Scotty] What does the
operational threat environment

01:44:10.689 --> 01:44:13.760
look like in 2030, and, in your view,

01:44:13.760 --> 01:44:15.630
what must your agency or entity

01:44:15.700 --> 01:44:18.550
in the intelligence community
do to protect the homeland,

01:44:18.610 --> 01:44:20.413
secure US interest abroad,

01:44:20.720 --> 01:44:23.590
and support our war fighters
in future conflicts?

01:44:23.590 --> 01:44:25.390
- Well, 2030's about a minute away,

01:44:25.390 --> 01:44:29.180
so I think we've spent the whole
afternoon talking about it.

01:44:29.180 --> 01:44:34.180
I'd add two things that I,
one thing that we meant to.

01:44:36.108 --> 01:44:39.313
One, bio technologies,

01:44:39.319 --> 01:44:44.319
I think we are just beginning
to really understand

01:44:47.420 --> 01:44:50.290
that technology and the
potential use of that

01:44:50.290 --> 01:44:51.150
by our adversaries.

01:44:51.150 --> 01:44:53.577
And I'm not just talking
about biological warfare

01:44:53.577 --> 01:44:55.980
in the classic sense,
I'm just talking about

01:44:55.980 --> 01:44:57.580
the manipulation of biologics,

01:44:57.580 --> 01:45:02.580
and I think that is
increasingly available and

01:45:07.470 --> 01:45:09.552
will test us in terms of our response

01:45:09.552 --> 01:45:13.510
because of its difficulty in
terms of being able to see it.

01:45:13.510 --> 01:45:15.893
And then the second is more generally.

01:45:17.482 --> 01:45:20.020
We've been talking about
counter proliferation

01:45:20.020 --> 01:45:24.163
for my whole lifetime,
or certainly since 1989.

01:45:24.257 --> 01:45:27.800
I think you have to just imagine that,

01:45:27.800 --> 01:45:30.883
with the use of chemical warfare,

01:45:31.170 --> 01:45:34.160
with the spread of nuclear capability,

01:45:34.160 --> 01:45:36.280
with the connectivity of the world,

01:45:36.280 --> 01:45:40.873
that weapons of mass
destruction, proliferation,

01:45:40.873 --> 01:45:44.830
different kinds of threats
than global thermonuclear war,

01:45:44.830 --> 01:45:47.273
but that proliferation
will come back around.

01:45:48.780 --> 01:45:50.370
What are we doing to prepare for it?

01:45:50.370 --> 01:45:52.220
I think we've mentioned that as well.

01:45:52.675 --> 01:45:57.675
Clarity, insight, left of action.

01:45:58.760 --> 01:46:03.121
Ability to understand the
intentions, not just the actions,

01:46:03.121 --> 01:46:08.121
of our adversaries, competitors,

01:46:09.758 --> 01:46:13.000
to be able to see geopolitics differently

01:46:13.000 --> 01:46:16.300
in a connected world, and the
economic drivers of activity,

01:46:16.300 --> 01:46:20.317
to be able to understand
the bilateral relationships

01:46:20.317 --> 01:46:23.223
that are not static,

01:46:23.760 --> 01:46:27.623
because people's interests
align and then don't,

01:46:28.019 --> 01:46:32.490
are all the elements of intelligence

01:46:32.908 --> 01:46:37.660
in order to be able to inform,
as I say, our policy makers,

01:46:37.660 --> 01:46:40.280
our war fighters, and our private sectors

01:46:40.280 --> 01:46:42.170
so that we can make decisions

01:46:43.900 --> 01:46:46.763
in order to act before we are forced to.

01:46:47.606 --> 01:46:49.760
- So I would add three to that.

01:46:49.760 --> 01:46:50.980
First of all, I believe that

01:46:50.980 --> 01:46:52.760
our threats will be much more virtualized.

01:46:52.760 --> 01:46:55.999
We talked about UASs, but
when I think about the threats

01:46:55.999 --> 01:46:58.190
in terms of a virtualized threat,

01:46:58.190 --> 01:47:00.548
I think of the bot armies of the future

01:47:00.548 --> 01:47:03.110
that will have an impact in terms of

01:47:03.340 --> 01:47:08.340
their ability to be a
player in this future space.

01:47:09.070 --> 01:47:12.223
The second thing is it will
be increasingly about data,

01:47:12.700 --> 01:47:13.770
more so than it is today.

01:47:13.770 --> 01:47:16.090
How do we store the amounts
of data, how do we ensure

01:47:16.090 --> 01:47:18.660
that we can get at the right
data, and most importantly,

01:47:18.660 --> 01:47:20.193
how do we protect that data,

01:47:20.410 --> 01:47:23.393
that data that is our lifeblood
to what we're going to do?

01:47:23.750 --> 01:47:25.640
And then I will also say, by 2030,

01:47:25.640 --> 01:47:27.740
our nation will have a quantum capability.

01:47:28.100 --> 01:47:31.744
That quantum capability will
provide us really a leap ahead

01:47:31.744 --> 01:47:34.760
in terms of what we'll be
able to to across our economy,

01:47:34.760 --> 01:47:37.653
across our national security
and across our future.

01:47:38.120 --> 01:47:40.230
How is our agency getting after that?

01:47:40.230 --> 01:47:41.063
Really three ways.

01:47:41.063 --> 01:47:43.603
First of all, our
priority focus on talent,

01:47:43.603 --> 01:47:46.660
ensuring that we continue
to hire the best people

01:47:46.910 --> 01:47:48.635
that are reflective of our society,

01:47:48.635 --> 01:47:51.180
that can continue to
make those large leaps

01:47:52.255 --> 01:47:55.180
in terms of what Deputy
Director Gordon talked about

01:47:55.180 --> 01:47:57.810
in terms of solving
those toughest problems

01:47:57.810 --> 01:47:59.060
that our nation takes on.

01:47:59.220 --> 01:48:01.830
Secondly is the fact that
we are focusing increasingly

01:48:01.830 --> 01:48:03.930
on different targets, targets

01:48:03.930 --> 01:48:05.660
that have an existential
threat to our nation

01:48:05.660 --> 01:48:06.800
that are obviously

01:48:06.800 --> 01:48:11.238
in the nesting of our
great power competition

01:48:11.238 --> 01:48:13.340
that our nation is ongoing today

01:48:13.360 --> 01:48:16.067
and will be of great
concern to us in the future.

01:48:16.067 --> 01:48:20.650
And the final thing is our
commitment to being first

01:48:20.650 --> 01:48:22.203
with technology and innovation.

01:48:22.450 --> 01:48:25.663
That's something that our agency
has done for 60-plus years,

01:48:25.907 --> 01:48:29.020
and whether it's been in
places like Cabul or Baghdad,

01:48:29.020 --> 01:48:31.140
or in places like the United States,

01:48:31.140 --> 01:48:33.070
we will continue to be very very focused

01:48:33.070 --> 01:48:34.670
on delivering that
technology and innovation

01:48:34.670 --> 01:48:35.503
for the nations.

01:48:36.450 --> 01:48:37.283
- [Scotty] Kari?

01:48:37.643 --> 01:48:39.693
- Yeah, I'm gonna hit the
five that I started out with.

01:48:40.090 --> 01:48:42.763
We need to move faster at
scale than the other guys,

01:48:43.374 --> 01:48:45.090
concentrating our investments

01:48:45.090 --> 01:48:47.863
in the resilient survivable
agile architectures,

01:48:47.879 --> 01:48:50.213
being effective in contested environments,

01:48:50.270 --> 01:48:53.663
placing some bets on some
game changing capabilities.

01:48:53.860 --> 01:48:56.620
We need to modernize
those manual data rich

01:48:57.240 --> 01:49:00.073
but labor intensive
processes to get faster.

01:49:00.230 --> 01:49:02.040
We need to elevate our defense security.

01:49:02.040 --> 01:49:03.950
This is not just an
administrative function

01:49:03.950 --> 01:49:05.310
but as an actual mission function

01:49:05.310 --> 01:49:08.837
looking holistically cradle
to grave at our technology

01:49:08.837 --> 01:49:10.746
and our trusted workforce,

01:49:10.746 --> 01:49:13.393
deepening our alliances
in our foreign partners,

01:49:13.570 --> 01:49:15.820
and better integrating
across our enterprises

01:49:15.820 --> 01:49:20.090
within defense and intelligence,
but also defense community,

01:49:20.090 --> 01:49:22.390
intelligence community,
and with our partners.

01:49:23.630 --> 01:49:24.960
- So I think we hit most of them already.

01:49:24.960 --> 01:49:25.793
For us, it will be looking at

01:49:25.793 --> 01:49:27.657
how do we sense the operation environment

01:49:29.001 --> 01:49:31.113
so that we're not surprised.

01:49:31.990 --> 01:49:34.230
Not surprised by the
moves of a nation state,

01:49:34.230 --> 01:49:36.680
we're not surprised by the
emergence of a technology

01:49:36.680 --> 01:49:38.163
that we did not anticipate,

01:49:39.956 --> 01:49:42.906
and one of those emerging
disruptive kinds of technologies.

01:49:43.810 --> 01:49:45.000
Going back to Miss Gordon's comment,

01:49:45.000 --> 01:49:47.410
I think a lot of times
we get very automatically

01:49:47.410 --> 01:49:48.673
focused on nukes.

01:49:49.366 --> 01:49:51.180
Rightfully so in a lot of ways,

01:49:51.180 --> 01:49:54.680
but you go back and think
about the threshold for use

01:49:55.302 --> 01:49:58.070
and kind of what happens in the gray zone,

01:49:58.070 --> 01:49:59.030
and what were some of those things.

01:49:59.030 --> 01:50:00.270
What we saw in the Novichoks

01:50:00.270 --> 01:50:01.820
with the use and the script-all

01:50:02.700 --> 01:50:05.500
case of a nerve agent or other
kinds of biological agent.

01:50:05.500 --> 01:50:09.093
So the threshold for nukes
I think is pretty high,

01:50:09.379 --> 01:50:11.777
because somebody says, if you
look at the last 500 years

01:50:11.777 --> 01:50:13.700
and talk about great power competition,

01:50:13.700 --> 01:50:16.460
we've not really had it over the period

01:50:16.460 --> 01:50:20.706
of the end of World War II,
and a lot of people say, well,

01:50:20.706 --> 01:50:22.730
what came out of Bretton Woods

01:50:22.730 --> 01:50:24.530
was the International Monetary Fund,

01:50:24.630 --> 01:50:28.797
World Trade Organization,
The United Nations, NATO, and

01:50:33.530 --> 01:50:38.113
nukes were held by more
than just the United States.

01:50:39.440 --> 01:50:41.760
So it played out in
proxies in other locations,

01:50:41.760 --> 01:50:42.610
in other ways.

01:50:42.610 --> 01:50:44.233
So I think looking at the things

01:50:44.233 --> 01:50:45.860
that are below the threshold of nukes

01:50:45.860 --> 01:50:48.140
in terms of threats is something
we have to stay focused on

01:50:48.140 --> 01:50:51.233
because the possibility
of them being used.

01:50:52.340 --> 01:50:55.930
And we really gotta stay
focused on what has existed

01:50:55.930 --> 01:50:57.590
since Bretton Woods at
the end of World War II,

01:50:57.590 --> 01:50:59.520
which is the current rules-based order

01:51:00.099 --> 01:51:03.893
that has allowed a lot of
nations to be prosperous.

01:51:04.030 --> 01:51:06.770
And that is threatened
by a couple of nations

01:51:06.770 --> 01:51:11.770
whose value system is very
inconsistent with our own

01:51:11.934 --> 01:51:13.925
and like mind nations,

01:51:13.925 --> 01:51:16.840
and so we gotta stay
ahead of how we ensure

01:51:16.840 --> 01:51:18.410
that we illuminate that threat

01:51:18.970 --> 01:51:21.164
or that risk to other partner nations

01:51:21.164 --> 01:51:23.683
as they make decisions
on who they align with.

01:51:25.990 --> 01:51:28.397
- So to take a little different tact

01:51:28.397 --> 01:51:31.500
since you guys have covered
just about everything,

01:51:31.500 --> 01:51:34.950
but I have to say, our track record here

01:51:36.050 --> 01:51:40.053
of doing 12-year projections
of threats is not that good.

01:51:41.803 --> 01:51:43.420
These were the four best answers

01:51:43.420 --> 01:51:45.920
I've ever heard about 12-year projections.

01:51:45.920 --> 01:51:47.470
I guess what I mean by that is,

01:51:47.485 --> 01:51:50.323
you're right, we're
gonna do the best we can

01:51:50.323 --> 01:51:54.423
to identify these emerging threats.

01:51:54.497 --> 01:51:59.497
I am prepared to be not
100% correct in 2030,

01:52:01.040 --> 01:52:03.752
and so I think Kari hit most of it.

01:52:03.752 --> 01:52:07.498
We gotta be ready for the unexpected,

01:52:07.498 --> 01:52:12.380
don't wanna be surprised,
but how quickly can we react,

01:52:12.380 --> 01:52:16.383
how quickly can we reengage
and re partner and reimagine?

01:52:16.890 --> 01:52:20.410
And so, to me, I think the
more we build that into our DNA

01:52:20.410 --> 01:52:21.610
the better off we'll be.

01:52:22.801 --> 01:52:26.293
- Like in a fantasy football draft,

01:52:26.748 --> 01:52:30.708
when you pick first you
get to come back around

01:52:30.708 --> 01:52:33.503
and pick again, 'cause a
lot of good players come.

01:52:33.720 --> 01:52:36.408
I'm gonna come back to
what I wish I'd said.

01:52:36.408 --> 01:52:38.703
I also think you have to press advantage.

01:52:40.321 --> 01:52:43.560
Press advantage in space,
press advantage in talent,

01:52:43.560 --> 01:52:47.513
press advantage in compute,
press advantage in imagination.

01:52:47.893 --> 01:52:50.520
Press advantage in innovation,

01:52:50.520 --> 01:52:53.470
press advantage in an open
society, press advantage

01:52:53.470 --> 01:52:56.830
in the private sector that
is a great engine for intent,

01:52:56.830 --> 01:53:00.450
press advantage in the US
government's willingness

01:53:00.450 --> 01:53:03.380
to put money into R&D to do it.

01:53:03.380 --> 01:53:05.990
I think if I look forward

01:53:06.620 --> 01:53:10.030
to everything that everyone
has said, I think that

01:53:13.120 --> 01:53:17.630
US intent to continue to advance

01:53:18.780 --> 01:53:23.180
is equally important to assessing

01:53:23.180 --> 01:53:26.600
and countering the intentions

01:53:26.600 --> 01:53:28.320
and the actions of our adversaries,

01:53:28.320 --> 01:53:33.030
and it's that great yin and
yang that has for so many years

01:53:33.030 --> 01:53:35.217
given us a tremendous
home field advantage.

01:53:35.217 --> 01:53:36.980
And so, I think that part of this

01:53:36.980 --> 01:53:39.600
is also to continue our press

01:53:40.200 --> 01:53:42.550
in the areas where we
know we've had advantage,

01:53:42.960 --> 01:53:44.650
and that, too, as Robert says,

01:53:44.650 --> 01:53:49.650
is an equal counterbalance
to the undoubted surprise

01:53:49.693 --> 01:53:53.380
that we will feel of
something that we didn't see.

01:53:53.895 --> 01:53:55.260
- It's the infamous quote
from Sir Michael Howard

01:53:55.260 --> 01:53:58.110
of the nation that gets it the least wrong

01:53:58.700 --> 01:54:00.583
is able to recover in the future.

01:54:02.690 --> 01:54:04.040
- [Scotty] And on that note

01:54:04.170 --> 01:54:06.970
I think we will close this panel out.

01:54:06.970 --> 01:54:09.680
To our panel members I
just want to say thank you

01:54:09.680 --> 01:54:10.867
on behalf of the secretary in the Army

01:54:10.867 --> 01:54:12.680
and the Chief of Staff of
the Army, thanks so much

01:54:12.680 --> 01:54:15.147
for taking time out of your
day to be here with us today.

01:54:15.147 --> 01:54:18.180
And to AUSA, thanks for
allowing us to do this

01:54:18.180 --> 01:54:20.390
and for hosting, and
everybody have a great day.

01:54:20.390 --> 01:54:21.290
Thanks, everybody.

01:54:21.735 --> 01:54:24.068
(applause)