- All right, good morning, everyone.
Today, we're joined by Marine Brigadier General
James F. Glynn, who is the deputy commanding general
of Special Operations Joint Task
Force-Operation Inherent Resolve.
General Glynn is currently briefs us
from Baghdad, Iraq, and is responsible
for U.S. special operations activities in Iraq specifically.
With that, we'll start with a radio check.
General Glynn, sir, how do you hear us?
- I have you very well, Adrian.
Thanks, how 'bout me?
- Very clearly.
Why don't we get started, sir,
with if you have an opening statement for us?
- Say that again?
- Sir, we'll get started.
If you have an opening statement for us?
- Okay, yeah, sure, I could open up with a few comments,
and then we'll turn it over to you, there, for questions.
So good morning, everyone.
Iraqi Security Forces continue to pursue
the few ISIS fighters that seek
to threaten the people of Iraq,
and clear previously ISIS-occupied areas,
making them safe for residents.
The campaign against ISIS has resulted
in over 4.5 million people in Iraq
liberated from the evil of ISIS,
and we congratulate the government of Iraq on their success,
and are proud to stand beside them.
However, we must not lose sight of the fact
that much work remains to ensure the enduring defeat
of this evil terrorist ideology.
ISIS has demonstrated its desire
to return to its terrorist roots,
with the bombings and attacks that have killed
innocent civilians in Ramadi, Nasiriyah, Baghdad
and elsewhere over the past several weeks.
Our Iraqi partners continue to provide security,
which will increasingly include policing
and border control functions to prevent
the migration and re-emergence of the ISIS threat.
Through this success, the Coalition Joint Task Force remains
committed to working with our Iraqi partners
to root out and destroy the remaining ISIS fighters
and the influence they attempt to peddle.
We anticipate this will take some time,
since ISIS fighters are hiding in the mountains
and amongst the civilian population.
But it is necessary in order to ensure
the sustained security to Iraq and guarantee
the safety of the Iraqi people.
The ISF has proven itself a legitimate fighting force
that has and will continue their momentum,
provide security for the people of Iraq,
and quell the rise of new insurgencies.
This has been shown in the last few weeks,
as the ISF has destroyed over a hundred IEDs
and thousands of pounds of explosives across Iraq.
As we look forward to the next stage in the campaign,
the coalition will continue to assist
in consolidating gains made over the past few years.
This involves the stabilization of security
and essential services, focused predominantly
in areas where ISIS once dominated.
And our Iraqi partners will make this happen.
This does not consist of nation-building
or large construction projects.
It instead focuses on returning the nation
and people of Iraq to a state of normalcy.
Residents can concentrate on earning a living,
taking care of their families.
It means enabling local governance,
moving towards self-sufficiency, in other words,
getting back to a normal life, free from the threat of ISIS,
and ensuring it doesn't return.
The CJTF will continue to be value added to our partners
by providing training, equipment, advice and assistance
that enables security and ultimately expanding
the government's and non-governmental organizations' access
to offer assistance to the people of Iraq, which will
ultimately lead to more regional and global stability.
The government of Iraq is currently focused
on providing essential services for people
most affected by the campaign against ISIS.
This is evident across Iraq as schools continue
to open, people return to their homes
and local security forces are established.
Several weeks ago, the Iraqi police conducted
a graduation ceremony for 300 new police officers.
An international aid agency has provided
over 280,000 people across Iraq with access to clean water.
Iraqi soldiers have helped repair desks
so that children can return to school.
And the United Nations migration agency recently announced
that, since 2013, the number of Iraqis
that have returned to their homes exceeds
the number of displaced Iraqis previously reported.
For us in the Special Operations Joint Task Force
here in Iraq, as an element of the CJTF, we continue to work
with Iraqi security forces in many training missions.
Since the beginning of January 2015, the coalition has
helped train over 120,000 Iraqi security forces,
to include the counterterrorism force,
Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense forces.
Within the past couple months, a thousand Iraqi men
have graduated from the counterterrorism service's
basic training, and 500 more are scheduled
to graduate from CTS in a coming week.
There are about 4,000 Iraqis who are currently
undergoing coalition-enabled training, as well.
And the SOJTF works closely with counterterrorism,
commando and SWAT forces to ensure violent extremism doesn't
threaten the livelihood of the people of Iraq ever again.
They are professional and capable forces committed
to the future of Iraq, and we quite honestly
take pride in their successes.
I'll share with you an example
that demonstrates their professionalism.
During the height of conflict in Mosul,
there was a CTS soldier on guard who observed
several ISIS fighters moving towards his position.
With no time to warn his teammates,
he engaged one of the fighters.
The four remaining ISIS fighters unleashed
a hail of gunfire on the CTS position,
hitting this particular CTS soldier five times.
With bravery, he continued to defend his position
as another ISIS fighter attempted
to enter through the back of the house.
CTS soldier was able to shoot the fighter
before he entered the home, but not before the combatant
was able to detonate his suicide belt.
The blast from the detonation threw
the already-wounded CTS soldier
into a wall, further injuring him.
Still fighting, however, now alongside
his awakened teammates, they were able
to drive away the remaining ISIS fighters.
And his actions reflect the courage, tenacity
and strength it takes to be a member
of the elite counterterrorism service
here in Iraq and explain a little bit
about the culture of the organization.
We applaud the successes of other elements
of the Iraqi Security Forces, just about all of whom
we've personally seen in action against ISIS.
Their success has been evident time and again
in the dismantling of threats
and tyranny held on communities.
We see this not only through the defeat
of ISIS on the battlefield,
but also through the marked drop in ISIS propaganda.
Although ISIS has been militarily defeated,
we recognize the post-conflict challenges they present.
As we recognize these challenges, we wish to extend
our sympathies to those who were killed and injured
in the suicide attack in a Baghdad market just yesterday.
This attack is another example of the cowardice, evil
and the desperate acts that ISIS
and other violent extremists who want to remain
relevant throughout this area of operation will execute.
We're dedicated to working with our partners
on the permanent defeat of ISIS.
The coalition will be here to help,
as we have been thus far, and we look forward
to the future that we all see as a safe, secure Iraq,
where people can live their lives freely,
with a government dedicated to protecting them.
And with that, I look forward to your questions.
Thank you.
- Thank you, sir.
We'll start with Joe Tabet from Al Hurra.
- Thank you.
General Glynn, I would like to ask you
about the border force that the U.S.
is backing in Eastern Syria.
If you could explain, give us more details about this force.
And what are the implications of this decision
on Turkey, when we heard, this morning,
the Turkish president saying that the Turkish military will
attack Afrin, and mainly the YPG in Afrin?
So, if you could address that, thank you.
- Yeah, thanks for that question.
Unfortunately, I don't have a lot
of information on that particular subject.
As it was stated in the opening, my emphasis,
here in Baghdad, is on operations in Iraq.
And so what I can tell you is,
as I mentioned, as our emphasis here,
the Iraqi security force emphasis, returns and focuses
on local policing and securing their borders.
As you're aware, ISIS has tried to take advantage of areas
such as that, that would be seen as vulnerabilities.
So I could tell you that that is
important for the Iraqi security forces
and something they're focused on, going forward.
- Next to Laurie Mylroie with Kurdistan 24.
- Hi, General.
Thank you very much for this briefing.
Since you're special operations, I wonder,
and on Kurdistan 24, we hear of the Peshmerga
and think of them as a kind of conventional army.
But is there a special operations
unit within the Kurdish forces?
- I had a little bit of trouble hearing you.
I think you asked about the Kurdish forces
and what kind of capabilities they have.
Across Iraq, the security forces are
arrayed to handle the situations
that are presented to them.
And so, as an example, I think about Kirkuk,
where they have both a SWAT and a commando unit
that are capable of handling
any and all threats that emerge.
And I think you'll find, similarly, we find, similarly,
in just about every large population center,
that you'll have some force that's focused
exclusively on counterterrorism and the special weapons
and tactics that would come with a police SWAT unit.
- Maybe I could make sure.
Is there an equivalent of special forces
within the Peshmerga, distinct from the regular Peshmerga,
like there is, say, in the Iraqi army or in the U.S. Army?
- No, there's no element that's
distinguished separate, that I'm aware of,
within the Peshmerga or any of the forces.
- Okay, and let me ask you also about there are news reports
that the Iraqis are preparing an offensive
against ISIS around Tuz Khurmatu.
Is there coordination still ongoing
between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi forces
in attacking these ISIS remnants, do you know?
- That one was a little bit hard to hear.
Could you say the question again?
I caught Tuz Khurmatu and the Kurds
or the Iraqi forces in Peshmerga.
- Okay, there are news reports that
the Iraqi forces are preparing an offensive
against ISIS remnants around Tuz Khurmatu, which is very,
you know, one of the disputed areas.
Is there coordination between the Peshmerga
and the Iraqi army that is still ongoing
for such an offensive or would that be the Iraqi army alone?
Would you be familiar with that?
- Yeah, I'm familiar with the situation
in the area of Tuz Khurmatu.
And I know that, like any place
that has that kind of challenge,
the challenges to security that would put at risk
the stability of the local area that it has
the attention of any security force in the area.
And so, at a military level, there is always
discussions between any of the forces that could cooperate
to achieve security in a local area
and that is the case in Tuz Khurmatu.
- Next to Jeff Schogol with Task and Purpose.
- Thank you, General.
Has ISIS become an insurgency?
If so, has the mission changed to counter-insurgency?
- Hey, thanks for that question, Jeff.
I would say that
it would be too early to make that kind of an assessment.
I would tell you that I certainly look
for those types of indicators.
However, it's just too soon.
There are still remnants of ISIS
who reside in a cellular structure
who seek to bring instability to local areas,
in particular population centers.
And that remains as it has for some time
the focus of the Iraqi security forces
and their counterterrorism forces specifically.
This did not allow those elements
to form into a network or something
that could look like an insurgency.
- If I could follow up, if you have cells of ISIS
committing terrorist acts, how is that not an insurgency?
- Jeff, there's no indicator of any coordination.
It's merely a matter of disparate
cellular structures trying to have
some legitimacy, some recognition
and, frankly, to be, at this point, to be disruptive.
I think that's what you saw in the
double suicide vest attack in Baghdad,
which is a disruptive act on the behalf
of an organization focused on violence.
- All right, next to Lita from AP.
- Hi General, Lita Baldor with AP.
Just one quick followup on Jeff's question.
You said there's no indicator of any coordination.
Are you talking about ISIS as a whole across Iraq,
that there is no indication that there is
any coordination within the terror group at all?
- Lita, what I'm saying is that there are
remnants of ISIS who have been isolated
and face some pretty dire choices.
And they are to try to come together
with potentially with other elements,
or to try to relocate somewhere else
and what the government of Iraq
and their very capable security forces are focused on
is ensuring that that doesn't happen,
to lock them down where they are and to give them
no alternatives but to be captured or killed.
- Can you give me an assessment of how much of your force
is actively advising and assisting and working
with the Iraqi units versus how much of it
is, you know, just doing sort of broader based training?
- On the special operations specifically, Lita,
I would say about, I mean, I'm pulling it
out of thin air to be honest, but the vast majority, I mean,
75, 80% of what we're doing is advising and assisting
our Iraqi counterparts in an active role.
Increasingly, the good news story is increasingly,
they execute an operation on their own.
And the advice and assistance we're
providing them is in the planning and
in the post-operational aspect
of exploiting what they've gotten
when they have captured the individual
who they're looking for and any of the associated materials
they might have available to exploit.
- [Lita] Thank you.
- Next to Tara Copp with Military Times.
- Hi, thank you for doing this.
I wanted to talk about contractors for a minute.
Over the last year, the number of contractors
in Iraq has increased significantly,
even though major operations have dwindled.
Is the U.S. transitioning a lot
of these roles to contractors, and, if not,
why would that footprint be getting bigger
if the kinetic mission there has reduced?
- Thanks for the question, Tara.
I honestly am not familiar at all
with the contracting numbers.
So I would deflect to somebody there
in the Pentagon to help you talk specifically
about what direction they're trending.
I can tell you, the few contractors that I work with
every day play a very significant role in our operations.
But their numbers have not changed at all.
- As the number of military operations
against ISIS in Iraq has gone down,
have the numbers of troops in Iraq gone down?
And, if so, can you give us a ballpark number?
- So, first of all, I wouldn't categorize
the number of military operations in Iraq as going down.
What has gone down are operations to liberate
terrain that ISIS formerly held.
But you got to give credit to the Iraqi Security Forces
who, quite frankly, night after night, day after day,
are getting out there and getting
after whatever they become aware of
or, in some instances, just proactively moving out
to patrol and secure local areas.
So that doesn't lend itself to anything,
numbers-wise, moving one direction or the other.
- Are U.S. and coalition, oh.
- With regards to numbers, I would say
it's less about numbers as it is about capability.
And what, I think can certainly be acknowledged
is that what you'll see on our part is
probably a shift in capability is what I would anticipate,
based on what the needs are going forward.
- And we lost you for just a part of your response.
But, to get back to the shift in capability,
so are you seeing the U.S. forces that are there,
on the ground, and the coalition forces there on the ground,
what they are doing has changed?
- You know, I would categorize it
as we were very actively
in a position to support the Iraqi Security Forces
as they moved around the country,
in some instances simultaneously,
to liberate particular areas.
For example, during my tenure here,
they left Mosul and went to Tal Afar and to Hawija
and then out west to Al Anbar and Al-Qa'im.
And so our positioning and our support
was specific to those particular missions.
What we've done now, in particular,
on the special operations side, is gone
where our partners have gone and continued
to support them with whatever they deem necessary.
Oftentimes, it comes in the form of intelligence, planning,
some of the things like I mentioned earlier,
exploitation of materials after an operation,
and that the operations are increasingly done
without us physically present with them.
- [Tara] Okay, thank you.
- Sir, if you could identify yourself
and your affiliation, please.
- (mumbles) So, General, Iraqis are preparing
for parliamentary elections in mid-May.
Are you concerned that ISIS and other militant groups
might increase their activities
just to disrupt the campaigns for the elections?
- So thanks for that question.
The Iraqi election upcoming in May
is actually a very exciting opportunity.
And the types of activities that I just described
a moment ago, in terms of what the Iraqi Security Forces,
local police forces are doing, are exactly
the types of things that they assess,
and I would certainly agree, need to be done now
to ensure that the conditions are set
so we don't have to be concerned
about exactly the types of things you just described.
And so, we're engaged in conversations
and planning with our Iraqi counterparts right now,
to talk about the things that need to be done now
and in the ensuing months to prepare for that election.
- Are you actually doing anything to assist
the local forces to secure the country
in preparation for the elections?
- At this juncture, with regard to the elections,
I would say that we are focused,
it's really in a planning stage,
and with a recognition that operations,
on any given day, particularly in a
population-dense area like Baghdad,
like Mosul, Ramadi, those types of operations
that are being done, day in and day out
by the Iraqi army, by local police forces
in the counterterrorism service, are being done
to set the conditions for security going forward,
but certainly with a mind towards ensuring
that it is firmly in place prior to the elections in May.
- Now to Courtney Kube from NBC.
- Hi, General Glynn.
It's good to see you back in the Pentagon.
Could I go back to this idea of some remnants of ISIS?
'Cause there's been some confusion,
in the last month or so, about how many ISIS fighters
are actually still in Iraq and Syria.
And there was a number that was put around that was
just included where there was coalition fighters.
What is the total number, if you have it,
of ISIS fighters you believe are in Iraq,
you believe are in Syria, and does that include
these ones who are sort of out and more disparate
in the area, in these cellular structures?
- Hey Courtney, thanks for the question.
And thanks for the welcome.
I don't have an exact number.
In fact, we don't focus on the exact numbers,
to be honest with you.
In much the same way that we focus
on our partners, it's about the capabilities.
So what we see, what we're watching closely is,
as I mentioned, where are they going?
Why are they going there?
And, at this point, unique to Iraq,
why would you want to stay?
The so-called caliphate has been dismantled
at this point, and so ISIS has no
recognizable structure of the bureaucracy
that they had previously sought to achieve.
And so, with a very few and dwindling options here in Iraq,
what capabilities are they trying to sustain here
and where are they trying to locate them
is really what we focus on more than anything else.
- Have you seen, if the consequence
or the choices there are so bad,
have you seen any large numbers of them leaving Iraq?
- We watch their movement, and the Iraqis
are a great source of that watching,
based on the local populace.
And we do have evidence of their moving.
It's just not all that coherent.
And I, frankly, don't think that's
a lack of understanding on our part.
I think that is indicative of the desperation
of ISIS at this point, trying to bring some coherency
to what has happened to them in the last,
certainly, at least in the last year.
- [Courtney] Thank you.
- Next to Wyatt Goolsby from EWTN.
- Thanks.
Thanks, General, for doing this, by the way.
You'd talked about Iraqis returning to a sense of normalcy.
I'm wondering if there's any insight
you can give us about what's happening
in the Nineveh region, the Nineveh Plains region.
'Cause, as you know, there's so many towns
and villages where religious minorities,
like Christians and Yazidis, were previously under attack.
Are there religious minorities
who are returning to their homes?
Is there more of a sense of normalcy there in that area?
- Yeah, I'll say it's an encouraging situation,
in most instances that, as I alluded to earlier,
that you see more people returning
to formerly ISIS-controlled areas than we were
previously reporting by aid organizations in 2013.
And so, unique to the Nineveh Plains, you're exactly right,
a very diverse and rich area, and an area
where there is now a sense of opportunity
to return and see what the future may hold.
And so, that's true in a number of areas,
and some places are gonna recover
from ISIS's presence quicker than others.
- [Wyatt] Thank you.
- All right, next to Ryan Browne, CNN.
- Hello General, thank you for doing this.
Quick question on the Baghdad suicide attacks.
Do attacks like these kind of highlight
the need for additional training of Iraqi police?
I know the focus had been, kind of,
before on offensive kinetic training.
Does there need to be a shift,
more coalition advisers with police units?
- So, the bombing in Baghdad,
as I mentioned early on, is, you know,
there's already, I mentioned in my opening comments,
I'm trying to harken back.
There has already been a shift in focus on the part
of the Iraqi government and the Iraqi Security Forces
to an emphasis towards local policing and border security.
And so, I wouldn't categorize it
as a shift that's necessary.
It was anticipated.
And that training, that advising
has already begun and is ongoing,
a recognition on the behalf of the Iraqis themselves.
- And one additional question.
Have the Iraqis, in kind of these mopping-up operations,
have they apprehended any foreign fighters
in the recent months, in the last month?
- Not that I'm aware of, but the foreign
fighter issue in ISIS, writ large,
is one that needs continued attention.
I mean, the future of ISIS, or organizations like ISIS,
they had their hopes and aspirations in being,
holding territory that have all
but been shattered and dismantled.
At this point, it's a matter of the ideology
and what would attract someone from another country
to come here to Iraq or to anywhere else in the region
and fight on their behalf, and so that's the focus.
Was it a month ago, maybe, I had
the privilege, here in Baghdad, of attending
what was the third annual conference
on defeating Daesh propaganda and ideology.
And I think that's indicative of the recognition,
regional recognition, because it had folks beyond Iraq,
predominantly Iraqis, but beyond Iraq,
with a recognition that this is about the ideology
and getting people to recognize, particularly young people,
to recognize that there's no hope in that.
- Next to Jack Detsch from Al-Monitor.
- Thanks, General.
You've mentioned that sort of a specific focus
of this effort, now, is to reduce
ISIS's capabilities and scale those back.
Does the coalition have a specific metric
or sort of threshold that you're using
to reduce ISIS's capabilities that might allow the mission
to be scaled back or U.S. troops to leave the region?
- A particular metric, certainly,
the things that we aspire to support
on behalf is that which the Iraqis want, as well.
And so those metrics are security and stability.
And I would tell you, in the places
where I travel to in Iraq, it's measured
by the ability of local governance
to provide essential services by access
on the part of the government of Iraq at a federal level,
as well as for non-governmental organizations
to come in and provide augmentation
to those essential services that allow
Iraqis to return to a normal life.
I was traveling the other day and had a conversation
with a local gentleman and, you know, in the end,
it really comes down to the same thing you and I want.
They want their kids to be able to go out in the street
in front of their house and have a soccer game
while they're preparing their dinner.
And so, you know, in terms of a personal metric,
when I travel and I talk to local folks,
that's the kind of metric I'm looking for.
- Got it, and you mentioned at the beginning
of your remarks that several thousand CTS
are scheduled to graduate from academy.
Does the coalition have an update
of how many CTS have been trained?
And are you still on track to reach the 20,000
that are expected to be trained
by the end of the next three years
that the Pentagon mentioned last year?
- Yeah, so thanks for that question.
CTS is our longtime partner,
both for the U.S. and for special operations,
have a very deliberate plan to get themselves refit
and refurbished and ready for any emerging threats.
And so, this week alone, they have had the opportunity
to rotate some folks back from what they have been doing
literally, now, for two and a half years
and get some well-deserved leave and begin to focus
on their training plan and some
of their equipment updates that need to be provided.
I mentioned the numbers that are in the course now.
The CTS has a plan, an annual plan
to keep themselves on track for what they think they need.
And, just like any of the challenges
any of the coalition nations face,
in terms of what their target is,
their target's driven by both what capabilities they need,
how significant the threat is they face, and then,
you know, like the rest of us, what can they afford.
But I'll tell you they're on a very good path
to maintain their capabilities, and they are,
without a doubt, a force that remains
focused and dedicated towards the counterterrorism mission
and ensuring that things like ISIS
do not return to the lands, here, of Iraq.
- Sorry, just real quick, are you
still on track for that 20,000?
Is that still the goal?
Or has that goal changed specifically for the CTS?
Are you not using that as a snapshot?
- The goal itself is in Iraq, that's a CTS,
that's a CTS-driven objective.
And what I would tell you is that is
what they started to plan against
in the last two and a half years of fighting
in urban environments every single day.
They're getting right back to focusing
on building their capabilities
and less concerned with what number they need right now.
- Next to Lucas Tomlinson with Fox News.
- General, when Turkey's president says,
"We will strangle U.S.-backed force
"in Syria before it's even born," is that helpful?
- Lucas, the political comments
and exchanges are clearly are not
in my lane nor in my area of expertise.
- He's a NATO ally, and this affects
your forces in Syria and, potentially, Iraq.
Does that give you some concern, General?
- We pay attention to the dynamics
between partners in the area.
Certainly, in the case of Turkey
and as it relates to how they interact
on a state-to-state level, nationally,
that's something we pay attention to.
But where we have the most interaction is militarily.
And so I keep track more
on what their military intentions are.
- To Lita's question, when you said
that U.S. Special Operations forces in Iraq spend 75 to 80%
of their time advising the Iraqi counterterrorism service,
what are you all doing the rest of the time?
(reporter laughs)
- So it's not just the counterterrorism service.
It's special weapons and tactics units
from the Ministry of Interior.
It's other elements, commando units
in the Iraqi army and, as far as the other percentage,
you know, like I mentioned, there's an element of ours
that's dedicated to supporting the training apparatus,
like the question a moment ago about the CTS.
And the CTS runs their own academy, or school.
What the coalition provides is some oversight
and some assistance with development of future programs,
based on lessons that they have learned
from two and a half years of hard fighting
and what kind of skills they want to expand on and improve.
- Each week, how often do U.S. Special Operations forces
accompany Iraqi forces on raids?
- We don't accompany the Iraqi Security Forces
hardly ever, at this point.
- [Lucas] Thank you.
- Next to Carlo Munoz with Washington Times.
- [Carlo] Hey sir, thanks for doing this.
A quick follow up on Jeff and Lita's
question about the existence
or nonexistence of an insurgency in Iraq.
In their claim of responsibility
for yesterday's bombing in Baghdad,
ISIS propaganda said that this was the beginning
of a, quote, "vengeance campaign" which could lead
to a string of bombings, similar to what we saw
in the run-up to the fight for Mosul.
What I wanted to ask: How does that sort of statement,
claim of responsibility square
with what you're picking up from Iraqi Security Forces,
as far as the existence of an insurgency in Iraq?
And, two, you mentioned that one of your main requirements
is to see what capabilities is
Islamic State looking to keep in the country.
What are those capabilities?
Are they focused on sort of these
bomb-making areas or bomb-making facilities that they use
to great effect in Mosul and elsewhere?
Or other capabilities that maybe relate
to more of their conventional military skills?
- So thanks, Carlo.
I'm not familiar, first, with that statement
that ISIS has put out, claiming responsibility.
So I appreciate that insight.
I'll have to go back and take a look at that.
With regards to the capabilities, the types of things
that we see ourselves, I'm trying
to remember the first half of your question.
It related something about insurgency.
Could you say it again?
- [Carlo] Sir, I just wanted to, you said
earlier that the Task Force...
the Task Force is focusing on looking at what capabilities
Islamic State is looking to maintain inside Iraq.
I kind of wanted to get some specifics on that.
What capabilities are they trying to maintain
from what you've seen, what you've
picked up from Iraqi Security Forces?
- Okay, thanks, much clearer now.
It is a little bit early for us to tell exactly.
I think they'd like to retain as much as they can.
But that's an assessment on my part.
Certainly, the ability to finance...
The strengths of ISIS at their peak were their brand
and their finances.
Their brand has been proven completely ineffective
and their finances, from everything that I can tell,
are severely diminished and very much struggling.
And so, the types of things that the Iraqis are focused on,
and that we cooperate with them most,
is on intelligence and how intelligence
is integrated and utilized to drive operations,
operations that are done to keep pressure
on that cellular structure I mentioned earlier.
And then, to your point about Baghdad,
it's also about counter-improvised explosive devices.
The types of materials that are necessary
to form those things, how they have to be moved,
the types of conditions that are required
in order to put them together.
And the Iraqis are very much focused
on precluding those types of things from occurring.
And then, lastly, of course, is the security side of it,
and a lot of that shifts from what was
clearing swaths of land that ISIS was holding,
and focused more so on the local security
and the border security, the types of things
that will allow all the capabilities
that I just rattled off to move around
and try to reform into an effective network.
- [Carlo] Thank you, sir.
- All right, next to Kasim Ileri with Anadolu.
- General Glynn, thanks for doing this.
I know you're, you know, you are focusing on Iraq.
But I will follow up on questions
regarding the Border Security Forces in Syria.
Under which legal premises does the coalition
form the Border Security Force in Syria, General?
Because, first, there should be a defined
and synchronized border before you form
a border security to protect that border.
Which legal premises leads the coalition to that decision?
- Okay, so, like I said earlier, and you acknowledged,
my focus here in Iraq doesn't put me
in a position to comment on that directly.
What I will say is that border security,
in this region, remains a concern
for everyone in the region.
And it's a common objective to ensure
that ISIS is unavailable
and not able to move
aspects of whatever remaining capabilities
they might have around, to build a structure that could
threaten any government in the area.
- He is considering YPG, which is part of the SDF,
as a connected group to the PKK,
that's a terrorist organization.
And Turkey is angered by that decision,
saying that the U.S. has said that they will stop arming,
giving, providing arms to the YPG after the defeat of ISIS.
Now, the U.S. is forming a 30,000-troop workforce
and give it under the leadership of the SDF, which is led
by YPG, which Turkey considers to be a part of PKK.
So, how do you situate this into the specific
U.S. mission in Syria, with respect
to defeating or fighting ISIS,
and the alliance with Turkey, of course?
- So, again, my focus here in Iraq,
that doesn't really get me a whole lot of,
you clearly have more information on that than I do.
- Next to Anna Varfolomeeva from Globe Post.
- (mumbles) but thank you so much.
General, thank you for doing this.
I just want to follow up on Ryan's
question and clarify something.
Are there any plans to transfer Iraqi military personnel
to civilian policing or counterterror roles at the moment?
- I missed the beginning of that.
Could you repeat that, please?
- Are there any plans to transfer Iraqi military personnel
to civilian policing or counterterrorism roles?
- Oh, okay, I understand the question.
Thanks.
There are a number of discussions going on now
about the capabilities that the Iraqi Security Forces have,
where they reside and where they're needed most.
And so, to your point, there are
or could be opportunities for folks
who have performed one function previously
to shift to another one going forward.
And, as I've mentioned several times now,
clearly, I would say the two most opportunistic areas
would be local policing and border security.
- Is there anyone already in training
at the moment, shifting these roles?
- Is there training in those particular areas?
Is that what you're saying?
- You are trying to shift these roles,
trying to shift to policing from military?
- I don't exactly know, in individual cases.
I do know that there is a considerable effort going
into police training as well as border guard training.
And both of those began, well, they've
been ongoing throughout, but there has been
a definite increase in emphasis
on those two particular areas since operations
out in Al-Anbar in terms of clearing ISIS-controlled areas
concluded back in the middle of December.
- [Anna] Thank you.
- Next we'll go to Tom Squitieri from Talk News Media.
- Happy Tuesday, General.
I'm pulling together some of your responses
to earlier questions and noted that you said
most of the missions now is not to clear territory
but to secure territory and restore normalcy.
Pulling another figure out of the air,
as you did earlier, how much territory still
needs to be cleared of ISIS, please?
- Here in Iraq, Tom,
it has all been cleared once.
So an easy answer would be none.
The reality, though, back to what I mentioned
about ISIS remnants, is
the Iraqis continue to see enough opportunities
that they're going back to areas of concern.
It was mentioned earlier about the
Tuz Khurmatu region in Hawija.
And they go back to revisit those areas
and to determine whether or not there's people that need
to be addressed and potentially captured,
or at least spoken to, as well as,
as you heard in my opening remarks,
the number of IEDs and caches
of explosive materials continues to be pretty substantial.
And it's those kinds of work when we talk about going back
and clearing particular areas, that's the kind
of work that's ongoing at this time.
- Clearing that up. (chuckles)
- Next to Fatima al-Samadi from Al Jazeera English.
- Good morning, thank you for doing this, General.
Excuse me, I'm wondering, what is
the, sort of, as you talk about shifting to advising,
it seems like there are a couple of gaps
with the Iraqi local forces in certain areas, an example,
obviously, being the double suicide vest bombings.
Do you think that with the shift
that those kind of concerns will continue?
Basically, is the shortfall with the local training?
Is it a training issue?
- No, so I wouldn't so much categorize it as a shift.
The advising and assisting has been ongoing
for the entire time that the coalition
has been side by side with Iraqi Security Forces.
As was asked earlier, what we've done much less of
is the accompanying, so the direct support.
And what that has allowed is an emphasis
on the training and the preparation.
And so that's where much of our attention is now
and that's at the request of our partners.
And so, it's working very well.
- Luis Martinez, ABC.
- Hey General, two questions, one
on the training aspect that you've talked about.
You talked about intelligence being something
that you're providing right now
as CT continues in its operations.
Is that a capability that you're training them specifically,
organically, to the special operations community in Iraq?
And how long do you think that process is going to take?
- Hey Luis, thanks for the question.
Good to hear your voice.
So, let's start with the Iraqi intelligence, very good.
You categorized it as we're providing it to 'em.
I would more so say, we, on a daily basis,
have an increasing awareness of just how good
and effective their intelligence is.
And so, it's much more a case of us providing
some advice on how that can best be integrated
into what they're planning and the kind of assessments
they're making of what any organization, in this case,
we'll stay focused on ISIS, may be trying to do.
And so, while we could continue to work
side by side in the intelligence area alone
for quite some time, and we'd be happy to, at the request
of our friends and partners in Iraqi Security Forces,
quite honestly, they'd be capable
of doing it without our help, today.
- So, do they have an enhanced capability?
Do you bring enhanced capabilities
to them as well, with regards to intelligence,
that maybe you may want to transfer to them
in the future as an enduring capability?
- Yes, there are definitely some capabilities,
often technical, that, for security reasons,
you know, obviously aren't transferrable.
And so we will, at their request, continue to support them
with the kind of technical assistance.
But, again, an increasingly capable
intelligence infrastructure and it's
the kind of areas that intelligence
to prepare for operations, Iraqi Security Forces have
been doing for quite some time,
and obviously, have more experience with it
than most of the rest of the world,
based on the last two and a half, three years.
As an example, I would offer to you is,
where some of our advice and assistance
is focused now is on after an operation,
when there is information available on documents
or on technical, on a laptop, for example,
the exploitation of that type of stuff
is what we increasingly find ourselves
partnered with and teaching, going forward.
- Thanks for that, and just one last question.
During the battles for Mosul and elsewhere,
what we saw were special operations
being used in large-scale formations.
It's a little different than, I think,
the original concept for special ops forces.
How did your teams adjust to that type of mission planning,
versus what I guess is now a return
to a more agile force capability
that I think is what is happening now against these cells?
- Yeah, Luis, another good question.
Our teams, in particular, well,
we're at the point, at this juncture,
we were at the point where we knew what we were getting into
and so we're well-prepared to provide
that kind of advice and assistance.
And the other half of it was that what we're asking,
in this case, the counterterrorism service
and commando units to do in Iraq were the types of things
that many of us would see as light infantry skillsets.
For example, the counterterrorism service has
a very good capability in that regard, at this point.
What we're doing, literally this week,
is having a conversation with their counterterrorism service
about the training plan they've put together for themselves,
to get back focused on those elite
counterterrorism school skills
that they perceive they're gonna need most,
and the ones that they're gonna need soonest,
in anticipation of ensuring a stable situation here in Iraq,
and as was asked earlier, particularly in a run-up
to an election here later this spring.
- We are nearly at one hour, so the last question
will go to Laurie Mylroie from Kurdistan 24.
- Thank you.
I just wanted to follow up on stability operations.
Can you give us a rough estimate of the number of IDPs
who have returned to their homes versus the number
who are still in camps and they're still displaced?
- I can get somebody there in the
Pentagon to get you the numbers.
I don't have them immediately at my fingers.
But I do, as I mentioned in the opening comments,
I do increasingly see, as I travel
and interact with the U.N. and with others
that IDPs are returning to areas from where they came,
in particular to familial areas,
where they had family or have family, to tribal areas.
And there's a growing attitude
of returning and rebuilding.
But, as far as the exact numbers go, I'm not 100% sure.
I can have somebody there in the Pentagon get them for you.
- And, as you transition to stability operations,
how does that change the composition
of the U.S. presence in Iraq?
Does that mean more contractors, State Department?
Are you more engaged in stability
operations than the conventional Army?
- So I'd like to clarify the question a little bit.
As you say, "As we transition to stability operations,"
that wouldn't be the way I would poise it, to be honest.
I would say that we remain focused,
the Iraqi Security Forces remain
focused on the security aspect of it.
And that's where we remain side
by side, in advising and assisting.
So, that doesn't shift things too much.
Now, what's the end state of that security?
It's to provide a stable local situation that allows
for essential services, allows for clearing and rebuilding.
In terms of what that means for us going forward,
most of you have heard General Funk say in the past,
and he says it to us on a regular, recurrent basis,
we're not gonna have one more soldier,
sailor, airman, Marine, contractor here
than we assess we need to do what we're being
asked to do by the government of Iraq.
What I think I can say with certainty
and absolute confidence is I think what we'll see
is a shift in what the capability of the force is here.
And what those capabilities will be will go
back along the lines of those types of things
that we're seeing most frequently in terms of intelligence,
in counter-IED, in security advising
and some of the counterterrorism skills
that we just talked about a moment ago.
- General Glynn, sir, thank you very much
for taking the time to brief the press corps here.
Do you have any closing words for the group?
- There's some familiar voices.
I can't see you all, but there's
some familiar voices in there.
So happy New Year to you all,
and I appreciate you spending an hour with me.
And, if you need anything in the interim,
you know where to find us.
We're here just about all day,
every day, so drop a line anytime.
Thanks.
- Thank you, sir.
Have a great day.