- Well, good morning everyone.
Let me welcome all of you
to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
I'm Ashley Tellis.
I'm a senior fellow here in the endowment.
And it's a great opportunity for us today
that we have Randy Shriver,
the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Asian and Pacific Affairs, joining us this morning.
The topic as we have advertised
is a conversation about the two-plus-two dialogue
that's going to happen within about a week in Delhi.
It's an event that is very important
in the political calendar because the relationship
has really come a long way since we first began
working on the transformation about 20 years ago.
And I'm particularly delighted that we could snag Randy
to speak about it, because he has the action
on this issue in the Pentagon.
Randy, as all of you know, has had a long career
in government, and public policy, analysis and in business.
Prior to his current position,
he was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asia, and the Chief of Staff
and the Senior Policy Advisor
to the Deputy Secretary of State under Bush
(mumbles) right about there.
He also served as the CEO and the President
of the Project 2049 Institute,
whose website, if you haven't seen,
I would strongly command to your attention
because it does superb work on East Asian security affairs.
And Randy ran that for a long time
before he came into government.
He also was a founding partner of Armitage International.
So he's covered all the basics,
everything from business to public policy to government.
And he's, without fear of contradiction,
one of the nation's premier analysts
of Asian security issues.
So welcome, Randy.
It's wonderful to have you.
- Thank you very much for the invitation
and I look forward to the discussion.
- I look forward to that, too.
I wanna start by just saying a few words
of tribute to Senator McCain.
Because he actually graced this very room at Carnegie
twice in the last decade, if I remember,
speaking on the very subject that we are about
to have a conversation on.
Without doubt, he was a towering figure
in America's public life and he certainly left the country
stronger by his presence and by his contributions
as a soldier and as a public servant.
They're very strong convictions about the issues
that we care about.
He reminded us that our values
are really the most important part
of who we are as people and as a country.
And that our strength is essential
if our vision and our values are to be protected.
And on the two occasions that he actually spoke
at Carnegie, he made a very strong plea
for a strengthened US-India bilateral relationship
as the foundation for the success of the liberal order.
And so it is a particularly important thing, I think,
that we recognize his spirit in this room
as we have this conversation.
I want to start this conversation with Randy with a quote
from Senator McCain's 2010 speech which was remarkable
as I was just going through it last night
so please hear it, and the vision.
And he said in 2010, if the United States and India
are to forge a truly strategic partnership,
our seniors leaders in government
must prioritize two areas of cooperation above all,
security and values.
In short, the creation of geopolitical conditions
that secure and expand the community of countries
that value political and economic freedom.
I think if there is lead motif
for the conversation this morning,
I think this is a great lead motif.
And I wanna start on that note, Randy,
by asking you to talk about the broader chapeau
under which we are thinking of the bilateral relationship
which is the free and open Indo-Pacific.
The President surprised many because of the fears raised
during the campaign of isolationism
and America's engagement in the world
when he came out and embraced
the free and open Indo-Pacific.
And yet this has been a subject
that has been clouded by some uncertainty.
So I was wondering if you could spend a few minutes
just laying out what the administration's vision is
and then sort of helping us think
how you see India fitting into that rubric.
- Sure.
Well, thank you, can I just start
by thanking you-- - Of course.
- For the invitation and giving me this opportunity
to talk about this relationship
and the upcoming two-plus-two.
And thank you so much for opening
by paying tribute to Senator McCain,
somebody who is a great American hero
and meant so much to so many, but particularly
for those of us who work in the Indo-Pacific.
His leadership was just tremendous and counted on
and now there's a real hole there that, I don't know,
that can be filled but we certainly valued
his voice for so long so thank you for that as well.
I gotta also say, it's a little,
it's a little strange for me to be sitting here
being asked questions by Ashley Tellis about India.
(audience laughing)
Ashley Tellis is the person that we all go to
to ask questions about India and have for a long time
so I'll play along.
- That's very kind.
That's very kind, Randy.
But you're not going to, please.
- But we still, in the Department of Defense
and across the government, count on Ashley's expertise.
So, but I'll play along today and do my best here.
So we've begun to publicly articulate
the aspects of the Indo-Pacific,
Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.
Secretary Mattis did that primarily
with his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue recently
at the Indo-Pacific Business Forum.
Secretary Pompeo, Secretary of Energy Perry,
Secretary Ross, OPIC President Washburne
all started to articulate the economic and energy
and development aspects of that
so I don't need to repeat all that.
But I think that the core is our belief
that we're promoting a positive,
affirmative vision for the region.
It's not necessarily anti anybody, counter anybody;
it's really affirming and promoting the principles
of a free and open Indo-Pacific.
So by free, at the core of that is
we believe countries should have complete
sovereign control of their countries
to make decisions from capital,
free from coercion, free from undue pressure.
We also mean free open transparent
and reciprocal trade relationships.
By open, we're talking about open
areas for commerce, for freedom of navigation,
for broad participation
in the life of the region commercially, economically.
So we think this is something that is,
US vision and strategy, but one that countries
can readily sign up for in a variety of ways,
but particularly this aspect of promoting sovereignty.
Because we know that there are threats to that,
we know that one of the principal challenges we're facing
is the potential erosion of sovereignty
coming through predatory economics,
coming through intimidation and coercion
through military means.
So at a minimum sort of baseline,
we really wanna promote that idea and be a partner.
We don't seek influence or control of anybody's territory.
We feel we're better off if countries have their own
sovereign control and the ability to protect that.
So how does India fit in?
That's a subject of continuing discussion
and will certainly be featured at the two-plus-two,
but I would suggest just lay side-by-side
Secretary Mattis' speech at Shangri-La
and Prime Minister Modi's speech at Shangri-La
who, of course, gave the keynote.
This is not a situation where we're really searching
for common ground and convergence.
This is where a situation where
as our leadership articulates the vision
we see a lot of convergence and belief
that these are principles we both share and wanna promote.
So our goal is really to operationalize that
with India as a partner.
And the specifics I think will take form
and some of that will be in the defense area,
some of that may be in the development assistance area,
but that's what we're working on.
But again I think at the foundation,
we can see our leadership roughly has the same vision
as articulated by Prime Minister Modi and Secretary Mattis,
and now it's our job to really operationalize that.
- I actually found Prime Minister Modi's speech
at Shangri-La quite remarkable,
because he emphasized the same teams that we have.
Though, he seemed to draw the distinction
between the vision and strategy,
and I'm not quite sure what was intended
by the emphasis of that distinction.
But clearly on the headlines,
he emphasized a complete comfort
with what the United States was trying to achieve
because I think he sees that
as being in India's interest as well.
Is that the sense that you get as you prepare
for the discussions going up to the two-plus-two?
- Yes, again, we see, at least on the vision,
a convergence and a lot of common ground.
In terms of the strategy, well, I think that's something
that we need to build out.
And we've been putting this together
but it's taken us a while to articulate this.
Secretary Mattis' speechs at Shangri-La
was a year and a half into the administration
and now we have our other agencies
articulating that at the Indo-Pacific Business Forum.
So these things take a little time to build out.
As we do that side-by-side in parallel with India,
I think that, again I'll use the same phrase,
operationalizing this strategy,
we need to figure out what the division of labor might be,
where the partnership might be,
where the minilateral, multilateral opportunities
that include both the United States and India may be,
and that's basically what we're discussing.
- Let me come back to this question in a different way.
Shyam Saran, who was the former Indian Foreign Secretary
and was deeply engaged in the negotiations
on the Civil Nuclear Agreement, wrote a piece two weeks ago,
I think it was published in one of the Indian newspapers,
where he made the argument that although the US and India
share very strong convergence on the Indo-Pacific vision,
let's not kid ourselves, at the end of the day
there is a common challenge,
and that common challenge is China.
If we did not have a challenge of the kind posed by China
in the area of economics, in the area of sovereignty,
in the area of its own military capabilities,
the Indo-Pacific concept would sort of be less salient.
How do we think of China?
Because it's almost like Banquo's ghost
when we talk about the Indo-Pacific.
It's the one country that has tremendous prominence
in the region that has a gravitational field
that is attractive in some areas
but also repelling because of some of its behaviors.
So you mentioned that this is not against anyone,
but there is a view both in India
and even in the United States
that we cannot sort of have rosy tinted glasses
when we think about China.
So how does China fit into our common vision
for a free and open Indo-Pacific?
- Well, I'm rarely accused of rose tinted glasses
when it comes to China, but,
look, I don't think we wanna lose the idea
that this is an inclusive strategy,
and we would prefer China embracing the same vision.
I think if you're against free and or open
there's a notice there to explain
exactly what it is you don't like about it
because then you're getting right to the heart
of threatening a country's sovereignty
and ability to have free flow of commerce,
freedom of navigation, et cetera.
So I think it's not so much, again countering
any particular country but China's behavior,
things they've articulated, sometimes we call China opaque
or difficult, but in other ways they're very clear, right,
and they're clear in public statements,
they're clear in their actions and their behavior
and they're demonstrating that they have
a different aspiration for the Indo-Pacific region
and it's manifested in their economic strategy,
Belt and Road Initiative, their militarization
of the South China Sea, a lot of the coercive approaches
to the internal politics of others.
So maybe there's a counterfactual
where China isn't doing these things
and we have trouble getting countries
to align on an Indo-Pacific vision and strategy,
but the world we live in it is in fact helping
countries coalesce around this.
So I suppose that's a residual sort of benefit
of China's behavior.
Again our preference would be an inclusive strategy
that includes China as a constructive participant
in regional affairs but that's I think largely demonstrated
by their behavior, not the world we live in.
So we wanna be a partner with India and other countries
at looking how to have alternatives.
You don't necessarily thwart or counter something
like Belt and Road Initiative;
you shine a light on the downsides of it,
but you also have to have an alternative.
And we've talked to India about
coordinating development assistance
and looking at how we can be partners
in providing that alternative.
Same would do in the military and security areas.
How do we prove ourselves a preferred partner
and a more trusted and reliable partner
to countries in the Indo-Pacific region,
rather than saying you shouldn't have a relationship
with China and you shouldn't do these activities with China,
that's just unrealistic given China's size,
influence and geography.
So this is the conversation we're going to have
in Delhi, or I should say continue to have in Delhi,
and I think China will be a factor
in most of what we do going forward.
- And I think the government of India
certainly does not want to have a relationship
that is one of complete alienation with China anyway,
because China exists on its borders,
it has a civilization relationship
going back centuries so on and so forth.
But I think there is a common effort being made
with respect to an effective response
and the effective response will take a different form
in the strategic area, different form and the economic area.
Do you have the sense that our relationship now
is mature enough that we could begin to think of things
that we do, not only for the other
but also for third parties that might be implicated
in both the strategic and economic realm?
So for example, are we ready to sort of work together
in a place like Africa or in Southeast Asia
in the economic realm?
In the strategic realm, what do you imagine
the two countries actually being able to do?
- It's a great question, and I do think our relationship
has matured to that point,
and these are items on our agenda.
So we'll talk about, as I said,
the coordination of development assistance,
and I think we'll try to find some key areas
where individual countries or regions
are facing particular challenges
in how we can find
a common effort that, or where synergies exist
if India and the US are involved in development assistance
or economic activities trade.
So I think that is where our relationship is
and I think we can both promote our respective interests
and our shared interests by doing that.
I think that'll be true in the security area as well.
We've seen exercises,
not just bilateral US-India exercises,
but multilateral exercises.
Well, obviously you exercise for a reason, right?
You exercise to improve readiness
and training of your own forces,
but you think about contingencies,
you think about real-world possibilities,
and so multilateralizing those opportunities
is part of that as well.
- Let me ask you a specific question about the two-plus-two,
because it's in this context that the two-plus-two
has received incredible attention in India,
partly because it's the APEX meeting
between leaders and the two sides
and will set an agenda for some time to come
in terms of activities, in terms of programmatic
developments and so on and so forth.
Can you tell us something about how this two-plus-two
will be structured, what's on the agenda for conversation
and just sort of walk our audience
through what's likely to happen in Delhi
a week or so from now?
- Sure.
Well, first of all, it's a historic meeting,
it's the first ever two-plus-two between our countries
that's significant in and of itself.
But I think beyond that, we have an opportunity
to really advance the relationship in in significant ways.
You were kind enough to go through some of my bio
and my background, I've seen a lot of high-level exchanges.
Sometimes you meet, you talk, you go away
and don't have a lot to show for it.
In this case, I think we're meeting at this high level,
we'll talk about regional issues and strategic issues,
but we're also gonna have a set of actual concrete outcomes.
So it's a very good combination
of strategic high-level dialogue
and concrete outcomes that will serve as enablers
for advancing the relationship well beyond the meeting
in Delhi on September 6th and 7th.
So the conversation on strategic issues,
regional security issues, certainly our shared interest
in understanding China and how to respond to that
will be front and center.
Other aspects of promoting the free and open Indo-Pacific,
how we approach Southeast Asia,
I think we'll talk about Afghanistan,
our shared interest there and driving that
to a political settlement.
But some of the concrete areas,
and maybe I'll just stick to the defense areas,
we're working on a set of enabling agreements,
it's a bit of an alphabet soup of agreements.
But collectively what that'll allow us to do
is have secure communications,
protect technology, protect information,
getting those enabling agreements in place
will allow security assistance cooperation to go forward,
will allow us to exercise and training
in more meaningful ways.
So again those are really key concrete outcomes
that will set us on a good course for the future.
I think we're gonna expand the scope
of some of our exercises.
Increase the complexity and the elements
that will participate in these exercises.
That's a very good outcome.
We're gonna talk about augmenting the two-plus-two
to include perhaps at my level a two-plus-two
and my counterpart at State Department
so that as valuable as those exchanges are
they tend to be once a year at best
so we can augment that with other senior-level dialogue.
So that's a very good outcome.
The elevation of India to Strategic Trade Authority
Tier One status is a very important outcome
because again that's an enabler for trade
and technology cooperation 'cause it lifts
some of the restrictions on our ability to do that.
So there's just a number of things that again
will really set us on a great course as we go forward.
- Well, the augmentation idea
is actually particularly important,
because it's hard to imagine the Secretary of Defense
and his counterpart in India being able to meet
as frequently as we would like
simply because of troubles of the calendar.
But if we can, at the working level,
have a continuous dialogue I think that would be
extremely productive and so kudos for doing that.
Let me come back to the strategic aspect at two levels.
One is the region itself.
India lives in a sort of troubled neighborhood
and we suddenly have a common project
with respect to success in Afghanistan.
There have been, the last few weeks in Afghanistan
had been particularly troubled with Taliban activity,
the attack on Ghazni and so on and so forth.
Where do you see the President's decision
to sort of stay the course in Afghanistan?
How do you see the future of US-India cooperation
in light of that decision?
What are the expectations of India at this point?
- Well, I'll leave the strategic policy decisions
to the President and Secretary Pompeo, Ambassador Bolton
about the future of our approach there.
But I think what Secretary Mattis said yesterday
and General Nicholson, our outgoing commander there,
have said is, looking through all this recent activity
we, nonetheless, see signs that there may be
opportunities to move the political process forward.
President Ghani's initial ceasefire was very revealing
in a lot of ways, first of all, that they pulled it off.
And some wanna say, well, it was only three days
but in fact there were sort of localized ceasefires
that extended beyond that.
And again it was very revealing that there was
a growing interest even on the Taliban side
maybe for accelerated reconciliation.
So we're seeing some signs
that a political process is moving.
President Ghani is pursuing another ceasefire
and we'll see if the Taliban are willing to step up to that.
So I think where we can be good partners with India,
first of all, I think our goals are shared and common here,
we do wanna drive this to a political settlement.
India has a lot of experience in being a multi-ethnic,
multi-religious democracy and manages
all those complexities very well.
There's things that Afghanistan can surely learn from that.
But then there's the more concrete,
the economic, and development assistance,
election training and potentially monitoring
some logistic support that may get into the security area,
although I think our Indian friends are,
have some limitations that they wanna honor and respect
for regional security interests there.
So I do see that this is an area where we can cooperate
and that will be an agenda item at the two-plus-two.
- And what about Pakistan?
Because a great deal of the prospects
for success in Afghanistan are determined
by the choices that Pakistan makes
which is one-dimensional to the issue.
But the other dimension is Pakistan
as a factor in US-India relations
where India has viewed itself as being a victim
of Pakistani supported terrorism over the years.
And the Trump administration has really
come out quite forthrightly in terms of holding Pakistan
to account for these misdemeanors.
How do you see the triangular relationship
between the US and India and Pakistan at this point?
- Well, I probably don't want to say a lot on that
because we wanna give the new prime minister,
the new government in Pakistan space
to explore where there may be opportunities
to improve relations with India.
Many new governments come in to power in Islamabad
and wanna do that and then run smack-dab into reality
and all the difficulties.
But in terms of separating what was said during a campaign
and what he said since the election,
we wanna give him space to find the opportunities
to improve things with India.
I think on the questions about how that all relates
to Afghanistan and shared interests,
there's no question we need Pakistan's help
in encouraging, persuading, pressuring the Taliban
to come to the negotiating table,
deal with the national unity government
under President Ghani and talk about a future
where they're included, but not through force
but through a political process.
We have made decisions on curbing assistance
and putting constraints on our relationship with Pakistan
as a means to try to persuade them to adopt that course
and use their influence on the Taliban.
We're still evaluating as to the impact of that.
It's certainly not where we want it to be,
but it's something that I think we'll stick with.
And certainly the end state should be one
that we can all agree on.
So I think it's a matter of dealing with suspicions
and distrust in the mix of all this.
And I think the best thing,
if we can get some momentum behind this
initial ceasefire, sorry, the second ceasefire offer,
and have that lead to some political dialogue,
I think that would go a long way in reducing
suspicions among all these other actors and players.
- Absolutely, and that, by definition,
will be a long-term process, right?
It's not likely to come to any happy conclusion, so be it.
- It may be.
I mean we've moved our Afghanistan approach
to a conditions-based approach, not a timeline,
but if Secretary Mattis were sitting here
I can assure you he would say
17 years is long enough to be involved in a war.
We need this to end.
We want this to end.
So we're not on a timeline; it's conditions-based.
But we do see, through President Ghani's initiatives,
some of the reaction from the Taliban
to the initial ceasefire.
We do see an opportunity there that we really wanna seize.
So it may be long term, ultimately, to get Afghanistan
to a place where we all want it to be,
but this is a potential inflection point
that we wanna seize.
- Can I move the aperture and make it
a little broader for a second 'cause I wanna talk about
a country to Pakistan's west to India's west,
which is of concern to India, and this is Iran,
and that concern is obviously anchored
in the change of course that the administration is pursuing.
I suspect this as an issue
that will come up in the two-plus-two.
The Indian concern about Iran, of course,
has to do with changes in US policy and the implications
for India's own relationship with Iran.
What are we asking of India and Iran?
What is the administration trying to get done here?
- Well, I am, on most days of the week,
happy to leave Iran to my colleague,
Robert Karem, my counterpart
as an assistant secretary of defense.
But you're right, it does very much bleed over
into my area of responsibility and it will be
a topic of discussion, I believe, at the two-plus-two.
Without going into a lot of detail,
because I think we need to hear from the Indians,
this is still a relatively new development
pulling out of JCPOA and what that may ultimately mean
for a variety of things, potential sanctions, et cetera.
I think we'll go to the table and look forward
to hearing from the Indians about their relationship there
and what they see as key priorities
to try to preserve, if they can.
But obviously the President made the decision he did on Iran
because of concerns about the agreement
and about having, in our view,
a need for something much stronger
and dealing with Iran's, not only nuclear program
but their behavior so I think we need to sit
and have that very open candid, sober dialogue
and see where we come out the other side.
But we understand that India will raise these issues
and we welcome that and we'll have the discussion.
- There is a parallel discussion around
that's also on Indian minds, and that is Russia.
The administration is struggling to come to terms
with the whole problem of Russian interference
in US domestic politics, while the President,
at the same time, has made various overtures
of outreach to Russia.
The specific concern to India at the moment
is of course the threat of sanctions
particularly on Russian and Indian defense trade.
I imagine this is one of those issues
that will also have to be discussed at some point.
How does one work with India
to achieve a common goal which is to sort of
strengthen India's capacity in the Indo-Pacific
without letting India's relations with Russia
become a problem in US-Indian relations?
- It's a complex issue so let me,
let me just say a few things.
We understand the historical nature of that relationship
and the legacy of that relationship as it applies
to the defense ministry and the military,
so a lot of legacy platforms and the need to support those.
I think what we wanna do is have a conversation
with India that's not about the past and their legacy,
but about the future and look at the nature of this regime.
Look at Crimea, Ukraine, I called it
the laundry list when I was in Manila,
the chemical attack in the UK.
And look at Russia's own future, their demographics.
This is I think not a country that you really wanna have
a strategic partnership well into the future.
We can be a more reliable, better partner.
So that's sort of at the macro level.
To deal with issues like CATSA and potential sanctions
I think we need to be very careful here.
Secretary Mattis did in fact go to Capitol Hill
and often use India as sort of a flagship example
as to why we wanted a waiver for the Secretary of State.
And so I think that created a certain impression
that we're gonna completely protect the India relationship,
insulate India from any fallout from this legislation
no matter what they do.
I would say that's a bit misleading.
We would still have very significant concerns
if India pursued major new platforms and systems.
I can't sit here and tell you that they would be exempt,
that we would use that waiver.
That'll be the decision of the President.
If he's faced with a major new platform
and capability that India has acquired from Russia
that'll be the President's decision.
But all I know is I can't sit here and tell you
that the waiver will be used in that case.
So that's a specific thing that we'll have to navigate.
I think overall one of the reasons Secretary Mattis
use India as that flagship example is he knows
where he wants the relationship to go with India.
He wants it to go forward.
He wants it to improve, strengthen,
be more capable as a partnership
and he doesn't want these impediments.
And so whether it's finding ways
to persuade India to go a different course,
rely on us as a trusted partner
and supplier of defense equipment,
whether it's giving consideration to a waiver
we know the direction we wanna go
and we don't want these to be impediments.
- I hope we get the opportunity of the two-plus-two
to actually have the strategic conversation.
Because the strategic conversation is truly fundamental.
If India understands Russia's own evolution
and recognizes its limits for India's own self-interests
that would be a productive opportunity
for us to see how we can break through
some of the logjams and other issues.
- Well said, I think we'll endeavor to do that.
- I will have two last questions
before I open it to the floor.
One has to do with the change that has occurred
in the Trump administration with respect to economic policy,
not only towards India but towards
a range of other countries.
But the specific question to India is the following.
The Department of Defense in particular
has gone out of its way to emphasize
the importance of the strategic partnership
as has the administration and the National Security Strategy
and the National Defense Strategy documents.
But how can we sort of work with India
when in the economic arena we still have
a series of irritants and difficulties
while we appear to be making much greater progress
in the defense space?
Because the Trump administration has made economic
so important and central to its engagement with the world,
how do we sort of keep both these elements
in the relationship in sync as we move forward?
- Well, it can be a challenge.
And I would just say in support of my colleagues
who do the trade and economic issues,
we need that channel at that ongoing dialogue
to be successful because these are long-standing irritants.
I would say this is not just the Trump administration
or maybe the Trump administration is taking this
more head on and applying different tools,
but you know better than I,
some of the long-standing irritants in this relationship.
I would say from a defense perspective
that the economic and trade relationship
can be supportive, additive, complementary
to what we do on the defense and security side
and that's the optimal environment.
But we certainly have history and are able
to walk and chew gum at the same time.
I'm old enough to remember the difficulties we had
with Japan in the 1980s when we had members of Congress
smashing Toshiba products on the steps of the Capitol
and incredible trade irritants and disputes with Japan,
all the while our alliance and our security relationship
was evolving at a very good pace
driven by our security interest.
So we are able to compartmentalize, if we have to.
I think the realities of the security environment
will create a natural convergence
and give us these opportunities
irrespective of what's happening on the trade side.
So I'm not saying that's what we want,
but I think our interests are very compelling
and persuasive on the defense and security side
that I think we'll be able to continue momentum
even in that environment.
- That is actually a consoling image
because you're absolutely right.
Japan offers a useful example of the United States
having faced the situation before and having come out,
both the United States and Japan having come out
the better for it.
So I hope we can actually end up
in the same place with India.
The last question I have before I open it to the floor
is going into the two-plus-two, how would you judge
the health of the US in their strategic relationship net-net
taking into account all these difficulties in some cases,
opportunities and others?
Where do you see us today?
Do we have the foundations in place
for building something that is truly substantial
for peace and security in the Indo-Pacific
over the next decade?
- Yeah, we're quite bullish as a US government
and at the Department of Defense in particular.
And it's really, and I should've said this earlier,
we're really the beneficiaries of decades of great work.
The Bush administration, your contributions, Ashley,
working through the civil nuclear deal,
the Obama administration particularly on the defense side,
we used to sometimes refer to Ash Carter
as the India desk officer when he was Secretary of Defense.
- He almost was.
- But the creation of the major defense partner concept
coming in the Obama administration.
And so this is sort of evolutionary in its nature.
But I think all that good work, what it amounts to
is the creation of that foundation
you're talking about and asking about,
I think would benefit from leadership on both sides
that are willing to take some risks,
having articulated a vision,
talk about how to operationalize a strategy.
So we're quite bullish, as I said.
We'll be able to navigate some of these challenges,
I believe, and come out the other side
with being able to say our administration
continued the momentum that the previous ones started.
So I'm pretty optimistic.
- Well, I wish you and your colleagues all the best
for the next couple of weeks
as you'll have these conversations
and for whatever comes after.
I'm gonna open the floor to our guests.
And if you could identify yourself
and make the question or the comment
sort of pointed and brief so I can give
as many people a chance that would be helpful.
Yes, ma'am.
- [Woman] How India is getting caught up
in the sanctions against Russia,
but you didn't talk as much about the sanctions
against Iran so I'm hoping you can give us
a little bit more detail and how you plan
to navigate those sanctions
particularly with regards to oil.
And I also wanted just to press you in terms of CATSA
on the purchase of the S-400.
And does the US plan to seek a waiver
for CATSA for the S-400 for India?
And if yes or no, what is the precedent that that sets?
- Nice to see you face to face.
We've had communication.
I'm gonna to resist the urge to talk more about Iran.
As I said, I think we need the opportunity to sit down
with our Indian friends at this high level
and have a good exchange on where
India thinks its interests are
and the aspects of the relationship with Iran
that they feel they need to protect or insulate
and we'll be able to explain our point of view on that.
But again it's a relatively new development
within JCPOA and the potential imposition
of sanctions as it relates to that.
So I'll leave that for the future
to talk about after the two-plus-two.
On Russia, CATSA, S-400,
obviously we have this legislation,
CATSA, not because of anything India's doing,
anything we're doing, it's because of Russian behavior.
And I went through the partial laundry list
but the Congress felt the need to take action
and to demonstrate not only in words and in spirit
why we think this regimes activities are so troublesome
but to actually take concrete action to try to have
a consequence and punishment for this behavior.
I think most people acknowledge it was flawed legislation
for the reasons that some of our partners,
friends and allies themselves might end up
paying a price that was not intended.
So Congress was very good at working with us
to create this waiver opportunity
and now we have a little more flexibility
for the secretary of state and President
to make those determinations.
I, as I said, I cannot sit here today and tell you
if India buys X then the waiver will be used
or it won't be used.
I think S-400 in particular is a system
that's particularly troubling for a lot of reasons.
And I think our strong preference,
India is a friend, it's a sovereign country,
they'll make their own decisions,
but our preference is to seek alternatives
and see if we can be a partner to India
in addressing those defense needs.
If they choose to go down that route,
like I said, I can't sit here and tell you today
that a waiver would necessarily be used.
It would be a topic discussed at the highest level
of our government and they would make some determination.
(audience faintly speaking)
Well, it'd be some weighing of the concerns
that that acquisition creates
and how that could impact a variety of things
including the future of our defense cooperation,
it could put limitations on it,
versus wanting the political space
and the ability to build out the strategic partnership
with India at a more rapid pace.
- Yes, sir.
Just wait for the microphone.
- [Mitsuo] Thank you for coming.
My name is Mitsuo Nakai, Reagan Foundation,
Heritage Foundation.
In my opinion, two of the most important allies
we have are Japan and India.
No doubt about that.
My question is do you envision
trilateral summit type of things in terms of security
including economic issues?
Thank you.
- We do have trilateral interactions
with US, Japan and India.
I joined my State Department colleagues earlier this year
in Delhi for a trilateral discussion at our level.
Taking that to a higher level is certainly a possibility
because, as you say these three great democracies
align on quite a bit of issues,
so we'll see about the future of that interaction
whether it's sustained at a high level
and I think we'd be open to that.
- [Kami] Yes, sir, my name is Kami Butt.
I'm with the Pakistani Spectator.
And you mentioned something about giving some space
to newly elected Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan.
Do you think that your Department of Defense
is willing to use its influence at IMF
or other institution to give Pakistan the necessarily loan
that it need to prevent its economy defaulting?
As you know, Imran Khan seemed to be a man of martial virtue
but he has so many limitation.
He really cannot print dollar; only America can print.
He cannot provide job to million of young kids
who are unemployed in this country.
He cannot get money to pay interest on its foreign debt.
In other words, Pakistan seem to be bound
to be collapsing very soon.
So my second question is in the case if it happen
then what role do you perceive for India
because no other country has better intelligence,
human intelligence about Pakistan than India does.
I know your department has a very elaborate plan
to recover Pakistani hundred atomic bomb
if in the case Pakistan collapses.
Does your department see any important role for India
to help your department or help United States
to cover those things?
Thanks.
- Upon returning to government in January,
I was reminded, you no longer have to answer
hypothetical questions and future questions,
and so I think I'll heed that advice.
There's a lot of hypotheticals there
about future collapse, nuclear weapon.
What I said about giving him space was really
in the context of the India-Pakistan relationship.
We'd certainly like to give him space
to make the right decisions on a variety of things,
but I think our approach of cutting assistance
and pressuring Pakistan on their relationship
with the Taliban, persuading them to come to the table,
dealing with terrorist networks that'll be sustained.
When I say give space it's not changing our approach
or our policy, I really mentioned it in the context
of developing opportunities between India and Pakistan.
I don't have a good answer on the economic
difficulties and challenges that Pakistan finds itself in.
What I can say is if you look at other examples
where countries went all-in or largely in with China,
the results have not been particularly good
and there's been an erosion of sovereignty
and an erosion of control
and there are many examples of that.
So if our friends in Pakistan wanna talk about
a way out of that or wanna talk about ways
to strengthen their economy and deal with that
I'm sure we'd be open to that
and trying to work with Pakistan,
work either bilaterally
or through international institutions
to try to get them on a better path.
We're not interested in a failed Pakistan
by any stretch of the imagination.
So we want them to be successful,
we want them to have sovereign control
and not cede that to any outside party including China
and the economic peace is probably gonna be key to that.
(audience faintly speaking)
- Thank you, Kami.
Is that Seema?
Yes, please.
- [Seema] I'm Seema Sirohi.
I'm a columnist for the Economic Times in India.
I wanted to press you further on the question of S-400.
Would the US be willing to offer something
that India could bear if it doesn't want India to buy S-400
since China already has got deliveries,
the first few deliveries on S-400?
The other question is about the quad.
Do you detect a certain hesitancy on part of India,
because the prime minister did not even mention it
in his speech in Shangri-La?
- Officials love questions that start
with let me press you further
'cause you thought you've addressed it.
I think, let me just say at a certain general level,
yes, we're willing to talk to India about
meeting defense requirements and alternatives.
There may not be an exact system
that we can produce as the back specifications
and capabilities, but you have systems
not to have systems, not to have platforms
but to address defense requirements
and needed capabilities.
So I can say we'd certainly be willing
to enter into that conversation with India.
And we have.
How we can be a good partner and addressing
what their real requirements are.
In terms of the quad, I come at this
from a little different perspective.
My perspective, I believe the quad
was born on December 26th, 2004
which was the day of the great tsunami in Southeast Asia
when the four countries that responded
were India, Australia, Japan and the United States.
And we responded because we're like-minded,
we saw the tragedy unfolding and felt compelled to act.
We had capability to bring to bear in a quick timely fashion
and we had a willingness to cooperate with one another.
So in a way it was born in reality and in an operation
before it was even born in concept.
I think now we're talking about this as a potential vehicle
for how we can address a range of interests
in the Indo-Pacific.
And I think we find general receptivity
particularly where we're talking about economic issues
and development assistance and the like
but I think it'll move at a pace and scope
that all four are comfortable with
and that's been the limiting factor historically, right?
And sometimes it's us, sometimes it's been Japan,
it's been Australia, it's been India
so I think we'll work through all that.
And if you stare at an iceberg
you don't necessarily see the movement,
but if you look away and look back again
I can see how this quad discussion has moved forward
and moving in the right direction.
Maybe not at the pace we like, but I think we'll get there.
- Yes.
- [Rajiv] My name is Rajiv Goel.
I started the defense practice
for one of India's largest industrial groups
called the Adani Group.
My question is two-fold.
India is a democracy.
And the longevity of the administration of the party
is really dependent upon the local economics.
And India is going through a massive issue of employment
so if any strategy needs to be succeed
between the US and India it has to include
the local perspectives as well, okay?
You have comments on that?
The second is that a lot of the forces
driving the geopolitical climate is China.
And China's relations with India have never been good.
But Russia and Iran are gravitating towards China
because they see certain, how should I say,
access materializing within the geopolitical framework.
So how do you plan to counter the Chinese threat,
if you wanna call it that.
It's not really a threat,
and unfortunately China has a copy, copy-paste model,
and the biggest Achilles' heel in my personal opinion
is their inability to be innovative,
which is where the US really thrives.
So how are you going to be able to use India,
because India is very strategically located
particularly with respect to the Strait of Malacca.
And by alienating Iran, the other choke point,
which is the Strait of Hormuz has now
well-materialized, in my opinion.
So just your comments on that
would be interesting in knowing.
So two-fold, the local.
- Well the second one first.
You said, how are we gonna use India to--
- No. - Well that's what you said.
(audience speaking faintly)
Okay, well I was gonna, you went where I was gonna go.
This is a subject of intense discussion at the highest level
between the United States and India.
And we've got to navigate
all those complexities.
That's being a practitioner.
That's the real world that you live in.
You've gotta develop policies,
you've gotta come up with activities.
And so we'll work through all that.
It is complex, there's no doubt.
And we note that India has a better relationship with China
this year than last, which is last was pretty bad,
and they've talked about having a normal year.
We support that.
By the way, we want a good relationship with China, too.
And I accompanied Secretary Mattis to Beijing
where they had very good discussions.
We had clear areas of disagreement
over the South China Sea and Taiwan and other issues,
but we ultimately all want a more stable
constructive relationship with China.
So we'll work with our friends in India to try to navigate
all that and develop common approaches.
And I don't know that I can get into much
specificity at this point, but I'm confident
we can work through it and get there.
Your first question on local politics, domestic politics
being supportive of the relationship,
I think all we can do, as a partner, is articulate
why we think the relationship is important,
what we think the capacity to work with one another may be,
and articulate a future vision for the relationship.
I don't think we can spend a lot of time
trying to game out local politics in India.
We'll have to leave that to the central government in Delhi.
But I think we can make a compelling case
at the national level, while this is important,
and we'll rely on our friends in the national government
to deal with the local politics for the most part.
(audience talking faintly)
Sure.
- [Rajiv] Pens cannot be isolated
from the economics of the country.
That's all I was saying.
So, therefore, if there has to be a lasting relationship,
there has to be an economic element to it
as well as a defense element which is what you were,
right, which is where we started.
So I'd just like you to amplify because,
ultimately, it's the grassroots that will define
the longevity of the strategy,
because jobs, technology, industry is not really,
India is basically a consumption story
but we are not supporting that consumption
with local investment in industry.
So there has to be some element in your discussions, I feel.
- Well, you're talking about issues
that are sort of beyond my purview at the Pentagon.
I can agree with you that the economic component
needs to be strong and that that's key
to sustaining broad support at local levels
for relationship going into the future.
I can tell you one of the reasons we're interested
in expanding defense industrial cooperation,
why we have programs, for example,
we have what used to be DUIx,
now DIU 'cause we're no longer experimenting.
We may have the opportunity to have
an Indian liaison officer there.
We're looking at ways to expand
defense industrial cooperation
so that we can be seen on the defense side
as contributing possibly to positive development in India.
And we see it from the defense perspective, joint projects,
collaboration between defense industry
creates better opportunities for interoperability
which is then enabling for training
and exercising and so on and so forth.
But there's clearly a domestic benefit for India
if we're involved in that kind of collaboration.
So from the Defense Department,
I can only appreciate your comment
and say that I agree it's important,
but I better leave that to my colleagues elsewhere
in government to really focus and drill down on.
- Yes, sir.
- Thank you, Randy, for doing this.
(clears throat) Sorry.
My name is Donghui Yu
with China Review News Agency of Hong Kong.
Randy, in term of the military presence
and deployment in the area, how would you compare
Trump administrations in Indo-Pacific strategy
and Obama administration's Asia rebalancing strategy?
How would you compare these two?
Is there any differences or similarities?
Thank you. - Sure.
When I was part of the loyal opposition
in the Obama administration, I was always supportive
of the so called pivot or rebalance.
I'm not sure they ever landed
on how they were gonna brand that.
But the pivot, rebalance because I certainly agree
that the Pacific was a priority
and over time that should be reflected
in our defense posture and our capabilities
and I think the Obama administration did things
to move us in that direction.
I think one of the biggest advantages we have
is we've got Congress now resourcing
the Department of Defense at a better level.
Obama administration was trying to do all this
during sequestration, which was damn hard,
because not only are the real resources not there,
there's also the perception that that sequestration
created in the region, would our uptick
through the pivot or rebalance be sustainable,
durable given budgetary constraints, et cetera.
So we've got Congress fully committed
to resourcing our defense needs.
We've got a very good uptick.
We wanna be good stewards of that and do the right thing
and prove that we're worthy and that there's payoff
for the American taxpayer
and that's what we're looking to do.
We may not be resourced at the same level every year
but we've got very good support from the Congress
through programs like Maritime Security Initiative,
which is a capacity-building effort
throughout Southeast Asia,
other programs of similar nature.
So I think that's our biggest advantage.
We're really working hand in glove with Congress
to resource this effort.
- Deepa.
- [Deepa] Deepa Ollapally from Sigur Center
for Asian Studies GWU.
One of the centerpieces of course of the upcoming dialogue
is the Indo-Pacific, and I wanted to raise the,
one simmering crisis that's been going on since February
in the Indo-Pacific, and that's the Maldives.
And it seems to me that some of the concerns
that you raised about free and open
all come together in the Maldives
given that there's cruel and authoritarian government.
Chinese have basically overtaken rather starkly
India's long-standing political
and strategic advantages there.
And so it seems to be having flipped pretty much
including the Maldives returning several helicopters
to India and so forth.
So my question is,
is the Maldives of concern to the United States?
How much concerned are you on that?
And what lessons, if anything, have you taken away
from India's action or not action during this crisis
which is you know still simmering
given that there's election coming up
in the end of September?
So, and will that be on the agenda and the upcoming talks?
- Thank you for raising this.
This is an issue of concern.
And as you say, it's still simmering
so I don't wanna go into great detail
or specificity about potential responses
'cause it is a dynamic situation to some extent.
I think we will, we have been discussing this
with our friends in India and very well.
It may come up at the two-plus-two.
But I think a number of things you can count on,
we need to shine a light on what's happening there
because I don't think it's well-understood or well-known
outside of small circles of people
who deal with these issues, but there should be
broader concern because it's not only
about the unfortunate people there
who have seen judges thrown in jail,
opposition leaders jailed or exiled.
It's a matter of a broader regional problem
when you fold in the China piece to that.
They don't have any particular concern
about freedom or political liberties there
and the future of the people there.
They have concerns about their own influence and access.
So that, we need to shine a light on all that
and bring in the experiences of others
and look at Djibouti, look at Sri Lanka,
look at other examples where countries
brought the Chinese in under certain circumstance,
certain conditions and certain understandings
and that quickly evolved in a direction
where China was exerting undue influence
and eroding the sovereignty of countries in question.
Now the leader may not care.
He may be making a deal that's gonna financially benefit him
and ensure that he can maintain political control,
but I suspect the people would care greatly.
So that's why shining a light is still important.
We saw in Vanuatu, for example,
when stories started to emerge
about the Chinese negotiating for a base.
There was a backlash there.
So shining a light on that is important.
Beyond that, looking at particular measures
and things in the toolkit looking at
what we might be able to do on visas,
looking at what we might be able to do
on economic consequence.
Those are all things that are under consideration,
but as you noted it's a simmering dynamic situation
so I wouldn't go into a lot of detail at this point.
- [Phoenix] Hi, I'm Phoenix Huang
with Hong Kong Phoenix TV.
Nice to see you again, Mr. Schriver.
So I have a question.
Could you please give us a broader picture about
how does the US and India
military cooperation moved forward,
and specifically on military sales
that we know that India wants,
wants to get the US EMAL System
which is the electronic catapult system
for the aircraft carrier.
And also how, likely, how possible
does the US want to sell the F/A-18
to India for their aircraft carrier?
Thank you.
- I think the security assistance aspect,
defense sales aspect of our relationship
is going to have an upward trajectory.
We certainly wanna convey to our Indian friends
that we wanna be a partner of choice
when it comes to their defense and security needs.
There are several
prongs to that overall approach.
We've gotta get these enabling agreements in place.
So there are certain things you're talking about
that we're not in a position to do right now
because the enabling agreements aren't there.
We need to do that.
We need to make clear where we can provide
capability and alternatives to what they're considering now
and we had a previous discussion
about their air defense needs
so clarifying what we can do as an alternative
and being a good partner there.
We need to build confidence and trust over time.
So we've gone from zero defense sales,
I forget the exact timeline,
a decade ago or so to $18 billion.
But we're still growing, comfortable with one another,
learning about our very complex FMS system
and how we support those programs.
So again I think the trajectory will be upward.
I don't wanna get into specific details
about the systems you're asking about.
That'll all be discussed and worked through.
I think on the on the exercise training side,
we're gonna see an uptick in the, as I said,
the complexity scope of those exercises
and our ability to do that
in a multilateral environment as well,
bringing in other countries to those exercises.
So overall we're very bullish, as I said earlier,
and defense security cooperation will be a part of that.
- [Ramesh] Yeah, my name is Ramesh Dishpande.
One question.
Today's Wall Street Journal carries an article
saying that both China and Russia are working hard
to surpass US conventional defense capacity,
now they want to create almost equal situation there.
And there the element of space defense
is assuming a lot of (mumbles) with China.
India has made good progress on the space side,
okay, they're going good.
Do you see any potential for India and US
to cooperate on developing space-based defense strategy?
Thank you.
- Very good question.
So first point I would make is you've
articulated the main reason we produced
the National Defense Strategy that we did.
Pillar number one is to make great power competition
a priority on how we approach our defense,
posture and requirements and doctrine, et cetera
and prepare to deal with fair competitors.
Having that in our National Defense Strategy
is very empowering for bureaucrats like me,
but for our services, for our combatant commands.
So we're thinking long and hard
about how to be prepared for whatever
China and Russia may do on the conventional side
as well as the strategic side.
So it's been an effort that has enjoyed
very senior leadership.
President Trump endorsed the National Security Strategy
which is talked about.
China is a strategic competitor,
Secretary Mattis' National Defense Strategy
and you'll see a steady flow of that,
our National Military Strategy will be coming out
at some point in the not-too-distant future.
So that's the general point.
The specific point, I think, we'd be very interested
in exploring the possibilities in the area of space,
I'm sure you're following the developments on our side
and the interest in creating a space possibly,
possibly a separate service is what Secretary Mattis
will discuss with the Congress.
But a space force and a separate command
is probably the interim step that's being done for a reason.
It's being done because we realize
the growing challenges in space
and having good partners with capability
is truly gonna be of interest to us as we go forward.
- Yes.
- [Su] Thank you, my name is Su Rin.
US in the security firm in cyber force.
Is is cyber security a mutual topic of discussion
that you plan to have in this two-plus-two
or I guess in a similar forum?
- Yeah, I don't know how specific
or what level of detail we'd get into on cyber security.
But I think if you talk about regional security challenges
and you obviously gravitate towards
some common shared concerns about China
and North Korea for that matter,
there's certainly a cyber component to that.
So it's something that we're,
again looking broadly for partners
who have not only the shared concerns
but capabilities and ideas about best practices.
We need to do better on cyber.
We're gonna have another strategy paper coming out
on cyber through the department.
We have created a cyber command
so again I think it's an area
where we need strong partners with good ideas
and I think we'll be compelled to talk about that
either in this forum or elsewhere
given the challenges we face from China and Korea.
- If I may just add to that.
We've actually had a dialogue under the rubric
of Homeland Security for many years.
But the interesting question to consider
is whether there is a defense component
particularly as our efforts at interoperability
and integration begin today whether we need to bring that
under the specific rubric of defense.
So that's something to think about.
- Yeah, I think there could be.
And we were,
the expression we were trying to fly
while we were building the plane
and this mean cyber is something
that we aren't particularly organized well for
but we're trying to get better
in the creation of Cyber Command
and thinking of the defense components of that
has now positioned us, I think, to talk to partners
in the defense space about it.
- [Sullivan] Hi, Sullivan Gassman.
I'm with the International Energy Partnership.
You mentioned how important it is
that we give space to India given the, excuse me, Pakistan,
given their recent elections on certain areas.
I actually wanted to ask you a bit about how our strategy
in India can be affected by our own elections
just given that every four years there's a chance
our leadership, who determines our approach
and meeting our objectives and even the
objectives themselves can change.
So yeah, I just wanted to ask you a bit
about how that timeline during Bush to Obama,
Obama and Trump affects your strategy.
- Well, where I said it doesn't,
it doesn't enter in the calculus much
'cause we've seen consistency,
understanding the value of this relationship
and trying to really push the envelope
of where the potentials are.
And I would add, in Congress, one of the,
it used to be the largest, I don't know if it still is.
It's the largest caucus in Congress is the India caucus,
and it's bipartisan.
And I've participated in some discussions with them
and with Secretary Mattis.
And when you go into one of those meetings
it's standing remotely.
So that leads me to think that this is not a partisan issue,
it's not a one administration versus another issue.
There's large consensus in the United States
about wanting to build this relationship out
and gives me confidence that we do that
no matter the outcome of future elections.
- And the same is true in India as well,
which is good reason for, yes.
- [Benjamin] Thank you very much.
Benjamin Tur, no current affiliation.
Could you say something about
your comment on Iran about
possible US collaborate,
US-India collaboration or lack of it in the Middle East?
I'm thinking specifically of Egypt,
Palestine, Israel, Syria, Turkey.
- Yeah, I think the conversations
that I've been involved in the preparations
we're making have largely focused on the Indo-Pacific.
I think Secretary Mattis, Secretary Pompeo
obviously have global responsibilities
and think globally in a way that I don't always do
and as a assistant secretary with regional responsibilities.
So I would assume if those topics do come up
at the two-plus-two or beyond we would have interested
parties on our side to have that discussion,
because we see the US-India relationship
is really grounded by shared vision, shared interest
come from two large democracies.
So if we can partner with one another in those areas
I'm sure our leadership would be interested
in having that discussion.
- We're gonna take one last question
and that goes to the young lady there.
- [Katie] Thank you.
Katie Wong with NTDTV.
Recently, DOD released the annual
congressional report on China.
This report seems quite different
from the reports we have seen before.
So can you share more of your thoughts
while preparing for this report
and the methodology and so on?
- Yeah, I'm not sure I would've shared the characterization
but it's interesting that you note that.
I think what's different is China continues to develop,
improve, change so our reports reflect that.
We try through the China military power report
to do a very objective non-politicized description
of what China is doing to advance its capabilities.
I'd date myself if I said Joe Friday, just the facts,
but that's, if you know that reference
that's how we approach the China military power report,
just the facts.
But I think the facts are that China has been making
rapid progress in certain areas.
That's what you get when you devote
double-digit increases to your defense budget
for over a decade now, almost two decades,
you get improvement and you get advancements.
And so the power report looks at things
that previous ones didn't.
The hypersonic, the developments in hypersonics,
anti-ship ballistic missiles and a range of things
we didn't have to talk about a decade ago.
So I wouldn't have characterized it that way,
I just would've said we're reporting the facts here
and that's what the facts are.
- Randy, let me thank you for,
not just taking the time,
which of course I'm very thankful for,
but for the extraordinary effort
and commitment that you brought to this position in the job
at a time when there is considerable flux
in the United States, in the international community
and to be able, in the face of those circumstances,
to sort of stay in the course and do the work
that you guys are doing diligently, you and your staff.
I do really wanna thank you as a citizen.
- Thank you.
- And of course I wanna thank you on behalf of Carnegie
for spending the morning here with us.
You're welcome anytime you wanna come back.
- Well, let's do this again. - And run the gauntlet again.
- Let's do this again.
- We would love that. - Yeah.
- We would love that. - Appreciate it.
- I thank all of you for coming here this morning.
Stay tuned.
(audience applauding)
Mr. Schriver, give us a preview
of what is likely to happen in the next week.
And I'm sure at some point, we'll have an opportunity
to pick up the threads and continue this discussion again.
So thank you very much and have a good day.
Thank you. - Thank you, appreciate it.
Thank you. - Let's do it again.