WEBVTT

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- After a great day one,

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and I think we would all agree
it was a very informative,

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insightful series of panels
that we had yesterday.

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Some keen observations and insights

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into the complexity of
operations in this theater.

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We'll begin day two with
an extraordinary leader

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and just to set the stage,

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we're gonna have a very quiet welcome

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for our first speaker because
he's been up all night.

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General Gustave Perna, the commander

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of the United States Army Materiel Command

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has phoned essentially all night

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and then because the army
that we know and love

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does not let generals have have much rest,

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upon landing went immediately
to I think to a two o'clock

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or 02:00 a.m. video teleconference
on some key decisions

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as Jill Townsend mentioned yesterday

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that the senior army
leadership is grappling with.

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But it should not be lost on this crowd

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that it was sufficiently
important that to General Perna

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that he make this trip and
to have the opportunity

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to engage with you
personally and directly.

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Convey his thoughts, his observations,

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and engage with you on the critical

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areas of sustaining
operations, multi-domain

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operations, in the
increasingly complex theater.

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So we've got some coffee up here guys.

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All right, if you need to
take a seat we can do that.

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If you need to take a little pause

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we'll all be very quiet let
you catch a little bit of rest.

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So ladies and gentlemen if
you would please very quietly

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welcome the commanding general

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United States Army Materiel Commander.

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(applauding)

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- So good morning everybody.

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It is as General Ham said it is my honor

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and pleasure to be here
and I'm very grateful

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for the invitation that was extended to me

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by both the AUSA and General Ham and team,

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but also by General Brown.

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Personal friend, somebody
who my admiration

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and respect for goes
beyond bounds and words,

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and Bob thanks so much.

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So it is true I got in last
night at about midnight

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and then was whisked off

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to a VTC for a few hours and then was able

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to do some things this morning,

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but be here on time.

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I will tell you the leading indicator

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and I know I'm being streamed live.

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If you start to see
drool come down my chin

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it's an indicator that maybe
I got to take a time out.

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So if I may today I would like to talk

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about a couple of things.

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First, it's the U.S. Army's
modernization strategy

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and what we're going to focus on.

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The focus of our modernization strategy

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is to ensure that our
soldiers, that are units

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are deploying with all the lethality they

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need to fight and win the next war.

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This morning you're
gonna hear me talk about

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one of the things that's very dear to me.

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How does sustainment fit into
the modernization picture?

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It is something that I
think about all the time

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and as I advise in
moving forward it's both

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about what equipment is
needed for sustainment,

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but how do we get the
best out of our equipment

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as we execute sustainment?

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You will hear me make direct
challenges to industry.

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Our industry partners and
to ourselves on the priority

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of everything we do,

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from modernizing our operational reach

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to modernizing our ability to decrease,

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as we modernize our ability to
decrease costs in execution.

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I'd like to take a moment,
though, to say thank you

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for all that are here today.

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All the general officers, civilians,

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and soldiers that are in the audience

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make this session
incredibly more powerful,

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but the reason I came out the LANPAC

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to be a part of this is
the nations that come

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here to be a part of it.

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The 36 nations that fly
in from all throughout

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the Pacific to express
their partnership with us,

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to learn what we're doing,
to see how we're doing it

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and then for us to grow
together is what is important.

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So I want to say thank
you for this opportunity.

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It is a big deal.

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Two months ago, the army announced that it

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will activate the U.S.
Army Futures Command.

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I'm proud to tell you that is on track

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and we will have IOC in July as directed

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by the secretary and the chief.

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Its mission will be to identify, develop,

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new capabilities, and technologies

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that deliver lethal weapons to our force

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in a timely manner.

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The goal is to achieve clear
overmatch in the future

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conflicts by increasing
what has made our army great

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in the past.

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From precision fires
to strategic mobility,

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to mission command, our
legacy is our future.

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The key is how do we go about doing it?

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Sustainment may not be
the first thing that comes

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to mind when you hear modernization.

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For me, as I said, it does.

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You may think about the
future of vertical lift

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long before you think about
the onboard diagnostics,

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but the ability to provide
the maneuver commander

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with operational reach to
enable his freedom of action

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and prolong his forces
endurance is an essential part

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of what we will do through modernization.

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Especially for the commander operating

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in a theater such as the one
as the Indo-Pacific region.

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Our ability to provide that reach,

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that freedom of maneuver,
that endurance is

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directly tied to our willingness to

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challenge the status quo.

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We must be creative, we must
be willing to prioritize,

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and we must be willing
to invest in the future.

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So what does that mean for the future

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of sustainment today?

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For the soldiers in
combat, it means everything

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and for us right now it
means making a choice

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between two potential courses of action.

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Choosing to challenge
and change status quo

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to reach the best one
is our responsibility.

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One of the futures is I talked about

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at the last session was the young children

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that are four, and five, six,
and seven years old today.

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The ones that we drop
off a baseball practice

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and at the soccer fields.

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The ones we see in church.

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The ones who, in 15 years,
will be our soldiers in combat.

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It is their future that
we are responsible for

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and only today can we
ensure that they will have

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the greatest advantages.

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Today we must get involved
so that in the future

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the equipment that is on
the battlefield provides

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us with the greatest lethality.

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We must understand what
the difference will

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be in our tanks, our
Bradleys and our helicopters,

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and what approach are
we gonna take on that?

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If we allow ourselves to
follow the acquisition process

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and the bureaucracy that
is embedded in that process

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and the parochialism that is supported

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from many different entities
we will not be successful.

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We, the army leaders,
the secretary, the army,

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the chief of staff of the army,

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are challenging the status quo.

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They are not gonna
accept business as usual.

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They're focused on Army Futures Command.

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Their priority, their six priorities,

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and their willingness to a lot funds

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to those six priorities means a lot.

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It has not been done in my lifetime

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as a general officer where
I reflect on six stalwart

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priorities that we're focused on.

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And I have never seen
the army move as fast

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as it is to create Army Futures Command

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so that we can develop, execute,

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and provide the equipment
needed on the battlefield

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for today's five year-olds,
15, 20, 30 years from now.

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The overmatch that we seek is necessary.

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We know that while we've been focused

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for the last 17 years
over inessential CENTCOM,

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we know as we've operated
in a coin environment,

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we know as we've focused modernization

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on that fight those who could potentially

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be our future enemies
have not been constrained.

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They have not been in this fight.

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They are not constrained
by the bureaucracy

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of their governments and or the funding.

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They are not constrained by taking

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our good ideas and applying
them to what they want.

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We must understand this.

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It's Sun Tzu, we've all read it.

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We understand that what we have
to do when we see ourselves,

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we see the environment and
we see the enemy situation.

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Those who are gonna be successful
assess and make changes.

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It is clear that we've
done well the last 15 years

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in defeating our enemy.

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It is clear that we've
adapted to that enemy

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and it is clear that
we will be victorious.

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What we must ensure that
we're ready to pivot

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to the next requirements
and that is defined,

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in my opinion, as the near peer competitor

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and if that is the enemy that we see

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and then we see ourselves
in the environment,

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we must adapt.

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The secretary and the chief are adapting.

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Their priorities and their focus

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on the future modernization
of the army equipment

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and training will enable the way we take

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or we approach the next fight.

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I'm a big believer in
the difference between

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being ready and reacting
will be accounted for

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in the last of American lives.

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We know in reflection
every war we've been in

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since the Revolutionary
War all the way through

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to today, we have been a
remarkable force in our

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ability to react.

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It has cost American lives.

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Are we willing to wait
for the next requirement

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against a near peer
competitor to understand

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that we do not have the best equipment

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and the best trained
force on that equipment

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or are we going to change the paradigm?

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I'm proud to tell you that our secretary

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and our chief have changed the paradigm.

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The VTC that General Ham talked about

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that I was in yesterday and today

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are all about prioritizing funding

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to the modernization priorities identified

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by the secretary and the chief.

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They are pushing millions
and in some cases billions

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of dollars into their future, so that our

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children will have the
capability they need

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to fight and win our nation's wars.

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It is with that leadership and that effort

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that I have confidence
that we'll be successful.

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It is with that leadership
and that effort,

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that we will be able to build partners

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around the world, the capacity needed

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to fight anybody because
our partners will be with us

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and our goal is for them to be
equally manned and equipped.

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It's sessions like today
that allow us to build

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the relationships and garner the ideas

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and work together so that in the future

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we're one team, not collective teams.

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We know in this region
alone that the 36 nations,

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that the 60 percent of the surface

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covered by water constrains
us from being partners,

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but because of the leadership out here

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because of events like this today,

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we know that we are
gaining strength every day.

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The key is is will we
take advantage of it?

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The key is moving the
ball forward not admiring

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the problem, but yet
determining what we're gonna do

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and take action accordingly.

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This is where I think we are right now

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in the United States Army.

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I think our leadership and
I hold myself accountable

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to one of those people are making

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the hard calls, have
prioritized our efforts,

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have determined what we need to do next,

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and are willing to make decisions today

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that might not be popular,
so that in the future

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we will be successful on that
decisive action battlefield.

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I think the keys to our success,
as I talked about early,

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is remembering our three strengths.

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Our ability to put fires
on any enemy at any time.

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Our ability to have strategic mobility

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across the requirement or where we're at

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and the ability to
mission command ourselves.

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All will be challenged
out here in the Pacific.

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Each, the tyranny of distance will cause

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a lot of friction, but with our focus

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in these three areas I am convinced

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that we will remain
ahead of the requirements

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and enabled to defeat our enemies.

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That is what modernization
of our force our army will do

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as we move forward.

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Not everything, though, has to be new.

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There's several things that we're doing

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to modernize ourselves inside
of our action right now.

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The United States Army in the last year

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has moved 86 equivalent
brigade combat teams

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around the world.

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86, three years ago that number was 17.

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Today we're able to project
from our CONUS based

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installations around the world,

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Brigade combat teams and their enablers

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and every day we gain strength on it

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and we're more efficient.

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We realize that the
environment has changed

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and that we are no longer
a forward based army.

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So what did we do?

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We changed our ability to deploy ourselves

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because it's not been since 2003

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since we've executed that.

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The second thing in this
light is we're changing

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the way we are gonna approach

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the long term sustainment of theaters.

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How do we integrate, synchronize,

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planning of sustainment through execution

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in each of these theaters?

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We have redesigned LOGCAP.

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We have broken it down and built it

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back up to meet the
requirements of the future.

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In LOGCAP V, we will push the envelope.

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We will embed planners
with COCOMs with ASCCs.

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We will expect and hold
accountable industry

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to make needs not only for today,

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but what we expect of the future.

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We believe they will be an intricate,

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integral part Of immediate action.

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Not after we owned the
terrain for a little while.

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We think this is gonna be a game changer.

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The third thing we have
done as many have known

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we prepositioned, army prepositioned

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stocks around the world.

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We have brigade combat teams
stationed around the world.

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They're afloat, they're in warehouses,

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and they are ready to go
when the president declares.

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You know why there's so much better now?

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Before it used to be the
basic piece of equipment

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where we would guarantee you, because

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of previous leaders, that
the equipment would work,

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but it would take us weeks if not months

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to put that equipment together.

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Now because of a great effort we have

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it structured so that
equipment can be ready

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and drawn in 96 hours
anywhere in the world

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and head to the line of departure

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with a complete fighting team;

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has not been able to be done
before, we can do that now.

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We can do that in the Pacific

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and we can do that in Europe.

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That is commitment to the
changing environments.

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The last thing that we've
done, we've reworked,

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is our supply stocks for class nine.

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We record the way we manage it
over in Korea and in Europe.

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We've created umbrella's
of our requirements

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so that we have a constant
stream of capability

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in both theaters being exercised every day

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as we deploy forces for training,

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but then we extended it
and we redesigned the way

20:26.940 --> 20:30.683
the brigade combat teams
ASLs are put together.

20:32.440 --> 20:34.530
No longer are the days that we're using

20:34.530 --> 20:39.180
demand based on one National
Training Center rotation,

20:39.180 --> 20:42.570
but yet the demand is
based on the op tempo

20:42.570 --> 20:44.573
of the equipment across time.

20:46.110 --> 20:48.360
We've increased the breadth and depth

20:48.360 --> 20:53.360
of the class nine from 1300
lines to up to 4000 lines,

20:54.800 --> 20:58.603
and then we made those lines deployable.

20:59.810 --> 21:02.270
We matched it against the trucks inside

21:02.270 --> 21:04.040
of our organizations.

21:04.040 --> 21:07.510
We designed how we load it

21:07.510 --> 21:10.643
and now we have an ASL that's 100% mobile.

21:12.620 --> 21:15.533
This will enable our war fighting force,

21:17.780 --> 21:19.750
so at the end of the day

21:23.540 --> 21:27.070
how do we put fires on the enemy?

21:27.070 --> 21:30.683
How do we maintain the
advantage of strategic mobility?

21:33.060 --> 21:35.020
And how do we execute mission command,

21:35.020 --> 21:37.093
is what I think about everyday.

21:40.620 --> 21:43.580
It starts with the future in modernization

21:44.541 --> 21:47.310
and what capabilities are we
gonna bring into the force

21:48.710 --> 21:51.260
and then extends all the
way down to what is our own

21:51.260 --> 21:53.623
tactical efforts to
improve what we're doing?

21:55.460 --> 21:57.953
We are a great army.

21:59.630 --> 22:03.573
We are led by great
leaders with great vision.

22:05.030 --> 22:08.103
We are challenging status quo,

22:09.610 --> 22:14.610
so that when something occurs
we will be ready not reacting.

22:18.810 --> 22:23.470
That is my challenge to
all of us to be ready

22:23.470 --> 22:24.883
and not to react.

22:25.930 --> 22:27.940
To be ready within ourselves

22:27.940 --> 22:30.303
and to be ready within our partnerships.

22:32.220 --> 22:35.120
That will be the key to our success.

22:35.120 --> 22:37.720
That will ensure our victory

22:37.720 --> 22:41.700
and more importantly as
people watch us and they

22:41.700 --> 22:44.290
understand what we're doing,

22:44.290 --> 22:47.583
it will deter them from coming against us.

22:50.150 --> 22:53.010
So with that said I'd like
to say thank you very much

22:53.010 --> 22:54.450
for your time.

22:54.450 --> 22:57.610
General Ham, General Brown
It's a great honor to be here

22:58.620 --> 23:01.570
and, sir, with your permission
I'll answer a few questions.

23:04.098 --> 23:06.515
(applauding)

23:28.290 --> 23:30.970
First question is, is
there a risk associated

23:30.970 --> 23:32.833
with the focus on overmatch?

23:33.750 --> 23:36.350
Overmatch is expensive, not guaranteed,

23:36.350 --> 23:39.940
and at best fleeting,
et cetera, et cetera.

23:39.940 --> 23:43.270
Yeah, absolutely, I
would tell you everything

23:43.270 --> 23:48.270
we do as war fighters
risk has to be determined.

23:48.600 --> 23:51.133
The operational risk there of.

23:52.060 --> 23:56.923
Me personally I come from
the place in the school yard

23:58.070 --> 24:00.253
where you go all in.

24:01.140 --> 24:02.670
You go all in.

24:02.670 --> 24:06.860
You defeat the enemy
first, fast, and best,

24:06.860 --> 24:09.720
and then you worry about
what happens afterwards.

24:09.720 --> 24:11.870
You do it morally, ethically, and legally

24:11.870 --> 24:13.193
and we'll be all right.

24:14.520 --> 24:17.127
It is a difficult task
that secretary of the army

24:17.127 --> 24:18.853
and the chief have right now.

24:19.830 --> 24:24.120
They have to continue to
fight CENTCOM operations,

24:24.120 --> 24:27.010
man and equip a force to fight there,

24:27.010 --> 24:30.960
and then they have to get
ready for the next requirement.

24:30.960 --> 24:35.390
It is a balancing act and it is something

24:35.390 --> 24:37.333
that I know weighs on them dearly.

24:38.580 --> 24:42.950
I am the advocate at the
table that recommends

24:42.950 --> 24:44.980
go big and go bold.

24:44.980 --> 24:48.950
I like to have the ammunition
that we need in the depos

24:48.950 --> 24:52.220
and arsenals and plants,
so that when it's called

24:52.220 --> 24:54.913
upon to use it it's ready.

24:55.780 --> 24:57.563
Ammunition is expensive.

24:58.570 --> 25:01.610
There could be a sound argument about not

25:01.610 --> 25:03.980
producing the precision munitions that we

25:03.980 --> 25:07.550
need to meet the requirements,

25:07.550 --> 25:10.913
and it could be justified
especially if nothing occurs.

25:12.180 --> 25:13.810
But I'm here to tell you that the amount

25:13.810 --> 25:15.240
of time it would take to produce

25:15.240 --> 25:18.890
the munitions needed to
fight a peer competitor

25:18.890 --> 25:23.693
is not measured in days,
but in months and years.

25:24.620 --> 25:28.480
And so in that case, I'm
a big believer in bold

25:28.480 --> 25:30.043
and overmatch accordingly.

25:31.930 --> 25:34.210
Modernization requires sustained

25:34.210 --> 25:37.830
and predictable funding
for a decade at least,

25:37.830 --> 25:40.330
are you confident that the
army will get the budget

25:40.330 --> 25:44.460
that will allow the modernization
strategy to succeed?

25:44.460 --> 25:46.544
Okay, many of you already know this,

25:46.544 --> 25:49.430
but just for myself I'm gonna repeat it.

25:49.430 --> 25:52.453
In simplest terms, money.

25:53.430 --> 25:56.270
When the secretary and the
chief are able to spend money

25:56.270 --> 25:59.330
they have three knobs that
they can spend money on:

25:59.330 --> 26:03.053
people, readiness, and modernization.

26:03.930 --> 26:06.760
Normally, usually, generally they're able

26:06.760 --> 26:09.660
to rotate two of those knobs to the right,

26:09.660 --> 26:12.950
people, more people, more readiness,

26:12.950 --> 26:16.160
and then they have to take
a hit on modernization

26:16.160 --> 26:18.640
or if they're going to
modernize they'll take

26:18.640 --> 26:20.703
a hit and they won't add any more people.

26:21.640 --> 26:24.210
So right now if you're paying attention

26:24.210 --> 26:27.530
and reading you'll figure
out that we're turning

26:27.530 --> 26:28.600
all three knobs.

26:28.600 --> 26:33.600
We're adding people, we're
increasing our readiness,

26:33.870 --> 26:36.663
and we're increasing our modernization.

26:37.850 --> 26:41.910
So the thought will be
can we sustain that?

26:41.910 --> 26:45.760
Can we sustain all three
knobs going to the right?

26:45.760 --> 26:47.690
Because if the money comes short

26:49.490 --> 26:51.640
then we're in, we have a problem

26:51.640 --> 26:54.770
because you can't turn
off people in one night.

26:54.770 --> 26:57.450
You can't turn off training in one night

26:57.450 --> 27:01.400
and you can't turn off
modernization in one night.

27:01.400 --> 27:03.313
So it's a balanced approach.

27:04.380 --> 27:06.070
And what I think the secretary,

27:06.070 --> 27:08.650
not what I think what I know,

27:08.650 --> 27:12.330
the reason we're in these VTCs today

27:12.330 --> 27:15.160
and tomorrow is because the secretary

27:15.160 --> 27:16.910
and the chief seek necessarily

27:16.910 --> 27:19.560
that we're not gonna have extended funding

27:19.560 --> 27:24.560
into the future, but yet
we get quite a bit of money

27:24.630 --> 27:26.070
in our army.

27:26.070 --> 27:29.200
A significant amount of money.

27:29.200 --> 27:33.203
So the question is, are we
spending it the best way?

27:35.020 --> 27:39.070
My sense is, not necessarily.

27:39.070 --> 27:40.340
We're not doing it illegally.

27:40.340 --> 27:41.660
We're not doing it immorally,

27:41.660 --> 27:43.840
we're not doing it unethically,

27:43.840 --> 27:46.610
but we've come quite a
bit accustomed to having

27:46.610 --> 27:48.583
a lot of money and spending it,

27:50.040 --> 27:51.580
and so what the secretary and the chief

27:51.580 --> 27:55.230
are doing right now is
they're focusing our spending

27:55.230 --> 27:57.623
to the output we're trying to achieve.

27:58.800 --> 28:01.570
So they see the potential of not getting

28:01.570 --> 28:06.110
a budget in 20 that we have today.

28:06.110 --> 28:09.860
So the actions are
taken today is how do we

28:09.860 --> 28:12.163
eliminate spending where we don't need it?

28:13.790 --> 28:16.350
How do we do the things that are not,

28:16.350 --> 28:18.993
eliminate the things that
are not in our portfolio?

28:22.560 --> 28:24.990
It's an important question to ask.

28:24.990 --> 28:26.570
I'll give you an example.

28:26.570 --> 28:28.410
I was in a briefing yesterday

28:28.410 --> 28:29.300
and there will be some people

28:29.300 --> 28:31.950
that will gasp a little
bit when I bring this up,

28:31.950 --> 28:34.060
but we're looking for
monies for the things

28:34.060 --> 28:37.130
we need in future vertical lift

28:37.130 --> 28:42.130
in future combat systems,
soldier lethality,

28:43.120 --> 28:45.440
and so I hit, we were looking for ideas

28:45.440 --> 28:47.217
and I hit the mic and I said,

28:47.217 --> 28:48.927
"okay I think it's time for the army

28:48.927 --> 28:50.857
"to get out of the boat business."

28:51.760 --> 28:56.727
I think we ought to stop
producing our soldier Navy

29:01.490 --> 29:05.260
and we should not produce the next ship

29:05.260 --> 29:07.950
and we should eliminate that capability.

29:07.950 --> 29:12.470
That is heresy especially out
here in the Pacific right.

29:12.470 --> 29:14.150
I already told General
Brown because I don't want

29:14.150 --> 29:17.810
him to hate me, but you
know those are the kinds of

29:17.810 --> 29:19.793
conversations we have to have.

29:21.380 --> 29:22.810
And trust me, nobody hit the mic

29:22.810 --> 29:25.020
and said, "brilliant, Gus, brilliant."

29:25.020 --> 29:28.580
(aduience lauhging)

29:28.580 --> 29:33.580
But as senior leaders, we owe
options with operational risk

29:35.130 --> 29:38.190
associated with it, so that the secretary

29:38.190 --> 29:40.870
and the chief can make tough decisions.

29:40.870 --> 29:44.100
My bluff to you, if we
think that a bunch of money

29:44.100 --> 29:47.333
is gonna continue to flow
our way I don't see it.

29:48.590 --> 29:50.010
I just don't see it.

29:50.010 --> 29:52.870
The second thing is we get a lot of money.

29:52.870 --> 29:54.870
We need to spend it wisely.

29:54.870 --> 29:57.860
The third thing is we can't be everything.

29:57.860 --> 30:00.163
As the chief tells us all the time,

30:01.010 --> 30:05.270
he says inside the army, it'll
take all three campos to win.

30:05.270 --> 30:08.030
Compos one, compos two, and compos three,

30:08.030 --> 30:10.110
Active Guard Reserve.

30:10.110 --> 30:14.035
This thought process is
just the act of force is

30:14.035 --> 30:16.880
not a good thought process.

30:16.880 --> 30:19.730
Embrace it and wrap your arms around it.

30:19.730 --> 30:21.550
The second thing he tells us,

30:21.550 --> 30:26.550
we will always go to war
with our fellow services.

30:27.088 --> 30:30.280
The Marines, the Navy, the Air Force,

30:30.280 --> 30:34.170
and the Coast Guard
will always go together.

30:34.170 --> 30:36.680
Think bigger than
yourself and think bigger

30:36.680 --> 30:38.090
than your organizations,

30:38.090 --> 30:40.830
and we will make the better decisions.

30:40.830 --> 30:43.990
So the bluff to that is I don't know

30:44.910 --> 30:46.630
how much money we're gonna get.

30:46.630 --> 30:51.140
My sense is it will
change in the near future

30:52.000 --> 30:53.690
and so the decisions we make today

30:53.690 --> 30:56.290
will be the big difference.

30:56.290 --> 30:58.070
What I'm proud to tell you is that we have

30:58.070 --> 30:59.793
leaders working on that right now.

31:02.090 --> 31:04.040
Oh, so here's the next question.

31:04.040 --> 31:06.030
What is the key, is from you Bob?

31:06.030 --> 31:09.001
What is the key role of army watercraft?

31:09.001 --> 31:11.251
(laughing)

31:16.690 --> 31:18.080
Okay, so I got to tell you,

31:18.080 --> 31:19.380
I don't think there is one

31:22.720 --> 31:23.760
because I know this is being streamed

31:23.760 --> 31:25.150
and I'm sure that she's watching it

31:25.150 --> 31:28.363
and I don't want to be backed
up on my recommendation.

31:30.930 --> 31:32.540
Hey, there's a role for everything.

31:32.540 --> 31:37.450
It's been a great mission
and it's a great team.

31:37.450 --> 31:40.730
It's about priorities and decision making.

31:40.730 --> 31:44.060
It's not about what, in my opinion,

31:44.060 --> 31:46.020
what they can or cannot do.

31:46.020 --> 31:47.880
It's about what do we need

31:47.880 --> 31:49.423
and when do we need it.

31:50.350 --> 31:51.740
So clearly there's a role,

31:51.740 --> 31:53.860
there's a role out here in the Pacific

31:53.860 --> 31:57.570
as we build partnerships, as we exercise

31:57.570 --> 32:00.900
Pacific pathways and we find ourselves

32:00.900 --> 32:04.220
scattered in the vast Pacific.

32:04.220 --> 32:06.243
It clearly enables what we do.

32:07.630 --> 32:12.630
My sense so and I defer to others is, okay

32:13.574 --> 32:18.010
when the bang really hits will
we be using the watercraft?

32:18.010 --> 32:19.930
That's just my personal opinion

32:19.930 --> 32:22.493
and I'll take your cards
and letters afterwards.

32:24.910 --> 32:27.100
Last question, how will Futures Command

32:27.100 --> 32:29.820
influence the field in timeline

32:29.820 --> 32:34.820
to the force post the
development in contrast?

32:36.140 --> 32:39.927
Okay, in simplest terms
I'll leave you with this:

32:42.810 --> 32:46.510
first of all I think
we're the greatest nation

32:46.510 --> 32:50.040
in the world in our ability

32:50.040 --> 32:53.690
to make sure our soldiers
have the equipment

32:53.690 --> 32:55.670
they need when they need it.

32:55.670 --> 32:57.910
I always talk about crossing the border

32:57.910 --> 33:01.360
in 2003 as a battalion commander,

33:01.360 --> 33:03.840
I was in a soft skinned Humvee.

33:03.840 --> 33:07.780
All my soldiers soft skin equipment.

33:07.780 --> 33:12.100
When I went back in 2006
as a brigade commander

33:12.100 --> 33:15.450
our whole fleets were being up armored.

33:15.450 --> 33:20.450
All our fleets being up
armored as we fought.

33:20.650 --> 33:24.110
When I went back in 2010 as the J4

33:24.110 --> 33:27.360
were fielding MRAPs, okay.

33:27.360 --> 33:30.290
No other country in the world

33:30.290 --> 33:34.860
could have and do what we did to field

33:34.860 --> 33:36.287
equipment to our soldiers

33:36.287 --> 33:39.870
and that speed to ensure their protection

33:39.870 --> 33:42.200
and their lethality, and
we ought to be pretty

33:42.200 --> 33:43.160
darn proud of that.

33:43.160 --> 33:46.170
Okay, it is remarkable.

33:46.170 --> 33:51.170
With that said, the immediate
focus on that war or wars

33:52.500 --> 33:55.940
Iraq and Afghanistan
took everything we had.

33:55.940 --> 34:00.940
Every dollar, every sense
of energy to do that.

34:02.050 --> 34:03.670
What the secretary and
the chief are trying

34:03.670 --> 34:08.670
to do with Futures Command is
get ahead of the requirements.

34:08.850 --> 34:12.100
They want one commander
who will synchronize

34:12.100 --> 34:15.810
and integrate all the capabilities inside

34:15.810 --> 34:20.660
the army to produce
output that will be needed

34:20.660 --> 34:25.093
in 15, 20, 25 years, not immediately.

34:26.270 --> 34:28.410
You want to put the requirements people,

34:28.410 --> 34:32.660
the contracting people,
the acquisition people,

34:32.660 --> 34:36.696
and the test people, and we
want to bring them all together

34:36.696 --> 34:40.640
and we want to hold them
accountable as a team.

34:40.640 --> 34:43.900
Unity of effort, unity
of command to produce

34:43.900 --> 34:45.683
the capability we will need.

34:47.194 --> 34:50.260
Now don't be, don't fool ourselves.

34:50.260 --> 34:52.060
Right now they're still constrained

34:52.060 --> 34:55.280
with the laws regulations and policies

34:55.280 --> 34:58.260
that exist today, but the secretary

34:58.260 --> 35:00.740
and the chief are taking that on.

35:00.740 --> 35:03.340
The second is funding.

35:03.340 --> 35:07.290
Funding is a crazy stream
with many different colors

35:07.290 --> 35:10.890
and we have to unravel that and
get that focus to our output

35:11.830 --> 35:13.690
and then the third thing is,

35:13.690 --> 35:17.660
we must have priorities that do not change

35:18.820 --> 35:20.810
and we have those now.

35:20.810 --> 35:23.610
Six priorities from the
secretary and the chief

35:23.610 --> 35:28.520
where we will drive
our efforts to do what?

35:28.520 --> 35:33.520
Improve Our lethality and our
ability to fight and win wars.

35:34.720 --> 35:37.990
I think modernization command
will bring that to us.

35:37.990 --> 35:41.180
I think their vision will
allow the synchronization

35:41.180 --> 35:43.380
and integration of all of our capabilities

35:43.380 --> 35:46.847
to a single output or as the chief says,

35:46.847 --> 35:49.007
"I just want one throat to choke."

35:51.290 --> 35:54.960
So I would I believe
it will be successful.

35:54.960 --> 35:56.860
What I also don't think you understand is

35:56.860 --> 36:00.970
the intangibles that are
gonna occur because of this.

36:00.970 --> 36:04.060
It will allow TRADOC to have greater focus

36:04.060 --> 36:06.850
on recruiting and training of the force.

36:06.850 --> 36:10.810
It would allow Army Materiel
Command to totally focus

36:10.810 --> 36:12.830
on sustainment of the army.

36:12.830 --> 36:16.530
It will ensure that Forces Command is only

36:16.530 --> 36:20.010
responsible for the equipping and training

36:20.010 --> 36:24.070
of that force, so
collectively the tangible

36:24.070 --> 36:27.440
and intangible outputs
are gonna be special,

36:27.440 --> 36:29.860
and we're all gonna be a part of it.

36:29.860 --> 36:32.829
So, sir that's my last question.

36:32.829 --> 36:34.130
Thank you very much.

36:34.130 --> 36:36.548
It's a great honor as always, thank you.

36:36.548 --> 36:38.965
(applauding)

37:04.520 --> 37:05.760
- Go get some sleep general.

37:05.760 --> 37:07.173
Go get some sleep.

37:08.380 --> 37:10.180
Thank you, General Perna.

37:10.180 --> 37:13.070
Clearly we have one of
the best logisticians

37:13.070 --> 37:16.810
and sustainment professionals in the world

37:16.810 --> 37:18.800
in charge of our Army Materiel Command

37:18.800 --> 37:20.450
and you just heard it.

37:20.450 --> 37:22.610
General Perna, has been a great friend

37:22.610 --> 37:24.260
and ally of the association.

37:24.260 --> 37:26.383
So thank you to General Perna.

37:27.490 --> 37:30.370
I'm gonna ask the panel guys
to start moving up here.

37:30.370 --> 37:32.520
We're gonna have our
first panel of the day

37:33.400 --> 37:35.587
which really is gonna
be kind of fascinating

37:35.587 --> 37:40.587
for all of you, entitled
non-kinetic power projection

37:40.850 --> 37:45.520
and the panel today will
discuss the role of space

37:45.520 --> 37:50.520
and cyber domains in this
critical region of the world.

37:50.550 --> 37:52.920
The panel chair is another good friend

37:52.920 --> 37:56.530
of the association, Lieutenant
General Jim Dickinson.

37:56.530 --> 37:59.700
The commander of U.S. Army Space
and Missile Defense Command

37:59.700 --> 38:03.410
today wearing his space
hat, not necessarily

38:03.410 --> 38:05.280
his missile defense hat,

38:05.280 --> 38:07.970
and our panel moderator
is Lieutenant General

38:07.970 --> 38:12.260
Retired Tony Crutchfield
who was the deputy commander

38:12.260 --> 38:17.230
at PACOM recently and he will
take charge of the panel,

38:17.230 --> 38:18.693
so Tony over to you.

38:22.153 --> 38:23.053
- Can you hear me?

38:24.400 --> 38:25.800
Thanks, Guy.

38:25.800 --> 38:30.800
Aloha, first thing, as Guy
said, I'm Tony Crutchfield

38:30.940 --> 38:33.400
I'm happy to be back and General Ham

38:33.400 --> 38:36.120
and also General Brown, very dear friend.

38:36.120 --> 38:39.950
Thank you for honoring me and letting me

38:39.950 --> 38:42.253
be a part of this panel.

38:44.700 --> 38:47.640
The panel course is
non-kinetic power projection

38:47.640 --> 38:50.000
and we're fortunate to have on this panel

38:50.000 --> 38:52.780
to my left Lieutenant
General Jim Dickinson

38:52.780 --> 38:56.610
who is the S.G. of U.S. Army
Space Missile Defense Command,

38:56.610 --> 38:59.450
Army Forces Strategic Command.

38:59.450 --> 39:04.450
Joining him will be
Brigadier General Tom James,

39:04.520 --> 39:07.713
Mr. Ron Pontius, and Mr. Chuck Eassa.

39:09.620 --> 39:13.040
The contact information
for all the panel members

39:13.040 --> 39:15.303
is on the screen behind us.

39:16.710 --> 39:19.137
Many if not all can
agree that non-kinetics

39:19.137 --> 39:22.740
are a significant combat multiplier today

39:22.740 --> 39:24.667
and it's gonna continue to be so

39:24.667 --> 39:28.690
and is going to grow in
significance of future battles.

39:28.690 --> 39:31.350
However, in the future we

39:31.350 --> 39:34.100
must become more fully integrated

39:34.100 --> 39:38.080
and normalized in our
plans whether it's peace,

39:38.080 --> 39:38.913
it's humanitarian, disaster assistance

39:38.913 --> 39:43.833
or disaster relief or during
full spectrum conflict.

39:47.160 --> 39:50.783
Our panel they will give us
their thoughts on the subject.

39:52.130 --> 39:56.130
After a brief opening
comments by each panel member

39:56.130 --> 39:58.260
we'll begin to take your questions.

39:58.260 --> 40:02.140
We have one hour and 15
minutes for our panel.

40:02.140 --> 40:05.170
I'll turn it over now
to General Dickinson.

40:05.170 --> 40:07.023
- Thanks, Tony, can hear me?

40:09.620 --> 40:11.445
All right, good morning, aloha.

40:11.445 --> 40:12.500
- [Audience] Aloha.

40:12.500 --> 40:14.707
We'll try that one more
time, come on, aloha.

40:14.707 --> 40:15.540
- [Audience] Aloha!

40:15.540 --> 40:18.270
- All right, first of all
it's great to be here out

40:18.270 --> 40:19.103
in the Pacific.

40:20.140 --> 40:22.910
General Ham, thanks again for putting

40:22.910 --> 40:24.730
on a great show for us here.

40:24.730 --> 40:26.020
This is always a great event

40:26.020 --> 40:28.280
and it seems like I meet
you more times than not

40:28.280 --> 40:29.690
in several different events.

40:29.690 --> 40:32.100
Whether it's space, whether
it's missile defense,

40:32.100 --> 40:34.820
but sir thank you for
what you do for our army

40:34.820 --> 40:35.760
and your team here.

40:35.760 --> 40:37.940
What a great team.

40:37.940 --> 40:39.780
General Brown, thank you sir for inviting

40:39.780 --> 40:41.510
me to get to lead this panel.

40:41.510 --> 40:42.840
It was a tough decision
when he said it was

40:42.840 --> 40:44.490
gonna be in Hawaii.

40:44.490 --> 40:46.690
So had a head of forced myself to change

40:46.690 --> 40:48.700
my calendar a little bit, but sir thanks

40:48.700 --> 40:51.790
for having us here and I
think this panel is very

40:51.790 --> 40:54.580
important, and important
if you kind of look

40:54.580 --> 40:56.350
at who's on the panel today.

40:56.350 --> 40:58.310
You know we're not from this AOR.

40:58.310 --> 41:00.020
So this is I think the first panel we've

41:00.020 --> 41:02.170
had where we don't all live work

41:02.170 --> 41:05.080
and breathe here in the PACOM AOR

41:05.080 --> 41:08.790
which tells us what we're
gonna talk about today

41:08.790 --> 41:11.450
will show us that the
domains that we talk about

41:11.450 --> 41:15.080
have no boundaries, have no AORs, no UCP

41:15.080 --> 41:17.110
boundaries that we have to adhere to.

41:17.110 --> 41:19.380
So again it's great to be here today

41:19.380 --> 41:21.190
and I thank General Crutchfield

41:21.190 --> 41:23.090
for moderating this panel

41:23.090 --> 41:24.990
and then my esteemed panel members looking

41:24.990 --> 41:26.170
down the line here.

41:26.170 --> 41:28.330
Tom James good to have you on the panel.

41:28.330 --> 41:30.000
Mr. Pontius, great to have you,

41:30.000 --> 41:32.620
and Colonel Retired Eassa,
thank you for being here today.

41:32.620 --> 41:35.130
I think they'll all clearly demonstrate

41:35.130 --> 41:40.080
that they are masters in their
particular fields of work.

41:40.080 --> 41:42.520
So really to kind of kick this off

41:42.520 --> 41:44.320
I want to kind of talk about the purpose.

41:44.320 --> 41:46.810
So the purpose of this panel
this morning is to address

41:46.810 --> 41:49.100
the emerging relevant challenges

41:49.100 --> 41:51.550
and opportunities presented by cyber,

41:51.550 --> 41:53.790
electronic warfare, space information

41:53.790 --> 41:56.040
operations, and public affairs.

41:56.040 --> 41:59.010
The overarching message this morning is

41:59.010 --> 42:02.670
that non-kinetics are a significant
combat multiplier today,

42:02.670 --> 42:05.510
but in the future must
become more fully integrated

42:05.510 --> 42:08.770
and normalized into our
plans whether in peacetime,

42:08.770 --> 42:11.810
during a humanitarian
assistance disaster relief

42:11.810 --> 42:14.323
or during a full spectrum conflict.

42:15.730 --> 42:20.020
Non-kinetic power projection
is domain agnostic,

42:20.020 --> 42:24.290
space information cyber,
electromagnetic spectrum.

42:24.290 --> 42:27.700
These aspects of modern
warfare have become a substrate

42:27.700 --> 42:30.890
underlying every type
of military operation

42:30.890 --> 42:32.450
and I want to give you
a little perspective.

42:32.450 --> 42:34.657
So I work for General Hyten commander

42:34.657 --> 42:36.380
of United States Strategic Command

42:36.380 --> 42:38.700
and I think he puts it in a great context

42:38.700 --> 42:41.570
for this particular
panel and I'll quote him

42:41.570 --> 42:43.510
and you know it's always good
when you quote your boss.

42:43.510 --> 42:47.030
So if he's watching I'm
sure he'll appreciate that,

42:47.030 --> 42:51.437
but he said, "there's no
such thing as war in space.

42:51.437 --> 42:53.007
"There's just war.

42:53.007 --> 42:55.497
"There's no such thing as war in cyber.

42:55.497 --> 42:56.967
"There's just war.

42:56.967 --> 42:59.817
"We have to figure out how
to defeat our adversaries

42:59.817 --> 43:02.857
"not to defeat the domains
where they operate.

43:02.857 --> 43:05.385
"So it has to be from
an adversary perspective

43:05.385 --> 43:09.600
"not a domain perspective," end quote.

43:09.600 --> 43:14.600
Chart please, so plan for
leveraging information

43:14.640 --> 43:16.370
in all phases.

43:16.370 --> 43:18.580
All of us, all leaders must understand

43:18.580 --> 43:21.550
information operations and plan for it.

43:21.550 --> 43:23.327
Operations in the information environment

43:23.327 --> 43:25.803
are not simply weaponized information.

43:26.760 --> 43:29.110
Planning for our
information operations must

43:29.110 --> 43:31.120
be incorporated throughout all phases to

43:31.120 --> 43:33.100
ensure that information is leverage

43:33.100 --> 43:35.790
to achieve results
favorable to the mission

43:35.790 --> 43:37.760
and the commander on the ground.

43:37.760 --> 43:40.083
All staffs and leaders must
understand the foundational

43:40.083 --> 43:42.057
aspects of information operations

43:42.057 --> 43:44.790
and non-kinetic effects.

43:44.790 --> 43:47.930
How to leverage information
and physical power across

43:47.930 --> 43:52.810
the five domains, land, air,
sea, space, and cyberspace,

43:52.810 --> 43:54.940
and the information environment

43:54.940 --> 43:56.720
commanders must consider information

43:56.720 --> 43:59.550
and the impact of
operational environments.

43:59.550 --> 44:02.930
Some considerations include: velocity,

44:02.930 --> 44:06.200
volume, variety, and veracity.

44:06.200 --> 44:10.780
In other words, how fast,
how much, what kind,

44:10.780 --> 44:12.590
and how true?

44:12.590 --> 44:13.543
Chart please.

44:16.010 --> 44:19.950
The environment is competitive,
crowded, and changing.

44:19.950 --> 44:22.280
The Department of Defense
joint staff in the army

44:22.280 --> 44:24.550
are all addressing strategies to operate

44:24.550 --> 44:26.837
in the information environment.

44:26.837 --> 44:31.300
Mergings of technologies creates
opportunities and hurdles.

44:31.300 --> 44:33.650
Today every device on the battlefield

44:33.650 --> 44:35.910
is an information device.

44:35.910 --> 44:38.581
Potential adversaries
recognize the importance

44:38.581 --> 44:41.220
of non-lethal capabilities and effects

44:41.220 --> 44:43.620
and their impact on the
operational environment.

44:44.460 --> 44:47.510
Cyber is a significant
non-kinetic concern.

44:47.510 --> 44:50.800
A competition that occurs at light speed

44:50.800 --> 44:54.163
and is increasingly
integral to our systems.

44:55.370 --> 44:58.240
Our force is dependent on space.

44:58.240 --> 45:01.220
Failure to address
resiliency in space will

45:01.220 --> 45:04.780
risk our competitive advantage
over potential adversaries.

45:04.780 --> 45:08.470
To put it in perspective an
average brigade combat team

45:08.470 --> 45:13.300
has more than 2500, that's
2500 pieces of equipment

45:13.300 --> 45:17.610
that are space enabled and
there's more than 250 pieces

45:17.610 --> 45:21.130
of equipment in a brigade
combat team that is enabled

45:21.130 --> 45:22.943
by satellite communications.

45:23.950 --> 45:28.950
Chart please, so technology
impacts of non-kinetic

45:29.160 --> 45:33.470
capabilities are compounded
by converging technologies.

45:33.470 --> 45:36.350
Technology evolves and merges.

45:36.350 --> 45:38.130
It's not just the phone anymore.

45:38.130 --> 45:42.840
It's a TV, it's a watch,
a map, an internet

45:42.840 --> 45:45.470
it's an Uber, it's a Lyft.

45:45.470 --> 45:47.790
Convergence of different technologies

45:47.790 --> 45:50.400
brings technological surprise.

45:50.400 --> 45:52.330
The information environment is packed

45:52.330 --> 45:54.840
with converging technologies today.

45:54.840 --> 45:59.306
Our capabilities must keep
pace to remain effective today.

45:59.306 --> 46:03.860
So, for a minute, you probably tell that,

46:03.860 --> 46:05.050
may or may not be able to tell,

46:05.050 --> 46:06.830
that I'm from Huntsville, Alabama.

46:06.830 --> 46:09.560
I may not sound like folks
from Huntsville, Alabama,

46:09.560 --> 46:11.710
but there are many in this
crowd that I think have served

46:11.710 --> 46:14.730
in Huntsville, Alabama
and to draw a comparison

46:14.730 --> 46:17.190
on technology convergence I would offer

46:17.190 --> 46:19.320
to you that every day I live in the shadow

46:19.320 --> 46:21.260
of the Saturn V rocket that sits

46:21.260 --> 46:26.080
along I565, 1960s technology.

46:26.080 --> 46:28.390
If you were to take an iPhone

46:28.390 --> 46:31.750
and compare the capabilities of an iPhone

46:31.750 --> 46:34.810
to the Apollo Guidance
computers in the 1960s

46:35.940 --> 46:40.250
you would find that back in
the 1960s the Apollo Guidance

46:40.250 --> 46:43.793
Computer could process about
42 instructions per second.

46:44.740 --> 46:47.809
Today, an iPhone that I have right here,

46:47.809 --> 46:49.910
because we must always
remain connected can

46:49.910 --> 46:53.950
process about 3.4 billion
instructions per second.

46:53.950 --> 46:57.060
That's outpacing that
technology back in the '60s

46:57.060 --> 46:58.803
by 81 million times.

46:59.840 --> 47:00.930
So why is that important?

47:00.930 --> 47:02.860
You ask yourself well
that was 60 years ago.

47:02.860 --> 47:06.750
I would hope that we came
that far with technology

47:06.750 --> 47:08.350
in 60 years.

47:08.350 --> 47:11.170
What I just described you on
the iPhone it will not take

47:11.170 --> 47:15.950
60 years now in this
environment in order to increase

47:15.950 --> 47:17.940
if not double the capacity of an iPhone

47:17.940 --> 47:19.740
and we see it everyday with our apps

47:19.740 --> 47:22.530
that are improved with
the software patches

47:22.530 --> 47:23.930
we get in the iPhone.

47:23.930 --> 47:27.010
So technology, technology convergence

47:27.010 --> 47:30.033
is significant in today's environment.

47:31.390 --> 47:35.460
Slide please, organizational change

47:35.460 --> 47:38.260
equals adapting to the environment.

47:38.260 --> 47:40.450
The new U.S. national strategies reflect

47:40.450 --> 47:42.930
a recognition that we must and will adapt

47:42.930 --> 47:46.320
to a rapidly changing global
and operational environment.

47:46.320 --> 47:49.430
Changes to organizations,
CyberCom, Futures Command,

47:49.430 --> 47:53.740
cross-functional teams,
multi-domain task force are,

47:53.740 --> 47:55.810
but a few that are well underway

47:55.810 --> 47:58.950
in terms of adapting to the environment.

47:58.950 --> 48:01.270
Just this month United
States Cyber Command

48:01.270 --> 48:04.620
was elevated to the United
States 10th Combatant

48:04.620 --> 48:08.266
Command under the
leadership of Paul Nakasone.

48:08.266 --> 48:11.150
Army Space Forces are
challenged to service

48:11.150 --> 48:13.750
increasingly high demand for their skills.

48:13.750 --> 48:15.430
As you can see on that chart in the upper

48:15.430 --> 48:16.870
right hand corner of the army's space

48:16.870 --> 48:19.350
training strategy which has been published

48:19.350 --> 48:21.150
in the news for a couple of years,

48:21.150 --> 48:23.090
will ensure our soldiers understand

48:23.090 --> 48:25.370
the integration of space capabilities

48:25.370 --> 48:27.260
and their applications.

48:27.260 --> 48:30.950
We must be able to operate
in a space denied environment

48:30.950 --> 48:33.781
or make sure we can adapt to degradation,

48:33.781 --> 48:36.690
understand that
degradation to capabilities

48:36.690 --> 48:38.530
that we have today.

48:38.530 --> 48:41.170
Evolving the organizations, authorities,

48:41.170 --> 48:44.510
and management of the
National Space Enterprise

48:44.510 --> 48:47.944
is how we will keep
ahead of our adversaries.

48:47.944 --> 48:52.944
Slide please, successful
non-kinetic power projection

48:53.730 --> 48:57.053
requires integrating
capabilities and effects.

48:58.020 --> 49:00.250
Development of the multi-domain operations

49:00.250 --> 49:03.300
concept exemplifies the
integration of capabilities

49:03.300 --> 49:06.690
and effects leading to
evolving concepts, doctrine,

49:06.690 --> 49:10.520
enforce design in employment
mentioned many times

49:10.520 --> 49:13.444
earlier, a few times earlier
multi-domain operations

49:13.444 --> 49:16.730
enables joint maneuver and
presents multiple options

49:16.730 --> 49:19.940
to national leadership
and joint force commanders

49:19.940 --> 49:24.000
and creates multiple
dilemmas for our adversaries.

49:24.000 --> 49:25.920
Multi-domain operations includes

49:25.920 --> 49:28.480
long range precision strike,
integrated air defense,

49:28.480 --> 49:32.650
electronic warfare, space
and cyber space capabilities.

49:32.650 --> 49:36.160
Multi-domain operations better
integrates land based systems

49:36.160 --> 49:38.230
into the joint targeting process

49:38.230 --> 49:41.563
and attacks adversaries A2AD systems.

49:43.450 --> 49:46.350
So we need to maintain
forward momentum to stay

49:46.350 --> 49:48.650
ahead of the threats
our army, joint forces,

49:48.650 --> 49:50.103
and allies are facing.

49:51.060 --> 49:54.060
We must get it right with
the capability requirements

49:54.060 --> 49:56.120
the force readiness levels and our ability

49:56.120 --> 49:58.963
to meet combatant commanders demands.

50:00.500 --> 50:05.500
Slide please, so power
projection is maximized

50:05.680 --> 50:07.860
by leveraging all tools.

50:07.860 --> 50:10.760
As you can see here these instruments

50:10.760 --> 50:13.950
of power projection are
easily recognizable.

50:13.950 --> 50:16.870
However, we must leverage
all the tools available

50:16.870 --> 50:20.735
and look to develop
more, better, and faster,

50:20.735 --> 50:23.260
streamlining the acquisition process

50:23.260 --> 50:26.103
for space platforms
and evaluating the most

50:26.103 --> 50:30.250
advantageous vestments,
nano and micro satellites,

50:30.250 --> 50:33.890
for example, and using
commercial satellites.

50:33.890 --> 50:38.040
Maybe we don't need more
exquisite space technology.

50:38.040 --> 50:40.677
Maybe we need more good enough.

50:43.620 --> 50:45.950
So in order to prepare for conflict

50:45.950 --> 50:49.260
we must innovate faster
than potential adversaries

50:49.260 --> 50:52.030
to project power from across all domains.

50:52.030 --> 50:54.530
To enable the joint force and our allies

50:54.530 --> 50:56.343
to defeat a sophisticated enemy.

50:58.410 --> 51:03.410
Slide pleas, information
projection must be delivered

51:03.740 --> 51:07.770
continuous and consistent
through all phases of operations.

51:07.770 --> 51:10.350
Non-kinetic power projection
has applications through

51:10.350 --> 51:12.073
the full spectrum of conflict.

51:12.928 --> 51:15.598
Potential adversaries
recognize the importance

51:15.598 --> 51:19.588
of non-kinetic and nonlethal
effects through all phases.

51:19.588 --> 51:24.588
So we must, in particular,
during shaping operations

51:25.270 --> 51:29.270
and integration doesn't
stop after the early phases.

51:29.270 --> 51:31.610
Non-kinetic effects must remain integrated

51:31.610 --> 51:35.393
with all other operations until
mission complete and beyond.

51:36.540 --> 51:39.380
Today we have a mature and
refined targeting process

51:39.380 --> 51:42.240
for kinetic effects and
have made great strides

51:42.240 --> 51:44.870
working with our allies
to coordinate effects,

51:44.870 --> 51:47.360
but we must continue to fully integrate

51:47.360 --> 51:50.500
non-kinetic planning into that cycle.

51:50.500 --> 51:53.470
Multi-domain operations demand achievement

51:53.470 --> 51:56.460
cross domain synergy
to maximize our efforts

51:56.460 --> 51:59.539
along with our allies
whether conducting combat

51:59.539 --> 52:01.533
or peacetime operations.

52:02.810 --> 52:04.990
Commanders operate within and throughout

52:04.990 --> 52:06.910
the information environment across

52:06.910 --> 52:09.280
an interrelated global commons.

52:09.280 --> 52:12.150
The interconnectedness requires seamless

52:12.150 --> 52:15.560
integration of images,
words, and deeds to avoid

52:15.560 --> 52:18.320
information fratricide and negative second

52:18.320 --> 52:20.620
and third order effects.

52:20.620 --> 52:24.240
Multi-domain operations
enables persistent power

52:24.240 --> 52:26.642
projection from the land domain into other

52:26.642 --> 52:29.253
domains to enable joint maneuver.

52:30.460 --> 52:35.070
Slide please, humanitarian assistance

52:35.070 --> 52:36.620
and disaster relief operations.

52:38.230 --> 52:43.010
We have a very diverse and
non-kinetic capabilities

52:43.010 --> 52:45.230
at our disposal and can provide response

52:45.230 --> 52:47.840
and support options to civil leadership.

52:47.840 --> 52:49.780
Whether an earthquake in Nepal,

52:49.780 --> 52:52.360
a tsunami in Malaysia,
flooding in the Philippines

52:53.906 --> 52:55.810
or a hurricane in Texas.

52:55.810 --> 52:58.630
Situational awareness and communications

52:58.630 --> 53:01.420
are two critical requirements
to begin providing relief

53:01.420 --> 53:04.010
to the populace and infrastructure.

53:04.010 --> 53:06.000
Tools like the DART that you can see

53:06.000 --> 53:07.400
in the lower right hand corner

53:07.400 --> 53:11.410
of that slide is the
domestic operations awareness

53:11.410 --> 53:14.466
and assessment response
tool that we developed

53:14.466 --> 53:17.190
in ESM DCR Strat for the National Guard

53:17.190 --> 53:19.850
and is in use today even here in Hawaii

53:19.850 --> 53:22.323
for the volcano activity.

53:23.230 --> 53:26.130
Army and DoD space platforms and resources

53:26.130 --> 53:29.020
have provided key solutions
in a timely fashion

53:29.020 --> 53:32.200
to expedite and streamline
search assistance

53:32.200 --> 53:34.233
and recovery operations worldwide.

53:37.560 --> 53:42.090
Slide please, so I will
close with what are,

53:42.090 --> 53:44.380
what I see are the challenges today.

53:44.380 --> 53:47.580
Today we operate in a highly competitive

53:47.580 --> 53:49.990
and crowded information environment.

53:49.990 --> 53:52.960
We are challenged to
keep pace with technology

53:52.960 --> 53:54.763
and adversary use of terrain.

53:55.670 --> 53:59.460
Technology as we know is in
the hands of every soldier

53:59.460 --> 54:02.870
that's both a strength
and a vulnerability,

54:02.870 --> 54:06.765
and finally non-kinetic
effects happen at light speed

54:06.765 --> 54:09.663
whether positive or
negative to the mission.

54:10.550 --> 54:12.350
So this concludes my opening remarks

54:12.350 --> 54:15.650
and I'll turn it back
over to Tony, thanks.

54:15.650 --> 54:18.120
- Thank you sir, General James.

54:18.120 --> 54:19.760
- And so I plan to come here today, sir,

54:19.760 --> 54:22.749
to talk mainly about the
efficacy of watercraft

54:22.749 --> 54:23.833
and the PACOM AOR.

54:23.833 --> 54:24.941
(laughing)

54:24.941 --> 54:28.180
But I think that was adequately
covered in the previous,

54:28.180 --> 54:30.930
so instead what I'd
like to talk today about

54:30.930 --> 54:33.020
is the evolving operational
space environment

54:33.020 --> 54:34.070
or space domain.

54:34.070 --> 54:36.740
And so, yesterday I was
going through my head

54:36.740 --> 54:40.130
about a good way to show and just a short

54:40.130 --> 54:43.700
slide or picture to
give a sense of how fast

54:43.700 --> 54:45.150
the space domain is changing

54:45.150 --> 54:46.970
and I was thinking military.

54:46.970 --> 54:49.970
But Mr. Scalen had in
his walking in slide deck

54:49.970 --> 54:51.610
a picture and I'm going,
that's the picture

54:51.610 --> 54:56.610
I want to talk about because
it shows very adroitly,

54:56.700 --> 54:59.460
I believe, how fast things are changing

54:59.460 --> 55:01.270
in the space domain from a commercial,

55:01.270 --> 55:03.660
from the government, from
all the different sectors.

55:03.660 --> 55:05.670
So the question I would
ask for those you that were

55:05.670 --> 55:07.930
in LANPAC back last year,

55:07.930 --> 55:10.300
was anybody there sitting in your chair

55:10.300 --> 55:12.930
kind of daydreaming while
the panelists are speaking

55:12.930 --> 55:14.760
and thought that this is it.

55:14.760 --> 55:19.690
This is the year that we're
going to put an environmentally

55:19.690 --> 55:24.690
friendly roadster into space
with an astronaut mannequin

55:24.855 --> 55:28.530
and it's gonna go out
past Mars in its orbit

55:28.530 --> 55:31.200
and come back to Earth where
we can sit again about 2073.

55:31.200 --> 55:32.250
Anybody?

55:32.250 --> 55:33.870
Who's thinking that way?

55:33.870 --> 55:35.150
Things change fast.

55:35.150 --> 55:37.123
So slide, if you would, please.

55:38.560 --> 55:41.180
So that happened and Starman

55:41.180 --> 55:43.070
and his roadsters out there today,

55:43.070 --> 55:44.860
but that has significant impact.

55:44.860 --> 55:46.120
It's not just a cool picture

55:46.120 --> 55:48.363
and interesting science experiment.

55:49.240 --> 55:52.750
The Falcon Heavy lift
system that launched that

55:52.750 --> 55:56.943
as a test in February
launched the first Bangladeshi

55:56.943 --> 56:00.390
telecommunications satellite
into geosynchronous

56:00.390 --> 56:01.433
orbit in May.

56:02.720 --> 56:05.870
So that's affecting the PACOM
AOR, but the ramifications

56:05.870 --> 56:06.880
are greater than that.

56:06.880 --> 56:10.050
It is the rapid progress in technology,

56:10.050 --> 56:12.050
as General Dickinson talked about,

56:12.050 --> 56:14.410
both in launch but in
the types of technologies

56:14.410 --> 56:16.430
that we put on orbit and so that's some

56:16.430 --> 56:17.720
of what I'll talk about today.

56:17.720 --> 56:22.230
Next slide please, have a
couple of war story vignettes

56:22.230 --> 56:24.730
about how important space
is, but looking through

56:24.730 --> 56:27.490
my notes I think most of
us in this room understand

56:27.490 --> 56:30.130
and I think it's suffice
to say that those that

56:30.130 --> 56:32.050
have had to train and fight without space

56:32.050 --> 56:34.170
capabilities in the
past will tell you they

56:34.170 --> 56:36.270
don't want to go back to those conditions.

56:37.440 --> 56:39.440
Most of you probably
use GPS to get here to

56:39.440 --> 56:40.273
the hotel today.

56:40.273 --> 56:41.620
If you're not familiar with Honolulu

56:41.620 --> 56:44.452
and driving downtown and
you had to do it without GPS

56:44.452 --> 56:46.802
you probably understand
what I'm talking about.

56:48.240 --> 56:50.862
We can fight without space and
we trained, General Volesky

56:50.862 --> 56:53.330
talked yesterday about
wanting to be prepared

56:53.330 --> 56:57.110
to do analog fighting when we
lose our digital capabilities.

56:57.110 --> 56:59.330
But we don't want to fight
that way if we don't have to.

56:59.330 --> 57:01.220
We don't want to see that
advantage to the enemy,

57:01.220 --> 57:03.740
so big portal what I'll
talk about that day will be

57:03.740 --> 57:06.840
how do we protect our
access to space assets

57:06.840 --> 57:09.800
that give us great advantage
on the battlefield.

57:09.800 --> 57:11.900
And what is it that
space brings to us space?

57:11.900 --> 57:14.480
Space assets provide the
ability to view a remote

57:14.480 --> 57:17.370
valley an adversary homeland, our carrier

57:17.370 --> 57:19.490
strike group transiting
the South China Sea

57:19.490 --> 57:22.140
all done legally and
within international norms

57:22.140 --> 57:25.020
with an imaging satellite
in low Earth orbit.

57:25.020 --> 57:27.480
Soldiers pursuing terrorists
in remote hostile areas

57:27.480 --> 57:29.880
have access to critical command control

57:29.880 --> 57:32.150
and air support through
persistent communications

57:32.150 --> 57:35.320
with satellites and lower
than geosynchronous orbit.

57:35.320 --> 57:37.060
Weather satellites tracked the development

57:37.060 --> 57:39.680
and movement of typhoons
across the Pacific

57:39.680 --> 57:42.480
giving ample warning to those in its path,

57:42.480 --> 57:44.960
and this provide support
humanitarian assistance

57:44.960 --> 57:47.030
and disaster relief efforts.

57:47.030 --> 57:49.570
Global positioning satellites
provide precision maneuver

57:49.570 --> 57:52.474
and fire support allowing
greater lethality

57:52.474 --> 57:53.970
and increasing force
protection on mitigating

57:53.970 --> 57:56.910
threat forces or reducing fratricide.

57:56.910 --> 57:59.330
Space based force tracking
allows greatly enhance

57:59.330 --> 58:00.860
situational awareness of rapidly

58:00.860 --> 58:02.783
moving widespread currently forces.

58:02.783 --> 58:06.090
You can imagine also assist with disaster

58:06.090 --> 58:08.500
relief teams that are
going through the rubble

58:08.500 --> 58:11.050
in the aftermath of a large earthquake.

58:11.050 --> 58:13.100
Those are warning satellites
are always on watch

58:13.100 --> 58:14.640
providing a central response time

58:14.640 --> 58:16.200
and enabling missile defense,

58:16.200 --> 58:18.730
and space capabilities
allow us to fight anywhere

58:18.730 --> 58:21.380
in the world, understand
the battlefield better,

58:21.380 --> 58:24.680
know exactly where we
are bringing precision

58:24.680 --> 58:26.470
to our operations all synchronized

58:26.470 --> 58:28.340
to a common time standard.

58:28.340 --> 58:30.600
They allow us to not only
look over the next hill,

58:30.600 --> 58:33.940
but all of the hills and
assist in rapidly synchronizing

58:33.940 --> 58:36.940
overmatch capability against our foes.

58:36.940 --> 58:39.100
There's a new focus in the
military space community,

58:39.100 --> 58:41.100
and general Dickinson
talked to some of this

58:41.100 --> 58:42.960
on building combat readiness and lethality

58:42.960 --> 58:44.710
for the contested multi-domain fight.

58:44.710 --> 58:47.330
Our space capabilities
are in integral part

58:47.330 --> 58:49.750
of all military operations
providing great advantage

58:49.750 --> 58:52.680
to the joint force our
nation and our allies.

58:52.680 --> 58:54.520
Every day the joint force based component

58:54.520 --> 58:56.750
command effectively
integrates space into air,

58:56.750 --> 59:00.560
land, maritime, cyber, and
yes even space operations.

59:00.560 --> 59:02.440
Space support to space ops.

59:02.440 --> 59:05.020
This integration enables precise fires

59:05.020 --> 59:07.680
real time command control,
global operational

59:07.680 --> 59:10.120
reach, and decisive power projection

59:10.120 --> 59:11.580
and those are three of the principles that

59:11.580 --> 59:13.600
General Perna just talked to.

59:13.600 --> 59:16.240
Environment of mobility mission command,

59:16.240 --> 59:19.140
but this is not lost on our adversaries

59:19.140 --> 59:23.180
or potential adversaries
on how effective space

59:23.180 --> 59:25.240
capabilities are in
increasing our lethality

59:25.240 --> 59:26.073
on the battlefield.

59:26.073 --> 59:28.030
So two things result from that.

59:28.030 --> 59:30.400
One, we see potential advertary state in

59:30.400 --> 59:33.240
non-state actors developing
similar capabilities

59:33.240 --> 59:35.110
to support their military operations

59:35.110 --> 59:36.360
and, therefore, we have to consider

59:36.360 --> 59:38.300
means to mitigate those capabilities

59:38.300 --> 59:39.133
in a fight.

59:40.020 --> 59:42.820
And, secondly, some nations
are advancing technological

59:42.820 --> 59:45.410
means to place our
advantage in space at risk

59:45.410 --> 59:47.080
so we have to work out how we protect

59:47.080 --> 59:48.750
and defend our access to those systems

59:48.750 --> 59:50.493
so they're there when we need them.

59:51.890 --> 59:54.820
The current national
defense strategy notes

59:54.820 --> 59:57.300
this by relying on access
and freedom of action

59:57.300 --> 01:00:00.837
in through and from space to
enable our military operations

01:00:00.837 --> 01:00:02.560
and I think that applies very strongly

01:00:02.560 --> 01:00:04.700
to PACOM AOR as well.

01:00:04.700 --> 01:00:06.310
The joint force space component commander

01:00:06.310 --> 01:00:08.290
General Raymond notes
that our current doctrine

01:00:08.290 --> 01:00:10.623
of force structure and
acquisition processes

01:00:10.623 --> 01:00:12.850
have not really involved with the growing

01:00:12.850 --> 01:00:15.750
global threats and clearly a critical

01:00:15.750 --> 01:00:19.350
part of integrating space
into future multi-domain,

01:00:19.350 --> 01:00:21.230
into the multi-domain fight will include

01:00:21.230 --> 01:00:22.720
war fighting structure and doctrine

01:00:22.720 --> 01:00:24.870
to maintain space superiority

01:00:24.870 --> 01:00:28.540
and to ensure space capabilities
are available when needed.

01:00:28.540 --> 01:00:30.830
Part of that will be space
situational awareness.

01:00:30.830 --> 01:00:33.090
Will be an important part of
us being able to understand

01:00:33.090 --> 01:00:35.200
the space environment
and facilitating access

01:00:35.200 --> 01:00:37.763
that help us maintain
that space of priority.

01:00:37.763 --> 01:00:39.790
Another key part of mission assurance is

01:00:39.790 --> 01:00:42.090
building resilience into
satellite architectures

01:00:42.090 --> 01:00:44.320
and improving our ability
to put new capabilities

01:00:44.320 --> 01:00:47.643
on orbit quickly,
repeatedly, and economically.

01:00:48.820 --> 01:00:51.840
So it talked off a good bit
already about the advances

01:00:51.840 --> 01:00:53.400
we made in launch and how that's gonna

01:00:53.400 --> 01:00:56.560
allow us to achieve those three qualities

01:00:56.560 --> 01:01:01.560
of getting to space fast
and economically feasibly.

01:01:01.960 --> 01:01:03.980
The military will be a demanding customer

01:01:03.980 --> 01:01:06.216
of those investments and launch,

01:01:06.216 --> 01:01:09.160
but just as important as
technological advances in launch

01:01:09.160 --> 01:01:11.310
is the technical technological advances

01:01:11.310 --> 01:01:13.413
in the capabilities that we put on orbit.

01:01:14.620 --> 01:01:17.330
The increases in our
traditional mission areas

01:01:17.330 --> 01:01:18.860
a position navigation and timing,

01:01:18.860 --> 01:01:20.640
satellite communications missile warning,

01:01:20.640 --> 01:01:23.429
intelligence surveillance
and reconnaissance

01:01:23.429 --> 01:01:26.790
environmental monitoring
and friendly force tracking.

01:01:26.790 --> 01:01:29.650
But not only in the
quality of capabilities,

01:01:29.650 --> 01:01:32.050
but also in the quantity of the satellites

01:01:32.050 --> 01:01:33.210
and I gets a General Dickinsons

01:01:33.210 --> 01:01:34.613
comment of good enough.

01:01:36.240 --> 01:01:39.170
It's been said that quantity
can have a quality all its own.

01:01:39.170 --> 01:01:41.070
We're going to see that
and fill that in a real way

01:01:41.070 --> 01:01:43.190
in the space domain in
the very near future

01:01:43.190 --> 01:01:44.830
in the next few years.

01:01:44.830 --> 01:01:46.450
Where in the not too
distant past the number

01:01:46.450 --> 01:01:48.170
of satellites the U.S. would put in orbit

01:01:48.170 --> 01:01:50.070
was in the dozens in a given year,

01:01:50.070 --> 01:01:51.410
in the next three to five years

01:01:51.410 --> 01:01:53.530
commercial companies, the U.S. government,

01:01:53.530 --> 01:01:56.040
and others will put much
smaller less expensive

01:01:56.040 --> 01:01:59.350
satellites on orbit in
the thousands per year.

01:01:59.350 --> 01:02:02.570
Thousands of satellites in
the next few years on orbit.

01:02:02.570 --> 01:02:04.700
This bifurcation satellites
will change impacts

01:02:04.700 --> 01:02:06.510
not only on the commercial sector,

01:02:06.510 --> 01:02:11.040
but in the military as well
and what you can imagine is

01:02:11.040 --> 01:02:13.450
one of these architectures
will allow you to have

01:02:13.450 --> 01:02:15.716
Internet service anywhere on the globe as

01:02:15.716 --> 01:02:18.390
long as you have access to the sky.

01:02:18.390 --> 01:02:20.370
You can see the sky you've
got power to your system

01:02:20.370 --> 01:02:23.190
and you paid your bill you'll be able to

01:02:23.190 --> 01:02:25.630
FaceTime from the sun on the South Pole

01:02:25.630 --> 01:02:27.565
that says I'm at the South Pole.

01:02:27.565 --> 01:02:30.260
That is going to change the way that

01:02:30.260 --> 01:02:33.887
we look at information operations
and information dominance,

01:02:33.887 --> 01:02:35.920
and so in that we talked yesterday.

01:02:35.920 --> 01:02:38.110
There's a lot of discussion
about black swans

01:02:38.110 --> 01:02:40.280
in that condition that I just laid out

01:02:40.280 --> 01:02:43.570
are numerous black swans
that we need to be ready

01:02:43.570 --> 01:02:45.520
as General Perna said that we are ready

01:02:46.510 --> 01:02:48.440
in both our partnerships
and our technologies

01:02:48.440 --> 01:02:50.890
and our processes to be
able to react to that

01:02:50.890 --> 01:02:53.048
quickly changing environment.

01:02:53.048 --> 01:02:55.300
In the interest of time
I'll go into the detail

01:02:55.300 --> 01:02:57.160
for the partnerships
with that is absolutely

01:02:57.160 --> 01:02:59.080
critical as we move forward.

01:02:59.080 --> 01:03:02.360
General Hyten, would
agree is as wholeheartedly

01:03:02.360 --> 01:03:04.160
as he could, sir, in
the discussions we had

01:03:04.160 --> 01:03:07.090
about the necessity of
multilateral approaches

01:03:07.090 --> 01:03:09.430
to how we fight and that
applies in space is a key

01:03:09.430 --> 01:03:11.073
part of our resiliency as well.

01:03:12.400 --> 01:03:15.167
And we're making big
advances in that and the GFCC

01:03:15.167 --> 01:03:18.080
and in the JSPOC as we transition

01:03:18.080 --> 01:03:20.040
to the Joint Space Operations Center

01:03:20.040 --> 01:03:22.060
into a coalition space operations center

01:03:22.060 --> 01:03:24.170
and with our allies.

01:03:24.170 --> 01:03:26.260
We also have a commercial integration cell

01:03:26.260 --> 01:03:28.670
that does close commercial integration

01:03:28.670 --> 01:03:32.313
not just in the acquisition
and an industrial part of that,

01:03:32.313 --> 01:03:35.800
but within the operations from
those systems in real time.

01:03:35.800 --> 01:03:37.790
We also work closely
with civilian agencies

01:03:37.790 --> 01:03:39.260
that those who will
follow the news you'll see

01:03:39.260 --> 01:03:41.920
the Department of Commerce
is now looking at taking

01:03:41.920 --> 01:03:43.320
over the role of traffic management

01:03:43.320 --> 01:03:45.620
for those thousands of satellites.

01:03:45.620 --> 01:03:48.530
Big sky, little airplane, bigger space,

01:03:48.530 --> 01:03:51.480
smaller satellites with
thousands of satellites

01:03:51.480 --> 01:03:54.680
coming on line soon, the
ability to manage those

01:03:54.680 --> 01:03:58.570
on a traffic management
scenarios is gonna be important

01:03:58.570 --> 01:04:00.750
to ensure those systems
are there when needed

01:04:00.750 --> 01:04:04.120
and lastly the United States military

01:04:04.120 --> 01:04:05.840
and with our allies is
looking very closely

01:04:05.840 --> 01:04:09.680
at the space components of
multi-domain we're finding.

01:04:09.680 --> 01:04:12.110
In my view the U.S. Army
is the main task force

01:04:12.110 --> 01:04:14.250
by very nature fighting dislocated

01:04:14.250 --> 01:04:16.290
from main forces support
the heavy reliance

01:04:16.290 --> 01:04:18.880
on battle space awareness
and long haul Comms

01:04:18.880 --> 01:04:21.410
for C2 and an battlefield
situation whereas

01:04:21.410 --> 01:04:23.470
in position fires demands the integration

01:04:23.470 --> 01:04:25.974
of space space capabilities in support

01:04:25.974 --> 01:04:28.810
of the army's future multi-domain
war fighting efforts.

01:04:28.810 --> 01:04:31.643
I look forward to the panel
discussion and your questions.

01:04:33.980 --> 01:04:36.400
- Thank you, sir, Mr. Pontius.

01:04:36.400 --> 01:04:37.520
- On behalf of Lieutenant General

01:04:37.520 --> 01:04:39.750
Steve Fogarty in Army Cyber Command.

01:04:39.750 --> 01:04:41.970
I want to thank Tim Dickinson
for inviting me to be

01:04:41.970 --> 01:04:43.540
part of this important panel.

01:04:43.540 --> 01:04:45.080
I also want to recognize General Ham

01:04:45.080 --> 01:04:48.810
in AUSA and General Brown
and the superb USARPAC team

01:04:48.810 --> 01:04:51.030
for putting together this
really outstanding event

01:04:51.030 --> 01:04:54.693
that is a great venue for
collaboration and partnership.

01:04:54.693 --> 01:04:57.630
Today I want to talk about
how the army and Army Cyber

01:04:57.630 --> 01:05:01.234
Command is preparing for
and supporting non-kinetic

01:05:01.234 --> 01:05:04.660
power projection and
multi-domain operations.

01:05:04.660 --> 01:05:07.570
I will discuss what we are
doing at the operational level

01:05:07.570 --> 01:05:09.133
and then at the tactical level.

01:05:10.380 --> 01:05:13.550
As many leaders have noted, we
are witnessing a fundamental

01:05:13.550 --> 01:05:16.060
transformation in the character of war.

01:05:16.060 --> 01:05:18.790
A transformation that is
largely driven by the evolution

01:05:18.790 --> 01:05:22.080
of technology to succeed in multi-domain

01:05:22.080 --> 01:05:24.910
operations of the
future, we'll require our

01:05:24.910 --> 01:05:28.700
army and the joint force
to adapt how we plan

01:05:28.700 --> 01:05:32.253
and conduct operations in
response to these changes.

01:05:33.100 --> 01:05:35.660
Cyberspace offers tremendous opportunities

01:05:35.660 --> 01:05:38.890
to achieve military affects through cyber,

01:05:38.890 --> 01:05:43.290
electronic warfare, and information
operations capabilities.

01:05:43.290 --> 01:05:47.270
It also poses tremendous
risks from cyber threats.

01:05:47.270 --> 01:05:49.920
Our vulnerabilities have grown alongside

01:05:49.920 --> 01:05:54.210
our growing reliance on
information technology.

01:05:54.210 --> 01:05:57.490
Malicious malware is now relatively cheap

01:05:57.490 --> 01:06:00.400
and readily available over the Internet.

01:06:00.400 --> 01:06:02.470
We face a growing variety of threats

01:06:02.470 --> 01:06:05.090
from adversaries acting with precision

01:06:05.090 --> 01:06:07.633
and boldness often with stealth.

01:06:08.580 --> 01:06:11.340
Recognizing the growing
importance of the cyber

01:06:11.340 --> 01:06:13.570
domain the President of the United States

01:06:13.570 --> 01:06:16.660
recently elevated the
United States cyber command

01:06:16.660 --> 01:06:19.460
to a full functional combatant command.

01:06:19.460 --> 01:06:22.147
U.S. Cyber Command's mission is a direct

01:06:22.147 --> 01:06:25.430
synchronized and coordinate cyberspace

01:06:25.430 --> 01:06:28.190
planning and operations to defend

01:06:28.190 --> 01:06:31.020
and advance national
interests in collaboration

01:06:31.020 --> 01:06:34.010
with domestic and international partners.

01:06:34.010 --> 01:06:36.060
Each of the services have a service cyber

01:06:36.060 --> 01:06:39.003
component which includes
Army Cyber Command.

01:06:40.270 --> 01:06:42.280
Our command engages with adversaries

01:06:42.280 --> 01:06:45.520
in cyberspace every day against near peer

01:06:45.520 --> 01:06:49.640
adversaries, ISIS, and
other global threats.

01:06:49.640 --> 01:06:52.680
Accordingly, we have developed substantial

01:06:52.680 --> 01:06:55.610
knowledge of how malicious
cyber actors work

01:06:55.610 --> 01:06:57.990
against the United States, our allies,

01:06:57.990 --> 01:07:01.510
and partners, and many
other targets as well.

01:07:01.510 --> 01:07:04.180
That knowledge in turn provides insights

01:07:04.180 --> 01:07:06.990
into the motivations, capabilities,

01:07:06.990 --> 01:07:09.070
and intentions of those who sponsor

01:07:09.070 --> 01:07:12.370
such activities whether they be states,

01:07:12.370 --> 01:07:15.920
criminal enterprises
or violent extremists.

01:07:15.920 --> 01:07:18.490
Cyberspace is a global
and dynamic operating

01:07:18.490 --> 01:07:21.390
environment with unique capabilities that

01:07:21.390 --> 01:07:25.488
demands a specially trained
and equipped cyber force.

01:07:25.488 --> 01:07:28.320
The army has built 41 active components

01:07:28.320 --> 01:07:30.160
cyber mission force teams as part

01:07:30.160 --> 01:07:33.600
of the total joint force of 133 teams

01:07:33.600 --> 01:07:35.870
consisting of both offensive and defensive

01:07:35.870 --> 01:07:38.690
focused cyberspace operations.

01:07:38.690 --> 01:07:42.280
The army is building 21
additional defensive teams in

01:07:42.280 --> 01:07:43.443
our reserve component.

01:07:44.680 --> 01:07:47.146
The army also established
cyberspace operation

01:07:47.146 --> 01:07:51.770
as a new branch of the
army, career field 17.

01:07:51.770 --> 01:07:54.040
It is designated as a combat arms branch

01:07:54.040 --> 01:07:55.830
on par with infantry, artillery,

01:07:55.830 --> 01:08:00.180
and aviation with the intent
to cyber mission force teams

01:08:00.180 --> 01:08:03.320
are another element of maneuver within

01:08:03.320 --> 01:08:05.303
and through the cyberspace domain.

01:08:06.470 --> 01:08:09.000
These cyber mission force
teams enable army cyber

01:08:09.000 --> 01:08:11.190
command to provide support to army

01:08:11.190 --> 01:08:13.830
and joint commanders with special emphasis

01:08:13.830 --> 01:08:17.310
in the Pacific theater to
ensure selected networks,

01:08:17.310 --> 01:08:20.682
systems, and data are
protected and secure.

01:08:20.682 --> 01:08:23.250
Army cyber forces have also supported

01:08:23.250 --> 01:08:25.710
the joint force as an
integral part of joint

01:08:25.710 --> 01:08:28.170
task force areas that has been countering

01:08:28.170 --> 01:08:31.590
ISIS's use of cyberspace as a domain

01:08:31.590 --> 01:08:35.460
to spread message and coordinate
their combat activities.

01:08:35.460 --> 01:08:37.910
The work of JT F. Ares
has been an important

01:08:37.910 --> 01:08:41.875
part of the coordinated,
multi-domain military campaign

01:08:41.875 --> 01:08:45.656
that helped defeat ISIS on
the ground in Iraq and Syria.

01:08:45.656 --> 01:08:47.976
As you heard General Townsend describe

01:08:47.976 --> 01:08:50.722
one such operation yesterday.

01:08:50.722 --> 01:08:53.500
Much of the cyberspace
operations we conducted

01:08:53.500 --> 01:08:56.660
against ISIS was either in direct support

01:08:56.660 --> 01:09:00.340
or actually integrated
into kinetic operations

01:09:00.340 --> 01:09:03.890
of CJTFOIR therefore demonstrating

01:09:03.890 --> 01:09:06.093
actual multi-domain operations.

01:09:07.025 --> 01:09:09.870
Since 2000, now at the tactical level.

01:09:09.870 --> 01:09:13.870
Since 2015, the Army's Cyber
Electromagnetic Activities

01:09:13.870 --> 01:09:17.420
or CEMA support decorum below pilot

01:09:17.420 --> 01:09:19.960
has been integrated into nine rotations

01:09:19.960 --> 01:09:22.290
at the army's combat training center.

01:09:22.290 --> 01:09:25.530
The focus of the pilot has been
helping brigade combat teams

01:09:25.530 --> 01:09:28.180
integrate CEMA which spans offensive

01:09:28.180 --> 01:09:30.440
and defensive cyber space operations,

01:09:30.440 --> 01:09:33.950
electronic warfare, and
information operations

01:09:33.950 --> 01:09:37.160
into a BCTs operational processes.

01:09:37.160 --> 01:09:39.000
At its core, this pilot has sought

01:09:39.000 --> 01:09:40.850
to answer three questions.

01:09:40.850 --> 01:09:45.550
First it seemed relevant to
tactical commanders operations.

01:09:45.550 --> 01:09:48.700
Second, if yes then how does it integrate

01:09:48.700 --> 01:09:51.570
into tactical operations and, finally,

01:09:51.570 --> 01:09:54.910
what structure and doctrine
best support tactical CEMA?

01:09:55.860 --> 01:09:58.530
This pilot has helped BCT leverage CEMA

01:09:58.530 --> 01:10:00.720
to understand their unit's footprint

01:10:00.720 --> 01:10:04.510
in the cyberspace domain and
an electromagnetic spectrum

01:10:04.510 --> 01:10:07.190
and to better deliver cyberspace effects

01:10:07.190 --> 01:10:09.570
and conduct electronic warfare in support

01:10:09.570 --> 01:10:11.380
of their operations.

01:10:11.380 --> 01:10:13.550
The pilot has also helped the BCTs

01:10:13.550 --> 01:10:16.630
to maximize the role of
electronic warfare section

01:10:16.630 --> 01:10:19.560
and identified the best
methods of leveraging

01:10:19.560 --> 01:10:22.570
the new expeditionary CEMA team concept

01:10:22.570 --> 01:10:26.550
being proposed with a cyberspace
warfare support battalion

01:10:26.550 --> 01:10:28.203
to support the tactical level.

01:10:29.090 --> 01:10:31.060
The lessons learned
through out CEMA support

01:10:31.060 --> 01:10:33.870
decorum below pilot have been invaluable

01:10:33.870 --> 01:10:36.460
and put to direct use.

01:10:36.460 --> 01:10:39.610
Today our cyber forces are
supporting operational units

01:10:39.610 --> 01:10:44.320
in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan,
Korea, and Europe.

01:10:44.320 --> 01:10:47.240
We are equipping and training
units with new tools,

01:10:47.240 --> 01:10:50.350
giving them a marked
advantage over the adversary.

01:10:50.350 --> 01:10:52.900
We are also supporting training
for the new security forces

01:10:52.900 --> 01:10:55.620
assistance brigade providing expeditionary

01:10:55.620 --> 01:10:57.770
and remote offensive
and defensive cyberspace

01:10:57.770 --> 01:11:02.300
operations, electronic warfare,
and information operations.

01:11:02.300 --> 01:11:05.290
Army Cyber Command is helping
shape the CEMA capabilities

01:11:05.290 --> 01:11:09.100
of the user pack led multi-domain
task force initiative

01:11:09.100 --> 01:11:10.670
and lessons learned are being applied

01:11:10.670 --> 01:11:13.100
to global contingency operations.

01:11:13.100 --> 01:11:15.080
We continue to support
the training of brigade

01:11:15.080 --> 01:11:18.250
combat teams helping build up a contested

01:11:18.250 --> 01:11:20.490
and congested cyberspace domain

01:11:20.490 --> 01:11:22.920
and electromagnetic
spectrum infrastructure

01:11:22.920 --> 01:11:24.950
at the combat training centers.

01:11:24.950 --> 01:11:27.330
Also as General Townsend stated yesterday,

01:11:27.330 --> 01:11:30.810
the army is replicating
real near peer threats

01:11:30.810 --> 01:11:32.203
at those training centers.

01:11:33.660 --> 01:11:36.010
Our greatest concern
remains that of actions

01:11:36.010 --> 01:11:38.900
by state sponsored malicious cyber actors

01:11:38.900 --> 01:11:40.930
and the states behind them.

01:11:40.930 --> 01:11:43.670
We find that near peer
states seek to integrate

01:11:43.670 --> 01:11:46.990
cyberspace operations with
the plans and capabilities

01:11:46.990 --> 01:11:49.700
of their traditional
military capabilities.

01:11:49.700 --> 01:11:53.017
Indeed, several have mounted
sustained campaigns to scout

01:11:53.017 --> 01:11:56.560
and access are key enabling technologies,

01:11:56.560 --> 01:12:00.050
capabilities, platforms, and systems

01:12:00.050 --> 01:12:01.970
as they are developed and produced

01:12:01.970 --> 01:12:03.863
by our cleared defense contractors.

01:12:04.900 --> 01:12:07.290
Multi-domain operations
requires the ability

01:12:07.290 --> 01:12:10.454
to maneuver and deliver
affects across all domains

01:12:10.454 --> 01:12:14.760
in order to develop and
exploit military operations

01:12:14.760 --> 01:12:18.070
across a much larger
operational framework.

01:12:18.070 --> 01:12:20.680
Cyberspace operations are now a critical

01:12:20.680 --> 01:12:23.390
part of multi-domain operations.

01:12:23.390 --> 01:12:26.040
Thank you, and I also look
forward to your questions.

01:12:27.215 --> 01:12:31.250
- [Crutchfield] Thank you,
Ron, and final comment

01:12:31.250 --> 01:12:33.050
before questions from Colonel Eassa.

01:12:33.959 --> 01:12:35.264
- Okay, thank you.

01:12:35.264 --> 01:12:38.660
Really appreciate allowing me to be here.

01:12:38.660 --> 01:12:42.350
As I look out at you, I want to start off

01:12:42.350 --> 01:12:47.350
and end with information and
its use compels, underpins,

01:12:49.600 --> 01:12:52.913
and enables human behavior and activities.

01:12:54.380 --> 01:12:55.420
So I'll say that again.

01:12:55.420 --> 01:12:58.230
Information compels, underpins,

01:12:58.230 --> 01:13:01.730
and enables human behavior and activity.

01:13:01.730 --> 01:13:05.713
Warfare is imposing your
will upon your adversary.

01:13:07.300 --> 01:13:10.830
So if I started out by
saying that Sergeant Major

01:13:10.830 --> 01:13:13.270
in the army, Preston, and I were looking

01:13:13.270 --> 01:13:15.461
at doing an opposed river crossing

01:13:15.461 --> 01:13:17.260
and we are going to do that

01:13:17.260 --> 01:13:20.640
in a heavy combat operations mode,

01:13:20.640 --> 01:13:24.070
we would all be able to
understand how to suppress

01:13:24.070 --> 01:13:27.310
the far side, how to move
the engineers forward

01:13:27.310 --> 01:13:30.307
and every commander in
here would understand

01:13:30.307 --> 01:13:33.113
how to approach that problem set.

01:13:34.380 --> 01:13:37.753
Now let's add the ubiquity of information.

01:13:39.110 --> 01:13:42.880
Information comes in many
flavors and many forms,

01:13:42.880 --> 01:13:46.830
and it comes in many
aspects to who you are

01:13:46.830 --> 01:13:50.820
and where you sit as to
how it can be employed

01:13:50.820 --> 01:13:54.600
at the strategic operational
and tactical level.

01:13:54.600 --> 01:13:57.010
I'm the Director of Plans and Strategy

01:13:57.010 --> 01:14:00.953
for OSD's Strategic Capabilities Office.

01:14:02.180 --> 01:14:04.640
We bring new and surprising ways

01:14:04.640 --> 01:14:08.880
of using existing commercial
and military technology

01:14:08.880 --> 01:14:11.910
to win tomorrow's wars and buy time

01:14:11.910 --> 01:14:16.290
for future technologies to emerge.

01:14:16.290 --> 01:14:19.780
With that, how I got
there, was I'm a field

01:14:19.780 --> 01:14:22.690
artillerymen who in 1989, the army went

01:14:22.690 --> 01:14:25.540
to career field designations

01:14:25.540 --> 01:14:28.290
and I became an IO officer.

01:14:28.290 --> 01:14:31.820
There was also a space
officer created at that time.

01:14:31.820 --> 01:14:33.550
There was no schoolhouse.

01:14:33.550 --> 01:14:37.210
There was no common
definition of what IO was

01:14:37.210 --> 01:14:41.170
and to earn my spurs I had go
to Sam's, become a planner,

01:14:41.170 --> 01:14:44.090
and get on a core staff
which took me through

01:14:44.090 --> 01:14:45.393
the invasion of Iraq.

01:14:46.723 --> 01:14:51.723
We are a very combat focused corps.

01:14:52.500 --> 01:14:55.840
We understood how to do combat operations.

01:14:55.840 --> 01:14:58.510
What we didn't understand was the ubiquity

01:14:58.510 --> 01:15:01.500
of the information environment
and our role in it.

01:15:01.500 --> 01:15:04.590
The information environment is
not something you can turn on

01:15:04.590 --> 01:15:05.583
or turn off.

01:15:06.650 --> 01:15:10.420
It touches every aspect of
your operating environment.

01:15:10.420 --> 01:15:12.080
Let me give you some facts and figures,

01:15:12.080 --> 01:15:14.170
so we can walk through that together.

01:15:14.170 --> 01:15:16.620
First off according to Hootsuite,

01:15:16.620 --> 01:15:20.440
there's 7.5 billion
people in the earth today.

01:15:20.440 --> 01:15:23.860
Of those, 55 are an urban environment.

01:15:23.860 --> 01:15:25.680
That's a different subject.

01:15:25.680 --> 01:15:28.840
Four million of those,
four billion of those

01:15:28.840 --> 01:15:30.160
are on the Internet.

01:15:30.160 --> 01:15:35.160
53%, two or 3.2 billion of them, 42%,

01:15:37.770 --> 01:15:41.433
of the Earth's population
touch social media every day.

01:15:43.603 --> 01:15:46.290
The Internet penetration in Europe is 85%,

01:15:46.290 --> 01:15:49.000
here in Asia it's 52%.

01:15:49.000 --> 01:15:53.130
Google, Twitter, Facebook
are all working very hard

01:15:53.130 --> 01:15:57.523
to increase that number to 80% by 2025.

01:15:59.160 --> 01:16:01.470
Last year, the growth of social media in

01:16:01.470 --> 01:16:06.470
China was 22%, Indonesia 23%, Vietnam 20%.

01:16:07.420 --> 01:16:12.420
In 2004, 10% of adults
were on the Internet.

01:16:12.830 --> 01:16:15.533
Now 65% of adults are on the Internet.

01:16:16.630 --> 01:16:20.830
2009 Bitcoin was there if
you invested a thousand

01:16:20.830 --> 01:16:23.320
dollars in bitcoin in 2009

01:16:23.320 --> 01:16:28.320
you'd be a, the figure
is $47 million dollars.

01:16:29.780 --> 01:16:31.960
So, quite unique.

01:16:31.960 --> 01:16:34.640
Uber came on the scene in 2011

01:16:34.640 --> 01:16:37.630
and is now over a $60
billion dollar company

01:16:37.630 --> 01:16:40.300
with an idea of how to be disruptive

01:16:40.300 --> 01:16:44.330
and how to bring in information
and innovation to bear.

01:16:44.330 --> 01:16:46.310
One out of every three minutes you spend

01:16:46.310 --> 01:16:49.620
online is doing social media.

01:16:49.620 --> 01:16:53.630
Facebook, YouTube, Twitter,
Google know more about you

01:16:53.630 --> 01:16:55.723
than I know about my own finances.

01:16:56.710 --> 01:16:58.900
These companies are working hard to bring

01:16:58.900 --> 01:17:01.980
innovation and they're data driven.

01:17:01.980 --> 01:17:05.630
They are bringing data
because data equals money.

01:17:05.630 --> 01:17:07.700
Data reaches audiences so they have to

01:17:07.700 --> 01:17:09.560
understand those audiences.

01:17:09.560 --> 01:17:12.630
They have to be able to shape
and compel those audiences

01:17:12.630 --> 01:17:14.630
to buy the products.

01:17:14.630 --> 01:17:16.743
That's having an impact on the economy.

01:17:17.650 --> 01:17:22.650
In 2016, the digital
economy was $1.2 trillion

01:17:23.780 --> 01:17:28.000
in the United States or 6.5% of the GDP.

01:17:28.000 --> 01:17:30.030
That equals six million jobs.

01:17:30.030 --> 01:17:32.840
Of that six million
jobs, the average paying

01:17:32.840 --> 01:17:36.270
was one $114,000.

01:17:36.270 --> 01:17:39.220
So being able to bring
that talent into the United

01:17:39.220 --> 01:17:43.475
States Army, into the military,
and keep them is critical.

01:17:43.475 --> 01:17:45.490
What's on the horizon?

01:17:45.490 --> 01:17:47.390
Artificial intelligence machine learning.

01:17:47.390 --> 01:17:51.290
How many of you have
Google homes in your house?

01:17:51.290 --> 01:17:54.580
Alexa or other things
that are waking you up?

01:17:54.580 --> 01:17:59.570
Reusable rockets, driverless
vehicles, it's amazing,

01:17:59.570 --> 01:18:01.357
and so as General Perna talked about

01:18:01.357 --> 01:18:04.840
the army Futures Command,
how do you deliver capability

01:18:04.840 --> 01:18:07.310
in two years to the field?

01:18:07.310 --> 01:18:08.830
How do you integrate it?

01:18:08.830 --> 01:18:11.120
And then, how does the commander visualize

01:18:11.120 --> 01:18:12.500
and understand that?

01:18:12.500 --> 01:18:14.820
Information is now a joint function.

01:18:14.820 --> 01:18:17.920
Its definition is integrate and generate

01:18:17.920 --> 01:18:21.580
the preservation of
combat power of friendly

01:18:21.580 --> 01:18:23.680
information to achieve the commander's

01:18:23.680 --> 01:18:28.350
objectives and achieve
his or her end state.

01:18:28.350 --> 01:18:30.950
You've got to be able to
tie it in with protection,

01:18:30.950 --> 01:18:35.610
fires, movement, intelligence,
and command and control.

01:18:35.610 --> 01:18:38.660
The commander has to be
able to visualize that space

01:18:38.660 --> 01:18:40.910
and be able to describe
and direct the actions

01:18:40.910 --> 01:18:43.780
he wants to take, so that guys like

01:18:43.780 --> 01:18:47.030
me can bring capability to bear,

01:18:47.030 --> 01:18:50.520
but it's not as simple as
pivot steering a howitzer.

01:18:50.520 --> 01:18:54.002
You've got to be able to
understand the relationships,

01:18:54.002 --> 01:18:59.002
build the capability, and
then get that capability

01:18:59.160 --> 01:19:01.950
into time and space where you need it.

01:19:01.950 --> 01:19:04.750
Whether that is a public affairs team

01:19:04.750 --> 01:19:07.540
or working with your allies and partners

01:19:07.540 --> 01:19:12.290
or working with all the
different aspects of information,

01:19:12.290 --> 01:19:15.080
so that it matters to you the commander

01:19:15.080 --> 01:19:18.285
and like fires you've
got to be able to call

01:19:18.285 --> 01:19:20.690
from your higher headquarters

01:19:20.690 --> 01:19:23.760
the capabilities that you need them to do.

01:19:23.760 --> 01:19:26.270
Information is ubiquitous
it's not gonna stay

01:19:26.270 --> 01:19:27.730
at the tactical level.

01:19:27.730 --> 01:19:29.340
It's gonna travel.

01:19:29.340 --> 01:19:31.640
You have to understand
your risk to mission

01:19:31.640 --> 01:19:35.320
if you fail to control your
information at all levels

01:19:35.320 --> 01:19:38.810
and if you fail to help
your boss understand

01:19:38.810 --> 01:19:41.160
the impact it's gonna
have with them over time.

01:19:42.030 --> 01:19:43.910
I look forward to your questions.

01:19:43.910 --> 01:19:45.970
Information is my life.

01:19:45.970 --> 01:19:49.110
It's what I've grown up in the army to do.

01:19:49.110 --> 01:19:51.200
It's a sad life sometimes, by the way,

01:19:51.200 --> 01:19:54.523
but it's it's challenging, thank you.

01:19:57.420 --> 01:19:59.400
- A thanks to all of our panel members

01:19:59.400 --> 01:20:01.861
for the opening comments
and I'm sure it'll

01:20:01.861 --> 01:20:04.909
spark lots of questions and we have a few.

01:20:04.909 --> 01:20:07.550
So let's kick them off now.

01:20:07.550 --> 01:20:10.803
The first one is to Mr. Pontius, Ron.

01:20:12.960 --> 01:20:15.150
When do you think U.S. cyber authorities

01:20:15.150 --> 01:20:18.030
are gonna match cyber capabilities

01:20:18.030 --> 01:20:22.233
in order to support commanders
non-kinetic effects?

01:20:24.540 --> 01:20:25.390
- Great question.

01:20:27.950 --> 01:20:30.960
If I go back, really, 18 months ago

01:20:30.960 --> 01:20:34.160
there was a tremendous amount
of discussion of authorities,

01:20:34.160 --> 01:20:38.210
but with the operations
we conducted against

01:20:38.210 --> 01:20:40.890
encounter ISIS with
Joint Task Force areas.

01:20:40.890 --> 01:20:45.230
We were able to work
through both within the DoD

01:20:45.230 --> 01:20:47.850
and an interagency process.

01:20:47.850 --> 01:20:50.680
A way to work through to say how,

01:20:50.680 --> 01:20:53.600
what kind of effects
are we trying to achieve

01:20:55.780 --> 01:20:58.190
with a specific what we
call the mission packages.

01:20:58.190 --> 01:21:00.840
What U.S. Cyber Command
with the mission package

01:21:00.840 --> 01:21:05.425
and understand what would be
any potential collateral effect

01:21:05.425 --> 01:21:08.770
because we all understand cyber, at times,

01:21:08.770 --> 01:21:10.720
can know no boundaries,
physical boundaries

01:21:10.720 --> 01:21:11.940
as we know them.

01:21:11.940 --> 01:21:15.980
So there has been tremendous
progress made on this

01:21:15.980 --> 01:21:18.838
in the larger interagency process

01:21:18.838 --> 01:21:21.840
and really establishing those norms.

01:21:21.840 --> 01:21:23.490
Additionally, the work
that we've been done

01:21:23.490 --> 01:21:28.490
on the CEMA cyber support decorum below,

01:21:28.610 --> 01:21:31.210
we really have been working
down at the tactical level

01:21:31.210 --> 01:21:34.000
to understand what it really means for VCT

01:21:34.000 --> 01:21:37.780
commander to be able to have the authority

01:21:37.780 --> 01:21:42.780
to use capabilities to deliver effects

01:21:43.240 --> 01:21:45.706
and that's that's the most
important thing there.

01:21:45.706 --> 01:21:50.706
In many ways it is about
enabling cyber electronic warfare

01:21:50.847 --> 01:21:53.030
and the other enablers together.

01:21:53.030 --> 01:21:55.722
There is progress being made on that.

01:21:55.722 --> 01:21:59.730
There will still be, I think, limitations

01:21:59.730 --> 01:22:03.570
on offensive capabilities, but
we are working through that

01:22:03.570 --> 01:22:06.670
to say what is, what
are we comfortable with

01:22:06.670 --> 01:22:09.020
and there's steady progress
being made on that.

01:22:11.850 --> 01:22:12.683
- Thank you.

01:22:13.770 --> 01:22:18.770
General James, how are
we partnering with allies

01:22:19.050 --> 01:22:21.763
and commercial industry in space?

01:22:22.770 --> 01:22:25.156
- So, I'm glad for the
question and 'cause I kind

01:22:25.156 --> 01:22:26.823
of hit that lightly.

01:22:29.244 --> 01:22:30.157
Can you hear me?

01:22:30.157 --> 01:22:30.990
Hello?

01:22:35.270 --> 01:22:38.460
Test, all right, a booming voice.

01:22:38.460 --> 01:22:40.610
So thanks for asking the question

01:22:40.610 --> 01:22:42.520
because I hit that kind of lightly through

01:22:42.520 --> 01:22:45.300
my initial comments there, but so to focus

01:22:45.300 --> 01:22:48.800
on a little bit on the
allied and coalition efforts

01:22:48.800 --> 01:22:50.390
I mentioned the effort of the combined

01:22:50.390 --> 01:22:52.080
Space Operations Center where today

01:22:52.080 --> 01:22:54.761
we have a joint space operation center.

01:22:54.761 --> 01:22:58.010
We're working very rapidly and fast

01:22:58.010 --> 01:22:59.763
in a general heightened tutelage.

01:23:04.670 --> 01:23:06.420
I feel like I'm doing karaoke here.

01:23:07.990 --> 01:23:11.080
And so has as we stand
up to coalition Space

01:23:11.080 --> 01:23:16.080
Operations Center out of the
Joint Space Operations Center

01:23:16.250 --> 01:23:18.680
we already have coalition
members that are part

01:23:18.680 --> 01:23:20.103
of our crews on the floor.

01:23:21.460 --> 01:23:24.609
We have a British and an Australian

01:23:24.609 --> 01:23:26.030
part of that organization.

01:23:26.030 --> 01:23:29.979
We have a German LNO
inside the coalition space

01:23:29.979 --> 01:23:32.140
operations center, but more
importantly we're building

01:23:32.140 --> 01:23:35.630
the foundation for rapidly
increasing coalition

01:23:35.630 --> 01:23:37.550
membership in those operations centers.

01:23:37.550 --> 01:23:40.300
We also tied closely into other nations

01:23:40.300 --> 01:23:42.820
as they begin to stand up
space operations centers

01:23:42.820 --> 01:23:45.995
in the UK and Canada and Australia.

01:23:45.995 --> 01:23:49.040
On the army side, we have as part of our

01:23:49.040 --> 01:23:52.140
wide band satellite
operations center in Hawaii

01:23:52.140 --> 01:23:55.222
about a dozen Australians
that are an integral

01:23:55.222 --> 01:23:57.560
part of that space operation
that provides critical

01:23:57.560 --> 01:24:00.223
satellite communications
for the PACOM AOR.

01:24:01.630 --> 01:24:03.480
I think that some of the challenges we see

01:24:03.480 --> 01:24:06.330
as we continue to push hard
to integrate our friends

01:24:06.330 --> 01:24:08.760
and allies into our space operations,

01:24:08.760 --> 01:24:10.750
the security classification concerns

01:24:10.750 --> 01:24:14.220
and there are those that will
say that on the space side

01:24:14.220 --> 01:24:16.930
we have probably over
classified some things

01:24:16.930 --> 01:24:20.880
as we continue to understand
what the impacts are

01:24:20.880 --> 01:24:22.610
and how close to that information should

01:24:22.610 --> 01:24:24.110
or should not be guarded.

01:24:24.110 --> 01:24:28.320
So we've gone through a
huge push as we transition

01:24:28.320 --> 01:24:32.570
to the combined operations of
the Space Operations Center

01:24:33.653 --> 01:24:36.120
to reduce classifications of a lot of our

01:24:36.120 --> 01:24:38.510
capability so that we
can work more closely

01:24:38.510 --> 01:24:40.960
with our allies and that
is a big push, I think,

01:24:40.960 --> 01:24:41.940
across the DoD.

01:24:41.940 --> 01:24:44.720
So our new organizational construct looks

01:24:44.720 --> 01:24:46.687
at embedding coalition members that are

01:24:46.687 --> 01:24:48.280
in critical positions
and bringing Space Forces

01:24:48.280 --> 01:24:50.130
as part of a multi-national operation

01:24:50.130 --> 01:24:54.250
multi-domain environment and
across multiple security levels

01:24:54.250 --> 01:24:55.960
and the step with multinational partners

01:24:55.960 --> 01:24:59.340
and I think PACOM is right for that type

01:24:59.340 --> 01:25:00.460
of integration and support.

01:25:00.460 --> 01:25:03.185
Your operations out here
on the commercial side

01:25:03.185 --> 01:25:04.290
just quickly talk briefly

01:25:04.290 --> 01:25:06.570
about the commercial integration cell.

01:25:06.570 --> 01:25:09.530
That has seven partners
from industry right now

01:25:09.530 --> 01:25:11.530
that sit on their operations center floor

01:25:11.530 --> 01:25:14.830
with us and in exercises in some pretty

01:25:14.830 --> 01:25:16.690
complex problems as we developed,

01:25:16.690 --> 01:25:20.490
they've been able to in
real time help us fill gaps

01:25:20.490 --> 01:25:22.210
as we went through the
scenario where we may

01:25:22.210 --> 01:25:24.600
lose certain capabilities
or a small amount

01:25:25.710 --> 01:25:29.050
of time of them to be
able to provide just as

01:25:29.050 --> 01:25:30.690
if they were part of our military

01:25:30.690 --> 01:25:33.460
organizational structure,
those capabilities.

01:25:33.460 --> 01:25:35.580
I mean we see that growing
in the future as well

01:25:35.580 --> 01:25:37.810
and will be a critical part in the past,

01:25:37.810 --> 01:25:40.640
I think, we have seen
in the space community

01:25:40.640 --> 01:25:43.650
the industry and the
commercial side has kind

01:25:43.650 --> 01:25:45.140
of been led by the military

01:25:45.140 --> 01:25:48.030
and you'd see offshoots
of military programs

01:25:48.030 --> 01:25:49.820
into the commercial sector.

01:25:49.820 --> 01:25:52.960
That's changed, that paradigm
has been stood on its head

01:25:52.960 --> 01:25:57.060
and some of the things we
talked about with SpaceX

01:25:57.060 --> 01:25:59.140
efforts where they can
re-land on those rocket bodies

01:25:59.140 --> 01:26:00.950
and reuse them quickly.

01:26:00.950 --> 01:26:05.190
I mean they landed on a
floating platform dusted

01:26:05.190 --> 01:26:06.880
off, checked for soundness of the system,

01:26:06.880 --> 01:26:09.090
they put it back in quickly and cheaply

01:26:09.090 --> 01:26:12.140
and increase our launch
that absolutely aids

01:26:12.140 --> 01:26:15.760
our ability to put
resiliency into how we manage

01:26:15.760 --> 01:26:19.443
our space strategy in
support of combat operations.

01:26:22.350 --> 01:26:23.200
- Thank you, sir.

01:26:24.600 --> 01:26:27.593
We'll have General Dickinson
fill the next question.

01:26:28.763 --> 01:26:31.010
- All right, so this question is speaking

01:26:31.010 --> 01:26:33.760
in terms of planning for
a crisis contingency.

01:26:33.760 --> 01:26:36.870
It was expressed several
times the importance

01:26:36.870 --> 01:26:40.230
of incorporating cyber
EW etcetera in all phases

01:26:40.230 --> 01:26:41.460
of the operation.

01:26:41.460 --> 01:26:44.280
How do you see the authorities
changing in the future

01:26:44.280 --> 01:26:47.490
or now to empower the theater
army to set the theater

01:26:47.490 --> 01:26:51.223
for tactical forces to
advantage them to win wars?

01:26:54.650 --> 01:26:56.010
Can you hear me now?

01:26:56.010 --> 01:26:59.807
All right, that was the
watercraft question right.

01:26:59.807 --> 01:27:00.770
(laughing)

01:27:00.770 --> 01:27:03.640
Okay, so, I think, Mr.
Pontius touched on this

01:27:03.640 --> 01:27:06.000
just briefly so in terms
of the authorities,

01:27:06.000 --> 01:27:10.404
I think my overall
comment would be the more

01:27:10.404 --> 01:27:13.530
that we continue to
incorporate non-kinetic

01:27:13.530 --> 01:27:16.700
and kinetic effects into
our planning process

01:27:16.700 --> 01:27:19.070
the more streamlined or
authorities will become

01:27:19.070 --> 01:27:21.960
because authorities are based upon,

01:27:21.960 --> 01:27:23.860
in my opinion, the understanding

01:27:23.860 --> 01:27:27.830
of how that effect is being generated.

01:27:27.830 --> 01:27:32.359
So as we look across cyber space

01:27:32.359 --> 01:27:34.140
and how those are incorporated

01:27:34.140 --> 01:27:36.950
in non-kinetic type planning efforts,

01:27:36.950 --> 01:27:39.905
our ability to communicate
that in in terms of risk

01:27:39.905 --> 01:27:43.420
associated with that creating
that effect is very important

01:27:43.420 --> 01:27:47.880
and with that our understanding
of the collateral damage

01:27:47.880 --> 01:27:51.430
that Mr. Pontius touched on
for a minute is very important.

01:27:51.430 --> 01:27:54.400
So I see that as authorities becoming more

01:27:54.400 --> 01:27:58.870
streamlined, more flat as we progress.

01:27:58.870 --> 01:28:01.010
- And, sir, if I could add to that.

01:28:01.010 --> 01:28:04.190
That's also part of the
concept that is emerging

01:28:04.190 --> 01:28:06.670
with this cyber warfare support battalion

01:28:06.670 --> 01:28:09.210
where there would be the specially trained

01:28:09.210 --> 01:28:12.770
cyber teams that would
bring the authorities

01:28:12.770 --> 01:28:14.710
with them that would get integrated with

01:28:14.710 --> 01:28:17.720
the brigade combat team
for specific operations.

01:28:17.720 --> 01:28:20.340
And so then, you have specially trained

01:28:20.340 --> 01:28:22.620
entities that the
authorities flow from U.S.

01:28:22.620 --> 01:28:25.750
Cyber Command to the army's cyber command

01:28:25.750 --> 01:28:28.740
to those teams that are supporting
the brigade combat team.

01:28:28.740 --> 01:28:30.750
And that's part of the
concept that's emerging

01:28:30.750 --> 01:28:32.800
with the cyber warfare support battalion.

01:28:34.230 --> 01:28:36.890
- Ron, can I just pull on
that thread a little bit?

01:28:36.890 --> 01:28:41.190
There's a question that
piles on the answer

01:28:41.190 --> 01:28:43.610
you just gave up with the authorities,

01:28:43.610 --> 01:28:46.390
but what about the, is there a need

01:28:46.390 --> 01:28:49.440
or is there a shortfall and the agility

01:28:49.440 --> 01:28:51.880
and rapid process to gain new authorities

01:28:51.880 --> 01:28:54.563
as well as permissions to execute?

01:28:56.176 --> 01:28:59.293
- In many ways, again, I go back to the,

01:29:01.300 --> 01:29:03.710
it has to be, you clearly
have to understand

01:29:03.710 --> 01:29:05.563
the authorities, but in many ways

01:29:05.563 --> 01:29:07.770
it's to get to a conversation of what

01:29:07.770 --> 01:29:10.240
effects you're trying to achieve

01:29:10.240 --> 01:29:12.820
and then you can have a
much better conversation

01:29:12.820 --> 01:29:16.840
that it's not so much a
hang up on the authorities.

01:29:16.840 --> 01:29:18.770
It's understanding what
effect you're trying

01:29:18.770 --> 01:29:21.200
to achieve in line with those authorities

01:29:21.200 --> 01:29:23.130
and so we've really made a lot of progress

01:29:23.130 --> 01:29:25.360
in the last 18 months on this conversation

01:29:25.360 --> 01:29:27.540
and again norms are
still being established.

01:29:27.540 --> 01:29:28.963
Totally recognize that,

01:29:30.270 --> 01:29:33.140
and truly what it means on
down to the tactical level.

01:29:33.140 --> 01:29:35.090
But as like, General
Townsend talked yesterday,

01:29:35.090 --> 01:29:37.830
that example he gave,
that was a very tactical

01:29:37.830 --> 01:29:40.010
fight there near Rocca, right?

01:29:40.010 --> 01:29:43.530
And there was clear authorities,

01:29:43.530 --> 01:29:44.790
we had to work through some things,

01:29:44.790 --> 01:29:47.620
but clear authorities of the
effects trying to be achieve

01:29:47.620 --> 01:29:50.160
and the integration of the non-kinetic

01:29:50.160 --> 01:29:53.140
with the kinetic to achieve
that battlefield effect.

01:29:53.140 --> 01:29:55.223
And we very much worked our way through,

01:29:56.220 --> 01:29:58.283
again, the authorities in effect piece.

01:30:00.730 --> 01:30:03.310
- I'm sure there's some
AUSA rule where a moderator

01:30:03.310 --> 01:30:06.193
can I give his opinion but
I'm gonna break it today.

01:30:07.260 --> 01:30:08.973
Sorry about that General.

01:30:10.092 --> 01:30:15.092
This brings me to an issue
we had at my last job

01:30:16.110 --> 01:30:19.490
sitting right here as
deputy commander PACOM

01:30:19.490 --> 01:30:22.554
and one thing that's
very hard for commanders

01:30:22.554 --> 01:30:24.010
because it was hard for us,

01:30:24.010 --> 01:30:26.350
it was during an incident
that we had probably

01:30:26.350 --> 01:30:29.363
about two years ago
where the commander was,

01:30:30.250 --> 01:30:32.350
we were trying to work authorities

01:30:32.350 --> 01:30:35.400
for an effect, for a non-kinetic effect.

01:30:35.400 --> 01:30:38.900
But the problem was sometimes if you input

01:30:38.900 --> 01:30:43.900
a non-kinetic effect you may
get a kinetic response back

01:30:45.120 --> 01:30:46.530
and so you have a think through that.

01:30:46.530 --> 01:30:48.600
It's not just the authority to do it,

01:30:48.600 --> 01:30:51.630
you need to think through
what's going to come back

01:30:51.630 --> 01:30:55.345
or how is that adversary
gonna see that non-kinetic

01:30:55.345 --> 01:30:57.400
input that you put in?

01:30:57.400 --> 01:31:00.180
And it could create a series of problems.

01:31:00.180 --> 01:31:03.270
This is a real world
event that happened here

01:31:03.270 --> 01:31:05.560
in PACOM, I'm sure it happens today.

01:31:05.560 --> 01:31:08.860
I'm sure it happens all over
the world and every COCOM,

01:31:08.860 --> 01:31:11.255
so these questions are very valid

01:31:11.255 --> 01:31:13.070
and we have to think about
it and we should also

01:31:13.070 --> 01:31:17.050
always keep that answer in those terms

01:31:17.050 --> 01:31:18.870
for combatant commanders.

01:31:18.870 --> 01:31:20.723
The impact, the second
that thwarted affects,

01:31:20.723 --> 01:31:21.830
does that make sense?

01:31:21.830 --> 01:31:25.710
- Yes, and I'll add to
that when adversaries

01:31:25.710 --> 01:31:29.760
do us a non-kinetic effect against us

01:31:29.760 --> 01:31:33.190
that it should be the potential responses

01:31:33.190 --> 01:31:36.273
the full range not just
in the cyber area, right?

01:31:36.273 --> 01:31:39.803
Because it may be that we get this,

01:31:40.765 --> 01:31:42.720
a non-kinetic response or a cyber response

01:31:42.720 --> 01:31:46.420
is not the right answer,
but maybe it's information.

01:31:46.420 --> 01:31:50.290
Maybe it's economic whatever

01:31:50.290 --> 01:31:53.210
and so in that larger
picture you need to think

01:31:53.210 --> 01:31:55.543
about the full spectrum
of options and domain.

01:31:57.240 --> 01:31:59.663
- All right, I'll sit on
my hands again, General.

01:32:00.530 --> 01:32:02.600
Just kidding, just having a little fun.

01:32:02.600 --> 01:32:06.050
This next question is for Colonel Essa.

01:32:06.050 --> 01:32:11.050
Chuck, the question is,
countries such as China

01:32:13.900 --> 01:32:16.580
and Russia are trying
to weaponize information

01:32:16.580 --> 01:32:19.033
to challenge U.S. national interests.

01:32:20.910 --> 01:32:23.770
What's the countermeasure
for this in your opinion

01:32:24.880 --> 01:32:27.560
and does the U.S. Army have the concept

01:32:27.560 --> 01:32:30.593
for weaponizing
information multilaterally?

01:32:32.850 --> 01:32:37.720
- So weaponized information
is a unique term

01:32:37.720 --> 01:32:41.570
because you're trying to
bring information to bear.

01:32:41.570 --> 01:32:45.970
So the greatest counter
to that is transparency

01:32:45.970 --> 01:32:48.960
and I think our nation
works on that principle

01:32:48.960 --> 01:32:50.430
and tries to be transparent.

01:32:50.430 --> 01:32:53.160
So the first piece is what

01:32:53.160 --> 01:32:55.730
is the U.S. Army's responsibility?

01:32:55.730 --> 01:32:59.300
And the unique thing is,
if you look at the National

01:32:59.300 --> 01:33:02.860
Defense Strategy it
provides you of a force

01:33:02.860 --> 01:33:04.910
that's in contact every day.

01:33:04.910 --> 01:33:06.677
A force that you're blunt force

01:33:06.677 --> 01:33:09.140
and a force that your surge force.

01:33:09.140 --> 01:33:13.177
So the unique thing is with both USARPAC

01:33:14.145 --> 01:33:17.070
and USAREUR they are
engaged every day in theater

01:33:17.070 --> 01:33:20.390
with allies and partners working every day

01:33:20.390 --> 01:33:22.820
to shape that information environment.

01:33:22.820 --> 01:33:25.200
It's not weaponized something,

01:33:25.200 --> 01:33:30.200
it's living your values through
the relationships you build

01:33:30.260 --> 01:33:34.100
and it's portraying that
daily as a theater army.

01:33:34.100 --> 01:33:37.130
So that's ongoing,
that's represented by the

01:33:37.130 --> 01:33:40.600
forum we're sitting at, and
the people who are here.

01:33:40.600 --> 01:33:44.480
The second piece is, yes, China and Russia

01:33:44.480 --> 01:33:45.930
are certainly doing that.

01:33:45.930 --> 01:33:49.650
That's an area that our
job is to do exactly

01:33:49.650 --> 01:33:52.557
what I said before,
partner with our allies,

01:33:52.557 --> 01:33:56.940
partner with those who
have and share our beliefs

01:33:56.940 --> 01:33:59.250
and keep it open and transparent.

01:33:59.250 --> 01:34:00.800
That's how you counter it, sir.

01:34:03.210 --> 01:34:04.510
- Thank you, sir,

01:34:04.510 --> 01:34:07.700
and for this next question I
thought it would be interesting

01:34:07.700 --> 01:34:08.870
to hear from each of you.

01:34:08.870 --> 01:34:12.311
It's a pretty broad question,
but one that is relevant

01:34:12.311 --> 01:34:17.311
and certainly in today's
atmospherics and headlines.

01:34:18.550 --> 01:34:20.370
So here's a question,
and General Dickinson

01:34:20.370 --> 01:34:23.440
our start with you and your thoughts

01:34:23.440 --> 01:34:25.750
and then I'll just go down the line Tom

01:34:25.750 --> 01:34:28.540
and each of you can give
your thoughts on this.

01:34:28.540 --> 01:34:30.360
So question, what are your thoughts about

01:34:30.360 --> 01:34:34.600
North Korea being a cyber superpower?

01:34:34.600 --> 01:34:37.920
Are they a near peer to the United States?

01:34:37.920 --> 01:34:39.640
General Dickinson?

01:34:39.640 --> 01:34:42.620
- Well, I think it's something
we always have to consider.

01:34:42.620 --> 01:34:45.210
I think when you look at technology

01:34:45.210 --> 01:34:46.830
as I mentioned during my remarks

01:34:46.830 --> 01:34:50.170
and how quickly you can
build that capability

01:34:50.170 --> 01:34:53.040
to that capacity given
technology today that

01:34:53.040 --> 01:34:56.980
we always have to remember
that we are vulnerable

01:34:56.980 --> 01:34:58.550
from that or we have that vulnerability

01:34:58.550 --> 01:34:59.560
from that perspective.

01:34:59.560 --> 01:35:04.200
So whether you're a near peer adversary,

01:35:04.200 --> 01:35:07.170
mean we always have to
plan for that cyber piece

01:35:07.170 --> 01:35:09.130
or cyber defense piece of it

01:35:09.130 --> 01:35:11.020
and everything that we do whether

01:35:11.020 --> 01:35:13.270
or not they're a superpower
or not I can't I don't think

01:35:13.270 --> 01:35:17.410
I could really term them or
categorize that in that way,

01:35:17.410 --> 01:35:19.910
but I do know that they
have a growing capability.

01:35:22.070 --> 01:35:25.920
- So from the cyber
space piece, I think we

01:35:25.920 --> 01:35:26.753
kind of touched on that.

01:35:26.753 --> 01:35:28.550
I'm sure you'll have
more the cyber detail,

01:35:28.550 --> 01:35:30.810
but I can take it from a space side

01:35:30.810 --> 01:35:32.840
because part of the space
environment, I think,

01:35:32.840 --> 01:35:35.610
is cyber electromagnetic spectrum

01:35:35.610 --> 01:35:38.330
and information flow through those systems

01:35:38.330 --> 01:35:42.150
and I know that North Korea
understands the advantages

01:35:42.150 --> 01:35:44.920
that we have from space
and looks at ways to try

01:35:44.920 --> 01:35:49.340
to affect how they can
mitigate those capabilities,

01:35:49.340 --> 01:35:52.240
but far from a near peer in that realm.

01:35:52.240 --> 01:35:54.903
There are other nations
that we're more concerned

01:35:54.903 --> 01:35:56.080
about in the PACOM AOR.

01:35:57.930 --> 01:36:02.100
- North Korea has clearly
demonstrated capabilities

01:36:02.100 --> 01:36:03.770
here in the U.S., the Sony Pictures

01:36:03.770 --> 01:36:06.310
Entertainment or in South Korea various

01:36:06.310 --> 01:36:11.106
attacks on their financial
industries and other commerce.

01:36:11.106 --> 01:36:15.823
And really over the last 18, 24 months,

01:36:16.720 --> 01:36:18.020
you could say a tremendous amount

01:36:18.020 --> 01:36:21.330
of cyber enabled criminal activities to

01:36:21.330 --> 01:36:23.880
generate revenue for the regime.

01:36:23.880 --> 01:36:27.010
And so they have they have
definitely demonstrated

01:36:27.010 --> 01:36:29.500
in what's been attributed publicly

01:36:29.500 --> 01:36:33.283
to them has been
demonstrated some capability.

01:36:36.840 --> 01:36:40.620
I don't really have an opinion
on the superpower question,

01:36:40.620 --> 01:36:43.493
but they have demonstrated capability.

01:36:44.910 --> 01:36:46.700
- I would offer what I said earlier,

01:36:46.700 --> 01:36:50.850
information in its use
compels and underpins

01:36:50.850 --> 01:36:54.230
and enables human behavior
in its activities.

01:36:54.230 --> 01:36:56.670
North Korea is certainly an example

01:36:56.670 --> 01:37:00.110
of a country that is
trying to use the assets

01:37:00.110 --> 01:37:04.670
it has at hand to
balance irregular warfare

01:37:04.670 --> 01:37:09.640
and attack us as they've
watched the gray zone activities

01:37:09.640 --> 01:37:10.900
that they bring.

01:37:10.900 --> 01:37:14.890
They're using information
as a tool to drive

01:37:14.890 --> 01:37:17.550
the activities and behaviors they want

01:37:17.550 --> 01:37:21.210
and I think our country
is countering that.

01:37:21.210 --> 01:37:26.210
Cyber is a capability
that enables that piece

01:37:26.400 --> 01:37:27.453
and their reach.

01:37:32.830 --> 01:37:37.093
- I got a question here
probably, it's for you, Tom.

01:37:38.090 --> 01:37:40.270
Does block chain technology offer a way

01:37:40.270 --> 01:37:43.920
for us to protect insecure satellites

01:37:43.920 --> 01:37:45.913
for satellite comms and navigation?

01:37:47.160 --> 01:37:49.160
- Block chain technology and they wrote,

01:37:50.568 --> 01:37:51.401
is that Bitcoin?

01:37:51.401 --> 01:37:52.234
- It says Bitcoin.

01:37:54.000 --> 01:37:56.770
- So is this an anonymous question?

01:37:56.770 --> 01:37:57.820
Who ask the question?

01:37:59.470 --> 01:38:00.540
- They're gonna see how the Bitcoin

01:38:00.540 --> 01:38:02.620
is gonna go up based on your answer.

01:38:02.620 --> 01:38:05.380
- And explain about the
block chain technology piece.

01:38:05.380 --> 01:38:09.200
So I'll tell you that
there are lots of ways

01:38:09.200 --> 01:38:10.980
that we look at especially the acquisition

01:38:10.980 --> 01:38:13.633
piece of how we provide, protect,

01:38:16.670 --> 01:38:18.470
and secure satellite communications

01:38:18.470 --> 01:38:20.410
in both SATCOM navigation,

01:38:20.410 --> 01:38:22.090
but more than that just the TTNC

01:38:22.090 --> 01:38:24.560
of our systems that provide ISAR an OPIR.

01:38:26.360 --> 01:38:29.460
So I will tell you that from
an acquisition standpoint

01:38:29.460 --> 01:38:32.110
and those are you familiar
with agile acquisition piece

01:38:32.110 --> 01:38:33.830
that maybe gets some of this,

01:38:33.830 --> 01:38:37.580
is that we have to be
accelerated in how we respond

01:38:37.580 --> 01:38:41.280
to threats and talk to some
of the the emerging technology

01:38:41.280 --> 01:38:43.870
that's happening fast
and it's not exponential,

01:38:43.870 --> 01:38:46.660
but it is on an accelerating curve

01:38:47.700 --> 01:38:49.960
and we have to be in front
of that in our acquisition

01:38:49.960 --> 01:38:52.640
processes and you'll see a lot discussion

01:38:52.640 --> 01:38:55.130
at the congressional
level and Air Force Space

01:38:55.130 --> 01:38:57.970
Command and the parts of
our DoD space community

01:38:57.970 --> 01:39:00.470
of our acquisition
problems and how do we get

01:39:00.470 --> 01:39:03.160
at mission assurance and resiliency

01:39:03.160 --> 01:39:06.040
as we look at growing threats.

01:39:06.040 --> 01:39:08.140
And some of what we talked
about the North Korea

01:39:08.140 --> 01:39:10.980
as a potential cyber superpower,

01:39:10.980 --> 01:39:15.980
that all gets muddled in
what is actually North Korea

01:39:16.520 --> 01:39:19.960
and other entities non-state
actors that support that

01:39:19.960 --> 01:39:23.100
in the information operations arena

01:39:23.100 --> 01:39:24.343
in the cyber world.

01:39:25.280 --> 01:39:28.450
And space has a big part
in play in all of that,

01:39:28.450 --> 01:39:32.090
both protecting our systems
that require electronic

01:39:32.090 --> 01:39:34.410
connections with everything else in space

01:39:34.410 --> 01:39:35.570
to be able to command the controls,

01:39:35.570 --> 01:39:36.770
how do you protect that,

01:39:37.774 --> 01:39:42.774
and how do you ensure that a
week we can keep infiltration

01:39:42.900 --> 01:39:44.085
into those systems?

01:39:44.085 --> 01:39:47.650
But also how do we look at
advancing new technologies

01:39:47.650 --> 01:39:49.900
and systems that either
through just the quantity

01:39:49.900 --> 01:39:52.630
of good enough makes a
problem set too difficult

01:39:52.630 --> 01:39:57.060
for a threat to be able
to target our systems

01:39:57.060 --> 01:39:59.440
and if you look at some of what we've seen

01:39:59.440 --> 01:40:02.670
in the not too distant
past with the Chinese

01:40:02.670 --> 01:40:06.530
using a satellite or a kinetic attack

01:40:06.530 --> 01:40:08.400
on one of their own
satellites to take a weather

01:40:08.400 --> 01:40:09.940
system out of orbit.

01:40:09.940 --> 01:40:11.870
The United States has done
the same thing a year later

01:40:11.870 --> 01:40:14.420
with a wayward satellite that was coming

01:40:14.420 --> 01:40:15.810
back in a hazardous chemicals.

01:40:15.810 --> 01:40:17.780
We demonstrated that we could kinetically

01:40:17.780 --> 01:40:20.340
attack on orbit satellites

01:40:20.340 --> 01:40:23.610
and so in the past as an
arrow scout helicopter pilot,

01:40:23.610 --> 01:40:25.550
I knew that I could fly
in if things got bad

01:40:25.550 --> 01:40:28.340
I could try to get behind trees or terrain

01:40:28.340 --> 01:40:30.860
and mask myself from enemy fires.

01:40:30.860 --> 01:40:33.460
Space, there aren't trees
and there aren't hills,

01:40:33.460 --> 01:40:35.000
and so you're very exposed up there

01:40:35.000 --> 01:40:40.000
and that pretty pristine,
non-contested environment

01:40:41.280 --> 01:40:43.700
that we were used to in space is gone.

01:40:43.700 --> 01:40:46.983
And so part of the protecting
of satellite systems

01:40:46.983 --> 01:40:50.450
in the future will be how
we designed to complicate

01:40:50.450 --> 01:40:53.420
a targeting process for
those type of kinetic

01:40:53.420 --> 01:40:55.200
and non-kinetic threats.

01:40:55.200 --> 01:40:57.350
I don't know if that answers
your block chain question,

01:40:57.350 --> 01:40:59.729
but it's something I want to
talk about so I'm satisfied.

01:40:59.729 --> 01:41:01.900
(laughing)

01:41:01.900 --> 01:41:04.700
- Thank you, as we wrap up here,

01:41:04.700 --> 01:41:07.260
I'm gonna ask each of the panel members

01:41:07.260 --> 01:41:09.480
to give us a very brief closing comments

01:41:09.480 --> 01:41:11.150
and we'll turn it over
to General Dickinson

01:41:11.150 --> 01:41:12.973
who will close out the panel.

01:41:14.260 --> 01:41:15.970
Before we start with you Tom,

01:41:15.970 --> 01:41:18.200
again, I just want to
thank, as you were saying,

01:41:18.200 --> 01:41:23.200
General Ham and also Guy
and everyone from USARPAC.

01:41:23.270 --> 01:41:24.680
This is my fifth or sixth LANPAC.

01:41:24.680 --> 01:41:26.910
I was here when this started.

01:41:26.910 --> 01:41:27.910
I'm honored to be here.

01:41:27.910 --> 01:41:30.756
I think I've only missed one
when was in time out last year

01:41:30.756 --> 01:41:31.663
I couldn't come talk to you.

01:41:31.663 --> 01:41:35.808
You know I had cuties and,
so I'm happy to be back

01:41:35.808 --> 01:41:39.313
and hopefully can join
you again in the future.

01:41:40.340 --> 01:41:42.810
Please, if you all would wrap up

01:41:42.810 --> 01:41:44.170
with a couple of brief comments before

01:41:44.170 --> 01:41:47.740
we turn over to General
Dickinson for close out.

01:41:47.740 --> 01:41:49.400
- So if I had to give some takeaway points

01:41:49.400 --> 01:41:52.240
it would be from
observation being a space,

01:41:52.240 --> 01:41:55.832
an on army space operations
officer for 19 years

01:41:55.832 --> 01:42:00.060
is that understanding my
DNA just like Chuck Eassa

01:42:00.060 --> 01:42:01.600
does from the information off piece,

01:42:01.600 --> 01:42:04.190
how critically important
space is to the way

01:42:04.190 --> 01:42:05.550
that we want to fight war,

01:42:05.550 --> 01:42:06.950
the way that we need to fight a war

01:42:06.950 --> 01:42:10.350
and maintain an advantage
over potential adversaries.

01:42:10.350 --> 01:42:12.420
And so that needs to be a continued push

01:42:12.420 --> 01:42:16.426
that we don't allow us to
get behind our adversaries

01:42:16.426 --> 01:42:19.240
in those technological advances.

01:42:19.240 --> 01:42:22.380
We see the threats to our systems on orbit

01:42:22.380 --> 01:42:24.360
growing continually and so we have to have

01:42:24.360 --> 01:42:26.140
a focused effort on how we protect

01:42:26.140 --> 01:42:28.960
and defend those systems to
assure that they are there

01:42:28.960 --> 01:42:30.283
for us when we need them.

01:42:31.118 --> 01:42:34.480
We need to pay close attention
to how we take advantage

01:42:34.480 --> 01:42:36.930
of the changing conditions
in the space domain

01:42:36.930 --> 01:42:40.180
in terms advances in
launch and satellite design

01:42:40.180 --> 01:42:41.890
that we are not lagging behind that.

01:42:41.890 --> 01:42:43.830
That we are at the front the forefront

01:42:43.830 --> 01:42:47.460
of that wave to take complete advantage

01:42:47.460 --> 01:42:49.050
of those technological advances

01:42:49.050 --> 01:42:51.130
and I think a critical, if I
have to give the most important

01:42:51.130 --> 01:42:52.710
take away would be some of the discussion

01:42:52.710 --> 01:42:54.280
we had from yesterday the importance

01:42:54.280 --> 01:42:56.420
and the value of partnerships.

01:42:56.420 --> 01:42:58.880
And across the space
domain, we are pushing hard

01:42:58.880 --> 01:43:01.580
under General Hyten and general Raymond's

01:43:01.580 --> 01:43:06.210
leadership to strengthen coalition allies

01:43:06.210 --> 01:43:08.450
in partnerships with our
commercial industries

01:43:08.450 --> 01:43:10.050
and civilian agencies.

01:43:10.050 --> 01:43:12.730
And then we look closely
as the army digs deeply

01:43:12.730 --> 01:43:15.020
into the idea of multi-domain warfare,

01:43:15.020 --> 01:43:16.810
how space has a role in that.

01:43:16.810 --> 01:43:18.650
The last thing I would say is this, that

01:43:18.650 --> 01:43:20.210
you've got my contact information.

01:43:20.210 --> 01:43:22.960
If you have questions about
things we've talked about here

01:43:22.960 --> 01:43:26.990
space related or in the
conduct of your operations

01:43:26.990 --> 01:43:30.030
and daily business, feel
free to call me directly

01:43:30.030 --> 01:43:32.370
as much as my schedule will allow,

01:43:32.370 --> 01:43:35.020
I look forward to those
types of conversations,

01:43:35.020 --> 01:43:37.170
so with that I'll close.

01:43:37.170 --> 01:43:39.300
- I have two closing thoughts.

01:43:39.300 --> 01:43:42.200
First and foremost, the
first one is we must secure

01:43:42.200 --> 01:43:45.680
and protect our own
networks, data, and systems

01:43:45.680 --> 01:43:48.480
to enable us to have mission command,

01:43:48.480 --> 01:43:50.670
freedom maneuver, freedom of action,

01:43:50.670 --> 01:43:52.180
that is absolutely critical

01:43:52.180 --> 01:43:55.350
and it is no small part
when I talked about

01:43:55.350 --> 01:43:57.920
the joint cyber Mission Force teams.

01:43:57.920 --> 01:44:01.180
Half of those teams are defensive teams

01:44:01.180 --> 01:44:04.690
and that just says how
critically important it is

01:44:04.690 --> 01:44:08.900
to be able to secure and
protect our own capabilities.

01:44:08.900 --> 01:44:10.250
That's the first thought.

01:44:10.250 --> 01:44:13.380
The second thought is
non-kinetic capabilities

01:44:13.380 --> 01:44:15.707
such as space, cyber, electronic warfare,

01:44:15.707 --> 01:44:19.540
and information operations
are key enablers

01:44:19.540 --> 01:44:23.060
and must be integrated
with kinetic capabilities

01:44:23.060 --> 01:44:25.780
to enable tactical commanders to achieve

01:44:25.780 --> 01:44:29.930
the desired effects in a time
and place that they need.

01:44:29.930 --> 01:44:33.323
That is the essence of
multi-domain operations, thank you.

01:44:34.440 --> 01:44:37.630
- Let me build on that
and say that you're always

01:44:37.630 --> 01:44:40.063
in contact in your
information environment.

01:44:40.930 --> 01:44:43.810
You always have to think through
how you're gonna maneuver

01:44:43.810 --> 01:44:47.000
and protect the information
environment you want

01:44:47.000 --> 01:44:49.840
whether you're in peacetime or in war

01:44:49.840 --> 01:44:52.410
that you cannot turn your
information environment

01:44:52.410 --> 01:44:56.340
on and off at will because
it exists around you

01:44:56.340 --> 01:44:58.080
and there are other actors

01:44:58.080 --> 01:45:00.213
and you are just a part of that.

01:45:01.280 --> 01:45:02.980
You've got to understand how to help

01:45:02.980 --> 01:45:04.950
your commander visualize

01:45:04.950 --> 01:45:09.390
and describe the effects that
he or she needs to create

01:45:09.390 --> 01:45:11.430
and you have to be agile enough

01:45:11.430 --> 01:45:13.690
with enough experience to reach

01:45:13.690 --> 01:45:15.960
into those different networks,

01:45:15.960 --> 01:45:19.120
gain the authorities,
gain the capabilities,

01:45:19.120 --> 01:45:23.760
and bring them to bear at
the time and place you need.

01:45:23.760 --> 01:45:25.780
That's multi-domain battle.

01:45:25.780 --> 01:45:30.780
It goes in peacetime, it goes in wartime,

01:45:30.840 --> 01:45:35.320
it is shifting before
the other domains shift

01:45:35.320 --> 01:45:37.460
and it takes a lot of care and feeding.

01:45:37.460 --> 01:45:41.310
So being able to pinpoint
where you need that

01:45:41.310 --> 01:45:45.870
is incredibly important
because it takes preparation

01:45:45.870 --> 01:45:48.470
and it takes unique resources

01:45:48.470 --> 01:45:50.640
that are not widely available

01:45:50.640 --> 01:45:53.320
and by the way my numbers up there,

01:45:53.320 --> 01:45:55.410
but I encourage you to
call Brigadier General

01:45:55.410 --> 01:45:58.003
Tom James if you have any questions.

01:45:59.410 --> 01:46:01.872
That's my information environment.

01:46:01.872 --> 01:46:04.323
- Deception, that's a critical part of it.

01:46:07.180 --> 01:46:09.870
- Okay, I'm gonna break the rules here.

01:46:09.870 --> 01:46:12.302
Just a second, we had one question that I

01:46:12.302 --> 01:46:14.130
didn't get an opportunity to address.

01:46:14.130 --> 01:46:15.350
I think we got a couple minutes

01:46:15.350 --> 01:46:18.500
and that was for, the question was,

01:46:18.500 --> 01:46:23.490
what is the next 10 years
of army space look like?

01:46:23.490 --> 01:46:27.450
So I think I'll touch on
that just for a minute

01:46:27.450 --> 01:46:28.730
while I've got a captive audience

01:46:28.730 --> 01:46:30.320
and that would be to say that I think

01:46:30.320 --> 01:46:33.020
it's very promising and exciting.

01:46:33.020 --> 01:46:34.340
So what do I mean by that?

01:46:34.340 --> 01:46:38.390
I see you know General Perna
talked about the three levers

01:46:38.390 --> 01:46:42.410
that we can turn: people,
readiness, and modernization,

01:46:42.410 --> 01:46:46.630
and when I look across
the army space enterprise

01:46:46.630 --> 01:46:50.470
I look at all three of
those with great momentum.

01:46:50.470 --> 01:46:54.780
People, I see a growth in
army space as we look at

01:46:54.780 --> 01:46:56.530
what we talked about
today and throughout this

01:46:56.530 --> 01:46:59.750
conference which is
multi-domain operations

01:46:59.750 --> 01:47:01.770
multi-domain task forces.

01:47:01.770 --> 01:47:05.900
I see a growth in the enterprise
both space as well as cyber

01:47:05.900 --> 01:47:09.100
as well as EW as well as intelligence.

01:47:09.100 --> 01:47:14.100
So I think it's good we
have army space operators

01:47:14.250 --> 01:47:18.450
about officers like General
James that are FA-40s.

01:47:18.450 --> 01:47:22.100
We have roughly 340, 350
of them in the active army

01:47:22.100 --> 01:47:24.960
today with a space cadre that he mentioned

01:47:24.960 --> 01:47:27.780
in terms of missile warning
and some of our satellite

01:47:27.780 --> 01:47:31.090
communications that we
do around the world.

01:47:31.090 --> 01:47:34.300
We've got about another
3500, I see that type

01:47:34.300 --> 01:47:37.618
of growth in the future.

01:47:37.618 --> 01:47:40.370
I also see it from a modernization

01:47:40.370 --> 01:47:43.130
and readiness perspective
in that we continue

01:47:43.130 --> 01:47:45.750
to modernize in the space enterprise

01:47:45.750 --> 01:47:49.250
and that's a recognition
by the senior leadership

01:47:49.250 --> 01:47:51.740
of the army of the importance of space,

01:47:51.740 --> 01:47:54.630
army space in particular
and what that brings

01:47:54.630 --> 01:47:57.870
to the ground commander
or the BTC commander.

01:47:57.870 --> 01:48:00.470
So I think it's very promising
over the next few years

01:48:00.470 --> 01:48:02.450
for the next 10 years, in particular,

01:48:02.450 --> 01:48:07.307
that we'll see and
experience a modernization

01:48:07.307 --> 01:48:09.640
and a growth in the army enterprise.

01:48:09.640 --> 01:48:13.000
We are training as I
mentioned in my briefing

01:48:13.000 --> 01:48:17.050
army space training strategy,
we're embedded at CTCs now.

01:48:17.050 --> 01:48:19.100
We are training soldiers every day,

01:48:19.100 --> 01:48:22.800
every rotation on how to
operate in a denied, degraded,

01:48:22.800 --> 01:48:24.560
and contested environment.

01:48:24.560 --> 01:48:27.370
We have army space planners
that are out here in the Pacific

01:48:27.370 --> 01:48:30.661
right now that are embedded in the USARPAC

01:48:30.661 --> 01:48:32.970
in PACOM and some other
elements that are out here.

01:48:32.970 --> 01:48:35.600
Our intent is to bring
that army space planning

01:48:35.600 --> 01:48:38.070
and talent to the lowest
level we can in terms

01:48:38.070 --> 01:48:41.254
of getting it as close as we
can to a brigade combat team

01:48:41.254 --> 01:48:44.300
to increase understanding and lethality

01:48:44.300 --> 01:48:46.740
on the on the battlefield
and that is really where

01:48:46.740 --> 01:48:48.230
we're moving right now.

01:48:48.230 --> 01:48:53.080
So that's where I see the army
space over the next 10 years.

01:48:53.080 --> 01:48:55.940
Our our understanding,
as I mentioned earlier

01:48:55.940 --> 01:48:58.690
and reliance upon space, when I gave you

01:48:58.690 --> 01:49:01.010
the numbers within a brigade combat team

01:49:01.010 --> 01:49:03.960
that are space enabled will only continue

01:49:03.960 --> 01:49:06.570
to grow as our systems become more capable

01:49:06.570 --> 01:49:07.700
and more lethal.

01:49:07.700 --> 01:49:11.250
So our ability to understand
what the space effects

01:49:11.250 --> 01:49:14.240
are in terms of our
capability on the ground

01:49:14.240 --> 01:49:15.690
is very important.

01:49:15.690 --> 01:49:17.020
So I'll wrap it up by saying that,

01:49:17.020 --> 01:49:19.580
hopefully, this morning in this panel

01:49:19.580 --> 01:49:21.760
and I would like to thank
the panel members again

01:49:21.760 --> 01:49:24.970
for your time and efforts
here on this panel to make

01:49:24.970 --> 01:49:27.070
it what it was today is that we hope

01:49:27.070 --> 01:49:30.890
that the overall message
was that non-kinetics

01:49:30.890 --> 01:49:33.312
are a significant combat multiplier today,

01:49:33.312 --> 01:49:36.180
but in the future must
become more fully integrated

01:49:36.180 --> 01:49:39.410
and normalized into our plans
whether it's humanitarian

01:49:39.410 --> 01:49:43.500
assistance or disaster relief
or full spectrum operations.

01:49:43.500 --> 01:49:45.090
And so hopefully their intent this morning

01:49:45.090 --> 01:49:47.060
was to provide a little
of that information to you

01:49:47.060 --> 01:49:49.120
and of course I think
I see up there you've

01:49:49.120 --> 01:49:50.810
got all of our contact information.

01:49:50.810 --> 01:49:53.240
So please feel free to reach out to us.

01:49:53.240 --> 01:49:54.431
Thank you very much.

01:49:54.431 --> 01:49:56.848
(applauding)

01:50:03.270 --> 01:50:04.180
- Good, thanks very much.

01:50:04.180 --> 01:50:05.190
What a great panel.

01:50:05.190 --> 01:50:06.307
Thank you very, very much,

01:50:06.307 --> 01:50:08.910
and General James has
agreed to stay up here

01:50:08.910 --> 01:50:10.420
for those who have army watercraft

01:50:10.420 --> 01:50:15.010
questions to to address
those a little later.

01:50:15.010 --> 01:50:16.260
Let's take a break now.

01:50:16.260 --> 01:50:18.550
We'll reassemble it at 10:30 a.m.

01:50:18.550 --> 01:50:21.130
Please take this opportunity
to visit the great exhibits

01:50:21.130 --> 01:50:23.800
and please stop by the
AUSA membership table.

01:50:23.800 --> 01:50:25.523
See you back here at 10:30 a.m.