WEBVTT 00:02.132 --> 00:03.359 - Can I get a mic please? 00:03.359 --> 00:04.359 There we go. 00:04.431 --> 00:06.598 This should be better now. 00:06.714 --> 00:07.996 Well hey, good morning everybody. 00:07.996 --> 00:11.829 Thanks so much for coming to this round table. 00:12.536 --> 00:14.253 It's hard to get to, hard to find 00:14.253 --> 00:15.342 and I know there's a lot of folks 00:15.342 --> 00:18.349 that are probably gonna join us in the middle here. 00:18.349 --> 00:19.715 My name is Rick Breckenridge, 00:19.715 --> 00:22.304 I'm the Deputy Commander at US Fleet Forces Command 00:22.304 --> 00:23.741 in Norfolk, Virginia, 00:23.741 --> 00:26.076 and it is indeed a pleasure and honor 00:26.076 --> 00:29.351 for me to be here today to lead this aghast panel 00:29.351 --> 00:33.004 on a discussion about the future of our navy. 00:33.004 --> 00:36.442 And about the challenges that are gonna be different 00:36.442 --> 00:37.489 as we look to the future 00:37.489 --> 00:40.383 and how we need to adapt to that changing environment, 00:40.383 --> 00:44.050 and we'll tee up the theme in just a second. 00:45.434 --> 00:48.307 While I'm doing my clerical duties as the moderator 00:48.307 --> 00:49.307 I just want to let the panel know 00:49.307 --> 00:52.664 that there's gonna be two signals that you're gonna hear 00:52.664 --> 00:54.331 during your remarks. 00:54.703 --> 00:56.295 I hit the timer as you get started 00:56.295 --> 00:58.972 and when you're at the, what I consider time out 00:58.972 --> 01:01.770 you're gonna hear the following sound. 01:01.770 --> 01:03.020 This is a hint. 01:04.521 --> 01:07.104 (loud buzzing) 01:07.312 --> 01:08.890 If you hear that, that means you got 01:08.890 --> 01:10.896 two more minutes to wrap it up 01:10.896 --> 01:14.462 and after that two minutes you're gonna hear this sound. 01:14.462 --> 01:15.664 (high pitched beeping) 01:15.664 --> 01:17.299 That means you're really done. 01:17.299 --> 01:20.998 And no matter what, we're gonna turn off your mic. 01:20.998 --> 01:24.748 Those are the ground rules as we get started. 01:24.893 --> 01:28.374 I will mention that last night we had dinner together 01:28.374 --> 01:30.049 at the Bonefish Grill. 01:30.049 --> 01:32.106 (buzzing) 01:32.106 --> 01:33.273 My time is up. 01:33.415 --> 01:35.544 (laughing) 01:35.544 --> 01:37.157 If the moderator gets out of line, 01:37.157 --> 01:39.574 you're gonna hear that sound. 01:39.857 --> 01:43.216 And it was just a wonderful evening together, 01:43.216 --> 01:44.764 getting to know each other 01:44.764 --> 01:48.046 sitting around a table, enjoying a glass of wine and a meal, 01:48.046 --> 01:49.963 and just having a chat. 01:51.654 --> 01:55.821 You know, almost seemed like it was a round table discussion 01:56.149 --> 01:57.727 and we sort of played off each other. 01:57.727 --> 02:00.560 There was a playful repartee and-- 02:00.775 --> 02:03.525 - [Voiceover] Activity completed. 02:03.963 --> 02:05.963 - We really are out now. 02:06.367 --> 02:08.910 And I said to myself, wouldn't it be special 02:08.910 --> 02:11.591 if today at the quote, unquote, "round table" 02:11.591 --> 02:13.586 instead of being in a panel 02:13.586 --> 02:15.398 sitting with straight in front of you 02:15.398 --> 02:17.428 and going for a down the row 02:17.428 --> 02:21.393 that we just got into some comfortable living room chairs, 02:21.393 --> 02:22.990 sort of in a circle facing each other 02:22.990 --> 02:24.835 and just had a conversation. 02:24.835 --> 02:26.779 And if I had been a better moderator 02:26.779 --> 02:28.430 I would have probably have set that venue up 02:28.430 --> 02:30.553 because I think you would have found it more exciting. 02:30.553 --> 02:32.870 But if we stick to the discipline of the time, 02:32.870 --> 02:35.094 I think we're gonna have some opportunity 02:35.094 --> 02:37.729 at the end here to play off each other, 02:37.729 --> 02:39.258 to have that discussion 02:39.258 --> 02:42.925 and sort of challenge some of the hypothesis 02:43.479 --> 02:45.396 that you'll hear today. 02:46.632 --> 02:49.410 But let me go ahead and kick it off. 02:49.410 --> 02:51.809 We have a new Chief of Naval Operations, 02:51.809 --> 02:53.343 Admiral John Richardson. 02:53.343 --> 02:55.391 He promulgated for the Navy 02:55.391 --> 02:58.309 this design for maintaining maritime superiority 02:58.309 --> 03:00.390 as we look ahead to the future. 03:00.390 --> 03:02.772 From yesterday, Admiral Richardson was quoted as saying, 03:02.772 --> 03:05.189 "America is a maritime nation 03:05.271 --> 03:06.716 "and our prosperity is tied 03:06.716 --> 03:09.129 "to our ability to operate freely 03:09.129 --> 03:11.306 "in the maritime environment. 03:11.306 --> 03:13.614 "Today's strategic environment," Richardson said, 03:13.614 --> 03:15.816 "is increasingly globalized 03:15.816 --> 03:18.399 "and increasingly competitive." 03:18.685 --> 03:22.592 Which I think is the CNO's polite way of saying 03:22.592 --> 03:25.611 times have changed and we now see a return 03:25.611 --> 03:27.778 of great power competitors 03:28.099 --> 03:31.958 who are actively engaged in controlling the seas 03:31.958 --> 03:35.791 and denying us our freedom to operate in them. 03:36.649 --> 03:39.026 Unlike the last 15 to 20 years 03:39.026 --> 03:41.005 as we look ahead to the future, 03:41.005 --> 03:44.284 the seas are gonna become much more highly contested 03:44.284 --> 03:47.610 and this is gonna present some unique challenges 03:47.610 --> 03:50.233 for our navy and for our country. 03:50.233 --> 03:52.733 In a sense, sea denial is back 03:53.620 --> 03:55.703 and is back in a big way. 03:56.067 --> 03:58.234 And we've had this sort of 03:58.636 --> 04:01.373 unusual period in our navy history, 04:01.373 --> 04:03.520 I would tell you that the last 20, 25 years 04:03.520 --> 04:05.749 is an aberration and not the norm. 04:05.749 --> 04:08.956 When we're able to operate essentially from sanctuary 04:08.956 --> 04:11.834 with immunity and project power and influence 04:11.834 --> 04:14.541 as we saw fit or as we were tasked by 04:14.541 --> 04:16.553 our nation's highest authority. 04:16.553 --> 04:19.136 And that past is not indicative 04:19.537 --> 04:21.255 of the future that we're gonna have 04:21.255 --> 04:24.505 with much more contested maritime seas. 04:25.313 --> 04:29.480 The challenge is many of us that are on active duty 04:29.780 --> 04:32.176 have grown up in a different paradigm 04:32.176 --> 04:35.061 than that in which we're gonna have to fight in the future. 04:35.061 --> 04:37.811 The theory the fight must change, 04:38.498 --> 04:41.703 we're not gonna be able to remain in the safe zone, 04:41.703 --> 04:44.502 outside the keep out zone of a contested 04:44.502 --> 04:46.419 sea-denied environment. 04:46.490 --> 04:48.490 That's one hypothesis is 04:49.102 --> 04:51.507 well, hey if we grow longer arms 04:51.507 --> 04:53.303 we could continue to stay out here where we're safe 04:53.303 --> 04:56.886 and have this kind of influence reaching in 04:57.530 --> 05:00.030 to a regional contested space. 05:01.892 --> 05:02.725 But the problem is, 05:02.725 --> 05:04.957 the adversary also is growing longer arms 05:04.957 --> 05:07.654 and this approach will never work. 05:07.654 --> 05:10.587 The reality is we're gonna have to go in 05:10.587 --> 05:13.238 and if you look at sort of our intolerance 05:13.238 --> 05:17.405 for casualties post desert war in the Middle East, 05:17.934 --> 05:19.605 there's a lot of friction associated 05:19.605 --> 05:22.712 with this kind of approach to naval war fighting 05:22.712 --> 05:25.042 of going inside, operating within 05:25.042 --> 05:26.786 the contested battle space 05:26.786 --> 05:28.755 and putting pressure on Red, 05:28.755 --> 05:30.505 changing his calculus 05:30.638 --> 05:33.305 and optimizing the effectiveness 05:33.526 --> 05:35.859 and efficiency of our force. 05:38.329 --> 05:40.356 The blue line of effort within the design, 05:40.356 --> 05:41.748 there are four lines of effort. 05:41.748 --> 05:44.487 The blue is strengthening naval power 05:44.487 --> 05:46.154 at and from the sea. 05:47.205 --> 05:51.288 In the design it says, combat at sea must address 05:51.420 --> 05:54.420 "blue water" scenarios far from land 05:54.741 --> 05:58.203 in a highly informationalized and contested environment, 05:58.203 --> 06:02.370 one marked by the threat of long range precision strike. 06:03.652 --> 06:06.524 The challenge before us is how do you 06:06.524 --> 06:09.191 aggregate, coordinate your force 06:09.312 --> 06:11.019 to go ahead and maximize 06:11.019 --> 06:13.914 in that type of future environment? 06:13.914 --> 06:17.247 And our hypothesis is a new fleet design 06:18.443 --> 06:21.648 is going to be necessary for us to prevail. 06:21.648 --> 06:25.648 And by fleet design, I mean how we fight and win 06:25.746 --> 06:27.281 fully leveraging the advantages 06:27.281 --> 06:30.994 inherent in our force that could be potentially untapped 06:30.994 --> 06:33.274 if we combine it in a different way 06:33.274 --> 06:35.664 with an integrated fighting force. 06:35.664 --> 06:37.307 How can we run the table 06:37.307 --> 06:39.440 with a total systems approach 06:39.440 --> 06:41.764 to sea power and sea control 06:41.764 --> 06:45.097 in this new, advanced technological era? 06:45.134 --> 06:47.531 Our panel today will examine the nature 06:47.531 --> 06:48.740 of how we should organize 06:48.740 --> 06:50.364 and employ our naval force 06:50.364 --> 06:52.587 to fight in this dynamic environment. 06:52.587 --> 06:55.810 It is highly contested, highly informationalized, 06:55.810 --> 06:59.893 high tech, long reach, kinetic punch environment. 07:00.166 --> 07:04.127 Our hypothesis naval operations distributed in nature, 07:04.127 --> 07:06.444 capitalizing on maneuver warfare 07:06.444 --> 07:08.692 integrated for a greater battle space awareness, 07:08.692 --> 07:10.754 and amassed affects will be key 07:10.754 --> 07:13.004 to putting Red on his heels 07:13.057 --> 07:16.096 as we change the calculus to our advantage. 07:16.096 --> 07:18.724 With that, I'd like to introduce our first speaker, 07:18.724 --> 07:21.719 General George Flynn, United States Marine Corps, retired. 07:21.719 --> 07:23.169 Brings the wealth of knowledge and experience 07:23.169 --> 07:26.584 in national security, strategy and international relations. 07:26.584 --> 07:28.251 He retired after 38 years 07:28.251 --> 07:31.569 of distinguished service to our country in the Marine Corps. 07:31.569 --> 07:33.409 Couple of highlights from his career. 07:33.409 --> 07:35.566 He created the Joint Force Development Directorate 07:35.566 --> 07:37.089 for the Joint Chiefs of Staff 07:37.089 --> 07:38.770 shaping the fighting force 07:38.770 --> 07:41.038 through development of operational concepts, 07:41.038 --> 07:42.871 doctrine and training. 07:43.196 --> 07:45.103 He is an experienced war fighter 07:45.103 --> 07:46.686 with the challenges of leading a multi force, 07:46.686 --> 07:48.686 multi national coalition 07:48.883 --> 07:51.087 while serving as the Deputy Commander General 07:51.087 --> 07:53.147 Multinational Force Iraq. 07:53.147 --> 07:54.633 And as Commanding General of Marine Corps 07:54.633 --> 07:55.806 Training and Education Command, 07:55.806 --> 07:57.995 he guided the Marine Corps training 07:57.995 --> 08:00.733 ensuring they were prepared for global operations. 08:00.733 --> 08:03.998 He's an advocate for the expeditionary war fighting approach 08:03.998 --> 08:05.523 that we can rapidly establish 08:05.523 --> 08:08.462 operational posture within a contested environment 08:08.462 --> 08:10.879 ensuring secure maneuver, logistics 08:10.879 --> 08:14.274 and commanding control advantages for our US forces. 08:14.274 --> 08:16.621 Ladies and gentlemen, it's a great pleasure to introduce 08:16.621 --> 08:18.236 General George Flynn. 08:18.236 --> 08:20.176 - Hey, so good morning everyone. 08:20.176 --> 08:22.820 Last night as we were drinking wine and eating dinner 08:22.820 --> 08:25.398 what we're about to say made a hell of a lot of sense. 08:25.398 --> 08:26.789 (laughs) 08:26.789 --> 08:29.402 I'm not sure missing at least one of those ingredients 08:29.402 --> 08:31.800 that it will come off as well as it did last night 08:31.800 --> 08:34.517 but I'm optimistic for the future here. 08:34.517 --> 08:36.778 I'm not here to give you a lecture 08:36.778 --> 08:38.842 or to tell you how this is gonna be, 08:38.842 --> 08:41.167 but maybe to give you some ideas to think about 08:41.167 --> 08:43.296 as we enter this new environment. 08:43.296 --> 08:45.478 The reality is that we live in a dynamic 08:45.478 --> 08:47.384 and obviously a complex world 08:47.384 --> 08:49.479 that requires in our war fighting capabilities 08:49.479 --> 08:51.801 the integration across five domains. 08:51.801 --> 08:54.970 We also have some unique fiscal realities. 08:54.970 --> 08:57.252 We live in a world where you can have anything you want, 08:57.252 --> 08:59.004 all you have to do is ask for it 08:59.004 --> 09:00.309 but you can't have everything 09:00.309 --> 09:02.007 so you have to make choices. 09:02.007 --> 09:03.292 And the choices that you have to make 09:03.292 --> 09:05.851 will be guided by your operational needs. 09:05.851 --> 09:07.633 You're gonna have to decide what capabilities 09:07.633 --> 09:09.540 you can fill and what capacity, 09:09.540 --> 09:13.672 and also sometimes the debate over presence versus posture. 09:13.672 --> 09:15.275 In the world we live in right now, 09:15.275 --> 09:18.529 we're not at peace but we're not also at total war. 09:18.529 --> 09:21.546 There is a competition ongoing in the global commons. 09:21.546 --> 09:23.510 Conflict is ongoing around the world, 09:23.510 --> 09:26.852 we are fighting radical Islamic ideology and naval forces 09:26.852 --> 09:28.842 and the ability to project power from the sea 09:28.842 --> 09:31.789 from our warships have been a key to that fight. 09:31.789 --> 09:33.944 We're also engaged in the cyber domain 09:33.944 --> 09:35.222 defending our networks 09:35.222 --> 09:36.597 and protecting our information 09:36.597 --> 09:38.937 in critical infrastructure everyday. 09:38.937 --> 09:41.756 Naval forces have also been key to this effort 09:41.756 --> 09:43.371 and at the near peer level, 09:43.371 --> 09:45.115 we are in a high stakes competition 09:45.115 --> 09:47.572 for economic and security advantage. 09:47.572 --> 09:49.267 In this competition there will always be 09:49.267 --> 09:51.652 winners and losers as in the past. 09:51.652 --> 09:53.746 We have to realize that several states 09:53.746 --> 09:55.427 have entered this competitive state 09:55.427 --> 09:57.176 and have clear ends in mind. 09:57.176 --> 09:58.852 Some of these ends are in direct conflict 09:58.852 --> 10:00.225 with their own national interest 10:00.225 --> 10:02.474 and our national security objectives. 10:02.474 --> 10:05.688 This competition is real and is ongoing right now. 10:05.688 --> 10:07.389 In many ways, some of our competitors 10:07.389 --> 10:09.519 have already moved from phase zero operations 10:09.519 --> 10:10.602 to phase two. 10:11.531 --> 10:12.930 They also seem to be well aware 10:12.930 --> 10:14.272 of how far they can push us 10:14.272 --> 10:17.625 in their phase two actions and activities. 10:17.625 --> 10:19.889 At times, it seems that we still believe 10:19.889 --> 10:21.114 that we're in phase zero 10:21.114 --> 10:23.202 and are shaping the operating environment, 10:23.202 --> 10:26.111 when in reality we need to be deterring our competitors 10:26.111 --> 10:29.059 and seizing the initiative from them. 10:29.059 --> 10:32.452 Being actively engaged forward and present 10:32.452 --> 10:34.408 where the competition is taking place 10:34.408 --> 10:36.756 is one of the principles to a key, 10:36.756 --> 10:39.798 principle keys to achieving our desired ends. 10:39.798 --> 10:42.082 We do not have the luxury of shaping the environment 10:42.082 --> 10:43.501 when some of our competitors 10:43.501 --> 10:45.749 are already in phase two operations. 10:45.749 --> 10:47.559 We must recognize the reality 10:47.559 --> 10:50.036 that the operating environment requires parallel 10:50.036 --> 10:52.725 rather than sequential phased operations. 10:52.725 --> 10:54.199 The goal of our naval efforts 10:54.199 --> 10:56.012 is to constantly challenge our competitor's 10:56.012 --> 10:59.478 operational understanding and risk calculus 10:59.478 --> 11:01.103 by creating greater uncertainty 11:01.103 --> 11:03.878 through ever increasing operational complexity 11:03.878 --> 11:05.836 and innovation on our part. 11:05.836 --> 11:08.024 This requires better thinking on our part, 11:08.024 --> 11:11.006 better education, better training and equipment 11:11.006 --> 11:15.115 to fuel the capabilities that we need to stay ahead. 11:15.115 --> 11:16.429 As a maritime nation, 11:16.429 --> 11:17.678 there will always be advantage 11:17.678 --> 11:19.906 to using the sea as maneuver space. 11:19.906 --> 11:22.782 With the goal of creating a depth problem for adversaries 11:22.782 --> 11:24.569 and assisting in changing the calculus 11:24.569 --> 11:27.663 of our adversary's escalatory postures. 11:27.663 --> 11:29.546 The good news is we have seen this before 11:29.546 --> 11:30.714 and we have won, 11:30.714 --> 11:32.496 and we must use the lessons of the past 11:32.496 --> 11:34.308 to inform our way ahead. 11:34.308 --> 11:36.803 When the Navy and Marine Corps operate as a naval team, 11:36.803 --> 11:38.271 we are hard to beat. 11:38.271 --> 11:40.793 As in the past, an integrated naval approach 11:40.793 --> 11:43.393 that fights an integrated multiple domain fight 11:43.393 --> 11:46.455 using all capabilities the naval force will win. 11:46.455 --> 11:48.392 Our most recent example of successfully 11:48.392 --> 11:50.260 executing a naval campaign 11:50.260 --> 11:54.045 is the maritime strategy developed during the Cold War. 11:54.045 --> 11:54.878 Cold War. 11:55.319 --> 11:56.661 Key tenants of this strategy 11:56.661 --> 11:58.640 in supporting operational concepts were 11:58.640 --> 12:00.126 it was a naval effort. 12:00.126 --> 12:02.904 It was designed to fight forward in all domains. 12:02.904 --> 12:04.934 It was designed to seize the initiative, 12:04.934 --> 12:06.896 create multiple dilemmas for the enemy 12:06.896 --> 12:08.704 both real and perceived 12:08.704 --> 12:12.838 and to make a clear linkage between strategy to tactics. 12:12.838 --> 12:14.882 The example I used in the Marine Corps 12:14.882 --> 12:16.737 having the maritime strategy 12:16.737 --> 12:19.828 allowed us to develop the naval operating concepts 12:19.828 --> 12:21.240 that led to us creating the 12:21.240 --> 12:23.196 operational maneuver from the sea 12:23.196 --> 12:25.578 which then guided our capability development 12:25.578 --> 12:27.185 which you see today. 12:27.185 --> 12:29.068 We also had a clear linkage between 12:29.068 --> 12:31.946 power projection and sea control in this example. 12:31.946 --> 12:34.615 For example as we pressed the fight forward, 12:34.615 --> 12:37.888 marines would go into Iceland to guard the airfield there 12:37.888 --> 12:40.170 with an infantry battalion hawk missiles 12:40.170 --> 12:42.694 to create another carrier for the P-3s 12:42.694 --> 12:45.558 that they could control the GIUK gap. 12:45.558 --> 12:47.193 We also press forward into Norway 12:47.193 --> 12:49.456 so the carriers could operate from the Fjords 12:49.456 --> 12:51.354 with the marines occupying the space 12:51.354 --> 12:52.802 to protect the carriers. 12:52.802 --> 12:54.595 It really was a naval effort 12:54.595 --> 12:58.031 and it was designed to complicate the enemy's targeting, 12:58.031 --> 12:59.817 it was designed to seize the initiative 12:59.817 --> 13:02.204 and it was designed to press the fight forward. 13:02.204 --> 13:04.003 We were also able to fight at range 13:04.003 --> 13:05.799 developing capabilities that allowed us 13:05.799 --> 13:07.291 to out range the enemy, 13:07.291 --> 13:09.005 and we would always found ourselves 13:09.005 --> 13:12.602 on the right side of the cause to kill chain. 13:12.602 --> 13:14.540 The current CMANO and CNO 13:14.540 --> 13:17.177 both understand the challenge that we face 13:17.177 --> 13:19.444 and the opportunity that is ahead of them. 13:19.444 --> 13:21.093 And within months of taking command, 13:21.093 --> 13:23.406 they have given guidance that enables the naval force 13:23.406 --> 13:25.447 to seize and maintain the initiative, 13:25.447 --> 13:29.577 and it combine a competitive phase zero to two environment. 13:29.577 --> 13:32.370 Cooperative strategy 21 stated that there is a linkage 13:32.370 --> 13:34.986 between sea control and power projection. 13:34.986 --> 13:36.827 In the past we tended to think of this 13:36.827 --> 13:38.428 as a one way relationship 13:38.428 --> 13:40.902 where sea control enabled power projection. 13:40.902 --> 13:42.402 But history is full of examples 13:42.402 --> 13:44.458 where it also works the other way around. 13:44.458 --> 13:47.595 If you go back to the Solomons Campaign of World War II, 13:47.595 --> 13:50.023 the reasons the marine seized Guadalcanal 13:50.023 --> 13:51.463 was for the airfield, 13:51.463 --> 13:53.831 so that we could operate airplanes out of the airfield 13:53.831 --> 13:55.998 to extend our sea control. 13:56.189 --> 13:58.068 That is the essence of so many ideas 13:58.068 --> 13:59.594 that we have to have in the future 13:59.594 --> 14:01.894 if we're gonna take this fight to the enemy. 14:01.894 --> 14:04.061 We need to update this linkage by developing 14:04.061 --> 14:06.238 and testing the new operating concepts 14:06.238 --> 14:08.969 needed to achieve the necessary integration, 14:08.969 --> 14:11.990 and it must, as I said, be a naval effort. 14:11.990 --> 14:13.720 All right, what would be the key elements 14:13.720 --> 14:15.455 of this new maritime strategy 14:15.455 --> 14:17.622 or this new fleet doctrine 14:17.636 --> 14:20.297 and new naval operating concept? 14:20.297 --> 14:22.842 First of all, it has to be the employment of a 14:22.842 --> 14:24.015 integrated naval team 14:24.015 --> 14:25.422 that more effectively applies 14:25.422 --> 14:28.026 sea control and power projection together 14:28.026 --> 14:31.461 in order to penetrate, maneuver and persist 14:31.461 --> 14:33.360 within contested battle space, 14:33.360 --> 14:36.454 in a manner that complicates adversary targeting, 14:36.454 --> 14:38.385 mitigates as precision targeting 14:38.385 --> 14:41.510 and holds at risk his security and economic interest. 14:41.510 --> 14:45.484 An example of this would be the Fjord basing of marines 14:45.484 --> 14:48.401 on certain islands on the outskirts 14:49.555 --> 14:51.472 of the contested space. 14:52.555 --> 14:54.783 Moving around whether they'd be HIMARS 14:54.783 --> 14:56.744 with the anti-ship missiles on them 14:56.744 --> 14:59.494 or just occupying places that use 14:59.574 --> 15:02.241 the temporary airfields to again 15:02.350 --> 15:05.214 complicate the enemy's targeting capabilities. 15:05.214 --> 15:06.817 The other part of the new strategy 15:06.817 --> 15:10.230 is that when you come up with these new ideas and concepts 15:10.230 --> 15:12.764 is that you have to exercise and with purpose. 15:12.764 --> 15:15.953 And the purpose is to send a message to your adversaries. 15:15.953 --> 15:17.924 It's that part of being able to deter 15:17.924 --> 15:19.570 to show that you have capabilities 15:19.570 --> 15:21.225 but also to show that you are willing 15:21.225 --> 15:22.922 to seize the initiative. 15:22.922 --> 15:25.204 You also have to understand that it's a campaign 15:25.204 --> 15:27.032 that begins with shaping, 15:27.032 --> 15:28.884 carries on to deterrence 15:28.884 --> 15:31.488 and leads to season the initiative. 15:31.488 --> 15:33.469 All actions have to be linked, 15:33.469 --> 15:35.752 not sequentially but in parallel. 15:35.752 --> 15:38.825 We have to be able to use the sea again as maneuver space. 15:38.825 --> 15:41.413 We have to be able to get more out of what we have 15:41.413 --> 15:44.335 so that we can stay inside the enemy's decision loop. 15:44.335 --> 15:46.348 We have to not cheat at solitaire, 15:46.348 --> 15:48.632 meaning we have to know ourselves 15:48.632 --> 15:50.635 and we have to know our capabilities. 15:50.635 --> 15:54.653 You can't make a capability sound bigger than what it is 15:54.653 --> 15:55.545 or you have to realize, 15:55.545 --> 15:57.408 this is what you're bringing to the table. 15:57.408 --> 15:59.609 You have to strive for disproportionate results 15:59.609 --> 16:01.079 because we have to be on the right side 16:01.079 --> 16:03.162 of a cost and opposing strategy. 16:03.162 --> 16:05.809 You have to always demonstrate capability and resolve, 16:05.809 --> 16:08.324 you have to understand your competitor. 16:08.324 --> 16:12.069 Do we really know what our competitors worry about? 16:12.069 --> 16:13.495 But we need to find that out 16:13.495 --> 16:15.372 because the goal of this new strategy 16:15.372 --> 16:17.205 is to make them worry. 16:17.285 --> 16:19.312 We have to be able to do cross domain operations 16:19.312 --> 16:20.512 that are linked in the achievement 16:20.512 --> 16:22.679 of operational objectives, 16:22.679 --> 16:24.129 and we have to use what we have 16:24.129 --> 16:26.391 in ever increasing innovative ways. 16:26.391 --> 16:28.108 Four actions are going on right now 16:28.108 --> 16:30.088 where we should see what these new concepts 16:30.088 --> 16:31.126 are gonna look like. 16:31.126 --> 16:32.709 One is the joint access 16:32.709 --> 16:34.809 and maneuver in the global commons doctrine 16:34.809 --> 16:37.183 being written by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 16:37.183 --> 16:38.443 The other is a naval effort 16:38.443 --> 16:39.790 between the Navy and Marine Corps 16:39.790 --> 16:42.540 on littoral operations in a contested environment. 16:42.540 --> 16:44.595 And then we have distributed lethality, 16:44.595 --> 16:48.214 another great idea that is being spearheaded by the Navy 16:48.214 --> 16:50.890 to again, increase the enemy's idea 16:50.890 --> 16:52.915 of what we're gonna come at. 16:52.915 --> 16:54.762 Use all the capabilities we have 16:54.762 --> 16:58.280 and the last one is expeditionary based operations. 16:58.280 --> 17:01.613 Again, in closing here, the key thing is 17:01.617 --> 17:04.258 we have to realize that we're in a competition 17:04.258 --> 17:05.708 and we have to realize right now 17:05.708 --> 17:07.450 that the way you win a competition 17:07.450 --> 17:10.283 is to be ahead of the competition, 17:10.354 --> 17:12.220 be ahead of your competitor, 17:12.220 --> 17:14.007 understand what makes them worry, 17:14.007 --> 17:15.186 and make them worry. 17:15.186 --> 17:17.475 And that's the way you seize the initiative. 17:17.475 --> 17:19.395 Thanks for having me today. 17:19.395 --> 17:21.061 - A round of applause. Very good. 17:21.061 --> 17:23.311 (clapping) 17:25.370 --> 17:29.366 Well ahead of the clock, three minutes, seven seconds. 17:29.366 --> 17:30.686 An over achiever. 17:30.686 --> 17:33.907 - He was buzzing me under the table here. 17:33.907 --> 17:35.645 - Let's see, the cattle prod. 17:35.645 --> 17:36.820 Well George, thanks very much 17:36.820 --> 17:38.909 for just the clarity of that discussion 17:38.909 --> 17:42.826 and again, sort of the shift in the environment 17:43.025 --> 17:44.395 and the way we're gonna have to adapt 17:44.395 --> 17:48.312 as a naval team, the Navy and the Marine Corps. 17:49.053 --> 17:50.553 I think you really 17:52.667 --> 17:56.834 articulately detailed this expeditionary fighting will 17:57.118 --> 18:00.701 of going into sort of the scrappy littorals 18:00.852 --> 18:02.935 not being shouldered out. 18:03.026 --> 18:04.639 Being able to go and operate 18:04.639 --> 18:07.306 and put the disadvantage on Red. 18:08.157 --> 18:10.074 I think for me as I look at the future, 18:10.074 --> 18:13.243 this boundary of the littoral battle space 18:13.243 --> 18:15.337 is gonna have a blurry line. 18:15.337 --> 18:16.804 And I think is gonna head further 18:16.804 --> 18:18.861 and further out into the open seas 18:18.861 --> 18:21.167 as our adversaries that are interested in 18:21.167 --> 18:23.365 shouldering us off their coast 18:23.365 --> 18:26.507 and in their regions develop weapons of greater range. 18:26.507 --> 18:28.747 And so, a lot of the principles 18:28.747 --> 18:32.103 I think that you brought from history is again, 18:32.103 --> 18:33.805 we've seen this movie before. 18:33.805 --> 18:35.888 And we are not a country, 18:36.105 --> 18:39.772 we are not a navy that's gonna be barred out 18:40.145 --> 18:42.363 from operating where we choose to operate, 18:42.363 --> 18:44.819 even though there may be risks. 18:44.819 --> 18:47.069 We're gonna design a method 18:47.723 --> 18:51.068 with the expeditionary fighting will to get inside 18:51.068 --> 18:54.651 and optimize the things that you mentioned. 18:55.130 --> 18:57.216 Thank you very much for teeing us up 18:57.216 --> 18:59.376 and getting the juices flowing. 18:59.376 --> 19:03.126 Our second speaker today is Admiral Jon Hill. 19:03.202 --> 19:04.989 He is the Program Executive Officer 19:04.989 --> 19:07.045 for Integrated Warfare Systems. 19:07.045 --> 19:09.595 Surface Warfare Officer, Engineering Duty Officer, 19:09.595 --> 19:13.072 vast leadership experience in acquisition. 19:13.072 --> 19:14.697 Brings expertise in the development 19:14.697 --> 19:17.534 and deployment of advanced weapon systems, 19:17.534 --> 19:19.367 sensors and platforms. 19:19.694 --> 19:20.789 As the technical director 19:20.789 --> 19:22.870 of the AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense. 19:22.870 --> 19:25.618 For the Missile Defense Agency he dealt first hand 19:25.618 --> 19:28.416 with the growing threat from potential adversaries 19:28.416 --> 19:30.643 and the challenges we face to maintain 19:30.643 --> 19:32.310 a war fighting edge. 19:32.339 --> 19:35.357 As Major Program Manager for the AEGIS Combat Systems, 19:35.357 --> 19:38.071 his insights into the war fighting grid, 19:38.071 --> 19:41.505 particularly the integrated air and missile defense grid 19:41.505 --> 19:44.731 is shaping the future of naval fire power. 19:44.731 --> 19:48.109 Now as PEO IWS, he ensures the future fleet 19:48.109 --> 19:51.204 will be equipped with highly capable combat systems 19:51.204 --> 19:52.961 and so at this point in our discussion, 19:52.961 --> 19:54.920 we're gonna look at how do we stitch 19:54.920 --> 19:56.852 this fighting force together? 19:56.852 --> 19:59.367 What does the architecture look like? 19:59.367 --> 20:00.914 How do we go ahead and run the table 20:00.914 --> 20:05.081 on this asymmetric advantage that is our current advantage 20:05.826 --> 20:08.135 and that is the integrated fighting force? 20:08.135 --> 20:10.840 Ladies and gentlemen, Admiral Jon Hill. 20:10.840 --> 20:12.325 - Great. Thank you Admiral. 20:12.325 --> 20:14.337 It's a real pleasure to be here this morning 20:14.337 --> 20:16.020 and what a great panel. 20:16.020 --> 20:18.206 You're gonna see we're a pretty diverse 20:18.206 --> 20:19.437 gang of folks up here today 20:19.437 --> 20:22.034 so I have been looking forward to this for a while. 20:22.034 --> 20:23.703 As you can tell by the description 20:23.703 --> 20:25.870 of what I do for a living, 20:25.890 --> 20:28.868 I really believe that the statement that our systems 20:28.868 --> 20:31.720 reflect our organization is absolutely true. 20:31.720 --> 20:33.962 And if you look at how we're organized within PEO IWS 20:33.962 --> 20:36.042 we have ship systems, we have missile systems, 20:36.042 --> 20:37.697 we have radar systems. 20:37.697 --> 20:41.222 And if we just produce those in a vacuum on their own, 20:41.222 --> 20:43.837 we'll put some great capability out there. 20:43.837 --> 20:45.856 What we're really talking about today is 20:45.856 --> 20:47.554 the power that comes from 20:47.554 --> 20:49.905 a full on integration of those systems. 20:49.905 --> 20:51.118 And so I'm gonna talk to you about 20:51.118 --> 20:53.685 something called cooperative engagement modes 20:53.685 --> 20:55.707 and these CEMs as I'll call them 20:55.707 --> 20:58.410 is a real way for us to provide more options 20:58.410 --> 20:59.683 to the war fighter. 20:59.683 --> 21:01.516 We're gonna leverage multiple capabilities, 21:01.516 --> 21:04.149 we're gonna walk across all domains 21:04.149 --> 21:07.701 and if you start to look at distributed maritime operations, 21:07.701 --> 21:10.293 whether it's from the Fleet Forces concept 21:10.293 --> 21:12.383 or Admiral Rowden's Distributed Lethality, 21:12.383 --> 21:14.259 multiple operational concepts 21:14.259 --> 21:16.132 are really about placing the sailor 21:16.132 --> 21:18.078 at the center of those operations, 21:18.078 --> 21:20.585 and it's an area that we all too often will forget. 21:20.585 --> 21:22.854 And so you'll hear me say sailor, 21:22.854 --> 21:23.803 well if you count it will probably be 21:23.803 --> 21:25.631 at least 10 times by script. 21:25.631 --> 21:28.065 It's because I really believe that as we develop, 21:28.065 --> 21:30.347 we have to make sure that training systems 21:30.347 --> 21:32.784 and maintenance and operations are included in that. 21:32.784 --> 21:34.342 And so I'll harp on that a little bit. 21:34.342 --> 21:35.648 I'm gonna talk to you about something called 21:35.648 --> 21:36.836 the Fleet Tactical Grid. 21:36.836 --> 21:38.857 You'll hear it referred to by some as the cube, 21:38.857 --> 21:41.511 I've got a slide that will talk to that in just a bit 21:41.511 --> 21:42.522 but it's really about bringing 21:42.522 --> 21:44.074 all of our communications together, 21:44.074 --> 21:46.029 our command and control, our computers, 21:46.029 --> 21:47.362 our sensors and weapons, 21:47.362 --> 21:49.182 and our officers and sailors together 21:49.182 --> 21:53.284 to fully operate in a very, very tough environment 21:53.284 --> 21:55.882 that was described by the admiral and the general. 21:55.882 --> 21:58.373 The grid's gonna facilitate a very intelligent exchange 21:58.373 --> 22:01.086 and analysis of data to provide our war fighters 22:01.086 --> 22:02.322 actionable knowledge. 22:02.322 --> 22:04.728 And for me because I'm in love with the fire control loop, 22:04.728 --> 22:06.374 it's all about precision fire control, 22:06.374 --> 22:08.106 precision engagement. 22:08.106 --> 22:10.419 I'm gonna be Timmy the Geek on the panel here 22:10.419 --> 22:12.438 and walk you through a little bit of geekdom. 22:12.438 --> 22:13.553 - [Rick] We all have our strengths. 22:13.553 --> 22:14.788 - Thank you sir. 22:14.788 --> 22:17.038 Francis, next slide please. 22:17.256 --> 22:18.125 You may have heard of 22:18.125 --> 22:20.383 Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air, 22:20.383 --> 22:21.966 we call it NIFC-CA. 22:22.882 --> 22:24.533 It was really, it's a great example 22:24.533 --> 22:26.100 of a clear war fighting need 22:26.100 --> 22:28.473 to kill over land cruise missiles, 22:28.473 --> 22:29.913 cruise missiles coming in. 22:29.913 --> 22:31.387 How do you go do that? 22:31.387 --> 22:33.233 It was developed by leveraging the expertise 22:33.233 --> 22:34.474 across multiple SYSCOMs, 22:34.474 --> 22:35.307 you see their logo up 22:35.307 --> 22:36.846 in the right hand corner of this chart, 22:36.846 --> 22:38.781 and the warfare training community. 22:38.781 --> 22:41.444 It was based on a concept of employment first. 22:41.444 --> 22:42.824 The General mentioned how you have to 22:42.824 --> 22:45.043 really understand what the word fighting need is 22:45.043 --> 22:47.587 and then on the systems development side, 22:47.587 --> 22:49.642 we go off and we develop that architecture. 22:49.642 --> 22:52.659 We test it and then we adjust as required 22:52.659 --> 22:54.287 because sometimes the technology 22:54.287 --> 22:55.443 doesn't always get you there. 22:55.443 --> 22:57.012 Sometimes you have to load the sailor 22:57.012 --> 22:58.466 with a little more work, 22:58.466 --> 22:59.917 sometimes you can relieve the sailor 22:59.917 --> 23:02.391 of some of that work with a very strong 23:02.391 --> 23:04.257 operator machine interface. 23:04.257 --> 23:07.037 If you look at the NIFC-CA architecture in the upper right, 23:07.037 --> 23:09.050 there we knew we needed an airborne sensor. 23:09.050 --> 23:11.501 We had to have it up high so we could see further. 23:11.501 --> 23:13.604 We were gonna pass radar data because we're going against 23:13.604 --> 23:15.719 very fast moving targets that were flying low 23:15.719 --> 23:18.099 so we used the cooperative engagement capability 23:18.099 --> 23:20.574 which allows us to move radar directly, 23:20.574 --> 23:22.569 radar information directly off that aircraft 23:22.569 --> 23:24.922 right to an AEGIS Combat System, 23:24.922 --> 23:27.418 and allows us to really realize 23:27.418 --> 23:29.437 the extended range of an SM-6 missile. 23:29.437 --> 23:31.492 That's what NIFC-CA in a nutshell is 23:31.492 --> 23:33.013 but we didn't get there overnight 23:33.013 --> 23:34.778 and if you looked at every one of these programs, 23:34.778 --> 23:36.119 they were all separate programs, 23:36.119 --> 23:37.253 separate program managers 23:37.253 --> 23:40.705 and they spanned across the different SYSCOMs. 23:40.705 --> 23:42.251 Which again, our systems 23:42.251 --> 23:43.815 will easily reflect the organization. 23:43.815 --> 23:45.894 You could find sims all over that architecture 23:45.894 --> 23:47.418 had we not taken it seriously 23:47.418 --> 23:49.401 based on that operational concept. 23:49.401 --> 23:50.489 We're very proud of the fact 23:50.489 --> 23:51.779 that we have deployed NIFC-CA, 23:51.779 --> 23:53.058 we're learning to use it now 23:53.058 --> 23:54.431 and we're working the training. 23:54.431 --> 23:55.716 Now one of the key observations 23:55.716 --> 23:57.625 that we take away from it when we look at it 23:57.625 --> 23:59.468 is the planning and the training tools 23:59.468 --> 24:01.548 were not something that we worked on 24:01.548 --> 24:03.075 in stride with the development. 24:03.075 --> 24:04.512 And that is definitely a lesson learned 24:04.512 --> 24:06.544 that we have to apply as we go forward. 24:06.544 --> 24:08.309 Our fleet tactical training systems 24:08.309 --> 24:10.092 should deliver war fires with the environment 24:10.092 --> 24:12.804 to readily develop and train the integrated tactics, 24:12.804 --> 24:14.157 techniques and procedures, 24:14.157 --> 24:16.232 whether you're peer side or if you're underway, 24:16.232 --> 24:18.842 and we got to do it on a regular basis. 24:18.842 --> 24:20.176 Building out that cube, 24:20.176 --> 24:21.893 if you shift down to the fleet need 24:21.893 --> 24:23.515 to kill a surface target, 24:23.515 --> 24:25.349 you could take the same architecture 24:25.349 --> 24:27.780 and then you can say I need a different kind of sensor 24:27.780 --> 24:29.827 because now I'm looking down on the water 24:29.827 --> 24:33.327 and I maybe not, may not need radar data moving as quickly. 24:33.327 --> 24:35.744 I can survive off of hits that are coming 24:35.744 --> 24:37.128 and I can take that covariance data. 24:37.128 --> 24:38.858 Using the tactical data links 24:38.858 --> 24:40.820 was absolutely fine in this architecture 24:40.820 --> 24:43.446 and that's what we've used to go off 24:43.446 --> 24:47.022 and sink surface ships in another version of NIFC-CA. 24:47.022 --> 24:48.571 If you look at the cube on the left there 24:48.571 --> 24:49.822 and you think of your sensors, 24:49.822 --> 24:51.691 your weapons and your payloads, 24:51.691 --> 24:54.108 those platforms can be ships, 24:55.083 --> 24:56.104 that can be an aircraft, 24:56.104 --> 24:58.912 that can be a UAV, it could be a submarine. 24:58.912 --> 25:00.558 A sensor's critically important, 25:00.558 --> 25:01.931 most of our sensors are designed 25:01.931 --> 25:04.646 to go against a very specific place in the battle space 25:04.646 --> 25:06.626 so they can't be leverage for everything. 25:06.626 --> 25:07.968 But what you can find is that 25:07.968 --> 25:10.006 many of your weapon systems and sensors 25:10.006 --> 25:11.315 have a lot of margin in them. 25:11.315 --> 25:13.652 And so it's about taking advantage of that margin 25:13.652 --> 25:15.116 then finding the right way 25:15.116 --> 25:17.864 to bring them in to those little red dots in the center 25:17.864 --> 25:19.644 which we'll refer to as nodes. 25:19.644 --> 25:21.407 But those are the critical real time functions 25:21.407 --> 25:22.530 of the combat system. 25:22.530 --> 25:24.306 How you bring in sensor data, 25:24.306 --> 25:26.118 how you connect that to the weapon, 25:26.118 --> 25:27.585 how you control it to make sure 25:27.585 --> 25:28.981 that you've got a precision engagement. 25:28.981 --> 25:32.564 I'll talk about that here in just a second. 25:32.627 --> 25:34.533 When you take a look at what we've done 25:34.533 --> 25:36.299 on the lower right of that chart 25:36.299 --> 25:39.734 going against surface ship or high value unit, 25:39.734 --> 25:40.864 that has been tested 25:40.864 --> 25:43.198 and it will be ready to deploy later this year. 25:43.198 --> 25:44.762 We're pretty excited about that. 25:44.762 --> 25:46.443 What we're doing now, 25:46.443 --> 25:48.083 leveraging yet another sensor, 25:48.083 --> 25:51.169 we are capturing data off the F-35 metalink 25:51.169 --> 25:53.922 and we're taking that in from the aircraft 25:53.922 --> 25:55.697 as they're coming off to production line. 25:55.697 --> 25:57.207 We're assessing that data for controlling 25:57.207 --> 25:59.060 the fire control loop within AEGIS. 25:59.060 --> 26:00.598 Pretty excited about it. 26:00.598 --> 26:02.098 Next chart please. 26:03.533 --> 26:05.546 Here's a busy one to wake you up in the morning 26:05.546 --> 26:06.892 but I will point out the sailor 26:06.892 --> 26:08.543 in the upper left hand corner. 26:08.543 --> 26:10.441 This is all about command and decision, 26:10.441 --> 26:12.628 whether it's the sailor specifically doing it, 26:12.628 --> 26:14.995 the CO of the ship, the combatant commander. 26:14.995 --> 26:16.888 You can raise this to whatever level 26:16.888 --> 26:18.521 is required to understand it. 26:18.521 --> 26:20.958 My message to you is that you have to care, 26:20.958 --> 26:24.377 very careful allocate the critical real time functions 26:24.377 --> 26:26.652 and it's extensible across all platforms, 26:26.652 --> 26:28.203 payloads and sensors. 26:28.203 --> 26:29.807 But understanding and imparting 26:29.807 --> 26:31.660 the concepts of integration, distribution 26:31.660 --> 26:33.177 and maneuver across a fleet 26:33.177 --> 26:35.051 requires a concerted effort. 26:35.051 --> 26:36.697 It's gonna continue to be something 26:36.697 --> 26:38.900 that crosses across all of our SYSCOMs, 26:38.900 --> 26:41.650 multiple PEOs, multiple services. 26:41.964 --> 26:44.453 And it will certainly require the training community 26:44.453 --> 26:46.098 and working closely with the fleet. 26:46.098 --> 26:48.053 Just to point out a few key functions, 26:48.053 --> 26:49.493 I started with the command and decision, 26:49.493 --> 26:50.527 that piece at the front. 26:50.527 --> 26:52.776 This is a different view of detect, control, engage. 26:52.776 --> 26:55.397 This is about what the control system requires 26:55.397 --> 26:57.024 of the sensor on the left. 26:57.024 --> 26:58.423 You got to task that sensor, 26:58.423 --> 26:59.835 it's got to be in the right mode. 26:59.835 --> 27:01.147 You have to do track management, 27:01.147 --> 27:02.579 you have to evaluate the threat. 27:02.579 --> 27:04.592 It doesn't matter what mission you're trying to accomplish. 27:04.592 --> 27:06.653 All those are required by the sensor 27:06.653 --> 27:08.131 and if the sensor is not doing it, 27:08.131 --> 27:11.073 something else in that architecture better be doing that. 27:11.073 --> 27:12.680 And then from a command decision perspective, 27:12.680 --> 27:15.006 you're gonna lay down your engage ability parameters, 27:15.006 --> 27:16.608 you're gonna set your priorities, 27:16.608 --> 27:18.422 you're gonna determine whether you're gonna use 27:18.422 --> 27:20.315 a soft kill or a hard kill weapon. 27:20.315 --> 27:21.312 You're gonna initialize 27:21.312 --> 27:22.715 and you're gonna control the launch. 27:22.715 --> 27:24.257 And then finally from a weapons perspective, 27:24.257 --> 27:25.677 what we expect from the weapon 27:25.677 --> 27:27.131 is that we're gonna command guide it 27:27.131 --> 27:28.291 whether that's a wire 27:28.291 --> 27:29.711 or that's through an up link, down link 27:29.711 --> 27:31.446 or if it's a pre-programmed maneuver. 27:31.446 --> 27:33.252 You're gonna command guide this thing 27:33.252 --> 27:34.704 and then you're gonna kill assess 27:34.704 --> 27:36.461 and reengage if you have to. 27:36.461 --> 27:37.784 Those functions are absolutely critical 27:37.784 --> 27:39.574 and it doesn't matter what mission you're talking about, 27:39.574 --> 27:41.424 it doesn't matter if all those functions reside 27:41.424 --> 27:45.101 on a single shift, an aircraft, a UAV or a submarine. 27:45.101 --> 27:46.368 You're gonna have those functions 27:46.368 --> 27:47.201 and if you don't do them 27:47.201 --> 27:49.068 you're not gonna get the precision engagement. 27:49.068 --> 27:51.010 Mission set up, control and training 27:51.010 --> 27:53.842 has to be a part of that overall iron triangle 27:53.842 --> 27:54.972 of precision engagement. 27:54.972 --> 27:56.143 In fact, it has to be at the top 27:56.143 --> 27:58.050 which is why I have it at the top there. 27:58.050 --> 27:59.824 Because a sailor's gonna play 27:59.824 --> 28:02.442 depending on what mission you're trying to do. 28:02.442 --> 28:04.801 My message to you, no free launch, right? 28:04.801 --> 28:05.972 Disciplined system engineering 28:05.972 --> 28:07.949 and sailor involvement will be required 28:07.949 --> 28:09.582 to realize a fleet tactical grid, 28:09.582 --> 28:10.994 and every one of these functions are required 28:10.994 --> 28:12.890 for precision fire control. 28:12.890 --> 28:14.390 Next slide please. 28:15.100 --> 28:16.496 My other message to you this morning 28:16.496 --> 28:18.712 is that no platform, no payload, 28:18.712 --> 28:20.462 no sensor is perfect. 28:20.628 --> 28:22.001 In the engineering geek world, 28:22.001 --> 28:24.833 we refer to those imperfections as errors and biases 28:24.833 --> 28:27.179 and in the end we got to close that outbound weapons vector. 28:27.179 --> 28:28.631 That's what's on the lower part. 28:28.631 --> 28:31.298 Well, can you back it up please? 28:32.117 --> 28:34.553 Back up one chart, there you go. 28:34.553 --> 28:35.553 Go down one. 28:37.131 --> 28:38.298 Yeah, go down. 28:39.758 --> 28:40.591 No. 28:40.740 --> 28:42.407 The other direction. 28:45.455 --> 28:47.122 I'm missing a slide. 28:47.651 --> 28:48.594 Okay, well I'll tell you what, 28:48.594 --> 28:50.596 I was getting really excited about closing 28:50.596 --> 28:53.329 the weapons vector yeah, to the target vector 28:53.329 --> 28:55.640 so I'm gonna finish what I was gonna say. 28:55.640 --> 28:57.071 Because you've got to do that 28:57.071 --> 28:59.119 and just to kind of give you a sense, right? 28:59.119 --> 29:00.254 The environment's really important 29:00.254 --> 29:01.710 that we operate in, 29:01.710 --> 29:03.977 how the operator sets up the system. 29:03.977 --> 29:05.264 They won't be perfect every time, 29:05.264 --> 29:06.212 there'll be error there. 29:06.212 --> 29:08.289 You could be working in the jamming environment. 29:08.289 --> 29:10.356 Your sensor may not know exactly where it's at, 29:10.356 --> 29:11.699 it may not be grid-locked. 29:11.699 --> 29:14.547 That's what I mean by errors and biases in the system 29:14.547 --> 29:16.459 and then you've got to go verify that 29:16.459 --> 29:18.909 all those functions are being exercised. 29:18.909 --> 29:22.325 Okay, so now we can hang on this chart here for just a bit. 29:22.325 --> 29:24.766 Realizing the distributed maritime operations 29:24.766 --> 29:27.074 in the fleet has begun today, right? 29:27.074 --> 29:28.434 And in fact, if you look back, 29:28.434 --> 29:29.471 for those of you naval officers 29:29.471 --> 29:31.497 and you look back on your career, 29:31.497 --> 29:33.042 you'll see pieces of this 29:33.042 --> 29:35.086 and how it's been realized throughout your career. 29:35.086 --> 29:37.249 And we're just getting better and better at it. 29:37.249 --> 29:38.246 What we're really doing today 29:38.246 --> 29:40.269 is leveraging a lot of new technology 29:40.269 --> 29:43.336 and we're leveraging that cognitive edge of our sailors. 29:43.336 --> 29:45.131 We've begun with, I started off 29:45.131 --> 29:46.620 the discussion here with NIFC-CA 29:46.620 --> 29:48.398 and variance of that architecture. 29:48.398 --> 29:49.654 We're gonna continue to explore 29:49.654 --> 29:51.277 the variance of the architecture. 29:51.277 --> 29:53.073 Every architecture I look at, 29:53.073 --> 29:55.912 I will always walk away and say we're sensor-poor, right? 29:55.912 --> 29:59.158 That's why I talked about leveraging an E-2, 29:59.158 --> 30:02.325 leveraging a P-3, leveraging the F-35. 30:03.038 --> 30:05.209 We're gonna continue to look for new sensors 30:05.209 --> 30:07.835 and capabilities so the hypothesis is 30:07.835 --> 30:10.487 that we'll expand that fleet tactical grid. 30:10.487 --> 30:13.633 Now if you look at payloads, platforms and weapons 30:13.633 --> 30:16.517 and the sensors and you bring those together, right, 30:16.517 --> 30:18.405 the more of that integration that we can do, 30:18.405 --> 30:20.099 the more of those cooperative engagement modes 30:20.099 --> 30:21.310 that we developed, 30:21.310 --> 30:24.370 the bigger that fleet tactical grid grows. 30:24.370 --> 30:25.650 The prediction is that we'll have 30:25.650 --> 30:27.287 increased sensor contributions, 30:27.287 --> 30:28.758 we'll get spectral maneuver 30:28.758 --> 30:30.496 and we'll have distribute engagement options 30:30.496 --> 30:32.062 and expanded battle space. 30:32.062 --> 30:34.215 And then finally, we always have to measure, right? 30:34.215 --> 30:35.597 Whether you're measuring the error 30:35.597 --> 30:37.683 or you're measuring your discreet performance 30:37.683 --> 30:39.518 in a precision engagement, 30:39.518 --> 30:43.677 it is about capacity and reaching that war fighting edge. 30:43.677 --> 30:45.336 Okay, so the other thing I forgot to tell you 30:45.336 --> 30:47.669 is that I did link my iPhone 30:47.846 --> 30:49.205 to Admiral Breckenridge's iPhone 30:49.205 --> 30:50.682 so I turned off the buzzer, 30:50.682 --> 30:52.767 so I'm gonna keep on going for another 10 minutes. 30:52.767 --> 30:54.190 No. Actually Sir, I'm done. 30:54.190 --> 30:55.282 Thank you, Sir. 30:55.282 --> 30:56.448 - [Rick] A minute 53 to spare. 30:56.448 --> 30:57.861 - Okay, I understand. Thank you. 30:57.861 --> 31:00.660 - [Rick] You guys are an awesome panel. 31:00.660 --> 31:01.496 Thanks Jon. 31:01.496 --> 31:02.382 - I noticed that you deleted a slide 31:02.382 --> 31:03.313 to speed me up, Sir. - [Rick] That's right. 31:03.313 --> 31:05.263 Well, you know, we have to use some trickery 31:05.263 --> 31:07.937 to stay On schedule. - [Jon] Yes, Sir. 31:07.937 --> 31:09.444 - [Rick] Ladies and gentlemen, 31:09.444 --> 31:11.912 Timmy the Geek, was that the term you said? 31:11.912 --> 31:12.766 - [Jon] Yes, Sir. - [Rick] Okay. 31:12.766 --> 31:13.827 - [Jon] I think you called me that the other night. 31:13.827 --> 31:15.126 - What I want to emphasize is 31:15.126 --> 31:17.477 as we look at this new fleet design, 31:17.477 --> 31:20.144 it's not about technology alone. 31:20.187 --> 31:22.831 As Jon mentioned, we're doing a lot of these 31:22.831 --> 31:24.794 integrated operations today. 31:24.794 --> 31:26.867 These cooperative engagement modes, 31:26.867 --> 31:29.238 NIFC-CA, counter air, counter sea 31:29.238 --> 31:31.378 are things that we're testing and employing 31:31.378 --> 31:33.370 with the carrier strike groups, 31:33.370 --> 31:35.953 other fast forming teams today. 31:36.473 --> 31:39.890 The challenge is the number of these CEMs 31:40.133 --> 31:42.626 is sort of a finite number with 31:42.626 --> 31:44.559 the way that this construct has evolved 31:44.559 --> 31:47.019 with this integrative fighting force. 31:47.019 --> 31:50.521 The question is, can we get an architecture in the future 31:50.521 --> 31:53.266 that results in an infinite number of CEMs 31:53.266 --> 31:56.270 where we have these fast-joining partners, 31:56.270 --> 31:58.473 these nodes that are able to have 31:58.473 --> 32:00.287 better battle space awareness 32:00.287 --> 32:04.120 and better massed effects in the future fight? 32:05.815 --> 32:07.542 It is, as I said, a disciplined 32:07.542 --> 32:09.165 systems engineering approach 32:09.165 --> 32:10.799 that extends beyond just technology. 32:10.799 --> 32:12.702 Technology is gonna be critical 32:12.702 --> 32:15.510 but there's these other aspects of it, 32:15.510 --> 32:18.237 these cognitive domain, more decision time 32:18.237 --> 32:19.907 given in the hands of our war fighters 32:19.907 --> 32:23.490 that are central to this operating concept. 32:23.787 --> 32:26.902 One of the challenges as we look at technology is 32:26.902 --> 32:28.721 sort of this very steep part 32:28.721 --> 32:30.812 of the curve we're on right now where 32:30.812 --> 32:32.942 Apple develops a new iPhone 7 32:32.942 --> 32:34.343 and it's only six months later 32:34.343 --> 32:36.548 before Samsung is able to jump to the same hoops 32:36.548 --> 32:38.152 and do the same tricks. 32:38.152 --> 32:41.571 And so, whereas in the past with technological advances, 32:41.571 --> 32:43.474 we could buy a decade or two 32:43.474 --> 32:45.509 of superiority against an adversary, 32:45.509 --> 32:49.676 that's just not gonna be the case as we move forward. 32:49.752 --> 32:52.363 But one of these asymmetric advantages we have 32:52.363 --> 32:54.904 is how we integrate the pieces together 32:54.904 --> 32:58.319 that are greater and stronger than some of the parts. 32:58.319 --> 33:00.976 And that's what's behind this operating concept 33:00.976 --> 33:02.170 as we go forward. 33:02.170 --> 33:05.676 Thanks Jon for keeping us at the right level. 33:05.676 --> 33:08.150 You didn't blow me away with some of the geek speak 33:08.150 --> 33:11.650 and I really appreciate your presentation. 33:11.856 --> 33:16.023 Our third speaker this morning is Admiral Mike Manazir. 33:16.048 --> 33:18.209 When you're asked to be a moderator of a panel, 33:18.209 --> 33:21.292 you quickly reach out to your friends 33:21.874 --> 33:25.541 and Nasty and I have been partners in crime, 33:26.150 --> 33:27.650 long time friends. 33:27.715 --> 33:31.048 We fought many a battle in the Pentagon. 33:31.866 --> 33:34.600 I see Admiral Terry Blake docking in the background. 33:34.600 --> 33:37.600 We're sort of Blake-trained converts 33:37.858 --> 33:41.363 and so if you really don't like this round table 33:41.363 --> 33:45.530 please see Retired Admiral Terry after our session. 33:46.882 --> 33:49.178 Nasty is a combat-proven naval aviator 33:49.178 --> 33:50.907 intimately familiar with the complexities 33:50.907 --> 33:52.785 of naval operations at the tactical, 33:52.785 --> 33:55.172 operational and strategic level. 33:55.172 --> 33:56.547 He's commanded a squadron, 33:56.547 --> 33:59.252 a deep draft auxiliary aircraft carrier 33:59.252 --> 34:00.832 and a Carrier Strike Group. 34:00.832 --> 34:02.609 He's an expert in the training 34:02.609 --> 34:04.996 and operational employment of ships and aircraft. 34:04.996 --> 34:07.826 More significantly, he's an expert at leading our sailors 34:07.826 --> 34:09.981 at the point end of the spear. 34:09.981 --> 34:13.292 Most recently, he has been advanced to become 34:13.292 --> 34:16.001 the newly appointed Director of Warfare Systems, 34:16.001 --> 34:18.751 the new OPNAV N9 in the Pentagon, 34:19.284 --> 34:21.037 probably one of the most influential 34:21.037 --> 34:24.058 deputy CNO positions in the building. 34:24.058 --> 34:25.840 And a right hand man to the CNO 34:25.840 --> 34:27.757 to realize this future. 34:28.084 --> 34:30.643 To make sure that we're doing the right things today 34:30.643 --> 34:32.674 with experimentation, exercises 34:32.674 --> 34:34.764 and developing and delivering capability 34:34.764 --> 34:37.050 in the hands of our war fighters now, 34:37.050 --> 34:39.471 as well as the right investments for the future. 34:39.471 --> 34:42.009 To increase the nodes, manned and unmanned, 34:42.009 --> 34:44.150 to have this knitting architecture 34:44.150 --> 34:45.734 that meshes them together 34:45.734 --> 34:49.151 into this cooperative, integrated manner. 34:49.171 --> 34:51.312 Ladies and gentlemen, it brings, 34:51.312 --> 34:53.297 gives me great pleasure to introduce to you 34:53.297 --> 34:55.047 Admiral Mike Manazir. 34:55.156 --> 34:56.323 - Thanks, Rick. 34:56.323 --> 34:58.309 Real honor to be here on this panel today. 34:58.309 --> 35:02.123 I'm humbled by the intellect that surrounds me. 35:02.123 --> 35:03.515 I'm a fighter pilot, a fighter pilot 35:03.515 --> 35:06.481 with a little bit of knowledge is very dangerous. 35:06.481 --> 35:09.214 Luckily Navy Nuclear Power trained me to ask 35:09.214 --> 35:13.381 the right questions and so I do a lot of question asking. 35:13.602 --> 35:15.967 The panel today I was particularly energized as well 35:15.967 --> 35:17.967 by the dinner last night 35:18.091 --> 35:20.637 where we sat around and debated back and forth, 35:20.637 --> 35:23.349 the coalescence of ideas that General Flynn started, 35:23.349 --> 35:25.237 that Jon Hill just talked about, 35:25.237 --> 35:27.592 and that J.D. is gonna challenge with at the end here 35:27.592 --> 35:30.352 is the kind of dialogue we need to have. 35:30.352 --> 35:32.539 There are four forces that we must face 35:32.539 --> 35:34.776 in this truly competitive world. 35:34.776 --> 35:36.252 Rick started to talk about them 35:36.252 --> 35:39.289 but the force of globalization, world trade flows 35:39.289 --> 35:41.539 are in our maritime domain. 35:42.036 --> 35:45.119 95% of American internet traffic 35:45.438 --> 35:47.605 is on under seabed cables. 35:48.094 --> 35:50.546 It is clear that 90% of our trade 35:50.546 --> 35:52.436 goes across at sea so this domain 35:52.436 --> 35:55.603 is one in which the Navy must continue 35:55.623 --> 35:58.742 to be able to operate where it matters, when it matters. 35:58.742 --> 36:02.214 The information flow that comes with globalization, 36:02.214 --> 36:06.381 information such that the information developed everyday. 36:07.087 --> 36:10.045 IBM says 2.5 quintillion bytes of data 36:10.045 --> 36:12.116 developed everyday means that 36:12.116 --> 36:14.768 90% of the data in the world today running around 36:14.768 --> 36:17.509 was created in the last two years alone. 36:17.509 --> 36:20.660 That information technology is digital, 36:20.660 --> 36:22.509 exponential and combinatorial. 36:22.509 --> 36:25.824 How do we grab ahold of that information piece? 36:25.824 --> 36:27.919 And then the speed of technology. 36:27.919 --> 36:31.919 As technology gets faster and better and smaller 36:32.125 --> 36:34.896 and the swat sea that goes into putting systems out there 36:34.896 --> 36:36.193 it gets better and better, 36:36.193 --> 36:37.636 how do we innovate in those systems 36:37.636 --> 36:39.747 that Jon Hill just talked about 36:39.747 --> 36:42.967 to get what we need in his geek charts, 36:42.967 --> 36:46.050 to get the war fighting capability to 36:46.828 --> 36:48.245 track the threat? 36:48.367 --> 36:51.934 And then the fourth force we have is our budget. 36:51.934 --> 36:54.530 We can no longer continue to acquire weapon systems 36:54.530 --> 36:57.363 like we have in the last 15 years. 36:57.831 --> 37:00.081 Our budgets are going down, 37:00.713 --> 37:03.796 the cost of our programs are going up 37:03.817 --> 37:06.055 and the threat is taking advantage 37:06.055 --> 37:08.150 of those information flows and technology 37:08.150 --> 37:09.900 to try to outpace us. 37:10.338 --> 37:13.755 Our program today with about $2.5 billion 37:14.555 --> 37:18.222 less each year than PB-14 is a PB-14 program 37:19.741 --> 37:22.368 and we're trying to buy a PB-14 program 37:22.368 --> 37:25.922 with a PB-17 budget and all that goes with it. 37:25.922 --> 37:28.626 As the cost come up, the budget goes down 37:28.626 --> 37:30.358 and the requirement for our war fighting 37:30.358 --> 37:32.965 capability and capacity continues 37:32.965 --> 37:34.530 to exceed our dollars, 37:34.530 --> 37:36.863 how do we think differently? 37:37.347 --> 37:39.784 And so listed up here are focal points 37:39.784 --> 37:42.117 that I like to use in the 98 37:42.375 --> 37:44.514 and then now into the nine about how we fight. 37:44.514 --> 37:46.964 They are not platform-specific. 37:46.964 --> 37:49.964 I'm very happy with the conversation 37:50.810 --> 37:52.046 we've had already this morning, 37:52.046 --> 37:55.130 at least the monologues that have come to you 37:55.130 --> 37:57.595 with Jon Hill going into the what 37:57.595 --> 37:58.524 that we're doing out there, 37:58.524 --> 38:00.864 cooperative engagement modes. 38:00.864 --> 38:02.289 What we're doing in the nine though 38:02.289 --> 38:03.775 is trying to determine how 38:03.775 --> 38:06.725 you put these capabilities unto the battle space. 38:06.725 --> 38:10.405 We must innovate, experiment and do demonstrations 38:10.405 --> 38:13.125 that continue into incubator units 38:13.125 --> 38:14.792 more than we do now. 38:15.254 --> 38:18.950 We must fail and understand what that failure gains us. 38:18.950 --> 38:20.287 Test a little, learn a lot, 38:20.287 --> 38:21.820 fail on the way to the war fighter. 38:21.820 --> 38:23.479 Where we can't fail is that the leading edge 38:23.479 --> 38:24.896 of the war fight. 38:25.448 --> 38:27.832 We can't give the war fighter a technology 38:27.832 --> 38:31.371 that then fails when they try to go use that. 38:31.371 --> 38:33.621 We have to fail on the way. 38:33.828 --> 38:36.842 But you and I both know in the government industry, 38:36.842 --> 38:40.592 academia, congressional dialogue that we have 38:41.636 --> 38:43.730 that people don't like failure. 38:43.730 --> 38:46.431 If we spend millions of dollars against a study 38:46.431 --> 38:47.836 and it ultimately fails, 38:47.836 --> 38:49.115 well, that money was a waste. 38:49.115 --> 38:51.792 I'd argue whether it was not a waste. 38:51.792 --> 38:54.798 What do we do with the X-47B unmanned system 38:54.798 --> 38:55.983 that landed on aircraft carrier 38:55.983 --> 38:58.381 and demonstrated how we refuel? 38:58.381 --> 39:01.223 If we stopped using that, is that a failure? 39:01.223 --> 39:03.250 We could say it's an opportunity cost 39:03.250 --> 39:05.250 we should be looking at. 39:06.304 --> 39:07.889 It's an advantage but we learned a lot 39:07.889 --> 39:09.429 about unmanned coming off of a carrier, 39:09.429 --> 39:10.929 how do we do that? 39:10.995 --> 39:12.663 We got to accelerate that innovation loop. 39:12.663 --> 39:15.219 I have a program of record that's proceeding. 39:15.219 --> 39:17.136 It's based on DoD 5000. 39:17.232 --> 39:20.166 It's based on a JCIDS requirements basis. 39:20.166 --> 39:23.749 How do I then innovate inside that program? 39:25.312 --> 39:27.729 IBM's computer Watson in 2011 39:28.124 --> 39:30.501 beat a couple of champions in jeopardy 39:30.501 --> 39:34.251 and at that time it was 10 refrigerators big. 39:36.124 --> 39:39.952 Today, Watson is the size of three pizza boxes 39:39.952 --> 39:42.035 and is 2700% faster. 39:43.566 --> 39:45.539 We have a ship self defense system 39:45.539 --> 39:47.913 that's on installed on our Nimitz-class carriers 39:47.913 --> 39:50.746 that's a size of 10 refrigerators. 39:51.046 --> 39:52.840 There is technology down right now 39:52.840 --> 39:55.178 that I can take a box that is 39:55.178 --> 39:57.252 well, about the size of that podium right there 39:57.252 --> 40:00.591 and replicate the information capability, 40:00.591 --> 40:03.460 the digital capability on our carriers 40:03.460 --> 40:04.894 and on our ships for SSDS. 40:04.894 --> 40:05.840 But we're not acquiring that 40:05.840 --> 40:08.080 because that's not the program of record. 40:08.080 --> 40:11.345 How do I take advantage of the technology advances 40:11.345 --> 40:12.480 that we all see out there, 40:12.480 --> 40:14.495 and roll them into programs that I have right now? 40:14.495 --> 40:16.214 If I go to the acquisition community and say, 40:16.214 --> 40:18.044 "I would like to have that," 40:18.044 --> 40:19.115 they'll come back to me and say, 40:19.115 --> 40:22.168 "Well, accordance with this DoD 5000, 40:22.168 --> 40:23.550 "you need a new set of requirements." 40:23.550 --> 40:25.888 We don't have a requirement to be that size. 40:25.888 --> 40:28.838 How do I innovate while I already have 40:28.838 --> 40:30.092 a program of record? 40:30.092 --> 40:31.158 That's a challenge we have. 40:31.158 --> 40:33.175 We have to do a systems to systems approach. 40:33.175 --> 40:35.928 We built an integrated warfare capability 40:35.928 --> 40:37.511 into NAVAIR SYSCOM, 40:37.863 --> 40:41.694 where integration interoperability is the coin of the realm. 40:41.694 --> 40:44.319 As you know, we have delivered weapon systems, 40:44.319 --> 40:47.069 AEGIS and SM6 and airplane system 40:48.735 --> 40:50.338 and they didn't talk to each other very well. 40:50.338 --> 40:51.753 And in fact, we had a bunch of baselines 40:51.753 --> 40:53.836 in many of these systems. 40:54.092 --> 40:55.348 We have recently realized 40:55.348 --> 40:56.689 that we need to align those systems 40:56.689 --> 40:58.787 so we can do integration interoperability 40:58.787 --> 41:00.522 to do the cooperative engagement modes 41:00.522 --> 41:02.359 that Jon just talked about. 41:02.359 --> 41:03.698 It is an engineering challenge 41:03.698 --> 41:06.635 to take a Boeing product in the front of an F-18 41:06.635 --> 41:08.684 and align it with a Northrop Grumman product 41:08.684 --> 41:09.737 in the back of an E-2 41:09.737 --> 41:11.083 so they get a weapons quality track 41:11.083 --> 41:13.083 shared across a network. 41:13.088 --> 41:15.597 And right now our network is based on Link 16 technology 41:15.597 --> 41:16.956 and all of you know what the limitations 41:16.956 --> 41:19.216 of that Link 16 network technology are, 41:19.216 --> 41:20.836 so we need a higher waveform. 41:20.836 --> 41:22.575 If we develop a new waveform 41:22.575 --> 41:23.859 how do you then take that information 41:23.859 --> 41:26.525 and put it on top of the new waveform? 41:26.525 --> 41:28.115 Well, we have to be able to do that 41:28.115 --> 41:30.137 to track the technology advances 41:30.137 --> 41:32.636 that are being made by many of you. 41:32.636 --> 41:34.570 And I have to figure out a way to afford them 41:34.570 --> 41:36.820 with a budget that we have. 41:37.068 --> 41:39.650 Interoperability is the key to the kill chain mindset 41:39.650 --> 41:42.983 but there's a way to do these kill chains. 41:42.983 --> 41:44.710 The line there that says independent 41:44.710 --> 41:47.134 all the way to interdependent. 41:47.134 --> 41:48.551 I flew a Tomcat a long time ago 41:48.551 --> 41:50.626 and I had an AWG-9 radar, a Phoenix Missile, 41:50.626 --> 41:52.523 a RIO in the back telling me where to go 41:52.523 --> 41:55.874 and I had a target out in front of me I was gonna shoot. 41:55.874 --> 41:56.998 When I gained that information 41:56.998 --> 41:58.930 I pulled the trigger and shot the Phoenix of that target, 41:58.930 --> 42:01.533 that was my independent kill chain. 42:01.533 --> 42:04.790 I go fly a Super Hornet, I'm getting Link 16 data from 42:04.790 --> 42:06.835 another airplane next to me. 42:06.835 --> 42:09.326 He's giving me weapons quality tracks. 42:09.326 --> 42:11.222 The cooperative engagement modes that Jon talked about 42:11.222 --> 42:14.691 means I can share data between shooters and sensors 42:14.691 --> 42:16.876 such that I can put a system together 42:16.876 --> 42:19.757 that is just independent kill chain. 42:19.757 --> 42:21.157 If you integrate something though, 42:21.157 --> 42:23.969 there is a chance when you pull apart the integration, 42:23.969 --> 42:25.425 a piece of that integration 42:25.425 --> 42:26.709 that the system will come apart. 42:26.709 --> 42:29.009 If it's interdependent that means that 42:29.009 --> 42:31.136 the system is put together interdependently. 42:31.136 --> 42:33.945 If you pull it apart it will not work. 42:33.945 --> 42:35.635 We have to be able to go across, 42:35.635 --> 42:36.990 that's why the double arrows are there. 42:36.990 --> 42:39.057 How do I keep an independent kill chain 42:39.057 --> 42:40.534 where I can roll in on something 42:40.534 --> 42:42.171 with a weapon on my airplane 42:42.171 --> 42:45.868 or shoot something within visual range of my LCS, 42:45.868 --> 42:48.281 but also be able to provide information up into the grid 42:48.281 --> 42:49.720 so that somebody else can take advantage 42:49.720 --> 42:51.637 of that targeting data? 42:52.682 --> 42:56.212 How do I turn a kill chain into a kill web? 42:56.212 --> 42:59.190 If you picture an air to air kill chain up here, 42:59.190 --> 43:00.863 we'll just do it geographically 43:00.863 --> 43:04.960 and you picture a surface to surface kill chain across here 43:04.960 --> 43:07.878 and then you picture an undersea surface kill chain. 43:07.878 --> 43:10.711 What if I start to draw lines between the sensors, 43:10.711 --> 43:13.044 the weapons and the shooters 43:13.089 --> 43:15.218 in those different domains? 43:15.218 --> 43:16.911 And I draw a line from the air 43:16.911 --> 43:18.917 down into the subsurface. 43:18.917 --> 43:21.084 You saw a picture of a P-3 43:21.181 --> 43:24.895 showing surface track data back down to a blue shooter. 43:24.895 --> 43:26.197 When you start to connect those lines 43:26.197 --> 43:27.432 you don't have a kill chain anymore, 43:27.432 --> 43:29.099 you have a kill web. 43:29.308 --> 43:31.600 And if we can connect those nodes together, 43:31.600 --> 43:33.931 now you have a resilient kill web 43:33.931 --> 43:36.243 that we can use to target different entities 43:36.243 --> 43:39.167 to be able to share data across advanced networks, 43:39.167 --> 43:43.000 and to be able to make our information problem 43:43.552 --> 43:46.885 better for us and worst for the bad guy. 43:48.469 --> 43:50.044 In order for us down on the bottom 43:50.044 --> 43:52.794 live, virtual, constructive, LVC, 43:53.499 --> 43:55.493 we've been live, virtual, constructive 43:55.493 --> 43:59.660 type of operations in testing for a long, long time. 43:59.975 --> 44:01.128 Our advanced capabilities 44:01.128 --> 44:02.507 before we send it out to the war fighter, 44:02.507 --> 44:05.090 we go on ranges and we use some 44:06.048 --> 44:08.950 simulated immersion constructive scenarios 44:08.950 --> 44:12.117 to be able to deliver high capability, 44:13.141 --> 44:15.700 high end capabilities to the war fighter. 44:15.700 --> 44:17.888 Fifth generation capabilities. 44:17.888 --> 44:20.357 We also need to migrate those to our training mindset. 44:20.357 --> 44:22.755 Right now have the ability to link 44:22.755 --> 44:26.045 simulators together in a high end constructive fight. 44:26.045 --> 44:28.042 I can do live constructive pairing 44:28.042 --> 44:31.335 where I can do a constructive simulation 44:31.335 --> 44:33.915 onto the displays of an airplane flying live 44:33.915 --> 44:37.129 and simulate for that pilot flying a live airplane 44:37.129 --> 44:39.854 that he or she has high end surface air threat, 44:39.854 --> 44:41.959 high end air to air threat. 44:41.959 --> 44:44.918 And if I can share sensitive compartment data 44:44.918 --> 44:47.982 down from a live airplane through an NSA-certified wave form 44:47.982 --> 44:51.257 to a ground facility which we are working on right now, 44:51.257 --> 44:54.669 I can now have a live airplane on the range 44:54.669 --> 44:56.778 flying with a simulated wingman 44:56.778 --> 45:00.411 who's in a simulator down in the facility down there. 45:00.411 --> 45:02.244 This type of training, 45:02.606 --> 45:05.059 this ability to connect all of our 45:05.059 --> 45:08.082 systems across an open architecture construct 45:08.082 --> 45:09.959 will give us the ability to extend 45:09.959 --> 45:12.404 the geographic capabilities of our ranges, 45:12.404 --> 45:14.256 and will also allow us to train to the high end, 45:14.256 --> 45:15.683 and we have to get after this for training. 45:15.683 --> 45:16.600 Next slide. 45:18.670 --> 45:20.638 I have three fifth generation questions 45:20.638 --> 45:22.197 that I think about. 45:22.197 --> 45:24.540 It's not just fifth generation platforms 45:24.540 --> 45:25.935 like the joint strike fighter 45:25.935 --> 45:29.396 with stealth and the ability to fuse data. 45:29.396 --> 45:31.443 It is all of the ability to fight 45:31.443 --> 45:34.026 in an informationicized domain. 45:35.348 --> 45:37.012 How do you do air dominance? 45:37.012 --> 45:38.765 I would argue with you, we can't do 45:38.765 --> 45:42.265 air dominance anymore in a high end fight. 45:43.050 --> 45:44.602 The verb "to dominate" means 45:44.602 --> 45:46.009 that you own the entire space 45:46.009 --> 45:47.491 and I think that our competitors 45:47.491 --> 45:49.119 just are not gonna allow us to do that. 45:49.119 --> 45:53.182 You have to establish local and temporal air superiority, 45:53.182 --> 45:55.538 you have to establish when you need to do 45:55.538 --> 45:56.793 the mission in the air 45:56.793 --> 45:58.511 at the time and place of your choosing, 45:58.511 --> 46:01.053 and then be able to then withdraw. 46:01.053 --> 46:02.342 We've got to move from a linear type 46:02.342 --> 46:04.004 of war fighting to high tempo. 46:04.004 --> 46:07.748 We have to make the effects happen across those kill webs. 46:07.748 --> 46:09.597 It has to be networks and capabilities, 46:09.597 --> 46:11.863 not just the platforms we're fielding. 46:11.863 --> 46:14.941 I focus on capabilities, not platforms. 46:14.941 --> 46:17.922 I don't as much care about buy me this many JSFs 46:17.922 --> 46:19.002 or this many Super Hornets 46:19.002 --> 46:20.934 or this many littoral combat ships, 46:20.934 --> 46:23.204 or this many DDG Flight II's. 46:23.204 --> 46:25.774 It's what are we gonna do to connect those platforms 46:25.774 --> 46:26.995 and then ultimately get back to 46:26.995 --> 46:29.246 the platforms that we would buy? 46:29.246 --> 46:31.165 People complain that the range of our aircraft now 46:31.165 --> 46:33.068 has gotten shorter than they were before 46:33.068 --> 46:35.165 and therefore, we're not as good as we were before. 46:35.165 --> 46:37.129 I'll argue with you that's the reach of the network, 46:37.129 --> 46:40.173 not the range of the airplanes that makes sense. 46:40.173 --> 46:42.583 If we can capitalize on the range of the network 46:42.583 --> 46:44.940 with weapons and sensors and nodes, 46:44.940 --> 46:46.159 and use those airplanes, 46:46.159 --> 46:48.392 we're optimized for the range 46:48.392 --> 46:50.252 of each individual type model series 46:50.252 --> 46:52.247 you will get a better effect. 46:52.247 --> 46:53.804 And again, we talked about information, 46:53.804 --> 46:56.536 we talked about live, virtual constructive. 46:56.536 --> 46:59.556 I have become a fan of John Boyd's OODA Loop. 46:59.556 --> 47:01.806 It's a cliche, I know that. 47:01.878 --> 47:03.844 The OODA Loop itself is the cliche 47:03.844 --> 47:05.571 as I'm inside of the decision speed 47:05.571 --> 47:08.427 but everything that goes into orienting yourself 47:08.427 --> 47:11.677 is what's most important to this fight. 47:11.701 --> 47:13.534 The orientation phase. 47:13.631 --> 47:15.233 (buzzes) 47:15.233 --> 47:16.066 Wow. 47:16.399 --> 47:17.866 - [Rick] Two more minutes. - [Mike] I got two minutes. 47:17.866 --> 47:18.960 - [Rick] Keep going, two minutes. 47:18.960 --> 47:21.120 - First guy, to exceed the time limit, 47:21.120 --> 47:25.203 now I know it happens and it just shocks you too. 47:25.505 --> 47:29.672 We talk about unmanned is where my head is on OODA Loop. 47:30.179 --> 47:32.357 People say you need an unmanned platform. 47:32.357 --> 47:33.762 Okay, to do what? 47:33.762 --> 47:36.412 Well, it's survive and you don't fly the human, 47:36.412 --> 47:37.662 da da da da da. 47:37.696 --> 47:39.244 When I think about unmanned, I think about machines, 47:39.244 --> 47:40.250 man-machine teaming. 47:40.250 --> 47:42.361 What if we could have the machine 47:42.361 --> 47:44.534 do the OO part of the OODA Loop? 47:44.534 --> 47:46.865 The machine, that machine speed can orient for you. 47:46.865 --> 47:48.500 We by static all the machines 47:48.500 --> 47:50.171 and the nodes that are in the air. 47:50.171 --> 47:53.588 That machine gives you SA on your SA page 47:54.214 --> 47:56.381 or in TFCC in the carrier. 47:57.708 --> 47:59.958 If the machine is doing OO, 48:00.439 --> 48:03.042 then the man is doing the DA part. 48:03.042 --> 48:04.757 The algorithm for AlphaGo was just developed 48:04.757 --> 48:08.273 and beat the Korean that is the champion at the game Go. 48:08.273 --> 48:10.606 Go has 10 to the 270th moves 48:11.441 --> 48:15.608 so there were neural networks put into that algorithm 48:16.161 --> 48:17.710 but the machine also learned 48:17.710 --> 48:19.817 through a bunch of games that a human had played 48:19.817 --> 48:22.929 so it took man-machine teaming inside of that machine 48:22.929 --> 48:24.686 to get to a better result. 48:24.686 --> 48:26.734 If we put man-machine teaming in there, 48:26.734 --> 48:28.663 we will get to what the OODA Loop 48:28.663 --> 48:30.996 actually wants us to get to. 48:31.402 --> 48:33.999 At the bottom, how do we turn a kill chain into a kill web? 48:33.999 --> 48:35.603 That's what I'm after. 48:35.603 --> 48:37.358 And as we look forward to buying our platforms, 48:37.358 --> 48:39.227 we have to figure out how to buy them differently 48:39.227 --> 48:40.834 so we get to these kind of capabilities. 48:40.834 --> 48:41.667 Thank you. 48:43.211 --> 48:45.961 - All right, great. Thanks Nasty. 48:46.281 --> 48:48.166 We're still on schedule J.D., 48:48.166 --> 48:50.572 so unlike our prediction last night, 48:50.572 --> 48:52.578 you will get your full time. 48:52.578 --> 48:54.293 Our final speaker, J.D. McCreary 48:54.293 --> 48:56.793 is the Chief of Disruptive Technology Programs 48:56.793 --> 48:59.351 at Georgia Tech Research Institute, 48:59.351 --> 49:01.382 and every round table needs a strong closer, 49:01.382 --> 49:03.736 much like the Boston Red Sox to succeed, 49:03.736 --> 49:06.403 you need to bring in the closer. 49:06.737 --> 49:08.884 He's the highly regarded subject matter expert 49:08.884 --> 49:10.136 on emerging technology, 49:10.136 --> 49:13.211 specifically in the electromagnetic spectrum. 49:13.211 --> 49:16.116 He had served 20 years as an EA-6B Prowler 49:16.116 --> 49:17.597 electronic counter measure officer 49:17.597 --> 49:20.899 with combat flight in operational experience. 49:20.899 --> 49:23.262 He was pivotal in the 2006 establishment 49:23.262 --> 49:24.982 of the counter radio controlled 49:24.982 --> 49:29.065 improvised explosive device combat support units. 49:29.677 --> 49:31.204 The training and equipping ground forces 49:31.204 --> 49:32.540 with the most capable assets 49:32.540 --> 49:36.040 to counter the growing IED threat in Iraq. 49:37.028 --> 49:40.113 As a Red Team lead for an OSD technology task force, 49:40.113 --> 49:43.610 he outlined linkages between emerging technology trends 49:43.610 --> 49:47.110 and US economic and education imperatives. 49:47.399 --> 49:48.758 He is a technical expert 49:48.758 --> 49:50.325 in the field of emerging technologies, 49:50.325 --> 49:53.262 man-machine teaming, reconfigurability, 49:53.262 --> 49:55.443 cloud, mobile and digital wireless 49:55.443 --> 49:57.579 and its impact to national security 49:57.579 --> 49:59.339 and commercial access. 49:59.339 --> 50:02.339 Ladies and gentlemen, J.D. McCreary. 50:03.429 --> 50:05.596 - Everybody still with me? 50:07.296 --> 50:10.535 I'm gonna take a little bit different spin. 50:10.535 --> 50:12.452 I want to talk about... 50:12.490 --> 50:14.705 Everything they said is terrific, 50:14.705 --> 50:18.872 if some of you folks went to the IW session before this, 50:19.391 --> 50:21.863 I'm gonna point out some things that I observed. 50:21.863 --> 50:23.959 Obviously maneuver in all domains, right? 50:23.959 --> 50:27.757 Is EMS gonna be a domain? We'll talk about that. 50:27.757 --> 50:30.523 Not necessarily just defend our networks, 50:30.523 --> 50:33.109 network is a weapon system itself. 50:33.109 --> 50:34.422 Technology as a terrain, 50:34.422 --> 50:35.727 Admiral Tide talked about that. 50:35.727 --> 50:37.728 What does that mean and how do we visualize that? 50:37.728 --> 50:41.561 How do we operate in that kind of environment? 50:42.026 --> 50:43.801 Admiral Norton reiterated something 50:43.801 --> 50:45.691 that's very important to the CNO, all right. 50:45.691 --> 50:48.902 We need to be experts at not going to war, right? 50:48.902 --> 50:51.535 And so non-kinetics are gonna play a key role in that 50:51.535 --> 50:53.103 in phase zero, phase one. 50:53.103 --> 50:55.312 We don't want to go to phase two, three, right? 50:55.312 --> 50:57.703 We have a responsibility, we. 50:57.703 --> 51:00.244 The DoD has a responsibility to win the wars 51:00.244 --> 51:01.994 that it's tasked with 51:02.008 --> 51:04.075 but hopefully we never get to that, right? 51:04.075 --> 51:06.164 And so can we do non-kinetics 51:06.164 --> 51:08.322 in the early stages to dissuade, deter, 51:08.322 --> 51:12.444 introduce doubts and maybe even escalate to de-escalate? 51:12.444 --> 51:14.694 How do we think about that? 51:15.883 --> 51:19.300 CYBERCOM talked about enabling operations 51:19.934 --> 51:22.755 and obviously it's very challenging 51:22.755 --> 51:24.922 to talk about non-kinetics 51:25.299 --> 51:27.531 in an unclassified environment, 51:27.531 --> 51:29.019 and so I'm not gonna talk about 51:29.019 --> 51:31.021 Cyber EW operations per se 51:31.021 --> 51:35.188 but what is it gonna take for us to do that successfully. 51:36.531 --> 51:38.031 Next slide please. 51:40.697 --> 51:42.689 All right, so it's really about 51:42.689 --> 51:45.022 what's the future look like? 51:45.304 --> 51:47.528 We can't think about a future force 51:47.528 --> 51:49.744 without understanding the future environment, 51:49.744 --> 51:52.525 and the future environment is today. 51:52.525 --> 51:54.775 When we talk as a military, 51:54.862 --> 51:56.776 we tend to think about ships and tanks 51:56.776 --> 52:00.108 and satellites and what does our force structure look like 52:00.108 --> 52:03.191 to do the six war fighting functions? 52:03.617 --> 52:05.205 And then you take the uniform off 52:05.205 --> 52:07.313 and you go home and your kids 52:07.313 --> 52:10.248 are in a totally different technology environment, right? 52:10.248 --> 52:13.140 Or you look at the TV and you look at 52:13.140 --> 52:15.993 we're boiling the frog, we resist robotics 52:15.993 --> 52:17.753 and we resist artificial intelligence 52:17.753 --> 52:20.279 because it's scary and look at all the Western movies. 52:20.279 --> 52:21.810 It's always a disaster. 52:21.810 --> 52:24.290 And yet, you're starting to drive cars 52:24.290 --> 52:26.063 that are highly intelligent 52:26.063 --> 52:28.580 with hundreds of networks inside of them. 52:28.580 --> 52:31.163 And automatic we went from ABS, 52:31.718 --> 52:33.012 you're not a very good braker 52:33.012 --> 52:34.708 so I'm gonna help you figure that out. 52:34.708 --> 52:35.991 To you're really not a good braker, 52:35.991 --> 52:37.263 I'm just gonna do it for you. 52:37.263 --> 52:39.130 I don't care if your foot's on it or not 52:39.130 --> 52:42.498 so I'm gonna park it, so I'm gonna avoid collisions. 52:42.498 --> 52:44.438 We're almost in a driverless car, 52:44.438 --> 52:46.929 we've just slowly boiled the frog to do that, right? 52:46.929 --> 52:48.413 And so we embrace that. 52:48.413 --> 52:51.913 How do we embrace that in our environment, 52:52.058 --> 52:53.231 in our culture? 52:53.231 --> 52:54.765 How do we get people to think that 52:54.765 --> 52:56.188 I'm not gonna be replaced? 52:56.188 --> 52:58.684 Man-machine teaming is actually, 52:58.684 --> 53:00.156 as Admiral Hill talked about 53:00.156 --> 53:02.040 and as Admiral Manazir talked about, 53:02.040 --> 53:03.873 it is about the human. 53:03.914 --> 53:05.672 But how we're operating 53:05.672 --> 53:07.882 in more and more complex environments 53:07.882 --> 53:12.049 and how do we actually leverage the value of the human being 53:12.363 --> 53:15.716 and offload certain things to intelligence, 53:15.716 --> 53:17.383 intelligent systems? 53:18.234 --> 53:19.067 And we have to recognize 53:19.067 --> 53:22.832 that our adversaries are already there, right? 53:22.832 --> 53:25.915 We in our doctrine don't really value 53:27.113 --> 53:30.098 until very recently non-kinetic effects. 53:30.098 --> 53:31.588 As a Prowler guy, I was always 53:31.588 --> 53:33.421 hey you know, go away. 53:34.141 --> 53:35.259 You're bothering me kid. 53:35.259 --> 53:37.119 You're making it really bothersome for me 53:37.119 --> 53:39.815 to do my training because you're jamming my links, 53:39.815 --> 53:41.423 you're jamming my COMs. 53:41.423 --> 53:43.423 That's the point, right? 53:44.039 --> 53:47.294 Non-kinetics can make it really painful to operate 53:47.294 --> 53:48.894 and we have to acknowledge that 53:48.894 --> 53:50.548 and train in that environment. 53:50.548 --> 53:52.978 If you look to the press reports 53:52.978 --> 53:55.675 about what's happening in Ukraine, 53:55.675 --> 53:58.269 Russia has a deep and established 53:58.269 --> 54:01.269 from World War II doctrine that says 54:02.078 --> 54:05.279 radio electronic combat now to include cyber warfare 54:05.279 --> 54:07.660 is integral to all their operations, 54:07.660 --> 54:11.827 and they were the opening salvos in Ukraine, right? 54:11.940 --> 54:14.169 They attacked lots and lots of systems 54:14.169 --> 54:16.564 and they enabled kinetic operations 54:16.564 --> 54:18.897 through the key use of cyber 54:19.540 --> 54:21.653 and electronic warfare capabilities. 54:21.653 --> 54:24.041 China integrated network and electronic warfare 54:24.041 --> 54:26.711 has been talking about what does this mean 54:26.711 --> 54:29.046 and how do we take it to the adversary. 54:29.046 --> 54:33.050 They understand our dependence on the EMS, right? 54:33.050 --> 54:35.300 2009 integrated capability, 54:36.783 --> 54:38.954 an initial capability document was signed 54:38.954 --> 54:40.287 by the chairman. 54:42.178 --> 54:45.011 That talks about what does it take 54:47.219 --> 54:50.383 to advance our ability to leverage the EMS 54:50.383 --> 54:52.677 and deny the adversary the use of that. 54:52.677 --> 54:54.093 And we start talking about contested 54:54.093 --> 54:55.836 and congested environments. 54:55.836 --> 54:58.421 Well, that contested and congested 54:58.421 --> 55:00.269 is not just the adversary trying to 55:00.269 --> 55:01.716 impose their will upon us, 55:01.716 --> 55:03.341 it's the commercial world, right? 55:03.341 --> 55:06.155 Technology convergence, a lot of people get uncomfortable 55:06.155 --> 55:08.242 with the term cyber EW convergence. 55:08.242 --> 55:10.256 I actually helped coin that 55:10.256 --> 55:11.563 and what we meant by it 55:11.563 --> 55:13.531 when we were drawing on that whiteboard 55:13.531 --> 55:15.454 is the intersection of technologies 55:15.454 --> 55:17.205 and mobile wireless digital, 55:17.205 --> 55:20.288 and how that suddenly enables wire... 55:21.232 --> 55:22.809 We used to think about cyber as wired 55:22.809 --> 55:25.263 and going after desktop computers. 55:25.263 --> 55:27.812 And well now, a ship, a satellite, a plane 55:27.812 --> 55:29.242 is not trailing a wire 55:29.242 --> 55:32.070 but it is highly dependent on the EMS, 55:32.070 --> 55:33.529 and that affords you opportunities 55:33.529 --> 55:35.219 to different kinds of networks. 55:35.219 --> 55:38.263 And so we have to think about that technology terrain 55:38.263 --> 55:40.269 and from a targeting perspective, 55:40.269 --> 55:42.359 what are the key nodes that we want to influence 55:42.359 --> 55:45.391 and how do we introduce doubt in phase zero, phase one? 55:45.391 --> 55:47.517 Well, there's discussion now, 55:47.517 --> 55:48.967 the vice chairman is considering, 55:48.967 --> 55:50.946 is spectrum an additional domain? 55:50.946 --> 55:52.670 Obviously, that will lead to more discussion about 55:52.670 --> 55:54.018 well, is it cyber? 55:54.018 --> 55:55.268 Is it spectrum? 55:55.399 --> 55:56.552 How do we converge these two? 55:56.552 --> 55:58.023 Do we converge these two? 55:58.023 --> 56:00.077 It doesn't really matter, right? 56:00.077 --> 56:02.001 We don't definitively say, 56:02.001 --> 56:03.762 well, air's over here and space 56:03.762 --> 56:07.179 and we're not gonna do anything in between those. 56:07.179 --> 56:08.920 They're all things that we have to think about 56:08.920 --> 56:11.608 leveraging all the capabilities all the time, 56:11.608 --> 56:14.885 and think about the entire information decision cycle 56:14.885 --> 56:17.487 and all the paths to influence that, 56:17.487 --> 56:20.488 whether it's them to us or us to them. 56:20.488 --> 56:22.531 The other thing to understand about that is 56:22.531 --> 56:24.796 the technology environment is 56:24.796 --> 56:27.110 and we hear a lot of about acquisition process, 56:27.110 --> 56:29.693 DoD 5000, how it lags so badly, 56:29.865 --> 56:33.682 how do you inject capabilities, existing program records. 56:33.682 --> 56:37.849 The commercial world is laying out a map for technology 56:38.054 --> 56:39.345 and understanding investment, 56:39.345 --> 56:42.245 why technology is developing is very, very important 56:42.245 --> 56:46.052 for us to understand not just to inject into our systems, 56:46.052 --> 56:47.504 but actually to understand 56:47.504 --> 56:49.623 our future operational environment. 56:49.623 --> 56:51.220 We have to understand, 56:51.220 --> 56:53.160 so this emerging technology Hype Cycle, 56:53.160 --> 56:55.179 the Gartner curves that come out every year, 56:55.179 --> 56:57.762 you can see technology migrate. 56:57.988 --> 57:00.303 And you could overlay that curve 57:00.303 --> 57:03.567 with if anybody's read Innovator's Dilemma 57:03.567 --> 57:07.152 and Crossing the Chasm, the adoption curves, right? 57:07.152 --> 57:08.843 And so, we always want to gain 57:08.843 --> 57:10.718 and maintain military advantages. 57:10.718 --> 57:12.882 To do that you're gonna have to take risks. 57:12.882 --> 57:14.699 You're gonna have to take technology risk. 57:14.699 --> 57:16.105 You're gonna have to understand 57:16.105 --> 57:18.794 where the technology is going in the commercial world 57:18.794 --> 57:20.896 and how you could leverage that 57:20.896 --> 57:24.229 because their R&D eclipses the DoD, R&D, 57:24.269 --> 57:25.313 and we need to figure out 57:25.313 --> 57:26.675 what are the unique things 57:26.675 --> 57:28.461 that the DoD needs to invest, 57:28.461 --> 57:30.019 and how do we figure out lead follow 57:30.019 --> 57:31.598 from an R&D perspective. 57:31.598 --> 57:34.448 Obviously, I'm not here to solve DoD 5000 57:34.448 --> 57:36.615 but even if it's not about 57:37.581 --> 57:39.378 in influencing programs or record, 57:39.378 --> 57:41.906 it's understanding our operational environment 57:41.906 --> 57:44.489 and that disruptive innovation. 57:44.607 --> 57:45.996 I didn't pick my title, 57:45.996 --> 57:47.848 it's disruptive technology programs 57:47.848 --> 57:49.314 If I were to pick it, 57:49.314 --> 57:51.807 I'm much more interested in disruptive innovation. 57:51.807 --> 57:53.993 Because if I go into the medical community, 57:53.993 --> 57:56.098 the under sea mining community, 57:56.098 --> 57:58.020 there's all kinds of communities out there 57:58.020 --> 58:00.146 that have incredible technology. 58:00.146 --> 58:02.858 And it's the convergence of those 58:02.858 --> 58:05.765 and bringing those together disruptively 58:05.765 --> 58:07.680 in ways they were not intended, 58:07.680 --> 58:08.930 ala 2006 RCIDs. 58:11.346 --> 58:13.773 Nobody thought we were gonna be fighting 58:13.773 --> 58:16.273 cellphone-enabled IEDs, right? 58:16.810 --> 58:19.335 That wasn't what we should have been thinking about it 58:19.335 --> 58:20.340 because it was obvious. 58:20.340 --> 58:22.803 In fact, we gave them all that technology 58:22.803 --> 58:25.590 because it was for economic purposes, right? 58:25.590 --> 58:28.119 We wanted them to have an advanced environment. 58:28.119 --> 58:30.502 Well, we gave them that technology, they reversed it. 58:30.502 --> 58:34.185 When you have to be thinking about dual use technologies. 58:34.185 --> 58:36.685 And again, that early adopter. 58:37.134 --> 58:38.370 We've got to take risks. 58:38.370 --> 58:39.639 We have to understand the environment 58:39.639 --> 58:42.490 and take risks if we want to gain those advantages 58:42.490 --> 58:44.501 because the adversary certainly is not, 58:44.501 --> 58:46.215 doesn't have the same restrictions we do. 58:46.215 --> 58:47.132 Next slide. 58:48.662 --> 58:49.771 All right, so everybody has to see, 58:49.771 --> 58:51.007 talk, shoot and survive, right? 58:51.007 --> 58:53.501 That is the function of militaries 58:53.501 --> 58:55.311 and even in phase zero, phase one, 58:55.311 --> 58:57.601 how do I understand my environment 58:57.601 --> 58:59.015 and how do I influence it? 58:59.015 --> 59:01.947 And how do I preserve my use of all those domains 59:01.947 --> 59:04.058 to preserve my information decision cycle 59:04.058 --> 59:06.340 as opposed to the adversaries? 59:06.340 --> 59:07.731 Distributed force, right? 59:07.731 --> 59:09.172 You need to be, we need persistence, 59:09.172 --> 59:10.793 we need pervasive access. 59:10.793 --> 59:12.358 As we think about unmanned, 59:12.358 --> 59:15.510 it's not just about a collection of platforms 59:15.510 --> 59:17.059 at the end of the network. 59:17.059 --> 59:20.164 The network itself is a weapon system, right? 59:20.164 --> 59:24.331 It may not be a blue node at the end of that network. 59:24.693 --> 59:26.053 It might be a red node 59:26.053 --> 59:27.373 so we have to think about the network 59:27.373 --> 59:30.836 not just as a way to connect all the things that we have, 59:30.836 --> 59:32.202 but for us to connect to our 59:32.202 --> 59:34.702 adversaries information nodes. 59:36.281 --> 59:39.074 Cognitive (mumbles) distributed different form of 59:39.074 --> 59:42.493 distributed lethality, distributed maritime operations 59:42.493 --> 59:46.660 but under, letting the machines do things intelligently 59:47.530 --> 59:49.295 and freeing up the human being 59:49.295 --> 59:53.212 to understand whether they're ultimate decider, 59:53.335 --> 59:56.009 or again, they're the human on the loop. 59:56.009 --> 59:58.486 In cyber and EMS it's so complex, 59:58.486 --> 59:59.802 the speed, scope and scale 59:59.802 --> 01:00:02.765 exceed human capacity to understand. 01:00:02.765 --> 01:00:05.054 And so, how do we actually contextualize that 01:00:05.054 --> 01:00:06.427 for those decision makers, 01:00:06.427 --> 01:00:08.768 for the war fighters to take the actions 01:00:08.768 --> 01:00:11.935 or understand how to give new guidance 01:00:12.177 --> 01:00:14.177 to their unmanned force. 01:00:16.035 --> 01:00:18.535 I specifically call out cyber. 01:00:21.858 --> 01:00:23.855 Despite the heroic attempts 01:00:23.855 --> 01:00:26.351 and heroic efforts and investment by the services 01:00:26.351 --> 01:00:28.954 through STRATCOM to provide forces, 01:00:28.954 --> 01:00:32.274 there's going to be insufficient capacity and capability, 01:00:32.274 --> 01:00:35.191 and speed of execution for CYBERCOM 01:00:35.673 --> 01:00:38.646 and the mission forces that are really designed 01:00:38.646 --> 01:00:41.896 to operate at the JTF and above levels. 01:00:42.332 --> 01:00:44.726 The fleet may be in the only position 01:00:44.726 --> 01:00:46.234 to deliver those effects. 01:00:46.234 --> 01:00:48.670 And so, how do we actually develop 01:00:48.670 --> 01:00:51.420 tactical cyber forces through the 01:00:52.022 --> 01:00:53.993 forward deployed capabilities and apertures 01:00:53.993 --> 01:00:55.392 that we have out there? 01:00:55.392 --> 01:00:56.355 What does that look like? 01:00:56.355 --> 01:00:57.351 How do you visualize that? 01:00:57.351 --> 01:00:59.140 How do you do the command and control? 01:00:59.140 --> 01:01:00.926 And people go, "Well, I'll never invest in that 01:01:00.926 --> 01:01:04.134 "because I'll never be allowed to execute that." 01:01:04.134 --> 01:01:05.079 It's no different. 01:01:05.079 --> 01:01:07.327 There are title 10 responsibilities 01:01:07.327 --> 01:01:09.013 and when you're given an X word, 01:01:09.013 --> 01:01:11.158 you can execute those lines. 01:01:11.158 --> 01:01:13.964 The vice chairman has given guidance 01:01:13.964 --> 01:01:16.568 in terms of we must develop these capabilities 01:01:16.568 --> 01:01:19.041 for title 10, not for title 50. 01:01:19.041 --> 01:01:21.257 Title 50 has its own responsibilities 01:01:21.257 --> 01:01:23.446 but we have to really think through 01:01:23.446 --> 01:01:24.279 how would you fight? 01:01:24.279 --> 01:01:25.633 What's a cyber warrior look like 01:01:25.633 --> 01:01:27.573 not just in defense of my network 01:01:27.573 --> 01:01:31.149 but projecting power from what nodes to what targets, 01:01:31.149 --> 01:01:33.566 and understanding that space. 01:01:34.001 --> 01:01:36.501 All right, so the man-machine. 01:01:36.740 --> 01:01:37.873 What does the cloud look like? 01:01:37.873 --> 01:01:39.224 What's the purpose of the cloud? 01:01:39.224 --> 01:01:41.030 It's not just a place to park your data, 01:01:41.030 --> 01:01:43.947 it's to inform and network together 01:01:44.130 --> 01:01:46.929 those machines that are gonna help you understand 01:01:46.929 --> 01:01:48.855 how to make faster decisions. 01:01:48.855 --> 01:01:50.857 It's about the speed of decision. 01:01:50.857 --> 01:01:52.360 Big data analytics, visualization, 01:01:52.360 --> 01:01:54.777 code generation R2-D2, right? 01:01:55.641 --> 01:01:56.847 What if no longer, 01:01:56.847 --> 01:02:00.022 there's no longer a RIO in his backseat, it's an R2-D2 01:02:00.022 --> 01:02:04.189 and that R2-D2 is linked to all the other R2-D2s out there, 01:02:04.250 --> 01:02:07.480 and you have instantaneous networked knowledge 01:02:07.480 --> 01:02:09.114 across the battle space? 01:02:09.114 --> 01:02:11.403 And they're providing you feedback 01:02:11.403 --> 01:02:14.400 on where to optimize your weapons employment, 01:02:14.400 --> 01:02:16.442 (buzzing) how to align you systems 01:02:16.442 --> 01:02:19.609 and how to make those smart decisions. 01:02:21.265 --> 01:02:24.098 To tell you where the industry is, 01:02:24.367 --> 01:02:25.342 Google RankBrain, 01:02:25.342 --> 01:02:26.829 they just changed over. 01:02:26.829 --> 01:02:29.412 They changed the search engine. 01:02:29.462 --> 01:02:32.004 Used to be human device algorithms. 01:02:32.004 --> 01:02:33.921 It is now AI-generated. 01:02:34.374 --> 01:02:38.383 AI is what's driving Google Search algorithms these days. 01:02:38.383 --> 01:02:39.592 They've switched over. 01:02:39.592 --> 01:02:41.503 They're partnered with NVIDIA. 01:02:41.503 --> 01:02:44.920 NVIDIA builds GPU, general purpose units. 01:02:44.935 --> 01:02:47.352 They're used instead of CPUs, 01:02:47.517 --> 01:02:48.966 you can do faster, 01:02:48.966 --> 01:02:51.216 all your games are on GPUs. 01:02:51.600 --> 01:02:54.685 They're using the money that they're gaining off GPUs, 01:02:54.685 --> 01:02:58.352 they invested $1.4 billion of R&D this money 01:02:58.853 --> 01:03:03.020 this year for GPUs purely for artificial intelligence. 01:03:03.155 --> 01:03:05.822 That is where industry is going. 01:03:06.214 --> 01:03:09.184 And then that's to offload the human expertise 01:03:09.184 --> 01:03:11.101 and workload, we talked about that. 01:03:11.101 --> 01:03:12.725 I know I'm out of time here. 01:03:12.725 --> 01:03:15.060 LVC, live, virtual, constructive, 01:03:15.060 --> 01:03:17.698 Ender's Game, a lot of you have probably seen. 01:03:17.698 --> 01:03:19.829 How do we afford opportunities 01:03:19.829 --> 01:03:21.776 for tactical employment in 01:03:21.776 --> 01:03:24.693 highly complex mission environments 01:03:24.918 --> 01:03:26.221 with high levels of risk 01:03:26.221 --> 01:03:27.910 and high levels capability that either 01:03:27.910 --> 01:03:29.321 we don't want to reveal 01:03:29.321 --> 01:03:32.414 or its developmental? (beeping) 01:03:32.414 --> 01:03:34.375 Can I finish this slide? No? 01:03:34.375 --> 01:03:35.208 - [Rick] 30 more seconds. 01:03:35.208 --> 01:03:36.041 - Okay. 01:03:36.748 --> 01:03:39.103 Oculus Rift, HoloLens, all those things, 01:03:39.103 --> 01:03:41.853 there's a ton of virtual reality, 01:03:42.373 --> 01:03:44.306 augmented reality capabilities. 01:03:44.306 --> 01:03:46.295 Battle management is going to be key 01:03:46.295 --> 01:03:50.421 to managing these complex systems and complex interactions. 01:03:50.421 --> 01:03:51.946 Oblong minority report, 01:03:51.946 --> 01:03:54.936 what you saw there is real, it's a real system. 01:03:54.936 --> 01:03:56.487 And internet of experience. 01:03:56.487 --> 01:03:59.783 We talked about it went from PCs to networks 01:03:59.783 --> 01:04:00.921 and we've talked about that 01:04:00.921 --> 01:04:03.617 but it's actually about that individual 01:04:03.617 --> 01:04:06.784 making decision space and accelerating 01:04:07.677 --> 01:04:10.325 that OODA Loop that we talked about. 01:04:10.325 --> 01:04:11.158 Thanks. 01:04:11.408 --> 01:04:12.938 - Okay, great. Thanks panelists. 01:04:12.938 --> 01:04:15.066 A round of applause for this great panel. 01:04:15.066 --> 01:04:16.066 Awesome job. 01:04:16.376 --> 01:04:18.626 (clapping) 01:04:21.068 --> 01:04:24.439 Ladies and gentlemen, we have 10 minutes still remaining. 01:04:24.439 --> 01:04:26.484 Really interested in your questions. 01:04:26.484 --> 01:04:30.178 Maybe some push back, challenge the hypothesis. 01:04:30.178 --> 01:04:31.504 Anything on your minds? 01:04:31.504 --> 01:04:33.906 I'll stall as I see you start, 01:04:33.906 --> 01:04:36.213 the thousands that are starting to stand up 01:04:36.213 --> 01:04:39.422 to go to the microphones or here in front. 01:04:39.422 --> 01:04:41.796 - [Voiceover] John (mumbles). 01:04:41.796 --> 01:04:44.460 My question is for the admirals on the panel. 01:04:44.460 --> 01:04:48.119 What kind of solution are you looking for from industry 01:04:48.119 --> 01:04:50.531 in terms of advancing existing technology 01:04:50.531 --> 01:04:54.364 you have developed (mumbles)? 01:04:57.196 --> 01:04:58.029 - Jon, why don't you kick us off 01:04:58.029 --> 01:04:59.351 and then Nasty jump in. 01:04:59.351 --> 01:05:00.184 - Sure. Okay. 01:05:00.184 --> 01:05:03.851 I have received a lot of briefs in question. 01:05:05.407 --> 01:05:07.193 The question was what sort of solutions 01:05:07.193 --> 01:05:09.138 are we looking from industry? 01:05:09.138 --> 01:05:11.123 And one that I'll just kind of drop an anchor on 01:05:11.123 --> 01:05:15.286 since Mr. McCreary mentioned it is big data management. 01:05:15.286 --> 01:05:18.365 When I look at the numbers of different types of links 01:05:18.365 --> 01:05:19.597 and we look at the numbers of weapons 01:05:19.597 --> 01:05:22.216 and sensors that we have out there, 01:05:22.216 --> 01:05:24.538 we know that we have to move at a faster speed. 01:05:24.538 --> 01:05:27.575 And so big data algorithms are very interesting to me 01:05:27.575 --> 01:05:30.019 because they can take lots of different, 01:05:30.019 --> 01:05:33.190 lots of different formats and data types 01:05:33.190 --> 01:05:35.397 and put them into something that we can actually use 01:05:35.397 --> 01:05:36.950 to close fire control loops. 01:05:36.950 --> 01:05:38.500 I'm very interested there. 01:05:38.500 --> 01:05:42.358 I'll defer to the rest of the panel to continue on. 01:05:42.358 --> 01:05:45.239 - I think the thing I'm focused on is 01:05:45.239 --> 01:05:47.906 extracting the power of industry 01:05:48.974 --> 01:05:51.057 through open architecture 01:05:51.248 --> 01:05:52.435 and a common set of standards 01:05:52.435 --> 01:05:53.922 that the government can provide, 01:05:53.922 --> 01:05:57.339 that you bring your particular expertise. 01:05:57.840 --> 01:06:00.593 There are companies that I'm used to working with 01:06:00.593 --> 01:06:03.033 that have specific expertise in certain areas, 01:06:03.033 --> 01:06:05.431 and some very lucky companies have 01:06:05.431 --> 01:06:08.828 specific war fighting expertise against a lot of areas. 01:06:08.828 --> 01:06:12.995 My challenge right now with the high nine resource sponsors 01:06:13.087 --> 01:06:14.903 is try to take programs that were developed 01:06:14.903 --> 01:06:18.011 sort of proprietorially under a set of requirements 01:06:18.011 --> 01:06:20.632 and figure how to put them together. 01:06:20.632 --> 01:06:22.879 If we can collaborate with industry 01:06:22.879 --> 01:06:25.129 to find means to do exactly 01:06:25.764 --> 01:06:28.490 what was discussed on my right and my left, 01:06:28.490 --> 01:06:30.559 that's the greatest power. 01:06:30.559 --> 01:06:32.940 If we can figure out a way to 01:06:32.940 --> 01:06:36.440 collaboratively share ideas and technology 01:06:38.712 --> 01:06:41.579 and get past the limits of acquisition, 01:06:41.579 --> 01:06:45.175 laws and rules and to the point where we can 01:06:45.175 --> 01:06:46.210 discuss how to go forward 01:06:46.210 --> 01:06:48.866 to the things that J.D. talked about, 01:06:48.866 --> 01:06:52.366 that would be what I would be looking for. 01:06:52.585 --> 01:06:55.176 If we can capture the innovation 01:06:55.176 --> 01:06:57.509 that you have in your houses 01:06:57.703 --> 01:06:59.544 and help us to go forward 01:06:59.544 --> 01:07:03.358 with making our war fighting capabilities better, 01:07:03.358 --> 01:07:06.025 that would be a primary request. 01:07:06.905 --> 01:07:08.113 - Yeah, just a foot stomp. 01:07:08.113 --> 01:07:10.223 This distributed maneuver warfare 01:07:10.223 --> 01:07:12.223 and naval warfare of the future is gonna be 01:07:12.223 --> 01:07:15.054 very dependent on integrating the pieces. 01:07:15.054 --> 01:07:18.004 The nodes, the platforms, the payloads, the sensors 01:07:18.004 --> 01:07:19.800 and that kind of common architecture 01:07:19.800 --> 01:07:22.217 to be fast forming teams that 01:07:22.321 --> 01:07:24.853 we're not trying to get across translation barriers 01:07:24.853 --> 01:07:26.589 between architectures. 01:07:26.589 --> 01:07:28.183 It's gonna be vitally important. 01:07:28.183 --> 01:07:31.215 If you can't quickly plug in and play and contribute, 01:07:31.215 --> 01:07:34.795 it's gonna impair this war fighting concept. 01:07:34.795 --> 01:07:37.545 Next question. To the mic please. 01:07:38.823 --> 01:07:40.073 - [Voiceover] This is Mike (mumbles), 01:07:40.073 --> 01:07:41.471 I probably don't need one. 01:07:41.471 --> 01:07:42.453 We don't have to repeat the question. 01:07:42.453 --> 01:07:44.787 My question is, being a former RO 01:07:44.787 --> 01:07:46.584 doing the requirement stuff 01:07:46.584 --> 01:07:47.870 but more to you, Admiral Breckenridge 01:07:47.870 --> 01:07:49.241 and then the rest of the panel. 01:07:49.241 --> 01:07:50.946 You're talking about all these stuff 01:07:50.946 --> 01:07:52.279 that you're gonna network together. 01:07:52.279 --> 01:07:53.446 You talked about OODA Loop, 01:07:53.446 --> 01:07:56.029 how are you going to change ROE 01:07:56.507 --> 01:07:58.130 so that people wearing your uniform 01:07:58.130 --> 01:08:01.329 are gonna trust R2-D2 or an (mumbles) or a seaman 01:08:01.329 --> 01:08:03.207 to actually act on their information 01:08:03.207 --> 01:08:04.412 that the network formed. 01:08:04.412 --> 01:08:06.149 Because if it has come up to your level 01:08:06.149 --> 01:08:07.290 while you're sitting back making sure 01:08:07.290 --> 01:08:08.732 everybody's doing what they're doing 01:08:08.732 --> 01:08:09.854 Nimitz is rowing in its grave 01:08:09.854 --> 01:08:11.129 and we're not winning the fight. 01:08:11.129 --> 01:08:13.262 - Yeah, great question and I'll just say for the record, 01:08:13.262 --> 01:08:15.826 when you mentioned RO, I think of reactor officer 01:08:15.826 --> 01:08:19.283 and not requirements officer, but great question. 01:08:19.283 --> 01:08:21.020 I'm gonna turn that one over to J.D. McCreary 01:08:21.020 --> 01:08:22.410 because what we're talking about here 01:08:22.410 --> 01:08:25.243 is a fundamental shift in culture. 01:08:26.465 --> 01:08:28.456 As we become more and more dependent 01:08:28.456 --> 01:08:30.266 on this man-machine teaming, 01:08:30.266 --> 01:08:31.794 things are gonna have to change 01:08:31.794 --> 01:08:35.379 all the way to the point of ROE rules and application. 01:08:35.379 --> 01:08:38.698 So J.D., why don't you take a swing at this one. 01:08:38.698 --> 01:08:41.230 - [J.D.] I'm gonna cheat in those slide I didn't get to 01:08:41.230 --> 01:08:42.800 so if you'll back a slide. 01:08:42.800 --> 01:08:44.045 (laughs) 01:08:44.045 --> 01:08:45.628 - [Mike] Way to go. 01:08:46.407 --> 01:08:49.824 - To your point, it's about trust, right? 01:08:50.465 --> 01:08:52.419 And it's speed of decision 01:08:52.419 --> 01:08:55.530 and it's about how do I visualize that? 01:08:55.530 --> 01:08:57.983 Because as a commander at any level, 01:08:57.983 --> 01:09:00.892 whether you're on the bridge of the ship, 01:09:00.892 --> 01:09:02.642 you're in the cockpit 01:09:02.891 --> 01:09:05.308 or you're at the mock or AOC, 01:09:05.530 --> 01:09:08.824 how do you understand what is commander's intent? 01:09:08.824 --> 01:09:10.704 How do I enable or how do I make sure 01:09:10.704 --> 01:09:13.821 I'm through my PID matrix, my ROE, et cetera, et cetera? 01:09:13.821 --> 01:09:17.482 But remember, we actually do some of these now. 01:09:17.482 --> 01:09:20.397 When you pull the trigger on an AMRAAM, 01:09:20.397 --> 01:09:23.814 you have authorized that unmanned weapon, 01:09:24.756 --> 01:09:27.839 that unmanned asset to go down range. 01:09:28.308 --> 01:09:30.999 And you've put it into a position 01:09:30.999 --> 01:09:33.409 that it's going to make a decision on its own. 01:09:33.409 --> 01:09:35.080 You gave it that authority. 01:09:35.080 --> 01:09:38.869 We have robo mode in the AEGIS cruiser, right? 01:09:38.869 --> 01:09:40.536 We can go full auto. 01:09:40.702 --> 01:09:43.743 Somebody is trusted because we've done the work ups, 01:09:43.743 --> 01:09:45.057 we've done the visualization, 01:09:45.057 --> 01:09:46.807 we've done the firing solutions. 01:09:46.807 --> 01:09:50.159 We've done enough that we've done the experimentation 01:09:50.159 --> 01:09:52.728 and demonstration to generate that trust. 01:09:52.728 --> 01:09:55.563 But we need those tools that I talked about 01:09:55.563 --> 01:09:57.230 on the slide before. 01:09:57.681 --> 01:09:59.746 You need to be able to display it, 01:09:59.746 --> 01:10:01.616 you need to be able to play with it 01:10:01.616 --> 01:10:03.565 in live, virtual, constructive, 01:10:03.565 --> 01:10:07.004 and develop the trust in the machine in extent 01:10:07.004 --> 01:10:09.061 and push that down, right? 01:10:09.061 --> 01:10:11.144 Because aren't we always, 01:10:11.163 --> 01:10:13.666 isn't our philosophy centralized planning, 01:10:13.666 --> 01:10:15.315 decentralized execution? 01:10:15.315 --> 01:10:18.221 How much can we decentralize that depends on 01:10:18.221 --> 01:10:21.388 the level of trust that we believe in. 01:10:21.570 --> 01:10:22.820 - [Rick] Nasty. 01:10:24.102 --> 01:10:25.218 - Great question. 01:10:25.218 --> 01:10:27.578 I, too, believe that trust is foundational 01:10:27.578 --> 01:10:30.911 but I'm finding that we need in this era 01:10:31.257 --> 01:10:34.985 of being bound by DoD 5000 rules, regulations, 01:10:34.985 --> 01:10:35.847 legal rules and stuff 01:10:35.847 --> 01:10:38.433 that we need a lot more bold leadership 01:10:38.433 --> 01:10:40.405 and then empowered teams. 01:10:40.405 --> 01:10:44.572 Bold leadership like Rickover who built nuclear power 01:10:45.212 --> 01:10:46.695 and pushed the barriers away. 01:10:46.695 --> 01:10:48.431 Bold leadership like Kelly Johnson 01:10:48.431 --> 01:10:49.623 out of the skunk works 01:10:49.623 --> 01:10:51.217 who pushed everybody aside and said, 01:10:51.217 --> 01:10:52.642 "This is what we're gonna do." 01:10:52.642 --> 01:10:54.893 That bold leadership pulls hurdles out of your way. 01:10:54.893 --> 01:10:57.691 What parts of DoD 5000 can we pull out of your way 01:10:57.691 --> 01:10:58.936 to allow to go forward, 01:10:58.936 --> 01:11:01.331 and then the demonstrations that are brought forward. 01:11:01.331 --> 01:11:04.013 There's good ideas that we take out to 01:11:04.013 --> 01:11:06.246 exercises like the flex series 01:11:06.246 --> 01:11:07.737 that fleet experiment series. 01:11:07.737 --> 01:11:10.750 It was particularly doing in the Cyber WE world 01:11:10.750 --> 01:11:12.353 that we can't go into in here, 01:11:12.353 --> 01:11:15.771 but the ideas that are coming from our teams out there 01:11:15.771 --> 01:11:18.660 to say, "Hey, let's go demo this capability." 01:11:18.660 --> 01:11:20.312 And then if you get a couple of like-minded 01:11:20.312 --> 01:11:21.659 executives together to say, 01:11:21.659 --> 01:11:23.289 how can we pull our resources 01:11:23.289 --> 01:11:26.288 and go after this sort of capability 01:11:26.288 --> 01:11:29.193 by linking technologies that we already understand? 01:11:29.193 --> 01:11:30.375 As J.D. talked about, 01:11:30.375 --> 01:11:32.257 the Google self-driving car is a car, 01:11:32.257 --> 01:11:35.261 a map, some good sensors and a fast computer. 01:11:35.261 --> 01:11:36.791 So we already have technologies out there 01:11:36.791 --> 01:11:38.734 that if we combine them in different ways 01:11:38.734 --> 01:11:40.769 will give you a demonstration. 01:11:40.769 --> 01:11:43.333 Back at World War II when they started 01:11:43.333 --> 01:11:45.478 to think about war fighting, 01:11:45.478 --> 01:11:46.801 they started testing a lot more 01:11:46.801 --> 01:11:49.134 in creating incubator units. 01:11:49.155 --> 01:11:50.475 Some of these demos we're doing 01:11:50.475 --> 01:11:52.414 kind of get done once and get put on the shelf. 01:11:52.414 --> 01:11:54.592 What if we can take these with the empowered teams 01:11:54.592 --> 01:11:56.140 and go out to an incubator unit 01:11:56.140 --> 01:12:00.037 and put some more water unto the keel as it were, 01:12:00.037 --> 01:12:01.576 and some of the good ideas that are coming out 01:12:01.576 --> 01:12:03.438 of the requirement officer world, 01:12:03.438 --> 01:12:04.964 and the industry lash up that's going on 01:12:04.964 --> 01:12:06.587 inside of Jon's world as well. 01:12:06.587 --> 01:12:08.939 To go out and push a little harder here 01:12:08.939 --> 01:12:10.841 to get some early adoption going out in the, 01:12:10.841 --> 01:12:12.560 I don't know, front line. 01:12:12.560 --> 01:12:14.553 - [Rick] Okay, I think we have time for two more questions. 01:12:14.553 --> 01:12:15.886 This mic please. 01:12:16.285 --> 01:12:17.118 Sir. 01:12:17.371 --> 01:12:18.427 - [Voiceover] Good morning. 01:12:18.427 --> 01:12:19.260 Jim Offutt. 01:12:19.260 --> 01:12:22.459 I'm a attack pilot who was converted to missile defense. 01:12:22.459 --> 01:12:24.959 I'm concerned or interested in 01:12:26.034 --> 01:12:29.784 where we are with the sea, naval power at sea 01:12:30.282 --> 01:12:31.957 in our concept of operations 01:12:31.957 --> 01:12:34.182 and how our defense in depth concept 01:12:34.182 --> 01:12:36.495 for the protection of our battle groups at sea 01:12:36.495 --> 01:12:40.662 fits in to all of these that we're talking about today? 01:12:41.230 --> 01:12:42.063 - Okay. 01:12:42.279 --> 01:12:45.428 Anybody want to take that or I'll jump in. 01:12:45.428 --> 01:12:47.372 - Yeah, I just want to make sure I have the question right. 01:12:47.372 --> 01:12:49.577 Concern about defense in depth 01:12:49.577 --> 01:12:53.327 why we're also turning that focus on offense? 01:12:53.571 --> 01:12:55.229 - [Voiceover] Correct. Exactly right. 01:12:55.229 --> 01:12:57.400 If we can't protect the forces at sea, 01:12:57.400 --> 01:13:00.657 how can we run on offensive operation from that? 01:13:00.657 --> 01:13:03.657 And so, I saw a lot of talking about 01:13:04.072 --> 01:13:06.489 getting the weapons on target 01:13:08.301 --> 01:13:10.551 but not a lot of talk about 01:13:11.103 --> 01:13:12.472 defending our forces at sea, 01:13:12.472 --> 01:13:15.674 with exception of the one diagram that showed the 01:13:15.674 --> 01:13:17.341 ship being taken out 01:13:17.612 --> 01:13:21.529 and the missile cooperation being talked about. 01:13:22.832 --> 01:13:25.082 Are we still in our battle, 01:13:25.130 --> 01:13:27.298 various battle groups that go to sea 01:13:27.298 --> 01:13:29.077 thinking about defense in depth 01:13:29.077 --> 01:13:30.713 and taking the same concepts 01:13:30.713 --> 01:13:34.880 and applying them to the protection of our fleet forces? 01:13:35.541 --> 01:13:38.506 - I would say that we always start first 01:13:38.506 --> 01:13:40.506 with defending the ship. 01:13:40.807 --> 01:13:43.924 In fact, when we talked about the range of capabilities 01:13:43.924 --> 01:13:46.586 and integration and inter-dependencies, 01:13:46.586 --> 01:13:47.923 it really starts with what I call 01:13:47.923 --> 01:13:49.054 the fighting integer, right? 01:13:49.054 --> 01:13:52.409 We have to have full defense capabilities on that ship 01:13:52.409 --> 01:13:54.274 or on that submarine or on that aircraft 01:13:54.274 --> 01:13:56.787 before you extend into these cooperative engagement modes 01:13:56.787 --> 01:13:59.543 so that you don't become fairly useless 01:13:59.543 --> 01:14:01.764 if you pull a sensor out of that network. 01:14:01.764 --> 01:14:04.493 I will tell you that POE Integrated Warfare Systems 01:14:04.493 --> 01:14:06.155 is very defense-oriented. 01:14:06.155 --> 01:14:07.643 In fact, our big push right now 01:14:07.643 --> 01:14:09.293 is to get more offense-oriented, 01:14:09.293 --> 01:14:10.797 not that we've got defense like this 01:14:10.797 --> 01:14:12.086 becoming harder and harder. 01:14:12.086 --> 01:14:13.900 But that detect, control and engage sequence 01:14:13.900 --> 01:14:15.532 and all those functions I talked about 01:14:15.532 --> 01:14:17.805 apply directly to the defense equation 01:14:17.805 --> 01:14:19.969 just as they do for the offense equation. 01:14:19.969 --> 01:14:21.306 It is becoming more challenging 01:14:21.306 --> 01:14:23.207 and we are looking at hyper velocity 01:14:23.207 --> 01:14:24.692 missile defense for example 01:14:24.692 --> 01:14:28.275 as an area that we have got to take on now. 01:14:28.501 --> 01:14:30.929 I don't know if that addresses where you're going, Sir. 01:14:30.929 --> 01:14:32.482 - The answer to your question is 01:14:32.482 --> 01:14:35.191 this isn't a shift where we're offensive only 01:14:35.191 --> 01:14:37.202 and we're gonna take a lot of risk in defense. 01:14:37.202 --> 01:14:39.345 There is gonna be a balance 01:14:39.345 --> 01:14:42.542 but it's not gonna be defense at the expense of offense 01:14:42.542 --> 01:14:45.492 stretching Red, making Red's challenge more hard. 01:14:45.492 --> 01:14:48.286 It's a defense in depth by other means 01:14:48.286 --> 01:14:52.003 aside from just sort of this layered defense system 01:14:52.003 --> 01:14:54.075 with regard to change in the calculus with Red. 01:14:54.075 --> 01:14:55.825 Last question please. 01:14:57.510 --> 01:14:58.472 - [Voiceover] Good morning Sirs. 01:14:58.472 --> 01:15:00.805 John Hooper with OPNAV N515. 01:15:02.517 --> 01:15:05.977 I am very, very excited with the technology 01:15:05.977 --> 01:15:08.347 and the concepts that I see here 01:15:08.347 --> 01:15:12.264 but an obvious question popped in my mind here. 01:15:12.327 --> 01:15:15.903 All of these technology is extremely expensive 01:15:15.903 --> 01:15:17.598 and as you know better than I, 01:15:17.598 --> 01:15:21.765 we're in a diminishing financial climate right now. 01:15:22.336 --> 01:15:24.583 And the other thing that concerns me is 01:15:24.583 --> 01:15:27.474 that this technology that is so exciting 01:15:27.474 --> 01:15:30.141 and has extraordinary potential, 01:15:30.777 --> 01:15:33.880 becomes outdated within two or three years. 01:15:33.880 --> 01:15:38.047 And so, and we have an acquisition process within DoD 01:15:38.177 --> 01:15:40.677 that takes years to fill them. 01:15:41.670 --> 01:15:45.337 How do you adjudicate the cost equation here 01:15:45.639 --> 01:15:49.639 and also the time equation with this technology? 01:15:52.554 --> 01:15:53.560 - Great question. 01:15:53.560 --> 01:15:55.086 There's always somebody. 01:15:55.086 --> 01:15:57.190 You have this killer round table 01:15:57.190 --> 01:15:59.021 and everybody is on this high 01:15:59.021 --> 01:16:02.854 and then the guy comes in and start, you know? 01:16:03.795 --> 01:16:05.212 Go ahead, George. 01:16:06.581 --> 01:16:08.885 - The reality of what you're talking about, 01:16:08.885 --> 01:16:12.790 whether you take a look at the Department of Navy budget, 01:16:12.790 --> 01:16:14.925 it's actually bigger than it has been in the past 01:16:14.925 --> 01:16:17.299 but the reality is things have become more expensive 01:16:17.299 --> 01:16:20.216 so your buying power is going down. 01:16:20.367 --> 01:16:23.410 You have to have a system where you make choices 01:16:23.410 --> 01:16:26.467 and I think we were circling around part of the idea 01:16:26.467 --> 01:16:28.300 a little bit before of 01:16:29.672 --> 01:16:32.333 we put this great network together 01:16:32.333 --> 01:16:35.279 and we get to the point where we can handle big data, 01:16:35.279 --> 01:16:37.804 we can have artificial intelligence. 01:16:37.804 --> 01:16:40.307 But the reality is, what happens when it all, 01:16:40.307 --> 01:16:42.390 when a network goes down? 01:16:42.694 --> 01:16:45.208 Are you gonna have the capabilities on 01:16:45.208 --> 01:16:47.621 the individual ships and platforms or units 01:16:47.621 --> 01:16:49.050 to be able to defend themselves 01:16:49.050 --> 01:16:51.566 and to be able to continue to operate? 01:16:51.566 --> 01:16:53.937 And that's the larger debate in this 01:16:53.937 --> 01:16:57.714 because you can feel that a lot of expensive capabilities 01:16:57.714 --> 01:16:59.827 but you're not gonna have capacity. 01:16:59.827 --> 01:17:03.120 So I think we have to go back to the past 01:17:03.120 --> 01:17:07.287 and realize that what drove our success in the past 01:17:07.444 --> 01:17:10.816 was that we had a concept of how we wanted to fight. 01:17:10.816 --> 01:17:14.255 And then we found the technology that enabled it 01:17:14.255 --> 01:17:17.005 rather than found technology now, 01:17:17.236 --> 01:17:19.287 and then figured out how to apply it. 01:17:19.287 --> 01:17:21.042 I think we got to go back to the basics 01:17:21.042 --> 01:17:23.570 about how do we want to fight forward, 01:17:23.570 --> 01:17:25.719 how do we want to seize the initiative, 01:17:25.719 --> 01:17:28.460 and then we ought to look for the technology to do it. 01:17:28.460 --> 01:17:30.932 And so much of the advances that are taking place 01:17:30.932 --> 01:17:33.087 in the information ager are being, 01:17:33.087 --> 01:17:36.301 are taking place in the commercial world. 01:17:36.301 --> 01:17:39.559 Why not leverage the fact that they're doing the R&D, 01:17:39.559 --> 01:17:41.053 we can save money there 01:17:41.053 --> 01:17:43.886 and with a little help on DoD 5000 01:17:44.138 --> 01:17:45.969 to be able to take what's already out there 01:17:45.969 --> 01:17:47.182 and apply it to a way. 01:17:47.182 --> 01:17:49.729 That's how I think that's gonna be one key way 01:17:49.729 --> 01:17:51.200 where you're gonna stay a step ahead 01:17:51.200 --> 01:17:52.859 is to be able to leverage 01:17:52.859 --> 01:17:55.423 everything that's going on in the commercial sector 01:17:55.423 --> 01:17:58.705 to be able to increase your capability here. 01:17:58.705 --> 01:17:59.684 - [Jon] I'm okay to try one more? 01:17:59.684 --> 01:18:01.248 - [Rick] Very good. One minute. 01:18:01.248 --> 01:18:04.021 - Just a real fast example of what we're looking at 01:18:04.021 --> 01:18:05.992 in ship building and combat system modernization 01:18:05.992 --> 01:18:07.427 that in fact Captain Druggan over there 01:18:07.427 --> 01:18:09.067 is my AEGIS program manager. 01:18:09.067 --> 01:18:11.349 If you look at the 30-year ship building plan, 01:18:11.349 --> 01:18:14.055 that is all new construction, right? 01:18:14.055 --> 01:18:15.970 So then you have to look at what combat systems 01:18:15.970 --> 01:18:17.252 are gonna be delivered to those ships 01:18:17.252 --> 01:18:18.442 and those time ethics. 01:18:18.442 --> 01:18:20.866 The only way to deal with that fast moving threat 01:18:20.866 --> 01:18:22.884 is to modernize more often 01:18:22.884 --> 01:18:25.208 and we need to be affordable when we do it. 01:18:25.208 --> 01:18:28.311 We are looking at modular concepts that allow us to 01:18:28.311 --> 01:18:30.940 insert into the new construction ship building insert 01:18:30.940 --> 01:18:34.449 in a modernization modular pretested combat systems 01:18:34.449 --> 01:18:37.053 that can very quickly be updated to deal with the threat. 01:18:37.053 --> 01:18:38.595 That's just one specific example 01:18:38.595 --> 01:18:41.402 to touch on affordability, technology turnover 01:18:41.402 --> 01:18:43.109 and pacing the threat. 01:18:43.109 --> 01:18:44.858 It is a different way of doing business 01:18:44.858 --> 01:18:47.356 but we're moving into that, in that direction. 01:18:47.356 --> 01:18:48.629 - I think I want to add as well 01:18:48.629 --> 01:18:50.625 that we are our own worst enemies 01:18:50.625 --> 01:18:52.778 so we have to capture two ideas. 01:18:52.778 --> 01:18:55.316 One, it cost too much and it takes too long. 01:18:55.316 --> 01:18:56.149 That's it. 01:18:56.149 --> 01:18:58.480 Just it cost too much and it takes too long. 01:18:58.480 --> 01:19:01.479 Why is it that Moore's Law as defined, 01:19:01.479 --> 01:19:03.194 basic definition is the complexity 01:19:03.194 --> 01:19:06.210 for a minimum cost doubles every year is still valid 01:19:06.210 --> 01:19:07.970 and yet we pay more for technology 01:19:07.970 --> 01:19:10.894 as it gets lighter and faster and less expensive? 01:19:10.894 --> 01:19:13.561 We should not accept that in DoD 01:19:14.399 --> 01:19:15.701 so it should be a partnership. 01:19:15.701 --> 01:19:17.365 Okay, it cost too much, takes too long. 01:19:17.365 --> 01:19:19.720 Well, your requirements Admiral are too many. 01:19:19.720 --> 01:19:21.939 Okay, how do I reduce my requirements? 01:19:21.939 --> 01:19:24.109 I want to go down from 15 KPPs, 01:19:24.109 --> 01:19:26.367 Key Performance Parameters to three. 01:19:26.367 --> 01:19:27.829 And the driver requirements that go into that, 01:19:27.829 --> 01:19:30.655 we've generate something that drives cost into programs. 01:19:30.655 --> 01:19:31.933 Our instability for the budgets 01:19:31.933 --> 01:19:33.064 drives cost in the programs. 01:19:33.064 --> 01:19:34.186 We have to tack all of that 01:19:34.186 --> 01:19:35.788 to get after what you're taking about. 01:19:35.788 --> 01:19:38.275 Cost too much, takes too long. 01:19:38.275 --> 01:19:41.223 - In conclusion, this new fleet design, 01:19:41.223 --> 01:19:43.806 this new operating concept will 01:19:44.163 --> 01:19:47.830 I think help integrate investment decisions. 01:19:48.851 --> 01:19:50.846 The same kind of things that we're already doing, 01:19:50.846 --> 01:19:52.760 this is gonna align activity, 01:19:52.760 --> 01:19:56.760 this is gonna bring sort of some central impetus 01:19:57.540 --> 01:19:59.988 to how we build this fighting force 01:19:59.988 --> 01:20:02.213 to operate and integrate better together. 01:20:02.213 --> 01:20:05.179 There is an efficiency here by having aligning concept 01:20:05.179 --> 01:20:07.900 which we'll get behind as we face the real threat, 01:20:07.900 --> 01:20:12.067 and that is Red's pace and challenge of the sea domain. 01:20:12.672 --> 01:20:14.192 Ladies and gentlemen, thank you so much for your attention. 01:20:14.192 --> 01:20:16.007 You have eight minutes to get up to lunch. 01:20:16.007 --> 01:20:18.257 (clapping) 01:20:22.208 --> 01:20:25.291 (indistinct chatter) 01:20:26.608 --> 01:20:27.896 - [George] Thanks, Rick. - [Rick] That was good. 01:20:27.896 --> 01:20:29.040 Thanks very much. 01:20:29.040 --> 01:20:32.123 (indistinct chatter)