- [Robert] Since 9/11 the nation has called upon
the 155th to deploy twice into Iraq, in 2004,
and again in 2009.
In both deployments the brigade answered the call,
and accomplished every mission given to it
adding to its rich, 220-year history
of service to Mississippi, and the United States.
(indistinct conversation)
(alarm sounds)
(dramatic music)
- [Michael] The leaders and soldiers of the 155th
Armored Brigade Combat Team are here at Fort Bliss
engaged in tough, realistic, and demanding
combined arms training that is honing every element
of the BCT's combat power that can be brought to bear
against any enemy.
- [Robert] Mississippi's own 155th Armored Brigade,
Dixie Thunder, as it conducts its final preparations
to deploy this summer in the Central Command
area of operations.
(explosion)
- It's basically a good opportunity to validate
our tactics and procedures on how we control
and synchronize our different fires assets.
So all the way down from direct fire weapon systems
all the way up to Shadow (mumbles).
That's to include the Apaches and the field artillery,
everything that we can bring to bear.
We're just practicing on how we can
synchronize those explosives.
(explosions)
- Roger, three destroyed T-72s, one BNP.
(gunfire)
(crowd chatter)
- Alright, good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.
My name's Brigadier General John Richardson.
I'm the director of operations, readiness and mobilization
and headquarters DA, G-357.
I'm joined by the Deputy Director, Brigadier General
Mark Strong, and we're going to talk to you today
about Army mobilization
and how we're evolving Army mobilization
of the reserve component to meet the current
National Defense Strategy, National Security Strategy,
National Defense Strategy.
As we make this transition away from the war fight
that we've seen over the last decade,
it's been more COIN-focused, to one that potentially
would require a larger mobilization
up to a full mobilization,
and ensuring that the Army is prepared to meet
the nation's need when it comes to employing
the total force.
And I think we're going to couch this and frame it in the,
frame it in the where we were, where we are,
and where we're going to kind of put it in context,
Army mobilization in the modern era
under the total force.
And it really goes back, I think you gotta go
back to General Abrams after Vietnam,
coming out of Vietnam, a war that was not popular
in the nation.
A war that we lost strategically.
And when he came out of Vietnam,
and he became the chief of staff for the Army
under the policy, created the policy of Total Army.
And the concept was that
never again would the Army go to war,
large-scale contingency operation, without the nation,
and you do that by bringing the reserves
and the National Guard with you if you go to fight.
And so that was the policy, Total Army,
up until Desert Storm,
and then we reached Desert Storm.
Next slide, sorry.
And a number of lessons came out of Desert Storm,
because really, what General Abrams envisioned
was that the reserve component would be a strategic reserve.
And that if we ever were to deploy, fight a war
on a large scale, that we would,
at the strategic level we would need
to call on the reserves,
both the reserve and the National Guard.
Desert Storm, first major combat operation after Vietnam,
and we saw some hiccups in the process,
and we found some faults in the policy.
So we did employ the reserves as a,
with the enablers, with the active component
very successfully, but then there were some challenges
with the National Guard.
And the question really became were we mobilizing
the National Guard as a strategic reserve,
or were we trying to use them as an operational reserve?
And if we were going to use them in an operational
manner, then how do we equip them,
how do we train them, and did we have the installation
support that would be required for that level
of a mobilization, for that type of conflict.
And so you go into the 90's, you see a reduction
in the number of active duty.
You've got the wall, and it's come down,
and we have the peace dividend.
And you have a great reduction in the active component,
and really, almost a leveling of active versus reserve
which was really in the spirit of the Total Army
that General Abrams envisioned.
Next slide.
And so we have 9/11.
And 9/11 has changed how we have used the reserve component.
And if you think through what we've faced
really from, let's go from 2003 to 2014, or 2008,
a lot of pressure put onto the active component
in a campaign that's long in time,
but not large in numbers at any given time.
So we started the use the reserve component
and specifically some National Guard units
almost in a batting order under Army Force Generation,
and in that concept you had time.
It was very predictable mobilization.
You had a train-up.
It wasn't decisive action, it was COIN-focused,
and so you had time to identify, train,
properly equip, and then deploy the reserve component
in the Army Force Generation model.
As we've come out of Iraq and Afghanistan
in large numbers, 11, 12, 13, 14,
the Army also came to the realization that we had to
look at our next major threat
and put our eye back on the ball
on large scale operations.
And so we started training the total force
back into decisive action rotations.
And it really put into question then
are we really prepared for mobilizing on a large scale.
'Cause as we look at the National Security Strategy,
National Defense Strategy, we're looking at near-peer
threats, and we're looking at great power competition.
And when you think about where that could lead
and if it was to lead to conflict,
you're talking about a large-scale contingency operation,
and not the small-scale contingency operations
that we saw with OEF and OIF.
And so then we have to ask ourselves,
as we look at our current conditions,
and I think the best one to look at there
is your installations, we reduced our power projection
platforms and our MG mobilization force generation
installation, your MFGIs.
We reduced down to two by 2014, Fort Bliss and Fort Hood.
And so we asked ourselves, next slide,
we asked ourselves if we were to fully mobilize,
did we have the capacity to do that?
So really right now what the Army is looking at
as we look at not only manning, training, equipping,
but also installations, and do we have,
have we made the investment, do we have the resources
that if the nation was to call on the Army
to mobilize, fully mobilize, do we have the capacity
to do that to fulfill our requirements
in the National Defense Strategy?
And so as you look at manning currently,
again, we gotta balance force between the active component
and the reserves.
We've transitioned our training,
and we're investing into decisive action
for our reserve components, as you can see there,
for CTC rotations
Four CTC rotations a year for the National Guard.
In addition to that we have the National Guard 4.0
where we're actually investing more training days
into certain high-impact units, ABCTs,
in the National Guard, where on their four-year
training cycle, their first year they have 39 days,
the traditional 39 days of active duty training.
Year two: 48, year three: 60, and year four: 60 days
of active duty training days to better prepare them
for decisive action, mobilization,
and potential large-scale contingency war fight.
In addition to that, in their third year
they have what's called an XCTC, externally evaluated
CTC rotation at a home station.
The example would be the 48th IBCT out of
the Georgia National Guard recently did, first,
their XCTC in 2017 at Fort Stewart, Georgia
evaluated by the 3rd Infantry Division,
resourced by the Third Infantry Division as far as
OC's, OP4, et cetera.
And then the following year, 2018,
went on to a CTC rotation before a eventual deployment.
And so where we're investing is training,
we're investing in equipment, and that's a challenge.
It always is a challenge when it comes to ensuring
that we have interoperability, not only with our
partners and our allies, but also between
the active component and the reserve component
as we try to maintain commonality in equipment
during transitions.
And then right now a lot of investment being made
by FORSCOM into installations to ensure that we've got
the resources and the capability that if we
were called to mobilize the reserve component
in a large scale, that we have the resources
and the MFGIs to provide the combat power
required for fulfilling the war plans.
So with that, what I'd like to do is just open up
questions for either myself or General Strong
on the concept of Army mobilization.
- Hello, sir.
John Vaughn, Raytheon.
My question has to deal with high-density, low-demand
units and some of your challenges in dealing
with the force gen model, for say, like (mumbles) batteries
or something that's really small numbers
and trying to maintain the force generation.
- Sir, great question, and I'll field that.
So one of the things that, from Army mobilization's
side of the house, is that we've gone kind of a,
as we're moving away from a rotational model
of Army force generation into a sustainable readiness model.
That sustainable readiness model allows us to set
the conditions based on given demand for how much
we're asking of those high-demand, low-density forces.
So that's kind of a shift of the way that we're
looking at things that allows us to prepare for,
and support, decisive action versus kind of a known
contingency rotation that we did into the CENTCOM AOR
for many years.
Thank you, sir.
- Hello.
Bob Harder, Army Reserve.
Johnny, good to see you, brother.
So I guess two questions.
One, going back to what you just said, Mark,
I heard Johnny lay out an ARFORGEN training cycle
for reserve component, right, as far as training days,
more training days each year,
which to me seems like being a little bit of conflict
with SRM because the Army reserve units are going to be
on the ARFORGEN schedule to meet that requirement
vice sustainable readiness, focused readiness.
But I guess the bigger question I have is
when you talk about, at least from the Army reserve
and sustainment capability, we got a lot of soldiers
and units that are deploying all the time
because the active component is taking down
a lot of sustainment structure.
Do you see a force structure equation,
or as part of the solution here to grow more
sustainment capability in the active component,
or more enabler capability in the active component
to maybe lessen the mobilization requirements
on the reserve components?
You guys see that as part of the plan?
- I'll field this one, too.
So I'll take this in two bites.
Your first question reference whether or not
we're on a force generation cycle
or we're doing purely sustainable readiness.
It's a combination of both, and I think you would recognize
that we have built a demand signal out there,
we understand how much of the force we need ready
at any one point in time.
So there is an element of force generation that's tied into
that, where people are on a rotational cycle.
One of the things under sustainable readiness
is how do you extend readiness past that peak cycle
if they're not used?
And one of the things that changes as we go forward
is the idea, the concept, that as we build reserve
component readiness, it may not be built purely
to deploy downrange.
It may be built so that we have a capability
within our reserve component for unforeseen contingency.
So that kind of goes into there is an element
that sustainable readiness is still has
a fourth generation cycle.
So hopefully that kind of gets after, and it gives kind of
a concept to where we're going to go in that.
Now you're gonna ask the harder question about
rebalancing the inventory between active, Guard,
and reserve from a force structure standpoint
in order to meet those demands.
I would tell you that on an annual basis
in the total Army analysis process we look at
whether or not we have too much capability
or not enough capability in a given SRC,
or element within the Army, and then we decide
is there an opportunity to buy additional capability
as we're growing the Army.
A lot of what we've been doing over the last couple years
is filling holes in formations and not buying out
those capabilities.
So right now I think it's something we look at
on an annual basis.
I don't see that we have made a move to invest
in additional sustainment logistics support
within the active component.
Which translates into the reason why
we're having this conversation.
How do you set the conditions such that
if we have to mobilize for a contingency
do we have the right power projecting platforms?
Have we done the right things in mobilization force
generation installations in order to allow
our reserve component members, in some cases,
who are called out before the active component
in order to meet the demand?
So hopefully that kind of answers your question.
It is something we look at all the time.
No adjustments at this time.
- General Richardson, Scott Sharp from actually
the Army National Guard.
If you would, you talked a little bit about investments
we're making in enhancing reserve component organizations
more ready, really about fielding equipment
and bringing us up to standards.
What is your perspective on the level of investment
for the MFGIs so they can accept the RC units
in sort of a on-demand, anticipated order and flow,
if you have any thoughts on that?
- For the MFGIs, you can do nothing,
you can do some things, and you could invest everything
and have them ready tomorrow.
And of course that's a balancing act.
There's limited resources.
And so what the Army's looking at is,
they're already investing in long lead time capabilities
and capacity at the MFGIs, things like internet,
CENTRIXS, things that would take a long time
to, if the balloon went up, it would take a long time,
months, years, to build up that MFGI.
So what the Army is doing is they're prioritizing,
they're looking at long lead times,
and then they're investing in these MFGIs
in areas that, long lead times so that that stuff's
taken care of, and then the things that can be done
in a short lead time, overnight, we will wait until
the time comes and then make those investments at that time.
So as you watch FORSCOM, you'll see that the FORSCOM
commander is personally involved in the investment
and in each one of these MFGIs,
'cause he takes it on as his personal responsibility
that when the chief of staff of the Army
looks at him and says, "I need these forces,"
he's gotta be able to generate 'em.
So he has got his team looking at these MFGIs
and doing a one-to-end on priorities and also
looking at which ones we have to invest in now
if we want them ready on D-Day,
and then what can be held off and invested in
at a later date.
Does that help answer that question?
(blows on mic)
- Major General Seikano from Botswana.
One of the elements of fighting power is the conceptual.
So I'd like you to share with us how you sustain
the training of the leadership of the reservist
so that when they are employed in this hybrid
and multi-domain operations they are always at par.
- Sir, could you repeat the part on exactly what
on the reserve component?
- Yeah.
I'd like you to share with us how you train,
how you sustain the training of the leaders
of the reserve force, how you sustain that training?
Because in this hybrid, multi-domain environment,
it is the leadership which is very, very critical.
They influence everything.
So here we are talking of the reserves,
and they come on rotations, maybe after a certain time
they come to have the rotation, the time of duty.
But the leadership should have that sustained training,
focused training.
What models, what approaches have we adopted
in the US Army to make sure that the leadership
of these people are always at par with the standard
which makes them commensurate to the active ones?
- (audio cuts out) of our challenges
with the reserve component is professional military
education, and making sure that we get our reserve,
National Guard leaders to their professional education
because they do have limited time.
And when you pull them out to go to their
professional military education, then they're not available
with their unit when they're training.
So that is an ongoing challenge,
and I'll probably turn it over,
General Strong is a reserve component officer
and I think could probably give you an idea
on some of the policies and techniques
that the reserve component does to maximize
their leader development.
- Sir, great question.
So one of the things that, as we look at what you ask
of a reserve component member, there's individual training,
the skills necessary to be proficient at the rank
that you are serving at,
and this is applicable to officers,
it's applicable to our non-commissioned officer corp.
There's also the collective training.
And given a limited amount of time,
and General Richardson talked about the span
of increasing investment of days throughout
kind of the readiness cycle.
Inside of that there's a demand signal for each of
those individuals to do personal development,
their professional military education.
In some cases it's in lieu of going to a
collective training event.
And that is a challenge.
The key thing for us, and I use kind of a,
we talk about it in the Army as kind of reps and sets.
Those reoccurring things that build our ability
to operate and take what we've learned
and go into an operational environment
having the frequency that is available
to a reserve component officer or non-commissioned officer.
And then the other thing that I think is key
is when General Richardson showed you a slide
and we talk about what we have done in our
culminating training events, those CTC rotations,
as we've added decisive action training
and gone back to the full-spectrum training.
That's where the key development of our
reserve component members.
And it's not only limited to brigade combat teams,
large formations that we have in the Army Guard.
Every CTC rotation has an element of USAR,
or Army Reserve and Army Guard formations
that may be enablers that are also going through
that rotation developing experience within
the reserve component leadership that translates
into a higher level of aggregate readiness
that we can apply when necessary,
if a contingency comes up.
Hopefully I answered your question, sir.
It's time.
- If there's no more questions,
General Strong and I will be up here
for the next 10 minutes if anyone has an individual
question they'd like to come up and ask us.
Alright, well thank you, everybody for your participation.